    [Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                      S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR

                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1253

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                  MARCH 30; APRIL 6, 13; MAY 11; JUNE 3, 2011

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    68-090                    WASHINGTON : 2012
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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    20402-0001

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                     E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman

    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
          Strategic Forces Programs of the National Nuclear Security
                                 Administration
                                 march 30, 2011

                                                                       Page

    D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration, and Under Secretary for Nuclear
      Security, Department of Energy; Accompanied by Hon. Donald L.
      Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National
      Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; ADM
      Kirkland H. Donald, USN, Deputy Administrator for Naval
      Reactors, and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National
      Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; Michael
      R. Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory; George
      H. Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
      and Paul J. Hommert, Director, Sandia National Laboratories....     5

                               Strategic Systems
                                 april 6, 2011

    Benedict, RADM Terry J., USN, Director of Strategic Systems
      Program, U.S. Navy.............................................   127
    Kowalski, Lt. Gen. James M., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
      Strike Command, U.S. Air Force.................................   131
    Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff
      for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air
      Force..........................................................   138

                       Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
                                 april 13, 2011

    O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency..   175
    Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.........................   182
    Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air
      and Missile Defense Organization, The Joint Staff..............   190
    Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................   200

                                     (iii)
                            Military Space Programs
                                  may 11, 2011

    Schulte, Hon. Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Space Policy...............................................   247
    Zangardi, John A. Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
      for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
      Information Operations, and Space..............................   252
    Helms, Lt. Gen. Susan J., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
      Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command............   256
    Formica, LTG Richard P., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
      Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command..........   260
    Titley, RADM David W., USN, Oceanographer and Navigator of the
      Navy, Director, Maritime Domain Awareness and Space............   266
    Hyten, Maj. Gen. John E., USAF, Director, Space Programs, Office
      of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition....   267
    Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space
      Command........................................................   270
    Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................   278

                             U.S. Strategic Command
                                  june 3, 2011

    Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command..   326

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

          STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                                 ADMINISTRATION

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
    Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Shaheen, and
    Sessions.
        Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
    nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker,
    security clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Brian F.
    Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
    Senator Shaheen; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
    Sessions.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Nelson. This is the first of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee hearings in review of the fiscal year 2012 budget
    request.
        I'm going to go ahead and start with my opening statement.
    I think my ranking member is on his way.
        We have hearings now scheduled for April 6, which will
    address the strategic systems, bombers, intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic
    missiles (SLBM); for April 13, which will address ballistic
    missile defense programs; and on May 4, which will address
    national security space programs.
        Today, we have with us Mr. Tom D'Agostino, the
    Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA). With Mr. D'Agostino are Dr. Donald Cook, the Deputy
    NNSA Administrator for Defense Programs, and Admiral Kirkland
    Donald, Deputy NNSA Defense Administrator for Naval Reactors.
    We also have the directors of the three NNSA National
    Laboratories: Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL); Dr. George Miller, Director of the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); and Dr. Paul
    Hommert, Director of the Sandia National Laboratories.
        We welcome you all to the hearing.
        I would note that this is the first time that Admiral
    Donald and Dr. Cook have testified before the subcommittee.
    Sadly, this will be the last time that Dr. Anastasio will
    testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in his
    capacity as Director of LANL, having announced his retirement,
    later this summer. You have had a long and distinguished
    career, and we wish you all the best in your future endeavors
    and thank you for all your service.
        Last year, the Armed Services Committee, and the Senate as
    a whole, devoted considerable time and effort to consideration
    of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Senate
    Armed Services Committee alone held 11 hearings and briefings
    on the subject. The debate on the floor went on for almost 2
    weeks before the New START treaty was ratified. One of the
    major issues discussed by the committee and the Senate was the
    ability of NNSA to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile
    safely, securely, and reliably into the future.
        A part of that debate and discussion was the overall well-
    being and funding of the nuclear complex, particularly, the new
    facilities that were needed at NNSA Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge,
    TN, and at LANL. Parts of this complex were described as
    ``decrepit'' by the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission. I
    would note that each of these new facilities--the Uranium
    Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12, and the new facility to
    replace the current Chemical and Metallurgical Resource
    Replacement (CMRR) facility, at Los Alamos--are multibillion-
    dollar facilities. The Government Accountability Office has put
    the NNSA on its high-risk list as a result of the difficulties
    that NNSA has had delivering major construction, and other
    projects, on scope, schedule, and budget. We look forward to
    hearing how NNSA will position itself to successfully deliver
    two new multibillion projects, both of which will be under
    construction at the same time.
        The long-term ability of the NNSA laboratories to provide
    the technical support to the stockpile was also a topic of
    considerable discussion. Over the 5 years prior to 2010,
    funding for nuclear weapons work was substantially reduced. The
    labs went through significant layoffs. The result was a system
    that was beginning to lose its technical capability to support
    the stockpile for the long term.
        To sustain the abilities of the nuclear weapons complex,
    President Obama laid out a 10-year plan last fall which
    included substantial annual increases in funding for fiscal
    years 2011, 2012, and beyond.
        From the $6.4 billion appropriated for weapons activities
    in fiscal year 2010, the fiscal year 2011 funding was to be $7
    billion, and the fiscal year 2012 budget request is $7.4
    billion. This increase was to continue over the 10-year period.
    Some Senators argue that even these substantial increases
    weren't enough, and voted against the New START treaty.
        With the Continuing Resolution (CR), the long-term funding
    for NNSA isn't clear and, based on the proposals coming from
    the House of Representatives, could be substantially less than
    the funding requested by the President for both 2011 and 2012.
    One of the main issues of the hearing today will be the impact
    of the current funding uncertainty and the projected funding
    levels on the ability of NNSA to maintain the nuclear
    stockpile.
        The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) determined that it was
    essential for the United States to maintain a triad of nuclear
    delivery system: bombers, land-based ICBMs, and the submarine-
    launched ICBMs. To sustain the triad into the future, the NPR
    outlined the need for replacement programs for the current
    bomber fleet and a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
    missile submarines. The Office of Naval Reactors, which Admiral
    Donald heads, is a dual-entity of the NNSA and Department of
    the Navy, with responsibility for the design, development,
    operations, maintenance, and disposal of the nuclear propulsion
    plants on naval surface ships and submarines.
        One of the primary ongoing missions of the Office of Naval
    Reactors is the development of a new reactor for the Ohio-class
    replacement ballistic missile submarines. The funding requested
    in the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets is critical to keeping
    the reactor design process in sync with the overall design of
    the submarine.
        Admiral Donald, we also look forward to discussing with you
    the impacts of the current funding situation on the Ohio-class
    replacement, as well as the other work of your offices.
        I thank you all.
        Now, it's my pleasure to turn this over to my good friend
    and ranking member, Senator Sessions.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
    pleasure for me to work with you. You know how much I respect
    and admire your leadership. I think, together, we'll do our
    best to fulfill our responsibilities to the taxpayers and to
    the security of America.
        This hearing focuses on the President's fiscal year 2012
    request for NNSA. Never has a nuclear weapons complex faced a
    turning point as significant, I think, as the one before us
    today. As highlighted by the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger
    Strategic Posture Commission, a commission that I helped put
    the language in to create, both physical and intellectual
    infrastructure are ``in serious need of transformation and
    require significant attention and investment. After years of
    neglect, the infrastructure has degraded to the point where we
    decide to recapitalize or forego the ability to certify and
    produce safe, secure, and reliable weapons.'' Today's hearing
    provides an opportunity to discuss the 2012 budget, assess its
    adequacy, and deliver a credible deterrent that is safe,
    secure, and reliable.
        So, I welcome the commitment that the President has made
    for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. While we may
    disagree on the likelihood that we'll have a nuclear-free world
    sometime in the future, the President has clearly recognized
    that the world we live in today requires a strong nuclear
    deterrent and that efforts toward reducing the size of the
    stockpile depend on a modernized weapons complex, a robust
    ability to produce, refurbish, and replace legacy weapons with
    weapons that are safer, more secure, and reliable.
        The 1251 report that's part of the New START Treaty was a
    key first step in ensuring the future viability of the complex.
    But, it was only a first step. A long-term sustained commitment
    that spans future administrations and Congresses alike is
    essential. Now, that's not always easy to do, to maintain a
    long-term defense project like this.
        I am, however, already concerned that some in Congress have
    forgotten the national security importance of the weapons
    complex, and have neglected to appropriate what seems to be the
    necessary amount of funds for 2011. In fact, in the most recent
    full-year fiscal year 2011 appropriations bills, the House
    appropriators cut the fiscal year 2011 budget by $312 billion,
    and the Senate appropriators cut the weapons program by $185
    billion. After countless hours of debate to fully fund the
    administration's 10-year-plus proposal during this Treaty
    debate, this failure to recognize the national security
    importance of complex modernization, I think, is disappointing.
    Hopefully, I'm wrong, and you can do the job without as much
    money as we originally thought. But, I'm worried about it.
        Going forward, I intend to advocate for the restoration of
    the funds necessary to meet the goals that we set when we
    worked on the treaty together. The construction projects at Y-
    12 and LANL are the foundations of the modernization effort,
    and are the key enabler to a long list of warhead Life
    Extension Programs (LEP) over the next 20-plus years. I look
    forward to hearing more about these programs, understanding how
    NNSA intends to ensure that both facilities are delivered on
    time and on cost.
        Cost is a big question on these projects, to me. In the
    report that accompanied the New START Treaty, and has since
    been updated, the current cost estimate for the CMRR is a range
    between $3.7 and $5.8 billion. That's a lot of money. Alabama's
    general fund budget is $2 billion a year. The cost estimate for
    the UPF is between $4.2 and $6.5 billion. Together, these
    buildings would cost between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. If
    necessary, okay. That's what we have to do. It's critical to
    our defense, so we have to do it. But, I don't think it's wrong
    for Congress to ask some questions about those high figures.
        When it was released last year, the NPR included some
    troubling language that threatens to restrict the tools
    necessary for our weapons designers to design weapons with the
    highest degree of safety, security, and reliability. According
    to the NPR, warhead LEPs will ``give strong preference to
    options for refurbishment or reuse,'' thus restricting the
    ability of the labs to pursue the benefits associated with the
    replacement option.
        I remain concerned by this guidance, and associate myself
    with the concerns raised by 10 distinguished former lab
    directors who stated, in a letter to the Secretaries of Defense
    and Energy, that the NPR ``will stifle the creative and
    imaginative thinking that typified the excellent history of
    progress and development at the National Laboratories.'' I
    think that's a serious point that we must consider.
        I look forward to hearing what steps have been taken to
    ensure our weapons designers will not be restricted from
    utilizing the tools necessary for developing the most credible,
    safe, secure, reliable stockpile possible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the witnesses.
        Senator Nelson. Well, thank you, Senator Sessions. It's
    always a pleasure to work with you.
        Senator Shaheen, do you have any opening remarks?
        Senator Shaheen. No, thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Okay. Mr. D'Agostino, I understand that you
    will present an oral opening statement on behalf of the panel.
    I would note that your prepared statement, as well as the
    statements of the three lab directors, will all be included in
    the subcommittee hearing record. Please proceed.

    STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
       NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR
      NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON.
      DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
    NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
      ADM KIRKLAND H. DONALD, USN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL
      REACTORS, AND DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION, NATIONAL
    NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MICHAEL
    R. ANASTASIO, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; GEORGE
     H. MILLER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY;
      AND PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

        Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator
    Sessions, Senator Shaheen. It's a real pleasure to have the
    opportunity to address you today on a variety of investments
    that the President's proposing in the future for our Nation's
    nuclear security enterprise.
        I'd like to begin by thanking all of the Senators on the
    committee for your continued support of our program, the
    Department of Energy (DOE), the NNSA, as well as the 35,000 men
    and women who work every day to keep our Nation safe.
        We couldn't do our work without strong bipartisan support
    and, from my standpoint, the engaged leadership by Congress.
    It's absolutely critical, and this is actually what we've seen
    over the past number of years, in moving forward.
        I'd also like to take a few moments to discuss our role in
    providing response to the tragic events in Japan. Mr. Chairman,
    the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011,
    causing significant damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
    powerplant. Some of the radioactive materials have been
    released as a result of the damage. First and foremost, our
    thoughts and prayers are with the people of Japan during this
    very difficult time.
        To assist in the response, we've deployed over 45 people
    and more than 17,000 pounds worth of equipment, including
    NNSA's aerial measuring system and consequence management
    response teams. Our response teams are on the ground and
    they're utilizing their unique skills and expertise and
    equipment to help with our partners in Japan.
        Since arriving in Japan, NNSA teams have collected and
    analyzed data gathered from more than 130 hours of flights
    aboard Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft and thousands of
    ground-monitoring points to get actual data on the ground and
    pass that information back to the Government of Japan.
        But, in addition to that, in order to ensure that this
    information is available to every single government agency,
    we've been moving this information throughout the government,
    as well as posted information online at our Web site,
    energy.gov, so members of the public can see this information
    themselves, evaluate it for themselves, and be informed. We'll
    continue to monitor this situation. We continue to provide
    detailed technical support for the Japanese; in fact, on a
    daily basis. It changes dramatically on a daily basis.
        DOE is also monitoring activities throughout--with a
    nuclear incident team that we have manned 24/7, with our naval
    reactors, as well. We get together and exchange data. We report
    our assets at our National Laboratories to provide ongoing
    predictive atmospheric monitoring capabilities based on a
    variety of different scenarios.
        It's important to note that all of the data that we have
    seen to this point reaffirms what the President has said from
    the beginning, that we do not expect any harmful levels of
    radiation from Japan to reach the United States.
        Mr. Chairman, I come before you today to discuss the
    President's fiscal year 2012 budget request. I do so at a time
    when the capabilities NNSA offers the Nation, and indeed the
    world, are on display in real time. The resources President
    Obama is requesting for fiscal year 2012 make a critical
    investment in the future of the nuclear security enterprise
    which will allow us to continue to implement his nuclear
    security agenda and respond to global crises like the one in
    Japan.
        Despite the challenging economic times facing our country,
    President Obama has requested $11.8 billion for NNSA, up from
    $11.2 billion in 2011. As I see it, the budget request can be
    broken down into three key themes.
        First, we're investing in the future. This budget request
    reflects the President's commitment, made last November, to
    invest more than $85 billion over the next decade to assure the
    safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile
    and to modernize the nuclear security infrastructure and
    revitalize the science and technology base that supports the
    full range of nuclear security missions that we have. It
    provides $7.6 billion for the weapons activities account to
    support our efforts to leverage the best science and technology
    and research in the world to maintain our deterrent and
    modernize the infrastructure that supports the deterrent. This
    will enable us to enhance our surveillance of the stockpile,
    proceed with key LEPs for the B61 and the W78 weapons systems,
    and continue to design the UPF at Y-12 National Security
    Complex, and the CMRR facility at LANL. These two facilities
    will provide the necessary capabilities that are absolutely
    critical to maintaining the Nation's expertise in uranium
    processing and plutonium research. Investing in a modern
    nuclear security enterprise is critical to our Stockpile
    Stewardship Program (SSP), but it also supports the full range
    of NNSA's nuclear security missions.
        Which brings me to the second theme in this request, which
    is implementing the President's nuclear security agenda.
    President Obama has made strengthening nuclear security and the
    nuclear nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. As
    he said in his speech in Prague in April 2009, the threat of a
    terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the most
    immediate and extreme threat we face. This budget makes the
    investments needed to continue to implement the President's
    nuclear security agenda.
        To power the nuclear Navy, President Obama has requested
    $1.1 billion for NNSA's naval reactors program. The NPR
    highlighted the need to build a replacement for the Ohio-class
    submarine, which will start to be retired from Service in 2027.
    Our fiscal year 2012 request continues the design work on the
    propulsion unit for that Ohio-class replacement submarine in
    order to meet the Navy's required procurement date of 2019.
        This budget request also includes critical investments in a
    modern and sustainable spent nuclear fuel infrastructure at the
    naval reactor site at the Idaho National Laboratory. This will
    allow us to move fuel away from wet to dry storage, and
    ultimately, to dispose of it, while we maintain the capacity
    necessary to receive spent fuel generated during a sustained
    intense period of fuel handling at our shipyards.
        Finally, the budget request seeks the resources to refuel
    the land-based prototype reactor in upstate New York.
        These are all critical elements of the President's nuclear
    security agenda defined in the national security strategy and
    in the NPR.
        Mr. Chairman, we recognize that this request for increased
    investments in the nuclear security enterprise comes at a time
    of acute financial challenges to our Nation. We recognize that
    we have the need to be effective stewards of the taxpayers'
    money.
        This brings me to the third key theme outlined in this
    budget, and that is our commitment to improving the way we do
    business and manage our resources, including budget resources,
    people resources, projects, and our infrastructure. I realize
    that you, the ranking member, and all members of this committee
    have many competing requirements. While I believe that nothing
    is more important than our shared responsibility to ensure our
    Nation's security, I also recognize that it's my responsibility
    to assure you that we can manage those resources wisely. That's
    why we are working with our management and operating partners
    to streamline our governance model to devote more resources to
    critical mission work and maximize our ability to complete our
    missions safely and securely, and do that in a cost-effective
    way. We're making sure that we have the right contracting
    strategy in place. We are improving our project management by
    ensuring we have qualified project managers leading our major
    projects, setting costs and schedule baselines on construction
    projects when design work is 90 percent complete, subjecting
    those estimates to rigorous independent reviews, and placing
    renewed focus across our enterprise on project management.
    That's why we recently created a new Policy and Oversight
    Office for managing major projects that reports directly to me
    and my office to make sure that this project management
    responsibility gets the high level of management attention it
    deserves.
        We're continuing to find innovative ways to save money
    across our enterprise. Take, for example, our supply-chain
    management center. Since 2009, it has used new technologies and
    pooled purchasing power to drive efficiencies across our
    enterprise. The result has been more than $213 million in
    auditable cost savings in the last 3\1/2\ years.
        All of this is part of our effort to create one NNSA, a
    true partnership between all of our programs and all of our
    Management and Operations (M&O) partners across the country to
    fulfill our common mission. We must break down our stovepipes,
    work collaboratively across our programs and organization, make
    sure our headquarters, site offices, and M&O partners are
    coordinated, and leverage all of our resources to meet a common
    objective, ultimately making the world a safer place.
        Taken together, these steps will ensure that we have a
    modern 21st-century nuclear security enterprise that is safer,
    more secure, more efficient, and organized to succeed, and an
    enterprise that can address broader national security needs.
        We're already realizing positive benefits as a result of
    our work. Last year, our Kansas City plant won the Malcolm
    Baldrige Award for quality. Since October, two NNSA projects
    have won separate Project Management Institute (PMI) awards,
    including our Global Threat Reduction Initiative that became
    the first Federal project to ever win PMI's Distinguished
    Project Award. That's the vision outlined in this budget
    request. It supports our full range of NNSA missions and, more
    importantly, invests in the infrastructure, in the people, in
    the science and technology and engineering required to fulfill
    our missions.
        I look forward to working with you and the members of the
    committee.
        With that, we'd be happy to take any questions that you may
    have.
        [The prepared statements of Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio,
    Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert follow:]
                Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our
    nuclear security posture and the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
    request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
        I am pleased to be joined at the table by Dr. Don Cook, Deputy
    Administrator for Defense Programs and Admiral Kirk Donald, Director
    for Naval Nuclear Propulsion. We are also pleased to have the Directors
    of the National Laboratories--Dr. Michael Anastasio from Los Alamos
    National Lab, Dr. George Miller from Lawrence Livermore National Lab,
    and Dr. Paul Hommert from Sandia National Laboratories--join us for
    this hearing.
        The NNSA has the important mission to enhance global security
    through nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, naval
    nuclear propulsion, and national leadership in science and technology.
    Today I am going to focus on how we at NNSA are: (1) investing in the
    future of the nuclear security enterprise, (2) implementing the
    President's nuclear security agenda, and (3) improving the way we do
    business and manage our resources from the standpoint of the status of
    the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure. These key mission
    areas are interdependent, and the men and women who support them make a
    direct contribution to advancing national and international security.
        Now more than ever, we must remain vigilant in ensuring that
    nuclear security programs and activities are properly managed in this
    tough budget climate. The national consensus that has developed
    following the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the New START treaty
    ratification on the need to modernize our arsenal and promote all
    aspects of nuclear security across the spectrum of deterrence,
    proliferation prevention, counterterrorism and response further
    underpins the need to execute this mission responsibly and effectively.
              the nuclear security policy context and nnsa's role
        The policy context remains one in which the advancement of global
    nuclear security is a priority. When President Obama revealed his
    vision for reducing nuclear dangers and moving toward a world without
    nuclear weapons, he made clear that ``as long as these weapons exist,
    the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to
    deter any adversary, and to guarantee that defense to our allies.''
        NNSA has been implementing the NPR guidance to ensure a safe,
    secure and effective arsenal and promote global nuclear security. With
    the entry into force of the New START treaty we are able to project
    what the stockpile will look like, to plan an integrated program that
    meets established military requirements, and to modernize the stockpile
    and infrastructure to support a leaner, modern 21st century Nuclear
    Security Enterprise.
        The ratification of the New START treaty brought the administration
    and Congress together on the need to modernize the Nation's nuclear
    arsenal, and to provide greater resources to the science and technology
    missions, the aging physical infrastructure, and the people that
    support our strategic deterrent. We have agreed with the Russian
    Federation and within the United States to decrease the number of
    operationally deployed nuclear weapons, but we must not lose sight of
    the commitment needed to maintain the current stockpile and ensure it
    is safe, secure and effective. The President's budget requests in
    fiscal year 2011 and again in fiscal year 2012 reflect this commitment
    in the clearest and most comprehensive terms.
                    21st century nuclear security enterprise
        While NNSA's primary mission is to maintain and deliver the
    Nation's nuclear deterrent to the Department of Defense, the expertise
    and tools used to accomplish that task have resulted in a multitude of
    other national security applications. The network of laboratories,
    production plants and sites that make up the Nuclear Security
    Enterprise evidences not only a shift from the Cold War capacity-based
    nuclear weapons complex, but a vision for preserving and enhancing one
    of our Nation's greatest national assets.
        This shift from a weapons complex into a nuclear security
    enterprise is about making adjustments to the program in order to
    prevent and respond to current and emerging global threats,
    particularly in relation to countering a wide-ranging set of nuclear
    threats such as preventing--or minimizing the impact of--the explosion
    of an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device. It is
    about staying ahead and advancing cutting edge science and technology
    to carry out this mission.
                               budget highlights
        The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request provides $11.78
    billion to invest in a modern, 21st century nuclear security
    enterprise, implement the President's nuclear security agenda, and
    improve the way the NNSA does business and manages its resources.
        The fiscal year 2012 request represents an increase of 5.1 percent
    over the $11.2 billion requested for fiscal year 2011, reflecting a
    commitment to investing in a modern enterprise that can support the
    full range of nuclear security missions. The request highlights the
    vital role NNSA plays in implementing the President's nuclear security
    agenda and the broad, bipartisan consensus that has developed regarding
    the role NNSA plays in enhancing our Nation's security and the
    resources needed to get the job done.
    Investing in the Future
        Secretary of Energy Chu and I work closely with Secretary of
    Defense Gates and other Defense Department (DOD) officials to ensure
    that NNSA remains focused on a strong interagency partnership that
    meets our national security requirements and promotes NNSA's
    sustainability. As a result, the President's request includes $7.6
    billion for the Weapons Activities appropriation, an 8.9 percent
    increase over the President's fiscal year 2011 request and a 19.5
    percent increase over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation to invest in
    the future of the nuclear security enterprise. These resources will
    support, among other things, the operation and construction of the
    modern research facilities needed to do cutting edge science and
    attract the next generation of nuclear security experts. It continues
    implementation of the President's commitment to invest $85 billion over
    the next decade to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to modernize the
    infrastructure that supports it, as well as to implement the agenda
    outlined in the NPR, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and
    the updated Section 1251 Report submitted to Congress.
        NNSA's budget request also includes associated out-year projections
    in the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program that identifies resources
    needed to meet the continuing requirements for significant long-term
    investments in the deliverables, capabilities, and infrastructure of
    the enterprise.
        These resources will help us invest in a modern, 21st century
    Nuclear Security Enterprise that can sustain the stockpile and support
    our full range of nuclear security missions. With these investments,
    NNSA will be able to continue to move toward an enterprise that is
    safer, smaller, more secure, more efficient, more sustainable, and more
    adaptable.
        The request includes an increase of 3.1 percent over the fiscal
    year 2011 level to protect and advance the scientific capabilities at
    the U.S. national security laboratories and a 21 percent increase for
    infrastructure improvements, including continuing work on the Uranium
    Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the
    Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility (CMRR) at Los
    Alamos National Laboratory. These capital projects are key elements for
    ensuring safe, secure, and reliable uranium and plutonium capabilities
    for nuclear security and other important missions.
        To power the nuclear navy, the budget request includes $1.2 billion
    for the NNSA's Naval Reactors program, an increase of 7.8 percent over
    the President's fiscal year 2011 request. The programs in this
    appropriation support the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet. Specifically, the
    request supports the administration's decision to recapitalize the sea-
    based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic submarines, the
    most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic deterrent, are reaching
    the end of their operational life. The request will enable Naval
    Reactors to continue reactor plant design and development efforts begun
    in 2010 for procurement of long-lead reactor plant components in 2017,
    in support of Navy procurement of the first Ohio Class submarine
    replacement in 2019. Providing the Ohio-class replacement a life-of-
    the-ship reactor core will require substantial advances in
    manufacturing technology to provide new cladding and a new fuel system.
    The request also supports the refueling of a land based prototype
    reactor, providing a cost effective test platform for these new
    technologies.
        Increased funding is also requested for the Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project, which will replace the over 50-year old
    Expended Core Facility as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel
    receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging, and secure dry storage.
    Fiscal year 2012 funding continues the conceptual design for the
    facility, equipment, and related systems, as well as continues meeting
    the National Environmental Policy Act's requirements and project
    oversight (e.g., engineering procurement and construction management).
    Detailed project engineering and design work will commence in fiscal
    year 2013 and construction will commence in fiscal year 2015.
        These vital projects will replace facilities that date back to the
    dawn of the Cold War with modern facilities that can support the full
    range of nuclear security missions--including maintaining the nuclear
    deterrent, preventing proliferation, securing vulnerable nuclear
    material, powering the nuclear Navy and providing the Nation with the
    best emergency response and counterterrorism capabilities possible.
    They will also ensure that NNSA continues to work with the Department
    of Defense and other interagency partners to keep the Nation safe.
    Implementing the President's Nuclear Security Agenda
        The fiscal year 2012 budget request also provides the resources
    required to continue to work toward the President's commitment to
    secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4
    years, a key national security goal. The budget request includes $2.5
    billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in fiscal year 2012 and
    $14.2 billion over the next 5 years to reduce the global nuclear threat
    by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling
    nuclear and radiological material worldwide, as well as promoting the
    responsible application of nuclear technology and science. Working
    together across the nuclear security enterprise, and in collaboration
    with our colleagues in a range of U.S. agencies, as well as with
    international organizations and partners in over 100 countries, we
    carry out these efforts globally on a daily basis.
        This request reflects the significant accomplishments of NNSA's
    nuclear nonproliferation programs and seeks the resources needed to
    complete the President's goals and prepare to respond to new
    challenges. This budget request provides the resources required to meet
    commitments secured from international partners during the 2010 Nuclear
    Security Summit to remove all remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU)
    from Belarus, Ukraine, Mexico, and other countries by April 2012,
    expand our efforts to prevent nuclear materials trafficking, encourage
    global implementation of higher standards for the physical protection
    of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and work with the Defense
    Department to improve international nuclear security cooperation.
        The request of $2.5 billion is a decrease of 5.1 percent from the
    President's fiscal year 2011 Request, but an increase of 19.6 percent
    over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This 5.1 percent or $138
    million decline flows logically from the fiscal year 2011 request which
    was `front loaded' to accelerate the effort to secure vulnerable
    nuclear materials within the President's stated timeframe. Even with
    this decrease, the NNSA's budget request remains consistent with our
    overall strategy to ensure that programs supporting the President's
    commitment to lead an international effort to secure the most
    vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years are fully
    funded in the Request. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts
    related to radiological material, as well as the International Nuclear
    Material Protection and Cooperation program's activities to enhance the
    ability of our foreign partners to detect nuclear smuggling at border
    crossings and in Megaports have been prioritized to accelerate nuclear
    material lockdown efforts. The decrease in the request for Fissile
    Materials Disposition reflects the completion of long-lead procurements
    for the MOX and Waste Solidification projects, as well as the decision
    to defer funding associated with the $400 million U.S. pledge for the
    Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program until agreement
    is reached on milestones for the program. Prior Year unobligated
    balances of $30 million associated with contingency funds for
    construction under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium
    Production Program are proposed for cancellation, due to the program's
    anticipated completion of CD-4 activities in the June 2011 timeframe.
    Improving the Way NNSA Does Business
        In 2010, the NNSA observed 10 years of major accomplishments since
    its inception. We have secured and removed hundreds of nuclear weapons-
    worth of nuclear material around the world; we have built the world's
    fastest supercomputers and largest laser; we have pushed the frontiers
    of science and discovery on a daily basis; and we maintain an aging
    stockpile to ensure that it will remain a safe and effective deterrent.
    In the next decade, we have major projects to complete: the First
    Production Unit of the life extended B61 by 2017; addressing the W78
    Life Extension Program and the potential commonality with the W88; and
    completing the design and construction of our plutonium and uranium
    capability at CMRR and UPF by 2020, with operations by 2023 and 2024
    respectively. We also continue to reduce our security footprint by
    consolidating nuclear missions and materials. We are on track to
    complete removal of Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials from the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by the end of 2012, which will
    enable NNSA to reduce security risks and costs there.
        We recognize that the fiscal year 2012 request for increased
    investments in the nuclear security enterprise comes at a time of acute
    financial challenges for our Nation, and we recognize the need to be
    effective stewards of the taxpayer's money. We have made a series of
    management decisions and put in place reforms and reorganizations to
    better reflect a 21st century mission and prepare us for the next 10
    years of the NNSA.
        Consistent with the President's commitment to deliver on critical
    national nuclear security missions at the best value to the American
    taxpayer, the fiscal year 2012 budget request will enable NNSA to
    continue to improve the way it does business and manages resources. The
    President's budget request for Federal oversight and staff included in
    the Office of the Administrator appropriation is $450.1 million, an
    increase of 0.4 percent over the fiscal year 2011 request and an
    increase of 7 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation.
        To maintain congressional support for NNSA's programs, the
    enterprise has a responsibility to work together as ``One NNSA,'' a
    fully integrated enterprise that operates efficiently, is organized to
    succeed, that performs its work seamlessly, and speaks with one voice.
    This ``One NNSA'' needs to be a true partnership among Headquarters,
    the Site Offices and our Management and Operations (M&O) partners. We
    are working from the senior management level to ensure all 35,000
    employees develop a culture where we all work in a more integrated and
    interdependent fashion.
        Changing the way NNSA does business is an important part of the
    effort to transform a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st
    Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. NNSA simply cannot expect Congress
    to support major investments in its programs and its facilities unless
    the enterprise can demonstrate that the Department of Energy is a
    responsible steward of the taxpayer's money.
        NNSA needs to do better, which is why the Federal sector leadership
    is working with its M&O partners to streamline the enterprise
    governance model in order to devote more resources to critical mission
    work and maximize NNSA's ability to complete its mission safely and
    securely.
        NNSA is making sure that it has the right contracting strategy in
    place. The agency is improving its project management by, for example,
    ensuring that NNSA no longer sets cost and schedule performance
    baselines on construction projects until design work is 90 percent
    complete, ensuring it has the right leadership teams in place, and
    performing independent cost reviews. NNSA has also created a new policy
    and oversight office for managing major projects, the office of
    ``Acquisitions and Project/Construction Management.'' The new office
    reports directly to the Administrator. This will help ensure that
    project management gets the high level focus it requires. In addition,
    we are moving to Federalize pilots for our secure transportation
    program in order to gain efficiencies and maintain operational control.
    Finally, as the Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program
    comes to an end, we will create the Capabilities Based Facilities and
    Infrastructure activity to continue to focus on maintaining the
    infrastructure we have.
        We are already beginning to see results. NNSA is increasingly
    recognized for its efforts to be an effective steward of tax dollars.
    For example, since 2007, NNSA's Supply Chain Management Center has
    saved $213 million by using pooled purchasing power to drive
    efficiencies across the enterprise. In the last year NNSA's Kansas City
    Plant won the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige Award, America's highest
    honor for innovation and performance excellence. Two other NNSA
    programs were recognized with Project Management Institute (PMI)
    awards. In 2010, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative became the
    first Federal project to receive PMI's Distinguished Project Award,
    while the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory received PMI's project of the year.
                                   conclusion
        Our Nation has carefully evaluated its security needs in an
    international landscape that remains challenging and uncertain. NNSA
    has charted a path forward that shows our unwavering commitment to the
    Nation's security and enhances our formidable capabilities to address
    broader security challenges.
        The NNSA is a technically based organization with a strong nuclear
    heritage that serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range
    of national security solutions. NNSA is rooted in the management of our
    Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, the application of nuclear energy
    for naval propulsion and its nonproliferation programs. Additionally,
    NNSA capabilities support a broad range of U.S. and international
    activities that address existing dangers, identify and prepare for
    future challenges, and advise the U.S. Government and our international
    partners on nuclear security matters.
        This 5 year budget request takes the NNSA well into its second
    decade and strengthens the capabilities that are integral elements of
    our nuclear deterrent. Our challenge is to retain the essential
    capabilities and to identify and develop those needed for the future.
                             appropriations detail
        Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four
    specific NNSA appropriations.

                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement Dr. Michael R. Anastasio
                                  introduction
        Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Sessions, I would like to thank
    you for your invitation to appear before the subcommittee on the
    ``challenges and tasks confronting the laboratories in fiscal year 2012
    and the out-years.'' I am pleased to appear today along with National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Tom D'Agostino,
    Director for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Admiral Kirk Donald, Deputy
    Administrator for Defense Programs Dr. Don Cook, and my fellow
    laboratory directors from Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National
    Laboratories. I am currently in my 31st year in the weapons program and
    in my 9th year as a laboratory director, having served first as
    director of Lawrence Livermore and now since 2006 at Los Alamos (LANL).
    As you likely know, I will be retiring as director this summer, and I
    wanted to take this opportunity to thank this committee for all its
    support of the Laboratory and the NNSA mission over the years.
        Los Alamos is one of the Nation's two nuclear weapons design
    laboratories. Although the Laboratory and its mission evolve over time,
    the primary focus of LANL remains to ensure the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile is safe, secure, and effective. More broadly, Los Alamos is a
    national security science Laboratory. We conduct work in the national
    interest in a broad range of areas including nonproliferation, support
    to the intelligence community and homeland security, and energy
    security and the science that underpins all these mission areas.
        Per the request of the subcommittee, I will focus my remarks today
    on the health and vitality of the Laboratory as it relates to our
    ability to meet the national security requirements of the Nation. Since
    I last appeared before the U.S. Senate in July 2010 much has happened
    here in Washington which will potentially have profound impacts on the
    future of Los Alamos. With the passage of the New START treaty last
    December and the preceding debate on the health of the United States'
    nuclear weapons complex and strategic stockpile, a baseline strategy
    was formed.
        The administration announced a nuclear policy in the form of its
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April 2010 and a budget outline to
    support it, through the so-called 1251 Report, which was released in
    May 2010 and then updated later that year in November. Along with my
    colleagues from Livermore and Sandia, we issued a statement on the NPR
    in April, parts of which I include here: ``We believe that the approach
    outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and
    includes the consideration of the full range of life extension option's
    (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
    different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on
    previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
    flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
    acceptable level of risk.''
        I addressed these issues further in my testimony before this
    Committee in July 2010, where I stated in general that I was encouraged
    by the policy, and I said further that I viewed, ``the NNSA's fiscal
    year 2011 budget request as a positive first step . . . '' However, I
    added that, `` . . . I have concerns about sustaining the focus and an
    appropriate budget over the several decades for which it will be
    required.'' As I will discuss further in my testimony today, this
    continues to be a concern.
        The three laboratory directors were once again asked our opinion of
    the updated 1251 Report, when it was released in November 2010. In
    response to a December 2010 letter from the Chairman and Ranking Member
    of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the three of us stated that
    ``We are very pleased by the update to the 1251 Report, as it would
    enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a
    safe, secure, reliable and effective stockpile under the Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan.'' We continued further that, ``We
    believe that, if enacted, the added funding outline in the Section 1251
    Report update--for enhanced surveillance, pensions, facility
    construction, and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF),
    among other programs--would establish a working funding level for a
    balanced program that sustains the science, technology and engineering
    base.''
        I recognize, however, that in the interim, the country is now
    confronting some very significant financial challenges. My comments
    today recognize that situation and are cognizant that all Federal
    programs will be facing budget constraints in the months and years
    ahead.
       health and vitality of the laboratory in support of the national
                                    mission
        When I testified before the Senate last July, the focus of my
    remarks was on the ability of the Laboratory to execute the new
    national strategy based on the funding in the President's fiscal year
    2011 budget submission. At the subcommittee's behest, I would like to
    outline what I believe are key elements for maintaining a healthy and
    vital Los Alamos, one that can support the national needs of the
    country. At the fundamental level, the Laboratory needs the best
    scientists, engineers, technicians and support staff that can work in
    multi-disciplinary teams on national security science challenges facing
    the country. In order for us to be able to attract and retain the best
    people, I believe that the following elements form a strong foundation
    for the Laboratory:

             A strong national commitment to compelling national
            security missions;
             Stable and adequate funding;
             Diverse and broad cutting-edge scientific programs,
            which attract the best and brightest scientific talent; and
             Tools, facilities and infrastructure to accomplish the
            above, such as: the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE),
            the proposed Matter Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE)
            facility, and exascale computing, among others.

        If all the above elements are in place, the Nation will be able to
    reap the benefits of a healthy Los Alamos. As director, I am
    responsible to ensure that this is as true 15 years in the future as it
    is today, even though no one can predict what then will be the
    compelling challenges facing the country. I will address the current
    status of each of these elements below.
      strong national commitment to compelling national security missions
        The Obama administration in April 2010 released its NPR that
    updated the Nation's nuclear weapons policy. One of the five key
    objectives of the NPR was ``sustaining a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear arsenal.'' The NPR discussed that this would be accomplished by
    studying ``options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability
    of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the
    congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range
    of LEP [Life Extension Program] approaches will be considered:
    refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
    different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.'' The NPR
    provided further detail on the fact that the ``U.S. nuclear stockpile
    must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure . . . '' and that
    the ``science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile
    stewardship as well as providing insights for non-proliferation, must
    be strengthened.''
        The NPR was followed by a program plan and funding profile (the
    revised 1251 Report) with an accompanying request for substantial
    funding increases in the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budget
    submissions. These policies and plans commit the NNSA's national
    security enterprise to an aggressive body of work for the next 20+
    years that includes completion of the current Life Extension Program
    (LEP) for the W-76, starting studies to complete LEPs of the B61, W78,
    and W88 and the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
    Replacement facility (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production
    Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 plant.
        The workforce at LANL is excited and energized to meet these
    challenges which are daunting. Certifying the stockpile in the absence
    of the ability to test (the last U.S. nuclear test was in 1992) has
    provided one of the greatest technical challenges to ever face the
    nuclear weapons complex and led to the creation of the science-based
    Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). At a high level, the SSP is
    critical both to the annual assessment of the stockpile, as well as to
    maturing the next generation of tools and technologies that will
    support certification of future LEPs. It requires powerful experimental
    capabilities to probe key questions facing an aging stockpile, as well
    as the most capable supercomputers in the world to integrate our new
    knowledge from experiments and validate this through comparison with
    the data that we have from our underground test history.
        I want to stress that we have learned a great deal about the
    science and engineering of weapons and the detailed phenomena that have
    to occur for a weapon to function properly. Contrary to what some have
    argued, we are definitely not ``done'' with science--there are many
    significant areas of work that remain to be done. There are critical
    open questions that remain to be solved to retain our confidence in the
    stockpile, and we cannot fully predict the scientific challenges that
    are still ahead as it continues to age and goes through modernization.
    As a nuclear weapons enterprise, we need to be fully utilizing the
    tools of Stockpile Stewardship that are now online, ranging from the
    Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility and LANSCE at
    Los Alamos, to the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore.
        We also need to continue what will likely be a decade long march to
    the next level of supercomputing performance, known as ``exascale
    computing.'' One of the largest successes of Stockpile Stewardship has
    been our advances in supercomputing capability, and specifically our
    ability to model the complex phenomena that occur in a weapon. What we
    have discovered is that with each improvement in simulation
    performance, we see greater fidelity and develop an improved
    understanding, as well as a further awareness of what we still do not
    understand. Thus, moving to the next generation of computing is not a
    luxury or simply speed for the sake of speed. It is essential to our
    understanding of the challenges we face with the stockpile, in
    particular as we move further away from our underground test
    experience.
        If funded according to the profile in the 1251 Report, this program
    of work constitutes national commitment to a compelling national
    security mission.
                                 stable funding
        Stable funding is another sign to the workforce that there is a
    national commitment to the mission. In the national security science
    area and weapons activities in particular, scientists of necessity
    become involved in classified research and development (R&D).
    Consequently, they disappear from the traditional forums of publication
    and conferences that lead to advancement in their fields and once out
    of sight it is very difficult to find opportunities to reenter this
    very competitive arena. Before forgoing this career path, scientists
    must judge if there is an opportunity for a career over several decades
    and the best of them have many other choices available. A national
    commitment and stable funding to go with it are essential elements to
    enable that personal decision.
        For a laboratory like Los Alamos, stable funding allows
    institutional workforce planning to ensure that the right mix of skills
    with the right mix of experience are available to the programs to
    execute work today and into the future. With funding uncertainty and
    the associated worries about downsizing coupled with pay freezes,
    increased contribution to pension and medical plans, the best of our
    workforce is difficult to retain. Currently for Los Alamos, with the
    uncertainty in the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets, I
    don't know what actions I should be taking--increasing the size of the
    workforce or decreasing the size of the workforce.
       broad and diverse science portfolio that can attract the best and
                                   brightest
        Over the years, I have engaged the national leadership about my
    concern that the scientific capability that underpins the nuclear
    weapons program has been squeezed by eroding funding, increasing costs
    for facilities and security, and uncertainty over the future of the
    program. This squeeze has impacted our ability to advance the science
    to address the gaps in our understanding that must be closed for our
    continued confidence in the nuclear deterrent. For example, we have had
    to forgo some areas of research and have not fully utilized our major
    experimental facilities like DARHT, LANSCE, and NIF. Additionally, we
    have not consistently provided the most capable diagnostics and
    instruments for our research. It is the knowledge developed from this
    broad range of experimentation that is essential to validate our
    simulation tools that forms the basis for confidence through the
    science-based SSP.
        In order to mitigate the consequences of these shortfalls in
    support for our scientific capabilities, we have consciously found
    funding from other sponsors that utilize some of the same science as
    that needed by the weapons program, and in that way sustain and enrich
    our capabilities that reside in the more than 2,500 Ph.Ds that are the
    core of our science base. For instance, our technical staff does work
    that is competitively selected for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
    Offices of Science and Nuclear Energy, and NNSA's Office of Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, that is, of course, very important in its own right.
    Our researchers fare well in these competitions as they are recognized
    as among the top scientists in the country, by numerous measures,
    including the number of peer-reviewed publications. These non-weapons
    programs serve to both attract top scientists to the Laboratory, and
    they also build up fundamental scientific capability that can then be
    further leveraged and applied to our core weapons program work.
        In the case of Los Alamos, the intellectual seed corn has to be
    attracted and incentivized to join our staff because of our remote
    location and the heavy recruitment of U.S. citizens with technical
    degrees from large corporations and research universities. As a March
    25, 2011, New York Times article highlighted, we have tough competition
    from today's Silicon Valley that can provide high salaries, stock
    options and free iPads to new recruits. The good news is that typically
    once we get the scientific talent to the Laboratory, they tend not to
    leave because of the diverse set of scientific opportunities we are
    able to offer. This is particularly true when our early-career
    scientists develop a better understanding of our national security
    missions in nuclear weapons, conventional explosives, materials
    research, radiography, intelligence activities, and actinide chemistry
    and plutonium science, to name just a few.
        One common example of the path that many of our employees take from
    newly hired postdoctoral candidate to highly trained weapons engineer
    or designer can be found at our linear accelerator LANSCE. LANSCE is a
    DOE national user facility, the largest such facility at an NNSA site,
    as measured by the number of visits. LANSCE is a perfect microcosm of
    the overall Laboratory. The facility is a proton accelerator supported
    by NNSA. This single accelerator, however, among other things supports
    Office of Science-funded work at our neutron scattering facility (Lujan
    Center) and our isotope production facility; Weapons Activities work at
    a proton radiography center, as well as at the Weapons Neutron Research
    facility; and work for the Office of Nuclear Energy. A new physicist
    will be hired to do unclassified science at LANSCE on the fundamentals
    of materials, for instance, and then over time they have the
    opportunity to start working on elements of our classified national
    security activities. The people who remain in the program do so because
    they believe in its scientific challenge and importance.
        This same underlying science that supports the weapons program is
    applied to other real national challenges, whether it is analyzing data
    from radiation detectors in Japan to help understand the status of the
    reactors and spent fuel rods or responding to the Gulf of Mexico
    crisis. For example, our staff experienced in radiography were able to
    immediately deploy to the Gulf of Mexico last year and quickly develop
    a new capability to x-ray the Deep Horizon blowout preventer. At more
    than a mile beneath the surface, we provided imagery using a sealed
    source to help national decisionmakers better understand what was
    occurring inside that device.
                      tools, facilities and infrastructure
        The Nation has invested billions of dollars over many decades in
    the scientific tools, facilities and infrastructure at Los Alamos. The
    reality, though, is that much of that infrastructure has aged, and more
    than 50 percent of our facilities are more than 40 years old. Los
    Alamos has been working closely with NNSA to build strategies that
    update the site's aging infrastructure.
        A key element of that infrastructure, in terms of the required
    national capability, is the replacement facility for the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research facility that was completed in 1952 and was
    discovered years later to reside on a seismic fault. The CMRR will
    provide the infrastructure required for the Nation's ongoing plutonium
    work, just as the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 will
    provide the Nation's ability to work with uranium. The currently
    operating plutonium and uranium facilities have both served our country
    well over the last 60 years. However, with evolving safety and security
    standards, these aging buildings now need to be replaced with more
    efficient structures designed to meet modern-day requirements.
        It is important to recognize, especially when I look at the overall
    health and vitality of the Laboratory, that the infrastructure needs at
    Los Alamos are much broader than just CMRR. Clearly, CMRR will be one
    of the biggest line-item projects in front of this subcommittee, but
    other smaller investments will be required that will help maintain the
    science at the Laboratory. One example of this is LANSCE. We have been
    working with this subcommittee, as well as with NNSA to ensure a path
    forward for the enhanced maintenance of this machine that supports not
    only NNSA's Defense Programs, but also our efforts with DOE's Offices
    of Science and Nuclear Energy. We have been charting a path with DOE
    and NNSA for the future of LANSCE and a follow-on materials science
    capability called MaRIE. As I discussed earlier, it is the broader set
    of science programs that enable us to attract the next generation of
    scientists. Absent these types of tools, we will be hard pressed to
    accomplish our recruitment goals.
                                   challenges
        We at Los Alamos, like most Americans, appreciate the significant
    fiscal constraints we are facing as a nation. However, I am
    increasingly concerned about the final outcome of the fiscal year 2011
    budget process and whether proposed reductions below the 1251 baseline
    will be enacted, and if so, whether that will be a trend into fiscal
    year 2012 and beyond. At Los Alamos alone, the differential in funding
    shifts that may arise from the current debate in Congress amounts to
    the equivalent of 20 percent of our annual budget. Absorbing such a
    contraction beyond fiscal year 2011 would undoubtedly result in
    workforce actions, not to mention the destabilizing effect that would
    take years to correct.
        Pressure from mounting pension requirements and on carryover
    balances have left very little flexibility remaining should our budget
    fall below the 1251 Report guidance. This concern is compounded, if not
    amplified, by the proposed funding reductions to the DOE's Science and
    Energy programs and NNSA's Nuclear Nonproliferation programs which
    would have significant negative impacts on the capabilities supporting
    the weapons program at Los Alamos, and the overall health of the
    Laboratory. As I discussed above, our research base is very broad, and
    we have significant crosscutting activity that provides additional
    support apart from the weapons program. A significant loss of funding
    in these areas will have impacts on our R&D workforce in the areas that
    the weapons program has not been able to fully support. It is the
    aggregate expertise and varied capabilities derived from multiple
    sources that comprise this great institution's technical strength in
    addressing issues of national importance.
        In addition, the re-commitment to the nuclear weapons enterprise
    embodied in the NPR has, I believe, engendered a sense of stability and
    dedication in our workforce over the past year. To reverse course and
    curtail our modest hiring efforts at this point will result in losing
    that momentum and, I predict, will result in a drain of technical
    experts via retirements and the pursuit of careers in institutions that
    can offer that stability. I would offer that the people, infrastructure
    and science that underlie our nuclear defense represent an expertise
    that warrants stability over the long term, independent of short-term
    fiscal constraints.
                                   conclusion
        With all the turmoil and uncertainty in the world, now more than
    ever, the Nation needs a strong national defense. Los Alamos is proud
    of the contributions we have made for more than 65 years, providing
    innovative and effective science and engineering to confront a broad
    range of the country's evolving security challenges. For our nuclear
    deterrent, the Nation has a clear policy together with a program of
    work and a funding profile for its execution. Regrettably, at the same
    time, the Federal budget is under tremendous strain. The uncertainty in
    the budget process and its eventual outcome puts that policy and
    program, as well as the health of the Laboratory, at risk. The
    disconnect between the budget, on the one hand, and the policy and
    program on the other, leads to instability and the inability to
    ultimately meet the goals.
        Los Alamos is prepared, as always, to do its very best to deliver
    on our missions with our most creative science and engineering.
    However, aligning the budget with a program balanced across near-term
    goals and the underlying science will be essential for success. If the
    budget cannot support the current program then the policy framework and
    program to carry it out must be revisited.
        Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you for the opportunity to come
    before the subcommittee and outline my concerns. I would be happy to
    answer any questions you might have.
                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement by Hon. George H. Miller
                                opening remarks
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
    continuing support for the Nation's Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am
    George Miller, Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL). We are one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear design laboratories responsible
    for helping sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
    strategic deterrent.
        The Nation not only depends on the success of our efforts in
    stockpile stewardship but also leverages the capabilities of the NNSA
    Laboratories to develop innovative solutions to major 21st century
    challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic security,
    and energy and environmental security.
                                    summary
             I believe that the program outlined in the President's
            budget request for fiscal year 2012 provides a measured
            approach to meeting the mission needs and sustaining the
            capabilities and deterrent value of the Nation's nuclear
            security enterprise through investments in a skilled,
            knowledgeable, and able workforce; advanced scientific
            facilities and production facilities; and a safe, secure, and
            effective stockpile.
             The tools of stockpile stewardship are being
            effectively applied to assess and, where necessary, refurbish
            and sustain our Nation's nuclear deterrent. Your investment in
            ``flagship'' capabilities in high-performance computing and the
            National Ignition Facility at LLNL are producing excellent
            results.
             It is important that we continue to move forward with
            refurbishing the aging stockpile. The inevitable changes that
            we detect through our surveillance and assessment programs
            increase risk with every year and must be mitigated. In
            particular, it is imperative that we begin the study of options
            for refurbishing the W78 warhead to address evolving issues
            identified in the annual assessment of this weapon system.
             High-performance simulations accomplished using the
            tools available today have demonstrated that still unresolved
            issues will require exascale-level computing to continue to
            stay on top of the stockpile concerns and challenges ahead.
            Achieving exascale computing is a technically challenging
            endeavor, similar to the effort in the 1990s to develop
            terascale computing. This new capability will have other
            positive impacts on our country's national security and
            competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate this
            effort is included in the President's budget request and
            strongly urge support for an aggressive research and
            development effort to create the technologies necessary to
            achieve and apply exascale computing.
             The science, technology, and engineering capabilities
            that are the foundation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
            and the core capabilities of the NNSA Laboratories have been
            successfully leveraged to help solve some of the country's most
            important and urgent issues in defense, energy, and
            environment.
             The national investment in the Stockpile Stewardship
            Program has produced impressive science, technology, and
            engineering capabilities at the NNSA Laboratories that should
            be carefully nurtured and preserved. However, like all
            treasures, if these assets are neglected, they and the key
            personnel that we rely on will disappear very quickly. I
            believe that they deserve your careful consideration as the
            country faces both very difficult budget decisions and a
            challenging future in a dangerous world.
                                  introduction
        I am here to provide my technical assessment of the NNSA weapons
    program activities as outlined in the President's fiscal year 2012
    budget request and of the ability of our Laboratory to sustain
    capabilities and fulfill mission requirements. The request reflects the
    need to deal with an aging stockpile and ensure the long-term health of
    the Nation's nuclear security enterprise by making substantial
    investments in a skilled workforce, facilities, and life-extension
    program activities. My testimony will focus on activities at Livermore
    and the importance of the budgeted investments to allow our Laboratory
    to accomplish the missions assigned to us. Without a healthy nuclear
    security enterprise, the Nation puts in jeopardy the safety, security,
    and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent over the long run as well as
    the ability of the NNSA Laboratories to apply outstanding science,
    technology, and engineering to a wide range of important national
    security challenges.
        The Nation's nuclear security strategy requires a stable and
    measured Stockpile Stewardship Program that is supported by the long-
    term commitment of successive administrations and Congress with
    sufficient funding to meet mission requirements. The President's
    proposed budget increase reverses the declining trend of the last
    several years and restores funding to a level sufficient to
    reinvigorate and sustain the Nation's program. These investments are
    urgently needed--in the face of enormous overall budget pressures--in
    all three major areas of stockpile stewardship: (1) life extension
    programs; (2) modernization of facilities and infrastructure; and (3)
    the science, technology, and engineering base. In my view, delays in
    providing adequate funding has both immediate, short-term consequences
    and raise longer-term sustainment issues.
                            life extension programs
        It is very important that we address the specific issues discovered
    in our aging stockpile through the surveillance program and the review
    processes supporting our annual assessments before these concerns
    worsen. The role of any Life Extension Program (LEP) is to fix issues
    that impact--or will soon impact--overall system effectiveness and take
    actions that will extend the stockpile life. Failure to address these
    issues can have immediate and drastic consequences for the viability of
    the deterrent our national security strategy relies on.
        Included in the request is funding for the Life Extension Study of
    the W78 Air Force Minuteman III ICBM warhead. This effort is vitally
    needed. $26 million was requested in fiscal year 2011 to begin a 6.1
    Phase study to identify and evaluate the LEP. I am concerned because
    the start of the 6.1 Phase study has been delayed. In fiscal year 2012,
    the administration requested $51 million to continue W78 LEP
    development in the 6.2/6.2A Phase (feasibility, planning, and costing
    studies). The official NNSA guidance designates LLNL as the lead
    nuclear design laboratory for the W78 LEP.
        It is important to begin the study activities on the W78 warhead
    because today it constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the triad
    and it has been deployed on the Minuteman III for more than 31 years.
    The warhead is currently beyond its planned service life and it will
    take a 10-year effort to study and then refurbish the necessary
    systems. We need to address concerns identified in surveillance of W78
    units and reported in annual assessments. There are issues with
    material aging and compatibility, which can impact components within
    the nuclear explosive package. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
    has been monitoring W78 aging characteristics and has assessed that
    aging ``has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the
    W78 to date;'' however, ``the condition is progressive and beyond
    current predictive capabilities.'' LLNL has concurred with these
    concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual assessment
    process. An important function of the study is to evaluate the
    different approaches available to refurbish the warhead--as were
    outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review--and assess the impacts of
    including additional safety and security features.
                 modernization of facilities and infrastructure
        Infrastructure modernization projects account for the largest
    portion of the proposed budget increase, and two of the projects are
    particularly high in cost and high in priority: the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at LANL and a new
    Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN. I fully
    support these modernization projects and urge that as the cost
    baselines are further defined, any cost changes that occur be
    accommodated without upsetting the overall delicate balance of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program.
                   science, technology, and engineering base
        The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for science,
    technology, and engineering capabilities is, in my view, prudent but
    constrained and austere: the level of activity will be less than that
    in fiscal year 2007. This level of capability provides the fundamental
    stockpile stewardship activities that permit surveillance, assessments,
    experiments, and computer simulations to ensure the aging stockpile and
    the refurbished weapons are safe, secure, and effective.
    Weapons Surveillance
        Weapons surveillance activities aim to predict and detect the
    effects of aging and other stockpile issues. The programmed increase in
    funding is vitally needed to step up the rate of stockpile surveillance
    and become more proficient at detecting and predicting potential
    problems early enough for our smaller complex to take measured action
    within limited resources. This area has suffered over the last few
    years and more sophisticated tools are needed to study how aging alters
    the physical characteristics of weapon materials and how these changes
    affect weapon effectiveness and safety.
    Assessments
        The Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a comprehensive set of
    activities to annually assess each weapon system and to address issues
    that arise. It is particularly important for processes to actively
    engage both centers of nuclear design expertise--LLNL and LANL--to
    provide independent assessments. In all areas of importance, advice
    from more than one independent source is crucial to the decisionmaking
    process. Our assessments require rigorous scientific and engineering
    demonstration and evaluation and are benefiting from the development of
    Uncertainty Quantification, a methodology that is increasing the rigor
    of weapon certification and the quality of annual assessments.
    Experiments and Simulations
        Because we do not perform nuclear tests, simulations are a major
    tool for providing assessment of the stockpile. These simulations
    require experimental validation, which in the absence of nuclear
    testing, is provided by very sophisticated non-nuclear experiments.
    Through these experiments and simulations, Laboratory scientists and
    engineers improve their understanding of nuclear weapon performance and
    exercise the necessary base of specialized skills in support of
    stockpile stewardship.
        There remain several key areas, such as energy balance and boost
    physics, where we still lack adequate knowledge. Predictive Capability
    Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to
    fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear weapon performance relevant to
    existing or expected issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities
    integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-
    fidelity simulation models, and data gathered from state-of-the-art
    experimental facilities. This cutting-edge research provides both the
    basis for stockpile stewardship and the tools by which the Laboratory
    experts make judgments about the health, safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the stockpile.
        Overall, LLNL conducts a wide range of experiments in support of
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program. For example, to enhance weapons
    surveillance, we developed and applied state-of-the-art radiographic
    methods to evaluate the health of the high-explosive system used to
    initiate weapon detonation. In fiscal year 2010 we also conducted
    important hydrodynamics experiments at the Contained Firing Facility at
    LLNL and at the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test Facility at
    LANL and many types of experiments to better understand material
    properties at extreme conditions. These include experiments at the
    National Ignition Facility.
        I will focus on high-performance computing and activities at the
    National Ignition Facility, which illustrate the outstanding work at
    our Laboratory in support of stockpile stewardship and the challenging
    science and technology efforts required for the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program.
                   high-performance computing and simulations
        Since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began in 1985, the NNSA
    weapons laboratories--working closely with industry--have made
    remarkable strides in high-performance computing. Our initial goal was
    to have a machine that could perform 100 trillion floating point
    operations per second (teraflops) available within a decade. Through a
    very concerted effort, the community achieved that goal, which provides
    the capability projected to be the minimum threshold for initial 3D
    simulations of weapons performance. With simulations on the 100-
    teraflops IBM Purple, we observed important phenomena that had never
    been seen before. We also learned that to accurately simulate these
    phenomena we needed supercomputers that perform much better and
    modeling techniques that are significantly more powerful and capable.
        Computer technology has since advanced by about a factor of 10
    (1,000 teraflops or 1 petaflops). Currently China leads the world with
    a 2.5-petaflops machine. The expanding international interest in
    supercomputing superiority is indicative of the technology's great
    value in advancing science and technology on many fronts and
    accelerating product development in industry.
        Improved high-performance computing capabilities are to better meet
    stockpile stewardship challenges. To better understand phenomena in
    areas such as boost, improvements in both the physics models and
    resolution are required. Model improvements, in turn, necessitate
    further advances in computing: 1,000-petaflops technology (1 exaflops)
    is required. Exascale computing is also needed to fully implement
    Uncertainty Quantification, the formal methodology to increase the
    rigor of LEP weapon certification and the quality of annual
    assessments. The methodology requires thousands of three-dimensional
    weapon simulations to be run to estimate uncertainties. Simulations
    with today's capability tell us that we need better resolution, better
    physics models, and the running of many more simulations than possible
    with today's machines to reach the level of understanding and analysis
    required to fulfill mission needs.
    Sequoia
        Through the NNSA ASC program, Livermore and IBM are poised to make
    the next major advance in supercomputing. Delivery of the 20-petaflops
    IBM Sequoia is to begin in December 2011. Sequoia's processing speed is
    equivalent to every person on Earth completing 3 million calculations
    per second. This nearly-factor-of-10 leapfrog advance over current
    capabilities is based on third-generation IBM BlueGene technology.
    Unclassified science calculations will be performed on Sequoia in 2012,
    transitioning after these tests to classified use in 2013.
        Since 2009, researchers have been using Dawn, a 500-teraflops
    initial delivery system for Sequoia. All three NNSA Laboratories run
    cutting-edge weapons science problems on Dawn and use the machine to
    prepare codes for use on Sequoia. For example, LANL performed the
    largest ever high-resolution turbulence simulations and uncovered new
    phenomena related to important open questions. The results are being
    used to improve physics models under development within Advanced
    Simulation and Computing. Sandia has been testing and improving the
    speed at which some of the key algorithms in their large simulation
    codes will run on Sequoia's 1.6 million processors.
        Among other applications, LLNL scientists are developing new tools
    on Dawn to study complex laser-plasma interactions and to predict and
    interpret the results of experiments at the National Ignition Facility.
    More generally, in preparation for Sequoia's arrival, we are making
    significant progress in the development of algorithms that will run
    efficiently on the machine's architecture, applications that are
    tolerant to the many ``faults'' that can be expected in long runs using
    over a million processors, tools to analyze and help balance the
    workload among processors, debugging methodology, and a variety of data
    visualization and interpretation tools.
    Exascale Initiative
        I am very pleased to note that the fiscal year 2012 President's
    budget request includes $126 million to support start of an exascale
    initiative in an effort to sustain U.S. leadership in supercomputing to
    support DOE/NNSA missions. This is a joint effort between NNSA and
    DOE's Office of Science. The path forward beyond the 20-petaflops IBM
    Sequoia toward exascale computing offers exciting opportunities to
    address a wide range of vital national needs, but it presents
    tremendously difficult technical challenges. We are working with DOE
    and NNSA leadership, other laboratories, and industry to size and scope
    the technical work program.
                         the national ignition facility
        The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world's premier laser
    facility. Since the facility's dedication in May 2009, NIF with its 192
    laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It is proving to be a
    remarkably reliable and precise system. Citing groundbreaking technical
    achievement and exemplary project management, the Project Management
    Institute (PMI) named NIF as the 2010 Project of the Year. PMI honored
    NIF for ``pushing beyond the state-of-the-art'' and lauded the effort
    as ``a stellar example of how properly applied project management
    excellence can bring together global teams to deliver a project of this
    scale and importance efficiently.''
        NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC).
    The purpose of NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition
    and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental
    operations for weapons and basic science by the end of fiscal year
    2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT
    ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of
    demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable
    ignition platform for weapons physics, basic science, and energy
    research by the conclusion of NIC at the end of fiscal year 2012. A
    national program, NIC includes as partnering institutions the three
    NNSA Laboratories, the University of Rochester Laboratory for Laser
    Energetics, and General Atomics. The NIC team has established
    collaborations with the Atomic Weapons Establishment in United Kingdom,
    Commissariat ` l'Energie Atomique in France, Massachusetts Institute of
    Technology, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and many others.
        The campaign is guided by the NIC Execution Plan (currently, NIC EP
    Revision 4), which describes the scope, schedule, and budget for the
    campaign. NIC is an exceedingly complex, frontier science and
    engineering project. Adjustments to the optimal path forward are made
    based on information learned from experiments. Accordingly, NIC
    accomplishments and plans are scrutinized by several external high-
    level committees: the NNSA Ignition Review Panel chaired by DOE
    Undersecretary for Science Steve Koonin, the NIC Technical Review
    Committee chaired by former Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director Al
    Trivelpiece, and the LLNL Directorate Review Committee chaired by
    former NNSA Administrator General John Gordon, USAF, Ret. The NIC
    reviews have been very positive and encouraging.
    The Ignition Campaign
        There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the
    hohlraum energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the
    interaction between the laser beams and the target could be
    satisfactorily controlled and that the conditions necessary to implode
    the hydrogen fuel could be achieved. Creation of the proper implosion
    conditions was a major concern of the original National Academies of
    Science Study that led to the construction of NIF.
        We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems
    needed for ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a layer
    of solid tritium, hydrogen, and deuterium have been successfully
    created and imploded. One shot in particular achieved a record-setting
    1.3 x 1014 neutrons in a purposely low-yield configuration.
        NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of
    implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much
    from the experiments and see no ``show stoppers.'' We are optimistic
    about success in achieving fusion ignition but mindful that NIC is an
    extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science
    and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion
    ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012.
    Stockpile Stewardship and Science Experiments
        In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent series of
    highly successful campaigns of high-energy-density physics experiments
    in support of stockpile stewardship on NIF. One campaign focused on
    radiation transport to gather data to validate the capability of our
    physics simulation codes to model phenomena very important to weapon
    performance. Altogether, 16 experiments were performed in 11 shot days.
    These included the first experiments performed that included
    diagnostics to provide time-resolved radiographic data. Preliminary
    comparisons of data taken are in reasonable agreement with pre-shot
    predictions. A second campaign focused on developing and using a
    technique for gathering equation-of-state data to characterize the
    properties of highly compressed (but unheated) materials--in this case,
    tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such experiments are needed for
    scientific advances that underpin both stockpile stewardship and
    planetary science. These experiments are important steps on the path
    toward transforming NIF to a national and international user facility
    in fiscal year 2013.
                 nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism
        A key aspect of our nuclear security efforts is applying our
    expertise in nuclear weapons science and technology, nuclear sensors
    and detection, and arms control verification technologies to programs
    in the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. For example, to
    help secure vulnerable weapons-useable and radiological materials,
    Livermore-led teams have been recovering radioisotopic thermonuclear
    generators, which contain highly radioactive heat sources, from remote
    areas of Russia. Additionally, we are developing advanced technologies
    to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Two of the technologies
    received R&D100 Awards, the Oscars of invention, in 2010. Complementing
    these efforts is a program focused on nuclear counterterrorism.
        The Laboratory provides both technical support to ongoing arms
    control negotiations and technology development. Livermore's
    underground nuclear explosion monitoring program is a longstanding
    nonproliferation program that provides the technical underpinning for
    both the domestic and international monitoring needed to uncover
    clandestine underground nuclear tests. We couple data from global
    seismic networks with LLNL's supercomputing capability to interpret the
    seismic data and model the earth, thereby improving U.S. capability to
    detect possible proliferation. This program also has strong links to
    international seismic safety and science engagement activities.
      importance of people and program growth to the health of stockpile
                                  stewardship
        Long-term success in stockpile stewardship fundamentally depends on
    the quality of people in the program. If the Nation is not confident in
    the expertise and technical judgments of the stewards, the Nation will
    not have confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
    nuclear deterrent. The specialized technical skills and expertise
    required for nuclear weapons work take a long time to develop through
    hands-on experience and mentoring by our very best. Program stability--
    based on sustained bi-partisan support and sufficient funding over the
    long term--is critically important to executing a balanced, integrated
    Stockpile Stewardship Program. We welcome the support provided by the
    administration and Congress on the importance of the NNSA Laboratories'
    work in maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
    Program Leverage
        An important benefit of a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program is
    that this foundational program enables the NNSA Laboratories to meet
    broader national security objectives by applying their unique
    capabilities and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving. With a
    focus on national security, the NNSA Laboratories are a vital part of
    the Nation's science and technology infrastructure. We partner with
    non-NNSA components of DOE, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence
    Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and many other agencies
    such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
    National Institutes of Health. In particular, nuclear weapons expertise
    at LLNL is directly applicable to the nuclear security challenges of
    proliferation and terrorism. Other areas of national defense, domestic
    and international security, and energy and environment security also
    benefit from the Laboratory's broad scientific and technical base and
    international leadership in areas such as high-performance computing.
        These activities also further strengthen our science and technology
    workforce, add vitality to the Laboratory, and spin new ideas and
    additional capabilities into and out of the weapons program and other
    national security programs. Very importantly, they serve as a pipeline
    to bring top talent to LLNL so that we continue to provide the Nation
    with outstanding stockpile stewards. A broader base of national
    security programs at the NNSA Laboratories can never be a substitute
    for a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program. Likewise, these programs
    are not a distraction from our defining mission and responsibilities to
    sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
        Continuing to foster partnerships between Livermore and the broader
    national security community is a key component of our strategy for
    helping solve the country's most important problems and sustaining
    science and technology excellence and intellectual vitality at the
    Laboratory. I am very concerned about the possibility of drastic
    reductions in the investments in science and technology broadly across
    Federal departments and agencies in these times of very constrained
    budgets. Investments in science, technology, and engineering provide an
    important spark of innovation that is a basis for our country's
    national security, energy and environmental security, and continuing
    economic competitiveness.
    Leveraging High-Performance Computing
        I emphasize the importance of high-performance computing in my
    testimony because it is a cornerstone of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program, a core strength of our laboratory, and critical to many of our
    programs for non-weapons-program sponsors. Some of our recent
    accomplishments provide a sense of the breadth of our high-performance
    computing activities and the many program areas they support:

             Support in response to environmental emergencies. The
            DOE's National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at
            LLNL is providing timely, state-of-the-art, predictions of
            fallout from the damaged nuclear reactors after the recent
            earthquake/tsunami in Japan. As the hub of the Department of
            Homeland Security's Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric
            Assessment Center (IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume
            predictions of the fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform
            and forecast the particulates that might be released from
            surface-oil burns.
             Persistent surveillance. Laboratory scientists
            developed an innovative data-processing ``pipeline'' designed
            to help the Department of Defense monitor tens of square
            kilometers of terrain from the skies and provide combat support
            by detecting in real time potentially important events in
            streaming video data.
             Third-generation conventional munitions. LLNL is using
            state-of-the-art engineering codes, advanced design
            capabilities, and expertise in materials to pursue, with the
            Department of Defense, development of third-generation
            munitions that are more effective against precision targets
            while, at the same time, limiting collateral damage. This
            effort represents a superb example of the power of high-
            performance simulation: a munitions program went from concept
            to completion of qualification testing in 10 months, providing
            significant advantages to the warfighter.
             Nuclear test monitoring. Laboratory seismologists
            developed improved 3D models of seismic wave travel time,
            greatly increasing the accuracy with which seismic events can
            be located and the ability to differentiate earthquakes and
            nuclear explosions.
             Cyber security and intelligence support. Livermore has
            developed advanced methods for gleaning information from
            extremely large-scale relational databases (graphs) and
            analyzing networks together with fast, accurate tools for
            large-scale text analysis.
             Microbial detection. Expertise in bioinformatics
            enabled Laboratory researchers to develop microbial detection
            array with 388,000 probes that fit on a glass slide, able to
            detect or identify more than 2,000 viruses and 900 bacteria
            within 24 hours.
             Aerodynamic drag reduction for semi-trailer trucks.
            Simulations with LLNL's fluid dynamics codes identified
            critical drag-reduction regions around semi-trailer trucks,
            with results verified by full-scale wind tunnel tests. Properly
            placed drag reduction devices could increase semi-trailer truck
            fuel efficiency by as much as 12 percent.
             Award-winning software tools. Livermore researchers
            have developed advanced tools--including several R&D100 Award
            winners--for solving linear equations, debugging and compiling
            programs, and visualizing extremely large data sets that are
            made available to and downloaded thousands of times per year by
            the user community.
             Fusion energy. New developments at LLNL in lasers and
            materials technologies could provide a much shorter path to
            carbon-free energy.
             Directed energy. Laboratory researchers are developing
            exciting new capabilities in lasers that could have important
            impacts on national security.
             Carbon capture. Laboratory scientists are using
            supercomputers to design small-molecule catalysts that can be
            adapted to capture CO2 from power-plant emissions.
                                closing remarks
        Again, I thank the subcommittee for its continuing support for the
    Nation's Stockpile Stewardship Program and the terrific people at the
    LLNL. As I have stated, I believe that the program outlined in the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 provides a measured
    approach to meeting the mission needs and sustaining the long-term
    health of the Nation's nuclear security enterprise through investment
    in a skilled workforce, facilities, and the stockpile.
        The investments will help us move forward refurbishment programs in
    response to inevitable changes in aging weapons that require our
    attention. In particular, initiating the study of the options for
    refurbishing the W78 warhead is urgently needed.
        The heart of our successful Stockpile Stewardship Program is our
    skilled workforce, who are the current generation of a worthy line of
    stewards in the service of our Nation. I have emphasized the importance
    of investing in the workforce and the tools that Laboratory scientists
    and engineers are effectively applying to assess and refurbish the
    nuclear deterrent. Our accomplishments in the areas of NIF experiments
    and high-performance computing are particularly noteworthy. In both
    areas, future opportunities are very exciting, and in particular, I
    urge that the Nation undertake a forceful effort in exascale computing
    because of its importance to stockpile stewardship and, more broadly,
    the Nation's security and economic future.
        With sustained support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, our
    Laboratory can best serve the country as a broad-based national
    security laboratory, developing innovative solutions to major 21st
    century challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic
    security, and energy and environmental security.
                                     ______

                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul J. Hommert
                                  introduction
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
    of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and
    Director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram
    national security laboratory owned by the U.S. Government and operated
    by Sandia Corporation \1\ for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA).
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        \1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
    Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
    94AL85000.
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        Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
    for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
    weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is uniquely
    responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear
    weapons in the stockpile and for the design, development, and
    qualification of nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons. While
    nuclear weapons remain Sandia's core mission, the science, technology,
    and engineering capabilities required to support this mission position
    us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there
    is natural, increasingly significant synergy between our core mission
    and our broader national security work. This broader role involves
    research and development in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, energy
    security, defense, and homeland security.
        My statement today will provide an update since my testimony of
    July 15, 2010, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Starting
    from an overall perspective of the nuclear weapons program and the
    challenges facing us since the beginning of the Cold War, I will refer
    to the following major issues: (1) the U.S. nuclear stockpile
    assessment, (2) the life extension programs (LEPs) with emphasis on the
    B61 LEP, and (3) the status of the capability base needed to support
    our mission. All these issues will be viewed within the context of the
    administration's request to Congress for the fiscal year 2012 budget.
                         major points of this testimony
        1. It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the
    first time the following three imperatives: continuing to further the
    tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and
    importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment
    creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require
    rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong
    program management.
        2. The most immediate stockpile challenge is the B61 life
    extension. In the context of my responsibilities, it is my judgment
    that the full nonnuclear scope of the B61 must be executed on the
    proposed schedule. Both the current scope and the schedule are
    demanding and can be achieved only by continuing the accelerating
    effort called for by the current program.
        3. Our nuclear weapons competencies impact our broader national
    security work. In turn, to sustain and sharpen those competencies,
    Sandia relies on this broader work. The symbiotic relationship between
    the nuclear weapons and broader national security missions prevents
    insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and
    engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that
    we need. Such an environment is essential to succeed against the
    challenges we now face.
                   perspective of the nuclear weapons program
        It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the
    first time the following three imperatives: continuing to further the
    tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and
    importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment
    creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require
    rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong
    program management. Our nation has been and continues to be fully
    committed to the U.S. nuclear deterrent as reflected by the near- and
    long-term nuclear weapons policy outlined in the National Posture
    Review (April 2010). The contribution of Sandia National Laboratories
    is crucial to the success of the next era of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent.
        The current nuclear stockpile was largely developed, produced, and
    tested in the 1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War. It was the time of
    the arms race, as new nuclear systems were frequently being developed
    and fielded.
        After the 1992 moratorium on underground testing, the nuclear
    weapons program went into its next phase, science-based stockpile
    stewardship. For the first 15 years of this program, creating the
    scientific tools and knowledge required in the absence of underground
    nuclear testing was a compelling grand challenge for the U.S. nuclear
    weapons program. At Sandia, the primary challenge following the
    moratorium was to find best solutions for sustaining, assessing, and
    certifying the stockpile against a full range of environments--most
    notably, the numerous radiation environments our products must survive.
    The advanced tools and deeper scientific understanding we developed
    have been applied to our annual assessment of the stockpile, to
    stockpile maintenance activities such as replacement of limited-life
    components, and to the qualification of the W76-1 life extension
    program. Science-based stockpile stewardship has been immensely
    successful in generating the required scientific competencies and
    resources, but it was not accompanied by a broad-based effort to extend
    the lifetime of the nuclear arsenal.
        Now, some 20 years since the end of the Cold War, we have a
    stockpile that has become significantly smaller and older. Considering
    our insights into and the average age of the stockpile, we have clearly
    reached a point at which we must conduct full-scale engineering
    development and related production activities to extend the service
    life of the nuclear arsenal. This work can be accomplished only by
    relying on the tools of stewardship and a revitalized, appropriately
    sized production capability. Let me restate that, in my view, the
    nuclear weapons enterprise has never before faced the combined need to
    further stewardship, address production infrastructure, and
    importantly, modernize the stockpile.
        As we enter the new era of the nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to
    see that a clear strategic direction has been outlined for U.S. nuclear
    weapons policy in the Nuclear Posture Review and that a collective
    guidance for implementation has been provided through the Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan, the updated section 1251 report, and
    the administration's fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress. The
    strategic direction for the nuclear weapons policy is also consistent
    with the New START, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in December
    2010 and the Russian Federation Duma in January 2011. In this context,
    we are actively positioning Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in
    support of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our
    ability to do so.
        In their totality, the documents describing the future of the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent represent a well-founded, achievable path forward,
    which I understand and support. However, we must recognize that a
    significant body of work is required to sustain a strong nuclear
    deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure that the
    resources are commensurate with the requirements and expectations.
    Specifically, I can be confident that, as an institution, we are
    positioned to execute stockpile management and deterrence policy to the
    priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if the
    fiscal year 2011 budget is appropriated at the level of the
    administration's request. Furthermore, the overall fiscal year 2012
    weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as
    requested by the President, will provide the basis for continuing the
    program consistent with national policy. This level of funding reflects
    a national commitment to strengthening the security of our country and
    allies by sustaining a smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure,
    effective, and reliable. Deviation from this funding, however, will
    impact the scope and/or schedule of the life extension programs.
                     the u.s. nuclear stockpile assessment
    Mission and Product Space
        Sandia is responsible for the systems engineering and integration
    of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and it is the nonnuclear
    component design agency for NNSA. The components that we design ensure
    that the weapons will perform as intended when authorized through the
    U.S. command and control structure, and that they remain safe and
    secure otherwise. These critical functions are provided through our
    core products of arming, fuzing, and firing systems (AF&Fs), neutron
    generators, gas transfer systems, and surety systems. As we prepare to
    execute these responsibilities for 21st century strategic deterrence,
    we are facing new challenges.
        While many critical tools were developed in the stewardship era,
    full-scale engineering development was almost entirely absent during
    this period. In addition, since we last put a system such as the B61
    into the stockpile, the technologies on which nonnuclear components
    rely have changed dramatically. Thus we must ensure that a new
    generation of component and system engineers is prepared to work to the
    exacting standards of nuclear weapons and that we can fully adapt to
    and take advantage of new technologies. I am confident that Sandia is
    prepared to meet these challenges due in no small measure to the fact
    that, over the past 20 years, work we have done in other national
    security arenas has allowed us to attract and train the talent that
    will bring new technology to high-consequence high-reliability
    engineering applications. In the decade since we began design on the
    W76-1 LEP, one additional challenge has grown in complexity. Sandia's
    products must also be robust against cyber risk. We believe it is vital
    to assess cyber risk and develop technologies to manage this risk for
    the next generation of life extension programs. All these realities
    bear directly and significantly on Sandia's responsibilities as we
    embark on the next era of the nuclear deterrent.
    Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment
        Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in
    assuring the nuclear deterrent. Through these activities, we develop
    knowledge about the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
    This knowledge provides the technical basis for our annual assessment
    findings and is reported to the President through the annual assessment
    process. Through this process, we have been, and remain, able to assess
    the Nation's stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable. The Department of
    Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Request places high
    priority on stockpile surveillance. I strongly agree with this
    emphasis, but there is important further work to be done. Specifically,
    the surveillance transformation plan was established to better align
    our surveillance program with the challenges of an aging and smaller
    stockpile. My fiscal year 2010 stockpile assessment letter to the
    secretaries of energy and defense and to the chairman of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council noted the need for a strong focus to complete
    surveillance transformation, which aims to shift the program from being
    reactive to becoming predictive and thus allowing us to better
    anticipate stockpile performance degradation and to schedule required
    actions.
        Today we are surveilling a stockpile for which most of the weapons
    were designed at a time when long design life was not typically a high-
    priority design requirement. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for
    example, was originally designed for a 5-year lifetime; today there are
    B61s in the stockpile with components manufactured in the late 1960s.
    It is a credit to our stockpile stewardship program that we have the
    technical knowledge base to support continued confidence in these
    weapon systems as they age. However, our surveillance efforts, coupled
    with the fact of the age of the stockpile, indicate that it is
    imperative that we begin to execute on replacing the aging components
    as the lead time for these activities will be 5 to 10 years on a
    system-by-system basis.
                          the life extension programs
    The B61 Life Extension Program
        The most immediate stockpile challenge for sustaining the deterrent
    is to extend the service life of the B61 bomb under expansive product
    requirements and a demanding schedule. The primary driver for the
    schedule of the B61 LEP is the fact that critical nonnuclear components
    are exhibiting age-related performance degradation. Another driver for
    the schedule is the deployment of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, which
    requires a new digital interface for the B61. Specific component
    issues, as well as the overall age of the system, lead me to conclude
    that we need to approach this LEP with a resolute commitment to address
    end of life, degradation, and technology obsolescence to ensure long-
    term safety, security, and effectiveness.
        Notably, the scale and complexity of this LEP will be much larger
    than that of the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now in
    production. To extend the lifetime of the B61 with a first production
    unit in 2017, full appropriation of the fiscal year 2011 funding
    requested by the administration is critical. We must complete the
    design definition in fiscal year 2011 to create a firm understanding of
    system requirements and thus fully establish future-year funding needs.
    Total cost estimates for the B61 LEP are subject to change until the
    design definition and requirements are finalized at the end of fiscal
    year 2011.
        To overcome technology obsolescence, it is important that we
    develop new technologies to insert into the B61. That is why we are
    conducting considerable technology maturation work in fiscal year 2011.
    Technology maturation is a rigorous approach Sandia applies to
    developing new technologies, from the earliest conceptual designs
    through full-scale product realization and ultimately to insertion into
    the stockpile. We use a construct of technology readiness levels, first
    implemented at the Department of Defense and then NASA, and we
    implement a series of technical and programmatic reviews to ensure that
    the maturity level of new technologies is understood and associated
    risks are effectively managed before the new technologies are used in a
    life extension baseline design. For the B61 LEP, we have more than 40
    product realization teams designing components and subsystems and
    maturing technologies. We are aggressively staffing this program to
    accomplish our objectives on the current schedule. In July 2010, we had
    a core of approximately 80 staff on the B61 project. Staffing levels
    are now more than 3 times that number and will continue to increase. We
    are planning to have a core of 400 staff on the project by the end of
    fiscal year 2011. These staffing levels are enabled by fiscal year 2011
    funding provided through the continuing resolutions. However, should
    fiscal year 2011 funding deviate significantly from the current levels,
    we will not be able to sustain staffing levels, and the scope and/or
    schedule of the project will have to be adjusted.
        The B61 LEP schedule and scope are also, of course, heavily
    dependent on the appropriated funding in fiscal year 2012 and beyond;
    multiyear sustained funding is required to bring this program to
    successful completion. The success of the B61 LEP also requires the
    necessary support for the nuclear explosive package agency (Los Alamos
    National Laboratory) and the production complex.
    Other Life Extension Programs
        The B61 LEP is one in a series of programs with timelines extending
    to 2035 that have been documented in the Stockpile Stewardship and
    Management Plan. Among them are the W88 ALT, the W78 LEP, and likely a
    weapon system associated with long-range stand-off delivery vehicles.
        Funding for the W88 ALT has been identified in the updated Section
    1251 Report. Sandia is pursuing work on the W88 ALT, which involves
    replacing the AF&F system and the neutron generators.
        The Nuclear Posture Review recommended ``initiating a study of LEP
    options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using
    the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
    types'' (p. xiv). Although the Department of Energy fiscal year 2011
    Congressional Budget Request includes funding for a W78 LEP with
    completion of a first production unit in 2021, work for this program
    has not been authorized by the continuing resolution under which we are
    operating. Should the W78 LEP be authorized, Sandia is ready to support
    the warhead systems engineering and integration effort and to fully
    leverage the work done on the recently completed feasibility study for
    a common integrated AF&F system. Using an envelope of the requirements
    for the W78 and the W88, and even the W87 and the U.K. system, our
    study concluded that this approach was technically feasible, including
    improvements in safety and security enabled by miniaturization of
    electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium in reentry
    systems, can be used for those additional safety and security features.
    The study results have been briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council and
    are being used to inform decisions regarding the scope, schedule, and
    interplay between the W78 and W88 life extensions. Such an approach
    offers the potential for significant cost savings for the overall
    Department of Defense and Department of Energy nuclear weapons
    enterprise.
    Our Capability Base Supports the Mission
        Over the next 25 years, we will rise to meet the challenges of a
    demanding program described in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
    Plan, but we also must establish the basis for long-term stability. For
    Sandia, stability should be viewed in the context of three pillars:
    infrastructure, broad national security work, and workforce.
    Essential Infrastructure and Capabilities
        Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life cycle
    responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition
    to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to
    ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment. Let me point out a few
    examples.
        The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major
    Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons
    program. Our facilities and equipment in this area are extensive: (1)
    20 test facilities at Sandia-New Mexico; (2) the Tonopah Test Range in
    Nevada; and (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test Laboratory in Amarillo, TX.
    We use environmental test capabilities to simulate the full range of
    mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments
    that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with
    postulated accident scenarios. In addition to these experimental and
    test facilities, Sandia's high-performance computing capabilities are
    vital tools for our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance,
    certification, and qualification, and they have proved to be
    indispensable in our broader national security work.
        I am very pleased that Test Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2
    funding has been requested in the fiscal year 2012 weapons activities
    budget. This funding will enable us to renovate our suite of mechanical
    environment test facilities, many of which were commissioned in the
    1950s and 1960s. These facilities are essential to support the design
    and qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent LEPs.
        Across the nuclear weapons complex, there is a shortage of funding
    for infrastructure, maintenance, and operation upgrades included in the
    Readiness in the Technical Base of Facilities program. However,
    mentioned in the updated Section 1251 Report is the Tonopah Test Range
    in Nevada, one example that I want to highlight not so much as a
    funding issue but as an essential mission requirement. Starting in
    fiscal year 2013, development flight tests must be conducted at the
    Tonopah Test Range for the B61 life extension.
        Another capability that Sandia stewards for the nuclear weapons
    program and also for the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
    payloads is the microelectronics research and fabrication facility,
    where we design and fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, as
    well as specialty optical components and microelectromechanical system
    devices. This capability includes a national ``trusted foundry'' for
    radiation-hardened microelectronics. We have been providing
    microelectronic components to the nuclear stockpile at the highest
    level of trust since 1978 and to the Department of Energy's
    nonproliferation payloads since 1982. In 2009, Sandia received Class 1A
    Trusted Accreditation (the highest level of accreditation) from the
    Department of Defense for Trusted Design and Foundry Services and is
    the only government entity with this accreditation for both design and
    foundry operations. We must recapitalize the tooling and equipment in
    our silicon fabrication facility, much of which dates back about 15
    years in an industry where technology changes almost every 2 years.
    Recapitalization will ensure production of the radiation-hardened
    components required by the B61 LEP and W88 ALT; this facility is the
    only source for the key microelectronics required for the life
    extension work specified. Recapitalization must begin soon in order to
    eliminate the risk of running existing equipment to failure. Sandia is
    therefore working with NNSA on a 4-year funding plan to stage the
    retooling (starting in fiscal year 2013). We have plans for meeting
    programmatic requirements with a staged funding profile.
        I mentioned earlier the need to continue strengthening the tools of
    stewardship. Let me mention two such areas for Sandia. First, a stable
    funding position is essential for the material science that underpins
    the broad range of materials for nonnuclear components in order to move
    to a more predictive basis for an older, smaller stockpile and prepare
    for the life extensions. We continue to work with NNSA to ensure
    adequate prioritization for nonnuclear components material science in
    fiscal year 2012 and out-year budgets. Second, I am pleased to see
    budget stability being brought to the area of radiation hardness. As I
    discussed in my July 2010 testimony, I believe this is an essential
    element of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We continue to advance the
    scientific basis for confidently certifying the stockpile to radiation
    hardness requirements in the absence of nuclear testing. We are also
    pursuing intrinsically radiation-hardened designs for use in future
    life extensions such as the W88 ALT and W78 LEP.
    Synergy between Our Nuclear Weapons Mission and Broader National
            Security Work
        Today's national security challenges are highly diverse. The NNSA
    laboratories are contributing solutions to the complex national
    security challenges. Indeed, as mentioned in the Stockpile Stewardship
    and Management Plan Summary, ``while NNSA nuclear weapons activities
    are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence aspects of the NNSA
    mission, they also inform and support with critical capabilities other
    aspects of national security'' (p. 7). In turn, to sustain and sharpen
    these competencies, Sandia relies on its broader national security
    work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons and
    broader national security missions prevents insularity and creates a
    challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment that
    attracts and retains the new talent that we need. Such an environment
    is essential to succeed against the challenges we now face. The
    following examples highlight the way in which this symbiotic
    relationship works.
        Sandia developed synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, which
    was made possible by our extensive design and development work for
    radars for nuclear weapon fuzing. This technology has been enhanced and
    is currently used by the Department of Defense. The extensive SAR work
    has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia aligned
    with advances in radar technology, such as radar frequency integrated
    circuits. We are now applying these modern technologies to the design
    of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP.
        Another example is our work in cyber security. Sandia's
    responsibilities for nuclear weapons include weapon system
    architectures and components to support the highest standards of
    command and control--U.S. nuclear weapons must always work when
    authorized by the President, and never work otherwise. Our technical
    expertise in this area was the foundation for contributions to broader
    national security problems associated with cyber threats. In turn, our
    life extension work will take advantage of the modern, state-of-the-art
    capabilities developed for broader national security.
        A third example demonstrates how these synergies have worked within
    the NNSA family of programs. For the past 10 years, Sandia has been
    leveraging the unique capabilities of our microelectronics research and
    fabrication facility for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In this
    effort, we designed, developed, and deployed the next generation of
    satellite-based treaty monitoring technology, called the ``enhanced
    optical sensor.'' In turn, we have used the advancements of the Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation satellite project in the nuclear weapons
    program.
        Finally, I want to acknowledge an important step in
    institutionalizing the relationship between the nuclear weapons and
    broader national security missions. In July 2010, NNSA, the Department
    of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence have signed a governance charter,
    which provides a framework for the participating agencies to coordinate
    shared, long-term planning for the science, technology, and engineering
    capabilities of Department of Energy national laboratories that will
    contribute to the Nation's broader national security missions.
    Workforce
        Our talented people are our most fundamental capability. Given the
    scope and nature of our work, it is mandatory to continue attracting,
    retaining, and training a highly capable workforce. To do so, we must:
    (1) ensure that our work is aligned with the national purpose; (2)
    create a climate of innovation and creativity that inspires our
    workforce; and (3) create a balanced work environment that is both
    responsive to the fiscal realities of our times and attractive to the
    talented staff we need in the future.
        Today we are facing a number of challenges. Currently, 37 percent
    of the experienced technical staff in Sandia's weapon system and
    component design organizations are over the age of 55. Their remaining
    careers will not span the upcoming life extension programs. This
    reality puts a premium going forward on stable commitment to the LEPs.
    The life extensions provide opportunities for our new technical staff
    to work closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept
    development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to
    the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. Finally, fiscal
    realities have forced us to reduce costs by addressing the funding
    liabilities in our pension program, restructuring the healthcare
    benefits, and simplifying internal processes. All these actions were
    necessary, but in my view, they can go no further without compromising
    our ability to attract and retain.
        At Sandia, we are focused on creating an environment that reflects
    our management's vision for success by coupling the experience acquired
    from our past work with new tools and modern technologies. Such an
    environment will foster innovation and provide foundational technical
    and scientific strength to support the stockpile over the long term.
    The multidisciplinary team we are assembling for the B61 LEP reflects
    this environment in which the powerful stewardship tools we acquired in
    the past are being adapted to meet future needs and the latest
    technologies and innovative designs are coupled with the rigor that
    comes from experience.
                                  conclusions
        As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, ``as long as nuclear
    weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear arsenal'' (p. iii). As we enter the new era of the
    nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to see that a clear strategic direction
    has been outlined for U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the Nuclear
    Posture Review and that a collective guidance for implementation has
    been provided through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan,
    the updated Section 1251 Report, and the administration's fiscal year
    2012 budget request to Congress. The strategic direction for the
    nuclear weapons policy is also consistent with the New START, which was
    ratified by the U.S. Senate in December 2010 and the Russian Federation
    Duma in January 2011. In this context, we are actively positioning
    Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation's
    nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our ability to do so.
        The documents referenced above represent a well-founded, achievable
    path forward, which I understand and support. However, we must
    recognize that a significant body of work is required to sustain a
    strong nuclear deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure
    that the resources are commensurate with the requirements and
    expectations. Specifically, I can be confident that, as an institution,
    we are positioned to execute stockpile management and deterrence policy
    to the priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if
    the fiscal year 2011 budget is appropriated at the level of the
    administration's request. Furthermore, the overall fiscal year 2012
    weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as
    requested by the President, will provide the basis for continuing the
    program consistent with national policy. This level of funding reflects
    a national commitment to strengthening the security of our country and
    allies by sustaining a smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure,
    effective, and reliable. Deviation from this funding, however, will
    impact the scope and/or schedule of the life extension programs. The
    fact that the three national security laboratory directors were invited
    to speak before you today and answer your questions is a clear
    indication of the leadership role of Congress in authorizing a path
    forward for U.S. nuclear deterrence.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        In the interest of time, we asked you to sort of
    consolidate all the statements here, but I would like to take
    the opportunity to ask each of you what might be your major
    concern or primary issue that you might like to address at this
    point, in case we don't raise a question about it.
        Why don't we start over on this side. Dr. Hommert?
        Dr. Hommert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In my written testimony, I raised three issues. The first
    is something that has already been mentioned, that we're at a
    very pivotal time with respect to the program and the multiple
    demands of maintaining the strength of our science base. The
    need to execute the LEPs, and the need to have the
    infrastructure commensurate with that, is creating a very
    substantial demand on the system. I think we have to look at
    that very actively. We have to demand the highest standards of
    project management, as Tom has alluded to. But, it is a very
    fundamental shift of the state of our weapons program, to take
    on that breadth of commitment.
        The second thing I'll mention that's most immediate, for us
    at Sandia, is the execution of the B61 LEP. The target First-
    Production Unit (FPU) date for that is 2017. To be at an FPU in
    that timeframe, that's right upon us now. So, the urgency of
    the resolution of the fiscal year 2011 budget, where we're
    staffing up now to hold to that timeframe, is an immediate
    issue for us at our laboratory. As an example, we need to be
    flight testing development units in 2013. So, there's very
    little time for us to adjust, if we're to hold that schedule.
    Very important issue.
        The last thing I would just highlight is an issue of
    sustaining the people competence, long term, for the
    institution and in support of the deterrent, and to highlight--
    I think this is true for all of the laboratories--the
    importance of the broader national security work that we do and
    what I would call the mutual reinforcing value of the work we
    do in other national security challenge areas to interplan and
    strengthen the basis of our workforce for supporting a nuclear
    deterrent, going forward. That's an important issue that I
    think now has become almost inseparable from how we would
    support the deterrent, going forward.
        So, thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Miller.
        Dr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting
    us today, and for your continuing support of these critically
    important national programs.
        The main points I'd like to summarize are, first that the
    fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets that have been
    submitted by the President for your consideration are good
    first steps. As many of us have mentioned, I think the critical
    issue is sustaining those budgets over successive
    administrations and successive Congresses, is critical to the
    long-term prospect of putting the nuclear deterrent on a firm
    footing.
        The tools that you have so wisely invested in, are now
    being effectively used to assess the stockpile today. It's
    critically important that we move forward and take the
    necessary actions that we learn from those assessments. In the
    case of an issue that LLNL is concerned about, it's getting on
    with a study to look at how we might refurbish the ICBM
    warhead, the W78. It is aging. We know there are issues. We
    just need to get on with a study to tell us and you, the
    decisionmakers, what options are the best ways of refurbishing
    this warhead so that it can continue to provide the deterrence
    that is so important.
        The final area that I would again emphasize is the
    importance of the science and technology that is derived from
    our NNSA mission, and the way in which that is leveraged to
    help the laboratories work on some of the country's most
    important problems. These are issues from supporting our
    warfighters in Afghanistan and as Administrator D'Agostino
    mentioned support of national and international emergencies,
    like what happened in the Gulf and what has happened in Japan,
    and at the other end of the spectrum, working to help defend
    this country against terrorists and cyberthreats.
        So, this is a very precious resource, in my view. In these
    very difficult budget times, I think it deserves your careful
    consideration. In my judgment, it's critical not only for
    national security, but also for the economic future of this
    country.
        Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald?
        Admiral Donald. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and
    Senator Shaheen, thank you very much for allowing me to appear
    before you today and discuss my program, the Naval Reactors
    Program.
        I would start off, first and foremost, by just
    acknowledging that what I spend the bulk of my time doing--I
    wake up every morning and go to bed every evening with my
    charter, and that is the safe and effective operation of naval
    nuclear propulsion plants. I don't think it should be lost on
    anyone that we operate 103 reactor plants. We operate them
    around the world, globally. We are welcome in over 150 ports
    worldwide. The reason we are able to do that, and including
    operating in the vicinity of cities in the United States, is
    that people trust us. They trust us because of our record of
    success. They trust us to deal with small problems before they
    become big problems, and to also be open and transparent with
    them, as far as how our program operates, and to ensure that
    we're doing good technical work.
        The success of the program: We've been around now for over
    60 years. We've been operating reactor plants at sea since
    1955, when Nautilus went to sea. We've steamed 145 million
    miles safely without a reactor accident, without a radiological
    incident that effects the environment or people. That record is
    attributable to a couple of things; first and foremost,
    technical expertise and the devotion to the work that we do.
    But, as much as anything, it has been the very strong and
    committed support from this subcommittee and from Congress in
    general. It allows us the latitude to do the technical work
    that we need to do and to work on small problems before they
    become big problems, and again, a key to our success.
        Mr. D'Agostino has highlighted three key projects that
    we're starting right now in support of national security. Those
    are certainly challenging projects. We understand that. But,
    it's also certainly within our expertise and experience to be
    successful in those projects. We've completed ship designs;
    most recently, the Virginia is the new class of submarine at
    sea, is held up as the hallmark of acquisition programs in the
    United States Navy right now. We're completing another design
    for the A-1B reactor plant; this is for the CVN-78, the Gerald
    R. Ford. So, we know how to do these things, and are ready to
    do it.
        What's critical right now, though, is, we're in the early
    stages of these very complex projects. The funding, early on,
    is critically important, because now we're setting design
    parameters, we're setting operational concepts for these plants
    that will, for the large part, define what the cost, schedule,
    and capabilities of these plants will be by the time they
    arrive at sea, when the first Ohio replacement goes to sea in
    2029. We're doing that right now. Since our equipment tends to
    be the first that has to be there for the construction start in
    2019, we are really in the very meat of the work to do to
    define what this plant is going to look like and what it's
    going to cost.
        That is where I would ask for your consideration, looking
    at our budgets, looking at the request that we've made, to
    ensure that we get off to a good start on these projects, that
    we have the design maturity that will guarantee success, and
    that we will be successful in what it is we go about doing.
        Thank you very much for your time.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Cook.
        Dr. Cook. My principal issue, concern, and direction is to
    execute the national strategy that was outlined in the NPR, the
    Stockpile Stewardship and Management Report, something we call
    the section 3113 report, 1251 report, as you mentioned, and now
    a ratified New START Treaty.
        As the program has changed, we've modified our program
    structure and management structure for execution. As you look
    at the President's budget, you'll see a 3.1-percent increase in
    science and weapons activities, a 4.8-percent increase in
    stockpile support, and a 21-percent increase in infrastructure.
    The reason for that ties to many of the things that you've
    mentioned and problems that we're well aware of across the
    complex.
        So, to name a few. Although we often talk in terms of
    projects, the UPF at Y-12 and the CMRR facility at LANL, in
    fact, these are basic capabilities for the Nation. One deals
    with uranium components, one deals with plutonium components
    and the necessary underpinning of science, technology, and full
    manufacturing. For example, when one really looks at UPF, it is
    a factory. It's not just a building. It's the basic capability
    of the Nation for dealing with uranium components. At LANL,
    it's not only a facility we're putting in place for actinide
    research and development, but will have the plutonium stores
    for the Nation. It will allow us to use other capabilities in a
    more effective way.
        I mentioned the management structure. In order to enable
    effective execution, we've asked the management and operations
    contractors, both at Y-12 and at LANL, who have parent
    companies who are, in fact, experienced and capable in nuclear
    areas, Bechtel and BWXT, to name just a few. That is based on
    the fact that we know we have to do these new builds. They are
    capability builds, but they're new nuclear builds, and they
    have to be done to modern safety and security standards.
        This all ties into stockpile deliveries for DOD. While, a
    few years ago, we had just one LEP in operation--and we still
    do, that's the full build of the life-extended W76 warhead that
    goes out to sea--we, today, have, also, the B61 study--the
    engineering prestudy and the cost study that we'll complete at
    the end of this year. We have requested approval to begin the
    study for the W78 warhead, as Dr. Miller mentioned, and look
    for adaptable interoperability we could have in two legs of the
    deterrent.
        That's quite a set of things. There are certainly other
    things, such as high explosives pressing at Pantex, which we
    have turned on to execute. But, that's what's on our screen.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Anastasio.
        Dr. Anastasio. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, Senator
    Shaheen.
        First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind
    remarks in your opening.
        I would just like to personally thank this committee for
    not only all the support the NNSA missions have received over
    many years, but also LANL and myself, personally. I really
    appreciate the support of this committee. So, thank you for
    that.
        When I think about LANL, my number-one thought is about the
    general role of the laboratory. We're a national security
    science laboratory, and the thing that I worry the most about
    is, are we a healthy, vital institution to carry out our
    missions and responsibilities? As we've heard, those are clear,
    from the NPR that flow down through Stockpile Stewardship and
    Management plan and the budget profile the administration has
    submitted. The question before this committee and Congress is,
    is there funding available, in these difficult times the
    country faces, to fund this activity?
        For me, as lab director, one of the special
    responsibilities we all have is not only, ``Can we carry out
    our mission today?'' but will we be able to do that 15 or 20
    years from now, as well. Of course, that's all about, not only
    ``Do we have adequate funding now?'' but also we have a stable
    funding profile that we can plan to, so that we can make sure
    that the workforce is available that has all the special
    diverse and deep capabilities that are necessary to meet these
    mission requirements that are so challenging technically?''
        Of course, the budget's been under some stress for some
    time. We have been working hard to try to mitigate that budget
    stress, and you've heard some of the strategies. Not only can
    we take the science and engineering that's so important for the
    nuclear weapons program, and use it to support other critical
    national missions around nonproliferation or countering
    terrorist threats, Intelligence Community work, DOD support, et
    cetera--not only can we do that, but we've also designed the
    efforts that we go after with other sponsors to supplement the
    science and technology base of the laboratory that the core
    program, and Mr. D'Agostino's program, is not fully able to
    support. So, we've tried to mitigate the constraints he has on
    his budget by seeking funds from other sponsors to help support
    that fundamental capability.
        So, when I think about the future, it's not only, ``Do we
    have adequate funding?''--the challenge that you face for the
    NNSA programs--but, it's even the broader spectrum of national
    security programs that this Congress is contemplating that will
    really impact the health and vitality of the institution and
    our ability to carry out our mission today and well into the
    future.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        We'll begin 8-minute rounds for questioning.
        My first question relates to weapons funding and gets right
    to the heart of it. It goes to, once again, Dr. D'Agostino and
    Dr. Cook. Under the CRs, the weapons activities budget request
    for fiscal year 2011 for NNSA was provided. This is a
    substantial increase, some $625 million above the fiscal year
    2010 funding level. On the other hand, there is now talk that a
    permanent budget for the balance of fiscal year 2011 may be
    $200 to $300 million lower than the fiscal year 2011 budget
    request, the level at which the weapons program has been
    operating. What impact would a reduction in fiscal year 2011
    funding have on the weapons activities programs, given that
    we're now half way through the fiscal year?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I'll be glad to start, sir. I'd ask Don to
    follow up.
        Senator Nelson. That would be fine.
        Mr. D'Agostino. It would have a significant impact, Mr.
    Chairman. Our ability to execute funds effectively depends a
    great deal on knowledge of the path forward. We're blessed to
    have the President request it and Congress follow, and allow us
    to proceed at the President's request in this area. Even with
    this uncertainty, Don has been executing, with the
    laboratories, to work on the program that we have requested and
    that the Senate has allowed us to move forward with.
        There is this uncertainty, of course, when we look at the
    debates that happen back and forth. It tends to color the
    ability to plan and has me thinking about, ``Well, should I
    hire up in order to do the B61 work at Sandia?'' For example--
    the many tens, and even hundreds, of people that are required
    to put this in place. Because, if it doesn't come through, I
    might have to fire them. This kind of cycling is very bad for
    the workforce. It's very inefficient. At the lower levels
    themselves, if we ended up with a lower level, of course--what
    would be authorized and appropriated--then, of course, we would
    have to start making some very significant cuts, because we've
    started the year at this higher rate.
        Don, you might be able to provide some more specifics.
        Dr. Cook. Yes. My answer, sir, would be that it would be a
    substantial change from where we are. With the anomaly in the
    CR, we have chosen not to waste time. We have a number of
    weapon systems that are operating beyond their original design
    lifetime. The infrastructure projects that we must execute
    across the board are at very key and sensitive steps in design,
    preparing for execution. The hiring has been going on. The
    national strategy has been made clear. So, at this point--and
    particularly now shortly close to halfway through the fiscal
    year--in fact, any reduction would have a very substantial
    effect.
        Senator Nelson. The effect of halfway through the year is,
    of course, doubling the impact, also catching you in the middle
    of hiring decisions, no ability to plan until we know what the
    number would be. So, we would appreciate you making that clear
    for the record.
        My colleague has also indicated a concern about that. We're
    going to engage in cuts, we need to know exactly what we're
    doing, and we have to do it in a responsible way, consistent
    with what decisions we've made and expectations we have
    following the New START treaty ratification, as well.
        Admiral Donald, we're going to talk a little bit about
    naval reactors funding. The fiscal year 2012 funding level for
    the Office of Naval Reactors is approximately $127 million
    below the fiscal year 2011 request and the amount available for
    your office under the CR. Can you explain to us what impact
    this CR has had on Office of Naval Reactors development work
    for the Ohio-class replacement reactor? Are there other areas
    where the CR is impacting the naval reactors?
        Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. What it has meant, so far, as I
    discussed in my earlier statement, is, it's put us behind, as
    far as the work that we're doing to do the concept development
    and the design work to prepare ourselves to get into
    construction of key components and to do the work we need to do
    to make sure that design is mature at the time we start
    construction in 2019.
        Specifically, on the Ohio replacement program, this is the
    design for the reactor plant, and I have to be in
    synchronization with the Navy as they're designing the rest of
    the ship, and as I am designing, from the Navy side, the
    remainder of the steamplant that goes with it. So, there's a
    very closely coupled relationship here. If I get out of sync
    with them, then that will not only potentially delay the ship,
    it'll also increase cost.
        When we look at where we are right now, if I were held at
    the CR level, our estimate is, is that we'd be looking at a 6-
    to 9-month delay in the delivery of the ship. Now, that's a
    long way out, but if you look at the compression of the
    schedule and what we have to do between now and 2019, compared
    to what we have done in the past, on Virginia, on the Ford
    aircraft carriers, we are pretty comfortable in saying that
    will be a delay of somewhere between 6 to 9 months.
        Similarly, on the Navy side, if there were reductions in
    funding on the Navy side that remained in the CR for the rest
    of the year, you looked at the entire ship, you would be
    talking to a 1- to 2-year delay, potentially, in the delivery
    of the ship.
        There are also personnel costs associated with that, and
    hiring. We would not be able to hire, our estimate right now
    is, somewhere on the order of 100 to 150 people to support the
    designers that we'd need to get in place to do that work. You
    can't ramp that up overnight, because these are highly
    technically sophisticated individuals. They need experience in
    what they're doing. We're in the middle of a demographic change
    in our business, where we have a lot of senior folks ready to
    retire. We want to transfer that knowledge over to the younger
    folks and help them become more effective at what they're doing
    in the design work.
        Then we would be looking at potentially having to lay
    people off, both in the shipyards and in our laboratories. Our
    estimate, if we stayed at the CR level, would be somewhere on
    the order of 50 people. That would just be the beginning of
    where we would start.
        So, it's a significant impact. Again, very early in the
    design work, where there are really two key technical
    challenges that we're looking at in this design. The first is,
    we want to build a reactor plant--a reactor core that will last
    for the life of the ship. This is a 40-plus-year ship. We've
    done life-of-the-ship cores for Virginia-class at 33 years.
    We've never gone to 40. You would ask, ``Why would you want to
    do that?'' If we can do that and eliminate that lengthy
    refueling overhaul in midlife, like we do for the Ohios right
    now, then the potential exists that we would not have to have
    as many Ohio replacements right now as we do Ohios. We have 14.
    We would be looking to buy 12 of those ships instead of 14,
    because you've bought more operational availability if it's not
    sitting in the shipyard. There are technical challenges to
    that. We believe we are capable of meeting that challenge.
    That's key to this early design work that we're doing.
        The second thing we're putting on this ship is an electric
    drive. We're changing the propulsion mode from the standard
    steam turbine reduction to electric drive. What that brings you
    is enhanced quieting. In a submarine, stealth is everything. A
    deterrent is not really a deterrent if people can find it. So,
    we want to make sure it cannot be found. Given the fact that
    this ship will be operating out to 2080, we feel that it's
    necessary to make the investment upfront in this stealth
    technology to ensure that it is a viable asset well into the
    future, long after we're gone from this business.
        So, those two key technical challenges, the importance of
    the early investment in the design, that's where I'm concerned.
    If I can't get that investment now, and get those parameters
    and that design work done now, and the right people in place,
    puts that at risk.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        It's difficult to overstate the fiscal crisis this Nation
    is in. Admiral Mullen has said it's the greatest threat to our
    national security--our debt. This year, we will spend $3.8
    trillion and we'll bring in $2.2 trillion. Forty cents of every
    dollar is borrowed that we're spending today. People know that
    I believe in a strong Defense Department, so the reporters,
    first thing they want to ask is, ``Well, is the Defense
    Department immune, Senator Sessions? You want to cut everything
    else. But, is Defense Department immune?'' DOD is not immune.
    I'm just telling you, and neither is DOE. DOE came forward with
    a budget request for next year of 9.5-percent increase. They're
    not going to get a 9.5-percent increase. We don't have the
    money.
        What would happen in a private world? Since I'm the ranking
    Republican on the Budget Committee and I'm living with these
    numbers every day, forgive me; but you have to get in your head
    that things have changed. That's all I'm telling you, that
    things have changed. The ability to go first-rate on everything
    we did and be able to proceed and pay big salaries and bonuses
    and build new buildings and all--of course, I guess the weapons
    complexes haven't seen a lot of increases in a long time,
    there's no doubt about it. That's why we have to go forward.
    But, every dollar has to be fought for, Mr. D'Agostino. If you
    can build a building for a little less, you have to do it.
        So, to follow up a little bit on the Chairman's question,
    the House CR version calls for a $312-million reduction; the
    Senate's; $185 million. Can you give us any more information
    about how much could be sustained and how much can't be
    sustained to reach your mission? Because I am of the long-term
    view, I think that all of you share, that we have diminished
    the weapons complex for a very, very long time, and it's at a
    very dangerous stage. We made a national commitment. The
    President made a commitment as part of this START Treaty.
        What can we do? What can you tell us about how much you
    have to have to stay on track without doing damage to the
    program and ending up costing more than otherwise would be the
    case?
        Mr. D'Agostino?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I might start, and then, as you
    wish, I'll let our colleagues add in, as well.
        You had talked specifically about the $312 million and the
    $185 million numbers, the differences, maybe, between House and
    Senate at various stages of the bills. One is a 50-percent
    reduction to our plans on increases and----
        Senator Sessions. Fifty-percent reduction of what, now?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The $312 million is about 50 percent of the
    $624 million that was requested, the difference between----
        Senator Sessions. Six---the 624 increase.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
        Senator Sessions. See, the American people are getting a
    little confused about all this.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
        Senator Sessions. You get an increase of 600 and you reduce
    that increase to 300, and you say you have a cut. I guess you
    have--since we started the year at the higher number, I guess
    you can say that. But, the way our budget projections work is
    that somebody projects it's going to increase it 3 percent, and
    you say we're only going to increase 2 percent; they say that's
    a cut. But, to the average American, that's not a cut.
        Mr. D'Agostino. I understand, Senator. As you mentioned, we
    are digging ourselves out of a hole.
        Senator Sessions. But, you only get half as much increase
    as you hoped to get.
        Mr. D'Agostino. As a result of that, we won't be able to do
    the type of program we put forward that we believe is necessary
    for the NPR, specifically in three broad areas. We can delve
    into the details as we have time to.
        The first area is our work on the stockpile itself. At a
    50-percent reduction--and, of course, we've been spending at
    the higher rate, as authorized in the CR, so it is--it has a
    magnifying effect--will result in significant changes to our
    B61 life extension work, just to carry that particular problem
    forward, this life extension is absolutely critical if we're
    going to get the system modernized in place so that it
    continues to support the Nation from fiscal year 2017 and
    beyond. So, if we don't do this life extension work that we
    have planned, it will have a grave impact on our ability to
    maintain that particular warhead for our stockpile, which DOD
    and the President both believe is necessary to do. That's a
    huge upfront impact.
        Senator Sessions. So, no money invested in that except for
    the new money that you got?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly, we have existing money to
    maintain the B61, which is what we call surveillance work. It's
    like lifting the hood and looking inside the warhead and
    maintaining it. But, our ability to move forward with the life
    extension in time to meet our 2017 date will be impacted, and
    we would have to scale back significantly the type of work, and
    do the bare minimum necessary on that particular warhead.
        The other significantly large area--that's an example in
    directed stockpile work--that would be impacted, I believe, is
    our ability to bring on board, for the Nation, a uranium and
    plutonium capability. It will be impacted. It'll be pushed out
    a few years. These are what have been called projects, but
    which Dr. Cook correctly describes as national capabilities. I
    believe the committee understands that these aren't just
    capabilities to take care of our stockpile. They are, at a
    minimum, that. They are a lot more than just taking care of our
    stockpile. These are the capabilities that are absolutely
    critical in order to work with plutonium and uranium, which is
    absolutely necessary for us to do nuclear counterterrorism work
    and do the nuclear nonproliferation work which many--including
    myself--feel is part of our integrated national security--our
    nuclear security mission space. All of this ties together.
        We want to get out of buildings and capabilities that were
    put in place in 1952. Even if we proceed at the President's
    requested level, we'll have been in these facilities for close
    to 70 years, as a matter of fact, because the capability won't
    come on board for another 10 years or so. So, moving forward is
    absolutely essential in order for us to maintain our stockpile
    and to maintain the nuclear security work.
        I've talked plenty. If you will, sir, I'd like Dr. Cook to
    provide some background.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Dr. Cook. I'll add a few words. Let's see, the difficulty
    is that, at the same time, we must replace 60-year-old
    capabilities in special nuclear materials, uranium and
    plutonium. We have weapon systems that are now operating beyond
    their original design lifetimes. The President's fiscal year
    2012 request is for the 20th year in which we have had a
    moratorium on underground testing. So, if I start with one
    point, it is, we must effectively put the complex to work, that
    waiting further, not investing, is a clear decision to take on
    additional risk in all three areas that I mentioned. Those are
    fairly severe.
        Now, if I can look to hope at all here, it is that we can
    reform our management practices, as the Administrator said,
    improve the way in which we're doing work. So, we're looking at
    the industrial suppliers--I've already mentioned the parent
    companies of LANL and Y-12, people who bring to the government
    sector the best industrial practices. We're already moving
    forward to directives reform, reform of the DOE directives in
    which we are seeking to adopt consensus standards--ISO-2000,
    ISO-9000, ISO-14000. I'll state an assertion that, in many
    areas, not nuclear areas, is a better way to go to improve
    speed, efficiency, and the conduct of all work. We can clearly
    improve our management disciplines.
        But, the core issue I'd start with is, if we don't
    effectively put the complex to work, all aspects--research and
    development, project development, rebuilding the capabilities,
    and mainly manufacturing warheads, but based only on the
    previously tested designs, with no new military capabilities or
    requirements--that is clear. That's national policy. Waiting
    will not make it better. I'm sure you understand that. But, we
    could improve some of our business practices.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald.
        Admiral Donald. I wouldn't want to walk out of here and
    leave you with the impression, Senator Sessions, that we don't
    understand the significance of the fiscal problem that we face.
    But, also, I want to leave you also knowing that we view it as
    our obligation to do the best that we can to operate as
    efficiently as we possibly can. If you look at our budgets over
    the last--really, since I've been in this job now, 6\1/2\
    years, we've been relatively flat, essentially adjusted for
    inflation. Even within that budget, we took on the project to
    put our spent-fuel handling capability in place so that we
    could transition from wet fuel storage in Idaho to dry fuel
    storage to keep us in compliance with our Idaho agreements that
    we entered into in the mid-1990s. We did that within our budget
    and didn't come and ask for any additional funding to do that.
    That came at a price, though, because the assumption was, if we
    were tasked with new projects, we'd have to come to you and ask
    you for some additional resources. What you see in our increase
    in funding--the $125 million between fiscal year 2002 and
    fiscal year 2011, and then the additional into fiscal year
    2012--really reflects those three projects that Mr. D'Agostino
    had mentioned. We're working against the clock on all three of
    those projects. The Ohio replacement, I've already mentioned,
    if we make decisions today to delay, it'll have the impact in
    2029, when a replacement ship is not there to cover for the one
    that went out in 2027. The prototype refueling, I'm working
    against physics, because the fuel is being depleted in that
    prototype right now. Not only is that where we're going to do
    the derisking of the technology to build a core for Ohio
    replacement, but that also is going to provide the training
    platform for one-third of our nuclear operators that go out
    into the fleet. So, I need to go and replace that capability,
    as well.
        Then finally, the spent fuel handling facility in Idaho--I
    have a water pit out there that has 25 metric tons of spent
    fuel in it, and some parts of it are over 50 years old. It
    needs to be replaced. It's not at current code. It's not
    particularly efficient. From our perspective, technically, it's
    not a situation we want to live with much longer in the future.
        That's the timeline that we're working to and why we've
    come to you to ask you for this assistance for these programs.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it's $84 billion over 10 years on
    total program, and that's a lot of money. We just need you to
    be thinking any way possible to keep those numbers at as
    reasonable level as possible. But, the United States of America
    cannot not have a reliable nuclear arsenal. It is not
    acceptable. So, we have to find the money. I hope that you
    won't take the view that some government people seem to take
    sometimes that, ``I'm not going to affect any efficiencies. You
    either give me money or I won't do the new project you want me
    to do.'' But, no business operates that way, what businesses
    have to wrestle with every day. Families have to make priority
    choices, and we're asking you to do that because I want to
    protect this program.
        I do think $300 million is clearly too much of a reduction,
    Mr. Chairman. Hopefully we can figure out a way not to go that
    far.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all very much for being here this afternoon.
        Mr. Chairman, I know that the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee normally handles the nonproliferation
    portfolio, but it's come up a little bit in testimony, and so I
    would like to raise the issue here and follow up on some of the
    budget questions.
        As you pointed out in your testimony, Mr. D'Agostino,
    President Obama, in talking about the threat to this country,
    pointed out that a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists is
    probably the biggest threat that we all stay up nights worrying
    about. I was really horrified to see that, according to
    International Panel on Fissile Materials, the global stockpile
    of highly enriched uranium, which is the easiest material for
    terrorists to use to make a nuclear weapon, in 2010 was enough
    to make more than 60,000 nuclear weapons. So, given the
    insecure nature of these materials around the world, clearly
    this is a threat that we should all take very seriously.
        While I appreciate, and know that you all do, the need to
    address efficiencies in our budget, and to deal with the
    country's debt and deficit, I am concerned about the proposal
    in the House's budget that would have cut $600 million from
    nuclear nonproliferation programs. I wonder if you, Mr.
    D'Agostino, or any of the other panel members, could speak to
    what that would mean, in terms of what would not get done if
    that cut is realized.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Absolutely. There is clearly a connection between these
    investments in the weapons activities account of the
    subcommittee's jurisdiction and how it impacts other elements
    of NNSA. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program
    absolutely counts on Y12, for example, in order to be able to
    have a place for this highly enriched uranium that we're
    bringing back to be processed, characterized, put in a
    situation so it can eventually be used as part of the national
    stockpile to support the naval reactors program for propulsion
    out into the future, as well as be available for downblending
    into low-enriched uranium to turn this into, ultimately,
    electricity for peaceful uses here in this country. So, these
    investments in the weapons account are directly connected to
    the nonproliferation program. I think that's an important
    point. I think the subcommittee understands that.
        I'm deeply concerned with the reductions in the
    nonproliferation program. Again, these are reductions from the
    request as Senator Sessions has pointed out--because what we
    are in the process of doing is implementing an aggressive but
    important program to lock down nuclear materials worldwide in 4
    years. We don't do it by ourselves, of course. We do this in
    partnership with over 100 countries. But, we do require
    expertise from this country. Work that happens at Sandia, LANL,
    and LLNL, in fact, provide the core expertise in order to say,
    ``What's the best security system to design in Russia? Or--and
    how do we put it in place? How do we know that it is actually
    in place and working as it should be?'' So, these laboratories
    provide the foundational element of that. That $600 million
    would have a direct impact on our ability to implement the
    security--what we call first line of defense--secure the
    material in place. It would also have an impact on our ability
    to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to
    low-enriched uranium, a plan that we have laid out. We've
    converted 70 reactors so far, but there are many more research
    reactors that we know exist that we have a plan laid out to
    convert these research reactors from HEU to LEU. It would
    impact the ability for us to put radiation detectors at
    seaports, land border crossings, airports, and the like.
        Obviously, if we are faced with a reduction, if you will,
    from our original plan, we will seek to fund the highest-
    priority work, the most important work, first. But, an element
    of maintaining nuclear security isn't just doing the security
    work in place, it's making sure that other nations who are in
    the process of bringing civil nuclear power do so in a way with
    the appropriate nuclear safeguards in place. So, we have an
    element of our program that is designed in order to help other
    nations have the right nuclear safeguards in place.
        I believe it would have a significant impact on our 4-year
    lockdown effort. I think this is the effort where we have a
    very clear direction that everyone feels is an important
    direction to go to. That's essentially where we are right now.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Do we have a limit on our time?
        Senator Nelson. Eight minutes.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay.
        Dr. Miller, you talked about your concern that we may lose
    some of the best scientists and technicians if we're not able
    to ensure future funding and a commitment to the program. I
    wonder if you feel like we're currently investing enough in our
    future workforce, and what kinds of things we ought to be doing
    to ensure that we can attract the best and the brightest people
    to the program.
        Dr. Miller. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Picking off of the recent conversations with Senator
    Sessions and yourself at the laboratories--LLNL, in
    particular--we have reduced the overall staffing at the
    laboratory by about 2,000 people over the last 5 years.
        Senator Shaheen. Two thousand out of how many?
        Dr. Miller. Out of about 8,000. So, there were 8,000.
        Senator Shaheen. Wow.
        Dr. Miller. There are about 6,000 now.
        Two years ago, I testified that I thought we were in danger
    of losing the fundamental science, technology, and engineering
    capability that the country relied on. That decline was
    stabilized in 2010. We have seen, again in my words, modest
    increases. Dr. Cook talked about 3 percent. That's only a
    slight--a percent increase or so above the rate of inflation,
    but it is positive. We have begun, under the CR and the
    President's planned budgets for 2011 and 2012, we have started
    growing that back to a level that, in my judgment, would be
    sustainable over the long term. The same issue would occur if
    there were substantial cuts in the nonproliferation program.
    Again, these are substantial investments in fundamental people
    that provide the technical capability to build radiation
    monitors, and provide advice to the government.
        In my view, as I testified 2 years ago, the most important
    part of securing the talent at the laboratory is that the
    scientists and engineers understand that they have a stable
    future. They are very highly trained, very highly technically
    qualified, and they want to be assured that they can work on
    some of the country's most important problems. If they can, we
    don't have difficulty hiring them, nor do we have difficulty
    retaining them. But, when there are budget ups and downs and
    uncertainties, that's when we have difficulty.
        My judgment is, as Dr. Anastasio talked about earlier, one
    of my fundamental responsibilities is the long-term health of
    the laboratory so it's capabilities are there when the country
    needs them to apply to whatever the country's most important
    problems are. For me to do that, the most important thing is
    stability and national consensus on what we're doing. I think
    we have the national consensus in the Congressional Bipartisan
    Commission that has been referred to, the NPR, and now the
    START treaty. We have that consensus. What we need now is to
    fund the programs that support that policy.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
        Let's take a second and talk about extending the
    replacement facilities, and what that implication is, in terms
    of being able to deal with a $100 million shortfall in 2011 and
    whatever we might face in 2012. Admiral Donald, in looking at
    replacing the facility that you have under your authority, we
    have 40.6 million for conceptual design, and that would be a
    new spent-fuel building to support the NR program. In fiscal
    year 2012, the request for conceptual design is $53.8 million.
    The construction wouldn't start until 2013. What would be the
    implications, in terms, first, of fiscal impact, and then the
    second implication, in terms of what it would do to our
    national security if this were to be extended 1 or 2 years into
    the future?
        Admiral Donald. This is our spent-fuel facility in Idaho.
    All of the spent fuel, when we refuel aircraft carriers and
    submarines, or defuel them at the end of their lives, this fuel
    is shipped by rail to this facility. What we do is, we put it
    in a large water pit and it cools down for a period of time. We
    also examine it to make sure it's performing the way it was
    designed to perform. Then we process it for dry storage, to be
    in compliance with the agreements that we have with the State
    of Idaho, for all spent fuel to be out of wet storage by 2023.
        So, the issue with this facility right now is, as I've
    mentioned before, it's aging. Most parts of it are 50 to 40
    years old. It is not in compliance with current code. In fact,
    it has cracks in it. We know that for a fact. We manage those
    cracks, and we deal with it. It does have some seismic
    liabilities that we manage. But, from a point of view of just
    stewardship, this is a facility that, in fact, needs to be
    replaced.
        There's another element, as well, in that we are in a very
    intense period of fuel handling in our shipyards that's being
    driven by the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. They're all
    coming in for their midlife refuelings. They're heel-to-toe.
    Right now, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is completing hers. Next
    will be USS George Washington. We will be heel-to-toe in these
    refuelings now for a very long time, all the way out through
    the retirement of the most recent ship, 50 years from now.
    There will be one in some sort of a fueling availability. We
    have to be able to move that fuel out of the shipyards. To do
    that, you have to have an efficient and capable facility. It
    has to be configured to take the fuel as it is designed when it
    comes out of a ship.
        We have had to, because of this heel-to-toe refueling,
    redesign how we take the fuel out, reconfigure it into a new
    system, and the facility has to be redesigned to accept this
    new fuel. Otherwise, I would have aircraft carriers backing up
    in the shipyards. They wouldn't be available to do what they're
    supposed to do. Or, we could have fuel that we have no place to
    put.
        So, the target is 2020. That's when I have to have the new
    facility in place. The construction starts in 2015. The
    construction design starts in 2013.
        What we're talking about in a delay is, it's really a day-
    for-day, because it's a fairly structured process of design,
    design maturing, and then buying the pieces, the heavy
    equipment that you need to go do this. So, you're talking about
    slipping out beyond 2020. When that happens, we're going to
    have to have another place to put that spent fuel from the
    aircraft carriers.
        The best way we would do that would be with new shipping
    containers--more additional shipping containers. Each one of
    these shipping containers costs about $22 million. For a
    Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, that's nine shipping containers
    that you would need. So, that's a $200 million bill that you'd
    be talking about if we couldn't get the facility done by 2020,
    for each Nimitz-class aircraft carrier that comes for
    refueling.
        That's the timeline that we're on, the impact that we're
    talking about. Then, there's a day-to-day impact of just doing
    work in an aging facility. Things break, and you have to go and
    fix them. It results in inefficiencies in how we deal with our
    business.
        So, I think that should capture it for you, the subject of
    your questions.
        Senator Nelson. Let's talk just a second about the delays
    in the naval reactors. The construction project to receive and
    handle M-290 spent-fuel shipping containers is about a year
    late. Would these be the shipping containers that you're
    talking about?
        Dr. Cook. Yes, sir, they are.
        Senator Nelson. They're a year late. The most recent
    schedule indicated that the approval would start construction
    CD-3 in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. That ends
    tomorrow--or, it begins--second quarter fiscal starts tomorrow.
    No, I guess it ends tomorrow. Can you give us some idea of the
    delay? Because, if there's already a shortfall, in terms of
    what we're looking at, in terms of money to be able to do, does
    this delay just add to that problem?
        Admiral Donald. Well, where we are--the CD-0 was--that was
    completed in 2009, I believe it was--CD-1, we have--we want to
    complete by fiscal year 2012--the end of fiscal year 2012.
    Because of the delays in funding we've seen so far, we are, in
    fact, behind in the design. We've been able to--at least to
    date, because the numbers have been relatively low, we have
    been able to continue some of the fundamental work. We're
    engaged, right now, in the environmental impact statement and
    the concept design work, and continuing that. But, really, this
    year and in 2012 is when we have to get the work completed to
    make the selection at CD-1 of the type of facility, what it's
    really going to look like, where it's going to be located, and
    how it's actually going to work--be configured to do the work
    that we need it to do. So, this is really a crucial point in
    the design, because you do set the basic parameters that define
    the cost and schedule for the rest of the program.
        Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, I am one who has been very
    interested in the efficiencies initiative at DOD. Secretary
    Gates has directed all elements of that Department to identify
    efficiencies that can be reutilized. I heard earlier
    discussion--I think Dr. Cook said--about efficiency and
    management programs and what you can do. Could you identify,
    maybe, for us some of the efficiencies that perhaps--a project
    that has been identified for the next 5 years. Have you gotten
    to the point where you can do that?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I mentioned one in my oral
    statement. We talked about the supply chain management center.
    This is something that I started in 2007, when we realized the
    way we were operating whereas, more or less--and this isn't
    quite a fair statement--I mean, there are no completely
    independent sites, but eight sites. We felt there were great
    efficiencies to be achieved by operating as an integrated and
    interdependent organization, where we would look to drive
    efficiencies in not having three capabilities to do the same
    thing, but dropping us down to one or two capabilities, when
    it's--where we need redundancy for a national capability, then
    we would have that. At that time, we felt we could go from 35
    million square feet--take 9 million square feet off of our 35-
    million-square-feet enterprise of buildings and things like
    that. So, we have 9 million square feet of space that we're
    moving out of.
        Another area of efficiency that we hope to implement, and
    have implemented part of the way, is to reduce the amount of
    security space that we have to protect in our enterprise, to
    consolidate nuclear materials to fewer geographic locations and
    to fewer sites within those geographic locations. Because, the
    fewer locations that we have to protect, the less expensive it
    is to maintain. As a result of those efficiencies, more
    recently, we've been able to take our $765 or $770 million
    security budget and drop it down to, like, about $22 million or
    so.
        At Y12, we plan on going from 150 acres of high security
    space, ultimately to 15 acres of high security space. That
    shift--and this is where this uranium processing capability
    that we want to shift into--will allow us to move forward and
    save what we believe is a total of $200 million of operating
    expenses, both in security costs per year, as well as operating
    efficiencies, by getting the whole enterprise right-sized, if
    you will, leaving, kind of, the cold-war enterprise behind us,
    and shifting to a much smaller, more integrated future
    enterprise. Those are the macro pieces that we have before us.
        There are a number of other specific initiatives we have,
    looking forward. One of them is to look at putting together a
    common work breakdown structure. This is something that Dr.
    Cook is implementing in the weapons program. We're looking at
    linking the formulation of the budget to the execution of the
    budget in a real way. We've brought into our organization some
    folks that have direct budget formulation and execution
    experience from OMB. Phil Calbos is here in the room. He really
    understands this work, and he works for Dr. Cook directly in
    this particular area.
        I'm optimistic. I could talk for a while, but you probably
    don't want me to.
        Dr. Cook. If I could add--and give you one past one and one
    future one.
        A past one that we had in this year. We knew that, when we
    got the training and the tooling in place at Pantex, that we
    would be able to do some of the disassembly work more rapidly
    and completely safely. That was proven. So, we had a target of
    number of disassemblies, and the Pantex operation, with the
    training and the tooling in place, exceeded that target--in
    fact, there was another 26 percent--so, 126 percent on 100--and
    in a year in which there was a major flood at Pantex; if you
    recall, more than 10 inches of rain on a very bad day in the
    city of Amarillo, and the ground couldn't absorb that much
    rain. In our programs, we're taking account of that effect.
    We're using efficiencies to make sure that we can recover from
    that.
        Now, that's the past. I said there was a future. When you
    look at the--it often is called ``common''--we really mean
    ``adaptable and interoperable'' study for the ICBM warhead, the
    W78 and the SLBM warhead, the W88. Provided that we can get
    authorization to move ahead on that, we have the potential to
    save cost and to have interoperability in the arming and
    fusing--arming, fusing, and firing units, that Dr. Hommert
    could address, or in the nuclear explosive packages, that Dr.
    Miller or Dr. Anastasio could address. What we do know is, if
    we don't do that work in a joint way, it's going to cost more,
    and so, some of this may be cost avoidance. It doesn't matter.
    It's still cost savings in the end.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Admiral Donald may have one, as well, if
    you have time, sir.
        Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. The Ohio replacement has been one
    that we've obviously been focused on here for several years
    now. But, in the name of efficiencies, one of the issues is, we
    work through DOD's acquisition process. We were the first
    program through that new process that Dr. Carter headed up.
    But, we were challenged to drive the cost of that ship down. As
    far as our part was concerned, one of the key decisions that
    was made, that helped us in that regard, was the decision to go
    from 20 missile tubes to 16 missile tubes. Because, what that
    allowed us to do was to downrate the propulsion power that was
    needed. So, obviously, it's a smaller reactor that you would
    need. But, what it also allowed us to do was to go back--the
    size fell into the envelope where we could go back and use
    components that we had already designed for the Virginia-class
    and bring those into this design--not have to do it over
    again--but, several of the mechanical components, to use those
    over again. It enabled us to drive the costs of that propulsion
    plant down and rely on proven technology that's--pumps and
    valves and things like that don't change like electronics do.
    So, we're pretty comfortable putting that in a ship that will
    be around til 2080. But, we were allowed to do that.
        Senator Nelson. Well, in the absence of my colleagues,
    perhaps I'll just continue.
        Last March, when we held subcommittee hearings, we were
    focused on the protective forces that guard the nuclear weapons
    and materials at DOE sites. Mr. D'Agostino, are you suggesting
    that you've been able to consolidate some of those sites, which
    now means that the actual cost of security for those has been
    reduced?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. The security costs have been
    reduced. We are also looking, very much so, at other
    opportunities to go forward even more. Dr. Miller and Dr.
    Anastasio are quite familiar with our joint effort to look at,
    instead of the Nation maintaining two separate plutonium
    capabilities to deal with large quantities of plutonium
    material, one at LLNL and one at LANL, we've decided to
    consolidate to one plutonium capability, and it's a national
    capability. It doesn't belong to LANL. It belongs to the
    Nation. But, both laboratories can work in one particular
    facility. That effort to reduce the amount of plutonium--we
    have a commitment to get this done by 2012--will allow us to
    change the size and the nature of the security forces at LLNL.
    Dr. Miller may be able to add to that, if he'd like.
        There are other things that we're doing in the security
    area. We're pushing towards common uniforms, for example, which
    get the security force together in a particular fashion to
    essentially show that this is a cohesive unit. Even though
    they're managed under different contracts, there are
    opportunities to drive some commonality there.
        We're using what I would call life extension activities for
    the security vehicles that we have in place. We're using
    technology to put in long-range detection capabilities and look
    out, further out, and rely less on humans, if you will, and
    guards--guns and gates--and put technology into the picture.
    We're introducing this in our training capability.
        All of these things have saved tens of millions of dollars
    a year. Brad Peterson, who runs that particular activity,
    working with the labs and our production plants, have been able
    to do that. That's why they've--we've been able to reduce it. I
    keep challenging Brad in this area. I do think that, as we get
    to fewer sites with large quantities of nuclear material, there
    are some further opportunities.
        But, we can't do it in a way that this whole purpose is
    just to drive costs down. I mean, in--or, to try to spend less
    money. We obviously want to make sure the security--as we're
    making these changes, we don't lose that kind of operational
    focus that we've had in the past.
        Senator Nelson. Now, the goal is, obviously, to create the
    best security at the most reasonable cost.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. So, I understand that. It's obvious that
    the primary goal here is to protect the materials and the
    weapons. So, we'll have to deal with that.
        In December, NNSA made a significant change in the way you
    manage the aviation program of the source of Office of Secure
    Transportation (OST). As part of this change, the DOE aviation
    program will have increased oversight responsibilities for the
    NNSA program, in lieu of the FAA. Is there a plan that's in
    place for DOE Aviation Office to oversee this NNSA program? Dr.
    Cook, would that be your area?
        Dr. Cook. Yes, it is my area, sir.
        If I could address some of the driving factors and where we
    are, I'd like to do that.
        The focus that we have in the aviation area is looking
    forward to the LEP work that we have to the material moves,
    whether they're special nuclear materials or not, and to the
    limited-life component exchanges that are required across the
    country. In order to focus on the efficiency and the
    effectiveness, we've taken a look across the board at the OST
    and have concluded--and we had a plan to replace our aging
    fleet of three DC-9s with 737s that would still be used
    airplanes, but would have perhaps only 10 years of life on
    them. We're part way through that effort. One of the DC-9s has
    been sold. Two 737s have now been acquired. In parallel with
    that, we're looking at the equipping contracts, the maintenance
    contracts, and the nature of the pilots. We also have taken the
    opportunity to sell aircraft that we no longer needed. We've
    sold a couple of Twin Otters and one other airplane, and are
    focusing now on those things that tend to be inherently Federal
    functions. Specifically, the aviation fleet for OST will be
    focused on moving the emergency response teams for radiological
    or nuclear threats effectively and as rapidly as we have in the
    past. As far as maintenance, given that we're going to have
    different aircraft, three 737s, rather than three DC-9s--we
    intend to competitively place the maintenance contract that is
    currently in place. Given the future need, we've taken a look
    at the nature of the pilots, although there are a small number
    of pilots, 15 or fewer, to operate around-the-clock and have
    the emergency response capability. We're looking at whether it
    makes sense to Federalize those pilots, or not.
        There are different standards that the FAA requires for
    different types of aircraft flights and different missions. We
    are working hand-in-hand with the FAA. We also work with the
    Office of Aviation Management within DOE, but outside NNSA, and
    I've given you the base for looking forward with this. The core
    objective here is to focus the activity that we have even more
    tightly on the mission, while we replace the aircraft, and then
    put in place the maintenance contracts for future years and for
    pilots to do that.
        Senator Nelson. Going back to the question about the
    security guards, has--have you addressed the--Mr. D'Agostino--
    the need to deal with the retirement issue for the Guards? Are
    we having some sort of a program that--perhaps an accelerated
    401k program--some system of reduction of that guard force?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, there was a report that had 29
    recommendations in it to address, frankly, a whole waterfront,
    if you will, of security guard issues that had cropped up over
    the previous 5 years. We've worked our way through 14 of those
    recommendations, I think smartly, dealing with making sure that
    there was a career path and a progression with those guards. In
    fact, we didn't do it just with ourselves. We made sure that we
    had security guard representation to identify these areas and
    work through these.
        We're now dealing with, if you will, the second half of
    those. We're undertaking a study right now. Some of them have
    to do with the question of whether there should be a 20-year
    retirement. What are the differences between a security force
    that's a static security force around a fixed location, versus
    a dynamic security force, such as the OST discussion we were
    just having earlier, that's moving about? How equivalent is
    that to the U.S. military, which has the 20-year retirement?
    These are the more difficult and more challenging questions,
    the ones that you've described, and we're looking at how to put
    that forward.
        But, I think what we have is a path forward, with the
    unions' representatives that are there, to kind of address
    these 29 recommendations systematically, and work our way
    through them. We haven't finished the job. Right now, we're in
    the process of comparing the different types of retirement
    systems.
        Senator Nelson. The retirement systems could be different,
    depending upon the requirements for the employment and what's
    required for employment. In other words, what kind of
    background, what kind of education requirement there might be
    as part of the job. So, I would think that would be a good
    thing to work on, because of the--it looks to me like you're
    going to be seeing a further reduction, at some point along the
    way, and having that taken care of upfront is almost always
    better than dealing with it after the fact.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, with respect to
    the security guard force, what we've observed--because we do
    have a few different models across our enterprise, and we're
    looking to drive--taking the best approaches out of each of
    these models. One of the main concerns is, particularly for
    those particular guards that are in a very active, what we
    call, a fighting position, is, we want to make sure that if
    they end up getting hurt--the knee hurts; that they aren't now,
    all of a sudden, laid off. We've observed that there's some
    value to have the security guards be actually a part of the M&O
    contractor workforce. That way, if there's a difficulty in
    meeting the physical requirements to continue in this position,
    they can be retrained and stay and have a full career, if you
    will, and serving our country as an active worker in the M&O
    contract.
        We're very much in tune to that. The guard force,
    particularly, is concerned about making sure they're not in a
    position of, ``Well, if you get hurt, then, I'm sorry, you've
    lost your job.'' We definitely don't want that.
        Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, I don't want you to think
    that your trip here was not worthwhile, not having asked very
    many questions.
        Dr. Anastasio. Every trip here is worthwhile, Senator.
        Senator Nelson. Is there anything that we haven't asked
    here that we should have asked or would be important for us to
    have asked, as you think about the budget issue, trying to cut,
    not slash, appropriate reductions, recognizing any cut has some
    implication? What we want to do is avoid the unfortunate
    implications, or the unfortunate consequences, of something
    that was not well thought through.
        Dr. Anastasio. Yes sir, I'd have a few comments along those
    lines. First, as far as efficiencies we've been talking about,
    of course, not only at the administration's level, at the
    Federal level, that the laboratories were working on that, too.
    As an example, last year, in fiscal year 2010, at LANL, we
    increased our purchasing by $209 million, and we did that with
    fewer staff. So, we were able to get a lot more work done, and
    actually were able to downsize the staff.
        The laboratories really made great strides in improving our
    efficiency. In the hearing we had last summer, I was worried
    about the pension system, and one of the ways we've been
    dealing with the pension system is to use some of the savings
    that we've accrued. That's available for us to put not back
    into science, unfortunately, but at least to cover the pension
    costs.
        You ask about what would happen with delay of major
    facilities. I had a few thoughts on the CMRR facility, what
    would happen with the delays there. Senator Shaheen talked
    about nonproliferation. Just a reminder that this facility, the
    CMRR facility, is where all the inspectors from the IAEA that
    go around the world that look at nuclear facilities, we bring
    them out to Los Alamos and train them. That's the facility that
    that's done in. So, again, it's a multi-use facility, a
    national capability, as Mr. D'Agostino said.
        With a delay, of course we'll have to continue to operate
    in our old facility, which right now is almost 60 years old. It
    happens to be literally on top of an earthquake fault--not the
    best place for a nuclear facility. We have a reminder of that
    with what's going on in Japan.
        By delaying it, also we put at risk when we'll be able to
    increase the capacity for pit production at the laboratory. The
    LEPs that we have planned are going to require some pits to be
    made even with the reuse of existing pits, we may run out of
    them. So, it's building more of the same pits that we already
    have in the stockpile. Of course, the CMRR facility will not
    build pits, but all the samples that are taken to qualify a new
    pit are used in the existing facility. We don't have the
    capacity or the efficiency to get that done in time. So, if we
    are delayed with CMRR, then that's going to delay the time
    we'll be available.
        Of course, the other thing we do is--the facility is
    separated from our pit production facility, and then we're
    shipping samples of plutonium around on the road. So by doing
    that, of course, that's a security risk. By bringing a new
    facility online, we'll reduce our security posture.
        Then the most important thing, perhaps, is--of course, any
    delay in a project ultimately costs you money. So, if we delay
    the start and the process of this facility, it means, in the
    end, the integrated costs--although in 1 year you might save
    money, over the life of the project, it's going to cost you
    money.
        So, I think those are some of the difficult challenges that
    Congress has to face. I think the simple version is, if you
    think of this in a project space, saving money this year may
    well cause you to spend more money in the long run.
        The other pieces we've harped on are--or, not harped on,
    but emphasized with you--is the people issue. Right now, our
    workforce sees pay freezes, sees increased contributions to
    pensions, increased costs of medical care, and now an uncertain
    budget. They've been very excited about the new commitment that
    the country has made. There's exciting consensus to work on.
    But, at the same time, these uncertainties make the younger
    ones start to wonder, is there a career here for them? We
    understand the challenges that the country faces, but if we can
    have a stable-looking budget out into the years, whatever level
    it's at, whatever the country can afford--and if it's too
    different than the one we've talked about, ultimately I think
    we have to go back to the policy and say, ``If the country
    can't afford this program, then perhaps we have to go rethink
    the policy and come up with a policy framework that the country
    can afford.'' I'm not sure I know what that is, but that's the
    sort of challenge that you face.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        I'll ask the same question of everyone else. Is there
    something that we should have asked, or something you would
    like to add, after all the discussion so far?
        Dr. Hommert?
        Dr. Hommert. I have a few quick comments.
        Just to continue a theme that Dr. Anastasio highlighted
    about cost efficiencies and our sensitivity to that. At Sandia,
    in the last year, we took decisions in our pension and our
    medical benefits and in cost efficiencies that have reduced the
    cost of our labor base by approximately $1 billion over this
    decade. The positive news in that is that our workforce has
    gone through that. They remain dedicated. We did not see an
    uptick in losses due to that, in part, because of their
    excitement about the program that they see the national policy
    laying out in front of them. So, again, I echo that, if that
    changes, that could have a different impact.
        Then, the last thing I'll say is to return to, I think,
    really the question that Senator Sessions raised about, Well,
    what are our options if we cannot afford? I'll focus it on the
    B61 for a moment. It's important to understand that every day--
    that the 61 is older than any other bomb system we've ever had.
    We're in unchartered territory. It--whatever budget the country
    can afford, our commitment is that we will work to minimize
    risks of sustaining that weapon and ensuring its safety,
    security, and reliability. But, there'll be limits to how much
    we can control that risk, either in schedule or in the scope of
    what we do. It will require a possible relook at policy. I hope
    that won't be the case. We will work diligently to extract
    every bit of efficiency for the funds you can authorize to
    execute that. But, it is a bit, again I'll emphasize, of
    uncharted territory for us on that weapon system.
        Thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you. That is clearly something we
    have to keep in mind. The irony is inescapable, that a year ago
    we were making certain that the administration would ask for
    enough money. Now we're talking about--it's too much, because
    we can't afford it. It's an inescapable irony. I do understand
    it. I would imagine that employees and those who are committed
    to the project might think that Washington has a bit of a
    sleight of hand: now you see it, now you don't.
        Thank you all for your candid comments. We appreciate it.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                        safety of naval nuclear reactors
        1. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, the Nuclear Navy has had an
    exemplary safety record over its almost 60 years of operations.
    Nevertheless, the recent events in Japan, a country with as much
    expertise in nuclear power as anyone, have taught us that even
    redundant redundancies can fail. What actions are you taking to
    reassure yourself that appropriate emergency contingencies and plans
    are in place and that these contingencies would avert a tragedy?
        Admiral Donald. There are no immediate changes planned to how U.S.
    naval reactors used onboard submarines and aircraft carriers are
    operated as a result of the Fukushima nuclear power plant failures.
    However, as we have done in response to other major accidents, nuclear
    or otherwise, the U.S. Navy will assess and implement lessons learned
    from the event that can be applied to further strengthen the U.S. naval
    nuclear propulsion program. I have already initiated an assessment of
    the implications of the Fukushima reactor accident to the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program.
        U.S. nuclear powered warships have safely operated for more than 50
    years without experiencing a single reactor accident or release of any
    radioactivity sufficient to harm human health or have an adverse effect
    on the environment. U.S. naval reactors have an outstanding record of
    over 146 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power, and they have
    amassed over 6,300 reactor-years of safe operation.
        Because of their military-unique missions, naval reactors are
    significantly different from commercial nuclear reactors. All nuclear
    powered warships are designed to survive wartime attack and allow the
    warships to continue to fight while protecting their crews against
    hazards. Survivability requires rugged designs, well-developed damage
    control capabilities, and redundant systems that also provide enhanced
    safety capability in the event of natural disasters.
        The earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan caused an extended
    loss of electrical power which resulted in the inability to properly
    cool the reactor cores at the Fukushima Daiichi site. Unlike the
    Fukushima nuclear power reactors, U.S. naval reactors have long-term
    decay heat removing capability that depends only on the physical
    arrangement of the reactor plant and on the nature of water itself
    (natural convection driven by density differences), not on electrical
    power, to cool the core. This is one example of the means available to
    nuclear-powered warships that assure, even in the unlikely event of
    multiple failures, naval reactors would not overheat and the fuel would
    not be damaged by heat produced in the reactor core.
        Further, there are multiple barriers that work to contain
    radioactivity on nuclear powered warships. Naval nuclear fuel contains
    fission products and prevents their release into the coolant loop
    during normal operations. Although commercial power reactors have
    similar barriers, barriers in nuclear powered warships are more robust,
    resilient, and conservatively designed. For example, U.S. naval nuclear
    fuel is solid metal, unlike the ceramic nuclear fuel used in commercial
    power reactors. U.S. naval nuclear fuel is designed for battle shock
    and can withstand combat shock loads 50 times the force of gravity
    without releasing fission products. This is greater than 10 times the
    earthquake shock loads used for designing U.S. commercial nuclear
    plants.
        Notwithstanding the enhanced capability of nuclear powered warships
    to survive natural disasters and continue to operate safely, other
    factors serve to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters on these
    ships. The fact that a moored nuclear powered warship sits in the water
    serves as a buffer against the ground forces felt during an earthquake;
    the earthquake forces on a moored nuclear powered warship, even those
    like the March 11 earthquake, would not be severe.
        Commercial nuclear power plants are designed to operate at high
    power levels for long periods to produce electricity. Because naval
    reactors are designed for warships, they are smaller and have a much
    lower power rating than commercial reactors. The rated power levels of
    the largest naval reactors are less than one-fifth of a large
    commercial reactor plant. Additionally, naval reactors typically
    operate at a fraction of their full power levels, since ships usually
    operate at speeds less than their maximum. Furthermore, because naval
    reactor power level is primarily set by propulsion needs when the ship
    is at sea, naval reactors are normally shutdown shortly after mooring
    and they are usually started up only shortly before departure. As a
    result of these facts, the amount of radioactivity potentially
    available for release from a reactor core of a U.S. nuclear powered
    warship moored in a port is typically less than about 1 percent of the
    levels for a typical commercial reactor. Naval cores also have
    significantly less heat buildup from fission product decay to be cooled
    when the reactors are shutdown. In addition, the reality that nuclear
    powered warships can be moved is a safety option that is not available
    to land-based nuclear facilities.
        U.S. nuclear powered warship crews are rigorously trained to
    respond immediately to any emergency in the ship. Naval operating
    practices and emergency procedures are also well-defined and rigorously
    enforced. The fact that the crew works in close proximity to the
    reactor ensures vigilant monitoring of even the smallest change in
    plant status. This is part of what we call ``Defense in Depth'' and is
    an element of our overall culture of maintaining high standards for
    design, manufacturing and operations--addressing small problems
    aggressively before they become larger ones. Because of the rugged
    design of the reactor plant, multiple safety systems, and fully trained
    and capable crew, the safety of U.S. nuclear powered warships is
    extremely high. In order for an accident that affects the operation of
    the ship or the crew to happen, the ship must simultaneously experience
    numerous unrealistic equipment and operator failures. Even though such
    an accident scenario is extremely unlikely, the U.S. nuclear powered
    warships and their support facilities are required to simulate such
    situations as they conduct meaningful training. In the extremely
    unlikely event of a problem involving the reactor of a U.S. nuclear
    powered warship, the U.S. Navy would initiate necessary actions to
    respond to the situation and could call on other U.S. national response
    assets if necessary.

                       nuclear safety at the laboratories
        2. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what
    have each of you done to ensure that your emergency contingencies and
    plans are adequate, and that they will operate as designed to avert a
    nuclear incident at any of the nuclear facilities at your labs?
        Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos is committed to maintaining the highest
    safety standards at all of its facilities. All Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities are required to have an in-depth
    safety analysis in place that reviews postulated accident scenarios and
    puts in place appropriate controls to prevent and mitigate such
    situations. This includes very severe scenarios which can include a
    combination of events, such as a large seismic event coupled with a
    facility-wide fire which is the most severe event postulated for the
    plutonium facility at LANL. As a result of these analyses, LANL has
    initiated a series of safety improvement activities to address
    identified issues such as implementing: strict controls over
    combustible materials to reduce the chance of a fire; seismic cut-off
    switches for electrical power to non-safety systems to eliminate a
    seismically-induced electrical fire; repacking nuclear material into
    robust containers to survive appropriate impacts and fires; upgrading
    the fire suppression, air handling and filtration systems, and storage
    infrastructure, and minimizing the nuclear material that is being
    processed at any given time. Additionally, in 2007 LANL adopted an
    updated site-wide seismic hazard analysis standard which incorporates
    new geologic data. Since that time, LANL has been conducting detailed
    structural analyses of its nuclear facilities using this updated
    hazards to identify potential structural issues that would result from
    a large seismic event. LANL is now completing these analyses and has
    identified some additional areas that will be reinforced to improve
    performance.
        For the 3 active nuclear facilities (WETF, CMR, and PF-4) 11 drills
    and/or exercises were conducted last year. Each drill/exercise is
    evaluated and observations are documented to develop lessons learned to
    be shared with response, operations, facilities, and programmatic
    science staff. We also include first responders from the community to
    participate in these drills. All issues are tracked and corrected per
    the site corrective actions process.
        With regard to emergency response, each facility or facility
    complex at LANL has a written plan that evaluates the response in the
    event of an accident and describes the specific actions to be taken for
    each potential scenario. Last year LANL performed over 45 drills and
    exercises designed to test the responses to a variety of accident
    scenarios such as spills, fires (including Wildland fire), criticality
    accidents, severe personnel injuries, transportation accidents, and
    facility-specific events.
        Dr. Miller. Safe and secure operations are a top priority at
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). We have comprehensive
    programs to protect the health and safety of our workforce and rigorous
    policies governing conduct of operations to ensure the safe operation
    of our high explosives and nuclear facilities. These critical
    activities are funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    (NNSA) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program.
    Finally, we constantly review ourselves to keep up with best practices
    and welcome the oversight provided by the NNSA in this area.
        Nuclear safety at the Laboratory is vigorously pursued and
    continually reviewed against a wide variety of accident scenarios to
    ensure we take a very conservative approach to protecting the
    environment, our workers, and the public. Routine nuclear safety
    operations include:

             Frequent review of operations protocols. LLNL's
            continuity of operations program was reviewed and updated in
            2010 to consider catastrophic events.
             Current safety documents analyze operational hazards,
            hazards from external events, and natural phenomena hazards to
            determine which safety systems would be required to stay
            operational during such events. Comprehensive maintenance and
            testing programs ensure continuous operability. Consistent with
            Federal regulations, safety documentation is continuously
            reviewed by LLNL and U.S. Government oversight organizations to
            ensure that, as changes are made or new information received,
            hazards are evaluated and appropriate reliable controls are
            maintained to avert nuclear incidents.
             Critical safety systems (e.g., those safety systems
            relied upon to protect the general public) are intentionally
            redundant by design for selected active components, and fail-
            safe modes are designed with seismic and other credible natural
            phenomena hazards in mind. These systems are examined
            frequently to ensure their functionality and operability.

        Dr. Hommert. Sandia National Laboratories has two nuclear research
    reactor facilities: The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and the
    Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX). The ACRR
    is an open-pool research reactor, similar to those used at universities
    with capability for Pulse and Steady-State Operation. It is used to
    support Sandia National Laboratories' Nuclear Weapons Strategic
    Management Unit stockpile stewardship activities and external
    customers. SPRF/CX is a laboratory scale research reactor used to
    explore the physics of commercial nuclear reactors.
        The nuclear facilities were examined pursuant to Department of
    Energy (DOE) Safety Bulletin 2011-01, ``Events Beyond Design Safety
    Basis Analysis'' issued by Secretary Chu on March 23, 2011. The review
    showed that the time-integrated fission power associated with ACRR and
    SPR-CX is sufficiently low to preclude the need for electrical power
    for post-emergency core cooling or any other safety system action. The
    review also found that radionuclide inventories at the facilities are
    so low that safety class systems are not required. Public and worker
    consequences for the full spectrum of accidents have been extensively
    analyzed in previously approved safety documents. Emergency response
    plans were also reviewed. Sandia is participating in the DOE-wide
    lessons-learned process to identify specific and systemic safety gaps
    and mitigate any gaps discovered. To date, Sandia has not identified
    any significant gaps in hazard protections or emergency response that
    would require immediate actions to ensure the safety of the public,
    workers or the environment. Nevertheless, Sandia continues to emphasize
    worker and public safety and continuously improve our emergency
    preparedness procedures. We are working to guard against complacency.

                           health of the laboratories
        3. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, there was a lot of discussion on the
    amount of weapons funding for the labs during the New START treaty
    debate. What was not discussed much is the breadth of the work that the
    labs carry out, beyond weapons work, and how this non-weapons work is a
    key element in maintaining world-class science and engineering. Could
    each of you describe the percentage of your lab's annual budget that is
    nuclear weapons activities, and describe the work that comprises the
    balance of the budget and why this work is important?
        Dr. Anastasio. LANL's core mission is to ensure the continued
    safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
    Los Alamos is more broadly a national security science laboratory.
    Engaging in this broader work is vital to the long-term health of the
    Laboratory and to our ability to address future national security
    missions. In fiscal year 2011, 56 percent of our operating budget is
    NNSA weapons program activities, 7 percent is associated Safeguards and
    Security, 9 percent is NNSA nonproliferation funding, 8 percent of our
    budget is from DOE environmental management (for cleanup activities), 7
    percent is from DOE science and energy programs, and 13 percent is work
    for other agencies, the majority of which are other Federal national
    security agencies (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of
    Defense (DOD), and the Intelligence Community).
        Much of the non-weapons work is still associated with nuclear
    security and leverages directly on expertise developed to sustain the
    Nation's deterrent. Essentially all of the non-weapons activity is at
    Los Alamos because of sponsor selection, i.e. whether Los Alamos is the
    sole provider or part of a team with other labs, a sponsor made the
    decision to fund this activity rather than others. Those activities
    make important, often critical contributions to national interests.
        While the core nuclear weapons program provides a majority of the
    capabilities (both scientific and personnel), these broader scientific
    security missions allow LANL to sustain and develop the science,
    technology, and engineering that enable us to respond to unplanned
    technical challenges both now and into the future. As an example, last
    year our staff experienced in radiography was able to immediately
    deploy to the Gulf of Mexico to quickly develop a new capability to x-
    ray the Deep Water Horizon blow out preventer. At more than a mile
    beneath the ocean surface, we provided imagery using a sealed source to
    help national decisionmakers better understand what was occurring
    inside that device.
        In addition, engagement with this broad range of different
    challenges helps extend key science, technology, and engineering at Los
    Alamos that is essential to our long-term core mission. Competitive
    selection and awards also help demonstrate to allies and potential
    adversaries that our technical capabilities remain world-class.
    Finally, the open science at Los Alamos supports a strong student and
    postdoctoral research program that is essential for our pipeline of the
    Nation's top science and engineering talent. Last year, Los Alamos
    hosted over 1,300 summer students, as one example.
        Dr. Miller. The NNSA laboratories have exceptional staff covering a
    broad range of scientific, technical and engineering capabilities-as
    well as unique, world-class facilities, which are leveraged to develop
    innovative solutions to major 21st century challenges in
    nonproliferation, intelligence, defense, homeland security and
    counterterrorism, and energy technology and climate science.
    Nonproliferation
        With globalization and worldwide interest in expanding nuclear
    power, proliferation challenges are evolving and covering a wider
    geographic area. LLNL has made important contributions to NNSA's
    mission in monitoring for signatures of proliferation activity,
    addressing problems posed by legacy materials and capabilities in the
    Former Soviet Union (FSU), providing technologies and experts to
    enhance nuclear safeguards through the International Atomic Energy
    Agency, and engaging with the international community to promote U.S.
    Government nonproliferation goals and objectives. Nonproliferation
    activities have broadened to address new regional challenges beyond the
    FSU through international cooperation and engagement and through
    enhanced monitoring and detection technologies. This work provides the
    technical basis for expanding the benefits of nuclear power without
    expanding the nuclear threat.
        An example of LLNL contributions to nuclear signatures detection is
    nuclear explosion monitoring. For more than a decade, LLNL
    seismologists have used available seismic data to develop empirical
    corrections to seismic event processing algorithms to adjust for
    specific source and monitoring station location. Today, with high-
    performance supercomputers, seismologists can capture three-dimensional
    earth structure to calculate these corrections with physics-based
    models for any source-receiver pair. This will enable more precise
    detection, location, and identification of explosions, potentially
    anywhere on the globe, and even at the low energy releases that might
    occur from a weapon development test. Development of new monitoring
    methods with three-dimensional earth models can proceed using current
    supercomputer capability, however, exacale computing is required to
    make these new techniques operational. Exascale computing will not only
    improve our country's ability to monitor nuclear explosions but will
    also allow researchers to better define seismically active faults where
    small earthquakes may occur.
    Intelligence
        The NNSA laboratories have a long and distinguished history of
    support to the Intelligence Community. The LLNL intelligence program is
    strongly focused on the activities of nuclear-capable states,
    unsafeguarded and clandestine programs and terrorist groups, cyber
    threats and countermeasures, and biological and chemical weapon
    development and deployment efforts. LLNL's intelligence support relies
    on our diverse, multidisciplinary professional staff, drawing in
    experts from across the Laboratory. For example, several insights and
    advances in the cyber security program have been informed by experience
    gained through LLNL's high-performance computing efforts. The
    contributions of the NNSA laboratories cut across the entire spectrum
    of the U.S. Government's efforts in prevention, deterrent, defense,
    consequence management, and related areas where detailed technical
    knowledge provides decision advantage.
        The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) is an
    example of decision support that LLNL has provided military planners
    for actual and potential operations against over 37,000 facilities that
    support or could support the production of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD). CAPS is used by over 1,500 planners and operators on a daily
    basis. Chosen in 1998 by then Secretary of Defense Cohen to be the
    preferred planning tool for use by U.S. Armed Forces to combat WMD,
    CAPS has played a significant role in supporting operations during the
    Kosovo conflict, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom. CAPS engineers provide in-depth assessments of WMD facilities
    to include isolating critical nodes, assessing the potential for
    collateral damage from interdiction attempts, and quantifying those
    signatures that can reflect real-time operations under way at selected
    sites. The engineering staff at CAPS also provides a daily technical
    reach-back capability that responds to hundreds of requests for
    assistance from troops presently engaged in combat.
    Defense
        For more than 6 decades, our military has benefitted from the depth
    and breadth of integrated, systems-level solutions developed at the
    NNSA laboratories. Beyond stewardship of the Nation's nuclear
    stockpile, the three NNSA laboratories provide high value to DOD in
    munitions, explosives science and engineering, and conventional weapons
    design; directed energy systems; cyber and network sciences;
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; operational warfighter
    support; countering the nuclear threat; nuclear weapons effects
    predictions and analysis; countering the chemical and biological
    threat; and space systems. Two examples of defense missions where LLNL
    is currently engaged are:

             Third Generation Conventional Munitions: The Laboratory was
            tasked by DOD to develop a next generation conventional
            munition with a more precise lethal radius, thus significantly
            mitigating collateral effects concerns in close air support or
            peacekeeping operations. We successfully combined and applied
            our high explosives expertise with our unique understanding of
            case materials and our High Performance Computing (HPC)
            capability to model and simulate the new munition, resulting in
            a significantly reduced concept to product timeline (10 months
            from concept to qualifications testing), providing the
            warfighter with a focused lethality weapon.
             The Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL): Sponsored by DOD, DPAL
            is a leap-ahead technology that will provide a laser that is up
            to 500 times more lethal per kilogram than any other currently
            demonstrated or contemplated laser weapon, thus enabling the
            deployment of high energy laser capabilities on a broad array
            of platforms. These advances take advantage of LLNL's rich
            history of laser science and technology development.

    Homeland security and counterterrorism
        The NNSA laboratories' role in homeland security and
    counterterrorism began nearly 30 years ago with the formation of the
    Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) and related nuclear threat
    assessment activities. Today, LLNL's efforts cover a wide range of
    programs and sponsors, from threat and risk assessments, to detection
    of threat materials, to understanding and mitigating the consequences
    of attacks, to forensic analysis, to aiding in the attribution of
    responsibility for WMD attacks. Our work encompasses chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive threats. Today's
    programs take advantage of significant historical investments by the
    NNSA in key infrastructure and most importantly in our
    multidisciplinary technical staff. Together these capabilities provide
    a major component of the Nation's defenses against the catastrophic
    threat posed by the malicious use of weapons of mass destruction.
        An example of LLNL support for homeland security and disaster
    response is the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC).
    NARAC has been on call since the Three Mile Island incident of 1979.
    NARAC can deliver an initial prediction to Federal, state, and local
    responders of the fate and atmospheric transport of hazardous materials
    for almost any kind of release in 5 to 15 minutes; it responds to
    roughly 25 events in a typical year (and simulates, for the purpose of
    exercises, 10,000 more). Right now, NARAC is applying LLNL's computing
    capabilities in support the U.S. response to recent events in Japan. As
    the hub of the Department of Homeland Security's Interagency Modeling
    and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume
    predictions of the fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform and
    forecast the particulates that might be released from surface-oil
    burns. NARAC and IMAAC are unique capabilities to the Nation that take
    advantage of LLNL's expertise, and exceptional computational and
    modeling capabilities.
    Energy technology and climate science
        The NNSA laboratories develop and deploy science, technology, and
    operational protocols to increase utilization of our Nation's large and
    secure Reserves of conventional and unconventional fossil fuels while
    safely reducing carbon dioxide emissions through innovations in carbon
    capture and long-term geologic sequestration. In addition, the NNSA
    labs have made seminal contributions to climate science, including
    participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. At
    LLNL, scientists are working on programs to expand the use of renewable
    energy through innovative technology, improved efficiency, new
    resources, systems integration, and reduced costs; deliver climate
    simulations at the regional scale to understand the critical processes
    that drive climate change; develop advanced nuclear fuels and reactor
    systems that are proliferation-resistant and provide for expanded safe,
    secure, carbon-free, cost-competitive nuclear power; and provide
    science and advanced technology needed to effectively store nuclear
    waste for long times or eliminate the nuclear waste altogether.
    Specific examples of LLNL efforts in energy and climate are:

             Energy, Water, and Carbon Dioxide Flow Diagrams LLNL
            specialists produced the first diagrams illustrating U.S.
            energy use. Portraying U.S. energy resources and their ultimate
            use, these diagrams, called energy flow charts, help
            scientists, analysts, and other decisionmakers to visualize the
            complex interrelationships involved in powering the Nation.
            Today, flow diagram concept has been extended to cover water
            use and carbon dioxide emissions, in reports that separately
            cover the 50 states and 136 countries.
             The Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison
            (PCMDI): Established in 1989, LLNL's DOE-sponsored PCMDI is an
            internationally recognized research group that focuses on
            understanding climate change and analyzing and diagnosing the
            performance of climate models. The climate research community
            relies on PCMDI to help organize and manage internationally-
            coordinated modeling studies. Through a PCMDI-led federated
            alliance of major data centers, output from the world's climate
            models is made freely accessible to thousands of researchers
            who evaluate the models and analyze their projections of future
            climate change. This widespread scrutiny of climate models is
            accelerating advancement of climate science and provides a
            multi-model perspective that has been a basis for reaching
            robust conclusions in major assessments of climate science
            (e.g., the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
            Change).

                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Fiscal Year
                                                Fiscal Year    2011  Percent
                                               2010  Percent       Funds
                                                 Funds In       Anticipated
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nuclear Weapons.........................              64              66
    Nonproliferation........................               6               6
    Defense and Intelligence................              14              13
    Homeland and Counter Terrorism..........               7               7
    Energy Technology and Climate Science...               4               4
    Other Basic Science.....................               5               4
                                             -------------------------------
                                                         100             100
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Dr. Hommert. Nuclear Weapons activities are Sandia's core mission,
    and in fiscal year 2011, comprise 47 percent of our total budget. We
    have other important missions that address a broad spectrum of U.S.
    national security needs. These other mission areas include Defense
    Systems and Assessments (30 percent); Energy, Climate and
    Infrastructure Security (12 percent); and, International, Homeland and
    Nuclear Security (11 percent).
        Our work in these other mission areas has direct national security
    impact for our customers, and is conducted in a way that is mutually
    reinforcing of the capabilities and competencies required for our core
    nuclear weapons mission. Often a unique Sandia capability is leveraged
    to address common or similar interagency needs. For example, in fiscal
    year 2011 the $44 million investment by the nuclear weapons program in
    our microelectronics/microsystems capabilities enables $119 million in
    project work for a number of national security agencies.

        4. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, if
    as set forth in the Continuing Resolution (CR), the funding for the
    nonproliferation programs of the NNSA is at or slightly above the
    fiscal year 2010 levels, does this also impact the health of the labs?
        Dr. Anastasio. NNSA's office of defense nuclear nonproliferation
    performs critical science for national security, drawing upon the
    entire national R&D enterprise. These programs solve problems
    associated with very real threats against the Nation. The capabilities
    and expertise that support these programs require substantial long-term
    investment. NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation budget has increased from
    $2.13 billion in fiscal year 2010 to an estimated $2.27 billion in
    fiscal year 2011, after rescissions. The administration's fiscal year
    2012 request of $2.54 billion demonstrates a commitment to harness the
    power of technology to address real challenges in nonproliferation
    research and development. Technological advances such as next
    generation nuclear detection capabilities and methods to detect foreign
    nuclear materials and weapons production facilities and processes are
    among the advances gained by investment in this area. We are working
    within the bounds of the current appropriation, but budgetary cuts
    would severely limit science and technology momentum against constantly
    evolving terrorist threats.
        Dr. Miller. As the question points out, the NNSA's Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation total budget under the Continuing Resolution for the
    rest of fiscal year 2011 is slightly above the fiscal year 2010
    appropriation. Because of uncertainties in some large budget items at
    other NNSA sites (the Satellite Program and the National Center for
    Nuclear Security), the Nonproliferation R&D budgets for activities at
    LLNL and other laboratories currently are significantly less than their
    fiscal year 2010 levels. Assuming the successful resolution of those
    uncertainties we expect to receive approximately the same amount of
    funding in our nonproliferation programs as last year, but we will
    likely receive it late in the year. We are planning now to make sure
    that these late-arriving funds are obligated against our programmed
    deliverables.
        Dr. Hommert. The funding for nonproliferation programs under the CR
    does not currently impact the health of Sandia. However, if funding is
    sustained at these levels in the out years, or if the amount of funding
    that Sandia receives from NNSA is decreased from current levels, an
    erosion of capability will occur at Sandia, both in the quality of
    staff and, more significantly, their experience. This will negatively
    impact the Nation's ability to obtain critical technical support for
    addressing current treaty obligations and objectives as well as for
    accomplishing key policy objectives in future negotiations.

        5. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    the same true for reductions in science funding for DOE as well as
    reductions at DHS?
        Dr. Anastasio. DOE is the largest funder of physical science in the
    United States, and support at Los Alamos in science is essential to the
    health of our open, peer-reviewed science and key experimental user
    facilities. DHS is also an important sponsor at Los Alamos. This
    funding allows Los Alamos to develop prototype technologies that
    leverage our innovations to protect the public from threats to the
    homeland. These non-weapons programs serve to both attract top
    scientists to the laboratory and build up fundamental scientific
    capability that can be further leveraged and applied to LANL's core
    weapons program work. Depending on the level of cuts in these programs,
    the impact on the Laboratory and the Nation could be significant. We
    recognize that funding for these and other agencies is constrained and
    in each case we work with the sponsoring programs to offer those
    agencies excellent technical options to address their mission
    priorities within the available budget.
        Dr. Miller. Impact on projects funded from the DOE Office of
    Science (SC) is not known for certain at this time. However, the
    reductions to the SC budget appear to be small. Specific impacts will
    depend on how the available budget is allocated throughout the DOE
    laboratory complex.
        SC program provides funding for the following LLNL R&D activities:

             Fusion Energy Sciences - research in experiments,
            theory, and modeling in magnetic fusion energy science; high
            energy density laboratory plasmas; and fusion technology and
            materials.
             Advanced Scientific Computing Research - development
            of advanced numerical methods for solving complex physics
            applications on high performance computers, basic research on
            the tools and methods necessary to allow scientists to
            effectively use the current and next generation of high
            performance computers, and technologies that increase our
            insight and understanding into massive scientific data sets.
            This research is particularly synergistic with LLNL NNSA
            missions and long-term strategic objectives; particularly as
            they pertain to the development and use of simulation and
            exascale computing environments.
             Biological and Environmental Research - includes
            analysis of different climate models; the Program for Climate
            Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, which is an
            internationally recognized research group at LLNL that focuses
            on understanding climate change, developing assessment methods
            and maintaining large data bases widely shared by the climate
            modeling community, and analyzing and diagnosing the
            performance of climate models; research on cloud and aerosol
            physics and atmospheric chemistry; microbial systems biology
            relevant to both biofuel development terrestrial carbon
            sequestration; the biogeochemistry of the subsurface reactive
            transport of plutonium; and the development of an artificial
            retina. These programs lie at the scientific core of the LLNL's
            mission to advance the energy and environmental security of the
            Nation.
             Basic Energy Sciences - fundamental investigations in
            the fields of materials science, chemical sciences,
            geosciences, and biomaterials. This includes research efforts
            in the areas of materials science at ultrafast timescales,
            actinide science, radiation-resistant materials for advanced
            energy applications, nanoscale materials science, and materials
            characterization for geosciences. This work is aligned with the
            Laboratory's long-term strategic objectives in support of
            national and energy security mission needs.
             High Energy Physics - includes fundamental research in
            advanced detector development, dark matter searches, the
            properties of neutrinos and the search for the Higgs and
            supersymmetry, as well as theoretical investigations of physics
            beyond the standard model. The scientists engaged in this
            research apply their skills and expertise across the span of
            programmatic work at LLNL which include nonproliferation,
            stockpile stewardship, homeland security, the National Ignition
            Facility (NIF) and the HPC facilities.
             Nuclear Physics - fundamental research in a broad
            range of topics including theoretical work spanning the range
            from quantum chromodynamics, to ab initio nuclear structure and
            reaction theory, to fissioning heavy nuclear systems.
            Experimental efforts include neutrinoless double-beta-decay
            searches, the elucidation of nuclear structure off of
            stability, and the study of relativistic heavy ion collisions
            at both the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider and the Large
            Hadron Collider. These programs complement the national
            security work; the same scientists support homeland security
            activities in attribution, stockpile stewardship and the NIF.
    Department of Homeland Security
        Details on the budgetary impact to LLNL's fiscal year 2011 funding
    from the DHS are still unknown at this time. Current funding to LLNL
    from DHS S&T is about $48 million, and DHS S&T's budget for research
    and development has been reduced by about 20 percent from fiscal year
    2010. While DHS S&T has yet to make key decisions on their R&D
    priorities for fiscal year 2011, LLNL expects some changes in
    priorities from their original plan that might result in reductions to
    LLNL's R&D program.
        LLNL has ongoing scientific and engineering projects in several
    important areas including explosives/aviation security, bio detection
    and bio forensics, bio threat awareness, chemical agent science and
    chemical forensics, response and recovery, and transit infrastructure
    protection.
        Examples of LLNL DHS funded research include:

             Explosives/Aviation Security: LLNL's scientists and
            engineers support a broad range of research and development
            programs in explosives and aviation security including:
            understanding the properties of homemade explosives, developing
            detection technologies for aviation security applications
            including both passenger check point and checked baggage
            screening, testing of screening technologies in support of
            TSA's technology acquisition programs, and modeling and
            simulation of aircraft vulnerabilities to a broad range of
            homemade explosive threats. These R&D programs are critical to
            the development and deployment of effective aviation security
            technologies at our Nation's airports.
             Biodetection and Bioforensics: LLNL's biosecurity
            research and development programs include: development of
            biodetection signatures to detect virulence genes in multiple
            biological pathogens, development of underlying technologies to
            support Gen-3 biowatch, development of integrated bioforensics
            database to support bioforensics analysis, and operation of the
            DHS BioKnowledge Center, which is focused on providing a deep
            understanding of the risks and countermeasures associated with
            current and future bio threats.
             Chemical Agent Science and Chemical Forensics: LLNL's
            chemical security programs include: development of
            comprehensive understanding of the fundamental mechanisms of
            chemical agents including novel threat agents and development
            of an integrated experimental and high-performance computing-
            based modeling capability to predict the effects and
            degradation of chemical agents. These R&D programs are critical
            to mitigating the impact of future chemical weapons-related
            terrorist events.
             Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Restoration
            Projects: LLNL brings unique technical capabilities and
            operational experience to multiple WMD restoration projects.
            These programs support critical partnerships with multiple
            Federal, state and local agencies as they work to improve our
            Nation's resiliency and facilitate the recovery from a WMD
            attack.

        DHS, DOE and NNSA have made significant investments in LLNL's
    infrastructure dedicated to Homeland Security S&T challenges. Unique
    facilities for explosives research, development, test and evaluation
    are in place at LLNL to ensure the development and assessment of the
    effectiveness of the current and next-generation of explosives
    screening technologies designed to counter the emergent threat of home-
    made explosives (HMEs). This infrastructure is critical to supporting
    TSA's acquisition of screening technologies for aviation security. In
    addition, LLNL operates the only select-agent research facility at the
    BSL-3 level at the DOE national laboratories. This capability is
    fundamental to our understanding of human pathogens and enables
    research and development in their detection, characterization and post-
    event remediation. LLNL also has the safe and secure infrastructure
    needed to synthesize and characterize small quantities of chemical
    weapons including novel threat agents. This secure research and
    development environment is critical in developing a predictive
    capability for mitigating the impacts of novel chemical weapons agents.
        Dr. Hommert. Based on the final fiscal year 2011 budget that was
    passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, Sandia's budget for
    Office of Science activities is expected to be $55 million, a reduction
    of $6 million or roughly 10 percent from the fiscal year 2010 level.
    This will reduce our ability to pursue research in areas of Basic
    Energy Sciences, Advanced Scientific Computing Research, and Fusion
    Energy Sciences. Our research in these areas creates the ideas and
    future innovations for advanced energy technologies and national
    security applications, and supports the overall health of the
    laboratories. While we realize that the Nation is in a difficult
    budgetary period, a reduction in our science budget makes it difficult
    to attract and retain the best and the brightest of the Nation's
    scientists and engineers, and this puts at risk our support of critical
    national security needs.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget of $688 million for the DHS Science and
    Technology (S&T) Directorate reflects a reduction of 20 percent
    relative to the fiscal year 2010 level of $863 million. Because DHS S&T
    has not yet fully distributed these cuts across existing or planned
    programs, specific impacts are not yet known. Our current assumption is
    that Sandia will receive a proportional negative budget impact of
    approximately $5 million.
        Looking forward, the new fiscal year 2012 House spending bill
    approved by the House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee on
    May 13, 2011, includes an additional 40 percent cut to DHS S&T. While
    these cuts are not at a scale to impact the overall health of Sandia,
    they will have enormous negative implications on the ability of the
    United States to reap the operational benefits of innovative new
    technologies in the homeland security arena.

            uranium processing facility and the plutonium laboratory
        6. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Uranium Processing Facility
    (UPF) in Tennessee, and the new plutonium facility, the Chemical and
    Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at the LANL, are
    technically complex, new, multi-billion facilities. These are also the
    last two large, new facilities slated for the weapons complex,
    completing a plan put in place almost 20 years ago to modernize major
    production and research facilities. In November of last year, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on the UPF,
    which made several recommendations specific to the UPF, but was also
    applicable generally to NNSA management of large construction projects.
    One of the issues raised by GAO was the maturity of new technologies.
    GAO's view is that prototypes of new technology should be successfully
    demonstrated in an operating environment prior to the start of
    construction. This level of maturity is a Technical Readiness Level 7
    (TRL-7) on a scale of 1 to 10. This scale is widely used by DOD. Will
    the new technologies at the UPF and the CMRR be at a TRL-7 as
    recommended by GAO at the start of construction of UPF and CMRR? If
    not, why not?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA continually monitors and evaluates technology
    readiness levels for new processes in UPF in alignment with best
    practices as identified in the GAO review. The UPF project is being
    planned and executed in accordance with the recently updated DOE Order
    413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital
    Assets, which requires significant critical technology element
    modification subsequent to CD-2. NNSA is encouraging achievement of a
    TRL-7 prior to CD-3 as a recognized best practice. However, in
    instances where a lower readiness level of development is acceptable,
    because of our robust understanding of the technology, we will
    recognize the risks of proceeding with demonstrating the technology at
    the next lower level and ensure appropriate contingencies are
    identified.
        DOE agrees that achieving TRL-7--demonstration of a prototype in an
    operational environment--is a level of technological maturity that
    constitutes low risk for starting a product development program but has
    determined that Technical Readiness Assessments coupled with Technology
    Maturity Plans are also an acceptable way to manage and mitigate
    technology risk when there are very low quantities of each type of
    technology. In contrast to DOD's air, sea and sub-surface weapons
    platforms, where large production quantities of new critical
    technologies must operate in mobile, extreme and very dynamic
    environments, UPF technologies exist only in UPF, are stationary and
    will operate in a stable, known environment. Further, demonstration
    with actual Special Nuclear Material in an operational environment
    would require construction of essentially the final system. For these
    reasons, a lower technology level (TRL-6, demonstration of prototype
    with simulate material in an operational environment) is acceptable in
    this instance, given the cost/benefit associated with further
    development of each individual new technology. Appropriate rationale
    and contingency will be incorporated into the baseline where a project
    technology is short of TRL-7.

        7. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, you have committed to having the
    design for the UPF and the CMRR 90 percent complete before the
    construction project baseline for cost and schedule is established.
    Under the DOE construction management order, construction projects must
    receive senior level approval at certain critical decision (CD)
    milestones. These milestones are CD-0, CD-1, etc. CD-2 is the milestone
    where the cost and schedule baseline is established. CD-3 is the start
    of construction. At which milestone will the cost and schedule
    baselines be set for UPF and CMRR?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The cost and schedule baselines for UPF and CMRR
    will be set at the CD-2 milestone. NNSA has committed to having UPF and
    CMRR projects at a minimum 90 percent design completion prior to
    seeking CD-2. NNSA will have greater confidence and less risk of
    exceeding performance baselines with this advanced level of maturity in
    design at CD-2. Both projects are currently planning to request CD-2
    approval for the full project scope in fiscal year 2013.

        8. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, will NNSA do an Independent Cost
    Estimate (ICE) for each project before CD-2?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. In accordance with DOE 413.3B, an External
    Independent Review (EIR) is required as part of CD-2 approval. For
    projects such as UPF and CMRR that are greater than $100 million, an
    ICE is a required component of the EIR and must validate the proposed
    total project costs. The EIR, conducted by the Office of Engineering
    and Construction Management (within DOE, but accountable to the
    Secretary and completely independent of the NNSA), must validate the
    proposed scope, cost and schedule baselines as a condition of CD-2
    approval.

        9. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, in the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, there is a provision,
    section 3114, which requires NNSA to report to Congress when the
    baseline is established for a major project. From that baseline,
    Congress and the NNSA will measure progress. Will CD-2 serve as the
    baseline for purposes of section 3114?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, the baseline will be approved at CD-2 for the
    purposes of Section 3114 of the NDAA. CD-2 is the milestone where
    project scope, cost and schedule baselines are established and approved
    by the Acquisition Executive.

        10. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, GAO also recommended that once
    the baseline cost and schedule is established, the NNSA Administrator
    must ensure that the baseline is ``consistent with NNSA's future years
    budget and spending plan prior to approval of . . . critical decision
    2.'' Will GAO's recommendation be followed for the UPF, CMRR, and the
    new Naval Reactors Expended Core Facility (ECF)?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA will establish budget requests and spending
    plans for UPF, CMRR, and the new Naval Reactors ECF to support the
    projects' cost, scope, and schedule as part of baseline approval at
    Critical Decision-2. NNSA is seeking as much certainty as possible in
    securing a budget profile and spend plan once the projects have been
    baselined, and will emphasize the importance of maintaining these
    budgets and spend plans until project completion. In the case of UPF
    and CMRR, NNSA's current project execution plan aligns with the 10 year
    budget profiles outlined in the Section 1251 Report of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2011.

        11. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Anastasio, is there
    anything specific in the design of the UPF or the CMRR facilities that
    you are reviewing in light of the events in Japan?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. UPF and CMRR are being designed in accordance
    with modern seismic design standards for nuclear facilities.
    Nevertheless, NNSA has retained independent seismic experts to study
    these projects for risks similar to the Japan event.
        Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR Nuclear Facility design is based on a very
    significant seismic event determined using geological analysis. The
    design was based on the most recent seismic hazard analyses (2007 and
    2009 revision). This includes very severe scenarios which include a
    combination of events, such as a large seismic event coupled with
    laboratory fires, the most severe event postulated for a facility of
    this type. In line with recent guidance from the Secretary of Energy,
    LANL is conducting a thorough evaluation of the seismic hazards coupled
    with other accident scenarios as factors in the CMRR facility design.
    As the design for the facility continues to mature the results of
    accident evaluations will continue to be incorporated as engineering
    inputs to structural, facility systems and equipment design criteria.

                replacement of the idaho expended core facility
        12. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, last year
    the Office of Naval Reactors (NR) requested $40.6 million for
    conceptual design for the replacement building for the new ECF in
    Idaho. This new facility would be a new spent fuel building to support
    the NR program. In fiscal year 2012 the request for conceptual design
    is $53.8 million. The actual construction project would not start until
    2013. What is the anticipated total project cost for this new facility?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The Total Project Cost for the
    Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP) is estimated to be
    $1,249 million, and will recapitalize the over 50-year-old ECF as the
    location for naval spent nuclear fuel receipt, packaging, and secure
    temporary dry storage. This estimate of the Total Project Cost is based
    on scoping studies conducted for a range of alternatives that could
    provide the required capabilities. Actual costs to design and fabricate
    similar equipment used at the ECF were considered in forming the basis
    of the approximate $400 million cost estimate for the required
    equipment. The cost estimate also includes approximately $650 million
    for the construction of new facilities as well as potential cost saving
    measures, such as modification of existing facilities for continued use
    with new facilities. Also included is approximately $200 million of
    Other Project Costs that include items such as conceptual design,
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) work, analysis, safety
    oversight, development of procedures and manuals, training, general
    facility engineering startup support, and technical support. This Total
    Project Cost estimate has been reviewed by industry experts with
    experience in delivering large, complex construction project associated
    with nuclear material handling.
        Included within the scope of the SFHP:

             Evaluation and selection from existing technology and
            processes for spent nuclear fuel handling.
             Design and delivery of a facility and facility systems
            in which the spent nuclear fuel handling will be performed.
             Design and delivery of infrastructure specifically
            needed to support spent nuclear fuel handling operations (power
            distribution substations, rail service to new facilities,
            etc.).
             Design and delivery of equipment needed for handling
            spent nuclear fuel.
             Design and delivery of equipment needed for packaging
            and disposal of waste generated during spent nuclear fuel
            handling operations.
             Ability to perform initial cursory external visual
            examinations.
             Test, operating, and preventive maintenance
            procedures, and drawings for the spent fuel handling process
            systems, equipment, facilities, and facility systems.
             Personnel training and development of training
            programs for the facilities, facility systems, and spent
            nuclear fuel handling equipment.
             Project management.
             Support services needed for the project.
             Management for subcontracts supporting the design and
            construction of the facilities, facility systems, and spent
            nuclear fuel handling equipment needed for this project.
             Reports and submittals, including those submittals
            required for Critical Decisions.
             NEPA analyses and actions.

        Full funding in the early years of the project remains critically
    necessary to ensure that the facility and equipment are sufficiently
    defined such that requests for fiscal year 2013 Project Engineering and
    Design funds and fiscal year 2015 Construction funds are fully
    justified and support the overall project schedule.

        A breakdown of the costs for labor and materials and subcontracts
    is provided below.

        13. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, would that
    amount include the demolition of the old facility?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The project cost of the SFHP
    does not include the demolition of the current ECF. The current ECF
    mission includes the unloading, examination, processing and temporary
    dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, in addition to the examination of
    irradiated material from the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Test
    Reactor. All of these aforementioned operations must continue while the
    SFHP is constructed and placed into operation. For example, ship
    refuelings will continue to require that spent nuclear fuel is unloaded
    from the limited number of spent fuel shipping containers available,
    and critical core examinations necessary to validate fuel performance
    must continue. Consequently, an inventory of spent nuclear fuel and
    irradiated materials will exist in ECF at the time SFHP becomes
    operational. It is impractical and cost-prohibitive to move the spent
    nuclear fuel present in ECF to SFHP to complete processing operations
    for dry storage in the new facility. In addition, there are a number of
    important core examinations underway later this decade that must not be
    interrupted in support technical decisions for the operating fleet. Due
    to these factors, final disposition of ECF will be deferred until after
    the completion of the currently identified ECF mission.

        14. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, can NNSA
    afford another expensive building?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP will recapitalize the
    over 50-year-old ECF as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel
    receipt, packaging, and secure temporary dry storage. Naval Reactors'
    ability to continue work in Idaho is dependent upon a viable, efficient
    fuel-handling infrastructure. Although the ECF continues to be
    maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible
    manner, further deterioration of the infrastructure could profoundly
    impact the Naval Reactors mission. Uninterrupted receipt of naval spent
    nuclear fuel is vital to the timely, constant throughput of ship
    refuelings and return of these warships to full operational status. If
    an interruption in ECF operations were to extend over long periods, the
    ability to sustain fleet operations would be negatively impacted since
    there would be no capacity available to receive naval spent fuel,
    thereby tying up shipping containers and halting defueling operations.
    Completion of the recapitalization of the spent nuclear fuel
    infrastructure is needed by 2020 to support the Navy's tight refueling
    and defueling schedule for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. A delay
    to delivery of this new facility will result in costly and time-
    consuming workarounds (e.g. procurement of additional spent fuel
    shipping containers and associated equipment) or delays to the
    defuelings of nuclear powered warships.
        In this constrained funding environment, Naval Reactors recognizes
    the need for prudent project management to constrain costs. Naval
    Reactors will leverage its extensive project management experience to
    do exactly that. The Program routinely manages significant projects,
    such as the design and construction of the Virginia-class submarine and
    the Ford-class aircraft carrier reactor plants. Naval Reactors also
    routinely manage large ship projects, including nuclear powered
    aircraft carrier and submarine refueling overhauls. These efforts
    include the planning and scheduling of the refueling; design and
    development of specialized equipment; planning and technical approval
    of shipyard facilities and equipment; transportation and handling of
    spent fuel, and reviewing and approving detailed procedures for conduct
    of refueling operations. Additionally, Naval Reactors has managed the
    development, operation, and maintenance of over 25 classes of nuclear
    powered submarines and three classes of nuclear powered aircraft
    carriers; as well as the design, construction, operation, and
    maintenance of eight land-based prototypes. The Naval Reactors
    professionals that are assigned to the SFHP have many years of Naval
    Reactors project management and oversight experience.
        In addition, the SFHP is being managed consistent with DOE Order
    413.3B (Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital
    Assets) as implemented by Naval Reactors. The Program is also
    capitalizing on established requirements and lessons learned from
    management of our Navy projects, including the use of formalized
    nuclear safety, refueling equipment, and refueling system design
    processes. These combined processes, along with the rigorous budgeting
    and accountability processes routinely employed by Naval Reactors,
    ensures capability of executing a project of this size.
        Finally, Naval Reactors has contracted with an experienced
    Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Management contractor and is
    leveraging relevant experience through our prime contractor, Bechtel
    National Inc.

        15. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the ECF
    have a design that is 90 percent complete by CD-2?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP is being managed
    consistent with DOE Order 413.3B (Program and Project Management for
    Acquisition of Capital Assets). Consistent with that order, the
    preliminary design will be 100 percent complete by CD-2. The
    preliminary design provides the detail needed to provide a reasonable
    assurance that the design will be implementable within the approved
    performance baseline. Consistent with DOE Order 413.3B, the fully
    completed preliminary design will form the basis of the Performance
    Baseline which is approved at CD-2.

        16. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the
    project baseline for the ECF for the purposes of section 3114 be
    established by CD-2?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. Yes. Naval Reactors approval of
    the SFHP CD-2, Performance Baseline, will establish the SFHP project
    cost and schedule baseline, consistent with the requirements of DOE
    Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of
    Capital Assets. CD-2 approval requires that the design be sufficiently
    mature to provide a reasonable assurance that the design will be
    achievable within the approved performance baseline. The SFHP
    Performance Baseline will include the key project performance, scope,
    cost, and schedule parameters, and will be provided to the
    congressional defense committee in accordance with section 3114 of NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2011.

        17. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will an ICE
    be performed for the ECF?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. Yes, Naval Reactors will perform
    ICEs prior to CD-1 and prior to CD-2, consistent with DOE Order 413.3B,
    Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
    The ICEs will help validate that the program estimates are well-
    documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible by ensuring that the
    included costs are reasonable and that no costs were omitted, that they
    reflect a realistic schedule with technically-reasonable assumptions,
    and that risks and uncertainties are appropriately accounted for and
    quantified.

        18. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will all new
    technologies be TRL-7 at construction start, as well as CD-3?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP will not pursue new
    technologies since the fundamental technology to unload, examine,
    process, and package naval spent nuclear fuel currently exists. While
    Naval Reactors does not use technology readiness levels to manage its
    technical efforts, the Program judges that the technologies included in
    the SFHP to be equivalent to a level 8 (total system completed, tested,
    and fully demonstrated). This assessment is based on the fact that the
    design of the spent fuel handling and processing equipment for the SFHP
    uses technology that has been demonstrated in existing equipment that
    is currently operating in a production environment at the ECF. The SFHP
    is being designed to improve the production capacity of the existing
    ECF infrastructure and will integrate lessons learned from over 50
    years of operating within the current ECF.

           delays in naval reactors m-290 idaho facility construction
        19. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, the construction project at the
    NR Idaho facility to receive and handle M-290 spent fuel shipping
    containers is about a year late, both in the start of construction and
    in the start of operations. The most recent schedule indicated that the
    approval to start construction, CD-3, would be in the second quarter of
    fiscal year 2011. What was the reason for the delay and has the delay
    resulted in increased costs?
        Admiral Donald. As part of the fiscal year 2010 budget request,
    Naval Reactors requested money for the ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge
    Station. At that time, the project was scoped only to modify (e.g.,
    installation of larger capacity crane) the current ECF to allow the
    receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers. Although the
    performance baseline for the project was not yet established, Naval
    Reactors included in the budget request documentation outlining a
    schedule, in which construction was scheduled to begin (CD-3) in the
    first quarter of fiscal year 2010. The fiscal year 2010 budget request
    also identified the need for a separate Naval Reactors Facility (NRF)
    Storage Overpack Complex in fiscal year 2011.
        After the fiscal year 2010 budget request was submitted, Naval
    Reactors recognized it could not meet its spent fuel handling
    requirements under this arrangement. Specifically, the Program would
    not be able to concurrently conduct two significant program missions in
    ECF:

        (1)  Return of spent naval fuel from the Idaho Nuclear Technology
    and Engineering Center (INTEC)
        (2)  Aircraft carrier refueling/defuelings using the M-290.

        If left unchanged, this would have had a direct negative impact to
    both the State of Idaho settlement agreement and operational needs of
    the nuclear aircraft carrier fleet.
        Accordingly, Naval Reactors modified the construction plan to
    ensure the Program could continue to meet its spent fuel handling
    requirements. Rather than modify the existing ECF as originally
    planned, Naval Reactors determined the mission required a new facility
    for the receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers. That
    facility, the ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station project, would also
    incorporate the NRF Storage Overpack Complex project identified above.
    This single Major Construction Project (MCP) will eliminate workflow
    conflicts and will provide the capability for concurrent receipt of
    fuel from INTEC and receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers.
        The current or revised scope of the project and schedule was
    outlined in the fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress. That
    schedule indicated that CD-2 would be completed in the first quarter of
    fiscal year 2010. CD-2, including the new performance baseline for the
    project, was approved on 30 November 2009. This approved performance
    baseline states that CD-3 will occur in the second quarter of fiscal
    year 2011. CD-3 for the project was approved by Naval Reactors on 25
    April 2011. In addition, the project is within the cost estimate
    included in the performance baseline.

        20. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, has construction approval been
    received? If not, why not?
        Admiral Donald. Yes, construction approval (CD-3 (Start of
    Construction)) for the M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2)
    rail siding was provided in the first quarter fiscal year 2011. The CD-
    3 for the CSRF/OSE2 facility has been approved by Naval Reactors on 25
    April 2011.

        21. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, what is the status of the
    design, is it 90 percent complete as is the NNSA requirement?
        Admiral Donald. The 100 percent final design for the ECF M-290
    Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2) has been submitted by the
    contractor. Construction began on the project in fiscal year 2011 with
    approval of the CD-3 for the CSRF/OSE2 rail siding. The CD-3 for the
    CSRF/OSE2 facility was approved by Naval Reactors on 25 April 2011.

        22. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, is this considered a new start
    and thus construction cannot begin under the CR?
        Admiral Donald. The ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station is not
    considered a new start and construction may begin under a Continuing
    Resolution. Identified as a MCP since fiscal year 2008, this project
    received $545,000 in fiscal year 2008, $300,000 in fiscal year 2009,
    and $3,236,000 in fiscal year 2010 in project engineering and design
    (PED) funding. The project received an additional $6,264,000 in fiscal
    year 2010 to support long-lead procurement of a 310 ton crane with a 75
    ton auxiliary hook.
        The PED funds provided Architect-Engineering services for the ECF
    M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station construction project, allowing the
    project to proceed from conceptual design into preliminary design and
    final design. The design effort assured project feasibility, defined
    the scope, provided detailed estimates of construction costs based on
    the approved design and working drawings and specifications, and
    provided construction schedules, including procurements.

                               protective forces
        23. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, last March, the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee held a hearing on the protective forces that guard
    the nuclear weapons and materials at DOE sites. The majority of these
    sites are NNSA sites. It was clear from that hearing that NNSA and DOE
    needed to look at the career path options for these highly trained
    forces, particularly with respect to retirement eligibility. The
    rigorous physical requirements of these forces merit the possibility of
    a 20-year retirement program along the lines of some law enforcement,
    military, and NNSA courier retirement programs. Shortly after that
    hearing, DOE was supposed to provide an implementation plan to address
    the retirement and other issues. This report was not submitted until
    January of this year and it did not include a plan, just a recitation
    of the issues and a promise to study the options again. This issue has
    been unresolved for over 3 years. The current contracts for the Guard
    forces expire in just over a year and it is possible that the forces
    will strike if these issues are not resolved. One site did have a
    strike over these issues when the last contract expired. The DOE
    representative at the March hearing testified that the issue needed to
    be resolved promptly. But here we are 1 year later and with the issue
    still unresolved. It is important to ensure that the nuclear materials
    and weapons continue to be protected. When is NNSA planning to resolve
    this retirement issue for the protective forces?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA and the Department as a whole continue to
    evaluate all measures that seek to enhance career longevity for
    contractor protective force employees. In furtherance of its goal to
    study retirement benefit options for protective force employees, NNSA
    commissioned a study to evaluate costs associated with a variety of
    different benefit options for contractor protective force employees.
    The study evaluated three benchmark retirement plans as the first step
    toward understanding the costs and comparative benefits associated with
    each type of plan. The three benchmark design alternatives were: (1)
    the Hanford Multi-Employer (Defined Benefit) plan applicable to the
    Guards union; (2) a Defined Contribution plan similar to the one
    offered to certain contractor employees at Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory; and (3) the Nuclear Materials Couriers Plan, which includes
    elements of both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans. A
    fourth ``Notional Alternative Plan,'' which mirrors the Couriers' plan
    but excludes some of the more costly features, was also included in the
    analysis.
        To be clear, the protective force members are employees of the
    contractors, not NNSA. The contractor protective force employees at all
    but one of the NNSA sites are represented by labor unions. Accordingly,
    any changes to existing benefits plans would have to be agreed to
    during the collective bargaining process between the contractor and the
    union representing the protective force employees. Therefore, the study
    that was performed provides objective cost estimates for the
    liabilities that the government would be responsible for reimbursing
    pursuant to its contracts with NNSA contractors if the protective force
    employees were to participate in benefit plans that resemble the
    benchmark plans.
        The study has been completed, and NNSA senior management is
    conducting a thorough review of the report. The Department owes its
    stakeholders, the taxpayers, and all potentially affected employees
    deliberate and careful consideration of these options.

        24. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, my understanding is that there
    is a way to address this by establishing an accelerated 401K system.
    Would you look into this and report to us, before the time we mark up
    the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2012, as to how
    we might fix this issue?
        Mr. D'Agostino. As part of the Department's protective force career
    options initiative, DOE and NNSA have encouraged protective force
    contractors and unions to offer ideas and concepts as to how career
    longevity and retirement options might be addressed, and we continue to
    receive input from these sources. One NNSA contractor and the
    protective force union at that site have discussed an ``accelerated
    401(k) system'' and this option will be included in the broader
    Departmental discussion of this issue as details of this notional plan
    emerge. All legal and feasible options that are brought to the
    Department's attention will be considered by DOE management. If the
    full accelerated 401(k) proposal is presented to the NNSA before the
    markup the fiscal year 2012 defense authorization bill, we will report
    to you on this recommendation.

                                    aviation
        25. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, in December, NNSA
    made a significant change in the way it manages the aviation program of
    the Office of Secure Transportation. As part of this change, the DOE
    Office of Aviation will have increased oversight responsibilities for
    the NNSA program in lieu of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
    Is there a plan in place for the DOE Office of Aviation to oversee the
    NNSA program?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. There will be no change to the manner
    in which the DOE Office of Aviation Management will conduct its
    responsibilities. Currently, OST is studying a move to Federalize
    pilots. Based on the outcome of this study, the FAA will conduct the
    appropriate surveillance of OST's aviation program pursuant to FAA
    regulations.

        26. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, the FAA had
    previously determined that the NNSA served in both a civil and public
    function and thus had to comply with part 119. Has FAA approved the
    NNSA plan to move away from FAA regulations under part 119?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation
    continues to operate both public and civil flights and will comply with
    applicable sections of Part 119 and all other applicable FAA
    regulations. As such we will operate under Part 125 as approved by the
    FAA. Public flights are conducted to support the agency's governmental
    function such as moving Limited Lifetime Components. All other flights
    are considered civil unless approved otherwise by the FAA
    administrator. An example of a civil flight would be to move passengers
    to training. All civil flights must be cost justified and compared to
    commercial air transport before utilizing government aircraft for civil
    flights. Historically over the last 3 years, approximately 90+ percent
    of our flights are public.

        27. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, I would note that
    the explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
    said with respect to the operation of the Secure Transportation Asset
    (STA) aircraft:
        The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA are
    directed to consult with the FAA to determine whether the operations of
    the STA aircraft are public or civil operations, or a combination, and
    the appropriate equivalency standard under which the STA aircraft
    should be operated, maintained, and managed. In addition, the Secretary
    and the Administrator are directed to submit a report to the
    congressional defense committees that sets forth the FAA determination,
    the ability of the NNSA to meet the requirements of the DOE orders if
    NNSA will operate as a self-regulated entity, and whether the DOE
    Office of Aviation is capable of conducting FAA like oversight and
    inspections. This report should be completed before 737 operations
    begin.
        When do you expect 737 operations to begin?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA's Office of Secure
    Transportation's (OST) Aviation Program will comply with the applicable
    portions of FAA regulations found at 14 C.F.R. (Aeronautics and Space)
    and 41 C.F.R. 102-33 (Management of Government Aircraft). Flight
    Operation of the aircraft is expected to begin in August 2011. Mission
    support availability expected to begin on 1 December 2011.

        28. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, when will the
    report be submitted to Congress?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA will comply with the requirements
    as set forth by the FAA. The FAA accepted a letter of application from
    NNSA that outlines our proposed operating construct to operate under
    Part 125 of 14 CFR. NNSA sees no operational, management or legal
    constraints that would result in a denial of authorization. At this
    point the only limiting factor before final consideration by the FAA is
    the hiring of pilots. NNSA owns one aircraft and is currently
    finalizing the acquisition of the second. At that point NNSA will have
    adequate information and direction from the FAA and can submit a report
    shortly thereafter.

                  computational and experimental capabilities
        29. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, all
    of the experimental tools that were identified when the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program (SSP) was established are now operational. Have you
    considered what experimental tools might be needed in the future?
        Dr. Anastasio. The experimental tools, DARHT, and Los Alamos
    Neutron Science Center at Los Alamos, and NIF at Lawrence Livermore
    that were first identified when the SSP began some 15 years ago are
    just beginning to provide remarkable data that scientist and engineers
    are using to better understand and evaluate the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Contrary to what some
    have suggested, we are definitely not ``done'' with science. There are
    many significant areas of work that remains to be done. There are
    critical open questions that remain to be solved to retain our
    confidence in the stockpile and we cannot fully predict the scientific
    challenges that are still ahead as it continues to age and goes through
    modernization.
        As we seek to sustain the deterrent and improve our understanding
    of the Nation's aging stockpile through the SSP, LANL believes that
    future mission needs require investment in new and more capable
    experimental facilities and computational capabilities. As an example,
    we are examining materials in extreme environments, exploiting in situ,
    transient measurements to study materials in relevant dynamic and
    irradiation extremes. Constructing such a facility would revolutionize
    material performance in extremes by conquering ``the micron
    frontier''--the domain in which materials microstructure and defects
    dominate performance AND our predictive capability for the stockpile is
    the weakest--and advancing the transition from observation and
    validation of materials performance to prediction and control of
    materials functionality.
        LANL has engaged the weapons science community including our
    colleagues at LLNL and Sandia as well as in the UK, and the broader
    scientific community to define such a facility and is currently
    performing a pre-conceptual design study for a facility that we call
    MaRIE, for Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes, including the
    identification of scientific and systems requirements, analysis of
    alternatives that would meet those requirements, and trade studies that
    would assess the cost-risk-benefits of a variety of technical options.
    LANL believes that a facility such as MaRIE would provide needed
    dynamic observations of microstructure to the SSP, validating
    theoretical descriptions and ultimately yielding control of materials
    needed to reduce cost and increase confidence in the stockpile. MaRIE
    provides not only multiple, simultaneous in situ measurements of multi-
    granular materials with sub-granular resolution, but also synthesis
    capabilities to predictively design high performing materials for these
    environments as well as multiple probes of materials mixing in
    extremes, a known consequence of materials damage and failure.
        Dr. Miller. From an experimental point of view, the most important
    thing right now is to provide the funding to adequately utilize the
    tools we have established, such as the Dual Axis Radiographic
    Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), the NIF, and the Joint Actinide
    Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility; requirements for
    additional experimental facilities have not emerged from our research.
    An area in which additional capability is need is HPC and simulation.
        There remain key areas, such as boost physics, where we still lack
    adequate knowledge. Predictive Capability Framework campaigns utilize
    our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge
    about nuclear weapon performance relevant to existing or expected
    issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities integrate the use of
    state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-fidelity simulation
    models validated by data gathered from state-of-the-art experimental
    facilities. This cutting-edge research provides both the basis for
    stockpile stewardship and the tools by which the Laboratory experts
    make judgments about the health, safety, security, and effectiveness of
    the stockpile.
        In addition to the experimental facilities we rely on, we need to
    continue to advance our HPC capabilities to provide the weapons program
    with computing platforms for modeling and simulation (M&S) at the
    exascale level. To assure that NNSA's future mission critical needs are
    met, a decadal, sustained R&D investment is necessary to advance
    supercomputing to exascale-class platforms (1 x 10 \18\ or
    1,000,000,000,000,000,000 floating point operations per second)-
    supercomputers on the order of 1,000 times more powerful than the
    fastest in existence. Current petascale supercomputing has manifestly
    improved M&S capabilities, but users remain limited by speed or length
    of run time in performing calculations, or inability to perform
    adequate uncertainty analyses of complex systems. A central R&D
    challenge is power consumption. If the current HPC technology were used
    and the number of processors simply scaled up, an exascale machine
    would take hundreds of Megawatts of power costing tens of millions of
    dollars annually to operate--making the machine more expensive to
    operate than procure. Therefore, significant technological innovations
    are needed to improve efficiency--gains approaching the order of 100--
    will be necessary to reach an optimal next-generation exascale
    platform.
        The NIF is a critical experimental facility required to meet the
    Nation's stockpile stockpile stewardship goals and validate our
    computational models. It is very important that the NIF be funded at a
    level consistent with the current implementation plan to meet required
    deliverables and maximally benefit from the investments made in the
    facility and its operation. The SSP relies on NIF for ignition and non-
    ignition experiments.
        NIF has been operational since the facility's dedication in May
    2009. NIF with its 192 laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It
    is proving to be a remarkably reliable and precise system.
        NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC).
    The purpose of NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition
    and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental
    operations for weapons and basic science by the end of fiscal year
    2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT
    ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of
    demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable
    ignition platform for weapons physics, basic science, and energy
    research by the conclusion of NIC at the end of fiscal year 2012.
        There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the
    hohlraum energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the
    interaction between the laser beams and the target could be
    satisfactorily controlled and the conditions necessary to implode the
    hydrogen fuel could be achieved.
        We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems
    needed for the ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a
    layer of solid tritium, hydrogen, and deuterium (THD) have been
    successfully created and imploded. One shot in particular achieved a
    record-setting 1.3 x 10 \14\ neutrons.
        NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of
    implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much
    from the experiments and see no ``show stoppers.'' We are optimistic
    about success in achieving fusion ignition but mindful that NIC is an
    extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science
    and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion
    ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012.
        NIF also executes ``non-ignition'' experiments in support of the
    SSP. In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent highly
    successful campaigns of high-energy-density physics experiments in
    support of stockpile stewardship on NIF. One campaign focused on
    radiation transport to gather data to validate the capability of our
    physics simulation codes to model phenomena. Altogether, 16 experiments
    were performed in 11 shot days. These included the first experiments
    performed that included diagnostics to provide time-resolved
    radiographic data. Preliminary comparisons of data taken are in
    agreement with pre-shot predictions. A second campaign focused on
    developing and using a technique for gathering equation-of-state data
    to characterize the properties of highly compressed (but unheated)
    materials-in this case, tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such
    experiments are needed for scientific advances that underpin both
    stockpile stewardship and planetary science.
        Dr. Hommert. The challenging work necessary over the next two
    decades to extend the lifetimes of key weapon systems in the US nuclear
    arsenal will require application of the new experimental facilities and
    tools created during the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship era, and
    will also require upgrades and recapitalization for a number of legacy
    capabilities. Several key investments are required in order for Sandia
    to successfully execute our warhead systems engineering and integration
    responsibilities and our design and qualification activities for non
    nuclear components and subsystems. Some of our major environmental test
    facilities were first commissioned in the 1950s, and they must be
    upgraded to modern standards to support the design and development
    testing for the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP). Facility and
    equipment enhancements are needed at the Tonopah Test Range where we
    will perform critical development flight testing of the B61 LEP. Sandia
    will provide critical radiation hardened microelectronics for upcoming
    LEPs and ALTs. Our capabilities are officially accredited with
    ``trusted'' status for both the design and manufacture of
    microelectronics, which is critical in an age of growing cyber threat
    concerns about microelectronic supply chain surety. Our silicon fab
    facility requires recapitalization because the tooling is 10-15 years
    old, and this is an industry where the technology turns over every
    couple of years. Of 137 tools in the silicon fab, more than 25 percent
    have only 3rd party support, and another 25 percent have no OEM support
    or spare parts. The recapitalization must begin soon to address the
    ever-increasing risk of running existing equipment to failure.
        The unique pulsed power capabilities associated with Sandia's Z
    facility are advancing our understanding of the performance of
    nonnuclear components in extreme radiation environments, and providing
    valuable Equation of State experimental data for the physics labs in
    the critical area of dynamic material response. We also apply this
    expertise in High Energy Density Physics more broadly to the
    diagnostics and experimental design needs of the National Ignition
    Campaign and the Predictive Capabilities Framework.

        30. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    underpinning all of the experiments and past nuclear tests are the
    world's leading computational and modeling capabilities, which have
    been developed by NNSA. The ability to model the performance of nuclear
    weapons using the new experimental data and past data from the days of
    nuclear testing is essential to maintaining the nuclear weapons
    stockpile, safely, securely, and reliably into the future. How
    important is this computation capability to your work?
        Dr. Anastasio. The computational capability to model and understand
    the performance of nuclear weapons is essential to our work, and it
    always has been. One of the largest successes of the Stockpile
    Stewardship has been our remarkable advances in supercomputing
    capability, and specifically our ability to model the complex phenomena
    that occur in a weapon. What we have discovered is that with each
    improvement in simulation performance. We see greater fidelity and
    develop an improved understanding as well as further awareness of what
    we still do not understand. Thus moving to the next generation of
    computing (exascale) is not a luxury or simply speed for the sake of
    speed. It is essential to our understanding of the challenges we face
    with the stockpile, in particular as we move further away from our
    underground test experience.
        Dr. Miller. HPC serves as the integrating element of the SSP and
    has been instrumental in the success of the SSP to date. The
    significant resources the country has expended over the past few
    decades in HPC have proven to be a very worthwhile investment. Nuclear
    weapons are highly engineered 3-D systems with complex materials that
    change over time. HPC simulations of stockpile performance, security,
    and safety help identify problems in the stockpile, assess the impact,
    and devise solutions. Without HPC, the SSP would not have been
    successful in sustaining confidence in the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear
    testing. However, there are still unresolved issues that require
    continued growth in our HPC capabilities to exascale computing in order
    to stay on top of stockpile concerns and meet future challenges.
    Achieving exascale computing is a technically challenging endeavor,
    similar in magnitude to the effort expended in the 1990s to develop
    terascale computing. This greatly increased capability will have other
    positive impacts on our country's national security and
    competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate this effort is
    included in the President's Budget Request and strongly urge support
    for an aggressive research and development effort to create the
    technologies necessary to achieve and apply exascale computing.
        Dr. Hommert. Computational capabilities, which encompass both
    engineering simulation codes and high performance computational
    platforms, are essential tools in meeting our stockpile modernization
    and stewardship commitments over the coming decades. As our Nation
    moves towards a smaller stockpile, confidence in the safety, security,
    and effectiveness of the arsenal must be characterized more rigorously
    through quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) of these
    engineered systems. Computational simulation allows us to create age-
    aware performance models and thereby predict the future impacts of
    fundamental materials aging mechanisms on stockpile performance. This
    predictive understanding provides lead time for decisions on required
    stockpile actions. HPC capabilities are also important to our coverage
    of environmental requirements for the stockpile. While it is not
    possible to perform physical tests in all of the environments and
    credible scenarios that a weapon could potential encounter during its
    lifecycle, computational simulation can simulate these environments and
    inform our technical understanding. Computational simulation plays a
    significant role in many lifetime extension program activities
    including: environments definition, engineering design and integration,
    and systems qualification. It is critical that our computational tools
    and platforms provide the confidence and credibility required to inform
    high-consequence stockpile decisions.

        31. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    the development of the capability keeping pace with stockpile
    requirements?
        Dr. Anastasio. Since the advent of the SSP, the increase in our
    computational capabilities has been impressive. What we have discovered
    is that with each improvement in simulation performance we see greater
    fidelity and develop an improved understanding as well as further
    awareness of what we still do not understand.
        With this increased capability, Los Alamos and the other national
    nuclear laboratories have been able to deal with stockpile maintenance
    for the past 18 years and have been able to introduce additional margin
    into the nuclear weapons systems where possible. The national
    laboratories have also been able to more accurately quantify the
    uncertainties associated with nuclear weapons as they age. However,
    after a decade and half of stockpile maintenance we have exhausted many
    of the maintenance options certifiable with our current computational
    capability.
        Throughout this process, we have been able to identify
    computational infrastructure and code improvements advancements needed
    to accurately understand the physics and chemical changes occurring in
    the stockpile as it ages or to further understand options available for
    future LEPS. From these examinations, it is clear that higher levels of
    computational power are required to assess and certify the current and
    future stockpile. This will require greater investments (platforms and
    codes) than is projected in the FYNSP. An enhanced computational
    capability that allows us to advance the scientific understanding of
    our maintenance options in the absence of nuclear testing is required.
    This will increase the number of options available to us as we maintain
    the stockpile, ensuring that we keep pace with stockpile requirements.
        Dr. Miller. In terms of experimental tools, additional tools are
    not required at this time. However, providing adequate funding to fully
    utilize the existing tools such as the DARHT, the NIF, and the JASPER
    facility is essential. In the HPC and simulation area, the additional
    capability of exascale computing and simulation platforms is necessary.
        The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in maintaining the
    nuclear deterrent without needing to resort to underground testing.
    Through our success in coupling advanced HPC simulation capabilities
    with data gathered from nuclear weapons science experimental facilities
    like LLNL's Contained Firing Facility and LANL's DARHT facility and
    high energy density physics data from NIF, we have largely resolved the
    energy balance anomaly. We now have a key piece of the puzzle to attack
    the many resulting science challenges and LEP design issues. We are
    also moving forward to complete the second keystone of SSP, developing
    a fundamental understanding and predictive capability for boost.
        Nuclear weapons are highly engineered 3-D systems with complex
    materials that change over time. The accumulation of small changes that
    are inherent in component aging, material compatibility issues, and
    refurbishment of aging components, take our warheads away from their
    original designs whose safety and reliability were certified in the era
    when nuclear tests were still being conducted. Recently identified
    warhead issues (that were not identified when certain warheads were
    first introduced into the stockpile) further complicate assessments.
    These factors increase uncertainty in the performance of existing
    warheads, but have not undermined weapon certification. Experience has
    shown that at least one major new and unanticipated issue is discovered
    about every 5 years.
        SSP is focused upon an extraordinary challenge: predicting how a
    nuclear weapon changes in time with quantified uncertainties. We do not
    currently have the computing power needed to simulate weapons
    performance in 3-D at the required resolution while incorporating the
    needed detailed physics and age-aware material models. Additionally, we
    do not have the computing power to conduct the tens of thousands of
    high-resolution 3-D simulations needed to quantify the uncertainty in
    our predictions. Today's available technology forces us to choose
    between simulating weapon performance in 2-D with high resolution and
    physics fidelity or simulating in 3-D. While 2-D simulations were
    sufficient to establish the physical principles behind aging effects,
    applying that understanding to the stockpile requires high-fidelity 3-D
    simulations. Therefore, a new architecture enabling exascale computing
    is needed.
        Dr. Hommert. The challenge we face going forward is the application
    of the powerful computational stockpile stewardship tools to the now
    urgent life extension needs of the stockpile. Our design and
    development work for multiple LEPs over the coming decades will rely
    extensively on our engineering simulation capabilities. We must sustain
    the investment in computational tools to ensure that capacity keeps
    pace with the LEP design workload as we integrate these new tools into
    the design process. The scope and complexity of Sandia's
    responsibilities for warhead systems engineering and integration, and
    non nuclear component design, requires state of the art computational
    capabilities. The competency base in computational science that
    underpins these capabilities is strengthened by the NW program research
    in this area, and effectively applied to broad national security needs
    associated with cyber threats. The extensive and growing national
    security challenges in this area will drive the need for continued
    investments to transition codes and computational platforms to exascale
    architectures expected over the next decade.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                nuclear testing
        32. Senator Shaheen. Mr. D'Agostino, is there any technical reason
    for the United States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the
    foreseeable future? Why or why not?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Currently, there are no known technical reasons for
    the United States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the
    foreseeable future. As a result of our successful Stockpile Stewardship
    and Management Program, NNSA has been able to maintain and enhance the
    safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing. We are now in the
    20th year of the underground testing moratorium, and the need for
    science-based stockpile stewardship is greater than ever. Our weapons
    systems are beyond their original design lifetimes, and while we have
    been able to certify them as safe, secure and effective, the stockpile
    contains some components that are based on technologies up to 60 years
    old and those components must be replaced and re-certified. Our ability
    to continue to certify the stockpile over the longer term requires a
    sophisticated physics-based understanding of the weapons, science-based
    tools that provide new means, other than underground tests, to solve
    complex problems, and predictive capabilities to reduce uncertainties.
    Furthermore, each of those pieces requires advanced computing
    capabilities to support them. We have made significant advancements in
    these areas in the past two decades; however, challenging goals remain
    such as achieving ignition at the NIF and providing a physics-based
    predictive capability for the stockpile. The success of the Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan--in particular the infrastructure and
    human capital investment components--will allow NNSA to continue to
    maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the
    U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive
    testing.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
      chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility and uranium
                              processing facility
        33. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the
    construction projects at Y-12 in Tennessee and LANL in New Mexico are
    the foundation of the complex-wide modernization plan and are the key
    enabler to the many future LEP efforts. Together, cost estimates for
    these facilities range between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. What is driving
    the cost?
        Mr. D'Agostino. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated
    nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will
    be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for
    modern nuclear facilities require robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind
    equipment and rigorous validation that all components meet
    specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse
    conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional
    construction projects.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino and add that, at 50 percent
    design, these projects are still in preliminary maturity. As their
    designs have matured these projects have acquired better definition of
    how the requirements for seismic ground motion, nuclear quality
    assurance, and security affect the design. We will not set the
    performance baseline for cost and schedule until the engineering design
    has reached 90 percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more
    than 10 years from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate
    contingency to address known uncertainties.
        Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility will support many programs
    involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct
    support for the stockpile, nonproliferation and counter-proliferation
    programs, counter-terrorism programs, energy programs, and plutonium
    science. To meet the mission requirements, these facilities must be
    designed to safely and securely handle and control nuclear material not
    only for the personnel working in the facility and for the public, even
    in major postulated and coupled accidents, such as earthquakes. The
    CMRR facility is being designed for personnel to safely handle all
    forms of plutonium, including bare metal. We expect these facilities to
    serve a broad array of national security programs over many decades. In
    addition, we must protect significant quantities of nuclear materials.
    These requirements have driven us to a design with multiple, redundant
    safety systems and security features.
        Dr. Miller. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA
    for specific information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y-12 and
    the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at
    LANL. However, I would observe that the type of work performed by NNSA
    often requires very complex, one-of-a-kind facilities. The nature of
    these one-of-a-kind facilities makes out-year budgeting quite
    challenging. For these types of facilities, it is very important to
    provide flexibility and appropriate contingencies that reflects the
    various elements of uncertainty within each project.
        Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
    institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.

        34. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, why do these facilities cost so much?
        Mr. D'Agostino. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated
    nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will
    be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for
    modern nuclear facilities require robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind
    equipment, and rigorous validation that all components meet
    specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse
    conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional
    construction projects.
        Moreover, the nuclear facility construction industry has been
    inactive for many years and there are no comparative construction costs
    that indicate the UPF and CMRR costs are above market price. NNSA
    acknowledges that the UPF and CMRR facilities are costly because they
    are unique and modern nuclear facilities that are being designed to
    modern nuclear, safety and security standards. As their designs have
    matured these projects have acquired better definition of how the
    requirements for seismic ground motion, nuclear quality assurance, and
    security affect the design. We will not set the performance baseline
    for cost and schedule until the engineering design has reached 90
    percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more than 10 years
    from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate contingency to
    address known uncertainties.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
        Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility (and likewise, the UPF) must be
    able to perform the assigned mission programs for multiple decades in a
    safe and secure manner. To meet the mission requirements, these
    facilities must be designed to safely and securely handle and control
    nuclear material not only for the personnel working in the facility but
    also for the public, even in major postulated accidents. The CMRR
    facility is being designed for personnel to safely handle all forms of
    plutonium, including bare metal. Dealing with special nuclear materials
    such as plutonium requires high levels of security and safety,
    requiring multiple, redundant safety systems and security features. All
    of these requirements tend to increase the facility cost.
        Dr. Miller. The NNSA facilities are one-of-kind facilities that
    have never been built anywhere in the world before in most cases.
    Regardless of the design and engineering challenges these projects
    present, I believe they are absolutely critical to our national
    security. Without both the stockpile stewardship research and
    development centers and production facilities, the country would not be
    able to support our nuclear deterrent. I fully recognize that they are
    costly, but I would also maintain that they are critical to our
    national security.
        Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
    institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.

        35. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, when does NNSA plan to have better confidence
    in the cost and schedule for these buildings?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA will gain more confidence in the cost and
    schedule for UPF and CMRR as the designs mature. The design is maturing
    at a rate of approximately 1 percent-2 percent per month. Both projects
    are on schedule and will be ready to establish project cost and
    schedule baseline (CD-2) in fiscal year 2013 after they have achieved
    90 percent design completion. I will only approve the baselines once
    the project teams have sufficiently demonstrated and DOE support
    offices have validated that the projects can be delivered at the CD-2
    specified level of cost, schedule, and defined scope.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino and add that a requirement of
    CD-2 approval includes an External Independent Review and ICE that
    supports, and provides additional confidence in, the proposed cost and
    schedules.
        Dr. Anastasio. The next major step in the CMRR NF will be when the
    performance baseline is set at 90 percent complete, currently planned
    for mid-fiscal year 2013.
        Dr. Miller. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to
    address this very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent
    ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and
    training professional large scale project managers. I would
    respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer.
        Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
    institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.

        36. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what steps are being taken to ensure that
    taxpayers' dollars will be spent wisely and that the buildings will
    come in on time and at cost?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The UPF and CMRR project teams are continually
    being challenged to identify cost effective opportunities while meeting
    all operational, safety, and security requirements. NNSA has supported
    numerous internal and external reviews to identify cost savings and
    validate that the requirements are current and support mission
    deliverables. NNSA will continue to challenge the projects to find more
    savings and to ensure that the proposed costs are appropriate for all
    elements of the projects' scope.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino. As an example of our
    commitment, DOD is currently conducting an independent review of CMRR
    and UPF to validate the costs of the project scopes. NNSA has
    established that the upper ends of the cost range estimates represent
    the maximum Total Project Costs for the projects, and that cost growth
    beyond these figures will not be supported. If the costs trend toward
    the upper end of the cost estimate ranges, NNSA is prepared to make
    scope adjustments as needed to maintain mission capabilities. As
    detailed in the DOE/DOD Memorandum of Agreement on DOD's funding for
    NNSA, another approach if costs increase is to slip schedules to the
    right.
        Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos recognizes that the Nation is confronted
    with very serious financial challenges and is committed to spending
    taxpayers' dollars wisely. We have assembled a strong team to design
    and construct this facility. I personally evaluate the CMRR project and
    we have driven the budgeted cost of this facility down over the last
    year. In addition, we support a large number of reviews that evaluate
    our plan and have learned from lessons from other MCPs.
        Dr. Miller. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to
    address this very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent
    ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and
    training professional large-scale project managers. I would
    respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer.
        Dr. Hommert. While, as indicated above, we are not directly
    involved in the detailed cost and schedule planning for these
    facilities, we strongly support the NNSA decision to apply rigorous
    project management tools and approaches to these MCPs. At Sandia, we
    are proud of our track record in completing MCPs ahead of schedule and
    under budget (for example with our MESA facility in 2007) and if called
    upon, we stand ready to support the NNSA with our relevant experience
    in this area.

        37. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, if Congress were to not provide funding for
    CMRR and UPF, what are some of the anticipated consequences to the
    nuclear stockpile and weapons complex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute
    the current LEP schedule at a high risk--that risk will continue to
    increase every year. Nuclear component work would need to be performed
    in existing facilities like Building 9212 at Y-12 and the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility at Los Alamos. However, the safety,
    security, and environmental issues associated with the aging existing
    facilities are mounting, as are the costs of addressing them. NNSA
    manages the risks associated with the aging facilities and will
    continue to do so, but as the facilities and their equipment continue
    to age, the ability to maintain them will diminish. NNSA will of course
    exhaust all options for keeping these facilities open until a new UPF
    and CMRR have been constructed. However, in the event that either of
    these facilities had to be shut down due to safety, security, or
    environmental concerns, the loss of work force and critical skills
    would be considerable, and it would likely be extremely expensive to
    restart operations. If there are delays in delivery of the CMRR and
    UPF, significantly more maintenance and infrastructure improvement
    measures would be needed in the existing facilities, at a significant
    cost, to avoid a potential shut down and ensure NNSA can meet delivery
    schedules for LEPs.
        For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has
    limited analytical capability, and the PF-4 vault is inadequate.
    Therefore, NNSA will not be able to achieve the required 80 pits per
    year rate until the new CMRR facility is in operation. This capability
    is required for the W78 LEP by 2021.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
        Dr. Anastasio. We cannot continue to operate the current CMR
    facility forever because of inherent safety risks of a 60+ year old
    facility that will continue to increase into the future. Los Alamos has
    already closed three wings of CMR by transferring mission work to TA-55
    and curtailing other activities. The CMRR facility will support many
    programs involving plutonium and other actinides for decades to come.
    Those programs include direct support for the stockpile including
    support to the pit production activities in TA-55/PF4, weapons complex,
    nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs, counterterrorism,
    energy programs, and plutonium science. Impacts can be significant,
    including the inability to support these required mission programs.
        Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets represent a
    positive first step toward reversing the recent declining budget trends
    and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA
    Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work across
    the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that
    underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a
    reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to
    keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization
    of the facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of
    the three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
    SSP. For instance, if Congress were not to provide funding for the CMRR
    facility and the UPF, the LEPs would be impacted. More specifically,
    the availability of CMRR could affect the extent to which new safety
    and security features are introduced into the stockpile, the
    performance margin of the LEP, and the interoperability between systems
    like the W78 and W88.
        Dr. Hommert. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP)
    assumes the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s.
    A fundamental change to the SSMP plan for the stockpile would be
    required if Congress decided not to provide the required funding. An
    alternative approach for ensuring U.S. capabilities for working with
    Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) would need to be developed and funded.

        38. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, given the long list of LEPs over the next 20-
    plus years, how could a delay in the construction of CMRR and UPF
    impact future LEPs?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute
    the current LEP schedule at a high risk--that risk will continue to
    increase every year. Nuclear component work would need to be performed
    in existing facilities like Building 9212 at Y-12 and the CMR Facility
    at Los Alamos. However, the safety, security, and environmental issues
    associated with the aging existing facilities are mounting, as are the
    costs of addressing them. NNSA manages the risks associated with the
    aging facilities and will continue to do so, but as the facilities and
    their equipment continue to age, the ability to maintain them will
    diminish. NNSA will of course exhaust all options for keeping these
    facilities open until a new UPF and CMRR have been constructed.
    However, in the event that either of these facilities had to be shut
    down due to safety, security, or environmental concerns, the loss of
    work force and critical skills would be considerable, and it would
    likely be extremely expensive to restart operations. If there are
    delays in delivery of the CMRR and UPF, significantly more maintenance
    and infrastructure improvement measures would be needed in the existing
    facilities, at a significant cost, to avoid a potential shut down and
    ensure NNSA can meet delivery schedules for LEPs.
        For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has
    limited analytical capability, and the PF-4 vault is inadequate.
    Therefore, NNSA will not be able to achieve the required 80 pits per
    year rate until the new CMRR facility is in operation. This capability
    is required for the W78 LEP by 2021.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
        Dr. Anastasio. Future plans for LEPs will require replacement pits
    to be produced in the TA-55/PF4 building. While CMRR will not produce
    pits, this facility does provide the science to ensure that TA-55 pits
    meet the exacting chemistry and material properties needed to ensure
    the pits will function as designed. As such, a delay in CMRR
    construction creates significant delays in completion of delaying
    future LEPs.
        Dr. Miller. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact the range of
    options under consideration for the upcoming LEPs. Today, the
    production complex is capable of producing components for weapons
    refurbishments. However, the facilities that CMRR and UPF will replace
    are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and
    costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental
    concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to operate
    more efficiently in support of the nuclear weapons enterprise. While
    the B61-12 is independent of CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR
    could have an impact on replacement or reuse design options for the W78
    LEP. The availability of CMRR could affect the extent to which new
    safety and security features are introduced into the stockpile, the
    performance margin of the LEP, and the interoperability between systems
    like the W78 and W88.
        CMRR's original construction completion date has been pushed out to
    the early 2020s according to the current schedule. LANL and LLNL
    continue to work with NNSA to ensure that sufficient capability for
    plutonium R&D is available to accommodate the workload of the complex
    to support the LEPs while CMRR is under construction. These same R&D
    capabilities are also required should the country need to characterize
    and/or attribute a nuclear terrorism related event. The country has no
    other capable facilities outside of the NNSA design laboratories.
        Dr. Hommert. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for
    in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and documented in the SSMP would
    not be achievable, and would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for
    certain systems could impact our confidence in the state of health of
    the US nuclear deterrent.

        39. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what is being done with respect to conducting
    an ICE for each facility?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Both UPF and CMRR project teams have ongoing ICEs
    being performed. The GAO has performed an independent review of the UPF
    project, and the UPF project team retained the US Army Corp of
    Engineers (USACE) to conduct an ICE for the project. The USACE results
    are being examined and compared to the project team's cost estimate to
    reconcile differences. The GAO has initiated a review of the CMRR
    project. The cost range estimates for CMRR and UPF are being
    independently validated by the DOD's Cost Analysis and Program
    Evaluation (CAPE) group.
        Furthermore, in accordance with DOE 413.3b, an External Independent
    Review (EIR) is required as part of CD-2 approval. For projects such as
    UPF and CMRR that are greater than $100 million, an ICE is a required
    component of the EIR and must validate the proposed total project
    costs. The EIR, conducted by the DOE's Office of Engineering and
    Construction Management, must validate the proposed scope, cost and
    schedule baselines as a condition of CD-2 approval.
        Dr. Cook. In addition, an independent cost reasonableness review
    was conducted on both projects in July 2010. The cost reasonableness
    review concluded that the process and steps that were being exercised
    to establish cost estimates is appropriate. Also, the former Office of
    Cost Analysis conducted an ICE on UPF and an initial review of CMRR.
    All reviews--the ones cited by the Administrator and myself plus others
    to be done as the cost estimates mature--will be considered in the
    final budgeting for both projects.
        Dr. Anastasio. We continue to support a large number of reviews of
    the CMRR, including DOD, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
    (DNFSB), GAO, and Independent Cost Evaluations (ICE). We expect to
    support comprehensive ICE reviews as the project proceeds to baselining
    in 2012 and 2013. In addition, the project will continue to support
    reviews throughout the Construction Execution Phase.
        Dr. Miller. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA
    for specific information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y-12 and
    the CMRR facility at LANL.
        Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
    institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.

        40. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in what way will CMRR and UPF influence U.S.
    Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) requirements for the overall size of the
    stockpile?
        Mr. D'Agostino. As described in the NPR, the non-deployed stockpile
    currently includes more warheads than required to hedge against
    technical or geopolitical surprise, due to the limited capacity of the
    NNSA complex to conduct LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner.
    Progress in restoring NNSA's production infrastructure will allow these
    excess warheads to be retired along with other stockpile reductions
    planned over the next decade.
        Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
        Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility will support many programs
    involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct
    support for the stockpile, weapons complex, nonproliferation and
    counter-proliferation programs, counter-terrorism, energy programs, and
    plutonium science. It is important to note that CMRR will not produce
    pits but will provide the science to ensure that pits manufactured at
    TA-55/PF-4 meet the exacting chemistry and material properties needed
    to ensure the pits will function as designed. STRATCOM's current, and
    projected stockpile size requirements will be supported, as required
    with manufacturing in TA-55/PF-4 building. While the CMRR facilities
    size is capability based, a small capacity for the stockpile is
    inherent in the capability base.
        Dr. Miller. This question is best answered by STRATCOM. I would
    note that even though today the production complex is capable of
    producing components for warhead refurbishments, the facilities that
    the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace are more than 50 years old,
    oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to maintain. They are also
    safety, security, and environmental concerns. Confidence in and
    demonstrated performance of the production complex is clearly important
    in the sizing of the stockpile with respect to its ability to respond
    to future strategic policy uncertainties and the need to protect
    against technological failures in the stockpile itself.
        Dr. Hommert. These facilities are part of the NNSA plan for a
    responsive infrastructure. In principle, a responsive infrastructure
    could enable a smaller hedge force which would be consistent with a
    smaller overall stockpile.

        41. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
    Miller, and Dr. Hommert, without these facilities, would NNSA be able
    to meet STRATCOM's current warhead requirements?
        Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. Should NNSA not have access to the
    capabilities in the planned new facilities, the ability to produce
    uranium components and conduct analysis for pit certification would be
    limited to rates existing today, which would erode as the existing
    facilities decay. Our ability to support the stockpile and the planned
    LEPs would be jeopardized. Without UPF and CMRR, it's not a question of
    whether these capabilities would be lost, but only when. Although NNSA
    is taking all measures to continue to operate the existing facilities,
    their age and single point of failure capability raise the costs of
    safe operation each year and will eventually exceed NNSA's ability to
    keep them operational.
        Furthermore, CMR presently enables the National Laboratories to
    conduct surveillance of plutonium components in the stockpile. Should
    the facility become unusable, it will negatively impact our ability to
    assess and certify the status of the current stockpile.
        Dr. Anastasio. Without these facilities, STRATCOM's requirements
    for extended life warheads starting with the W78 LEP will be
    significantly impacted if the replacement option is selected by the DOD
    and funded by Congress.
        Dr. Miller. Today, the production complex is capable of producing
    the required components for current warhead refurbishments underway.
    However, the facilities that the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace
    are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and
    costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental
    concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to provide
    components more efficiently. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact
    the range of options for the upcoming LEPs and the ability of LEPs to
    meet new military requirements.
        Dr. Hommert. The current NNSA plan calls for these facilities to
    become operational in the 2020s. In the near term, the stockpile can
    and will be maintained with existing facilities to meet requirements.
    However, these facilities will be needed to meet anticipated future
    requirements.

                          ssbn(x) life of hull reactor
        42. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, what is the current
    technology readiness level for the life of hull reactor anticipated for
    the SSBN(X)?
        Admiral Donald. Naval nuclear reactor designs are evolutionary
    rather than revolutionary. The reactor for Ohio Replacement SSBNs will
    incorporate technologies that provide greater energy and a longer
    lifetime than any previous submarine core.
        Initial development of the materials required to achieve the life-
    of-ship core were part of previous research, design and manufacturing
    efforts. The knowledge gained from these efforts identified the
    additional steps needed to be ready for production. Naval Reactors is
    confident in the feasibility of the life-of-ship core and will validate
    this through rigorous testing and manufacturing demonstrations. A final
    decision on the core material for Ohio Replacement is planned to be
    made in February 2012 based on manufacturing demonstrations to date.
        While Naval Reactors has not historically used technology readiness
    levels to manage its technical efforts, the Program judges that the
    life-of-ship core technology would represent a level 5 (component and/
    or breadboard validation in a relevant environment). This assessment is
    based on the fact that a prototype test cell incorporating the new
    material has been inserted in an operating, land-based reactor plant.
    Manufacturing development at the ship-production scale needs to be
    demonstrated.

        43. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, how are the requirements for
    the life of hull reactor design for SSBN(X) different from those in
    current Virginia-class submarines?
        Admiral Donald. SSBNs spend more time at sea than SSNs in order to
    meet the requirements for strategic patrols. Ohio Replacement will also
    be designed for a life of 42 years, vice 33 for Virginia. The Ohio
    Replacement core will operate at sea for more than twice as many days
    as Virginia's core. In order to achieve this increase in energy and
    lifetime demand, Naval Reactors is designing a core with new materials
    based on previous research. A more detailed, classified briefing can be
    provided.

        44. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, I understand that the current
    milestone and decision point for determining the technical feasibility
    of developing a life of hull reactor for SSBN(X) is in February 2012.
    If it is determined that a life of hull reactor for the SSBN(X) is not
    possible, how will that impact the overall number of boats required to
    meet STRATCOM requirements?
        Admiral Donald. The resources in our DOE budget are based on
    completing the additional development needed to ensure success of
    production of a life-of-ship core in Ohio replacement. Without a life-
    of-ship core, two additional ships will be required to meet STRATCOM's
    requirements, thereby costing taxpayers approximately $10 billion in
    ship construction.

        45. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, would additional boats be
    required to compensate for refueling?
        Admiral Donald. Yes. Without a life-of-ship core, two additional
    ships will be required to meet STRATCOM's requirements, thereby costing
    taxpayers approximately $10 billion in ship construction.

        46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, in the House-passed version
    of H.R. 1, the fiscal year 2011 full year CR, the Energy and Water
    Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee cut the President's
    fiscal year 2011 NR budget by $103 million. What is the anticipated
    impact of that reduction?
        Admiral Donald. The $103 million cut proposed in H.R. 1 grew to
    $111 million in P.L. 112-10 signed by President Obama on 15 April 10.
    The impacts of that $111 million cut are as follows:

             a 6- to 9-month delay to the Ohio Replacement Program
            and resultant loss of synchronization with the Navy's work on
            the ship.
             staffing reduction of over 50 contractors at shipyards
            and Naval Reactors' laboratories.
             deferral in planned hiring of 150 contractors at
            shipyards and Naval Reactors' laboratories.
             deferral in Ohio Replacement reactor plant component
            design subcontract placements.
             a reduction in pension contributions.
             other impacts to Naval Reactors, including deferral of
            previously planned General Plant Projects (GPP).
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
                                  pantex plant
        47. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, on July 7, 2010, the Pantex
    Plant was impacted by a severe thunderstorm, causing significant
    flooding throughout the plant, as well as equipment and facility
    damage. Pantex received $8.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for flood
    recovery efforts. It is my understanding that Pantex requires an
    additional $17.2 million for repair and recovery efforts, as well as
    $2.25 million to mitigate the impact of future flood events. The
    President's fiscal year 2012 budget request for operating requirements
    at Pantex is $649.3 million. Does this figure cover all remaining flood
    repair, recovery, and mitigation efforts required at Pantex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The Pantex rain event occurred in July 2010, after
    the fiscal year 2011 President's budget had been submitted to Congress.
    NNSA committed $8.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for immediate flood
    recovery efforts. This funding, along with Pantex internal
    efficiencies, addressed the most critical issues faced by the site to
    restoring operations. NNSA continues to evaluate the available fiscal
    year 2011 funding in the RTBF program, and will work to determine the
    best option for addressing the most urgent needs. The President's
    fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $164.8 million for Pantex RTBF
    Operations of Facilities, which is sufficient to fund any remaining
    flood repair, recovery, and mitigation activities.

        48. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2012 budget
    request also covers resumption of work on a new 45,000-square-foot
    high-explosives pressing plant at Pantex. Design work for this facility
    was completed in 2009 and then put on hold, and it is my understanding
    that projected completion of this project is now by 2017. What is the
    current timeline for construction, and what is your department doing to
    ensure that no further delays are experienced?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The project completion date is now September 2016.
    An External Independent Review (EIR) has been conducted to validate the
    new cost and schedule and the project's baseline revised per the EIR
    findings. Costs have increased due to the need to add more contingency
    for risk and the added cost escalation due to delay. The United States
    Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Construction Services Manager
    and will manage the cost, schedule and technical performance of this
    project to ensure no further delays and cost overruns are experienced.
    The USACE has received bids for the project on March 1, 2011 and
    expects to award the construction contract in third quarter fiscal year
    2011. The contract will be a firm-fixed price contract with fixed cost
    and completion date.

        49. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, according to the 2009 report by
    the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
    States, ``excessive regulation originating outside the NNSA but within
    a risk-averse DOE was raising cost and hampering production at
    Pantex.'' The report found that two broad attitudes are often cited as
    contributing to excessive regulation: ``the failure of the NNSA and DOE
    to distinguish between what to do (a government function) and how to do
    it (a contractor responsibility),'' as well as the government's
    ``tendency to respond to problems by imposing new rules that will
    `guarantee' that the problem does not recur.'' What efforts have the
    NNSA and DOE taken to alleviate this excessive regulation, promote
    production, and reduce costs at Pantex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. In 2009, I established and chaired a Governance
    Board consisting of senior leaders from NNSA and its contractors to
    develop an approach to transforming the way we govern our contractors
    and ourselves. The efforts of the Board resulted in a number of short-
    and long-term actions to drive transformation in governance and
    oversight programs. The ultimate goal of these actions is to streamline
    how NNSA does business and allow resources to be focused and directed
    in a way that maximizes mission accomplishment, while ensuring that
    safety and security are integral components of that mission.
        Upon completion of the governance and oversight transformation
    effort, NNSA expects to have the following:

             Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability
             Stronger Contractor Assurance Systems
             Better balanced Federal requirements
             More focused, integrated, effective and efficient
            Federal and contractor oversight systems, and
             Improved contractual performance accountability

        The effort to better balance Federal requirements directly
    addresses the concern regarding the ``two attitudes'' cited from the
    2009 report by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
    the United States. NNSA has implemented a number of changes to its
    contract requirements to address duplication and redundancy in
    requirements and to eliminate unnecessary prescription. NNSA
    established the expectation that a team of senior managers review
    proposed new requirements or changes to requirements promulgated by
    DOE. As part of its review, the team ensures new or modified
    requirements focus on performance outcomes. The team also helps ensure
    those requirements are not an inappropriate response to addressing a
    performance problem at an individual site. This team of managers has
    worked with other DOE organizations responsible for internal
    requirements and regulations to effect significant change in those
    requirements; many of the changes address the concerns raised in your
    question. However, this is a work in progress as the same pressures and
    attitudes that led to the concerns raised by the Commission still exist
    internal and external to NNSA and DOE.
        DOE has also undertaken initiatives to improve its requirements. In
    2010, the Deputy Secretary initiated DOE's 2010 Safety and Security
    reform effort. This effort is intended to streamline DOE requirements
    in the areas of safety and security. NNSA has worked with DOE on this
    effort. As part of the security reform initiative, and in partnership
    with the DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security, NNSA has
    completed the initial phase of a Zero-Based Security Review that will
    improve NNSA's ability to implement its nuclear security mission while
    maintaining a robust security posture at all of its sites. These
    reforms will demonstrate to Congress and others that the NNSA
    effectively accomplishes its safety and security requirements in a
    manner that is reasonable, defensible, and consistent across the
    Nuclear Security Enterprise.

                             national laboratories
        50. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, was
    there an assessment made 4 years ago that the W78 should be replaced
    within a decade, meaning that weapon won't begin replacement work until
    6 years after you stated it needs to be replaced?
        Dr. Anastasio. The W78 warhead entered the stockpile in 1980. LANL
    has been monitoring the health of the W78 since then, principally
    through the surveillance program, which includes flight testing. In
    each of the last 15 years, the Laboratory has issued a W78 annual
    assessment report, and the respective Laboratory Directors have issued
    an annual assessment letter that included the W78.
        LANL has been monitoring one particular W78 aging characteristic
    for over a decade. When I became Director in 2006, and annually
    thereafter, I received technical briefings on the health of all the
    warheads and bombs for which LANL is responsible, including the W78. I
    mentioned this aging issue in my first annual assessment letter (2006)
    and updated my comments and assessment each year thereafter.
        In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended that the W78 be
    replaced or enter a comprehensive life extension activity to correct
    this specific aging condition, but I did not specify a timeframe for
    execution.
        Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78's aging
    characteristics and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the
    safety, reliability, or performance of the W78 to date;'' however,
    ``the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive
    capabilities.'' LANL Director Dr. Michael Anastasio first made this
    assessment about 4 years ago and at that time stated that a life
    extension would be needed within a decade. LLNL has concurred with
    these concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual assessment
    process. Issues identified include material aging and compatibility
    issues, which can impact components within the nuclear explosive
    package (NEP).
        The W78 warhead constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the
    triad and has been deployed on the Air Force's Minuteman III for more
    than 31 years. It is beyond its planned service life and requires a 10
    year effort to study and then refurbish the necessary systems. It is
    important to begin the study activities on the W78 LEP in order to
    explore options to extend this warhead's life to address concerns
    identified in surveillance of W78 warheads and reported in annual
    assessments. An important function of the study is to evaluate the
    different approaches available to refurbish the warhead--as were
    outlined in the NPR--and also to assess the impacts of including
    additional safety and security features.
        Dr. Hommert. The technical issue driving the need for a life
    extension of the W78 warhead is associated with the NEP which is the
    design responsibility of LANL. I defer to Dr. Anastasio regarding the
    assessment of the W78 issue and the timelines required for the life
    extension. Regarding Sandia design responsibilities, we perform tests
    and analyses on the non-nuclear components and subsystems each year,
    adding data to the technical basis for assessing whether the
    requirements for the W78 warhead are met. Our current assessment, based
    on 30 years of data collected, is that we see no evidence of
    degradation of the non-nuclear components that would require their
    urgent replacement. However, the Sandia designed electronics in the W78
    warhead are now 30 years old and we believe it would be prudent to
    replace them when a LEP is undertaken for the warhead. The insertion of
    modern non nuclear technologies will likely be required to enable
    surety improvements and flexibility in Nuclear Explosive Package (NEP)
    options.

        51. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what prompted that statement?
        Dr. Anastasio. In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended
    that the W78 be replaced or enter a comprehensive life extension
    activity to correct a specific aging condition, but I did not specify a
    timeframe for execution.
        The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the
    surveillance and research that had been accomplished. The specific
    aging condition is progressive and must be addressed in the future.
        The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the
    surveillance and research that had been accomplished. The specific
    aging condition is progressive and must be addressed in the future.
        Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78's aging
    characteristics and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the
    safety, reliability, or performance of the W78 to date;'' however,
    ``the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive
    capabilities.'' LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer
    review role as part of the annual assessment process. Issues identified
    include material aging and compatibility issues, which can impact
    components within the NEP. The classified LANL Annual Assessment
    Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004 through the present (fiscal year
    2010), offer the best detailed classified summary overview regarding
    the recent history associated with the warhead. The W78 warhead is
    already well beyond its planned service and requires a 10-year effort
    to complete the life extension options study and physical refurbishment
    of the warhead.
        Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.

        52. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has
    your assessment of the W78 changed in the following years?
        Dr. Anastasio. Additional surveillance data and analysis has
    improved the Laboratory's understanding of this condition. However, my
    assessment that the W78 should be replaced or undergo a comprehensive
    life extension activity has not changed.
        Dr. Miller. No, LLNL's assessment has not changed. The W78 warhead
    is beyond its original design lifetime. Material aging and
    compatibility concerns increase as warheads continue to age and
    concerns about other possible changes invariably grow as a warhead type
    exceeds its original design lifetime. Results from surveillance of W78
    units have identified issues associated with material aging and
    compatibility, which have the potential to impact components within the
    NEP. This has resulted in increased attention on this warhead by LANL.
    The classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year
    2004 through the present (fiscal year 2010), offer the best detailed
    classified summary overview regarding the recent history associated
    with the warhead.
        Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.

        53. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
    long have you recognized the aging and reliability concerns found in
    the W78?
        Dr. Anastasio. The specific W78 aging issue was first reported in
    an annual assessment letter by then-Director John C. Browne.
        LANL assesses that this aging issue has not affected the safety,
    reliability or performance of the W78 to date.
        Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78 aging characteristics
    and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the safety, reliability,
    or performance of the W78 to date;'' however, ``the condition is
    progressive and beyond current predictive capabilities.'' Dr. Anastasio
    first made this assessment about 4 years ago and at that time stated
    the life extension would be needed with a decade. LLNL has concurred
    with these concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual
    assessment process. Issues identified include material aging and
    compatibility issues, which can impact components within the NEP. The
    classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004
    through the present (fiscal year 2010), offer the best detailed
    classified summary overview regarding the recent history associated
    with the warhead.
        Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.

        54. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what is the consequence of additional delays in the start of the LEP
    study, if for example the study does not commence in fiscal year 2011?
        Dr. Anastasio. Delaying the start of the W78 LEP study results in
    delaying the work that will be required to extend the life of the
    system. Within the limited nuclear weapons complex capabilities, delays
    in the W78 LEP schedule will delay future LEPs.
        We have been delaying the start of the W78 life program for several
    years. The specific condition in the W78 is progressive and must be
    addressed in the future. The longer we delay the LEP, the greater the
    risk is to the W78 and the missions that this weapon supports. As I
    mentioned earlier, at the current time, LANL assesses that this aging
    issue has not affected the safety, reliability or performance of the
    W78.
        Dr. Miller. There are a number of potential consequences associated
    with delays in starting the LEP study for the W78 warhead, which would,
    in turn, delay start of the effort to refurbish this vitally important
    weapon system that is already beyond its design life. At the highest
    level, delaying the study will increase the risk of meeting the
    proposed first-production-unit which is currently slated for fiscal
    year 2021. In addition, delays will also put at risk achieving the high
    level goals currently being put forward for the warhead attributes
    associated with this life extension (for example improving warhead
    safety, security, and use control). Delays in initiating the W78 LEP
    study would also impact the ongoing joint Navy and Air Force effort to
    develop a common Arming, Fusing, and Firing assembly for their
    respective reentry vehicles. Delays in the W78 study will also result
    in missing the opportunity to work synergistically with the ongoing
    B61-12 LEP to develop and mature technologies and processes that could
    potentially be used in both warhead life extensions.
        Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.

        55. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    the W78 the most likely candidate for a ``replacement'' LEP?
        Dr. Anastasio. The W78 is the first possible candidate for a
    ``replacement'' LEP, as the W76-1 LEP is currently being built, and the
    B61 is not designed as a ``replacement'' LEP. With regards to the W78
    LEP, many options have been proposed as possible solutions for the W78
    LEP, but until the study is complete it is impossible to decide what
    the optimal solution is. LLNL has the responsibility for this LEP. Los
    Alamos will provide a critical analysis of any options that LLNL
    proposes in this process (red-teaming the design).
        Dr. Miller. LLNL looks forward to commencing the study on the W78
    LEP. At this time it would be premature to decide which life extension
    option (refurbishment, reuse, or replacement) is the best technical
    option for the Laboratory to present to leadership in the Departments
    of Energy and Defense.
        Based on direction from the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA
    Administrator, the laboratories will explore all options. With
    information at hand on all options, stockpile decisions will be based
    on U.S. national security and stockpile requirements, informed by our
    best scientific judgment, and consistent with the guidance contained in
    the NPR and the plans outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and
    Management Plan. I consider it my critical responsibility as a
    Laboratory Director to assure that all options authorized by Congress
    and the President are explored when LEPs option are evaluated.
        Dr. Hommert. Per the national policy guidance in the NPR, the full
    range of options will be considered for the W78 LEP, and a
    ``replacement'' approach would require Presidential authorization. The
    final decision on which LEP approach is best for a given warhead is
    based primarily on characteristics of the NEP, and I therefore defer to
    Dr. Miller.

        56. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, can
    you explain why it is important to study the W88 warhead, in terms of
    potential commonality with the W78 LEP?
        Dr. Anastasio. One of the advantages of having a warhead that is
    compatible with both delivery systems (ICBMS and SLBMs) is that it
    allows different options to address potential and or unanticipated
    failures in the stockpile. The laboratories have examined the
    possibility of common adaptable warheads for a variety of applications
    over several decades. The key issue in all these evaluations is ``how
    common do the warheads need to be?''
        The studies indicate that if the goal is to maintain a credible
    deterrent with fewer warheads in the stockpile, stockpile diversity is
    critical. Ideally, the design of the physics packages for the W78 and
    W88 should be different yet able to fit and fly in ``common'' reentry
    bodies.
        Dr. Miller. A high level goal for all future LEPs is to develop
    options that would enable the life-extended warhead to be used in
    multiple delivery platforms. We need to explore if this is a viable
    approach to reducing the number of different warhead types in the
    future stockpile without adversely impacting overall stockpile
    reliability, and if this approach offers the potential to reduce the
    number of hedge (non-deployed) warheads required. For the W78 LEP, this
    goal entails developing options that would enable the resulting warhead
    to be interoperable with (able to be used in) the Air Force Mk12 A and
    the Navy Mk5 reentry vehicles. (The W88 is currently fielded in the Mk5
    Reentry vehicle.) Therefore, this requires the W78 LEP to address the
    life cycle/stockpile-to-target requirements for both of these warheads
    and both delivery vehicles and missile systems.
        Dr. Hommert. The NPR recommends ``initiating a study of LEP options
    for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the
    resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
    types.'' The development of an interoperable warhead that could be
    mated to either an ICBM or SLBM delivery platform would support a hedge
    strategy that includes ``cross-leg'' hedging which would allow desired
    reductions in the size of the overall stockpile. Cross leg hedging
    means that a weapon system from one leg of the triad would be used to
    cover a shortfall created from a systemic defect or problem in a weapon
    system from another leg of the triad.
        A feasibility study of a common Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F)
    system for the W78/Mk12A and W88/Mk5 warheads was conducted by Sandia
    with excursions that examined extensions of the AF&F for high-surety
    warheads and the existing W87/Mk21 system. This 90-day study, which was
    completed in February 2010, considered enveloped functional and
    environmental requirements that were derived from Air Force, Navy, and
    STRATCOM inputs. While it is not possible to make one AF&F that can be
    used without modification on multiple delivery platforms or reentry
    systems, the study found that significant levels of AF&F commonality
    are possible with existing system architectures and enable additional
    surety features compatible with the existing NEPs and future high-
    surety warhead designs. The results of this Sandia study will be
    incorporated into the W78 LEP Phase 6.1 study once it is authorized by
    Congress.

        57. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    there capacity in the enterprise to undertake an LEP on the W80?
        Dr. Anastasio. The complex has limited capacity to execute several
    LEPs at the same time. In addition, several LEPs are needed in the next
    decade. It is critical for the DOD and NNSA to work out the national
    priorities in the context of limited resources. If it is a national
    priority to do the W80 LEP simultaneously with the other LEPs, there
    will be significant cost impacts and likely LEP schedule impacts as the
    nuclear weapons enterprise works towards increasing its capacity.
        Dr. Miller. The current NNSA LEP Plan includes the W80 undergoing a
    life extension in 2030. NNSA continually reviews the scheduling of LEPs
    with the aim of best supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
        Dr. Hommert. The current Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
    sustains the W80 in the U.S. stockpile through the end of the next
    decade, with an LEP or another Long-Range Standoff option activity at
    that point in time. If this timing holds, there should be capacity in
    the enterprise to undertake this work. In the meantime, a strong
    surveillance program for the W80 is essential.

        58. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what risks is the United States taking in view of the current status of
    that warhead?
        Dr. Anastasio. On October 1, 2004, the NNSA transferred design
    agency responsibility for the W80 warhead from LANL to LLNL. In May
    2006 Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) decided to cancel the LEP for the
    W80.
        Dr. Miller. LLNL has certified the W80 for a planned service life
    through 2030, barring any unforeseen issues with the system. Like the
    W78, a life extension of the W80 will require a 10-year effort for
    study of options and refurbishment. If a critical performance issue
    were to be identified, a delay in commencing the life extension could
    affect the status of the system.
        The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a balanced and well-
    funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons enterprise's agility
    and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The fiscal year 2011 and
    fiscal year 2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward
    revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent, reversing the recent trend of declining budgets, and
    manage risk. The requested budget increase to the NNSA Weapons
    Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
    primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
    our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
    surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
    systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
    facilities and infrastructure.
        Dr. Hommert. In Sandia's non nuclear component space, concerns
    about technology obsolescence and aging are significant. We have very
    limited data associated with components fielded for more than 30 years.
    Our current experience with the B61 indicates an increasing likelihood
    of degradation and performance impacts as components age.

        59. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    when will the CMRR and UPF be required for the W78 production?
        Dr. Anastasio. Many options have been proposed as possible
    solutions for the W78 LEP, but until the study is complete it is
    impossible to decide what the optimal solution is. CMRR will be
    available to support pit production in TA-55/PF-4 starting no later
    than 2023 if the pit replacement option for the W78 is selected by the
    NNSA and approved and funded by Congress.
        Dr. Miller. The CMRR facility and the UPF are both scheduled to be
    operational in the 2021-2022 timeframe to support production
    requirements. This is fully consistent with the current W78 LEP's
    current production schedule. While it is important that the facilities
    follow the current schedule to meet its targeted FPU of the W78 LEP, it
    is equally important that potential cost growth in facility
    construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that
    underpins stockpile assessment. A balanced and well-funded SSP is
    required to support the deterrent. The requested budget increase for
    the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work
    across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and
    technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and
    supports a reinvigorated surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are
    necessary to keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the
    modernization of the facilities and infrastructure.
        Dr. Hommert. I defer to Dr. Anastasio and Dr. Miller.

        60. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what are the risks to the stockpile if the facilities follow the
    current schedule?
        Dr. Anastasio. Stockpile risks can be grouped in two areas. First,
    ongoing stockpile stewardship activities (surveillance and
    manufacturing assessments) that are dependent on the chemistry and
    materials capabilities planned for the CMRR nuclear facility and
    currently housed in the existing CMR, a facility that is more than 60
    years old. Second, planned schedules for new facilities are being
    factored into LEP planning such as W78. Given this advanced planning
    risks to the stockpile are currently manageable. However, pit
    production in TA-55/PF-4 at the necessary rate cannot be supported by
    CMRR nuclear facility until 2023.
        Dr. Miller. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a
    balanced and well-funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons
    enterprise's agility and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The
    fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first step toward
    reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the
    nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons
    Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
    primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
    our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
    surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
    systems safe, secure, and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
    facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
    three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
    SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. While it is important that the
    facilities follow the current schedule and are available for the FPU of
    the W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in
    facility construction does not adversely affect the science and
    technology that underpins stockpile assessment.
        Dr. Hommert. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP)
    assumes the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s.
    If the facilities follow the current schedule, the enterprise will be
    able to execute the stockpile LEPs as documented in the SSMP.

        61. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what are the risks to the stockpile if the facilities are delayed?
        Dr. Anastasio. If the pit replacement option for the W78 is
    selected by the NNSA, and approved and funded by Congress, the risk to
    delays will be determined by the existing pit build capacity. Without
    CMRR's chemistry and analytic capabilities, necessary pit production
    rates in TA-55/PF-4 cannot be supported, delaying the W78 LEP and
    future LEPs.
        Dr. Miller. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a
    balanced and well-funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons
    enterprise's agility and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The
    fiscal year 2011 and the fiscal year 2012 budgets are positive first
    steps toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and
    revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons
    Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
    primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
    our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
    surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
    systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
    facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
    three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
    SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. While it is important that the
    facilities follow the current schedule and are available for FPU of the
    W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in facility
    construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that
    underpins stockpile assessment.
        A delay in the CMRR facility and/or the UPF could impact the range
    of options for the upcoming LEPs. While the B61-12 is independent of
    CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR could have potential impact
    on replacement or reuse design options for W78 LEP. For the W78 LEP,
    the availability of CMRR could affect the W78 LEP's performance margin
    and the potential warhead interoperability between systems like the W78
    and W88. Also, the facilities that CMRR and UPF will replace are more
    than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to
    maintain, and they are safety, security, and environmental concerns.
        Dr. Hommert. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for
    in the NPR and documented in the SSMP would not be achievable, and
    would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for certain systems could
    impact our confidence in the state of health of the US nuclear
    deterrent.

        62. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
    you support the acceleration of the construction of these facilities?
        Dr. Anastasio. Completing these projects sooner reduces risk to
    execution of required life extensions. Continuing to rely on greater
    than 60+ year old facilities to support the Nation's nuclear deterrent
    cannot be sustained.
        Dr. Miller. In the out-years, the uncertainties associated with the
    baselines for the planned LEPs and the construction of large facilities
    are my primary source of concern. Without detailed designs for the CMRR
    facility and the UPF and the corresponding cost analysis, funding
    requirements will remain uncertain. The laboratories and plants are
    working with the NNSA to develop baselines for these projects, but the
    total costs are not yet known. It is critically important to budget for
    adequate contingency in large construction projects to ensure
    sufficient flexibility to accommodate the detailed design issues that
    typically arise in constructing these complex, one-of-a-kind
    facilities. It is equally important to ensure that funding for these
    construction projects does not erode available funding for the science
    and technology activities that underpin the maintenance and assessment
    of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
        The fiscal year 2011 and the administration's proposed fiscal year
    2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward revitalizing the
    nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent. The nation's nuclear strategy requires a SSP that is
    balanced, integrated, and sustained over time. The level of investment,
    consistent with planned nuclear warhead reductions, must grow over time
    to capitalize construction of essential new facilities; sustain a
    healthy science, technology, and engineering core; manage the aging
    stockpile; support an increased level of LEP work; and maintain a
    critically skilled workforce. Until the baselines are completed, we
    will not have an accurate and reliable estimation of the resources
    required. It is clear that sustained effort will be necessary to ensure
    the appropriate balance within the program across all of its
    requirements.
        Dr. Hommert. The current schedule is aligned with the life
    extension plans for the stockpile and therefore should be sufficient. I
    don't believe the overall budget profile for the NNSA over the next
    decade will support both the acceleration of these facilities and the
    required work on the stockpile.

        63. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what steps is Los Alamos taking
    to accelerate the construction of the CMRR?
        Dr. Anastasio. The project will be executed in a cost effective and
    phased manner where possible with available funding. For example, we
    plan to execute some site preparation activities such as establishing a
    concrete batch plant while the facility design is finalized. That way,
    construction can begin once the design is approved and the project
    receives authorization and the needed appropriations to begin facility
    construction.

        64. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what is your understanding of
    the timeline for the CMRR to be completed and to be fully operational?
        Dr. Anastasio. Formal direction from NNSA requires that CMRR be
    completed no later than 2020 with operation no later than 2023.

        65. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, why are different completion
    dates (2020 and 2023) provided in the Section 1251 report?
        Dr. Anastasio. The 2020 date is for completion of construction.
    Readiness and startup activities leading to full operation of the
    analytical chemistry and material characterization operations is 2023.

        66. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, after your retirement, how many
    weapon designers at Los Alamos will have direct nuclear test
    experience?
        Dr. Anastasio. After I retire there will be 8 nuclear weapon
    designers at Los Alamos with nuclear test experience. They range in age
    from 50 to 70 years old and in experience from a single nuclear test to
    being involved in greater than ten nuclear tests. In addition, we have
    10 Laboratory-Affiliate weapon designers (retired staff who work on a
    part-time basis) with nuclear test experience that helps train the next
    generation of designers.

        67. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what are the risks associated
    with the eventual condition when no weapon designers will have
    designed, tested, and deployed a new weapon?
        Dr. Anastasio. I have confidence in our design experts with and
    without nuclear weapons testing experience. The upcoming LEPs provide
    an essential element in continuing to develop new expertise in our
    design staff. I have also worked to develop new tools and methods for
    ensuring our confidence in the stockpile in the absence of new nuclear
    testing opportunities. In addition, the design labs have, for many
    years, instituted a rigorous training program for our incoming
    designers in anticipation of the time when our weapons staff with test
    experience would no longer be available. Another important element to
    ensure the continuing reliability of the stockpile will be in
    maintaining two distinct design laboratories, where we have two
    separate teams; one at each lab, reviewing the annual data will ensure
    good overall confidence in our systems.

        68. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, how many weapon designers at
    Livermore will have direct nuclear test experience?
        Dr. Miller. There are presently 12 active nuclear weapons designers
    at LLNL with direct nuclear test experience. These designers continue
    to make vital contributions to maintaining the stockpile and assessing
    foreign threats. Additionally, there are a handful of LLNL managers
    with direct nuclear test experience who continue to share their
    expertise with the next generation of designers.

        69. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, what are the risks associated with
    the eventual condition when no weapon designers will have designed,
    tested, and deployed a new weapon?
        Dr. Miller. The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in
    developing the tool set required to maintain the stockpile in the
    absence of testing and using those tools to train the next generation
    of stockpile stewards. The program was specifically designed to
    maintain the skills necessary in the absence of nuclear testing. The
    SSP's above-ground experimental facilities, such as the NIF and DARHT,
    not only provide data required for stewardship, but also provide our
    weapons designers with opportunities to carry out complex, integrated
    physics experiments that stress and hone designer judgment as issues
    are investigated or potentially new phenomena are revealed.
    Additionally, judgment is developed through computational simulation.
    Detailed simulations of weapons system performance continue to give new
    insight into weapons physics, often times beyond that available during
    the era of underground nuclear testing.
        Of equal importance is providing adequate opportunity to exercise
    skills in the complete design through production cycle, which is
    essential for training laboratory and production plant personnel. For
    example, the NNSA's assignment of responsibility for the W78 LEP to
    LLNL provides an essential path for maintaining the competency and
    capability of its design and engineering cadre through the exercise of
    an integrated system design/engineering/manufacturing program. Finally,
    involvement in the annual assessment process provides a basis for
    developing and exercising the judgment of new nuclear weapons staff in
    dealing with difficult issues related to nuclear design and
    engineering, in much the same way that the development of nuclear
    weapons and underground testing did.
        The NNSA and the laboratories have made a concerted effort to
    mentor, train and validate the skills of the next generation of the
    Nation's stockpile stewards at a time when scientists and engineers,
    who were trained during the period of extensive weapon development
    programs and nuclear testing, are still available. I am confident in
    the capabilities and competencies of LLNL's workforce. Because of this,
    and the success of the SSP, I believe that the risks associated with
    the eventual condition when there are no weapon designers who have
    designed, tested, and deployed a new weapon are minimal.

        70. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
    Strategic Posture Commission led by Secretaries Bill Perry and James
    Schlesinger recommended that DOE, NNSA, the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, and the DNFSB be realigned, and that NNSA should be a
    separate agency from the DOE. Has this occurred?
        Dr. Anastasio. No. The Strategic Posture Commission
    recommendations, as outlined in Chapter 6, include the realignment of
    the DOE/NNSA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the DNFSB and the
    establishment of NNSA as a separate agency. Implementing these
    recommendations requires actions on the part of Congress in cooperation
    with the executive branch.
        Dr. Miller. Not to my knowledge.
        Dr. Hommert. No, this has not occurred.

        71. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what efforts, if any, have NNSA and DOE taken to streamline Federal
    operations to facilitate laboratory productivity?
        Dr. Anastasio. We continue to work with DOE and NNSA to seek
    improvements in process efficiency and to reduce and streamline Federal
    rules and regulations and their interpretation impacting laboratory
    operations and productivity to ensure the long-term vitality of the
    Laboratory. As the Strategic Posture Commission warned, NNSA has become
    part of the problem, ``adopting the same micromanagement and
    unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate''
    As the Stimson Center recommended in its report (pg 41) Leveraging
    Science for Security A Strategy for the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in
    the 21st Century ``NNSA should configure its oversight of the
    Laboratories and NTS to ensure performance meets the national security
    priorities within the bounds of budget, policy, and law. The DOE should
    provide oversight in an audit capacity, not in a compliance capacity,
    to minimize unnecessarily intrusive and bureaucratic intervention.''
        Dr. Miller. In December 2009, NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino
    launched an Enterprise Re-engineering Reform Initiative aimed at
    dramatically rethinking and redesigning what is widely perceived to be
    a compliance and enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and
    contractor entities in NNSA. The goal is transform to a more
    constructive Federal/contractor partnership using NNSA's effort with
    the Kansas City Plant (KCP) as a model.
        LLNL submitted in June 2010 an Implementation Plan to the NNSA
    Livermore Site Office (LSO) for a governance approach implementing
    aspects of the KCP Oversight Model for Non-Nuclear Operations.
    Considerations included streamlining DOE orders and directives,
    implementation of a Management Assurance System, and changes to the
    Performance Evaluation Plan (used by NNSA to assess each site's
    performance) to focus it on more strategic issues.
        Some progress is being made. The DOE Office of Health, Safety
    intends to streamline 107 directives. A LLNL/LSO Change Control Board
    has been chartered that will determine implementation of changes to DOE
    directives. In addition, our Laboratory has been taking significant
    steps to strengthen its Contractor Assurance System and transform it
    into a fully-functioning Management Assurance System that would serve
    as a means to eliminate Federal-contractor inefficiencies in management
    and controls and reduce fixed costs. We are not yet at a stage where
    the NNSA LSO has significantly modified oversight processes based on
    its use of our Contractor Assurance System.
        Dr. Hommert. Since 2009, DOE, NNSA and Sandia have been working at
    DOE Secretary Steven Chu's direction to reengineer and transform the
    way DOE runs the enterprise and manages its contractors. Reform is
    necessary because the cost of doing business has outpaced the budget.
    Costs are being driven by management by directive, unclear Federal and
    contractor roles and responsibilities, and the government-owned
    contractor-operated (GOCO) contracting mechanism that needs updating.
        To address the problems of overly prescriptive requirements that
    are open to inconsistent interpretation and application, NNSA and the
    contractors have focused reform on: (1) thorough reviews of all
    requirements by Federal/contractor boards; (2) use of voluntary
    consensus standards where they exist and are appropriate; (3) risk-
    based tailoring to each work situation; and (4) decisionmaking pushed
    to the lowest appropriate levels.
        At all steps of this process, we are assuring that the referenced
    changes will enable continued improvement in our safety and security
    environments.

        72. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
    you have extra layers of administration and expense because of the
    current management structure involving NNSA and DOE?
        Dr. Anastasio. We have still not fully implemented the approach
    where the Federal Government establishes our goals and we find the most
    efficient and effective means of delivering those goals.
        Dr. Miller. Safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally
    responsible work performance is a top priority at LLNL. Our management
    structure and our systems reflect that priority and are designed to
    ensure that our work is performed safely and securely and meets
    environmental quality standards.
        Many aspects of the way we operate are driven by DOE orders and
    directives-often requiring more manpower than is ideally necessary to
    ensure the quality of work performance. We are working with DOE and the
    NNSA to streamline applicable DOE orders and directives without
    compromising operational quality while implementing a Management
    Assurance System that can be used by the NNSA Livermore Site Office to
    modify and streamline oversight processes.
        Dr. Hommert. We do have to meet administrative and management
    requirements at both the DOE and NNSA levels. For the most part, these
    requirements are specific to different components of the organization
    and are addressed accordingly. However, in my view, there is some level
    of redundancy.

        73. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
    Strategic Posture Commission also recommended that laboratories be
    recognized for their involvement in the assessment of weapons in ways
    not involving an award fee. Has this recommendation been implemented?
    If so, how?
        Dr. Anastasio. The Strategic Posture Commission recommended that
    Congress and the administration create a formal mechanism (not
    involving awarding fee) to recognize the importance of the involvement
    of the directors of the weapons laboratories in the annual
    certification process. I am not aware of any action to bring this
    recommendation to fruition.
        Dr. Miller. The Commission recommended creation of a formal
    mechanism ``to recognize the importance of the involvement of the
    directors of the weapons laboratories.'' The Annual Assessment of the
    Stockpile is singularly my most important responsibility as director of
    LLNL. It is a responsibility that I--and prior directors--have taken on
    with full diligence and utmost seriousness.
        To my knowledge, no direct action has been taken on the
    Commission's recommendation. However, the importance of my weapons
    assessment responsibilities is properly recognized within the Federal
    Government. I have had access to all necessary audiences on any
    occasion where I have felt it necessary to voice a concern or issue
    about the stockpile. In addition, it is noteworthy that the fundamental
    importance to national security of independent, critical assessments of
    the condition of the Nation's nuclear stockpile by trained,
    knowledgeable experts at the NNSA laboratories was made clear in the
    2010 NPR. This recognition is being supported by proposed necessary
    budget increases. Your continued support for the SSP is a highly
    valuable form of recognition of the importance of the work of the NNSA
    laboratories and their directors.
        Dr. Hommert. The majority of Sandia's fee is fixed rather than
    award fee. While the award fee is associated with the overall
    laboratory performance, and some of the performance measures and
    milestones are associated with our stockpile evaluation and assessment
    responsibilities, in practice, I do not find any conflict between our
    fee structure and the ability to independently conduct the assessment
    of the stockpile. Going forward, I believe it is important to maintain
    our technical independence and that our technical judgment not be
    impacted by fee. Any changes to our fee structure should be carefully
    assessed to ensure appropriate incentives are established that do not
    compromise this technical independence.

        74. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
    you worry about the management structure of the laboratories?
        Dr. Anastasio. I do have concerns that in practice, the DOE/NNSA
    structure overseeing management of the Laboratory has room for improved
    efficiency and effectiveness, in balancing between enabling our support
    of technical work activities for our national security science missions
    (and which are aligned with the strategic views of both DOE and NNSA),
    and oversight of our operations. Related to this is the challenge of
    ensuring adequate investment in science, technology, and engineering
    capabilities and facilities that are essential to our mission, but
    extend beyond the near-term needs of the weapons program. This concern
    has also been identified in several previous external studies and
    assessments of the management and oversight structure under which the
    Laboratories function. Some studies, such as the report of the
    Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,
    have suggested profound restructuring. We continue to work with DOE and
    NNSA to seek improvements in process efficiency and to work with them
    and other agencies to ensure the long-term vitality of the Laboratory.
        Dr. Miller. Under the new contract and management structure, the
    Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) partnership has
    assembled a prestigious Board of Governors consisting of leaders of the
    parent organizations and national experts in science and technology,
    mission, business, operations, and security. Oversight of Laboratory
    performance is maintained through a number of standing committees of
    the Board and regular corporate assessments. The Laboratory Director is
    also the President of LLNS and reports to this Board of Governors. The
    Federal Government through the LLNS Board of Governors has access to a
    broad range of commercial and academic expertise. The Board facilitates
    ``reach back'' to the parent organizations for augmenting the talent
    and expertise at the Laboratory when the need arises. Parent
    organizations have organized Assess, Improve, Modernize (AIM) Teams,
    and Functional Management Assessment (FMA) reviews are regularly
    scheduled throughout the year to help drive continuous improvement.
        Over time, this has allowed the Laboratory to more cost effectively
    and efficiently fulfill its mission to provide exceptional science and
    technology to help solve the Nation's most important problems.
        Dr. Hommert. I believe there is an effective management structure
    in place today. Within the construct of the GOCO model, further
    refinements and modernization are required to optimize our
    contributions to the broad set of national security challenges faced by
    our full customer set.

        75. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has
    there been a change in the emphasis on scientific research and academic
    freedom since the conversion to the for-profit model?
        Dr. Anastasio. Our emphasis on scientific research and academic
    freedom has not changed-it is critical to our mission. Los Alamos'
    national security mission, and its role as the premier national
    security science laboratory, requires a strong emphasis on scientific
    research. We continue to lead the national laboratories in the number
    of peer-reviewed scientific publications, we continue to win a
    significant number of R&D 100 awards each year, and our staff continues
    to be recognized by professional societies for their work. Our annual
    external reviews of our technical capabilities also help us validate
    our strengths and identify any weaknesses. Our mission requires that we
    act first and foremost in the best interests of the Nation, and
    represent our best technical judgments with integrity and objectivity.
    Our internal policies therefore continue to protect academic freedom to
    publish, and to demand intellectual integrity and expect scientific
    objectivity even in the face of possibly competing interests. Without
    scientific integrity, we would fail both ourselves and the Nation.
        Dr. Miller. In my view, the importance of scientific research and
    academic freedom has not been impacted by the change in the
    organization that manages the Laboratory for the Federal Government.
    These remain important cores values of the institution. I highlighted
    in my written testimony some of the many outstanding scientific and
    technical accomplishment made at LLNL in fiscal year 2010. The Lawrence
    Livermore National Security (LLNS) Board of Governors shares my belief
    that the Laboratory's continuing success ultimately depends on the
    strength of its science, technology, and engineering, which in turn,
    depends on the quality of people at the Laboratory and their ability to
    pursue scientific research in the national interest.
        As I also stressed in my written testimony, the national investment
    in the impressive science, technology, and engineering capabilities at
    the NNSA laboratories needs to be carefully nurtured and preserved. My
    concerns are budgetary. If these assets are neglected, they will
    quickly erode and disappear. This issue merits your careful
    consideration as the country faces both very difficult budget decisions
    and a challenging future in a dangerous world.
        Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #73.

        76. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
    you worry about the independence of the laboratories now and in the
    future?
        Dr. Anastasio. The Laboratories remain independent today and must
    in the future, to continue to properly serve the Nation. As I noted in
    my answer to the previous question, our mission requires both a strong
    emphasis on science and to provide out best technical judgments with
    integrity and objectivity independent of possibly competing interests.
    Los Alamos maintains that independence today-from both political and
    commercial interests. I have no concern that this is changing, today.
    Among other things, the presence of the University of California among
    the parent companies in Los Alamos National Security, LLC helps support
    that historical--and vital--tradition. However, retaining this
    independence requires vigilance. It is important that future Congresses
    and administrations recognize the importance to the Nation of the
    independence of the Laboratories and help the Laboratory guard it, for
    it is certainly possible for future decisions on management and
    structure to undermine it.
        Dr. Miller. I do worry about the continuing independence of the
    NNSA laboratories in the future because it is an essential element and
    core strength of the Laboratory--not only for our assessments of the
    safety, security, and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
    certification of changes made to weapons to extend their lifetime, but
    also to ensure the quality of the other vitally important national
    security work we perform.
        Our continuing independence depends on three key factors. First is
    continuing recognition by the executive branch and Congress of the
    importance of the laboratories and their independence. Second, funding
    for the laboratories over the long term must be sufficient for them to
    sustain the scientific skills and technical know-how required to
    competently deal with challenging nuclear weapons issues and merit the
    confidence of the American people in the judgments of our stockpile
    stewards. Finally, the NNSA national laboratories must continue to
    attract and retain top-notch talent to address the major scientific and
    technical challenges of stockpile stewardship and the many national
    security issues facing the U.S. Vigilance is required in each of these
    areas to sustain laboratory independence.
        Dr. Hommert. It is important that the laboratories live up to the
    principles of the FFRDC model by ``operating in the public interest
    with objectivity and independence and to be free from organizational
    conflicts of interest''. In my view, this model needs to be continually
    reinforced and while I believe the national laboratories continue to
    render effective independent advice to the government; constant
    vigilance is required to retain this independence.

        77. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    the Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) model
    intact at the NNSA laboratories? If not, what has changed?
        Dr. Anastasio. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulations, an FFRDC
    ``meets some special long term research or development need which
    cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor
    resources'' and ``is required to operate in the public interest with
    objectivity and independence.'' The Laboratories are exemplars for both
    attributes. The FFRDC model is excellent. However, I am concerned that
    our current contractual environment has led to an overemphasis on
    managing the Laboratory as a procurement contract and that this
    constrains the implementation of the FFRDC model at the Laboratories,
    and limits the efficiency and effectiveness with which we can offer
    support to Federal agencies in the way that the FFRDC model intends.
        Dr. Miller. LLNL is a FFRDC, operated as a GOCO entity. The
    paradigm for GOCO model is that the Government tells the contractor
    ``what to do,'' and the contractor determines ``how to do it.''
        The GOCO model needs attention. The DOE Secretary, the Deputy
    Secretary and the Under Secretaries have made it a high priority to
    improve the efficiency of the Departmental processes and mechanisms for
    governance. In December 2009, NNSA launched an Enterprise Re-
    engineering Reform Initiative aimed at dramatically rethinking and
    redesigning what is widely perceived to be a compliance and
    enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and contractor entities
    in NNSA. We are working with NNSA to identify governance/oversight
    issues and address them with the goal of transforming to a more
    constructive Federal/contractor partnership.
        Dr. Hommert. For the most part, the FFRDC model is intact at the
    NNSA laboratories. However, these laboratories are much more diverse in
    their national security roles than when the FFRDC model was first
    created. There is an interplay between the GOCO and FFRDC models that
    can impact the ability of the laboratories to fulfill their FFRDC
    roles. For these reasons, I believe a re-examination of the model is
    appropriate.

        78. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what is the role of the national laboratories in doing deterrence
    analysis, targeting analysis, model development, analysis validation,
    etc.?
        Dr. Anastasio. The nuclear weapons laboratories bring critical
    technical capabilities to bear on numerous national security problems.
    While the core mission of Los Alamos is assuring the safety, security,
    and effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile, the skills and personnel
    required for this mission also contribute to addressing other national
    challenges. The Laboratory was heavily involved in Cold War deterrence
    modeling and analysis, as well as in assessing weapon effects. Today,
    we are working on deterrence, stability and other related national
    security issues. Los Alamos is also involved in providing detailed
    analysis on nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign
    weapon intelligence, and event response capabilities. Much of this work
    performed at Los Alamos involves and/or benefits from the development
    of applicable models to help inform decisions. Wherever possible,
    validation tools are also used to increase confidence in the robustness
    of such analyses.
        Dr. Miller. LLNL personnel have supported decisionmaking at the
    highest levels of government since the establishment of the Laboratory.
    LLNL has played a significant support role by providing in-depth
    technical analysis across the full spectrum of the Nation's `Strategic
    Assessment' efforts.
        Generally, a strategic assessment capability consists of three
    broad areas of capabilities:

        (1)  Deterrence Theory. This includes its translation into nuclear
    policy and doctrine. This effort draws on the intellects of our most
    experienced academics, former and current senior policy advisors, and
    former and current senior military officers. Over the years, the
    national effort has been informed by studies conducted at LLNL on the
    impact of systems and technologies that might be deployed in the
    future.
        (2)  Decisionmaking. Background and context support of the
    necessary government decisions is required to turn nuclear policy
    guidance into practical implementation plans. This is the area where
    LLNL's history of integrating science, technology and engineering has
    fundamentally contributed to the assessment of U.S. and foreign nuclear
    weapons systems and capabilities-as well as the impact of potential and
    proposed arms control agreements. Three examples are ICBM basing
    analysis, studies of strategic stability with the deployment of
    ballistic missile defenses, and the analysis of modernization of
    tactical nuclear forces in Europe.
        (3)  Development of execution plans for our nuclear forces. This is
    comprised of direct support to the Nation's nuclear warfighting
    apparatus and involves a myriad of technical analyses. We serve in
    technical advisory roles for such systems as the STRATCOM's S&T
    Advisory group, Red on Blue type exchange studies, and technical issue
    reviews associated with targeting studies such as ``hard and deeply
    buried targets.''

        Dr. Hommert. The 1953 Agreement between the AEC and DOD directs the
    laboratories to perform analyses of weapons effects, target
    interactions, and weapon options. The nuclear weapons laboratories have
    a long history of performing these analyses, often in partnership with
    the DOD. DOD has the lead in weapons effects/target interaction
    analysis methodology while the national laboratories are primarily
    responsible for weapons performance and output modeling.

        79. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what is the status of these capabilities at the laboratories?
        Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos prides itself on being a national
    resource, where as a trusted advisor for the government, we provide
    technical input and support on a variety of key national security
    issues. As a result of our broad mission space, our national security
    scientific capabilities have grown and strengthened over the past
    several years to new levels (e.g., nonproliferation and
    counterterrorism). Unfortunately, other critical areas have experienced
    significant atrophy, resulting in areas where we are manpower and/or
    resource limited (e.g., radiochemical analysis and assessment, and
    weapon targeting and effects analyses). For now, I remain confident
    that we are able to deliver on the missions we are asked to address
    today, but I am concerned about the future for some of these critical
    programs.
        Dr. Miller. Today, the strategic assessment capability that exists
    at the Laboratory is significantly less than the capabilities we had at
    the height of the Cold War and what continued to exist up through the
    early 2000s. Some of this reduction had begun, understandingly, with
    the demise of the Soviet Union and the halt in the development of new
    nuclear weapons systems. The remaining reductions were a direct result
    of a combination of circumstances: (1) budgetary pressures on the
    nuclear enterprise such that the Laboratory could no longer continue
    this mission-supportive effort as a funded priority; (2) the lack of a
    government agency willing to sponsor and sustain the special skill base
    required for these types of analyses; and (3) the attrition of the high
    caliber, experienced individuals able to lead these types of
    specialized assessments without any replacement planning.
        While LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do
    technical analyses, we will have to ``grow'' the necessary skill sets
    of these individuals. They would provide leadership in LLNL's efforts
    to rebuild the Nation's efforts in this critical area. Essentially, if
    we are to develop such a sustainable, focused capability in a short
    amount of time, we would need to ``mentor'' a few handpicked
    individuals drawing on those experienced strategic systems analysts at
    LLNL who have led previous efforts and are either semi-retired but
    still available or about to retire in the next few years. This would
    require a concerted effort that must be planned and executed before the
    opportunity vanishes.
        It is important to note that this is a widely prevalent situation
    for the Nation's Strategic Assessment Capability, and that high-quality
    analyses require an interconnected network of skill sets. The nation
    would need a multi-year commitment from DOD and the NNSA to restore a
    sustainable Strategic Assessment Capability and a coordinated,
    interagency plan on what to specifically refresh, restore, and/or
    refocus.
        Dr. Hommert. At Sandia, these capabilities are strong. We have
    maintained a core group of systems analysts who have the appropriate
    clearances, access to data, and the broad understanding of nuclear
    weapons, weapons effects, target response, and military operations
    required for such assessments. The weapons modeling activity is a core
    activity for the laboratories and has been strongly supported. Sandia's
    recent focus in these efforts has been on supporting both DOD and NNSA
    decisions regarding LEPs, and on maintaining nuclear deterrence with
    the smallest possible number of weapons.

        80. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
    have those capabilities been enhanced or decreased over the last 20
    years?
        Dr. Anastasio. As I mentioned in my previous answer, Los Alamos has
    had some capabilities increase over the past 20 years, while others
    have atrophied. Some of our enhanced capabilities include the
    advancement of simulation, modeling, and computational capabilities,
    improved validation supporting not only the weapons program, but also
    nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign weapon
    intelligence and event response capabilities. One area where skills
    have atrophied includes the tri-laboratory (LANL, LLNL, SNL) efforts on
    targeting analysis and weapon effects modeling. The current expertise
    in these areas resides mainly in increasingly senior staff, whose
    skills are not exercised regularly and whose capabilities must be
    transferred to create the next generation of experts.
        Dr. Miller. Despite the need to deal with a number of new
    technologies and innovations in the strategic area that have strong
    implications for our national security, there has been little
    government agency interest in conducting the type of rigorous
    analytical assessments that have supported decisionmaking in the past.
    This atrophy in capability began with the collapse of the Soviet Union
    and the subsequent peace dividend and was followed by a shift of the
    Nation's focus to conventional wars and countering terrorism. In terms
    of our remaining capabilities, it would be fair to say that current
    capability is largely aimed at support for the warfighter and the
    development of nuclear force execution plans.
        A major concern I have--in addition to the erosion and potential
    loss of our Strategic Assessment Capability--is the fact that we are
    not developing and applying necessary assessment capabilities to
    address the new realities we are beginning to face today from technical
    innovations and potential threats that are lurking just over the
    horizon. For example, we have limited ability to do assessments that
    incorporate advanced conventional capabilities, cyber, space warfare,
    hypersonic and boost glide delivery technologies, and advances in
    stealth and directed energy weapons.
        Dr. Hommert. In the area of weapons modeling, Sandia's capabilities
    have been substantially enhanced over the past 20 years. The Science-
    Based SSP strengthened our ability to predict weapon system behavior in
    a variety of environments. This has increased our confidence in
    assessments of the reliability of the stockpile. In the deterrence and
    targeting analysis areas, Sandia's capabilities are longstanding and
    have been enhanced in the last 20 years by the close interaction and
    relationships established with the organizations responsible for
    building the Nation's war plans (e.g., STRATCOM, JFCC Global Strike,
    OSD, DIA, and the military services).

        81. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
    there appropriate expertise to assess a potential major shift in U.S.
    nuclear weapon policy?
        Dr. Anastasio. There is a small core group of dedicated individuals
    at Los Alamos with a broad range of experience involving issues related
    to nuclear weapons policy. In 2009 and 2010, this core group provided
    technical guidance on, and input into, the development of the
    government's policy positions for the 2010 NPR, the NPT Review
    Conference, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the New START treaty.
    Often on short timelines, this team helped engage the broader
    scientific capabilities of the laboratory to provide direct assistance
    to the administration on the technical issues involved in these
    important events and documents, helping to enable informed decisions
    that affect the future of U.S. nuclear weapons, nonproliferation and
    arms control policies.
        Dr. Miller. Assessing a major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy
    is a very complex undertaking requiring an integrated set of analytical
    skills that includes policy, sociological, and technical expertise.
    LLNL has participated in studies of this character in the past, but
    recent experiences and current capabilities are limited. The strategic
    assessment capability that exists at LLNL is significantly less than
    the capabilities we had at the height of the Cold War and what
    continued to exist up through the early 2000s.
        LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do technical
    analyses, but we will have to ``grow'' the necessary skill sets of the
    individuals at the Laboratory that would provide leadership in our
    efforts to support the Nation's efforts to carry out such an
    assessment. Most importantly, an integrated set of analysis
    capabilities--here at the Laboratory or elsewhere--largely does not
    currently exist and would have to be rebuilt. However, key pieces exist
    at LLNL. We can build on technical expertise and capabilities in areas
    such as weapons reliability and effectiveness, weapons enterprise
    production capabilities, issues related to monitoring nuclear weapons
    and their production, technologies and challenges related to
    verification, emerging strategic technologies and threats, and the
    capabilities of other nation states.
        Dr. Hommert. The appropriate expertise does exist to both assess
    the pros and cons of various policy options, as well as assess the
    detailed implications of any given policy. Close interaction and
    coordination among the major stakeholders mentioned previously is
    required. Sandia's contributions stem primarily from our broad
    understanding of nuclear weapons and possible future stockpile
    scenarios, including implications for deterrence policy and the
    nonproliferation and arms control regime.

        82. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    what additional measures are needed?
        Dr. Anastasio. As the Nation continues to rely on a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent for its security and that of its
    allies, the national nuclear laboratories play a critical role.
        Included in this role is providing technical support to policy
    makers. One of the concerns at the national laboratories is that the
    set of individuals, which hold both in-depth technical and policy
    capabilities in nuclear weapon policy, is small in number and getting
    older. One of our goals in the coming years will be to engage more
    young laboratory staff in technical/policy issues involved in
    sustaining an effective deterrent, while also addressing broader
    national security issues including nonproliferation and arms control--
    and to help these staff develop the experience needed to support future
    policy discussions and decisionmaking. Their informed technical input
    will be critical for the future, especially as it relates to the U.S.
    nuclear weapons stockpile and enterprise, and to the development and
    effective implementation of nonproliferation, nuclear security,
    counterterrorism and arms control monitoring and verification
    capabilities.
        Dr. Miller. The experienced, skilled analysts and integrated set of
    analysis capabilities needed to carry out a thorough assessment of a
    major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy largely does not exist--at
    LLNL or elsewhere--and would have to be rebuilt. The nation would need
    a multi-year commitment from DOD and the NNSA to restore a sustainable
    Strategic Assessment Capability and a coordinated, interagency plan on
    what to specifically refresh, restore, or refocus.
        Rebuilding a Strategic Assessment Capability is also important for
    addressing the new realities we are beginning to face today from
    technical innovations and potential threats that are lurking just over
    the horizon. For example, the Nation currently has limited ability to
    do assessments that incorporate advanced conventional capabilities,
    cyber, space warfare, hypersonic and boost glide delivery technologies,
    and advances in stealth and directed energy weapons.
        Dr. Hommert. It will be important for the United States to develop
    a better understanding of future adversaries to maintain deterrence at
    lower stockpile numbers while simultaneously strengthening global non-
    proliferation construct. This can be accomplished by more regular and
    robust interagency collaborations that seek to cost-effectively enhance
    analytic capabilities. In addition, we need a stronger emphasis on
    assessments of aging and technology obsolescence as we move forward
    with the modernization of the stockpile.

        83. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
    would you rate expertise in nuclear weapons effects analysis?
        Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos has expert-level capability in certain
    areas, and a lesser level of expertise in other areas. While the number
    of staff with these skills are limited, expert-level capabilities exist
    in definition of the weapons-effect source term (all radiation outputs
    emanating from a nuclear explosion); in the transport of radiation
    (e.g., neutrons, gamma-rays, x-rays) and the radioactivity levels they
    induce; in nuclear forensics; in electromagnetic pulse assessment; in
    air-shock and ground-shock environments; in certain nuclear-explosion
    space environments; and in assessment of nuclear weapon effects on U.S.
    warheads. Los Alamos has some expertise on modeling radiation plume
    dispersal; thermal-pulse environments; and structural damage.
        Dr. Miller. I believe that the integrated set of capabilities to
    perform weapons effects analysis has degraded significantly. Today, the
    skill to perform weapons effects analysis resides in a mere handful of
    people. At LLNL, we continue to be mindful of the importance of
    maintaining the expertise in this essential analysis area within the
    context of limited resources.
        However, it is important to note that with the tools developed by
    the SSP, the ability of the community to significantly advance our
    understanding of nuclear weapons effects has greatly increased. HPC
    advances make it possible to develop and apply far more detailed
    simulations of weapons effects than were possible even a decade ago.
    Tools like the NIF have enormous potential to conduct weapons effects
    tests and to gather detailed data that can be used to validate
    simulation models. In fact, the first campaign of weapons effects
    experiments was performed in 2010. A cadre of critically skilled
    weapons scientists and engineers is available to execute the task
    rebuilding weapons effects analysis capabilities.
        Dr. Hommert. Our nuclear deterrence depends on the capability of
    our stockpile to hold an adversary's assets at risk. To guarantee this,
    nuclear weapons must be designed and built to withstand extreme levels
    of radiation and still function as intended. The laboratories must have
    a deep scientific understanding of how radiation can damage systems and
    be able to model the effects of radiation on our stockpile. We can no
    longer do the testing that was done at the Nevada Test Site or at other
    facilities that are no longer operating, such as the Sandia Pulsed
    Reactor. We are more dependent than ever on our remaining experimental
    facilities and our ability to model effects.
        Our expertise in modeling weapons effects is extensive but fragile.
    This capability depends on scientific expertise in a wide range of
    esoteric subjects, such as electromagnetic effects, shock and
    mechanical response, equation of state of exotic materials, radiation
    transport, radiation damage in semiconductors, high-voltage breakdown,
    nuclear and plasma diagnostics, pulsed-power and reactor technologies,
    density functional theory, and molecular dynamics. In some areas our
    expertise is very robust, but in other areas it depends on just one or
    two people. In a couple of cases we have lost important capability, and
    we are trying to rebuild it. Many of our best scientists are nearing
    retirement, and we are aggressively recruiting people to work on the
    upcoming stockpile refurbishments. It takes some time for newly hired
    staff to become fully effective in working on our unique technologies.
    We face significant technical challenges in understanding the
    performance of aging weapons and in refurbishing the stockpile. Our
    research programs in these areas are essential to supporting the
    stockpile and to training the staff of the future.

        84. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in
    terms of the connection between stockpile stewardship and assessing the
    targeting value of a weapon, what are the consequences of warhead aging
    and reliability for STRATCOM on targeting, especially at reduced
    stockpile numbers?
        Dr. Anastasio. Intended weapon targeting is factored into the
    Military Characteristics and Stockpile-to-Target sequence requirements
    associated with each type of U.S. weapon system. Weapons must sustain
    the rigors of warhead launch and delivery, and may be intended to fly
    through and survive defended target space (so-called hostile
    encounters). In general, nuclear weapons were designed with margins to
    sustain the rigors of warhead delivery, including hostile encounters.
    Weapon aging can lead to internal weapon changes that reduce those
    margins, which, in principle, can impact STRATCOM targeting options.
    Los Alamos has the capability to assess the impact of weapon aging, as
    well as the rigors of warhead delivery and hostile encounters, in
    evaluating reduced weapon margins. Accordingly, inputs are made
    available to STRATCOM to help inform their decisions on targeting.
    These inputs become more important at reduced stockpile numbers and as
    the stockpile continues to age.
        Dr. Miller. As the number of weapons decrease, the importance of
    optimal selection of targets and reliable weapon performance greatly
    increases. At some point, a fundamental shift in approach will be
    necessary. During the Cold War, with large numbers of weapons and
    targets, consideration of a statistical average of expected weapon
    reliability was sufficient and if a target were especially important,
    more than one weapon could be designated. At much smaller numbers,
    knowledge of the health of each individual warhead becomes increasingly
    important. Such information will require a fundamental change in the
    nature of the surveillance stockpile program and use of technical
    options such as imbedded sensors that would allow assessment on a
    weapon-by-weapon basis rather than reliance on statistical ``average''
    behavior.
        Dr. Hommert. Today, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is assessed
    to be safe, secure, and reliable. We strive to continuously strengthen
    the scientific underpinnings of our assessments, and thereby improve
    our understanding of the state of health of the stockpile. For the
    future, concerns we have about aging and technology obsolescence
    associated with our non-nuclear components must be addressed through
    the LEPs.

        85. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
    should there be consideration given to increased reliability/
    survivability requirements as the stockpile is reduced?
        Dr. Anastasio. Consideration for stockpile reliability and
    survivability requirements is extremely high today, and would remain so
    as the stockpile is reduced.
        Dr. Miller. It is important to ensure the reliability of stockpile
    remains high as the stockpile is reduced. It is equally important that
    the Nation have high confidence in the quality of the weapon
    performance and reliability assessments of the stockpile stewards. A
    balanced and well-funded SSP is key to ensuring the stockpile is safe,
    secure, reliable, and effectively meets evolving military requirements
    and assuring decisionmakers that the weapons scientists and engineers
    making those assessments have the necessary training, skills, and
    ability.
        The fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first step
    toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing
    the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent. The necessary program of work to create a balanced SSP
    includes: (1) the science and technology that underpins our
    understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
    surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
    systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
    facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
    three primary areas of SSP will affect the deterrent, particularly as
    the stockpile is reduced.
        Dr. Hommert. The requirements for stockpile reliability and
    survivability are high today, and should be maintained as the size of
    the stockpile is reduced. As we go forward to reduced numbers, we must
    address aging and technology obsolescence associated with non nuclear
    components to ensure that our stockpile continues to meet these
    requirements.

        [Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
    Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
    Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
    assistant to Senator Nelson; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
    Senator Sessions.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Nelson. Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee convenes today to discuss the strategic systems of
    the Military Services, the bombers, the submarine-launched
    ballistic missiles (SLBM), and the land-based ballistic
    missiles. They'll all be in the inventory of U.S. strategic
    systems for many years, but in smaller numbers. At the same
    time that we're reducing the overall numbers of strategic
    systems, we must also be modernizing them. Most of these
    systems will support U.S. deterrence through 2030.
        To discuss these systems today, we have with us: Lieutenant
    General James M. Kowalski, Commander, Air Force Global Strike
    Command; Rear Admiral Terry J. Benedict, Director, Navy
    Strategic Systems Programs (SSP); Major General David J. Scott,
    Director, Air Force Operational Capability Requirements, Deputy
    Chief of Staff, Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; Major
    General William A. Chambers, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff
    for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; and Brigadier
    General Garrett Harencak, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons
    Center.
        Welcome to all of you here today. We appreciate your being
    here.
        At approximately 3:30 p.m., we'll adjourn here and
    reconvene in a closed session in room 217 of the Senate
    Visitors Center. Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford,
    Military Deputy, Office of the assistant Secretary of the Air
    Force for Acquisition, will brief the members of the committee
    on the Air Force plans for the new bomber program.
        Last year the administration completed the congressionally-
    directed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which set forth the
    nuclear force structure for the next decade. This force
    structure is reflected in the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START) which entered into force in February. Under the
    terms of the treaty, the United States will maintain no more
    than 700 deployed strategic missiles and nuclear-capable
    bombers and no more than 800 non-deployed strategic missile
    launchers and nuclear-capable bombers. While the United States
    has 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty, planning
    is already underway.
        We look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses this
    afternoon about the plans for implementing the New START
    treaty. While reducing the number of delivery systems, they
    must also be sustained, modernized, and eventually replaced.
    Each of the systems today is highly capable, but maintaining
    that capability well into the next decade will take significant
    focus and funding.
        All three of the bombers will need significant
    modernization until the new bomber can replace them. The B-52,
    the oldest of the bomber fleet, will be almost 70 years old
    when it's replaced. While old, the bombers remain formidable,
    as evidenced by recent events in Libya and the ongoing
    deployments in support of the war in Afghanistan.
        The Trident D5 SLBM will continue in production, with
    targeted upgrades, as it transitions from the current ballistic
    missile to the Ohio-class replacement submarine. Planning and
    design for that new submarine is already underway.
        The Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    has recently been upgraded to last through 2020. To continue to
    be a viable system through 2030, updates will be needed.
        While most of the attention is focused on the delivery
    systems, the infrastructure that sustains these systems is
    fragile and must also be maintained and modernized. The
    support, test, and training equipment, the command and control
    systems, and even the helicopters that provide access to the
    missile fields must all be updated or replaced.
        Since the events of August 2007, when the Air Force
    unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on the wings of a B-52 bomber
    from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, the Air
    Force has undertaken significant changes in its management,
    organization, and support of the nuclear enterprise. The
    positions that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Major General
    Chambers, and Brigadier General Harencak now hold were all
    established as the result of that mistake. The Air Force has
    made considerable progress in an effort to ensure that its
    nuclear enterprise is sound.
        We look forward to hearing from each of you about the
    changes that have been made, the progress that has been
    achieved, and the plans to ensure that the progress is
    sustained.
        Now it's my pleasure to turn to the attention of Senator
    Sessions, my good friend and ranking member, for any opening
    comments you may have.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just so much
    enjoy working with you and respect you and your knowledge of
    these issues and commitment to America, to the defense of our
    country. I know you deeply share those views.
        I thank the distinguished panel for being with us and your
    service to your country. Given that appropriate policy
    officials couldn't be here today, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman,
    your commitment to hold another committee hearing next month to
    address critical issues regarding the modernization and future
    plans for further potential reductions, and I'm afraid unwise,
    reductions in the size of our nuclear stockpile with the U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Department of Defense (DOD)
    policy officials.
        Last week's hearing focused on the cost for modernizing the
    nuclear weapons complex. The effort is a critical
    recapitalization program which the administration estimates
    will cost at least $84 billion over 10 years.
        I came up, Mr. Chairman, and I asked about those two
    buildings. They would cost a lot of money. We just had the
    biggest industrial, I think, announcement in America in
    Alabama, Thyssenkrupp steel mill, $5 billion, 3,700 acres, 7
    million square feet under roof, 160 acres under roof, 11
    million cubic yards of Earth moved, twice that for Hoover Dam;
    75,000 pilings laid end to end would stretch from Mobile, AL to
    Houston, TX; 1 million cubic yards of concrete, and much more.
    That was including their equipment, a $5 billion project.
        I think our two buildings that they're talking about were
    $4 or $5 billion each, and I think we need to ask about the
    cost of those buildings as we go forward. We need them, though.
    I really do believe that there's no alternative to modernizing
    our infrastructure at our labs.
        Today's hearing focuses on the triad of nuclear delivery
    vehicles and its modernization, which is estimated to cost more
    than $120 billion over that same period. In sum, for the
    foreseeable future our country must commit itself to
    approximately $20 billion a year to sustain and modernize our
    strategic deterrent. This, I think, is necessary investment. If
    we can make it successful for less, we need to try to do that.
    But we just have to assume this, because we neglected real
    investments in this area for many years.
        I fully agree with the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger
    Strategic Posture Commission finding that: ``The triad of
    strategic nuclear delivery systems should be maintained for the
    immediate future and this will require some difficult
    investment choices.'' I think that bipartisan commission is
    correct. Characterizing the choices before us as ``difficult''
    might be an understatement, but one thing that is absolutely
    clear is that the recapitalization of our deterrent will
    require a sustained, smart, and long-term commitment spanning
    future Congresses and administrations.
        I look forward to discussing the overall importance and
    crucial need for this modernization effort. I also look forward
    to discussing the timeline during which these modernization
    efforts must be accomplished, our ability to sustain what we
    currently have, and the steps being taken early on in
    emphasizing the affordability of the systems.
        DOD unfortunately is not immune to the current fiscal
    situation that we find ourselves in. This year we'll spend $3.7
    trillion and we take in $2.2 trillion. Admiral Mullen, the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told us that our
    biggest national security threat is our debt.
        Everybody will be challenged, but there are certain things
    we have to have. We have to have a triad. We have to have
    nuclear deterrence and it needs to be safe and reliable. A
    robust triad of nuclear delivery vehicles is essential and the
    recapitalization is critical to national security.
        One of the biggest unanswered questions in the future is
    the ICBM force. According to section 1251 of the report's
    November 2010 update, the administration intends to begin to
    study what a follow-on ICBM might look like, but it is doing so
    with the concerning caveat, we note. That is, in a way that
    ``supports continued reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons.''
        Recent statements by the President's National Security
    Adviser have shed new light on the administration's intention.
    In his speech before the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Donilon stated
    ``The administration is currently making preparations for the
    next round of reductions''--we've hardly gotten through this
    one, or approved this one, and that DOD will ``review our
    strategic requirements and develop our options for further
    reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued to
    mention in that speech the, as he said, the President's
    declared vision for ``achieving peace and security in a world
    without nuclear weapons.'' I'm confident that I won't live to
    see that, unless we do have a second coming.
        Mr. Donilan continued by stating that in meeting these
    objectives the White House will direct DOD to consider
    ``potential changes in targeting requirements and alert
    postures.''
        Last month, along with 40 of my colleagues, I sent a letter
    to the President regarding our desire to be consulted on any
    further reduction plans to the nuclear stockpile. The New START
    treaty was only signed a few weeks ago. Yet the administration
    is moving forward in my opinion in a pace that justifies the
    phrase ``reckless,'' pursuing more reductions at an expedited
    and potentially destabilizing pace.
        I am very concerned and I look forward to discussing with
    our witnesses today what guidance and assumptions they have
    been given or told to follow in the design, development, and
    posture for modernizing the triad, and we'll have the policy
    people to discuss at a later date.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and for
    the excellent team of witnesses we have before us.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I appreciate
    very much your opening comments and look forward to the
    opportunity for questioning.
        We have a large panel this afternoon and limited time. All
    of the prepared statements will be included for the record.
    It's my understanding that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Rear
    Admiral Benedict, and Major General Chambers will be making the
    opening statements. I guess we should start with you, Admiral.

    STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC
                       SYSTEMS PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Benedict. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee: It is an honor to
    testify before you today representing SSP. SSP's mission is to
    design, develop, produce, support, and protect our Nation's
    sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II D5 strategic
    weapon system.
        The recently ratified New START treaty increases the
    dependence on the submarine leg of the triad. The reductions in
    warheads and launchers will result in ballistic missile
    submarines carrying approximately 70 percent of the Nation's
    strategic commitment.
        I have focused on four priorities since returning to SSP:
    nuclear weapons security, the D5 life extension program (LEP),
    the Ohio replacement program, and the solid rocket motor
    industrial base. The first priority I would like to address and
    arguably the most important priority is the safety and the
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Our Marines and Navy
    Master-at-Arms provide an effective and integrated elite
    security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities, in
    King's Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard units have
    been commissioned at both facilities to protect our Ohio-class
    submarines as they transit to and from their dive points.
        The second priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life
    extension efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based
    deterrent. The D5 weapon system continues to demonstrate itself
    as a credible deterrent and exceeds the operational
    requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago.
    Last month the USS Nevada conducted the 135th consecutive
    successful flight of the D5 system.
        SSP is extending the life of the D5 weapon system through
    an update to all the subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire
    control, guidance, missile, and reentry. These life extension
    efforts will provide the Navy with the system we need to meet
    the operational requirements.
        My next priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is
    the Ohio Replacement Program. To lower development costs and
    leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II D5, the Ohio
    replacement SSBN will enter service with the D5 strategic
    weapon system beginning in 2029.
        Finally, I would like to discuss the importance of the
    solid rocket motor industrial base. The Navy is maintaining a
    continuous production of rocket motors. However, we have faced
    significant cost challenges as both the National Aeronautics
    and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force demands have
    declined. We are working with our industry partners, DOD, and
    Congress to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base and
    find ways to maintain successful partnerships.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and at the
    end of the other two opening statements I would be pleased to
    take your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by RADM Terry Benedict, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Navy's
    strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this morning
    representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support and protect
    our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II (D5) Strategic
    Weapon System (SWS). The Trident II (D5) Submarine Launched Ballistic
    Missile (SLBM) represents the Nation's most survivable strategic
    deterrent capability. The men and women of SSP and our industry
    partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors on
    strategic deterrent patrol and our Marines and Sailors who are standing
    the watch ensuring the security of the weapons we are entrusted with by
    this nation.
        It has been 11 months since I assumed command as the 13th Director
    of SSP. This is a relatively small number of incumbents since the
    inception of the program 55 years ago. Since returning to SSP, I have
    focused on four priorities: Nuclear Weapons Security; the Trident II
    (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; and the
    Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base. Today, I would like to discuss my
    four priorities and why these priorities are keys to the sustainment of
    the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent and its future viability. I
    will also provide an update on our SSBN force and our flight test
    program.
                            nuclear weapons security
        The first priority I would like to address, and arguably the most
    important priority, is the safety and security of the Navy's nuclear
    weapons. Navy leadership has clearly delegated and defined SSP's role
    as the program manager and technical authority for the Navy's nuclear
    weapons and nuclear weapons security in Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
    Instruction 8120.1.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
    at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
    two Strategic Weapons Facilities in Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S.
    Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been commissioned at
    both facilities to protect our submarines as they transit to and from
    their dive points. These coast guardsmen and the Navy vessels they man
    provide a security umbrella for our Ohio-class submarines. Together,
    the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our
    Nuclear Weapons Security Program.
        SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
    these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. On
    October 1, I stood up a new division within SSP responsible for
    overseeing all nuclear safety and security operations, as well as
    managing the future acquisition planning for this mission. SSP
    continues to maintain a safe, reliable, and secure environment for our
    strategic assets as well as focus on the custody and accountability of
    the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to the Navy.
                           d5 life extension program
        The next priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life extension
    efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based deterrent. We are
    executing the Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program in cooperation
    with the United Kingdom (U.K.), under the auspices of the Polaris Sales
    Agreement. I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership
    with the U.K. remains strong.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and meets the operational requirements established
    for the system almost 30 years ago. We have successfully conducted 135
    consecutive flight tests of the D5 missile and continue to exceed our
    required performance. This record of success demonstrates our Navy's
    ability to respond if called upon. Our allies and any potential rivals
    are assured the U.S. strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and
    effective.
        However, we cannot simply rest on our successes. The Trident II
    (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarines for over 20 years, and is planned for operational deployment
    for at least another 30 years, making it operational longer than any
    other missile system SSP has deployed. We must remain vigilant of age-
    related issues to ensure a continued high level of reliability.
        The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
    technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the D5 Strategic
    Weapon System to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to
    serve as the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement
    submarine platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all
    the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
    guidance, missile and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
    guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
    fit, and function of the original system, in order to keep the deployed
    system as one homogeneous population and to control costs. We will also
    remain in continuous production of energetic components such as solid
    rocket motors. These efforts will provide the Navy with the missiles
    and guidance systems we need to meet operational requirements.
        SSP previously restructured the D5 Life Extension Program to ensure
    sufficient time for additional missile electronics design evolutions. I
    am pleased to report that our restructured program is on track. SSP
    successfully conducted a system Critical Design Review of the missile
    electronics in January 2011. Our life extended guidance system also
    completed its Critical Design Review and is scheduled for its first
    flight test in fiscal year 2012. Our first flight test of a D5 life
    extended missile is scheduled in fiscal year 2013. The Initial
    Operating Capability of the combined missile and guidance systems is
    scheduled in fiscal year 2017.
        Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
    is our SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) efforts, which utilizes open
    architecture and commercial off-the-shelf hardware. The first increment
    of this update is now being installed throughout the fleet and training
    facilities. To date, installation is complete on four U.S. SSBNs and
    two U.K. SSBNs. This effort is a technical obsolescence refresh of
    shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will
    provide greater maintainability of the SWS and ensure we continue to
    provide the highest nuclear weapons safety and security for our
    deployed SSBNs. The first end-to-end operational test of the SSI
    Increment 1 was successfully conducted in March 2011 on the USS Nevada
    (SSBN 733).
        To sustain the SWS, SSP is extending the life of the W76 reentry
    system through a refurbishment program known as the W76-1. This program
    is being executed in partnership with the Department of Energy,
    National Nuclear Security Administration. The W76-1 is now in full
    production and has achieved Initial Operating Capability. The W76-1
    refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original W76 for
    approximately an additional 30 years. This program successfully
    incorporated commercial off-the-shelf hardware and other economies to
    achieve Navy component production costs 75 percent less than previous
    nuclear arming, fuzing, and firing systems.
        In addition to the W76-1, the Navy is in the initial stages of
    refurbishing the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the
    Air Force to reduce costs through shared technology. This refurbishment
    will reach Initial Operation Capability in the SLBM Fleet in 2018.
    These programs will provide the Navy with the weapons we need to meet
    operational requirements throughout the Ohio service life and the
    planned follow-on platform.
                            ohio replacement program
        My third priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is the
    Ohio Replacement Program. The continued assurance of our sea-based
    strategic deterrent requires a credible SWS as well as the development
    of the next class of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy team is
    taking aggressive steps to ensure the Ohio Replacement Program is
    designed, built and delivered on time with the right capabilities at an
    affordable cost. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense
    Acquisition Board approved the Ohio Replacement Program Milestone A in
    January 2011 and authorized entry into the Technology Development
    Phase.
        The Navy team has the benefit of leveraging the success of the
    Virginia class build program and the opportunity to implement many of
    those lessons-learned to help ensure we design the Ohio replacement for
    affordability both in terms of the acquisition and life cycle
    maintenance. Maintaining this capability is critical to the continued
    success of our sea-based strategic deterrent now and into the future.
        The Ohio Replacement Program will replace the existing 14 Ohio-
    class submarines. To lower development costs and leverage the proven
    reliability of the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio replacement will enter
    service with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 life-extended missiles
    onboard beginning in 2029. These D5 life extended missiles will be
    shared with the existing Ohio class submarine for approximately 13
    years until the Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the
    transition to the Ohio-class replacement is beneficial from a cost,
    performance, and risk reduction standpoint.
        A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
    development of a Common Missile Compartment that will support Trident
    II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio class replacement and the successor
    to the U.K. Vanguard Class. The United States and the United Kingdom
    have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the
    Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The United States will
    continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the U.K.
    for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales
    Agreement. As Director, SSP I am the U.S. executor of this agreement.
    Our programs are tightly coupled both programmatically and technically
    to ensure we are providing the most cost effective, technically capable
    nuclear strategic deterrent for both nations.
        The New START Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, and
    the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reinforce the importance of strategic
    submarines and the SLBMs they carry, as the most survivable leg of the
    Triad. The reductions in warheads and launchers will result in
    ballistic missile submarines carrying the majority of the Nation's
    strategic force. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5) SWS
    is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed today on
    our Ohio class submarines, as well as, in the future on the Ohio
    replacement.
        The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose
    endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous,
    uninterrupted strategic deterrence into the 2080s. The development of
    this follow-on capability requires the cooperation of the executive
    branch and Congress to deliver an effective sea-based deterrent on time
    with the right capabilities to sustain the most survivable leg of our
    Triad at the right cost for many decades to come.
                       solid rocket motor industrial base
        The fourth priority I would like to discuss is the importance of
    the defense and aerospace industrial base. In particular, the decline
    of the Solid Rocket Motor industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy
    resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability
    at a minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year through
    the Future Years Defense Plan. However, we have faced significant cost
    challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    (NASA) and Air Force demands have declined. We will continue to
    experience those cost increases if demand shrinks further in coming
    years.
        Reduced industrial demand has resulted in overhead costs spread
    over a smaller customer base. The Navy's growing percentage of the
    Solid Rocket Motor business base has already resulted in increased unit
    costs. In addition, Trident II (D5) is the only program in production
    of Class 1.1 type propellant. This type of propellant is highly
    energetic and necessary for use in submarines due to volume
    constraints.
        Navy added funding to the budget to address the unit cost increase.
    While these additional funds are essential for the continued production
    of D5 rocket motors, the long-term sustainment of this vital national
    capability must also be addressed.
        We are working with our industry partners, the Department of
    Defense and Congress, to sustain the Solid Rocket Motor industrial base
    and find ways to maintain successful partnerships. The OSD (Industrial
    Policy)-led Interagency Task Force, with membership from Navy, the Air
    Force, OSD along with the Missile Defense Agency and NASA, is
    developing a Solid Rocket Industrial Base Sustainment Plan. SSP is an
    integral part of this process. We look forward to continuing this
    collaborative process to find an interagency solution to maintain this
    crucial national capability.
                                 today's force
        The final topic I would like to address is our SSBN force. Our 14
    U.S. Navy SSBNs, 8 of which are homeported in the Pacific and 6 in the
    Atlantic Fleet, continue to provide a credible, survivable and reliable
    sea-based strategic deterrent for our national leadership.
        Last month, the USS Nevada (SSBN 733) successfully conducted her
    Demonstration and Shakedown Operation involving the launch and flight
    test of a Trident II (D5) missile and is now ready to return to
    strategic service. The completion of this test marks the 135th
    consecutive successful flight test of a D5 missile. Therefore, I am
    pleased to report to you the Trident SWS continues to demonstrate
    itself as a credible deterrent and meet the operational requirements
    established for the system almost 30 years ago.
        USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) will soon complete her Engineering
    Refueling Overhaul, enter post availability testing, prepare for her
    Demonstration and Shakedown Operation, and return to the operational
    force in the spring of 2012. Two more of our SSBN submarines are
    undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls, which will maintain the
    viability of these platforms through the service life of the Ohio
    class.
        We must continue to be vigilant of age-related issues to ensure the
    high reliability needed for our SWS. With the Trident II (D5) missile
    planned for operational deployment through the service life of the Ohio
    class and as the initial payload on the Ohio replacement, D5 hardware
    will age beyond our previous experience base and will be operational
    almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent.
    Therefore, SSP has adjusted our flight testing philosophy to focus on
    older flight hardware in order to best predict aging characteristics.
    We tested our oldest missile to date from the USS Nevada last month.
    The first and second stage rocket motors were nearly 22 years old.
                                   conclusion
        This is an exciting time to be the Director at SSP. The New START
    Treaty reduces both deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, which
    will require the United States to continue to rely heavily on the
    survivable capability provided by ballistic missile submarines. The
    ballistic missile submarine is only one leg of the nuclear Triad. Land-
    based ICBMs, nuclear capable heavy bombers, and the SSBN force work
    together to provide the total U.S. nuclear deterrent. Each leg of the
    deterrent provides unique capabilities.
        The 2010 NPR also committed to strengthen conventional capabilities
    and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear
    attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on
    the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S.
    nuclear weapons. SSP stands ready to support and participate in future
    Conventional Prompt Global Strike efforts should leadership authorize
    our participation. However, the NPR makes clear that as long as nuclear
    weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure and
    effective nuclear deterrent. This includes modernizing nuclear weapons
    infrastructure; sustaining the science, technology and engineering
    base; investing in human capital; and ensuring that these goals remain
    a senior leadership focus. As the Navy's primary stakeholder, SSP is
    accountable for the technical oversight, safety, and security of Navy
    nuclear weapons and we understand the vast responsibility entrusted to
    us.
        Our Nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical component of
    our national security since the 1950s and will continue to assure our
    allies and deter our enemies well into the future. I am privileged to
    represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best
    interests of our great Nation.

        Senator Nelson. General Kowalski.

     STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. KOWALSKI, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
              FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

        General Kowalski. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions,
    I'm honored to appear before you today for the first time as
    commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, representing
    nearly 24,000 airmen and civilians. With strong support from
    Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, we have pursued three
    parallel efforts: the standup of a new major command, execution
    of current operations in support of our combatant commanders,
    and establishing a culture that embraces the special trust and
    responsibility nuclear weapons require.
        We're now fully engaged on our core organize, train, and
    equip tasks. Our new headquarters is about 81 percent of our
    authorized strength and we've established the organizational
    structure and processes necessary to execute the mission. Our
    work in revitalizing the nuclear enterprise is ongoing, as we
    build upon relationships between all the stakeholders
    representing the Services, the combatant commands, and other
    Federal agencies.
        We established a number of new training programs tailored
    to the nuclear and global strike missions. These programs
    develop expertise throughout the nuclear enterprise, to include
    operations, maintenance, intelligence, and security forces. As
    we worked to equip our forces, we assumed lead major command
    responsibilities for the Minuteman III, UH-1N helicopter, B-2
    and B-52 bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, gravity nuclear
    weapons, and Air Force nuclear command and control.
        As we go forward, I see three major challenges for the
    command. First, we must consolidate the gains of the last few
    years across the nuclear enterprise. We will continue to mature
    our headquarters and be rigorous in the examination of our
    processes. Second, we have to achieve enduring cultural change
    in our nuclear enterprise, while also aggressively supporting
    the current conventional fight. Our bomber forces are more than
    just dual-capable; they are full spectrum. Recent B-2 and B-1
    missions into Libya from bases in the United States show how
    quickly a crisis can develop and how long-range bombers can
    rapidly bring flexible combat power to a joint commander.
        Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force
    while preparing to meet the challenges of the future. At Air
    Force Global Strike Command we recognize our responsibility to
    be efficient and effective stewards of resources. Our goal is
    to instill a culture that consistently encourages innovation
    and fosters productivity.
        Our central mission remains unchanged: to develop and
    provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global
    strike operations in support of the President and the combatant
    commanders.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of the
    committee again for the opportunity to discuss the status and
    future of Air Force Global Strike Command, and I look forward
    to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Kowalski follows:]
             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. James M. Kowalski, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
    of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today for the
    first time as the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command,
    representing nearly 24,000 dedicated airmen and civilians.
        I would like to update you on the current status of the command,
    some of our progress since my predecessor, Lieutenant General Klotz,
    last testified in March 2010, and what I see as our central challenges.
                                 current status
        On 30 September 2010, Air Force Global Strike Command declared full
    operational capability. As we built this command, the first completely
    new Air Force major command (MAJCOM) in 27 years, the rest of the world
    did not pause. Some of the events that have shaped our development over
    the last year include the Nuclear Posture Review, the New START, and as
    a reminder of our conventional responsibilities, ongoing operations in
    support of U.S. Africa Command.
        Our efforts during the last year to strengthen the nuclear
    enterprise involved three parallel efforts: the methodical stand-up of
    a new major command and headquarters, the disciplined execution of
    current operations in support of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and
    the geographic combatant commanders, and the enduring effort to
    establish a culture that embraces the special trust and responsibility
    of nuclear weapons.
        As we approach our planned manpower levels and have the initial
    tasks associated with standing up the Headquarters behind us, we must
    now focus on building the relationships and processes both internal and
    external to the command. We are pleased by the progress the
    headquarters has made in assuming responsibilities for guidance and
    oversight of our forces. We continue to mature our processes in
    developing fiscal guidance and plans within the Air Force corporate
    structure. The connective tissue between organizations within the
    command is getting stronger as the units align to our priorities,
    metrics, and battle rhythm. In declaring full operational capability,
    we closed out 696 specific action items under Programming Plan 09-01
    that ranged from the broad task of establishing the initial Air Force
    Global Strike Command structure to specific tasks such as the
    identification of formal training quotas.
        On any given day we have 1,100 airmen deployed or on standby to
    support STRATCOM in the missile complexes and about another 1,100
    deployed in support of our regional combatant commanders. In addition,
    we stand ready to deploy up to 16 B-2s and 44 B-52s along with a range
    of combat support capabilities to support national taskings.
                    air force global strike command progress
        With the completion of initial stand-up activities, we were able to
    fully focus on our strategic master plan and make headway on our goals,
    objectives, and tasks. Although much work remains, I would like to
    share some of the progress we have made in our core areas of organize,
    train, and equip.
                   air force global strike command--organize
        Our ongoing efforts to organize the Air Force's newest MAJCOM have
    included standing up the Headquarters, defining our role within the
    nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3), establishing
    the 69th Bomb Squadron at Minot Air Force Base, the stand-up of General
    Officer Steering Groups in support of each of our weapons systems,
    providing Air Force Office of Special Investigations support to our
    missile convoys, and re-establishing the presence of Intelligence
    Officers in our Missile Wings.
        Standing up the headquarters presented a unique challenge the Air
    Force had not faced in 27 years. We are now operating at 81 percent of
    our authorized strength and we have established the Headquarters
    organizational structure, battle rhythms, metrics, and reviews
    necessary to execute the mission.
        ``Air Force Global Strike Command serves as the lead MAJCOM for 14
    major NC3 systems. In that capacity we provide a clear and strong voice
    for NC3 sustainment and modernization. Additionally, our staff has
    successfully integrated 14 previously dispersed NC3 programs into a
    unified and cohesive Global Strike Command NC3 portfolio. This
    translates into greater command situational awareness and management of
    these vital programs.''
        On 30 June of this year, the 69th Bomb Squadron will declare Full
    Operational Capability under the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base.
    The Air Force activated the 69th in September 2009 to better balance
    operational taskings with the addition of a fourth B-52 squadron, with
    two at Minot and two at Barksdale.
        We have also organized new General Officer Steering Groups (GOSGs)
    dedicated to sustaining each of our assigned weapon systems. These
    GOSGs focus on warfighter concerns, prioritize sustainment initiatives,
    and remove obstacles in order to keep Air Force Global Strike Command's
    assigned weapons systems capable and available. GOSG participation
    includes members of the Headquarters staff, senior representatives from
    Air Force Material Command and the Defense Logistics Agency, leadership
    from each of Air Force Global Strike Command's wings, and the National
    Nuclear Security Administration. Through this steering group process,
    funds and focus have been reprioritized to address issues with aging
    support equipment, diminishing manufacturing resources, supply parts
    support, and parts availability.
        We are now organized to provide the sole Response Task Force for
    any Air Force nuclear incident in the continental United States and
    stand ready to assist the Department of Energy and U.S. Air Forces in
    Europe (USAFE). An aggressive training schedule will culminate with
    participation in our first full scale national response exercise in May
    2012.
        Another organizational initiative is the revitalization of the
    Nuclear Weapons Stakeholder Partnership Meeting. This semi-annual
    meeting is the framework for discussion on specific nuclear weapon
    issues and is a forum for building relationships and trust between
    organizations from the Air Force, Navy, STRATCOM, USAFE, Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and the National Labs. We look
    forward to our next meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base later this
    month.
        Over the course of the past year Air Force Global Strike Command
    and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has teamed up
    to close a 4-year gap in Federal law enforcement support to off-base
    nuclear convoys. Air Force OSI agents have joined our Security Forces
    in the convoy, and provide an important link to local, state, and
    Federal law enforcement.
        Conducting inspections is a critical MAJCOM function, and we have
    made significant progress in this area as well. Over the course of the
    last year, our Inspector General, starting from scratch, built an 86-
    person inspection team fully capable of inspecting our bomber and
    missile wings. This team has been able to combine the inspection
    philosophies and instructions from Air Combat Command and Air Force
    Space Command to produce specific Air Force Global Strike Command
    direction for inspections throughout the nuclear enterprise.
        Finally, I am pleased to report that for the first time in nearly a
    decade, we have taken the steps necessary to send Intelligence Officers
    back into Missile Wings. Improving intelligence support to our nuclear
    forces was a key recommendation of the Schlesinger report and will
    enhance missile crew situational awareness, their understanding of
    strategic threats, and the vital role they play in the defense of our
    Nation.
                     air force global strike command--train
        In December 2008, the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force
    on Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Management identified
    the need for more nuclear-qualified and experienced personnel. Filling
    positions designated for personnel with nuclear experience is a command
    priority, and tailored training plays a major role in consolidating the
    gains we have made across the nuclear enterprise. Therefore, we
    established a number of programs to build upon the excellent basic
    military training and initial skills training that other Air Force
    organizations provide.
        On 30 March 2009, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the
    creation of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapons Instructor
    Course (WIC) at the U.S. Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS), Nellis Air
    Force Base, NV. The mission of the ICBM WIC is to produce weapons
    officers to lead weapons and tactics development and provide in-depth
    expertise throughout the ICBM community and the nuclear enterprise. On
    19 December 2010, the USAFWS graduated the first four students from the
    ICBM WIC. Three of these graduates have returned to our ICBM units to
    stand up the first weapons and tactics flights. These weapons officers,
    well versed in the nuclear enterprise, can serve as the lead integrator
    on issues related to operations, maintenance, and security forces at
    the missile units. The ICBM WIC is on track to produce eight graduates
    per year.
        One of our newest programs is an Intelligence Formal Training Unit
    designed to help our unit intelligence teams support the nuclear and
    global strike mission. We will host 5 courses in fiscal year 2011 and
    will train approximately 100 nuclear intelligence professionals to
    fully understand the daily deterrence mission.
        For our security forces, helicopter crews, and convoy drivers, we
    conduct graduate level training at Camp Guernsey in Wyoming and expect
    to expand our investment there over the next few years. We have
    significantly increased our nuclear security training program with
    emphasis on tactical expertise, marksmanship, and small unit
    leadership. This training allows integration of security forces,
    helicopter crews, and maintenance personnel into a cohesive and
    effective security team. Training together as a team, these warfighters
    maximize the capabilities necessary to protect our Nation's most vital
    resources and most powerful weapons. Additionally, we expanded our
    training capacity to include 8th Air Force's nuclear bomber security
    forces alongside the 20th Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile
    security forces in our tactical security training classes.
                     air force global strike command--equip
        Air Force Global Strike Command assumed lead command
    responsibilities for the Minuteman III and UH-1N helicopter weapon
    systems from Air Force Space Command on 1 December 2009, and for the B-
    2 and B-52 dual capable bombers from Air Combat Command on 1 February
    2010. Our four major weapons systems are on average, over 40 years old,
    and this includes our ``new'' 22-year-old B-2 bombers.
                                  equip: b-52s
        We have been successful in investing in multiple B-52 platform
    improvements to address both modernization and sustainment. The Combat
    Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program is the most
    significant B-52 modernization program since 1980 and will add 21st
    century capability to the aircraft. CONECT ground testing is ongoing at
    Edwards Air Force Base. We have also recently tested a bomber flight
    control software block upgrade that will significantly improve Advanced
    Targeting Pod capabilities and provide the interface to employ
    Miniature Air-Launched Decoys, and have started the Military Standard-
    1760 Internal Weapons upgrade program which will enable the carriage of
    8 modernized smart weapons in the bomb bay, such as the Global
    Positioning System-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition, increasing the
    total aircraft load-out from 12 to 20 Precision Guided Munitions.
        In the near-term, the B-52 needs upgrades to its anti-skid system,
    it needs airspace access upgrades such as the Mode S/5 transponder for
    real-time aircraft identification, data, and position, and it needs a
    new radar as the current radar is based on 1950s technology and may be
    unsupportable by 2016. We also need to resolve a safety of flight issue
    with the installation of the MultiMode Receiver 2020 Instrument Landing
    System Receiver that brings the aircraft in compliance for frequency
    modulation immunity, a requirement that previously restricted B-52
    aircraft transiting European airspace and using European airfields.
                                  equip: b-2s
        We made significant progress with the B-2 Radar Modernization
    Program during the past year, completing 4 aircraft and bringing the
    fleet total to 12 upgraded aircraft. Air Force Global Strike Command
    increased maintainability of the upgraded radar system by accelerating
    technical data deliveries and by maximizing antenna diagnostic and
    prognostic capabilities through software enhancements. We have also
    completed integration of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator with the B-2
    aircraft, giving the warfighter increased capability against hardened
    and deeply buried targets.
        We made progress in addressing B-2 aircraft parts obsolescence
    issues through weekly teleconferences across the B-2 enterprise to
    track current problem parts and project future parts issues. Improved
    communication, proactive planning, and procurement, as well as new
    logistics models for small fleet management, have decreased the B-2
    monthly non-mission capable supply rate by one third since February
    2010.
        For the B-2, we also must meet national requirements for nuclear
    command and control--the program of record is the extremely high
    frequency satellite communications. This upgrade not only meets nuclear
    requirements, it provides wideband ``net-ready'' beyond-line-of-site
    connectivity for full spectrum operations.
                            equip: uh-1ns and cvlsp
        Bombers are not the only aviation weapons systems vital to our
    mission in Air Force Global Strike Command. The UH-1N (Huey) Helicopter
    has served the Air Force well since 1970, primarily in providing
    missile field support, convoy security, and ferrying missile crews and
    maintenance teams to and from the missile complexes and providing
    aerial security surveillance of remote ICBM facilities. However,
    mission requirements changed in the late 1990s, and again after the
    terrorist attacks on September 11.
        The Air Force currently operates 62 UH-1N aircraft which do not
    meet all of the vertical lift requirements in our missile fields, nor
    in the AF District of Washington. Post-September 11, DOD determined an
    urgent need for vertical lift improvements over the current UH-1N. For
    AF Global Strike Command, the Huey's primary role is to provide a
    robust and agile missile field security capability. Presently, the UH-
    1N fleet does not meet missile complex security requirements for
    endurance, speed, and payload. In addition to the UH-1N's clearly
    defined capability gaps, there are not enough UH-1N aircraft to meet
    the security needs for our nuclear enterprise and the missions in the
    Military District of Washington. Finally, the UH-1N's advanced age is
    manifesting itself in the form of airframe cracks. Cracks in the UH-
    1N's lift beam area and tail boom assembly present the challenge of
    keeping a 40-year-old aircraft combat mission ready while working
    through the issue of parts availability and obsolescence.
        The risk we assume with the current helicopter is unacceptable and
    the need for a replacement helicopter is both urgent and compelling. As
    lead MAJCOM, we will continue to advocate for the Common Vertical Lift
    Support Platform (CVLSP) to ensure the safety and security of missile
    field operations and to meet the requirement posed by Air Force
    District of Washington continuity of operations and government missions
    for the National Capital Region.
                                  equip: icbms
        Turning now to ICBMs, the Minuteman III is congressionally mandated
    to be in service until 2030. We're in a modernization program to reach
    2020, and Air Force Materiel Command is exploring what will be required
    to reach 2030. Since 1962, the Minuteman ``family'' has been updated
    from the MMI, to the MMII, to the MMIII, and there have been upgrades
    and modifications to each of those respective models. We made
    significant strides in the past year toward completing the Propulsion
    Replacement Program, which marks the full deployment of new solid fuel
    stage motors and refurbished flight controls across the entire force to
    extend booster service life through the end of this decade. We will
    reach completion on this major effort when the last two boosters are in
    place this month.
        While the Minuteman missiles have been upgraded and modified, the
    infrastructure supporting these missiles is still early 1960s era
    equipment and we will ensure our reviews include this element of the
    weapon system. Along those lines, we began, with the support of Air
    Force Materiel Command, a depot overhaul program for the fleet of 23-
    year-old Transporter Erector Vehicles and silo emplacement vehicles. We
    have established requirements for a Transporter Erector Vehicle
    replacement and have begun development of the new Payload Transporter
    vehicle. The new ICBM Payload Transporter will introduce physical
    security technologies into the reentry system transport vehicle, to
    include advanced security delay features with stand-off command and
    control activation capability. I want to thank Congress for funding
    this program at $117.8 million across the Future Years Defense Program,
    and we should see the first Payload Transporter deliveries in fiscal
    year 2015.
        These handling equipment sustainment efforts will significantly
    enhance the safety and security of daily operations across our three
    ICBM bases and supports modernization and upgrade necessary to extend
    Minuteman III through 2030. Additionally, these efforts will enable the
    Air Force to execute activities required for implementation of New
    START.
                       equip: icbm security improvements
        We have taken a number of steps to provide our security forces with
    the equipment and technology they need to protect and defend our
    Nation's nuclear deterrent.
        Air Force Global Strike Command has purchased 152 armored vehicles
    to better protect our security forces and meet DOD requirements. Some
    of these new armored vehicles have been delivered to our wings, and
    delivery will be complete no later than calendar year 2013.
        We are in the process of fully deploying new Remote Visual
    Assessment (RVA) equipment to assist security forces monitoring of the
    ICBM missile complexes. RVA enhances situational awareness, and helps
    security forces tailor the responding forces in accordance with the
    assessed threat. We are transitioning from a satellite dependent RVA
    system to a terrestrial system that increases both performance and
    responsiveness at a lower long term operating cost. In addition, we are
    modernizing our security sensor systems used to protect our above-
    ground weapons storage areas, with completion of the upgrade at Minot
    Air Force Base, ND, this year.
                   equip: long-range strike family of systems
        We are strong advocates and partners in the development of a long-
    range strike (LRS) family of systems that will provide a visible
    deterrent and global strike capability well into the future. The Air
    Force LRS strategy uses a family-of-systems construct consisting of
    three precision-strike pillars: a long-range strike platform, a long-
    range standoff missile, and a conventional prompt global strike
    capability. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Donley have made a
    commitment to a new nuclear capable, long-range penetrating bomber.
                                   challenges
        Air Force Global Strike Command faces three central challenges.
    First, we must consolidate the gains we have made across the nuclear
    enterprise. Second, we must achieve enduring cultural change in our
    nuclear enterprise while also aggressively supporting the current
    conventional fight. Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current
    force while preparing to meet the challenges of the future with
    innovative solutions. I am proud of the progress our airmen have made,
    and as I address these challenges through this testimony, I will share
    my perspective on Air Force Global Strike Command's significant
    accomplishments.
                            consolidating our gains
        Now that we have established the Command and declared full
    operational capability, we must consolidate our gains, sustain
    momentum, and provide stability to the enterprise while continuing to
    pursue improvements. One example is our recent initiative to capture
    and categorize recommendations or findings relating to our nuclear
    alert forces. In partnership with the Air Force Materiel Command, we
    are reviewing studies, assessments, reports, and other documents dating
    back to 1990 to audit the recommendations and follow through with the
    findings that have not been executed, funded, and/or mitigated. Any
    open recommendations will be worked to resolution or prioritized and
    tracked for later action according to fiscal constraints and level of
    risk.
                       sustain conventional capabilities
        Our second challenge is to achieve enduring cultural change in our
    nuclear enterprise while also aggressively supporting the current
    conventional fight. Our bomber forces are more than just dual-capable--
    they are full-spectrum. Having both a nuclear and conventional mission
    is not something new for our bomber units. Nuclear capable bombers
    participated in numerous conventional operations from Korea through
    Operation Desert Storm. During the Cold War, the conventional
    employment of bombers was seen as a distraction from the core mission
    of nuclear deterrence. However, since the end of the Cold War,
    providing support to conventional operations has been a core mission
    enhanced by developments in stealth; precision; intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance; and joint connectivity. Our nuclear
    capable bombers, with enhanced conventional capabilities and training,
    have excelled in Operations Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring
    Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Odyssey Dawn.
        To help our commanders strike this balance, we executed a year-long
    review of our Designed Operational Capability statements for every unit
    in the command. We ensured that the units' missions, resources, and
    readiness metrics are clearly linked to the combat power or the combat
    support required by the joint warfighter.
        Today, our B-52s and B-2s rotate to Guam to provide continuous
    long-range strike presence and proven combat capability to the
    commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Furthermore, our recent B-2 missions
    into Libya show how quickly a crisis can develop, and how long-range
    bombers can rapidly bring flexible combat power to a joint commander.
    As a command, we must continue to evolve long-range strike as a core
    competency to ensure no adversary has complete freedom of action.
                      preparing for the future challenges
        Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force while
    preparing to meet the challenges of the future. Sustaining our aging
    platforms and meeting current commitments competes for the resources we
    need to modernize our forces in advance of future threats.
        Secretary Gates has directed a thorough and vigorous scrub of
    military bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization
    programs, civilian and military personnel levels, and associated
    overhead costs. At Air Force Global Strike Command we recognize our
    responsibility to be efficient and effective stewards of resources. To
    achieve both efficiency and effectiveness requires a commitment to
    creating a climate where productivity improvements--faster, better,
    cheaper--thrive. As Secretary of Defense Gates has said, ``We have not
    seen the productivity growth in the defense economy that we have seen
    and expect from the rest of the economy.''
        This is an opportunity to achieve not just efficiency targets for
    the next few budget cycles, but to institutionalize the processes,
    education, and mindset to encourage, reward, and implement operational
    innovation. Our goal is to instill a culture that consistently
    encourages innovation and to foster airmen for whom productivity
    improvements are second nature. We will ensure they have a command
    structure that allows their ideas to be raised, vetted, and
    implemented. We must be more productive in ways we have not been in the
    past while remaining focused on the daily execution of our missions.
            summary of challenges, special trust, and responsibility
        In conclusion, we have made great strides in the last year, and
    Americans can be proud of what the Airmen assigned to Air Force Global
    Strike Command accomplished since we last testified before your
    committee in 2010. We must now consolidate those gains and continue to
    forge a culture that recognizes the special trust and responsibilities
    of the most powerful weapons in our Nation's arsenal; we must do this
    while aggressively supporting the current fight; and we must sustain
    and enhance our force while preparing for future challenges.
        The existence of Air Force Global Strike command reflects the
    commitment of the Air Force to ensure the United States maintains a
    safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and the importance of
    the global strike mission.
        Thank you.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
        General Chambers.

      STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT
          CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR
                      INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE

        General Chambers. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions:
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air Force's
    strategic deterrent forces. Your Air Force nuclear enterprise
    consists of 450 ICBMs, 96 bombers, squadrons of F-16C and F-15E
    dual-capable fighters, and the thousands of dual-capable airmen
    who operate and sustain them. These weapons systems and
    dedicated airmen maintain the credibility of a strategic
    deterrent that requires a long-term visible commitment.
        Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the
    number one Air Force priority. Our Secretary and Chief of Staff
    have ingrained the Air Force's commitment to and are sustaining
    the focus on the nuclear enterprise. My written statement lays
    out their specific strategic guidance and I respectfully
    request that statement be entered into the record. Today I
    simply highlight the following areas: human capital,
    modernizing and recapitalizing, the NPR and New START.
        When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the
    nuclear enterprise as our top priority, we included our most
    precious resource, our airmen, as an integral part of that
    effort. In response, the nuclear and personnel communities
    jointly created an analytical process resulting in a
    comprehensive nuclear enterprise human capital effort which
    lays out the active management steps required to deliberately
    develop airmen and their nuclear expertise.
        From investing in our people to investing in our systems,
    every weapons system in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise is
    undergoing some form of modernizing or recapitalizing.
    Successful deterrence over the next 2 decades requires
    sustaining and modernizing our force structure in a consistent,
    year-by-year deliberate manner.
        During the next 7 years, implementation of the NPR and New
    START will bring a reduction in the role and numbers of nuclear
    weapons in our national security strategy. Our final force
    structure will meet the combatant commander's requirements and
    maintain overall effectiveness of the deterrent force.
        The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects
    the positive steps we are taking to improve this Air Force core
    function. Across the FYDP, Air Force investment in nuclear
    deterrence operations totals $28 billion. The Air Force is
    committed to ensuring this investment results in systems and
    capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrence for
    our Nation.
        The national military strategy acknowledges our Nation's
    security and its prosperity are inseparable and preventing wars
    is as important as winning them and far less costly. In this
    time of constrained resources, the efficacy of nuclear
    deterrence operations is evident in the fact that for
    approximately 3 percent of the Air Force total obligation
    authority your Air Force continues to deliver the bedrock of
    global strategic stability, providing the ICBM and bomber legs
    of the triad, as well as dual-capable fighter capability 24
    hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
        Thank you for this subcommittee's continued support of
    America's Air Force and particularly its support to our airmen
    and the strategic deterrence they provide.
        [The prepared statements of General Chambers, General
    Scott, and General Harencak follows:]
           Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. William A. Chambers, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air
    Force's strategic deterrent forces.
        In pursuit of the President's vision as outlined in the Nuclear
    Posture Review to ``reduce U.S. nuclear weapons and their role in U.S.
    national security strategy,'' the Air Force takes to heart its
    responsibility to uphold the entirety of his vision and pledge, `` . .
    . [that] as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will
    maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential
    adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that
    they can count on America's security commitments.'' We employ that
    arsenal to produce strategic deterrence that remains vital at a time
    when our National Military Strategy notes, `` . . . ongoing shifts in
    relative power and increasing interconnectedness in the international
    order indicate a strategic inflection point.'' Maintaining credibility
    of our strategic deterrent requires a long-term, visible commitment to
    our nuclear capabilities.
              continue to strengthen--the air force's #1 priority
        Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the number
    one Air Force priority. A year ago, testimony before this committee
    recounted Air Force efforts to reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise.
    That focus significantly advanced our structure, processes, and
    culture. Our focus now is on making sure those advances endure.
        Since last year's testimony, Air Force Global Strike Command
    (AFGSC), as the first major command stood up in 27 years, is the most
    visible structural change taken to ensure focused operational oversight
    and proper support to U.S. Strategic Command. AFGSC now has full
    operational command of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
    and nuclear-capable bomber forces and is continually focused on the
    airmen and their weapon systems that produce strategic deterrence every
    day. Additionally, the Air Force designated Nuclear Deterrence
    Operations as 1 of 12 Service Core Functions to ensure alignment of
    policy and resources. These are just two of the many changes to
    structure, process and culture that reflect a concerted effort to
    institutionalize our reinvigoration initiatives and maintain safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear capabilities.
        The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
    articulated strategic guidance to ingrain the Air Forces' commitment to
    sustained focus on the nuclear enterprise.

             Strengthen Positive Inventory Control of Nuclear
            Weapons Related Materiel
             Refine Inspection Processes
             Fulfill Human Capital Plan to Ensure Appropriate
            Expertise at All Levels
             Modernize and Recapitalize Nuclear Deterrent
            Capability
             Implement New START
             Craft a Comprehensive Deterrence and Crisis Stability
            Vision that Builds on the Nuclear Posture Review

        The initiatives in the President's budget request will build on
    successes achieved since 2008 and enable the Air Force to Continue to
    Strengthen along these Strategic Steps to maintain safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear capabilities.
       strengthen positive inventory control of nuclear weapons related
                                    materiel
        Efforts continue to tighten, assess, and automate accountability
    for Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel through a completely revamped
    Positive Inventory Control process. To improve accountability,
    sustainment activities such as these have been consolidated under a
    vastly revitalized Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The Air Force now
    has improved visibility of our worldwide inventories and accountability
    continues to improve.
                          refine inspection processes
        We have seen positive results from the current inspection regime
    across the board. We have reinforced our long-held nuclear standards
    and we will continue to examine the size and scope of the inspections
    required to ``sustain'' excellence, focusing on effectiveness. We will
    continue critical self-inspection, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance
    Visits, and Nuclear Surety Inspections. The goal is to bolster resolute
    attitudes of exacting compliance and strict adherence to prescribed
    standards with continual self-assessment. We now perform Root Cause
    Analysis on all major write-ups, track them and brief progress of
    corrective actions to Air Force leadership. Senior Air Force leaders
    continue to review inspection results and other key indicators on a
    frequent and recurring basis.
       fulfill human capital plan to ensure appropriate expertise at all
                                     levels
        When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the Nuclear
    Enterprise as our top priority, we included our most precious resource
    . . . our airmen . . . as an integral part of the effort.
        In response, the nuclear and personnel communities jointly created
    an analytical process resulting in a comprehensive Nuclear Enterprise
    Human Capital Execution Plan. This action plan focuses on synchronizing
    the Air Force's Continue to Strengthen objectives that relate to
    development of airmen and their nuclear expertise.
        As a result of collaborative efforts across all nuclear
    specialties, we have instituted changes to improve the long-term
    professional fitness of our people. Over the past year, we have
    scrutinized our small, critical nuclear career fields, and recognized
    that in this era of small total force numbers and dual capability
    requirements, we must take innovative steps to optimally manage, grow,
    and retain this specialized expertise. As a result, several initiatives
    are now underway that will improve operational effectiveness in these
    critical areas. In addition, the Air Force is testing a new Enlisted
    Developmental Team process starting with the nuclear enterprise, to
    ensure deliberate development of our senior noncommissioned officers to
    create a sustainable leadership bench. We have also moved out
    aggressively to retain nuclear talent, ramping up programs to target
    expertise and critical skills through retention incentives.
        Recently, my organization was designated the Functional Authority
    for the Human Capital performing the Nuclear Deterrent Operations. As
    such, we are responsible for injecting strategic perspective in the
    array of nuclear-related human capital programs. This broadens the
    perspective of the human capital policy arm to the needs of the nuclear
    enterprise career fields, brings attention to some unintended
    consequences of broader policies, and allows for refinements in
    leveraging our skilled dual-capable nuclear airmen.
        These changes allow us to deliberately develop and manage our
    nuclear-capable personnel. Air Force senior leaders have energized
    these efforts through advocacy, continuous, focused attention and
    regular review of nuclear initiatives.
            modernize and recapitalize nuclear deterrent capability
        From investing in our people to investing in our systems, every
    weapon system in the nuclear enterprise is undergoing some form of
    modernization or recapitalization. Successful deterrence requires
    sustaining and modernizing our force structure in a consistent and
    deliberate manner. This is a vital contribution to the long-term
    credibility of our deterrent.
        Air Force funding efforts maintain ongoing investment for the
    Minuteman III and support equipment programs to extend life expectancy
    through 2030, as directed by the 2010 National Defense Authorization
    Act. Ensuring consistent, adequate sustainment of MM III requires an
    investment strategy addressing cryptographic upgrades, ICBM fuze
    refurbishment, and modernizing data transfer technology. Additionally,
    the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    plan to start a life extension program for the W78.
        Although a decision on a follow-on ICBM is not needed for several
    years, the Nuclear Posture Review recognized the need for studies to
    inform a decision on Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence beyond 2030. In
    January 2011, AFGSC initiated study efforts appropriate to the early
    stages of the ICBM follow-on. Once these are complete, the study will
    move into a Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, which will include
    an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We plan to complete the MSA phase in
    fiscal year 2014.
        Air Force modernization plans for our current B-52s and B-2 bomber
    fleet continue an effort to maintain a viable force. The B-2 is the
    only aircraft capable of long-range delivery of direct attack munitions
    in an anti-access environment. To ensure the B-2 can continue to
    operate in high threat environments, we have programs to modernize
    communication, offensive, and defensive systems. For the B-52, we have
    programs to modernize and sustain the communication, radar, and weapon
    delivery systems.
        Beyond modernization of existing platforms, we recognize the
    changing threat environment of the future requires improved
    capabilities. To meet that need, the Air Force is programming for a
    long range, nuclear capable, penetrating bomber. This program will
    leverage mature technologies and follow streamlined acquisition
    processes and focus on affordability with unit cost targets informing
    design trades and ensuring sufficient inventory. The program will begin
    in fiscal year 2012 delivering an initial capability in the mid-2020s
    with a planned production of 80-100 bombers.
        The Air Force will sustain the current Air Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM) until a follow-on advanced penetrating long-range stand off
    (LRSO) missile capability is fielded. We have multiple service life
    extension programs to ensure viability of the propulsion systems,
    guidance and flight control systems, and warhead arming components.
    Preparation activity began in November 2010. The AoA final report is
    due in May 2012. The Air Force has programmed for research,
    development, test and evaluation over the next 5 years for the
    development of LRSO.
        The Air Force continues to program for a nuclear-capable F-35 to
    modernize the Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) fleet. The investment over
    the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for F-35 DCA ensures effective
    transition of this capability from our legacy fleet.
        The B61 Life Extension Program continues to be a top priority. The
    Air Force is committed, with the NNSA, to improve the safety and
    security of the B61 and ensure the Tail Kit Assembly acquisition
    schedule remains on track for a fiscal year 2017 First Production Unit
    delivery. The B61 will remain compatible with current nuclear capable
    platforms to maintain effectiveness against projected target sets for
    years to come. This will also ensure the United States retains the
    capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support
    of Alliance commitments.
        The Air Force started the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
    (CVLSP) program to address capability gap shortfalls in helicopter
    nuclear security support, and Continuity of Government/Continuity of
    Operations missions. The CVLSP program seeks to replace existing UH-1N
    fleet with an off-the-shelf, nondevelopmental aircraft. We are
    currently evaluating acquisition strategies to best meet warfighter
    requirements with a goal of an fiscal year 2015 Initial Operational
    Capability.
        There are many other initiatives required to maintain a safe,
    secure, and effective arsenal. The Air Force will spend approximately
    $1 billion over the FYDP in critical areas, such as Transporter Erector
    Hoists, Weapons Load Trailers, Electronic Systems Test Sets, Weapons
    Storage and Security System (WS3), and Reentry System Test Set cables.
    The Air Force also continues its commitment to maintaining its history
    of safe and secure resource transportation. To this end, AFGSC is
    actively programming to rapidly replace the current Payload-Transporter
    vehicle with a model with improved safety and security features.
      implement the nuclear posture review & new strategic arms reduction
                                     treaty
        During the next 7 years, implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR) and New START Treaty (NST) will bring a reduction in the
    role and numbers of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.
    Under the NPR, the Air Force will remove multiple warheads from its
    ICBMs. Under NST, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, the
    United States and Russia will reduce the number of accountable
    strategic warheads from the current Moscow Treaty warhead limit of
    2,200 to 1,550. Within the treaty's central limits on Strategic
    Delivery Vehicles, the Air Force will reduce the numbers of deployed
    ICBMs and convert some nuclear-capable B-52s to conventional-only
    capability. Final force structure will be based on meeting the
    combatant commander's requirements and maintaining overall
    effectiveness of the deterrent force. We are currently developing
    options to reach the force levels specified in the treaty and have
    initiated the appropriate planning, programming, logistics, engineering
    and environmental studies to support these decisions, inform Congress,
    and meet treaty obligations.
        For its part, the Air Force began formal data exchanges with Russia
    in March. Inspections and exhibitions of bombers and missiles will
    start this month. The Air Force will also begin actions necessary to
    reduce deployed bombers and missiles, convert some nuclear-capable B-52
    bombers to conventional-only capability, and eliminate other assets
    such as, Peacekeeper silos, 564th Missile Squadron silos, and B-52s to
    comply with central treaty limits. These actions must be completed by
    February 2018.
        Global Strike Command will lead the Air Force portion of this
    effort. Lieutenant General Kowalski and his team of dedicated
    professionals are finalizing implementation and compliance plans to
    ensure the safety and security of our nuclear force as we draw down to
    NST mandated levels, all the while preserving the ability to deter
    adversaries, and assure allies and partners.
        In preparing for the new verification regime, the Air Force is also
    working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S.
    Strategic Command.
       craft a comprehensive deterrence and crisis stability vision that
                      builds on the nuclear posture review
        As we think about providing deterrence in the 21st century, it's
    important to remember that not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold
    War is over. Airmen who started active duty service after the fall of
    the Soviet Union are now retirement eligible. A generation has passed.
    That does not mean that strategic deterrence and nuclear forces are
    anachronisms. What it does mean is that we need to hit fast-forward on
    how we think about Nuclear Deterrence Operations in the complex
    security environment of today and tomorrow. The 2010 Joint Operational
    Environment declared: ``For the past 20 years, Americans have largely
    ignored issues of deterrence and nuclear warfare. We no longer have
    that luxury.'' Successful strategic deterrence in the 21st century
    requires stability-based analysis that goes beyond traditional numbers-
    based assessments to determine optimal deterrence force structure and
    posture. The Air Force is revitalizing deterrence thinking to meet the
    challenges of our complex ``multi-nodal'' security environment.
                                   conclusion
        Our ability to enable other nations to achieve their security
    goals, serve as a convener to cooperatively address common security
    challenges, or lastly, act as a security guarantor, preferably with
    partners and allies, but alone if necessary, rests on a foundation of
    U.S. nuclear capabilities and the strategic deterrence they provide.
    Your Air Force is continuing to strengthen our strategic deterrent
    force. This will be a long-term, systematic effort to refine and
    solidify earlier ``reinvigoration'' initiatives and to codify
    institutional changes ensuring safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    capabilities for the Nation.
        The President's budget request reflects the positive steps we are
    taking to improve this Air Force core function. Across the FYDP, Air
    Force investment in Nuclear Deterrence Operations totals $28 billion.
    The Air Force is committed to ensuring this investment results in
    systems and capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrence
    for our Nation in the multi-nodal security environment we face.
        The National Military Strategy acknowledges, ``Our Nation's
    security and prosperity are inseparable'' and ``Preventing wars is as
    important as winning them, and far less costly.'' In this time of
    limited resources, the efficiency of Nuclear Deterrence Operations is
    evident in the fact that for approximately 3 percent of the Air Force
    Total Obligation Authority, your Air Force continues to deliver the
    bedrock of global strategic stability providing the ICBM and Bomber
    legs of the Triad as well as dual-capable fighter capability 24 hours a
    day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
        Thank you for the committee's continued support of America's Air
    Force and particularly to its airmen and their contributions to
    strategic deterrence.
                                     ______

              Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. David J. Scott, USAF
        Today, the Air Force flies, fights, and wins in air, space, and
    cyberspace--globally and reliably--as a valued member of our Joint and
    coalition teams. Last year the Air Force conducted more than 45,000
    sorties supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and almost 101,000
    sorties supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Just recently, the Air
    Foprce led the way in executing and supporting Operation Odyssey Dawn
    in Libya, flying hundreds of sorties to date. As we continue to
    accomplish our current mission sets and plan for future threats, we
    must remain mindful of the increasing age and costs of operating our
    aging air fleet which is 33.7 years old, on average. Our Air Force
    leadership is scrutinizing programs and budgets to find acceptable
    solutions to meet growing demands that are competing for limited funds.
        Our fleet of 156 bombers remains engaged in today's fight while
    retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force bombers have
    maintained a continuous presence in Southwest Asia since shortly after
    September 11. Bombers have also provided the U.S. Pacific Commander
    with a continuous presence throughout the area of responsibility (AOR)
    since 2004. The Air Force continues its commitment to future long-range
    strike capabilities as part of a comprehensive, phased plan, valued at
    $5.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), to modernize
    and sustain our bomber force.
                                      b-1
        The B-1 currently provides long-range persistent airpower in direct
    support of NATO/ISAF, U.S. and Afghan troops in three major operations.
    The B-1 also provides real-time intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance with full-motion video, enhanced situational awareness
    and a demonstrable overwatch presence. The Air Force added the SNIPER
    Advanced Targeting Pod capability to B-1 aircraft in summer 2009 to
    provide aircrews with positive identification capability and the
    ability to share video with ground forces. The B-1 has proven to be the
    workhorse of current combat operations, flying the majority of the
    bomber combat sorties in the Central Command AOR. Most recently, two B-
    1s launched from Ellsworth AFB, and dropped munitions in Libya in
    support of Operation Odyssey Dawn. With less than 2 days from first
    notice to takeoff, Ellsworth airmen prepared several aircraft and
    hundreds of weapons to provide the combat configuration needed halfway
    across the globe. This is the the first time the B-1 fleet has launched
    combat sorties from the continental United States to strike targets
    overseas. The B-1 is beginning to show its age and requires multiple
    upgrades to maintain critical combat capability. B-1 modernization and
    sustainment programs include the Integated Battle Station program,
    combining Fully Integrated Data Link (FIDL), Vertical Situational
    Display Upgrade (VSDU), and Central Integrated Test System (CITS)
    programs under one installation contract. Four B-1 upgrades are
    required to prevent grounding of the B-1 fleet. The four grounding
    modifications are: VSDU, CITS, Radar Maintainability and Improvement
    Program (RMIP), and the Inertial Navigation System (INS).
        B-1 upgrades are a must, but funding has proved challenging. The
    Air Force has decided that force structure adjustments can provide the
    necessary cost savings that will allow us to keep the B-1 fleet viable.
    As such the Air Force is retiring 6, from an overall force of 66, B-1s
    to fund the 4 grounding modifications plus Fully Integrated Data Link
    through the remainder of the B-1 fleet. This is strictly a programming
    action, taking acceptable (moderate) risk to the overall bomber
    capability requirement. This retirement will not impact current
    operations because real-world taskings will always take priority over
    home-station training missions.
        B-1 aircraft availability rates remained relatively level for
    fiscal year 2002-2007 with a drop in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year
    2009 primarily driven by modernization efforts. To mitigate manpower
    shortages and reduced maintenance experience levels, B-1 bases have
    been augmented by contract field teams which will continue through
    April 2011. Manning authorizations have been approved but B-1 aircraft
    availability will be affected into the distant future while personnel
    are trained and gain experience. The Air Force places great emphasis on
    sustaining and maintaining the B-1 fleet, ensuring that this key
    capability and keeping it available to support our warfighters.
                                      b-2
        The B-2 has participated in every combat action, including Odyssey
    Dawn, since Operation Allied Force and is pivotal to U.S. Strategic
    Command's plans as well as to U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) Continuous
    Bomber Presence to assure allies and support U.S. interests in the
    Pacific. The B-2 Spirit provides a lethal combination of range,
    payload, and stealth. It remains the world's sole long-range, low
    observable dual-role bomber. It is the only platform capable of
    delivering 80 independently targeted 500-lb Joint Direct Attack
    Munitions (GBU-38). It is the only platform capable of carrying the
    developing Massive Ordnance Penetrator; a weapon crucial to our
    capabilities against hardened, deeply buried targets. While B-2
    availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, in part due
    to enhancements in low observable maintenance such as the highly
    successful Alternate High Frequency Material program, it faces
    increasing need for upgrades to avionics originally designed over 20
    years ago.
        The Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer
    Upgrade Program (EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) has three increments.
    Increment 1 upgrades the B-2`s flight management computers and main
    data bus as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment 2
    integrates the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) along
    with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable strategic
    communication, and Increment 3 connects the B-2 into the Global
    Information Grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is
    beginning procurement this year for fleet installations beginning at
    the end of fiscal year 2013.
        We will finish replacing the B-2's original radar antenna, upgrade
    selected radar avionics and change the radar operating frequency as
    part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP). Thanks in large part to
    Congressional support, the RMP acquisition strategy was modified to
    include life-of-type component buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing
    source issues during the production run.
        The Department is also investing in B-2 Defensive Management System
    (DMS) modernization to ensure continued survivability. This will allow
    the B-2 to continue operations in more advanced threat environments
    while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. The
    DMS faces obsolescence in light of threat system advances and
    diminishing manufacturing sources for critical components. $41 million
    is being invested in fiscal year 2012 with $560 million across the FYDP
    to maintain B-2 penetration capability. We just completed an Analysis
    of Alternatives and are preparing to move towards the technology
    development phase.
                                      b-52
        The B-52 Stratofortress is our Nation's oldest frontline long-range
    strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. It
    amplifies the consistent message of long-range U.S. airpower in a
    theater like PACOM where distances drive decisions. Equipped with an
    advanced targeting pod, the B-52 can also provide real-time
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with full-motion video,
    enhanced situational awareness, a demonstrable overwatch presence and
    precision joint fires in support of PACOM`s objectives. The Air Force
    has invested in modernization programs to keep the B-52 platform viable
    and operationally relevant. Major B-52 modernizations include the
    Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT), EHF SATCOM,
    Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2), and the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay
    Upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated communication and
    mission management system with machine to machine data link interfaces
    for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure provided in CONECT is
    the backbone for EHF SATCOM. The EHF SATCOM program integrates the FAB-
    T providing assured, survivable two-way strategic command and control
    communications. The SR2 program, starting in fiscal year 2010,
    integrates a modern nondevelopmental radar to address systemic
    sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN-166 radar. Finally, the
    1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade provides internal J-series weapons
    capability through modification of Common Strategic Rotary Launcher and
    an upgrade of stores management and offensive avionics software.
    Updated with modern technology the B-52 will be capable of delivering
    the full complement of jointly developed weapons and will continue into
    the 21st century as an important element of our Nation`s defenses.
                            long range strike (lrs)
        Our existing bomber force has performed exceptionally well and has
    provided our Nation an unmatched global strike capability. However,
    these systems will eventually reach the end of their service lives. Our
    bomber fleet also faces challenges in the face of advancing threat
    capabilities and emerging Anti Access/Area Denied (A2/AD) environments.
    The Air Force must look ahead to the next generation of long range
    strike capability in order to provide future presidents the ability to
    hold any target at risk, anywhere on the globe.
        On January 6, 2011 the Secretary of Defense announced that the Air
    Force would initiate a new bomber program as the cornerstone of the
    future of our Long Range Strike portfolio for the United States Air
    Force. Our intent is to field a new long-range penetrating bomber to
    join the joint portfolio of deep-strike capabilities. He directed this
    new penetrating bomber would be nuclear capable, and envisioned to
    accommodate both unmanned and manned operations. The SecDef also
    directed the Air Force to procure 80-100 of these new highly survivable
    bombers, which should begin delivery in the mid-2020s. The fiscal year
    2012 President's budget provides funding for the long range penetrating
    bomber program, following an extensive 18 month, OSD-led review of long
    range strike requirements. By leveraging proven technologies and
    streamlining program management during development, the Air Force will
    ensure the new bomber can be delivered before our current fleet goes
    out of service. Though details of the program, including specific
    system performance attributes such as range, payload and speed are
    classified, the total annual budget will be executed by regular
    appropriation of funds, with the Air Force making capability tradeoffs
    as necessary to hold procurement costs down to ensure affordability for
    the full purchase of the program of record. The President's budget
    requests $197 million in fiscal year 2012 and $3.7 billion over the
    FYDP for the new penetrating bomber.
        In the mid-term (2017-2030), we plan to field the new penetrating
    bomber while continuing to develop its capability as the threat and the
    technology mature. Long-term (2031-2050) plans aim to complete fielding
    of the fleet while continuing to evolve the weapon system as the threat
    environment and technology mature. The Air Force LRS strategy provides
    present and future leaders continued and affordable global strike
    options within emerging anti-access area denial environments.
                                    closing
        The Air Force stands ready to win today's joint fight and plan for
    tomorrow's challenges. We are committed to working together to
    determine the right procurement, sustainment and retirement strategy to
    remain prepared for the current fight as well as posturing for future
    demands. Dominance of air, space, and cyberspace continues to be
    requisite to the defense of the United States. We appreciate your
    continued support and look forward to working in concert to ensure our
    decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force to meet future
    requirements.
                                     ______

            Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, USAF
        Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee thank you for this opportunity to discuss
    our continuing improvements to the Air Force's nuclear sustainment
    efforts. As a result of the dedication of our talented team of military
    personnel, civilians and industry professionals, I can attest that the
    Air Force nuclear enterprise is considerably stronger today than at any
    point prior to the Nuclear Weapon Center's establishment in 2006. The
    vitality that we see today represents a reversal in a decades-long de-
    emphasis of America's strategic forces that was first documented in
    studies ranging back to 1998. In the years that followed, a series of
    reports called for a single manager for nuclear weapons sustainment, a
    consolidation of management sustainment activity and a unified funding
    strategy. In response to these reports, Air Force Materiel Command
    (AFMC) developed a two-phase strategy to establish a new center
    responsible for nuclear sustainment activities. The first phase was
    completed in March 2006 when the Nuclear Weapons Center was activated.
    AFMC and the Center then began the lengthy task of pulling together the
    fragmented pieces of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Phase II was
    accomplished in April and May 2008 with the assignment of the first
    flag-level officer as Center commander and the assignment of the
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Program Office to the
    Center. Phase III began in February 2009 with the signing of Program
    Action Directive (PAD) 08-05 which directed further integration of the
    enterprise.
        I am pleased to tell you that on January 20, 2011, General Hoffman,
    the AFMC Commander declared that the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
    had achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC). This is a measure of
    General Hoffman's confidence that AFNWC has successfully created and
    codified staff best practices and standards, that we are sufficiently
    capable of advocating for the resources necessary to execute our plans,
    that our staff is sufficiently manned and capable and that we have put
    in places processes and procedures that are measurable, repeatable and
    auditable, all contributing to our primary mission: support for the
    warfighter.
        Most assuredly, this does not represent any sort of watershed
    moment in the strengthening of the nuclear enterprise . . . the pursuit
    of the nuclear zero defect culture requires continuous improvement and
    oversight and we still have a long way to go to get to where we want to
    be. The declaration of FOC does, rather, show how far we have come in
    applying common-sense leadership and organizational principles to a
    difficult problem. There can be no letting up, however, on tracking
    down and eliminating remaining problems that confront the enterprise.
    We will continue to perform self-assessments, independent inspections
    and progress reviews to ensure that focus is maintained on critical
    factors that define the health of our strategic deterrent. The Nation
    will not tolerate any less of the stewards of the Air Force's most
    potent weapons.
        In addition to the completion of Phase III of AFNWC's standup and
    declaration of FOC, AFMC and the Air Force as a whole have made
    significant strides in reorganization that have reinvigorated and
    strengthened the nuclear sustainment enterprise. The Air Force vested
    the AFMC Commander as the single four-star officer responsible for
    nuclear sustainment. It is important to note that since the
    inactivation of Strategic Air Command in 1992, no single four-star
    officer had been charged with understanding and articulating the needs
    of the Air Force with regard to nuclear sustainment below the Chief of
    Staff. In contrast, today the Air Force has a one-star officer
    overseeing the day-to-day sustainment issues of the enterprise, while a
    four-star officer keeps the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of
    Staff, and the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command informed
    and engaged in issues involving the sustainment of nuclear weapons and
    the health of the various delivery vehicles and pieces of support
    equipment which comprise the Air Force strategic deterrent. A series of
    recurring reviews, culminating in the Nuclear Oversight Board, chaired
    by the Secretary and Chief of Staff and comprising all Major Command
    (MAJCOM) commanders ensure high-level oversight of trends, developments
    and attention to emergent issues. Additionally, AFMC created a new
    directorate specifically focused on nuclear matters and tasked with
    representing the Command to other MAJCOMs, the Air Staff and the Joint
    warfighter.
        As members of the subcommittee are well aware, a number of studies
    were conducted in the wake of the 2007 and 2008 incidents that brought
    the shortcomings of the Air Force nuclear enterprise into the public
    eye. While the studies revealed a large number of discrete process
    failings, organizational issues, and leadership problems, in the macro
    sense, they all bore out the same root cause: that the focus on
    standards had atrophied over the years and that this root cause ended
    up manifesting itself in three serious ``seams'' that had to be
    addressed immediately. These seams are: (1) a lack of nuclear
    expertise; (2) a lack of nuclear focus; and (3) a lack of authority.
    These seams ``opened'' under the weight of competing priorities and the
    stress of continuous combat operations since 1991. AFNWC has been
    working with its numerous mission partners to close these seams by
    making thoughtful and deliberate changes to the way in which things get
    done in the nuclear enterprise.
        There are three overarching ways in which we as a center are
    working these problems. The first is by enabling collaborative
    partnerships. We realized from the very beginning that, given the large
    number of players in the nuclear arena, we simply cannot have a
    stovepiped view of the enterprise. From other Air Force agencies, such
    as the Air Staff's nuclear directorate, AFMC's nuclear directorate, Air
    Force Global Strike Command, other centers and commands, and the joint
    warfighter, to other government organizations such as the National
    Nuclear Security Administration and beyond to colleges, universities,
    and national laboratories, AFNWC has been working hard cultivating
    contacts and associates. By doing this, we're ensuring that we can meet
    requirements more rapidly, find answers and recruit the right people to
    get the job done for the warfighter and the Nation. One of our most
    vital collaborations is with the newly created office of the Program
    Executive Officer (PEO) for Strategic Systems. The PEO position was
    created in response to specific recommendations made by the Schlesinger
    Report, and has assumed responsibility for the development and
    acquisition of future systems and for modernization efforts while AFNWC
    focuses on day-to-day operations and sustainment. The PEO, Brigadier
    General John Thompson, who reports to the Air Force Service Acquisition
    Executive, Mr. David Van Buren, is colocated with AFNWC at Kirtland Air
    Force Base, NM.
        The second way we're sealing the seams is by improving our ability
    to spot problems and come up with solutions before they become crises.
    As our nuclear stockpile ages, it is becoming apparent that any number
    of serious problems may be waiting around the corner. By using sound
    engineering principles, we are becoming increasingly able to spot
    trends with weapons, delivery systems and their associated support
    equipment and determine practical, effective and timely solutions
    before the problem reaches a critical stage, at which point they become
    difficult and expensive to address. Like other complex systems, our
    nuclear arsenal is dependent upon a vast number of components and
    processes, the failure of any one of which can be very serious for a
    given weapon system. Many of these components have not been updated in
    decades and, while expertly maintained, are not immune to
    deterioration. As former U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander,
    General Kevin Chilton stated in 2008, nuclear weapons, even when
    sitting on the shelf, are chemistry experiments. They are constantly
    changing from chemical reactions inside of them. This extends as well
    to other equipment as well, some of which is affected by wear and tear
    on top of everything else. Metal fatigue, corrosion and chemical
    changes all take their toll. If a weapon, delivery system or a piece of
    support equipment only had to last to the end of its 10-year design
    life before replacement, like much of our equipment was intended to
    have, it wouldn't be as crucial that all these very long term issues be
    taken into account. However, if we extend this to the 30, 40, or 50
    year lives we now expect from our current weapons, it becomes vitally
    important that we understand the relationship between the various
    components and use sound engineering practices to determine the correct
    course of action to maintain reliability and availability for the
    warfighter.
        The third way we're closing the seams is by deliberately
    maintaining a forward-looking view, both in order to be proactive to
    possible problems on the horizon and to ensure that nuclear sustainment
    equities are thoroughly considered in the planning and development of
    future systems. AFNWC is heavily involved in the Long-Range Standoff
    Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process and is helping lay the
    groundwork for the forthcoming Ground Based Strategic Deterrence AoA.
    We are also working with the PEO for Strategic Systems on acquisition
    and modernization programs for the various systems which make up our
    strategic deterrence force. We are looking to the future in other ways
    as well, reaching out to universities and national laboratories to
    recruit new talent, helping to rebuild the nuclear expertise that has
    been lost in the years of atrophy. Finally, AFNWC is involved in
    ensuring that adequate qualified military personnel are available to
    perform the difficult task of maintaining the arsenal and that they
    have available the necessary equipment and tools to do their job.
        I am a strong advocate of keeping a big picture, strategic view.
    With so many discrete tasks requiring attention, this is sometimes
    difficult. However, it is vital that our perspective be kept broad and
    that we always question what effect changes will have on the health of
    the force. As we have found in the past, there are often second- and
    third-order effects that can result from decisions we make now.
    Decisions such as how reductions for the New START treaty are executed,
    for instance, will have long-term repercussions, for good or ill that
    will continue for decades. We are committed to providing thoughtful
    solutions and advice based on sound engineering and logistical
    principles and always moving no faster what we have termed ``the speed
    of nuclear surety.''
        AFNWC's most important mission is to provide direct support for the
    warfighter, in this case, STRATCOM. To that end, as part of Phase III
    of AFNWC's stand-up, we assumed command of the Air Force's remaining
    five CONUS Weapons Storage Areas (WSAs)--which had previously been
    split between three commands--AFMC, AFSPC, and Air Combat Command
    (ACC). This was done with the goal of standardizing publications,
    procedures and leadership in mind. In addition to this, we created a
    Directorate of Nuclear Surety within AFNWC to work with the WSAs as a
    coherent and integral weapon system. This Directorate recently
    published a detailed study of the Air Force WSAs, further pointing out
    their need for standardization across civil engineering,
    communications, security and safety disciplines. The Nuclear Surety
    Directorate has also brought together WSA stakeholders from across the
    Air Force and Navy in recurring council sessions to deliberately work
    through requirements and to better advocate for needed modernization
    and upgrades.
        In addition to WSAs at CONUS bases, the Air Force Nuclear Weapon
    Center responsibilities include direct support to force providers in
    Europe--the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). We manage programs for
    support equipment sustainment in the European Theater, including
    weapons storage vaults and the weapons maintenance truck, both of which
    are vital to the safety, security, and sustainment of the B61.
    Additionally, we are working closely with the AFPEO for Strategic
    Systems on life extension modifications to the B61 to ensure that it
    continues to meet the requirements of USAFE and our NATO allies.
        Furthermore, to ensure that the Air Force's ICBM force remains
    robust and capable through 2030, as required in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we are currently undertaking a
    number of critical actions to sustain today's aging forces. First among
    these is a two-pronged approach to providing sufficient Mk21 fuzes to
    support the warfighter. We have instituted an aggressive screening
    program to identify fuzes requiring few or no repairs. Those which pass
    the screening are returned to the field for installation into the
    Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle modified Minuteman III ICBMs. Those
    failing the screening tests become candidates for refurbishment.
    Initial attempts in 2008 to refurbish Mk21 fuzes were unsuccessful, in
    large part due to their level of sophistication and complexity. Our
    two-pronged approach to refurbishment has enlisted the assistance of
    the original manufacturer, which has been successful in demonstrating
    its ability to refurbish the fuze. Additionally, an organic production
    line at Hill Air Force Base is in the process of performing its proof-
    of-concept trials and will begin fielding refurbished fuzes in fiscal
    year 2012. Along with the screening process, these two production
    lines, operating simultaneously, will be able to provide enough
    operational Mk21 fuzes to meet initial warfighter requirements in the
    mid-term. We are also working closely with our mission partners at
    Ogden Air Logistics Center which is currently completing their first
    refurbishment cycle for the Mk12A fuze. This refurbishment effort is on
    schedule and meeting production goals. AFNWC is also working with AFGSC
    and the NNSA to ensure that they have our full support in the field of
    testing. By bringing on board a dedicated Center Test Authority (CTA),
    we are not only ensuring that there will be no surprises related to
    ICBM test supportability, but we are also looking to the future to
    ensure that testing requirements are included in AoAs and studies for
    follow-on systems. The value of the CTA had been validated by recent
    cooperative work between the ICBM Systems Division, AFGSC and the ICBM
    Prime Contractor on emergent issues with the Minuteman III Command
    Destruct system. Finally, we are working closely with the PEO/SS on
    requirements and considerations for a joint fuze, which is envisioned
    as a replacement for both the Navy Mk5 fuze and the Air Force Mk12A
    fuze, with the goal of realizing benefits in standardization,
    functionality and cost.
        As I mentioned previously, possibly our greatest challenge is with
    our most important asset--our people. From where we are right now, we
    can see that we are far from healthy with regard to our pool of
    available talent. Years of atrophy have reduced the overall number of
    nuclear-experienced personnel available, and the recent reinvigoration
    of the nuclear enterprise has made competition for the scarce talent
    severe. Additionally, the available personnel are tending to be toward
    the top and bottom of the demographics. We have a number of experienced
    senior level personnel and the Air Force is doing a good job bringing
    in inexperienced but enthusiastic junior people, but we currently lack
    the strong mid-career professionals, both military and civilian, who
    are the backbone of a successful organization. While time and
    experience will resolve this problem eventually, the Air Force has
    embarked on an aggressive program to identify its nuclear experienced
    personnel and to ensure that they are tracked and placed appropriately
    to make the best use of their experience. Furthermore, AFNWC has
    created the Air Force Nuclear Fundamentals Course, which encompasses
    nuclear weapons fundamentals, force structure, nuclear stockpile
    guidance and planning, nuclear surety and the nuclear enterprise. We
    are also working with the Air Staff and Air Force Personnel Center to
    rebuild a strong, well-managed nuclear science and engineering
    workforce. We're trying to ensure that our people receive everything
    they need in order to thrive in the difficult nuclear environment,
    including a solid organization with strong, repeatable processes,
    training, education and meaningful experience as well as the necessary
    support equipment and processes to do the job.
        In closing, I would like to emphasize the hard work and dedication
    of AFNWC's professionals and their efforts to address the most pressing
    concerns in the nuclear enterprise. The American public rightly holds
    its nuclear stewards to the very highest standards, and we will not let
    them down. I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
    address these issues and look forward to your questions.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General. Thank you all. We'll
    commence a 6-minute round of questions.
        General Kowalski and General Scott, the B-1 and B-2 bombers
    each flew in Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. What is your
    assessment of the mission success of each of these bombers and
    did either have any equipment or other problems?
        General Kowalski. Chairman Nelson, the bombers and their
    weapons performed exactly as we expected them to. The crew
    members' performance was superb, and the command and control of
    the operation also was executed very well from organizations
    within the U.S.
        Senator Nelson. General Scott, anything to add?
        General Scott. Sir, I would just add that if you looked at
    the B-1, for the first time in history they flew from the
    States to a target in another nation and then returned, not
    back to the States, but to a point in space. So they flew a 24-
    hour sortie. If you remember that particular day where they
    were launching those aircraft 42 hours after they got notified,
    it was in the snow and ice. Those were some pretty tough
    conditions for our young men and women loading those aircraft
    up and getting them airborne to do the mission that they did.
    Sir, it was absolutely flawless.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Also, to the two of you, the last time the longevity of the
    current fleet was reviewed, all the bombers would begin to
    start retirement around 2035 to 2037. Can you tell us now, what
    is the expected retirement date for the B-52, the B-1, and B-2
    based on current expectations and current projections?
        General Kowalski. All of those bombers, based on longevity
    in terms of the aging and surveillance information that we get
    on the airframes as they go through depot and other studies,
    have them all going out past 2040. The limiting factor on the
    B-2s is the rudder attachment point right now. The limiting
    factor on the B-52s is the upper skin of the wing, and on the
    B-1s it's the lower skin on the wing.
        General Scott. That's absolutely right. In the B-1 fleet,
    we have it from right now structurally out to 19,900 hours.
    That takes it out to the '40s. If we also look at it, by 2018
    we will be doing a fleet viability board and a structural test
    on it to see where we need to go further with that aircraft.
        Senator Nelson. Now, continuing with this, all of the
    current bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying
    types to try to reach that 2040 point in time. Do we have a
    comprehensive plan developed for each bomber aircraft that
    would help us understand what it's going to take to sustain and
    modernize each bomber so that we can be certain that each
    platform remains capable through that period of time? Is there
    an overall program for each one of the birds?
        General Kowalski. Senator, for both the B-2 and the B-52
    there are existing roadmaps. With the standup of Air Force
    Global Strike Command, we have put into place a larger
    strategic master plan to sort of guide our efforts from our
    mission and vision all the way down to specific tasks to be
    done during any current year. We're in the process right now of
    integrating the roadmaps for the B-2 and the B-52 into that
    strategic master plan so we can track it and work tasks on a
    regular basis.
        Senator Nelson. General Scott, several of the upgrade
    programs are needed to prevent the bombers from being grounded.
    For example, the B-1 had three programs that had to be in place
    this year to prevent grounding. These three programs are the
    central integrated test system, the vertical situation display,
    and the radar modernization improvement program. Are all the
    programs that I've just outlined on track to complete by the
    end of the year to avoid having any grounding?
        General Scott. Sir, they are on track. The end of the year
    is not the timeline. The actual timelines are for these
    specifically, are in 2012 and 2013. But the funding is in place
    for the B-1 to do this. As we look at this, we look at it in
    four different ways: the sustainability, lethality,
    responsiveness, and the survivability. That's how we tie the
    things that the Air Combat Command (ACC) is working on to
    maintain this modernization of this fleet.
        They are on track, but the timelines are in second quarter
    of 2012 and 2013.
        Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, the Global Strike Command
    is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move the B-1
    to Global Strike?
        General Kowalski. Senator, I'm not aware of any plans at
    this time.
        Senator Nelson. Is anybody else aware of any plans to do
    that?
        General Chambers. No, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Nelson. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012
    budget request the Air Force has proposed to retire six B-1
    bombers. Could you explain why these bombers are being retired
    and what are the cost savings associated with the retirements?
        General Scott. Mr. Chairman, as we look at our fleet and as
    we look at the entire bomber fleet, we look at how we can
    balance and manage capability and capacity. As we look at the
    modernization pieces that we're doing with the B-1 and as we
    look at these specific aircraft, the six that we're reducing,
    we're not retiring the fleet; we're reducing the number that we
    are. It's to enable us to be able to take those 60 aircraft,
    continue that modernization on time to maintain that combat
    capability that we give to the COCOM commanders.
        Senator Nelson. Do you think that the 60 will be sufficient
    for that by reducing it by 6, or will we be shorting ourselves
    of our capabilities for cost savings?
        General Scott. Sir, the analysis that we have done looking
    at all of the force planning structure and the analytical
    agendas that we have been given show that the 60 will be--with,
    again, as you look across the fleet of the bombers and the
    combat air forces, working with Global Strike Command and ACC--
    yes, sir, the total number of bombers is still well within the
    capability of the risks that we accept.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General Scott. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I'll submit some questions to each of you concerning the
    modernization of our strategic deterrent and the cost. I know
    you're wrestling with that and I'd like to have as much
    information as we can as we wrestle with it. I happen to be the
    ranking member on the Budget Committee, which makes all this no
    fun to talk about.
        Let me ask, Admiral Benedict, about the solid rocket motor
    industrial base. Or maybe General Kowalski mentioned that
    earlier. The fiscal year 2012 budget shows an almost 85 percent
    per unit increase, Mr. Chairman, $8.5 million more than the
    cost for the same motors in 2011, for the purchase of the D5
    solid rocket motors. How much of that price is related to the
    cancellation of the Constellation and lack of NASA's decision
    to have a clear path for heavy lift, and what can be done about
    that if that's the problem?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. We have seen the unit cost
    increase from approximately $10.7 million to approximately
    $19.2 million. Of that, part of it is due to overhead
    increases. We calculate motor costs to be about 60 percent of
    that increase. The other 40 percent is due to requalification,
    material increases, and the retooling in order to continue
    production of the original D5 design.
        We have worked very closely with Lockheed Martin and
    Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK), our industry partners, to try
    and mitigate the cost of the uncertainty and the cancellation
    in the NASA programs. We have seen ATK reduce their indirect
    overhead by approximately 24 percent. We have seen ATK reduce
    their current work force by approximately 42 percent.
        In parallel with that, we have taken significant process
    and quality improvements. We estimate savings of about 17,000
    man-hours or about $10 million a year cost avoidance.
        So as we look at this issue today, we have a requirement to
    STRATCOM to continue to provide the survivable strategic
    deterrent. We are the only program today in current production.
    So we are working very closely with the industry partners as
    they try to develop not only a business plan, but understand
    the larger plan for this national capability solid rocket motor
    industry.
        Senator Sessions. Do I understand that the decline in
    numbers of purchases driven by NASA's situation has increased
    the cost? What part of the cost increase do you attribute to
    that?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. If you look at it in just terms
    of pure volume, NASA is about 70-plus percent of the solid
    rocket motor industry. We're about 20 percent. Another baseline
    point is it would take 10 Trident motors--first, second, and
    third stages--in order to make one solid rocket motor booster
    for the Shuttle. So in pure volume, the NASA decision is one
    that causes the overhead to be spread amongst the remaining
    programs.
        We have worked closely with the Air Force. Their Minuteman
    program is in a smart shutdown. The NASA program is
    significantly ramped down. We are the only strategic program of
    solid rocket motors that are currently in production, so we are
    currently bearing that overhead shift.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we've tried to work on that because
    I think NASA needs to maintain its role, and through our budget
    and other reasons we haven't been able to do that. It's had the
    perverse result of driving up DOD's costs.
        General Kowalski and General Chambers, as I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, the 1251 report that accompanied the New START
    treaty stated that the administration intends to begin to study
    a follow-on ICBM in a way that ``supports continued reductions
    in U.S. nuclear weapons.'' Can you elaborate and provide some
    context for that statement? Do you know precisely what was
    being referred to there?
        General Kowalski. Senator, I'm not sure what's being
    referred to there. In terms of the ground-based strategic
    deterrent, our command is working with headquarters Air Force
    on a capabilities-based assessment and we plan to move to pre-
    ICD activities next year.
        Senator Sessions. ``ICD'' is?
        General Kowalski. Initial capabilities document, and
    analysis of alternatives by fiscal year 2013.
        Senator Sessions. Well, could this guidance that you
    conduct this review for the follow-on ICBM in a way that
    supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons--is it
    possible that such a statement could influence the results that
    you produce, the nature of the study? Have you been directed to
    consider that as you make your study?
        General Kowalski. Senator, the guidance we have right now
    is in the nuclear posture report and that's the guidance that
    we're using for the capability-based assessment.
        Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
        General Chambers. Yes, sir. The exact context of that
    wording is unclear. However, the section 1251 report does
    indicate, of course, that the ground-based leg of the triad the
    Air Force will retain up to 420 ICBMs from a current force of
    450. So the ``up to 420'' is the baseline for the New START
    level of ICBMs, and so the follow-on ICBM uses that as the
    starting point.
        Now, if further policy looks are made at further
    reductions, we are not yet tasked to go any further than that.
    So the ``up to 420'' is our guiding baseline right now.
        Senator Sessions. The problem I want to know is that, here
    we have the report suggesting that anything you say, anything
    you conclude, should support continued reductions. Are you
    prepared to issue a report if you so decide that does not
    recommend reductions? It seems like to me otherwise you're
    having a political interference or a political override of
    military best judgment.
        General Kowalski. The efforts that we're pursuing right now
    in ground-based strategic deterrence won't address the
    policies. It will simply address what we see as the capability
    requirements based on the 2010 nuke posture review.
        Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
        General Chambers. Yes, sir. As General Kowalski indicated,
    the entire material solution analysis phase for this new--for
    this potential Minuteman follow-on, will continue into fiscal
    year 2014. Between now and fiscal year 2014, if there are
    national policy decisions made with regard to force structure,
    I know I'm very confident that my chief of staff will be
    involved in providing military advice to those discussions. But
    they will certainly inform the final force structure number.
    But right now we're starting this study effort with a baseline
    of up to 420.
        Senator Sessions. Well, ultimately the political leaders
    make final decisions on the matter, there's no doubt about it.
    But I would trust that all of you--and I guess I'll ask you to
    state for the record: Do all of you understand it would be your
    duty, if asked in hearings or within DOD, that your duty would
    be to give your best military judgment as to how to best defend
    America, even if it's not in accord with us politicians?
    General Scott?
        General Scott. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. General Kowalski?
        General Kowalski. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
        General Chambers. Most definitely, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I just wanted to raise that,
    because sometimes, even in the military, cultures and climates
    get established and people feel like they should try to make
    their judgment comply with what higher officials would like to
    see. But this is so important and so critical, and I appreciate
    your willingness to speak the truth as you see it.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        To comply with the New START treaty, the Air Force will
    draw down the number of nuclear-capable bombers, as has been
    discussed, the number of deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, and the
    Navy will reduce the number of deployed D5 SLBMs. Let's start
    with the bombers. General Scott, the B-1 became a conventional-
    only bomber over a decade ago. Nevertheless, they were counted
    under the old START Treaty. Do we know when the efforts will
    begin to modify all the B-1 aircraft so that they're not
    nuclear-capable any more under the new treaty?
        General Scott. Mr. Chairman, I'll start with the answer but
    then I'll pass it to General Chambers as the guy that works the
    treaty.
        Under the old START treaty, all of the B-1s, I think as of
    about a week ago, General Chambers will say, have been
    retrofitted non-nuclear. So under old START they are non-
    nuclear. Now, there are some timelines on when we notify the
    Russians, and again I'll let General Chambers follow on with
    that, for the New START inspection process. But currently today
    the B-1s are conventional platforms.
        Senator Nelson. Great.
        General Chambers?
        General Chambers. Mr. Chairman, one of the first provisions
    of the new treaty was to provide the Russian Federation an
    exhibition of a B-1. That has now been completed in compliance
    with the treaty, and that was the last hurdle to converting the
    last B-1. So the entire B-1 fleet has now either been converted
    or eliminated, and thus the Russian Federation now has 60 days
    to confirm that using inspection means. Then some time late
    this summer, early fall, the database for New START will no
    longer reflect B-1s as an accountable nuclear delivery
    platform.
        Senator Nelson. It's my understanding, General Kowalski,
    that all the B-2 aircraft will remain nuclear-capable. Is that
    accurate?
        General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, yes, that's accurate.
        Senator Nelson. Has there been any decision as to how many
    B-52s will be modified to no longer be nuclear-capable?
        General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, that conversation is
    ongoing. We expect a decision will be made soon on the force
    structure options.
        Senator Nelson. Has there been a decision as to the actual
    modification that will be needed to remove the B-52 from being
    counted as a nuclear-capable bomber under that New START
    treaty?
        General Kowalski. No, that decision has not been made yet.
        Senator Nelson. Do we have some idea when it may be made?
        General Kowalski. I'd turn that over to General Chambers.
        General Chambers. Mr. Chairman, the conversion method for
    the bomber, for the B-52, has to be reviewed by a body called
    the Compliance Review Group. It's a bilateral group of Russians
    and American specialists. That Compliance Review Group will
    meet later this spring, I believe in the month of May, but we
    can check that for sure.
        The command has given their method of converting and that
    method will be reviewed, and we hope to get a good answer soon.
        Senator Nelson. Okay. If you would, for the record respond
    to us with that information when it's available.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        When is the next CRG to discuss bomber conversion method? How long
    will it take for a decision? What's the CRG membership?

        (1)  Date of the next Compliance Review Group (CRG): CRGs do not
    meet regularly; rather they convene in reaction to Services (or DOD
    Agencies) bringing forward proposed activities that raise issues of
    compliance with arms control treaties. For B-52 conversion, the Air
    Force's aim is to meet the Treaty's requirement to render the converted
    bombers incapable of employing nuclear armaments while simultaneously
    preserving full conventional functionality. We have found that the more
    due diligence we conduct before approaching the CRG, the more rapidly
    they can reach compliance decisions. With this in mind, the Air Force
    is currently fleshing out a proposal for converting some number of
    operational B-52Hs to a non-nuclear role. We currently envision
    approaching the CRG with a thoroughly developed package within the next
    couple of months.
        (2)  How long will it take: Engaging the Compliance Review Group
    marks the beginning of the process leading to a compliance decision.
    Experience reveals that the decision process can sometimes be an
    iterative one. We have seen some issues settled in a matter of weeks to
    months while in some rare cases others have taken years. As a result,
    it can be difficult to predict the point where a decision will be made.
        (3)  CRG membership: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    Technology and Logistics is the DOD official responsible for ensuring
    that DOD activities are conducted in compliance with treaties. The
    Under Secretary is supported by Compliance Review Groups--one for each
    treaty. The individual membership may change from treaty to treaty.
    However, the organizational composition remains the same--senior-level
    experts from OSD (Policy), OSD (General Counsel), the Joint Staff, and
    is chaired by OSD(AT&L).

        Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, my understanding is that
    the Navy will retain the current number of Ohio-class ballistic
    missile submarines under the New START treaty, and that's 14,
    but will remove missiles from the missile compartment of the
    deployed submarines. Each submarine can carry 24 missiles. How
    many D5 missiles will be removed from each deployed submarine,
    and will this process start soon and how long might it take?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. The Navy's current planning is
    to remove four missiles per deployed submarine, so we would go
    from 24 to 20. We are currently programmed to do that beginning
    in fiscal year 2015, and we expect that to be accomplished
    within a 2-year timeframe.
        Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, the Air Force plan is to
    reduce to approximately 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs from
    the current 450, and my understanding is that each squadron of
    50 missiles is interdependent, but the Air Force is exploring
    options as to how to reduce the number of ICBMs. In other
    words, will a whole squadron be deactivated or will the Air
    Force pick and choose among missiles and among the squadrons?
        General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, the force structure options
    will be determined soon in terms of the Chief and the Secretary
    looking, reviewing them, and then making their recommendations
    back to the Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Nelson. Because there's some sort interdependence,
    is it going to be possible to take out of the various different
    locations maybe one or two, or do you have to remove an entire
    set at once?
        General Kowalski. The options that we're looking at--as we
    put forward the 1251 report, if you do the math on that you see
    that we end up with about 720. So there's about 20 strategic
    delivery vehicles that we're trying to get--trying to get our
    arms around in terms of how we get from 720 to 700. So whether
    that 20 is bombers or whether that 20 is missiles to go from
    420 down to 400 is what we're wrestling with right now.
        Once we determine what is the best way to get there, then
    there's a follow-on discussion of that. For example, if we do
    decide that it is to go to 400 on the ICBMs, then the decision
    then is do you spread that out among the force? We have 45
    flights of 10 missiles out there in the field right now, so if
    you took one from each that would get you to about 45. Or
    whether you pursue an entire squadron. There are pros and cons
    to both, and that will inform the decision as we go forward
    here in the next few weeks.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the solid rocket motors,
    has there been a consideration, Admiral Benedict, of working
    with NASA to try to achieve a reduction in cost per unit as a
    result of more numbers?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. I met with the director of
    NASA's Huntsville location just last Friday. We have been very
    collaborative with NASA, MDA, and other Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD) groups. OSD industrial policy led the review
    in response to the congressional direction for a report on the
    future of the solid rocket motor industry.
        My understanding as of this morning, that report has been
    approved by Dr. Carter and will be released. We provided an
    interim report last summer on what we believed within the
    Department was the proper path forward for the solid rocket
    motor. The final was just signed this morning, sir. So we have
    been working very collaboratively with all the other solid
    rocket motor users.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Chambers, can you tell us about the current status
    of the dual-capable, nuclear-capable variant of the F-35? Is it
    scheduled for the 2017 delivery date still?
        General Chambers. Senator Sessions, the F-35 as a platform,
    of course, is part of the larger F-35 program both for the
    United States and the allies. That program overall is now
    undergoing a technical baseline review. That technical baseline
    review will later this summer and fall probably give us a new
    timeline. The timeline for production and delivery of the F-35
    is going to slip to the right. The amount of time is unknown,
    but that will impact the delivery of that capability with the
    new B61 life extended--B61 Mod 12, to the alliance in Europe.
        Thoroughgoing planning is under way to cover any potential
    gap that this slip may require. Sir, the current mission is
    being fulfilled by F-16s and F-15Es stationed in Europe. Those
    units that conduct that mission continue to conduct it,
    continue fully certified to conduct it. Some portion of those
    airplanes will continue to perform the mission until the F-35
    is ready and fully integrated and deployed to Europe.
        Senator Sessions. Are you not prepared to give us a date of
    the F-35?
        General Chambers. Yes, sir. The F-35 Joint Program Office,
    of course, is working this very hard, and we just know that,
    writ large, the F-35 program is approximating a 2-year slip.
    That doesn't mean that every piece of F-35 capability is going
    to slip to the right 2 years. So we are also very confident
    that the piece of that F-35 development program which calls for
    it to carry a nuclear weapon is still the first block of
    software after the development phase, which is a good thing.
    But the exact date I can't name yet.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict, according to recent
    press reports the Navy rejected the recommendations of STRATCOM
    to design the next generation of ballistic missile submarines
    with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat.
    What is the basis for the Navy's decision of 16? I'm sure cost
    is a factor. In what ways will that decision impact overall
    nuclear force structure associated with the command?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy
    analysis, STRATCOM's analysis, as well as the OSD analysis as
    we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision that
    Dr. Carter conducted based on our input, which was the
    technical input, as the Director of SSP. Other factors were
    considered. As you stated, cost was one of them.
        But as the Secretary, as the CNO, and I think as General
    Kehler submitted in their testimony, given the threats that we
    see today, given the mission that we see today, given the
    upload capability of the D5, and given the environment as they
    saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable with the
    decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Does that represent your judgment? To
    what extent were you involved in that?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, we were involved from a technical
    aspect in terms of the capability of the missile itself, what
    we can throw, our range, our capability. Based on what we
    understand the capability of the D5 today, which will be the
    baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement Program, as the
    Director of SSP I'm comfortable with that decision.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Nelson. General Harencak, you have recently assumed
    command of the Nuclear Weapons Center, another organization
    established to address the problems with the nuclear
    enterprise, particularly the incident where a missile nose cone
    was mistakenly shipped to Taiwan mismarked as a battery. I have
    two or three questions that I'd like to ask.
        Do you think you have positive control over all nuclear-
    related parts?
        General Harencak. Absolutely, sir. We've made significant
    progress over the years in developing positive inventory
    control (PIC) and merging of databases, and we are absolutely
    positive that we have fixed that problem.
        Senator Nelson. Could you describe what kind of a database
    you've put together to make sure that all the parts are
    accounted for, incoming, outgoing, and in supply?
        General Harencak. What we've developed is what we call PIC
    fusion. What it does is, it merges all of the databases into
    one. We take in-transit databases. We take databases that are
    in base supply, any type of database that may be even
    indirectly under our control or not. For example, we're right
    now beginning to merge the nuclear weapons-related material
    (NWRM), that is ours, that the Department of Energy currently
    holds for us at Pantex and the Kansas City plant, for example.
    So we've merged this. It's been under development. It's a
    constantly evolving system that gives us very, very solid
    visibility on where all this is.
        I might also add that when it comes to actually the nuclear
    weapons themselves, there is one general in the Air Force that
    knows at all times where every weapon is, whether it be in
    storage or in transit, and that is me. We do that through our
    Sustainment and Integration Center (SIC), which is
    headquartered at my headquarters in Albuquerque. It has
    complete control and focus on where everything is.
        Senator Nelson. Much of the maintenance and test equipment
    supporting the missiles and the nuclear weapons is old and
    needs to be replaced. Now that we have knowledge of where
    everything is, do you have any plans to begin replacing the old
    equipment?
        General Harencak. Absolutely, sir. We have spent and plan
    on spending almost $1 billion from 2009 to 2016 on specifically
    ensuring the capabilities are retained through refurbishment
    and repair and getting ahead of the systems. For example, the
    reentry system test tabs, which are cables that have to be
    repaired. We're getting out ahead of them. While we're
    refurbishing, while we're fixing these and getting them out to
    the field as quick as possible, we're also fast-tracking the
    designing and building of replacements.
        So we are very focused on keeping a whole weapons system,
    specifically the Minuteman III, viable through a focused
    sustainment life cycle cradle-to-grave approach.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General Kowalski, much of the support equipment for the
    missiles, it's very old. What are your plans to address the
    issue of aging equipment, including, for example, the need to
    replace the Vietnam-era helicopters that support the missile
    fields? Are there new helicopters needed, and if so why, and
    can the Air Force replace these helicopters with very little,
    minimal, or no development costs?
        General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, we're working with the
    system program offices and with the Nuke Weapons Center on a
    lot of the test equipment issues for the ICBM. We also have a
    missile engineering squadron that's currently based at Peterson
    Air Force Base, that does a lot of the facility kinds of
    sustainment for it.
        On the requirements for the helicopters, when the UH-1 was
    introduced it was introduced primarily as a lift platform for
    support. It really wasn't identified as part of the security.
    When we did a series of stressing reviews of the security
    requirements of the missile fields, what was identified was a
    need for a helicopter that could carry more security forces
    members, could get them to launch facilities or convoys faster,
    and which had greater range, and that's what we have been
    working on since the mid- to late-1990s.
        Senator Nelson. From your testimony, it appears that the
    mission for the new helicopters will be missile field support,
    as you've just indicated, and to meet the continuity of
    government needs for the military district of Washington. Is it
    clear that the new common vertical lift support platform will
    support only those two missions and won't serve as a combat
    search and rescue function?
        General Kowalski. I think the acquisition decision has yet
    to be made in terms of the final elements and the strategy to
    go forward. Right now, in the capability document that we had
    put together it is a lift support platform for the missile
    field security, for continuity of ops, continuity of government
    here in Washington, DC, and there is also some platforms that
    are used out in the Pacific.
        Senator Nelson. How many helicopters do you expect might be
    needed to achieve each mission? Do you have a number in mind?
        General Kowalski. Senator, I would probably have to give
    you for the record a precise number. That number is probably
    somewhere between 80 and 100.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Air Force needs 42 Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
    helicopters for missile field security and 27 to meet the continuity-
    of-government requirements for the Air Force Military District of
    Washington. There are 24 additional helicopters required for Pacific
    Air Forces, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Special Operations
    Command, and AETC training and transport needs.

        Senator Nelson. I guess that's everything that I have.
    There's a personnel concern. We should try to address this and
    then I think we can go to the secure location. When you work in
    the nuclear fields, obviously that can be difficult for
    personnel. Do either of you have any challenges bringing young
    airmen and sailors into the nuclear enterprise, and are these
    sought-after assignments or do they just sort of happen? Are
    they actually sought after by young men and women coming into
    the Service?
        General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, we don't really have any
    issues with getting airmen to join the Air Force and then being
    assigned tasks out in the missile fields. Probably the larger
    challenge that we face is getting our younger airmen, once
    they've reached that decision point, if they have been
    stationed in one of our northern bases where the environment's
    a little bit tougher, the smaller communities around them, they
    tend to leave the Service.
        So we have been very concerned about that. We've been
    watching it very closely in cooperation with headquarters Air
    Force in terms of how do we improve quality of life and things
    up there for them.
        But at the end of the day our airmen really want two things
    from us: they want to know what it is that they have to do and
    they want to know that what they do is important. The Secretary
    and the Chief have established Air Force Global Strike Command.
    I have been to each base at least three times. I've talked to
    these airmen. The functional directors on my staff have been
    out talking to the airmen.
        They get the clear message that what they do is important
    and they also have the clear message about what it is that we
    need them to do. So I think we're making real headway, and we
    see it right now in our younger officers when they get to the
    decision point. Because of the numbers of ICBM missileers that
    we take in, the crew members, we don't need them at about the
    5-year point. A lot of them are allowed to do other things in
    the Air Force. Right now we have more volunteers to stay in the
    ICBM community in the nuclear enterprise than we have spots
    for. So right now that's a good sign on how the enterprise has
    turned around in the last few years.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you for that update. Thank you all
    for your testimony today. We appreciate your being here and
    your service.
        Senator Sessions. Just one question.
        Senator Nelson. Sure.
        Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, or maybe Chambers or
    whoever, the 1251 report stipulated a force structure of up to
    420 ICBMs. That's a reduction of 30. When will the decision be
    made as to what that number will be? Have you decided that?
        General Kowalski. Senator, I expect that decision to be
    made here shortly, within the next 3 months.
        Senator Sessions. Will that allow you appropriate time to
    analyze all the factors necessary?
        General Kowalski. Senator, yes. We have been looking at
    this for about 7 to 9 months already in terms of analyzing the
    costs and working down this path. Then as the Secretary of
    Defense has stated, the entry into force will be toward the end
    of the treaty. What we see right now as we look at the
    different options that we have is that, frankly, the critical
    path to make sure we're in compliance with the treaty is
    eliminating a lot of the phantom silos out there. So there's a
    lot of work to be done out in eliminating the silos.
        But in terms of the force structure decisions, that's not a
    particularly driving force right now.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Again, thank you all.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                   bombers--upgrades and future capabilities
        1. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, the last
    time the longevity of the current fleet was reviewed, all of the
    bombers would begin to start retirements around 2035 to 2037. What is
    the expected retirement date for the B-52, the B-1, and B-2, based on
    current projections?
        General Kowalski and General Scott. The Air Force expects to begin
    retiring legacy bomber platforms once the Long-Range Penetrating Bomber
    (LRPB) achieves Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Until that time,
    the Air Force will continuously assess the overall capacity and
    capability of our combat forces, including bombers, to ensure that the
    overall force is appropriately sized to provide for the Nation's
    defense. Potential legacy bomber retirements as a result of LRPB IOC
    will likely be a mix of B-1s and/or B-52s (numbers and dates to be
    determined). Legacy bomber retirement decisions will be based on
    operational requirements, operating costs, economic service life, and
    treaty compliance mandates. The Air Force plans to maintain the B-2
    fleet to beyond 2040.

        2. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, what are the
    serious life-limiting factors for each aircraft?
        General Kowalski and General Scott. The Structural Service Life for
    each bomber is based on when a key component within the aircraft
    structure reaches the point where further repair is not economically
    viable. Key components are tracked and service life is updated through
    the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program. The current limiting factor
    for the B-52 is the wing upper surface. For the B-1 it is the wing
    lower surface. For the B-2 it is the rudder attach points. All three
    bomber types are currently projected to reach their Structural Service
    life beyond 2040.

        3. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, all of the
    current bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying types
    underway. Has a comprehensive plan been developed for each bomber
    aircraft to sustain and modernize each bomber to assure that each
    platform remains capable through the projected future life for each
    bomber and to meet the retirement date outlined above?
        General Kowalski and General Scott. Air Force Global Strike Command
    (AFGSC) possesses the B-2 and B-52 dual-capable bombers. These aircraft
    each have plans detailing current and future sustainment and
    modernization requirements. The most recent B-2 Long Range Capability
    Flight Plan is dated November 2009 and addresses sustainment and
    modernization requirements to ensure the platform remains capable
    through 2058. The most recent B-52 Road Map is dated December 2007 and
    outlines sustainment and modernization requirements to ensure the
    platform remains capable through 2040. AFGSC is currently writing
    Bomber Master Plans for both of these platforms. The Master Plans will
    build on these previous plans and provide updated sustainment and
    modification requirements designed to keep the platforms capable
    through their life expectancies. AFGSC will publish these plans later
    this year and look to publish future plans until the new bomber attains
    IOC.
        Air Combat Command (ACC) possesses the B-1 conventional bomber. The
    B-1 Roadmap dated October 2007 addresses sustainment and modernization
    requirements to ensure it remains capable through 2025. The Bomber
    Force Structure Study from February 2008 estimates the structural life
    of the platform out to 2040. ACC and the B-1 Systems Program Office
    (SPO) at Tinker Air Force Base are currently producing a Strategic
    Action and Investment Plan (SAIP) that will update and validate the
    sustainment and modernization efforts for the B-1 to ensure that it
    remains viable through its expected service life of 2040. The SAIP will
    be published later this year.

        4. Senator Nelson. General Scott, several of the upgrade programs
    are needed to prevent the bombers from being grounded. The B-1, for
    example, had three programs that had to be in place this year to
    prevent grounding. These three programs are the Central Integrated Test
    System (CITS), the Vertical Situation Display, and the Radar
    Modernization and Improvement Program (RMIP). Are all these programs on
    track to be completed by the end of the year to prevent grounding?
        General Scott. All three modification programs are on track to
    begin installations early enough in 2012 to prevent grounding. The RMIP
    production contract was awarded on 30 September 2010. First kit
    deliveries begin in the spring of 2012 with the first aircraft
    modification scheduled for June 2012. The CITS program has completed
    development, and the production contract award is projected for June
    2011. The Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU) program is
    scheduled to begin flight test this summer. Early procurement of
    critical kit parts has been authorized, and the contract award is
    projected for June 2011. Kit deliveries for both CITS and VSDU are
    scheduled to begin in September 2012 with first aircraft installation
    starting in November 12.

        5. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, the Global
    Strike Command is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move
    the B-1 to Global Strike? If not, why not?
        General Kowalski and General Scott. Currently there is no plan to
    move the B-1 from ACC to AFGSC. The decision to transfer only the
    nuclear capable bombers to AFGSC was focused and deliberate, given
    their primary mission of safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrence. Maintaining the B-1 within the ACC portfolio supports ACC's
    tasked role as the lead integrator for the Combat Air Force.

                                b-1 retirements
        6. Senator Nelson. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012 budget
    request the Air Force has proposed to retire six B-1 bombers. What are
    the cost savings associated with these retirements?
        General Scott. The retirement of six B-1s will provide a total
    fiscal year 2012 savings of $62M in procurement and sustainment
    funding.

        7. Senator Nelson. General Scott, how much of the savings will go
    to each of the B-1, other bombers, and Air Force higher priorities?
        General Scott. The Air Force is reinvesting $33 million in fiscal
    year 2012 into critical B-1 sustainment and modernization programs to
    ensure the health of the remaining fleet. These programs include
    procurement and installation of VSDU and CITS sustainment efforts,
    Fully Integrated Data Link capability upgrade, and procurement of
    critical initial spares for these modifications. The Department applied
    the remainder of the savings from the B-1 reduction to other Air Force
    and Department of Defense (DOD) priorities to include continuing to
    strengthen the nuclear enterprise and investing in Building
    Partnerships.

        8. Senator Nelson. General Scott, will the retirement have any
    impact on the Air Force ability to meet any operational plan or other
    requirements?
        General Scott. The retirement of six B-1 bombers will free up
    funding to modify the remaining B-1 aircraft. The modifications to the
    remaining aircraft will improve their ability to respond to Combatant
    Commander operational taskings and ensure their viability in the
    future.
        Tactical and campaign level analysis conducted by Air Force Studies
    and Analysis has indicated a reduction of six B-1 primary aircraft
    authorizations (three combat coded and three training coded) can be
    taken with limited risk against currently approved Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) Analytic Agenda scenarios. Cost per flying
    hour and mission capable rate analyses further supported a modest B-1
    reduction as a wise reinvestment strategy geared toward increasing the
    pool of equipment spares and freeing funds to source critical
    sustainment and capability modifications. The Air Force expects to
    achieve an increase in aircraft availability in the near-term as a
    result of these retirements and monies reinvested, in part, to fund
    fleet modernization programs. Funded programs include fully integrated
    data link, vertical situation display, and CITS upgrades, providing a
    capabilities-based bridge to the future Long Range Strike platform.

                                start reductions
        9. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General
    Chambers, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) allows 800
    nondeployed missile launchers and nuclear capable bombers. Has there
    been a decision as to how the 800 nondeployed systems will be
    allocated?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The fiscal year 2012 Annual
    Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Section 1251 Report)
    allocates the 800 total deployed and nondeployed launchers as follows:
    submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)--280; intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBM)--up to 454; and nuclear capable bombers--up
    to 66. Within the bomber force we will maintain all 20 B-2s as dual
    capable bombers. Up to 700 of these systems may be deployed (as defined
    by the treaty). We are assessing how the nondeployed systems might be
    allocated during the treaty period.
        Admiral Benedict. One of the New START treaty central limits is a
    limit of 800 deployed plus nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and
    deployed plus nondeployed heavy bombers, to be achieved by 7 years
    after entry into force of the treaty. In order to meet this limit,
    current U.S. plans call for a total of 280 deployed plus nondeployed
    SLBM launchers. Of this total, 240 will be deployed launchers (20
    launchers on each of 12 strategically-loaded SSBNs) and 40 will be
    nondeployed launchers (20 launchers on each of 2 SSBNs in extended
    overhaul).

        10. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General
    Chambers, has there been a decision on what constitutes a nondeployed
    missile launcher?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. Under the New START treaty,
    a silo launcher at an operational ICBM base that does not contain an
    ICBM is considered a nondeployed launcher. In addition, those silo
    launchers at ICBM test ranges and space launch facilities are
    accountable as nondeployed launchers. Plus, all ICBM silo training
    launchers are accountable as nondeployed launchers, of which the Air
    force currently has no launchers that fit this definition. Finally, non
    silo-based fixed launchers of ICBMs and space launch vehicles (i.e.,
    ``soft-site'' launchers) at any of these facilities are not accountable
    as nondeployed or deployed launchers.
        Admiral Benedict. As defined in the treaty:

              The term ``nondeployed launcher of SLBMs'' means an SLBM
            launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that is intended for
            testing or training, or an SLBM launcher that does not contain
            a deployed SLBM.

        In simpler terms, a nondeployed SLBM launcher is an accountable
    missile tube that is empty; thus, if the Navy were to remove an SLBM
    from its launcher, the status of that launcher (and the status of the
    SLBM) would change from deployed to nondeployed. A nondeployed SLBM
    launcher is accountable under the New START treaty towards the central
    limit of 800 deployed plus nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
    and heavy bombers.

                       solid rocket motor industrial base
        11. Senator Nelson. General Chambers, the cost of solid rocket
    motors (SRM) continues to grow. The National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration's decisions to halt the Constellation/Aries programs
    have, as we discussed last year, increased the portion of overhead
    costs borne by DOD. Now that the Air Force has completed Minuteman III
    upgrades and it will be several years before a new engineering effort
    is needed to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030, the Air Force is
    apparently not planning to invest in the SRM infrastructure. What are
    your thoughts on how to ensure the industry has the ability to support
    an additional life extension for Minuteman III and a replacement ICBM
    in the future?
        General Chambers. The Air Force is committed to support the
    industrial base for current and future strategic SRMs needs. The Air
    Force is developing a Minuteman III SRM Modernization concept which
    proposes a modernization program to leverage latest SRM technology
    development into replacement SRMs for MM III (expected need date post-
    2020). The proposal would operationally qualify modernized motor
    designs; replace current MM III motors with new SRM technology; utilize
    modern industrial practices; and posture DOD for future SRM
    requirements with transferable technologies. Many of these technologies
    are currently being matured in the ICBM Demonstration and Validation
    Program specifically designed to support industrial base by exercising
    the critical SRM systems engineering and design skills. We believe that
    this Modernization program will be able to provide the needed SRM
    development to sustain the Industry until the time comes for a
    replacement for the current MM III ICBM.

                       long-range nuclear cruise missile
        12. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, in your prepared testimony
    you talk about the process for fielding a new long range nuclear cruise
    missile, starting with an analysis of alternatives (AoA) that will be
    completed in 2010. What is the assumption on the life of the existing
    nuclear cruise missile?
        General Kowalski. The Air Force has two service life extension
    programs (LEP): one to sustain the air launched cruise missile (ALCM)
    through 2020, which is fully funded; and another to sustain the ALCM
    through 2030, currently being programmed for in the fiscal year 2013
    Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

        13. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when does the replacement
    need to be in place?
        General Kowalski. Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) must be in place by
    2030, which aligns with the projected end date for the ALCM service
    LEP.

        14. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, has there been any discussion
    about the warhead that will be used in the new cruise missile?
        General Kowalski. Recommendations on the specific warhead for use
    in the new cruise missile are being developed by a cross-organizational
    Warhead Working Group with participation from Department of Energy
    (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM), AFGSC, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC),
    and Air Armament Center. There are several warhead candidates being
    considered, including the W80. Data from the LRSO AoAs will be used to
    help finalize the warhead recommendation. Final recommendations for
    warhead selection will be completed prior to Milestone A, which is
    currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013.

                       global strike command--helicopters
        15. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, much of the support equipment
    for the missiles is very old. What are your plans to address the issue
    of aging equipment, including the need to replace the Vietnam-era
    helicopters that support the missile fields?
        General Kowalski. Support equipment is a critical component of the
    ICBM Master Plan, our overarching planning document for sustaining the
    Minuteman III through 2030. All ICBM support equipment needs are
    prioritized within the Master Plan to support our planning and
    programming process for building the POM submission. Two specific
    examples of support equipment needs highlighted in the Master Plan and
    included in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) are replacements
    for the ICBM Payload Transporters and Transporter Erectors. The 17-
    year-old Payload Transporter fleet is currently funded in fiscal year
    2011 for replacement with first deliveries projected to begin in fiscal
    year 2015. A program to replace the 21-year old Transporter Erector
    fleet is being considered as part of the fiscal year 2013 POM.
        We intend to replace the UH-1N with the Common Vertical Lift
    Support Platform (CVLSP) with an initial operating capability in fiscal
    year 2015.

        16. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, why are new helicopters
    needed?
        General Kowalski. The UH-1N does not have the four critical/
    fundamental key performance parameters (KPP) of speed, range,
    endurance, or payload capacity for the nuclear security mission or meet
    the continuity of government requirements for the Military District of
    Washington.

        17. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when are new helicopters
    needed?
        General Kowalski. Our continued reliance on the UH-1N platform for
    the missile field security results directly in 11 nuclear security
    deviations now. Those deviations will not be resolved until the CVLSP
    is fully fielded in our Missile Wings. Given this compelling need,
    AFGSC is pressing for an initial operating capability of fiscal year
    2015 and an full operational capability (FOC) by fiscal year 2019, with
    FOC for the remainder of the Air Force fleet by fiscal year 2022.

        18. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, can the Air Force replace
    these helicopters with minimal or no development costs?
        General Kowalski. Yes. The CVLSP program intends to procure a non-
    development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that will require
    minimal or no development effort. The CVLSP program currently has $21.7
    million budgeted for RDT&E from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year
    2014.

        19. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, from your testimony it
    appears that the mission for the new helicopters will be missile field
    support and to meet the continuity of government requirements for the
    Military District of Washington. Is it clear that the new CVLSP will
    support only those two missions and will not serve a combat search and
    rescue function?
        General Kowalski. The CVLSP program will replace the UH-1N fleet
    that is supporting AFGSC nuclear security support, AFDW continuity of
    government missions, and a variety of other secondary missions, not
    including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR missions are currently
    performed with HH-60 helicopters. There is a separate acquisition
    program to address recapitalization of the HH-60 CSAR fleet.

        20. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, how many helicopters will be
    needed for each mission?
        General Kowalski. The Air Force needs 42 CVLSP helicopters for
    missile field security and 27 to meet the continuity of government
    requirements for the Military District of Washington. There are 24
    additional helicopters required for PACAF, AFMC, AFSOC and AETC
    training and transport needs.

        21. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, what is the total number that
    will be purchased?
        General Kowalski. The CVLSP program plans to procure 93 helicopters
    for the various CVLSP missions. This will include 42 helicopters for
    AFGSC nuclear security support, 27 helicopters for the Air Force
    District of Washington continuity of government mission, and 24
    helicopters for training and other CVLSP missions at four other
    MAJCOMs.

        22. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when will there be a decision
    on the acquisition strategy for the helicopters?
        General Kowalski. On 12 April 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force
    (SECAF) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) approved a full and
    open acquisition strategy for the CVLSP program. The funding in the
    fiscal year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President's budget
    will support the planned acquisition strategy that seeks to provide an
    IOC in fiscal year 2015.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                               further reductions
        23. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
    Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
    Harencak, the President's National Security Advisor recently made
    comments at the Carnegie Endowment that the administration is currently
    ``making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions'' and
    that DOD will ``review our strategic requirements and develop options
    for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued
    by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will
    direct DOD to consider ``potential changes in targeting requirements
    and alert postures.'' What guidance and assumptions have you been given
    or told to follow in the design, development, and posture for
    modernizing the nuclear triad?
        General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
    Chambers, and General Harencak. We have not received further guidance
    or assumptions from DOD. As stated in the fiscal year 2012 Annual
    Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act, ``DOD will invest in its nuclear delivery systems to
    ensure that existing capabilities are adequately sustained with
    essential upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to
    modernize systems to ensure continuing capability in the face of
    evolving challenges and technological developments.''
        Admiral Benedict. Strategic Systems Programs has been tasked to
    extend the life of the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System to match
    the hull life of the Ohio-class submarine and to serve as the initial
    payload of the Ohio Replacement. SSP is extending the life of the W76
    reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the W76-1. This
    program is being executed in partnership with DOE, NNSA. In addition to
    the W76-1, the Navy is in the initial stages of refurbishing the W88
    reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the Air Force to reduce
    costs through shared technology.

        24. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
    Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
    Harencak, in your best military judgment, how prudent is it to begin
    consideration of reductions past the New START levels?
        General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
    Chambers, and General Harencak. It is prudent to begin consideration of
    reductions past the New START levels only to the degree that such
    consideration is based on national strategy. That strategy continues to
    affirm the central role of Deterrence. Deterrence applied to the
    complexities of the 21st century strategic and operational reality
    requires deliberate analysis and planning. Such analysis of 21st
    century requirements for strengthening strategic Deterrence must also
    deliberately include Extended Deterrence and Assurance as a requisite,
    as our reliance on Allies and partners is fundamental.
        National strategy also continues to affirm the efficacy of the
    Triad. Any strategy-based look at further reductions needs to carefully
    assess the effects on the complementary capabilities inherent in the
    three legs of the Triad. Such an assessment will show that
    consideration of further reductions is not accomplished by application
    of mathematical formulae alone, but via thorough analysis of the
    attributes of each leg at lower levels; indeed, fewer warheads and
    fewer platforms can fundamentally alter overall deterrent attributes.
        So, then, the prudence of beginning consideration of reductions
    past New START levels is based on the comprehensive analysis a
    strategy-to-task methodology requires. Such analysis may soon be
    underway, and the Air Force is prepared to fully engage with OSD and
    the combatant commands in providing analytical support and military
    advice.
        Admiral Benedict. Issues involving reductions of nuclear systems
    past the levels specified in the New START treaty is a consideration
    for the executive branch, in consultation with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the responsible combatant
    commander, STRATCOM.

                  balance between affordability and capability
        25. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
    Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
    Harencak, as I mentioned earlier, the modernization and sustainability
    of strategic deterrent is an immense yet critical investment that will
    cost around $20 billion per year for the foreseeable future. Within
    each of your portfolios what steps are being taken to address
    affordability?
        General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, and General
    Chambers. Our ability to sustain the current systems we have is viable.
    DOD will invest in its nuclear delivery systems to ensure that existing
    capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades and
    modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to modernize systems to
    ensure continuing deterrent capability in the face of evolving
    challenges and technological developments.
        The Minuteman III will be sustained through 2030. Weapon system
    requirements are continuously reviewed and if sustainment programs not
    previously programmed become  necessary  they  will  be  implemented
    to  ensure  we  meet  the  requirement  `` . . . to maintain a
    sufficient supply of launch test assets and spares to sustain the
    deployed force of such missiles through 2030.'' (ref: H.R. 5122 Section
    139)
        The Air Force plans to maintain heavy bombers for the indefinite
    future to provide long-range conventional and nuclear attack.
        DOD will sustain the current ALCM until a classified follow-on
    capability is fielded.
        Dual-Capable aircraft will continue to carry the B61 gravity bomb.
    The B61 will be sustained through LEPs and the Air Force will provide a
    new tail kit during the LEP. Additionally, the F-35 will be equipped to
    carry the B61.
        Admiral Benedict. A low-rate production continuity procurement
    strategy was extensively reviewed and approved by DOD and Congress. We
    have been in execution for nearly 15 years. This procurement strategy
    has proven successful, based on the demonstrated superb performance of
    the Trident II (D5) weapon system. The Navy submitted a report to
    Congress in December 2002 that detailed the impact of alternative full-
    funded procurement strategies and recommended continuation of the
    current production continuity procurement strategy. Continued
    production of critical components represents the best balance of cost
    and risk to extend the life of the D5 missile.
        In addition, examples of other affordability initiatives SSP has
    implemented are:

        (1)  Integrated Support Facility consolidation for missile guidance
    increased efficiency and improved supportability by consolidating the
    missile guidance infrastructure to support the MK6 and deploy MK6LE.
        (2)  Shipboard Electronics Repair Facility established to repair
    and recertify shipboard Strategic Weapons Systems and Attack Weapon
    Systems electronic equipment. A common repair facility has yielded both
    cost avoidance and savings for SSP in the out-years by eliminating
    duplicate repair capabilities across four locations.
        (3)  Moving Navigation efforts to Heath, Ohio, which provides co-
    location with the Air Force efforts and also is a lower cost-of-living
    area.

        General Harencak. There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons are
    expensive. Everything about them and their delivery vehicles is
    meticulously designed, over-engineered, and has multiple, redundant
    failsafes. Add to this the fact that many of the weapons and delivery
    vehicles are being sustained well beyond their design lives, and costs
    will inevitably be high. However, one of the Nuclear Weapons Center's 5
    Priorities, as defined in its strategic plan, is entitled ``Ensure
    Resource Stewardship,'' and that is something we take very seriously.
        By using smart engineering and logistics processes, we're
    constantly improving our ability to determine what hardware can be
    refurbished and what must be replaced. As a result, we're planning
    integrated roadmaps and schedules to avoid bottlenecks in production
    that result in higher costs. As we continue to streamline our
    sustainment processes, we're beginning to get a better understanding
    for the effects of advancing or deferring certain sustainment actions,
    which will allow us to plan more efficiently with an eye to reducing
    costs and to ensure that the needs of the warfighter are met.
        In partnership with the AF Program Executive Officer for Strategic
    Systems (AFPEO/SS), we're also looking at innovative teaming
    opportunities to produce needed technology. For example, in the past,
    if an Air Force warhead required a new fuzing assembly, the Air Force
    would foot the entire bill. Now, we're looking at combining efforts
    with Navy SSP in the Integrated ICBM Fuze Program. Since the
    requirements for these fuzes are similar--though not identical--we plan
    to develop a common family of components for the Air Force Mk12A and
    Mk21 reentry vehicles as well as the Navy's MK 5 reentry body. These
    building block components should be adaptable into fuzes for all three
    systems. The savings vice three separate programs should be very
    significant.
        The bottom line is that the Center will do nothing that will
    compromise nuclear safety or security. However, as conscientious
    stewards of the Air Force nuclear arsenal, we are acutely aware of the
    fiscal environment and will continue to seek innovative ways to serve
    the vital goals of meeting warfighter needs, preserving nuclear surety
    and ensuring fiscal responsibility.

        26. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
    Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
    Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is the timeline these
    modernization efforts must be accomplished?
        General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
    Chambers, and General Harencak. The timeline for the below key
    modernization efforts is an estimate and will change as required.
    Current projected delivery dates are:

        1.  B-52 1760 IWB: 2013
        2.  CVLSP: 2014
        3.  B61 LEP: 2017
        4.  Joint Fuze: 2019 (Mk21); 2020 (Mk12A)
        5.  B-2 DMS: 2018
        6.  LRSO: 2023

        Acronyms:

             CVLSP: Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
             DMS: Defensive Management System
             IWB: Internal Weapons Bay
             LEP: Life Extension Program
             LRSO: Long-Range Standoff

        Admiral Benedict. Modernization efforts are occurring now for the
    Trident II (D5) weapon system. The Navy and OSD agreed to extend the
    life of the D5 missile to match the Ohio class submarine service life
    and to serve as the initial payload on the Ohio Replacement based on
    programmatic advantages and the ability to meet effectiveness
    requirements that are derived from the national deterrence strategy.
    The life extension is being accomplished through an update to all the
    Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS) subsystems: launcher,
    navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight
    hardware--missile and guidance--life extension efforts are designed to
    meet the same form, fit and function of the original system, in order
    to keep the deployed system as one homogeneous population and to
    control costs. The Initial Operating Capability of the D5 Flight
    Hardware Life Extension efforts is scheduled in fiscal year 2017. The
    Shipboard Systems efforts are ongoing and will support the baseline
    configuration for the Ohio Replacement Program Strategic Weapon System.

        27. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
    Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
    Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is our ability to
    sustain the systems we currently have?
        General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, and General
    Chambers. In support of the Secretary of Defense's efficiency
    initiatives, program managers are required to treat affordability as a
    requirement. Specifically, at Milestone A, the Acquisition Decision
    Memorandum (ADM) will contain an affordability target to be treated by
    the program manager as a KPP. At Milestone B, program managers will
    present a systems engineering tradeoff analysis showing how cost and
    risk varies as major design parameters and time to complete are varied.
        Furthermore, new ``Will Cost/Should Cost'' direction will
    incentivize both industry and the program office to aggressively
    scrutinize every element of program cost as they pursue affordability
    solutions to our nuclear deterrence capability requirements.
        Admiral Benedict. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget is
    sufficient to sustain the safety and reliability of the Trident II (D5)
    SWS. However, D5 SWS has just completed 20 years of deployed service
    and is fast approaching its 25-year design life goal. To address aging
    concerns, the Strategic Systems Programs has been tasked to extend the
    life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the hull life of the Ohio
    class submarine and to serve as the initial payload of the Ohio
    Replacement. Life extension efforts are being accomplished through an
    update to all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation,
    fire control, guidance, missile and reentry. These efforts will provide
    the Navy with the SWS needed to meet operational requirements
    throughout the Ohio service life and will serve as the initial SWS on
    the planned follow-on platform.
        General Harencak. Within the AFNWC portfolio, we have the LGM-30G
    Minuteman III ICBM, the AGM-86 ALCM, and support equipment for these
    systems. AFNWC also sustains the support equipment and handling gear
    for gravity bombs and weapons storage areas.
        AFNWC's ability to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM is good. As an
    aging system now 50 years old (the original Minuteman infrastructure
    was emplaced starting in 1961, most of the flight equipment dates from
    the 1970s), there are issues with aging components and infrastructure,
    parts obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing, loss of industrial base,
    and other concerns. However, 50 years of experience has taught us how
    to be good stewards of this system, and we have conducted dozens of
    LEPs over that period. We have developed comprehensive roadmaps that
    show the way for us to sustain this weapon system through 2030 and
    minimize risks. Additionally, the Air Force participates in a robust
    Force Development Evaluation (FDE) program, which includes flight,
    ground and C2 testing to ensure that any weaknesses with a force-wide
    impact are detected as early as possible so that a fix can be planned
    and executed as quickly as possible. We also monitor facility hardness
    to ensure that ICBM infrastructure remains survivable in the event of
    attack. Support equipment is another area that requires constant
    monitoring. Equipment that has worked and been well maintained for
    decades eventually wears out and requires refurbishment or replacement.
    AFNWC is currently working on refurbishing and replacing a number of
    pieces of support equipment that are well past their designed
    lifespans. In many cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find
    manufacturers who can build systems and components that can still
    integrate effectively with the Minuteman system. As we continue to look
    at a successor to the Minuteman ICBM, we remain mindful that this
    system has served with unsurpassed reliability for a half-century and
    can continue for some time into the future, though the cost of
    sustaining such an old system will eventually start to increase more
    and more rapidly if modernization of infrastructure, ground equipment
    and flight equipment do not continue.
        Sustainability prospects for the ALCM are also good. As this system
    is significantly newer than the Minuteman ICBM, it has fewer problems
    with disappearing suppliers, industrial infrastructure and obsolete
    technology. We continue to conduct a robust FDE program on ALCM as
    well, and have discovered some issues with aging and/or problematic
    components, which we are in the process of addressing. Additionally, we
    are refurbishing and upgrading some ALCM ground equipment, such as the
    Electronic System Test Set to improve reliability through funding of
    the long term modernization plan, as this test set is crucial to
    sustaining the ALCM through 2030. Though AFNWC is involved in the LRSO
    AoAs to determine the requirements for the successor to the ALCM, we
    fully realize that this system is amply capable of serving through
    2030.
        In addition to the Minuteman and ALCM, AFNWC sustains the loading
    and support equipment for gravity bombs, both in CONUS and overseas.
    We've recently been executing a Service LEP for the Weapons Maintenance
    Truck (WMT) used to sustain gravity bombs in Europe. Prior to AFNWC
    intervention, the WMT was in very poor repair and frequently
    necessitated sharing a single working vehicle between multiple air
    bases, hundreds of miles apart. At this time, each base has its own
    working WMT. Additionally, the Air Force Program Executive Officer for
    Strategic Systems (AFPEO/SS) is working to replace the WMT system
    entirely with a much newer and more capable system (the Secure
    Transportable Maintenance System).
        The bottom line is that AFNWC and its allies in the nuclear
    sustainment business understand what it will take to keep the systems
    in our portfolio going and we will take the necessary steps to preserve
    their surety and effectiveness. This task becomes harder and more
    expensive as the systems continue to age, but there is no point in the
    future we can identify beyond which the systems become unsustainable

                       icbm sustainment and modernization
        28. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, a
    recent article in the Air Force Times cited a failure review board's
    conclusion that an equipment failure was responsible for the hour-long
    communication outage at F.E. Warren Air Force Base that affected 50
    nuclear missiles last fall. Given the age of the current ICBM
    infrastructure, some have speculated that the incident may be
    indicative of the aging ICBM infrastructure. Do you believe the
    incident is indicative of the aging ICBM infrastructure?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. No, the Minuteman III Weapon
    System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
    Our newest Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive review of last
    fall's event and determined this was an isolated incident and is not
    indicative of age-related systemic problems within the ICBM force. The
    Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert rate exceeds 99 percent.
        In addition, consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air
    Force, through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and
    modernization plans, specified in the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the
    infrastructure necessary to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel
    these plans will meet the challenges required to sustain the MMIII to
    2030.

        29. General Kowalski and General Chambers, do you believe it was an
    isolated incident?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. Yes, the Minuteman III
    Weapon System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective
    deterrent. Our newest Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive
    review of last fall's event and determined this was an isolated
    incident and is not indicative of age-related systemic problems within
    the ICBM force. The Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert rate exceeds
    99 percent.
        Consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air Force,
    through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and
    modernization plans, specified in the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the
    infrastructure necessary to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel
    these plans

        30. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, how
    confident are you that the Air Force will be able to sustain the
    current ICBM force through 2030?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. Very confident. The AF is
    committed to sustaining and modernizing the existing Minuteman III ICBM
    system through 2030. The fiscal year 2012 PB request includes
    approximately $1.9 billion of investment funding over the FYDP (fiscal
    year 2012-2016) to extend the existing MM III ICBM weapon system
    through 2030. All aspects of the ICBM Federal and contractor community
    are being exercised and funded to sustain and/or modernize (through
    refurbishment or replacement due to obsolescence and/or diminishing
    vendor base) the MM III ICBM force and associated infrastructure.

        31. General Kowalski and General Chambers, when should a decision
    be made for pursuing the development of a follow-on ICBM?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The 2010 Nuclear Posture
    Review stated that studies are needed now to inform a decision on a
    follow-on ICBM. To meet this need, pre-AoA efforts have already begun.
    AFGSC has already initiated a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    Capability Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA supports development of the
    Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) which establishes baseline
    requirements for any future Minuteman III replacement program. The next
    step is the actual AoA which will be accomplished in fiscal year 2013-
    2014.
        Once the AoA is completed it will be used to recommend the best
    ICBM follow-on options from a broad range of alternatives. A final
    decision is needed sometime in the fiscal year 2015 timeframe.

                          air launched cruise missile
        32. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, are there any challenges
    associated with sustaining the ALCM until 2030?
        General Chambers. Yes. ALCM faces the common, yet manageable
    challenges you might expect any weapon system to face that is having
    its service life extended. Any system that has been in the inventory
    for more than two decades must manage diminishing manufacturing source
    issues, weapon system reliability concerns and service life extension
    priorities. The Air Force has a robust FDE (flight test), functional
    ground test, analytical condition inspection and aging and surveillance
    program to assist with managing these challenges.

        33. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, the fiscal year 2012 budget
    includes $884 million over the next 5 years for the development of a
    new ALCM. Has the Air Force decided if this new ALCM will be nuclear
    capable at the outset?
        General Chambers. Yes, the Air Force has decided that the new ALCM
    will be nuclear capable at the outset.

        34. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, if nuclear, does the Air
    Force intend to use the W-80, and if so, when would the LEP on the W-80
    have to begin so that it will be available for the new cruise missile?
        General Chambers. The Air Force has decided that the new ALCM will
    be nuclear capable at the outset. Recommendations on the specific
    warhead for use in the new cruise missile, and requisite LEP start date
    are being developed by a cross-organizational Warhead Working Group
    with participation from NNSA, STRATCOM, AFGSC, AFNWC, and AAC. There
    are several warhead candidates being considered, including the W80. The
    Warhead Working Group is also supporting the development of an
    integrated master schedule that will include a required LEP start date.
    Data from the LRSO AoAs will be used to help finalize the warhead
    recommendation. Final recommendations for warhead selection and LEP
    start date will be completed prior to Milestone A, which is currently
    scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013.

                                      b-61
        35. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, what is the current status
    of the Air Force's efforts on the B-61's tail subassembly development
    and overall integration efforts?
        General Chambers. The Air Force is currently preparing for a
    combined Material Development Decision (MDD)/Milestone A Defense
    Acquisition Board, scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
    2011. Preparations include developing and finalizing technology
    development and acquisition strategies, contracting strategies,
    requirements, and cost estimates. The Air Force is also drafting
    statutory and regulatory documents required for MDD and Milestone A. In
    addition, the Air Force is gathering data from three ongoing concept
    development contracts and has established integration working groups
    that include participation from platform program offices and the DOE/
    NNSA.

        36. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, do any challenges currently
    exist in meeting the fiscal year 2017 deadline for the first production
    unit (FPU)?
        General Chambers. Yes, challenges do exist, but both the DOD (Air
    Force) and DOE (NNSA) efforts are on track to meet an fiscal year 2017
    FPU. At this stage of the acquisition program, the primary challenge we
    have identified is synchronizing the DOE and DOD acquisition efforts,
    and emphasis has been placed on communication at all levels. One
    specific forum we have established to ensure communication between the
    Air Force and NNSA is a flag officer level Senior Management Team
    (SMT). The SMT meets monthly to review progress and provide guidance to
    the Air Force and NNSA program management teams.

                       air force replacement helicopters
        37. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
    is the current acquisition strategy for the Air Force procurement of
    the CVLSP, the helicopter replacement program for the current fleet of
    UH-1s?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The SECAF and CSAF approved
    a full and open competition acquisition strategy for the CVLSP program
    on 12 Apr 2011. Schedule milestones include request for proposals in
    late fiscal year 2011, contract award in later part of fiscal year
    2012, leading to an IOC in fiscal year 2015. The funding in the fiscal
    year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President's budget request
    is considered adequate to support this acquisition strategy.

        38. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, will
    this be a new development program or do any current DOD airframes exist
    that could meet requirements at a lower cost?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The CVLSP program intends to
    procure a non-development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that
    will require minimal or no development effort. There are helicopters
    currently in production including DOD airframes that could potentially
    satisfy CVLSP requirements.

                          start treaty implementation
        39. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
    is the anticipated cost for Air Force implementation of the New START
    treaty?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force continues to
    evaluate projected cost for implementation of the New START treaty.
    However, until a final decision is made on deployed Air Force strategic
    delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for the ICBM silos
    and conversion method for the B-52, an accurate cost is not feasible at
    this time.

        40. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
    is the Air Force plan for meeting New START levels for deployed ICBM
    launchers?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. Our ICBM planning efforts
    are focused on complying with the limit as dictated in the NDAA Section
    1251 Report of up to 420 deployed ICBM launchers. While a final force
    structure decision has not been made, the Air Force continues to
    analyze several options to meet the New START limits.

        41. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, the
    1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty stipulated an ICBM
    force structure of up to 420 (a reduction of 30). When will a decision
    on the actual number be made?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force is currently
    working with the Joint Staff to evaluate force structure options and to
    make a final decision on the number of deployed ICBMs and nuclear-
    capable bombers. When the actual decision will be made is still to be
    determined.

        42. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, does
    the Air Force intend to spread reductions across multiple ICBM wings or
    would it be more economical to eliminate a block of silos at an
    individual base? If so, why? If not, why?
        General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force has not made a
    final decision on how reductions in deployed ICBMs would be made across
    the force. Some of the considerations involved in this decision are the
    method of reduction (elimination vs. nondeployed status), ongoing
    modification programs, technical characteristics of the Minuteman III
    weapon system, the conditions of specific launchers and the actual
    number of reductions that have to be made. The Air Force continues to
    evaluate options.

        [Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
    Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Levin, Udall,
    Shaheen, and Sessions.
        Committee staff member present: Mary J. Kyle, legislative
    clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
    Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.
        Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    Professional Staff Member.
        Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N.
    Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
    assistant to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
    Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; and
    Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Nelson. The subcommittee today meets to consider
    the ballistic missile defense (BMD) policies and programs of
    the Department of Defense (DOD) supported in the fiscal year
    2012 budget request. We're pleased to have four distinguished
    public servants as witnesses today and we all appreciate your
    service to our country.
        Dr. Brad Roberts is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. He's been
    deeply involved in developing missile defense policy and
    strategy, including last year's comprehensive Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review (BMDR). He continues to develop our strategy and
    is also working to ensure the implementation of those policies
    and strategies.
        Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly is the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is responsible for
    conceiving, developing, testing, building, and delivering an
    integrated and operationally effective ballistic missile
    defense system (BMDS), including its component elements, to the
    Services and combatant commanders.
        Rear Admiral Arch Macy is the Director of the Joint
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) at the
    Joint Staff. He has been leading the joint warfighter
    assessment of our missile defense needs and has just completed
    an important study called ``The Joint Capabilities Mix III
    (JCM-III),'' which will help guide our future missile defense
    program and budget decisions. I would note that Admiral Macy is
    planning to retire at the end of this month, so this is likely
    his last hearing with the committee, but at his suggestion, not
    ours. We thank you for your many years of service to the
    Nation, Admiral Macy, and we wish you and your family the very
    best in your future.
        Cristina Chaplain is the Director of Acquisition and
    Sourcing Management for the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO). She and her team have recently completed their annual
    assessment of MDA's progress on the development and acquisition
    of the BMDS, focusing particularly on issues of transparency
    and accountability.
        As the BMDR emphasized last year, BMD is an essential
    national priority to protect the Homeland from the possibility
    of a missile attack from countries such as North Korea and Iran
    and to protect our forward-deployed forces, our allies, and
    partners overseas against the large and growing threat of
    regional missiles. As Admiral Winnefeld indicated last week,
    with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system we're
    ahead of the Homeland threat from North Korea and Iran, and we
    want to keep it that way. Our regional missile defenses, using
    the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), are designed to meet the
    existing threat and adapt to future threats.
        Developing effective BMDS is an extremely complex technical
    endeavor. Consequently, it often takes longer than we would
    like. However, it's essential that we develop the systems
    carefully, test them adequately and realistically, and
    demonstrate that they work effectively before we produce and
    deploy them. Lives depend on it.
        BMD is also expensive. This is particularly notable under
    the current constrained budget environment. The fiscal year
    budget request for missile defense is $10.7 billion and the
    planned budget for MDA for fiscal years 2011 through 2016 is
    roughly $52 billion. As GAO notes, the BMDS is the largest
    single acquisition program within DOD. So it's important that
    the administration has a policy that missile defenses must be
    fiscally sustainable and affordable and that we have
    appropriate accountability and transparency for the program.
        Within this context, there are a number of issues we hope
    to discuss today. For example, concerning Homeland defense,
    we're interested to hear about proposed fixes, enhancements,
    and hedging options for the GMD system. We're interested to
    know what the implementation of the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is, to know more about that.
    This includes the development, testing, production, and
    deployment of the planned elements for the EPAA, such as the
    Standard Missile 3 interceptor variants to be deployed with
    each successive phase. We'd also like to learn more about our
    efforts to expand other international cooperation, including
    efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense.
        We thank all of you for your contributions to improving
    missile defense and to our security and we look forward to your
    testimony.
        Now it's my pleasure to turn to my ranking member and good
    friend, Senator Sessions, for any opening comments he may have.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
    important hearing and an important subcommittee. Thank you for
    your leadership. I've enjoyed working with you and respect you
    and your judgment on these issues very highly.
        Today's hearing focuses on the President's 2012 budget for
    the MDA. I'm pleased that the top line of $8.6 billion includes
    a modest increase over last year, but I'm concerned that the
    overall 5-year budget represents a more than $2.2 billion
    reduction below last year's planned future defense budget. So I
    have concerns whether we have the ability to support the full
    cost and on-time delivery of the weapons systems we've invested
    so much in.
        I've long urged that we focus more on the GMD system, the
    only system solely responsible for protecting the Homeland at
    this time. Unfortunately, the budget request continues to
    deprive GMD, I'm afraid, of the resources necessary to provide
    and refine the system.
        General O'Reilly, you tout the improvements of GMD such as
    the emplacement of 30 interceptors and upgrades to the missile
    to Fort Greely area. Those accomplishments are welcome and
    appreciated, but without additional resources, the GMD program
    may not succeed, and the two recent test failures should serve
    as key reminders that more must be done to ensure the
    capability we have works and that it will improve over time.
    I'm confident that the difficulties we are having will and can
    be solved, but we have to spend some time and effort on that.
        I look forward to understanding why you believe you can
    achieve and sustain success in a program that needs more
    attention with a budget that's $1.4 billion below what you said
    you needed in the Fiscal Year 2011 Future Years Defense Plan
    (FYDP). After all the money we've spent on developing this
    program, it's really not the time to take our eye off the ball.
    It really needs to be completed. I think it would just be a
    tragedy if we didn't follow through here after all the decades
    of work.
        The GAO questions the plan for the sustainment and
    modernization of GMD. Last year, GAO reported that DOD ``still
    lacks full knowledge of GMD's capability and limitations'' and
    that, although there is a need to continue development until
    2020, the ``acquisition of major GMD assets is nearly
    complete,'' and that DOD has shifted its focus to ``improving
    its knowledge of GMD's capabilities and improving
    integration.''
        Given the two recent failures, I look forward to discussing
    whether or not we need to look back a bit here and make sure
    we're not ahead of ourselves.
        The Aegis weapon system remains one of our most promising
    capabilities and its legacy of incremental development,
    refinement, and proven design is a cornerstone of its success.
    Last week, MDA awarded its first contracts for the new Aegis
    evolution, the SM-3 Block IIB, and I look forward to hearing
    more about the development plan for the IIB.
        Nonetheless, I remain concerned that the schedule is overly
    optimistic. Development of the SM-3 Block I was an 8-year
    effort for an incremental upgrade of the proven SM-2 Block IV.
    The SM-3 Block IIB concept appears to be a far more significant
    upgrade and, according to some initial descriptions, could
    represent a significant departure from Standard Missile
    variants.
        Furthermore, I question the decision not to include the
    Aegis program office in the early stage development, ignoring
    in my opinion the design philosophy that has epitomized
    success.
        The PAA to missile defense establishes a global framework
    for regional uncertainties. If executed correctly and on time,
    it will represent a good approach that is both relocatable and
    scalable. According to the BMD review, the fourth phase of the
    PAA and SM-3 Block IIB will improve the defense of the
    Homeland. As we are all aware, this layered protection could
    have come earlier with the prior plan that we had from the
    prior administration. However, I agree that defending both
    Europe and the U.S. from Iran with only 10 interceptors was not
    sufficient--it was not going to provide the inventory necessary
    to deter Iranian aggression.
        So I look forward to learning more on the anticipated
    Homeland defense capabilities of SM-3 Block IIB, how they
    compare to the previously planned two-stage GBIs, while the
    two-stage GBI has been designated as a contingency if the
    recent development of IIB takes longer than anticipated.
        The JCM-III study to provide warfighter input on necessary
    global force requirements for sensors, interceptors, and
    launchers has just been finalized. I look forward to hearing
    more about this study.
        Let me close by offering a special thanks to Admiral Macy
    for being here today. I understand you plan to retire this
    month and we congratulate you on your service and thank you for
    your commitment to your country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Udall, do you have any opening comments that you
    might like to make?
        Senator Udall. I'm eager to hear from the witnesses.
        Senator Nelson. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. No.
        Senator Nelson. If it's okay with everybody, let's have a
    7-minute round. Is that satisfactory? [No response.]
        General O'Reilly, you know we're more than halfway through
    fiscal year 2011 and DOD is still--oh, excuse me, yes. I guess
    you get a chance to talk first. That doesn't happen often
    enough. But thank you, Richard. Thank you.
        You may even answer the question before I ask it, now that
    I've tipped you off. Will you start first, General O'Reilly?

     STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General O'Reilly. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking
    Member Sessions, other distinguished members of the
    subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
    you today on the MDA's $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012 budget
    request to develop protection of our Nation, our Armed Forces,
    allies, and friends against the continually growing threat, the
    proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles.
        In fiscal year 2012 we propose to continue our enhancement
    and integration of sensor, fire control, battle management, and
    interceptors in the BMDS, to improve the reliability and
    performance of our Homeland defense, and to defeat large raid
    sizes of a growing variety of regional ballistic missiles. By
    the end of fiscal year 2012 we will complete the initial
    fielding of a GMD system for Homeland defense against first
    generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
    potentially being developed by current regional threats. We
    will also continue our initial fielding of regional defenses
    against today's short-, medium-, and intermediate-range
    ballistic missiles that are in direct support of our combatant
    commanders.
        I should note that our fiscal year 2012 budget request was
    predicated on receiving the fiscal year 2011 requested budget.
    Therefore, we will adjust our program accordingly once the
    final fiscal year 2011 budget is approved.
        We have had significant accomplishments over the past year,
    including the conduct of 8 out of 8 planned flight tests using
    13 successful targets, the first flight of a two-stage Ground-
    Based Interceptor (GBI), the third successful missile intercept
    by the Japanese Aegis program, a successful low-altitude
    intercept by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System
    (THAAD). We destroyed two boosting ballistic missiles with our
    Airborne Laser Testbed; and we proved sufficiently accurate
    missile tracks from two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
    satellites to enable a missile defense intercept without using
    ground radars.
        Additionally, we supported Israel's successful intercept of
    a threat missile earlier last month. We also delivered 25 SM-3
    IA interceptors, began the THAAD interceptor production,
    emplaced the 30th GBI, and completed the upgrade of the early
    warning radar in Thule, Greenland.
        Today, MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of
    the most recent GBI flight test failure, then verify the
    resolution of the problem and successfully repeat the previous
    flight test. While the failure review board has only produced
    preliminary results, it is clear more ground testing and an
    additional non-intercept flight test of an upgraded GBI
    exoatmospheric kill vehicle will be required before the next
    intercept.
        For the GMD, in fiscal year 2012 we are requesting funding
    for procuring five new GBIs, completing the construction of the
    GMD Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, the construction of a
    missile communications system on the east coast of the United
    States, placing Missile Field 1 in a storage mode for possible
    upgrade and operations in the future, and upgrading the early
    warning radar in Clear, AK.
        Today 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against
    a limited ICBM attack launched from current regional threats.
    We closely monitor intelligence assessments with the
    intelligence community and if this capability is determined to
    be insufficient we are developing options to increase the
    number of operational GBIs and accelerate the delivery of new
    sensor and interceptor capabilities.
        DOD is committed to brief Congress soon on our strategy to
    hedge against uncertainties in threat estimates. Additionally,
    I've answered questions in other hearings that I've testified
    to that it is my personal judgment that, in light of the two
    GBI test failures, the need for an additional non-intercept
    test, and the need to repeat the failed test, we will need to
    reassess the total number of GBIs we are procuring and reflect
    that assessment in the President's budget request for fiscal
    year 2013.
        Our execution of the EPAA is on track for meeting the
    timelines outlined by the President in September 2009. For
    phase 1, or our initial capability in Europe, our first Aegis
    ballistic missile ship deployment, the U.S.S. Monterey, is on
    station. The latest command and control system upgrades are
    being installed at the U.S. European Command, and the Army
    Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) forward-based
    radar will be available in August for deployment in southern
    Europe by the end of this year.
        Finally, in a few days we will conduct a major test in the
    Pacific to verify the readiness of the phase 1 architecture
    against an intermediate-range ballistic target.
        For phase 2, or our enhanced capability against medium-
    range ballistic missiles by 2015, we will conduct the first
    flight test of the next generation Aegis missile interceptor,
    the SM-3 Block IB, this summer and certify the associated
    upgrade of the Aegis fire control system in 2012. The design of
    the adaptation of the Aegis system for land basing, called
    Aegis Ashore, began last summer and the test site will be
    installed in Hawaii in 2013 and flight tested in 2014. The
    installation of the Aegis Ashore in Romania will also occur in
    2014 and be fully operational by 2015.
        For phase 3, or an enhanced capability against
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 2018, the SM-3 Block
    IIA interceptor is completing its preliminary design this year
    in support of flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018. We
    are preparing the Airborne Infrared sensor for early missile
    tracking using the Air Force's next generation sensor in fiscal
    year 2012, and we will begin the design process of the
    Precision Tracking Space System.
        For phase 4, or medium and intermediate-range and ICBM
    early intercept capability in Europe by 2020, we competitively
    awarded concept design contracts for the SM-3 IIB interceptor
    to three industry teams last week. The SM-3 IIB development
    timeline is consistent with the average development timeline of
    other missile interceptors of its class to ensure a low
    development risk approach.
        While not necessary for the defense of the United States
    against limited attacks by early generation ICBMs, the SM-3 IIB
    will complement the GMD, Aegis, and THAAD systems to greatly
    increase the cost-effectiveness of our missile defenses.
        Beyond PAA phase 4, we are pursuing advanced technologies
    for more effective missile defenses in the future, to develop
    high-energy, compact, lightweight laser technologies.
        Finally, the MDA continues to engage in international
    missile defense projects, studies, and analyses with over 20
    countries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
        In conclusion, our fiscal year 2012 budget request funds
    the development of BMD capabilities that are flexible,
    survivable, cost-effective, and tolerant of uncertainties of
    intelligence estimates of both nation state and extremist
    ballistic missile threats.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
    your subcommittee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
               Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
        Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, other
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
    to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) $8.6
    billion fiscal year 2012 budget request to develop protection for our
    Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and friends against a growing
    threat--the proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles.
    We continue to enhance and integrate sensor, fire control, battle
    management, and interceptor systems into the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS) to improve the reliability and performance of our
    homeland defense and defeat large raids of a growing variety of
    regional ballistic missiles over the next decade. By the end of fiscal
    year 2012, we will complete the initial fielding of the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) system for homeland defense against first
    generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) potentially
    being developed by current regional threats. We will also continue our
    initial fielding of regional defenses against today's short-range
    (1,000 km or less), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), and intermediate-
    range ballistic missiles (3,000 to 5,500 km), or short-range ballistic
    missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), and
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), respectively.
                   fiscal year 2010 accomplishment highlights
        During this past year, we have improved our homeland defense by
    emplacing the 30th Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), upgrading two
    additional GBIs, installing a training node at Fort Greely, AK (FGA),
    and completing a significant upgrade of the Early Warning Radar in
    Thule, Greenland. Additionally, we had a successful two-stage Ground-
    Based Interceptor (GBI) booster test and conducted a three-stage GBI
    intercept test where we did not achieve our primary objective, but we
    did demonstrate integrated sensors and command, control, battle
    management, and communication (C2BMC) during the longest range flight
    test to date. During the past year, we also improved our regional
    defenses by converting 2 Aegis BMD ships, delivering 25 SM-3 IA
    interceptors, and increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 20 operationally
    configured BMD ships. Aegis BMD ships carrying SM-3 IA interceptors are
    currently deployed and on-station in forward operating areas, including
    the USS Monterey as part of the first phase of the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA). We also commenced production of Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Batteries 3 and 4 and the associated
    interceptors. We accelerated the refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar for
    phase 1 of the EPAA and installed a C2BMC system and prepared a second
    AN/TPY-2 for deployment to U.S. Central Command. Moreover, we
    successfully flew 14 target missions, including a successful intercept
    of a separating MRBM with our Japanese allies using an SM-3 IA
    interceptor (thus completing the first BMD Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
    case), and conducted a successful intercept of a unitary SRBM with
    THAAD. For future capabilities, we demonstrated the ability of the two
    Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites to provide
    stereo, high-fidelity tracking capabilities and transfer tracks into
    C\2\BMC. Our Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully destroyed two
    boosting ballistic missiles. We achieved our goal of demonstrating NATO
    Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense interoperability with
    the U.S. C2BMC in Joint Project Optic Windmill. Finally, we completed
    U.S. and Israeli Government project agreements on the Arrow 3 Upper
    Tier Interceptor, the David's Sling Weapon System, and an Israeli Test
    Bed. Recently, we supported Israel's successful intercept mission of a
    separating threat missile off the coast of California.
                           enhancing homeland defense
        MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of the most recent
    GBI flight test failure, verify the resolution of the problem, and
    successfully repeat the previous flight test. While the Failure Review
    Board has only produced preliminary results, it is clear more ground
    testing and an additional non-intercept flight test of an upgraded GBI
    Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be required before the next
    intercept.
        We are requesting $1.16 billion in fiscal year 2012 in Research,
    Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the GMD program
    (including completing the construction of Missile Field 2 at FGA),
    which will complete the initial fielding of the defense of our homeland
    against limited ICBM attacks. In fiscal year 2012, we also will
    continue to upgrade existing GBIs and acquire new GBIs to meet our
    minimum requirement of 26 operational GBIs at FGA, 4 at Vandenberg Air
    Force Base (VAFB), CA, and 22 GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability
    testing, and spares. Key to an effective GBI sustainment program is
    examining the results of flight tests (including the loss of two GBIs
    during recent flight testing) and reliability testing. In parallel, we
    continue GBI component vendor requalifications for the future GBI
    avionics upgrade and obsolescence program. Given the two flight test
    failures and the need for a new non-intercept flight and a repeat of
    the last flight test, we need to assess the procurement quantity of
    additional GBIs as part of the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
    request. The new missile field (Missile Field 2) will replace the
    prototype Missile Field 1, which will be placed in a storage mode for
    possible upgrade for operational use in the future. We will complete
    the construction of a second fire control node at FGA to allow testing
    or exercises to be conducted while simultaneously controlling the
    operational system. In addition to completing the upgrade of our new
    hardened backup power plant at FGA in fiscal year 2011, we will also
    complete the upgrade of the communications system at FGA in fiscal year
    2012. Additionally, we will begin the planning, design and environment
    work for a GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data
    Terminal (IDT) on the east coast of the United States by 2015. This
    East Coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs launched from FGA
    and VAFB on longer flights, thus improving the defense of the eastern
    United States against potential ICBM threats from the Middle East. We
    also are requesting $177.1 million in RDT&E funding for the Sea-Based
    X-band radar in fiscal year 2012 for software upgrades to improve its
    discrimination capability.
        In addition to GMD upgrades, we are requesting $222.4 million in
    fiscal year 2012 for BMDS Sensors for homeland defense, including
    support of the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and AN/TPY-2
    radars. Integration of the Thule, Greenland radar in fiscal year 2012
    will make it a fully operational UEWR in the BMDS. We continue to
    upgrade the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska for full missile
    defense capability by 2016. In addition, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-
    band radar will be deployed to southern Europe to provide early
    tracking for both enhanced homeland and regional defense. We will
    continue to upgrade system software to address new and evolving
    threats, including enhancing Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
    discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI avionics, and
    increasing GBI interoperability with the Command and Control, Battle
    Management and Communications (C2BMC) system.
        After last year's successful initial flight of a two-stage GBI, we
    plan to conduct an intercept flight test with a two-stage GBI as a
    potential hedge to allow for a longer intercept window of time if ICBMs
    were launched against the United States from Northeast Asia or the
    Middle East. However, as a consequence of the need to repeat the failed
    three-stage GBI flight tests, we plan to delay the first intercept test
    of the two-stage GBI from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014.
    Finally, we will continue development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)
    IIB to protect our homeland in the future by having the capability to
    intercept first generation ICBMs within the regions from which they
    were launched.
                   hedge for protection of the united states
        Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
    medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. If this
    capability is determined to be insufficient for protection of the U.S.
    Homeland based on intelligence estimations of future threats, we have
    options to increase the number of operational GBIs and accelerate the
    delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities. The Department is
    committed to brief Congress soon on the results of our ongoing BMD
    analysis and our recommended hedge strategy.
                           enhancing regional defense
        We are also currently deploying our initial missile defense
    capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. Over the next decade we are
    enhancing this initial capability by developing increasingly capable
    missile defenses that can be adapted to the unique circumstances of
    each combatant command region. In regions where ballistic missile
    threats are a concern, the United States will tailor Missile Defense
    Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) (like the European PAA (EPAA)) to
    plan the establishment of command and control, sensor, fire control,
    and interceptor infrastructures to provide fundamental defenses and
    facilitate the effective surge of transportable missile defense assets
    to their regions when needed.
        The EPAA focuses on addressing missile defense interoperability
    with NATO and our allies and partners as the threat from the Middle
    East is anticipated to increase over the next decade. In November 2010,
    NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to develop an Alliance
    territorial missile defense capability to ``provide full coverage and
    protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces
    against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic
    missiles.'' The United States has committed to provide the EPAA as a
    national contribution to this capability, built on the Active Layered
    Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control system, and we
    are encouraging our allies to field and provide national capabilities
    as well.
        Phase 1: Initial SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM Defense in Europe--to be
    completed by the end of 2011. In this phase, our goal is to achieve an
    initial missile defense capability in Europe using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
    weapon system with SM-3 IA interceptors, forward-based AN/TPY-2 and
    SPY-1 radars, and the C2BMC system at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany,
    which will improve connections to NATO command and control structures.
    The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired with the AN/TPY-2
    radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe from
    existing SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats. While no decision on the
    location of the radar has been made, we expect to meet our 2011
    deployment timeline. Additionally, THAAD batteries will be available
    for deployment in this and subsequent phases. The Army activated a
    second THAAD battery in October 2009, which is scheduled to complete
    training by the end of calendar year 2011. We are requesting $290.5
    million in RDT&E funding to enhance communications and enable THAAD's
    launch-on-sensor network capability, which will allow THAAD to
    intercept threat missiles tracked by many different missile defense
    sensors. We also request $833.2 million for the production of 68 THAAD
    interceptors, 6 launchers, and 1 Tactical Station Group to be delivered
    by fiscal year 2014, and $380.2 million for the production of 2 AN/TPY-
    2 radars.
        Phase 2: Enhanced MRBM Defense in Europe by 2015. Our goal in this
    phase is to provide a robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs by
    launching several different interceptors to engage each threat missile
    multiple times in its flight. This architecture includes the deployment
    of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 weapon fire control systems with SM-3 IB
    interceptors at sea and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. When
    compared to the current SM-3 IA, the IB will have an improved two-color
    seeker for greater ability to discriminate threat Reentry Vehicles from
    other objects, and it will have improvements to enhance reliability and
    producibility of the SM-3 IB's divert and attitude control system.
    These improvements also provide greater capability against larger sized
    raids. We are requesting $565.4 million for the production of 46 SM-3
    Block IB interceptors to be delivered by fiscal year 2014 and $960
    million for Aegis BMD to fund continued development and testing of the
    SM-3 IB as well as upgrades to Aegis 5.0 fire control software to
    support the operation of the SM-3 IB and IIA interceptors and
    associated flight tests. In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $306.6
    million to begin acquiring Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems (land-
    based SM-3) batteries--one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range
    Facility, and one for deployment in Romania by fiscal year 2015. We
    request $364.1 million for the C2BMC program for continued development
    of software and engineering to incorporate enhanced C2BMC capability
    into the C2BMC battle management architecture and enable
    interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate boost phase
    tracking, and improve system-level correlation and tracking.
        Phase 3: Enhanced IRBM Defenses in Europe by 2018. The SM-3 Block
    IIA interceptor, being co-developed with the Japanese Government, is on
    schedule to be deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and at an
    additional Aegis Ashore site in Poland, and at sea, in 2018 to provide
    enhanced protection for European NATO countries from all ballistic
    missile threats from the Middle East. The fiscal year 2012 request for
    SM-3 Block IIA co-development is $424.5 million. Additional BMDS
    improvements during this phase include expanded coordination of missile
    defense fire control systems and improvements to radar discrimination.
    Likewise, beginning with their first launch in 2017, the Precision
    Tracking Space System (PTSS) satellites will detect and track hostile
    ballistic missiles over their entire flight and enable earlier
    engagements to improve homeland and regional defense. Furthermore, the
    deployment of the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor will provide the
    capability to provide early track of large ballistic missile raids from
    forward locations, decreasing the time between the enemy's launch of
    the first ballistic missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile
    defense interceptor.
        Phase 4: Early Intercept Defense in Europe by 2020. The SM-3 IIB
    will provide an early intercept (pre-apogee) capability against MRBMs
    and IRBMs and provide an additional layer for a more enhanced homeland
    defense against ICBMs launched from today's regional threats. In fiscal
    year 2012, we are requesting $123.5 million to fund three industry
    teams to begin concept development of the SM-3 IIB design while MDA
    develops advanced propulsion and lightweight material technologies
    relevant to the SM-3 IIB interceptor. Advanced discrimination
    technologies also will be deployed during EPAA Phase 4 including GMD's
    use of fused data from the entire network of BMDS sensors (including
    enhancements from PTSS and ABIR sensor capabilities) to improve
    homeland defense.
             proving missile defense works through enhanced testing
        In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting nearly $1 billion of RDT&E
    funding for Testing and Targets. In collaboration with the Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation and the Operational Test Agencies
    (OTAs), MDA updated its Integrated Master Test Plan. The updated test
    plan (version 11.1), consisting of 53 flight tests and 74 ground tests
    from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016, promotes cost-
    effectiveness by conducting fewer, but more complex, flight tests to
    achieve more objectives and enhance the realism of each test.
        It is the Agency's plan to conduct later this month an Aegis BMD
    flight test using an SM-3 IA interceptor using data from the AN/TPY-2
    radar passed through the C2BMC system to intercept an IRBM target.
    Later this summer we will also demonstrate Aegis BMD 4.0.1 fire control
    and the first flight test of the SM-3 IB interceptor. Additionally, we
    will conduct two critical ground tests this year to demonstrate the
    EPAA Phase 1 capability for defending European allies and deployed
    forces from multiple and simultaneous SRBM and MRBM threats.
        We will hold a series of system-level operational flight and ground
    tests to demonstrate the initial capability against SRBMs and MRBMs for
    theater/regional defense as well as planning in fiscal year 2012 the
    first entirely operational test of the defense of the homeland by 2015.
    Each operational test will be conducted as realistically as possible
    and involve multiple targets of different ranges. This is where the
    Agency will test how well these layered defenses work. These tests are
    being planned and will be executed in concert with the BMDS Operational
    Test Agencies and under the oversight of the Department of Defense
    Director for Operational Test & Evaluation.. The BMD system under test
    will be operated by the soldiers, sailors, and airmen assigned to their
    respective missile defense equipment and placed under realistic wartime
    conditions to truly document the capabilities and limitations of the
    system. Finally, in fiscal year 2011, THAAD will execute a near-
    simultaneous engagement of an MRBM and SRBM.
                          developing new capabilities
        In fiscal year 2012, we plan to develop BMDS capabilities and
    technologies that can adapt as threats change and are fiscally
    sustainable. Early intercept capabilities enabled by satellites,
    forward based sensors and the SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide
    additional opportunities to kill threat missiles, enlarge protection
    areas, and improve the overall performance of the BMDS.
        After completing all of their original on-orbit testing in 2010, we
    continue to operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct
    cooperative tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the
    capability of STSS satellites against targets of opportunity. These
    tests demonstrate the ability of space sensors to provide high
    precision, real-time, tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that
    enable the fire control solutions BMDS interceptors. We are requesting
    $96.4 million for the STSS system in fiscal year 2012. Lessons learned
    from the two STSS demonstration satellites inform PTSS development
    decisions. We are requesting $160.8 million for PTSS in fiscal year
    2012. The PTSS, a new program start in cooperation with Johns Hopkins
    University Applied Physics Laboratory, Navy Research Laboratory, Air
    Force SPACECOM, and industry will use simple designs and mature
    technologies to provide persistent classification and tracking
    capability of enemy ballistic missiles for areas of the globe that have
    ballistic missile activity. PTSS project scope includes the delivery of
    PTSS ground segments and the launch of the first two PTSS spacecraft in
    fiscal year 2017.
        In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $46.9 million for the ABIR
    program. The ABIR program will provide a capability to track large
    ballistic missile raids with an airborne forward-based sensor,
    decreasing the time between the enemy's launch of the first ballistic
    missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile interceptor.
    Initially, we will integrate a sensor from the Multi-spectral Targeting
    System family of infrared sensors onto an MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted
    Vehicle to prove that we can enable Aegis fire control solutions with
    forward-based airborne assets. In fiscal year 2012, using platforms and
    operators supplied by the Air Force, and working closely with the Navy,
    we propose to demonstrate the ability to provide external cueing,
    sensor performance, and timely and accurate ballistic missile tracking.
    Our objective is to integrate the ABIR sensor into a pod that can be
    attached universally to the wing of a variety of aircraft.
    Additionally, in fiscal year 2012 we are enhancing our command and
    control capability to handle larger threat missile raid sizes and
    leverage airborne and space sensor missile tracking data networks. We
    will continue our development and testing of a multi-sensor application
    (ABIR and space sensors) tasking and signal processing capability that
    will provide data with sufficient quality to enable Aegis, THAAD, and
    GMD fire control solutions for launching interceptors.
        In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $96.3 million for Directed
    Energy Research ($92.6 million for ALTB). Following the successful
    shoot downs of liquid-fueled and solid-fueled boosting ballistic
    missile targets with an airborne laser in fiscal year 2010, the
    Assistant Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering designated the
    ALTB as a science and technology test bed for high power laser research
    and development. In fiscal year 2012, we are teaming with the Air
    Force's Research Laboratory to use the ALTB for testing advanced
    directed energy technologies and conducting beam propagation and
    lethality testing. A primary objective of our directed energy program
    is to continue our partnership with Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory to develop Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser System
    technology, which offers great potential for high efficiency,
    electrically-driven, compact, and light-weight high energy lasers for a
    wide variety of missions of interest to MDA and the Department of
    Defense.
                           international cooperation
        As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, developing
    international missile defense capacity is a key aspect of our strategy
    to counter ballistic missile proliferation. In Europe, we remain
    committed to working with our NATO allies to make NATO lower layer
    missile defense assets interoperable with U.S. upper-tier missile
    defense assets deployed under the EPAA through NATO's territorial
    missile defense capability. In East Asia, we are improving missile
    defenses through bilateral relationships. In the Middle East, we
    continue to work with long-term partners and pursue strengthened
    cooperation with other countries that have expressed interest in
    missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in missile defense projects,
    studies and analyses with over 20 countries, including Australia, the
    Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, NATO,
    Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates,
    and the United Kingdom.
        MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM-3 IIA
    interceptor (Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM-3 IIA
    second and third stage rocket motors and the nosecone), studying future
    architectures, and supporting that nation's SM-3 IA flight test
    program. We also continue collaboration with Israel on the development
    and employment of several missile defense capabilities that are
    interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. Last month, at a U.S. test range off
    the coast of California, the Arrow Weapon System successfully
    intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic missile
    threats facing Israel today. We are requesting $106.1 million for
    Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement and
    the David's Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2012. We are working
    with our partners from the United Arab Emirates on the development of a
    FMS case for the THAAD system that would represent the first sale of
    this capability.
        Additionally, MDA is actively engaged with the Russian Federation
    through three missile defense working groups led by the State
    Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. We
    are optimistic from the outcomes of both the NATO Russia Council
    meeting at Lisbon and the U.S. bilateral working groups that we will
    make meaningful progress this year in cooperating with the Russian
    Federation on missile defense, including considering leveraging the
    combined early warning and surveillance radars of both countries.
                                   conclusion
        Our fiscal year 2012 budget funds completing the initial deployment
    of SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the warfighters'
    near-term missile defense development priorities. Subsequently, we will
    build on that initial capability with the long-term goal of creating an
    international and enhanced network of integrated BMD capabilities that
    is flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of uncertainties of
    estimates of both nation-state and extremist ballistic missile threats.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
    committee's questions.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General, and I want to make it
    clear that we'll insert all your prepared statements in the
    record, so if you are able to summarize, as General O'Reilly
    did, that would be good. Thank you.
        Dr. Roberts.

       STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Dr. Roberts. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member
    Sessions, members of the subcommittee. I'm grateful for the
    opportunity to be here today and look forward to your
    questions. I just have a brief oral statement. The written
    statement begins with a review of the scope and conclusions of
    the BMDR, with the hope that that might be of general interest
    to this subcommittee. But my focus here today is on the key
    issues that have emerged in our dialogue as we have shifted
    from the phase that was policy development to policy
    implementation.
        From my perspective, there have been four main issues in
    discussion between us of a policy kind. The first relates to
    developments in the threat. In the missile defense review we
    made a commitment to closely monitor developments in the threat
    and to assess our defense investment priorities in light of new
    information about the threat. Of course, in the last year we've
    had a lot of new information that simply reconfirms the fact
    that we have an accelerating development of threat, both
    quantitatively and qualitatively, and this new information has
    simply reinforced the commitment, our commitment as reflected
    in the missile defense review, to a balanced approach that
    ensures that we continue to improve protection of the Homeland
    while at the same time accelerating regional protection.
        The second main issue that's been of continuing discussion
    among us relates to Homeland defense. In the missile defense
    review we made the commitment to firstly continue to improve
    our GMD of the Homeland in order to, in your words, stay ahead
    of the threat as it develops, and to keep ahead over the long
    term. But we made a related commitment to be well-hedged, and
    we've had some continuing discussion about what that means.
        I would emphasize that we made a series of commitments in
    the last budget and some new commitments in the current budget
    to take steps to continue to improve the performance of the GMD
    system. Enhanced performance of the system can add future
    capability in meeting quantitative and qualitative threat
    developments clearly.
        But the focus of discussion has been about the hedge. What
    is it, first of all, we seek to hedge against? In shorthand,
    it's the appearance of a second generation threat before we're
    ready for it. Now, what does that mean? The posture we have
    today is one that has us well-protected against the initial
    ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and
    Iran, that are few in number, relatively slow, and lack
    sophisticated countermeasures. Against this threat we have the
    current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to
    come in the defense of the Homeland with the future deployment
    in the 2020 timeframe of SM-3 IIB.
        The hedge problem is what happens if we have a number of
    ICBMs deployed by states like North Korea, Iran, or
    sophisticated ICBMs with sophisticated countermeasures before
    the availability of the SM-3 IIB to enhance the protection of
    the Homeland? For that problem, we have already taken steps to
    hedge, as reflected in the BMDR, principally providing
    additional silos into which we could place additional GBIs if
    required to do so. This year we took the additional step of
    mothballing rather than decommissioning some additional number
    of silos so that when that's implemented we would have the
    ability to increase from 30 to 44, roughly 50 percent, the
    number of GBIs as a part of the hedge posture. We've also
    committed to maintaining development of the two-stage GBI as a
    part of this hedge.
        The question that we've been engaged with now internally in
    DOD for a few months is what more do we need to do to ensure
    that the hedge posture is sufficient to deal with the possible
    threat developments in the timeframe before 2020? As we've
    stated in various venues, we're committed to bring that work
    forward to you as soon as our Secretary is satisfied that it's
    complete, and we expect to do so soon.
        The third topic of continuing discussion between us has
    been on implementing the PAA. Our attention has naturally been
    attracted to Europe because this is the approach that attracted
    the most political discussion and required the biggest push
    over the last year politically. But this is a global approach
    to the regions and one that has to be tailored to each of the
    regions.
        In a general summary, General O'Reilly has already given
    you good detail on the technical aspects of this. But our first
    priority in implementing PAA is to ensure that we are growing
    the capabilities that are available that are relocatable and
    flexible and adaptive to the different security environments.
    So we've been ramping up procurement in order to meet the
    rising demands of the combatant commands (COCOMs), and
    politically we've been working within the multilateral
    framework at NATO, bilaterally with our allies in East Asia and
    elsewhere, to define needed next steps.
        Lastly, the fourth issue I'd like to touch on relates to
    expanding international cooperation. This is again a global
    agenda from our perspective, but our focus here today, I think,
    is on Russia. You've posed some specific questions there. We
    believe, as I think you do, in the potential benefits of
    cooperation with Russia. We believe also in the potential
    risks.
        We see the benefits as potentially significant for the
    United States, for the European security environment, and for
    NATO, but also for Russia. We're mindful of the challenges. We
    reject cooperation that would in any way limit our missile
    defenses. You know the shorthand: NATO will defend NATO, but
    Russia will defend Russia, and we will seek to reinforce each
    other's defense where there's mutual benefit in doing so.
        We will not compromise essential technologies. There's no
    discussion of sharing hit-to-kill with Russia. We have made
    clear that cooperation will require successful conclusion of
    the defense technology cooperation agreement. This has been
    under discussion with Russia since it was proposed by the Bush
    administration in 2004. We've also made it clear that any
    classified information that's required for discussion with the
    Russians on this topic would only be discussed after thorough
    review under our national disclosure policy.
        So we hope that we're being mindful of the risks while
    being clear about the opportunities. We're working two parallel
    paths: the NATO-Russia Council pathway with Russia, where we
    are exploring the possibility of cooperative systems in defense
    of common spaces, where we've resumed the theater missile
    defense cooperation that was being pursued under the Bush
    administration and where we're developing a joint analysis for
    a future framework of cooperative activities.
        Bilaterally, we're also working to pursue parallel work on
    a joint analysis in order to better understand the capabilities
    we would each contribute and on the defense technology
    cooperation agreement.
        With that, let me close my opening remarks and look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:]
                     Prepared Statement by Dr. Brad Roberts
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
    Department's ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. BMD is a key
    strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying
    and answering your questions about our policies and plans.
                   the 2010 ballistic missile defense review
        A year has passed since the Obama administration released its
    review of BMD policy. It is important to recall that this was the first
    ever comprehensive review of BMD policy and that it was undertaken with
    congressional direction in order to inform our national debate about
    policies, strategies, plans, and programs. As we continue to work
    within the framework set out in that report, it is useful here to
    recall its main elements.
        The review began with an assessment of the ballistic missile
    threat. Among its key findings were the following:

             The threat is increasing both quantitatively and
            qualitatively and is likely to continue to do so over the
            coming decade.
             Several States are developing nuclear, chemical, and/
            or biological warheads for their missiles and may attempt to
            use the resulting capabilities for military advantage in
            conflict but also to coerce States near and far.
             Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue
            to develop long-range missiles that will be threatening to the
            United States. There is some uncertainty about when and how
            this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat
            to the U.S. Homeland will mature.
             But there is no uncertainty about the existence of
            regional missile threats. They are clear and present and
            increasing at a particularly rapid pace.
             Although confident predictions about the future of the
            threat are difficult to make, there are some clear trends.
            These include the progress from short- to longer-range missiles
            and an increasingly open market in technologies, materials, and
            expertise. There is also the troubling possibility that non-
            state actors might acquire weapons of mass destruction and the
            means to deliver them.

        We drew two key conclusions from this threat analysis. First, U.S.
    defense investments must be balanced in a way that enables the
    effective defense of the U.S. homeland and of U.S. forces, allies, and
    partners overseas in both the near and long term. Second, our defensive
    capabilities must be adaptable to unexpected threat developments.
    Threats may mature more rapidly or more slowly than predicted, may
    appear in unexpected locations, or may involve novel technologies or
    concepts of operations. It is essential that the United States be well
    hedged and has a strong posture against unpredicted threat
    developments.
        The Review identified the administration's main policy priorities.

        1.  The United States will continue to defend the homeland from
    limited ballistic missile attack. These efforts are focused on
    protecting the homeland from a ballistic missile attack by a regional
    actor such as North Korea or Iran. The U.S. Homeland is currently
    protected against limited threats and possesses a capacity to counter
    the projected threats from these States. But the United States must
    maintain this advantageous position as the threat matures. Through our
    continued commitment to maintain and develop the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system, the United States seeks to dissuade such States
    from developing an ICBM, deter them from using an ICBM if they develop
    or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by States if
    deterrence fails.
        2.  The United States will defend against regional missile threats
    to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners--and enabling them
    to defend themselves. Regional approaches must be tailored to the
    unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary
    considerably in their geography, in the history and character of the
    threat, and in the military-to-military relationships on which to build
    cooperative missile defenses. The review reflected our commitment to
    strengthen regional deterrence architectures with missile defense. It
    also set out the phased adaptive approach to regional missile defense.
    It is phased in that it will incorporate improving U.S. capabilities as
    they become available. It is adaptive in that it is tailored to unique
    regional requirements and opportunities. Because the demand for missile
    defense assets within each region over the next decade will exceed
    supply, we must focus on developing capabilities that are mobile and
    relocatable.
        3.  Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing
    that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions. This
    commitment reflected our assessment that it is no longer necessary to
    pursue a high-risk acquisition strategy that simultaneously develops
    and deploys new systems. The Integrated Master Test Plan announced in
    June 2009, and updated every 6 months since, reflects the Missile
    Defense Agency's new approach.
        4.  New capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long
    term. This commitment reflects our leadership's assessment that tough
    decisions must be made to ensure the long-term viability of the
    investment program. As such, we are pursuing lower-cost interceptors
    and enabling early intercepts to minimize the inventory required to
    negate a missile launch. The more constrained fiscal environment has
    only reinforced our sense of resolve on this matter.
        5.  BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats
    change. This conclusion derives from the threat assessment described
    above.
        6.  The United States will seek to lead expanded international
    efforts for missile defense. This is essential to the implementation of
    the phased, adaptive approach to regional missile defense. More
    broadly, it supports the objective of creating an environment in which
    the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles
    by regional adversaries can be deterred.
                ballistic missile defense review implementation
        Over the last year, our focus has shifted from policy formulation
    to policy implementation. In the continuing executive-legislative
    discussion of implementation, four key issues have emerged, and I will
    address each in turn.

        1.  Monitoring the threat: the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR) expressed a commitment to maintain a strong focus on threat
    developments and to rigorously assess defense planning in light of new
    information. What have we learned?
        2.  Protecting the Homeland: the BMDR expressed a commitment to
    continue to improve the GMD system in order to maintain the currently
    advantageous offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be
    well hedged against threat developments. What additional steps are
    needed at this time?
        3.  Pursuing phased adaptive regional missile defense: the BMDR
    expressed a commitment to deploy the phased adaptive approach in Europe
    and apply the approach in East Asia and the Middle East. How much
    progress has been made?
        4.  Seeking expanded international cooperation: the BMDR expressed
    a commitment to lead expanded international efforts for missile
    defense. This includes a commitment to work to establish a cooperative
    BMD relationship with Russia. What opportunities and challenges have
    emerged?
                             monitoring the threat
        The last year has brought abundant confirmation that the threat is
    continuing to grow quantitatively and qualitatively. A central focus
    remains on Iran and North Korea as sources of potential threat to the
    United States and to our allies. In addition, a number of States are
    developing or acquiring Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities such as
    anti-ship cruise missiles or anti-ship ballistic missiles. These
    capabilities are intended to deny our forces access to key regions, and
    to blunt the operations of forces that do deploy forward.
        Iran already possesses the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
    in the Middle East, and is developing more of them. In addition to its
    growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran is boosting the lethality
    and effectiveness of those stockpiles, through accuracy improvements,
    new submunitions, and salvo launch capabilities. Furthermore, Iran's
    Simorgh space-launch vehicle shows that Iran is making the
    technological progress needed for the development of an ICBM.
        Iran also shows continued interest in pursuing its nuclear-related
    programs, though the Obama administration's economic sanctions program
    has clearly begun to bite more deeply than the present regime might
    have expected. Although we do not know if Iran will eventually decide
    to build nuclear weapons, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is
    deeply concerning to the United States and the global community, and
    there is a risk that Iran's continued efforts along these lines may
    prompt neighboring States to pursue national nuclear programs.
        North Korea is modernizing every aspect of its deployed missile
    forces--including short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems. It
    has reinforced its long-range artillery forces near the DMZ with a
    substantial number of mobile ballistic missiles that could strike
    targets in South Korea, Japan, and U.S. bases in the Pacific. North
    Korea has not successfully tested an ICBM, but we expect it to continue
    to test-launch missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2). With
    further TD-2 tests, North Korea may develop an ICBM capable of reaching
    the United States. In addition, Pyongyang has a long history of
    ballistic-missile proliferation, and likely will continue to market and
    potentially export missile technologies to a number of countries--
    including Iran and Syria.
        North Korea's nuclear-weapons program only increases our concerns
    about that nation's missile capability. According to the Director of
    the Defense Intelligence Agency, ``The North may now have several
    plutonium-based nuclear warheads that it can deliver by ballistic
    missiles and aircraft as well as by unconventional means.''
        The ballistic-missile threat from North Korea is especially
    relevant in light of recent provocative behavior by the regime. A
    multinational Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Team concluded that
    a North Korean midget submarine sank South Korea's naval corvette
    Cheonan on March 26, 2010 near the contentious Northern Limit Line in
    the West Sea, causing the loss of 46 South Korean sailors. Then, in the
    first attack against a civilian-inhabited area since the Korean War,
    North Korea shelled Yonpyong Island on November 23, killing two South
    Korean marines and two civilians.
        These assessments reinforce the administration's commitment to a
    balanced approach that continues to improve the defense of the homeland
    while also accelerating protection against regional threats.
                             defending the homeland
        As noted above, the BMDR expressed a commitment to continue to
    improve the GMD system in order to maintain the currently advantageous
    offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be well hedged
    against threat developments. What additional steps are needed at this
    time?
        The assessment that the United States is currently protected
    against limited strikes derives from the strength of the current
    posture against the current threat to the homeland. Today, the United
    States is protected against limited ICBM attacks as a result of
    investments made over the past decade in the GMD system. Thirty Ground-
    Based Interceptors (GBIs) are now deployed to defend the homeland. To
    enable successful intercepts by these missiles, radars are now in place
    in Alaska, California, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. They are also
    deployed at sea aboard Aegis destroyers and cruisers, at Shariki,
    Japan, and in the form of the Sea-based X-band radar. These
    capabilities are enabled by a sophisticated command and control
    infrastructure. Looking to the future, this posture will provide
    continued protection against initial ICBM deployments.
        The commitment to continue to improve the GMD system is reflected
    in a number of ongoing activities and in the associated fiscal year
    2012 budget. We continue to:

             Test and upgrade the system to increase reliability
            and survivability
             Develop and upgrade Ballistic Missile Defense System
            sensors
             Procure GBIs (in fiscal year 2012, we will procure
            five more)
             Implement GBI refurbishment and reliability
            sustainment programs (in order to sustain the fleet for another
            two decades)
             Upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software
             Enhance the Command, Control, Battle Management and
            Communications system to handle larger raid sizes
             Develop and deploy new sensors in a variety of
            settings--including forward bases in Europe, unmanned vehicles
            in the skies, and platforms in space
             Develop early-intercept concepts to help defeat
            countermeasures and reduce the inventory required to negate
            missile launches

        Additionally, we are developing the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block
    IIB for deployment against future IRBM and ICBM threats in the regional
    defense architectures (as discussed further below), which is an
    important part of the long-term defense against future ICBM threats to
    the homeland.
        The performance of the GMD system will also be strengthened with
    new investments that will result in better sensor information reaching
    the GBI during its flight. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes new
    funding for an In Flight Interceptor Communications System Data
    Terminal on the East Coast and for upgrades to the Early Warning Radars
    at Clear, AK, and Cape Cod, MA. Looking to the longer term, the
    administration is also investing to develop next generation missile
    defense capabilities. This includes continued work to research the
    potential of directed energy systems for missile defense.
        We are sustaining these commitments even as the Department has
    identified efficiencies and cuts as a result of government-wide budget
    limitations.
        These capability enhancements will contribute significantly to
    preservation of the currently advantageous posture of the United States
    against limited strikes if or as ICBM threats develop from Iran and
    North Korea, or other regional threats. But they may not be enough. The
    United States must also be well hedged against the possibility that
    threats might evolve more rapidly than planned capability enhancements.
    It must also be well hedged against the possibility that those
    capability enhancements may be delayed for technical reasons. After
    all, development programs involve inherent technical risk.
        To strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, the administration has taken
    the following steps:

             Construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, is
            being completed in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a
            contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs if needed.
             Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are
            being mothballed instead of decommissioned, allowing their
            return to service within 2 years if necessary; and
             Testing and assessment of a two-stage Ground-Based
            Interceptor is continuing in order to preserve future
            deployment options.

        The administration is considering additional steps to strengthen
    the U.S. hedge posture. We have been studying threat developments,
    future capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios.
    We have been evaluating the deployment timelines associated with
    fielding additional capabilities with an eye to enabling rapid
    responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate
    improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and
    battle space. This work involves a significant amount of classified
    information from both the intelligence community and the system
    developers. We have committed to brief this subcommittee on the results
    in a classified setting in the next several weeks.
        A key issue of continuing congressional interest is the role of the
    two-stage GBI in the hedge strategy. The BMDR explicitly recognized
    this role. The classified analysis addresses this matter directly, as
    well as the continued role of GBIs more generally. DOD will ensure that
    it preserves the capacity to provide additional GBIs to missile field
    two and possibly missile field one should such decisions be taken in
    the future. As General O'Reilly said in his testimony before the House
    Armed Services Committee on March 31, several of the assumptions we
    used to arrive at a total purchase of 52 GBIs are no longer valid,
    primarily due to test failures and the need for additional testing.
    Some increased number of GBIs that will be necessary, but we must
    conclude the investigation of the most recent test failure before we
    can make a determination about the number of additional GBIs that will
    be required. The decision to procure five additional GBIs, together
    with the ongoing refurbishment program, will keep GBI production lines
    warm for several years. This in effect provides us with additional
    decision time to procure additional GBIs without letting the production
    lines go cold.
               pursuing phased adaptive regional missile defense
        The BMDR expressed a commitment to deploy the phased adaptive
    approach (PAA) in Europe and apply the approach in East Asia and the
    Middle East. How much progress has been made? In brief, the progress
    has been significant.
    Required Capabilities
        To support PAA implementation, we are procuring a pool of missile
    defense assets that will allow us to address current regional threats
    and surge missile defenses into troubled regions in a time of
    political-military crisis. To date, MDA has delivered two THAAD
    batteries and seven AN/TPY-2 radars. By the end of fiscal year 2012, a
    total of 29 Aegis ships will have BMD capability and there will be a
    total of 15 U.S. PAC-3 battalions. The fiscal year 2012 budget
    continues the procurement of additional THAAD batteries, forward-based
    radars, as well as the conversion of additional Aegis ships, and SM-3
    interceptors. This commitment to additional regional capabilities will
    allow for increasingly robust regional architectures over the decade.
    Europe
        The BMDR set out the main elements of the application of the phased
    adaptive approach in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (EPAA) is phased to incorporate improving U.S. capabilities and
    adaptive to the particular geopolitical landscape of Europe. The Obama
    administration is committed to the deployment of all four phases.
    Toward that end, it has begun to deploy initial capabilities. It has
    also developed a diplomatic strategy with allies and partners in
    Europe.
        The first deployment of EPAA capabilities came on March 7 when the
    guided missile cruiser USS Monterey, carrying SM-3 Block IA
    interceptors, deployed to Europe. This deployment is supported by other
    decisions within a comprehensive force management process, led by the
    Joint Staff, that adjudicates competing requirements from the combatant
    commands.
        We are currently in discussions with potential host nations for the
    deployment of an AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to southeastern Europe.
    While no decision has been made, we expect to meet our 2011 deployment
    timeline. Looking ahead to Phase 2 in 2015 and the deployment of land-
    based SM-3 interceptors in southeastern Europe, Romania has agreed to
    host the site. Looking further ahead to Phase 3 in 2018, Poland has
    agreed to host the second land-based SM-3 site.
        Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), considerable
    progress has also been achieved. This past November at the Lisbon
    Summit, NATO's leaders took the unprecedented step of deciding to
    pursue full coverage and protection for the Alliance's populations,
    territories, and forces in Europe against ballistic missile attacks.
    NATO also decided at Lisbon to expand its existing missile defense
    command and control backbone--the Active Layered Theater Ballistic
    Missile Defense--to encompass territorial missile defense, which will
    make current and future Alliance missile-defense assets interoperable.
    These decisions send a strong signal that NATO will not allow itself to
    be defenseless against ballistic missile coercion or attack.
    Other Regions
        The same basic approach is being pursued in East Asia and the
    Middle East, but in a way that is tailored to the existing foundations
    of cooperation and unique regional requirements. Capabilities will be
    phased in as they become available for deployment, but in a manner
    adapted to specific regional circumstances.
        In East Asia, a strong foundation of missile defense capabilities
    and cooperation already exists. The U.S. deploys Aegis BMD-capable
    ships in the region. Japan has a layered missile defense system that
    includes Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 interceptors, PAC-3 fire units,
    early-warning radars, and a command-and-control system. Japan also
    hosts an AN/TPY-2 radar. U.S. and Japanese forces regularly train
    together and have successfully executed simulated cooperative BMD
    operations. We are also engaged in cooperative development of the next
    generation SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which is projected to enter
    service in 2018.
        Australia participates in our Trilateral Missile Defense Forum with
    Japan, and takes part in the Nimble Titan missile-defense exercise
    series hosted by U.S. Strategic Command. Australia is also acquiring
    ships that would be compatible with U.S. Aegis BMD systems, should they
    choose to pursue that capability.
        With South Korea, we have engaged in bilateral missile-defense
    cooperation discussions and have recently signed a Terms of Reference
    and an agreement that will enable our two nations to carry out a
    requirements analysis so that South Korea can make informed decisions
    about the utility of any future BMD program.
        One of the key differences between East Asia and Europe is the
    absence of a multilateral alliance framework based on collective
    defense. Thus our plans to strengthen the regional missile defense
    architecture have had to be built on the foundations of bilateral
    cooperation and a variety of security interests and perceptions.
        The administration has also sought dialogue with China on BMD, with
    little success. We have sought to explain U.S. intentions and
    capabilities and also to better understand China's concerns that such
    defenses might negate China's strategic deterrent. We have also sought
    to convey longstanding U.S. concerns about the pace and scope of
    China's current military modernization efforts, which encompass a wide
    range of advanced air, air-defense, naval, missile, space and
    cyberspace capabilities. We believe that such a dialogue could help to
    reduce mistrust, enhance mutual understanding, and broaden cooperation.
    China deploys a limited but growing number of conventionally armed,
    medium-range ballistic missiles, and it likely is nearing deployment of
    a medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile. It has more than 1,000
    conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan for a
    variety of precision-strike missions. China is also forming more
    missile units, upgrading some older missile systems, and developing
    methods to penetrate missile defenses.
        In the Middle East as in East Asia, the absence of a multilateral
    security framework means that the regional approach must be built on
    the foundation of bilateral relationships.
        In the Persian Gulf, the United States maintains a robust mix of
    missile-defense assets to protect our troops and facilities in the
    region. We have built a series of bilateral missile defense agreements
    with the Nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to address the
    regional ballistic missile threat from Iran. U.S. Central Command
    continues to work on establishing air defense and missile defense
    architectures for the GCC nations. In addition, the United States has
    approved the sale of Patriot and THAAD systems to the United Arab
    Emirates. We are also working with Saudi Arabia to refurbish its
    Patriot systems and recertify the interceptors for those systems.
        We have also taken steps to ensure that Israel will remain capable
    of countering the full range of Iranian ballistic missile threats that
    may emerge. In doing so, we have built on a longstanding relationship
    with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting major missile-defense
    exercises over the last several years, the United States and Israel
    meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a range of missile-defense
    programs, including the Arrow weapon system and a new program for
    defeating short-range ballistic missiles, known as David's Sling, as
    well as various other shared plans and operations.
        In both East Asia and the Middle East, new capabilities will be
    phased in as appropriate to address regional threats, and as they
    become available through the comprehensive joint force management
    process identified above. This will help to ensure that the
    requirements of the different combatant commands are met in a
    responsible manner as additional asserts become available.
    Seeking Expanded International Cooperation
        The BMDR expressed a commitment to lead expanded international
    efforts for missile defense. The intent here is global--to work with
    allies and partners generally to strengthen cooperation. A key priority
    is to establish a cooperative BMD relationship with Russia. Significant
    opportunities have emerged, along with some challenges.
        Our pursuit of missile defense cooperation with Russia occurs
    against the backdrop of broader changes in U.S.-Russian relations. Over
    the past year, there has been important progress in these relations
    such as ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the
    joint pressure applied to Iran's nuclear program, and new steps to
    strengthen the NATO-Russia Council. Russia's leaders have accepted
    proposals from the United States and NATO to pursue cooperation on
    missile defense to enhance our common security against common threats
    and as part of the broader re-set of U.S.-Russia relations.
        Cooperation with Russia on missile defense would be significant for
    a number of reasons. Cooperation could offer tangible security benefits
    to Europe, Russia, and the United States in the form of stronger
    protection against missile threats than would be possible if pursued
    separately. Most significantly, by beginning missile defense
    cooperation now, Russia, the United States and NATO will gain
    information, experience, and confidence that will strengthen strategic
    stability and help to shape and bring closer together our security
    strategies.
        Officials from the Department of Defense and Russian Ministry of
    Defense have been working to initiate a joint analysis of opportunities
    for enhanced missile defense cooperation. In addition to our bilateral
    efforts, NATO and Russia agreed to resume missile defense cooperation,
    and to study ways in which we might cooperate on territorial missile
    defense in Europe.
        As President Obama has stated, we are pursuing BMD cooperation
    ``even as we have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with
    Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit
    United States' or NATO's missile defense capabilities.'' NATO alone
    will be responsible for defense of NATO territory, just as Russia
    should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. We would
    operate our respective systems independently but cooperatively, in a
    way that reinforces their performance without putting them at risk.
        A requirement for the safeguarding of sensitive information in
    support of cooperation is a Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC)
    Agreement, which will provide the legal framework for undertaking
    cooperative efforts. The proposed DTC Agreement (which we began to
    negotiate in 2004) contains an annex that addresses the sharing of
    classified information. But this on its own will not constitute
    authorization to provide classified information to Russia. Exchange of
    classified information with Russia would still be subject to U.S.
    National Disclosure Policy and the associated careful review, just as
    it is with other partners.
        Expectations for cooperation with Russia are running high, but it
    is important to be realistic about both the opportunities and
    challenges ahead. That said, I do believe we have an opportunity for
    meaningful cooperation that will enhance the security of the United
    States, our NATO allies, and Russia.
                                   conclusion
        A year after release of the BMDR, implementation is well launched.
    Capabilities are in place to protect the homeland from limited attack,
    and steps are being taken to continue to improve those capabilities.
    Capabilities are also in place to protect U.S. forces, their families,
    and our allies from regional attacks, and the first steps have been
    taken to implement the phased adaptive approach. We have put in place
    investment programs aligned with our policy priorities.
        We have also tried to put in place the political foundations for a
    long-term commitment by the United States in this area, building on the
    important work of our predecessors. Missile defense is a long-term
    challenge that requires sustained support from a succession of
    administrations and Congresses. As Secretary Gates has argued, ``The
    protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile
    attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our
    deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing
    rapidly. This threat has significant implications for our ability to
    project power abroad, to prevent future conflicts, and to prevail
    should deterrence fail.''
        I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today to make our case
    for your support and I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Admiral Macy.

      STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
      INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, THE JOINT
                                 STAFF

        Admiral Macy. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
    ranking member, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
    the opportunity to testify on the JIAMDO and our contribution
    to BMD. Let me also take a moment here to thank you both for
    your comments on my behalf, and I very much appreciate your
    attention and the opportunity to work with this subcommittee
    over the last 2 years. It's been truly a pleasure.
        JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is
    to identify and coordinate joint requirements for air defense,
    cruise missile defense, and BMD to support the development of
    solutions, to deliver capabilities for the warfighter. We
    provide expertise, analysis, planning, and coordination across
    the combatant commanders and the Services in a number of vital
    efforts relative to both air threat and BMD. These include
    advocating for the warfighters' desired air and missile defense
    capabilities, where we facilitate COCOMs and Services'
    collaborative efforts to identify and develop operational
    concepts, joint requirements, system interoperability, and
    operational architectures for integrated air and missile
    defense.
        We provide support to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM), in his role as the air and missile defense
    integrating authority. We provide support for, and interaction
    with, other elements of the Joint Staff for global force
    management of the high-demand, low-density BMD assets and
    systems.
        We represent the United States to NATO for matters of air
    and missile defense policy and planning, and we conduct
    assessment, analysis, and validation of integrated air and
    missile defense capabilities to inform both warfighter planning
    and system development and acquisition.
        The Chairman has directed JIAMDO to be at the intersection
    of the requirements processes for air defense and BMD and to
    act as an integration mechanism for harmonizing both common and
    differing needs across multiple services, platforms, and
    systems. Several recent JIAMDO key activities in BMD capability
    development highlight this integration responsibility. These
    include follow-on efforts from the BMDR, initial steps in
    fielding the EPAA, and conducting the JCM-III study that the
    chairman referred to earlier.
        During the BMDR, completed approximately a year ago, I was
    one of the three co-directors of the review, which holistically
    assessed U.S. BMD policy and strategy. Since that time, JIAMDO
    serves as a nexus within the Joint Staff for tracking and
    enabling implementation of the recommendations and
    characteristics of the BMDR report and, critically, providing
    support to the COCOMs and the interagency in fulfilling the
    goals of that review.
        These efforts have included examining how BMD capability
    needs fit into DOD's global force management processes to
    apportion, allocate, and assign BMD elements in a process to
    adjudicate competing COCOM requirements.
        As the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S. representative to
    the NATO Air Defense Committee, responsible for addressing air
    and missile defense-related issues in NATO and for drafting and
    coordinating U.S. positions. In this role, I have the privilege
    of working with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss
    the application and implementation of the PAA in Europe and the
    potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO
    context.
        As was mentioned already, the first BMDS element deployment
    in support of phase 1 EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of
    this year when the cruiser USS Monterey deployed to Europe. Two
    weeks ago, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic
    Council, the NATO Military Committee, the NATO Air Defense
    Committee, and other NATO senior policy and technical
    committees and international staff received tours and
    demonstrations aboard the ship during a port call on Antwerp.
    For the rest of this year, Monterey will spend the spring and
    summer helping to develop, test, and verify the command and
    control processes, the data pathways, tactics, techniques, and
    procedures necessary for the phase 1 capability to become
    operational later this year.
        In the course of this, two areas have become clear in my
    dealings with the allied nations. First is the criticality of
    being able to integrate partner nations into the missile
    defense architecture and structure through networking. This
    builds coalition unity and provides other nations the
    opportunity to actively participate in both their own defense
    and a larger collaborative defense, and results in shared
    responsibility and costs.
        Second is the value of satellite systems, such as the STSS,
    to provide a means to rapidly increase the level of protection
    in designated areas or extend protection to an undefended area.
    This is an unprecedented level of flexibility and
    responsiveness for combatant commanders to offer their allied
    partners should the need arise.
        Finally, as was mentioned, JIAMDO recently completed the
    base case in the third of a series of air and missile defense
    inventory sufficiency analyses called the JCM-III study, to
    examine the implications and opportunities for the PAA to our
    overall capability for BMD. This study has been reviewed by
    DOD. We're in the process of briefing the base case results to
    appropriate parties, including this committee, and we are
    continuing the analytic efforts of JCM-III to examine a number
    of excursions and alternatives that we have developed.
        The JCM-III study assesses warfighters' requirements for
    BMD elements for the Homeland and for each of the European,
    Central, and Pacific Commands' areas of responsibility (AOR) as
    the commanders anticipate using BMD capabilities within their
    overall operational planning. Working with the COCOMs, the
    Services, and the MDA, we looked to understand how many
    interceptors, launchers, and sensors were needed to counter
    various future scenarios and, most critically, the effect those
    numbers had on warfighting capability. We took into account how
    the COCOMs intend to employ the BMD elements, their desire for
    a layered defense, what the threats are, and generally how the
    threat will be expected to be employed.
        The significant level of warfighter and developer
    involvement in the process gives us a high level of confidence
    in the results. It also shows that the development programs are
    correctly focused on warfighters' desires for forward-based
    airborne and satellite systems that enable earlier intercepts,
    larger engagement areas, more shot opportunities, and increased
    effectiveness against countermeasures.
        You may remember that we previously conducted JCM-I in 2005
    and 2006 and JCM-II in 2007 and 2008. These focused on the
    number of interceptors that might be required under different
    scenarios against specific threats. There are three main
    differences between these earlier studies and JCM-III.
        First, JCM-III examines all the elements of the regional
    BMDS, including sensor systems, launcher systems, and
    interceptors, whereas the previous studies looked only at
    interceptors.
        Second, JCM-III examines performance against threat
    ballistic missiles that employ a range of countermeasures. We
    had not done this previously.
        Third, as I have previously noted, JCM-III is a study of
    warfighting sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition
    objectives. We examine the ability of the application of PAA
    architectures in the different AORs of the COCOMs and for the
    defense of the Homeland to determine how BMDS contributes to
    their overall plan to deter aggressors and, if necessary, to
    end enemy ballistic missile attacks should they occur. We do
    not attempt to simply answer how much to buy. We give
    alternatives to the warfighter on how to achieve his overall
    warfighting goals.
        The specific study results cannot be discussed in this open
    forum, but I'm prepared to discuss the classified results in a
    closed session following our time this afternoon or at another
    time at the subcommittee's convenience or that of the
    individual Members.
        Overall, JIAMDO continues to provide the Joint Staff and
    the combatant commanders a linchpin resource for the
    development, refinement, planning, and fielding of, among other
    things, BMD for our Homeland, our deployed forces, citizens,
    partners, and friends overseas.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member for the
    opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by RADM Archer M. Macy, USN
        Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
    It is an honor and pleasure to join Dr. Roberts, LTG O'Reilly, and Ms.
    Chaplain to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) and inform you how
    the Joint Staff and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Organization (JIAMDO) contributes to this important mission area.
    joint integrated air and missile defense organization as a part of the
                                  joint staff
        As a reminder, JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to
    identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts
    developing air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD solutions for
    the warfighter.
        We are a Chairman's Controlled Activity tailored to provide current
    operational expertise in air and missile defense and our members are
    drawn from across the Services. The background and experience of these
    military experts allows them to relate at an operational level with the
    warfighter and enables them to translate operational needs into
    requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and
    demonstrations.
          joint integrated air and missile defense organization's key
                   contributions to ballistic missile defense
        In support of the Chairman and the Joint Staff, JIAMDO provides
    expertise, analysis, planning, and coordination across the combatant
    commanders and the Services in a number of vital efforts relative to
    BMD. These include participating in, and following up on the results
    of, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that concluded last
    year; support for BMD weapon system fielding processes; support to U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating
    Authority; support for and interaction with other elements of the Joint
    Staff for Global Force Management of High Demand/Low Density BMD assets
    and systems; representing the United States to North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) for matters of air and missile defense policy and
    planning; and Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessments and
    Analysis. I'll address each of these briefly, but first I'd like to
    discuss JIAMDO and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs).
        A key part of our contribution is advocacy for the COCOMs. JIAMDO
    is focused on ensuring the Department is delivering capabilities that
    support COCOM operational plans and address their air and missile
    defense gaps. We assist the COCOMs in the Department's annual
    Capability Gap Assessment process that addresses their critical
    warfighting capability gaps in their Integrated Priority Lists that
    identify risk in accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan
    missions. In addition to JIAMDO's role in the Joint Staff capabilities
    processes, we have liaison personnel at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
    U.S. European Command (EUCOM), STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, U.S.
    Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. North
    American Aerospace Defense Command, and U.S. Forces, Japan. The liaison
    provides a direct link between JIAMDO and the COCOMs as they work air
    and missile defense issues day-to-day for both the hosting command and
    JIAMDO.
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review
        JIAMDO had four key roles in the BMDR. As the Director of JIAMDO, I
    was one of the three directors of the review; other JIAMDO personnel
    served as co-chair of the Programmatic Process and Execution Working
    Group; led the Requirements Issue Team; and served in the Directorate
    of Activities. In short, JIAMDO played a central role in the
    development of the BMDR. Subsequent to the completion of the Review, we
    have continued to work with the offices of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Joint
    Staff, and members of the Interagency as we develop and advance the
    principles and policies for BMD, such as the Phased Adaptive Approach
    (PAA), that were enumerated in the BMDR report.
    Ballistic Missile Defense Elements System Fielding
        The fielding plan for new missile defense systems developed by MDA
    identified a need for the department to develop a process to transition
    and transfer those systems from MDA to the Services. JIAMDO worked
    closely with Service staffs and MDA to develop business rules and
    processes to handle this, and was the lead to take the new process to
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for approval.
    Support to the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority
        STRATCOM is designated the Air and Missile Defense Integrating
    Authority (AMD IA) and serves as the COCOMs' representative for air and
    missile defense. JIAMDO is formally tasked to provide operational
    expertise and analytic support to the AMD IA as it documents BMD
    requirements to MDA. Currently, we are assisting in developing the
    expanded Prioritized Capability List that will provide transparency and
    insight for Service developers and MDA for missile defense, and a
    common requirements view for senior decisionmakers.
    JIAMDO and Global Force Management
        JIAMDO is also assisting the Joint Staff J-3 to formalize the
    inclusion of Missile Defense in the Global Force Management Process to
    address the force sourcing and mitigation options for BMD assets. This
    would assure that, like other high demand/low density assets, missile
    defense is included in the assignment, allocation, and apportionment
    process to adjudicate competing COCOM requirements.
    JIAMDO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
        Closely associated with COCOM relationships are the NATO
    responsibilities of JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S.
    Representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), responsible
    for addressing air and missile defense related issues in NATO. The
    Director's unique position allows insight into policy and military
    issues from both a U.S. and Alliance point of view, and enables the
    United States to understand and address tactical level integration of
    allies and partners in analysis and studies, and during the development
    of employment concepts. In this regard I have had the privilege of
    working with the NATO staff and appearing before the North Atlantic
    Council to discuss the application of the PAA in Europe and the
    potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO context.
    Most recently, the NADC led the senior policy and technical committees
    from NATO Headquarters on tours and demonstrations on the Aegis BMD
    ship USS Monterey (CG 61).
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessments and Analysis
        A concurrent responsibility for JIAMDO is assessing and validating
    operational concepts and architectures, and helping COCOMs and Services
    define and refine air and missile defense requirements. This is
    performed primarily through studies and analyses, modeling and
    simulation, and the conduct of wargames. Study activities vary from
    inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and options
    for various mixes of surveillance sensors. JIAMDO recently completed
    the third of a series of quantitative performance analyses, the Joint
    Capability Mix III (JCM III) Study, to determine the warfighter
    requirements for elements of the BMD System required for BMD; I will
    discuss this in some more detail later in my testimony.
        A centerpiece of JIAMDO's analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and
    simulation activity. Nimble Fire is a classified operator-in-the-loop
    simulation where Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army operational
    personnel come together to simulate the execution of joint air and
    missile defense missions. The events are structured to allow
    operational personnel to employ their systems and forces as they deem
    appropriate and the data we obtain is used to define and refine
    capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and in some instances
    employment techniques. It is a fully functional joint architecture
    capable of executing current and future concepts with operationally
    representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, Airborne Warning and
    Control System, E-2, F/A-18, F-15, F-22, and JLENS among others. The
    simulation can conduct distributed operations to U.S. and overseas
    military locations and annually executes a combined air, cruise
    missile, and BMD event in conjunction with MDA's Missile Defense
    Integrated Operations Center simulation at Colorado Springs. Analysis
    events are based on COCOM war plans and routinely have participants
    from the commands in the operational positions. Results are out-briefed
    to the COCOMs as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble Fire is a
    one-of-a-kind capability that has proven to be invaluable in analyzing
    concepts and requirements.
        JIAMDO also provides analytical support and coordinates COCOM
    participation and input into two of the premier BMD wargames, Nimble
    Titan and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame. Nimble
    Titan is sponsored by STRATCOM and led by the Joint Force Component
    Command, Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy and
    military wargame designed to assess and evaluate coalition and allied
    participation in missile defense. U.S. and international missile
    defense experts from both ministries of foreign affairs and ministries
    of defense take part in the events. Eight nations currently
    participate, with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from
    these wargames allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential
    policy and military issues such as command and control, information
    sharing, and coalition decisionmaking. The BMDS Wargame, sponsored by
    MDA, is a U.S.-only classified tactical level simulation that brings
    together warfighters and developers to collaboratively examine the
    optimal employment of the future BMDS. This wargame explores areas such
    as shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory management, and
    force employment. JIAMDO leverages findings from these events to
    support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine developed during the
    BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies.
        The Department has recognized that air and missile defense is a
    complex mission area and has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is
    part of that commitment and we are working hard to ensure that
    warfighter needs are met. I would next like to discuss the PAA for BMD
    as mentioned earlier.
                      the phased adaptive approach concept
        The concept of a PAA to missile defense was an outgrowth of the
    BMDR, which took a holistic look at the different aspects of our
    missile defense strategy and its programs. These ranged from trends in
    threat development, U.S. missile defense technology development,
    operational fielding needs and opportunities, and capability
    requirements from COCOM war plans. The particular focus of PAA is the
    regional missile threat coming from short-, medium-, and intermediate-
    range ballistic missiles and is responsive to both congressional
    direction, and the warfighters' needs, to place more emphasis on these
    types of threats. In short, it is a more effective and efficient
    approach to missile defense. I think it is important to emphasize here
    that the PAA is not an acquisition program, or a single plan to be
    applied unchanged across all areas of the globe. It is a conceptual
    approach to providing BMD capability for our deployed forces, allies
    and partners, and additional capability for homeland defense, in
    different regions, circumstances and times.
        The recently completed NATO Summit of Heads of State and
    Governments at Lisbon adopted the new Strategic Concept for NATO, which
    explicitly affirms that, in the face of `` . . . the proliferation of
    ballistic missiles, which pose a real and growing threat to the Euro-
    Atlantic area,'' the Alliance will ``develop the capability to defend
    our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a
    core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the
    indivisible security of the Alliance.'' We view this as a ringing
    affirmation of the priority to develop missile defense for our European
    NATO allies and our deployed forces.
        I would like to point out that although there has been significant
    focus and discussion on Europe, the PAA is much more than just the
    defense of Europe. The PAA concept provides the United States with an
    enhanced capability to respond to regional threats worldwide, no matter
    where they emerge, and to strengthen defense of the Homeland. It also
    provides us with the flexibility to tailor the type and size of that
    response by being able to adapt to the threats, partners' capabilities,
    and geography of each region. The PAA is ``phased'' to advances in our
    own technical and operational capabilities for BMD, and it is
    ``adaptive'' to trends and advances in potential adversary threats. The
    European version of the PAA has four phases based upon projected
    advances of our technical capabilities; however, in other COCOM's areas
    of responsibility (AOR) the number and timing of individual phases will
    vary based upon their unique circumstances. The geographic COCOMs are
    developing plans for phases for each AOR, with the European PAA
    currently being the most advanced.
        The PAA has not resulted in a wholesale change in what the
    Department had previously planned to develop, but it does adjust the
    timing and quantity of some of the systems. A key enabler for this
    flexibility is the structured and disciplined approach to development
    and fielding of the BMDS. MDA is providing the Department with an
    impressive array of very capable systems that give us the freedom to
    maneuver and adapt to different and changing environments and threats.
    To fully capitalize on this range of capabilities, the Joint Capability
    Mix studies help guide decisions on maximizing COCOM capabilities and
    provide senior leaders with a risk-relevant assessment based on
    operational plans. This is a critical effort, particularly in light of
    the need to maximize every dollar spent. I would now like to address
    the operational benefits of the PAA.
                operational benefits of phased adaptive approach
        As has been noted before, Congress and our warfighters have said
    the most pressing threat for our deployed forces today is the
    increasing number of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium
    Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without going into classified
    details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of these
    threats grows daily and the Nation needs to find a way to deal with
    them. The PAA addresses these issues head on. The United States cannot
    afford to build the number of launchers, interceptors, and sensors it
    would take for each COCOM to have his own dedicated BMDS capability
    that can address all the potential strikes that could be launched. What
    the PAA provides instead, is a balanced investment that has the
    capacity to engage the range of threats; can be tailored to the
    geography, political circumstances, capabilities of regional partners;
    and has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets where and when
    they are needed.
    european paa phase i (2011) initial short-range ballistic missiles and
              medium-range ballistic missiles capability in europe
        European PAA Phase I is focused on the near-term essentials to go
    against the SRBM and MRBM threats. We are already giving the overseas
    combatant commanders more of what we already have by increasing the
    number of Patriot interceptors to complement the existing inventory of
    Patriot and Aegis with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The European PAA
    Phase I will also add SM-3 Block IA. This is a simple and direct
    operational counter. As the threat grows, we increase the number of our
    defensive interceptors. While this is workable to a point, it rapidly
    becomes unaffordable as the threats continue to grow in numbers over
    time.
        To break out of the spiral of trying to match the threat missile-
    for-missile, the European PAA Phase I also begins the introduction of
    operational leverage by placing a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in
    Southern Europe. The addition of this AN/TPY-2 radar will allow the
    combatant commander to use Aegis to launch interceptors against
    ballistic missiles tracked by either the ship itself or the AN/TPY-2
    radar. This significantly increases the size of the area that can be
    defended, and we will examine this architecture in a live intercept
    test mission in the near future. Phase I also includes the Command,
    Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) upgrade to the
    air operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. C2BMC controls the
    AN/TPY-2 and also ties it and any Aegis ships into our command and
    control structure in Europe. C2BMC is a major operational leverage
    point for PAA because it provides the pathway for data exchange
    throughout a theater and from a theater to the Homeland.
        The first BMDS element deployment in support of Phase I European
    Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability occurred on March 7, of this
    year when the USS Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will
    spend this spring and summer helping to develop, test, and verify the
    command and control processes, data pathways, tactics, techniques, and
    procedures necessary for the Phase I capability to become operational
    later this year.
        This phase is also concurrent with efforts to enhance our
    capability for Homeland defense with early warning radar upgrades,
    adding more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, and developing
    improved GBIs. In the instance of the European PAA the radar tracks
    from the AN/TPY-2 in Southern Europe will be provided to NATO for
    defense of the territory and populations of the European members of the
    Alliance, and will be used by the United States to provide early
    tracking information to enhance our Homeland defense assets. This
    linkage enables very efficient management of radar data and missile
    engagements. C2BMC will ensure threats are detected, tracked, and
    efficiently engaged. It will both prevent inadvertent
    ``overengagement'' where too many shots are taken at an incoming
    threat; and the worse alternative, ``underengagement'' where no shots
    are taken, because each shooter is operating independently. The
    operational bottom line on Phase I is that it gets us greater ability
    to engage the SRBM and MRBM threats, and just as important, it begins
    fielding a netted sensor and weapons infrastructure.
         european paa phase ii (2015) enhanced mrbm defense in europe
        Phase II of the European PAA further embodies operational
    innovation. From a developmental point of view, the introduction of
    Aegis with SM-3 IB interceptors and AN/TPY-2 radars gives us expanded
    capability against MRBMs. We also significantly increase the size of
    area that can be defended. The true operational innovation in this
    phase comes from the increasing use of integrated and networked systems
    and the concept of placing SM-3 on land in Romania as a part of Aegis
    Ashore.
        Aegis Ashore is a shift away from forward based GBIs in fixed
    launch sites, to a relocatable land-based Aegis radar with land-based
    SM-3 IB interceptors. This approach provides all the engagement range
    and capability of an Aegis ship but without the requirement to keep a
    ship in a fixed location for extended periods of time, nor the cost of
    maintaining the rest of the multi-mission capability of an Aegis
    warship. Operationally this allows a combatant commander to provide
    long-term coverage for his assets or allies, establish a presence, and
    have a visible deterrent in theater. Similarly, a land-based SM-3
    system can be augmented with Aegis warships and other BMDS assets to
    provide a very robust defense if the situation warrants. This is a very
    operationally responsive concept for the combatant commanders.
        A more significant development beyond deployment of a new weapon
    system is the operational leverage gained from the improvements in the
    SM-3 Block IB interceptor. The SM-3 IB seeker's discrimination
    capability improves its performance during intercepts. The SM-3 IB will
    be deployed with Aegis Ashore and Aegis ships at sea. Because the
    missile seeker has been improved, both Aegis at sea and on land will be
    able to launch on remote sensor data (for example, using data from one
    of the land based radars). The operational impact of this concept is
    not obvious until you understand that the SM-3 missile has a fly-out
    range that goes well beyond where the Aegis radar can detect. The
    establishment of networks combined with the ability to use remote
    sensor data enables a combatant commander to take full advantage of the
    SM-3 range and reach out to extremely long ranges to engage targets.
    Operationally, this equates to a much larger defended area and a
    greater number of defended assets with the same force structure. The
    ability to use multiple weapons systems, and particularly systems that
    are not in the immediate area, does several things. First, it prevents
    an enemy from being able to tell which assets are being defended.
    Second, it makes it impossible to determine ahead of time which
    defensive systems have a shot at an incoming missile. Lastly, it
    prevents an adversary from being able to take down our defenses by
    targeting a single node. I would summarize Phase II as the transition
    phase where we move from classic concepts of single asset employment to
    a modern networked concept.
      european paa phase iii (2018) enhanced irbm defense in europe and
               phase iv (2020) early intercept defense in europe
        European PAA Phases III and IV add significant operational
    capability and continue to leverage and build on the netted
    infrastructure of the earlier phases. The key capability in Phase III
    is the addition of the SM-3 IIA, to be deployed in Poland, which will
    expand the defended area against MRBMs and Intermediate Range Ballistic
    Missiles (IRBMs). SM-3 IIA will be fielded with both Aegis ships and
    land-based SM-3 systems. Phase IV adds SM-3 IIB to our Aegis Ashore
    sites which will be capable of engaging potential future ICBMs from
    today's regional ballistic missile threats. This is the first
    capability beyond GBIs to defend against ICBMs, and provides enhanced
    defense of the Homeland. The SM-3 IIB also adds the ability to
    intercept MRBMs and IRBMs earlier in their flights which allows the
    warfighter to thin out large raid sizes, and suppress the use of
    countermeasures by engaging a missile before they are deployed. Phases
    III and IV will both continue the use of netted employment and its
    inherent advantages.
        At the completion of Phase IV, Commander EUCOM will have multiple
    defensive capabilities across the entire ballistic missile threat
    regime from SRBMs to ICBMs. It's worthwhile at this point to contrast
    the European PAA with the previous approach for defense of Europe to
    further illustrate the operational impact. Under the previous GBI
    approach we could defend portions of Europe, but the primary benefit
    was defense of the U.S. Homeland. Under EPAA we defend increasing areas
    of Europe, enhance defense of the Homeland, and develop capabilities
    that can be deployed worldwide. So operationally, PAA does much more
    than support a specific combatant commander, it provides capabilities
    that can be employed by every combatant commander. This is major step
    forward in protection for the United States and its allies and
    partners.
        Before I leave the operational discussion of the EPAA Phases, I
    wanted to reinforce the point that BMD, such as we embody in the EPAA,
    is not an isolated mission but part of a larger campaign against an
    adversary. Fundamentally, the BMDS is not, and cannot be, the sole
    method by which we defend ourselves against the threat or use of
    aggressor ballistic missiles. Many potential aggressors already have
    larger threat missile inventories than we have, or expect to have,
    numbers of interceptor missiles. BMDs can prevent an adversary from
    winning the fight with the first wave of the attack, limit damage to
    friendly forces and civilians, and provide time for our other elements
    of national and military power to be brought to bear to end the
    conflict. Further, the possession of a capable BMD such as provided by
    the EPAA, assists in deterring potential aggressors from the use of
    ballistic missiles, as they have to contemplate that they will not be
    successful in achieving their aims from the use of these weapons.
                      analysis supporting paa development
        The analytic efforts that JIAMDO leads are used to support
    operational planning by the warfighters, and support the resources and
    acquisition communities in research and development, production,
    budget, and programming decisions on missile defense. We have recently
    completed the base case of the JCM III to examine the implications and
    opportunities of the PAA as an element of our overall capability for
    BMD. The study has been reviewed by the Department; we are in the
    process of briefing the results to appropriate parties including this
    committee; and, we are continuing the analytic efforts of JCM III to
    examine a number of excursions and alternatives that we have developed.
    The study results cannot be discussed in this open forum, but I will
    discuss the process used at this point. I am prepared to discuss the
    classified results in a closed session following our time this
    afternoon, or at another time at the committee's convenience or that of
    some of the members.
        Building a BMD capability is a blend of determining what the right
    technology is, how many of each system is acquired, and how are the
    elements to be applied in different contexts of threat, geography, and
    international political and military environments of allies and
    partners. In operational terms this gets shortened to ``how much PAA do
    we need, and where?'' A simple phrase, but a very complex problem.
        We previously conducted JCM I in 2005-2006 and JCM II in 2007-2008.
    These focused on the number of interceptors that might be required
    under different scenarios against specific threats.
        There are three main differences between these earlier studies and
    JCM III:
        First, JCM III examined all the elements of the regional BMD
    system, including sensors systems, launcher systems, and interceptors,
    whereas the previous studies only looked at interceptors.
        Second, JCM III examined performance against threat ballistic
    missiles that employed a range of countermeasures; we had not done this
    previously.
        Third, JCM III has been a study of warfighting sufficiency rather
    than inventory acquisition objectives. We examined the ability of the
    application of PAA architectures in different AOR of the combatant
    commanders to determine how BMDS contributed to their overall plan to
    deter aggressors and, if necessary to end enemy ballistic missile
    attacks should they occur. We do not attempt to simply answer how much
    to buy; we give alternatives to the warfighter to best achieve his
    overall goals.
        I would also like to spend a couple of minutes discussing the study
    methodology. In order to determine force needs at this level of
    granularity, we had to take into account how the COCOMs intend to
    employ them, what the threats are, and generally how the threat will be
    expected to be employed. COCOMs provided operational employment
    information, to include asset laydowns and shot doctrine. For system
    performance, we went to the experts at MDA. The analysis was executed
    by JIAMDO in conjunction with representatives from CENTCOM, EUCOM,
    PACOM, STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, MDA, the Services, and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. The
    significant level of warfighter and developer involvement in the
    process is why we have such a high level of confidence in the results.
    The results have been briefed to the JROC, the Missile Defense
    Executive Board, and finally to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's
    Advisory Working Group. I have included a graphic on the Senior Review
    Group of the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use for our
    analysis.

          european phased adaptive approach and north atlantic treaty
                                  organization
        As I mentioned earlier, NATO has just taken the decision that BMD
    is `` . . . a core element of our collective defence.'' In both my role
    as the Director of JIAMDO, and as the U.S. head of delegation to the
    NADC, I have spent a significant amount of time discussing the EPAA
    with various allies and friends throughout Europe. The United States is
    not building a missile defense system in isolation. Our allies are
    appreciative of our efforts to include them in our discussions and
    explain our missile defense concepts and approaches. The EPAA concept
    and implementation provides the opportunity for allies and partners
    across the globe to participate with and alongside U.S. systems. Not
    only is this the right thing to do, it is a very effective and
    efficient approach to missile defense that allows all participants to
    leverage the investment the other nations are making. The recent MDA
    demonstration of C2BMC with NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
    Missile Defence is a premier example of the right approach to follow.
        Now that NATO has made the decision, the U.S. BMDS capabilities of
    the European PAA will constitute our national contribution to this
    mission. We will work closely within the Alliance to craft the
    appropriate command and control structure to provide for the effective
    defense of ourselves and our partners from ballistic missile threats in
    the region.
                                    summary
        The Department is investing a significant portion of its budget in
    missile defense and the PAA is providing the necessary framework to
    ensure it is invested effectively and wisely. The PAA is shaping the
    integration and networking of our systems across the COCOMs, Services,
    and allies which is the correct path to successful and effective
    missile defense. We have established a solid process and analytic
    approach to monitor and guide the implementation of the PAA and expect
    to develop and field the phases in the most operationally effective and
    cost efficient manner possible.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
    answering your questions.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
        Ms. Chaplain.

     STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
         SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and
    members of the subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to
    discuss accountability and transparency for the BMDS. As you
    noted earlier, the BMDS is DOD's largest single acquisition
    program. It is also likely the most challenging, not only
    because of the inherent technical challenges involved with the
    missile defense mission, but because of the wide range of
    assets involved, the global nature of the system, and the need
    for a high degree of integration and jointness.
        While the inherent risks are substantial, intense early
    schedule pressures driven by presidential directive exacerbated
    acquisition risks, as they required MDA to take on a high
    degree of concurrency in development. That concurrency
    continues. More recently, budgetary pressures have further
    challenged MDA. A faster pace of acquisition and development
    activity often comes with a higher price tag. Yet, fiscal
    conditions require DOD to reexamine all of its programs with an
    eye toward achieving greater cost efficiencies and savings.
        Taken together, these conditions create a high risk
    environment for the MDA and thus call attention to the need for
    strong oversight, accountability, and transparency. Yet, the
    flexibilities given to MDA in order to field initial capability
    quickly have made accountability and transparency elusive. Our
    testimony and report detail the differences between the BMDS
    and DOD's largest acquisition programs. I would just like to
    highlight a few.
        First, while other large programs have been required to
    create baselines and report variances once they enter into the
    engineering and manufacturing development cycle, until recently
    MDA has not been required to do so for pieces of the missile
    defense system.
        Second, while other programs must obtain approval of a
    higher level acquisition executive before making changes to
    their baselines, MDA does not. In fact, the Director of MDA
    serves as both approving acquisition executive and as the
    program manager.
        Third, while other programs must obtain independent life
    cycle cost estimates, MDA does not.
        Fourth, while other programs must complete initial
    operational test and evaluation before proceeding beyond low
    rate initial production, MDA does not.
        This broad flexibility enabled MDA to make decisions faster
    than other acquisition programs and to be more agile. But from
    an oversight and decisionmaking perspective, there were
    considerable disadvantages. The lack of baselines for BMDS
    along with high levels of uncertainty about requirements and
    program cost estimates effectively set the missile defense
    program on a path to an undefined destination at an unknown
    cost.
        I'm pleased to report, however, that the MDA has recently
    made significant strides in increasing transparency and
    accountability. Specifically, in the last year MDA established
    resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and
    contract baselines for several BMDS components. MDA also
    identified three phases where baselines are approved to help
    ensure the appropriate level of knowledge is obtained before
    acquisitions move from one phase to the next.
        In addition, MDA implemented a process under which product
    development and initial production baselines can be jointly
    reviewed by MDA and the military Service senior leaders, as a
    number of missile defense systems are expected to eventually
    transition to the Services for operation. These improvements
    were made subsequent to recent improvements to test planning to
    better link testing to models and simulations needed to assess
    performance and to extend test planning into the future.
        Given the breadth, scope, and complexity of the systems
    involved in the missile defense mission and the wide range of
    stakeholders and gaps in past data, these improvements were not
    easy achievements. Significant progress has been made.
    Nevertheless, there is still much work ahead to ensure
    oversight and management data is clear, complete, accurate, and
    reliable. My statement and our report detail improvements that
    are needed, particularly in the areas of cost reporting and
    testing.
        Moreover, improvements to oversight reporting should be
    complemented by other actions, including stabilizing the
    approach to acquisition efforts, improving transparency and
    accountability for the EPAA, and lastly embracing knowledge-
    based acquisition practices that ensure programs complete
    developmental activities before proceeding in production, that
    test plans are stabilized and adequately reported, and that
    targets used for testing are reliable, available, and
    affordable.
        This concludes my statement and I'm happy to answer any
    questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Cristina Chaplain
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the transparency
    and accountability progress made by the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA). MDA has been charged with developing and
    fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), a system expected
    to be capable of defending the United States, deployed troops, friends,
    and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of
    flight. The BMDS is DOD's single largest acquisition program--spending
    between approximately $7 billion to $9.5 billion per year--to develop
    and field nine elements and supporting efforts. The system's
    architecture includes space-based and airborne sensors as well as
    ground- and sea-based radars; ground- and sea-based interceptor
    missiles; and a command and control, battle management, and
    communications system to provide the warfighter with the necessary
    communication links to the sensors and interceptor missiles.
        In fulfilling this charge, MDA began delivering an initial
    defensive capability in 2004. In meeting this challenge, MDA was
    afforded much more flexibility than DOD's other major weapons programs.
    However, this flexibility also introduced transparency and
    accountability challenges that persisted after the 2004 date for
    initial capability. Today, I will highlight significant progress that
    MDA has recently made to strengthen accountability and transparency and
    also the shortfalls that still need to be addressed in order to further
    strengthen MDA's oversight posture and ensure new capabilities are
    fiscally sustainable for the long term.
        Since 2002, the National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated
    that we prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost, schedule,
    testing, and performance progress.\1\ In March 2011, we issued our
    report covering MDA's progress toward achieving its goals during fiscal
    year 2010 as well as its efforts to improve transparency,
    accountability, and oversight.\2\ My statement today will focus on the
    issues covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit from
    March 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
    perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
    a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
    objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
    basis for our fmdings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    Additional information on our scope and methodology is available in the
    issued report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
    L. No. 107-107, Sec. 232(g) (2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 233
    (2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
    L. No. 109-163, Sec. 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, Sec. 224 (2006); and
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
    110-181, Sec. 225.
        \2\ GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency
    and Accountability, GA0-11-372 (Washington, DC: March 24, 2011).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     acquisition flexibility given to mda has downsides for oversight and
                                 accountability
        MDA is a unique agency with extraordinary acquisition flexibility
    and a challenging mission, however while that flexibility has helped it
    to rapidly field systems, it has also hampered oversight and
    accountability.
        Over the years, Congress has created a framework of laws that makes
    major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned
    outcomes and cost, gives decisionmakers a means to conduct oversight,
    and ensures some level of independent program review. Application of
    many of these laws is triggered by the phases of the Department of
    Defense's acquisition cycle, such as entry into engineering and
    manufacturing development. Specifically, major defense acquisition
    programs are generally required by law and policy to do the following:

             Document program parameters in an acquisition program
            baseline that, as implemented by DOD, has been approved by the
            Milestone Decision Authority, a higher-level DOD official prior
            to the program's entry into the engineering and manufacturing
            development phase.\3\ The baseline provides decisionmakers with
            the program's best estimate of the program's total cost for an
            increment of work, average unit costs for assets to be
            delivered, the date that an operational capability will be
            fielded, and the weapon's intended performance parameters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2435 requires an approved program baseline
    description for major defense acquisition programs before the program
    enters system development and demonstration, production and deployment,
    and full rate production. The system development phase of the DOD
    acquisition cycle is now known as the engineering and manufacturing
    development phase.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Once approved, measure the program against the
            baseline, which is the program's initial business case, or
            obtain the approval of a higher-level acquisition executive
            before making changes.
             Obtain an independent life-cycle cost estimate prior
            to beginning engineering and manufacturing development, and/or
            production and deployment.\4\ Independent life-cycle cost
            estimates provide confidence that a program is executable
            within estimated cost.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2434.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Regularly provide detailed program status information
            to Congress, including information on cost, in Selected
            Acquisition Reports.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2432.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Report certain increases in unit cost measured from
            the original or current program baseline.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433, also known as ``Nunn-McCurdy''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Covered major defense acquisition programs and
            subprograms are required to complete initial operation test and
            evaluation before proceeding beyond low-rate initial
            production.\7\ After testing is completed, the Director for
            Operational Test and Evaluation assesses whether the results of
            the test confirm that the system or components are effective
            and suitable for combat.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ 10 U.S.C Sec. 2399 requires completion of initial operational
    test and evaluation of a weapon system before a program can proceed
    beyond low-rate initial production. According to DOD policy, low-rate
    initial production is intended to result in completion of manufacturing
    development in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing
    capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide
    production or 1production-representative articles for initial
    operational test and evaluation, establish an initial production base
    for the system; and permit an orderly increase in the production rate
    for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon
    successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable)
    testing.

        When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional
    flexibility in setting requirements and managing the acquisition, in
    order that its BMDS be developed as a single program, using a
    capabilities-based, spiral upgrade approach to quickly deliver a set of
    integrated defensive capabilities. This decision deferred application
    of DOD acquisition policy to BMDS until a mature capability is ready to
    be handed over to a military service for production and operation.
    Because the BMDS program has not formally entered the DOD acquisition
    cycle, application of laws that are designed to facilitate oversight
    and accountability of DOD acquisition programs and that are triggered
    by phases of this cycle, such as the engineering and manufacturing
    development phase, has also effectively been deferred. This gives MDA
    unique latitude to manage the BMDS and it enabled MDA to begin
    delivering an initial defensive capability in 2004. However, the
    flexibility also came at the expense of transparency and
    accountability.
        Specifically, a BMDS cost, schedule, and performance baseline does
    not have to be established or approved by anyone outside MDA. Recent
    laws have created some baseline-related requirements for parts of the
    BMDS.\8\ In addition, while most major defense acquisition programs are
    required by statute to obtain an independent verification of cost
    estimates, MDA has only recently developed cost estimates for selected
    assets and plans to work with the DOD Office of the Director for Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop independent cost estimates
    for more MDA elements. Further, assessments of a system's suitability
    and effectiveness in combat have only been accomplished, with
    limitations, for the currently deployed Aegis BMD weapon system. The
    limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily
    developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and
    accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness,
    suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments. MDA
    has agreed to conduct an operational flight test in 2012.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.
    L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223(g); Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, Sec. 225.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As we concluded in a prior report, having less transparency and
    accountability than is normally present in a major weapon program has
    had consequences.\9\ The lack of baselines for the BMDS along with high
    levels of uncertainty about requirements and program cost estimates
    effectively set the missile defense program on a path to an undefined
    destination at an unknown cost. Across the agency, these practices left
    programs with limited knowledge and few opportunities for crucial
    management oversight and decisionmaking concerning the agency's
    investment and the warfighter's continuing needs. At the program level,
    these practices contributed to quality problems affecting targets
    acquisitions, which in turn, hampered MDA's ability to conduct tests as
    planned.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides
    Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, GA0-10-311 (Washington,
    DC. Feb. 25, 2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          numerous strategy changes have exacerbated transparency and
                           accountability challenges
        MDA has employed at least three strategies to acquire and deploy
    missile defense systems, which has exacerbated transparency and
    accountability challenges. From its inception in 2002 through 2007, MDA
    developed missile defense capability in 2-year increments, known as
    blocks, each built on preceding blocks intended to enhance the
    development and capability of the BMDS. However, there was little
    visibility into baseline costs and schedules associated with the
    systems that comprised the blocks or how the blocks addressed
    particular threats.
        In response to our recommendations, in December 2007, MDA announced
    a new capabilities-based block structure intended to improve the
    program's transparency, accountability, and oversight. Instead of being
    based on 2-year time periods, the new blocks focused on fielding
    capabilities that addressed particular threats. Because the new block
    structure was not aligned to regular time periods, multiple blocks were
    under way concurrently. This approach included several positive
    changes, including a DOD commitment to establish total acquisition
    costs and unit costs for selected block assets, including only those
    elements or components of elements in a block that would be fielded
    during the block and abandoning deferrals of work from one block to
    another.
        MDA was still transitioning to this new capabilities-based block
    approach when the Director, MDA terminated it in June 2009. According
    to MDA, this was done in order to address congressional concerns
    regarding how to structure MDA's budget justification materials. This
    termination marked the third acquisition management strategy for the
    BMDS in the prior 3 years and effectively reduceo transparency and
    accountability for the agency. The agency then began to manage BMDS as
    a single integrated program but planned to report on cost, schedule,
    and performance issues by each element within the program.
        Changing the acquisition strategy is problematic because each time
    it is changed, the connection is obscured between the old strategies'
    scope and resources and the new strategy's rearranged scope and
    resources. This makes it difficult for decisionmakers to hold MDA
    accountable for expected outcomes and clouds transparency of the
    agency's efforts.
        We also reported in December 2010 that the adoption of the European
    Phase Adaptive Approach (PAA) for deploying missile defense assets has
    limitations in transparency and accountability.\10\ Specifically, we
    reported that DOD made progress in acquisition planning for technology
    development and systems engineering and testing and partial progress in
    defming requirements and identifying stakeholders but had not yet
    developed a European PAA acquisition decision schedule or an overall
    European PAA investment cost. We found that the limited visibility into
    the costs and schedule for the European PAA and the lack of some key
    acquisition management processes reflect the oversight challenges with
    the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously
    reported. We concluded that for the European PAA, the flexibility
    desired by DOD is not incompatible with appropriate visibility into key
    aspects of acquisition management. Moreover, as DOD proceeds with the
    European PAA acquisition activities, it is important for Congress and
    the President to have assurance that the European PAA policy is working
    as intended and that acquisition activities are cost-effective. We made
    recommendations also in January 2011 regarding the development of life-
    cycle cost estimates and an integrated schedule for the acquisition,
    infrastructure, and personnel activities to help identify European PAA
    implementation risks.\11\ DOD partially concurred with the first
    recommendation and fully concurred with the second.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ GAO, Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach
    Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability
    Challenges, GAO-11-179R (Washington, DC: Dec. 21, 2010).
        \11\ GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning
    and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, GA0-
    11-220 (Washington, DC: Jan. 26, 2011).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        prior gao recommendations and congressional actions to improve
                        transparency and accountability
        Congress has taken action to address concerns regarding the
    acquisition management strategy, accountability, and oversight of MDA.
    For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2008, Congress required MDA to establish acquisition cost, schedule,
    and performance baselines for each system element that has entered the
    equivalent of the engineering and manufacturing development phase of
    acquisition or is being produced or acquired for operational
    fielding.\12\ Most recently, the Ike Skelton National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the Secretary of
    Defense to ensure that MDA establishes and maintains an acquisition
    baseline for each program element of the BMDS.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Pub. L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223(g).
        \13\ Pub. L. No. 111-383, Sec. 225.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since our first MDA report in 2004, we have made a series of
    recommendations to improve transparency and accountability, many of
    which are designed to adapt the key transparency and accountability
    features already embedded in the DOD acquisition regulation and apply
    them to MDA. Some of our key recommendations include:

             Establishing and reporting to Congress costs and unit
            costs, including development costs in unit costs, including
            sunk costs in cost estimates, reporting top-level test goals,
            obtaining independent cost estimates and taking steps to ensure
            the underlying cost estimates are high quality, reliable, and
            documented reporting variances.
             Improving transparency by requesting and using
            procurement funds instead of research, development, testing and
            evaluation funds to acquire fielded assets.
             Strengthening the test program by establishing
            baselines for each new class of target in development,
            including sufficient schedule and resource margin, including
            spare test assets and targets, and strengthening the role of
            the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing
            missile defense progress.
             Implementing a knowledge-based acquisition strategy
            \14\ consistent with DOD acquisition regulations, and ensure
            that items are not manufactured for fielding before their
            performance has been validated through testing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process
    in which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before
    proceeding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     mda has recently made significant progress in increasing transparency
                               and accountability
        DOD has committed to take action on many of these recommendations.
    While agreeing with our recommendations to enhance baseline reporting,
    there are differences in MDA's perspectives on such issues as sunk
    costs and changes in unit cost.
        In 2010, MDA made significant progress in implementing some of
    these recommendations by fmalizing a new baseline phase review process
    in which the agency set detailed baselines for several BMDS elements,
    or portions of elements, for the first time. Specifically, MDA
    established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical,
    and contract baselines for several BMDS components. It reported these
    to Congress in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report.
        MDA also identified three phases of development where baselines are
    approved-technology development, product development, and initial
    production phases-and specified the key knowledge that is needed at
    each phase. MDA officials stated that they expect that aligning the
    development efforts with the phases will help to ensure that the
    appropriate level of knowledge is obtained before the acquisitions move
    from one phase to the next.
        In another key step, approval of the product development and
    initial production baselines will be jointly reviewed by the Director
    of MDA and the respective service acquisition executive, as a number of
    missile defense systems are expected to eventually transition to the
    military services for operation. In addition, in regard to these new
    phases, the agency established a process for approving baselines. As a
    result of MDA's new baseline phase review process, its 2010 BMDS
    Accountability Report is more comprehensive than its 2009 report.
        MDA also undertook a new approach to testing in recent years to
    address our prior findings. In March 2009, we reported that MDA's
    Integrated Master Test Plan--its test baseline--was not effective for
    management and oversight because it was revised frequently, only
    extended through the following fiscal year and was not well integrated
    with other key aspects of testing such as target acquisitions.\15\ In
    addition, the BMDS Operational Test Agency identified several
    limitations in the previous BMDS test program, including unaccredited
    models and simulations, flight test artificialities, and inadequate
    modeling of some environmental conditions.. Congress also expressed
    concern with MDA's test approach. For example, in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 conference report, conferees
    noted that MDA failed to ensure an adequate testing program and that
    its test and targets program needed to be managed in a way that fully
    supported high-priority near-term programs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
    Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
    Planned, GA0-09-338 (Washington, DC: March 13, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We reported last year that MDA extensively revised the test plan to
    address these concerns.\16\ MDA's new approach now bases test scenarios
    on modeling and simulation needs and extends the test baseline to cover
    the Future Years Defense Program which allows for better estimation of
    target needs, range requirements, and test assets. Also, as part of its
    new test plan, MDA scheduled dedicated periods of developmental and
    operational testing, during which the system configuration will remain
    fixed to allow the warfighter to carry out training, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures for developmental and operational
    evaluation. Additionally, the new test plan is expected to provide
    sufficient time after test events to conduct a full post-test analysis.
    As we reported last year, these improvements are important because BMDS
    performance cannot be fully assessed until models and simulations are
    accredited and validated and the test program cannot be executed
    without meeting its target needs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ GA0-10-311.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These steps represent significant progress in providing a better
    foundation for managing and overseeing the missile defense system.
    Given the breadth, scope, and complexities of systems involved in the
    missile defense mission and the wide range of stakeholders and gaps in
    past data, these were not easy achievements. Nevertheless, there is a
    significant amount of work ahead to ensure oversight and management
    data is clear, complete, accurate, and reliable. Specifically:

             We found that the cost baselines that have been
            established are not clear, consistent and complete nor are they
            based on high quality estimates and therefore we remain unable
            to assess cost progress for the 8th year until MDA develops
            high-quality, reliable cost estimates. For example, we found
            that the unit cost baselines and the baselines for portions of
            and sometimes all the life cycle costs reported to Congress did
            not provide clear, consistent, and complete information. We
            also assessed the 12 life cycle cost estimates that were the
            basis for these baselines and found that half did not support
            the baselines and the other half were insufficient to be
            considered high-quality, reliable cost estimates.
             Our assessment of the schedule baselines determined
            that we could not compare the asset delivery schedule to the
            prior year's baseline because MDA has stopped reporting a
            comprehensive list of planned asset deliveries.
             Finally, we found the test baseline to be well
            documented. However, because it is success oriented, any
            problems encountered in executing the plan can cause ripple
            effects throughout remaining test events. The frequent changes
            that continue to occur undermine the value of the test baseline
            as an oversight tool.
      rapid pace of fielding assets makes transparency and accountability
                              even more important
        Over the past 10 years, we have conducted extensive research on
    successful programs and have found that successful defense programs
    ensure that their acquisitions begin with realistic plans and baselines
    prior to the start of development. We have previously reported that the
    key cause of poor weapon system outcomes, at the program level, is the
    consistent lack of disciplined analysis that would provide an
    understanding of what it would take to field a weapon system before
    system development begins. We have reported that there is a clear set
    of prerequisites that must be met by each program's acquisition
    strategy to realize successful outcomes. These prerequisites include
    establishing a clear, knowledge-based, executable business case for the
    product. An executable business case is one that provides demonstrated
    evidence that: (1) the identified needs are real and necessary and can
    best be met with the chosen concept; and (2) the chosen concept can be
    developed and produced within existing resources--including
    technologies, funding, time, and management capacity. Knowledge-based
    acquisition principles and business cases combined are necessary to
    establish realistic cost, schedule and performance baselines. Without
    documented realistic baselines there is no foundation to accurately
    measure program progress. Our work has shown that when agencies do not
    follow a knowledge-based approach to acquisition, high levels of
    uncertainty about requirements, technologies, and design often exist at
    the start of development programs. As a result, cost estimates and
    related funding needs are often understated.
        MDA has begun to institute some key aspects of a knowledge-based
    approach to acquisition as we noted. Moreover, in its Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review, DOD emphasized that it is no longer necessary to pursue
    a high-risk acquisition strategy that simultaneously develops and
    deploys new systems. However, we continue to identify and report on
    areas of high levels of acquisition risk associated with the rapid pace
    of fielding assets. We see this effect most pronounced in three key
    areas--testing, the Aegis Ashore program and the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) program.

             Testing and Targets: As in previous years, failures
            and delays in testing have continued to delay the validation of
            models and simulations used to assess BMDS performance. Target
            availability was a significant, though not the only, driver to
            the test plan delays. Since 2006, we have reported that target
            availability has delayed and prompted modifications to planned
            test objectives. This trend continued in 2010. We reported this
            year that five tests scheduled for fiscal year 2010 were
            canceled because of a moratorium on air launches of targets.
            The moratorium was imposed following the failure of an air
            launched target participating in MDA's December 2009 Theater
            High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) flight test. A failure
            review board investigation identified the rigging of cables to
            the missile in the aircraft as the immediate cause of the
            failure and shortcomings in internal processes at the
            contractor as the underlying cause. Additionally, target
            shortfalls contributed to delays in flight tests, reduced the
            number of flight tests, and altered flight test objectives.
              Another area of risk related to targets identified in this
            year's report is MDA's extended use of an undefmitized contract
            action to acquire targets from its incumbent prime targets
            contractor.\17\ This action, signed in April 2010, asked the
            prime contractor to build a new type of medium-range air-
            launched target. The contract action initially included three
            targets; the quantity was then increased to five targets in
            September 2010. The current ``not-to-exceed'' level for the
            contract action is $496 million. MDA has allowed this
            undefinitized contract action to continue for an extended
            period. According to MDA officials, the delay in defmitization
            is due to changes in its requirements for the targets, and they
            anticipate definitization in July 2011, by which time the
            contract action will have remained undefinitized for about 450
            days. MDA officials stated that this new acquisition was to
            obtain a second procurement source for air-launched targets
            following the December 2009 THAAD flight test failure. The
            extended use of undefinitized contract actions has previously
            been identified by GAO and others as risky to the government.
            Because contracting officers normally reimburse contractors for
            all allowable costs they incur before definitization,
            contractors bear less risk and have little incentive to control
            costs during this period. The government also risks incurring
            unnecessary costs as requirements may change before the
            contract is definitized.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ To meet urgent needs, DOD can issue undefinitized contract
    actions, which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a
    final agreement on contract terms. Undefinitized contract action means
    any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or
    price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action.
    Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
    217.7401(d).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Aegis Ashore: Aegis Ashore is MDA's future land-based
            variant of the ship-based Aegis BMD. It is expected to track
            and intercept ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase of
            flight using Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor variants as
            they become available. However, while Aegis BMD has
            demonstrated performance at sea, these demonstrations used the
            currently fielded 3.6.1 version of Aegis BMD with the SM-3 IA
            interceptor, not the newer variant of the Aegis operating
            system and new interceptor that Aegis Ashore will use. Aegis
            Ashore is dependent on next-generation versions of Aegis
            systems--Aegis 4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0--as well as the new SM-3 IB
            interceptor, all of which are currently under development.
            Moreover, a series of changes are required to further modify
            these new variants of Aegis BMD for use on land with Aegis
            Ashore. These modifications include changes to the Vertical
            Launching System; suppression or disabling of certain features
            used at sea; design, integration, and fabrication of a new
            deckhouse enclosure for the radar, and potential changes to the
            SM-3 IB interceptor. Changes to those existing Aegis BMD
            components that will be reused for Aegis Ashore may reduce
            their maturity in the context of the new Aegis Ashore program,
            and new features will require testing and assessment to
            demonstrate their performance. MDA plans to make production
            decisions for the first operational Aegis Ashore before
            conducting both ground and flight tests. We concluded in this
            year's report that it is a highly concurrent effort, with
            significant cost, schedule, and performance risk.
             Ground-based Midcourse Defense: GMD is a ground-based
            defense system designed to provide combatant commanders the
            capability to defend the homeland against a limited attack from
            intermediate, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
            during the midcourse phase of flight. The GMD consists of a
            ground-based interceptor--a booster with an Exoatmospheric Kill
            Vehicle on top--and a fire control system that receives target
            information from sensors in order to formulate a battle plan.
            GMD continues to deliver assets before testing has fully
            determined their capabilities and limitations. The Director,
            MDA testified on March 31, 2011 that he considers the GMD
            interceptors essentially prototypes. In the urgency to deploy
            assets to meet the Presidential directive to field an initial
            capability by 2004, assets were built and deployed before
            developmental testing was completed. During the ongoing
            developmental testing, issues were found that led to a need for
            retrofits. GMD intercept tests conducted to date have already
            led to major hardware or software changes to the interceptors--
            not all of which have been verified through flight testing. In
            addition, manufacturing of a new variant called the Capability
            Enhancement II is well underway and more than half of those
            variants have already been delivered although their capability
            has not been validated through developmental flight tests. To
            date, the two flight tests utilizing this variant have both
            failed to intercept the target. According to MDA, as a result
            of the most recent failure in December 2010, deliveries of this
            variant have been halted. Again, because of the urgency to
            deploy some capability, limited work was undertaken on long-
            term sustainment for the system which is critical to ensure the
            system remains effective through 2032. In September 2010, MDA
            finalized the GMD Stockpile Reliability Program Plan, a key
            step in developing the knowledge needed to determine the
            sustainment needs of the GMD system.
                            concluding observations
        This year MDA has made significant strides in providing a better
    foundation for Congress and others to assess progress and hold senior
    leadership accountable for outcomes. Undoubtable progress has been made
    in terms of implementing new acquisition reviews and reporting detailed
    baselines, but critical gaps remain in the material reported,
    particularly the quality of the underlying cost estimates needed to
    establish baselines. We look forward to continuing to work with DOD and
    MDA in addressing these gaps and further strengthening the
    underpinnings for sound oversight. Moreover, as we have recommended
    previously, improvements to oversight reporting should be complemented
    by knowledge-based acquisition approaches that ensure programs complete
    developmental activities before proceeding into production; that test
    plans are stabilized and adequately resourced; and that targets used
    for testing are reliable, available, and affordable. Given the breadth
    and scope of the European Phased Adaptive Approach it is also important
    that Congress have assurance that this policy is working as intended
    and is cost-effective.
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
    respond to any questions you may have at this time.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        I guess now I get to ask a question. General O'Reilly, as I
    was starting to say, and I think you began to address it, being
    more than halfway through fiscal year 2011 and DOD still
    operating under a continuing resolution at fiscal year 2010
    funding levels, can you tell us what the impacts on your
    missile defense program has been on operating under the
    continuing resolution (CR), and will you be able to mitigate
    some of those impacts if Congress passes a year-long funding
    resolution with most of the fiscal year 2011 defense
    appropriation levels soon?
        General O'Reilly. Thank you, sir. The impact of the CR,
    series of CRs, for 2011 on the MDA's program has been
    significant. One area, for example, is the GMD system, which
    the President had requested a $324 million increase in fiscal
    year 2011 over fiscal year 2010, so we're still operating at
    the fiscal year 2010 position. That is significant when it
    comes to construction, for example, of the GMD system in
    Alaska. We're approaching the construction season, where most
    of the work is done, and if we were not able to get a budget
    this week I would be in a significantly diminished position in
    order to hire the construction crews on time and we could
    perhaps lose most of the year's construction.
        The mitigation to that is, if it does look like and if we
    do receive a budget for fiscal year 2011 I will be able to
    accomplish about 80 percent of the construction I was
    intending. But I must tell you that across our programs the CRs
    have prevented us from starting new starts for fiscal year
    2011, such as our satellite programs that were to support EPAA,
    and they have caused a tremendous inefficiency in allowing
    contracts to only move forward, very large contracts, for
    several weeks at a time.
        So the combined impact is a significant inefficiency and a
    reduction in, now with this budget, how much I can accomplish
    over the remaining months of this fiscal year. I do believe I'm
    going to have to readjust what I intended to accomplish in
    fiscal year 2012 because the budget was received in April and
    before all of the funding will be received will be many weeks
    later than that.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        I see we're joined by the chairman of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee, Senator Levin. Senator Levin, would you
    have any comments you'd like to make?
        Chairman Levin. I would have questions later on, but
    Senator Shaheen was here first, so please go in the regular
    order. Thank you, though.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You all have alluded to the current budget situation that
    we're facing and clearly it's going to affect everyone across
    the board. As you look at the budget situation, can you talk
    about how you expect to be able to keep programs on track?
    Specifically--I guess this goes to you, General O'Reilly, and
    perhaps Dr. Roberts--can you talk about the balance between
    development and testing versus deployment and what potential
    risks there are if you misjudge on one side or the other?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, I will start first. As far as
    the budget impacts are, as I said, they're very significant
    across the board. In some cases where we've just lost at least
    half a year's worth of program and we will not--for example,
    the start of my satellite surveillance program, our new
    program--we will now be allowed our new start at the end of
    this week if we receive a budget, which is more than half a
    year. I don't believe we're going to be able to catch up on
    that time.
        So in some cases we can't. In other cases, with production
    lines and so forth, we will try to acquire larger lots of
    supplies and accelerate the production line on some of our
    interceptors. But again, I don't believe we're going to be able
    to mitigate the total impact of the CRs this year. So what we
    set out to accomplish in 2011, some of it's going to have to
    occur in 2012.
        As far as the balance between testing and development, we
    have taken a look several years ago at all of the data that was
    required for testing in order to do two things: one, to confirm
    for the operational test agencies, independently confirm, that
    missile defense systems are suitable and operationally
    deployable and effective. The second reason is to support the
    accreditation of our models and simulations. Our testing is so
    expensive--a typical GMD test can cost $300 million. So to
    fully test its full operational capability, especially against
    large raid sizes of missiles, it's critical that we have
    independent verification of our models and simulations which
    our combatant commanders will use.
        So we have set out and restructured our programs to ensure
    that every new deliverable product has gone through a testing
    regime sufficient for the operational test agencies to make an
    independent assessment, are they ready.
        The penalties we can see in the approach for GMD, for
    example: I can understand why we fielded GMD as quickly as we
    did, but we will still be testing some of the original
    fundamental operations of the system for many years. As we
    discover that we need to upgrade the system because of
    something we found in flight testing, we will go back and
    refurbish the missiles we have. So that's why we've started a
    stockpiling of missiles to do that. But that is much more
    expensive than to completely qualify, what we call, for
    production all of our systems on the ground before we go into
    flight testing.
        But I understand why we did it in GMD. We have a strategy
    to increase over time the reliability of the system through
    testing. But we will not approach that, nor have we, as a
    result of the BMDR for the rest of our systems.
        Senator Shaheen. So when you do those independent
    verifications of your models, since we're not actually testing
    in real time, do you have any evidence that there's ever a
    problem?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, there are two levels where we
    find problems, actually three. The first is in the component
    testing on the ground. To the greatest extent possible, we
    replicate the performance of the missile components on the
    ground as if they were flying. We do that hundreds of times. It
    occurs in very severe environments. That's our first confidence
    level that these components work right.
        In our latest GMD test, we did find we had a failure mode
    that could not be replicated on the Earth and that's why I am
    going to request an additional test to verify we fixed it. The
    Earth's gravitation is one problem with testing it on the
    ground, and literally the rotation of the Earth. These are very
    sensitive items and you must be in flight testing, and the
    frequencies and shocks that we can replicate on the ground are
    limited, even with our best capabilities, our best facilities.
        So one of the problems is until you're into flight testing
    you can't totally replicate on the ground. But you can do a
    lot.
        Second is to integrate the system in extensive ground
    testing. We do it in laboratories and then we repeat it
    actually in the field with the soldiers, sailors, and airmen
    operating the system, and we simulate threats on the system and
    we run those hundreds of times in order to gain a confidence
    level. But the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation--and
    each Service has its own independent operational test agency--
    makes the final assessment on my products, not the MDA, so that
    there's some independence.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        In competing for some of the scientists and engineers that
    we're going to need for the future to continue the work of the
    MDA and also for DOD, are you comfortable that the current
    budget actually supports our ability to recruit and train the
    scientists and engineers and mathematicians that we're going to
    need? I have an ulterior motive in asking this question because
    I think we're not doing enough to train the folks in the
    science, technology, engineering, and mathematics subjects that
    we're going to need for the future to continue to lead this
    country, and obviously in your agency there's a critical need
    for people with those degrees and training.
        General O'Reilly. Ma'am, I couldn't agree more. Senator,
    our issue with qualified young engineers and scientists has
    been increased or exacerbated by the 2005 Base Realignment and
    Closure Act. We moved our technical workforce from Washington,
    where I had over 3,000 engineers. I will now have 300 people
    here by the end of September. We moved those to Huntsville, AL,
    and Colorado Springs and Dahlgren, VA.
        The problem was the average age of my workforce was 49, so
    most of them were not willing to move. So I needed to hire over
    1,000 engineers. We went to the universities and there were two
    aspects that we observed. One, I think it takes personal
    engagement. I have personally engaged with universities, as
    well with the chairman, out on trips. We've gotten a tremendous
    response from that.
        Two is, unfortunately, the economy. For every engineering
    position I have had as we hire the college graduates, we have
    had between 18 to 26 highly qualified applicants for every
    position. So the MDA as a consequence, unintended, of the
    economy, we've received tremendously qualified applicants. The
    average person we receive has over a 3.8 average. 40 percent
    are master's degrees or Ph.Ds.
        But I do spend a lot of time in the universities, also with
    research. Key to this is investing in research with the faculty
    members so they in fact can talk to the students and the
    postdocs and they can see opportunities in government such as
    this.
        Finally, I have outreach to historically black colleges and
    universities because our agency had 12 percent minorities, but
    in the engineering field 2 years ago, .3 percent of our
    engineers were minorities. Today it's 4 percent. So it may not
    seem like a lot, but it took a significant amount of effort to
    reach that.
        So in all of those areas, Senator, I couldn't agree more.
    The young folks really respond to personal energy and personal
    appearances and that's what I have been pursuing.
        Senator Shaheen. I'm out of time, but how many women?
        General O'Reilly. In some universities over 70 percent of
    the engineering students are women, and that's reflected today.
    In the group that we have hired since I first mentioned, over
    40, I believe it's 42 or 44 percent are women engineers. So we
    previously had less than 10 percent--significant growth in that
    area, too.
        Senator Shaheen. So what's the final number? Where are you
    at today?
        General O'Reilly. We have hired 380 new college graduates
    in the last 2 years. What I'm trying to do is prevent a
    demographic bump again in my organization. So we hire 100 at
    the end of every semester, to smooth out the demographics.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go over.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General O'Reilly, as I mentioned in the opening statement,
    after two recent test failures it's clear that GMD is in need
    of some additional resources. More I think is needed to ensure
    the capability that we have works to the advanced degree that
    you'd like it to operate at.
        I would first note--see if I'm correct--that the initial
    guidance system's kill vehicles have performed ably and I
    believe 20 of those are in the ground today and you believe are
    capable of defeating the kind of incoming missiles likely to be
    received from an Iran or North Korea; is that correct at this
    point in time?
        General O'Reilly. I can't get into the actual number of
    that configuration, but our original configuration, yes, sir,
    we have had five flight tests and three intercepts out of three
    attempts and have found no indication of the type of problem we
    found in the newest version, where we have failed twice.
        Senator Sessions. The new version was designed to be even
    more sophisticated to deal with more sophisticated threats; is
    that correct?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. It had more accurate guidance
    instrumentation on board.
        Senator Sessions. So it's going to take some effort to get
    that under control. I think you've indicated you need more
    interceptors to facilitate the kind of realistic testing that
    you believe is necessary. Is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Before the first generation of
    GBI, we flew a test where we did not have an intercept, and I'm
    asking for another test in order to verify that we've resolved
    the problems on this latest interceptor version.
        Senator Sessions. Could you give an estimate of what that
    test might cost, say one test?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, since it does not involve a target,
    the cost would be primarily of the interceptor, which would be
    around $70 million, and then an additional $30 to $40 million
    of support for that test. So it's approximately $100 million
    for that test.
        I have also, sir, determined that we're going to need
    significant ground testing of at least $50 to $100 million more
    on the ground, again to verify that we have absolutely resolved
    this problem.
        Senator Sessions. We've had such a long and basically
    successful effort to establish the capability to defend the
    United States against a missile attack, we don't need to stop,
    allow our adversaries to develop more sophisticated missiles,
    and then all of our efforts have been not productive.
        So you would say that it does make sense that we continue
    to develop the more sophisticated capabilities that the threats
    may pose to us in the years to come?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. I would agree with, for example
    as Admiral Winnefeld said, to stay ahead of the threat.
        Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts indicated that the threat is
    qualitatively and quantitatively advancing, I believe.
        Now, with regard to this money that's going to be needed,
    maybe $250 million you just referred to, where do you plan to
    get that and how can you obtain that?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, for this year I've had to stop the
    production of seven GBIs in production because we don't want to
    go forward until we've absolutely assured we've identified and
    resolved this design issue that's caused the most recent
    failure. So I am proposing to divert the funding that we would
    have had to build those seven interceptors and to do more
    refurbishments and to support this ground testing, than we had
    originally planned.
        Senator Sessions. So that looks to me like you're robbing
    Peter to pay Paul, and it raises the fundamental question, of
    does this budget give you enough money to keep the program on
    track and actually fix the failures. I know that you have
    difficulties. All of us in Congress, the White House, and the
    Secretary of Defense are saying watch spending, try to contain
    spending, and we all believe in that, trust me.
        However, when we've done this much work and we're down to
    maybe $40 billion more has been spent on this project and we've
    hit a difficulty, we need to be able to go forward with it and
    we don't need to stop short of the number of interceptors we
    need in the ground and prepared.
        So I guess my question is, in your personal professional
    opinion--and we ask you for that--do you have enough money to
    keep this program on track and to fix the challenges from the
    GMD system?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, for fiscal year 2011 and for fiscal
    year 2012, because I have had to stop the production of the
    current GBIs and I am diverting that funding to fixing this
    problem and I'm using funding that was reserved for a flight
    test next year of the two-stage interceptor, which will have to
    move another year----
        Senator Sessions. That will push the two-stage interceptor
    back.
        General O'Reilly. Sir, without additional funding in fiscal
    year 2013 and beyond, there will need to be a delay of about a
    year of our overall flight test program that we were trying to
    complete by 2017. So that's one way to do it.
        Right now, sir, I have the funding I need to address this
    problem because I've stopped my production line.
        Senator Sessions. That has costs and ramifications also.
        So I guess what I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that the DOD
    budget is tight. Just looking at the basic numbers on the MDA
    budget, DOD gets an increase as requested by the President, I
    think, in the House. But you have a reduction of, I estimate,
    about 5 percent in MDA's budget request; is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, for fiscal year 2012 it's $48
    million higher than fiscal year 2011, and fiscal year 2011 was
    $324 million higher than fiscal year 2012. So for this budget
    it's actually higher than last year.
        Chairman Levin. You mean fiscal year 2010?
        General O'Reilly. I'm sorry. I meant 2010. Fiscal year 2010
    to fiscal year 2011 was $324 million higher than fiscal year
    2010.
        Senator Sessions. I think we should take a note here how
    alert the chairman is over here.
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I apologize.
        Senator Sessions. Somebody is watching the store. You get
    an A, Mr. Chairman. I'm asking the questions. I wasn't
    following that--I wasn't that quick.
        Chairman Levin. I didn't mean to interrupt.
        Senator Sessions. No, you do a fabulous job of keeping up
    with things.
        General O'Reilly. Sir, I do believe in the near term, for
    fiscal year 2011 and 2012, however, as I've said before----
        Senator Sessions. Next year you begin to bite. 2013, the
    budget is less than originally projected, is it not, the 5-
    year?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Across the following 5 years,
    two things. First, we're finishing the heavy construction over
    fiscal year 2012. So the remainder of the work is focused on
    interceptors, flight testing, and upgrades. So that accounts
    for about half of it.
        The other half is the efficiencies we're approving, sir. We
    have not reduced what we intended to accomplish, even though
    there's $2.4 billion less in the MDA budget. We have identified
    all of the steps we're taking so they can be accounted for and
    it will be evident we're either achieving it or we're not,
    these efficiencies, for the same amount.
        Senator Sessions. Excuse me. You just noted, though, that
    you're delaying the two-stage testing and you're stopping the
    production of your interceptors. Both of those will add costs
    to the future.
        We can talk more about where we are financially. I applaud
    you for the efficiencies that you've found, but I think there's
    no doubt, with the unfortunate failures of these tests, that
    it's going to hit our budget more than we expected, and we
    really need to see what we can do to keep your already-reduced
    plans from putting us in a situation we don't want to be in.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You say you stopped the production of the interceptors. I
    thought it was the kill vehicles which you've stopped
    production on.
        General O'Reilly. Sir, it is the kill vehicles. I can't
    deliver the interceptor without the kill vehicles.
        Chairman Levin. No, that's fine. But you said the
    production of the interceptors and I think you meant kill
    vehicles; is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. That part of the interceptor, yes, sir,
    the kill vehicles.
        Chairman Levin. On the funding issue, you're stopping
    production not to save money, but because you want to do
    testing first to make sure that what you produce will work; is
    that fair?
        General O'Reilly. That's absolutely the case, sir. We did
    not anticipate this failure, and especially when it happened
    when the budget was already developed. So that was not to save
    any money. It is solely driven by we need to confirm the design
    works before we go back into production.
        Chairman Levin. I totally agree with that philosophy,
    because I think you should know whether something works before
    it's produced and deployed, and there's been too many times
    where we've deviated from that course in the past, particularly
    in missile defense, for my comfort level.
        But you're satisfied. Let me ask the other witnesses too.
    Do you all agree that it makes sense to not produce further
    kill vehicles until we have corrected the problem, so that when
    we do produce them we know that they're going to properly
    behave? Admiral, would you agree with that?
        Admiral Macy. Absolutely, sir. It was one of the basic
    results of the BMDR that we would, if you will, fly before we
    buy. We would ensure that to the best of our ability within
    costs of testing and modeling and simulation that we would
    understand the performance of the systems. So when they are
    fielded, from my perspective representing the warfighter, I
    have confidence in their level of performance. So that I can
    build my operational plans to meet the need.
        Chairman Levin. Dr. Roberts, do you have any difference
    with that?
        Dr. Roberts. Ditto.
        Chairman Levin. Now, General, last year I believe you
    displayed some frustration with the quality of some
    contractors' work, and you and I discussed the need to improve
    the MDA contracts to try to get more protection for the
    government against defects, which would require some defects
    clauses in the contracts.
        Have you made any progress towards including defects
    clauses in the contracts?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, we've worked with industry to get
    their feedback. I've worked with the leaders, the chief
    executive officers, of the major aerospace corporations and
    asked them for their ideas and help on this, so that it is most
    effective, these clauses.
        The clause that we're looking at is not to indemnify
    industry from trying to achieve an unprecedented technical
    goal. That is the reason why we have cost-plus contracts.
    Unfortunately, when we find a failure mode that was caused by a
    quality, what we refer to as a quality escape--they didn't
    follow their own processes, their supervisors didn't catch it,
    and ultimately it caused a defective product--that's also today
    under our contracts protected by a cost-plus contract. It's the
    cost just went up.
        An example is the first of the two GMD failures was caused
    because of a quality problem, and no matter how much additional
    money we added that wouldn't have resolved the root cause of
    that problem.
        So where I am today is looking at the fee and looking at
    the profit that we're providing contractors and having the
    ability to go beyond the limited scope that we currently have
    in our award fees for quality control and extending it to a
    much greater pool of award fee money, even past-awarded money,
    so that the government can be compensated for egregious errors
    in quality control.
        Chairman Levin. I hope you'll pursue that. As I understand
    it from our conversations, that first flight failure was due to
    a lock wire, if I have the right word, not being in place; is
    that accurate?
        General O'Reilly. That is accurate, sir.
        Chairman Levin. It was not where it was supposed to be?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, that is not something that the
    government should be losing money over as far as I'm concerned.
    I agree with you that you want the industry to be creative and
    if things fail because there's design problems and because
    we're taking risks, that's fine. That's what research is all
    about. But if you have a plan that says the lock wire, whatever
    that is, has to be here and instead it was put over here and we
    have a missile test failure because of that, that's a totally
    different deal as far as I'm concerned.
        There is a role for cost-plus. We use it much too much, and
    I commend, by the way, Senator McCain and others on this
    committee for really joining in an effort to go after cost-plus
    contracts where they shouldn't be cost-plus. But I'm very much
    troubled by this. When you have a missile failure, a test
    failure, and it costs hundreds of millions of dollars and it's
    because something was not put in the right place according to
    the plan, then I think that the taxpayers should not be paying
    for that, and I hope you'll pursue that approach that you're
    using vigorously.
        Do I have time? I don't know.
        Senator Nelson. Go ahead.
        Chairman Levin. I'd like to talk to you, Admiral, about the
    PAA to missile defense in Europe. As I understand it, you are
    responsible for assessing missile defense capability
    requirements of the combatant commanders. I believe that, after
    input from the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs
    unanimously recommended the PAA to missile defense in Europe.
    If that's true so far, can you tell us why from a warfighter
    perspective the military benefits of the EPAA to missile
    defense make sense?
        Admiral Macy. Thank you, Senator. Yes, it makes sense
    because it provides us two opportunities. The first is an
    opportunity in time and the second is an opportunity in
    planning.
        In the role of time, the PAA allows us to address the
    closer threat to Europe, the threat of medium-range, and
    intermediate-range missiles coming from the Middle East,
    whereas previously we did not have a method to do so prior to
    2017 at the earliest with the so-called third site plan, which
    because of physics also would have had some limitations in
    defending some of the parts of Europe, those more to the south.
        The PAA, being phased to our own technologies and adapted
    to the threat, gave us a way in which to organize our thoughts
    and our plans to take advantage of the near-term capabilities
    that are present in Aegis and in THAAD, developed by MDA, to
    address those near-term threats to Europe. So that's a time
    issue. Basically, we can address the threats to Europe much
    sooner than we would have been able to.
        The second is in the flexibility and the capability of the
    system. It allows us to adapt to changes that may appear in
    enemy intent and the emergence of threats from another area. We
    have done most of our planning for threats coming from one
    particular country or set of countries and part of the region.
    If another were to develop this capability, it would allow us
    to adjust faster.
        It would allow us to increase or decrease the capability
    based on the amount of threat. It allows us opportunities for
    partners to take part in the missile defense of Europe by
    having more opportunities for ways in which they can connect
    with our system and come up with an allied approach. Whereas
    previously it was a unitary system linked to the homeland
    defense BMD capability and there was not a real practical way
    to have the partners involved.
        So we have flexibility in capability, we have flexibility
    in the alliance, and we have the opportunity to address threats
    on a more timely basis.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome to all of you. Thank you for being here today.
        Let me start with this. As we develop active defense
    networks to counter advanced ballistic missiles, deployed
    American forces and some of our allies, as we know all too
    well, are faced with the threat of low-tech rockets and
    missiles. Some of these weapons don't require a lot of
    technical knowledge for the user. They can be launched from the
    backs of pickup trucks and they're easily hidden.
        How do we strike a balance between countering complex
    systems and those that are basically flying improvised
    explosive devices (IED)?
        Admiral Macy. Senator, that falls into the, if you will,
    larger realm of which I am responsible, which is integrated air
    and missile defense (IAMD), where we look at the defense of the
    Homeland, of own forces and partner forces from all threat
    objects arriving in the atmosphere, regardless of source. So we
    look at the IAMD architecture, the IAMD capability, across the
    board to address that.
        We have an IAMD operational architecture, a formal way of
    looking at what decisions and information are there made at
    each stage in that process, who has to make them, and who they
    have to provide it to. This has been done in a very rigorous
    and organized fashion, in accordance with the operational
    architectural framework.
        We coordinate with program providers across the spectrum of
    air and missile defense at the program level, how they fit into
    that operational architecture, and how they address these
    issues. Recently we've had a number of discussions with the
    Army in particular on countering rockets, artillery, and mortar
    issues, and what needs to be done, what are the requirements,
    what are the current capabilities, and what are the shortfalls.
        We serve, as I said earlier, at the nexus of how this is
    done within DOD. We participate with the Services in their
    development of classic air defense systems through the joint
    capabilities process, and we participate with STRATCOM, who has
    the responsibility as the air and missile defense integrating
    authority to look at those requirements across the spectrum of
    threat.
        In the BMD world, we look at the prioritized capabilities
    list, the achievable capabilities list, that's generated by
    STRATCOM with the combatant commanders, and the dialogue that
    goes on with MDA over the programs that General O'Reilly is
    asked to provide.
        So we are the nexus across that span of questions from
    rockets, artillery, mortars, long-range rockets, short-range
    ballistic missiles, manned bombers, fighter aircraft, et
    cetera. I don't know if that answers your question, but that's
    how we try to put it together, then integrate both solely
    service programs--Army air defense, Navy air defense, Air Force
    air defense capabilities--with joint programs, how they work
    together.
        We conduct a number of studies on that, one of the most
    significant being a series of exercises known as Nimble Fire,
    where in a classified environment we can bring together the air
    defense capabilities of all of the Services and see how they
    interact. We've been involved in all of these discussions that
    we've had here today.
        Senator Udall. I may want to follow up with some additional
    questions for the record.
        General, did you have anything to add, or Dr. Roberts?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, in my charter it does not cover the
    very short-range rockets you referred to. So I develop
    typically a Scud threat and beyond. I have been asked by
    Congress and we do co-manage some Israeli programs that are
    short-range, such as the David's Sling. But even what you're
    referring to is more in the realm of the Iron Dome system,
    which was not part of our development, but I have been watching
    that and I have seen it's been successful in its recent
    deployment against very short-range rockets.
        Admiral Macy. Senator, I'd like to add, if I may, sir, that
    I'm frankly very proud of the very close liaison between my
    staff and that of MDA, where we look at these intersections
    very closely to understand where there are opportunities for
    exchange of information, exchange of data and capabilities.
        So it's not that one part of JIAMDO is doing air defense
    and another part is doing ballistic missiles. We are very
    closely integrated with MDA as well as with the service
    engineers. We understand this is a spectrum of capability.
        Senator Udall. It's hard to see it being a threat in a
    broad-based way to our forces, but General O'Reilly mentioned
    the situation in Israel and I think that that has political
    elements as well as military elements, and the political
    elements can affect the military situation and the stability in
    the region. The more we develop the capacity to counter flying
    IEDs, in some ways the better.
        I'll follow up with some additional questions on cost and
    so on. I want to use the second half of my time, if I have some
    left, to turn to GAO. Ms. Chaplain, you're here, and thank you
    for your good work. You talked about some aspects of MDA's
    flexible acquisitions process that create what the report
    describes as ``down sides'' for oversight and accountability. I
    know that DOD concurred with some of the GAO recommendations
    and that MDA has made some significant progress. But there are
    some recommendations that DOD still disagrees with, and I'd
    like you just to discuss those, if you would, and then give
    General O'Reilly a chance to respond.
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes, there were some disagreements. Our
    recommendations focused on where we thought MDA could further
    improve the reporting that it had started. One issue, for
    example, was with regard to sunk costs for targets, and we
    believe those sunk costs should be reported and pretty clear,
    and MDA only partially agreed with that. They didn't feel like
    that would fit the way they want to report targets and that
    it's difficult to report some of the heritage costs in targets.
        But our concern was even MDA sunk costs weren't reported
    and we felt that they need to be, and to the extent the other
    costs can be or cannot be found that needs to be disclosed.
        We also had some partial disagreements on the way testing
    is planned. We encouraged MDA to make test plans more
    realistic. There are often failures in testing and a lot of
    rework going on. We thought maybe some additional time and
    resources should be built into the plan, and they only
    partially agreed with that recommendation. I think it's just
    part of the issues involved with testing. As General O'Reilly
    said, they're very expensive tests to conduct and it might
    require more resources upfront.
        But our goal is to avoid a lot of the rework that goes
    along with a test plan that's not fully stabilized yet.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        I think my time has expired, so, General O'Reilly, I'll
    have you respond for the record, if I might, so that Senator
    Shaheen can ask some questions.
        I would just add that when I was a businessman I on the one
    hand loved seeing my auditors and on the other hand I wasn't
    all that happy to see my auditors. So thank you for what you
    do. I know General O'Reilly and I have had some conversations
    and he takes seriously your insights and has made some real
    improvements and is notably and understandably proud. I look
    forward to your responses for the record. I did want to yield
    so Senator Shaheen can ask her questions.
        Thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Chaplain raised two issues, one regarding reporting sunk costs
    of targets and one on adding additional time and resources to execute
    our test programs. I will respond to both.
        Target sunk costs are not reported in MDA program baselines.
    Targets are developed in support of separate and distinct Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) test events and do not follow a
    traditional DOD weapon system procurement process. As the test program
    adjusts, the quantity of targets in the baseline adjusts as well.
    Additionally, each target is inherently a test article and no two are
    truly identical. As such, there is not a clear quantity of targets to
    be procured over the lifecycle in order to amortize the non-recurring
    engineering costs.
        MDA strives to reuse previously developed and procured strategic
    missile components in our targets program, so including all sunk costs
    would not accurately reflect program costs. Accordingly, MDA uses the
    costs incurred or planned during the Future Years Defense Program to
    calculate unit costs.
        The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is defined well enough over
    a 6-year period to provide a reasonable baseline from which target
    needs can be defined and targets can be procured.
        With respect to the second issue raised by Ms. Chaplain, MDA builds
    available schedule and resource margin into the test baseline in order
    to stabilize, to the extent possible, the test program and minimize
    rework in test planning and execution.
        MDA continuously evaluates the availability and allocation of test
    resources to ensure all components of the test program (e.g., range
    availability, target availability, range safety systems, data
    collection assets, et cetera) are synchronized. MDA thoroughly analyzes
    all test results (successes and failures) to ensure test objectives
    were met. When analysis determines an objective was not fully met, it
    is assessed for inclusion in a future test event. This continuous
    evaluation allows MDA to re-allocate resources based upon test results,
    priorities, and warfighter requested capabilities. The IMTP has defined
    flight and ground test plans, at both the system and element levels,
    that can be adjusted based upon emerging test results or changing
    warfighter requirements. Test delays, accelerations, cancellations, and
    additions are analyzed using established MDA processes to update the
    IMTP and maximize the use of planned test events for additional data
    collection.

        Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, you in your testimony referred
    to the hedge options. It's my understanding that DOD has been
    planning to implement a number of these hedge capabilities and
    I understand that DOD is currently conducting an analysis. Do
    you have some idea of when this analysis of the hedge options
    would be finished, and is it possible that you would brief us
    at the time that you have those options analyzed and under
    consideration?
        Dr. Roberts. Yes, we're committed to brief you as soon as
    we have the Secretary's review and decisions in this area.
    Frankly, we expected that to be by now. We thought we'd have
    more to say in this hearing about the hedge. But of course,
    other events have intervened and we expect within a matter of a
    few short weeks.
        Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, are you confident that
    the MDA will be able to deploy additional GBIs at the eight
    extra silos at Fort Greely in a timely manner if DOD chooses to
    do so?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, we're going to need to complete the
    additional missiles that are currently stopped in production in
    order to do that. As soon as we have those completed, we will
    have at that point, I believe, over 10 missiles additional for
    those 8 silos, sir. So I will get back to you on the record the
    exact delivery dates for those remaining missiles.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Pending the outcome of the Failure Review Board, once the
    corrections to the missiles are made, MDA will prioritize repair of
    both emplaced missiles and Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in
    production. While no decision has been made to fill additional silos in
    Missile Field 2, if directed to do so, eight additional GBIs will be
    available for emplacement by the end of fiscal year 2015.

        Senator Nelson. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Macy, can you explain how DOD assesses how many
    missile defense interceptors are required to meet the needs of
    the combatant commanders? I presume it's not as simple as
    planning to have at least two interceptors for each adversary
    ballistic missile so we can shoot at every missile. But if you
    could help us understand how the COCOMs and the military view
    the actual role of missile defense and the force structure that
    they need.
        In other words, how does missile defense fit into the
    larger picture of a COCOM's missions and capabilities?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. I'm looking forward to addressing
    that. To begin with, it's important to note that BMD capability
    as we have been talking about it today is not an isolated
    mission. As you pointed out, it's on the warfighters' planning.
    It's part of a larger campaign against an adversary.
        I shorthand it sometimes that BMD does not defend you
    against ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are an action
    taken by an adversary for a political result. BMD provides part
    of the national capability to deal with that potential threat
    or to deal with the event should it occur.
        So what BMD allows us to do is to prevent the adversary
    from winning the fight with the first wave. What it does is to
    provide the requisite level of protection for critical forces
    and nodes and capabilities sufficient for the combatant
    commander to bring all the other elements of national power to
    bear to get the enemy to change his behavior, because in the
    end that's what you're trying to do, is to change the enemy's
    behavior.
        The goal is not to just simply sit there and keep taking
    incomings. As you pointed out, it's not practical. The number
    of threat missiles in the world already exceeds our inventory
    and will continue to do so. So buying missiles equal to twice
    the number is just not practical.
        So what we look for and what we have done in the JCM-III
    study is to look at that from a warfighting perspective: How
    long can BMD capability provide the requisite level of
    protection to those critical assets that the combatant
    commander has identified so that he can take other steps
    necessary to change the enemy's behavior, to stop the enemy's
    use of ballistic missiles?
        That's from an operational perspective. From a planning
    perspective, demonstrating that having sufficient capability
    may assist in deterring the enemy from contemplating the use of
    ballistic missiles, knowing that he will not be successful in
    his initial attacks, and he can remain confident that the
    reaction of the United States is going to be significantly more
    than simply defending against the incoming.
        Senator Nelson. How does the Joint Staff allocate the
    number of missile defense systems to the various combatant
    commanders, who I'm sure are competing to one degree or another
    for those assets?
        Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. It's a safe bet that each of them
    has a list which is a little bit longer than the one I have.
        It is part of our global force management process, which is
    our formal process to assess the operational plans and
    requirements of each combatant commander, to understand the
    risks and the rewards of allocating them different
    capabilities. This is true across the board, whether it's BMD
    ships, whether it's long-range bombers, whether it's infantry
    brigades, for their different needs.
        We have an ongoing process through the Global Force
    Management Board to understand their needs and their
    requirements, to balance across the forces what we have
    available, and to use that information to essentially do two
    things. One is to feed back through the Secretary to the
    development community and the budget community what we need to
    increase because we assess the overall risk as being too high
    and, until we have those, to give to the Secretary that
    information he needs to make the decision on what risks he's
    going to take and where he's going to take them.
        Last year we looked very carefully at the issue of BMD
    forces with the Global Force Management community. We are
    folding that into the community. STRATCOM is currently leading
    an effort among the three COCOMs plus U.S. Northern Command to
    understand how all of their different plans fit together and to
    understand how we would apportion and allocate forces in the
    near term and over time as we get more capability to each one
    of those.
        Senator Nelson. So at the end of the process, is it the
    Secretary who makes the decision or is it brought to the
    Secretary's attention and the Secretary either assents or
    dissents to it?
        Admiral Macy. Every deployment order is a decision by the
    Secretary in his role on behalf of the President as the command
    authority, whether it's for a ship or for a brigade. We have a
    process that goes on every week. It's called the Dep Ord Book.
    It's the Deployment Order Book, where the movement of forces,
    the reassignment of forces, goes through a review process among
    the COCOMs, goes through the Joint Staff, is reviewed by the
    Chairman in his role of providing military advice, and then is
    presented to the Secretary, and he literally signs off each
    page. His initials go on: ``yes'', ``no'', or ``come see me''.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just have a final question. I was interested in the back
    and forth around Israel's Iron Dome and David's Sling program
    and the Arrow program, because I had the opportunity to visit
    Israel last summer and be briefed by their director of the
    missile defense program on those systems. I actually think we
    should take a lesson in terms of naming our systems. I think
    theirs are quite descriptive.
        But what I was interested in is, you mentioned that the
    Iron Dome technology was Israeli and I know that we contribute
    to the work that's being done there, so I wonder if you could
    talk about what we have learned from the technology that's been
    developed and how much of that is shared and whether we are
    actually incorporating any of that into what we're doing here.
        General O'Reilly. Senator, actually the Iron Dome is one of
    the few Israeli programs that's totally developed by them. So
    we do not have a sharing agreement with them. David's Sling, we
    provide 50 percent of the funding and they provide 50 percent
    of the resources. Our companies, such as Raytheon, work with
    that development so that they have the proprietary rights and
    the information rights to develop that type of capability
    should we want David's Sling. The same with Boeing on Arrow 3.
    Those two programs, in which we are investing approximately
    half of the resources, we do not--first of all, our industry
    team is working on those programs, so they see the details of
    the technology, and we have the rights to that technology.
    There are certain limitations, but all that is pre-agreed to
    prior to the start.
        But in the Iron Dome, that is not a MDA program. I have
    been asked to provide funding out of my budget for the
    procurement of Iron Dome. So we're ready to follow the guidance
    of Congress in that regard. But I don't participate in the
    actual management or the development of that capability. But
    I've reviewed it.
        Senator Shaheen. Where are we in terms of the procurement?
    There has been a request from Congress, but have we done
    anything on that?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, I need this year's budget,
    fiscal year 2011. It's in the fiscal year 2011 budget, $205
    million for the MDA for the procurement of that for Israel.
        Senator Shaheen. If we do contribute to that, what would we
    learn from that and will we be able to take advantage of any of
    the procurement efforts?
        General O'Reilly. Once we have the budget, I will begin
    that process. But we have not begun that, those agreements with
    the--and the office in Israel that you were referring to, they
    also were not responsible for the development of Iron Dome.
    That office, we work together closely every day. So this is
    something we're going to have to determine ahead of time of the
    agreements. That hasn't occurred yet.
        Senator Shaheen. So who developed the Iron Dome technology?
        General O'Reilly. I know the company is Rafael and I've
    been out there. I've seen their testing. It's very impressive
    for what it can do.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
        Ms. Chaplain, when GAO makes recommendations for MDA to
    improve its program management, DOD formally indicates its view
    of those recommendations. I believe in response to
    recommendations in your report in March, DOD either agreed or
    partially agreed with all your recommendations. Your report and
    your testimony indicate that MDA has made significant progress
    in improving the accountability and transparency of its
    programs.
        If MDA implements the recommendations in your report, how
    far will it have come toward what you would consider an
    acceptable level of transparency and accountability?
        Ms. Chaplain. If they implemented all the recommendations,
    they will have come a very long way in getting the things that
    we want to see for accountability and transparency. There are
    some actions that need to be taken that shouldn't be taken
    lightly. One thing we're looking for, for example, are
    independent cost estimates (ICE) and MDA has just started that
    process. So that's going to take some time.
        Another thing we're looking for is backing cost estimates
    with all the data and documentation you need to trace and
    verify them and to really understand them in an easy way. That
    wasn't present this round. I think they'll be more present the
    next round.
        Along with the transparency and accountability of just what
    they report to Congress, we would like to see a few other
    things happen. One is just stabilizing the acquisition
    approach. We've had three different ways of reporting on
    progress for the missile defense system and each time we change
    those ways it becomes very difficult for us to go backwards and
    track costs back in time and schedule and progress.
        We'd also like to see some of the things we recommend
    extend to the efforts like EPAA, where we can learn more about
    costs and schedule within that effort. Then we'd also like to
    see the structure and the clarity of MDA's budget request
    improve as well.
        So there's more beyond just what you see on paper, but I
    think if everything that we're asking for in this round is
    implemented it will be just a huge amount of progress that's
    been made.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General O'Reilly, have you determined what or how many of
    the recommendations you may be seeking to implement?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, we believe GAO has accurately
    captured the challenges which missile defense has to operate
    in, but at the same time--the management challenges. At the
    same time, we are on a path to accomplish the ICE. As she has
    said, there's been recent changes. I've made most of those
    changes, to enhance the baseline reporting.
        This was the second year we've done it in a row. This
    year's report that we submitted to Congress wasn't taken into
    account. The delivery was after this GAO audit was done. We
    believe that has each year more enhanced accuracy and the level
    of detail they're looking at.
        The one area in which we disagree with the GAO's
    recommendation--Ms. Chaplain just referred to it before--is in
    the area of our targets. We feel that we reuse--because we have
    to find intermediate-range and ICBM-type targets, instead of
    buying brand-new targets. We go out and work with the Air Force
    and the Navy and we identify retired missiles, and then we
    modify those missiles and make them into a target.
        Now, the cost of the original missile we don't believe
    accurately reflects the cost to MDA of achieving that target. I
    know GAO looks at it as the cost to the government, but those
    missiles were bought for a particular reason, they were
    retired, and we've taken them out of retirement. We do agree
    with GAO we should capture all of the costs of modifying those
    missiles, but there's a difference there that we're still in
    discussions with the GAO on.
        Senator Nelson. In that regard, I know that you've changed
    some of your acquisition requirements and contracting
    requirements now where you get competitive bidding for
    contracts. Could you tell us a little bit about what you've
    been doing there and maybe some of the cost savings that the
    agency has achieved?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, of our $2.4 billion that was
    identified in efficiencies by MDA this year, almost a half a
    billion was due to the way in which we acquire contractor
    support for government agencies or government staff. In the
    past, we used to hire--we determined and told our contractors
    how many engineers we needed and of what seniority and what
    were the particulars of the resources we wanted these companies
    to provide us to augment our staffs. Instead, we're taking a
    different approach. We define the task that we want these
    companies to provide for us and we leave it up to the companies
    to determine the seniority and number of engineers.
        We do this in a competitive fashion, so they know they're
    competing for cost, schedule, and performance of their
    competitors, against their competitors. This year we've
    identified so far over $100 million in savings because of the
    way that contractors have proposed. It may be an equal amount
    of personnel or it may be even more, but it might be fewer
    senior engineers that cost more, more mid-level, and then some
    junior engineers, which industry has told me in the past the
    way we were contracting was preventing them from literally
    hiring and developing a new generation of engineers.
        So this has worked quite effectively for us, sir. We do
    have about $30 billion more of contracts over the next 5 years
    which we are looking to compete.
        Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, given the two failed GMD
    flight tests, you're planning to conduct two more flight tests
    to verify the solution for the problem encountered in the test,
    and you've indicated that you will need some additional GBIs
    for the GMD test program, but that number hasn't yet been
    determined. I understand that you plan to assess the need for
    additional GBIs after the flight tests verify and demonstrate
    the solution to the GBI problem we've been discussing.
        Is that correct? Since the GBI production line will remain
    open for several years and the refurbishment and target
    programs will also keep that production line busy, we'll have
    several years in which to decide how many additional GBIs are
    needed. In other words, we don't need to decide that this year;
    is that assumption accurate?
        General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We believe that through this
    failure review board process one of the outcomes will be what
    is the right number and the strategy for testing GBI
    reliability in the future. We already have a program that we
    plan over the next 10 years to test over 900 components off the
    missiles that are currently in the missile fields as we
    refurbish, as you say. But we will reassess what additional
    testing is needed beyond that.
        Senator Nelson. This is to both General O'Reilly and Dr.
    Roberts. Your prepared statements discuss a number of planned
    enhancements to the existing GMD system to increase the
    capability to defend the Homeland over the coming decade.
    General O'Reilly, can you summarize the enhancements briefly
    and describe the degree to which they are expected to improve
    our defenses and over what period of time are we looking?
        General O'Reilly. Sir, there are several studies that are
    being done independently and they all indicate that--one of
    them, including Admiral Macy's study that he just finished--one
    of the key indicators to the effectiveness of missile defense
    is not actually the number of interceptors--you do need a
    certain amount--but it is the sensor system and our ability to
    discriminate objects and determine which is the reentry vehicle
    (RV) with enough certainty in order to affect your firing
    doctrine, how many missiles are you going to shoot at that
    cluster of objects?
        All missiles when they're launched have associated objects
    that come with them--upper stages, shrouds, other components
    that come off the missile during powered flight. So we have to
    have the ability to determine where is the RV to hit it. Those
    types of upgrades to the sensor systems, as I've mentioned,
    Clear, AK, those algorithms will have a significant impact on
    our capability.
        Also, the East Coast communications system will, in fact,
    significantly enhance the protection of the United States
    because we can communicate with the GBI late in flight before
    it has to intercept any threat that's coming from the Middle
    East.
        Those are, the ability to discriminate, the ability to use
    our new sensors like our satellite systems and even our
    forward-based airborne platforms and forward-based radars,
    those totally combined give us a very early track, and with the
    SM-3 IIB we would be able to intercept. Our cost estimate of
    that interceptor is about $15 million, so it's very cost-
    effective for the first layer of defense for Homeland defense.
    It doesn't replace the GMD system, though, that still is
    necessary.
        Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, how do you see these GMD
    enhancements fitting into our overall missile defense strategy?
        Dr. Roberts. To go back to your opening formulation, we're
    ahead of the threat of limited strikes from states like North
    Korea and Iran, and we want to make sure that we stay ahead. A
    part of that is on the quantitative side. We want to be sure
    that we have the ability to provide sufficient interceptors, a
    sufficient number to match the requirement.
        But we often forget the qualitative side, and we can
    significantly enhance the performance of the current system and
    prepare it for substantially enhanced performance when the SM-3
    IIB becomes available to us. So we see these capabilities
    enhancements as essential. They are separate from the hedge,
    meaning these are things we're going to do in any case because
    they're important to staying ahead, and the hedge involves a
    set of things that we might want to do that are in addition, in
    the case of a more early emergence of capabilities that would
    overwhelm the GMD system.
        Senator Nelson. In that regard, my colleague, Senator
    Sessions, was raising questions about the budget for what I
    would call the out years, from 2013 on, and raised a question
    about whether or not that was sufficient funding for that
    period of time. Dr. Roberts, do you have any thoughts about how
    you might respond to that?
        Dr. Roberts. You had two good answers from the same
    military advisers that we listen to in Policy on this topic. We
    are satisfied that the budgets as projected are sufficient to
    our purpose. We don't see any opportunity for additional
    savings.
        We have a clearly emerging threat in the regions. We have
    the challenge of staying ahead in the defense of the Homeland.
    We have future technologies that we'd like to be invested in to
    ensure that we remain competitive over the very long term. We
    have a testing program that we've all accepted needs to be
    robust and sustained over the long term. There's no significant
    opportunity there for additional savings.
        So Policy clearly has the view that there are not
    significant new savings to be realized in the BMD budget if
    we're committed to the policy principles articulated in the
    BMDR.
        Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, do you have any thoughts
    you'd like to share?
        General O'Reilly. Senator, as Dr. Roberts laid out, our
    current budget, the question that Senator Sessions was
    referring to, it was aimed at efficiencies. We're still
    intending to accomplish the same scope, and we've done this in
    a way that's auditable to determine are we more efficiently
    buying this capability. It was not determined nor is it our
    intent to reduce the amount of work that we plan to do in
    fiscal year 2011.
        As Dr. Roberts was saying, the hedge strategy would be
    additional, if we executed those hedges, would be beyond what
    was in our current budget.
        Senator Nelson. So we would have to increase the budget at
    some point down the road to take into account these additional
    efforts at defense?
        General O'Reilly. If those efforts are turned on, yes, it
    would require additional funding.
        Senator Nelson. My final question is, is there anything we
    should have asked that we didn't ask?
        General O'Reilly. No, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Very politic.
        Thank you very much, all of you, and thank you for your
    service to our country. We appreciate it.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                            phased adaptive approach
        1. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy,
    in September 2009, the President announced his decision to accept the
    unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff to pursue the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile
    defense in Europe. He described each of the four phases of the PAA,
    including the planned deployment timeframe for each phase. As explained
    in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), it is U.S. policy that
    ``before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that
    enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against
    threat-representative targets to demonstrate that they can reliably and
    effectively help U.S. forces accomplish their mission.'' Do you each
    agree that this central fly-before-you-buy policy criterion should be
    applied to each phase of the European PAA (EPAA), so that we have
    confidence that the systems will work before we deploy them, and so
    that we only deploy systems that have demonstrated that they will work?
        Dr. Roberts and Admiral Macy. The fly-before-you-buy policy as
    outlined in the BMDR should and will be applied to each phase of the
    EPAA. The EPAA was specifically designed to take advantage of
    capability developments as they became operationally available, which
    includes realistic testing of the systems as they are fielded.
        General O'Reilly. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test
    the capabilities and limitations of a missile defense system before we
    begin procurement, or fly-before-we-buy.

                   future contract improvement opportunities
        2. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have indicated that future
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) contracts will provide opportunities for
    increasing value and protection to the taxpayer, including through
    increased competition and enhanced contract terms to protect against
    defects or other unsatisfactory contractor performance. What are your
    plans and objectives for improving these future MDA contracts, and what
    enhancements do you expect to achieve, in terms of savings or other
    enhancements?
        General O'Reilly. MDA awards contracts for hardware and services
    using both competitive and noncompetitive procedures. We continually
    look at our existing contracts and all new requirements for future
    competition opportunities. By conducting market research, we are able
    to define the extent to which system components or services can be
    competed in the future. Where necessary, we plan to obtain technical
    data under existing contracts to facilitate future competition.
    Additionally, MDA has implemented a competitive procurement strategy
    for the acquisition of our advisory and assistance service support
    requirements. This support is obtained using competitively awarded task
    orders under multiple award contracts. We are committed to ensuring
    maximum competition is planned for and considered in all acquisitions.
        To address recent unsatisfactory contractor performance, MDA has
    developed a draft contract provision, titled ``Contractor
    Accountability for Quality.'' This provision will allow MDA to reduce
    or even eliminate the amount of performance incentive fee awarded when
    our prime and subcontractors fail to follow their own best practices,
    internal processes, or accepted industry standards which then result in
    quality problems. We intend to include this provision for the first
    time in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Development and Sustainment
    Contract. We plan to incorporate a contract provision holding
    contractors accountable for quality in all applicable MDA contracts.

                          counterfeit electronic parts
        3. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, the committee has initiated an
    investigation into the presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the
    defense supply chain. MDA has taken steps to mitigate the risk of
    counterfeit electronic parts finding their way into our missile defense
    systems. From MDA's perspective, how serious is the problem of
    counterfeit electronics?
        General O'Reilly. MDA recognizes the seriousness of counterfeit
    electronic parts in the defense supply chain and has developed an
    effective process to identify and remove them. Specifically, to date
    MDA has experienced six instances of counterfeit parts within our
    supply chain which is made up of thousands of unique parts and
    materials provided by hundreds of suppliers providing hundreds of
    assemblies. One of the counterfeit part incidents required a recall of
    49 mission computer assemblies which necessitated the removal of
    approximately 800 parts from inventory. Counterfeit electronic parts in
    the defense supply chain can affect overall system quality and
    reliability if not properly addressed.

        4. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what national security risks
    result from the presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain?
        General O'Reilly. The predominant risk is reduced reliability and
    availability of weapon systems due to the failures related to
    counterfeit parts and materials. A counterfeit part may pass all
    production testing. However, it is possible that the part was damaged
    during unauthorized processing (e.g., removing the part from a previous
    assembly, or sanding the surface in order to place a new part number)
    causing the deployed system to fail. Similarly, reliability may be
    affected because a counterfeit part may be near the end of its useful
    life when it is installed. Should any mission critical component fail,
    that system fails and national security is impacted.
        A more insidious risk is the potential for access or the ability to
    disable a weapon system or communication network through malicious
    circuits embedded in counterfeit devices. Testing for this type of
    defect is extremely difficult.

        5. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, many of our defense systems
    rely on parts that are no longer in production, forcing agencies to
    purchase them from places other than the original manufacturer. What
    steps has MDA taken to ensure that their sources of supply for obsolete
    parts are trustworthy?
        General O'Reilly. Understanding and controlling the source of parts
    and materials is critical in reducing the counterfeit part risk. Our
    MDA Parts, Materials, and Processes Mission Assurance Plan (PMAP)
    requires parts and materials for new or modified mission and safety
    critical hardware to be purchased only from the original manufacturer
    or an authorized distributor. MDA realizes that there are cases when
    obsolete parts are no longer available from the original manufacturer
    or an authorized distributor. In these cases, MDA PMAP requires that
    the contractor justify the reason why an authorized source was not
    available and provide a plan for verifying authenticity of the part.
    MDA Policy Memo #50, released in June 2009, extended these requirements
    to also include heritage mission and safety critical hardware.

        6. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, has MDA adopted any policies or
    procedures to mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronic parts that
    DOD should consider adopting?
        General O'Reilly. MDA established requirements for mitigating
    counterfeit parts dating back to October 2006. At this point, MDA's
    requirements sufficiently mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts. There
    are other standards that are being developed. For instance, SAE is
    currently developing a comprehensive standard. MDA is participating in
    its development. DOD may want to look at all the standards and
    determine how such requirements should be imposed.

                    missile defense cooperation with russia
        7. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony states that,
    ``a key priority is to establish a cooperative [ballistic missile
    defense] relationship with Russia. Significant opportunities have
    emerged, along with some challenges.'' You also state that you believe
    ``we have an opportunity for meaningful cooperation'' that will enhance
    security. Why do you believe such missile defense cooperation would be
    in our security interests, and do you believe it could send an
    important signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are both
    opposed to its developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles?
        Dr. Roberts. Cooperation with Russia in our missile defense efforts
    would send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United
    States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and
    use of ballistic missiles. Effective Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD),
    including a potential U.S.-Russia cooperative architecture, can also
    devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence
    that an attack would be successful. This would help undergird a broader
    strategic objective: to strengthen deterrence in key regions through
    the integrated and innovative use of military and nonmilitary means
    that adapt regional deterrence architectures to 21st century
    requirements.

        8. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, your prepared testimony states
    that you are, ``optimistic . . . that we will make significant progress
    this year in cooperating with the Russian Federation on missile
    defense.'' Why are you optimistic, and what sort of cooperation do you
    anticipate?
        General O'Reilly. We continue to support expert dialogue on
    cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation whose surveillance
    radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
    development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
    opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our
    future research and development, and our command and control activities
    and exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that
    we're not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a
    defense against the proliferation of these missiles.

              defense technology cooperation agreement with russia
        9. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony describes
    the administration's effort to conclude a Defense Technology
    Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Russia as a ``requirement for the
    safeguarding of sensitive information in support of cooperation'' on
    missile defense. Please describe the role and purpose of such a DTCA,
    and why you believe such an agreement would be necessary to permit
    missile defense cooperation with Russia.
        Dr. Roberts. To facilitate greater cooperation with Russia, we need
    to conclude a DTCA, which will be beneficial not only for missile
    defense cooperation, but for cooperation in other areas, such as
    counterterrorism.
        We have made clear to Russia that we must complete a DTCA in order
    to undertake more extensive BMD cooperation. The DTCA will contain an
    annex that addresses the exchange of classified information. Even with
    a DTCA in place, a National Disclosure Policy review will still be
    required to provide classified information to Russia.

                           national disclosure policy
        10. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, you indicated that, in the context
    of possible missile defense cooperation, the United States would not
    share classified information with Russia unless and until we have
    conducted a National Disclosure Policy review. Please describe what
    such a review entails and how it would protect our information.
        Dr. Roberts. The DTCA will provide a legal framework to support
    defense technology cooperation between DOD and the Russian Federation
    Ministry of Defense for projects (classified or unclassified) to
    include missile defense and counter-improvised explosive device
    projects.
        All projects involving classified information that will be
    undertaken with the Russian Federation under the DTCA will require
    review and approval by the interagency National Disclosure Policy
    Committee (NDPC). An exception to the National Disclosure Policy must
    be authorized prior to the release of any information on a program
    involving classified information. Exceptions to the National Disclosure
    Policy may be authorized personally by the Secretary of Defense or his
    Deputy or the NDPC.
        NDPC reviews result in well-coordinated and informed interagency
    decisions regarding the types and level of classification of military
    information and projects authorized for disclosure, as well as specific
    conditions and limitations to be applied when sharing classified
    information and technology with a foreign government.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                              flight test failures
        11. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system currently has 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI)
    deployed to provide defense of the Homeland against limited missile
    attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. However, the last
    two flight tests of the system failed to intercept the target. Can you
    explain what happened, what you are doing to fix this problem, and
    whether these test failures affect the deployed interceptors?
        General O'Reilly. For FTG-06 in January 2010, the Exoatmospheric
    Kill Vehicle (EKV) lost attitude control during the acquisition phase
    and failed to intercept the target. The failure was traced to an EKV
    quality control problem, a missing lockwire on an attitude control
    system thruster. Corrective action, manufacturing, and inspection
    procedures have been modified and there was not a recurrence of this
    problem in the two subsequent flight tests: BVT-01 in June 2010 and
    FTG-06a in December 2010. This issue impacts both CE-I and CE-II
    interceptors; however, records and photographic evidence have been
    reviewed for every delivered GBI to support a comprehensive risk
    assessment and no other instances were identified.
        During FTG-06a in December 2010, the EKV lost track of the target
    during the discrimination phase and failed to intercept the target. The
    failure investigation is ongoing and final determination of root cause/
    corrective action has not been made. However, GMD is developing/testing
    multiple potential corrective actions and plans to validate the
    correction during the next flight test (non-intercept test FTN-01) in
    fiscal year 2012. Preliminary indications are that the failure is
    unique to the CE-II GBIs. Testing and analysis that the original
    deployed interceptors are not affected by the failure mode seen in FTG-
    06a is underway.

        12. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, will you brief this committee
    when the Failure Review Board has completed its review and you have
    decided on a plan for how to fix the problem?
        General O'Reilly. Yes.

                            phased adaptive approach
        13. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, it appears that some view the PAA
    as a specific system or architecture, with a fixed number of assets and
    capabilities. However, as explained in the BMDR, it appears more like a
    strategy or an approach than a system or architecture. Can you provide
    your view of whether the PAA is an approach to missile defense or a
    specific system architecture?
        Admiral Macy. The PAA is not a specific system architecture or
    acquisition program. It is a conceptual approach that provides BMD
    capability for our deployed forces, allies, and partners, and
    additional capability for Homeland defense, in different regions,
    circumstances, and times. The PAA provides a balanced investment with
    the capacity to engage the range of threats that can be tailored to the
    geography, political circumstances, and capabilities of regional
    partners. It also has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets
    where and when they are needed.

        14. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, you helped develop the policy and
    strategy for the PAA. What is your view?
        Dr. Roberts. I agree with Admiral Macy that the PAA is not a
    specific system architecture or acquisition program. It is a conceptual
    approach that provides BMD capability for our deployed forces, allies,
    and partners, and additional capability for Homeland defense, in
    different regions, circumstances, and times. The PAA provides a
    balanced investment with the capacity to engage the range of threats
    that can be tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and
    capabilities of regional partners. It also has the flexibility to
    rapidly deploy more assets where and when they are needed.

        15. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, as explained in the BMDR, DOD
    developed the EPAA as a regional policy approach for missile defense of
    Europe, not as a specific acquisition program. Can you explain why the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) seems to be evaluating this
    policy approach as if it were a new major defense acquisition program?
        Ms. Chaplain. At the request of the House Armed Services Committee,
    GAO conducted a broad assessment of DOD's planning for implementation
    of the EPAA policy. Although we understand that the EPAA is a policy
    approach, not an acquisition program, it is an investment in a subset
    of MDA's systems requiring coordination and technical integration to be
    deployable in the European region, and to meet the timelines set out in
    the policy. In our view this represents a significant acquisition
    challenge. The criteria we applied in our assessment, however,
    represent sound management principles for guiding complex, highly
    integrated efforts. They reflect DOD's acquisition guidance as well as
    the Office of Management and Budget's guidance for capital programming
    across Federal agencies, particularly as it relates to bringing
    together and synchronizing multiple development efforts. We continue to
    believe these acquisition management principles serve as a useful,
    appropriate, and beneficial standard to assess DOD's EPAA acquisition
    activities. Importantly, these six principles are not just acquisition
    principles, they reflect general management principles for any major
    initiative: Identify what you need; identify the players and their
    roles; put together a plan with timeframes; ensure the pieces of the
    initiative are organized for success; test your assumptions; and
    determine how much it's going to cost to see the initiative to
    completion.

             decision timeframe for more ground-based interceptors
        16. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, you have indicated that you
    believe there will be a need for additional GBIs because of the two
    failed GBI flight tests last year. You stated that you plan to complete
    two additional flight tests to confirm and demonstrate that MDA has
    properly diagnosed and corrected the problem encountered in the most
    recent flight test failure. The second verification flight test,
    designated FTG-06b, is not expected to take place until late 2012,
    which means during fiscal year 2013. You have also stated that after
    you have studied the results of that second verification flight test,
    then you will assess the need for any additional number of GBIs, and
    any additional elements for the test and sustainment plan for the GMD
    system. During the hearing, you acknowledged that--because the GBI
    production line will remain open for several years--we have several
    years to decide how many additional GBIs we might need. Given this
    plan, is it correct to understand that your assessment and
    recommendations about additional GBIs would not be completed until
    sometime during fiscal year 2013, and could be ready for inclusion in
    the budget request for fiscal year 2014?
        General O'Reilly. Successful ground testing of the EKV
    modifications to resolve the previous flight test issues could be
    successfully concluded this fall. Based on those results, the PB13
    request will reflect whether we propose additional procurement of GBIs
    at that time. The non-intercept flight test in the winter of 2012 and
    intercept in summer of 2013 will inform congressional budget
    deliberations. If these tests are delayed or unsuccessful, Congress
    will be in an informed position to delay the request for additional
    GBIs beyond the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

        17. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, does this notional schedule fit
    within our GMD enhancement strategy and plans?
        Dr. Roberts. Several of the assumptions we used to arrive at a
    total purchase of 52 GBIs are no longer valid, primarily due to test
    failures and the need for additional testing. Some increased number of
    GBIs will be necessary, but we must conclude the investigation of the
    most recent test failure before we can make a determination about the
    number of additional GBIs that will be required. Based on the outcome
    of the investigation, the PB13 request will reflect whether we propose
    additional procurement of GBIs at that time.

                significance of nato decision on missile defense
        18. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, last November at the Lisbon
    Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to adopt
    missile defense of NATO Europe as a core mission. As part of this
    decision, NATO decided to expand its missile defense command and
    control system, endorsed the U.S. plan for the EPAA to missile defense,
    and invited Russia to cooperate with NATO on missile defense. Can you
    tell me your view of the significance of NATO's decision, and how it
    could benefit security in Europe?
        Dr. Roberts. I believe the Lisbon decision reflects NATO's
    determination to remain the world's premier defense alliance by
    adapting to new challenges. Allies recognized that a new threat to our
    homelands comes primarily from non-traditional sources such as
    ballistic missile and WMD proliferation. Therefore, NATO's decision to
    pursue a territorial missile defense capability is a key step that
    sends a clear message--NATO is serious about responding to new threats,
    and is willing and able to pursue critical capabilities to counter
    those threats.

        19. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, you are the U.S. military
    representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee and you have worked
    closely with NATO on the new missile defense plan. What steps is NATO
    taking to implement the new plan?
        Admiral Macy. NATO is fully engaged in incorporating territorial
    missile defense of Europe. Per the decisions from the Lisbon Summit,
    November 2010, NATO has made the decision that missile defense is ``its
    core task of collective defence'' and our allies are appreciative of
    our efforts to include them in our discussions regarding our missile
    defense concepts and approaches. Now that NATO has made the decision,
    the BMDS capabilities resident within the EPAA will constitute our
    national contribution to the mission of collective defense.
    Implementing the EPAA provides the opportunity for NATO to contribute
    national systems and participate alongside the United States, and it is
    a very effective and efficient approach to NATO missile defense that
    allows all participants to leverage the investment other nations are
    making. The recent MDA demonstration of the Command, Control, Battle
    Management, and Communications (C\2\BMC) system interfacing with NATO's
    Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is a
    premier example of this implementation. In addition, NATO has committed
    to expand the ALTBMD program from beyond the protection of NATO
    deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory,
    and forces. Finally, the alliance is increasing its participation in
    missile defense exercises progressing from simply observing to active
    participation in the Nimble Titan 2012 exercise. We will work closely
    within the alliance to craft the appropriate command and control
    structure to provide for the effective defense of our forward deployed
    forces, allies, and our partners from missile threats in the region.

                   standard missile-3 block iib schedule risk
        20. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, DOD plans to deploy a new
    variant of the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB, on land in 2020 for
    Phase 4 of the EPAA to missile defense. This interceptor is intended to
    defend Europe against medium-, intermediate-, and long-range missiles,
    and to supplement the GMD system for additional defense of the Homeland
    against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) from North Korea or
    Iran. Your agency awarded contracts in early April to three companies
    to help define the concept and development plan for the new missile,
    through the end of 2013. Consequently, there is not even a design yet
    for this interceptor. In addition, MDA is just starting to develop new
    technology needed for the missile, and the Aegis BMD program office is
    not expected to manage the program until 2013. Given these
    considerations, how confident are you that this new missile will be
    ready to deploy in 2020, and how will you manage schedule risk?
        General O'Reilly. I am confident that we will deploy the SM-3 Block
    IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The
    SM-3 Block IIB schedule is based on recent government experience
    developing similar successful missile defense interceptor programs.
    Product development for SM-3 Block IIB spans 7 years, beginning in
    third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through initial
    operational capability (IOC) in 2020. The time between product
    development and a production decision for this program is 5\1/2\ years.
    This development to production decision timeline is consistent with the
    average of BMD interceptors including Patriot, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3
    Block IB as reported by GAO (see attached).

        Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently
    awarded to three potential SM-3 Block IIB development prime contractors
    add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule
    projections. Each contractor is conducting missile trade studies to
    define SM-3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for
    Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology
    risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that
    increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are
    investing now with multiple vendors in kill vehicle divert and attitude
    control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and
    lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These
    investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our
    Product Development schedule risk.

                         gao view of aegis ashore risk
        21. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, the Aegis Ashore program planned
    for deployment in Europe is based on the existing Aegis BMD program. As
    your prepared statement notes, and as the Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation has also stated, the Aegis BMD program is the most
    mature in terms of development and operational suitability. If the
    Aegis Ashore program is based on the most mature existing Aegis BMD
    system, can you explain why GAO believes the Aegis Ashore program still
    has a degree of developmental risk?
        Ms. Chaplain. While Aegis Ashore is being developed out of the
    Aegis BMD program, it is not based on the configuration that has been
    tested and is deployed today, which is the 3.6.1 Aegis Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) with the Standard Missile 3 Block 1A. The
    high levels of risk we see are based on the commitment to produce the
    weapon system before the design is proven through ground and flight
    testing. This commitment increases the chances for discovering issues
    with the hardware and software that could lead to costly redesign,
    rework, and doubts about the performance of the system.
        The Aegis Ashore will use the new 4.0.1 and 5.0 systems currently
    in development, and the new version of the interceptor also in
    development. Yet MDA has decided to commit to procure the system
    starting in 2012, well before results of ground and flight testing are
    available. We have repeatedly found in our reviews of major
    acquisitions that basing commitments, such as the decision to
    manufacture systems for operational use, should be based on
    demonstrated knowledge. One key step before that commitment is
    demonstrating a production representative system in a realistic
    environment. That will not occur until 2014 when the test version
    demonstrates the ability to successfully launch and engage a target.
    However, in order to meet the schedule that requires the Aegis Ashore
    to be operational by 2015, manufacture must begin in 2012.
        We discuss additional acquisition risks related to Aegis Ashore in
    Appendix IV of our March 26, 2011 report (GAO-11-372).

                     impact of epaa radar on gmd capability
        22. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, there has been discussion of
    the importance of a forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar in Phase 1 of the
    EPAA for the defense of Europe. However, that radar would also improve
    the performance of the GMD system to defend the United States. Can you
    tell me how that radar would enhance the GMD system, and how
    significant that improvement would be?
        General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]

        23. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, would you consider this radar
    deployment to be an enhancement of the GMD system, even though it is
    placed in a regional missile defense context?
        Dr. Roberts. Yes, the deployment of a forward-based radar in
    southern Europe improves the missile defense protection of both Europe
    and of the United States.

                       u.s.-israeli cooperative programs
        24. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, for the cooperative missile
    defense programs we are developing jointly with Israel, you have
    established a joint program management structure including
    representatives from both nations. Has this joint program management
    structure worked as you had hoped it would?
        General O'Reilly. The joint management structure implemented in the
    two most recent U.S.-Israeli cooperative Project Agreements (Upper Tier
    and David's Sling) is working as expected. Older agreements for
    programs such as the Arrow System Improvement Program did not specify
    joint management practices. This created a potential problem where MDA
    was informed of progress and actions after the fact, and without
    performance metrics. In the newer agreements, visibility and
    accountability have increased through the establishment of program
    baselines, configuration control boards, jointly-defined and approved
    Knowledge Points, and joint decision authority for major program
    decisions (e.g., contract issuance, concurrence to proceed with test
    events, and design review entrance and exit criteria). These practices
    have all contributed to better U.S. understanding of progress,
    challenges, and risk to both schedule and resource planning for these
    programs.

        25. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, in the past, you expressed
    concern that the Arrow-3 interceptor being developed jointly by the
    United States and Israel had high technical and schedule risk. What is
    your current assessment of the level of technical and schedule risk in
    the Arrow-3 program, and has the program met its required knowledge
    points?
        General O'Reilly. While significant progress has been achieved in
    the Arrow-3 development program, I believe that my original assessment
    of high technical and schedule risk is still valid. Of the 20 Knowledge
    Points, 6 of 7 planned have been successfully accomplished thus far.
    One Knowledge Point related to the booster motor was not met due to a
    static test failure, and the re-design and re-test is in progress. As
    we have proceeded into more complex component ground tests leading up
    to the first flight test, additional technical issues have surfaced.
    These technical issues are driving slight schedule delays (first
    quarter so far) for the first flight test, but there is very little
    schedule margin to be able to accommodate any additional issues. The
    remainder of the schedule through IOC declaration is also success-
    oriented with no room for error. Execution of the first flight test at
    the end of this year will be a major program milestone from which
    additional technical and schedule assessments will be made.

                         development of sensor systems
        26. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, MDA is developing two sensor
    systems to improve tracking and interception of large numbers of
    regional missiles. These systems are the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) and
    the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). The ABIR would be an
    unmanned aerial vehicle, and the PTSS is a satellite system. Can you
    explain the role of these two systems, and whether you believe they
    would both be necessary--or if one of them would be sufficient?
        General O'Reilly. While the PTSS provides the most cost-effective
    and assured comprehensive coverage of the Northern Hemisphere, I
    believe both systems, ABIR and PTSS, are necessary for the success of
    the BMDS.
        PTSS is planned because it offers the advantages of assured access
    to the greatest regions of threat launch activity and provides
    persistent tracking coverage of ballistic missiles over their entire
    flight. Because of Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
    demonstrations and our work with the SBIRS community, we believe that
    the technological basis for satellite-to-shooter engagements is
    available today. PTSS post-boost and midcourse tracking accuracies are
    suitable for any of our BMDS interceptors to achieve a high probability
    engagement over the widest possible geometries. The estimated annual
    O&M costs of a globally deployed PTSS constellation is $75 million/
    year.
        ABIR is being demonstrated now because of the flexibility that UAV-
    based systems have to rapidly extend sensor coverage and battle space
    beyond fixed radar sites outside the PTSS coverage of the Northern
    Hemisphere, provide early ascent phase tracking, and integrate readily
    with the existing Service infrastructures and BMDS network. Further,
    while today's sensors are useful and complementary to the BMDS radars,
    advanced ABIR sensors will significantly improve tracking accuracies,
    threat identification, and timeliness of reporting to the regional
    shooter. The estimated annual O&M cost of an ABIR Combat Air Patrol
    (CAP) of 3 aircraft is greater than $56 million per CAP. Of note, ABIR
    will require overflight permission from countries required for viewing
    access.
        Both of these systems promise improvements to the warfighter in
    earlier and higher confidence threat awareness and ability to address
    the highest priority ballistic missile threats. Given the actual annual
    O&M costs to operate an AN/TPY-2 radar of more than $50 million per
    year per radar and the requirement for Host Nation basing agreements to
    locate a radar in a region of interest, the PTSS is a critical system
    for affordable, unrestricted, and responsive missile defense in the
    future. The PTSS provides persistent broad earth coverage and ABIR
    provides flexible regional surge capability.

        27. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, can you give me a military
    perspective on the importance of these two systems to our future
    missile defense capability?
        Admiral Macy. The ABIR sensor and the PTSS are vital to the future
    BMDS. Both systems will enhance the combatant commanders' ability to
    defend against ballistic missiles by increasing their capability and
    capacity to counter these threats. Any further discussions of the
    importance of these systems and the contribution that they make must be
    conducted in a classified setting.

        28. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, do you view them as both being
    necessary to the capabilities that the combatant commanders will need?
        Admiral Macy. The capabilities of the ABIR system and PTSS will be
    vital to the combatant commanders' future ability to defend against
    ballistic missiles. Any further discussions of the importance of these
    systems and the contribution that they make must be conducted in a
    classified setting.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                an/tpy-2 program
        29. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, the forward deployment of
    AN/TPY-2 radars will be fundamental to the success of the EPAA and will
    be important in meeting the combatant commands' (COCOM) needs for
    regional missile defense around the globe. In your written testimony,
    you note several accomplishments with respect to the AN/TPY-2 program,
    including the refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar for phase 1 of the
    EPAA as well as the preparation of a second radar for deployment to
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). You also note that the fiscal year 2012
    budget request includes support for additional AN/TPY-2 radars. Is DOD
    currently planning for the possibility of a multi-year procurement of
    the AN/TPY-2 radar and what would be the reasoning behind such a
    decision?
        General O'Reilly. MDA is evaluating the merits of a multi-year
    production procurement for AN/TPY-2 radars. This strategy reflects
    DOD's initiative to identify efficiencies that reduce costs of
    delivering warfighting capability. No decisions have been made at this
    time due to considerations of obsolescence changes and the need for
    subsequent testing prior to proposing a multi-year procurement.

        30. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, would you anticipate cost
    savings to accrue from a multi-year procurement of the AN/TPY-2 radar?
        General O'Reilly. MDA anticipates there would be cost saving from a
    multi-year procurement. We are evaluating the merits of a multi-year
    production for AN/TPY-2 radars. This strategy reflects DOD's initiative
    to identify efficiencies that reduce costs of delivering warfighting
    capability. No decisions have been made at this time due to
    considerations of obsolescence changes and the need for subsequent
    testing prior to proposing a multi-year procurement.

        31. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, are you confident that the
    current AN/TPY-2 development plans are adequate to match our COCOM
    near-term requirements as well as the requirements of the EPAA?
        General O'Reilly. MDA remains confident that current AN/TPY-2
    capability, increased quantities, and delivery timelines included in
    the budget will provide the warfighter the capability to address near
    term emerging threats and the EPAA.

        32. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, do you anticipate that any
    of the emerging challenges faced by our COCOMs will require additional
    development in the near-term?
        General O'Reilly. Depending on how and when the challenges emerge,
    MDA has options for additional near-term development of the AN/TPY-2.
    We conducted a 2010 summer study to evaluate investment options in
    response to challenging scenarios. The study concluded that while
    additional development to the AN/TPY-2 was not expected to be
    necessary, several investment options could add operational margin to
    help improve defense against an uncertain threat including dynamic
    resource management and debris mitigation.
                                     ______

              Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
                    east coast missile defense data terminal
        33. Senator Gillibrand. General O'Reilly, I appreciated your
    testimony that an east coast interceptor communication terminal for the
    GMD system will significantly enhance the security of the United States
    by improving defense of the east coast against a potential future
    missile threat from North Korea or Iran. I understand that Fort Drum in
    New York is under consideration as the site for such a terminal. Can
    you explain why you are pursuing this new capability and why Fort Drum
    would be a good site for the data terminal?
        General O'Reilly. An east coast interceptor communications terminal
    improves the ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the
    United States by providing data updates to Ground-Based Interceptors
    (GBI) launched from Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA,
    later in flight, thus increasing its probability of engagement success.
    The performance region was determined based upon current projections of
    the threat capability by 2015 and on the planned BMDS architecture in
    the same timeframe. Fort Drum, NY, was selected because it is within
    the required performance region and previous site surveys,
    environmental assessments, and use permits are already in place.

        34. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Roberts, how does this planned east
    coast missile defense data terminal fit into the planned enhancements
    you mentioned for the GMD system?
        Dr. Roberts. An east coast interceptor communications terminal
    improves the ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the
    United States by providing data updates to GBIs launched from Fort
    Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, later in flight, thus
    increasing its probability of engagement success.

        35. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Macy, from a military perspective,
    would this east coast data terminal provide a useful improvement to our
    Homeland missile defense capability?
        Admiral Macy. A data terminal on the east coast would improve our
    overall defense capability by providing better information to the GBIs
    in flight. This data terminal will enable communication with GBIs
    launched from Alaska and California on longer flights that will improve
    the defense of the eastern United States against potential ICBM
    threats.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                          future budget affordability
        36. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, it seems quite clear that there
    will not be enough money in future budgets to cover the costs of the
    weapon system programs currently underway. In your opinion, is MDA's
    current portfolio of acquisition programs affordable at the funding
    level set forth in the President's fiscal year 2012 and Future Years
    Defense budgets?
        Ms. Chaplain. Judgments about affordability need to be made in the
    context of the overall DOD budget, the Nation's priorities, and
    reliable cost data. I can only comment on the last point. We have
    reported that MDA's cost estimates are not yet reliable or credible nor
    do they meet our criteria for high quality estimates. Our March 2011
    report details where cost estimates need to improve and how.

                      phase 1 of phased adaptive approach
        37. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, what is the current status for deployment of Phase 1 of the PAA
    to missile defense in Europe?
        Dr. Roberts and Admiral Macy. The first BMDS element deployment in
    support of Phase 1 of the EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of this
    year when the USS Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will
    spend this spring and summer helping to develop, test, and verify the
    necessary command and control processes, data pathways, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures. In addition, the C\2\BMC upgrade to the air
    operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany has been installed to
    control the AN/TPY-2 forward based radar and connect it and any Aegis
    ships into our command and control structure in Europe. Finally,
    negotiations are continuing to finalize plans to locate and operate the
    AN/TPY-2 radar in support of the EPAA.
        General O'Reilly. USS Monterey CG 61, Aegis BMD 3.61 with SM-3
    Block 1A missiles is currently deployed in theater. AN/TPY-2 radar is
    currently undergoing refurbishment and is on schedule to be available
    to MDA on August 31, 2011, with a proposed movement date of September
    20, 2011. C\2\BMC systems are available and scheduled to deploy on
    August 31, 2011. Current schedule meets test program timelines. A
    critical EPAA phase 1 milestone was achieved in March 2011 when an
    IRBM-range target was intercepted in the Pacific by a SM-3 IA
    interceptor using the current Aegis fire control system and the EPAA
    forward based AN/TPY-2 and command and control architecture. Finally,
    negotiations are continuing to finalize plans to locate and operate the
    AN/TYP-2 radar in support of the EPAA.

        38. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, do you foresee any obstacles for meeting full deployment of Phase
    1 by the end of the year?
        Dr. Roberts. We have already deployed the USS Monterey as part of
    the sea-based missile defenses that are part of Phase 1 of the EPAA.
        While I do not see any insurmountable obstacles, there may be
    challenges to reaching a host-nation agreement and deploying the AN/
    TPY-2 radar by the end of the year. However we still intend to deploy
    the radar as part of Phase 1 of the EPAA.
        General O'Reilly. We are awaiting host nation agreement to field
    the AN/TPY-2 in support of Phase 1.
        Admiral Macy. In order to achieve full deployment of Phase 1 by the
    end of the year, a host nation agreement must be achieved to support
    deployment of the AN/TPY-2 radar. Once this host nation agreement is
    obtained and deployment preparations begin, we will have better
    fidelity on when full deployment will actually occur. At this time,
    there are no obstacles that cannot be overcome, however, full
    deployment of Phase 1 may be delayed.

        39. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, what is the current status of basing negotiations for the
    forward-based radar in southern Europe?
        Dr. Roberts. We are currently in discussions with potential host
    nations for the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to
    southern Europe. No final host-nation decision has been made.
        General O'Reilly. MDA provides programmatic and technical support
    for basing negotiations. Current status of basing negotiations is more
    authoritatively addressed by OSD(P) and the Department of State.
        Admiral Macy. The current status of basing negotiations is best
    addressed by OSD(P) and the Department of State.

        40. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
    Macy, in order to consider Phase 1 fully deployed by the end of 2011,
    when must a basing decision be made for the radar in southern Europe?
        Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. We expect that the deployment of
    the radar will take several months from the time that a basing decision
    is made. The actual timeline may vary due to the specific basing
    agreements and legal arrangements associated with the deployment.
        Admiral Macy. While we are already inside the window of the optimal
    deployment timeline, it is still technically possible to achieve a 2011
    deployment given a favorable host nation decision, rapid approval of
    the necessary legal framework, strong and active host nation support,
    and selection of a prepared site that requires little to no additional
    development to accommodate the radar.

       european phased adaptive approach transparency and accountability
        41. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
    and Ms. Chaplain, according to a recent GAO report, ``DOD has not fully
    implemented a management process that synchronizes European Missile
    Defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and
    accountability.'' Without these key metrics, the ability to conduct
    effective oversight is greatly impeded. Given that each of the four
    phases of the PAA are closely tied to concrete timeframes, what tools
    will be used to ensure that planned capabilities are delivered on time?
        Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. The tools the MDA uses to ensure
    on time delivery of the PAA planned capabilities include an Integrated
    Master Schedule (IMS), the BMDS Specification, the Integrated Master
    Test Plan (IMTP), the MDA budget, and the program baselines from the
    contributing BMDS component programs.
        BMDS component programs use six baselines for each system element
    being developed. These include a Technical Baseline, Operational
    Capacity Baseline, Test Baseline, Schedule Baseline, Resource Baseline,
    and Contracts Baseline. Critical milestones are captured in each, and
    specifically in the schedule and technical baselines including key
    events such as planned capability delivery in support of the EPAA.
        The MDA Baseline Execution Review (BER), Technology Baseline Review
    (TBR), and Development Baseline Review (DBR) are the tools used to
    ensure that planned capabilities are being developed and delivered on
    time. These baselines are reviewed monthly to monitor program
    performance and ensure alignment with the schedule for delivering the
    PAA. The MDA Director conducts quarterly BERs. MDA annually provides
    the BMDS Accountability Report (BAR) to Congress which contains
    detailed information on all of the baselines for each MDA program.
        Admiral Macy. As the programmatic and technical lead for
    acquisition and development in support of the EPAA, the tools necessary
    to deliver these planned capabilities on time is more authoritatively
    addressed by MDA.
        Ms. Chaplain. Given the extent of acquisition activity associated
    with implementing the EPAA, GAO believes that the following basic
    acquisition management tools and principles should be used to ensure
    that the EPAA effort can be successfully implemented. We found MDA had
    partially adopted these principles as described below.

             Well-defined requirements - DOD and MDA continue to
            define architectures, systems, and quantities needed to
            accomplish the missile defense mission set across the four
            phases. We have reported over the years that stable
            requirements are necessary to fully understand and plan for
            successive steps in the acquisition process, such as
            development and testing. As the series of acquisitions
            supporting the EPAA proceeds, we believe a clear business case
            is important to inform tradeoffs leadership may have to accept
            among cost, schedule, and performance to deliver capability
            within desired EPAA phase timeframes.
             Stakeholders and decisionmakers identified and roles
            defined - DOD and MDA's acquisition management and oversight
            process is structured around reviewing and approving activities
            of individual missile defense elements through a phased
            decision process. It remains unclear whether, how, and which
            various bodies reviewing MDA acquisitions are specifically
            reviewing the overall progress in acquiring integrated
            capability for EPAA phases within the timeframes called for by
            that approach. We continue to believe top level reviews of EPAA
            acquisitions would be useful.
             Integrated schedule and decision reviews - DOD and MDA
            manage and oversee MDA acquisitions through several mechanisms
            including the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) and its
            associated subcommittees. It remains unclear whether the MDEB
            has a management or oversight role in acquisition
            decisionmaking related to EPAA specifically.
             Integrated planning for technology development and
            system engineering - MDA's planning efforts for development and
            system engineering reflect the interdependencies of the BMDS
            elements and the integrated performance expected under the
            EPAA. Executing these development plans remains challenging
            under the EPAA deployment schedule.
             Integrated testing - MDA's test plan is structured
            around the PAA, and includes plans to test key capabilities
            expected as part of EPAA. The twice-yearly process of updating
            the test plan facilitates the participation of a wide variety
            of stakeholders in MDA's testing approach; however while the
            test plan itself is sound, we continue to have concerns about
            the plan's executability. MDA's practice of eliminating or
            deferring important developmental and operational tests limits
            knowledge available for management decisions.
             Integrated view of financial commitment - We continue
            to believe that a life cycle cost estimate for the subset of
            capabilities to be deployed as part of EPAA would help to
            ensure that DOD's investment decisions are fully informed.

        42. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
    and Ms. Chaplain, has MDA developed a life-cycle cost estimate for the
    EPAA?
        Dr. Roberts. The EPAA is a capability deployment approach and not
    an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life cycle
    cost estimate. EPAA is the phased deployment of individual BMDS
    capabilities as those capabilities are developed, tested, produced, and
    deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces life cycle cost
    estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that comprise
    the EPAA and other deployments globally. MDA can provide the cumulative
    deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual
    elements that comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM.
    Due to its adaptive nature, no fixed inventory can be established for
    EPAA due to the possibility that differing regional security
    environments may require the surging of missile defense capabilities
    into other regions.
        General O'Reilly. EPAA itself is a capability deployment approach
    and not an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life
    cycle cost estimate. EPAA is the phased deployment of individual BMDS
    capabilities as those capabilities are developed, tested, produced and
    deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces life cycle cost
    estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that comprise
    the EPAA and other deployments globally. We can provide the cumulative
    deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual
    elements that comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM.
    Due to its adaptive nature, no fixed inventory is established for EPAA
    vice the simultaneous deployment needs of other COCOMs.
        Admiral Macy. The EPAA is not a system for which a single life-
    cycle cost estimate can be developed. Rather, the EPAA is a framework
    that provides an adaptable strategy for missile defense in Europe.
    While some components within this framework possess life-cycle costs
    that can be readily attributable to EPAA (e.g., Aegis Ashore), many of
    the components that have dual or multi-use purposes (e.g., Aegis ships)
    cannot.
        Ms. Chaplain. MDA has not developed a life-cycle cost estimate for
    the EPAA. While MDA did produce an informal estimate in the fall of
    2009, it does not reflect the current EPAA architecture. As we reported
    in January 2011, DOD has not developed and does not plan on developing
    EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers EPAA an adaptive
    approach that will change over time. However, best practices for cost
    estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even
    with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD
    and Congress to assess the goal of fielding affordable and cost-
    effective BMDs as well as determine if corrective actions are needed.
    We therefore recommended in January 2011 that DOD develop a life-cycle
    cost estimate for EPAA.

        43. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
    and Ms. Chaplain, now that the Joint Staff has completed its Joint
    Capabilities Mix III (JCM III) study, shouldn't MDA have a better
    understanding of the total costs associated with the deployment of the
    architecture envisioned for Europe?
        Dr. Roberts. The JCM III results are a useful component for
    developing the total costs associated with the deployment of the
    architecture envisioned for Europe. However, the study did not include
    deployment costs in its assessments.
        While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to
    establish the total cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, its
    findings will be helpful as we determine future missile defense needs.
        General O'Reilly. MDA considers the JCM III results as a useful
    component of our developing the total costs associated with the
    deployment of the architecture envisioned for Europe. However, the
    study did not include deployment costs in its assessments. Furthermore,
    the radar location in Europe that JCM III assumes may still change due
    to political considerations. Any changes in radar basing would impact
    the number and deployment costs of interceptors as well as the
    deployment costs of the radars themselves.
        The JCM III study shows the capability of the currently funded PAA
    against intel-based threats, and analyzes improvements that could be
    achieved with increased resources. The study made a number of
    assumptions about system track correlation and weapons system
    deconfliction, hit assessment, and C\2\BMC capability that are still
    under development. In addition, the study did not factor in the
    platform costs of fielding the number of ABIR systems employed in their
    analysis.
        While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to
    establish the total cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, we
    will support the study as it moves to the next phase and incorporate
    its findings into our cost estimation.
        Admiral Macy. The JCM III study was a qualitative performance
    analysis to determine the warfighters' requirements for elements of the
    BMD System required for BMD. This study focused on warfighting
    sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition objectives by examining
    the application of architectures to deter aggressors and end enemy
    ballistic missile attacks should they occur. JCM III did not attempt to
    simply answer how much to buy, but rather give alternatives to the
    warfighter to best achieve their overall goals. As such, JCM III
    provides utility to senior leaders on resourcing and allocation
    decisions, not total costs.
        Ms. Chaplain. DOD should have a better understanding of the total
    costs associated of EPAA after completion of JCM III. DOD has not
    briefed GAO on the study. Given that DOD, led by the Joint Staff, has
    used the JCM III study to examine all elements of the regional BMDS, to
    examine the performance against threat ballistic missiles that employed
    a range of countermeasures, and to identify alternatives that the
    warfighter can employ to best achieve his overall goals, the results of
    the study should yield additional information needed to better
    understand costs associated with each phase of the EPAA. As we reported
    in January 2011, the Joint Staff-led JCM III along with a U.S.
    Strategic Command study should help to better define force allocation
    and quantity needs for PAA in Europe and other regions. It is clear,
    however, that DOD faces a management and operational challenge since
    there is greater demand for missile defense assets than there will be a
    supply of those assets.
        Best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing
    valid cost estimates even with the uncertainties associated with EPAA
    architectures. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD and
    Congress to assess the goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective
    BMDs as well as determine if corrective actions are needed. However, we
    reported in January 2011 that DOD needs to determine whether the EPAA
    schedule is realistic and achievable, to identify potential problems,
    and to analyze how changes will affect the execution of this effort.

                                 sm-3 block iib
        44. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, as I mentioned in my
    opening statement, I am concerned that the schedule for development and
    deployment of the SM-3 IIB is overly optimistic. How confident are you
    that the SM-3 IIB will be delivered by 2020 for Phase 4 of the PAA?
        General O'Reilly. I am confident that we will deploy the SM-3 Block
    IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The
    SM-3 Block IIB schedule is based on recent government experience
    developing similar successful missile defense interceptor programs.
    Product development for SM-3 Block IIB spans 7 years, beginning in
    third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through IOC in 2020.
    Within that interval, 5\1/2\ years is projected between the product
    development and production decisions. This time allocation is
    consistent with the average of typical BMD interceptors including
    Patriot, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3 Block IB as reported by the GAO.
        Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently
    awarded to three potential SM-3 Block IIB development prime contractors
    add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule
    projections. Each contractor is conducting missile trade studies to
    define SM-3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for
    Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology
    risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that
    increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are
    investing now with multiple vendors in kill vehicle divert and attitude
    control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and
    lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These
    investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our
    product development schedule risk.

        45. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, what is the anticipated SM-
    3 IIB capability against ICBMs from Iran?
        General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]

        46. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, do you agree with the Aegis
    weapons system development philosophy of incremental development,
    refinement, and proven design? If so, why did you decide to not involve
    the Aegis program office in early SM-3 IIB development efforts?
        General O'Reilly. The MDA fully supports a development philosophy
    of incremental development, refinement, and proven design. The Aegis
    program office has been involved with the SM-3 Block IIB program. The
    SM-3 Block IIB program office employs 12 full-time Aegis BMD personnel
    to support Aegis Weapon System integration and program planning
    activities. Following the proven technology approach of the current
    family of SM-3 interceptors, the program currently falls under the
    leadership of the MDA Program Executive for Advanced Technology because
    the Block IIB is currently in the Technology Development Phase. As in
    our Navy/BMDO Terrier Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP)
    technology demonstration program which developed the technical concepts
    used in today's SM-3 family of interceptors under the management of our
    Technology Directorate, we will prove the fundamental kill vehicle and
    booster technology was ready for product development. As with the
    original LEAP program, the SM-3 IIB program takes advantage of MDA's
    advanced technology efforts to develop new concepts in propulsion,
    lightweight materials, and sensors to reduce the risk associated with
    achieving the velocity and divert capabilities necessary for the SM-3
    Block IIB. After these concepts and technology mature over the next 2
    years, the program will then shift to product development and will
    transition under full Aegis BMD Program Office management in fiscal
    year 2013.

                           mda oversight by congress
        47. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, responses to requests for
    information from MDA have never been slower. Countless requests from
    both personal offices and committee staff take weeks and in many
    instances months for responses. Are you aware of this? If so, how do
    you intend to ensure that requests from Congress are responded to in a
    timely manner?
        General O'Reilly. My Deputy Director and I personally review all
    responses to congressional questions. To respond effectively to
    congressional inquiries, MDA coordinates closely with the Services, the
    combatant commanders, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (AT&L,
    Policy, and the Comptroller) to ensure our answers are accurate,
    consistent with DOD objectives, and our programs are executable. This
    past year has been more challenging due to uncertainty of fiscal year
    2011 funding.
        However, I fully concur that MDA should respond more rapidly to
    congressional inquiries. I recently completed a congressional response
    process review with my senior executive staff. As a result, we have
    improved our internal processes for responding to congressional
    inquiries by elevating questions to the attention of our senior
    executive leaders and increasing visibility of the staffing process
    within our command group.

        48. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has had
    issues with MDA transparency and timely responses to requests for
    information. Is this true? If so, have you requested that MDA improve
    access to information necessary for conducting effective oversight?
        Ms. Chaplain. GAO has experienced issues with MDA's timely
    responses to our requests for information. We reported in 2010 that we
    experienced significant delays in obtaining information from MDA.
    During that audit, MDA did not always provide GAO staff with
    expeditious access to requested documents and articles of information,
    which delayed some audit analysis and contributed to extra staff hours.
    We reported in 2011 that we again experienced significant delays in
    obtaining information from MDA. In early 2011, MDA's Director agreed to
    meet with GAO in an effort to improve our access to data and our
    working relationship. These efforts have produced new guidance on
    access which has been signed by both MDA and GAO and we are currently
    beginning to implement the guidance as we begin our new missile
    defense-related engagements. We see the guidance as a positive step
    forward, although it is too soon yet to see significant outcomes from
    its implementation. Improved access to information will be vital to
    ensuring we are in a position to assist Congress as it oversees MDA's
    missile defense efforts.

                        precision tracking space system
        49. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, this committee is painfully
    aware of the troubles associated with space system acquisition. What is
    your acquisition strategy for the PTSS and why do you feel you are
    better suited than Air Force Space Command to execute this strategy?
        General O'Reilly. PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of
    the BMDS. This will require extensive participation of all BMDS
    elements as the preliminary design is developed. While the Air Force
    Space Command is a critical partner in the PTSS development, the PTSS
    development phase must also have involvement of Federally Funded
    Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, MIT
    Lincoln Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, Space Dynamics
    Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory); dedicated Service Cells of
    the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated System
    Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop
    Grumman, Orbital Sciences, and Raytheon). These PTSS stakeholders will
    develop non-proprietary, government-owned intellectual property to
    enable full and open competition for industry to produce the PTSS.
    FFRCs are well-suited to perform this technical management role for MDA
    and Air Force Space Command.
        MDA's charter is to develop and test all missile defense
    capabilities, including but not limited to missiles and radars. The
    development of space-based remote sensing, and the integration of the
    data into BMD fire-control loops, are integral to the MDA's development
    of early intercept capability. MDA is better able to lead the systems
    engineering and testing between the BMDS elements, including PTSS,
    prior to making production decisions. To support this strategy, the MDA
    and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center agree to assign Air
    Force personnel to the MDA's programs (included the PTSS program).

        50. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, DOD space programs are a part
    of your GAO portfolio. Do you have any concerns with MDA's acquisition
    of space systems?
        Ms. Chaplain. Our concerns about space acquisitions extend across
    DOD. As I recently testified before this subcommittee, despite the
    significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale
    acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
    during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of
    millions and even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years,
    and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD
    altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it
    intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or
    terminating major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the
    cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant
    schedule delays--of as much as 9 years--resulting in potential
    capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military
    communications, and weather monitoring. These problems have been
    evident in Air Force, Navy, and MDA space programs. However, as I
    testified, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    have taken a wide range of actions to prevent them from occurring in
    new programs.
        We have not performed an in-depth review of the PTSS in particular
    nor of MDA's broader capability to acquire space systems. An assessment
    of MDA's capability to acquire space systems may be worthwhile given
    the broader concerns we have identified of a shortage of space
    acquisition expertise within DOD.
        Further, an in-depth review of PTSS may also be worthwhile given
    issues we highlighted in our March 2011 report. As we reported in
    March, we have concerns regarding the PTSS program's optimistic
    schedule. MDA has developed an optimistic PTSS acquisition approach to
    field an operational constellation by fiscal year 2018. The agency
    plans to conduct prototyping efforts beginning in fiscal year 2011 and
    launch two prototype satellites in fiscal year 2015. MDA also plans to
    launch a minimum of seven additional satellites by fiscal year 2018. We
    are concerned about this compressed schedule because it took MDA about
    8 years to refurbish and develop its predecessor--the two demonstration
    STSS satellites--which launched in 2009 and took almost 15 months after
    launch to reach full operational capability. PTSS intends to develop
    and launch two prototype satellites in approximately 5 years and
    subsequently launch seven operational satellites in approximately 3
    years.
        We also reported that delays in fielding a PTSS constellation in
    fiscal year 2018 would significantly affect the implementation of the
    PAA to defend Europe and the United States against regional ballistic
    missile attacks. MDA discovered that there were sensor coverage gaps in
    its ability to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid sizes,
    intercept ballistic missiles earlier in their trajectories, assess
    intercept attempts in real time, and launch additional interceptors, if
    necessary. Currently, the sensor systems of the BMDS consist of radar
    sensors, such as SBX and AN/TPY-2. According to MDA, infrared
    satellites such as PTSS would have advantages over terrestrial radars
    because they can limit the affect of weather conditions, eliminate the
    need for host nation agreements, and observe ballistic missile launches
    occurring in remote locations. In addition PTSS is being designed to
    track large missile raid sizes soon after launch to enable earlier
    intercepts. Such capabilities would alleviate sensor coverage gaps and
    reduce the need for terrestrial sensors.

                              acquisition reforms
        51. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, 1 of the 23 principal
    actions outlined in Dr. Carter's September 2010 Better Buying Power
    memo was mandating affordability as a requirement for new weapon
    programs. How is MDA determining what is affordable?
        General O'Reilly. The MDA performs government cost estimates on all
    BMDS component programs to create a basis for affordability reviews.
    BMDS component programs that require an Under Secretary of Defense
    (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) production decision typically
    have an Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation) Independent Cost Estimate conducted to support the
    decision. All BMDS component programs are reviewed by a MDA Director-
    level program change board to prioritize activities within the BMDS and
    within individual BMDS component programs. Affordability initiatives
    from the program manager, program executive staff, and functional staff
    are applied at this time. These reviews form the basis for the
    overarching MDA budget request and ultimately determine what each of
    the BMDS component programs are provided to execute their programs.

        52. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, how will programs be held
    accountable for meeting affordability targets?
        General O'Reilly. BMDS component programs are reviewed quarterly at
    the MDA Director-chaired BERs. BERs review all six baselines to include
    the Resources Baseline (the Resource Baseline includes cost and
    affordability). Any changes to baselines must be approved by the
    program manager, program executive, and functional manager responsible
    for the baseline to ensure integration with other BMDS component
    programs and other baselines. The program manager must account for any
    variations from the baselines, and significant variations are reported
    to Congress in the annual BAR.

        53. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, will affordability targets
    be reported to Congress in the BAR?
        General O'Reilly. Yes.

                                israeli programs
        54. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the fiscal year 2012 budget
    included a $5 million efficiencies-related reduction for Israeli
    missile defense cooperative programs. I understand that this reduction
    is below the funding level agreed to by the United States and Israel.
    Is that correct?
        General O'Reilly. The agreement allows for each partner to execute
    in accordance with its own national laws and regulations, and those
    obligations are subject to availability of funds. Thus, the agreement
    allowed for U.S. efficiency directives to be implemented on our Israeli
    cooperative programs. $5.0 million in savings was identified in U.S.-
    Israel Cooperative Programs in fiscal year 2012 through a refined test
    approach. For example, the completion of U.S.-based flight testing in
    2011 (Caravan-2), and the decision to move additional planned flight
    testing (Caravan-3) to Israel, reduced U.S. test planning and personnel
    requirements in fiscal year 2012. Thus, the original objectives and
    scope of U.S. contribution to these Israeli programs will be met.

                       two-stage ground-based interceptor
        55. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, while the
    two-stage GBI has been designated as a contingency in the event
    development of the IIB takes longer than anticipated, I remain
    concerned that DOD has yet to identify a serious hedging strategy for
    testing and potential deployment. If it is determined that the SM-3 IIB
    will not be technologically feasible in time for a 2020 deployment, how
    much time would be needed to deploy the two-stage GBIs in its place?
        Dr. Roberts. The hedge strategy is in the process of being
    developed and refined. We have committed to brief this committee on the
    results once it has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The
    hedge strategy will include a discussion of hedge options to mitigate
    the effect of a delay to the SM-3 IIB interceptor.
        General O'Reilly. The hedge strategy is under development and will
    be briefed to Congress by the Office of the Secretary of Defense once
    it has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Hedge strategy
    decision timeline triggers include both the threat assessment and SM-3
    IIB developmental progress. The hedge strategy will include timelines
    for deployment.

        56. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, has the
    administration outlined a plan that ties two-stage GBI procurement and
    basing agreements with the schedule and technological milestones for
    the SM-3 IIB?
        Dr. Roberts. DOD is reviewing its hedge strategy, including
    ensuring a sufficient hedge to a potential delay to the SM-3 IIB
    interceptor. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the
    Secretary has approved the hedging strategy.
        General O'Reilly. As Dr. Roberts stated in his testimony, DOD is
    reviewing what more needs to be done to ensure the hedge posture is
    sufficient to address the possible threat developments in the timeframe
    before 2020. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the
    Secretary has approved the hedging strategy.

        57. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, how will
    delaying the test for the two-stage GBI next year to pay for corrective
    measures related to the two recent three-stage GBI test failures impact
    the availability of the two-stage as a hedge to the SM-3 IIA and IIB?
        Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. The repeat of FTG-06a will
    consume a majority of the resources previously estimated for funding
    FTG-08 (the first intercept test of a two stage GBI). There are two
    remaining two-stage flight tests necessary prior to a two-stage GBI
    deployment decision, FTG-08 and FTG-17. FTG-08 has been delayed by 2
    years from the second quarter of fiscal year 2012 until the fourth
    quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG-17, with upgraded avionics, is delayed
    from the third quarter of fiscal year 2016 to the fourth quarter of
    fiscal year 2019. However, we could accelerate flight testing if it is
    deemed necessary.
        The repeat of FTG-06a will consume a majority of the resources
    previously estimated for funding FTG-08 (the first intercept test of a
    two stage GBI). There are two remaining two-stage flight tests
    necessary prior to a two-stage GBI deployment decision, FTG-08 and FTG-
    17. FTG-08 has been delayed by 2 years from the second quarter of
    fiscal year 2012 until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG-17,
    with upgraded avionics, is delayed from the third quarter of fiscal
    year 2016 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. If a threat change
    was to dictate an earlier need, we could accelerate flight testing to
    accommodate.

        [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator E.
    Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research
    assistant.
        Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
    Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
        Committee members' assistant present: Ann Premer, assistant
    to Senator Ben Nelson.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Nelson. I call this hearing to order. My good
    friend, Ranking Member Senator Sessions, is on his way, but
    they've suggested we go ahead and start, given the fact that
    we're interrupted by a vote and the White House.
        I'd like to welcome all of you this afternoon and our many
    witnesses. Today we meet to discuss military space programs.
    Often there is little appreciation or understanding either in
    the Senate or in the general public of the advantages that
    space systems provide the U.S. military, the Intelligence
    Community (IC), and our economy in general. Somehow a satellite
    flying over a football game just isn't the same as a flyover by
    a B-2. It just hasn't gotten there yet.
        We as a Nation would be greatly diminished without our
    space assets. Thank you for your commitment and dedication to
    space and I look forward to a good discussion today.
        Our witnesses this afternoon are: Ambassador Gregory L.
    Schulte--we welcome you to your new position, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Dr. John A. Zangardi,
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, Control,
    Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information
    Operations, and Space. Is there anything left? [Laughter.]
        Dr. Zangardi. No, sir, there is not. [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. All right.
        General William L. Shelton, USAF, Commander, Air Force
    Space Command (AFSPC), we welcome you. Lieutenant General Susan
    J. Helms, USAF, Commander, AFSPC, Strategic Command, Joint
    Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC Space);
    Lieutenant General Richard P. Formica, USA, Commander, U.S.
    Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
    Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT); Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN,
    Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy and Director, Maritime
    Domain Awareness and Space; Major General John E. Hyten, USAF,
    Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force for Acquisition; and Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain,
    Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government
    Accountability Office (GAO).
        First, congratulations, as I said, are in order for the
    successful launch of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
    GEO-1 last Saturday. This satellite is years behind schedule
    and substantially over budget, but it's finally in orbit.
        General Shelton, this is your first opportunity to testify
    before the subcommittee since your confirmation as the new
    Commander of AFSPC. Welcome.
        I'd also like to note that we have included Lieutenant
    General Formica in our hearing today representing the Army's
    small but growing interest in space. General Formica may not
    think it's small, but by comparison some others do. We've not
    had the Army testify on space issues in many years and we look
    forward to hearing from you today.
        Finally, Lieutenant General Helms, congratulations on your
    induction last week to the Astronaut Hall of Fame.
        This past year has been a very active one in the space
    community. The first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
    satellite was launched in August, although as a result of a
    failure in the satellite propulsion system it is not yet in its
    proper orbit. We would appreciate any update on the satellite's
    progress. As I understand it, AEHF-1 is supposed to be in the
    right orbit by later this summer.
        The first Global Positioning System (GPS)-3F satellite
    launched just after our hearing last year and the second one
    should launch later this year, this summer even. The first
    Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite launched in
    September. Operational Response Satellite 1 (ORS-1) should
    launch in June and TacSat-4 will also launch later this summer.
    Both of these satellites are awaiting resolution of a launch
    vehicle issue. Of course, the SBIRS launched last week. Quite a
    year of firsts.
        As we all know so well, the Air Force and Navy have
    struggled for many years with their satellite programs and,
    while it appears that the many design, development, and
    manufacturing issues are mostly resolved, it's been a long and
    expensive process. The question we have is, what are the
    lessons learned that can be applied to future programs?
        One satellite program is not out of the woods, however, and
    that is the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), the
    successor to National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS). Even though the NPOESS program was
    cancelled a year ago, the acquisition plan for the much-needed
    DWSS is not finished. We'd like to know the schedule for this
    program and when there will be an acquisition decision.
        While the Navy appears to have solved the technical
    problems with the antenna on the Mobile User Objective
    Satellite (MUOS), a communications satellite which just last
    year was about 11 months late, with a launch date of September
    of this year. I now understand that MUOS is approximately 21
    months late and will not even be delivered until mid-next year.
    In the mean time, the Navy just put the fifth satellite on
    contract. We'll be anxious to hear, learn, and discuss more
    about this delay as well.
        The Air Force has two proposals on the table this year. One
    is to look at block buys of satellites starting with AEHF
    satellites 5 and 6. The second proposal is to look into a
    commitment to buy at least eight booster cores per year for the
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). This would entail a
    much-needed restructuring of the EELV contract and a better
    understanding of the actual launch costs. We look forward to a
    thorough discussion of the very successful, but expensive,
    EELVs.
        The final issue is the space industrial base. From rocket
    motors and engines to the smallest satellite parts, the supply
    base is getting smaller. We'd like to hear your thoughts on how
    to strengthen this industrial base.
        We have a large panel today, so I will conclude and ask
    Senator Sessions for his comments. What I'm hopeful is that our
    panelists know that we have to leave at 3:20 p.m., we have a
    vote at 3 p.m., and for a late-breaking meeting to the White
    House. You've submitted prepared statements, they will be
    included in the record. If we could maximize the time and, very
    briefly, identify your highest priority in about 2 minutes.
        Ambassador Schulte, we'll begin with you. Then Zangardi,
    Shelton, Helms, Formica, Titley, Hyten, and Chaplain. Thank
    you. Ambassador.

        STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
                 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY

        Ambassador Schulte. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify this afternoon. In February, Secretary
    Gates and Director of National Intelligence Clapper submitted
    to Congress a first-ever National Security Space Strategy
    (NSSS). This new strategy starts with dramatic changes in
    space, a domain that remains vital to our national security,
    but that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
        In the face of these challenges, this new strategy seeks to
    protect the strategic advantages that we derive from space
    while also protecting the domain itself and the industrial base
    that is so important to our capabilities there. My prepared
    statement summarizes the strategy. I would like to focus
    briefly on three important aspects: first, promoting
    responsible use of space; second, partnering with other
    countries; and third, deterring attacks on our space systems.
        Promoting the responsible use of space is one of the new
    strategy's key approaches. A more cooperative, predictable
    environment enhances our national security and discourages
    destabilizing behavior. The United States is leading by
    example. We are preparing to begin providing pre-launch
    notifications of our space launches, just as we have notified
    ballistic missile launches in the past.
        U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has signed agreements
    with some 23 satellite operators across the world to share data
    and warnings of possible collisions. The United States is also
    looking to promote international transparency and confidence-
    building measures for space. With that in mind, we are
    currently evaluating the European Union's (EU) proposed
    International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Our
    preliminary review suggests that such a code could provide a
    positive approach to promoting responsible space--responsible
    behavior, but the administration has not yet made a final
    determination on the code or changes that would be necessary
    for us to accept it, and the Department of Defense (DOD) is
    assessing its operational impact.
        Partnering with other countries is another key approach of
    the new strategy. Partnerships allow us to benefit from the
    growing space capabilities of allies and other countries, to
    make our space systems more diverse and resilient, and to
    improve our ability to operate in coalition. As an important
    step in that process, we are looking at transitioning
    STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) into a
    combined space operations center with allies.
        Another good example of partnership is the Wide-Band Global
    satellite communications (SATCOM). Australia has bought into
    the constellation and the Air Force is negotiating with other
    allies to also buy in. This expands the number of satellites,
    adds coverage and resiliency, and shares the cost, a welcome
    benefit at a time of budget constraints.
        The new strategy also reflects a new multi-layered approach
    to deterring attacks on our space systems, which is important
    as space becomes increasingly contested. The first layer of
    deterrence is the establishment of norms of responsible
    behavior, as I discussed. The second layer of deterrence is the
    establishment of international coalitions so that an attack on
    the capability of one becomes the attack on the capability of
    many.
        The third layer of deterrence is increasing our resilience
    and capacity to operate in a degraded environment. The fourth
    layer of deterrence is a readiness and capability to respond in
    self-defense and not necessarily in space.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD has adopted a new space
    strategy to protect the national security advantages that we
    derive from a domain that is increasingly congested, contested,
    and competitive, and we look forward to working with you and
    Congress in implementing this strategy.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Schulte follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Department of
    Defense (DOD) space policy. I am honored to join my distinguished
    colleagues from the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO). Today, I am pleased to discuss the
    recently released National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).
        Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is
    central to our national security. Space systems allow our warfighters
    to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with
    accuracy, and operate with assurance. However, an evolving strategic
    environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages. The current
    and future strategic environment is driven by three trends--space is
    increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
        Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and
    testing of China's destructive anti-satellite system have increased
    congestion in important areas in space. DOD tracks approximately 22,000
    manmade objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are active satellites. Another
    area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum. As many
    as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in
    orbit by 2015. As more transponders are placed in service, the greater
    the probability of radiofrequency interference. This congestion is
    complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from
    space.
        Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Potential
    adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities
    through a range of counterspace threats that may deny, degrade,
    deceive, disrupt, or destroy space assets and supporting infrastructure
    from widely available jamming technology to highly-sophisticated,
    kinetic anti-satellite weapons. As more nations and non-state actors
    develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S.
    space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space
    environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems
    could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide
    services upon which the civil and commercial sectors depend.
        Space is increasingly competitive. More than 60 nations and
    government consortia currently operate satellites. Although the United
    States maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S.
    competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have
    lowered. Some U.S. suppliers are at risk due to inconsistent
    acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, and a more
    competitive foreign market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further
    challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical
    technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and
    maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by
    challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical
    workforce.
        However, the challenges of a congested, contested, competitive
    environment also present the United States with opportunities for
    leadership and partnership. The recently released joint DOD and
    Intelligence Community NSSS charts a path for the next decade to
    respond to the current and projected space strategic environment.
        The NSSS seeks to maintain and enhance the national security
    benefits the United States derives from its activities and capabilities
    in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and
    strengthening the foundations of our space enterprise. The strategy
    identifies three U.S. national security space objectives: strengthen
    safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the
    strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by
    space; and energize the space industrial base that supports U.S.
    national security. Achieving these objectives will ensure our military
    continued access to space-based assets national security purposes.
        The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening
    our space capabilities and improving our collaboration with others
    worldwide. Leadership cannot be predicated on declaratory policy alone.
    It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while
    working with the international community to develop collective norms,
    share information, and collaborate on capabilities. Thus the United
    States will pursue a set of five interrelated strategic approaches to
    meet our national security space objectives and enhance U.S. leadership
    in space, as outlined in the NSSS.
              promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space
        The United States will promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe
    use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and
    contested space domain. A more cooperative, predictable environment
    enhances U.S. national security and discourages destabilizing crisis
    behavior. The United States will encourage responsible behavior in
    space and will support development of data standards, best practices,
    transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior
    for responsible space operations. The United States will consider
    proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable,
    effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United
    States.
        With increasing congestion in the space domain, efforts to develop
    and share situational awareness can help bring order to the congestion
    and prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. DOD will continue to
    improve the quantity and quality of the space situational awareness
    (SSA) information it obtains and, in coordination with other government
    agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other nations and
    commercial firms to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties. DOD is
    also pursuing opportunities to expand sharing of space situational
    awareness data to increase transparency and cooperation in the domain.
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has entered into agreements with 23
    companies, including both launch providers and satellite owners and
    operators, to improve spaceflight safety.
        The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to promote
    the responsible use of space. In keeping with the new strategy and the
    President's National Space Policy, we are currently evaluating the
    European Union's (EU) proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer
    Space Activities as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe
    activity in space. We are also discussing the Code with other space-
    faring countries, including our key allies, as well as Russia, China,
    and India. The administration has not made a final determination on the
    EU proposal, and DOD is assessing its operational impact. However, our
    preliminary assessment finds it a positive approach to promoting
    responsible behavior in space, enhancing our national security in the
    process.
        Promoting transparency for responsible space operations will
    enhance the security of the United States by singling out those actors
    who seek to disrupt peaceful uses of outer space. As a concrete step
    towards transparency, DOD recently revised its pre-launch notification
    policy to include space launch vehicles in addition to ballistic
    missile launches. DOD will continue to work with the Department of
    State and other departments to promote responsible behavior worldwide
    that will help ensure the long-term sustainability of the space
    environment.
                    provide improved u.s. space capabilities
        Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely,
    reliable, and responsive manner is critical for military forces to plan
    and execute effective operations. Improving our acquisition processes,
    energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological
    innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are
    critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership.
        The United States seeks to foster a space industrial base that is
    robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space
    capabilities on time and on budget. International advances in space
    technology have put increased importance on reforming U.S. export
    controls to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial
    base while addressing technology security. Secretary Gates has actively
    called for an overhaul of our export control system. Reforming export
    controls will facilitate U.S. firms' ability to compete in the
    international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon
    become, widely available globally, while strengthening our ability to
    protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages. The NSSS
    reaffirms the necessity of these reforms and echoes the National Space
    Policy's call for giving favorable consideration for export of those
    items and technologies that are generally available on the global
    market, consistent with U.S. national security interests.
        We are exploring innovative acquisition strategies for buying
    spacecraft, with a focus on block buys. As part of the Secretary of
    Defense's broader efficiency initiatives, our goals are to: (1) reduce
    unit cost for ``production ready'' satellites; (2) enable the
    Department to acquire these systems more efficiently and affordably;
    and (3) stabilize production including the industrial base. Our
    innovative acquisition strategy will include full-funding of two
    satellite classes--Advanced Extremely High Frequency (in fiscal year
    2012) and Space Based Infrared System (in fiscal year 2013)--through
    the use of advance appropriations. We ask for your support of this
    approach.
      partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and
                                commercial firms
        The United States will pursue additional opportunities to partner
    with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial
    firms to augment the U.S. National Security Space Posture. Decisions on
    partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and international
    commitments and will consider cost, protection of sources and methods,
    and effects on the U.S. industrial base. U.S. military personnel will
    ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to
    enhance partner access to space information.
        With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space
    doctrine that endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space
    capabilities in crisis and conflict. DOD is already exploring
    transforming STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center into a Combined
    Space Operations Center operated with international partners. A
    Combined Space Operations Center will allow our allies to work side-by-
    side with U.S. commanders, integrating a coalition approach to space
    into our day-to-day operations. DOD, in conjunction with the State
    Department and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies, will work to
    expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize
    existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national
    security space capabilities. Wideband Global Satellite Communication is
    a good example--Australia has joined the constellation and other allies
    are looking at doing the same. A larger, more international
    constellation adds resilience and augments our space-based capabilities
    and forces a potential aggressor to contemplate attacking space systems
    used by a coalition of countries instead of one country.
        We will explore sharing space-derived information as ``global
    utilities'' with partnered nations. We will continue to share SSA
    information to promote responsible and safe space operations and will
    pursue enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning
    and maritime domain awareness. We will explore the establishment of a
    collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks against our
    interests and those of our allies and partners.
        Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in
    areas that stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space
    architectures upon which we rely. Such partnerships enhance national
    security capabilities by providing opportunities to host national
    security payloads on commercial spacecraft or by offering innovative
    opportunities to buy or lease capabilities on-orbit. In an era of
    limited resources, the DOD will develop space systems only when there
    is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternatives or when national
    security needs dictate. We will also actively promote the sale of
    capabilities developed by U.S. companies to partner nations. Such
    capabilities could then be integrated into existing U.S. architectures
    and networks through arrangements that enhance and diversify U.S.
    capabilities.
    prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports
                             u.s. national security
        The United States is pursuing a multilayered approach to prevent
    and deter aggression against U.S. and allied space systems that support
    our national security. The Department seeks to enhance its capability
    to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of
    counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space
    systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national
    security.
        Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach. DOD
    will: support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible
    behavior in space which may dissuade and impose international costs on
    irresponsible behavior; pursue international partnerships that
    encourage potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to
    attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to
    deny the benefits of an attack; and retain the right to respond, should
    deterrence fail.
        SSA will continue to be a top priority, as it decreases the risk
    that an adversary's action could occur without warning or attribution.
    We are working with the Director of National Intelligence to improve
    our intelligence posture--predictive awareness, characterization,
    warning, and attribution, to improve our understanding of activities in
    the space domain. When combined with efforts to promote responsible
    behavior, such transparency will facilitate the quick identification of
    actions that threaten U.S. interests.
        Furthermore, the United States will deny adversaries meaningful
    benefits of attack by improving protection and strengthening the
    resilience of our architectures. Partnerships as well as alternative
    U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted
    payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can
    deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked. This also
    will enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment.
        Finally, the United States is developing a range of options to
    deter, and if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with U.S. or
    allied space systems consistent with the inherent right of self-defense
    and other longstanding principles on international law. Such options
    could include necessary and proportional responses outside of the space
    domain.
       prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment
        Notwithstanding our efforts to deter, some actors may still pursue
    counterspace actions as a means of achieving military or political
    advantage. Our military capabilities must be prepared to operate
    through a degraded environment and attacks targeted at our space
    systems and supporting infrastructure. We must deny and defeat an
    adversary's ability to achieve its objectives.
        As DOD invests in space capabilities, it will include resilience as
    a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures. Resilience can
    be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space
    system protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of
    platforms in various orbits, drawing on distributed international and
    commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive
    space capabilities.
        To enhance resilience, DOD will continue to develop mission-
    effective alternatives, including land, sea, air, and space-based
    alternatives for critical capabilities currently delivered primarily
    through space-based platforms. In addition, DOD will seek to establish
    relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner capabilities
    if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to use
    these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a
    degraded space environment.
        Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes
    relying on space information, operating our space systems, and
    analyzing space-derived information. Ensuring that our servicemen can
    operate effectively during an attack on our space assets reduces the
    benefit of attack. DOD is also developing exercises and training to
    ensure our ability to access the requisite capabilities and
    information, from space or through cross-domain solutions, in the event
    of interference with space capabilities.
                                   conclusion
        Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach
    that updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power.
    DOD, in coordination with other departments and agencies, will
    implement this strategy by updating guidance, plans, doctrine,
    programs, and operations to reflect the new strategic approach.
        DOD included initial steps towards implementing the strategy in its
    fiscal year 2012 budget and will use the coming year to lay the
    foundation for changes in fiscal year 2013 and beyond. DOD looks
    forward to working closely with Congress, industry, and allies to
    implement this new strategy for space.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Zangardi.

        STATEMENT OF JOHN A. ZANGARDI, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,
       COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND SPACE

        Dr. Zangardi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
    much for giving me the opportunity to testify this afternoon on
    issues of space.
        The Navy continues to provide narrow-band SATCOM for U.S.
    forces worldwide through the legacy Ultra-High Frequency (UHF)
    Follow-On (UFO) constellation. We will continue to lease
    commercial UHF services to supplement existing capacity as
    required in support of the warfighter. The Navy looks forward
    to the first on-orbit capability of Satellite No. 1 of the MUOS
    in 2012. As subsequent MUOS satellites are delivered to replace
    the fragile UFO constellation, it is critical that the Navy
    remain postured to provide uninterrupted UHF SATCOM services
    for the warfighter, including preserving the ability to launch
    MUOS satellites as they are delivered, in order to mitigate a
    loss of UFO satellite on-orbit.
        Sir, that completes my statement. Thank you.
        [The joint prepared statement of Admiral Titley and Dr.
    Zangardi follows:]
        Joint Prepared Statement by RADM David W. Titley and Dr. John A
                                    Zangardi
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are
    honored to appear before you today to address the Navy's space
    activities. Successful Naval operations in the 21st century demand
    increased global situational awareness and proficiency in the areas of
    intelligence, cyber defense, ballistic missile defense, information
    management, and space. To achieve this primacy, the Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) directed the realignment of his staff a year ago to
    bring all Navy information-related capabilities and systems under a
    single resource sponsor--the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
    Information Dominance. In the area of space, the OPNAV N2/N6
    Information Dominance Directorate has established a single focal point
    to oversee Navy's space related policies, programs, requirements,
    investments, and resourcing. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet,
    established over a year ago to be the Navy's operational lead for
    information and cyberspace, continues to execute Navy's space
    operations today.
        Our maritime strategy demands a flexible, interoperable and secure
    global communications capability to support the command and control
    requirements of highly mobile, geographically dispersed U.S., joint,
    and coalition forces. Our satellite systems provide a decisive
    advantage to our deployed forces across the broad spectrum of military
    operations, from peacetime engagements to humanitarian relief efforts
    to major combat operations. The Navy relies upon space-based
    capabilities to achieve information dominance over potential
    adversaries and enable commanders to exercise effective command and
    control at all warfare levels and across multiple information enclaves
    in all domains.
                            navy space requirements
        The Navy's interests in space include communications, intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, positioning, navigation, timing, missile
    warning, meteorology, and oceanography capabilities. The Navy continues
    to engage with the other Services and our interagency partners to
    ensure that all of our space equities, interests, and requirements are
    well understood so that the combatant commanders and Navy's operating
    forces have the space capabilities they need to succeed in their
    missions.
        The Navy remains critically dependent on space to conduct not only
    its wartime mission, but also its core capabilities of forward
    presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security,
    humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Space capabilities are
    vital to our Nation's maritime operations and are foundational to our
    ability to operate in a networked and dispersed manner. As the recently
    signed Navy Space Strategy states, space provides the ultimate crow's
    nest for maritime operations.
        The Navy's mission of ensuring the security of our citizens at home
    and abroad requires a global reach and persistent presence. Our ability
    to conduct missions of mercy or rapidly deploy decisive combat power,
    in concert with the other Services and our coalition partners, depends
    on assured space capabilities with inherent flexibility and
    responsiveness to support our worldwide responsibilities. In accordance
    with the National Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy
    (NSSS), commercial and foreign partner capabilities have become
    increasingly useful in bridging the gap between requirements and
    capabilities. The Navy will continue to work with the commercial sector
    and foreign partners to explore options that address multiple maritime
    mission requirements. Decisions to exploit these partnerships, though,
    must include consideration of the information assurance risks inherent
    in the capabilities being employed. Further, these decisions must be
    based on feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit,
    and risk analysis.
        Due to the long lead times involved in fielding complex space
    programs, it is essential that Navy requirements and maritime missions
    are factored into the pre-launch design and planned on-orbit operation
    of future satellite acquisitions. The Navy is actively engaged with key
    national and joint space-related organizations to ensure current and
    future Navy needs in space are identified and incorporated. Further, we
    welcome the opportunity to participate in the recently chartered
    Defense Space Council as a senior-level forum to discuss Navy space
    equities with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Intelligence
    Community, and the Services who are represented at the Secretary and
    Under Secretary level.
                             navy space investments
        Nearly 50 percent of Navy's current fiscal contributions to space
    remains dedicated to the acquisition, development and management of the
    Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) and Mobile User Objective
    System (MUOS) communications satellite systems. The remainder is
    predominantly apportioned to acquisition of the various satellite
    receiver terminals and equipment for Navy units, and space-based
    navigation, oceanography, and meteorology.
        Additionally, the Navy invests in space-related Science and
    Technology/Research and Development efforts that address maritime-
    related capability gaps critical to the successful execution of our
    Nation's maritime strategy. In this fiscally-constrained environment,
    investments have been modest.
        The Navy depends on space capabilities now, and expects the demand
    for space capabilities to grow in the future, especially in the area of
    satellite communications (SATCOM). The Navy's major space segment
    responsibility to the joint community is the UHF narrowband SATCOM
    constellation. Today this constellation consists of eight UFO
    satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased
    Satellite (LEASAT-5), and leased capacity on SKYNET-5C. MUOS will begin
    to replace these systems in May 2012. Based on evolving warfighting
    concepts, UHF SATCOM requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as
    designed, will support those requirements.
                          mobile user objective system
        The increasing joint demand for SATCOM access at ever-higher data
    rates requires moving beyond current legacy UHF satellite capabilities.
    MUOS will help satisfy those demands when initial operational
    capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. The first satellite in the
    planned constellation of four operational satellites, with one on-orbit
    spare, is now scheduled for on-orbit capability in May 2012.
    Previously, Navy planned for the first MUOS satellite to achieve on-
    orbit capability in December 2011; however, the launches of several
    higher priority spacecraft have dictated a primary launch date in
    February 2012. Over the past year, the MUOS program made significant
    progress completing electromagnetic interference testing of spacecraft
    #1, propulsion and satellite bus mating of spacecraft #2, and
    development of the ground infrastructure required to support MUOS
    launch. MUOS program performance continues to support a Fall 2011
    launch should a date become available. Navy's fiscal year 2012 budget
    submission continues our investment in MUOS to replace the aging UFO
    constellation.
        MUOS will support Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components,
    Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies, and our coalition
    partners by providing worldwide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-
    point, and broadcast voice and data services in challenging
    environments, including double-canopy foliage, urban environments, high
    sea states, and all weather conditions. MUOS will carry two distinct
    payloads. The legacy UHF payload will provide the capability of a UFO
    satellite, while a new UHF waveform payload will significantly increase
    the number of accesses while also increasing available throughput to
    the warfighter.
        MUOS will be the common denominator for future command and control,
    enhancing the capability to communicate from the tactical edge to
    theater headquarters. MUOS will allow more comprehensive and
    coordinated support to regional engagement efforts, providing the
    capability to synchronize actions with other Services and agencies.
    This capability will be realized through the fielding of MUOS capable
    Joint Tactical Radio System terminals and by upgrading existing legacy
    UHF software programmable terminals.
                                delivering muos
        The timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy, and we
    recognize both our responsibility and commitment to providing this
    vital warfighting capability to all our DOD, Intelligence Community and
    Interagency partners. The delay in delivery of the MUOS system, coupled
    with the age and fragility of the current UHF satellite constellation,
    has our full attention and focus.
        Navy has taken several proactive steps to minimize the operational
    impact if a gap in UHF satellite availability occurs. We have completed
    a payload reconfiguration on UFO satellite Flight 11 that significantly
    increased the number of available channels. We completed this action at
    no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft. A recent modification
    to the frequency plan on FLTSAT 8 allowed us to optimize the UFO
    satellite Flight 7 and provide two additional channels at no cost.
    Additionally, the Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources
    from two commercial satellite systems, LEASAT and SKYNET. Our total
    mitigation efforts to date are providing the equivalent capacity of an
    additional UFO satellite. Navy has also explored options using
    commercially hosted payloads, but all possible material solutions would
    not address potential near term gaps. We will keep these options in
    reserve if their use becomes necessary.
        We are also continuing efforts to make more efficient use of our
    currently available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW),
    a software upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and control system,
    completed operational testing and is currently being deployed. IW will
    optimize our use of UHF satellite channels by doubling the number of
    accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel. DOD has also
    signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian Ministry of
    Defense (MOD) for use of channels on an Australian-hosted payload
    covering the Indian Ocean region. In exchange, the United States will
    provide the Australian MOD use of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses in the
    Pacific Ocean region commencing in 2018. Finally, we are exploring the
    use of TACSAT-4, an Office of Naval Research and Naval Research
    Laboratory co-led development that supports Operationally Responsive
    Space Office efforts. TACSAT-4 may provide a very limited operational
    capability when it reaches on-orbit capability later this summer.
                          environmental remote sensing
        The Navy provides DOD with global atmospheric modeling, and global
    and regional ocean modeling. We rely on partnerships with the Air
    Force, and civil and international agencies to meet our space-based
    environmental sensing requirements. Meeting these requirements is
    critical to the execution of missions that enhance safe, effective
    military operations. For our future, the Navy is engaged in defining
    the requirements for the DOD Defense Weather Satellite System and the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Joint Polar Satellite
    System, which will together satisfy a large portion of the Navy's
    environmental sensing requirements over the next 15 years.
        In support of the new National Space Policy, the Navy is adopting a
    new strategy to meet its unique space-based ocean altimetry
    requirements. We have deferred procurement of the Navy Altimeter
    satellite (GEOSAT follow-on) until fiscal year 2016 with full
    operational capability achieved in fiscal year 2021. In the interim,
    the Navy is seeking to enter partnerships with civil and international
    agencies to satisfy our altimetry requirements.
                      positioning, navigation, and timing
        The Navy continues to rely upon the Air Force's Global Positioning
    System (GPS) to meet the vast majority of our positioning, navigation,
    and timing (PNT) requirements. The Navy intends to award a contract
    this year for the GPS-based PNT service which will modernize our aging
    shipboard PNT systems and provide enhanced PNT assurance by
    implementing jam-resistant antennas, a Selective Availability Anti-
    Spoofing Module, and a foundation for future M-code implementation. The
    Navy is also investigating the impact of a GPS-challenged environment
    on maintaining synchronized timing across our full suite of combat and
    communications systems.
        The Navy is continuing the technology development phase of the
    Joint Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey satellite, transitioning from
    Science and Technology to a major acquisition category program, which
    will update the DOD star catalog to meet positioning and orientation
    accuracy requirements for the next several decades.
                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        A robust architecture of signals and geospatial intelligence
    systems to meet current and emerging requirements remains crucial to
    successful maritime operations. It is imperative that Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities be funded and fielded in
    sufficient quantity and capacity to sustain continuity of essential
    space-based intelligence data throughout the maritime domain.
    Accordingly, we fully support Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence collaboration with combatant commands and Services to
    ensure emerging requirements are adequately supported by future
    Intelligence Community collection systems.
        These intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
    are indispensable contributors to maritime domain awareness. As the
    Nation continues to develop and field these and future capabilities,
    persistent coverage in the maritime domain remains a key requirement. A
    constrained fiscal environment will no doubt make this challenging,
    but, in accordance with the National Space Policy and NSSS, emerging
    capabilities are being explored with our coalition and commercial
    partners in an effort to reduce costs while increasing capability.
                            commercial space systems
        Commercially provided systems provide the ability to augment, but
    not replace, existing national and military systems. These commercial
    capabilities have become increasingly useful in bridging the gap
    between requirements and capabilities. The Navy has used commercial
    communications satellites since the early 1990s to augment bandwidth
    requirements not fully satisfied by military communications satellites.
    Technical advances in the commercial sector provide opportunities for
    rapid capability implementation not only for communications, but in
    other mission areas as well, such as safety of navigation and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Navy continues to
    work with the commercial sector to explore options to address multiple
    maritime mission requirements, and we continue to field systems, such
    as Commercial Broadband Satellite Program terminals, to fully leverage
    available commercial capability. Potential cost savings and capability
    supplementation should continue to be evaluated for all commercially-
    provided space-based capabilities at every opportunity.
                                  space cadre
        Our Navy equities, requirements, operations, and management of
    space resources are the responsibility of a small but agile corps of
    space professionals that make the Navy's use of space possible. The
    Navy's Space Cadre is comprised of approximately 1,350 Reserve, civil,
    and active duty service personnel from all warfighter designators and
    communities, and is a key component of the DOD's 15,000 military and
    civilian space professionals. Part of our Total Workforce strategy is
    to ensure that fully qualified Navy Space Cadre personnel are
    consistently assigned to our most critical and influential space
    billets. This strategy requires the Navy to continue to recruit and
    retain a talented and highly skilled workforce to fill vital space
    leadership positions now and into the future. We continue to assign
    personnel with a proven capacity to represent unique Navy requirements
    for space systems in the joint acquisition processes at the National
    Reconnaissance Office. To enable us to do this more efficiently, we are
    developing specific career progression plans to actively manage space
    experts' individual career paths to ensure that Navy and joint space-
    related assignments complement and enhance career progression and
    promotion opportunities while infusing naval operational expertise back
    into the space community.
                                   conclusion
        In closing, we would like to reiterate that space capabilities will
    continue to be critical to our Nation's success in the maritime domain.
    We operate in an increasingly dynamic and challenging global
    environment, demanding additional capability and more capacity to
    operate in a networked but geographically dispersed fashion. A robust
    space layer is essential to providing the Nation's soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines with the situational awareness and force capacity
    to operate, fight, and succeed in a myriad of missions.
        Navy is leaning forward in the use, advocacy, and development of
    space capabilities. We are building and fielding the necessary space-
    based systems across multiple mission areas and the plan we have
    submitted will deliver the future space-based capabilities within the
    fiscal constraints of the budget.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
    Continued support from this subcommittee and Congress is deeply
    appreciated.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General Helms.

     STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. SUSAN J. HELMS, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT
     FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Helms. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson. I am
    honored to appear before you as STRATCOM's Commander for JFCC
    Space. This is my first opportunity to come before you as the
    Commander and I look forward to working with you and the other
    subcommittee members to enhance the United States' standing as
    a global leader in space.
        It's an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines of JFCC Space, as well as our
    exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United
    Kingdom. These men and women form a tireless and innovative
    Joint Force supporting our warfighters 24 hours a day, 365 days
    a year.
        Operating within an increasingly congested, contested, and
    competitive space environment requires strategically
    reexamining our processes, planning flexibility, improving
    awareness of the space environment, and expanding collaboration
    efforts with all spacefaring nations and corporations.
    Correctly adapting our operations will allow JFCC Space to
    continue to provide the following capabilities to the Joint
    Force: Unmatched position, navigation, and timing information;
    missile warning and missile defense; communications,
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) support; and
    technical intelligence and characterization of the operational
    environment.
        In today's strategic world, JFCC Space is at the forefront
    of defending our ability to operate freely within space. We
    continue to search out better ways to support those in harm's
    way. We will continue to develop and employ systems to enhance
    our comprehensive space situational awareness. We will strive
    to strengthen our relationships with allied and industry space
    partners, ensuring our global capabilities remain available for
    those requiring them.
        You can be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines of JFCC Space. I thank the subcommittee for your
    continued support as we work to preserve and enhance our space
    capabilities for our Nation.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Helms follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Susan J. Helms, USAF
        Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee,
    I am honored to appear before you as U.S. Strategic Command's
    (STRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Space (JFCC Space). This is my first opportunity to come before you as
    the Commander for JFCC Space and I look forward to working with you to
    enhance the United States standing as a global leader in space.
        It's an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines of JFCC Space. In addition to our active duty
    military members, JFCC Space has more than 1,000 National Guard,
    Reserve unit members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, as well
    as, exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
    These men and women form a tireless and innovative Joint Force, working
    hard to provide position, navigation, and timing information; missile
    warning and missile defense; communications; intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance support; and technical intelligence
    and personnel recovery to our warfighters 24 hours a day, 365 days a
    year.
        The space environment has become increasingly congested, contested
    and competitive. Operating within space is correspondingly more
    uncertain than ever in our past. Addressing the changes in the
    environment requires strategically rethinking our processes,
    integrating extra flexibility in our planning, improving our awareness
    of the space environment and expanding our collaboration with all space
    faring nations and corporations. Correctly adapting our operations
    within the space environment before we are required to respond to an
    unforeseen circumstance will allow JFCC Space to continue to provide
    space capabilities to our Joint Force throughout these uncertain times.
        One of our premier responsibilities is to deliver space effects to
    the Joint Force. As the most prevalent space effect delivered by my
    operators, we have continued to operate and improve the most widely
    used space capability on the planet, the global positioning system
    (GPS) constellation. In January we completed the first phase of our
    ``Expandable 24'' operation, the largest satellite repositioning effort
    in GPS program history. This two phase operation repositioned three
    satellites to optimize GPS coverage for terrain-challenged
    environments, such as cities and the mountains and valleys of
    Afghanistan. We also began operations of the newest GPS variant, the
    GPS IIF, which will add a second civilian safety-of-life signal and
    provide more robust signal availability for military users.
        Our Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities in space are
    the stalwart to providing critical ballistic missile warning to field
    commanders and national leaders. At least 20 nations currently have
    nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the technology to deliver
    them over long distances. According to intelligence estimates, during
    the next 10 years, additional countries will develop the technology and
    capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United
    States. Our detection systems provide both strategic warning for
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and space launches as well as
    tactical warning for shorter-range ballistic missile launches. Space
    based missile warning satellites are able to provide continuous global
    coverage. These systems are capable of providing missile warning to the
    Joint Force and coalition partners in the event of a short-range
    ballistic missile attack. In addition, deployed units throughout the
    world provide Geographic Combatant Commanders the means of receiving
    missile warning data direct from the Defense Support Program (DSP)
    constellation for their area of responsibility. Space OPIR continues to
    ensure missile threats are detected and reported in a timely fashion
    but the technology continues to advance and we are constantly finding
    new ways to provide better battlespace awareness and technical
    intelligence to the ground commanders beyond our foundational ballistic
    missile warning mission. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) in its
    highly elliptical orbit (HEO) gives significant coverage over the
    northern hemisphere for infrared detection and technical intelligence
    gathering. We can now detect and report, in near real-time, natural and
    man-made infrared events. The quality of data provided by SBIRS HEO is
    a key part in our ability to characterize launches and predict threats
    within minutes. Following its operational acceptance, the first SBIRS
    in its geosynchronous orbit will give us the ability to paint a picture
    for national leadership of new foreign technology development and
    proliferation information. This capability is so significant that the
    SBIRS community is developing a pre-certified use plan to get valuable
    information to the Joint Force as soon as practical.
        These space based sensors are only one portion of our missile
    warning capability. Ground-based radars provide warning by detecting,
    tracking and counting individual objects in a missile attack early in
    their trajectory. Several of the ground based radars are integrated
    into the Ballistic Missile Defense System used by the Missile Defense
    Agency to improve midcourse sensor coverage by providing critical early
    warning, tracking, object classification and cueing data.
        Information technologies have truly revolutionized our capability
    to operate globally. From combat operations to humanitarian assistance,
    we use military satellite communications every day. In addition to GPS
    and OPIR capabilities, JFCC Space provides to the Joint Force
    protected, wideband and narrowband satellite communication
    capabilities.
        Protected communications make possible the ability to command and
    control forces and support national decisionmakers in a contested
    communications environment, including the high end nuclear environment.
        Wideband satellite communication provides automatic Digital
    Network/automatic Secure Voice Communications, Secret Internet Protocol
    Router Network and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System
    access from space. Additionally wideband communications include relays
    for Defense Message System, Defense Switched Network, Diplomatic
    Telecommunication Service Communications and real-time Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle video for ground mobile forces.
        In the category of narrowband communications, our ultra-high
    frequency follow-on (UHF) satellite system, is the space-based portion
    of the Department of Defense (DOD) communication system that enables
    reliable communications among aircraft, ships, submarines, ground
    stations and the presidential command network as well as a multitude of
    joint and allied users. UHF satellite communications is a primary
    enabler for distributed command and control, critical for dispersed
    maritime operations, and provides critical communications for
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts such as the Haitian
    and Japanese earthquake. DOD provided more than 20 UHF satellite
    communications channels dedicated for supporting tsunami relief efforts
    in Japan.
        JFCC Space is forging ahead in our efforts to provide new,
    operationally responsive space effects to the Joint Force. We are
    actively engaged with Air Force Space Command and STRATCOM in
    developing the concepts and command relationships that may allow us to
    quickly transition rapid development capabilities to operational use.
    For example, the TACSAT-3 satellite has an experimental, hyper-spectral
    imagery payload that has shown great promise in support for ground
    troops as well as in disaster relief and recovery operations. We are
    also working with Service partners to deploy the Operational Responsive
    Space (ORS)-1, a small spacecraft that will supply urgently-needed
    imagery to Central Command.
        Day to day, JFCC Space tasks our space based assets to provide
    standard space support to the Joint Force. We maintain a close and
    dedicated relationship with each theater's Space Coordinating Authority
    (SCA). Through the SCA relationship JFCC Space is proactively postured
    to rapidly adapt to changing mission requirements based on combatant
    commander's changing needs. JFCC Space, through the Joint Space
    Operations Center (JSpOC), coordinated specific support to the U.S.
    response to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and ongoing
    coalition military operations over Libya. These efforts include using
    data from the hyperspectral sensor on TACSAT-3 to help contain the
    damage at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In support of the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation Unified Protector, JFCC
    Space tailors theater missile warning coverage, strike assessment and
    technical intelligence support for coalition forces protecting Libyan
    civilians and civilian-populated areas.
        Space situational awareness (SSA) is the cornerstone of JFCC Space
    operations and the space surveillance network (SSN) is the workhorse of
    our SSA. The data provided by the space surveillance network are
    analyzed at the JSpOC by a collection of military and civilian
    analysts. These analysts keep track of what satellites are active,
    predict when pieces of debris or satellites will re-enter the
    atmosphere or collide, and provide vital information to decisionmakers
    about when a payload can be safely launched. Over the past 2 years, we
    have increased daily conjunction screening at the JSpOC from 110
    primary satellites to all active satellites (over 1,100). Due to this
    increase in number of satellites screened, we have seen conjunction
    warning notifications increase from 5 to up to 25 per day, up 46
    percent from 2009 and we have had a corresponding increase in our
    interaction with commercial and foreign government space operators.
    Information sharing with commercial and foreign entities is now a
    routine occurrence executed via a formalized process within JFCC Space.
    We currently have data sharing agreements with 23 commercial and
    foreign partners.
        However, we still suffer from an aged and limited sensor network to
    gather our most important SSA resource: orbital observations. Many of
    our SSN sensors operate on a one-object-at-a-time system and a majority
    of the SSN sensors are not networked with one another. The Continental
    United States (CONUS)-based space fence and our Eglin SSN sensor are
    currently the only machine-to-machine network between SSN radars. These
    networked sensors are resulting in 30,000 observations per year that
    would otherwise go undetected due to sensor limitations with Eglin's
    space surveillance fence. We could see a huge benefit to our SSA
    through greater machine-to-machine networking between our SSN sensors.
    The CONUS-based space fence can detect and observe multiple objects at
    one time and contributes more observations to our network than any
    other sensor. Additionally, we have considerable gaps in coverage in
    the southern hemisphere. Placement of a space fence in the southern
    hemisphere will improve our coverage considerably. Another sensor that
    will improve our capability is the Space-Based Space Surveillance
    (SBSS) satellite launched in September. This sensor operates from
    space, free of boundaries, borders, or atmospheric effects to distort
    or obscure viewing. With a potential capability to track objects much
    smaller in size than what our older sensors can track, SBSS will detect
    significantly more objects in orbit and produce a corresponding
    increase in the volume of SSA data. Current analytic and processing
    capacity in the JSpOC is not sufficient to exploit the full capacity of
    this or other future sensors. This shortfall is driving an urgent need
    to upgrade JSpOC systems. The JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is the Air
    Force's program of record for solving this problem and ensuring the
    JSpOC is properly equipped to handle the mission is part of my service
    function as commander of 14th Air Force.
        The JMS is planned to replace our legacy command and control
    systems designed in the 1980s and fielded in the 1990s. We are working
    closely with the acquisition team to prioritize our mission
    requirements. In the months ahead we intend to employ an early JMS
    release that will significantly enhance our ability to understand the
    space situation with an integrated operating picture, as well as the
    ability to respond to a dynamic space environment. We will continue to
    build upon this initial capability to ensure our operators on the JSpOC
    floor have the tools, and the infrastructure, they need to accomplish
    the mission.
        We cannot properly equip the JSpOC without addressing our current
    facilities and the need for modern infrastructure to house the state of
    the art command and control system and the JSpOC personnel. Today the
    JSpOC performs its operational mission from a converted missile
    assembly building. Over 50 years old and designed for an entirely
    different purpose, the building presents significant challenges towards
    meeting our integrated space operations mission. Successful integration
    with U.S. and coalition forces, as well as commercial partners will
    depend upon a future military construction project for new facilities
    designed specifically for space command and control.
        SSA is not only an understanding of the physical objects within
    space but also includes characterizing disruptions to services provided
    by satellite signals transmitted through space. JFCC Space provides the
    capability to monitor the service quality of U.S. and coalition
    satellite communications systems in order to detect interference which
    may ultimately be determined to be either unintentional incidents or
    purposeful acts. When an interference event is detected, JFCC Space
    receives support from other elements of STRATCOM to geolocate the
    source of interference. In these efforts, we continue to build on the
    early successes of current programs leading to the development of new
    systems to be deployed later this year in order to conduct
    electromagnetic interference detection in different frequencies and
    different locations throughout the world. These efforts support broader
    U.S. Government efforts--in cooperation with civil, commercial, and
    foreign partners--to identify, locate, and attribute sources of radio
    frequency interference, and take necessary measures to sustain the
    radiofrequency environment in which critical U.S. space systems
    operate.
        Consistent with the President's National Space Policy and the
    National Security Space Strategy, we are working with the Department of
    State to expand our current partnerships and develop new partnerships
    through transparency and cooperation with partners and allies,
    including industry partners. The United States will continue to promote
    safe and responsible space operations both for ourselves and with other
    space faring nations and industry partners. Our leadership in the
    development of best practices and bilateral and multilateral
    transparency and confidence building measures to encourage responsible
    actions in, and the peaceful use of, space, is of critical importance.
    As the National Space Policy states, it is the shared interest of all
    nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps,
    misperceptions, and mistrust.
        A Combined Space Operations concept is a starting place and we will
    work with our closest allies to flesh out and mature the concept toward
    mutually supportive goals. The concept must be expandable and
    tailorable to allow the flexibility to incorporate partners beyond our
    own U.S. Government agencies and closest allies.
        As resources permit, we plan to continue expanding the SSA
    information and services we offer. In coordination with the Department
    of State and civilian departments and agencies, we intend to enter into
    SSA Sharing agreements with foreign governments and international
    organizations, and build upon our bilateral space cooperation dialogues
    with key allies and partners. These dialogues have already resulted in
    agreements in principle for SSA cooperation between DOD and its
    counterparts in Australia, Canada, and France. SSA Sharing agreements--
    combined with ongoing discussions on SSA cooperation with other allies
    as well as the European
        Space Agency and European Union--will put us on a path to improve
    collective awareness of the space domain and work to preserve its
    advantages for all.
        Space operations continue to evolve rapidly and JFCC Space is at
    the forefront of defending our ability to operate within space. We
    continue to search out better ways to support Joint Forces around the
    globe, especially those in harm's way. We will continue to develop and
    employ systems to enhance our comprehensive SSA. We will strive to
    strengthen our relationships with allied and industry space partners,
    ensuring our global capabilities remain available for those requiring
    them. You can be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of
    JFCC Space. I thank the committee for your continued support as we work
    to preserve and enhance the critical space capabilities of our Nation.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General Formica.

    STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
    SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Formica. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and again
    thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers, civilians,
    and families. I appear today as the Commander of the Army's
    Space and Missile Defense Command and Army Forces Strategic
    Command. I'm honored to testify before this committee. You've
    been a strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities
    that space affords our warfighters and we value your continued
    support.
        My purpose today is to inform the committee about the Army
    as a user of space capabilities, to summarize the Army's space
    strategy and policy, and to discuss the space capabilities
    provided by the Army. These are provided in more detail in my
    written statement which was prepared and provided for the
    record. I'll briefly summarize those three, sir.
        As a user of space capabilities, the Army depends on
    position, navigation, timing, communications, ISR, assured
    missile warning, and weather. The space-based services are
    critical enablers to our forces and assured access to space-
    based capabilities is a critical element in the Army's ability
    to shoot, move, and communicate. While we may face localized
    tactical disruptions, our Army does not want to face a day
    without space-based capabilities.
        The Army's space policy and strategic plan provide our
    priorities and equities for space capabilities and forces. Our
    focus is on leveraging DOD and national space assets in
    partnership with the joint community to provide assured access
    of space-based capabilities in support of full-spectrum
    operations.
        The Army provides critical space capabilities for the
    combatant commanders and to the warfighter. In our space role,
    we have three core tasks: providing trained and ready space
    forces and capabilities to combatant commanders and to the
    warfighter; building future space forces; and researching,
    developing, testing, and integrating future space capabilities.
        Our command is uniquely organized in the Army to perform
    these three tasks, with operations, capability development, and
    materiel development functions. We are also geographically
    well-positioned in Huntsville, AL, and Colorado Springs, CO, to
    capitalize on the tech bases there. Our space capabilities are
    positioned in 14 other locations around the globe to accomplish
    these 3 core tasks.
        In conclusion, the Army is critically dependent upon the
    capabilities that space brings to the battlefield and seeks
    assured access to those capabilities. I appreciate the
    opportunity to speak on these important matters and I look
    forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Formica follows:]
               Prepared Statement by LTG Richard P. Formica, USA
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers,
    civilians, and families, as well as the opportunity to testify before
    this panel. This marks my first appearance before the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a body that has
    been a strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities that space
    affords our warfighters. Your continued support is important as we
    pursue our joint efforts to provide critical space capabilities in
    support of our Nation, our fighting forces, and our allies.
        In my current assignment, I wear three hats: first, as the
    commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, I have
    Title 10 responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space and
    missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as the Army Forces
    Strategic Command, I am the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to
    the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) charged with the responsibility
    for planning, integrating, and coordinating Army forces and
    capabilities in support of strategic missions. Third, I serve as
    STRATCOM's Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) in order to leverage the
    capabilities and skill sets of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT).
        In my role here today as the Commander of ASMDC/ARSTRAT and the
    ASCC to STRATCOM, I am honored to testify before you with these
    distinguished witnesses--all providers of critical space capabilities
    to the warfighter and as essential contributors to the joint space
    planning process and our Nation's continued advances to effectively
    operate in space. Within the Army, space operations and space-related
    activities are pursued as an enterprise and are not the exclusive
    domain of the ASMDC/ARSTRAT or any other single branch or functional
    proponent.
        My purpose today is to outline the Army as a user of space
    capabilities; to articulate the Army's space strategy and policy; and
    to inform the committee about the Army as a provider of space
    capabilities.
                    the army as a user of space capabilities
        As America's principal land force, our Army must be organized,
    trained, and equipped to provide responsive and sustained combat
    operations in order to fight as a joint team and to respond, as
    directed, to crises at home and abroad. Geopolitical uncertainties and
    nearly a decade of continuous combat have necessitated a high degree of
    operational adaptability. The Army's Operating Concept identifies six
    warfighting functional concepts that contribute to operational
    adaptability: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence,
    protection, fires, and sustainment. Space-based capabilities leveraged
    and employed across the Army Space enterprise enable each of these
    warfighting functions. Simply put, space-based capabilities are
    critical elements to the Army's ability to shoot, move, and
    communicate.
        The Army is reliant on space-based systems, such as global
    positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather satellites,
    and intelligence collection platforms. They are critical enablers to
    our ability to plan, communicate, navigate, and maintain battlefield
    situational awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, and
    protect and sustain our forces. For example, the Army is dependent on
    the DOD's Defense Weather Satellite System capabilities to meet its
    military weather forecasting requirements. The Army continuously works
    with the Air Force to define our requirements in order to ensure future
    warfighters have access to essential weather data. Most of these
    services are so well integrated into weapon systems and support
    processes that Soldiers are unaware of the space connection. This
    seamless integration is due in large part to the coordination and
    cooperation of space professionals at the Air Force Space Command,
    STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space, the Navy, the
    Army, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and joint agencies.
        The Army's unrelenting dependency on space-based capabilities
    requires active participation in defining space-related capability
    needs. The identified needs serve to ensure necessary joint force
    structure, systems, and concept of operations are developed and
    acquired, thereby enabling the land force to conduct the full range of
    military operations now and in the future.
        Ensuring tactical and assured access to space is our focus--
    reassuring the requisite capabilities and effects are delivered to the
    tactical warfighter on time, every time demands that our space
    capabilities and architectures become more resilient against attacks
    and disruption. We must ensure that our Army does not face a day
    without space and space-related capabilities.
                   the army's space policy and strategic plan
        The Army Space Policy, most recently updated in 2009, focuses on
    the operational and tactical needs of land forces and assigns space
    related Army organizational responsibilities. It follows implemented
    DOD space policies and procedures, reestablishes objectives for Army
    space, and continues the Army Space Council. The Army's Space Policy
    outlines four broad space related objectives:

             To maximize the effectiveness of current space
            capabilities in support of operational and tactical land
            warfighting needs.
             To influence the design, development, acquisition, and
            concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and
            enhance current and future land forces.
             To advance the development and effective use of
            responsive, timely, and assured joint interoperable space
            capabilities.
             To seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities
            into the operating force.

        The Army recently drafted its Army Space Strategic Plan, which is
    in final coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Army. This
    document is shaped by national level guidance, such as the National
    Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy. The draft plan,
    coupled with the Army's Space Policy, outlines the Army's space
    enterprise path for strategic planning, programming, and resourcing.
        The essence of our space strategy and the guiding vision of the
    Army space enterprise are to assure access to resilient and relevant
    space-enabled capabilities to ensure Army forces can conduct full
    spectrum operations. To achieve this, our draft space strategy rests on
    three tenets that link Army strategic planning and programming for
    space to the guidance in national and DOD space policy and strategy.
    The three essential tenets are:

             To enable the Army's enduring mission by providing
            requisite space-enabled capabilities to support current
            operations, as well as future transformation efforts.
             To leverage existing DOD, national, commercial, and
            international space-based capabilities.
             To pursue cross-domain solutions to create a resilient
            architecture to mitigate threats, vulnerabilities, and assure
            access to critical capabilities needed to sustain land force
            operations.

                   the army--a provider of space capabilities
        The Army is a provider of space capabilities. Historically, our
    greatest investment in space capabilities has been in the ground
    segment--the integration of space capabilities into operational forces
    through command and control systems, communication terminals, and
    intelligence feeds. However, due to the critical importance of space
    capabilities, the Army has strengthened and broadened its investment to
    include exploitation of national and strategic space capabilities,
    defensive counterspace, leveraging the capabilities of space to enhance
    missile defense systems, and training and development of space
    professionals and space enablers.
        In 2012, the Army plans to invest approximately $500 million in
    pursuing space and space-related activities, evolving from a position
    of simply exploiting strategic space-based capabilities to a position
    where the Army is fully integrated into the planning, development, and
    use of theater-focused operational and tactical space applications.
        ASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army's space proponent, and coordinates with
    the Army Intelligence and Signal communities, STRATCOM, and other
    members of the joint community to bring space-based capabilities to the
    warfighter. ASMDC/ARSTRAT is at the forefront--providing trained and
    ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the
    warfighter and building future space forces. Aside from delivering and
    integrating space products and trained professionals to joint
    warfighter operations, ASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts space mission
    related research and development activities. I would like to highlight
    our space provider role within three core tasks: providing trained and
    ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the
    warfighter; building future space forces; and researching, developing,
    testing, and integrating future space capabilities.
    Providing Trained and Ready Space Forces and Capabilities
        Over 1,100 soldiers and civilians serving with ASMDC/ARSTRAT's 1st
    Space Brigade provide access to products and services that are
    essential in all phases of combat operations. The brigade's three
    battalions, comprised of Active, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers,
    support combatant commanders by providing satellite communications,
    space operations, missile warning, and forward deployed space support
    teams. These Space Operations Officers, along with members of the
    Army's Space Cadre, directly influence the execution of strategic
    operations in support of tactical level ground maneuver forces. Their
    principal duties include planning, developing, resourcing, acquiring,
    integrating, and operating space forces, systems, concepts,
    applications, or capabilities in any element of the DOD space mission
    areas.
        During the 1990s, realizing the essential need of space
    professionals, the Army created Functional Area (FA) 40--Space
    Operations Officers--within our commissioned officer corps. ASMDC/
    ARSTRAT is the Army's personnel developer for FA 40 officers. The
    approximately 300 FA 40s serve in Army, joint, and DOD commands and
    organizations across all echelons--tactical, operational, and
    strategic. The Army's Space Cadre, initiated in 2007, is comprised of
    both military and civilian personnel who represent the Army's interests
    in space operations, policy, science and technology, and acquisition.
    The Cadre consists of soldiers and civilians from a wide variety of
    branches, career fields, disciplines, and functional areas.
        As part of the DOD overarching effort, the Army has integrated
    Space Operations Officers into the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, the North American Aerospace Defense
    Command, the Air Force Space Command, and other space focused
    organizations and academic institutions. In each of these
    organizations, personnel not only provide the Army perspective of space
    related capabilities, they articulate requirements from an operational
    standpoint in the joint and combined environments. A summary of the
    critical space capabilities provided by Army's space professionals is
    highlighted below.

             Army Space Support Teams: During operations, including
            those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ASMDC/ARSTRAT's Army Space
            Support Teams continuously provide space-based products and
            services to combatant commanders and other international
            government agencies. The teams are on-the-ground space experts,
            pulling key commercial imagery, forecasting the impact of space
            weather, and providing responsive space support to their units.
            Just last month, 3 new teams deployed to theater to provide
            their capabilities for the next 9 months--60 teams have now
            provided invaluable on-the-ground responsive expertise to
            combatant commanders and the warfighter in Afghanistan and
            Iraq.
             Satellite Communication Support Centers: ASMDC/ARSTRAT
            provides and operates the DOD's Regional Satellite
            Communications Support Centers and Wideband Satellite
            Communications Operations Centers, located both in the United
            States and overseas. These centers are the regional management
            hubs for a majority of the DOD's satellite communications
            capabilities, providing reliable and responsive support. In
            close partnership with our Air Force and Navy partners, we
            ensure essential communications lifelines are available to our
            ground, air, and sea forces, as well as the diplomatic corps
            around the world.
             Friendly Force Tracking: Situational awareness is
            particularly vital given the challenges of conducting
            operations in urban areas. As the Army has the greatest number
            of warfighters and systems to track on the battlefield, our
            Friendly Force Tracking assets help deliver timely situational
            awareness and identify friendly forces during combat. In
            support of Operation Tomodachi, we provided the friendly force
            tracking architecture that enabled the U.S. Forces Japan and
            the U.S. Pacific Command to see its ground support elements via
            a common operational picture.
             Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Critical to the Joint
            Force Commander's theater force protection, the Army provides
            ballistic missile early warning and missile defense support
            from within the theater or region. The 1st Space Brigade's
            Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) Detachments, operated by
            Army personnel, monitor enemy missile launch activity and other
            infrared events of interest and share the information with
            members of the air and missile defense and operational
            communities. Presently, our JTAGS Detachments are forward-
            stationed across the globe, providing assured missile warning
            to theater commanders and joint warfighters.
             Geospatial Intelligence Support: The Army, as an
            operational element of the National System for Geospatial-
            Intelligence, provides geospatial intelligence production in
            direct support of the combatant commands. The Army's space and
            intelligence experts perform exploitation of a variety of
            commercial, civil, and DOD imagery data derived from space and
            airborne sources. Current support includes providing imagery to
            U.S. Africa Command in support of contingency operations in
            Libya, as well as imagery and exploitation products to U.S.
            Pacific Command regarding the extent of damage to the Fukushima
            nuclear power site in Japan. Additionally, they aid in the
            exploration of emerging spectral system technologies and in
            transitioning new capabilities to the warfighter.
             Operations Reach-back Support and Services: The ASMDC/
            ARSTRAT Operations Center, located at Peterson Air Force Base
            in Colorado Springs, CO, provides reach-back support for our
            space experts deployed throughout the operational force and
            allows us to reduce our forward-deployed footprint. This center
            maintains constant situational awareness of deployed elements,
            continuously responds to requests for information, and provides
            the essential reach-back system of connectivity with technical
            subject matter experts.
             Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities: The
            Army Special Program Office is the Army focal point for the
            exploitation of national intelligence, surveillance, and
            reconnaissance assets and products through the Tactical
            Exploitation of National Capabilities program. The Army is
            fully integrated into the National Reconnaissance Office and
            the Intelligence Community and has numerous deployed units
            providing support throughout the intelligence battalions and
            brigades.
             Strategic Space Surveillance: The Army also operates
            facilities and assets that are of upmost importance to
            advancing the Nation's use of space. The U.S. Army Kwajalein
            Atoll/Reagan Test Site (RTS), located in the Marshall Islands,
            is a national asset that provides unique capabilities to
            monitor objects in deep space. The RTS maintains a vigilant
            watch, providing critical space situational awareness and
            contributing to a variety of missions.

    Building Future Space Forces
        The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
    space-based needs and pursue Army and joint validation of its
    requirements. This disciplined approach helps ensure limited resources
    are applied where warfighter operational utility can be most
    effectively served. We continue to pursue and develop the necessary
    adaptability across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
    Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to
    mitigate threats and vulnerabilities while sustaining land force
    operations. Within the DOTMLPF combat development arena, the Army has
    focused tremendous efforts on the development of our space
    professionals. For example, the Army Space Personnel Development Office
    develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the Army Space Cadre and
    executes the life-cycle management functions of FA 40 Space Operations
    Officers ensuring the Army has trained personnel to meet national
    security space needs. Without well-trained and motivated Army soldiers
    and civilians, we cannot maintain our advantage on the battlefield that
    our Nation's space superiority affords us.
        To properly train space professionals, the Army developed the Space
    Operations Officer Qualification Course and the Army Space Cadre Basic
    Course. These two courses provide the necessary foundation for the
    Space Cadre. The Army also leverages the high-quality space training
    developed and administrated by the Air Force. Finally, numerous space
    officers complete additional post-graduate studies at the Naval
    Postgraduate School, accredited civilian institutions, and training
    with industry. The Army is committed to growing, training, developing,
    tutoring, and advancing space professionals.
    Researching, Developing, Testing, and Integrating Future Space
            Capabilities
        The Army is an instrumental joint partner in addressing tomorrow's
    space requirements to ensure land warfare dominance. Each year, the
    Army plans and programs funding for space related technology research
    and development. Despite the current and projected resource constrained
    environment, the Army recognizes the need to prioritize, leverage, and
    invest in promising space research and development technologies. I
    would like to briefly highlight three technology endeavors that have
    potential to provide space support to the ground warfighter.

             Space and Missile Defense Command--Operational
            Nanosatellite Effect: To achieve enhanced capabilities for the
            warfighter from space, an approach that holds great promise is
            the deployment of constellations of very small satellites into
            low earth orbit. The Space and Missile Defense Command-
            Operational Nanosatellite Effect is an initiative to meet
            specific Army space related operational needs via the use of
            nanosatellites. The Army recently built eight, nine-pound
            satellites for use in a technology demonstration. The first of
            these nanosatellites was placed into low earth orbit last
            December. This marked the first launch of an Army designed and
            manufactured satellite in more than 50 years. The primary
            objective was to receive data from a ground transmitter and
            relay that data to a ground station. The demonstration was
            successful and offers evidence that the means may be available
            to provide the Army--the largest user of space data--with an
            ability to economically provide non-line of sight sensor data
            from non-permissive environments to remote located soldiers.
             Kestrel Eye: Kestrel Eye is an Army endeavor to
            manufacture a small imaging satellite that will provide near
            real-time, medium resolution imagery to the tactical
            warfighter. Since its manufacturing costs will be relatively
            inexpensive, Kestrel Eye may have the ability to be robustly
            deployed into orbit, providing a potential solution to present
            existing imagery needs to tactical forces. The satellite is
            designed for operational theater command capabilities,
            providing dedicated space-based support to the tactical
            commander. Kestrel Eye is scheduled for its initial launch in
            2012.
             Vertical/Horizontal Integration of Space Technologies
            and Applications: We are successfully progressing in a
            technology demonstration to integrate space-based data into our
            ground forces at the tactical level. The Vertical/Horizontal
            Integration of Space Technologies and Applications (VISTA)
            provides the capability to seamlessly distribute relevant space
            developed products and services to all levels of Army battle
            command--from corps and theater needs to the specific needs of
            individual warfighters. The capability to identify what
            specific pieces of space-developed information are relevant to
            individual warfighters is a key component of VISTA's support
            capability.
                                   conclusion
        The Army is dependent upon the capabilities that space brings to
    the battlefield--space is the ultimate high ground. Space capabilities
    continue to be inextricably linked to warfighting. In present and
    future conflicts, we rely on and advocate for space products and
    services provided by the DOD, other government agencies, our allies and
    coalition partners, and commercial entities to shoot, move, and
    communicate. The Army will continue to provide trained and ready space
    forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the warfighter,
    build future space forces, and research, develop, test, and integrate
    future space capabilities. Fully integrated capabilities will provide
    depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders at the
    strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Assured space systems and
    well-trained and experienced space professionals significantly reduce
    the fog, friction, and uncertainty of warfare. The Army depends on
    space for everything we do in our military operations. This committee's
    continued support is essential in enabling us to maintain and further
    improve our space capabilities and provide the best-trained space
    professionals to combatant commanders. The courageous warfighters that
    serve to protect the safety and welfare of our Nation deserve nothing
    less.
        I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
    matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
    committee members may have. Secure the High Ground and Army Strong!

        Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions, what we've done is we've
    started the 2-minute comments summarizing their testimonies. We
    have three more, so then we're open for your opening comments.
        Admiral Titley.

       STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID W. TITLEY, USN, OCEANOGRAPHER AND
    NAVIGATOR OF THE NAVY, DIRECTOR, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND
                                 SPACE

        Admiral Titley. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Sessions. I'm honored to appear before you today on behalf of
    our Nation's sailors to address your Navy's space activities.
    The Navy is critically dependent on space to meet our maritime
    strategy's demands for a flexible, interoperable, and secure
    global communications capability to support the command and
    control requirements of highly mobile, geographically
    dispersed, U.S., joint, and coalition forces.
        Our Navy's interests in space include communications, ISR,
    positioning, navigation, timing, missile warning, and
    meteorology and oceanography capabilities.
        The Navy expects the demand for space capabilities to grow
    in the future, especially in the area of space communications.
    Our major space contribution to the joint community is the UHF
    narrowband SATCOM constellation. Beginning in 2012, the new
    system, MUOS, will begin to replace those legacy UHF systems.
        Timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for the Navy and
    our fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues our investment
    in this vital warfighting capability.
        In closing, sir, I would like to reiterate that space
    capabilities will continue to be critical to our Nation's
    success in the maritime domain. As the recently-signed Navy
    space strategy states: ``Space provides the ultimate crow's
    nest for maritime operations.''
        Thank you, sir, and I look forward to answering any
    questions you or Senator Sessions may have.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        General Hyten and then General Shelton.

      STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, DIRECTOR, SPACE
     PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
                            FOR ACQUISITION

        General Hyten. Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, it's an
    honor for me to be here today representing the thousands of men
    and women involved in the Air Force space acquisition business.
    It is undeniable that the Air Force has experienced significant
    challenges controlling cost, schedule, and performance in our
    space acquisition programs over the last decade. We acknowledge
    this and we understand that we must improve our acquisition
    practices to both continue to deliver the critical capabilities
    our warfighters need while at the same time achieving better
    value for the taxpayers. Mission assurance remains fundamental
    to what we do, but not at any cost.
        We believe we've taken important steps to recapture space
    acquisition excellence. We are finally finishing the
    development phase of many of our programs, delivering new
    capabilities, and moving into more stable production. We are
    placing new and additional emphasis on efficient space
    procurement that includes new acquisition strategies for
    acquiring space and launch vehicles included in our fiscal year
    2012 budget submission.
        We are working to stabilize funding requirements and
    personnel to ensure programs are more affordable, executable,
    and delivered as planned. This is hard work and it's going to
    take time for these changes to have measurable impact on
    performance. Nonetheless, we're confident that the space
    acquisition community is moving in the right direction and
    creating a fundamentally different space acquisition culture.
        Again, let me express my thanks and appreciation to the
    members and staff of this subcommittee for your continued and
    dedicated support of our space capabilities. More importantly,
    thanks to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I also
    look forward to answering your questions, sir. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. John E. Hyten, USAF
                                i. introduction
        Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee; I'm honored to be in front of you to discuss a
    challenging but exciting topic: space acquisition. I'm also honored to
    be with these leaders of the National Security Space Enterprise
    including members of other Services, displaying the inherent joint
    nature of space. This subcommittee oversees some of the most important
    aspects of our national security--nuclear weapons, ballistic missile
    defense, and our space programs. I want to thank you for everything
    that you do for our airmen and, specifically, our space cadre.
                      ii. challenges in space acquisition
        It is well documented that the Air Force has experienced
    significant challenges controlling cost, schedule, and performance of
    space acquisition programs over the last decade. We were often
    criticized for ``over reaching'' on space programs. The developmental
    systems promised giant single-step leaps in technology, but often over
    ran program budgets and failed to meet requirements in a timely manner.
    I acknowledge these challenges as areas where the Air Force needs to
    improve our acquisition practices to deliver better capabilities to the
    warfighter while achieving better value for the taxpayer. We have not
    ignored these challenges; rather, we have taken important steps to
    recapture space acquisition excellence.
        Over the last year, the Air Force made both structural and
    strategic changes improving space acquisition. Structurally, my Space
    Directorate was recently moved back under the Air Force Assistant
    Secretary for Acquisition better aligning space acquisition policies
    and programs with those of the greater Air Force. This move
    consolidates all Air Force programs under one Service Acquisition
    Executive providing better oversight of the full Air Force acquisition
    portfolio. The new organization also optimizes total obligation
    authority and allows greater funding flexibility to manage all Air
    Force systems. Air Force acquisition can now provide an integrated,
    balanced Service position toward our investments in weapon systems
    acquisitions.
        In addition, we are placing new and additional emphasis on
    Efficient Space Procurement that includes new acquisition strategies
    for acquiring space and launch vehicles in the fiscal year 2012 PB. One
    element, the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE)
    approach for procuring satellites employs the following key tenets:
    block buys of satellites, fixed-price contracting, stable research and
    development investment, and a modified full funding approach. Block
    buys and fixed-price contracts are key tenets to bring satellite unit
    costs down and reinvest realized savings in research and development
    for next generation capabilities. The modified funding approach enables
    affordability of the block buys by funding the satellite procurement
    over multiple years--specifically, under EASE, we plan to fully fund
    our satellite procurements by using advance appropriations. The Air
    Force envisions implementing the EASE approach to drive down costs,
    improve stability in the fragile space industrial base, and invest in
    advanced technology development and critical capabilities to lower risk
    for future programs. We appreciate the dialogue we've already had with
    your staff on EASE and look forward to working with the committee
    further, as needed.
        The National Security Space enterprise couldn't reach space without
    our reliable launch capability. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    (EELV) launch systems have a record of unparalleled success since the
    first launch in 2002. The Air Force recently completed the 40th
    consecutive successful launch of EELV, demonstrating our continuing
    commitment to assured access to space. In a separate and distinct
    acquisition strategy, the Air Force is proposing a block buy approach
    for the EELV program. If approved, the National Security Space
    enterprise would commit to block buys of at least eight launch vehicle
    cores per year to stabilize launch industrial base production rates and
    control launch cost. We will also support competition from vendors with
    proven capabilities. Our revised EELV acquisition strategy will include
    a new entrant approach that we are coordinating with the National
    Reconnaissance Office and National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration. Future competition could further drive cost savings and
    enhance the domestic industrial base and our operational flexibility.
    However, we must still closely scrutinize mission assurance practices
    to ensure we are safely and reliably getting our valuable space assets
    to orbit.
        In both strategies, the Air Force is working to stabilize funding,
    requirements, and personnel to ensure programs are more affordable,
    executable, and delivered as planned. Again, we want to attain better
    capabilities for the warfighter while achieving better value for the
    taxpayer.
             iii. completed development and launch of space systems
        Despite the challenges encountered in space program development,
    our resilient workforce has persevered ensuring the warfighter receives
    greater capability in key mission areas. Over the past year, we have
    completed development of essential, first-of-their-generation systems.
    Just last week, we achieved the launch of the first Space Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite to
    enhance our Overhead Persistent Infrared capability. The SBIRS GEO
    system will provide improved infrared capabilities with a faster
    revisit scanning rate and greater sensitivity than the legacy Defense
    Support Program system. Moreover, with a taskable staring capability,
    it will provide higher fidelity and persistent coverage for areas of
    interest.
        Last September, we launched the Space-Based Space Surveillance
    (SBSS) Block 10 system to enhance awareness of deep space objects of
    interest for safety of flight, threat detection, and warning. SBSS
    Block 10 significantly improves the timeliness of data on space objects
    in transit to deep space orbits. This satellite is currently in
    operation and is exceeding performance expectations, demonstrating
    excellent focus, high stability, and superb photometric sensitivity.
        This past August, the Air Force launched the first Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. While we encountered initial
    issues with the propulsion system, the team revised the orbit-raising
    plan and has been successful in executing this plan to achieve the
    required on-orbit design life. The AEHF team's dedication and resolve
    is a testament to government and industry space team cooperation. AEHF
    satellites accommodate ten times the throughput and greater than five
    times the data rate of the current Military Strategic and Tactical
    Relay II Satellite Communication System.
        Finally, in May 2010, we launched the first of 12 Global
    Positioning Satellite (GPS) IIF satellites that will broadcast a third
    civil signal, in addition to legacy signals provided. These satellites
    will sustain a healthy, but aging, GPS constellation providing
    ubiquitous position, navigation, and timing capabilities for military
    and civil users.
                       iv. modernizing our mission areas
        While the Air Force provides new space capability for the joint
    warfighter today, we are keeping an eye on the needs of the future and
    developing the next generation systems to meet those requirements. For
    example, the GPS III program is progressing on schedule to deliver the
    first IIIA satellite in 2014. The next generation of GPS will deliver
    significant enhancements including better anti-jam capabilities, a
    Galileo-compatible L1C civil signal, and improved accuracy,
    availability and integrity. The GPS IIIA program received its Milestone
    C approval in January 2011, following a very successful Critical Design
    Review--2 months ahead of schedule. The program office is also
    advancing the Next Generation Control Segment and Military GPS User
    Equipment programs.
        Regarding defense space weather, the DOD approved a plan to modify
    the existing National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System contract to procure two Defense Weather Satellite
    System spacecraft for the early-morning orbit, with the first launch
    planned for 2018. This system will replace the Defense Meteorological
    Satellite Program in the early-morning orbit, ensuring continuity of
    detailed overhead weather imagery and sensing information.
        In the space situational awareness mission area, the Air Force
    awarded two Space Fence contracts early in 2011 for Phase A development
    leading to a Preliminary Design Review in early 2012. Ultimately, the
    Space Fence will replace the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which
    is rapidly becoming unsustainable. The two ground-based radar sites
    comprising the Space Fence will provide timely information on launch
    detection, maneuvers and breakups to support protection of space
    assets. We are also seeking international cooperation on the Space
    Fence program through establishment of a space situational awareness
    (SSA) partnership with Australia to jointly employ and operate a site
    in Australia. This partnership will establish a foundation for
    continuing nation-to-nation cooperation.
        Similar to efforts on the Space Fence program, the Air Force is
    taking steps on international partnerships in our Wideband Global
    SATCOM (WGS). In addition to providing critical communications
    capabilities, WGS has also become the keystone for international
    cooperation measures in space, with our Australian allies funding WGS-6
    in return for a portion of the overall bandwidth. In accordance with
    the National Security Space Strategy, the Air Force is pursuing other
    international agreements to further expand space-based communication
    capability through the procurement of a ninth WGS satellite.
        Finally, as discussed earlier, we are proposing the EASE strategy
    for procurement of AEHF satellites five and six in fiscal year 2012 and
    SBIRS GEO satellites five and six in fiscal year 2013. These
    procurements will enhance our protected communications and overhead
    persistent infrared mission areas, respectively.
                v. fundamentally changing the way we do business
        To effectively modernize our space systems, the Air Force must
    fundamentally change the way we do business in space acquisition and
    incorporate these changes into our strategies going forward. We have
    already made adjustments by adopting a ``Back to Basics'' approach to
    space system procurement, which ensures more rigorous systems
    engineering and program management enacted early in development and
    maintained throughout its lifecycle. ``Back to Basics'' focuses on:
    mission success through clear and achievable requirements; disciplined
    systems engineering; proven technology; and appropriate resourcing. The
    Air Force has also implemented the Acquisition Improvement Plan to
    establish an experienced, skilled, empowered, and accountable
    workforce, and ensure proper requirements and adequate and stable
    funding. Improvement of acquisition processes and training of our
    personnel is essential to the success of space system development.
        As we incorporate these changes, it is critical that space
    acquisition professionals gain a better understanding of the business
    principles behind system development and procurement. Mission assurance
    is fundamental, but not at any cost. Not only do we have a
    responsibility to the warfighter in achieving better capability, we
    also have an equal responsibility to the taxpayer in achieving better
    value. Striking that balance is essential to acquiring affordable
    systems for the future. These fundamental shifts in acquisition
    perspective require a considerable culture change in our space
    acquisition workforce. It will take time for these changes to have
    measured impact on performance, but I'm confident the space acquisition
    community is moving in the right direction.
                                 vi. conclusion
        The Air Force has been, and continues to be, committed to achieving
    excellence in space acquisitions. Our effort in refining acquisition
    practices and proposing efficiency initiatives coupled with our work to
    modernize and recapitalize the space inventory exemplifies our
    dedication to supporting the Nation's national security space
    objectives. The Air Force fiscal year 2012 budget reflects that
    commitment as we seek to maintain critical space capabilities for our
    Nation and our warfighters.
        I am grateful for the continued and dedicated support of the space
    capabilities we provide for this Nation and the service of each member
    of this committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                          FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, it's a
    true honor for me to appear before you today as the Commander
    of AFSPC. I'm also honored to appear with these distinguished
    witnesses, and I'd like to also publicly congratulate Susan
    Helms on her induction into the Astronaut Hall of Fame. Her
    people launched SBIRS last Saturday and then shortly after that
    she was inducted into the Hall of Fame, so all around not a bad
    Saturday for the Helms household. I'm fortunate to have this
    talented officer and role model in my command.
        In AFSPC, I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty,
    Guard, and Reserve airmen, government civilians, and
    contractors who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities
    around the world for our Nation. AFSPC space and cyberspace
    capabilities are integral to the joint fight. Our professionals
    work extremely hard to continually ensure excellence and
    mission success in global combat as well as humanitarian
    operations, ranging from Afghanistan and Libya to Japan.
        I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast
    support of AFSPC and the capabilities we provide for this
    Nation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today as the
    Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
        I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
    airmen; government civilians; and contractors delivering space and
    cyberspace capabilities around the world for our Nation. The men and
    women of AFSPC accomplish our mission at 84 worldwide locations, yet we
    operate in domains where borders are often indiscernible. AFSPC space
    and cyberspace capabilities are integral to the Joint fight and our
    professionals continually ensure excellence and mission success.
        Based on the unique responsibilities of the Command, I have
    established three priorities. First, AFSPC must support the Joint
    fight. We are focused on supporting our deployed compatriots with our
    best efforts, and we will not fail them. Second, we must address space
    system costs and deliver capabilities on time and on budget. In a very
    constrained budget environment, it is essential that we drive down
    costs to maximize our buying power. Finally, for the purposes of
    organizing, training and equipping, we must operationalize and
    normalize cyberspace to conduct Air Force operations. Cyberspace cuts
    across the spectrum of military operations; therefore, it is imperative
    that Airmen understand the special requirements and operational
    considerations of cyberspace. As the lead Air Force Major Command for
    cyberspace, we will continue to work with other Major Commands to
    ensure we have the same level of rigor which has served the Air Force
    well in air and space.
        I look forward to a strong and mutually supportive working
    relationship with the subcommittee as we seek to deliver critical space
    and cyberspace capability to our forces. Likewise, I am committed to
    working with our space and cyberspace partners, including U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), the
    National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration (NASA), to advance our collective interests.
                  moral obligation to support the joint fight
        I strongly believe we have a moral obligation to do everything in
    our power to provide outstanding support to our brothers and sisters in
    arms who are in harm's way. Whatever we can do operationally, whatever
    we can procure that would make their task easier and bring them home
    safely, we will pursue. In that vein, AFSPC has many capabilities which
    are central to today's fight, and we are posturing these systems to be
    even more capable in the future. The President's fiscal year 2012
    budget requests $12.1 billion for AFSPC to field and operate vital
    space systems and critical cyberspace capabilities.
    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
        As stewards of the world's ``gold standard'' for PNT information,
    AFSPC is significantly improving the Global Positioning System (GPS)
    for military and civilian users alike. This past January, we completed
    the first of a two-phased operation called ``Expandable 24,'' the
    largest satellite repositioning effort in GPS program history. This
    operation was planned and executed under the outstanding leadership of
    Lieutenant Colonel Mike Manor, Captain Dan Highlander, and Captain
    Blake Hajovsky of the second Space Operations Squadron (SOPS) at
    Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), CO. Each phase repositions three
    satellites to optimize terrestrial coverage of the constellation for
    terrain-challenged environments, such as cities and the mountains and
    valleys of Afghanistan.
        The second and final phase of this operation is already underway
    and it is scheduled for completion this summer.
        The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $1.7 billion (Operations and
    Maintenance [O&M]; Research, Development, Test and Engineering [RDT&E];
    Procurement; and Military Personnel [MILPERS]) also will advance PNT
    capability by procuring and launching upgraded satellites (GPS IIF and
    GPS III), funding a significant upgrade to the operational control
    segment (OCX) and building new Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE). GPS
    III, OCX and MGUE will improve user collaboration, incorporate an
    effects-based approach to operations and establish a net-centric ground
    architecture, thereby accelerating the mission application of
    positioning and timing information.
        Last May, AFSPC launched the first of 12 GPS IIF satellites, which
    provides improved timing technology, a more jam-resistant military
    signal and a higher-powered civilian signal. Captains Vivian Elmo and
    Linda Gostomski, both from our GPS Reserve Associate Unit, 19 SOPS,
    Schriever AFB, CO, led the way as integrators of contractor, booster,
    satellite vehicle and ground network teams to ensure a successful
    launch and on-orbit checkout of this new capability.
    Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM)
        The demand for satellite communications continues to grow as
    warfighters increasingly depend on information relayed from space,
    especially for today's distributed operations in this era of
    information-enabled warfare. This past June, the first block of
    Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites became fully operational with
    the acceptance of WGS-3. Launches of the next block of WGS satellites
    (4-6) are planned for 2011-2013, with funding for WGS-6 coming from
    Australia. This partnership is an example of the international
    cooperation envisioned in the National Space Policy and National
    Security Space Strategy. The fiscal year 2012 request includes $481.5
    million (RDT&E and Procurement) for WGS to meet combatant commander
    requirements to deliver voice, data, and imagery, as well as full
    motion video from Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA).
        The first satellite in the next generation of protected and
    survivable MILSATCOM, our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
    satellite, was launched last August. Compared to its predecessor,
    Milstar, AEHF will soon provide a 10-fold throughput increase in
    secure, jam-resistant communications for national leaders and combatant
    commanders, as well as support for our international partners including
    Canada, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom.
        While the launch was perfect, a spacecraft propulsion system
    anomaly left AEHF-1 well short of its intended geosynchronous (GEO)
    orbit. A team of experts from the Space and Missile Systems Center
    (SMC), led by Lieutenant General Tom Sheridan and Mr. Dave Madden,
    developed a plan to innovatively use the remaining much smaller
    thrusters to save this vital asset. The team worked around the clock
    addressing the immediate need to conserve fuel, developing the recovery
    plan and demonstrating the recovery could be done safely and
    effectively. Thanks to the outstanding engineering and hard work of
    these space professionals, the AEHF-1 orbit is progressing toward
    geosynchronous altitude and we expect to begin initial testing later
    this year. The budget includes $974.5 million (RDT&E and Procurement)
    in fiscal year 2012 to fund AEHF.
    Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
        Data from the legacy Defense Support Program (DSP), as well as the
    highly elliptical orbit (HEO)-based Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
    sensors, provides real-time missile warning and missile defense
    information to national decisionmakers and commanders. Last year, we
    provided the U.S., coalition members and our allies assured warning for
    over 200 missile launches and 4,500 special infrared (IR) events, a 150
    percent increase over 2009. This is due, in part, to the vastly
    improved battlespace awareness capability of the latest HEO payloads.
    To further assist Geographic Combatant Commanders, and in cooperation
    with STRATCOM, we substantially improved our missile warning reporting
    criteria, thanks to the herculean efforts of Captain Christopher
    Castle, First Lieutenant Michael Mariner and Technical Sergeant Michael
    Johns of the 2d Space Warning Squadron, Buckley AFB, CO. This new
    criteria will provide more timely and accurate warning information to
    our entire force.
        The 40th anniversary of the DSP was celebrated in 2010. This
    constellation provides outstanding service to the Nation and Captains
    Barry Croker and Zach Lehmann are creatively finding ways to extend the
    lives of these satellites. They led a team of professionals who have
    developed a series of new system procedures to wring every last drop of
    capability from these assets. The team's actions already are credited
    with forestalling disposal of one of these valuable satellites.
        While DSP has a long history of proven strategic, operational and
    tactical value, we are entering the era of SBIRS GEO, the replacement
    for DSP. Each SBIRS GEO has a staring infrared sensor to allow
    detection of dimmer, faster burning missiles and more accurate missile
    launch and impact point predictions, as well as a scanning sensor that
    covers an entire hemisphere in its field of view. The fiscal year 2012
    budget request includes $1.22 billion (O&M, RDT&E, Procurement and
    MILPERS) to continue the development of additional OPIR capability.
    Operationally Responsive Space
        The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) philosophy seeks to
    rapidly deliver warfighter-demanded capability at reduced cost through
    innovative acquisition approaches with shorter timelines. Last June,
    TacSat-3, a hyperspectral imaging satellite, transitioned from an Air
    Force Research Lab experiment to a warfighter-taskable, Department of
    Defense (DOD)-operated, system in support of Combatant Commands
    (COCOMs) worldwide. TacSat-3 support of the Haitian earthquake recovery
    efforts and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill demonstrated the value of
    hyperspectral imagery, and it is now being used by COCOMs to support
    daily operations. Leading these efforts is Lieutenant Colonel Darren
    Johnson, from the Headquarters AFSPC ORS Division, who deployed to
    Afghanistan as Chief, International Security Assistance Force Space
    Operations. His experience with TacSat-3 expedited theater usage of
    this unique space-based imager for improved location and targeting of
    threats to coalition forces in harm's way.
        The next ORS satellite on the horizon, currently scheduled to
    launch later this spring, is ORS-1 which will support U.S. Central
    Command's (CENTCOM) multispectral imagery needs. The fiscal year 2012
    budget request includes $86.5 million (RDT&E) to develop these ORS
    systems.
    Weather
        As part of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS) restructure, AFSPC will support Joint forces
    by developing the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), a fiscal
    year 2012 request of $444.9 million (RDT&E). The acquisition of DWSS
    will maximize NPOESS-developed capabilities to best preserve program
    schedules and reduce costs. DWSS will replace the military's weather
    workhorse, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), now in
    its sixth decade. We will continue to leverage longstanding
    partnerships with the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NASA as we develop the morning
    orbit satellite to accompany their Joint Polar Satellite System's
    afternoon orbit satellite, on which both defense and civil users rely.
        Currently, DMSP is operated at the NOAA Satellite Operations
    Facility in Maryland with a backup control station operated by 6 SOPS,
    a Reserve unit at Schriever AFB, CO. This blended partnership works
    well for all parties. As an example, in January, an emergency situation
    at NOAA required activation of the backup unit. Within an hour, Major
    Jeremy Edwards and his crew--on hot standby--mobilized and assumed full
    command of all DMSP satellites, continuing delivery of critical
    environmental intelligence information to worldwide forces.
    Space--Contested, Congested, and Competitive.
        Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
        As the National Security Space Strategy states, ``space is becoming
    increasingly contested, congested and competitive.'' In light of these
    challenges to the space domain, we must maintain adequate resiliency of
    space capabilities to ensure space-based information delivery and
    access for Joint forces and allies. Foundational to our ability to
    ``operate through'' the growing threats is SSA, which is enabled by the
    fusion of Space Surveillance Network (SSN) sensor information at the
    Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). Behind the scenes providing this
    capability daily are Space Event Duty Technicians, like Staff Sergeant
    Adrian Cervantes, ensuring the accuracy of the SSA data by working
    closely with fellow space, cyber and intelligence operators. In 2010,
    the JSpOC routinely tracked over 22,000 space objects, an approximately
    10 percent increase in objects from the previous year. Each week JSpOC
    conducts over 7,000 space object conjunction (collision potential)
    screenings which are critically important to the 23 commercial and
    agency partners in the SSA Sharing Program. Last year, there were 126
    collision avoidance maneuvers, a 180 percent increase over 2009, the
    year of the very unfortunate Cosmos and Iridium satellite collision.
        Our ability to maintain leadership in SSA depends on SSN
    modernization and adding increased SSA capability to track smaller
    objects, increase timeliness of revisit rates and mitigate coverage
    gaps. Replacing the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which employs
    a 1960's era Very High Frequency radar, is important to this overall
    objective. The Space Fence and its S-band radar capability will
    significantly aid the detection of smaller objects and provide uncued
    tracking of space objects.
        Last September, the first operational launch of a Minotaur IV
    delivered the Space Based Surveillance System to orbit, the first
    dedicated on-orbit SSA satellite, which provides us the capability to
    track an object, day or night, without weather interference. The
    satellite's first image was taken in October by a team of SMC, one SOPS
    and seven SOPS (Reserve Associate Unit) personnel as part of planned
    calibration and characterization activities, and the initial data is
    superb. Another new potential SSN contributor is the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Space Surveillance Telescope (SST),
    based in New Mexico, which is currently undergoing extensive testing.
    SST has the potential to provide AFSPC with new capability to detect
    and track faint space objects at geosynchronous distance.
        Foundational to all the space surveillance architecture
    improvements is ensuring that we have the processing and data fusion
    capabilities to conduct SSA. The JSpOC Mission System, with a fiscal
    year 2012 budget request of $122.1 million (O&M, RDT&E, and
    Procurement) will replace legacy technology with improved data
    processing, integration, visualization and exploitation capabilities.
    Without the capability to receive, process, fuse, and exploit the data
    we receive from SSA sources, we will not meet the challenges of an
    increasingly congested and contested space environment.
        Space Protection Program (SPP)
        SPP continues to inform the national space community by raising
    awareness of space threats and system vulnerabilities, as well as
    identifying material and non-material solutions to mitigate those
    threats. The Air Force's fiscal year 2012 budget request is for $9.8
    million (RDT&E) to continue this work to gain architectural insights
    for the future. Through several analytical studies, SPP provided AFSPC
    and NRO leadership significant recommendations and mitigation options
    to protect space assets. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Samson
    led an analysis and software demonstration activity which illustrated
    how some immediate operational changes could reduce the effects of
    known threats and regain reconnaissance mission capability. Another
    study, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bates, provided several
    recommendations to sustain PNT capabilities in a contested environment.
    SPP's analytical work also supports real world events, exercises and
    wargames. Finally, SPP supports national efforts to develop policy,
    strategy and architecture options across the national security space
    community.
        Schriever Wargame 2010
        The Schriever Wargame series generates leadership insights in
    contested space and cyberspace environments. The most recent iteration,
    Schriever Wargame 2010, brought together military and civilian experts
    from more than 30 government agencies. Under the leadership of
    Lieutenant Colonel Joe Wurmstein, Headquarters AFSPC Wargaming Branch
    Chief, and Major Jim Pedersen, the Game Director, this version focused
    on space and cyber deterrence, escalation control, response options,
    policy, planning, and national command relationships and authorities.
    The wargame featured expanded international and industry participation,
    including Australia, Canada, Great Britain, a North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization observer cell and cyber industry representation. As AFSPC
    prepares for the next iteration in 2012, we will use a comprehensive
    approach to gain additional insights, integrating instruments of
    national power to deter, prevent, and contain conflict.
    Space Innovation and Development Center
        The SIDC, as the name implies, is our center for space and cyber
    innovation. Among other responsibilities, it is home to the Air Force
    Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, which works to deliver
    game-changing increases in capability for the joint fight. Other Space
    Innovation and Development Center (SIDC) projects include on-demand
    commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar distribution to warfighters,
    distribution of fifth generation aircraft data into legacy fighter
    aircraft and C2 platforms, and a prototype Data Integration and Fusion
    Center (DIFC) capable of providing a robust common operating picture to
    COCOM decision-makers by fusing multiple sources of non-traditional and
    national level information.
    X-37B
        Several AFSPC organizations supported DOD's first-ever operational
    space plane mission, the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV). Through
    lessons learned from the first flight, the SIDC's 3rd Space
    Experimentation Squadron has identified concepts of employment,
    training, education and technical skill sets required for future X-37B
    operations. Also crucial to this success was First Lieutenant Gordon
    Barnhill of the 45th Launch Support Squadron at Patrick AFB, FL, who
    was the launch site's lead engineer and developer of ground-breaking
    procedures for the launch and landing of this unique space plane.
    Additionally, the Western Range Team at Vandenberg AFB, CA, developed
    and tested new procedures for X-37B pre-recovery operations. Mr. Dennis
    Pakulski, the Chief Mission Engineer, applied both ingenuity and
    experience to replace 658 steel runway plates that posed a danger to
    the X-37's landing gear. Captain Dariusz Wudarzewski, the Range
    Operations Commander, led more than 250 landing team members and
    provided the complex final recommendation for ``clear to land'' for the
    safe return of the OTV after nearly 8 months of successful on-orbit
    operations. The second launch of the X-37B took place March 5.
    Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN)
        The AFSCN is our capability to receive mission data and control
    many of our Nation's satellites. In fiscal year 2010, the AFSCN
    conducted over 150,000 satellite contacts, supported 21 launches and 39
    vehicle emergencies. The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $328 million
    (O&M, RDT&E and Procurement) for AFSCN. The AFSCN recently underwent a
    major upgrade, replacing decades-old communication and switching
    equipment, and upgrading communication circuits to handle Internet
    Protocol traffic. Considerable downtime over a 4-day period was
    required to make these changes. First Lieutenant David Rothzeid of
    SMC's Satellite Control and Network Systems Division orchestrated the
    outages site-by-site, working with multiple organizations and
    contractors to ensure the network could maintain its average 450 per
    day satellite contact rate during the transition.
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
        In 2010, the Air Force Frequency Management Agency, Alexandria, VA,
    was redesignated the Air Force Spectrum Management Office (AFSMO) to
    better reflect the broader responsibilities of that organization.
    Colonel Brian Jordan, the AFSMO Commander, is the strategic thinker and
    visionary dealing with the difficult challenges that accompany
    preserving access for essential Air Force capabilities. The backbone of
    information flow is the electromagnetic spectrum which is the common
    link among networks, sensors, weapon systems, commanders and combat
    forces. In the Presidential Memorandum, Unleashing the Wireless
    Broadband Revolution, issued on June 28, 2010, Federal agencies were
    directed to cooperate in the effort to locate 500 megahertz of Federal
    and non-Federal spectrum suitable for wireless broadband use. As a
    result of the memorandum and at the direction of the Department of
    Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
    AFSMO will lead the Air Force's evaluation of the 1755-1850 megahertz
    spectrum sought by wireless companies to determine if it can be made
    available without harming critical capabilities.
        This spectrum is used by a wide array of critical Air Force
    systems, including precision guided munitions, airborne telemetry
    systems, RPAs and the C2 of numerous satellite systems, including GPS.
    As the Air Force designs, tests and deploys new or modified systems,
    spectrum management is of paramount importance to supporting the joint
    fight.
    Silent Sentry
        Since 2005, Operation Silent Sentry, a capability initially
    designed for a 120-day demonstration, has provided CENTCOM with
    spectrum monitoring for electromagnetic interference (EMI) of satellite
    communications in the AOR. Spearheaded by personnel from the 16th Space
    Control Squadron (SPCS), Peterson AFB, CO, and its collocated Reserve
    Associate 380 SPCS, this nine-person team is instrumental in detecting
    and geo-locating sources of EMI events--both intentional and
    unintentional--including monitoring of RPA satellite links used for C2
    and mission data. The current deployment team is led by Lieutenant
    Colonel Blake Jeffries (16 SPCS) and Master Sergeant Scott Westfall
    (380 SPCS).
    In-Theater Space Professionals
        Many of our space professionals have deployed to critical positions
    in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to ensure timely space
    support is available to the warfighter. Included in this group is the
    Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR). The DIRSPACEFOR, currently
    Colonel Dave Buck, brings senior-level space perspective and harnesses
    the expertise of our mid-level space professionals who are integrated
    in theater units, directly supporting Joint and coalition forces.
    Additionally, the DIRSPACEFOR reaches back to the Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space and the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA, for
    access to all DOD space forces.
        Captains Aaron Cochran and Peter Norsky are just two examples of
    these mid-level theater space professionals, in this case assigned to
    the 504th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group. They provide
    critical forward-based space expertise enabling integration of space
    capabilities into air and ground operations in Kandahar and Mazar-e-
    Sharif, Afghanistan. Their presence allows expert knowledge transfer to
    tactical users, including Army brigades and battalions, Joint Terminal
    Attack Controllers and other battlespace owners.
    Space and Cyberspace Capabilities at Red Flag
        Another milestone for AFSPC is tactical level integration of space
    and cyber capabilities with traditional air capabilities at the Air
    Force's premier training exercise, Red Flag, held at Nellis AFB, NV.
    Recently, a space officer was designated the overall mission commander
    during one of the exercise days--a Red Flag first. Captain Warren
    Riner, 76th SPCS, Peterson AFB, CO, led a multi-faceted air, space and
    cyberspace force, which highlighted the diverse, yet synergistic,
    mission capabilities of the Air Force. Captain Riner's team was also
    responsible for all air, space and cyberspace nonkinetic capability
    integration during all exercise missions. I believe this is the future
    of our force: seamless integration of multiple capabilities, where the
    result is greater than the sum of the parts.
                           control space system costs
        AFSPC is implementing significant changes as part of the Air
    Force's ``Recapture Acquisition Excellence'' priority. From
    requirements definition to contracting to hard-nosed program
    management, we must work to reduce our space system acquisition costs.
    In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air
    Force is redefining acquisition strategies for buying military
    satellites. Anticipated savings will allow for research and development
    investment for future performance improvements and to lower cost of
    follow-on systems. We will closely collaborate with the Headquarters
    Air Force acquisition staff to implement this new strategy for the next
    blocks of AEHF and SBIRS satellites. We look forward to working with
    Congress to obtain the necessary legislative authorities to execute
    this strategy and achieve our vision.
        The record of successful national security launches since 1999 is
    truly remarkable. Nevertheless, we treat each launch as if it were our
    first, applying sound mission assurance principles to ensure success.
    Unfortunately, the space launch industrial base is very fragile,
    resulting in significantly increased costs of the Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. To arrest this cost growth, we are
    implementing a new launch vehicle purchasing strategy. Our plan is to
    commit to an annual production rate of launch vehicles, alongside the
    NRO, with block buy procurement. We believe this will provide
    predictability, economic order quantity opportunities and a more stable
    industrial base, thereby lowering overall costs. A team of acquisition
    and launch experts, including NRO, NASA, and industry partners, is
    developing an improved approach to maintaining EELV's outstanding
    mission success record while controlling costs and providing more
    operational flexibility. The Air Force request for EELV is $1.76
    billion (RDT&E and Procurement) in fiscal year 2012.
        A Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding signed by the
    Air Force, NASA and the NRO commits the organizations to closer
    coordination in the acquisition of launch vehicles, liquid-fueled
    engines for boosters and upper stages, and the development of launch
    bases and ranges. This is recognition of the continued need for
    collaboration to help assure the Nation's access to space, especially
    in a challenging fiscal environment for all the agencies involved.
        operationalize and normalize cyberspace for air force operations
        As the Air Force's lead Major Command for cyberspace, AFSPC is
    making significant strides in leveraging existing resources, applying
    appropriate lessons learned and new processes, and working toward
    increasing our effectiveness within cyberspace for 21st century
    military operations. Using this approach, we have rapidly developed the
    organizational structure, C2, career field management, education and
    training, and technical capabilities in cyberspace. Last October,
    Twenty-Fourth Air Force (24 AF) achieved Full Operational Capability
    status and in December was designated Air Forces Cyber to signify its
    role as the Air Force's operational component to CYBERCOM.
        We are applying lessons learned from the Space Professional
    Development Program to build a counterpart cyberspace program. The
    focus of the Cyberspace Professional Development Program is to build
    21st century cyberspace warriors with a mindset and skill set tailored
    to operational roles. Last year, we produced our first graduates from
    Undergraduate Cyberspace Training, Cyber 200 and Cyber 300 classes,
    forming the beginnings of a highly trained cyber force.
        Cyberspace integration into the Joint fight is beginning to take
    shape. A recent milestone was the integration of RPA mission assurance
    efforts, also called ``cyber escort missions,'' into the operations
    section of the CENTCOM Air Tasking Order. This signifies the first
    major, sustained employment of cyber capability into day-to-day air
    operations. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Ramsey, who is assigned to the
    624th Operations Center, Lackland AFB, TX, currently leads one of the
    first deployments of the Cyberspace Operations Liaison Element (COLE)
    to the CENTCOM AOR. The COLE ensures cyber effects are fully integrated
    into contingency planning efforts from initial planning through
    execution. The COLE also provides mission assurance, exercise planning
    and development, and cyber intelligence support to joint operations.
        Our 689th Combat Communications Wing (689 CCW) already is fully
    integrated in warfighter support. Last year, the 689 CCW deployed 700
    Airmen to 54 locations, highlighted by establishing initial
    communications capability on four bare bases in hostile areas.
    Additionally, they provided support to homeland defense and disaster
    relief efforts, including Secret Service support and crucial
    involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Haiti and
    Chile. Staff Sergeant Alexander Yessayan, a combat communication
    specialist, received the Air Force Combat Action Medal and Army Combat
    Action Badge for his heroic actions in defending his Provincial
    Reconstruction Team against a Taliban ambush while in Afghanistan.
    Major Noland Greene, Commander of the 34th Combat Communications
    Squadron, led a 47-member team of cyber warriors to Shindand Air Base,
    Afghanistan, where they built and operated a network that provided all
    required communication services for the Army at this forward operating
    base.
        While AFSPC and 24 AF have swiftly reached significant cyberspace
    milestones, much work remains. Our top priority is to consolidate into
    a single Air Force network. This single network will be a major step
    toward achieving real-time situational awareness, allowing better
    defense of the network, and facilitating efficient enterprise solutions
    for the Air Force. This will standardize and simplify delivery of
    services to our force, thereby reducing operations and maintenance
    costs.
        In addition to terrestrial network consolidation, the Air Force
    Network Integration Center leads the Single Integrated Network
    Environment (SINE) initiative. Under the leadership of Lieutenant
    Colonel Patrick Dunnells, SINE is an overarching framework for how the
    Air Force will provide seamless information flow across terrestrial,
    air and space domains. Information flow among domains is critical for
    efficient and effective mission accomplishment and SINE is a path
    forward to provide resilient, risk-mitigated infrastructure for
    increased operational reliability, availability, C2 and situational
    awareness.
        AFSPC's cyberspace portfolio request is for $1.9 billion in fiscal
    year 2012. Approximately $1.2 billion of this request is for operations
    and maintenance and over $700 million is allocated for developing
    additional capability. Operationalizing and normalizing the cyberspace
    mission for the Air Force is in its nascent stages, but beginning to
    take root as we build a strong foundation
        with deliberate speed and thought. These efforts will enhance the
    asymmetric advantages of our Joint forces and provide the vehicle for
    synergistic benefits through integration of air, space and cyberspace.
                              afspc professionals
        The talented men and women of AFSPC and the families who support
    them are essential to achieving the Command's three priorities. We have
    trained and ready Airmen who deliver for the joint fight every single
    day in technically demanding domains. I strongly believe the continued
    development of our space and cyberspace professionals is key to our
    future. Last year we broke ground on the new $14.4 million Space
    Education and Training Center, which will give a permanent, on-base
    residence for the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) and Advanced
    Space Operations School (ASOpS). Each year, ASOpS provides advanced
    training to more than 1,600 DOD space professionals, while NSSI, the
    Air Force's space professional development school, provides unique
    education to approximately 800 space professionals from all Services.
    Again in compliance with the new National Space Policy, this year the
    NSSI will provide its first course offerings to our Australian, British
    and Canadian international partners.
        In addition to the training we provide for our people, a
    professional, non-discriminatory environment creates the opportunity
    for all to achieve their full potential. We steadfastly support the Air
    Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program and its role in
    fostering a healthy unit environment. AFSPC is proud of our bystander
    intervention video, shared AF wide, which captures the experience of
    Airman First Class Edward Todd of the 21st Dental Squadron, Peterson
    AFB, CO. The video recreates how he applied his training to assist a
    young woman in a dangerous situation, averting a potential assault.
    Further, I believe a focus on the resiliency of our people is
    foundational to developing a wellness culture that combats not only
    suicides, but alcohol and substance abuse, and other self-destructive
    behaviors. We are working hard to provide education and training to
    raise the resiliency of our entire command, thereby providing better
    tools to our people as they deal with the stressors of daily life.
    Total Force Enterprise
        The contributions of our Reserve and Guard forces to the Joint
    fight simply cannot be overstated. In AFSPC, the Air Reserve Component
    (ARC) comprises approximately 40 percent of our Airmen. Space and
    cyberspace operations require high-caliber individuals with in-depth
    technical skills. As many AFSPC missions are 24x7 and deployed-in-
    place, the ARC can augment active duty units as part-time force
    multipliers providing needed technical expertise, especially in cyber
    where industry is currently leading innovation. The ARC enables a
    superb intersection of military and civilian experience, which is
    mutually beneficial to both active duty and ARC Airmen in our Command.
                                   conclusion
        Significant technological advances in space and cyberspace have
    transformed the way we conduct military operations--and even the way we
    live our daily lives. Recognizing the mandate to keep pace with this
    high rate of change, AFSPC will proceed with a sense of urgency as we
    deliver global capabilities, which are so crucial in this age of
    information-enabled warfare. We will focus on our three priorities:
    support the joint fight, get control of the costs of space programs,
    and operationalize and normalize cyberspace for Air Force operations.
    Above all, our workforce of highly trained and motivated professionals
    will continue to produce excellence, global and beyond.
        I consider it a deep personal honor to command AFSPC, and again, I
    appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to
    represent my Command.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
        Ms. Chaplain.

     STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
         SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our focus at GAO is
    on acquisition oversight. If I have to sum up my remarks very
    quickly, I would just say that space acquisition has been
    broken, it is being fixed, but more needs to be done. I just
    want to spend a few minutes telling you what's on our watch
    list in terms of what needs to be done. I want to say that a
    lot of credit should go to both the Air Force and DOD for the
    actions they have been taking, and they are all detailed in our
    statement.
        First, there are some major programs that face considerable
    schedule pressures and schedule risks. Although they are
    attempting to incorporate best practices, it's still unknown at
    this time the extent that these practices can shorten the
    schedules by years.
        Second, many of the systems on the ground that support
    space activities and that enable satellite capabilities to be
    used, are still facing a high degree of acquisition risk. These
    include ground systems like the operational control segment
    (OCX) program for GPS, user terminals for the AEHF system, some
    of the sensors involved with space situational awareness, and
    the control system for space situational awareness, known as
    the JSpOC mission system (JMS), which is the linchpin in that
    mission and it's very critical that it be done successfully.
        Third, while there's been a number of organizational
    changes made over the past year, it's just unclear at this
    point how they'll shake out and whether they'll really
    streamline oversight and strengthen it for space acquisitions.
        Fourth, there's more organizations involved in space now.
    You have the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) taking on a new major
    program, the Army is taking on some space efforts, and you need
    to balance this with the dwindling workforce. There's key areas
    of space expertise that have been decreasing in recent years.
    There's a question as to how we have that capability, is it
    being stretched too far across DOD.
        Lastly, there's just budget pressures that we all know are
    out there. At the same time, space is very costly. The question
    going forward is: can we still start new major efforts or is
    that going to be unaffordable? When we do start them, are we
    going to be pressured to take shortcuts, including testing and
    important mission assurance activities?
        That's just what's on our list for this year. I thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee:
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of
    dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military
    and other government operations, as well as to enable DOD to transform
    the way it collects and disseminates information. Despite the
    significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale
    acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
    during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of
    millions and even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years,
    and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD
    altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it
    intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or
    terminating major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the
    cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant
    schedule delays--of as much as 9 years--resulting in potential
    capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military
    communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist;
    however, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have
    taken a wide range of actions to prevent them from occurring in new
    programs.
        My testimony today will focus on: (1) the status of space system
    acquisitions, (2) results of our space-related reviews over the past
    year and the challenges they signify, (3) the efforts DOD has taken to
    address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its
    space system acquisitions as well as efforts currently underway, and
    (4) what remains to be done. Notably, DOD has acknowledged the
    acquisition problems of the past and recognizes the need for better
    management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors.
    More important, several high-risk space programs appear to have finally
    resolved technical and other obstacles and have started to or are close
    to beginning to deliver capability. However, other space acquisition
    programs--including the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA and Mobile
    User Objective System (MUOS)--continue to face challenges in meeting
    their cost and schedule targets and aligning the delivery of space
    assets with the ground and user systems needed to support and take
    advantage of new capability. Moreover, it may take years for
    acquisition improvements to take root and produce benefits that will
    enable DOD to realize a better return on its investment in space.
    Importantly, DOD has taken steps to decide how to best organize, lead,
    and support space activities. But more may be needed in light of the
    wide range of stakeholders and past issues with diffuse leadership.
        The work that supports this statement was performed in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
    require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
    appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
    obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
    based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and
    methodology are provided in appendix II.
                status of space acquisitions: challenges persist
        A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program
    and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates,
    while in some cases the capability that was to be delivered goes down.
    Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost estimates
    for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years
    2010 through 2015. The wider the gap between original and current
    estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new
    programs. As shown in the figure, cumulative estimated costs for the
    major space acquisition programs have increased by about $13.9 billion
    from initial estimates for fiscal years 2010 through 2015, almost a 286
    percent increase. The declining investment in the later years is the
    result of mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding,
    cancellation of several development efforts, and the exclusion of space
    acquisition efforts for which total cost data were unavailable (such as
    new investments).

        When space system investments other than established acquisition
    programs of record--such as the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)
    and Space Fence programs--are also considered, DOD's space acquisition
    investments remain significant through fiscal year 2016, as shown in
    figure 2. Although estimated costs for selected space acquisition
    programs decrease 21 percent between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, they
    start to increase in fiscal year 2016. According to current DOD
    estimates, costs for two programs--Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High--are expected to
    significantly increase in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The costs are
    associated with the procurement of additional blocks of satellites and
    are not included in the figure because they have not yet been reported
    or quantified.

        Figures 3 and 4 reflect differences in total program and unit costs
    for satellites from the time the programs officially began to their
    most recent cost estimates. As figure 4 shows, in several cases, DOD
    has increased the number of satellites. The figures reflect total
    program cost estimates developed in fiscal year 2010.

        Several space acquisition programs are years behind schedule.
    Figure 5 highlights the additional estimated months needed for programs
    to launch their first satellites. These additional months represent
    time not anticipated at the programs' start dates. Generally, the
    further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining
    current capabilities. For example, delays in launching the first MUOS
    satellite have placed DOD's ultra high frequency communications
    capabilities at risk of falling below the required availability level.

    Some Acquisition Programs Appear to Have Overcome Problems, but Other
            Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns
        DOD had longstanding difficulties on nearly every space acquisition
    program, struggling for years with cost and schedule growth, technical
    or design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses.
    However, to its credit, it continues to make progress on several of its
    high-risk space programs, and is expecting to deliver significant
    advances in capability as a result. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA)
    Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites
    were launched in September 2009. Additionally, DOD launched its first
    GPS IIF satellite in May 2010 and plans to launch the second IIF
    satellite in June 2011--later than planned, partially because of
    system-level problems identified during testing. It also launched the
    first AEHF satellite in August 2010--although it has not yet reached
    its final planned orbit because of an anomaly with the satellite's
    propulsion system--and launched the Space Based Space Surveillance
    (SBSS) Block 10 satellite in September 2010. DOD is scheduled to launch
    a fourth Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite broadening
    communications capability available to warfighters--in late 2011, and a
    fifth WGS satellite in early 2012. The Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) program had its 41st consecutive successful operational
    launch in May of this year.
        One program that appears to have recently overcome remaining
    technical problems is the SBIRS High satellite program. The first of
    six geosynchronous earth-orbiting (GEO) satellites (two highly
    elliptical orbit sensors have already been launched) was launched in
    May 2011 and is expected to continue the missile warning mission with
    sensors that are more capable than the satellites currently on orbit.
    Total cost for the SBIRS High program is currently estimated at over
    $18 billion for six GEO satellites,\1\ representing a program unit cost
    of over $3 billion, about 233 percent more than the original unit cost
    estimate. Additionally, the launch of the first GEO satellite
    represents a delay of approximately 9 years. The reasons for the delay
    include poor government oversight of the contractor, unanticipated
    technical complexities, and rework. The program office is working to
    rebaseline the SBIRS High contract cost and schedule estimates for the
    sixth time. Because of the problems on SBIRS High, in 2007, DOD began a
    follow-on system effort, which was known as Third Generation Infrared
    Surveillance (3GIRS), to run in parallel with the SBIRS High program.
    DOD canceled the 3GIRS effort in fiscal year 2011, but plans to
    continue providing funds under the SBIRS High program for one of the
    3GIRS infrared demonstrations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The $18 billion does not include the cost of two replenishment
    sensors, which the Air Force does not include as part of the SBIRS High
    baseline.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch,
    other space acquisition programs face challenges that could further
    increase cost and delay delivery targets. The programs that may be
    susceptible to cost and schedule challenges include MUOS and the GPS
    IIIA program. Delays in the MUOS program have resulted in critical
    potential capability gaps for military and other government users. The
    GPS IIIA program was planned with an eye toward avoiding problems that
    plagued the GPS IIF program and it incorporated many of the best
    practices recommended by GAO, but the schedule leaves little room for
    potential problems and there is a risk that the ground system needed to
    operate the satellites will not be ready when the first satellite is
    launched. Additionally, the National Polar-orbiting Operational
    Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was restructured as a result of
    poor program performance and cost overruns, which caused schedule
    delays. These delays have resulted in a potential capability gap for
    weather and environmental monitoring. Furthermore, new space system
    acquisition efforts getting underway--including the Air Force's Joint
    Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) and Space Fence, and MDA's
    Precision Tracking and Surveillance System (PTSS)--face potential
    development challenges and risks, but it is too early to tell how
    significant they may be to meeting cost, schedule, and performance
    goals.
        Table 1 describes the status of these efforts in more detail.

            results of gao space-related reviews over the past year
        Over the past year, we have completed reviews of sustaining and
    upgrading GPS capabilities and commercializing space technologies under
    the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR),\2\ and we have
    ongoing reviews of: (1) DOD space situational awareness (SSA)
    acquisition efforts, (2) parts quality for DOD, MDA, and the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and (3) a new acquisition
    strategy being developed for the EELV program. These reviews, discussed
    further below, underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD
    space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and
    deliver modernized capabilities. Our reviews of GPS and space
    situational awareness, for instance, have highlighted the need for more
    focused coordination and leadership for space activities that touch a
    wide range of government, international, and industry stakeholders;
    while our review of the SBIR program highlighted the substantial
    barriers and challenges small business must overcome to gain entry into
    the government space arena.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and
    Upgrading Capabilities Persist, GAO-10-636 (Washington, DC, Sept. 15,
    2010) and Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing
    Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research
    Program, GAO-11-21 (Washington, DC: Nov. 10, 2010).

             GPS. We found that the GPS IIIA schedule remains
            ambitious and could be affected by risks such as the program's
            dependence on a ground system that will not be completed until
            after the first IIIA launch. We found that the GPS
            constellation availability had improved, but in the longer
            term, a delay in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could
            still reduce the size of the constellation to fewer than 24
            operational satellites--the number that the U.S. Government
            commits to--which might not meet the needs of some GPS users.
            We also found that the multiyear delays in the development of
            GPS ground control systems were extensive. Although the Air
            Force had taken steps to enable quicker procurement of military
            GPS user equipment, there were significant challenges to its
            implementation. This has had a significant impact on DOD as all
            three GPS segments--space, ground control, and user equipment--
            must be in place to take advantage of new capabilities.
            Additionally, we found that DOD had taken some steps to better
            coordinate all GPS segments, including laying out criteria and
            establishing visibility over a spectrum of procurement efforts,
            but it did not go as far as we recommended in 2009 in terms of
            establishing a single authority responsible for ensuring that
            all GPS segments are synchronized to the maximum extent
            practicable.\3\ Such an authority is warranted given the extent
            of delays, problems with synchronizing all GPS segments, and
            importance of new capabilities to military operations. As a
            result, we reiterated the need to implement our prior
            recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in
    Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, GAO-09-325
    (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR). In response
            to a request from this subcommittee, we found that while DOD is
            working to commercialize space-related technologies under its
            SBIR program by transitioning these technologies into
            acquisition programs or the commercial sector, it has limited
            insight into the program's effectiveness.\4\ Specifically, DOD
            has invested about 11 percent of its fiscal years 2005-2009
            research and development funds through its SBIR program to
            address space-related technology needs. Additionally, DOD is
            soliciting more space-related research proposals from small
            businesses. Further, DOD has implemented a variety of programs
            and initiatives to increase the commercialization of SBIR
            technologies and has identified instances where it has
            transitioned space-related technologies into acquisition
            programs or the commercial sector. However, DOD lacks complete
            commercialization data to determine the effectiveness of the
            program in transitioning space-related technologies into
            acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Of the nearly
            500 space-related contracts awarded in fiscal years 2005
            through 2009, DOD officials could not, for various reasons,
            identify the total number of technologies that transitioned
            into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Further,
            there are challenges to executing the SBIR program that DOD
            officials acknowledge and are planning to address, such as the
            lack of overarching guidance for managing the DOD SBIR program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L.
    No. 97-219, established the SBIR program to stimulate technological
    innovation, use small businesses to meet Federal research and
    development needs, foster and encourage participation by minority and
    disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and increase
    private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal
    research and development.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Under this review, most stakeholders we spoke with--DOD, prime
            contractors, and small business officials--generally agreed
            that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program
            face difficulties transitioning their space-related
            technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial
            sector. Although we did not assess the validity of the concerns
            cited, stakeholders we spoke with identified challenges
            inherent to developing space technologies; challenges because
            of the SBIR program's administration, timing, and funding
            issues; and other challenges related to participating in the
            DOD space system acquisitions environment. For example, some
            small-business officials said that working in the space
            community is challenging because the technologies often require
            more expensive materials and testing than other technologies.
            They also mentioned that delayed contract awards and slow
            contract disbursements have caused financial hardships.
            Additionally, several small businesses cited concerns with
            safeguarding their intellectual property.
             Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We have found that
            while DOD has significantly increased its investment and
            planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years
            to address growing SSA capability shortfalls, most efforts
            designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost,
            schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic
            problems that most space system acquisition programs have
            encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5
            fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA
            capabilities as originally expected. Capabilities that were
            delivered served to sustain or modernize existing systems
            versus closing capability gaps. To its credit, last fall the
            Air Force launched a space-based sensor that is expected to
            appreciably enhance SSA. However, two critical acquisition
            efforts that are scheduled to begin development within the next
            2 years--Space Fence and JMS--face development challenges and
            risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to
            deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment versus
            smaller and more manageable increments. It is essential that
            these acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start
            of development to help ensure that their capabilities are
            delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. DOD plans to
            begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years,
            but it is too early to determine the extent to which these
            additions will address capability shortfalls.
             We have also found that there are significant inherent
            challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely
            because of the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and
            assets involved in the mission. This finding is similar to what
            we have reported from other space system acquisition reviews
            over the years. Additionally, while the recently issued
            National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the
            Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have
            the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility.
            However, actions, such as development of a national SSA
            architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate
            management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space
            Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other
            positive steps, such as the determination of roles, missions,
            and responsibilities to manage national security space
            capabilities and the development of options for new measures
            for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently
            issued National Security Space Strategy could help guide the
            implementation of the new space policy. We expect our report
            based on this review to be issued in June 2011.
             Parts quality for DOD, MDA, and NASA. Quality is
            paramount to the success of DOD space systems because of their
            complexity, the environment they operate in, and the high
            degree of accuracy and precision needed for their operations.
            Yet in recent years, many programs have encountered
            difficulties with quality workmanship and parts. For example,
            DOD's AEHF protected communications satellite has yet to reach
            its intended orbit because of a blockage in a propellant line.
            Also, MDA's STSS program experienced a 15-month delay in the
            launch of demonstration satellites because of a faulty
            manufacturing process of a ground-to-spacecraft communication
            system part. Furthermore, NASA's Mars Science Laboratory
            program experienced a 1-year delay in the development of the
            descent and cruise stage propulsion systems because of a
            welding process error. We plan to issue a report on the results
            of a review that focuses specifically on parts quality issues
            in June 2011. We are examining the extent to which parts
            quality problems are affecting DOD, MDA, and NASA space and
            missile defense programs; the causes of these problems; and
            initiatives to detect and prevent parts quality problems.
             EELV acquisition strategy. DOD spends billions of
            dollars on launch services and infrastructure through two
            families of commercially owned and operated vehicles under the
            EELV program. This investment allows the Nation to launch its
            national security satellites that provide the military and
            intelligence community with advanced space-based capabilities.
            DOD is preparing to embark on a new acquisition strategy for
            the EELV program. Given the costs and importance of space
            launch activities, it is vital that this strategy maximize cost
            efficiencies while still maintaining a high degree of mission
            assurance and a healthy industrial base. We are currently
            reviewing activities leading up to the strategy and plan to
            issue a report on the results of this review in June 2011. In
            particular, we are examining whether DOD has the knowledge it
            needs to develop a new EELV acquisition strategy and the extent
            to which there are important factors that could affect launch
            acquisitions.
        dod has taken and is taking actions to address space and weapon
                              acquisition problems
        DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more
    executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the
    actions it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it
    will take time to determine whether these actions are successful and
    they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead,
    organize, and support space activities.
    Causes of Acquisition Problems and Best Practices for Avoiding Them
        Our past work has identified a number of causes of the cost growth
    and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a
    broad scale, DOD has tended to start more weapon programs than it can
    afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost
    estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news,
    and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and
    assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on
    advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably,
    with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually
    shift funds to and from programs--particularly as programs experience
    problems that require additional time and money to address. Such
    shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects.
        Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that
    is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing
    can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This
    tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition
    programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on
    proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend
    technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical
    problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover,
    when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned
    to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns.
    Put more simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it
    would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when
    critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively
    early stages of discovery and invention.
        Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
    requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or
    the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full
    capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and
    more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather
    than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that
    gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology
    challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly
    increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to
    maximize capability on individual satellites because it is expensive to
    launch them. Figure 6 illustrates the various factors that can break
    acquisitions.

        Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons
    portfolio as well, though we have reported that space programs are
    particularly affected by the wide disparity of users, including DOD,
    the intelligence community, other Federal agencies, and in some cases,
    other countries, U.S. businesses, and citizens. Moreover, problematic
    implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total
    System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in
    problems on a number of programs because it was implemented in a manner
    that enabled requirements creep and poor contractor performance--the
    effects of which space programs are finally overcoming. We have also
    reported on shortfalls in resources for testing new technologies,
    which, coupled with less expertise and fewer contractors available to
    lead development efforts, have magnified the challenge of developing
    complex and intricate space systems.
        Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
    commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
    to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
    that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
    incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
    requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
    demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
    have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
    manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
    of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit
    space programs. These practices are highlighted in appendix I.
    Actions to Improve Space and Weapon System Acquisitions
        Over the past several years, DOD has implemented or has been
    implementing a number of actions to reform how space and weapon systems
    are acquired, both through its own initiatives as well as those
    required by statute. Additionally, DOD is evaluating and proposing new
    actions to increase space system acquisition efficiency and
    effectiveness. Because many of these actions are relatively new, or not
    yet fully implemented, it is too early to tell whether they will be
    effective or effectively implemented.
        For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that critical
    technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin,
    requirements are defined early in the process and are stable
    throughout, and system design remains stable. DOD also intends to
    follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus
    pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk
    and has done so with the only new major satellite program undertaken by
    the Air Force in recent years--GPS IIIA. DOD is also providing more
    program and contractor oversight and putting in place military
    standards and specifications in its acquisitions. Additionally, DOD and
    the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight of the
    national security space enterprise. For example, all Air Force space
    system acquisition responsibility has been aligned to the office that
    has been responsible for all other Air Force acquisition efforts, and
    the Defense Space Council--created last year--is reviewing, as one of
    its first agenda items, options for streamlining the many committees,
    boards, and councils involved in space issues. These and other actions
    that have been taken or are being taken that could improve space system
    acquisition outcomes are described in table 2.

        At the DOD-wide level, and as we reported last year, Congress and
    DOD have recently taken major steps toward reforming the defense
    acquisition system in ways that may increase the likelihood that weapon
    programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule
    objectives.\5\ In particular, new DOD policy and legislative provisions
    place greater emphasis on front-end planning and establishing sound
    business cases for starting programs.\6\ For example, the provisions
    require programs to invest more time and resources to refine concepts
    through practices such as early systems engineering, strengthen cost
    estimating, develop technologies, build prototypes, hold early
    milestone reviews, and develop preliminary designs before starting
    system development. These provisions are intended to enable programs to
    refine a weapon system concept and make cost, schedule, and performance
    trade-offs before significant commitments are made. In addition, DOD
    policy requires establishment of configuration steering boards that
    meet annually to review program requirements changes as well as to make
    recommendations on proposed descoping options that could reduce program
    costs or moderate requirements. Fundamentally, these provisions should
    help (1) programs replace risk with knowledge and (2) set up more
    executable programs. Key DOD and legislative provisions compared with
    factors we identified in programs that have been successful in meeting
    cost and schedule baselines are summarized in table 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning
    and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GAO-10-522 (Washington, DC: May
    6, 2010).
        \6\ In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition instruction--
    Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
    Acquisition System. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,
    Pub. L. No. 111-23, was enacted May 22, 2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Furthermore, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2011, signed into law on January 7, 2011, contains further
    direction aimed at improving acquisition outcomes, including, among
    other things, a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to issue
    guidance on the use of manufacturing readiness levels (including
    specific levels that should be achieved at key milestones and decision
    points), elevating the role of combatant commanders in DOD's
    requirements-setting process, and provisions for improving the
    acquisition workforce.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Pub. L. No. 111-383.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While it is too soon to determine if Congress's and DOD's reform
    efforts will improve weapon program outcomes, DOD has taken steps to
    implement the provisions. For example, in December 2009, the department
    issued a new implementation policy, which identifies roles and
    responsibilities and institutionalizes many of the requirements of the
    Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. DOD has also filled
    several key leadership positions created by the legislation, including
    the Directors for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Developmental
    Test and Evaluation, Systems Engineering, and Performance Assessments
    and Root Cause Analyses. To increase oversight, the department embarked
    on a 5-year effort to increase the size of the acquisition workforce by
    up to 20,000 personnel by 2015. Furthermore, the department began
    applying the acquisition reform provisions to some new programs
    currently in the planning pipeline. For example, many of the pre-
    Milestone B programs we reviewed this year as part of our annual
    assessment of selected weapon programs planned to conduct preliminary
    design reviews before going to Milestone B, although fewer are taking
    other actions, such as developing prototypes, that could improve their
    chances of success. With respect to space system acquisitions,
    particularly GPS III--DOD's newest major space system acquisition--has
    embraced the knowledge-based concepts behind our previous
    recommendations as a means of preventing large cost overruns and
    schedule delays.
        Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
    Force are proposing new acquisition strategies for satellites and
    launch vehicles:

             In June of last year, and as part of the Secretary of
            Defense's Efficiencies Initiative,\8\ the Under Secretary of
            Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics began an
            effort to restore affordability and productivity in defense
            spending. Major thrusts of this effort include targeting
            affordability and controlling cost growth, incentivizing
            productivity and innovation in industry, promoting real
            competition, improving tradecraft in services acquisition, and
            reducing nonproductive processes and bureaucracy. As part of
            this effort, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
            Force are proposing a new acquisition strategy for procuring
            satellites, called the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space
            Efficiency (EASE), to be implemented starting in fiscal year
            2012. Primary elements of this strategy include block buys of
            two or more satellites (economic order quantities) using a
            multiyear procurement construct, use of fixed-price
            contracting, stable research and development investment,
            evolutionary development, and stable requirements. According to
            DOD, EASE is intended to help stabilize funding, staffing, and
            subtier suppliers; help ensure mission continuity; reduce the
            impacts associated with obsolescence and production breaks; and
            increase long-term affordability with cost savings of over 10
            percent. DOD anticipates first applying the EASE strategy to
            procuring two AEHF satellites beginning in fiscal year 2012,
            followed by procurement of two SBIRS High satellites beginning
            in fiscal year 2013. According to the Air Force, it will
            consider applying the EASE strategy--once it is proven--to
            other space programs, such as GPS III. We have not yet
            conducted a review of the EASE strategy to assess the potential
            benefits, challenges, and risks of its implementation.
            Questions about this approach would include the following:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense
    Efficiencies Initiative to increase efficiencies, reduce overhead
    costs, and eliminate redundant functions in order to improve the
    effectiveness of the DOD enterprise. The goal is to apply savings from
    this initiative to force structure and modernization.

                     What are the major risks incurred by the
                    government in utilizing the EASE acquisition strategy?
                     What level of risks (known unknowns and
                    unknown unknowns) is being assumed in the estimates of
                    savings to be accrued from the EASE strategy?
                     How are evolutionary upgrades to capabilities
                    to be pursued under EASE?
                     How does the EASE acquisition strategy
                    reconcile with the current Federal and DOD acquisition
                    policy, acquisition and financial management
                    regulations, and law?

             The Air Force is developing a new acquisition strategy
            for its EELV program. Primarily, under the new strategy, the
            Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office are expected to
            initiate block buys of eight first stage booster cores--four
            for each EELV family, Atlas V and Delta IV--per year over 5
            years to help stabilize the industrial base, maintain mission
            assurance, and avoid cost increases. As mentioned earlier, we
            have initiated a review of the development of the new strategy
            and plan to issue a report on our findings in June 2011. Given
            concerns raised through recent studies about visibility into
            costs and the industrial base supporting EELV, it is important
            that this strategy be supported with reliable and accurate
            data.
     additional actions leadership, organization, and support may still be
                                     needed
        The actions that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
    Force have been taking to address acquisition problems listed in tables
    2 and 3 are good steps. However, more changes to processes, policies,
    and support may be needed--along with sustained leadership and
    attention--to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including
    addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. Diffuse
    leadership has had a direct impact on the space system acquisition
    process, primarily because it has made it difficult to hold any one
    person or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants,
    for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with
    space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to
    be dedicated. This has hampered DOD's ability to synchronize delivery
    of space, ground, and user assets for space programs. For instance,
    many of the cost and schedule problems we identified on the GPS program
    were tied in part to diffuse leadership and organizational stovepipes
    throughout DOD, particularly with respect to DOD's ability coordinate
    delivery of space, ground, and user assets. Additionally, we have
    recently reported that DOD faces a situation where satellites with
    advances in capability will be residing for years in space without
    users being able to take full advantage of them because investments and
    planning for ground, user, and space components were not well
    coordinated.\9\ Specifically, we found that the primary cause for user
    terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space
    systems is that user terminal development programs are typically
    managed by different military acquisition organizations than those
    managing the satellites and ground control systems.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System
    Components, GAO-10-55 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization,
    and management of national security space have found that there is no
    single authority responsible below the President and that authorities
    and responsibilities are spread across the department.\10\ In fact, the
    national security space enterprise comprises a wide range of government
    and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing and operating
    space-based capabilities serving both military and intelligence needs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
    Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
    Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
    National Security Space (Alexandria, VA, July 2008), and House
    Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and
    Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture (Washington,
    DC, Oct. 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been
    made--including revalidating the role of the Secretary of the Air Force
    as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, disestablishing the Office of the
    assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
    and the National Security Space Office, and aligning Air Force space
    system acquisition responsibility into a single Air Force acquisition
    office--and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how
    effective these changes will be in streamlining management and
    oversight of space system acquisitions. Additionally, while the
    recently issued National Space Policy assigns responsibilities for
    governmentwide space capabilities, such as those for SSA, it does not
    necessarily assign the corresponding authority to execute the
    responsibilities.
        Finally, adequate workforce capacity is essential for the front-end
    planning activities now required by acquisition reform initiatives for
    new weapon programs to be successful. However, studies have identified
    insufficient numbers of experienced space system acquisition personnel
    and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions
    as problems needing to be addressed in the space community. For
    example, a recent Secretary of the Air Force-directed Broad Area Review
    of space launch noted that while the Air Force Space and Missile
    Systems Center workforce had decreased by about 25 percent in the
    period from 1992 to 2010, the number of acquisition programs had
    increased by about 41 percent in the same time period.\11\
    Additionally, our own studies have identified gaps in key technical
    positions, which we believed increased acquisition risks. For instance,
    in a 2008 review of the EELV program, we found that personnel shortages
    in the EELV program office occurred particularly in highly specialized
    areas.\12\ According to the EELV program office and Broad Area Review,
    this challenge persists.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Launch Broad Area Review 2010
    (BAR-X) (Alexandria, VA, June 2010).
        \12\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight
    Challenges, GAO-08-1039 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               concluding remarks
        DOD is working to position itself to improve its space system
    acquisitions. After more than a decade of acquisition difficulties--
    which have created potential gaps in capability, diminished DOD's
    ability to invest in new space systems, and lessened DOD's credibility
    to deliver high-performing systems within budget and on time--DOD is
    starting to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast
    enhancements in capability. In 1 year, DOD has or expects to have
    launched newer generations of navigation, communications, SSA, and
    missile warning satellites. Moreover, given the Nation's fiscal
    challenges, DOD's focus on fixing problems and implementing reforms
    rather than taking on new, complex, and potentially higher-risk efforts
    is promising. However, challenges to keeping space system acquisitions
    on track remain, including pursuing evolutionary acquisitions over
    revolutionary ones, managing requirements, providing effective
    coordination across the diverse organizations interested in space-based
    capabilities, and ensuring that technical and programmatic expertise
    are in place to support acquisitions. DOD's newest major space system
    acquisition efforts, such as GPS IIIA, DWSS, JMS, Space Fence, and the
    follow-on to the SBSS will be key tests of how well DOD's reforms and
    reorganizations have positioned it to manage these challenges. We look
    forward to working with DOD to help ensure that these and other
    challenges are addressed.
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my
    prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or
    other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
                          contacts and acknowledgments
        For further information about this statement, please contact
    Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact
    points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may
    be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
    contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, assistant
    Director; Kristine Hassinger; Arturo Holguin; Rich Horiuchi; Roxanna
    Sun; and Bob Swierczek.
      appendix i: actions needed to address space and weapon acquisition
                                    problems
    Before undertaking new programs
        Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and it
    is clear where projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio.
        Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather
    than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step.
        Match requirements to resources--that is, time, money, technology,
    and people--before undertaking a new development effort.
        Research and define requirements before programs are started and
    limit changes after they are started.
        Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated
    regularly.
        Commit to fully fund projects before they begin.
        Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended
    before programs are started.
        Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research
    departments until they are ready to be added to future generations
    (increments) of a product.
        Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and
    requirements before launching the development process.
    During program development
        Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go
    decisions, covering critical facets of the program such as cost,
    schedule, technology readiness, design readiness, production readiness,
    and relationships with suppliers.
        Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are
    met--for example, a high proportion of engineering drawings completed
    or production processes under statistical control.
        Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the
    program and to resolve problems and implement solutions.
        Hold program managers accountable for their choices.
        Require program managers to stay with a project to its end.
        Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their
    products through such activities as regular supplier audits and
    performance evaluations of quality and delivery, among other things.
        Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage
    collaboration and communication.
                       appendix ii: scope and methodology
        In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space
    programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of
    individual space programs, common problems affecting space system
    acquisitions, and DOD's acquisition policies. We relied on our best
    practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting
    space system acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address
    these problems, and what remains to be done, as well as Office of the
    Secretary of Defense and Air Force documents addressing these problems
    and actions. We also relied on work performed in support of our annual
    weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding estimates to
    assess cost increases and investment trends for selected major space
    system acquisition programs. The GAO work used in preparing this
    statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
    perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
    a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
    objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
    basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I sincerely apologize for not being able to be here when
    the hearing started. I want to thank all of our witnesses for
    being here.
        Let me start by congratulating the Air Force for the
    successful launch of the first SBIRS. The long-anticipated
    launch of this first of a kind, state-of-the-art satellite is a
    significant accomplishment and I congratulate the Air Force
    upon this major milestone.
        I don't need to remind our witnesses of the many challenges
    that led to the 9-year delay or the estimated $11.5 billion
    increase in total program cost. We just have to insist that DOD
    reverse that trend, as we go forward, that's been taking place
    over 2 decades. Maybe GAO can help. We must ensure that the
    taxpayers' money is spent wisely and that capabilities are
    delivered without delay or extra expense.
        As DOD, and in particular the Air Force, enters a new era
    of space acquisition driven by decreasing budgets, and we will
    have some of that, we'll try to protect the military as much as
    we can. We know space assets cannot be eliminated from our
    future budgets. Some might think so, but they cannot. Our whole
    infrastructure, as the chairman knows, and communications
    systems are space-based that are so critical to DOD, we can't
    allow that to be eroded.
        Being on the Senate Budget Committee, I have to tell you a
    lot of people are in denial about how serious our financial
    condition is. We're borrowing 40 cents of every dollar we
    spend, that cannot and will not continue. I would just share
    that with you. All of you are committed to the kind of
    procurement programs and expense reductions that help us
    strengthen our capabilities.
        I'm pleased that GAO has joined us and look forward to
    hearing their latest assessment of space acquisition efforts.
    In the past GAO has expressed a number of valid concerns over
    cost overruns, schedule slips, and capability gaps. In the
    fiscal year 2012 budget, the Air Force announced its intent to
    change the way it procures our multi-billion dollar space
    capabilities, and I look forward to GAO's comments on that.
        The fiscal year 2012 budget marks a fundamental shift for
    defense space. I appreciate that the Air Force has been working
    to ensure that its space programs are more executable and
    produce a better return on investment. However, I am concerned
    that some of this refocusing has come at the expense of needed
    investments in future technologies. The lack of sufficient
    technology risk reduction is a key reason we often experience
    cost overruns. Without that appropriate level of investment, we
    risk exacerbating the cycle of schedule slips, cost overruns,
    and credibility gaps.
        With the release of the NSSS, DOD and the IC have proposed
    a framework for responding to the current and projected
    strategic space environment. The NSSS aptly characterizes the
    congested, contested, and competitive nature of the space
    domain.
        However, I have significant concerns regarding the
    administration's stated intention of pursuing proposals and
    concepts for arms control measures. Since the release of the
    NSSS in February, it appears the administration is planning to
    go forward and maybe sign the EU Code of Conduct for Outer
    Space Activities.
        According to recent comments by Ambassador Schulte, the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary, who I thank you for joining us
    today, DOD has tentatively concluded that the EU Code of
    Conduct should be adopted and is consistent with the Obama
    administration's policy interests. I'm uncomfortable with these
    comments and have a number of questions.
        Any pursuit of a multilateral arms control agreement on
    space capabilities could have a number of highly damaging
    implications for our national security interests. To date, the
    administration has not consulted with the Senate on its intent,
    nor shared any specific provisions. Furthermore, it remains
    unclear if the administration has the authority to enter into
    such agreement without advice and consent.
        Mr. Chairman, this is an excellent panel. Thank you for
    convening it and thank you for your leadership and commitment
    to the defense of America. It's an honor for me to work with
    you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I feel
    likewise. We've worked on so many different things for so long;
    it's a pleasure to continue to do so.
        I thought what we might do is have 6-minute rounds.
        General Shelton, you assumed command of the AFSPC in
    January. On a broad basis, what do you see as your greatest
    challenges? What did you see when you took your
    responsibilities? What was the greatest challenges that you
    could see out there?
        General Shelton. Senator, there's probably three things
    that I have established as top priorities. First, is to
    continue to support the joint fight and continue to support our
    brothers and sisters in harm's way. Second, is to get control
    of the cost of space programs, and you both have talked some
    about that, and we are at that work mightily. Third, is to
    operationalize and normalize the cyberspace domain within the
    Air Force. Those are the three things that we've been focused
    on at the top level.
        Senator Nelson. What plans do you have, on item number 2,
    to get control over the costs, which is one of the things that
    is foremost in our minds as we deal with budgetary issues?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. A couple of things. First, is to
    do a better job of writing the requirements, such that we are
    not pushing the state-of-the-art of the technology, but rather
    that we accept very mature technologies. SBIRS is a very good
    case in point, we pushed pretty hard on the state-of-the-art
    and we ended up with long development timelines, over cost, and
    certainly over schedule.
        Second, I would tell you, is to manage the kinds of
    contracts that we write. We have in the past gone with much
    more of a development approach, as opposed to acquiring with a
    fixed-price approach. Where government has shared the cost with
    the contractor, now we want the contractor to identify the cost
    upfront such that we can be much more deterministic in how we
    develop our cost estimates.
        Senator Nelson. General Shelton, in some recent remarks at
    the National Space Symposium, you discussed the growing problem
    of space debris. You mentioned that the Air Force tracks
    approximately 20,000 objects, most of which is debris, and
    there are probably 10 times more objects that are too small to
    track at the same time, any one of which could be lethal to a
    satellite.
        I'd note that when China tested its anti-satellite weapon
    in 2007, space debris increased by as much as 25 percent. The
    collision of two satellites in 2009 added even more debris.
        Is there any possibility to remove some of that debris? For
    instance, we've heard of proposals to use a laser to remove
    that debris. Is there any other concept that's technologically
    possible that you might think of or that we might be able to
    develop? If it were feasible to have it, who would pay for it?
    Not just the United States, I would hope, but others who have
    contributed.
        If it can't be removed and we're faced with it, what indeed
    are the options? One of the concerns, of course, is that more
    debris increases the chances of a collision that, oddly enough,
    creates more debris. Perhaps you can share your thoughts on
    that?
        General Shelton. Senator, you're exactly right. Debris
    begets debris, just from a probabilistic point of view. We have
    not found a way that is either technically nor economically
    viable to eliminate debris. What we have done, both nationally
    and internationally, is encouraged the conduct of space
    operations in a way that it minimizes debris. As we launch new
    satellites, as we reach end of life on satellites, we think
    about disposal of those satellites. We think about mitigation
    and minimization of debris. We're encouraging others across the
    world to do the same.
        Senator Nelson. General Helms, to protect satellites you
    have to know what you're protecting them from. Improving space
    situational awareness, including the ability to detect and
    determine interference, is one of your major responsibilities.
    Obviously, there are many sensors that provide or could provide
    space situational awareness data. One of the problems, however,
    is the computer system that the JMS that utilizes this data to
    provide meaningful information, is old and no longer is able to
    handle the available data.
        Upgrading this system has proven to be an acquisition
    challenge. Do you have, and if you do, what's your vision for
    how this system should work in the future?
        General Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we do have a
    vision, and you're exactly right. The Space Defense Operations
    Center system is currently the capability that we use in order
    to track objects in space, including our satellite operations
    and pieces of debris. We have a sensor suite that's all over
    the world, that contributes to a catalogue and allows us to
    have knowledge of what is going on in space.
        The system on which that catalogue resides is aging
    rapidly. It's pretty much past its design life. It will become
    unsustainable due to the nature of the computer system that it
    rides on. This JMS capability is, in effect, a critical
    capability that we need to get in order to continue to do the
    mission that I'm responsible for, which is to have space
    situational awareness of all objects in space.
        The vision is that, first, we get that replacement in a
    timely manner so that we don't have a gap, which I would call
    an absolutely critical gap, between what we have today and
    being able to sustain what we have today, and then bring
    something on board that replaces it.
        Second, we need to have a vision of an open architecture.
    What I mean by that is there are sensors that we have in JFCC
    Space, but there are also other sensors that are available,
    potentially through the MDA, for example. If we set this up
    right, we'd have an open architecture that will, in effect,
    allow us to leverage the exposure of sensor data from all over
    the world, not just from my own sensors, but from others' as
    well.
        If we build a system with an open architecture such as
    that, then what we will have is a multiplying capability that
    will allow us to bring more capability to bear, to fuse data,
    and to watch the space environment.
        Third, the JMS capability would bring interface to the
    space professionals. Right now, they're faced with lines of
    text. I've seen the products myself. It's very cumbersome to
    work with. It slows them down. They have to use sneakernet, as
    we call it, in order to manage the knowledge that's necessary
    to understand what's happening in the space environment.
        If we were to be able to put some user interfaces in front
    of them that were more pictorial and much more comprehensive
    than what we're working with today, as is envisioned with the
    JMS capability, my young space professionals will take off.
    They will become much more sophisticated. They are really
    sharp. What they need is to have their creativity unleashed.
        The way that the JMS capability is envisioned will allow
    that to happen. We will have some pretty amazing forces at work
    here to try to understand what's happening in the domain as we
    acknowledge it as congested, competitive, and contested.
        Thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Ambassador Schulte, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I
    am concerned about the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space
    Activities. Can you tell us whether the administration intends
    to inform Congress prior to signing any multilateral
    commitments in space activities?
        Ambassador Schulte. The headline that came out of my speech
    in Colorado Springs was: ``Pentagon tentatively okays EU
    code.'' That headline was wrong. I trust that never happens
    here.
        Let me step back and explain what we're trying to achieve,
    where we are, and try to address some of the concerns that you,
    Senator, and at least 36 other Senators have raised, too. The
    national space policy from the President says, as you
    mentioned, we will consider arm control in space. It sets out
    three criteria: It has to be effectively verifiable, it has to
    be equitable, and it has to serve our national security
    interest.
        So far we haven't found an arms control agreement that does
    that. There's one on the table. It's been proposed by Russia
    and China. We have declared it, not very politely, but we've
    said it's fundamentally flawed because it's not verifiable and
    it's not clear it would even capture a lot of the Chinese
    counter-space systems that worry us.
        Instead of pursuing arms control at this point, we're open
    to it, we're looking at what we call transparency and
    confidence-building measures, voluntary measures to encourage
    responsible use of space.
        The one such set of measures that we are currently
    evaluating is the proposal from the EU, its proposed Code of
    Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
        Senator Sessions. Let me tell you my concern, and I've seen
    this for a number of years since I've been in the Senate. We
    have, in space, the most capable program in the world by far.
    We've advanced further technologically, in development, and
    actual deployment of systems than anyone else. Agreements,
    codes of conduct, tend to constrain our military. Our military
    is fundamentally configured so it depends on space capability.
        I would be a bit nervous, am a bit nervous, and want to
    examine carefully whether or not through some agreement we've
    constricted our ability to effectively defend our interests.
        Let me ask you a few questions and see if you can answer
    them briefly, and if you can I'd appreciate it. Has the AFSPC
    or STRATCOM reviewed and provided an assessment at this date to
    the draft code of conduct?
        Ambassador Schulte. Senator, in DOD, we are currently
    conducting an operations assessment of the EU code to see what
    the impact would be. Our goal isn't to constrain ourselves. We
    think we act pretty responsibly in space. The goal is to try to
    constrain new emergent space powers, to ensure they adopt
    procedures that would, for example, mitigate the creation of
    debris and avoid mishaps and instability in space.
        The goal of the IC and DOD is to protect our national
    security equities. We also, as the strategy says, have a stake
    in a domain in which others are operating that's a bit more
    predictable. We want to encourage other countries to apply the
    same type of standards that we do in space.
        Senator Sessions. Would there be any impact such as this in
    such an agreement, would there be anything that would impact a
    U.S. decision to deploy missile defense interceptors of any
    sort in space?
        Ambassador Schulte. Sir, the EU code is about behavior in
    space, it's not about capabilities in space. It would not, for
    example, prohibit the deployment of space-based interceptors.
    Now, if somebody wanted to do that and they're going to create
    a lot of debris by doing so, we might say that's a bad
    approach. But it doesn't prohibit deployment of space-based
    interceptors.
        Senator Sessions. As a practical matter, would it or could
    it impede our ability to do that?
        Ambassador Schulte. No, sir, not as we understand it.
        Senator Sessions. Is there anything in it that would impact
    the development, test, or deployment of an anti-satellite
    weapon such as the one successfully used in the 2008 Operation
    Burnt Frost?
        Ambassador Schulte. Sir, it would not do that. It doesn't
    constrain capabilities; it constrains behavior. In fact,
    Operation Burnt Frost, and I was in Vienna at the time and we
    did very well there, not just from a technical standpoint, but
    from a diplomatic standpoint, we showed how we were acting
    responsibly to minimize debris. In fact, the draft EU code as
    it now stands would allow such operations in the future.
        Senator Sessions. Would it impact, in any way, the
    research, development, testing, or deployment of a kinetic
    defensive system in outer space, one that could take out a
    satellite and let's say we're in an area of hostilities.
    There's a satellite that's providing intelligence information
    that places our military personnel at risk. Is there anything
    that would in any way impact our research, development, and
    testing of such a kinetic defense system in outer space?
        Ambassador Schulte. No, sir. It would discourage any
    activities that, again, would create a lot of debris.
        Senator Sessions. But it would be hard under our current
    technology to destroy a satellite that's spying on our
    military. Would this agreement keep us from doing that?
        Ambassador Schulte. Senator, actually there are many ways,
    that we can't discuss entirely here, to neutralize another
    satellite, and you can certainly do it without creating a lot
    of debris.
        The other thing I should mention, sir, if I could, is
    that----
        Senator Sessions. I'm not sure that I'm totally sold on
    that, that you can necessarily impact all satellites without
    creating debris. Are you sure that's accurate?
        Ambassador Schulte. Sir, we could go into another session
    for that, certainly the Chinese, for example, are looking at
    ways of neutralizing satellites that don't create a lot of
    debris.
        The other thing that----
        Senator Sessions. Looking at it and doing it are two
    different things. Excuse me; go ahead.
        Ambassador Schulte. Sir, I just wanted to mention, the code
    is voluntary, it can be put aside if you have to. It's not a
    treaty. It's not legally binding. It also is full of references
    to the inherent right of self defense, and you can imagine at
    DOD we appreciate that. It allows actions to be taken for self
    defense.
        As General Kehler told another panel recently, we see it as
    largely consistent with our operations plans, with our current
    practice, but we are doing a detailed assessment.
        Senator Sessions. What are your plans about advising and
    briefing Congress on this before anything is signed?
        Ambassador Schulte. Sir, I would actually defer to the
    Department of State (DOS) about how to handle that with
    Congress. Having said that, though, in response to the letter
    that you and many of your colleagues signed, there was a
    response. We offered briefings to your staff. I'm happy to come
    meet with you separately on this. We understand that many have
    concerns about this and we're prepared to come and talk to you
    about them.
        Senator Sessions. Are Russia and China involved in these
    discussions?
        Ambassador Schulte. Russia and China are interesting. The
    two countries that are most nervous about the EU code are
    Russia and China. Part of that is because they see the code as
    a competitor to the arms control agreement that they've
    proposed, which we've found as fundamentally flawed. They've
    been a little bit reluctant to look at the code.
        As they see more and more countries looking at the code
    they're thinking, gee, maybe we should look at this, too. We
    have encouraged them to consider it, making clear we haven't
    made a final decision. Again, we see this as a possible way to
    get the Russians and the Chinese to act more responsibly.
        Only if we sign the code along with the EU, otherwise it's
    meaningless. We want to get the Russians and the Chinese into
    this type of framework. We want to get the Indians in there and
    we want to get Brazil. Again, the goal is in many ways to
    export the best practices that we use, to other parts of the
    world, to create a more predictable space environment, while
    still protecting our defense equities.
        Senator Sessions. We've spent billions of dollars to
    produce a fabulous SATCOM network that is a critical part of
    our defense structure. I would hate to see us take any action
    that would neutralize any part of that capability we've
    invested so much to achieve.
        Thank you.
        Ambassador Schulte. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
        General Formica, the Army is heavily dependent on space
    systems for much of what you do, particularly in theater. This
    subcommittee is worried about disconnects between the equipment
    that enables the warfighter to utilize space systems,
    particularly GPS and communications, and the satellites
    themselves. Improved capability is on orbit, but the equipment
    is not fielded. Do you see this as an issue for the Army? What
    are your thoughts?
        General Formica. Senator, thank you. As you said, the Army
    is invested in space capabilities and requires them in order to
    function our operating forces in theater and around the world.
    We are dependent on GPS SATCOMs, among others. Having reliable
    ground systems and being able to push those down to the lowest
    level is important to us and it is a capability that is
    something that needs to be developed and that we count on.
        Senator Nelson. In your statement, you mention the Army
    space support teams. Apparently these teams play a vital
    function in providing space support to commanders in the field.
    In your view, do these teams have all the support they need or
    do they need additional support or access to information?
        General Formica. Senator, again, thank you for the
    question. The Army space support teams and the space support
    elements which go at the various levels of Army commands and
    our operational forces are an essential part of our space
    cadre. We manage over 300 space professionals as part of the
    space cadre and they are well-trained. They train in a joint
    environment. They train not only at schools that we've
    developed at Space and Missile Defense Command, but we rely on
    the Air Force National Strategic Space Institute for some of
    the advanced training that these space professionals get. They
    go to the Navy Postgraduate School and other advanced civil
    schooling. They're very well-trained.
        We've deployed now our 60th Army space support team
    rotation in support of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They
    provide reachback capability to those forces to access the
    space capabilities that our joint forces provide. They are a
    very essential part of what it is we do. We maintain the
    capability to continue that rotation. They get the support that
    they need, and they're clearly a capability that operational
    commanders seek when they get ready to deploy.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, as I mentioned in my
    opening statement, last year the first MUOS satellite was
    expected to launch in September of this year. Now it looks like
    the first satellite will not launch until mid-2012. In your
    prepared statement you indicate that there's an issue with
    scheduling the launch. Is that the only reason for the delay,
    and what is the cost of the delay, both in terms of dollars and
    operational capacity?
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, sir. We
    project that the launch will occur in February 2012. We've been
    provided with a launch slot and that was firmed up a few months
    ago. The on-orbit capability for the first space vehicle of
    MUOS will be available in May 2012.
        As far as the cost for that delay, we'll have to take that
    as a question for the record. I'm not prepared to answer that
    today.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In March 2011 the assignment of Mobile User Objective Satellite
    (MUOS) 1 to a February 2012 launch slot was finalized by the Air Force
    as the earliest slot available since higher-priority National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration missions had been assigned to
    August 2011 and November 2011 launch slots. Current Ultra-High
    Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) availability models project that the
    UFO constellation will meet its availability requirement beyond MUOS 1
    On-Orbit Capability in May 2012, so no impact to operational capacity
    is expected. The program incurred an additional cost of approximately
    $3.7 million due to the extension of contractor program management and
    system engineering effort for 4.5 months.

        Senator Nelson. Okay. Is there any danger that that program
    might experience a Nunn-McCurdy breach?
        Dr. Zangardi. Sir, in my view, and having talked with the
    program manager extensively before coming here, our view is
    that it will not at this point in time.
        Senator Nelson. Is there anything that could cause that to
    happen that you're aware of?
        Dr. Zangardi. Sir, at this time there's nothing that I'm
    aware of that could cause that. That does not preclude the
    possibility that something can occur, because, as we know,
    space is very complicated.
        Senator Nelson. Admiral Titley, how do you approach this
    from your perspective?
        Admiral Titley. Yes, sir, Senator. Thank you for the
    question. As we look at the amount of UHF capability that is in
    orbit today and how between a combination of some legacy Fleet
    Satellite Communication Systems, some leased satellites, and
    some Skynet as well as our UFO constellation, we believe that
    we will have in excess of 70 percent of that constellation
    still available by the time that the first MUOS bird achieves
    on-orbit capability in May 2012.
        There's a number of reasons for that. STRATCOM has worked
    very hard along with the UFO program office. We have been able
    to squeeze more capability out of the existing constellation.
    We're careful on how we reprioritize. We've been careful with
    how we've used the leases. That has us to the point where we
    believe we will have again in excess of 70 percent of our
    capacity, which is the benchmark, by the time MUOS No. 1
    achieves on-orbit capability.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nelson. What are your thoughts about a potential
    Nunn-McCurdy breach?
        Admiral Titley. I would just echo Dr. Zangardi's comments
    there, sir. From my perspective, I have not seen anything from
    the program briefs that at this point in time trigger that
    concern. As Dr. Zangardi said, this is something you always
    have to keep watching for.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. General Shelton, Ambassador Schulte, and
    Ms. Chaplain, over the 5-year Future Years Defense Program
    budget for 2012, the cost for space launch vehicles has risen.
    Last year the budget called for 26 launch vehicles from fiscal
    year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 at a cost of $6.4 billion. This
    year's budget for the same time period reduces the number of
    launch vehicles by three, but the cost appears to have risen
    from $6.4 billion to $9.8 billion. That's three less rockets,
    but a $3.4 billion increase in cost.
        How much of this price increase is related to the
    cancellation of the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration's (NASA) Constellation program, which I know is
    some of it, and a lack of a clear NASA pathway for heavy lift?
    Would you comment on that?
        Ambassador Schulte. Senator, I'd be glad to. First, we need
    to start with an economic order quantity buy of piece parts for
    the rockets that started with the beginning of the EELV
    program. When we first started that program, we thought we were
    going to have a very robust commercial launch market. The
    vendors went out, bought a lot of parts, and got good deals on
    the buys of those parts. We are entering the end of those parts
    and it's time to buy new.
        We're buying smaller quantities. A lot of the vendors that
    we used before are no longer in business. In terms of the cost
    of upper stages, individual components that go on larger
    components, those prices have increased, as well as the engines
    for the rockets themselves.
        As we go through with this new strategy to buy eight
    rockets per year, five for DOD, three for the National
    Reconnaissance Office, we will try to bring those costs down by
    going at it with a much more fixed-price mindset and again get
    back to an economic order quantity capability for the United
    Launch Alliance, our launch provider, and get down to lower
    costs as much as we can.
        This is just a relatively small market that we're in here
    and it's just very difficult to contain the costs, but we're
    working hard at it.
        Senator Sessions. The Air Force is dependent and required
    to provide the entire support now that NASA has reduced its
    play, participation, and consumption, NASA used to consume 70
    percent of this capability. Has that impacted the price for the
    Air Force?
        Ambassador Schulte. Senator, you're talking about the solid
    rocket capability?
        Senator Sessions. Right.
        Ambassador Schulte. We're not a big player in the big solid
    rocket business. That's the business of the strategic programs
    of the Air Force and the Navy, the strategic missile programs.
    In the space launch business we use liquid propulsion.
        Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, would you like to comment
    on that, please?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Specifically about the engines, their
    effect on price, and what's going on in the NASA Constellation
    program. I do believe the engine prices are supposed to be
    increasing because there is a lot of uncertainty of what NASA's
    going to do in terms of the Constellation program and that
    could be factoring into the prices considerably.
        When will we know what NASA's going to be doing? It should
    be this year, but there's still a lot of unknowns about how
    NASA's going to answer its own authorization requirements. The
    Senate Commerce Committee laid out an architecture that it
    desires to see and NASA has not come back yet and answered how
    they're going to answer that architecture.
        We still have uncertainty and until that certainty comes
    it's likely that those engine prices are going to be higher.
        Senator Sessions. I agree. I talked to one of the Chief
    Executive Officers involved in this said the number one thing
    going on in our supply base right now is uncertainty, and
    really it's uncertainty on what NASA is going to do. So we're
    trying to work on that problem.
        Let me ask this. In their mark of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the House Armed
    Services Committee chose not to fund MDA's request for $160.8
    million for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). I
    talked to General O'Reilly about that and he is concerned that
    this is a decision that could increase costs.
        Ms. Chaplain, the MDA programs are part of your GAO
    portfolio. Do you have any concerns with the MDA's strategy for
    PTSS or MDA leading the acquisition of a major space system?
        Ms. Chaplain. A couple months ago in our MDA report we
    reported on the PTSS program along with all the other MDA
    systems, and it's still fairly early in the program. We did
    note that the program is adopting some practices that we like
    to see in space programs, one being that they want to build
    prototypes before operational satellites.
        Senator Sessions. In other words, DOD would basically build
    the prototypes and own the proprietary data, the patents or the
    rights to procure?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes. They would be working with the U.S.
    Naval Research Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
    Lab up the road, the two labs, to build prototype satellites.
    It's unclear whether the prototypes are going to be what the
    operational satellites are going to end up being. It's also
    something else we're trying to pursue as to the extent to which
    the schedules for developing the prototypes overlap the
    operational satellite schedules; are we giving enough time
    there to actually learn from the prototypes and feed that into
    the subsequent effort by contractors?
        The other thing MDA has been trying to do that we thought
    was good, is keep requirements simple for PTSS. There are
    pressures and ideas for other things that PTSS could do.
        We do have a concern about capability in terms of managing
    the large space program at MDA in terms of broader workforce
    issues across DOD and are we stretching the space workforce and
    the acquisition capability for space a little too thin. We
    haven't reported on that issue and we haven't done enough
    exploration about what MDA has versus what the Air Force has to
    be able to make reasonable comparisons.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that it's
    possible the House didn't have all the information that's
    necessary on this system. General O'Reilly suggests that it
    could actually save a lot of money and get more capability.
        General Shelton, do you have any thoughts about that,
    briefly?
        General Shelton. Senator, I talked to General O'Reilly just
    before coming over here and by what he has shown me it looks
    like a very capable system. Certainly not my area, but in terms
    of the way he described the capability and what it brings to
    missile defense and potentially to space situational awareness
    as well, it looks like a very valuable capability.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. It may be that we can work
    together to determine what would be the best thing to do,
    because a satellite could do more than other systems at less
    cost.
        General Formica. Senator Sessions, would it be appropriate
    for me to comment?
        Senator Sessions. Please.
        General Formica. I actually speak from my operational
    perspective as STRATCOM's JFCC for Integrated Missile Defense.
    I can't speak to the programmatics of the PTSS. I will leave
    that to General O'Reilly. But the operational implications of
    having PTSS or a capability like that is the ability to defend
    against larger raid sizes. It has increased capability. It
    would reduce our reliance on terrestrial-based radar systems
    which require host nation basing agreements, or even airborne
    platforms that require air space. It's a persistent satellite-
    based contributor to the missile defense and would provide
    quality control tracking data that we would need.
        It is a viable capability and there are operational
    implications to not having it. Again, I'll defer the
    programmatic discussions to General O'Reilly.
        Senator Sessions. Briefly, he indicated that it has
    exceeded your expectations when you started with that program
    technologically?
        General Formica. We know that the Space Tracking and
    Surveillance System, which is its predecessor capability, was
    recently successful in being able to transmit data during the
    flight test mission-15 a couple weeks ago.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I have to go
    to the White House following the vote, but I'll be glad to
    leave this open and it will be in your very capable hands.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I appreciate this panel. I
    might have a question or two and then we'll wrap it up.
        Senator Nelson. That sounds fine.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, and make sure you figure a way
    to balance that budget, and not on the backs of the military.
        Senator Nelson. I'll do my best.
        Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you.
        General Shelton, in January the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    voiced significant concerns to the Chairman of the Federal
    Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the FCC's provisional
    authorization of LightSquared's new wireless broadband proposal
    and the potential for interference with GPS signals, which our
    DOD relies on in a lot of different ways.
        Secretary Lynn states that there's a ``strong potential for
    interference to these critical national security systems,'' and
    that ``DOD strongly recommends the FCC defer final action until
    proper interference analysis and mitigation studies can be
    conducted.''
        Do you agree with the concerns expressed by Secretary Lynn
    and what are the national security implications if we have
    interference problems?
        General Shelton. Senator, at the time he signed that letter
    and a subsequent letter in March, we had analytical data from
    an equipment manufacturer and some of the information that our
    program office in Los Angeles had been able to gather. We have
    since conducted actual testing using LightSquared's equipment,
    civil, commercial, and military GPS receivers at Kirtland Air
    Force Base. Although the data is still being analyzed, I would
    tell you that the empirical data appears to be consistent with
    the analytical data.
        Yes, sir, we have concerns for commercial, civil, and
    military applications.
        Senator Sessions. People with a GPS in their car could have
    problems also?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We have to look at these things as we go
    forward and I think it's very appropriate to ask FCC to look at
    it hard.
        I realize the vote time is winding down. I thank all of you
    for your service. We believe in what you do. People do not
    appreciate the extent to which our space capabilities help sea,
    air, and land teams, unmanned aerial vehicles, Army squad
    leaders all over the world, and Navy ships and capabilities.
    It's an extraordinary thing that this Nation has accomplished.
    No nation in the world has ever achieved so much in this
    regard. It costs a good deal, but it saves a lot of money too
    in a lot of different ways in making our military more capable
    and requiring less support.
        Thank you for your attendance. We will be submitting some
    written questions and I hope that you'll be able to answer
    those within the time required. Thank you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
                            protecting space assets
        1. Senator Nelson. General Helms, to protect satellites, you have
    to know what you are protecting them from. Improving space situational
    awareness (SSA), including the ability to detect and determine
    interference, is one of your major responsibilities. There are many
    sensors that provide or could provide SSA data. One of the problems,
    however, is the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System
    (JMS), that utilizes this data to provide meaningful information is old
    and no longer able to handle the available data. Upgrading this system
    has proven to be an acquisition challenge. What is your vision for how
    this system should work?
        General Helms. My vision for the JMS is that information technology
    be a modern, scalable, service-oriented architecture that is capable of
    collecting, processing, displaying, and disseminating data across
    multiple security levels. Information technology should be able to
    receive and transmit data to and from current and future military,
    commercial, and allied sources to enable rapid, proactive
    decisionmaking and effective operations.
        To do this effectively JMS should be designed on an open
    architecture with an efficient, user-definable interface. Information
    technology should be easily expandable in terms of capacity,
    throughput, and storage. Its interfaces with all space systems and
    current and future SSA sensors should be efficient and effective.
    Finally, JMS must be net-centric to enable distributed operations,
    rapid dissemination of information, and continuity of operations.
        To achieve this, the acquisition process must allow for rapid
    identification, development, testing, integration, and operation of new
    capabilities to address emerging threats and to support current,
    future, and unanticipated future missions. Close collaboration with the
    user is key. The legacy systems have been primarily focused on
    integrating space surveillance metric track data. JMS, as a modern,
    flexible, and extensible platform, should be able to incorporate
    additional intelligence and non-Space Surveillance Network data to
    enhance the JSpOC's ability to collaborate with mission partners to
    identify and characterize threats interfering with U.S. space assets.

        2. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, you recently made a decision to
    take a pause in developing a new JMS, and move the acquisition
    responsibility to the Space and Missile Systems Center. What was your
    reasoning behind that decision and what impact does this have on new
    operating capability?
        General Shelton. The combination of the JMS program cost estimate
    growth to $1 billion or more and the required sustainment of legacy
    systems until 2019 levied an unacceptable risk to space operations and
    the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) budget. In January 2011, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    (OSD AT&L) directed an Independent Program Assessment (IPA) of the
    program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
    requirements compelling, information technology found the current
    acquisition strategy and approach inadequate. The IPA made several
    recommendations including a revised acquisition strategy and the
    extension of the prototyping phase to provide critical capabilities and
    reduce the risk for an agile information technology strategy.
        The IPA results provided an opportunity for a strategic pause, and
    the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    evaluated potential courses of action that would incorporate the IPA
    recommendations. The result is an approach that fully leverages
    multiple prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the
    initial JMS service-oriented architecture and user-defined operational
    picture. This approach will provide early-use capability, allow JMS to
    provide more timely space effects, and utilize new data sources
    quicker. Information technology allows decommissioning of the legacy
    SSA systems soonest, avoiding an extended legacy sustainment bill.
    Finally, information technology establishes rigorous systems
    engineering and test and training processes early, enabling successful
    rapid integration.
        In evaluating the JMS course of action, information technology was
    also determined the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was best
    suited to conduct this acquisition. Among SMC's core competencies is
    SSA which is the foundation of the capabilities we must deliver in JMS.
    The impact is key mission capability delivered to the warfighter
    sooner.

        3. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, in your view is the acquisition
    system simply not structured to buy a new JMS, and if not, what has to
    change?
        General Hyten. Air Force leadership agrees with the 2009 Defense
    Science Board (DSB) Task Force report on the Acquisition of Information
    Technologies that there are challenges associated with acquiring agile
    information technology under the current Department of Defense (DOD)
    5000.02 acquisition policy. The DSB concluded that, ``The conventional
    DOD acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to fit the needs
    of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades--a
    reality driven by the short half-life of commercial information
    technology, supportability of hardware (which is often a commodity),
    software applications, and operational requirements.''
        DOD is progressing toward developing a new acquisition process for
    information capabilities (as initially described in the November 2010
    report to Congress titled, ``A New Approach for Delivering Information
    Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense''), that embraces
    the tenets of section 804, paragraph (b) of the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, to include: (1) early
    and continual involvement of the user; (2) multiple, rapidly executed
    increments or releases of capability; (3) early, successive prototyping
    to support an evolutionary approach; and (4) a modular, open-systems
    approach. A new policy designed with these tenets in mind will provide
    DOD and the Air Force the flexibility to develop agile information
    technology while providing the foundation and structure to ensure
    programmatic success and fiscal responsibility.
        In January 2011, OSD AT&L directed an IPA of the JMS program.
    Although the IPA found the operational needs and system requirements
    compelling, information technology found that the JMS acquisition has
    not incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices.
        JMS is being restructured to better implement these concepts and
    has been reassigned to Program Executive Office (PEO) Space at SMC. SMC
    is synergistically aligned with AFSPC and 14th Air Force and has the
    requisite space domain expertise. They will be better poised to
    successfully develop this critical space capability in the timeframe
    necessary to migrate off the increasingly unsustainable legacy systems.

        4. Senator Nelson. General Helms, as the Joint Functional Component
    Commander for the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), you work with
    commercial space companies and other countries to share SSA data. You
    mentioned in your statement that there are now 23 data sharing
    agreements in place. How is the data sharing working in practice, is
    information technology valuable, is the data reliable, are you seeking
    additional agreements, and are there any implementation problems?
        General Helms. As of 1 June 2011, we have 24 signed SSA Sharing
    Agreements. The program is working very well. Companies with agreements
    submit data requests directly to Joint Functional Component Command for
    Space (JFCC Space), and if the request is consistent with national
    security interests and we have the resources available, we provide the
    information to the company. Additionally, as an emergency service, we
    provide all global operators with alerts when there will be a close
    approach between their satellites and other objects. Data sharing is
    invaluable to our space operations. It has improved our SSA, increased
    our capabilities, and resulted in greater cooperation between allied,
    coalition, and commercial partners. Our partnerships have allowed us to
    better understand domestic and international commercial space
    operations and processes to include satellite status, orbit maneuver
    plans, and launch windows and parameters; information that would have
    been almost impossible to get without these agreements in place. These
    agreements will be even more important as space becomes more congested,
    competitive, and contested. For example, companies notify us of planned
    maneuvers and launches which enables us to proactively posture sensors
    for tracking and understand a change in status before it occurs, rather
    than reacting to events. This program is extremely valuable as an
    example of U.S. leadership and international confidence-building.
        Data reliability is good and getting better. We receive operator
    information, compare it to our own, and incorporate the useful
    information. Demand for SSA sharing services is growing. We are
    currently talking with two additional interested companies and we will
    begin entering agreements with international governments once we
    receive Department of State (DOS) and DOD approval.

        5. Senator Nelson. General Helms, there are many other sensors that
    could provide SSA data that are not currently incorporated to the
    JSpOC. AFSPC is providing a small amount of operational support to an
    array of radio receivers to determine if these privately owned
    receivers could provide additional SSA. Could you look into these and
    provide your thoughts?
        General Helms. The Allen Telescope Array (ATA) is capable of
    providing SSA data that could supplement current sensors, track
    transmitting satellites without disruption from the sun or most
    weather, and provide a ``special event'' RF observation capability. Air
    Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities has successfully
    demonstrated that the ATA can provide position data on transmitting
    satellites and conduct secure direct-to-disk observations. We are
    always interested in ways to improve our SSA capabilities and the
    surveillance network. We support AFSPC desire to further assess ATA
    through a military utility assessment to determine the benefit it could
    provide to SSA and whether such a capability could be provided in a
    cost effective manner.

                     mobile user objective system satellite
        6. Senator Nelson. General Helms, as I mentioned in my opening
    statement, last year the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
    satellite was expected to launch in September of this year, now
    information technology looks as if the first satellite will not launch
    until mid-2012. If the launch of the first MUOS is late solely as a
    result of congestion in the launch schedule, what is the plan to manage
    the schedule?
        General Helms. Satellite vehicles are assigned launch slots as
    early as 24 months in advance. If they fail to meet these slot dates, a
    backup will be scheduled in its place and the satellite vehicle will
    have to compete for subsequent launch slots based on booster
    availability and national priorities.
        The MUOS-1 launch was delayed when the satellite vehicle did not
    complete thermal vacuum testing on time, a major processing milestone.
    Launch slot priority was given to a mission more likely to meet the
    launch slot date. Unfortunately, the next two launch slots support
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) two inter-
    planetary missions scheduled to launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force
    Station with fixed launch windows and no launch opportunity between the
    two missions. The length of MUOS-1 delay is based on booster
    availability and national priorities rather than congestion.
        MUOS-1 is currently scheduled for the February 12, 2012, Atlas V
    launch slot.

        7. Senator Nelson. General Helms, how are launch priorities
    determined?
        General Helms. The quarterly Current Launch Schedule Review Board
    integrates a wide range of inputs to determine the Current Launch
    Schedule (2 year schedule). Inputs are received from AFSPC, the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA, National Reconnaissance Office
    (NRO), STRATCOM, Constellation Sustainment Assessment Teams (CSAT) and
    other organizations who have spacecraft preparing to launch. Launch
    priority is then based on all inputs, national priorities, and
    satellite/launch vehicle readiness to meet assigned launch dates.

                          acquisition lessons learned
        8. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, you and your colleagues at the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) have spent many years following
    space acquisition programs. As most of these challenging programs are
    on the cusp of operations, what are the lessons learned from years of
    late and over budget programs?
        Ms. Chaplain. Key lessons on acquiring space systems have been
    learned the hard way over the past decade. These lessons mirror many of
    the best practices identified in our prior reports. Principally,
    information technology is vital that programs start with as much
    critical knowledge on requirements, technology, schedule, and cost as
    possible, and that they not be allowed to move into more complex phases
    of development without demonstrating that defined levels of knowledge
    have been attained. Most of the programs that have experienced
    significant delays and overruns lacked critical knowledge at the start
    and throughout. Another key lesson is that programs be set up in
    achievable increments versus revolutionary advances. In other words,
    not every military satellite initially needs to serve all the needs of
    multiple communities. Lastly, while acquisition ``reform'' and adopting
    ``commercial'' practices intuitively seem like the right things to do,
    DOD has learned that information technology needs to stay knowledgeable
    and involved in its acquisition efforts and provide adequate oversight.
    Many of the problems we have identified in the past decade can be
    linked back to reform initiatives that loosened oversight, quality
    standards, and government involvement. Table 1 highlights practices we
    have recommended that could benefit space programs.
    Table 1: Actions Needed to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition
            Problems
        Before undertaking new programs:
             Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully
            funded and information technology is clear where projects stand
            in relation to the overall portfolio.
             Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission
            needs rather than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single
            step.
             Match requirements to resources--that is, time, money,
            technology, and people--before undertaking a new development
            effort.
             Research and define requirements before programs are
            started and limit changes after they are started.
             Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and
            updated regularly.
             Commit to fully fund projects before they begin.
             Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work
            as intended before programs are started.
             Assign more ambitious technology development efforts
            to research departments until they are ready to be added to
            future generations (increments) of a product.
             Use systems engineering to close gaps between
            resources and requirements before launching the development
            process.
        During program development:
             Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to
            make go/no-go decisions, covering critical facets of the
            program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, design
            readiness, production readiness, and relationships with
            suppliers.
             Do not allow development to proceed until certain
            thresholds are met--for example, a high proportion of
            engineering drawings completed or production processes under
            statistical control.
             Empower program managers to make decisions on the
            direction of the program and to resolve problems and implement
            solutions.
             Hold program managers accountable for their choices.
             Require program managers to stay with a project to its
            end.
             Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality
            parts for their products through such activities as regular
            supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and
            delivery, among other things.
             Encourage program managers to share bad news, and
            encourage collaboration and communication.

        Source: GAO.

        9. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, do you see these lessons being
    applied to new programs, such as the Defense Weather Satellite System
    (DWSS)?
        Ms. Chaplain. In general, DOD is working to ensure that critical
    technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin,
    requirements are defined early in the process and are stable
    throughout, and system design remains stable. DOD also intends to
    follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus
    pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk
    and has done so with the only new major satellite acquisition program
    undertaken by the Air Force in recent years--GPS IIIA. DOD is also
    providing more program and contractor oversight and putting in place
    military standards and specifications in its acquisitions.
    Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline
    management and oversight of the National Security Space Enterprise.
    Regarding DWSS, we have not conducted a detailed review of the
    development effort to determine the extent to which lessons learned are
    being applied.

                   future for operationally responsive space
        10. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte and General Shelton, the
    Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office has had several successful
    space efforts, including TACSAT-3, demonstrating the military utility
    of small satellites to the warfighter. Two more small satellites,
    TACSAT-4 and ORS-1, should be launching shortly. What are your views on
    the future utility of small satellites from an operational and a policy
    perspective?
        Ambassador Schulte. Small satellites can play a role in making our
    space architectures more resilient and in providing tailored
    capabilities to the warfighter, goals that help fulfill several
    strategic approaches in the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).
    Resilient architectures contribute to deterring aggression against
    space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and provide
    a means to operate in a degraded environment should deterrence fail.
    One approach to improve resilience is to disaggregate specific missions
    or payloads, and satisfy requirements by flying multiple smaller
    satellites. Smaller, more responsive space capabilities also improve
    our ability to operate in a degraded environment by enabling the DOD to
    respond quickly to urgent needs or reconstitute a capability after it
    is lost. Small satellites can also help address the challenges of our
    space industrial base, providing a steady requirement for many smaller
    satellites spread over many years and offering opportunities to
    incorporate new technologies and innovations rapidly.
        General Shelton. As you mentioned, the TACSAT-3 spacecraft built by
    the Air Force Research Laboratory has demonstrated the military utility
    of a hyper-spectral imaging sensor. We believe that both the Naval
    Research Laboratory TACSAT-4 and ORS Office/AFSPC ORS-1 spacecraft will
    provide unique capabilities to the warfighter and useful data regarding
    small spacecraft performance.
        The National Space Policy (NSP) directs DOD to develop and exercise
    capabilities and plans for operating in and through a degraded,
    disrupted, or denied space environment. We need to think about new ways
    to field our future satellite constellations in terms of higher
    resiliency and increased assurance. Smaller satellites may be one
    approach to the problem. There may be other creative ways to
    disaggregate capabilities or distribute sensors and networks to provide
    adequate space capabilities. Many applications, such as communications,
    navigation, or missile warning, require a constellation of spacecraft
    to provide persistent global coverage. In the future, a strategy of
    greater distribution of spacecraft constellations, responsive launch
    for critical capabilities and/or on-orbit spares may provide needed
    resilience in a contested space environment.

        11. Senator Nelson. General Formica, the Army has been putting a
    lot of effort into small satellites, including a small satellite called
    Kestrel Eye. What is driving this attention on small satellites?
        General Formica. Space capabilities are required for the Army to
    shoot, move, and communicate. Small satellites have the potential to
    provide responsive and cost effective alternatives to augment existing
    space capabilities. With the changing nature of ground warfare, this
    added capability would provide the potential for persistent
    communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to
    warfighters at the tactical level, including those in remote locations.

                                export controls
        12. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, the International Traffic
    in Arms Regulations restrictions on the export of space-related
    technologies, many of which are global commodities today, have had a
    negative impact on the U.S. space industrial base--especially on lower-
    tier suppliers. The new NSSS acknowledges this situation and states the
    need for export control reform. What is the status of these export
    control reforms?
        Ambassador Schulte. On May 6, 2011, DOS and DOD transmitted a joint
    interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2010. The ``Risk Assessment of United States Export Control
    Policy'' report is a conservative starting point for transferring
    satellites and related items from the United States Munitions List
    (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL). It recommends that, under
    certain conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems,
    subsystems, and components be controlled on the CCL. In addition, the
    report recommends that the President be provided with the authority to
    determine the export licensing jurisdiction of satellites and related
    components, which are currently required by statute to be on the USML.
        A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related
    items, and technology is currently underway, as part of the
    administration's Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its
    interagency partners, is expected to complete this review of USML
    Category XV, Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment, by July 2011.
    The draft will include recommendations for what items should remain on
    the USML and what items can be moved to the CCL. No items controlled on
    the USML by statute will be moved off that list unless and until the
    authority to do so is provided by Congress.
        We expect to provide the final section 1248 report to Congress
    later this year, based on the findings from the ECR initiative.
    Implementation of the interim report's recommendations would represent
    a significant step forward in export control reform for satellites,
    which we hope will boost U.S. content in foreign satellites, increase
    opportunities for partnering with foreign manufacturers, and help
    energize the U.S. space industrial base.

                     space science and technology strategy
        13. Senator Nelson. Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
    National Intelligence to develop a Space Science and Technology (S&T)
    Strategy, which was recently delivered to Congress. Is the Space S&T
    Strategy being used by the Navy to guide or inform investments in space
    systems?
        Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley. Yes, the Office of Naval
    Research's and Naval Research Laboratory's current space capability
    development efforts are focused on the following DOD Space S&T Strategy
    goals: (1) Satellite Communications including communications-on-the-
    move; dedicated/theater controlled, space-enabled tactical
    communications; enhanced flexibility and resilience in challenged
    environments; and support to ISR collection platforms (e.g., TACSAT-4
    communications satellite (scheduled to launch 27 September 2011)); (2)
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) including
    increased persistence of space-based ISR and improved cross-cueing for
    space-based assets (e.g., Detection and Fusion of Remote Sensors Future
    Naval Capabilities Initiative)); and (3) Space Environmental Monitoring
    including improved understanding and awareness of the Earth-to-Sun
    environment; improved space weather forecast capabilities and tools to
    predict operational impacts; and improved space weather forecasting and
    enabling real-time threat warning (e.g., a Space Weather Discovery and
    Invention Initiative.) These efforts illustrate the Navy's application
    of this strategy as a tool to guide its space S&T initiatives and
    investments.

        14. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Hyten, is the Space
    S&T Strategy being used by the Air Force to guide or inform investments
    in space systems?
        General Shelton and General Hyten. The report was completed less
    than 2 months ago and is still being reviewed by our organizations. Air
    Force inputs were primarily provided by the Air Force Research
    Laboratory and they were consistent with the outputs from yearly S&T
    reviews conducted by the Air Force Space Command Commander, the Air
    Force Research Laboratory Commander, and the Space and Missile Systems
    Center Commander.

        15. Senator Nelson. General Formica, is the Space S&T Strategy
    being used by the Army to guide or inform investments in space systems?
        General Formica. Yes, the Space S&T Strategy is being used by the
    Army to guide our investments in space systems. The strategy captures
    and reflects the guidance set forth to the Army outlined in the NSP and
    the NSSS regarding priorities and investment strategies for space.

        16. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, do you know who in DOD will
    be responsible for oversight of the execution of the strategy?
        Ambassador Schulte. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
    and Engineering is responsible for oversight of the execution on the
    Space S&T Strategy.

                                  space launch
        17. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, what is the Air Force plan to
    reduce launch costs, and rethink how launch vehicles are purchased,
    particularly the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)?
        General Hyten. The recently appointed Air Force PEO for Space
    Launch is crafting a new EELV acquisition strategy that supports a
    minimum production rate by implementing a lot-buy approach to procuring
    launch vehicles. This strategy also includes a ``new entrant'' approach
    to allow for near-term opportunities and future competition in all lot
    buys. The Air Force, NRO, and NASA are working together to develop and
    publish a coordinated strategy for certification of new entrants,
    targeted to begin in fiscal year 2013. Key elements of the strategy are
    an initial Atlas V and Delta IV lot buy of sufficient size to ensure
    economic order quantity prices and a steady launch vehicle production
    rate. An AF/NRO study team and the Broad Area Review 2010 recommended
    an annual minimum production rate of eight launch vehicle cores plus
    associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets to
    sustain our spacelift industrial base. With lot buys, a steady
    production rate, and a ``new entrant'' approach, we believe launch
    costs can be controlled.

        18. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has an ongoing review of the
    development of the new EELV acquisition strategy. When will this review
    be completed and do you have any preliminary thoughts on how to reduce
    launch costs?
        Ms. Chaplain. We plan to issue a report on the results of our EELV
    review in July 2011. In this review we are examining whether DOD has
    the knowledge and information technology needs to develop a new EELV
    acquisition strategy and the extent to which there are important
    factors that could affect launch acquisitions. Given concerns raised
    through recent studies about visibility into costs and the industrial
    base supporting EELV, information technology is important that this
    strategy be supported with reliable and accurate data. Without such
    data, efforts to manage launch costs may not be effective.
    Additionally, deficiencies in the space acquisition workforce in
    general and those in the Air Force's Launch and Range Systems
    Directorate in particular, increase the challenge of implementing the
    new strategy effectively.

        19. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Helms, what do you
    see as the advantages and disadvantages to having new launch providers?
        General Shelton. There are two advantages: (1) new providers may be
    able to bring innovative approaches that result in lower costs, and (2)
    creating competition in space launch. The disadvantage we have
    identified thus far is that the launch market may not be sufficiently
    robust to support multiple providers at efficient production levels.
        General Helms. The advantages of a new provider for space launch
    are innovative approaches with lower costs. Additionally, competition
    provides incentive for current providers to find ways to lower costs.
    At any point in time, a more experienced provider will be perceived to
    have a matured reliability advantage over a less experienced launch
    provider. If a new launch provider experiences ``growing pains'' while
    establishing its position in the launch business, it may expose the
    government to unique schedule, cost, and performance risk.

        20. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Helms, what are the
    general performance objectives and goals that you would want to see
    from an operational perspective to ensure that a new launch provider
    can successfully launch a satellite?
        General Shelton. Our current requirements documents state that a
    launch provider must be able to meet the range of lift requirements to
    launch national security payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle
    reliability of 98 percent or better. The launch vehicle must adhere to
    standard interface specifications to enable spacecraft to fly on the
    new rocket without being redesigned, and it must be able to launch from
    both the east coast and the west coast. We are evaluating new entrant
    criteria to encourage competition and allow a path for new launch
    providers to certify readiness for national security missions.
        General Helms. Our requirements are specified in the EELV
    operational requirements document. For example, a new provider must be
    able to meet the variety of lift requirements to launch national
    security payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle reliability of 98
    percent or better. The launch vehicle must adhere to the EELV standard
    interface specification to enable spacecraft to fly on the new rocket
    without being redesigned and be able to launch from both coasts.
        As a goal, the new provider should be able to deliver lower cost
    launches and bring long-term stability to Air Force launch services.

                        defense weather satellite system
        21. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, in February 2010, the President
    restructured the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS) weather satellite program. This decision
    directed the acquisition and development of separate military and civil
    weather satellite programs for the Air Force and the National
    Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), rather than the
    joint NPOESS program. NPOESS had experienced technical problems that
    had resulted in cost and schedule increases and had a management
    structure that was not workable. The Air Force plans to acquire the
    DWSS to satisfy military weather requirements, and the NOAA will
    acquire the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). Both NOAA and the Air
    Force will continue to use a shared common ground system to address
    weather and environmental requirements. The DWSS program is expected to
    launch two satellites with the first launch in 2018. What is the status
    of the DWSS effort?
        General Hyten. The DWSS program is proceeding according to last
    year's plan. The Air Force retained the NPOESS prime contractor,
    Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS) and modified the contract for
    DWSS development. This restructured contract was awarded on 24 May
    2011. The Air Force also transitioned the NPOESS climate sensors and
    the common ground system from the NPOESS contract to NOAA/NASA to
    support development on the JPSS contracts.
        DWSS is the result of a presidentially-directed restructure, not an
    NPOESS termination, and is consequently bound to the NPOESS acquisition
    baseline for annual acquisition reports to Congress. As a result, the
    restructure led to a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach of the NPOESS
    Program Acquisition Unit Cost. This breach was detailed in the 15 April
    2011 NPOESS Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and a 29 April 2011
    notification to Congress by the Secretary of the Air Force.
        This year the Air Force and NGAS are focused on early development
    of the two DWSS satellites, finalizing contract restructure efforts,
    and completing the transition of non-DOD payloads to NOAA/NASA for
    JPSS. DWSS development activities will ramp-up considerably over the
    next year. Significant planned efforts in 2012 include continued
    spacecraft redesign to a smaller and lighter bus, continued development
    of the two primary sensors--the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer
    Suite and Microwave Imager Sounder--and development of algorithms to
    satisfy DOD-specific requirements in the common ground system.
    Following Milestone-B approval by the Defense Acquisition Executive in
    early 2012, the contractor will conduct the Preliminary Design Review
    in late 2012.
        The DWSS program is still on track to launch the first DWSS
    spacecraft no earlier than 2018.

        22. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, we have heard that a major
    program review of DWSS has been postponed indefinitely because of
    scheduling issues. What is the status of and schedule for the program
    review?
        General Hyten. The DWSS Program Review Defense Acquisition Board
    (DAB) was replaced by a program update to the Defense Acquisition
    Executive, Dr. Carter, which was held on 31 March. This update provided
    Dr. Carter with a summary of the program's annual SAR delivered to
    Congress on 15 April and also addressed acquisition schedule, contract
    status, and sensor design.

        23. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, Earth environmental
    monitoring, weather sciences, and related technologies were not
    included in the 2011 Space S&T Plan. Do you know why these technologies
    were omitted?
        Ambassador Schulte. Historically, the vast majority of DOD S&T
    programs that address meteorological and atmospheric issues have not
    been considered a part of the Space S&T domain. However, future Space
    S&T strategies will more clearly identify significant space-specific
    S&T goals in Earth environmental monitoring, weather sciences, and
    related technologies.
        The Space S&T Strategy's ISR core mission area incorporates DOD-
    funded S&T for sensors, electronics, and modeling, including
    terrestrial, atmospheric, and space weather. These S&T efforts support
    development of future technology options that address military needs in
    the ground, air, and space operational domains, including monitoring of
    seismic activity, typhoons, and the coastal ocean environments.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                      air force space acquisition proposal
        24. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten, the
    Air Force has proposed an efficiency initiative to adopt a new method
    for acquiring satellites called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space
    Efficiency (EASE). We have recently heard that the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for AT&L does not believe that the use of multiyear
    contracts to procure additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF) assets is appropriate at this time. We understand, however, that
    AT&L is considering other, more conservative block buy approaches that
    may be more appropriate for buying high technology-risk military
    satellites. In pursuing this contracting strategy, what sort of
    accountability does the Air Force intend to place on the prime
    contractor of these satellite systems?
        General Shelton and General Hyten. The best approach for
    accountability under EASE is the fixed-price, incentive fee contract.
    Once the contract is negotiated and put into action, the government's
    obligation is limited. Government liability is constrained if the
    contractor experiences problems directly related to the contractors'
    responsibilities within the scope of the contract. Contract penalties
    for unmet milestones or premature failure in on-orbit performance will
    also apply. Along with these provisions we hope to bring improved
    industrial base stability that will help avoid the conditions that have
    contributed to past cost overruns.
        In addition, designating block buys as Subprograms will provide
    congressional insight into actual space vehicle block costs. The
    resulting visibility ensures Air Force and DOD accountability to the
    costs and funding requirements to which they committed at the block
    Milestone Decision.

        25. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten,
    given AEHF-1 has yet to reach its operational orbit and won't do so
    until August, why should Congress write the check now for two more
    until we know if the satellite works and can meet its intended
    requirements?
        General Shelton and General Hyten. The AEHF program requirements
    are solid, the design is stable and mature, and the experienced
    government and contractor team is in place. We are making great
    progress on AEHF-1 orbit raising having reached the third of a four-
    phase revised orbit raising strategy and expect to have a full 14-year
    mission life. Once in the proper orbit, AEHF-1 checkout will commence
    verifying that AEHF-1 can meet its intended requirements. In addition,
    AEHF-2 is in storage awaiting launch, and AEHF-3 and -4 are in various
    stages of production. The block buy of AEHF-5 and -6 will comprise a
    smooth continuation of the production line. Design maturity and
    stability lend well to a fixed-price contracting strategy for future
    production. If, for some unexplained reason, we discover unforeseen
    problems with AEHF-1, we believe they will be resolved before any final
    decisions are made concerning the production of AEHF-5 and -6.

        26. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten,
    shouldn't the Air Force be required to demonstrate the reliability of
    these systems before asking Congress to authorize buying these assets
    in bulk?
        General Shelton and General Hyten. AEHF-1 is scheduled to reach GEO
    by October 2011 and commence the 6-month on-orbit checkout process.
    Barring any schedule changes, the Air Force will complete AEHF-1 on-
    orbit checkout by April 2012 and will have proven satellite
    reliability. The Air Force does not plan to award the AEHF-5 and -6
    block buy contract before April 2012.

        27. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, has the GAO reviewed the Air
    Force EASE strategy?
        Ms. Chaplain. While we have not yet fully assessed the EASE
    strategy, this new approach appears to offer various benefits, such as
    ensuring technologies are mature and requirements are stable, accruing
    cost savings from economic order quantities, supporting the industrial
    base, and reducing the workload burden on government acquisition
    program offices. However, the strategy also appears to pose several
    challenges, including the potential to limit competition and
    innovation, as well as developing accurate and reliable cost and
    schedule estimates for acquiring state-of-the-art satellites so that a
    fixed-price contracting strategy can be successfully employed. An
    overarching architecture could help implement and ensure the EASE
    strategy meets future needs. Additionally, a knowledgeable workforce
    would be essential for effectively implementing the strategy and
    developing adequate insight into costs and industrial base
    capabilities.

        28. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, do you have any concerns,
    particularly about the use of multiyear contracts, to buy high
    technology-risk military satellites?
        Ms. Chaplain. Spreading the high procurement costs of satellites
    over several years should help to stabilize space system acquisition
    funding needs. However, the use of advance appropriations in
    conjunction with multi-year contracting would commit future budget
    authority for these procurements and thus tend to limit flexibility in
    future Congress' budget decisionmaking. For this reason, we remain more
    concerned with the use of advance appropriation than the use of
    multiyear contracts.

        29. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, what other acquisition
    strategies should the Air Force consider that can both depressurize the
    appropriated funding vis-a-vis increasingly expensive satellite
    programs, but also allow the Air Force to procure high-risk space
    assets responsibly and in a way that allows for robust and meaningful
    congressional oversight?
        Ms. Chaplain. Similar to major satellite acquisitions, the Navy's
    major ship acquisitions are characterized by high cost items and low
    quantities. In some instances, the Navy procures its high cost ships by
    spreading procurement costs over multiple years without utilizing
    advance appropriations. A similar approach may be beneficial and
    applicable to procuring high cost satellites. Additionally, a strategy
    that calls for constellations of smaller and less technically complex
    satellites--such as single-mission satellites with shorter planned
    lifespans--could help DOD meet cost goals, bolster the space industrial
    base, allow capabilities to be fielded faster, and facilitate
    constellation sustainment in case of a launch or unexpected on-orbit
    failure. Finally, enterprise planning across the space acquisition
    programs portfolio could also significantly help normalize the spikes
    and valleys in space funding. Efforts under these scenarios would allow
    for robust and meaningful congressional oversight.

      space situational awareness: joint space operations center mission
                                     system
        30. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms,
    one of your top priorities is the development of a modern SSA system
    for analyzing and monitoring activity in space. I am concerned that the
    traditional defense acquisition process is not optimal for the
    development of software-based service-oriented architectures like the
    one envisioned for the JSpOC management system. I understand that
    recently you decided to reevaluate the acquisition strategy for this
    program. What is the current status of the JSpOC management system?
        General Shelton. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the
    JMS program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
    requirements compelling, it found the JMS acquisition had not
    incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices.
        The IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy which included
    the extension of a prototyping phase to reduce the risk. The Air Force
    has now embarked on an approach that fully leverages multiple current
    prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the initial JMS
    service-oriented architecture capabilities. This approach will provide
    early-use capability, utilize new data sources quicker, and allow
    decommissioning of the legacy SSA systems soonest. Finally, it
    establishes rigorous systems engineering, test and training processes
    early, enabling successful rapid integration.
        We are now in the process of transferring program responsibility to
    the SMC to implement this prototyping approach for more rapid delivery
    of mission capability to the warfighter.
        General Helms. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the
    program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
    requirements compelling, it found the current DOD acquisition policy,
    and therefore the JMS acquisition, has not properly incorporated agile
    information technology acquisition practices. The IPA recommended DODI
    5000.2 (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System) be amended to
    reflect the Information Technology Box concept and incorporate DOD's
    section 804 response to Congress for agile acquisition.
        In addition, the IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy
    including the extension of the prototyping phase to reduce the risk for
    an agile information technology strategy. To comply, the Air Force is
    proposing an approach that fully leverages multiple prototype
    development efforts while capitalizing on the initial JMS service-
    oriented architecture and user-defined operational picture already at
    the JSpOC. This approach will provide early-use capability, utilize new
    data sources quicker and allow decommissioning of the legacy SSA
    systems soonest. Finally, it establishes rigorous systems engineering
    and test and training processes early, enabling successful rapid
    integration.
        AFSPC is now in the process of transferring program responsibility
    to the SMC to implement this prototyping approach to more rapidly
    deliver mission capability for the JSpOC.

        31. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms,
    what is the expected timeline and cost?
        General Shelton. We will transition off of legacy SSA core
    processing systems by the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the
    remaining JMS capabilities is now being developed.
        The total cost of the new rapid prototyping approach is expected to
    be less than the previous approach. We are finalizing the detailed
    program baseline and acquisition strategy.
        General Helms. We hope to transition off of legacy SSA core
    processing systems by the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the
    remaining JMS capabilities is now being developed.
        The new rapid prototyping approach, as informed by the OSD directed
    IPA, is expected to cost significantly less than the previous approach.
    At this time, detailed program baseline and acquisition strategy are
    still being finalized.

        32. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, does GAO have any thoughts or
    insights on the JMS acquisition strategy?
        Ms. Chaplain. We have not reviewed the latest changes to the JMS
    acquisition strategy resulting from the recently-conducted IPA.
    However, in our review of the acquisition effort last year, we raised
    several concerns about the then-current draft JMS acquisition strategy
    including the following:

             The potential for deferring requirements could be an
            oversight consideration given the Air Force's history of
            consistently deferring requirements in previous attempts to
            upgrade information technology systems that support SSA.
             The JMS acquisition was not adopting an incremental
            approach--the effort instead consisted of a single increment
            delivered in a series of releases--as exemplified by its plans
            to proceed without knowledge of all critical technologies and
            deferral of other planning activities. This lack of knowledge
            could result in unanticipated costs and other programmatic
            risks to the acquisition effort.
             The program planned to award a contract for developing
            a high accuracy catalog without first conducting limited
            development or developing prototypes. The high accuracy catalog
            is foundational for most JMS capabilities and is intended to be
            a net-centric data repository of information about earth-
            orbiting objects.
             Support for use of a service-oriented architecture was
            relatively new under DOD policy and the practice was not yet
            widely used--although service-oriented architectures offer
            significant benefits, they also pose integration and
            information assurance challenges.

                                quality control
        33. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Schulte, Dr. Zangardi, General
    Shelton, Lieutenant General Helms, Lieutenant General Formica, Rear
    Admiral Titley, Major General Hyten, and Ms. Chaplain, contractor
    quality issues have had significant impacts on major defense space
    programs over the years. In your opinion, what more can be done to
    address quality control?
        Ambassador Schulte. Energizing the space industrial base is one of
    the three strategic objectives of the NSSS. This includes working with
    the Intelligence Community and our industrial base partners to
    revalidate current measures and implement new ones, where practicable,
    to stabilize program acquisition more effectively, and to improve our
    space acquisition processes. Stabilizing our acquisition programs will
    allow prime contractors and suppliers to work over the long-term to
    increase quality. Suppliers will tend to provide higher quality where
    there is longevity to a production run.
        DOD also needs to engage the supplier community more strategically
    about far-reaching issues concerning the industrial base. The existing
    Space Industrial Base Council is intended to serve this purpose and
    will be used to address this and other supplier issues as needs arise.
        Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley. Navy's primary space
    responsibility is the procurement, sustainment, and operation of DOD's
    Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) communications satellites. While fulfilling
    this responsibility, it has been Navy's experience that a majority of
    the systems that comprise the current UHF constellation have operated
    well beyond their design lives. The satellites and their sub-systems
    are well engineered, so the Navy can't comment on negative impacts from
    quality control problems. Navy space programs leverage lessons learned
    from other space programs and utilize numerous proven quality control
    mechanisms that conform to industry standards. The Navy Communications
    Satellite Program Office along with our contractors are fully engaged
    in ensuring Navy space programs continue to produce high quality
    systems.
        General Shelton and General Hyten. The Air Force, as a whole,
    continues to move away from the Total System Performance Responsibility
    (TSPR) approach to acquisition embraced in the mid-1990s. The crux of
    the TSPR approach was to transfer government tasks to the contractor in
    order to gain efficiencies by taking full advantage of the contractor's
    overall management approach and commercial best practices with minimal
    government oversight. As a result of minimizing that government
    oversight, critical acquisition and engineering skills within the Air
    Force atrophied resulting in less and less ability to provide quality
    oversight.
        Today, the Air Force is aggressively improving its acquisition
    corps, to include focus on the systems engineering discipline. Robust
    up-front systems engineering, detailed design reviews, and continuous
    risk analysis and mitigation will design quality into the system from
    the beginning, rather than solely relying on quality control officials
    to validate checklist compliance during final production and
    integration. Robust systems engineering and acquisition oversight of
    contractor performance during the engineering phase will lead to the
    quality product we require for the warfighter.
        We also believe stable production runs underwritten by stable
    funding will benefit the industrial base and enhance quality.
        General Helms. I believe there are a few ways we can improve
    quality control. First, we can increase contractor financial
    responsibility for poor quality control of subcontractor work. Second,
    provide contractor greater predictability for orders and production
    enabling the contractor to retain expertise. Third, we should make
    award fees large enough to incentivize contractor behavior. Finally,
    more block buy purchases with smaller steps in technologies will avoid
    large technological leaps that are complex and costly.
        General Formica For the government to achieve improved quality
    control, we must focus our efforts on strong quality assurance programs
    and enhanced contractor oversight. We must increase our collaborative
    efforts with quality assurance specialists to ensure that appropriate
    quality clauses and provisions are included in contracts. Additionally,
    the government should assess and build its organic capability to
    effectively measure and validate contractor quality and procure
    essential technical data for effective contractor oversight.
        Ms. Chaplain. Over the years, we have identified practices related
    to technology transition, quality assurance, and other acquisition
    program management approaches that could benefit space programs.
    Approaches that could improve the quality of space systems acquisitions
    include:

             Improving quality systems engineering.
             Holding suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality
            parts for their products through such activities as regular
            supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and
            delivery.
             Providing effective oversight during the development
            process.
             Providing an adequate workforce capacity for the
            front-end acquisition planning activities.
             Capturing manufacturing knowledge in a timely manner.

        DOD has developed policies that address the need for adopting
    commercial quality standards, using good systems engineering practices,
    and overseeing supplier quality. However, DOD still has difficulty
    acquiring high-quality weapon systems in a cost-efficient and timely
    manner. While many problems are caused by poor prime contractor
    practices related to systems engineering, manufacturing, and supplier
    quality, an underlying cause lies in the fact that DOD typically
    assumes most of the financial risk associated with development of
    complex systems. Moreover, risks associated with this situation are
    exacerbated because DOD generally enters into development contracts
    without demonstrated knowledge or firm assurance that requirements are
    achievable, which too often result in inefficient programs and quality
    problems.

        34. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has
    conducted comprehensive quality review on contractor quality. Could you
    please share some of your findings and recommendations?
        Ms. Chaplain. We were asked by the Committee on Oversight and
    Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense
    and Foreign Operations, to assess: (1) the extent to which parts
    quality problems are affecting DOD and NASA space and missile defense
    programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to
    prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. We reviewed 21
    space and missile programs at DOD and NASA that were, as of October
    2009, in development, projected to be high cost, and had demonstrated
    through a critical design review that the maturity of the design was
    appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication,
    assembly, integration, and test. Each program provided a list of the
    top 5 to 10 parts, materials, or processes problems, as defined by that
    program, affecting that program's cost, schedule, or performance. In
    addition, they provided an explanation of the root cause and
    contributing factors that may have led to each problem reported.
    Through our discussions with agency officials, we were able to obtain
    information on working groups and initiatives to prevent, detect, and
    mitigate parts quality problems. At this time, we are unable to discuss
    our specific findings and recommendations given that the report is in
    draft and not final. We expected to issue the report in mid-June 2011,
    at which time we will provide you with a copy.

        [Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                           Bellevue, NE

                             U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:33 a.m. in
    Bellevue Public Schools/Offutt Air Force Base, Welcome Center,
    1600 Highway 370, Bellevue, NE, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee member present: Senator Nelson.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd.
        Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
    assistant to Senator Nelson; and Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
    Senator Shaheen.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Nelson. The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces will come to order at this time.
        General Kehler, welcome. It is a pleasure to be with you
    here in Bellevue today, just up the road from Offutt Air Force
    Base, the historic home of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and
    today the home of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the
    Fighting 55th.
        I also want to acknowledge and welcome two retired military
    leaders, Lieutenant General Bob Hinson and Vice Admiral Bob
    Bell, who are close advisors to me and continue to serve this
    community and the Nation. You may know that Vice Admiral Bell
    retired after 37 years in the Navy and then was President and
    CEO of the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce from 1988 until
    2001. Lieutenant General Hinson, prior to his retirement, as
    did Admiral Bell, served as Vice Commander of the Air Force
    Space Command and also served as Deputy Commander of STRATCOM.
        In 2001 they, along with other leaders in the community,
    established the Military Support Coalition to champion Offutt
    Air Force Base, the Fighting 55th, and STRATCOM. For many years
    before that, however, they worked to improve and support
    Offutt. We are certainly grateful that the military service
    brought both of these officers to Omaha and the community kept
    them.
        The command has a proud history, dating back to its Cold
    War roots. Since the creation of STRATCOM in 1992, the reach
    and breadth of the command has continued to grow, particularly
    following the merger of STRATCOM with U.S. Space Command
    (SPACECOM) in 2002.
        Today STRATCOM is truly a global command. Today its
    missions include nuclear deterrence, protecting space,
    thwarting cyber attacks, global strike, combating weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD), overseeing missile defenses, providing
    real-time battlefield intelligence, and more. It is probably
    safe to say that STRATCOM plays one of the most important but
    perhaps not one of the best known roles in America's national
    security.
        General Kehler, this is your second appearance before the
    Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, but
    your first opportunity to discuss the full scope of the command
    and its activities. Although you assumed your responsibilities
    of this command just a little over 4 months ago, you are not
    new to these issues and most of your career has been involved
    with strategic and space systems. You are not new to the
    command, having previously served as Deputy Commander. Maybe I
    should say welcome back and welcome home.
        But before we begin today, I would also like to recognize
    the men and women who serve around the world as members of the
    military services in support of STRATCOM and their families as
    they support and enable their loved ones to carry out the wide
    range of important global missions.
        The global strike responsibilities have been repeatedly
    demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. The B-2, the B-52, and
    the B-1 bombers have all rotated through Iraq or Afghanistan,
    providing large amounts of ordnance where and when needed. The
    B-1 has been able to do double duty by providing both ordnance
    and intelligence.
        With the stand-up of the new U.S. Cyber Command, which is
    part of STRATCOM, there is now a military force to protect and
    defend military cyber assets and to respond to a cyber attack
    on the United States when and if necessary. This is a
    significant challenge. The Department of Defense (DOD) is
    targeted for thousands of cyber attacks per month. Some
    estimates range as high as 5,000 attacks per month.
        STRATCOM also manages the unmanned aircraft such as Global
    Hawks, Reapers, and Predators that help the forces in
    Afghanistan gather intelligence and see over the next hill or
    mountain. These unmanned aircraft stay in the air for hours and
    constantly provide eyes in the sky and the fire power necessary
    to track and, if needed, attack Taliban and others who are
    attacking U.S. and NATO forces.
        STRATCOM is also responsible for implementing the New
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, the New
    START treaty, which the Senate ratified this past December.
    This new treaty will reduce the number of deployed strategic
    nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear delivery systems that
    each country has. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on
    implementing this important new treaty.
        The U.S. military remains a superior military force due in
    large part to the advantages and capabilities that the military
    and other national security space systems provide. This
    advantage is not a secret, and others are constantly trying to
    reduce that advantage. STRATCOM is responsible for protecting
    those satellites and finding whoever it is that is trying to
    interfere with those satellites.
        Space is also full of space debris, junk that moves around
    in space and that can damage our space satellites. STRATCOM is
    responsible for keeping track of these objects and providing
    advanced warning so the junk does not collide with the
    satellites. In 2009, unfortunately a dead Russian satellite
    collided with a U.S. commercial communications satellite. The
    two satellites broke apart from the impact and, unfortunately,
    created even more space debris. STRATCOM also provides warning
    information to the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) to protect the astronauts on the Space
    Station from space debris. Even the Space Station has had to
    change its location on several occasions to avoid that space
    debris.
        The most important role of the STRATCOM is to maintain a
    safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Maintaining the
    nuclear deterrent is an everyday event at STRATCOM.
        There is also another piece to deterrence for which
    STRATCOM is also responsible, and that is preventing states and
    non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, materials, and
    technologies. This equally important mission is one that is
    often not well understood by the public or even Congress for
    that matter, but one that is growing.
        Finally, STRATCOM is the responsible command for ensuring
    that missile defenses are militarily effective. As missile
    capabilities of countries such as Iran and North Korea grow,
    the threat to deployed U.S. forces and allies in these regions
    also grows. The United States has begun, in cooperation with
    NATO, a missile defense program that will protect our troops
    and our allies from existing and anticipated regional missile
    threats, including those from Iran.
        So it is a pleasure for me to be here and to welcome all of
    you to be able to listen to and discuss these issues and all of
    the work of STRATCOM. General Kehler, your prepared remarks and
    statement will be included for the record.
        Before your opening remarks, I just wanted to thank Hannah
    Lloyd, our subcommittee staff assistant, and your staff,
    General Kehler, for all their hard work organizing the hearing
    today. We do not get the chance to do many field hearings, as
    they require a little extra preparation being outside of
    Washington, but I do honestly believe they are important as
    part of our transparent government and the opportunities that
    we have to explain to the American public what, in fact,
    STRATCOM in this case does for our national defense.
        General Kehler, I welcome your opening remarks.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Kehler. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    on behalf of STRATCOM and the Offutt Air Force Base community.
    We appreciate this opportunity to appear before the
    subcommittee again and discuss STRATCOM's missions,
    responsibilities, and requirements.
        On a personal note, Marge and I are very happy to be back
    in Omaha and Bellevue and part of the Offutt Team again. As you
    say, we get tremendous support from the local communities here,
    and I will say a word about that in just another minute.
        There is a reason for that and that reason is that the
    Bellevue and Omaha and Offutt communities share more than 143
    years together, beginning with the establishment of what was
    called Sherman Barracks back in 1868 which later became Fort
    Omaha and continued with the building of Fort Crook in 1894. Of
    course, I live in a set of quarters that were completed in
    1896. It has been occupied by, I think at last count, 62
    leaders that have been assigned here throughout those
    intervening years. Those quarters have been continuously
    occupied for all that time.
        Of course, Fort Crook added Offutt Field to its purview in
    1924 which eventually became Offutt Air Force Base.
        Other important milestones include--we, of course, had
    heavy bomber production for World War II which began in the
    1939-1940 timeframe; SAC headquarters, which was established
    here in 1948; the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, which was
    established here in 1966, which became the present day 55th
    Wing in 1991; the stand-down of SAC and establishment of
    STRATCOM as a joint command initially in 1992; transition of
    Global Weather Central into the Air Force Weather Agency in
    1997; and of course, the new STRATCOM after merging with
    SPACECOM in 2002.
        I would like to take just a minute to introduce some of
    STRATCOM's Team Offutt partners whose leaders are with us
    today. Brigadier General Don Bacon is here. He is the commander
    of our host unit, the 55th Wing. He took command there in March
    and leads the second largest wing in the United States Air
    Force. As I said, the Fighting 55th is our host wing. It
    operates 48 aircraft from locations around the world. They
    conduct essential reconnaissance, command and control, treaty
    verification, presidential support, and airlift missions.
        Last March, Don's command passed 7,500 consecutive days
    deployed in support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
    operations. That is a tremendous milestone. They did all of
    this while providing great host unit support for all of Team
    Offutt's people, our families, and the retirees that make Omaha
    home.
        Colonel Bob Russell is also with us this morning. He
    commands the Air Force Weather Agency. That includes 1,400
    Active Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contract people that are at
    locations around the world. Through its groups in
    observatories, the agency provides global weather products and
    services, including space weather support to the Air Force,
    Army, Special Operations, Intelligence Community, and other DOD
    activities. Notably he claims no credit for the increased rain
    that has fallen in Nebraska that are causing some worries as we
    are thinking about the potential for flooding, and our
    sympathies are with those that are having to deal with those
    problems right now.
        Of course, our three organizations are all successful and
    these two commanders would say the same thing that I say about
    this. We are successful because of the extraordinary men and
    women we are privileged to lead.
        So I would like to recognize four of STRATCOM's enlisted
    members who represent the best of America's soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines. From the U.S. Army, Sergeant Ralph Pohlman
    who was the 2010 STRATCOM Soldier of the Year; from the U.S.
    Navy, Petty Officer 2nd Class, Erica Bushell, the STRATCOM 2010
    Junior Sailor of the Year; Tech Sergeant Alicia Maharaj, the
    STRATCOM Mid-Tier Enlisted Person of the Year; and from the
    U.S. Marine Corps, Sergeant Kelly Nielson, STRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Global Strike Marine of the
    Year.
        Senator Nelson. Excuse me. Let us have them stand and let
    us give them a round of applause.
        General Kehler. Yes, please. [Applause.]
        So together, Team Offutt's 35,000 Active Duty warriors,
    civilians, reservists, contractors, dependents, and retirees
    share deep bonds with Omaha, Bellevue, and the communities
    throughout Eastern Nebraska and Western Iowa. As I said, for
    well over 140 years, our heartland neighbors have opened their
    arms to welcome our warriors, our families, and our children,
    which is an interesting side note to where this hearing is
    located today, one of the unique facilities in my experience in
    36 years of military service now where a community has actually
    dedicated its educational institutions to the support of our
    military children and how welcome that is as our people
    struggle with these often moves and the conflict that that
    shows. I think that says something about Bellevue and the great
    support that we get from the community here.
        In addition, community support and care for our wounded
    warriors has always been important, and today it has a new and
    greater sense of emphasis and is an important resource for
    commanders at every level. On behalf of Team Offutt, and
    especially to anyone who ever hosted a young service member in
    your home on a holiday, mowed the lawn of a deployed service
    member, cared for our wounded warriors, reached out to a new
    family on the block, or just visited with a deployed member's
    spouse, I want to say we owe you a very deep and very heartfelt
    thanks. This bond that we have with this community--as I say,
    the roots are deep and they go back a very long time.
        In this challenging era of protracted conflict, constant
    change, and enormous complexity, the demands on our
    servicemembers and their families are great. You may never know
    how much your many acts of kindness means to those of us who
    are blessed to receive them, but we are very grateful.
        Indeed, today's Armed Forces face a significantly different
    operating environment than in the past. This is a modern
    operating environment that is characterized by extraordinary
    technological advances, rapid changes in the number and type of
    actors, and hybrid combinations of strategies, tactics, and
    weapons. We operate in a complex, dynamic, and uncertain
    environment that demands focused effort, flexible approaches,
    and innovative responses. We must think strategically, plan
    with flexibility, assess comprehensively, and share information
    in unprecedented ways.
        STRATCOM's mission is to detect, deter, and prevent attacks
    against the United States and our allies and to join with the
    other combatant commands to defend the Nation should deterrence
    fail. At subordinate commands, task forces, and bases around
    the globe, more than 54,000 Active Duty, Reserve, National
    Guard, and civilian members of our team execute this mission
    every day.
        STRATCOM's mission priorities and responsibilities are
    complex and far-reaching, and we have five priorities that
    guide our work.
        First, we are to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure,
    and effective deterrent force. Our men and women operate the
    Nation's strategic deterrent forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a
    year. They also produce the Nation's nuclear employment plans
    that provide the President with credible response options to
    deter attack and achieve national security objectives should
    deterrence fail. Today we are working closely with the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services,
    as you said, Mr. Chairman, to implement both the Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) and the New START treaty. In particular,
    we are working to implement the treaty's provisions safely,
    securely, efficiently with the right resources and the right
    timeline and with the right force structure.
        The administration's 10-year plan for investment in our
    nuclear capabilities, as reflected in the President's budget,
    is absolutely essential. As affirmed by the 2010 NPR, we must
    sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex, the triad of
    nuclear forces, our human capital, and key supporting command/
    control/communications and ISR capabilities. Mr. Chairman, we
    appreciate Congress' strong support in fiscal year 2011 and we
    urge full funding again as you consider the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget proposal.
        Our second priority is to partner with other combatant
    commands to win today's fight. Ongoing operations demand our
    full commitment, and in partnership with other combatant
    commands, we are working to improve plans, procedures, and
    capabilities to address regional problems, including the
    development, proliferation, and delivery of WMD and to bring
    unity of effort, especially where problems and capabilities
    requirements cross geographic boundaries.
        Our third priority is to respond to new challenges in
    space. As you pointed out, sir, space is increasingly
    contested, congested, and competitive, and its importance goes
    far beyond national security. We must ensure uninterrupted
    access to space and space-based capabilities, improve our
    awareness of objects and activities in space, and enhance the
    protection and resilience of our most important systems.
        Our fourth priority is to build cyberspace capability and
    capacity. In cyberspace, our greatest challenge is to improve
    our ability to operate and defend DOD's networks at cyber
    speed, to make sure our vital activities can continue even in
    the face of attempts to deny or disrupt, something that happens
    thousands of times every day.
        With our subunified command, U.S. Cyber Command, we are
    working hard to improve organizations and relationships,
    enhance network situational awareness and protection, increase
    technical capacity, and develop the human capital we need as we
    look to the future.
        Finally, fifth, we must prepare for uncertainty. Today's
    adversaries and tomorrow's potential challengers closely watch
    our actions, our plans, and our capabilities to understand our
    values, our operations, and our vulnerabilities. These actors
    are not static, and combined with environmental, economic, and
    other factors, these potential adversaries could present
    surprising and asymmetric conventional, digital, or WMD
    challenges against which we must constantly be vigilant.
        Tying together this range of truly global responsibilities
    and associated capabilities must be a reliable and assured
    national command, control, and communication capability from
    the President to the nuclear forces and across the range of
    military capabilities. Our current systems require investment
    to ensure reliability and to address looming capability gaps. A
    new STRATCOM and control complex and nuclear command and
    control node at Offutt Air Force Base is the center of our
    nuclear C3 plans for the future. STRATCOM operates a unique
    national command and control capability, and today's complex
    command center and IT systems lack the capability and capacity
    to support our missions in the long term.
        Sir, again, we appreciate your support and the
    subcommittee's support for the President's request for funding
    in fiscal year 2012 for this new nuclear and national command
    and control node.
        So in conclusion, sir, the Active Duty, Reserve, National
    Guard, and civilian members of STRATCOM's team perform their
    difficult mission with remarkable skill and dedication. I am
    proud to be associated with them and look forward to working
    with you and the subcommittee as we address these important
    national security issues.
        Again, we appreciate the opportunity to appear in front of
    the subcommittee. We especially appreciate the opportunity to
    do so right outside our gate in Bellevue. With that, sir, I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
        Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to present my views on U.S. Strategic
    Command's (STRATCOM) missions and priorities. I am especially pleased
    to have this hearing here in Nebraska, just down the road from
    STRATCOM's headquarters and Offutt Air Force Base. We have a great team
    here and throughout our distributed command. Today is an important
    opportunity to showcase STRATCOM's Active Duty, Reserve, National
    Guard, and civilian members, who are standing watch this very minute at
    locations across the country and around the globe. They truly exemplify
    the best of today's joint force. I look forward to discussing the
    command's missions with you today, especially our role in the Nation's
    nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture and
    essential NC3 capability requirements.
        America's strategic forces proudly continue their longstanding role
    as the foundation of our national security posture. The President of
    the United States has assigned STRATCOM the responsibility to detect,
    deter, prevent, and defeat attacks against the United States, its
    territories, possessions and bases, and to employ appropriate force to
    defend the Nation should deterrence fail. The Command's specific
    mission responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating,
    and employing capabilities to meet the Nation's strategic deterrence,
    space operations, cyberspace operations, information operations (IO),
    global strike, missile defense, intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance (ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD)
    objectives. We conduct these activities in close coordination with
    other combatant commands around the world. Today, I would like to
    describe the strategic context in which we operate and STRATCOM's
    priorities for addressing our many challenges.
                               strategic context
        The national security landscape continues to be marked by
    protracted conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. While
    war remains a difficult struggle between human beings, today's
    operating environment is significantly different than those we
    experienced in the past. The number and type of actors (state, non-
    state, terrorist, criminal) are rapidly changing, and the distinction
    between combatants and non-combatants is less clear. Friend and foe
    alike can span global distances in seconds through space and
    cyberspace, and technological advances allow adversaries to cross
    traditional geographic and military boundaries with ease. Adversaries
    seek advantages by using asymmetric means to find and exploit our
    vulnerabilities and to defeat our advanced capabilities in air, sea,
    space, and cyberspace. At the same time, these adversaries wield hybrid
    combinations of capabilities, strategies, and tactics and operate in
    the shadows to present us with ambiguous indications and situations.
    Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of
    formerly advanced military capabilities have also reduced .entry
    costs,. making available completely new weapons and enabling actors to
    access capabilities that would not have been available to them in the
    past without significant investment. Indeed, surprise may be our
    deadliest foe, because it can make our plans ineffective, our training
    irrelevant, and, therefore, our organizations vulnerable.
        The need to foster strategic stability and deter strategic
    conflict, ensure uninterrupted capabilities from and access to space
    and cyberspace, respond to traditional and non-traditional threats, and
    deal with surprise in an era of rapid technological advances presents
    STRATCOM with significant challenges. Of the threats we face, weapons
    of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the
    American people, particularly when pursued or possessed by violent
    extremists or state proliferators. The potential of nuclear
    uncertainties in unstable regions adds special significance to this
    concern.
        At the same time, today's fiscal environment will pose additional
    challenges regarding the means and manner with which we address the
    difficult global, strategic landscape. Last year, Secretary of Defense
    Robert Gates challenged us to foster an efficient ``culture of saving''
    throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). The resulting review
    emphasized our responsibility to maximize both mission effectiveness
    and taxpayer value. STRATCOM's exhaustive assessment of our missions
    identified some functions that we could reduce, consolidate with other
    DOD organizations, or eliminate in favor of higher priority operational
    requirements. We are now evaluating these initiatives with the DOD
    leadership and will realign resources as directed at the conclusion of
    this assessment.
        In summary, the challenges are great, the choices are hard, and
    there is no textbook solution.
                                   priorities
        The 21st century security environment demands fast, comprehensive
    awareness, strategic thinking, flexible planning, decentralized
    execution, rapid innovation, and an unprecedented emphasis on sharing
    information. In this environment, STRATCOM has been uniquely organized
    and positioned to shape and employ global capabilities to deter,
    enable, and, when needed, join with the other combatant commands to
    fight and win the ever changing joint fight.
        First and foremost, we must guarantee a safe, secure, effective,
    and ready nuclear deterrent force. As affirmed by the 2010 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR), sustaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons
    complex, the triad of nuclear forces, the human capital, and key
    supporting command/control/communications (C3) and intelligence/
    surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities is essential to retain
    confidence in the deterrent's long-term credibility, provide tools to
    combat proliferation, and assure our scientific and innovation edge.
        Next, in full partnership with the other combatant commands, we
    must improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address trans-
    regional problems. Ongoing operations demand our full commitment, and
    STRATCOM's activities both enable and support joint operations around
    the world. The Command's work to synchronize and advocate for missile
    defense, ISR, electronic warfare, and combating WMD plans and
    capabilities helps bring unity of effort and flexible capabilities to
    trans-regional operations. Whether providing space-based communications
    or position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information, rapidly
    transmitting data around the world, or ensuring tested, capable missile
    defenses or other globally significant capabilities are developed,
    positioned, and optimally managed, STRATCOM is instrumental in winning
    today's dynamic joint fight.
        Finally, we must continue to improve our capabilities and operating
    concepts in the important civil and national security areas of space
    and cyberspace. Ensuring uninterrupted access to space and space-based
    capabilities, improving our awareness of objects and activities in
    space, integrating their effects with all operational phases, improving
    space access, protection, and resilience, and expanding our planning
    and implementation for partnership operations requires that we continue
    our investment and that we demand acquisition results. For cyberspace,
    we must enhance network protection and mature our organizations,
    capabilities, workforce, and partnerships to ensure effective
    operations.
                              strategic deterrence
        In today's complex security environment, the concept of strategic
    deterrence must encompass strategies to deter adversaries and dissuade
    competitors across the full range of their capabilities. We must
    consider actors and capabilities in aggregate, not in a vacuum, a need
    that highlights the importance of a better understanding of
    adversaries' values, motivators, capabilities, intentions, and
    decisionmaking processes. Not every potential adversary has or seeks
    nuclear weapons, and modern deterrence requires broad coordination,
    tailored strategies, effective capabilities, international cooperation,
    and focused capabilities like conventional prompt global strike.
        Still, STRATCOM's first priority is to deter nuclear attack on the
    United States, our allies, and our partners. Last year, the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR), the NPR, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (New START) discussions produced an important national consensus
    that affirmed the necessity of the United States' nuclear deterrent and
    the funding required to sustain it. The president has pledged that the
    United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. STRATCOM is now committed
    to implementing New START and to advocating for planned investment in
    the deterrent force. The updated ``1251 Report'' submitted in February
    of this year outlines both DOD and Department of Energy nuclear funding
    requirements through fiscal year 2021. While budget estimates will be
    refined as major program baselines evolve, these important investments
    must begin immediately. I very much appreciate Congress' strong fiscal
    year 2011 support and urge you to fully fund the President's request in
    fiscal year 2012.
    Nuclear Enterprise
        The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget requests reverse several years
    of downward trend in nuclear enterprise funding. These budgets provide
    investments in the facilities, equipment, and personnel dedicated to
    sustaining and managing the Nation's nuclear weapons, as well as to
    dismantling weapons no longer needed. To emphasize the importance of
    this investment and to better understand the conditions, urgent needs,
    and impending challenges across the complex. I made visiting each lab
    and production facility a high priority upon taking command, and to
    date I have visited all three nuclear weapons laboratories and most
    other related facilities--with plans to complete these visits soon.
        The men and women of America's nuclear weapons complex perform
    uniquely difficult, highly technical, and demanding work. As our
    stockpile ages well beyond each weapon's originally designed lifespan,
    robust stockpile surveillance and assessment programs will enable
    strategic deterrence and stability at New START force levels. Weapon
    safety, reliability, and performance may change in ways we cannot fully
    predict, and surveillance activities permit confidence and continued
    stockpile certification without nuclear testing. Dedicated surveillance
    and life extension studies constitute the best means of informing the
    President and Congress of our nuclear weapons' health, status, and
    requirements. The NPR's case-by-case approach to studying and selecting
    from the full range of life extension options (refurbishment, reuse,
    and, if needed, replacement) ensures the best future for our stockpile.
        Today, a narrow window is available to synchronize weapon
    sustainment efforts for the W76-1 and B61 (full scope) life extension
    activities--cost-effectively introducing improved safety and security
    features, avoiding a second B61 nuclear refurbishment in the 2020s, and
    potentially reducing the stockpile by consolidating four legacy B61
    variants into a single weapon. In addition, a Nuclear Weapons Council
    study of W78 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and W88
    submarine-launched ballistic missile life extension program options
    will examine opportunities to use modular fuze components and develop a
    possible common warhead, potentially reducing costs and supporting
    long-term capability sustainment. These and future actions that
    evaluate ways to reduce warhead numbers and types through stockpile
    commonality and flexibility offer the opportunity to continue
    accomplishing our strategic deterrence mission while also achieving the
    goal of a smaller, more efficient stockpile.
    Strategic Delivery Vehicles
        The NPR also affirmed the continuing need for the nuclear triad,
    which provides the President with multiple options for a variety of
    scenarios. The value of the triad lies in its flexibility and
    responsiveness to the changing world environment and in its ability to
    hedge against technical failure, geopolitical change, or a breakthrough
    in another nation's capabilities. America's strategic forces require
    continued investment to ensure their future capability, and STRATCOM is
    actively engaged with our Service partners to define and advocate for
    necessary nuclear force modernization and recapitalization programs.
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
        The widely dispersed and responsive Minuteman III ICBM force
    provides high readiness, low operating costs, and sovereign basing with
    multiple aim points that complicate adversary targeting. The Air Force
    is successfully concluding decade-long efforts to enhance safety and
    security and to sustain the Minuteman force through 2020. The Air Force
    is also evaluating requirements to sustain the force through 2030.
    STRATCOM supports these programs and is working with the Air Force on a
    Capabilities Based Assessment and pre-analysis of alternatives
    activities that begin to define options for a follow-on land-based
    strategic deterrent beyond 2030.
    Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
        Ohio-class SSBNs provide an assured and highly survivable response
    capability, and the highly accurate Trident II D5 strategic weapon
    system continues to exceed the demanding operational reliability
    standards established almost 30 years ago. By the time they begin to
    retire in 2027, the Ohio-class SSBNs will have served for more than 40
    years. The Navy completed an Ohio-class follow on platform AoA and,
    with STRATCOM, continues to refine specific replacement requirements.
    STRATCOM fully supports Navy efforts to maintain the current fleet,
    fund the necessary research and development for its replacement, and
    sustain the Trident II D5 ballistic missile and associated
    infrastructure to satisfy future deterrent requirements. For example,
    current infrastructure at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA lacks sufficient
    Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW) capacity to meet growing missile
    handling requirements. A second Pacific EHW wharf at Naval Base Kitsap-
    Bangor, WA, is essential to long-term SSBN readiness.
    Bombers
        America's B-2s and B-52s ensure that the President has visible and
    flexible conventional and nuclear global strike and deterrence options.
    Affirming their critical deterrent role, the nuclear-capable bomber
    force transitioned to STRATCOM's day-to-day operational control in
    2010. STRATCOM now has a far stronger voice in balancing this unique,
    dual-capable nuclear and conventional bomber force's day-to-day
    readiness, training, and operational employment. While the Air Force
    continues to sustain mission-critical systems, it will also soon begin
    developing a new long-range, dual-capable penetrating bomber. Coupled
    with the development of a new bomber, two additional capabilities will
    ensure the viability of the air-breathing leg of the Triad for decades
    to come. Air Force investments will sustain the Air Launched Cruise
    Missile through 2030 (or until a suitable replacement is fielded),
    ensuring standoff capability for the long term. Further, the bomber
    force must be supported by a fleet of new aerial refueling tankers to
    extend their range and assure the bombers' strategic and extended
    deterrence roles. STRATCOM supports Air Force progress toward ensuring
    the long-term health of the airborne component of our strategic
    capability.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
        A reliable, assured C3 capability from the President to the nuclear
    forces is fundamental to an effective strategic deterrent. National
    leaders, commanders, ISR assets, and strategic forces must share
    assured linkages to confidently understand and effectively address
    nuclear mission demands. Current systems require investments to ensure
    reliability and address looming capability gaps in our National
    Leadership Command Capability.
        A new Strategic Command and Control Complex and Nuclear C3 node at
    Offutt Air Force Base, NE, is at the center of our nuclear C3 plans.
    The fiscal year 2012 budget seeks a first increment of $150 million to
    begin replacing the aging and fragile Curtis E. LeMay building and
    colocated facilities. Today's building, command center, and computer
    systems took shape long before the IT revolution and now lack the
    capacity to support current mission demands. The buildings' systems
    strain to support numerous computer and communication systems, and the
    spaces occasionally experience serious heating and cooling problems,
    electrical failures, and other outages. For example, in December 2010
    and January 2011, two water pipe ruptures caused significant system
    outages and dislocated staff for several days, although the Command
    remained capable of performing its missions due to extraordinary
    workarounds and the remarkable efforts of the dedicated staff and a
    small army of outside emergency help.
        Prior to defining the current requirement, STRATCOM--in
    consultation with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force--
    evaluated sustaining the status quo, renovating the existing facility,
    or engaging in new construction. The evaluation concluded that new
    construction offered the most operationally efficient solution to
    support STRATCOM's missions, operations, and nuclear C3 needs. The new
    facility will ensure an EMP-protected, flexible, sustainable, reliable,
    and collaborative environment with an infrastructure that meets the
    security challenges of today and tomorrow.
    Conventional Prompt Global Strike
        A limited, credible, conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS)
    capability would provide the President with an important deterrent
    option in some strategic scenarios. Today, we still lack the ability to
    rapidly deliver conventional effects against fleeting or geographically
    isolated targets, allowing a potential adversary to establish a
    sanctuary using mobility and strategic depth. Research, development,
    test, and evaluation projects continue making progress, and I ask you
    to continue supporting these PGS efforts.
    International Engagement
        Deterring and dissuading nuclear threats in today's national
    security environment also requires careful attention to international
    relationships. While the specter of global nuclear war may be more
    remote than decades ago, the possibility for miscalculation between
    nuclear-armed states remains a perilous threat to global security. As
    noted in the NPR, ``Enduring alliances and broad-based political
    relationships are the foundation of strategic stability and security.''
    Indeed, many nuclear-armed states are important partners in combating
    proliferation. New START lowers the maximum number of U.S. and Russian
    strategic offensive arms, restores an important, confidence-building
    verification regime, and provides opportunities to continue military-
    to-military engagement. China's willingness to consider and study
    Secretary Gates' proposal for a strategic security dialogue represents
    an important avenue for growth between our two militaries in this area
    as well. STRATCOM will continue to support DOD, Department of State,
    and geographic combatant command activities to develop stable and
    cooperative relations with other responsible nuclear powers and will be
    prepared to provide advice on other arms control measures that could
    encompass a greater range of weapons.
                                     space
        Throughout the 20th century, the United States and other countries
    developed and exploited the space domain's extraordinary potential,
    including changing how we navigate, communicate, and understand our
    world. However, the domain is increasingly congested, contested, and
    competitive. Guaranteeing mission assurance through adequate Space
    Situational Awareness (SSA), resilience, and critical-asset protection
    is essential. The new National Space Policy, signed by the President,
    and the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), co-signed by the
    Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, emphasize
    the need to continue developing resilient capabilities which will
    improve our ability to satisfy combatant commanders' requirements for
    uninterrupted ISR, expanded military satellite communications, and PNT
    support. Implementing the NSSS will position the national security
    space enterprise to shape and strengthen the space domain's safety,
    stability, and security; to maintain and enhance U.S. advantages in
    space; to energize the U.S. industrial base by engaging a broad range
    of partners; to prevent and deter aggression; and to improve
    sustainability, acquisition, and flexibility of U.S. space
    capabilities.
    Situational Awareness
        SSA is central to mission assurance and increasingly important. As
    part of its SSA mission, STRATCOM now tracks more than 22,000 orbiting
    objects. Approximately 1,100 of these objects are active satellites,
    but the remaining debris litter a variety of orbits and threatens both
    critical systems and human spaceflight. While space surveillance is
    improving, we do not yet have robust, assured, and real-time
    situational awareness of the orbital domain. Current and future
    investments should expand data integration, sharing, and exploitation;
    improve object detection, identification, and tracking; and advance our
    ability to characterize potential collisions (conjunctions). Notably,
    the proposed Space Fence promises to expand detection capacity more
    than tenfold from just two or three locations outside the continental
    United States and to construct a more comprehensive orbital picture.
    Increasing the number of objects tracked will be largely useless,
    however, without corresponding improvements in data integration and
    exploitation technologies. As part of its SSA mission, the Joint Space
    Operations Center (JSpOC) must also be prepared to identify and
    attribute purposeful space system interference and provide timely
    recommendations to address the interference. Without space situational
    awareness of the orbital domain, link segment, and supporting ground
    infrastructure, any plans for resilience, mission assurance,
    augmentation, and reconstitution will have a weak underpinning.
    STRATCOM fully supports funding for both the JSpOC Mission System (JMS)
    and planning and design work for a modern JSpOC facility that will
    facilitate a generational leap from static displays to automated, real-
    time visual conjunction analyses--improving our ability to protect
    critical space-based assets and maintain our free access to and use of
    space. In addition, technology will soon allow us to link multiple
    sensors together in a single network that will meet the needs of many
    users.
    Cooperation
        As a global domain, space and space-based capabilities operate
    irrespective of geographic or military boundaries. As more nations join
    the space-faring ranks each year and the number of objects in earth
    orbit grows, the need to establish norms of behavior and to improve the
    cooperation and collaboration among responsible space users grows as
    well. Our objective is to sustain a safe, stable, and secure space
    domain while maintaining the national security advantages space systems
    provide. U.S. efforts to share SSA data represent an important step
    toward greater international space cooperation, which should eventually
    help to integrate sensors and data from allies and partners worldwide
    and ultimately move towards a combined space operations center.
        Today, the STRATCOM SSA sharing community includes more than 41,000
    users in 141 countries. Our efforts promote the safe and responsible
    use of space by providing satellite operators with highly accurate
    predictions of close approaches between space objects for every
    satellite operator. Since the Secretary of Defense delegated his
    authority to enter into agreements with commercial entities to the
    STRATCOM Commander last September, we have concluded 23 agreements and
    are processing others. Each partner and each agreement signifies an
    operational relationship that can yield important exchanges, perhaps
    someday leading to a broad, international partnership for space
    situational awareness. STRATCOM fully supports expanded planning and
    implementation for space partnership operations among allies, coalition
    partners, and commercial interests and will work with our partners in
    the DOD and elsewhere to help review proposals to establish normalized
    behavior.
    Space-Based Capabilities
        Enabling better situational awareness will improve the overall U.S.
    space posture; however, long-term, uninterrupted capability from space
    requires equal dedication to protection, resilience, augmentation, and
    reconstitution of assets in space, supported by timely design and
    development, cost-effective acquisition, and high-confidence space
    launch. Today's operating forces rely on space capabilities throughout
    the kill chain and beyond. Putting already stressed space capabilities
    that allow the joint force to navigate, communicate, see the
    battlefield, and strike under all conditions in the kill chain places
    those same valuable capabilities on any potential adversary's target
    list. STRATCOM fully supports DOD efforts to improve resilience and
    increase the protection of key space assets.
    Launch
        Reliable space capabilities also require an assured ride to orbit.
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) are the DOD's primary launch
    vehicles and the sole U.S. vehicles for much of the national security
    manifest. STRATCOM supports further Air Force investments in this and
    other programs that will assure our access to space. Additionally,
    improvements in manifest and scheduling processes and investments
    designed to sustain and ensure national launch facilities' availability
    for future demand will maximize synergies between launch management and
    national priorities.
    Industrial Base Concerns
        Beneath our national security space requirements lies the need for
    a stable, responsive, and innovative national industrial base. Since
    the space age began, we have rarely been so reliant on so few
    industrial suppliers. Many struggle to remain competitive as demand for
    highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce their
    customers to a niche government market. Careful interagency planning
    that more tightly defines and oversees requirements, supported by
    stable budgets and production rates will help sustain a national
    industrial base essential to commercial users, military space, and the
    strategic deterrent. The retirement of the Space Shuttle and other
    changes at NASA also injected significant concern into the solid rocket
    motor industrial base--an industry we cannot afford to lose.
    Substantial weakening of this capability would impede current strategic
    system sustainment and follow-on development. While industry
    adjustments are inevitable, DOD, in consultation with NASA and other
    agencies, is working to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base
    to ensure we retain right-sized, cost-efficient, and viable design,
    development, and production capabilities. STRATCOM supports these
    important DOD efforts to improve program stability, increase the
    quantity and quality of the acquisition workforce, strengthen clarity
    and articulation in the requirements process, and stimulate scientific
    and technological advancements.
                                   cyberspace
        Last fall in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William
    Lynn noted that, ``Every day, U.S. military and civilian networks are
    probed thousands of times and scanned millions of times.'' Like space,
    cyberspace capabilities have rapidly become critical but also
    increasingly vulnerable. Cyberspace's pervasive presence, high
    importance, difficulty of attribution, and low cost of entry highlight
    some of our challenges. Combined with a growing, global reliance on
    cyberspace and its hosted capabilities, this constant evolution
    challenges mission assurance efforts--particularly as the threat moves
    from exploitation to disruption. Ensuring reliable, sustainable
    networks, freedom of access, and freedom of maneuver is not just a DOD
    problem. This is a national security problem. Assuring access demands
    sustained, resilient, and flexible approaches to maturing our defense
    capabilities, our capacity, and our cooperative relationships within
    and beyond the U.S. Government.
    Capabilities
        The most important asset any commander can have is robust, up-to-
    date situational awareness. Cyberspace is dynamic, and specific threats
    require specific countermeasures. The Maginot Line failed because it
    was static and the defense failed to anticipate and address
    technological and tactical changes. .After the fact. detection and
    attribution don't work in cyberspace today either. The offense always
    has a strong advantage, overwhelming, subverting, or defeating static
    defenses. Continued advances in system and organization teamwork,
    coupled with the development and deployment of information-based
    capabilities and intelligence-driven sensors that .see. intrusions and
    can respond at equivalent speed is essential. Driven by strong, capable
    organizations, dynamic, agile, and informed capabilities that
    comprehend the network and mitigate threats at the boundary will
    significantly strengthen defense of DOD networks.
        In response to the growing threat, last year the DOD established
    U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) at Fort Meade, MD as a subunified command
    to STRATCOM. STRATCOM delegated responsibilities to CYBERCOM to
    coordinate, plan, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations in
    order to better defend DOD networks and to support other combatant
    commanders. We must accelerate the acquisition of comprehensive, shared
    cyber awareness tools to expand opportunities to secure critical
    information, reduce points of vulnerability, and develop responses to
    ensure warfighter access to essential information systems.
        Capacity. Today, operators at CYBERCOM and its subordinate Service
    components work to defend against and attribute numerous information
    network intrusion attempts. The cyber workforce is growing, but our
    organizations and capabilities must also grow to keep pace with ongoing
    operations. STRATCOM is working with CYBERCOM to improve the cyber
    awareness of every DOD member with access to an information system,
    strengthen organizations, resolve roles/responsibilities, expand
    partnerships, build technological and human capacity for full-spectrum
    cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber capabilities into every
    commander's plans and operations. Recruiting adequately trained and
    equipped cyber warriors is challenging, but fortunately young Americans
    grow up learning and adapting to new technological platforms from a
    young age. Service cyber career paths are still being developed, and
    these critical, technical skills need both time to develop and
    sustained investment to prevent their atrophy. Sustained force
    development emphasis and investment is essential. The U.S. is also home
    to the world's premier educational and commercial information
    technology entities. We must continue to capitalize on this capacity
    and partner with these organizations on our requirements and to spur
    domestic math and science interest. Doing so will help develop, expand,
    and sustain a base of cyber expertise and adapt DOD personnel processes
    to attract, develop, and retain the cyber professionals necessary to
    protect critical DOD infrastructure and preserve U.S. freedom of action
    in cyberspace.
    Cooperation
        Cyber defense must include a wide range of partners. After all,
    this is truly a national security issue, making interagency and allied
    partner engagement and information sharing essential to a robust
    defense. Military operations depend on the broader U.S. information
    technology infrastructure, and defending military networks will net
    fewer benefits if the wider civilian infrastructure remains at much
    greater risk. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is ultimately
    responsible for coordinating the protection of the ``.gov'' and
    domestic ``.com'' domains, but DOD has much to offer in terms of
    intelligence and technical support. The DOD-DHS Memorandum of
    Understanding signed last fall lays important groundwork for enhanced
    cooperation, mutual support, and synchronized operations.
                             winning today's fight
        In strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace, STRATCOM both
    operates forces and supports the full range of military operations. The
    broad scope of our responsibilities and trans-regional capabilities is
    clearly woven into the fabric of today's operations. Winning the fight,
    whether we are either a supported command or are supporting the
    geographic combatant commands, is something our team strives to do each
    and every day. However, STRATCOM also has responsibilities to
    integrate, synchronize, and advocate for other capabilities with trans-
    regional impact, and we are dedicated to partnering with other
    combatant commands to improve the warfighting effectiveness of these
    capabilities.
    Information Operations
        Consistent with our mission to improve strategic joint
    capabilities, STRATCOM participated in a 2010 Secretary of Defense
    directed Strategic Communication (SC) and IO Front-End Assessment,
    designed to evaluate and recommend improvements for DOD roles,
    missions, definition, management, and resources for SC and IO. As a
    result of the assessment, STRATCOM will reorganize the Joint
    Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) at Lackland AFB, TX.
    Existing JIOWC resources and missions not specific to electronic
    warfare will be realigned to the Joint Staff, and STRATCOM will remain
    the DOD lead for Electronic Warfare (EW).
    Electronic warfare
        The electromagnetic spectrum spans almost every modern
    technological convenience. While operational plans normally assume
    unfettered spectrum access, this assumption is not assured. Changing
    industry standards, global growth of civilian devices, military
    bandwidth requirements, and disruptive or destructive adversary
    electronic warfare capabilities all threaten to pinch or sever the
    shrinking electromagnetic links between national security platforms and
    the operating forces that rely on them.
        Recognizing future threats, potential limitations, urgent
    warfighter needs, and the need for unified DOD advocacy, JIOWC
    completed several Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) tasks to
    examine capability gaps and solutions for emerging electromagnetic
    spectrum threats. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2010 required DOD to develop an EW strategy, submitted to Congress
    last year. That EW strategy concluded that we must move beyond the
    traditional understanding of EW by combining it with other kinetic or
    non-kinetic capabilities to increase U.S. combat effectiveness and
    achieve electromagnetic spectrum superiority. STRATCOM is planning to
    establish a Joint Electronic Warfare Center to advocate for and support
    DOD Joint EW capability requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine,
    planning, training, and operational support.
    Missile Defense
        The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) exists to meet
    combatant commands' theater defense needs and to provide for the
    limited defense of the United States. Working with geographic combatant
    commands and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), our efforts focus on
    building tailored, regional missile defense architectures using the
    concept of a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and on meeting urgent
    warfighter capability needs. STRATCOM's work provides a comprehensive
    assessment of the fielded BMDS's suitability and effectiveness and
    combines warfighter needs for air, cruise missile, and ballistic
    missile defense capabilities to inform programmatic actions and guide
    future R&D investment priorities.
        At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO
    allies affirmed the PAA for missile defense as a means to address the
    continued qualitative and quantitative growth of global ballistic
    missile programs. The Allies also invited the Russian Federation to
    participate in missile defense cooperation. As a strategy, PAA applies
    to several geographic combatant commands, and STRATCOM's current
    challenge is to make sound, analytically-based recommendations to
    balance limited BMD assets worldwide. The European PAA's four phases of
    increasing capability are designed to defend against existing and near-
    term threats posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and to
    build up defenses against long-range ballistic threats over time as
    those threats mature. As stated during the New START debate, the U.S.
    will not agree to any ballistic missile defense limitations or
    constraints and indeed intends to continue developing and deploying
    systems consistent with U.S. interests. The U.S. missile defense
    program is not designed to counter the strategic forces of Russia or
    China, but rather to address limited ballistic missile threats such as
    those posed by Iran and North Korea.
        As various regional PAAs develop, STRATCOM will continually re-
    evaluate the standing Global Integrated Missile Defense Concept of
    Operations and other acquisition, deployment, basing, and employment
    plans for missile defense capabilities between and across all areas of
    responsibility. Our analysis will ensure that the joint warfighters'
    requirements receive deliberate management and readiness structures to
    ensure timely, flexible deployment, employment and redeployment of
    tested, understood BMD capabilities during and after crises.
        Consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, new
    advancements and allied technologies must be made interoperable with
    existing systems, including required improvements in discrimination
    capabilities essential to the efficient employment of limited missile
    defense resources.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        Timely, useable situational awareness and intelligence analysis is
    essential to all military operations. Airborne, submarine, and space-
    based ISR capabilities all provide key indications and warning
    information to commanders facing an array of traditional adversaries,
    nontraditional threats, and challenging intelligence problems. For the
    past decade, ISR efforts focused primarily on meeting the expanding
    demand in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. As
    overseas contingency operations change, DOD must carefully examine
    force requirements to ensure we organize, train, and equip a balanced
    force across the range of requirements, including anti-access
    environments and New START verification. An objective, multi-domain,
    capabilities-based architecture that improves the ability to identify
    requirements across geographic boundaries and the range of potential
    threats is essential to appropriately balancing risk against necessary
    programmatic, budgetary, and acquisition decision points.
        STRATCOM's ISR efforts achieved significant resource efficiencies
    and shaped ISR capability decisions through initiatives like the ISR
    Force Sizing Construct project, the High Altitude Transition study, the
    Synoptic Operational Area Reconnaissance Study, and the Mobile Nuclear
    Air Sampling Study. STRATCOM also successfully advocated for a critical
    CENTCOM ISR capability--designed and executed in approximately 30
    months and at a lower cost than traditional acquisition processes. The
    Services and Intelligence Community must continue to strive for better
    integration in order to reach greater efficiencies--not only for the
    collection platforms themselves but also across the still-limited
    processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture needed to
    transform collections into actionable intelligence.
    Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
        Another mission area requiring sustained attention is CWMD, since
    the pursuit of WMD by violent extremists and their proliferation to
    additional states remains the primary threat to the United States, our
    allies, and our partners. STRATCOM received the responsibility to
    synchronize DOD CWMD activities in 2005 and has made discouraging,
    detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating these threats a
    priority for theater operations and strategic deterrence. Some actors
    seek nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to coerce their neighbors
    or to deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts. Others may seek
    such weapons to use them in terrorist attacks or as weapons of war.
    Diffuse networks of non-state entities, secretive state sponsors, shell
    corporations, and terrorist-financed transactions challenge our
    intelligence organizations to develop comprehensive, accurate, and
    actionable assessments that enable global CWMD. STRATCOM continues to
    pursue further national CWMD capability improvements with interagency
    partners to coordinate CWMD objectives, plans, and activities.
        Among current and future CWMD enhancements are technological
    improvements to detect, analyze, and assess WMD developments. The 2010
    QDR affirmed the need to enhance National Technical Nuclear Forensics
    capabilities which, along with accurate intelligence and other
    information, support nuclear threat attribution and may thereby deter
    those considering the diversion, transfer, development, or use of
    nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersal
    devices, and other nuclear or radiological threats. In the past year,
    the STRATCOM Center for CWMD (SCC WMD) embedded Proliferation Security
    Initiative activities within U.S. Africa Command, CENTCOM, and U.S.
    Southern Command exercises and supported planning and funding efforts
    to expand exercise participation and training synchronization across
    geographic combatant commands. Finally, SCC WMD collaboratively
    operates the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database
    of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) System with
    the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. INDRAC provides a strategic level
    information reference resource to inform CWMD operations, planning,
    advocacy, training, and exercises across the government.
        In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to establish
    a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to ``better plan, train,
    and execute WMD-elimination operations . . . with increased nuclear
    disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination
    capabilities.'' Last December, Secretary Gates tasked STRATCOM to
    execute this task and stand up a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for
    Elimination of WMD with ``standing exploitation and intelligence cells
    in order to plan, train for, and execute global WMD elimination
    operations.'' STRATCOM is currently analyzing the requirements
    necessary to implement the Secretary's direction.
                                   conclusion
        Great challenges lie ahead of the United States and STRATCOM, but
    so too do great opportunities. The Command is dedicated to being an
    effective steward of taxpayer resources while maintaining a strategic
    force structure ready and able to deter aggression, preserve U.S.
    freedom of action, and defeat adversaries when necessary. The
    uncertainty inherent in today's complex, multi-domain security
    environment requires that we summon our best efforts to develop and
    deploy the plans, systems, and forces needed to sustain America's
    deterrent, ensure unfettered access to and through space and
    cyberspace, and win the dynamic joint fight. I look forward to working
    with Congress as we pursue these priorities together, and I appreciate
    your support and counsel in the months and years ahead. Thank you again
    for the opportunity to be here today, and welcome back to Nebraska and
    the Bellevue-Offutt community.

        Senator Nelson. Thank you very much, General.
        The advantage of being the only member here is I get to ask
    all the questions. I do not have to share the time with anybody
    else. So there is an advantage. It was not why I thought we
    ought to do it here, but it is certainly an added benefit.
        Thank you for your very thoughtful comments, and I do have
    a couple of questions.
        In your prepared statement, you described the mission of
    STRATCOM and it includes the responsibility to foster strategic
    stability and, as you have said, ensure uninterrupted
    capabilities from and access to space and cyberspace, respond
    to both traditional and nontraditional threats, and deal with
    surprise in an era of rapid technological advances as we talked
    about this morning, a very complex but related set of missions.
        Now that you have been in your new responsibilities as
    commander, what are the three most difficult challenges that
    you see in being able to fulfill these missions?
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, the first challenge that I
    would continue to highlight is this dramatically different
    operating environment that we find ourselves in today. I think
    my colleagues in the other combatant commands would share my
    assessment of this. I do not think we have ever seen an
    operating environment like today's. When we look at the range
    of activity that we are engaged in around the world today, when
    we look at the complexity of the national security environment
    that we find ourselves engaged with today, when we look at the
    differences for us--for example, when we talk about space and
    cyberspace, items that we have talked about in military
    planning for years about distances and time do not mean the
    same thing when you can span global distances through space and
    cyberspace in milliseconds.
        When we talk about boundaries--and typically we have
    focused on geographic areas as areas of interest for our
    military activities--those boundaries are not the same when we
    talk about space and cyberspace.
        When we talk about asymmetric challenges to us--and those
    come frequently in space and cyberspace. This ambiguity--actors
    can act in cyberspace and you never know who they are or you do
    not know for quite some time until you do the forensics and
    discover who someone was when they were actually doing some
    criminal activity, for example, in cyberspace.
        So the changed operating environment is one of the toughest
    challenges that we face.
        The second one with aging systems, in particular, is to
    ensure the level of readiness that we need to meet those
    challenges in this new operating environment. We find that
    continued investment is required certainly across the nuclear
    enterprise. We have testified to that before, as you well know.
    The President's budget contains requests to continue our
    investment in the existing forces that we have for strategic
    deterrence, as well as the support and command and control, as
    well as the weapons complex that underpins all of it.
        In addition to that, I am equally concerned about aging
    weapons systems today. We were very gratified with the
    selection by the Air Force of a new tanker and the ability to
    move forward there. We are very gratified that Congress has
    given us approval to move forward with a replacement to the
    Ohio-class submarine. We have been very encouraged by decisions
    inside DOD in the proposal now to Congress to go forward with a
    new bomber platform. In the meantime, we have to make sure that
    we are sustaining those platforms that are out there to include
    our space systems, to include the new area that we have for
    cyberspace.
        Finally, the third challenge that I have that I think about
    every day is preparing for and responding to surprise. Surprise
    can be particularly decisive when it involves things like space
    and cyberspace potentially or the nuclear world, for example.
    This is where our concern about combating WMD, not just
    maintaining this strategic stability we have with Russia, for
    example, but combating WMD and especially WMD in the hands of
    violent extremists or state proliferators are things that we
    must pay attention to.
        I have other concerns but those are the top three that keep
    me awake at night. Significantly, by the way, when people ask
    if anything keeps me awake at night, nothing operational keeps
    me awake at night because of the magnificent people that you
    see here with me today. Once the missions are in their hands, I
    stop worrying about it. It is all the things that I am supposed
    to do to make sure that they have the tools that they need that
    keep me awake.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        You made reference to the fact that the President's budget
    request includes the money to start construction of a new
    headquarters for STRATCOM. I think you gave us some indication
    why this is an important investment as part of our national
    security. Could you maybe expand on that just a little bit?
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM performs a unique
    mission among the Nation's military forces. We occupy a unique
    place, not only a unique physical place, but we occupy a unique
    operational place in our Nation's defense infrastructure. We
    have a unique location here in terms of our abilities to
    conduct planning, in terms of our capability to do national
    level command and control of our strategic deterrent forces, in
    the ability for us to pull together the pieces of our strategic
    deterrent with our space activities, with our cyberspace
    activities, with our national nuclear defense activities, to
    pull all of those pieces together to perform a uniquely
    important job.
        The facilities that we perform that job from today were
    designed in the early 1950s, constructed in the middle 1950s,
    and are much like we were talking earlier this morning. The
    multiple electronic devices that you bring into your house
    today or have carting around, in my case in my car--I have a
    lot of different things that I carry around with me. Those have
    all come along pretty late, and yet none of my infrastructure
    in my home supports any of that. I have more of those plug-in
    power strips around my house, for example, than I do have
    anything else. So that is one example of the facility that we
    have here not supporting the mission demands any longer.
        Power is an issue for us. Cooling air is an issue for us.
    We have essentially cobbled together over the years a number of
    systems on top of systems. We find ourselves in a position here
    where, if we are not careful, we have created a very vulnerable
    place from either a simple accidental problem with the
    infrastructure to other more significant problems dealing with
    cyber threats and other things.
        Our assessment has been that for this unique mission we
    need to go back and reconstruct a new command and control
    facility, and while we tend to look at that as a building, the
    building surrounds it. What is important here is what goes in
    the building and the building that is built to support it. So
    we have made a budget request that is working its way through
    your committee and others to essentially bring the
    infrastructure here to the point where it matches now the
    mission responsibilities that we have been given.
        Senator Nelson. If a terrorist, for example, were able to
    obtain nuclear materials, plutonium or uranium, build an
    improvised nuclear device, and blow that device up in a U.S.
    city, obviously, the devastation would be significant. First,
    what is STRATCOM's role in making sure that this does not
    happen? Second, if it does happen, what is STRATCOM's role in
    responding to that kind of an event?
        General Kehler. Sir, one of the mission responsibilities
    that STRATCOM has is what we would call collectively combating
    WMD. As I said in my opening remarks, the current national
    security strategy says very clearly that the most significant
    threat that we are facing today is WMD in the hands of a
    violent extremist or in the hands of a state proliferator,
    which is why we are so concerned about North Korea and Iran,
    for example.
        STRATCOM has been given planning responsibilities to be the
    synchronizer, if you will, for the global planning that goes on
    in every one of our combatant commands, to include U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM). We are given the responsibility to
    sit, if you will, at the top of the pyramid and make sure that
    all of the plans fit together. The problem is not unique to
    STRATCOM. I think if you had the other combatant commanders
    here, which you have done, I know, in your subcommittee at some
    length and in front of the full committee, every one of the
    geographic combatant commanders stated their concerns about
    proliferation of WMD. It is a concern for all of the combatant
    commanders today.
        Our responsibility is to make sure that all the plans fit
    together. And we host some planning conferences, which does not
    sound as important as what it is, where we make sure that all
    of the combatant commands have the appropriate plans in place
    to both detect such activity, track it, if necessary, and then
    offer the President alternatives for how to deal with that if
    it should ever arise, all the way up to and including U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which would have the responsibility
    to assist civil authorities in dealing with the horrible
    scenario that you laid out for us.
        We also have responsibility to work with the Joint Staff
    and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
    interagency to make sure that our activities are coordinated
    along with those of law enforcement, the Intelligence
    Community, and other parts of our Government to make sure that
    we are all focused on this issue with the attention that it
    deserves.
        Had we been having a conversation here 20 years ago and you
    said to me, ``point out to me the number one plan that is on
    the top shelf in your office,'' I would have pulled out our
    nuclear deterrence master plan, and I would have said, ``here
    it is. This is the number one most important thing that we are
    doing today.''
        If you ask me today, I would say there are two plans up
    there. One would be the nuclear deterrence plan, which always
    has to be there in my view, but the other would be a plan
    called ``combating WMD.'' It is our plan to pull these pieces
    together to make sure that we are in the position, even though
    we do not have a lot of the forces that would be used to deal
    with such a problem, that we are in a position that we have the
    appropriate plans in place and we have either deterred or
    dissuaded or prevented that kind of thing from happening to
    begin with.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        You have touched on this by mentioning North Korea, but let
    us say countries like North Korea and Iran proliferate WMD, as
    well as the delivery systems such as missiles. Is there
    anything in particular that you do in connection with
    proliferating countries as opposed to, let us say, a terrorist
    or an effort at an attack?
        General Kehler. For counterproliferation, sir, we are part
    of a big team that is an intergovernmental team. In fact, that
    team extends outside DOD into the rest of our U.S. Government
    and from there through state and other means to our allies and
    friends around the world as well.
        To effectively counter the proliferation of either
    ballistic missiles or WMD is a hierarchy of steps that we take.
    Beginning with treaties, international legal arrangements,
    norms of behavior, all of those things that would typically
    fall in the Department of State's realm are complemented by
    things that would fall within the Intelligence Community's
    realm, within DOD's realm, and then ultimately at the combatant
    commander level a series of plans that we could offer to the
    President if he chose to take action in response to
    proliferation.
        The real objective here is to dissuade it or deter it or
    prevent it. Those actions are underway through a variety of
    means. Of course, you are well familiar with your former
    colleagues, Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, the actions that
    have gone on there that have been counterproliferation to try
    to secure WMD materials around the world, the treaty structure
    that has surrounded some of these activities as well, and then
    beyond that, ultimately the activities that would go on in the
    regional combatant commands and then in STRATCOM, SOCOM, and
    elsewhere to be supportive of whatever other steps might need
    to be taken.
        Senator Nelson. Maybe you could help us understand a little
    bit about how the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) actually works
    and how there would be coordination through STRATCOM and MDA to
    protect against any kind of an attack, but in the event that
    there were an attack, how that could work.
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, first of all, our U.S.
    missile defense system is a global system. The national part of
    this is aimed at a small, very limited number of missiles that
    would be launched against the United States from one of these
    smaller state actors. Specifically, our orientation today is on
    North Korea where they have both demonstrated that they have
    the capability to produce a nuclear weapon and they have
    demonstrated in a very aggressive way their ability to field
    ballistic missiles that today are capable--they have not yet
    put all the pieces together--of reaching our allies in the
    western Pacific as well as ultimately the testing that they are
    doing on longer-range missiles that eventually will have the
    capability to reach the United States.
        Our missile defense system today that is oriented for
    national defense is intended to deal with that problem and,
    hopefully, it is a part of our overall effort to dissuade that
    kind of activity on the part of the North Koreans from having
    them put all those pieces together eventually.
        It also, though, is oriented toward those that are
    considering going forward here, Iran, for example.
        It is not oriented against Russia and China with larger,
    far more sophisticated arsenals. The way we maintain stability
    there, although we do not consider either Russia or China an
    enemy, with their capabilities is through the arms control and
    stability, confidence-building transparency measures that we
    have going on elsewhere, and then ultimately through our
    strategic deterrent force which is still there and sized and
    shaped to be that stabilizing force and deterrent force, vis-a-
    vis both Russia and China.
        So we work very closely with the MDA. We set the
    requirements for national missile defense. We do the assessment
    of its military utility. We are working very carefully with
    NORTHCOM that would have the responsibility to use that system
    under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense
    if that were ever necessary, and we pull all of the combatant
    commanders together to make sure that the needs of the
    warfighters are being met, in particular, now that we have a
    good start and an effective system in place for national
    missile defense, to begin to orient that missile defense system
    now on where the very large threat and real threat is to our
    forces and our allies, and that is at the feeder level, which
    is why we have begun to focus as intensely as we have on the
    feeder-related pieces of this.
        Senator Nelson. Our goal is, obviously, to make sure that
    others know what we can do to prevent their being successful in
    attacking us. If they understand that we can deter, we can
    prevent, deflect any effort on their part, hopefully then that
    dissuades them from trying to go forward and spend additional
    time trying to find ways to further defeat our defensive
    system.
        Do you think that we have been successful in some respects
    at least? I understand North Korea is controlled by a very
    unusual person who does not seem to deal with reality the same
    way the rest of us do. But apart from that, do you think that
    we perhaps have been able to dissuade some of the other
    countries from looking at trying to defeat our systems of
    defense?
        General Kehler. It is hard to say, Mr. Chairman. There are
    two things I would say.
        First, I believe in the assessment that we have done on our
    limited defensive posture that we have for the Nation today, I
    believe that is an effective system, and I believe that system
    would work as advertised in response to a limited threat. So,
    number one, the credibility of how others would view it, I
    think, is linked to the assessments that we have made about its
    potential effectiveness. I believe that it is to the point
    where our assessment of this from a military standpoint is that
    it is effective for the purpose that it is intended. That does
    not mean that it would be capable of responding to some
    overwhelming strike. It could not do that, and yet that is why
    we also still retain offensive weapons to make this a package
    of things that we would use for deterrence purposes.
        The second point I would make is we do not see one-size-
    fits-all deterrence any longer. We think that deterrence is a
    combination of things. Missile defense is one piece of that.
    Offensive forces is another piece of that. Our conventional
    forward forces is another piece of that. Our ability to command
    and control is another piece of that. So there are lots of
    pieces that make up the deterrence equation.
        I believe that any potential adversary, certainly nation
    states, take those factors into account in their
    decisionmaking. They wind up making their decisions based upon
    lots of things. It is hard to tell why the North Korean
    Government makes the decisions that it makes sometimes, but we
    assume some amount of rationality to other actors out there at
    the nation state level. My view is that all of them take this
    into account. How effective it is depends on their own
    assessment of benefit/risk/reward, and all the things that they
    will go through and the behavior that we will see based upon
    their own decision calculus. But I believe very firmly that
    they all take all of these issues into account when they are
    making those decisions.
        Senator Nelson. As you indicated, STRATCOM is responsible
    for implementing the New START treaty with Russia. Your
    predecessor, General Chilton, was a strong advocate for the
    treaty. The treaty has now been ratified by the Senate. It is
    in place. Can you give us your thoughts on how effective you
    think this treaty may be and what our objectives will be in
    reducing mutually the arms race and hopefully stop the
    proliferation in the world of the arms race?
        General Kehler. Yes, sir. First of all, I too am a firm
    supporter of the New START treaty. The Senate did ratify it. It
    has entered into force in February. We have 7 years to
    implement the provisions of the treaty. However, we are moving
    out to implement those provisions. A number of things are
    already underway. We have exchanged data with the Russians. We
    have done other things. There have been some preliminary
    inspections done. There have been some demonstrations and
    expositions, if you will. So a number of steps are underway.
        We have not yet made final decisions on what our force
    structure will look like within the treaty limits. The treaty
    does not require us to do anything other than meet its limits,
    1,550 operational warheads, 700 deployed operational launchers,
    up to 800 deployed and non-deployed. How we structure our force
    remains to be seen, and that decision process is underway both
    inside the combatant command here, inside the Joint Staff, as
    the Chairman is working his way through all of this, ultimately
    en route to discussion with the Secretary of Defense and
    ultimately en route to a discussion with the White House over
    how we should structure our forces.
        So we are moving forward. I think the single, most valuable
    thing about the treaty is that it does, in fact, place limits
    on those weapons that threaten the United States of America
    most significantly and most immediately. So that was a very
    positive step.
        A second very positive step is the fact that we have a
    treaty with the Russians at all. I think that what that does is
    it creates a dialogue with the Russians. We have found that to
    be a useful dialogue from well before the end of the Cold War.
    We have found that that is helpful for transparency reasons. It
    forces us to deal with one another on all kinds of levels, and
    it, in fact, allows us to continue this pathway that we have
    been on with the Russians since before the end of the Cold War,
    which is to reduce the overall number of weapons in a way that
    promotes stability and yet continues to allow us to have the
    strategic deterrent force that we think we need to meet our
    deterrence objectives. I see all of those as positives, and we
    see this as a positive way forward to work the implementation
    details as we decide what that force structure should
    ultimately look like.
        Senator Nelson. I think there were a lot of questions
    raised during the debate on the floor of the Senate about the
    treaty, whether or not there would be enough nuclear weapons
    for our offense and defense. So I guess the question is are
    there enough for our mutually assured destruction given what
    Russia will have and what we have, which is not our goal, but
    there was some concern that we are getting down to maybe a
    manageable level but an unsafe and insecure level.
        General Kehler. Sir, I do not think we are unsafe or
    insecure at all given the levels in the New START treaty. I
    would not characterize this any longer as mutually assured
    destruction. That means a lot of things.
        Senator Nelson. It is still something to think about.
        General Kehler. Yes, sir. That means a lot of things to a
    lot of people.
        What I would say is that at this force level that I am
    confident that we can meet our deterrence objectives. The force
    level that was agreed to and the assessments that were made
    which were prior to my time but which I fully agree with--those
    assessments were made based upon a series of deterrence
    objectives that have been in place for quite some time. The
    next step is to go back and look, and the NPR said that we
    would do this. Once the New START treaty has been put into
    force, now the question is, what is next. So we have begun to
    work with the rest of DOD and others to think our way through
    what is next.
        Senator Nelson. There was also a question about whether or
    not this would, in the words of President Reagan, permit us to
    trust but verify, and being able to have a certain level of
    verification was, in fact, part of what this treaty was about.
    So are you comfortable with the ability that we have to verify
    what Russia is doing as they would have the ability to verify
    what we are doing, as I described it, looking under each
    other's hood of the vehicle to see what is there?
        General Kehler. Yes, sir. I am comfortable with this. I
    believe that the verification mechanism that was put in place
    for this treaty fits the treaty. There was some discussion
    about whether this verification process would have fit the last
    treaty, and the answer is it would not have but it does fit
    this one and I am comfortable with it, with the provision, of
    course, that we continue to source those verification methods
    to include the national technical means that we use to help us
    enforce the verification provisions of the treaty.
        Senator Nelson. Turning to the area that I think a lot of
    people are paying close attention to or beginning to learn
    about, cyberspace, you referred to the Cyber Command as being a
    subunified command under STRATCOM. Maybe you could help us
    understand exactly what a subunified command is. We are all
    trying to learn how to speak the military language. I do not
    know that I have mastered it all, but I am trying to learn more
    about it.
        General Kehler. Sir, I can just say as an aside, the
    military people in here have not mastered it all, I can
    guarantee you. [Laughter.]
        We stand up a subunified command when there is a specific
    mission responsibility that requires focused attention is, I
    think, the best way to say it. For example, U.S. Forces-Korea
    is a subunified command to the U.S. Pacific Command. We stood
    that up years ago because there is such a unique set of
    challenges associated with what is still a standoff, of course,
    on the Korean Peninsula that we felt it was necessary to put a
    separate senior officer in charge of worrying about that every
    day, 24 hours a day.
        We did the same thing for U.S. Forces-Japan some years ago,
    and we have done that from time to time over the years when a
    specific issue was significant enough, required such detailed
    activities and awareness and specific responses that it
    required the full-time attention of a senior officer every day.
        That is what we have done in this case with cyberspace. We
    have stood up U.S. Cyber Command as a subunified command. It is
    commanded by a four-star officer, General Keith Alexander, of
    the U.S. Army. He wears another hat as well as the Director of
    the National Security Agency. The headquarters is at Fort Mead.
    That is a center of gravity for this kind of activity for the
    Nation that we have charged him. In fact, we have delegated the
    responsibilities that are given to STRATCOM to operate and
    defend DOD's networks. We have delegated those responsibilities
    to him, and what we find is the uniqueness of cyberspace
    demands that kind of attention where we have made, I believe,
    very good progress. Certainly we have a long way to go but we
    have made very good progress.
        The other thing this does is it gives a specific focal
    point for the rest of the government to interact with when they
    are talking about how do we do cyberspace business as a
    complete government. It also gives a way to reach out to
    commercial. As you well know, sir, the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) retains responsibilities here for defending the
    Nation's critical infrastructure, to include the cyberspace
    critical infrastructure. What we are trying to work our way
    through with Cyber Command is not how do we completely reinvent
    the role of the U.S. military related to cyberspace, but how do
    we apply our traditional military activities to cyberspace.
    That is everything from defense support of civil authorities to
    protecting our own DOD activities to conducting military
    operations.
        So Cyber Command is in the thick of all of that
    conversation. We are, of course, working with them from
    STRATCOM. In fact, yesterday we spent an entire day, both
    staffs together, back at Cyber Command headquarters outside of
    Washington. I think that putting a subunified command together
    for this subject at this time has been exactly the right thing
    to do.
        Senator Nelson. Statistics are now showing that criminals
    engaging in cyber crime make more money today in that cyber
    crime than via the drug trade for the first time. Obviously, we
    have to deal with criminal efforts in cyber or terrorist
    activity that could be criminal but for a different purpose not
    necessarily for profitability but to try to destroy our
    networks to adversely impact us.
        In working with DHS, how does this work? If you are not
    reinventing the wheel, trying to work with DHS, which would be
    concerned primarily, not entirely, with terrorists but with
    cyber crime, how do you distinguish or how do you divide up
    those responsibilities or follow up after they are discovered?
        General Kehler. Sir, first of all, those relationships are
    still being established. There has been a memorandum of
    agreement signed between DHS and DOD that lays out an initial
    relationship between the two departments. I think it is
    important to note that the Department of Justice (DOJ), for
    example, is a key player in all of this as well. There are
    other Federal departments that are also key players in here,
    and so the question is really one of relationships across the
    entire Federal Government.
        But let us take the DHS example for a second. Our friends
    in NORTHCOM and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld who commands that
    command today--we have worked through a series of relationships
    that allow him to do what we would call defense support for
    civil authorities. He supports DHS in the physical world in
    many ways whether it is from wildland fire fighting, whether it
    is flood activities, whatever it is where DHS turns to DOD and
    says, ``I need help, you have unique capabilities, unique tools
    that we need, unique manpower, unique training, whatever it
    happens to be, and we need that to support civil authorities
    and their activities.'' This is the same set of lanes in the
    road, if you will, that we need to carve out with DHS for
    cyber. It is different in that cyber is a different animal for
    us to deal with, but I am confident--and I think we are all
    confident--that we can establish those relationships.
        You asked how would we respond. In some cases, those
    relationships are in place today, and we have ways to respond.
    In other cases, they are not. If you listen to the
    conversations that go on from our Deputy Secretary of Defense
    and others, I think we would all acknowledge today that there
    is much more to do to position the Nation to be able to deal
    with cyberspace in terms of the amount of activity that we see
    from all different directions.
        But I think the final point I would make here is very
    significantly, in some cases things that happen in cyberspace,
    while the press headlines might use the word ``attack,'' when
    the word ``attack'' is used for people like us with uniforms
    like these, that means something to us that is not always
    necessarily the same thing we mean when we talk about attacks
    in cyberspace. In some cases, as you pointed out, those are
    criminal activities and best handled by our criminal activity
    handlers, whether that is the Federal Bureau of Investigations
    or whether that is local law enforcement or whether that is the
    State patrol or whatever, whether it is DOJ. Those are the
    kinds of questions that we are asking ourselves to make sure
    that we are not wanting to pick up the phone and call DOD for
    the wrong reasons.
        Senator Nelson. This is sensitive because I am going to
    make reference to China. There have been a lot of penetrations
    of U.S. Government and industrial computer systems with data
    theft that have been traced back to China, and while it is not
    possible to determine with certainty that these attacks are
    coming from or directly directed by the Chinese Government, the
    evidence over a number of years might cause some people to draw
    that conclusion. But at a minimum, if these attacks are not
    sponsored or officially sanctioned by the Chinese Government,
    it appears to most of us that the Chinese Government has done
    little or nothing to stop them, almost reminiscent of
    intellectual property theft as well.
        Is this something that is being looked at? I know it is a
    very delicate sort of a question, but is this something that is
    being looked at right now militarily? If you can even answer
    that in this environment.
        General Kehler. Sir, what I would say is about a week and a
    half ago, maybe 2 weeks ago, the White House released a
    document. I may get the title a little bit wrong, but I think
    it is called ``The International Strategy for Cyberspace.'' I
    think that is what it was called. If it was not called that,
    that is close.
        One of the highlights of that document is the idea that
    everyone will have to behave responsibly in cyberspace, that
    there is some expectation that to get the benefit out of
    cyberspace, that people will behave responsibly. I think that
    gets to your point here, that there needs to be responsible
    behavior at all levels.
        I will not comment on the specifics of any country, et
    cetera, because the other thing that you pointed out with your
    question is how difficult it is to determine who is doing what
    in cyberspace. Ambiguity is almost a hallmark of people's
    behavior in cyberspace. That is not a bad thing because we all
    want our privacy, of course. But it provides us with some
    difficult problems in trying to attribute behavior to various
    actors out there. So that is going to be a problem for us, I
    think, to work our way through for quite some time to come.
        Senator Nelson. Is that something that we could gather as a
    group of countries who have this capability as governments? We
    recognize there are private citizens located all around the
    world that have the capabilities that sometimes astound us that
    individuals would develop those levels of capability. But is
    that something where you think we might, as we have with the
    New START treaty, enter into some sort of an agreement with
    other countries where it is actual signatories to try to police
    that back home, wherever we possibly can, whether it is our
    country or another country?
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the
    mechanism would be, nor would I suggest a mechanism to do it.
    But I would say that the new national strategy suggests that we
    need to band together in some way as some type of a community
    of nations to make sure that our behavior is consistent with
    what our objectives are for the Internet, which is free and
    open activity for everybody.
        The interesting thing here is going to be, I think, whether
    by engaging nation states, you have everyone that you need in
    such an agreement. If you think about some of the issues we
    have seen in the last several years, there have been a couple
    of cases where we have non-nation states accusing nation states
    of bad behavior. So you have companies accusing nations;
    nations accusing companies. This is going to be very
    interesting, I think, for policymakers to sort out who you
    include in these kinds of agreements, which is why I think the
    strategy for cyberspace was pretty insistent on this idea that
    everyone has to behave responsibly.
        Senator Nelson. There is the distinction that we talked
    about between that that is just criminal for profit type
    efforts versus terrorists or nation state efforts that are the
    equivalent of spying to try to access our secrets and inveigle
    their way into our systems.
        General Kehler. Yes, sir. Vandalism, criminal activity,
    espionage, military activity, all of those things are happening
    in there at some level, and sorting all that out is one of our
    big challenges.
        Senator Nelson. I mentioned and you mentioned as well space
    debris. Can you give us some relative understanding of how much
    stuff is up there? Obviously, we think of space as being
    unlimited and we think about it as expanding the globe. How
    congested and contested is space right now with all that
    debris?
        General Kehler. I think two things that I have seen that
    have been really dramatic changes in my time on Active Duty,
    one was, of course, the end of the Cold War and the reduction
    of our nuclear forces. The other has been the change in space
    from the start of the Space Age which, of course, I was not on
    Active Duty for, but from the late 1950s to today, how much the
    nature of our space activities has changed, how much our
    reliance has changed on those space things, how much the
    participants have changed, and how much the number of manmade
    objects has changed.
        So if I just focus on the objects for a second, I think in
    1957 there was one manmade object on orbit. Today we are
    sitting here in 2011 and there are well over 20,000 manmade
    objects. About 1,000 of those are active satellites. So 19,000-
    plus pieces of debris of one kind or another. That is those
    things that we can see, some sized around a softball or so
    larger. Our estimates are that there are probably 10 times that
    amount of debris that is smaller than what we actually actively
    would look at on a case-by-case basis. So pretty soon we are
    talking about a lot of objects here.
        You would say big space, little object theory, but you have
    to think about this, that there are some places on orbit that
    are more crowded than others, that are more desirable than
    others, not unlike driving. There are a lot of cars that
    transit Nebraska, but most of them are on the interstate, I
    would hazard a guess, and a lot of them go through the
    intersection out here of I-80 and 480. So that is the same
    thing on orbit, that there is a lot of stuff up there but it is
    channeled in certain places, and in some places it goes through
    intersections.
        So that in and of itself is a risk, first, to human space
    flight, and we put a protective observation bubble, if you
    will, around the Space Station and human space flight. Second,
    we put an observation bubble, if you will, around our active
    satellites, and then we are in agreements with others around
    the world to provide that kind of service for them as well.
        The final thing about this that makes it so potentially
    damaging is the speed at which things are traveling on orbit.
    Even though they are small objects, they are going at a very
    high speed, and therefore impacts cause a tremendous amount of
    damage. When you are talking about things moving at 17,000
    miles an hour, for example, collisions that occur at those
    speeds--that is faster than .30-06 round, by the way, that
    would go down range. Those kinds of speeds are particularly
    damaging if you talk about the unintended collision.
        Senator Nelson. In addition to worrying about space debris,
    we also have to be concerned about our adversaries perhaps
    trying to bring down or jam our satellites. What are we doing
    in a general sense to protect against having somebody, another
    country or a bad operator, find a way to effectively render
    inoperative one of our military satellites?
        General Kehler. Sir, the threat to our space capabilities
    is real. The threat that we are concerned about is
    predominantly a ground-based jamming threat, for example, GPS.
    GPS, as universally used as it is, is essentially in its
    orbital component a radio transmitter. It does not transmit at
    particularly high power, and so it is not a terribly difficult
    signal to jam, if you have the right pieces of equipment in
    place. So jamming is one of the issues.
        We see the development of jammers in militaries around the
    world. We know Sadaam Hussein in the early days of Operation
    Iraqi Freedom actually operated GPS jammers. They were not
    effective. He did not have many of them and they were not used
    particularly well. They were not employed effectively, and
    ultimately they were taken out.
        But we see a proliferation of jammers. We see satellite
    communications jamming. Sometimes we see that today in an
    unintentional way because the frequency spectrum is getting
    more crowded, but we have also seen it in an intentional way as
    well.
        Then, of course, we have seen the demonstration by the
    Chinese and we had seen years ago the demonstration of anti-
    satellite weapons by the Russians. So we know that those types
    of capabilities exist out there in the world and we have to be
    mindful of those. So we are taking a number of steps.
        At some level, some of this is an engineering solution.
        We have to design the satellites differently. In some
    cases, they are pretty well protected today from a lot of
    things, but they are not protected against everything. We get
    into difficulty in determining what those other satellites that
    are on orbit--what is their real purpose? They can all look
    like communications satellites, but that may not be their
    purpose. So we have a better job that we have to do in
    situational awareness so we get advance warning of things that
    could happen, and then we can take some additional protective
    steps. In some cases, we have not put much in the way of
    protective steps in place. Resilience in the capability will
    come maybe from airborne platforms or elsewhere instead of
    space.
        Senator Nelson. There is a certain amount we can do to
    protect. Whatever we do can in some way or another be defeated
    if the other side develops the capacity to do that. We cannot
    protect anything and everything.
        General Kehler. No, we cannot. Resilience is the ultimate
    way to take care of these vulnerabilities. That is true in
    cyberspace as well. But ultimately mission assurance, which
    means that you can operate through something even in the face
    of duress of some kind, and then resilience, multiple ways to
    get the job done, is really the way that we are ultimately
    trying to get at these vulnerabilities.
        Senator Nelson. This question is about our men and women in
    uniform who are part of the STRATCOM. On any given day, how
    does STRATCOM support our troops in, let us say, Afghanistan?
        General Kehler. Sir, I tell my colleagues in the other
    combatant commands--and I actually believe this firmly--that
    there is no military operation that goes on out there that is
    not being impacted by STRATCOM in some way. The number one
    example is GPS. There is not a military activity that is going
    on out there somewhere today that is not impacted or touched
    somehow by GPS. Satellite communications is another one that
    there is either voice traffic or data going over satellite
    communications somewhere in the world right now in large
    volumes that is supporting military activities. We are
    providing the networks over which their data and communications
    are flowing. We are providing a strategic umbrella, I believe,
    a deterrent umbrella over top of them. We are ensuring that the
    missile defensive capabilities that they need are in place and
    effective. We are taking steps with them to combat WMD. We can
    provide expertise forward when they need expertise. We can
    provide other planners that go forward to conduct, for example,
    global strike operations.
        Let me use a couple of examples here. You asked about
    Afghanistan. The reason I believe that we can operate the way
    we do in Afghanistan is because of space and cyberspace. It
    allows our troops to navigate with accuracy. It allows them to
    communicate with certainty. It allows them to strike with
    precision. It allows them to do those kinds of things that have
    essentially become the American way of warfare in a place like
    Afghanistan. It allows troops to operate in geographically
    dispersed locations, which we do in Afghanistan. It allows us
    to put forward operating locations in places where their only
    communications might be through satellite communications means.
    It allows us to fly remotely piloted aircraft using a
    combination of cyberspace and space so that you do that half a
    world away. All of those things are either provided by the
    Service components of STRATCOM or somehow planned via a global
    synchronization effort through STRATCOM.
        Finally, in the early stages of the Libyan operations,
    STRATCOM conducted, on behalf of U.S. Africa Command, global
    strike operations as well.
        I believe we have a supporting role that we live every
    single day with those forward commanders that are out there. We
    are touching them in ways that they do not really realize we
    are touching them in. We are also helping to manage the global
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that they
    are relying on every minute of every day.
        I feel very proud of the men and women of STRATCOM and what
    they do not only when we are supported in our efforts to deter
    the strategic end of the spectrum, but also in the supporting
    activities that they put out to support what they would call
    the warfighters. I think you would find that if you went around
    and talked to any STRATCOM assigned people today in any of our
    operating locations, they would say that they are there for
    that. So I am very proud of them.
        Senator Nelson. I think the American public is probably
    fascinated with the unmanned aerial vehicles and the way in
    which they operate. Could you give us maybe a little bit of an
    overview of how you can operate a machine halfway around the
    world with precision and that it does not have to be operated
    like a model airplane with a local control right on the ground
    close to the vehicle?
        General Kehler. Yes, sir. Well, actually it does.
        It is both.
        Senator Nelson. Yes, it can be both ways, but it does not
    have to be.
        General Kehler. Right.
        The way I think about it, sir, is I split it into two
    pieces. One is actually flying the aircraft itself. The other
    is operating the sensors or the systems that are on the
    airplane.
        So to do the airplane operations in the immediate vicinity
    of the airfield, we do it a lot like a model airplane. There is
    somebody there in the local vicinity to get it airborne and
    bring it home when it is on final approach, if you will. But
    the whole rest of that operation is being flown remotely. The
    vehicle itself is being flown by a pilot who is remote, and
    sitting next to that pilot is a sensor operator or a mission
    operator of one kind or another. That is all being done through
    cyberspace. It is all being done through a network. It is all
    being done through a combination of things, by the way, which
    is some military pieces, but mostly it is commercial pieces.
    There is probably a commercial satellite link that is involved
    in there somewhere. There may be some commercial fiber optic
    that is involved in there somewhere which, by the way,
    reinforces with us why the nature of cyberspace is largely in
    the civil and commercial domain when we use it. We are talking
    about protecting ourselves in cyberspace. A very interesting
    point of contact between DOD and the other departments and
    commercial industry is in just that kind of a thing for just
    that kind of a purpose, for example, flying remotely piloted
    aircraft.
        That is the way it is done. It is done from places that are
    relatively small rooms. I know you have seen some of them and
    been with the crews that do that. What strikes me is if they
    are flying over Afghanistan, if you enter a shelter with them
    and close the door behind you, you do not know where you are.
    After a while you forget that you are in the United States
    somewhere. You are not in Afghanistan with them. You are not
    where the vehicle is. After a while, I think the mindset that
    the people have that do this is the same.
        That goes all the way out to the tactical level. There are
    some smaller vehicles that are flown at the tactical level.
    There are some that are actually flown like model airplanes
    from some person forward on the ground who is doing almost the
    same thing that we did as kids, but they have sensor packages
    on them that allow them to see and perceive things that are out
    there that might be threats.
        I think it is a remarkable testament to space and
    cyberspace that we do those things today.
        Senator Nelson. It is a little bit like science fiction.
    There is no fiction to it but there is a lot of science
    associated with it.
        This question relates to the fact that STRATCOM is very
    technically oriented and requires a lot of dependence on
    scientists and engineers and other people with a high degree of
    technical specialty. Are we seeing enough young people and
    others in the educational system today who are taking that kind
    of background coursework to fill the needs that we are going to
    have tomorrow and the next day and the day after that for the
    kind of capacity that STRATCOM has in the future that is not
    that very far ahead?
        General Kehler. No, sir, I do not think we are seeing
    enough. It may very well be that if we were to visit the major
    universities around the country--and certainly we have had a
    little bit of this conversation with the University of
    Nebraska--I think you would find that they are producing high
    quality engineering students, and I think you would find that
    every one of our major engineering schools around the country
    are producing high quality engineering students and I think you
    would find that they are producing maybe significant numbers of
    them. I think you would find that of those numbers, the
    percentage who stay in the United States and enter the national
    security business is way too small. So there are interesting
    issues here with recruiting, with retention, with making sure
    that we have identified what skills we need, and making sure
    that we have put in place the incentives, I think, for people
    to enter the national security business and stay there when it
    is a little more difficult to do that.
        NASA is shifting its directions and is in a period where we
    are coming to the end of the Space Shuttle. There is going to
    be a period of time here as they are reorienting to go off and
    do some other things.
        I think it is going to be a challenge for us to attract and
    retain the kinds of people that we need. Cyberspace is another
    one of those areas and particularly when there is highly
    competitive demand on people to go to industry as well. So I
    think educating them, keeping them, going back to the secondary
    education as well and then post-secondary is something that is
    very concerning for us.
        Senator Nelson. It is something that obviously we need to
    work on because if we do not have the workforce coming into the
    command, we are not going to be able to continue the command as
    it is or we will have to structure it differently and that is
    not in anybody's best interest. So I hope that we can keep
    pushing to get that kind of effort and capacity growing.
    Otherwise we will not have any seed corn and we definitely have
    to have that.
        General Kehler. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. STRATCOM is responsible for, as we talked
    about, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or
    as it is referred to in military terms, ISR. We know that ISR
    played a role in the successful raid that took out Osama bin
    Laden. Can you talk about any kind of support that STRATCOM
    might have provided in that mission?
        General Kehler. Sir, not really.
        Senator Nelson. You can say that we had some involvement.
    You just do not have to say what it is.
        General Kehler. We did have some involvement. We provide
    involvement across the board to the activities in CENTCOM all
    the time. So most of what we do for ISR, anyway, in those
    forward areas is planning and recommendations on what assets
    they should get. How they use them and what they are using them
    for is not always apparent to us.
        Senator Nelson. That is my final question. Is there
    anything that I did not ask that I should have asked?
        General Kehler. No, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to
    appear again.
        I will say again in closing, on behalf of the men and women
    of STRATCOM, we certainly appreciate the support of Congress.
    We appreciate the support of the entire Senate Armed Services
    Committee and your support and your subcommittee, in
    particular. These are difficult issues and you know and I know
    both that there will be fiscal pressures as the President's
    budget works its way through.
        I would just make one final advocacy comment about the need
    to sustain the funding that is in the President's budget,
    particularly for these critical items related to sustaining our
    nuclear forces, the nuclear infrastructure that backs them up,
    the command and control systems that we have in place, our need
    to increase both our space and cyberspace situational awareness
    and the investments that are there to do that, the investments
    that we have in place to sustain our force.
        Then finally, I would remind all of us again that those
    steps that you all have taken to support the men and women who
    actually are the heart and soul of what we do--the hardware is
    one thing. But it is not the hardware that ultimately is
    important. It is the men and women that are in STRATCOM and
    throughout the rest of our military. So the support that we
    have for them I would continue to advocate in the strongest
    possible way.
        Other than that, sir, thanks for the opportunity.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, General Kehler, for your very
    candid remarks and responses to questions. Thank you and the
    men and women of STRATCOM for their service to our country, to
    wish you and all of them the very best and to thank the young
    men and women who are here with us, as well as the Fighting
    55th and the ``Weather Command'' as well.
        The colonel was quick to point out that it is the Chaplain
    who is responsible for the rain. [Laughter.]
        So thank you so very much.
        I also want to thank the staff here at this wonderful
    facility, once again, for hosting one of our field hearings. We
    thank you.
        We thank all who are here and hope that you have perhaps
    some idea, if not a better idea, of the role of STRATCOM which
    we are all so proud is located here in this part of our
    wonderful State. We hope that we will be able to continue to
    have hearings of this kind for transparency and for
    enlightenment to the men and women who are relying on this kind
    of protection for our national defense and the taxpayers who
    continue to support them. Thank you all.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]