[Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1253
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
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MAY 10, 2011
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Proliferation Prevention Programs at the Department of Energy and the
Department of Defense
may 10, 2011
Page
Harrington, Anne M., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy; Accompanied by John Gerrard.............. 5
Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, Department of Defense.................................. 14
Handelman, Kenneth B., Acting Assistant Secretary for Global
Strategic Affairs, Department of Defense; Accompanied by Jed
Royal, Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy,
Department of Defense.......................................... 24
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
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TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:55 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Portman.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Jessica L.
Kingston, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority
investigative counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Brian
F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; and Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. I would like to convene the second session
of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee today.
Good afternoon. We meet today to discuss proliferation
prevention, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and threat
reduction programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy.
We began this hearing today in closed session to understand
the threats these programs are designed to address, and in that
session we learned more about why we worry about proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), technology, and
materials, and who is trying to get WMDs.
I want to welcome our witnesses to this session. We have
Ms. Anne Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) at the Department of Energy (DOE); Mr.
Kenneth Myers III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA); and Mr. Kenneth Handelman, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs at the
Department of Defense (DOD).
As I mentioned in the closed session, there is wide
agreement that the use of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist would
be a catastrophic event. The probability that this will occur,
however, is unknown, but some, such as former Senator Sam Nunn,
worry that it's just a matter of time--not if, but when.
President Obama has embarked on a three-pronged effort to
reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and
nuclear technology. As the President said in the Nuclear
Posture Review, ``The threat of global nuclear war has become
remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.''
The most immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear
terrorism. Today we will discuss the efforts at DOD and DOE to
thwart the goals of these potential nuclear terrorists and
reduce the chances that a nuclear or radiological device is
detonated in a U.S. city or anywhere else.
At the end of the Cold War, DOD and DOE, at the direction
of former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar,
established programs with Russia and the states of the Former
Soviet Union to secure, dismantle, or destroy nuclear and
chemical weapons and to secure or destroy biological weapons
materials. That program, I'm pleased to say, has been a
resounding success, with thousands of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems destroyed, tons of nuclear material secured,
tons of chemical weapons destroyed, and significant quantities
of biological material secured. While there is still work left
to be finished, this work is winding down.
Today the focus is shifting to address more global threats,
not only from nuclear and radiological threats, but also
biological materials. The biological threat is very different
from the nuclear threat, but an attack using biological
material would be devastating. As a result, DOD is increasing
its work to prevent the biological threat. Almost half of the
cooperative threat reduction program in fiscal year 2012 will
be dedicated to preventing a biological attack.
We look forward to discussing with our DOD witnesses how
this effort, particularly those new efforts in Africa and
elsewhere, are progressing. We would also be interested in
hearing from our witnesses today how the response to the threat
is evolving and what is the next round of challenges in
nonproliferation programs generally. States such as India,
Pakistan, and North Korea continue to increase the size of
their nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems. Other
states, such as Iran, are still trying to hide their actions
and expand their nuclear programs. We would be interested in
the progress and programs such as the proliferation security
initiative and export controls, which are designed to prevent
the further proliferation of nuclear technology and delivery
systems, primarily among state actors.
While the United States has been a leader in threat
reduction programs, the problem is not a U.S. problem only. As
a result, many of the programs are designed to build capacity
in regional partners to detect and interdict illicit
trafficking in WMD and related materials. Is the United States
getting good cooperation from these partners?
The two Departments seek to engage new partners, such as
India and China, in preventing proliferation. How will these
programs be different from the traditional programs and who
will bear the cost?
I thank each of our witnesses for being here this
afternoon. I look forward to you answering these and many other
questions and generally having a good discussion on this
important topic.
Senator Portman.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair, for this hearing
and for our previous one, where we had the opportunity to speak
with some of your colleagues in closed session. I'd like to
join you, Madam Chair, in welcoming those here today and tell
you thank you for your service and for those who serve under
you, for what they're doing every day to help protect us from
the existential potential threat of nuclear proliferation.
Clearly, since the Cold War our approach has had to change
with regard to the issues you deal with every day. At that time
I think ``weapons of mass destruction'' referred to the Soviets
almost exclusively in the possibility of a nuclear attack, and
we had a mutually assured destruction approach that really has
dissolved now, and now the threat in some respects is much more
difficult because it's more diffuse, and of course includes
chemical and biological weapons, as well as radiological and
nuclear weapons.
Of course, it has become a lot less predictable, as we've
seen recently with rogue nations like Iran or North Korea and
so many non-state actors having the shared goal to develop
these destructive capabilities to terrorize and maybe sometimes
to coerce others. Although we had a great success by recently
eliminating the most wanted terrorist in the world, there are
lots of violent groups now without a home who are dedicated,
not to a government or to a place, but to an ideology of
extremism. So that proliferation, as the chair has said, would
be top on our priority list today to talk about.
With regard to the funding, let me just say that we looked
at some of these numbers and part of what we're doing here is
building a record for the authorization bill. We do spend
billions of dollars a year in securing the world's most
dangerous materials and keeping them out of the hands of those
who wish to do us harm. As we've said, that's extremely
important.
This has been a bipartisan effort over time and we're all
committed to countering these threats. Nonetheless, in this
fiscal condition we find ourselves in we need to be sure those
dollars are being spent most effectively.
There is currently a discrepancy that I just want to raise
in my opening statement and then we'll have a chance to talk
about. If you look at the 2012 budget request from DOE's NNSA,
it is a $2.55 billion request and as I look here, since 2009
this means these programs at DOE have expanded substantially.
In fact, it's almost $1 billion a year, more than it was during
the previous administration. So we have seen substantial
increases in DOE's programs.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised some
concerns about the effectiveness of some of these programs and
I'm sure you have had the opportunity to look at GAO's report.
It says that the 4-year global nuclear materials security
initiative lacks specific details on implementation. As I read
it, it also indicates it lacks measurement to be able to know
whether performance is being met.
It talks about the three nuclear nonproliferation programs
that they reviewed having made different levels of progress.
Only one, the materials protection control and accounting
program, did they consider to have made considerable progress
in securing the Russian nuclear warhead and material
facilities, which is of course one of the major objectives.
They thought that the materials consolidation and
conversion and the global threat reduction initiative programs
had only exhibited limited success in achieving their
objectives in Russia. The report also said that, because of
questionable high-level Russian political commitment to working
with the United States, the future of these programs was
unclear.
Again I think NNSA has a critical mission. The question is
whether the increased funding is justified and what measures
can be taken to address these concerns, assuming they are valid
concerns.
On the other hand, DTRA has had its budget decreased in the
fiscal year 2012 request, and again this is a discrepancy I
just want to hear more on today. Again, this decrease in DTRA
funding comes as DTRA is being asked to do more and more and
more, including hosting and conducting on-site verifications of
arms control treaties, which is very important, particularly
given the New START Treaty, including looking at issues that
were raised in the U.S. Senate and in the House in that
process. I understand inspections are already underway and I
look forward to getting an update on how things are progressing
there.
In contrast to the increases for NNSA, I'm interested in
hearing the reasoning for DTRA's budget reduction despite these
increased responsibilities.
Again, Madam Chair, I thank you for having the hearing and
I appreciate the witnesses being here today. I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Each of you have submitted a written statement that will be
included into the record and I'd like you each to keep your
opening comments to about 5 minutes or so. Ms. Harrington, if
you would start, then will be followed by Mr. Myers and then
Mr. Handelman. Ms. Harrington.
STATEMENT OF ANNE M. HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN
GERRARD
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman,
Ranking Member Portman: Thank you for the opportunity to join
you today to discuss the investments the President has
requested for NNSA's defense nuclear nonproliferation programs.
I will abbreviate that as ``DNN'' in my remarks.
More importantly, thank you for your continued support of
the NNSA and the 35,000 men and women working across the
enterprise to keep our country safe, protect our allies, and
enhance global security. We could not do this work without
strong bilateral support and engaged leadership from Congress.
Since I have submitted a more detailed written statement, I
will keep my remarks short.
If I could, I'd like to start with a simple but important
statement. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and keeping
dangerous nuclear and radiological materials out of the hands
of terrorists is a vital national security priority. These are
without a doubt national security programs. As President Obama
said in his speech in Prague in April 2009, the threat of a
terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the most
immediate and extreme threat we face. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more dangerous threat to our Nation.
That's the danger. Here's the good news. On any given day,
we have some of our Nation's most talented and hard-working
people engaged worldwide in more than 100 countries to reduce
the global nuclear threat. In that work, we are joined by a
network of similarly committed nations, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals
that support and enable and collaborate with us on these
critical efforts. I'm honored to share this table with two of
those.
President Obama has shown strong leadership in protecting
the safety and security of the American people by working to
reduce global nuclear dangers. As part of that effort, he has
requested $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2012 and $14.2 billion
over the next 5 years to reduce the global nuclear threat by
detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling
nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the
responsible application of nuclear technology and science. This
includes stemming the risk of expertise proliferation through
innovative science and technology partnerships.
The President's request provides the resources required to
meet commitments secured during the 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit. NNSA, along with DOD and other U.S. Government
departments and agencies, working with countries around the
world, is implementing these commitments. As partners, we are
engaged in a focused and intensified international effort to
lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear materials. We are
executing an integrated, prioritized strategy that aligns
authorities, capabilities, and resources to address global
nuclear threats.
This three-tiered strategy covers the site, country, and
global levels. NNSA takes a lead role in many of the activities
that meet this goal, including removing or eliminating special
nuclear material where possible, securing that material and
providing critical support to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
For fiscal year 2012, our budget request includes more than
$1 billion to remove and prevent the smuggling of dangerous
nuclear material around the world and enable NNSA to continue
leading international efforts to implement more stringent
standards for the physical protection of nuclear material and
nuclear facilities worldwide.
The President is also seeking $890 million for fissile
materials disposition, which supports the continued
construction of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility,
waste solidification building, and efforts to baseline the pit
disassembly and conversion project at the Savannah River site
in South Carolina. Not only will these facilities be used to
permanently eliminate more than 34 metric tons of U.S. surplus
weapons-grade plutonium, this will be done in a way that
produces electricity for American consumers. Similarly, as part
of our broader nonproliferation effort, Russia will also be
disposing of 34 metric tons of its surplus weapons plutonium in
a way that will provide energy for Russia.
Finally, this budget request directs more than $360 million
to support the research and development required to create new
technologies for detecting nuclear proliferation or testing and
for monitoring compliance with nuclear nonproliferation and
arms control agreements. To me, this last point is key.
Investing in the future of the scientific and technical
underpinnings of our program is critical to implementing the
President's nuclear security agenda. This is serious business
and we need the best minds in the country working at our
national laboratories and sites to develop new tools that will
keep the American people safe and enhance global security.
Investing in a modern 21st century nuclear security enterprise
is essential to preventing nuclear terrorism or nuclear
proliferation.
All of NNSA, including defense nuclear nonproliferation,
defense programs, counterproliferation, and emergency response,
and many other agencies outside NNSA, as we recently discussed,
rely on the skills, people, and facilities of the DOE
enterprise. For example, our nonproliferation mission to
protect, remove, and eliminate weapon-useable material, the
uranium and plutonium, depends on maintaining our scientific
and technical capabilities in these areas. These infrastructure
investments, such as the uranium processing facility and the
chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility, are
critical to our enterprise and deserve your support.
Madam Chairman, these are the highlights of our budget
request as it relates to our nuclear nonproliferation programs.
We recognize that we are making this request at a time of acute
financial stress for our entire Nation and that this committee
has many competing requests.
As we work to invest in the future and implement the
President's nuclear security agenda, we remain committed to
improving the way we do business. We fully understand that we
cannot come before this Congress and expect increased
investments if we are not able to demonstrate our ability to
spend those resources wisely.
I am proud to say that improving how we do business is a
priority for defense nuclear nonproliferation programs and
we're seeing results. Last year our global threat reduction
initiative became the first Federal program to receive the
Project Management Institute's coveted Distinguished Project
Award. Two weeks ago, our MOX program was honored with an
environmental stewardship award from the State of South
Carolina.
This committee has also voiced concerns in the past about
the level of our uncommitted carryover funds. I can report that
we have made continuous improvements in that area over the past
6 years and through diligent management efforts we have reduced
the end-of-year uncommitted carryover funds from 15.5 percent
in 2005 to 10.1 percent in 2010, while at the same time, seeing
budget increases of 40 percent. This reduction puts the nuclear
nonproliferation program well below the 13 percent threshold
for uncommitted carryover funds established by DOE.
The vision outlined in this budget request supports the
full range of NNSA missions by investing in infrastructure,
people, science, technology, and engineering required to fulfil
our missions. I look forward to working with the members of the
subcommittee to make NNSA's vision a reality and I look forward
to any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:]
Prepared Statement by Anne M. Harrington
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the fiscal year
2012 President's budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). This budget request will enable the
NNSA to meet its commitments to the American people and our
international partners to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers
around the world. The request also provides the science, technology,
and engineering capabilities necessary to allow us to address the
broader national security challenges of the 21st century.
While recognizing the economic challenges facing our Nation, the
President has demonstrated through this fiscal year 2012 budget request
his strong commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear security. This
unprecedented investment in DNN's mission represents a commitment to
implement the President's nuclear security agenda, but does so in a way
that balances our highest priorities with continued focus on efficiency
and effectiveness.
During his speech in Prague in April 2009, the President unveiled
an ambitious nuclear security agenda, which identified the need to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and keep dangerous nuclear
materials out of the hands of terrorists, as a top national security
priority. Meeting this objective, however, requires international
commitment and action. The success of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit
was the first concrete demonstration of broad international commitment,
resulting in 47 heads of state coming together and jointly endorsing
global nuclear security objectives. Today, there is a robust
international effort underway to secure the most vulnerable nuclear
material around the world and to build on the success of the 2010
Summit.
NNSA's vision is to make the world a safer place. The words are
simple, but the challenges to realizing that vision are substantial.
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation's role in the NNSA
mission is to leverage its technical expertise, creativity, and other
unique capabilities and resources to confront the challenges of nuclear
proliferation and the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism
around the world. Our strategy includes engaging our domestic and
international partners in a global effort to secure the most vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide; impeding the proliferation of nuclear
weapons technologies, information, materials and expertise; providing
technical support to the President's nonproliferation and arms control
agenda; developing a new framework for nuclear energy that minimizes
proliferation risks; and advancing the science, technology and
engineering base that supports DNN's missions.
implementing the president's nuclear security agenda
The fiscal year 2012 NNSA budget request includes $2.55 billion for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for fiscal year 2012 and $14.3 billion
over the next 5 years to reduce the global nuclear and radiological
threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling
nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible
application of nuclear technology and science. Each fiscal year from
fiscal year 2012 until fiscal year 2016 has been analyzed for
priorities to achieve Presidential and operational objectives. This
includes stemming the risk of weapons-expertise proliferation through
innovative science and technology partnerships. The budget request
provides the resources required to continue making progress on the
President's international effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear
material around the world within 4 years, a key national security goal.
This budget request recognizes significant accomplishments of
NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs in the past year and seeks the
resources needed to continue to work toward the President's goals. NNSA
along with the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government
departments and agencies, working with countries around the world, is
implementing Prague speech commitments to a focused and intensified
international effort to lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear
materials. We are executing an integrated, prioritized strategy that
aligns authorities, capabilities, and resources to address global
nuclear threats. This three-tiered strategy covers the site, country
and global levels. NNSA takes a lead role in many of the activities
that meet this goal, including removing or eliminating special nuclear
material when possible, securing that material when not and providing
critical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
For example, this request provides the necessary resources to
support commitments secured from international partners to remove all
remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Belarus, Ukraine, and
Mexico by April 2012, and to carry out the removal of nuclear material
from other countries. It also contributes to preventing nuclear
terrorism by working with Russia and other countries to secure and
eliminate vulnerable weapons-usable material. The budget request also
provides resources to work with the Department of Defense to strengthen
international nuclear security cooperation. It will enable NNSA,
working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to continue
leading international efforts to implement more stringent standards for
the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities
worldwide.
The request of $2.55 billion is an increase of 10 percent from the
fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution, and an increase of 19.6 percent
over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This 10 percent, or $230.8
million increase will support efforts to secure the most vulnerable
nuclear materials within the President's stated timeframe. The NNSA
budget request remains consistent with our overall strategy to ensure
that programs supporting the President's commitment lead to an
international effort to reduce nuclear dangers.
In addition, the budget request supports the efforts of the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) related to radiological material, as
well as the activities of the International Nuclear Material Protection
and Cooperation (INMP&C) program to enhance the ability of our foreign
partners to detect nuclear smuggling both at fixed border crossings and
internal checkpoints. The budget request also continues to support the
Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) U.S. plutonium disposition mission
to include the three construction projects, as well as the U.S. uranium
disposition program.
Specifically, our $2.55 billion fiscal year 2012 request includes:
More than $508 million for GTRI to remove and secure
high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the world in 4
years, accelerate additional conversions of HEU fueled research
reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and to
provide a comprehensive approach to permanently deny terrorists
access to nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites
worldwide;
More than $890 million for the FMD program to dispose
of U.S. surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium by
constructing a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and a Waste
Solidification Building, and developing a capability to
disassemble nuclear weapon pits and convert the material for
use in MOX fuel. The fiscal year 2012 request also supports
programmatic activities that are not part of the line item
construction projects but are essential to dispose of surplus
weapon-grade plutonium, including: MOX fuel qualification,
executing utility contracts, obtaining plutonium feedstock from
Los Alamos National Lab in advance of a full-scale pit
disassembly capability, obtaining depleted uranium oxide
feedstock, storage of feed materials, and transportation.
Over $571 million for the INMP&C program for
additional Material Protection Control & Accounting (MPC&A)
upgrades and sustainability support, expansion of MPC&A
cooperation with countries outside of Russia and the former
Soviet Union, and additional deployment of radiation detection
systems with enabling support for sustained operations to
combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
materials under the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program;
Over $417 million for the Nonproliferation and
Verification Research and Development (R&D) program to provide
the key technical support for the President's arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, as well as to provide funding for the
University of California pension obligations; and
Nearly $162 million for the Nonproliferation and
International Security (NIS) program to safeguard nuclear
material; ensure adequate security of U.S.-obligated nuclear
material provided to other countries and enhance work with
partners to strengthen security globally; control the spread of
WMD technologies, equipment, and expertise; and verify nuclear
reductions and compliance with international regimes, treaties,
and agreements.
an integrated effort to achieve the goal
Different people perceive the ``threat'' in different ways; we all
have our views on how to make the world safer. At NNSA, we have formed
our view collectively through discussions with our counterparts from
across the U.S. Government. Working with a strong team from the
National Security Staff and with the intelligence community, we have
developed strategies and identified priorities for programmatic and
diplomatic engagement. No matter what the risks and threats are, the
most effective approach is to integrate our efforts and capitalize on
our unique capabilities to work effectively across NNSA, within DOE and
the interagency, and with our foreign partners. In that respect, the
threat priorities of our international partners are also taken into
account.
As One-NNSA, all of NNSA's major components work together closely.
For example, the Office of Defense Programs and DNN collaborate on
approaches to transparency and monitoring for treaty-related purposes;
DNN and the Office of Emergency Response work together to carry out
training in partner countries. This pattern of collaboration is
important because our missions are so closely interrelated and we
because share resources across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. For
example, investments that sustain the stockpile will also support our
full range of nuclear nonproliferation missions. In addition to the
substantial support that our National Laboratories and facilities
receive from Defense Programs and other parts of DOE, DNN also makes a
major contribution to preserving and developing world-class expertise
that can support all of NNSA's missions. We must continue to invest in
the future.
We also have important common ground with our colleagues in the
Offices of Nuclear Energy and Environmental Management at DOE as we all
develop strategies to address the expansion of nuclear energy and the
disposition of nuclear and radiological materials in a safe and secure
way. We maintain constant contact with our partners throughout the
interagency, particularly at the Departments of Homeland Security,
State, and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National
Security Staff (NSS). For instance, the NSS currently leads a strong
interagency team that meets regularly to prioritize activities and to
assess risk by material type and country, which in turn informs how we
execute our programs. As the largest nonproliferation account in the
government, NNSA's fiscal year 2012 budget request was developed with
the interagency effort in mind and in the context of a well-defined
scope of work within the President's timeframe for the 4-year effort.
But no matter how coordinated and integrated our efforts are in the
United States, none of our efforts would be possible without the full
engagement and cooperation of our foreign partners. The United States
cannot control knowledge, material and technology as we did in the
past. Globalization requires us to pursue partnerships based on shared
nonproliferation objectives.
NNSA is one of several U.S. agencies actively working on the
President's nonproliferation agenda, and has taken the lead in a number
of areas. These capabilities are reflected in our fiscal year 2012
budget request, including:
Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material from Theft and Diversion
NNSA is the interagency leader in making sure that nuclear material
worldwide is secured from theft and diversion at its source.
Through GTRI, NNSA leads U.S. efforts to convert research and test
reactors from HEU to LEU, remove excess or unwanted weapons-usable
nuclear and radiological material, and enhance the security of risk-
significant quantities of nuclear and radiological materials in use at
civilian sites around the world to help prevent terrorists from
acquiring what they need to make a nuclear weapon or radiological
``dirty bomb.'' Since President Obama's April 2009 Prague speech, NNSA
has removed 963 kilograms of HEU and plutonium from 19 countries around
the world. That is enough material for more than 38 nuclear weapons.
Six countries have had all of their HEU removed since the Prague
speech. In November 2010, NNSA completed a large-scale campaign to move
spent fuel from Kazakhstan's BN-350 plutonium production reactor to a
secure storage facility in eastern Kazakhstan. The spent fuel contains
10 metric tons of HEU and three metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium--enough material for more than 775 nuclear weapons. NNSA
plans to complete a number of important projects in fiscal year 2012,
including the removal of all HEU from Ukraine, Belarus, and Mexico in
cooperation with each of those countries. NNSA will continue efforts to
remove HEU from Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Poland, and Hungary in 2013. In
fiscal year 2012, NNSA will continue to lead U.S. efforts to secure or
recover high-risk radiological materials, enhance security at an
additional 158 buildings worldwide, and recover an additional 1,900
disused or unwanted radioactive sealed sources here in the United
States.
The INMP&C program has two main components. Under Material
Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A), the program prevents nuclear
terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of concern to secure
and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons exploitable
material. Under its SLD Program, NNSA works with international partners
to deploy radiation detection systems at international crossing points,
airports, and seaports, and to provide mobile systems for use at
interior checkpoints to detect and deter the illicit transfer of
nuclear and other radioactive materials. Training and sustainability
support are also key components of this program. Since the President's
2009 Prague speech, the program has completed MPC&A upgrades to 33
buildings containing weapons-usable material in Russia; initiated new
upgrades at a number of Russian facilities; placed a cumulative total
of 25 MPC&A regulations in development in Russia and other FSU
countries to strengthen nuclear security safeguards; cooperated with
the FBI to provide mobile detection training in four countries;
deployed radiation detection systems at 162 sites; downblended over two
metric tons of HEU to LEU in Russia; and initiated cooperation with
India and China to develop nuclear security Centers of Excellence to
help those nations become regional centers on nuclear security culture
and training. The budget request will allow INMP&C to: complete MPC&A
upgrades at 3 additional buildings in Russia with weapons usable
nuclear material; provide additional MPC&A upgrades at 25 Russian
nuclear material sites; continue to support the transition of security
upgrades to sustainable operations at 76 sites in Russia, Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Ukraine; complete Russian Ministry of Defense training
centers (Ochakovo, Krasnoyarsk, Abramovo); continue Russian inspections
support activities and training, and support for secure transportation
sustainability, measurement methodologies, and protective force
programs; and will downblend an additional 1 MTs of HEU. SLD plans to
install detection systems in 30 foreign strategic transit and border
sites (cumulative total of 448 of 650 planned), to complete 3 Megaports
in Cameroon, Vietnam, and Italy (for a cumulative total 48 of 100
planned), and to deploy mobile detection systems in 8 more countries.
In fiscal year 2012, marking one of the first major accomplishments
of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, NNSA led the U.S.
Government and international efforts to finalize the fifth revision of
the IAEA's Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (IAEA Information Circular
225). In fiscal year 2012, through the NIS Program, NNSA will lead U.S.
and global efforts to implement INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and work closely with
foreign partners to operationalize its recommendations. Such efforts
will include facilitating the exchange of information on best practices
for securing nuclear material in facilities and in transport. NNSA's
NIS program will continue to lead U.S. interagency physical protection
assessment visits to other countries that have received U.S.-obligated
nuclear material under Section 123 Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation. In doing so, NNSA and its predecessor organizations will
have led over 125 visits to 48 countries since 1974. Additionally, NIS
will continue to engage foreign partners and multilateral organizations
on nuclear security initiatives globally through technical projects and
nuclear security training activities.
NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is working to
strengthen the international safeguards system, a central pillar of the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Safeguards ensure the timely
detection of diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful activities.
As NGSI works to advance the President's call in Prague for ``more
resources and authority for international inspections,'' it is
simultaneously creating the next generation of dedicated
nonproliferation experts, developing cutting edge technology for use by
the IAEA and other safeguards organizations, and working with
international partners to strengthen the implementation of IAEA
safeguards.
Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Smuggling
As a complement to our facility-based physical security efforts
that serve as a first line of defense, NNSA executes a number of
programs that provide an additional layer of defense by detecting and
preventing illicit transfers of nuclear-related material, technology
and equipment. These programs help implement the President's call
during his April 2009 Prague speech call to build on efforts to break
up nuclear black markets and detect and intercept dangerous materials
in transit.
Within INMP&C, the SLD Core program cooperates with foreign
partners to install radiation detection equipment at borders, airports,
and strategic ports in Russia, other former Soviet Union states,
Eastern Europe, and other key countries, and provides mobile detection
capability to law enforcement as well as related training and support.
The SLD Megaports Initiative likewise cooperates internationally to
deploy radiation detection equipment and provide related training to
key strategic and high-volume ports. The fiscal year 2012 budget
request provides for SLD installations at an additional 30 sites in
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Mongolia, Croatia, and Moldova, mobile detection
capability to 8 countries, and completion of Megaports installations
and activities at 3 additional foreign seaports with ongoing
installation activities at an additional 13 ports. The SLD Program will
continue to provide some level of sustainability support to over 250
sites in over 40 countries.
NNSA's R&D program funds research to deliver nuclear detectors that
are more sensitive, have better discrimination and are easier to deploy
facilitating the discovery and identification of contraband radiation
materials. The R&D program also delivers state-of-the-art imaging
equipment that identifies chemical trails at a distance.
Within NIS, the International Nonproliferation Export Control
Program (INECP) supports U.S. Government efforts to combat illicit
trafficking of dual-use commodities required to manufacture WMD and
their means of delivery. Specifically, INECP improves partners' export
control systems and their ability to prevent illicit smuggling--
particularly threats posed by black market networks. Notably, INECP
collaborates with partners to develop sustainable national training
capabilities, including outreach to strategic industries to improve
compliance and efforts to strengthen our partners' frontline inspection
and other enforcement capabilities. Since 2001, INECP has trained over
17,000 frontline personnel to recognize WMD dual-use commodities in 65
countries, 19 of which have adopted domestic programs.
Moreover, to help governments investigate the illicit use of
nuclear materials and deter illicit trafficking of those materials,
NIS's Confidence-Building Measures Program is advancing international
cooperation in nonproliferation nuclear forensics. Nuclear forensics
applies scientific techniques to identify unique characteristics of
nuclear and radioactive material. Promoting cooperation among countries
in nuclear forensics can produce investigative leads to link a seizure
by one country with diversion in another, helping to better prosecute
those involved. NIS's Confidence-Building Measures Program sponsors
technical collaborations to strengthening the global capacity for
effective nuclear forensics and increase data sharing.
Permanent nuclear material disposition
Part of the challenge in making the world a safer place is to be
ever mindful of the challenges associated with disposing of large
quantities of Cold War nuclear weapons materials. Disposition not only
permanently reduces the risk that these materials could be stolen or
diverted for use by rogue nations or terrorists but it also allows us
to reduce the number of sites where these materials are stored thereby
significantly reducing the cost associated with guarding and storing
the material. In this regard, the President is seeking $890 million for
the FMD program, which supports continued efforts to down-blend surplus
U.S. HEU as well as to continue construction of the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility, Waste Solidification Building, and efforts to
disassemble nuclear weapons pits at the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina. Not only will these facilities be used to permanently
eliminate more than 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium, they
will do so in a way that produces electricity for consumers right here
in the United States. Similarly, as part of our broader
nonproliferation effort, Russia will also be disposing of 34 metric
tons of surplus weapons plutonium in a way that will provide energy for
Russia. As I like to say, this is the ultimate swords to plowshares
program, and a key element of the President's nuclear nonproliferation
agenda.
Ensuring Transparent and Verifiable Compliance
The budget request allows NNSA to provide national leadership with
continuous, global, real-time assurance that nuclear test agreements
are respected through the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System
satellite payloads. DNN is leading interagency re-evaluation of system
requirements and implementation to sustain needed capability at an
affordable cost. The Nuclear Detonation Detection seismic model and
sensor development raises confidence of policy makers about the nature,
magnitude, and location of explosions that could be tests of nuclear
devices.
The budget request will also support the monitored elimination of
an additional 30 metric tons of Russian weapons-grade HEU in fiscal
year 2012. This is one of the final steps toward completing the U.S.-
Russia HEU Purchase Agreement in 2013. The Agreement has been one of
NNSA's most successful nonproliferation efforts to date and is on track
to convert 500 metric tons Russian weapons-grade HEU, the equivalent of
20,000 nuclear weapons, into nuclear fuel used to generate nearly 10
percent of all U.S. electricity.
The 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) between the
United States and the Russian Federation has a goal of eliminating
plutonium production for use in weapons. The Agreement has monitoring
provisions to ensure that shutdown U.S. and Russian production reactors
remain shutdown and that at least nine metric tons of Russian plutonium
oxide produced from the last three operating Russian production
reactors is not used in weapons. DOE is the Executive Agent for the
PPRA, is a member of the U.S. component of the bilateral Joint
Implementation and Compliance Commission that oversees PPRA activities,
supplies technical experts for the monitoring visits in Russia, and
hosts the Russian monitors at DOE sites during the shutdown reactor
visits.
An important PPRA milestone has been reached--the three remaining
operating Russian plutonium production reactors recently were shut
down. The two reactors in Seversk were shut down in 2008, and the
closure of the last, at Zheleznogorsk, was announced at the Nuclear
Security Summit in April 2010. In accordance with the Agreement, those
reactors will be transitioned to the established PPRA monitoring regime
to ensure that they remain permanently shutdown. Of the 27 plutonium
production reactors covered in the Agreement, including 14 in the
United States and 13 in Russia, 11 have already been decommissioned to
the point that they have been removed from monitoring and will never be
used again for plutonium production. The United States and Russia will
continue to monitor the remaining reactors until they are similarly
decommissioned and the subject plutonium oxide is transitioned to
another monitoring regime or is eliminated.
Technical Support to the President's Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Agenda
DNN provides technical expertise, drawing from NNSA's nuclear
security enterprise, as well as negotiating and policy expertise, to
support the development, negotiation, and implementation of treaties
and agreements, including the New START Treaty with Russia. While
contributing to overall U.S. national security objectives, our focus is
to meet our current and potential future treaty commitments and
obligations while at the same time continuing to ensure the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Drawing upon our expertise, including work in support of past arms
control and nonproliferation agreements, DNN is playing an essential
role in technology development to address future arms control and
nonproliferation challenges. This includes developing the next
generation of radiation detection equipment, advanced tamper indication
and unique identification capabilities, and methodologies to support
potential future warhead and material identification and verification
requirements. We are also capitalizing on the resources in place at the
National Center for Nuclear Security in Nevada. Such resources enable
us to advance and demonstrate capabilities to address verification,
monitoring, and transparency requirements by increasing confidence in
our ability to detect and discriminate signatures of interest and
capabilities that address technical nuclear forensics requirements and
other nonproliferation initiatives, as described in the Nuclear Posture
Review. We work in close cooperation with NNSA's Defense Programs and
our U.S. Interagency counterparts to develop initiatives that
accomplish U.S. objectives while minimizing any potential impacts
across our own enterprise.
Investing in our future
The Nuclear Science and Security Consortium builds a stable
pipeline of highly trained nuclear nonproliferation technical expertise
for the NNSA laboratory system, sponsors basic research in nuclear
nonproliferation, and bridges the nuclear nonproliferation knowledge
bases in academia and the NNSA Laboratory system. By ensuring DNN
maintains a vital R&D program to fund cutting edge nonproliferation
technologies in the National Lab complex, we also make an investment in
human capital development at the labs. Challenging research
opportunities and world class facilities enable our labs to attract and
hire the best and brightest young research scientists, technicians, and
engineers, and thereby renew the workforce for generations to come. In
addition, the DNN programs engage with national laboratories and
facilities across the DOE complex to ensure the long term capabilities
and expertise necessary to serve all of our missions.
International Engagement
We are also continuing to build upon our existing partnerships with
foreign colleagues and to initiate new partnerships. Our traditional
defense partnership with the United Kingdom, for example, is decades
old. Our collaboration on technologies and methodologies to support
monitoring and verification initiatives is now in the beginning of its
second decade, and provides an essential mechanism to evaluate and test
approaches in alternative environments. We hope to build upon this
success by engaging with other key allies and partners as we work
toward addressing the range of global nuclear security challenges,
including potential future arms limitations and reductions agreements.
NNSA strives to build strong cooperative relationships with our
international partners, both old and new. DNN's NIS program provides
training and other support to enhance the capabilities of our partners
to meet the commitments they made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
The pledges from Japan and the Republic of Korea to develop Centers of
Excellence for nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation are two
examples as NNSA is collaborating with both to develop nuclear security
training curriculum, nuclear security test beds, and international
workshops in nuclear security for their respective centers. The Obama
administration is also working closely with strategic partners such as
China and India to advance regional centers of excellence, with the
overarching goal of spurring deeper engagement in preventing the spread
of WMD-related material, technology, equipment and expertise.
As outlined in his 2009 Cairo speech, the President has also called
for a more comprehensive engagement with Middle East and North African
countries, stressing science and technology partnerships focused on
issues of common concern. Since 2003, NNSA has advanced regional
security cooperation through the Middle East Scientific Institute for
Security (MESIS), formerly known as the Cooperative Monitoring Center,
in Amman, Jordan. As a regional center of excellence, MESIS provides a
forum for training and dialogue on regional security and proliferation
concerns, including export controls, border security, and nuclear
safety, security and safeguards. It marshals regional, U.S., and
international resources to cultivate indigenous nonproliferation
expertise. The Institute also facilitates workshops and training
efforts for other NNSA and U.S. Government nonproliferation programs,
and leverages U.S. Government and international nonproliferation
efforts in the region.
Preparing for the Threats We Don't Know
As threats evolve and our knowledge of the world changes, NNSA must
constantly re-evaluate its efforts to ensure that we have the
flexibility to accomplish our goals. This constant re-evaluation must
stretch from advanced technology R&D to working with our international
partners to prepare for unknown threats by asking them to consider the
plausible range of adversary capabilities, strategies, and tactics--
including insider and cyber capabilities--when designing security
systems. In this way, all of DNN's programs, along with the
complementary activities of our partners throughout NNSA, DOE, and the
rest of the U.S. Government, are forward looking and prepared for any
eventuality.
conclusion
NNSA carefully evaluates its security needs in a fluid, uncertain,
and challenging international landscape. In coordination with the rest
of the U.S. Government, NNSA has charted a path forward for DNN that
shows our unwavering commitment to our Nation's security and enhances
our formidable capabilities to address broader security challenges.
The NNSA is a technically-based organization with a strong nuclear
heritage that serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range
of national security solutions. NNSA is rooted in the management of our
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and the application of nuclear
energy for naval propulsion. Additionally, NNSA capabilities support a
broad range of U.S. and international activities that address existing
dangers, identify and prepare for future challenges, and advise the
U.S. Government and our international partners on nuclear security
matters.
This budget request takes DNN into the future and strengthens the
capabilities that are themselves integral elements of our national
security. The challenge is to retain the capabilities that continue to
be essential, and to identify and develop those capabilities that are
needed for the future.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Mr. Myers.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman: It is an
honor to be here today to address the countering WMD mission
performed by DTRA and the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Center for Combating WMDs. I serve as director for both of
these organizations, which are collocated at Fort Belvoir, VA.
We work together to reduce WMD threats at their source, provide
capabilities to deter, detect, interdict, and defeat them, and
develop means for minimizing the effects and consequences of
such attacks. We provide subject matter expertise and
capabilities at the global, national, and battlefield levels.
We conduct technology development to counter WMD threats. We
also help maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
The threat is very real. The consequences of a WMD attack
would cause mass casualties, have a crippling economic impact,
and cause major sociological harm. As General Bob Kehler, the
Commander of STRATCOM, recently told the full committee: ``Of
the threats we face, WMD clearly represent the greatest threat
to the American people, particularly when they are pursued or
possessed by violent extremists or state proliferators.''
We have an increasingly effective national strategy for
countering this threat. It harnesses expertise across the whole
government and the international community. Our focus is on
building additional and more effective barriers between the
threat and the American people. Our team is truly a unique,
agile, and dynamic institution. As you walk down the halls of
our facilities, you will see nuclear physicists,
microbiologists, and special forces operators working together
to solve complex problems.
If you spend a day with us, this is what you might
experience: At 7:30 a.m., senior leadership assembles in our
24-7 operations center for briefings on ongoing activities
around the world and intelligence updates. In the briefing a
map is projected displaying the location of our teams around
the world. Status updates are provided for ongoing real world
exercises and testing, and a detailed overview of all requests
for information for reachback support from across the entire
government.
Next door in a vault, subject matter experts of the
reachback team are working on a request from a combatant
commander for plume modeling analysis on a threatened chlorine
attack against U.S. forces. At the same time, we are overseeing
the Nunn-Lugar program's elimination of a Typhoon-class missile
submarine in northern Russia. The submarine was armed with 20
intercontinental missiles carrying 200 nuclear warheads, each
capable of destroying an American city. Today it is being
dismantled piece by piece.
Two thousand miles to the southeast, at the Nunn-Lugar
Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Siberia, 152-
millimeter artillery rounds containing VX nerve agent are being
destroyed as the program eliminates the 2 million chemical
weapons stored there. In the Mediterranean, our personnel are
observing a proliferation security initiative exercise, where
they are focused on stopping the potential trafficking of
nuclear weapons material.
Half a world away in the Straits of Malacca, together with
the U.S. Navy and a Southeast Asian partner, we successfully
completed the test of a new nuclear material detector developed
by our research and development enterprise.
At the U.S. naval submarine base at King's Bay, Georgia, we
are preparing for a Russian inspection under the terms of the
New START treaty. Across the planet, an inspection team has
just arrived in Russia, en route to a base in Siberia to
inspect warheads of deployed ballistic missiles or heavy
bombers.
In the Middle East, a team is supporting a U.S. Central
Command exercise to interdict a WMD shipment, while another
team is conducting a vulnerability assessment of a critical
U.S. command and control facility. At White Sands Missile Range
in New Mexico, personnel are preparing to oversee a live test
drop of a 30,000-pound massive ordinance penetrator by a U.S.
Air Force B-2 bomber against a tunnel facility that replicates
a known underground target in a potentially hostile country.
In Africa, at the request of the State Department, we are
assisting a central African nation in improving the safety,
security, and accountability of its manportable anti-aircraft
missiles and other small arms. In East Africa, we are part of a
U.S. interagency team discussing plans with their host
counterparts for safety and security improvements at a facility
where dangerous pathogens are potentially vulnerable to
terrorist threats.
Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, what I have described here
are real examples of the practical differences made by our team
on a daily basis. In closing, we could not do our job without
your strong and continued support. I thank you for authorizing
our full fiscal year 2011 budget request and hope that we will
earn your support for the fiscal year 2012 request.
I'd be pleased to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kenneth A. Myers III
introduction
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission performed by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and U.S. Strategic Command Center for
Combating WMD (SCC-WMD).
The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical
weapons is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential
applications. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such
weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic,
political, and social damage on a global scale. They have stated and
demonstrated their intent to acquire and use WMD against us. For
example, the fall 2010 issue of the magazine ``Inspire . . . and
Inspire the Believers,'' published by al Qaeda, contains the following
passage: ``For those mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or
chemistry lays the greatest opportunity and responsibility. For such
brothers we encourage them to develop a weapon of mass destruction,
i.e., an effective poison with the proper method of delivery . . . Due
to the extreme importance of moving the war with America over to the
next stage, the state of weapons of mass destruction, we shall In Sha'
Allah cover such topics in more detail in our upcoming issues.''
The United States has a national strategy that harnesses the
Counter WMD (CWMD) expertise and capabilities across the U.S.
Government and the international community. The President has
challenged us to secure vulnerable nuclear materials across the globe
and reduce the likelihood and consequences of biological attacks. In
addition, focused efforts by the U.S. Government and other parties to
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are destroying their chemical
weapons. The Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years has better
organized itself to perform the CWMD mission to include more
streamlined policy development, mission oversight, requirements
identification, WMD intelligence fusion, investment prioritization,
planning and exercising, and CWMD mission execution. Additionally, DOD
is working more closely with partners across the U.S. Government and
overseas to counter WMD threats.
defense threat reduction agency mission
The mission of DTRA is to safeguard America and its allies from WMD
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons) and from high-
yield explosives by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and
counter these threats and mitigate their effects.
DTRA is the DOD's center of expertise for the CWMD mission and is a
national asset in terms of its unique CWMD knowledge and capabilities.
The agency's programs and activities span the scope of the full
national response: nonproliferation--reduction of WMD threats at their
source; counterproliferation--the deterrence, interdiction, and defeat
of WMD threats; and consequence management--the minimization of the
effects of WMD attacks and the mitigation of their consequences. DTRA
provides CWMD subject matter expertise at global, national, regional,
local, and battlefield levels; performs CWMD-related technology
development and integrates that technology with operational needs;
provides planning assistance for the warfighters; and helps maintain a
safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. Today, more than
ever, DTRA is working closely with our DOD, interagency, and
international partners to build more effective barriers between WMD
threats and the American people and our allies.
The agency has approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel
located primarily in Virginia, New Mexico, and Florida, but also at 17
more locations across the globe. Our budget request for fiscal year
2012 is $1.487 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Operations and Maintenance,
Procurement, and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $504.747 million
Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DOD Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the
remainder of that program's funding, $1.021 billion. Therefore, the
total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $3 billion.
DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As the Director of DTRA, I
report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because
DTRA conducts CWMD-related S&T development, we also work in partnership
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
In addition, as we are executing programs that implement DOD and
national security policy, DTRA has a close partnership with the
assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Our close
relationship to the Intelligence Community is also vital in terms of
assisting that community in better assessing WMD threats and, thereby,
better informing our planning and mission support.
DTRA is also the DOD Combat Support Agency charged with providing
CWMD expertise and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military
Services, and the combatant commanders. While we serve all combatant
commanders, we work most closely with the six Geographic Combatant
Commanders, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and STRATCOM.
u.s. strategic command center for combating wmd
DTRA's roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it
provided technical and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to
the Military Services. This assistance was and continues to be provided
to the Services and also STRATCOM.
In late 2005, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Commander,
STRATCOM, the responsibilities for integrating and synchronizing DOD
CWMD efforts in support of U.S. Government objectives. The Commander,
STRATCOM turned to DTRA for its CWMD expertise and established the U.S.
Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). On 31 January
2006, the Secretary of Defense assigned the DTRA Director to serve in
the additional capacity as the Director, SCC-WMD under the authority,
direction, and control of the Commander, STRATCOM. The SCC-WMD is
colocated with DTRA at the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Fort
Belvoir to leverage the agency's technical expertise and to provide a
seamless partnership between the two organizations.
The mission of the SCC-WMD is to synchronize planning for the
counter-WMD mission across DOD in conjunction with the entire U.S.
Government's effort in the field. The SCC-WMD is responsible for
establishing technical support and providing analysis of the global
CWMD mission to the combatant commanders, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Staff. The Center's approximately 70 military
and civilian personnel coordinate global CWMD operations support; plan
against designated WMD threats; develop and maintain a global CWMD
concept of operations; provide military representation to U.S. national
agencies, commercial entities, and international agencies for matters
related to CWMD efforts; advocate for CWMD capabilities; integrate
theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities
that support campaigns to combat WMD; and execute CWMD operations, as
directed.
Twice each year, the SCC-WMD hosts the Global Synchronization
Conference, a series of planning sessions that bring together hundreds
of CWMD leaders from across the U.S. Government and several partner
nations. Participants work on specific issues in focus groups, develop
desired outcomes and solution paths, and make meaningful progress on
solution implementation between conferences. Achievements across recent
conferences include development of a DOD-wide CWMD Campaign plan from a
framework document to a detailed plan with goals, tasks, and
performance standards that will enable us to assess CWMD mission
progress; the drafting of health-based chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) decontamination clearance standards
for unrestricted operations of U.S. Transportation Command airlifters;
and an interagency biosurveillance indications and warning exercise
that clarified for CWMD planners the roles of the intelligence and
medical communities in responding to a biological event.
The SCC-WMD also supports WMD Elimination operations undertaken in
a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate,
characterize, secure, and disable or destroy WMD programs and related
capabilities. Its Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE)
provides joint expertise and support in the development, training, and
exercising of WMD Elimination related plans, operations, and forces.
The SCC-WMD and DTRA are providing assistance to the Commander,
STRATCOM, who was tasked to establish and maintain Standing Joint Force
Headquarters for WMD Elimination as called for by the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
Additionally, the Center is a key facilitator of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), an international effort by 98 countries to
stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The
PSI Support Cell assists combatant command staffs in developing,
planning, and executing PSI exercises; assists OSD and the Joint Staff
in planning and executing international PSI exercises involving other
U.S. Government departments and agencies; and provides subject matter
expertise to international PSI meetings and activities.
recent dtra/scc-wmd accomplishments
I am pleased to report that DTRA and the SCC-WMD work together as a
fully integrated team. As a team we have assisted the development of
more efficient and effective DOD and combatant commander CWMD plans;
advanced the means for assessing and exercising CWMD capabilities;
shaped and advocated for CWMD requirements; and provided improved PSI
planning support.
Other recent accomplishments include:
DTRA successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance
Penetrator (MOP) to the United States Air Force. The MOP is a
30,000-pound conventional penetrating weapon designed to
provide substantial improvements in accuracy and lethality over
current weapons in the arsenal to defeat hardened, deeply
buried targets.
DTRA responded this past year to over 1,600 ``reach
back'' requests for CWMD expertise and WMD effects analysis
from OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, National
Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and other DOD and
interagency customers. This is an over four-fold increase in
numbers of requests from when we began providing this expertise
several years ago. In addition, our reach back customers are
asking for more detailed information and analysis, and
expecting faster turn around times. We have provided expertise
and supported events ranging from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan to the Gulf Oil spill to the Super Bowl and the
State of the Union Address.
Without missing a beat in executing our daily mission,
we concurrently responded to events in Libya, supporting
Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, as well as the
consequences of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, by
supporting Operation Tomodachi. At the peak level of activity,
over 200 DTRA and SCC-WMD personnel daily supported 33
liaisons, CWMD planners, JECE personnel, and consequence
management experts deployed to the U.S. Africa Command in
Germany, as well as the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Japan
(USFJ) and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. We responded to well over
500 requests for information in support of both operations. In
addition, we recommended consequence management technologies
for consideration by the Commanders, U.S. Pacific Command and
USFJ. Our ability to support these events at opposite ends of
the earth, on short notice, and on a continuing basis while
still meeting other mission requirements demonstrates the
agility and professionalism of the DTRA/SCC-WMD team.
dtra's new strategic plan
Many organizations within DOD and across the U.S. Government
contribute in some way to countering WMD threats. With a fulltime focus
on CWMD, DTRA provides the core of the DOD expertise for countering WMD
threats. Rather than duplicating capabilities and expertise that exist
elsewhere inside and outside the department, DTRA partners with these
organizations, leveraging their expertise and efforts and making the
full scope of our knowledge and capabilities available to them. As
threats evolve and budgets tighten, we must deepen existing
relationships and build new partnerships across the department and
throughout the U.S. Government and with our friends and allies
overseas. We also understand that we need to be more effective and
efficient in how we perform our mission. Two examples of this are our
ongoing effort with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) on opportunities for: (a) collaborative
R&D on nuclear-related threats; and (b) joint offices that will reduce
required space in U.S. embassies or the need to rent commercial office
space abroad. Both departments and the United States will benefit.
The new DTRA Strategic Plan, released last November, recognizes
today's realities. It will provide for forward movement in concert with
our DOD, interagency, and international partners; facilitate more
efficient and effective mission execution; and underpin our fiscal year
2012 budget request. At the heart of this plan are three goals.
Goal 1--Adapt to and shape the dynamic Global Security Environment
DTRA cultivates interconnected, mutually supportive partnerships to
counter WMD threats. We must focus on developing new and expanding
existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships to promote broader
international cooperation on nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and consequence management; support the cooperative elimination of WMD
threats abroad; improve the security and accountability of vulnerable
nuclear, biological, and chemical material globally; and improve
strategic global situational awareness to respond to emerging threats.
As the revolution in the life sciences advances enabling
technologies and the ability to exploit these technologies becomes
increasingly available, there is the urgent need to provide improved
protection against naturally occurring extremely dangerous pathogens or
newly created biological materials. As American troops are called upon
to operate around the world, disease surveillance becomes an even more
important aspect of force protection.
Guiding these efforts is a strategy built upon our success with the
Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, which is expanding to include new partnerships
beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU) and greater focus on reducing the
threat of biological weapons. This innovative cooperative program for
reducing WMD threats has an impressive history of success. In the FSU,
the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,599 nuclear warheads; and
destroyed 2,367 ballistic missiles and strategic air-to-surface
missiles, 155 strategic bombers; 32 ballistic missile submarines, and
678 silo and mobile missile launchers. In addition, 24 Russian nuclear
weapons storage sites have received security upgrades as have 19 former
biological weapons and health facilities. Four former Soviet biological
weapon production facilities have been eliminated or converted. Twenty-
three disease surveillance labs across the FSU have been built and
equipped to enhance early detection of biological incidents. In
addition, over 17,000 tons of chemical weapon agents and 819,000
chemical weapon rounds have been destroyed either in Russia or Albania.
While Nunn-Lugar activities will continue in the FSU, the program
is expanding to new regions and increasingly focused on cooperative
efforts to reduce biological threats. The Cooperative Biological
Engagement (CBE) Program is working with new partner countries to build
capacity that improves safe and secure diagnosis of dangerous disease
outbreaks and to gain an understanding of their indigenous pathogens.
These Nunn-Lugar efforts will directly contribute to improved force
protection for our military personnel--a top priority for the Services
and the combatant commands as expressed by the Commander, U.S. Africa
Command, in a 4 January 2011 letter to Senator Richard Lugar, who had
visited diagnostic and research laboratories in East Africa in November
2010. In this letter, General Kip Ward stated: ``Your call for the
United States to work together with African partners and provide
financial support to mitigate potential bio-terrorism threats was very
timely and highlights a key area for intensified engagement now. I
share your concern that bio-security should be enhanced, and quickly,
so that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region are denied
access to deadly pathogens that may cause large-scale human suffering,
death, and economic chaos.''
To accomplish this, we rely on the knowledge, skills, capabilities,
and, in some cases, existing relationships with these nations that our
partners across the U.S. Government--including the Departments of
State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture--already
possess. Our efforts simultaneously aid the regional strategic
objectives of the combatant commands by increasing biosafety for
partner nation populations.
Objectives under this goal include:
In collaboration with the NNSA, support President
Obama's 4-year nuclear lockdown goal, both with existing
partners in the FSU and with new partners like China and India.
Initiate and strengthen strategic relationships in
conjunction with our interagency partners to explore
collaborative efforts to prevent, reduce, and respond to WMD
threats.
Initiate and expand CBE programs and relationships
with, among others, Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
India to secure and consolidate collections of extremely
dangerous pathogens and their research in the minimum number of
secure laboratories and build capacity to quickly diagnose and
report natural occurring or deliberate bio-threats.
In concert with the CBDP develop and expand
biosurveillance technologies that encompass early detection,
early information sharing, and the ability to make informed
decisions in near-real time.
Develop bilateral and regional-level capacity to
counter WMD proliferation through collaborative workshops,
training, equipment enhancements, and regionally integrated
counterproliferation efforts to include the International
Counterproliferation Program, the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation
Prevention Program, and various counter-trafficking programs.
Support Department of State Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement efforts to assess, reduce, and secure stockpiles
of small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide. These efforts
help foreign governments ensure that manportable air defense
systems, other SALW, and related ordnance are properly secured
and managed and that excess stockpiles are destroyed. DTRA
performs assessments, provides technical advice, and presents
best practices through training seminars. Although these
weapons and munitions are not WMD, DTRA's on-site weapons
inspection and accountability expertise has been applied to
reduce the proliferation risks and advice countries on how to
avoid accidental explosions in their munitions depots.
In concert with the Department of State, develop and
execute a ``whole-of-government'' supported program to build
consequence management capacity with international partners.
Goal 2--Provide Counter WMD Capabilities to Meet Current Threats and
Challenges
DTRA enables warfighters and allies to counter WMD threats swiftly,
effectively, and as far from our borders as possible.
Counterproliferation and consequence management activities account for
the largest part of this second goal. Related objectives include:
Expansion of near-real time technical ``reach back''
support to meet the increased number and sophistication of WMD
related requests from a growing list of customers including
OSD, the combatant commanders, and the WMD-CSTs.
Priority attention on the safety, security, and
accounting of the Nation's nuclear weapons under DOD's
responsibility.
Expanded development of WMD active and passive
detection technologies and accelerated integration into
operational concepts to measurably increase standoff detection
capabilities and improve means for interdicting WMD on the
move.
Improved non-nuclear means of defeating underground
facilities, particularly those associated with WMD. We have
particularly close partnerships with the Services, SOCOM, and
the Intelligence Community in this area.
Accelerated development and transition of nuclear
forensics and weapons effects capabilities that will increase
the understanding of tomorrow's WMD threat environment and
ensure the survivability and operability of systems and key
infrastructure following WMD attacks.
Enhanced combatant commanders' capability to eliminate
and respond to WMD threats and vulnerabilities, including the
improvement of the combatant commanders' ability to plan and
execute CWMD responsibilities.
Improved WMD technical analysis efforts with
particular emphasis on modeling, simulation, wargaming, and
tool development across the WMD spectrum.
Better integrated intelligence data and WMD technical
expertise to provide improved understanding of the
characteristics, risks, and vulnerabilities of WMD threats.
Develop a collaborative approach to CWMD education and
training better focused on the needs of the combatant
commanders, the Military Services, and our interagency
partners.
Improved capabilities to defeat WMD agents with
minimal collateral damage.
Accelerated development and transition of technologies
to improve the protection of the warfighters through passive
means and decontamination.
In cooperation with the CBDP, develop medical
technologies to protect the warfighter and the populace from
emerging and genetically engineered biological threats by
linking the identification of pathogens to the development of
medical countermeasures and placing higher priority on vaccine
development and production to counter disease pandemics.
Goal 3--Institutionalize a ``whole-of-DTRA'' approach to enhance the
agency's mission performance
The third goal calls for the improvement and integration of
strategic planning, management, and business processes; improved
information technology infrastructure and knowledge management; and the
development of increased intellectual capital to meet the future WMD
threats and provide the required CWMD expertise.
fiscal year 2012 budget request
I would like to thank the subcommittee for fully authorizing DTRA's
fiscal year 2011 budget request. I request your support for our fiscal
year 2012 budget request of $1.487 billion as follows: $432.133 million
in Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide funding; $13.006 million in
Procurement, Defense-wide; $533.652 million in Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide funding; and $508.219 million for
Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. I also urge your support for the request for
the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Science and Technology
(CBDP S&T) program, which DTRA executes. These budget requests include
efficiencies implemented as part of developing the President's budget
submission. Highlights of the DTRA fiscal year 2012 budget request
follow.
operations and maintenance funding
Most DTRA Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding directly
supports the warfighters and national missions. The requested $432.133
million would be applied as follows:
$71.731 million for Nonproliferation Activities
including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Open
Skies missions; Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program;
International Counterproliferation Program; and Secretary of
Defense Support.
$147.113 million for WMD Combat Support and Operations
including combat support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
combatant commands, and Services; operational and analytical
support for nuclear weapons and WMD matters; direct technical
support to the combatant commands for planning, exercises, and
real-world operations; deployable subject matter expertise;
targeting support and combat assessments; Balanced
Survivability Assessments that provide mission survivability
evaluations; Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
to improve force protection at home and abroad; support to the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and support to
Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation planning and
activities.
$25.253 million for DTRA's support to the SCC-WMD
including development and maintenance of a WMD common operating
picture; synchronization of CWMD planning across DOD and with
interagency partners to include the Global Synchronization
Conference; access and continuity to national WMD expertise;
DTRA Operations Center; and 24/7 technical reach back.
$10.093 million for the Defense Threat Reduction
University that provides unique training for students from all
levels of DOD, Federal and state agencies, and allied countries
in nuclear weapons; nuclear and radiological incident command,
control, and response; counterproliferation with emphasis on
operational support; and maintenance of the DOD source of
information and analysis of CWMD and nuclear knowledge.
$177.943 million for Core Mission Sustainment that
provides for all agency mission essential functions including
resource management, security and asset protection, information
and knowledge management, and acquisition and logistics
management. Special care was taken in preparing this request to
ensure that much-needed information technology and knowledge
management upgrades essential to DTRA's global mission
execution were funded to the fullest extent possible.
research, development, test and evaluation funding
DTRA research and development programs respond to the most pressing
CWMD challenges including stand-off nuclear detection; modeling and
simulation; support to Special Operations Forces; WMD intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; support to the Intelligence
Community; hard target defeat; and system survivability against WMD
effects.
The requested $533.652 million would be applied as follows:
$47.737 million for Basic Research to discover and
develop CWMD-related fundamental knowledge and understanding by
DOD and other U.S. Government laboratories, industry, and
academia--to include partnerships with foreign universities.
This program manages over 200 active basic research awards on a
3- to 5-year cycle. Since 2007, DTRA has made 205 basic
research awards worth $97.2 million in 36 States, thereby
funding the CWMD-related research projects performed by more
than 500 students and 100 post-doctoral researchers and
resulting in more than 500 publications and 25 patents.
$196.954 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied
Research including systems engineering and innovation; counter-
terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced
energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; nuclear and
radiological effects; WMD battle management; test
infrastructure; and CWMD fundamental research.
$283.073 million for Counterproliferation Initiatives
Advanced Technologies Development including systems engineering
and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection
technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear
survivability; WMD battle management; and target assessment
technologies.
$5.888 million for WMD Defeat Capabilities Development
and Demonstration on nuclear and radiological effects.
cbdp s&t budget request
Defending the homeland and improving CBRN defense capabilities are
top national and DOD priorities because it is not possible in a
practical sense to distinguish between public health and warfighter
protection. The CBDP is a key part of a comprehensive, national
strategy to prevent, protect, and respond to emerging 21st century
threats posed by an ever-evolving spectrum of chemical and biological
threats. Directed by the National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats, the White House Initiative on Reinventing the Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and
the Defense Planning and Program Guidance, the CBDP supports
comprehensive DOD efforts to: research, develop, and acquire
capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRN agents;
better understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous
materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although
the funding for the CBDP is not part of the DTRA budget request, the
agency does execute the S&T portion of this program, for which the
department has requested $504.747 million in fiscal year 2012.
This S&T funding provides for technology development to advance
CBRN detection, decontamination, medical treatments and diagnostics,
battle analysis and management, modeling and simulation, integrated
early warning and medical surveillance, individual and collective
protection, and medical prophylaxes. I will highlight four significant
programs and initiatives:
The Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI) will
address unique operational medical countermeasures (MCM)
requirements; establish a Public-Private Partnership for
advanced development of MCM candidates to achieve Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) licensure, priority manufacture of FDA-
licensed products, and surge production capacity to respond to
a national emergency. This program is vital to staying ahead of
WMD threats and I urge your strong support for it.
The Transformational Medical Technologies (TMT)
Program represents a paradigm shift for biodefense through the
rapid identification of known and unknown pathogens and the
corresponding rapid discovery of effective countermeasures. The
TMT has demonstrated an ``end-to-end'' capability to respond to
emerging infectious diseases and genetically engineered
threats. This highly successful effort has demonstrated
abilities to: perform threat identification, characterization,
and evaluation within 24 hours; manufacture and test materials
in 72 hours; and initiate animal efficacy testing within 2
weeks, to be completed within 1 year.
Since time is the key critical factor in responding to
biological threats, enhancing global biosurveillance
capabilities is a priority for DOD. Biosurveillance activities
performed by the department include research, development, and
acquisition of medical diagnostics, data fusion and management,
and environmental biodetection capabilities. DOD
biosurveillance activities are enhanced by establishing
strategic partnerships and scientific cooperative efforts with
partner Federal departments and agencies as well as nations
across the globe.
Nontraditional Agents (NTAs) are chemicals and
biochemicals reportedly researched or developed with potential
application or intent as chemical warfare agents, but which do
not fall in the category of traditional chemical warfare agents
or Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Materials. NTAs pose unique risks
and challenges for our chemical defense capabilities and the
NTA Countering Advanced Threats initiative addresses emerging
and future capabilities.
It is important to emphasize that DOD CBDP programs are conducted
in partnership with, and leverage the expertise and capabilities of,
departments and agencies across the U.S. Government.
procurement funding
The DTRA Procurement, Defense-wide request replaces mission
essential vehicles and equipment and procures new investment items
required to perform agency missions. The fiscal year 2012 request is
for $13.006 million, $0.949 million higher than the fiscal year 2011
estimate. As with the DTRA O&M account, special care was taken in
preparing this request to ensure that critically essential information
technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA's global
mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible.
nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction funding
The Nunn-Lugar program's overarching mission is to partner with
willing countries to reduce the threat of WMD and related materials,
technologies, and expertise. This program has expanded its activities
beyond the FSU as authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008. For fiscal year 2012, the Nunn-Lugar program has
been restructured to clearly link efforts to established national
security strategies, gain efficiencies among related project efforts,
and enable and promote the expansion of the program beyond the FSU.
The $508.219 million, a 3-year appropriation, requested for this
program in fiscal year 2012 would be applied for 3 years as follows:
$63.221 million for Strategic Offensive Arms
Elimination in Russia to include 20 SS-19 Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 11 SS-19 silos and launch control
centers, 36 SS-25 ICBMs, 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers, and 20
SS-N-18 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). This
request is a $10.311 million less than the fiscal year 2011
estimate. In addition the funding would decommission one SS-25
ICBM regiment; complete the dismantlement of nuclear reactor
cores and launcher sections of 1 DELTA III Ballistic Missile
Submarine (SSBN) and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers; and complete
the dismantlement of the nuclear reactor cores and launcher
sections of one Typhoon SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers.
$9.804 million for Chemical Weapons Destruction
technical support to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility
at Shchuch'ye, Russia. This is $6.204 million more than the
fiscal year 2011 estimate. To date, this effort has resulted in
the destruction of 1,680.4 metric tons of declared chemical
weapon agents.
$121.143 million for Global Nuclear Security. This is
$43.136 million less than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. This
program area renames and consolidates all activities related to
nuclear warhead and weapons-grade nuclear material security
within selected countries. These efforts provide enhanced
physical security, including associated inventory management
and security training support, for strategic and non-strategic
(tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program
also improves security for nuclear material that meets specific
criteria for enrichment and quantity and is judged to be
vulnerable. In addition, it assists in the secure transport of
nuclear warheads and other qualifying material to dismantlement
facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing
facilities for disposition. This program also assists with the
establishment of Centers of Excellence with partner countries
to enhance training capabilities for nuclear security, material
control, and inventory management that is consistent with best
international practices, and installs additional security
measures in Kazakhstan.
$259.470 million for Cooperative Biological
Engagement. This is $50.436 million more than the fiscal year
2011 estimate. This program was formerly titled Biological
Threat Reduction. The CBE program counters the threat posed by
pathogens (as delineated in the U.S. Select Agent List);
related materials and expertise; and other emerging infectious
disease risks. It helps prevent these pathogens from reaching
any foreign state or non-state actors who may use them against
the United States and its allies. The CBE program focuses on
delivering tailored approaches that recognize and build upon
partner countries' indigenous capacities. The CBE program
builds capacity and advocates best practices for the safe and
secure handling of extremely dangerous pathogens. It supports
transparent responsible research to understand indigenous
dangerous pathogens in partnership with the whole of U.S.
Government and international partners. These collaborative
partnerships enhance global capacity to detect, diagnose, and
mitigate biological risks of concern. These partnerships also
facilitate an ability to initiate timely and effective disease
control measures to contain trans-border global disease
threats. The program is engaged with Ukraine, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Kenya, and Uganda. In fiscal year 2012, it will partner with
Iraq, Tanzania, Djibouti, South Africa, and India.
$28.080 million for Proliferation Prevention by
building partner capacity in Armenia and Moldova, in
collaboration with counterproliferation capacity building
programs across the U.S. Government, and expanding ongoing
efforts within the FSU, to include additional land border
assistance and bolstered regional training capacities in
Ukraine; land border assistance in Armenia; and possible land
border training and equipment assistance in Moldova. This is
$1.919 million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate.
Additionally, it is envisioned that this will support project
assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that
enhance CWMD command, control, communications, surveillance,
and detection and interdiction capabilities.
$2.5 million for Threat Reduction Engagement
opportunities in new geographical areas. This is $2.500 million
less than the fiscal year 2011 estimate.
$24.001 million for Other Assessments/Administrative
Support including audits and examinations of provided
assistance, contractor advisory and assistance services, and
U.S. Embassy support in partner countries. This is $0.961
million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate.
conclusion
Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee,
the DTRA/SCC-WMD team has an impressive record of reducing, deterring,
defeating and countering WMD threats. We have strong partnerships with
the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, across the U.S. Government,
and with allies and friends overseas. DTRA has made and continues to
make the world safer--whether we are performing on-site inspections as
part of the U.S. arms control treaty obligations; overseeing the
destruction of FSU WMD weaponry; conducting imaginative and
unprecedented threat reduction activities; developing new capabilities
for defeating WMD in place or on the move; protecting people, systems,
and infrastructure; improving CWMD planning; enabling CWMD operations;
and supporting the U.S nuclear deterrent.
In the years ahead we will be expanding cooperative threat
reduction and engagement on a worldwide scale with new partners. We
will enable the warfighters and our allies to more effectively and
efficiently counter WMD threats by providing the intellectual,
technical, and operational expertise that will permit far more
effective decision making and mission execution.
I hope that we continue to earn your trust and support. I would be
pleased to respond to your questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Mr. Handelman.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH B. HANDELMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY JED ROYAL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Handelman. Madam Chairman, Senator Portman: It's an
honor to testify today on DOD's nonproliferation activities and
on our efforts more broadly to counter the threat of WMDs. It's
a personal pleasure to be joined by Mr. Jed Royal, who is
sitting behind me to my left, who is the Director of the Office
of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy. It's Jed and his team,
working with Ken Myers and his team, who actually make things
really happen in the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction
program.
I'd like to focus my opening remarks on an area that has
attracted significant attention and indeed to which you
referred, Madam Chairman, in your opening remarks. That is
DOD's work in biodefense. Now let me be clear about the
administration's WMD priorities overall. The President has said
that the greatest threat to the United States is a nuclear
weapon in the hands of a terrorist. However, the President has
also given a similar high priority to biodefense. The December
2009 national strategy for countering biological threats
highlighted the significant threat to our people, our coalition
partners, and our forces posed by especially dangerous
pathogens.
Sometimes it is not so obvious why DOD should care so much
about biodefense issues. Let me briefly highlight why we care
and very much. First, biodefense is not merely about the health
of U.S. troops and their families. It's about the ability of
U.S. troops to fight and win in an environment that might be
compromised by diseases against which we have no protection or
treatment.
Second, even if U.S. forces are prepared to fight in such
an environment, our doctrine and our force structure require
that we fight alongside coalition partners. If our partners are
vulnerable to biothreats, then we can count them out of the
fight right from the start.
Third, biodefense is an area where we can use modest
investments prior to a conflict to maximize our capabilities
during a conflict. Here are some of the things that we are
already doing in this area. To limit proliferation of
especially dangerous pathogens, we're working with partner
countries in areas where dangerous diseases are endemic to
improve laboratory physical security and security practices.
To improve our understanding of dangerous diseases that can
impact our troops, we're expanding cooperative research
projects with partner countries and leveraging the U.S.
military's overseas lab network. To improve our early warning
posture, we're pursuing a disease surveillance capability that
will give us a heads-up about the origin and potency of
outbreaks that could spread in our forces or our population.
These are just a few examples of how DOD is trying to get
ahead of what we believe is an underaddressed security
challenge. I want to emphasize how closely we coordinate with
our colleagues in the public health business without getting
into their business. We have been careful to maintain our focus
on national security and to avoid overlap with the efforts of
established U.S. public health outreach overseas. But it is
very important that DOD engage aggressively in this global
biodefense effort. DOD and State are the only U.S. agencies
with authority to develop biodefense relationships with
partners around the globe in support of U.S. national security,
and DOD has a special equity, given how frequently and far
afield we deploy our military members.
Our work in this area is still in its infancy. We have a
great partnership with other U.S. agencies and we are learning
important lessons. I want to leave you with two of those
lessons as I wrap up.
First, we've learned that, as with other WMD, threats to
the health of our forces are best addressed at the source, in
regions where dangerous diseases originate.
Second, we've learned that, even as we carefully deconflict
our biodefense work with activities of our public health
colleagues, there really is no way to draw a bright line
distinction between public health and national security.
Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, I wanted to use my opening
remarks to focus on DOD's biodefense activities because this is
a conversation that we need to expand with the committee. As
biological science becomes more accessible and borders less
secure, we believe that the bio threat will only increase, and
DOD's biodefense activities will increase as well.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Handelman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kenneth B. Handelman
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the
Department of Defense's (DOD) countering weapons of mass destruction
(CWMD) efforts. The Department is building on its legacy of
counterproliferation and threat reduction work while adjusting
activities to meet new proliferation challenges and emerging threats. I
welcome the opportunity to discuss these developments with you today.
It is a special honor to appear with two colleagues with whom I
work very closely: the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA), Ken Myers, and the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ms.
Anne Harrington.
DTRA and the office I oversee--OSD-Policy's Global Strategic
Affairs organization--serve complementary roles in the development,
execution, and oversight of the Department's CWMD mission. In general
terms, my office develops strategy and policy guidance, manages
interagency and international relationships, and sets Department CWMD
priorities. DTRA is the entity responsible for implementing the CWMD
strategic guidance which my office has developed. DTRA accomplishes
this mission with acquisition oversight of the Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological programs. As a practical matter, all
of these DOD components execute responsibilities at all levels in close
coordination with each other, and with combatant commanders, especially
U.S. Strategic Command.
Our missions are executed with essential support from the
Department of State, and in cooperation with Ms. Harrington and her
team at NNSA. I do not claim complete success in all we do, but it is
not an exaggeration to say that the U.S. Government's CWMD
``community'' is a successfully integrated interagency team.
global environment and dod's strategy
The threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) remains complex. The intent of states and non-state actors to
acquire WMD, combined with the availability of sensitive materials and
increased access to scientific expertise make WMD more accessible than
ever to potential adversaries.
President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that
overcoming the threat posed by WMD--especially the nexus between WMD
and terrorism--requires a comprehensive approach. This is reflected in
the broad strategic framework that guides our efforts.
The 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats, a comprehensive approach to prevent or respond to the
proliferation and use of biological weapons by states or non-
state actors. A key part of this strategy is a broad effort to
increase capability worldwide to conduct effective and timely
disease surveillance and to improve capacity to counter both
naturally occurring and deliberately-caused disease outbreaks
through the application of targeted and proven tools for
biological risk management.
The 2010 National Security Strategy, which outlines a
comprehensive nonproliferation and security agenda, including
reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear
weapons, promoting regional stability, and ensuring the
effectiveness of our deterrent and defensive capabilities.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which devotes
more attention to this challenge than any prior defense review,
establishes ``Preventing Proliferation and Countering WMD'' and
``Defending the United States and Supporting Civil Authorities
at Home'' among the Department's top six priority mission
areas.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which seeks to better
align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent
priorities--preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation
while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
In support of these efforts, DOD is aligning its CWMD programs to
become more flexible and responsive. Here our approach is three-fold:
First, we are supporting the administration's broader effort to
reinvigorate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties.
Second, we seek to secure or eliminate WMD threats at their source and
in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond
to emerging threats, and to ensure our troops, along with coalition
partners, can fight and win in an environment contaminated by chemical,
biological, radiological or other hazards. These three lines of effort
can be summed up as touchstones: leadership, partnership, and
innovation.
strengthening the nonproliferation regimes
This area of effort is about enhancing U.S. leadership in global
non-proliferation forums.
For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a
nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective
vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives,
regimes, and treaties offers important tools for advancing this
critical agenda. The administration's efforts to strengthen the global
non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to raising barriers to WMD
proliferation. In this area we are not naive: the worst actual or
potential proliferators won't meet non-proliferation obligations under
any circumstance. However, a number of nations face choices about their
role in the world's WMD nonproliferation ``conversation''; with strong
U.S. leadership we can convince them from staying on the sidelines, or
worse, from becoming proliferators themselves.
We are actively working to strengthen the NPT--the cornerstone of
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The May 2010 NPT Review Conference
reaffirmed parties' commitment to the Treaty and significantly achieved
consensus on an Action Plan for future progress. This Action Plan
endorsed a balanced approach to advance the three pillars of the
regime: nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear
disarmament. DOD will continue to actively participate with State and
our interagency colleagues in international activities to implement
this Plan. The United States' ``negative security assurance'' set forth
in DOD's 2010 Report of the Nuclear Posture Review is clear: ``The
United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear NPT and in
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.'' This
assurance underscores the security benefits of adhering to, and
complying fully with, the NPT.
In addition, the administration is committed to ratification of the
CTBT. The CTBT would limit countries without nuclear weapons from
confidently deploying such weapons; it would hinder existing nuclear
powers from developing new types of warheads. As a sign of our
commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our
unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, and will remain fully
engaged in development of the Treaty's verification regime. At the same
time, we remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent for our security and that of our allies.
We also seek a FMCT that would ban production of fissile material
for use in nuclear weapons. DOD continues to support discussions among
technical experts in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. These
discussions are not a substitute for actual negotiations, but hopefully
they will foster greater appreciation of key technical issues.
Further, we are engaged actively in efforts to ensure that the
upcoming Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference
strengthens the global norm against possession and use of biological
weapons. We hope to expand membership in the Convention and strengthen
its implementation to meet the bioweapons challenges of the 21st
century. As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to increase the
transparency of our biological defense activities; the United States is
encouraging other treaty parties to do the same.
Finally, the administration recognizes the importance of
multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent
proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Since its creation in 2003, nearly one hundred countries have endorsed
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which commits signatories
to take action individually and cooperatively, as necessary to
interdict WMD related materials in transit to states of proliferation
concern. The PSI also continues to help build states' individual and
collective ability to fulfill this commitment, using military
exercises, table top workshops and ship-boarding training. This year we
are focusing our efforts to promote key interdiction capabilities,
identify resources to support these capabilities, and design strategies
to proactively engage nations in the capacity-building process.
Last year the U.N. Security Council imposed the toughest sanctions
to date against Iran. As with the case of North Korea, the Security
Council called on states to inspect suspicious cargo bound from or to
Iran at airports, seaports, and on the high seas. This illustrated the
utility of PSI and related activities to non-proliferation success.
U.N. members are now obligated to block North Korean and Iranian
transfers of WMD and related cargoes, to include missile parts,
explosives, and other nuclear-related technology. Exercises and
training provided under the PSI help increase the international
community's collective capability to execute these activities.
United States multilateral non-proliferation leadership was
punctuated last year by the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit,
attended by 47 countries. The momentum and specific non-proliferation
accomplishments generated by the Summit were impressive, and we are
supporting the Republic of Korea as it prepares to host the next
Nuclear Security Summit in spring 2012.
reducing and eliminating threats
This area of effort focuses on our essential partnership with
governments dealing with legacies of WMD on their territory, or which
are interested in building the capacity to prevent WMD and related
materials from crossing their borders illicitly.
Since its inception in 1992, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program has worked with states of the former Soviet
Union (FSU) to address nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical
threats. Since 2005, CTR has evolved to keep pace with the changing
global security environment, and that evolution has accelerated
recently. In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, determined that CTR partnerships
with Iraq, India, China, and the countries of Africa will assist the
United States in achieving long-standing nonproliferation goals, as
well as sustaining long-term partnerships that enhance security. The
Secretary's action adds to his 2009 determination to pursue CTR
cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This work beyond CTR's
``traditional'' area of operations in the FSU reflects opportunities we
see for expanded partnerships on WMD security issues. Four principles
guide evolution of CTR as we expand geographically: integration,
responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation.
Integration
In the past, CTR was often the lead U.S. interlocutor with a
foreign government on a particular project. In the future, CTR needs to
build on work that other U.S. and international agencies have
accomplished, taking care to leverage others' success without
reinventing-the-wheel. This is especially true in CTR's expanding bio-
engagement.
Responsiveness
CTR has typically taken a very methodical approach to its
activities. Should the need arise, we are revising procedures to in
order that we can be agile enough to accept targets of opportunity and
flexible enough to utilize CTR in new regions and for new projects.
Stewardship
We are working closely with DTRA to ensure that partner countries
can join effectively in sustaining the capacity that many new CTR
projects are intended to create.
Cooperation
CTR is about protecting U.S. interests. However, we increase our
risks when our solutions are devised with an inside-the-Beltway
perspective. We can better leverage partners' local creativity to meet
common goals.
Having just described the principles governing CTR's geographic
expansion, it is worth highlighting two other points of principle.
First, we are expanding the program beyond its traditional area of
activity because we believe that a threat persists which CTR can help
address. CTR has built important interagency relationships and global
experience working in remote locations; this is a valuable asset we are
redeploying in relevant, modernized ways in pursuit of U.S. interests.
Second, our geographic expansion of CTR does not necessarily imply
significantly increased costs. We appreciate Congress's support last
year for a substantial increase in CTR's budget. We believe that step
addressed a prior mismatch between CTR's missions and resources.
However, at this time we believe the fiscal year 2012 budget request
and the program's future years projected baseline is well-balanced
against likely demands. DOD will do its part in the national deficit
reduction effort, and we are prepared to make hard choices in the CTR
program should they be necessary.
The President has requested $508.2 million for CTR in fiscal year
2012. This figure supports a variety of counter-WMD efforts described
in my testimony, within the context of Secretary Gates' imperative to
maximize efficiencies in the Department. DTRA and the NNSA have also
presented balanced requests, well-synchronized across the CWMD
community. I urge the committee's support for these requests; I'd like
to highlight a few of the activities these funds will support.
CTR's strategic nuclear systems elimination work in the FSU has
largely been concluded; however, work continues in Russia as ballistic
missiles, launchers, and ballistic missile submarines are being
dismantled in verifiable fashion. With the entry into force of the New
START Treaty, we anticipate that the Russian Federation will request
continued CTR assistance to ensure strategic systems are properly
disposed of with no residual proliferation-sensitive components
remaining.
CTR also assists Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally
sound destruction of a portion of its nerve agent stockpile that is
most vulnerable to theft or diversion. Russia is responsible for
meeting its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention; CTR's
involvement focuses only on the most dangerous, most proliferable
portion of the former Soviet stockpile and related infrastructure. Our
current chemical weapons-related work in Russia involved primarily
technical assistance: we are ensuring proper maintenance at the
Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility constructed by CTR,
which began eliminating chemical weapons in March 2009. This protects
our investment, as well as the contributions of other donor countries.
Through CTR's work in Russia, DOD is contributing to the ``site-
level'' approach of the interagency strategy for the President's global
nuclear lockdown agenda, described by my DOE colleague. CTR continues
to assist Russia with transport of nuclear warheads from operational
locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated
storage sites. We are also assisting Russia with secure transport of
spent naval fuel that is both enriched and vulnerable to a degree that
gives rise to proliferation concern. CTR's successful partnership with
the Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense
to secure warhead storage sites also continues. Although primary
activity for this effort (the so-called ``Bratislava Initiative'')
concluded some years ago, CTR is ensuring that Russia can sustain the
modernized physical protection systems that were installed for the long
term. This sustainment work is nearing completion, and we are working
with DOE to transition responsibility for their sustainment to the
Russian Federation.
CTR considers each Russian request independently; not all requests
for support are granted. We continue to believe that engagement with
Russia through the CTR program supports U.S. nonproliferation and
strategic interests. Moreover, cooperation with Russia funded through
CTR has endured as a steady, open channel even when the success of
other aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship have been inconsistent.
We are also leveraging our nuclear security experience in the
former Soviet Union to support the implementation of the ``country-
level'' and ``global-level'' approaches of the global nuclear lockdown
strategy. Alongside DOE and other interagency stakeholders, CTR is
supporting a ``Center of Excellence'' for Nuclear Security in China,
and will participate with India in the nuclear security component of
its Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, both announced at the
April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Through these Centers we hope to be
able to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate
equipment, and contribute to national and regional training programs.
DOD is also active in multilateral nuclear security collaborations,
such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as
the Nuclear Security Summit process.
The most dynamic area of CTR activity for the foreseeable future
will be biodefense. CTR's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program
(CBEP) (formerly designated Bio-Threat Reduction Program) is pursuing
four lines of effort. First, CBEP consolidates and secures collections
of especially dangerous pathogens that might serve as the source for
biological weapons. Second, CBEP provides laboratory safety
enhancements and training to prevent accidental release of especially
dangerous pathogens. Third, CBEP strengthens partner countries'
detection, diagnostic, and reporting systems with training, technology
upgrades, and improvements to laboratory detection networks. Finally,
CBEP promotes collaborative research projects to increase capacity to
understand and recognize the most dangerous pathogens. Collectively,
these four areas help address the growing human and animal biodefense
challenge which we believe has heretofore lacked appropriate resources
and attention from U.S. agencies with national security missions. CBEP
activities are synchronized with the National Security Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats, specifically, its goals of strengthening
global health security, obtaining timely insight on emerging outbreaks,
reducing the potential for exploitation of life sciences material and
technology, and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct.
The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) continues to
partner with countries of the FSU and is active in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In Georgia, we recently
opened a new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) and are in the process
of helping it become an internationally recognized center for disease
surveillance and diagnostics. A similar effort is underway in
Kazakhstan. In Ukraine, the CBEP consolidate Ukraine's human especially
dangerous pathogens at an upgraded, secure facility, with an eye toward
taking similar action for Ukraine's animal especially dangerous
pathogens.
Earlier, I mentioned Secretary Gates' approval of CTR expansion to
Africa for biodefense work; and I'd like to say a bit more about why
DOD views Africa as a priority for this kind of engagement. Africa is a
continent that is rich in indigenous, naturally-occurring especially
dangerous pathogens, which local scientists and health professionals
must work with on a routine basis. Limited funding for training,
infrastructure and other needs means that this work is all too often
performed with less than ideal safety and security standards in place.
Security of borders is also a challenge in many parts of Africa. These
factors make Africa a tempting destination for both state and non-state
organizations that seek biological weapons.
The United States and its allies have had a longstanding public-
health presence in Africa, a base of experience and familiarity that
facilitates CTR's activities on the continent. Potential African
partner governments are both enthusiastic and creative about the
opportunities for Nunn-Lugar CTR program activities, and we are working
with them to pursue a regional approach for our cooperative engagement
program that would have a lasting impact beyond traditional bilateral
relationships. The U.S. military has important relationships in the
Horn of Africa and elsewhere, so we view our activities as directly
supporting U.S. troops' security, in addition to furthering larger non-
proliferation goals. Our work has been aided greatly by the support of
State Department colleagues and country teams as CTR managers build
relationships in the program's first major expansion outside the FSU.
While securing WMD materials at their sources is an important
component of the CTR program, our strategy requires a layered defense
against WMD proliferation threats. CTR's WMD Proliferation Prevention
Program (PPP) can enhance partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD
``on the move'' through provision of detection, surveillance, and
interdiction capabilities. DTRA's International Counterproliferation
Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive investments of the WMD-
PPP program through its modest ``train and equip'' efforts. ICP is
unique in its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD
across the FSU, the Baltic States, and in Eastern Europe. We are
currently working to determine how best to expand both border security
programs to new partners.
detecting and responding to emerging threats
This area of activity will depend for success on innovation in
technology, intelligence, and planning; innovation which we will need
to foster. Our attention in this regard has focused on re-looking the
Nation's defenses against the threat of loose nuclear material, plus
consideration of new defenses against emerging biological threats.
As President Obama said in his April 2009 Prague speech, ``the
threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear
attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. . . .
Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound.
Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal'' a nuclear weapon.
The President's charge to executive agencies was to look again at what
heretofore had been viewed as a reliable whole-of-U.S. Government
response should we suspect a terrorist organization has obtained one or
more nuclear devices. Faced with such a threat, we will potentially
need a globally-synchronized response to detect, interdict, and contain
the effects of nuclear weapons. This could include activities such as
securing material at the source, intercepting material on the move, and
increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is also closely intertwined with
state challenges. For instance, the instability or collapse of a
nuclear-armed state could quickly lead to proliferation of nuclear
weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involve
multiple state and non-state actors as it moves. Our plans for these
potential challenges need to be revised to reflect the ever-increasing
velocity of information, new challenges and capabilities in
intelligence collection, and enduring technical hurdles related to
nuclear detection and forensics.
Within DOD, we seek to synchronize a layered defense against these
threats that includes enhanced protective posture of the homeland;
better identification of likely proliferation pathways; and, new
abilities to detect and characterize sources and properties threats. We
can be certain that in a nuclear or other WMD crisis, all these
activities would be occurring simultaneously, under withering media
scrutiny. Our focus in DOD is to improve capacity among top leaders,
the combatant commanders, and the providers of key expertise to
coordinate efforts as a potential threat is tracked from remote parts
of the globe.
The emerging biodefense threat lacks the signature characteristics
of a ``loose nuke,'' but is no less dangerous.
An important priority of the President's National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats is increasing capability to conduct
effective and timely disease surveillance worldwide. This will improve
our capacity to respond successfully to both naturally occurring and
deliberate disease outbreaks. A 2009 report by the National Research
Council noted that countries which lack the public health
infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and report naturally
occurring disease outbreaks are substantially less able to effectively
deal with a bio-terror attack. I spoke earlier of efforts of the CTR
program to address the bio-surveillance shortfall. In addition, we have
worked with the Army and Navy to restructure DOD support for its
overseas laboratory system beginning in fiscal year 2012. These labs
are DOD's primary means to discover novel pathogens or characterize
pathogens that are not generally found in the United States. Within the
military medical community these labs have long been well-known for
their intrepid work protecting U.S. military members from disease. The
innovation we will implement in 2012 is to begin leveraging these
important facilities for non-proliferation purposes, as an addition to
their original clinical missions.
Other innovations reflect an array of concerns about the changing
WMD threat and how best to prepare our troops and coalition partners to
confront it:
The revolution in biotechnology and the chemical
industry is undermining our confidence in defenses currently
protecting our forces. With growing access to expertise,
equipment and precursors needed to produce new chemical or
biological compounds, we sought more RDT&E funding to develop
improved countermeasures, personal protection gear, and
research new decontamination techniques to mitigate the effects
of novel chemical and biological agents.
We have recognized a need for innovation in our
military organizational capacity to counter WMD threats. The
2010 QDR called for a new standing Joint Force Headquarters for
Elimination which will serve as a permanent, join advocate for
training, exercising and refining military tactics, techniques
and procedures related to WMD elimination. The Secretary
designated U.S. Strategic Command as the lead, and the command
is currently completing its mission analysis. The standing
headquarters will greatly increase DOD's capability to locate,
characterize, secure, disable or destroy hostile WMD
capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive
environment.
We have also made a down-payment on innovative
approaches to building partners' WMD defense capabilities. For
fiscal year 2012, the DOD budget request includes a small
start-up fund for ``counter-WMD Cooperative Defense
Initiatives.'' These funds are dedicated for each Geographic
Combatant Command to provide an initial capacity for
interoperability among U.S. forces and regional partners, and
ensure partner nations can survive an attack, eliminate further
threats, and manage the humanitarian consequences of a WMD
attack. This initiative is supported strongly by our COCOM
counterparts and we look forward to reporting to Congress in
future years on its progress.
Finally, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the new Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and
Government at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit reaffirmed the
Alliance's commitment to further develop NATO's capacity to
defend against the threat of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons. At the United States'
behest, the Strategic Concept directed NATO to assess how it
can improve capacity to counter proliferation of WMD and their
means of delivery. DOD is working closely with State to assist
NATO in this important effort.
conclusion
Congress has provided authorities and resources which allow DOD to
address the WMD threat to our troops and our people. It is an evolving
threat that spans traditional counter-proliferation and non-
proliferation responses. Our mission is to ensure that DOD's responses
stay ahead of the threat in order that our troops and those of our
coalition partners can fight and win in a WMD environment, and that our
people are protected from WMD threats. We are committed to working
closely with our interagency and international partners, and with
Congress in this endeavor.
Senator Hagan. Thanks to all three of you.
What I'd like to do is to now take maybe 6-minute questions
each, and then we'll have a second round.
Let me just mention budgets for a quick question. NNSA did
not receive all of the funding requested in its fiscal year
2011 budget. What is the programmatic impact of not receiving
the amount requested? What will not get done, and will not
having all of the requested funding in fiscal year 2011 have an
impact on the fiscal year 2012 funding and programs?
Ms. Harrington.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you very much for that question.
Fiscal year 2011 has been a management challenge. I will not
mince words about that. The successive continuing resolutions
have caused us to rebalance our programming on a very regular
basis throughout the year so far. We're very pleased and
grateful that we're now on solid footing for the remainder of
the year.
Through good management and creative distribution of
available funds, we have preserved all of the critical
activities that are scheduled under the 4-year lockdown effort.
We feel confident right now that we will be able to meet all of
the high-level presidential commitments that were made. So in
that regard, we have been able to successfully preserve that
piece of our programming.
That is not to say that none of our programming was
affected. Certainly when you simply don't have the money
certain things will suffer. So the radiological source recovery
and security activities that we typically undertake in the
United States have been cut back, and we have also eliminated
some of the funding for the Russia piece of the fissile
material disposition program. But we have done that without
sacrifice to those programs. We will see some of those funds
come back in future years, so it's not that those weren't
important items to fund. It's just that we had to postpone
certain things because of budget realities this year.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Myers, I understand the DTRA is in a
similar position. What impact will the reductions in fiscal
year 2011 have on DTRA's mission and what won't get done?
Mr. Myers. Thank you. Let me take one step back before I
discuss 2011 and 2012. I think it's important to put this in
the proper context. DTRA was flat-lined for approximately a
decade. So the 2011 budget that was submitted by the President
for DTRA represented a significant increase, approximately 17.5
percent, and we are very appreciative of the fact that the vast
majority of those resources were provided. A small cut was
made, but the vast majority of those were provided.
So when you compare the 2010 to the 2011 to the 2012 budget
request that Senator Portman suggested, you will see a spike.
So the 2012 request is not necessarily a cut. It is not as high
as the correction, if you will, of the 2011 budget.
Now, I will tell you we have taken the Secretary of
Defense's challenge very, very seriously. We are working very
hard to become more effective, more efficient, with the
resources that we have. We are prioritizing. We have taken a
very long, hard look at what we're doing and how we're doing
it, to ensure that we're getting maximum efficiency out of
every effort currently underway.
We have shut down a number of offices because we believe we
can support them equally well from our headquarters with
foreign trips or TDY efforts or the like. We've also looked at
a number of our efforts and narrowed the technological paths
that we're following in those areas. We've also done a complete
rack-and-stack prioritization of all the things that we do at
DTRA.
The item that came out at the bottom was the Advanced
Systems and Concepts Office. This is an organization that has
sponsored dialogues and conferences and studies in the past,
and we identified that as our lowest priority. That is going to
be significantly cut back in the future. We will continue some
support for those efforts in coordination with Policy and our
friends at the NNSA. But those are the ways that we have
identified savings, so we can continue to place the highest
priorities in our role as a combat support agency directly to
the warfighter and continue our threat reduction activities and
our research and development activities as well.
Senator Hagan. I appreciate your comments on having to be
more efficient and more effective, and I think every agency and
every entity has to be doing that. So thank you.
Ms. Harrington, every year the subcommittee hears that
there are countries that want to participate in the Megaports
program, but there is not enough money to fund all of these
agreements. Is that true this year, and why is the Megaports
program important? Are there other countries helping in the
cost of Megaports oversight or the program? Does NNSA know if
there has been any detection of nuclear materials that could be
used in a dirty bomb or an improvised nuclear device?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you very much for your question. I'd
like to ask John Gerrard, if I could, to answer your specific
question about the Megaports program and countries that would
like to participate or not.
Also, on the detection piece of it, yes, our equipment has
in fact detected various shipments, sometimes false alarms,
sometimes not. But these are tracked, working in coordination
with our Office of Emergency Response, and the recipient
countries are alerted. The system actually works quite well. In
fact, in a closed session we could describe perhaps more in
detail, but there was a recent detection in fact with the
contents being identified as to what the problem was.
So this is an ongoing but effective program that I believe
does deserve support, including, for example, in countries like
Pakistan, where this is one of our active programs with them.
Certainly we don't want anything exported to us from Pakistan
that has a surprise in it. So we are very serious about that
program there.
John.
Mr. Gerrard. We have 100 Megaports in our baseline program
right now to be completed by 2018. I can't say that we have
countries that are requesting assistance at the moment that we
are not currently engaging, but if we did outreach to
additional countries it would probably generate interest.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I thank the witnesses today for giving us some great
information about their work and their budgets. As I said in my
opening, I'd like to talk a little about this GAO report and
some of the concerns that were raised.
But let me start, if I could by talking about again the
fiscal situation. By the way, I have to commend you, Mr. Myers.
I don't think I've ever heard an agency head say, including in
my time at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), that a 5
percent reduction in spending was not a cut. I understand what
you're saying about last year's budget, but you're a good
soldier. I wish you'd been working there when I was at OMB, so
your agency would have been more understanding.
The concern about cost-sharing and particularly sharing the
overall cost burden associated with monitoring and securing
material is a challenge. There was a summit in 2010 when there
seemed to be a lot of global support for nonproliferation
efforts. But my understanding is that very few nations have
stepped up.
Ms. Harrington, maybe you're the best one to answer this
one about cost-sharing. What countries do we currently have
cost-sharing arrangements with and how much are they doing?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you very much. I'd like to start
that, that cost-sharing and coordination, by pointing out to
you that I think we have the best example of that sitting here
at the table. Between our organization, DOD Policy, and DTRA,
we have quarterly what we call bridge meetings. We have five
standing working groups that are addressing various elements
that are in common among our organizations. We look at
everything from the strategic planning level to what can we be
doing in specific countries together. So we really are trying
to work very hard as U.S. Government agencies across the
government to make our nuclear security work more effective.
On your specific question about what impact has the nuclear
security summit had and what assistance are other countries
providing, there is a fairly detailed accounting of what
different countries are putting into their commitments for the
nuclear security summit. It's one of those circumstances, which
I'm sure you understand well, that when you get heads of state
or heads of government together and they make commitments, they
don't like to look foolish 2 years later when they show up at
the follow-up summit with nothing in hand.
So we actually have seen some real movement. For example,
the Chinese, who are working with us on a center of excellence,
are putting many tens of millions of dollars into both the land
and construction of that facility. Other nations, including The
Netherlands, the U.K., Denmark, Norway, have over time provided
I believe it's either $61 or $71 million. It's a little bit
over $61 million to our programs.
So that often comes in half a million or million dollar
pieces, but it has been a very steady trend over the past years
that these countries are providing additional funding directly
to us. That is allowable because you gave us the authority to
accept the foreign funds and that has in fact opened the gate
to providing those additional funds to us.
But we can provide you with a detailed breakout of the
countries, the amounts, and the programs to which the funds
came.
[The information on commitments was not available. The
information on foreign contributions follows:]
Senator Portman. I'd appreciate that, if you could give us
what the commitments were and then where they are in terms of
their cost-sharing obligations.
Ms. Harrington. Yes.
Senator Portman. Any information you have as to the future.
As you say, maybe some of these countries are going to come
through before the next meeting. I assume that's in 2012. I'd
like to see what they're actually doing.
Since you mentioned China, let's go to China. The GAO
report said that political sensitivities in China and in India
have limited your efforts in both countries to the relatively
noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices,
training, demonstration projects, instead of implementing these
activities directly at nuclear sites. So my question would be,
to the extent the American taxpayer is paying for the nuclear
center of excellence in China, and my understanding is we are
paying the bulk of that, and to the extent that China is not
cooperating per the GAO report, what confidence do you have
that there is going to be cooperation going forward that
justifies this expense?
Ms. Harrington. I'll be happy to share this, to share the
answer, with my DOD colleagues. First, I think we need to be
aware that cooperation with China is extensive in the nuclear
security, nuclear energy, and nuclear safety areas. I was
recently in China for a meeting of our peaceful uses of nuclear
technology joint coordinating committee, and also spent time
during that visit with China Customs going over plans for a new
radiation detection training center that we're developing with
them.
But we have a very deep and professional relationship with
the Chinese in a number of nonproliferation areas. The center
of excellence is simply another layer on top of that. So I
would say that we are already working on collaboration at many
levels.
Senator Portman. You disagree with the GAO analysis saying
that this relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear
practices and so on and training and so on is problematic, that
they're not moving ahead because of political sensitivities?
Ms. Harrington. That does not at all track with my
discussions a month ago, when there was uniform enthusiasm for
proceeding with the center of excellence and for exploring how
broadly we can use that as a new mechanism, not just for
bilateral, but also for regional and international activities
in the nonproliferation area.
Senator Portman. Back to the first question I raised in my
opening statement, when the GAO looked at two of your three
programs and said they had only limited success in achieving
their objectives in Russia, how do you respond to that? Do you
disagree with that as well?
Ms. Harrington. The GAO report came out at a time when
there was a lot of work that was midstream, and since that
report was published a great deal has happened. For example,
since the April 2009 Prague speech we've removed 963 kilograms
of nuclear weapons-useable material from a variety of
countries, 21 countries. We've eliminated all material from six
countries: Romania, Libya, Turkey, Taiwan, Chile, and Serbia.
We also were able to secure a number of shipments, again after
the GAO report came out. There were multiple shipments out of
Ukraine to Russia in December of 2010 and again from Belarus.
That material, with our cooperation with the Russians, was
removed in November and December of 2010.
So at the point when the GAO data collection was complete
for their report, that was one point in time. We're in a very
different point in time now.
Senator Portman. It might be helpful if you could give the
committee that in writing, relative to the GAO analysis.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Portman. One final question. Last year you
testified that the Russians have resisted granting us access to
their serial production plants, the plants where weapons are
actually built. My question is, do you think these facilities
are adequately secured? This time last year, the list you had
for securing facilities in Russia was down to 19. What's your
number now? How much progress has been made, and what's the
time frame for securing the remaining facilities?
Ms. Harrington. I'll turn to John Gerrard for that one.
Mr. Gerrard. With regard to the serial production
enterprises, we are not working with those facilities, so that
situation continues.
Senator Portman. You're not working with those facilities?
Mr. Gerrard. We are not. We haven't been granted access to
those facilities, so we've not visited them and we have very
little information about the conduct of security operations at
them.
Senator Portman. So you can't tell us whether they're
adequately secured?
Mr. Gerrard. No.
Senator Portman. Is Russia covering the cost of sustaining
a security infrastructure at those facilities and others?
Mr. Gerrard. Yes, yes. We believe a lot of our nationally-
oriented programs, like our training programs and our
regulatory programs with the Russian Rosatom complex, affect
the serial production enterprises. So we think we are touching
them indirectly, but we are not on the ground at them.
Senator Portman. What are your plans for being able to
access the serial production plants to know whether they're
being adequately secured?
Mr. Gerrard. We have a continuing desire to dialogue with
Russian officials on that subject. But there is no particular
path forward right now with regard to gaining access to those
facilities. They have assured us several times, including in
writing, that they are doing that on their own.
Senator Portman. My time has expired. I have some questions
about START that I hope maybe, Mr. Myers, you can get back to
us in writing on. Again, I thank you for your hard work and
your testimony today.
Senator Hagan. I think we'll take two more quick rounds of
4 or 5 minutes.
Biological surveillance. Mr. Handelman and Mr. Myers, DOD
is expanding its biological surveillance and early warning
efforts. How are these activities coordinated with other health
care-focused activities to ensure that there is no overlap, and
why has DOD decided to do work in Africa, if you can comment on
that? Are other countries providing funds to help with the
biological surveillance work?
Mr. Handelman. Senator, let me take those in reverse order.
I think there were three questions. Your last point touched on
this issue of cost-sharing.
Senator Hagan. Right.
Mr. Handelman. As I was listening to Secretary Harrington
discuss it with Senator Portman, I wanted to chime in and make
what I think is a really important point about these programs.
These programs are not foreign assistance. Now, I'm not trying
to be pejorative about foreign assistance. We engage in these
activities because they benefit the United States interest and
they're supposed to be in pursuit of U.S. interests.
Now, in a time of fiscal austerity, and certainly if you're
trying to build a mutual relationship that's built on
commitments and trust, cost-sharing is a good thing. However, I
can tell you from my perspective, my experience with the Nunn-
Lugar program, you get what you pay for, and when you want to
meet certain milestones on a certain time line, sometimes you
have to just go and do it.
Now, when we were working in Russia and the other former
Soviet states, that had sometimes colossal cost implications
because we were dealing with a very heavy infrastructure and
complex projects. As we move into Africa or other areas outside
the former Soviet states, particularly with respect to
biodefense, it's our expectation that those cost implications
are going to be less.
Let me hesitate to say, you gave us authority for cost-
sharing. We're not ignoring that. I'm not trying to say that
we're just not going to pursue that.
Why did we look at Africa? Well, first of all, why did we
look so much at biodefense? You have a large part of the U.S.
Government in the nonproliferation business that's worrying
about nuclear and radiological issues. The vast expertise in
the entire DOE, for example. As I said in my opening comments,
though, there really are not very many U.S. agencies with
authority to deal with biodefense issues overseas. Department
of Homeland Security does a fine job domestically. So this
really, as we looked at it, was an underaddressed area and it
was something we wanted to pursue, and there was a huge base of
experience dealing with what was known as Biopreparat. This is
the old Soviet bioweapons complex in the former Soviet states.
Africa is not the first time that the U.S. is addressing
biosecurity.
But when we looked outside the former Soviet states,
African countries first were a place where the United States
already has a significant perch or presence. Public health
agencies have been working there for many years. Second,
needless to say, highly dangerous pathogens are endemic. Africa
is also a continent where borders are less secure.
So from our perspective, if we wanted to dip a toe in the
water, so to speak, outside the former Soviet states, this was
a continent where we could leverage preexisting U.S. presence
and also one where a mosaic of factors contributed to a
potential threat profile. We are not aware of any particular
terrorist organization raiding labs in a particular African
country right now, but all the pieces and parts are there for
that kind of threat to emerge.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Myers, did you have any comments on
that?
Mr. Myers. Just two quick ones. Mr. Handelman and I had the
opportunity to join Senator Lugar on a trip to Kenya and Uganda
last fall, and I think the thing that became very clear to me
was that that region of the world, that's the birthplace for a
lot of these pandemics and deadly diseases. I mean, they occur
naturally in that region.
Many of the weapons programs around the world have gone to
East Africa to collect samples, take them back home, and begin
to develop weapons programs. So that our goal is to keep the
terrorists as far away from the weapons or the pathogens or the
diseases as possible. In a lot of cases when you're talking
about East Africa, that really is one of the places that an
organization could find those kind of diseases occurring
naturally.
Mr. Myers. Thank you.
Mr. Portman, Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Just briefly on the biological side. On
your trip, my understanding is that you found certain
facilities, particularly laboratories, which were not
laboratories focused on weaponization, but rather just focused
on research facilities, much as we have here in this country;
and that some of them were not as well secured as you would
have hoped. What, if anything, has the United States done with
regard to those labs and others in Kenya, Uganda, and other
countries?
Mr. Handelman. Well, I introduced Mr. Jed Royal in my
opening remarks. He's made a number of trips out to those
countries.
Senator Portman. Would Jed please raise his hand? Is it J-
e-d?
Mr. Royal. Yes, sir, J-e-d.
Senator Portman. I have a son Jed who's in town right now.
It's a very prestigious name, and unusual.
Mr. Handelman. I hope you claim credit for your son's good
works, as I do for this Jed.
Senator Portman. Yes, you're talking him up.
Mr. Handelman. So we are in the phase where we're building
the relationship. We have yet to formally exchange diplomatic
notes. One thing we're trying to get away from is the
cumbersome overarching sort of legal frameworks that were
necessary in some of the former Soviet projects. We just want
to get on with the work.
The first step will be physical security. That's easy. The
harder parts and the longer term part of it are cooperative
research programs, giving these laboratories the capability,
for example, to do surveillance. As I alluded to in my opening
statement, the hard part about this is we can give them a PCR
machine, which is the thing that figures out some genetic
aspects of a sample. They could use that for measles. I'm not
going to tell you otherwise. But they could also use it for
ebola, depending on what's happened out in the countryside,
assuming a sample can be brought into the laboratory.
I will say, in some of those countries they actually have
quite an advanced science capability already, particularly in
Kenya. Our goal is to be able to work with them so they know to
communicate this stuff--well, first of all do the science
correctly, and then communicate it through the World Health
Organization, through the relationships with us, in order that
we have a bit of a heads up on whether an outbreak is naturally
occurring or manmade.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Harrington, Mr. Myers?
Mr. Myers. I would just follow up with one quick point, and
that is when we're talking about the cooperation that we are
seeking to engage with African partners on, we're really
talking about a different scale and scope of the cooperation
that we had with states of the former Soviet Union. In the
states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), we were talking about
a massive infrastructure, the Biopreparat system that Mr.
Handelman referred to earlier. It was a very large undertaking,
a very complex undertaking.
When we're talking about providing the equipment that Mr.
Handelman referred to and security and safety upgrades, we're
talking about a much more straightforward, much simpler, much
less expensive process. So I really want to point out the
difference in the scale and scope of the efforts that we have
underway or had underway in the FSU as compared to those that
we are engaging Kenya, Uganda, and other countries in today.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Harrington, Mr. Myers, and Mr.
Handelman, thank you very much for your testimony today. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]