[Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1253
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
MILITARY POSTURE
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM
__________
FEBRUARY 17; MARCH 1, 8, 17, 29, 31; APRIL 5, 7, 12; MAY 19, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 17, 2011
Page
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller........ 15
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 25
U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command
march 1, 2011
Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 175
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 182
Department of the Navy
march 8, 2011
Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 261
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations............... 275
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps........ 294
Department of the Air Force
march 17, 2011
Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force.............. 433
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 456
U.S. European Command and U.S. Strategic Command
march 29, 2011
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command/
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe............................... 543
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 587
Department of the Army
march 31, 2011
McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 669
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army....... 701
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command
april 5, 2011
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 757
Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 765
U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Africa Command
april 7, 2011
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 842
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 852
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea
april 12, 2011
Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 926
Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command/
Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea...................... 940
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program
may 19, 2011
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 999
Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 1009
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 1012
Van Buren, David M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Air Force for Acquisition...................................... 1017
Venlet, VADM David J., USN, Program Executive Officer, F-35
Lightning II Program........................................... 1053
Burbage, Charles T. ``Tom'', Executive Vice President and General
Manager, F-35 Program Integration, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics
Company........................................................ 1054
Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 1057
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss,
Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, and Graham.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; John
H. Quirk V, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional
staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and
Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff,
Christine G. Lang, Brian F. Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and
Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee welcomes this morning Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Michael Mullen for our hearing on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) fiscal year 2012 budget request, the associated Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the posture of the U.S. Armed
Forces. We also recognize Secretary Hale and welcome him here
this morning as well.
We are thankful to all of you and your families for your
dedicated service to this Nation and to the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way around the globe,
and to their families. Your personal commitment to the welfare
of our troops and their families shines through all that you
do. The American people are grateful for that and we are
grateful and eager to help wherever we can.
DOD, like all Federal agencies, is currently operating
under a continuing resolution (CR) that expires on March 4,
2011. If the current CR is extended for the whole year, then
DOD's base funding of $526 billion for fiscal year 2011 would
be $23 billion below the original fiscal year 2011 request of
$549 billion. Secretary Gates will describe to us this morning
this situation as a crisis on his doorstep. I hope that we will
soon, as a committee, be in a position to enact a full year
appropriation at an appropriate level and that the full Senate
will adopt such an appropriation.
At a time when we face a budget deficit in excess of $1
trillion and many in Congress are convinced that we need steep
spending cuts to put our fiscal house in order, no part of the
Government, including DOD, can be exempt from close
examination. The Secretary of Defense has subjected DOD's
budget to close examination. He has insisted on efficiencies,
streamlining, cuts, and cancellations that we are told add up
to $178 billion over the course of the next 5 years. The fiscal
year 2012 base budget request of $553 billion is $4 billion
higher than last year's request but is a reduction in
inflation-adjusted terms. We will be closely scrutinizing the
Secretary's efficiencies initiative and will be looking for
additional efficiencies as we move through the legislative
process.
The total defense budget, which includes base funding for
DOD and additional funding for overseas contingency operations
(OCO)--that total defense budget declines from $708 billion in
fiscal year 2011 to $671 billion in fiscal year 2012. That
decline is due largely from our continued withdrawal from Iraq
which results in the budget for the OCOs falling from $159
billion in 2011 to $118 billion in fiscal year 2012.
Even as the defense budget request reflects difficult
choices, it rightly requests increased funding for military
personnel and health care, including funding sufficient to
continue initiatives supporting wounded and sick
servicemembers, continued research into traumatic brain injury
(TBI), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and psychological
health, and fully funds a variety of family support programs.
Notably, the budget request would reduce Active Duty Army and
Navy end strength by 7,400 soldiers and 3,000 sailors,
respectively. The Army has announced its plan to reduce its so-
called temporary end strength by 22,000 soldiers over the next
3 years, followed by an additional reduction of 27,000 soldiers
between 2015 and 2017. As the Services resize their forces
according to anticipated demand, we must ensure that any
reductions avoid unnecessary increased risk or stress on our
servicemembers.
The budget request also prioritizes funding for ongoing
major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Senators Reed,
Tester, and I heard during our visit to Afghanistan and Iraq
last month, both of these conflicts are entering critical
transition periods.
In Iraq, our forces are implementing the decision by
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, as set forth in the
2008 security agreement, to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq
by December 31, 2011. As we draw down, our goal is to leave
behind an Iraq that is stable. Because Iraq will continue to
need support in meeting its security needs, the budget request
includes significant funds for starting up the Office of
Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to make
our security assistance available to Iraq. The transition from
a DOD lead to a State Department lead for numerous bilateral
activities in Iraq can only be successful if the Department of
State (DOS) and our other civilian agencies receive the
resources that they need to take on these missions.
In Afghanistan, July 2011 will mark the date set by
President Obama a little over a year ago for the Government of
Afghanistan to take more and more responsibility for Afghan
security and governance and by July 2011 for the beginning of
reductions in U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The President's
decision to set the July 2011 date has increased the urgency,
as General Caldwell put it, of the efforts of Afghan leaders to
prepare for this transition. General David Petraeus told us
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Afghan
officials are preparing to provide President Karzai by the end
of the month with a recommendation on which provinces and
districts should be transferred to an Afghan security lead in
the coming months.
During our visit to Afghanistan, we saw significant signs
of progress over the last 6 months, although great challenges
remain. The Afghan army and police have surged by an additional
70,000 over the last year and are on track to meet the current
target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by October of this
year. President Obama's budget request for fiscal year 2012
includes substantial resources to continue supporting those
Afghan forces which will bring closer the day when Afghan
troops will bear the major responsibility for their nation's
security, which in my judgment is and always has been key to
success in Afghanistan.
On February 15, 2011, in an op-ed that appeared in the
Chicago Tribune, General Caldwell said that while the
international community has expended tremendous blood and
treasure for this just cause, the remarkable story of the surge
of Afghans, of a people committing themselves to the defense of
their country, is a reason to hope for a successful long-term
outcome.
In an e-mail message to me, General Caldwell, who is in
charge of training of Afghan forces, followed up that op-ed by
saying: ``It has become truly the untold story of the last 15
months. In that time, Afghan men and women have swelled the
ranks of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to levels
more than double the U.S. and NATO surge.'' He continued,
``While the enormous increase in quantity is significant to the
security of Afghanistan, our focus on the improvement of
quality is even more important.''
The op-ed and the e-mail message to me from General
Caldwell will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. The administration is also considering a
proposal to grow the Afghan army by 35,000 men and the Afghan
police by a similar number, which would bring total Afghan
security force levels of 378,000 by the end of 2012. These
additional forces would add important enablers, logistics,
engineering, and intelligence and others, that would reinforce
and sustain the transition of responsibility for Afghanistan's
security to the Afghan security forces. I support this proposed
increase. I know from our conversations that Secretary Gates
and Admiral Mullen support it as well. I have urged President
Obama, as recently as last Friday, to approve that request.
In the field, Afghan security forces are partnered with
coalition forces and deployed in the key regions of Helmand and
Kandahar in equal or greater numbers than coalition forces.
U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces are taking the momentum from
the insurgency, particularly in former Taliban strongholds in
the south. The Afghan army is increasingly in the lead in
planning and executing operations. That is what the Taliban
fear the most: Afghan security forces, as opposed to foreign
forces, out in front providing security for the Afghan people.
As support for the Afghan army and police grows, lower-level
insurgent fighters are slowly beginning to reintegrate into
Afghan society.
Improving Afghan governance remains a major challenge to
success. The government in Kabul is largely absent from
Afghans' daily lives and corruption and mismanagement remain
major obstacles.
We must ensure that our forces are prepared to address
other threats in other places besides Iraq and Afghan. We
obviously must remain attentive to those threats around that
region and throughout the world. I outline those threats in
some detail in the balance of my opening statement, but I will
put that in the record rather than reading it at this time.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
This morning, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, for our hearing on the Department of Defenses' fiscal year 2012
budget request, the associated future years defense program, and the
posture of the U.S. Armed Forces.
We are thankful to you and your families for your dedicated service
to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home
and in harm's way around the globe and to their families. Your personal
commitment to the welfare of our troops and their families shines
through all that you do. The American people are grateful for that and
we are grateful and eager to help wherever we can.
The Department of Defense, as are all Federal agencies, is
currently operating under a continuing resolution (CR) that expires on
March 4, 2011. If the current CR is extended for the whole year, then
the Departments base funding of $526 billion for fiscal year 2011 would
be $23 billion below the original fiscal year 2011 request of $549
billion. Secretary Gates will describe to us this morning this as a
crisis on his doorstep. I hope that we will soon be in a position to
enact a full year appropriation at an appropriate level.
At a time when we face a budget deficit in excess of a trillion
dollars and many in Congress are convinced that we need steep spending
cuts to put our fiscal house in order, no part of the government,
including the Department of Defense, can be exempt from close
examination. The Secretary has subjected the Departments budget to
close examination and insisted on efficiencies, streamlining, cuts and
cancellations that, we are told, add up to $178 billion over the course
of the next 5 years. The fiscal year 2012 base budget request of $553
billion is $4 billion higher than last years request but is a reduction
in inflation-adjusted terms. We will be closely scrutinizing the
Secretary's efficiencies initiative and will be looking for additional
efficiencies as we move through the legislative process.
The total defense budget, which includes base funding for the
Department of Defense and additional funding for Overseas Contingency
Operations, declines from $708 billion in fiscal year 2011 to $671
billion in fiscal year 2012. That decline is due largely from our
continued withdrawal from Iraq which results in the budget for Overseas
Contingency Operations falling from $159 billion in fiscal year 2011 to
$118 billion in fiscal year 2012.
Even as the Defense budget request reflects difficult choices, it
rightly requests increased funding for military personnel and health
care, including funding sufficient to continue initiatives supporting
wounded and sick service members, continue research into traumatic
brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, and psychological health,
and fully fund a variety of family support programs. Notably, the
budget request would reduce active duty Army and Navy end strengths by
7,400 soldiers and 3,000 sailors, respectively. The Army has announced
its plan to reduce its so-called temporary end strength by 22,000
soldiers over the next three years, followed by an additional reduction
of 27,000 soldiers between 2015 and 2017. As the Services for re-size
their forces according to anticipated demand, we must ensure that any
reductions avoid unnecessary increased risk or stress on our
servicemembers.
The budget request also prioritizes funding for ongoing major
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Senators Reed, Tester, and I
heard during our visit to Afghanistan and Iraq last month, both of
these conflicts are entering critical transition periods.
In Iraq, our forces are implementing the decision by President Bush
and Prime Minister Maliki, as set forth in the 2008 Security Agreement,
to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As we
drawdown, our goal is to leave behind an Iraq that is stable. Because
Iraq will continue to need support in meeting its security needs, the
budget request includes significant funds for starting up the Office of
Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to make our
security assistance available to Iraq. The transition from a DOD lead
to a State Department lead for numerous bilateral activities in Iraq
can only be successful if the Department of State and our other
civilian agencies receive the resources they need to take on these
missions.
In Afghanistan, July 2011 will mark the date set by President Obama
a little over a year ago for the Government of Afghanistan to take more
and more responsibility for Afghanistans security and governance and
for the beginning of reductions in U.S forces in Afghanistan. The
Presidents decision to set the July 2011 date has added urgency, as
General Caldwell put it, to the efforts of Afghan leaders to prepare
for this transition. General David Petreaus told us that th North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Afghan officials are preparing
to provide President Karzai by the end of the month a recommendation on
which provinces and districts should be transferred to an Afghan
security lead in the coming months.
During our visit to Afghanistan last month, we saw significant
signs of progress over the last several months, though great challenges
remain. The Afghan Army and police have surged by an additional 70,000
over the last year, and are on track to meet the current target of
305,000 Afghan security forces by October of this year. The Presidents
budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes substantial resources to
continue supporting these forces, which will bring closer the day when
Afghan troops will bear the major responsibility for their nations
security, which is key to success in Afghanistan.
On February 15, 2011, in an op-ed that appeared in the Chicago
Tribune, General Caldwell said, While the international community has
expended tremendous blood and treasure for this just cause, the
remarkable story of the surge of Afghans, of a people committing
themselves to defense their country, is a reason to hope for a
successful long-term outcome. In an email message to me he followed up
by saying, It truly has become the Untold Story of the last 15 months.
In that time, Afghan men and women have swelled the ranks of the Afghan
National Security Force to levels more than double the U.S. and NATO
surge. He continued, While the enormous increase in quantity is
significant to the security of Afghanistan, our focus on the
improvement of quality is even more important. Without objection, the
op-ed and General Caldwell's email message to me shall be made a part
of the record.
The administration is also considering a proposal to grow the
Afghan Army by 35,000 and the Afghan police by a similar number, which
would bring total Afghan security force levels to 378,000 by the end of
2012. These additional forces will add important enablers logistics,
engineering and intelligence and others that will reinforce and sustain
the transition of responsibility for Afghanistans security to the
Afghan security forces. I support this proposed increase, and I know
from our conversations that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen support
it as well. I have urged President Obama as recently as last Friday to
approve this request.
In the field, Afghan security forces are partnered with coalition
forces and deployed in the key regions of Helmand and Kandahar in equal
or greater numbers than coalition forces. U.S., Afghan, and coalition
forces are taking the momentum from the insurgency, particularly in
former Taliban strongholds in the south. The Afghan Army is
increasingly in the lead in planning and executing operations. Thats
what the Taliban fear most: Afghan security forces, as opposed to
foreign forces, out in front providing security to the Afghan people.
As support for the Afghan Army and police grows, lower-level insurgent
fighters are slowly beginning to reintegrate into Afghan society.
Improving Afghan governance remains a major challenge to success.
The Government in Kabul is largely absent from Afghans daily lives and
corruption and mismanagement remain major obstacles.
We must ensure our forces are prepared to address other threats in
other places besides Iraq and Afghanistan. We must remain attentive to
the threats burgeoning from al Qaeda and its affiliates in places like
Somalia, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa. Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has narrowly failed to strike the U.S.
Homeland on two occasions these narrow misses, which were planned and
executed by AQAP operatives in Yemen, have inspired them to develop new
and creative ways to attack the United States and our interests. It is
critical that we continue to work with our partners in the region to
increase the pressure on AQAP and its associated forces. As protests in
the Middle East continue to unfold, it is also critical that we urge
our partners to as President Obama said earlier this week get out ahead
of change. If countries like Yemen fail to do this, transitions could
create a less favorable outcome for their people, for the region, and
for the United States.
Earlier this week, the President spoke of the hunger for freedoms
among the peoples of the Middle East. The committee looks forward to
hearing from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen on: the current
situation in Egypt and the broader Middle East; our communications with
Egyptian military leadership and their confidence in their commitment
to truly democratic elections; and the future of U.S.-Egyptian military
relations. The Egyptian people have been denied their democratic rights
for too long and over the few plus weeks the Egyptian people demanded
those fundamental rights. It is critical that the United States
supports transition to democratic governance in the Middle East and the
world.
Across the Gulf of Aden, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa more
broadly commerce continues to be impacted by threat of increasingly
aggressive pirates, as well as certain elements of al Shabab that have
expanded their violent attacks to include regional targets, most
recently in July 2010 in Uganda.
Iran clearly provides a challenge for the United States and the
international community. While continuing to profess that its nuclear
activities are for peaceful purposes, all of Irans actions indicate
otherwise. Iran continues to violate the directives of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and refuses
to enter into meaningful negotiations with the P-5 plus 1 group of
nations. The sanctions that have been imposed by the United States and
most of the international community under the U.N. sanctions
resolutions, as well as domestic laws, have had an effect.
In recent days, domestically, Iran has demonstrated yet again its
total disregard for the fundamental rights of its people when it once
more violently oppressed the political opposition to its tyrannical
rule. The Iranian people are demanding that their voices be heard, we
should stand with them.
I also wanted to highlight Admiral Mullens Guidance for 2011, which
states that DOD would continue to plan for a broad range of military
options should the President decide to use force to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear arms. While not the preferred option, it is important
that Iran understands that military actions remain on the table.
The Asia-Pacific region also requires increasing attention from the
administration, Congress, and the U.S. military. Among the challenges
we face are the unprovoked aggression from North Korea, questions
raised by the continuing growth and modernization of Chinas military
capabilities, and the destabilizing influences of violent extremism in
South and Southeast Asia. As we confront these challenges, we must work
closely with partners and allies, and make smart decisions about the
U.S. military's posture, presence, and capabilities throughout the
region.
In the area of missile defense, the budget request is $10.7
billion, an increase of $450 million from last years request, including
funds for the Missile Defense Agency and the missile defense programs
of the Army. There are likely to be two major focal points for missile
defense this year: implementing the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe, and taking the steps necessary to make sure
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is on a path to being
effective, reliable, and sustainable.
On implementation of the European PAA, the key objective this year
is to deploy Phase 1, which includes deployment of an Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense ship to the Mediterranean, and a forward-based radar in
southeastern NATO Europe. These deployments will provide near-term
protection against existing and future Iranian missile threats to NATO.
Numerous capabilities for future phases of the European PAA are under
development, particularly the enhanced Aegis missile defense elements
for deployment on land and at sea.
It is particularly noteworthy that last November at the Lisbon
Summit, the NATO alliance agreed unanimously to adopt missile defense
of its territory and population as a core mission, and NATO fully
supports the European PAA as the U.S. contribution to NATOs missile
defense mission.
One of NATOs key objectives in this decision is to seek cooperation
with Russia on missile defense, through the NATO-Russia Council. As
President Obama described in his December 18 letter to the Senate on
missile defense, such cooperation will not in any way limit United
States or NATO's missile defense capabilities. I hope our witnesses
today will describe the types of cooperation they believe would be both
useful and possible.
As for the GMD system, I would note that the last two flight tests
have failed to result in intercepts, and we want to make sure that the
Department is taking the necessary steps to understand and fix the
problem, and to ensure that the system will work effectively and
reliably. It remains essential to test our missile defense programs in
a realistic manner, and to demonstrate that those systems work properly
before we deploy them.
Turning to the readiness of our Armed Forces, the fiscal year 2012
budget request provides adequate levels of funding and an overall
increase from fiscal year 2011 levels, including support for ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the war funding request to
reset and reconstitute equipment has decreased from $21.4 billion in
fiscal year 2011 to $11.9 billion in fiscal year 2012. We must
recognize that long term reset requirements must be supported with
sustained funding for several years after forces have withdrawn from
Iraq and Afghanistan. As operational tempo increases in Afghanistan, it
is imperative that the vital readiness accounts are protected and fully
funded.
Lastly, I applaud the Department for recognizing the need to
maintain robust funding for science and technology programs that will
provide the underpinning for the technological superiority of our
future military capabilities. These efforts, along with supporting a
capable acquisition workforce and maintaining a vibrant national
defense industrial base, will be crucial for the successful and timely
development and fielding of the next generation of cost-effective and
reliable weapons systems.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony.
Now I will turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks he may have.
Chairman Levin. I will turn now to Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
in welcoming Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen and Secretary
Hale to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
2012 and its impact on the FYDP for DOD.
Secretary Gates, you were asked to return to public service
at a time when this country was embroiled in the turmoil of an
unpopular war and another deteriorating war, and Pentagon
critics were abounding. Your historic tenure has been marked by
a surge to victory in Iraq, a new strategy to defeat our
enemies in Afghanistan, and DOD's lead on humanitarian
responses around the world. Your service will also be noted for
the substantial reforms for the defense acquisition process and
your decisive actions to stop wasting taxpayers' funds on
unneeded and outdated systems. On behalf of my fellow citizens,
I want to thank you for your outstanding service. I view you as
one of the greatest public servants that I have ever had the
opportunity of serving with.
Today we are faced again with a demand for change. We are
facing a harsh reality that runaway Federal spending has put
this country on an unsustainable path. I agree with Admiral
Mullen who observes in his written statement ``our debt is our
greatest national security threat.'' The competing demands for
our resources and the imperative we face to reduce our debt
requires Congress to provide more leadership than it has shown
in the past to restore fiscal responsibility.
I believe we took a step in the right direction in last
year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) by stripping
the earmarks from the bill. Since then, both House and Senate
have imposed moratoriums on earmarks for 2011 and 2012. I
commend my colleagues in advance for restraining themselves
from using earmarks, and I know it is tough for some. Mr.
Secretary, I hope you will reinforce the President's commitment
made during the State of the Union Address and recommend a veto
of any 2012 defense bill that contains earmarks.
I am concerned about the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). I know
that you are. We have had many briefings, many discussions, but
it has been a source of great frustration to you, to me, and to
members of this committee, but most of all, it has been an
incredible waste of the taxpayers' dollars. It hurts the
credibility of our acquisition process and our defense
industry. It reinforces the view of some of us that the
military industrial congressional complex that President
Eisenhower warned us about is alive and well. I hope that you
can make your position absolutely clear to the Senate today to
prevent further wasteful action by Congress that will deny DOD
the resources it really needs but, at the same time, give us
the kind of assurance that the F-35 can be put on the right
track. I believe that as we move to try to reduce the deficit
and the debt, almost everything is going to be on the table.
Overall the base budget request of $553 billion is $13
billion less than the amount projected last year. I commend
your efforts to get out ahead of the cuts by finding ways to
improve the efficiency of DOD. Your decisions to reduce the
number of senior military and civilian officials, freeze
civilian pay, and halt with some exceptions the process of
expanding the civilian workforce are sound decisions. I worry
that we might, however, do some things that might cause us to
see what we saw in the 1970s and the 1980s. Reducing flying
hours, deferring aircraft maintenance, and postponing needed
facility repairs are not true savings, and I fear the
possibility of a return to what we once knew as a hollow Army.
I have long said DOD does not deserve a special pass from
spending the American taxpayers' dollars efficiently. But I
have also said that the savings we identify must be reinvested
in critical defense priorities. One example of this
reinvestment is the increased efforts to combat the trafficking
of drugs and illicit materials through Mexico. This has become
an issue of national security. I look forward to working with
you and our allies in Mexico to combat this scourge.
Yesterday you stated, regarding the U.S. presence in Iraq
``there is certainly on our part an interest in having an
additional presence, and the truth of the matter is the Iraqis
are going to have some problems that they are going to have to
deal with if we are not there in some numbers.'' I agree. We
are now scheduled to be completely out by the end of this year.
I think it is time we engage in active discussions with the
Iraqis as to their future needs as well as any threats there
might be to our national security if there is a complete
withdrawal by the end of this year.
In addition to Iraq, we will still have 98,000 U.S. forces
in Afghanistan. I expect our troops will remain there until
they are no longer needed.
A couple of weekends ago, I was at Munich and our allies
came up to me and said, you say you are beginning to withdraw
in the middle of 2011. Why should we not go to our constituents
and say we are beginning to withdraw? I think one of the worst
announcements ever made, as far as the conflict in Afghanistan,
was the statement that we would be beginning withdrawal in
2011. I am glad to see that 2014 is now the operative year, but
it still is very unsettling to our allies and encouraging to
our enemies.
Success of our mission in Afghanistan must be assured to
honor the sacrifices of our brave men and women, as well as
coalition partners who have fought, died, and been injured
there.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, we face many
challenges in the year ahead which will require your continued
skill and tenacity.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
We have a quorum here and in a moment I will ask approval
of a number of nominations and the committee budget. Before I
do that, though, I just want to say, Mr. Secretary, I join and
concur with Senator McCain and his comments about you and your
tenure here as Secretary of Defense. It has been an
extraordinary number of years. You have brought great
capability, objectivity, and thoughtfulness to the job and
great strength, independence, and courage, and I very much
commend you for it. I look forward to many more times when you
will be before this committee, and I am sure that you do too. I
do not want this to sound kind of like it is anywhere near the
end of your tenure here. [Laughter.]
I discussed the matter of the committee budget with Senator
McCain, and I now would ask the committee to consider and
approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding for our
committee from March 1 of this year through February 28, 2013.
The funding resolution is consistent with the joint majority
leader and Republican leader's February 3 agreement on
committee funding and with the funding guidance provided to us
by the Senate Rules Committee on February 7. This matter is
time-sensitive. All committees have been asked to report their
budgets to the Senate by no later than today. So I would now
entertain a motion to favorably report this resolution.
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Lieberman. Second.
Chairman Levin. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of
ayes.]
Opposed, nay. [No response.]
The ayes have it.
Now, we have some discussion that lies ahead of us on our
committee rules. I would ask everybody to read those rules
during the next week, and we will take up the matter of our
rules on Monday or Tuesday after we return from the recess.
We also have in front of us 670 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to
favorably report those nominations?
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Lieberman. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Levin. Opposed, nay. [No response.]
Chairman Levin. The motion carries. Thank you all.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 17,
2011.
1. LTG Eric E. Fiel, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Commander,
Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 138).
2. Col. Howard D. Stendahl, USAF to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 139).
3. LTG Dennis L. Via, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General/Chief of Staff, US Army Materiel Command (Reference
No. 141).
4. LTG Mark P. Hertling, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army (Reference No.
142).
5. MG Susan S. Lawrence, USA to be lieutenant general and Chief
Information Officer/G-6, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Reference
No. 143).
6. MG John M. Bednarek, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, First US Army (Reference No. 144).
7. MG Francis J. Wiercinski, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, US Army Pacific (Reference No. 145).
8. BG Renaldo Rivera, ARNG to be major general (Reference No.
147).
9. BG William M. Buckler, Jr., USAR to be major general (Reference
No. 148).
10. BG Mark J. MacCarley, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
149).
11. In the Army Reserve, there are eight appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Marc T. Arellano) (Reference No. 150).
12. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Gregrey C. Bacon) (Reference No. 151).
13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with John G. Brown) (Reference No.
153).
14. Col. Arlen R. Royalty, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 167).
15. In the Marine Corps, there are 11 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Juan G. Ayala) (Reference No. 168).
16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Erwin Rader Bender, Jr.) (Reference
No. 171).
17. In the Air Force, there are six appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with David M. Crawford)
(Reference No. 172).
18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 175 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Richard T. Aldridge) (Reference No.
173).
19. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Sebastian A. Edwards) (Reference No. 174).
20. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel
(Gregory R. Ebner) (Reference No. 175).
21. In the Army Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Curtis O. Bohlman, Jr.) (Reference No. 176).
22. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Timothy E. Lemaster) (Reference No. 178).
23. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Dax Hammers) (Reference No. 180).
24. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Richard Martinez) (Reference No. 181).
25. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with William Frazier, Jr.) (Reference No. 182).
26. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Douglas R. Cunningham) (Reference No. 183).
27. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with James E. Hardy, Jr.) (Reference No. 184).
28. In the Marine Corps, there are five appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Conrad G. Alston) (Reference No. 185).
29. In the Marine Corps, there are five appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with David M. Adams) (Reference No. 186).
30. In the Marine Corps, there are six appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Stefan R. Browning) (Reference No. 187).
31. In the Marine Corps, there are seven appointment to the grade
of major (list begins with Joel T. Carpenter) (Reference No. 188).
32. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Roger N. Rudd) (Reference No. 189).
33. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Lowell W. Schweickart, Jr.) (Reference No. 190).
34. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Katrina Gaskill) (Reference No. 191).
35. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Sean J. Collins) (Reference No.
193).
36. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with William H. Barlow) (Reference
No. 195).
37. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (James H. Glass) (Reference No. 197).
38. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Richelle L. Kay) (Reference No. 198).
39. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Chris W. Czaplak) (Reference No.
201).
40. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Scott D. Scherer) (Reference No. 202).
41. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Carlos E. Moreyra) (Reference No.
203).
42. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with David Q. Baughier) (Reference
No. 204).
43. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Timothy M. Callahan) (Reference No. 206).
44. MG Ellen M. Pawlikowski, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command
(Reference No. 210).
45. MG Michael J. Basla, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice
Commander, Air Force Space Command (Reference No. 211).
46. MG Rhett A. Hernandez, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Cyberspace Command (Reference No.
212).
47. Col. Johnny M. Sellers, ARNG, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 214).
48. Col. Janson D. Boyles, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 215).
49. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Stephen L. Buse) (Reference No. 216).
50. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Thomas J. Collins) (Reference No.
217).
51. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Phillip M. Armstrong) (Reference No.
218).
52. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Lloyd H. Anseth) (Reference No.
219).
53. In the Air Force Reserve, there are seven appointments to the
grade of major (list begins with Kathleen M. Flarity) (Reference No.
220).
54. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Melina T. Doan) (Reference No. 221).
55. In the Air Force, there are 12 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Villa L. Guillory) (Reference No. 223).
56. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Alfred P. Bowles II) (Reference No.
224).
57. In the Air Force, there are 49 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian F. Agee) (Reference No. 225).
58. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 100 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Earl R. Alameida, Jr.) (Reference
No. 226).
59. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Edward J. Benz III) (Reference No. 227).
60. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Charles E. Lynde) (Reference No. 228).
61. In the Army, there are four appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Ozren T. Buntak) (Reference No. 229).
62. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Marcia A. Brimm) (Reference No. 230).
63. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of lieutenant
colonel and below (list begins with Dustin C. Frazier) (Reference No.
231).
64. In the Army Reserve, there are eight appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Robert L. Bierenga) (Reference No. 232).
65. In the Army Reserve, there are 12 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Don A. Campbell) (Reference No. 233).
66. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are seven appointments to
the grade of colonel (list begins with Ernest L. Ackiss III) (Reference
No. 234).
67. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are 74 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Philip Q. Applegate) (Reference No.
235).
68. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Jeffrey K. Hayhurst) (Reference No. 238).
69. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Steven D. Elias) (Reference No. 239).
70. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Amy R. Gavril) (Reference No.
241).
71. In the Air Force Reserve, there are seven appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Steven L. Argiriou) (Reference No.
242).
72. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Richard C. Ales) (Reference No. 243).
73. MG Vincent K. Brooks, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Central Command/Third U.S. Army
(Reference No. 248).
Total: 670.
Chairman Levin. We will now call on you, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
COMPTROLLER
Secretary Gates. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
2012.
But first I want to thank the members of this committee for
your outstanding support of DOD, but especially your support of
the men and women in uniform serving in a time of war. I know
you will join me in doing everything to ensure they have all
they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely.
The budget request for DOD being presented today includes a
base budget request of $553 billion and an OCO request of
$117.8 billion. These budget decisions took place in the
context of a nearly 2-year effort by DOD to reduce overhead,
cull troubled and excess programs, and rein in personnel and
contractor costs, all for the purpose of preserving the global
reach and fighting strength of America's military at a time of
fiscal stress for our country.
In all, these budget requests, if enacted by Congress, will
continue our efforts to reform the way DOD does business, funds
modernization programs needed to prepare for future conflicts,
reaffirms and strengthens our Nation's commitment to care for
the All-Volunteer Force, and ensure that our troops and
commanders on the front lines have the resources and support
they need to accomplish their mission.
My submitted statement includes more details of this
request.
Now I want to take this opportunity to address several
issues that I know have been a subject of debate and concern
since I announced the outlines of our budget proposal last
month: first, the serious damage our military will suffer by
operating under a CR or receiving a significant funding cut
during fiscal year 2011; second, the projected slowing and
eventual flattening of the growth of the defense budget over
the next 5 years; third, the plan for future reductions in the
size of the ground forces; and fourth, the proposed reforms and
savings to the TRICARE program for working age retirees.
I also would express the hope that the Senate will continue
to reject the unnecessary extra engine for the F-35 as it did
the last time the Senate spoke to this issue in 2009.
I want to start by making it clear that DOD will face a
crisis if we end up with a year-long CR or a significant
funding cut for fiscal year 2011. The President's defense
budget request for 2011 was $549 billion. A full-year CR would
fund DOD at about $526 billion. That is a cut of $23 billion.
The damage done across the force from such reductions would be
further magnified as they would come halfway through the fiscal
year.
Let me be clear, operating under a year-long CR or
significantly reduced funding, with the severe shortfalls that
entails, would damage procurement and research programs causing
delays, rising costs, no new program starts, and serious
disruptions in the production of some of our most high-demand
assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Cuts in
maintenance could force parts of our aircraft fleet to be
grounded and delay needed facilities improvements. Cuts in
operations would mean fewer flying hours, fewer steaming days,
and cutbacks in training for home station forces, all of which
directly impact readiness.
Similarly, some of the appropriations proposals under
debate in Congress contemplate reductions of up to $15 billion
from the President's original fiscal year 2011 request. I
recognize that given the current fiscal and political
environment, it is unlikely that DOD will receive the full
fiscal year 2011 amount. Based on a number of factors,
including policy changes that led to lower personnel costs and
reduced activity forced by the CR, I believe DOD can get by
with a lower number. However, it is my judgment that DOD needs
an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fiscal year 2011
for the U.S. military to properly carry out its mission,
maintain readiness, and prepare for the future, which brings me
to the proposed $78 billion reduction in the defense budget top
line over the next 5 years.
To begin with, this so-called cut is to the rate of
predicted growth. The size of the base defense budget is still
projected to increase in real inflation-adjusted dollars before
eventually flattening out over this time period.
More significantly, as a result of the efficiencies and
reforms undertaken over the past year, we have protected
programs that support servicemembers, readiness, and
modernization. These efforts have made it possible for DOD to
absorb lower projected growth in the defense budget without
sacrificing real military capabilities. In fact, the savings
identified by the Services have allowed our military to add
some $70 billion beyond the program of record toward priority
needs and new capabilities. Of the $78 billion in proposed
reductions to the 5-year defense plan, about $68 billion comes
from a combination of shedding excess overhead, improved
business practices, reducing personnel costs, and from changes
to economic assumptions. Only $10 billion of that 5-year total
is directly related to military combat capability. $4 billion
comes from restructuring the JSF program, a step driven by the
program's development and testing schedule that would have
taken place irrespective of the budget top line. The rest,
about $6 billion, results from the proposed decrease in end
strength of the Army and Marine Corps starting in 2015, a
decision I will address now.
Just over 4 years ago, one of my first acts as Defense
Secretary was to increase the permanent end strength of our
ground forces, the Army by 65,000 to a total of 547,000 and the
Marine Corps by 27,000 to 202,000. At the time the increase was
needed to relieve the severe stress on the force from the Iraq
war as the surge was getting underway. To support the later
plus-up of troops in Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a
further temporary increase in the Army of 22,000, an increase
always planned to end in 2013. The objective was to reduce
stress on the force, limit and eventually end the practice of
stop-loss and to increase troops' home station dwell time.
As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year,
according to our agreement with the Iraqi Government, the
overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing
significantly. Just 3 years ago, we had some 190,000 troops
combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of this calendar
year, we expect there to be less than 100,000 troops deployed
in both of the major post-September 11 combat theaters,
virtually all of those forces in Afghanistan.
This is why we believe that beginning in fiscal year 2015,
the United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army
Active Duty end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by
somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000. These projections assume
that the number of troops in Afghanistan will be significantly
reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with both the
President's and NATO's strategy. If our assumptions prove
incorrect, there is plenty of time to adjust the size and
schedule of this change.
It is important to remember that even after the planned
reductions, the Active Army end strength would continue to be
larger by nearly 40,000 soldiers than it was when I became
Secretary of Defense 4 years ago.
I should also note that these reductions are supported by
both the Army and Marine Corps leadership.
Finally, sharply rising health care costs are consuming an
even-larger share of DOD's budget, growing from $19 billion in
2001 to $52.5 billion in this request. Among other reforms,
this fiscal year 2012 budget includes modest increases to
TRICARE enrollment fees, later indexed to Medicare premium
increases for working age retirees, most of whom are employed
while receiving full pensions. All six members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have strongly endorsed these and other cost-
saving TRICARE reforms in a letter to Congress.
I understand that any kind of change to these benefits
prompts vigorous political opposition, but let us be clear. The
current TRICARE arrangement, one in which fees have not
increased for 15 years, is simply unsustainable, and if allowed
to continue, DOD risks the fate of other corporate and
government bureaucracies that were ultimately crippled by
personnel costs, in particular, their retiree benefit packages.
All told, the cumulative effect of DOD's savings and
reforms, combined with a host of new investments, will make it
possible to protect the U.S. military's combat power despite
the declining rate of growth and eventual flattening of the
defense budget over the next 5 years. As a result of the
savings identified and reinvested by the Services, our military
will be able to meet unforeseen expenses, refurbish war-worn
equipment, buy new ships and fighters, begin development of a
new long-range bomber, boost our cyber warfare capability,
strengthen missile defense, and buy more of the most advanced
UAVs. But I should note this will only be possible if the
efficiencies, reforms, and savings are followed through to
completion.
In closing, I want to address the calls from some quarters
for deeper cuts in defense spending to address this country's
fiscal challenges. I would remind them that over the last two
defense budgets submitted by President Obama, we have curtailed
or canceled troubled or excess programs that would have cost
more than $300 billion if seen through to completion.
Additionally, total defense spending, including war costs, will
decline further as the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq.
We still live in a very dangerous and often unstable world.
Our military must remain strong enough and agile enough to face
a diverse range of threats from non-state actors attempting to
acquire and use weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated
missiles to the more traditional threats of other states
building up their conventional forces and developing new
capabilities that target our traditional strengths.
We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our
peril. Retrenchment brought about by short-sighted cuts could
well lead to costlier and more tragic consequences later,
indeed, as they always have in the past. Surely we should learn
from our national experience since World War I that drastic
reductions in the size and strength of the U.S. military make
armed conflict all the more likely with an unacceptably high
cost in American blood and treasure.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working through this next
phase of the President's defense reform effort with you and
your colleagues in the weeks and months ahead to do what is
right for our Armed Forces and what is right for our country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2012. I first want to thank
the members of this committee for your support of the men and women in
uniform who have answered the call in a time of war. I know you will
join me in doing everything to ensure they have all they need to
accomplish their mission and come home safely.
The budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD) being
presented today includes a base budget request of $553 billion and an
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for $117.8 billion. These
budget decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2-year effort by
DOD to reduce overhead, cull troubled and excess programs, and rein in
personnel and contractor costs--all for the purpose of preserving the
fighting strength of America's military at a time of fiscal stress for
our country. The goal was not only to generate savings that could be
applied to new capabilities and programs, but for our defense
institutions to become more agile and effective organizations as a
result.
In all, these budget requests, if enacted by Congress, will:
Continue our efforts to reform the way the department
does business;
Fund modernization programs needed to prepare for
future conflicts;
Reaffirm and strengthen the Nation's commitment to
care for the All-Volunteer Force; and
Ensure that our troops and commanders on the front
lines have the resources and support they need to accomplish
their mission.
Before I further summarize the elements of the President's budget
request, I want to address three issues that I know have been a subject
of debate and concern since I announced the outlines of our budget
proposal on January 6:
First, the serious damage caused to our military by
operating under a continuing resolution or receiving a
significant funding cut during fiscal year 2011;
Second, the projected slowing and eventual flattening
of growth of the defense budget over the next 5 years; and
Third, the planned future reductions in the size of
the ground forces.
I want to make clear that we face a crisis on our doorstep if DOD
ends up with a year-long continuing resolution or a significant funding
cut for fiscal year 2011. The President's defense budget request for
fiscal year 2011 was $549 billion. A full-year continuing resolution
would fund the department at about $526 billion. That's a cut of $23
billion. Similarly, some of the appropriations proposals under debate
in Congress contemplate reductions of $15 billion and more from what
the President requested for defense in fiscal year 2011. The damage
done across the force from such reductions would be magnified as they
would come halfway through the fiscal year.
Let me be clear, operating under a year-long continuing resolution
or substantially reduced funding--with the severe shortfalls that
entails--would damage procurement and research programs causing delays,
rising costs, no new program starts and serious disruptions in the
production of some our most high demand assets, such as Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles. The reductions would likely fall most heavily on our
operations and maintenance accounts. Cuts in maintenance could force
parts of our aircraft fleet to be grounded and delay needed facilities
improvements. Cuts in operations would mean fewer flying hours, fewer
steaming days, and cutbacks in training for home-stationed forces--all
of which directly impacts readiness. That is how you hollow out a
military--when your best people, your veterans of multiple combat
deployments, become frustrated and demoralized and, as a result, begin
leaving military service.
Consider also that throughout this past decade of conflict, the
Service Chiefs and Members of Congress have repeatedly voiced concerns
about the lack of training opportunities for conventional high-end
combat resulting from the operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan.
We are just now beginning to get the kind of dwell-time for our home
stationed forces to allow that kind of training. If forced to operate
under a continuing resolution or reduced funding, some of that full-
spectrum training will not happen in fiscal year 2011.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize that given the current fiscal and
political environment, it is unlikely that DOD will receive the full
amount originally requested for fiscal year 2011. Based on a number of
factors--including policy changes that led to lower personnel costs and
reduced activity forced by the continuing resolution--I believe the
department can get by with a lower number. However, it is my judgment
that DOD needs an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fiscal
year 2011 for the U.S. military to properly carry out its mission,
maintain readiness, and prepare for the future.
Which brings me to the second issue--the proposed $78 billion
reduction in the defense budget topline over the next 5 years. To begin
with, this so-called ``cut'' is to the rate of predicted growth. The
size of the base defense budget is still projected to increase in real,
inflation-adjusted dollars, before eventually flattening out over this
time period.
More significantly, as a result of the efficiencies and reforms
undertaken over the past year, we have protected programs that support
military people, readiness, and modernization. These efforts have made
it possible for DOD to absorb lower projected growth in the defense
budget without, as Chairman McKeon warned last month, ``leav[ing] our
military less capable and less able to fight.'' In fact, the savings
identified by the Services have allowed our military to add some $70
billion towards priority needs and new capabilities.
Of the $78 billion in proposed reductions to the 5-year defense
budget plan, about $68 billion comes from a combination of shedding
excess overhead, improving business practices, reducing personnel
costs, and from changes to economic assumptions. Only $10 billion of
that 5-year total is related directly to military combat capability. $4
billion comes from restructuring the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program, a step driven by the program's development and testing
schedule that would have taken place irrespective of the budget top-
line.
The rest, about $6 billion, results from the proposed decrease in
end strength of the Army and Marine Corps starting in fiscal year 2015,
a decision that I will address now. Just over four years ago, one of my
first acts as Defense Secretary was to increase the permanent end
strength of our ground forces--the Army by 65,000 to a total of 547,000
and the Marine Corps by 27,000 to 202,000. At the time, the increase
was needed to relieve the severe stress on the force from the Iraq war
as the surge was getting underway. To support the later plus up of
troops in Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a temporary further
increase in the Army of some 22,000. The objective was to reduce stress
on the force, limit and eventually end the practice of stop-loss, and
to increase troops' home station dwell time.
As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year, according to
the agreement with the Iraqi Government, the overall deployment demands
on our force are decreasing significantly. Just 3 years ago, we had
some 190,000 troops combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of
this calendar year we expect less than 100,000 troops to be deployed in
both of the major post-September 11 combat theaters, virtually all of
those forces being in Afghanistan.
That is why we believe that, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the
United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army active duty
end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000
and 20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops in
Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in
accordance with the President's strategy. If our assumptions prove
incorrect, there's plenty of time to adjust the size and schedule of
this change.
It is important to remember that even after the planned reductions,
the active Army end strength would continue to be larger, by nearly
40,000 soldiers, than it was when I became defense secretary four years
ago. I should also note that these reductions are supported by both the
Army and Marine Corps leadership.
I would note that prior to these budget decisions, the last Marine
Commandant stated that he believed the Marine Corps was larger than it
should be for the long term. The current Commandant, General Amos, has
just completed a comprehensive force structure review for the post-
Afghanistan security environment that is consistent with the out-year
reductions projected in the President's budget plan.
REFORM--EFFICIENCIES
These budget decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2 year
effort by DOD to reform the way the Pentagon does business--to change
how and what we buy, to replace a culture of endless money with one of
savings and restraint. To not only make every defense dollar count, but
also become a more agile and effective organization in the process.
Last spring, we launched a comprehensive effort to reduce DOD's
overhead expenditures. The goal was--and is--to sustain the U.S.
military's size and strength over the long-term by reinvesting those
efficiency savings in force structure and other key combat
capabilities. This process culminated in my announcement last month
that summarized the impact of these reforms on the fiscal year 2012
budget.
The Military Services conducted a thorough scrub of their
bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization programs,
civilian and military personnel levels, and associated overhead costs.
They identified potential savings that totaled approximately $100
billion over 5 years. More than $70 billion is being reinvested in high
priority needs and capabilities, while about $28 billion is going to
higher than expected operating costs--``must pay'' bills that would
otherwise be paid from investment accounts.
We then looked at reducing costs and deriving savings across the
department as a whole--with special attention to the substantial
headquarters and support bureaucracies outside the four Military
Services--savings that added up to $78 billion over 5 years.
As I mentioned earlier, $10 billion of that total came from
restructuring the JSF program and reducing Army and Marine Corps end
strength starting in fiscal year 2015.
The rest of the DOD-wide savings came primarily from shedding
excess overhead, improving business practices, and reducing personnel
costs. Key examples include:
$13 billion from holding the civilian workforce at
fiscal year 2010 levels for 3 years, with limited exceptions
such as growth in the acquisition workforce;
$12 billion through the government-wide freeze on
civilian salaries;
$8 billion by reforming military health programs to
maintain high quality care while slowing cost growth;
$11 billion from resetting missions, priorities,
functions for the defense agencies and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
$6 billion by reducing staff augmentation and service
support contracts by 10 percent annually for 3 years;
$2.3 billion by disestablishing Joint Forces Command
and the Business Transformation Agency;
$1 billion by eliminating unnecessary studies and
internal reports;
$4 billion in changed economic assumptions, such as a
lower than expected inflation rate;
$100 million by reducing more than 100 flag officer
and about 200 civilian senior executive positions; and
$11 billion in a variety of smaller initiatives across
the department.
To better track how and where taxpayer dollars are spent, the
department is also reforming its financial management systems and
practices--with the goal of having auditable financial statements by
the congressionally mandated date of 2017. We are pursuing a
streamlined approach that focuses first on the information we most use
to manage the department.
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BASE BUDGET REQUEST
The President's request for the base defense budget is for $553
billion, which represents a 3.6 percent real increase over continuing
resolution levels--and about 1.5 percent real growth over the omnibus
defense bill marked up by Congress last year. The four major components
are:
$207.1 billion for operations, maintenance, logistics
and training;
$142.8 billion for military pay and benefits;
$188.3 billion for modernization; and
$14.8 billion for military construction and family
housing.
MODERNIZATION
In all, the fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $188.3 billion
for modernization in the form of Procurement, Research, Development,
Testing and Evaluation. Key modernization initiatives include:
$4.8 billion to enhance intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities and buy more high demand
assets, including the MC-12 surveillance aircraft, Predator,
Reaper and Global Hawk UAVs--with the aim of achieving 65
Predator-class Combat Air Patrols by the end of fiscal year
2013;
More than $10 billion to modernize our heavily used
rotary wing fleet;
$3.9 billion to upgrade the Army's combat vehicles and
communications systems;
$4.8 billion to buy new equipment for the Reserves;
$14.9 billion to buy new fighters and ground attack
aircraft;
$24.6 billion to support a realistic, executable
shipbuilding and investment portfolio that buys 11 ships in
fiscal year 2012 and modernizes existing fleet assets;
$10.5 billion to advance the modernization portion of
the administration's approach to ballistic missile defense
(BMD)--including $8.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency;
and
$2.3 billion to improve the military's cyber
capabilities.
Questions have been raised about whether we are too focused on
current conflicts and are devoting too few resources to future possible
high-end conflicts. This budget should put those questions to rest. The
fiscal year 2012 base request provides for significant investments at
the high end of the conflict spectrum, including:
$1 billion ($4.5 billion over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP)) for a tactical air modernization program that
would ensure that the F-22 will continue to be the world's
preeminent air-to-air fighter. This effort will leverage radar
and electronic protection technologies from the JSF program;
$204 million ($1.6 billion over the FYDP) to modernize
the radars of F-15s to keep this key fighter viable well into
the future;
$30 million ($491 million over the FYDP) for a follow-
on to the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, that would
provide greater range, lethality and protection against
electronic jamming;
$200 million ($800 million over the FYDP) to invest in
technologies to disrupt an opponent's ability to attack our
surface ships;
$1.1 billion ($2.2 billion over the FYDP) to buy more
EA-18 Growlers than originally planned, plus $1.6 billion over
the FYDP to develop a new jamming system, expanding our
electronic warfare capabilities;
$2.1 billion ($14 billion over the FYDP) to fund
Aegis-equipped ships to further defend the fleet from aircraft
and missile attack and provide theater-wide tactical BMD; and
To improve anti-submarine capabilities, $2.4 billion
for P-8 Poseidon aircraft ($19.6 billion over the FYDP) and
$4.8 billion for procurement of Virginia-class attack
submarines ($27.6 billion over the FYDP).
The fiscal year 2012 budget also supports a long-range strike
family of systems, which must be a high priority for future defense
investment given the anti-access challenges our military faces. A key
component of this joint portfolio will be a new long-range, nuclear-
capable, penetrating Air Force bomber, designed and developed using
proven technologies and with an option for remote piloting. It is
important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber
can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service.
The budget request includes $10.6 billion to maintain U.S.
supremacy in space, in keeping with the recently released National
Security Space Strategy. This new strategy will help bring order to the
congested space domain, strengthen international partnerships, increase
resiliency so our troops can fight in a degraded space environment, and
improve our acquisition processes and reform export controls to
energize the space industrial base.
As the Military Services were digging deep for excess overhead,
they were also taking a hard look at their modernization portfolio for
weapons that were having major development problems, unsustainable cost
growth, or had grown less relevant to real world needs.
The JSF program received special scrutiny given its substantial
cost and its central place in ensuring that we have a large inventory
of the most advanced fifth generation stealth fighters to sustain U.S.
air superiority well into the future. The fiscal year 2012 budget
reflects the proposed restructuring of the F-35 JSF program to
stabilize its schedule and cost. The department has adjusted F-35
procurement quantities based on new data on costs, on likely orders
from our foreign nation partners, and on realigned development and test
schedules.
The proposed restructuring adds over $4 billion for additional
testing through 2016. It holds F-35 procurement in fiscal year 2012 at
32 aircraft and reduces buys by 124 aircraft compared with last year's
plans. Even after these changes, procurement ramps up sharply to 108
aircraft by fiscal year 2016. This is the fastest that future
procurement can prudently be increased.
The F-35 restructuring places the Marine's short takeoff and
vertical landing variant on the equivalent of a two year probation. If
we cannot fix this variant during this timeframe and get it back on
track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it
should be canceled. To compensate for any delays in F-35 deliveries, we
propose buying 41 more F/A-18s between fiscal year 2012 to 2014.
I also want to reiterate the President's and my firm opposition to
buying an extra engine for the F-35--a position echoed by the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps leadership. We consider it an unnecessary
and extravagant expense, particularly during this period of fiscal
contraction. The Congress has not spoken with one voice on this matter
and DOD has been operating this fiscal year under ambiguous guidance at
best. Given the situation, I decided to continue to fund the JSF extra
engine effort during this interim period to give Congress the
opportunity to resolve this matter as part of its ongoing debate on the
budget.
However, this also means that the American taxpayers are spending
$28 million a month for an excess and unjustified program that is
slated for termination. The President, the military services and I
continue to oppose this extra engine and, when the current CR expires,
I will look at all available legal options to close down this program.
It would be a waste of nearly $3 billion in a time of economic distress
and the money is needed for higher priority defense efforts.
This budget proposes cancelling the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
(EFV) and reallocating funds to existing Marine ground combat
requirements, a decision based on the recommendation of the Secretary
of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Ultimately, the Navy and Marine Corps leadership based their
recommendations on two main principles: affordability and balance. The
EFV, a program originally conceived in the 1980s, has already consumed
more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to
build. The EFV as designed would have cost many times more than the
system it would replace, with much higher maintenance and service
costs. If continued over the next two decades, the EFV program would
consume fully half of all Marine Corps procurement dollars while
swallowing virtually the Corps' entire ground vehicle budget--
procurement, operations, and maintenance--with all the risk to
readiness that entails.
To be sure, the EFV would, if pursued to completion without regard
to time or cost, be an enormously capable vehicle. But as with several
other high end programs completed or cancelled in recent years--the F-
22, the Army Future Combat Systems, or the Navy's DDG-1000 destroyer--
the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be
judged against other priorities and needs.
Let there be no doubt--we are committed to sustaining the Marine
Corps amphibious mission. This fiscal year 2012 request proposes that
the $2.8 billion previously budgeted to the EFV for the next 5 years
instead be reinvested towards an integrated new vehicle program for the
Marine Corps, including:
New armor, weaponry and engines, plus a life-extension
program for the existing amphibious assault vehicles:
The development of a new, more affordable, sustainable
and survivable amphibious vehicle;
Accelerated procurement of new personnel carriers; and
Enhancement of existing Marine vehicles such as the
Abrams tank and Light Armored Vehicle.
Throughout this process, we will harness the lessons learned--in
terms of engineering, design, and testing--from the development of the
EFV.
PERSONNEL
The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $142.8 billion for
military pay and benefits and continues our strong support for troops
and their families. This includes funding for wounded, ill and injured
care, enhancing the military health care system and supporting military
families under stress. Examples in this request include:
$2.3 billion to provide care for our Wounded Warriors
and their families; and
$8.3 billion for supporting families, including child
care and school programs; and
While the department continues to insist on and pay for the highest
quality health care, we are also mindful of sharply rising health
costs--which have risen over the last decade from $19 billion in 2001
to $52.5 billion in this budget request. The department has taken a
comprehensive look at all facets of the military health care model--
emphasizing the need to balance the number one priority of continuing
to provide the highest care and service, while ensuring fiscally
responsible management.
One area we have identified are benefits provided to working-age
retirees under the TRICARE program. Many of these beneficiaries are
employed full time while receiving full pensions, often forgoing their
employer's health plan to remain with TRICARE. This should come as no
surprise, given that the current TRICARE enrollment fee was set in 1995
at $460 a year for the basic family plan and has not been raised since.
By comparison, the fees for a comparable health insurance program for
Federal workers total roughly $5,000 per year.
Accordingly, we propose a modest increase to TRICARE Prime
enrollment fees for working age retirees: $2.50 per month for
individuals and $5.00 per month for families in fiscal year 2012, and
then indexed to Medicare premium increases in future years.
We are proposing other health care initiatives such as efficiencies
in pharmacy co-pays designed to provide incentives to make greater use
of generic prescriptions and those ordered by mail. We also seek to
phase out, over several years, special subsidies offered to a small
group of hospitals that treat military families and retirees.
Additionally, we are proposing providing TRICARE-for-Life to all
Medicare-eligible retirees aged 65 and over, including future enrollees
in the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan. It is important to note
that none of these changes would affect health care benefits for
active-duty personnel.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE REFORM
The fiscal year 2012 request includes funding and authorization for
a key step forward in a critical policy area: helping other countries
to protect and defend themselves. The Pentagon and the State Department
have agreed to a 3-year pilot pooled fund--called the Global Security
Contingency Fund--that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent
conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. The proposed fund would
incentivize interagency collaboration through a new business model. It
would provide a more agile and cost effective way to reduce the risk of
future conflicts by allowing our government to respond to unforeseen
needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities to help partners
secure their own territories and regions.
The request is modest, an initial $50 million State Department
appropriation, along with a request for authority to transfer an
additional $450 million into the fund from either department if needed.
DOD intends to make significant contributions from its own resources
into this pooled fund. We will be requesting in parallel an
authorization for this initiative in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
Finally, this budget request includes $117.8 billion in fiscal year
2012 to support OCOs, primarily in Afghanistan, and to wind down our
operations in Iraq--this is a significant reduction from the $159
billion request for OCO in fiscal year 2011. The request, which fully
funds our wartime requirements, includes:
$86.4 billion for wartime operations and related
costs;
$425 million for the Commander's Emergency Response
Fund;
$475 million for the Afghan Infrastructure Fund;
$2.6 billion to support counter-IED efforts;
$3.2 billion for mine-resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) vehicles, including the MRAP All Terrain Vehicles
developed for Afghanistan; and
$11.9 billion to replace and restore worn, damaged, or
destroyed equipment.
$12.8 billion for training and equipping of the Afghan
security forces.
CONCLUSION
All told, the cumulative effect of the department's savings and
reforms, combined with a host of new investments, will make it possible
to protect the U.S. military's global reach and fighting strength
despite the declining rate of growth, and eventual flattening, of the
defense budget over the next 5 years. As a result of the savings
identified by the Services and reinvested, our military will be able to
meet unforeseen expenses, refurbish war worn equipment, buy new ships
and fighters, begin development of a new long-range bomber, boost our
cyber-warfare capability, missile defense, and buy more of the most
advanced UAVs. But, I should note, this will only be possible if the
efficiencies reforms and savings are followed through to completion.
Before closing, I want to address the calls from some quarters for
deeper cuts in defense spending to address this country's fiscal
challenges. I would remind them that over the last two defense budgets
submitted by President Obama, we have reformed and rebalanced the
department's spending habits and priorities, curtailing or canceling
troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than $300 billion
if seen through to completion. Additionally, total defense spending--
including war costs--will decline further as the U.S. military
withdraws from Iraq.
We still live in a very dangerous and often unstable world. Our
military must remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of
threats--from non-state actors attempting to acquire and use weapons of
mass destruction and sophisticated missiles, to the more traditional
threats of other states both building up their conventional forces and
developing new capabilities that target our traditional strengths.
We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our peril.
Retrenchment brought about by short-sighted cuts could well lead to
costlier and more tragic consequences later--indeed as they always have
in the past. Surely we should learn from our national experience, since
World War I, that drastic reductions in the size and strength of the
U.S. military make armed conflict all the more likely--with an
unacceptably high cost in American blood and treasure.
Today, I ask your support for a leaner, more efficient Pentagon and
continued sustainable, robust investments in our troops and future
capabilities. Our troops have done more than their part, now it is time
for us in Washington to do ours.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working through this next phase of
the President's defense reform effort with you in the weeks and months
ahead--to do what's right for our Armed Forces and what's right for our
country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and distinguished members of this committee, I am honored to
appear before you today to discuss the President's fiscal year
2012 defense budget.
Before I do, however, let me just echo Secretary Gates'
comments about the very real dangers inherent in failing to
pass this year's budget. The fiscal year 2011 CR, if carried
forward, would not only reduce our account by $23 billion, it
would deprive us of the flexibility we need to support our
troops and their families.
The Services have already taken disruptive and, in some
cases, irreversible steps to live within the confines of the
current CR. Steps that ultimately make us less effective at
what we are supposed to do for the Nation. The Navy did not
procure Government-furnished equipment for another Arleigh
Burke class destroyer. The Army and the Marine Corps have
curtailed or altogether frozen civilian hiring. All the
Services are now prevented from issuing contracts for new major
military construction projects. Some programs may take years to
recover if the CR is extended through the end of September.
So I urge you to pass the fiscal year 2011 defense bill
immediately. Even at a reduced top line, it will provide us the
tools we need to accomplish the bulk of the missions we have
been assigned.
Accomplishing those missions into the future demands as
well support for the President's fiscal year 2012 proposal. As
the Secretary has laid out, this budget, combined with the
efficiency effort he led, provides for the wellbeing of our
troops and families, fully funds current operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and helps balance global risk through
streamlined organization, smarter acquisition, and prudent
modernization.
The Army, for instance, will cancel procurement of a
surface-to-air missile and the non-line-of-sight launch system,
but it will continue production of the joint light tactical
vehicle and spearhead the development of a whole new family of
armored vehicles. The Navy will give up its second fleet
headquarters, reduce its manpower ashore, and increase its use
of multiyear procurement for ships and aircraft, allowing it to
continue development of the next generation of ballistic
missile submarine, purchase 40 new F/A-18s, and 4 littoral
combat ships and another LPD-17. The Marines will cancel the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and like the Army, reduce their
end strength starting in 2015. But they will reinvest these
savings to sustain and modernize the amphibious assault vehicle
and the light armored vehicle, even as they advance a new
concept of operations and restore much of their naval
expeditionary skills. The Air Force will be able to continue
development of the next tanker, a new bomber, and modernize its
aging fleet of F-15 fighters, all the while finding savings of
more than $33 billion through reorganization, consolidation,
and reduced facilities requirements.
None of this balancing will come on the backs of our
deployed troops. We are asking for more than $84 billion for
readiness and training, nearly $5 billion for increased
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities, and more than $10 billion to recapitalize our
rotary aircraft fleet. These funds plus those we are requesting
to help build partner capacity in places like Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen all speak to the emphasis we are
placing on giving our troops and their partners in the field
everything they need to do the difficult jobs we have asked of
them.
We must also give them and their families everything they
need to cope with the stress and the strain of 10 years at war.
That is why I am so pleased with the funds devoted in this
proposal, almost three-quarters as much as the $200 billion
budgeted for operations and maintenance (O&M), to personnel
housing and health care issues. The chiefs and I penned a rare
24-star letter to Congress this week expressing our unqualified
support for the military health care program changes included
in this budget. We sought equity across all health care
programs with beneficiaries and health care delivery providers
having the same benefits and equivalent payment systems
regardless of where they live or work.
That, in turn, led us to propose increases in TRICARE
enrollment fees for working age retirees. These increases are
modest and manageable and leave fees well below the inflation-
adjusted, out-of-pocket costs set in 1995 when the current fees
were established. We sincerely hope you will see fit to pass
these increases.
Please know that we will continue to invest wisely in
critical care areas to include research, diagnosis and
treatment of mental health issues and TBI, enhanced access to
health services, and new battlefield technologies. We
understand that changes to health care benefits cause concern
among the people we serve and the communities from which we
receive care, but we also understand and hold sacred our
obligation to care completely for those who have born the brunt
of these wars, as well as those for whom the war never ends.
I am convinced that we have not begun to understand the
toll in dollars and in dreams that war extracts from our
people. As the grandsons and granddaughters of World War II
vets still struggle to comprehend the full scope of the horror
those men yet conceal, so too will our grandchildren have to
come to grips with the wounds unseen and the grief unspoken
unless, of course, we get it right. I believe the investments
we are making in wounded care and family readiness will pay off
in that regard, but it will take time and patience and money,
three things we seem so rarely to possess in this town.
That brings me back to this particular budget request. With
limited resources and two wars in progress, we should be
prudent in defining our priorities in controlling costs and in
slaking our thirst for more and better systems.
We should also be clear about what the joint force can and
cannot do, just as we should be clear about what we expect from
our interagency and international partners. Our global
commitments have not shrunk. If anything, they continue to
grow, and the world is a lot less predictable now than we could
have ever imagined. You need look no further than Tahrir Square
to see the truth in that. Foolhardy would it be for us to make
hasty judgments about the benefits, tangible and intangible,
that are to be derived from forging strong military
relationships overseas such as the one we enjoy with Egypt.
Changes to those relationships in either aid or assistance
ought to be considered only with an abundance of caution and a
thorough appreciation for the long view, rather than the flush
of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. The $1.3
billion we provide the Egyptian military each year has helped
them become the capable professional force they are and, in
that regard, has been of incalculable value.
Of equal or greater value is increased appropriations for
DOS and our request in this budget for the Global Security
Contingency Fund, a 3-year pooled fund between DOD and DOS,
that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent conflicts,
and prepare for emerging threats. The request is modest, an
initial $50 million appropriation, along with a request for
authority to reprogram an additional $450 million if needed.
But what it will buy us is an agile and cost effective way to
better respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of
emerging opportunities for partners to secure their own
territories and regions.
We must get more efficient, yes, but we must also get more
pragmatic about the world we live in. We can no longer afford
bloated programs or unnecessary organizations without
sacrificing fighting power, and we can no longer afford to put
off investments in future capabilities or relationships that
preserve that power across a spectrum of conflict. I have long
said we must not be exempt in DOD from belt-tightening, but in
truth, there is little discretionary about the security we
provide our fellow citizens. Cuts can reasonably only go so far
without hollowing the force. In my view then, this proposed
budget builds on the balance we started to achieve last year
and represents the best of both fiscal responsibility and sound
national security.
I would be remiss, indeed, if I did not close by lauding
the incredible effort of our troops overseas and their families
as they finish one war in Iraq and begin to turn corners in
Afghanistan. I know you share my pride in them and their
families and your support has been superb. I know you will keep
them foremost in mind as you consider the elements of this
proposal. I thank you for your continued longstanding support
of our men and women in uniform and their families, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my privilege to report on the posture of the U.S.
Armed Forces.
We remain a military at war. Yet, in the face of daunting
challenges, our Armed Forces have successfully carried out their far-
ranging missions over the past year. They have disrupted al Qaeda,
improved security in Afghanistan, continued on a path to soon end the
war in Iraq, promoted stability in the Pacific Rim, and provided
humanitarian assistance when disasters struck. However, the cumulative
stress of 9 years of war is growing and substantial. We will need your
sustained support, even in the midst of fiscal difficulties, to reset
the Joint Force needed to protect the American people.
Our country is fortunate to be served by the best Armed Forces I
have seen in over 42 years of wearing the uniform. Despite continuous
deployments and combat operations, our men and women in uniform and
their families have been resilient beyond all expectations. They are
patriots who care deeply for this country and serve under very trying
conditions. They are the most combat experienced and capable force we
have ever had, and they continue to learn and adapt in ways that are
truly remarkable. I am continuously humbled as I visit them around the
country and the world. Time and again, these men and women and their
families have proven that our All-Volunteer Force is the Nation's
greatest strategic asset.
This Force cannot thrive without the support of the American
people. Everything we are and everything we do comes from them. I am
grateful for Congress' and the American people's constant reminders
that the service, heroism, and sacrifices of our servicemembers and
their families are valued. However, I am concerned that because our
military hails from a shrinking percentage of the population, some day
the American people may no longer know us. We cannot allow this to
happen. We will endeavor to stay connected and to maintain a strong and
open relationship.
As we look to our military's posture and budget, we recognize that
our country is still reeling from a grave and global economic downturn
and is maintaining nearly historic fiscal deficits and national debt.
Indeed, I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our national
security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal imbalances in
the near-term, our national power will erode, and the costs to our
ability to maintain and sustain influence could be great. To do its
part, the Department of Defense (DOD) must and will become more
efficient and disciplined, while improving our effectiveness. We must
carefully and deliberately balance the imperatives of a constrained
budget environment with the requirements we place on our military in
sustaining and enhancing our security.
Going forward our fundamental resourcing problem will be
identifying where we can reduce spending while minimizing the
additional risk we will have to take on. For too much of the past
decade we have not been forced to be disciplined with our choices. This
must change, and it already has. We have identified a number of
efficiencies in our budget and have reduced spending, while also
retaining the combat readiness, force structure, essential
modernization, and personnel programs we need. We are proud of what we
have done so far, identifying $100 billion in efficiency savings over
the next 5 years. But we need to do more.
Under the Secretary's leadership, DOD has conducted two
comprehensive reviews of our requirements. First, the Quadrennial
Defense Review surveyed the strategic environment, identified the
strategy for the Joint Force, and determined what we need to execute
that strategy. Second, we reviewed our spending to ensure we can
achieve the maximum security benefit for every defense dollar. We must
be careful to not cut defense beyond prudent levels, below which U.S.
Armed Forces would be unable to execute our defense strategy at
acceptable risk. Given the challenges and complexity of the security
environment and the breadth of our national security interest, the
defense strategy is necessarily global, wide-ranging, and highly
responsive. This is why it is expensive.
At about 4.5 percent of GDP, the return on U.S. defense spending
has been immense and historic: preventing world war between great
powers, securing the global commons and the free flow of international
trade and natural resources, combating terrorism across the globe, and
protecting the American people and our allies. However, our operations
have come with stresses and strains as well as costs to our readiness.
For this reason, if we are to continue to execute the missions set out
by our strategy, we must recognize that returning from war and
resetting the force is costly and will require several years of
continued investment. Congressional support is required for our forces,
their families, their equipment and training, and our military
infrastructure to ensure the success of our ongoing efforts and for us
to be ready to respond to new and emerging security challenges.
The President's National Security Strategy, the recently released
National Military Strategy, and the President's Strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan describe our military approaches and ongoing
operations in great detail. This posture statement will focus on the
strategic priorities for the military and the Congressional support we
need. My priorities remain defending our vital interests in the broader
Middle East and South Central Asia, improving the Health-of-the-Force,
and balancing global strategic risk.
DEFENDING OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND
SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA
Over the past year, our Armed Forces have continued to shoulder a
heavy burden, particularly in the Middle East and South Central Asia.
The balance of this burden and our wartime focus has shifted, however,
from Iraq to Afghanistan. This was made possible by drawing down
military forces in Iraq and transitioning security responsibilities to
the Iraqis. Meanwhile, we committed additional forces and resources to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have made steady, albeit uneven, progress
toward disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda in
the region, while remaining ready to address other challenges around
the world.
As a result of our operations with our Coalition, Afghan, and
Pakistani partners, and extensive cooperation with other partners, al
Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan is weaker and under greater
pressure than at any other time since being forced out of Afghanistan
in late 2001. They have suffered the losses of numerous senior leaders
and face significant challenges to coordinating operations, maintaining
safe havens, and acquiring funding. Despite this operational progress,
al Qaeda retains the intent and capability to attack the United States
and other Western countries. The movement's leaders continue to operate
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, planning operations and
guiding the efforts of al Qaeda networks operating out of the Arabian
Peninsula, Africa, and even Europe. We, in turn, remain committed to
our deepening and broadening partnerships in the region and to our goal
of ultimately defeating al Qaeda and creating the conditions to prevent
their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
We continue to implement our national strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan with great urgency. This past November, we completed the
deployment of the 30,000 additional U.S. forces, and we are beginning
to see signs of improvements on the ground. These forces have allowed
us to go on the offensive with our Afghan partners, force the Taliban
out of safe havens in its heartland of Kandahar and Helmand, protect
the Afghan population, and reduce civilian casualties. Our
counterinsurgency operations, conducted in close partnership with
Afghan forces, have reduced the Taliban's influence, reversed the
insurgency's momentum in key areas of the country, and forced many
Taliban leaders to flee across the border. Our forces will consolidate
recent gains in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces and further expand
security in other critical parts of the country.
This success against the Taliban and other insurgent groups is
essential to prevent the return of al Qaeda, gain time to build the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and force insurgents to
reconcile with the Afghan Government on acceptable terms. We expect the
violence coming in 2011 to be greater than last year. The fighting will
be tough and often costly, but it is necessary to sustain and even
increase the pressure we have been placing on the insurgent groups. We
cannot allow the Taliban to reorganize and reconstitute as they did in
2004 and 2005, regain their oppressive influence over the Afghan
people, and once again provide safe haven to al Qaeda.
For the success of our military operations to be enduring, it is
critical that the ANSF be able to provide security for the Afghan
people. Our greatest success story this past year has been the growth
and development of the ANSF. With the help of additional NATO trainers,
the ANSF added 49,000 soldiers and 21,000 policemen to their ranks--an
astonishing growth of 36 percent. The ANSF also continue to improve on
the battlefield and increasingly contribute to the war effort. They are
fighting beside us and have grown in their ability to plan and conduct
complex operations. In fact, their expanding capabilities and presence
have already allowed ISAF forces to ``thin out'' in some parts of
central Helmand and Kabul Province. We are on track to begin the
transition of security responsibilities and drawdown of our forces in
July 2011. In the coming year, while continuing to grow the ANSF in
size, we will place greater emphasis on improving its quality,
professionalism, and self-sufficiency, to ensure that they remain on
track to assume the overall lead for security in 2014. To this end, the
Afghan Security Forces Fund remains critical to the building of the
ANSF's capabilities and to the ANSF's eventual assumption of security
responsibilities.
Despite our successes, numerous other challenges remain. Achieving
sustainable security requires developing Afghan governing capacity,
cultivating the conditions needed for conflict resolution, neutralizing
insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, and countering corruption. Absent
these conditions, we will not succeed. Despite a dramatic increase in
our civilian presence in Afghanistan this past year, improvements in
subnational governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with
progress in improving security. This has impeded our ability to
``hold,'' ``build,'' and ``transfer.'' For this reason, the Commander's
Emergency Response Program remains the most responsive means for
addressing a local community's needs and is often the only tool our
commanders have to address pressing requirements in areas where
security is challenged. Along with development projects, we believe
that new transparency and anti-corruption efforts may counter the
deleterious effects of Afghanistan's criminal patronage networks,
mitigate the distortive effects of international aid and development
programs, and ultimately improve the confidence the Afghan people have
in their government and their governing officials. To complement this
``bottom-up'' development, we will support the Afghan Government's
reconciliation and reintegration efforts in order to achieve the
political solution that is an imperative to sustainable peace.
Successful military and security gains cannot be sustained unless we
meet this challenge.
Though our operational efforts are focused on Afghanistan, our
diplomatic efforts have increasingly focused on Pakistan, a country
critical to our strategy in the region. We must overcome years of
mistrust and continue to lay the foundation for a true partnership with
Pakistan. We made progress this past year by holding a third,
productive round of Strategic Dialogues in October and by improving
high- and mid-level coordination on security operations in the vicinity
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Equally important, we responded to
last summer's devastating floods with timely aid and humanitarian
relief. Our assistance eased some of the burden of the Pakistani
military and demonstrated our enduring commitment to the Pakistani
people.
A key component of our partnership is to help enable the Pakistani
Military's counterterror and counterinsurgency operations. The series
of offensive operations undertaken by the Pakistani Military in the
tribal areas expanded dramatically in 2009. Since then, the Pakistanis
have fought bravely and sacrificed much--losing thousands of soldiers
in the process. We have faithfully supported them in a variety of ways,
primarily in the development of the counterinsurgency capabilities of
Pakistan's security forces. This development and the military's
operations have kept pressure on al Qaeda's senior leadership and the
militant groups threatening Pakistan and Afghanistan. However,
insurgent groups such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network
operate unhindered from sanctuaries in Pakistan, posing a significant
threat to NATO and Afghan forces. The aftermath of devastating flooding
continues to place a high demand on the military. Our efforts to enable
the Pakistani Military depend on several critical programs, such as the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund and the Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment
announced by Secretary Clinton last fall. It is also important that
through exchange programs, such as the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program, we establish relationships with the
generation of Pakistani officers with whom we had cut ties. In
addition, because we so heavily depend on Pakistan as a supply route
supporting our efforts in Afghanistan, Coalition Support Funds remain
critical to reimbursing the Pakistanis for their assistance.
In terms of our broader engagement with Pakistan and the region,
reducing some of the long-standing enmity and mistrust between India
and Pakistan would greatly contribute to our efforts. As neighbors, it
is in both India and Pakistan's interests to reduce the tension between
them and strengthen their political, security, and economic ties. While
we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue
their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for
continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to
improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that
builds long-term stability across the wider region of South Asia.
Another increasingly important aspect of our engagement in South
Central Asia is the development of the Northern Distribution Network.
This line of communication has proven critical to maintaining
flexibility in our logistical support to our efforts in Afghanistan. We
will continue to work with our partners to ensure access and sustain
the viability of redundant supply routes for our forces.
We have ended our combat mission in Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and started a new chapter in our partnership, Operation New Dawn. We
successfully transferred lead for security responsibilities to the
Iraqi security forces (ISF) on August 31, 2010. Iraq's military and
political leaders are responding vigorously and professionally to the
residual, but still lethal, threat from al Qaeda. As a result, and
despite a drawn-out government formation process, the security
situation there continues to improve, and the Iraqi people are
increasingly able to focus on jobs and development. Beyond this
security transition, the State Department has taken the lead for U.S.
efforts in Iraq, and our diplomats and other civilians are increasingly
the face of our partnership with the Iraqi people and their government.
Sustained funding for our civilian efforts, commensurate with the State
Department's growing responsibilities--particularly our development
assistance and police training programs--is needed to ensure we are
able to successfully turn our military accomplishments into political
ones.
However, the end of the war in Iraq will not mean the end of our
commitment to the Iraqi people or to our strategic partnership. We must
focus on the future to help Iraq defend itself against external threats
and consolidate a successful, inclusive democracy in the heart of the
Middle East. As we continue to draw down forces through December 31,
2011, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, we will
transition to a more typical military-to-military relationship. We will
shift the focus of our assistance from Iraq's internal domestic
security to its external national defense, keeping in consideration the
interests and sensitivities of all Iraqis as well as Iraq's neighbors.
While ISFs have made great improvements, they will require external
assistance for years to come. The cornerstone of our future security
partnership with the Iraqis will be a robust Office of Security
Cooperation as part of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Key to our assistance
and not squandering our hard won gains will be continued support to the
ISF fund through fiscal year 2011, equipment transfer provisions, IMET
and other traditional security assistance programs, as well as section
1234 authority to transfer equipment from DOD stocks.
Despite the energy we commit to defeating al Qaeda and to
stabilizing the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, we
remain vigilant against other security challenges and sources of
aggression and proliferation throughout this critical region. The
Iranian regime continues to be the region's greatest state-level threat
to stability. Despite growing isolation from the international
community and a fourth round of increasingly costly U.N. sanctions, the
regime has neither ceased providing arms and other support to
Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups nor accepted a verifiable
end to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Many of the potential
flashpoints in the Levant and the Gulf region bear Iran's signature,
commanding the region's and the world's attention. That said, strong
social, economic, and political tensions pull on the region and its
people--as evidenced by the turmoil we have recently witnessed in
Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere. Volatility in regional affairs can often
follow volatility in domestic affairs. However, strong military-to-
military relationships can help reduce and mitigate the risks of
instability.
We will continue to help counter terrorist threats, deter Iranian
aggression, and protect our partners from coercive influence. To do
this we will continue to build the capabilities of our partners. More
important, we will nurture the development of a regional security
architecture based on multi-lateral partnerships that address a wide
range of security issues including counter-proliferation, maritime
security, counter-terrorism, air and missile defense, and emergency
response. As with our other partnerships across the globe, our security
assistance programs form the keystone of our relationships. In
particular, our section 1206 and 1208 programs provide a unique and
necessary flexibility and responsiveness to combatant commander
requirements that we cannot currently get with our Foreign Military
Funding (FMF) programs.
IMPROVING THE HEALTH-OF-THE-FORCE
The back end of war--the continued care of our veterans and their
families and the resetting of our force--cannot be an afterthought, and
getting it right will be expensive. Moreover, because of the duration
of these conflicts, we have begun to reset our units even in the midst
of conflict. The stress of nine years of constant warfare has come at a
great cost to the Force and its ability to continue to conduct
operations and respond to other emergent crises. We must care for our
people and their families and reset and reconstitute our weapon systems
to restore our readiness, capabilities, and wartime effectiveness. This
will require a sustained commitment of at least 3 to 5 years, and could
continue well beyond the end of our involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Care for our People
Our foremost focus is on our service men and women, their families,
and their supporting communities--the bedrock of our Armed Forces. They
each play unique and growing roles in our national security fabric, but
they have been under great, often unrecognized, stress for the past 9
years. Hundreds of thousands of our servicemembers have deployed to
fight overseas. Some have served multiple grueling tours, a great
number have suffered significant injuries, and thousands have
sacrificed their lives. Even those serving stateside enjoy only short
respites between deployments. We have asked a great deal from our
people, and we must invest in them and their families--through
appropriate pay, health care, family care, education, and employment
opportunities--as they are the single greatest guarantee of a strong
military. And they become our best recruiters.
The many accomplishments of our All-Volunteer Force over the past 9
years of continuous combat operations have been unprecedented. That we
remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent during this
period is simply extraordinary. All of our Services in the active Duty,
Reserve, and National Guard components continue to have exceptional
recruiting and retention rates. Ninety-six percent of our accessions
have earned at least a high school diploma, which helps explain why
this is one of the finest forces we have ever fielded. Competitive
compensation and selective bonuses are critical to our ability to
recruit and retain talent, as are other ``people programs,'' such as
the new GI Bill, improvements in housing, access to quality schooling
for military children, mental health counseling, adequate child care,
and attractive family support centers. All of these programs make the
harsh burdens of military life easier to bear. I ask for Congress'
continued support for them in order to sustain the Force while our
overseas operations continue.
I also urge Congress to continue funding the programs that will
create a continuum of health care for our veterans and their families
that seamlessly spans active duty and veteran status. With a focus on
our enduring commitment, we must continue to improve our active and
veteran care services, with special emphasis on Wounded Warrior
Support. We will expand our public and private partnerships and tap
into the ``sea of goodwill'' towards our veterans found in our Nation's
communities and civic organizations. That will be important, but it is
not sufficient. Long term fiscal support for the Department of Veterans
Affairs will serve the growing number of veterans requiring care.
One issue that demands acute national attention is the challenge of
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is
the signature weapon of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and is
directly responsible for many of these injuries. Many of our heroes
suffer from severe TBI and have had their lives dramatically changed in
ways we do not yet fully understand, and over 150,000 others have been
exposed to events that may have caused moderate TBI. As such, we need
to aggressively identify the victims of TBI, both within the serving
force and among our veterans, and the treatment and rehabilitation they
need and deserve. The effects of these efforts will pay dividends for
some time, because we can expect to face IEDs in future conflicts as
well.
In addition, suicides and the many other stresses and social health
costs that lag behind war--divorce, domestic violence, post-traumatic
stress, depression, and even homelessness--are becoming alarmingly
evident. Suicide rates remain unacceptably high, although programs such
as the Department's Suicide Prevention Task Force and our improved
leadership efforts have helped to lower the rates this past year in
three of our four Services. Leaders must remain focused on this issue,
as we work to improve our systematic understanding of the problem's
scope, warning signs, and at-risk populations. As a society we must
work to end the stigma that prevents our servicemembers, veterans, and
families from seeking early help.
By more effectively leveraging public-private partnerships, we can
pursue solutions and treatment for all of these health issues
afflicting the Force with great urgency and compassion and honor the
sacred trust our Nation has with all of our combat veterans.
Reset and Reconstitute
The grueling pace of deployments has not allowed for the training
needed to keep our forces ready along the entire spectrum of military
operations and, as a result, our readiness in some mission areas has
atrophied over the past decade. There are some modest reasons for hope,
though. The Army now has fewer soldiers deployed than it has had at any
time since the invasion of Iraq. In addition, this past year we
completed the increases in the Army and Marine Corps end strengths
authorized in 2007. As a result, we are beginning to see some
stabilizing deployment rates and modestly improving dwell times. We
appreciate the Congressional support to our wartime manning needs that
has enabled this. However, our overseas contingency operations do
continue to demand significant numbers of ground and special operations
forces and low-density, high-demand specialties. For our Army combat
units, we do not expect to begin to reach our interim goal of 1:2
deploy-to-dwell ratios until 2012. After reset and reconstitution
activities and as demand decreases, we expect to begin off-ramping some
of our recent force level increases.
However, my concerns about the health of our force go beyond our
people and training--we must also restore the readiness of our combat
systems and capabilities, which have similarly been under extraordinary
stress. In the back end of previous conflicts, we were able to contract
our equipment inventory by shedding our oldest capital assets, thereby
reducing the average age of our systems. We cannot do this today,
because the high pace and duration of combat operations have consumed
the equipment of all our Services much faster than our peacetime
programs can recapitalize them. We must actually recapitalize our
systems to restore our readiness and avoid becoming a hollow force. All
of this will force us to be more efficient and disciplined in our
choices.
We must focus resources where they matter most, and we will reset
and reconstitute by prioritizing people, readiness, capabilities, and
essential modernization to maintain a technological edge. In the short-
term, we will continue previous efforts to reconstitute and expand our
rotary wing and tilt-rotor capacity in our Combat Aviation units and to
convert one heavy Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade. However,
over a period of years, we will modernize our battle fleet of ground
combat vehicles, including replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We
require enhancements to our manned and unmanned Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, a new bomber program,
extending the service life of a portion of our F-16 fleet, and
continuing improvements in our missile defense and electronic warfare
systems. We hope to modernize and extend the service life of
our F/A-18 fleet and invest in additional P-8A aircraft and tankers.
Lastly, we ask for full resourcing of the Air and Missile Defense
Radar, the Next-Generation Jammer, and communications and integrated
fire control systems designed for operating in contested environments.
These investments are, without question, costly, but they are
critically demanded by our current and likely future challenges. Your
support is particularly important this year as we adjust to the impact
of recent Continuing Resolutions on program starts and growth rates and
to the $17.9 billion difference between the amount authorized by the
resolutions and our fiscal year 2011 budget request--$23 billion if
this becomes a year-long resolution.
Just as important as the reconstitution of these combat systems are
the acquisition processes and production capacities underlying them.
Our procurement systems remain complex and in need of streamlining to
help us acquire needed capabilities faster and more affordably. Last
year we committed to adding 20,000 experts to our acquisition corps by
2015. In doing so, we seek to improve stability in our programs,
conduct more comprehensive design reviews, improve cost estimates,
utilize more mature technology, and increase competition in order to
make the entire process more responsive.
In addition, as I stated last year, I am concerned about the
capabilities of our defense industrial base, particularly in ship
building and space. Our ability to produce and support advanced
technology systems for future weapon systems may be degraded by
decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions.
Left unchecked, this trend will impact our future warfighting
readiness. Although we are properly focusing on near-term reset
requirements, DOD, our industry leaders, and Congress need to begin
considering how to equip and sustain the military we require after our
contemporary wars come to an end.
BALANCING GLOBAL STRATEGIC RISK
Balancing global risk requires maintaining a ready and forward
presence with available forces that, overall, can meet the full scope
of our security commitments. To meet these requirements, we must reset,
sustain, and properly posture a force that includes both our Active
Force and our National Guard and Reserve components. But we must also
make prudent investments and continuously evolve the force so as a
whole it can meet the challenges of an increasingly complex global
security environment.
For many decades, our overmatch in our general purpose forces has
underwritten our National security and our prosperity, as well as that
of our many allies and partners. This credible strength has deterred
aggression and reduced the likelihood of interstate conflict like those
of the 19th and early 20th centuries. With these capabilities, we have
stood side by side with our allies in the face of belligerent
aggression, helped secure access and responsible use of increasingly
contested domains, and provided timely humanitarian assistance in
response to natural disasters across the globe. However, our recent
experience reminds us that we must continue to adapt some of our
systems and tactics to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies,
which may involve both the most advanced and simplest technologies.
This year I will publish my ``Joint Force 2030,'' which will lay
out the operating concepts and capabilities of our future force. But we
already know some of the contours of what that force will need to do.
We know that, in addition to the current array of aggressive states and
transnational terrorists we face, we must adjust to a changing global
environment impacted by the rise of China and other emerging powers as
well as the growing worldwide use and capabilities of cyber space. Such
a world requires an agile, adaptive, and expeditionary force. It must
ensure access, protect freedom of maneuver, and project power globally.
It should retain decisive overmatch with air, land, sea, and special
operations forces and be able to operate in degraded space and cyber
environments. As such, transitioning to this future force will likely
involve a greater emphasis on ISR, command and control, long range
strike, area denial, undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber
capabilities. This transition will also involve further developing
flexible leaders, operators, and technicians who are highly proficient
and able to fully integrate our efforts with our partners from other
agencies and other countries.
Beyond maintaining our regular and irregular warfare capabilities,
we will also continue to rely on secure and stable nuclear deterrence.
It is also important that we maintain the safety and surety of our
nuclear forces, even as we seek to reduce them in accordance with the
Nuclear Posture Review and implement the recently ratified New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We need to modernize our nuclear force
and its supporting infrastructure to ensure that a smaller force is
nonetheless safe, secure, and effective. Lastly, our missile defense
systems should support the stability of our deterrence architectures.
And while we work to reduce, safeguard, and provide confidence in
our nuclear force and those of treaty signatories, we acknowledge that
the proliferation of nuclear technology and other weapons of mass
destruction by state and non-state actors remains one of the most
significant and urgent worldwide threats. Effectively countering
proliferation requires strong international partnerships, new
surveillance technologies, and layered defenses. These are supported by
ongoing expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
establishment of a standing joint headquarters for weapons of mass
destruction elimination, and investments in nuclear forensics
technology and programs. These relatively small programs can have a
disproportionately large positive impact on our security.
Balancing global strategic risk also requires improving our
capabilities in cyberspace. Today we face a range of threats to our
computer systems from other states, mercenaries, and even civilian
hackers, and their ability to wreak havoc cannot be understated. Lower
grade cyber threats conducted by organized criminals and talented
individuals do not necessarily put the Nation at serious risk. But the
effects of a well-coordinated, state-sponsored cyber attack against our
financial, transportation, communications, and energy systems would be
catastrophic. We have made headway by standing up U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM) and by developing constructs for cyberspace operations, but
more work is needed. Critical to CYBERCOM's future success will be our
ability to recruit, train, and most importantly, retain the right
people. We must devote the same time and attention to cultivating this
nation's cadre of future cyber warriors as we do to our combat
specialists. We must also empower CYBERCOM and the combatant commands
by working with the Executive Office of the President and other
agencies to develop appropriate cyber authorities and by refining our
cyber doctrine, tactics, and procedures. Lastly, we need to actively
foster public discussion about international observance of cyber space
norms.
Balancing global strategic risk requires strong military-to-
military engagement programs. These collaborative efforts engender
mutual responsibility and include ongoing combined operations, multi-
lateral training exercises, individual exchanges, and security
assistance. They help demonstrate the United States' responsible
military leadership in critical regions, reassure our allies, and
strengthen the international norms that serve the interests of all
nations. They also foster connections with other governments that
reinforce our diplomatic channels and have proven critical during times
of crisis.
We currently benefit from numerous strong and well appreciated
military partnerships. For example, at the November NATO Summit in
Lisbon, we and our allies recommitted to our alliance, ongoing
operations, and a new Strategic Concept for the next decade. NATO is
also poised to release its Alliance Maritime Strategy. In Asia, though
still underpinned by U.S. bilateral alliances, the region's security
architecture is becoming a more complex mixture of multi-level
multilateralism and expanded bilateral security ties among states. As
the region's military capability and capacity increases, we seek new
ways to catalyze greater regional security cooperation.
Unfortunately, the global economic downturn is placing pressure on
the resources of partner nations' security forces. We foresee no
decrease in the commitment of our partners to us or to any of our
mutual security efforts, but we must face the reality of less spending
by our partners on our combined security and stability efforts. Any
measures we take to strengthen our partnerships, such as the
administration's Export Control Reform effort, can only improve our
collective security.
We should not engage only with like-minded allies. Military-to-
military engagement, in coordination with other diplomatic efforts, can
help foster cooperation in areas of mutual interest between nations
with varying levels of amity. We have seen the fruits of our engagement
programs in strengthening cooperation in the Middle East, countering
piracy in the Red Sea and the Straits of Malacca, and countering
proliferation across the globe. We will seek out military-to-military
relations even where they have not existed before because sound
relations can prevent miscommunication and miscalculation that could
lead to crisis or conflict. In particular, increased engagement with
China could increase understanding and cooperation on a multitude of
issues, including encouraging North Korea to refrain from further
provocation and ensuring access to and equitable use of the global
commons.
A significant component of our engagement program is the security
sector assistance we provide to build the capabilities of our partner
nations' security forces. These cost-effective programs properly place
security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments
and reduce the tactical strain on our own forces by helping to prevent
conflicts and instability. In many places, across the range of U.S.
interests, investments in capacity building result in strong
foundations for the future. These investments are often small but, if
persistent, can yield a high return. I urge your continued support for
Theater Security Cooperation programs, Global Train and Equip
initiatives (under 1206 authorities), funding for special operations to
combat terrorism (under 1208 authorities), as well as the many security
assistance programs managed by the Department of State (DOS), including
FMF and IMET programs.
However, just as these programs require full funding, they also
need wholesale reform. Our security assistance structures are designed
for another era--our authorities are inflexible, and our processes are
too cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a
timely manner. I urge your assistance in modifying the laws and
regulations surrounding security cooperation and assistance to create a
better coordinated, pooled-resource approach that make resources more
fungible across departments and programs and better integrates our
defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence efforts. We should
not allow bureaucratic resistance to trump operational effectiveness
when security sector assistance is essential to our national strategy
of helping others secure and defend themselves.
On this last point of interagency cooperation, I want to reiterate
our commitment to comprehensive approaches to our security challenges
that employ all elements of national, and international, power in
coordination. Our future security concerns require a whole-of-
government effort, not just a military one, and we serve best when we
serve hand-in-hand with all of our partners and support, rather than
lead, foreign policy. As such, we will work closely with DOS and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support their
implementation of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,
particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and response. To this
end, I reiterate my unequivocal support to Secretary Clinton and her
efforts to fully resource DOS's and USAID's activities and an expansion
of its diplomacy and development capabilities, particularly in Iraq to
support the transition from a military to a civilian-led mission. In
addition, I support interagency cooperation programs and work to expand
the number of exchanges between DOD and other executive agencies.
CONCLUSION
In the upcoming year, our Armed Forces will build on the past
year's achievements and continue to provide the common defense our
Constitution directs with distinct honor and effectiveness. We will
advance our ongoing efforts and maintain the credibility of our forces
while learning, adapting, and preparing for new security challenges. We
know that the military's role in national security will remain
substantial, and the demands on our service men and women will be high.
However, we also know that we can never let our actions move us away
from the American people, and that the quality of our work and our
personal conduct will say far more about who we are and what we stand
for than anything else we do. In all of our efforts, we will maintain a
strength of character and professionalism, at the individual and
institutional levels, that is beyond reproach and continues to be a
source of pride for our Nation.
As we move forward, I remain thankful to Congress for doing its
part this year to better guarantee our Nations' security. You have
reminded us of your important role as a steward of our Armed Forces and
of our mutual respect for our Nation's security, values, and
servicemembers by approving the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and
repealing the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. I am encouraged that the
repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell will enhance the connection between the
military and the American public, particularly in our relationships
with some of America's premier universities. We look forward to working
with you as we implement these initiatives and as you consider other
pending security agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ratification
of these two agreements would greatly benefit our national security.
Again, on behalf of all our men and women under arms, I thank this
committee, and the entire Congress, for your unwavering support for our
troops in the field and their families at home during this time of war
and for our efforts to maintain a strong, agile, well-trained, and
well-equipped military that can prevail in our current conflicts and
remain poised to deter or respond to new challenges.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Mullen, for your
eloquent statement and for your great service. Secretary Hale,
do you have anything to add before we begin?
Mr. Hale. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. We will have a 7-minute first round. Mr.
Secretary, you indicated that we are on track to end the
presence of our combat troops in Iraq by the end of this year
as decided upon by President Bush. Do you continue to support
that decision?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Are you planning to begin reductions of our
troops in Afghanistan by July of this year as ordered by
President Obama with the pace to be determined by conditions on
the ground? Do you support that decision?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us why?
Secretary Gates. Frankly, this was the most difficult part
of the Afghan strategy, going forward, for me to support. I
steadfastly, as some on this committee will remember--
steadfastly--opposed any deadlines in Iraq and so came to this
with a certain skepticism.
But I also realized that there is a difference between Iraq
and Afghanistan in this respect. The truth of the matter is the
Iraqis want us out of the country as quickly as possible. On
the other hand, the Afghans, at least a certain number of them,
would like us to stay forever. They live in a very dangerous
neighborhood and having U.S. forces there to support them and
help them often in the place of their own troops is something
that they would like to see.
So it seemed to me that we needed to do something that
would grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and bring a
sense of urgency to them of the need for them to step up to the
plate to take ownership of the war and to recruit their own
young men to fight. I think that the comments that you quoted
earlier from General Caldwell has illustrated that over the
last year or so the Afghans have, in fact, done this to a
considerable degree, particularly in terms of their own troops.
I must say I was very pleased to have--and I recognize the
risk of the message we were also sending to our adversaries, to
the Taliban. However, it seemed to me that if the Taliban was
messaging to all of their people that we were all leaving, that
our troops were all leaving in July, that they would be in for
a very big surprise come August, September, and October when we
are still hunting them down in very large numbers.
So on balance--and I will say it was a close call for me,
but I came to believe that it was the right thing to do.
I must say I very much support and applaud NATO's decision
to accept the idea of a full turnover of security
responsibilities to the Afghans by 2014 because I think that
bookends the July 11th statement and lets everybody know that
we are not leaving precipitously. We are going to do this based
on conditions on the ground, and we will continue to carry the
fight to the Taliban.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, do you want to add anything to that? Do you
agree basically with what the Secretary said, or do you have a
different view?
Admiral Mullen. No, no. I agree with that. I would say
again a very tough part of the whole decision process.
Certainly not the signal that we are not staying is one that is
of great concern in that part of the region for a long time,
and at the same time sending the message that we, in fact, are
going to get to a point where we turn this over to them I think
was very important. I have seen the effects of that in their
leadership in the military and the police. It has given them a
sense of urgency that they did not have before the decision was
made.
I also think, with respect to the Taliban specifically,
with where we are right now, they have a lot more things to
worry about in terms of just how well they are doing because
they are not doing very well, and they know we are going to be
there beyond July. They had a really bad year. That does not
mean this year will not be tough. It will. It will be very
difficult on both sides. But we have made a lot of progress
because we have committed the resources to get this right.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the size of the Afghan security
forces, there is a proposal currently under consideration
within the administration to increase the size of the ANSF by
around 70,000 personnel. That would raise the target end
strength for the security personnel of the Afghans to about
378,000. Now, those forces, as I indicated, would include some
key enablers, including intelligence and logistics.
As I also indicated, I spoke to the President now twice on
this subject and very strongly support the increase that is
being considered for the reasons which you have just talked
about and which I talked about in my opening statement in terms
of the importance of the Afghan security forces taking
responsibility for security. They are very much supported by
the Afghan people and they are targeting an enemy that is
detested by the Afghan people, to wit, the Taliban.
Our partnering with the security forces has really improved
many more partnerships between our forces. The training is
intense and very successful. The operations are joint. We
witnessed that when we were down in Kandahar.
So my question to both of you, Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen, is do you support the proposal to increase the size of
the ANSFs as is being considered?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that we have all
recognized from the beginning that being able to turn security
over to Afghan forces to deal with a degraded Taliban was our
ticket out of Afghanistan and to accomplish our goal of making
sure we are not attacked out of there again.
I think the issue is under discussion within the
administration. We do have a request from the commander. The
issue is under discussion in no small part because of the
question of sustainability. How big an army can we afford? Let
us not kid ourselves. Nobody else is contributing to this in
any significant way. We have in our OCO budget for fiscal year
2012 $12.8 billion to pay for the ANSFs. So the question is how
long can we afford to do that, and you cannot do that
indefinitely. So then can you look at an increased number of
Afghan forces in the same terms as you look at our surge as
something that is temporary until this problem gets solved, and
then those numbers begin to go back down again. So this is one
of the big issues that we are discussing and I expect a
decision in the fairly near future. But this is really the core
issue that I think is under discussion.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Mullen, do you support that?
Admiral Mullen. I think, Mr. Chairman, you know that the
recommendation was teed up from somewhere between 352,000 to
378,000. That is the range. I certainly share the concern the
Secretary has spoken of in terms of the sustainability of this.
You also characterized in your opening statement a specific
recommendation from me. We are still very much in discussion
inside the administration on where this comes out. As the
Secretary said, I think in the near future we will have that.
There are a lot of issues at play here.
None of us disagree with your assertion or your statement
about the importance of this part of the mission, training them
and turning it over to them. It has gone incredibly well over
the course of the last year. So how fast we can move, how much
more there should be is still very much in discussion and the
comprehensiveness of the issues that are associated with this
are being reviewed as we speak, and I think it will be resolved
here in the near future.
Chairman Levin. The bottom part of that range you mentioned
would represent an increase from the current goal. Is that
correct?
Admiral Mullen. Right. We are at 305,000 at the end of this
year, and 352,000 would be a range from 352,000 to 378,000.
Chairman Levin. So even if the approval were at the bottom
of the range, that would represent about a 45,000 increase. Is
that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So we save a lot of money having their
forces there trained and equipped rather than our forces in
terms of relative costs. I think you both would agree to that.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates,
did you recommend to the President the date of July 2011 as a
date to begin withdrawal?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, I did not.
Senator McCain. Did you, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir, I did not.
Senator McCain. On the issue of our continued presence in
Iraq, obviously the casualties have been reduced dramatically,
but I think it is also obvious that the Iraqi military does not
have a lot of the technological capability that they need to
combat this kind of insurgency that is still out there. But
also, if they want to have an air force, it seems to me they
need that kind of technical assistance, a number of other areas
of modernization of their forces. It is necessary. We are not
talking about continued combat operations on the part of the
United States, but they do need the kind of technical
assistance that they will need to maintain their security. Do
you agree with that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So is there any discussion that you know of
going on with the Iraqi Government concerning the future role
of the United States in Iraq besides the fact that we are now
scheduled to leave by the end of the year?
Secretary Gates. There have been a number of informal
conversations with the Iraqis about this.
Our concern, as I indicated yesterday, is principally in
three areas: intelligence fusion, logistics and maintenance,
and in air cover in providing the ability to protect their own
air space. Right now, under current circumstances, as of the
1st of January, we will have 157 DOD military and civilians,
along with several hundred contractors, basically processing
foreign military sales, and that would be it.
As I have indicated, I think this government is very open
to a continuing presence that would be larger where we could
help the Iraqis for a period of time. I am not actually
concerned about the stability of the country, but I am
concerned about their ability to address these three issues in
particular.
But the fact is we have a signed agreement that President
Bush signed with the Iraqi Government, and the initiative for
this needs to come from the Iraqis. My hope is that once they
sort out who their new defense minister is going to be, which
has been a problem in putting together their government, that
then we will be able to move forward with this dialogue with
the Iraqis. I think it is little bit, frankly, in Iraq like the
strategic agreement itself in the sense that our presence is
not popular in Iraq. So the politicians, I think, the leaders
understand the need for this kind of help, but no one wants to
be the first one out there supporting it, very much like the
security agreement itself. So we will continue that dialogue,
but at the end of the day, the initiative has to come from the
Iraqis. They have to ask for it.
Senator McCain. I take it you were pleased with the House's
decision yesterday on the--what did you call it--the additional
engine?
Secretary Gates. The extra engine.
Senator McCain. Extra. Excuse me. Yes, extra engine. I take
it you would support efforts over here to do the same.
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator McCain. I share your optimism about our success in
Afghanistan, which has confounded many of the critics. I also
share your view that there is a long way to go.
But do you share that same optimism about Pakistan? There
have been some very serious disruptions, obviously, with this
American citizen who is now being held in prison, the whole
role of private contractors, the continued allegations of
relationships between Interservices Intelligence (ISI) and the
Taliban. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Pakistan,
which obviously is vital to the sustained and long-term success
in Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates. Let me just say a word or two and then
turn to the chairman because he has spent a lot more time in
Pakistan in the last few years than I have.
I worry a lot about Pakistan. It has huge economic
problems. Those problems were significantly aggravated by the
terrible flooding last year. They have a serious internal
terrorism threat that is seeking to destabilize Pakistan
itself. I worry that some of those terrorists might try and
provoke a conflict between Pakistan and India. So I think that
there is a lot to be concerned about with Pakistan.
Senator McCain. There are still sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Secretary Gates. That said, there are still the
sanctuaries.
But I will say the Pakistanis have 140,000 troops on that
border. These things improve step by step, but not as quickly
as we would like, but we get to a better place over time. If
you had asked me 2 years ago if the Pakistanis would withdraw
six divisions from the Indian border and put them in the west,
I would have said, impossible. If you would have asked me if we
would begin coordinating operations on both sides of the border
with Afghan and ISAF forces on the one side and the Pakistanis
on the other, I would have said, that is very unlikely.
They are chipping away at some of these sanctuaries. It is
very important what they have done in south Waziristan and
SWAT, but it is a mixed picture, and it is something we just
need to keep working at. The chairman has worked at it about as
hard as anybody.
Admiral Mullen. On the military side, Senator McCain, I am
more optimistic than I have been. I mean, the Secretary talked
about the cross-border coordination, the work that we have done
with them. But on the political side, the economic side, at
least from my perspective, it looks worse than it has in a long
time.
So I share your concern. The vector is going in the wrong
direction overall for the country. We are very unpopular there.
You have seen that. It gets highlighted in each crisis. We
provided extraordinary support for the floods last year--we,
the military. Then that registers in a popular way shortly. You
have an incident like the one we are going through right now,
and our popularity is back down in very small numbers.
So I do think we have to stay at it. It is where lots of
terrorist organizations head, not just al Qaeda. They are more
combined in their efforts than they have ever been. So I do
think we have to continue to work at it, but I am concerned as
I have ever been.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, just briefly. Anything more on the Wikileaks
investigation?
Secretary Gates. Sir, after our last hearing, I went back
and I had been told that I had to keep my hands off of it
because of the criminal investigation. But I have been able to
narrow an area that I have asked the Secretary of the Army to
investigate in terms of procedures and the command climate and
so on that has nothing to do with the accused individual, but
to see what lapses there were where somebody perhaps should be
held accountable.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Secretary
and Chairman, for your service, for your leadership, for your
testimony today.
I believe that the President's budget for DOD is a budget
that recognizes the times of economic stress we are going
through particularly with regard to our national deficits and
debt but also meets our defense needs. I appreciate, Mr.
Secretary, your advocacy of the budget but also your warning
that we have to be very careful about cutting too deeply into
our defense budget.
I have noticed some change of terminology around here which
concerns me, which traditionally, as we have discussed the
various components of the Federal budget, when we get to
discretionary spending, we distinguish between defense and non-
defense spending. The defense spending had a more protected
status, if you will, and I think it was for a good reason,
which I believe I know you and all of us on the committee
believe, which is that we have no greater responsibility in our
national government than to protect our security. It is the
underpinning of our freedom and our prosperity. So we have to
be very cautious about cutting below a level that we can
continue to fulfill that--well, it is really a constitutional
responsibility to provide for the common defense.
I have noticed now the difference between defense and non-
defense discretionary spending in terminology seems to be
fading, and I think we do that at our peril. So it does not
mean, obviously, that what everybody at the Pentagon wants we
are going to say yes to or that we can tolerate wasteful
spending. I know the two of you have been very aggressive about
that in the programs you have set forward.
But I hope as we go forward in these very difficult
economic times with a lot of stress politically on everybody
here, that we keep that primary responsibility we have for the
national security in mind.
Frankly, without going any further on it, I think for those
of us who are committed to doing everything we can to continue
to give you the resources and the men and women in uniform to
protect our security, it compels us to look much more directly
and act more boldly on the most expanding part of our national
deficit and debt, which is the entitlement programs that are
non-defense.
So with that invocation, I just want to pick up on what
Senator McCain said earlier about the input we got at the
Munich security conference this year. It was quite significant
to me on Afghanistan.
The first was I thought there was a real change in opinion
from our European colleagues, that we really are making
progress in Afghanistan, and they feel good about it. Normally
we have been concerned that they would leave the fight before
we did. They turned the tables on us this time, and they said
we are committed now through NATO to the 2014 exit date from
Afghanistan. We are worried that you in America are going to
begin to leave earlier, and they still have in mind,
notwithstanding all the transition to 2014, this July 2011
date. So I would ask you if you would care to respond to that,
and of course, part of that is just to urge that whatever we do
in July 2011, be mindful of the effect it will have not only on
the Afghans and the region but on our European allies.
Secretary Gates. I would just make two comments.
First, I had a NATO defense ministers meeting last December
and it was really quite extraordinary because I do not think I
have ever seen so many ministers so optimistic about how things
were going in Afghanistan. I did not encounter a single one who
was pessimistic or who felt that the effort was for naught and
that we were not headed in the right direction. So there was a
level not just of sort of grudging support but a general
feeling of cautious optimism that we finally had all the parts
right in this thing, the civilian strategy, the military
strategy, had the resources there.
When I took this job there were 12,000-13,000 Europeans or
other partners in Afghanistan. There are now 50,000. They have
really stepped up to the plate. Now, we are carrying the bulk
of the burden, but they are doing a lot as well.
By the same token, one of my missions in next month's
defense ministers meeting is to ensure that in fact whatever we
do in July does not start a rush for the exits on the part of
our allies, and I would say particularly those who have the
largest contingents there. There are a lot of countries that
are making a real contribution, but they have fairly limited
numbers of people there. I think that our principal allies and
those who are the principal contributors are probably okay, but
I need to be able to reassure them that this is going to be
conditions-based and that it will be gradual.
The other point I will make to them is it should not be
mathematical. If we take out 1 percent or 2 percent of our
troops, or whatever the number is, that does not mean everybody
gets 2 percent because in some of them 2 percent--when you have
only 10 guys there, you have a problem. So I think that we need
to ensure that their forces are taken out on a conditions-based
arrangement as well. I think this is the challenge for General
Petraeus.
The way I think he is thinking about it is that when we
turn over security responsibility, sort of three things will
happen to the foreign troops that are there. A few will stay to
continue to provide a strategic overwatch and safety net, if
you will. Some will be reinvested in the neighboring district
where the security is not as good yet, and then some portion
would be allowed to come home. So I think that that is the
approach that he is taking, and frankly I have not seen from
the defense ministers, at least, signs of nervousness or a
feeling that they would be compelled to make significant
withdrawals themselves before the timing that they have already
announced.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that reassurance. What you
found at the defense ministers meeting is exactly what we found
in terms of the cautious optimism at the Munich conference.
I appreciate it. I think you are right on target in your
focus for the next meeting coming up because it sounded to me
as if they need that reassurance. I will just tell you that one
of the people high up in one of our major NATO allies' foreign
ministry said that they were worried that if we withdrew a
small proportion of our troops in July, that there would be a
tendency of their political community to take it in absolute
mathematical numbers. So for us it is only 1 percent, but let
us say it is 1,000. They are worried that at home their
parliament is going to say, well, how about taking out 1,000 of
our troops as a result.
Secretary Gates. The interesting thing about particularly
the Europeans who are in Afghanistan--most of them are in
coalition governments and most of their publics are opposed to
their participation.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Gates. I think it needs to be said these
governments have shown some real political courage in being
willing to commit to the alliance and to Afghanistan the forces
that they have in the absence of political support at home.
Senator Lieberman. I could not agree with you more.
Final word. My time is up. But the other thing that I found
very heartening is that our NATO allies, particularly following
the meetings you have referred to, have stepped back and
understand not just that we are doing better in Afghanistan,
but this is the first time NATO has gone to war. A failure in
this first time at war, interestingly outside of the geographic
area of NATO, would have terrible consequences for NATO's
credibility, and NATO's credibility at this uncertain,
dangerous time in the world is critically important to the
stability and security of a lot of other places far from the
United States, Europe, and Afghanistan. So I think we are at a
point where the alliance is really moving together in a very
positive way.
I thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was glad to hear that statement, Secretary Gates, what
you said about the 17,000 to 50,000. Somehow I had missed that.
But I am glad to know that more are coming to the table.
Senator Hagan and I spent New Year's Eve with the troops in
Afghanistan and had a chance to spend a little time to get out
to the training area. When we talk about what is going to
happen in reduction and so forth, a lot of that is going to be
dependent on the success and the training of the Afghan
National Army and how they are coming. I was very pleased.
Senator Hagan and I were both surprised at the Kabul
military training center, the segregation of infantry and
artillery and how they are doing that on two sides of the
mountain. We are used to seeing how we do it in this country. I
was most impressed with their training.
To accommodate some of these potential discussions on
withdrawal, I would just like to know your opinion as to how we
are coming with that training. Is it ahead of where you thought
it would be, or are you as impressed as we were when we went
over and witnessed it?
Secretary Gates. I think we both should address that
briefly.
But I would say that what General Caldwell has done in the
last year or so I would characterize as nearly a miracle. It is
not just the numbers. A year ago 35 percent of the recruits or
the new soldiers, Afghan soldiers, qualified on marksmanship.
It is now in the 90s. They have a literacy program going for
officers, for noncomissioned officers (NCO), and even for some
junior enlisted that is going to make a huge long-term
difference in Afghanistan. So I think that the quality of what
they have been doing and the speed with which they have been
doing it and the ability to accommodate the significant
increase in the numbers being trained and getting quality
training has just been really quite extraordinary and I think
has played a big part in the progress that we have had over the
last year.
Admiral Mullen. I would say very briefly, sir, I think the
number I saw the other day was 24,000 trainees in training
right now. That number was minimal a year to 2 years ago, I
mean, literally in the hundreds because all you did was you
recruit and place a soldier or a policeman in the field.
What also gets lost here is that there has been an
extraordinary jump on the police side as well behind the
military, as it was in Iraq. So we are making a lot of progress
there.
I would just commend General Caldwell and all his people
because they put in the structure. You have seen for yourself
the kind of training. It has really been an exceptional effort
over a very short period of time.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We even had an opportunity to talk to
some of the ones who are being trained to be trainers. They are
excited. They are looking at careers. I was very shocked and
very pleased.
As you know from previous meetings, I always bring up the
1206, 1207, 1208, Commander's Emergency Response Program and
Combatant Command Initiatives Fund. These are programs that I
have been very enthusiastic about and I think have been very
successful. I was pleased that the 1206 funding was increased
in this budget request from $350 million to $500 million.
The thing that I am confused about, because I am not sure
what it means, is this pooled funding. When I first read about
this, I thought is this returning back to what we were trying
to get away from, in other words, having more of the
concentrated commanders in the field, having greater authority,
and this type of thing. How does the pooled funding work? Would
either one of you like to share that with me?
Admiral Mullen. This is actually a $50 million
appropriation, should it be approved, initially DOS money, with
an opportunity to reprogram upwards of $450 million between us.
So there is no specificity that says how much DOS would
reprogram at this point or how much DOD would.
What is really critical here--and this goes back to your
support of 1206, 1207, and 1208--is it gives us the flexibility
and the ability to meet an emergent sort of this year maybe
even this month need which, heretofore, we just have not been
able to do. We see it year after year in country after country.
So it actually is very consistent with what has happened in
1206, 1207, and 1208 in terms of the strategic thrust, although
some of the mechanisms will be a little different.
Senator Inhofe. That is good. I am glad to hear that
because I did not want to dilute that program that I think has
been very, very successful.
Recently we have heard more and more about China and Russia
and how much further advanced they are on the fifth generation
of fighters, the T-50, J-20, or whatever that is over there.
The decision that we had made to move backwards a little bit or
move the 124 F-35s out of this 5-year period or delay them--was
that decision made before we realized that they were perhaps a
little further along in developing fifth generation fighters in
other countries that might be sold eventually to people who
could be our enemies?
Secretary Gates. I think that, first of all, the way I have
characterized it, Senator, is that when I was in China,
President Hu rolled out the red carpet and the People's
Liberation Army rolled out the J-20.
They may have flight-tested it a half a year, a year or so
before our intelligence estimated they would, but the truth is
it will be quite a while before they have any numbers. The
latest estimates on the Chinese side would be that by 2020 they
might have 50 deployed and by 2025 maybe a couple hundred. We
will have 325 F-35s by the end of 2016, even under the revised
program, which with the F-22s gives us over 500 fifth
generation aircraft. We will have 850 F-35s by 2020 or fifth
generation aircraft by 2020 and about 1,500 by 2025. So there
is still a huge disparity in terms of these aircraft.
Frankly--and I do not want to get into it too much in an
open hearing--this is their first low-observable aircraft.
Given the challenges that we have had--and we have been at this
now better than 20 years, frankly, I think they have a long
road in front of them before this becomes a serious operational
aircraft in any numbers.
Senator Inhofe. I am glad to hear that.
My time is expired but I want to ask a question for the
record, and it might be more appropriate to respond to it for
the record. You commented about your visit to the Far East, and
at that time you were saying North Korea will have developed an
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile within 5 years. We hear
about our intelligence estimate talking about Iran's
capabilities in 2015. I would like to have an update on those
estimates for the record, if you would do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is coordinating with Senator
Inhofe's staff to provide the Senate with a briefing on the latest DIA
and National Air and Space Intelligence Center threat assessments.
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, if I could. Back to just a
specific on the F-35, the Secretary's decision to move those
aircraft to the right--those are short takeoff and vertical
landing aircraft. I actually think----
Senator Inhofe. Those are the Marine version?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. That actually puts us in a better
position to deliver the Navy and the Air Force version sooner
because those two versions are actually doing pretty well in
testing and development. So I thought it was a wise decision
and to give the Marine Corps, give us--give the Navy an
opportunity to work on this airplane for the next 2 years. It
was at the front of the queue and actually it was holding up
the development of the other two airplanes.
Secretary Gates. I would just say that the first Air Force
variant of the F-35 will go to Eglin in May and others will
flow through September to begin training, and the Navy variant
will be at Eglin in fiscal year 2012.
Senator Inhofe. That is very helpful. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your service to our country.
Secretary Gates, for the past several years, the need for a
new U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) headquarters has been
under consideration. It has been apparent and identified as a
requirement. So I have been extremely pleased with the progress
made toward addressing this vital need. The existing facility's
shortcomings and problems have put STRATCOM's mission and its
personnel at some risk. STRATCOM's existing headquarters was
built in 1957 and it has weathered 5 decades with little
renovation.
So for any combatant command, of course, these problems
would be challenging if they continue to have electrical
service and cooling water and other problems, but for STRATCOM,
these facility maintenance matters are just untenable and they
stand in the way of some of the most important national
security missions.
General Chilton, the retiring commander of STRATCOM, said
it best, that the STRATCOM headquarters is the nuclear command
and control mode for the United States and that we must make
the appropriate investments.
So I am very pleased that this budget represents that and
wonder if you might have any comments on it and, as well,
Admiral Mullen.
Secretary Gates. I just have one comment and that is
Admiral Mullen and I were there a couple of weeks ago for the
change of command at STRATCOM, and the building looks a lot
like it did when I walked in as a 2nd lieutenant in 1967.
Senator Nelson. The electrical systems are probably the
same as well. But thank you very, very much. In addition to the
concerns that have been raised about continuing our
relationships in the Middle East right now, the fiscal year
2012 budget presumes that the military, in terms of Iraq, will
depart on December's plan. We have had a lot of discussions
here about whether or not it is important to do that or
appropriate to do that and what kind of assistance and advice
will we continue to provide the Iraqis. But as we are looking
at our budget and trying to find ways to economize in DOD, is
there a plan to have the Iraqis pick up more of the costs of
any retention that we might have of our personnel there to
provide the advice and the training that will be required?
Secretary Gates. Not at this point, Senator. To tell you
the truth, we have not really done much in the way of the
budget looking beyond the 31st of December because we are
assuming that we will come to December 31 and that will be it.
So we would have to revisit that issue.
I think we would have to take a look at whether the Iraqis
could do that. They are running about--even with the price of
oil where it is, they are devoting about 14 percent of their
gross domestic product (GDP) to security, and they are running,
I think, a $15 billion or thereabouts--$10 billion to $15
billion deficit this year. We should be so lucky. But we really
have not gone down that road yet.
Senator Nelson. But if we are in a position to where we are
requested and we make the decision to continue some
relationship there, would it be possible to look at that from
the standpoint of the budget? It is not that I want to drive
their budget into the ditch any more than I want ours to
continue to be there. We have to find a way to balance it for
them and for ourselves as well.
Secretary Gates. I understand, and we will certainly take
that into account.
Senator Nelson. I appreciate that.
In terms of ISR assets, DOD has put forth spending about
$4.8 billion on procuring another 110 airframes for the budget.
Can you speak about what the infrastructure and personnel will
cost? Maybe this is for Admiral Mullen. The personnel costs and
the infrastructure costs for adding these additional ISR
assets.
Admiral Mullen. I would have to get back to you with a
detailed response.
Senator Nelson. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
Increasing our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities in support of combat operations continues to be one of our
highest priorities. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues development,
integration, and expansion of ISR enhancements to unmanned platforms to
deliver critical command/control, persistent ISR, and firepower to U.S.
and coalition forces. These systems cover the full spectrum of
capabilities from high-altitude, long-endurance capabilities to hand-
launched, tactical systems.
The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $4.8 billion to invest in the
following ISR capabilities:
Procure additional Global Hawks (RQ-4)
Three aircraft/$1.7 billion
Maximum Reaper (MQ-9) production
48 aircraft/$1.4 billion
Maximum Gray Eagle (MQ-1) production
36 aircraft/$1.0 billion
Accelerate unmanned maritime unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) (MQ-8 Fire Scout)
12 aircraft/$0.3 billion
Other UAVs: Shadow, Raven, Small Tactical Unmanned Air
System
$0.3 billion
Procure/sustain MC-12
12 aircraft/$0.3 billion
Each of these investments apply to current programs of record and
are either in-line with current acquisition strategies or an
acceleration of existing plans. Each system fits into a planned
architecture to meet commitments to our warfighters and the Services
have incorporated the necessary infrastructure and personnel costs to
support their integration into operations.
Based on contracting and production schedules, the fiscal year 2012
investments listed above will deliver and field approximately 1 to 2
years after receipt of funding. The personnel and infrastructure costs
will be incurred over several fiscal years as soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines are trained and assigned to maintain and operate
these systems.
To match the growth in capacity, balanced investments in operations
and support (O&S) include:
An increase in RQ-4 Global Hawk personnel and O&S
funds by 21 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year
2012 level.
An increase in MQ-9 Reaper personnel and O&S funds by
55 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level.
An increase in MQ-8 Fire Scout O&S funds by 101
percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012 level.
These funds include contractors operating in conjunction with
on-board military personnel.
An increase in ``Other'' UAV personnel and O&S funds
by 15 percent in fiscal year 2014 from the fiscal year 2012
level.
The MQ-1C Gray Eagle is integrated into the Army Force
Generation Equipping Strategy. Overall, the Military
Construction costs to field the entire complement of systems
(not only the fiscal year 2012 systems) totals $522 million.
Admiral Mullen. Certainly the infrastructure and personnel
costs are incorporated into the budget and that is how the
services actually bring it forward. It has become more and more
significant.
But I would also say, Senator Nelson, it has just become
such a critical part not of just what we are doing now but what
we are going to do in the future. We oftentimes think about the
future sort of out there by itself, what is going to happen in
5 or 10 years. One of the things that has happened in these
wars is there are a lot of capabilities that we have developed,
rapidly field that will be every bit as relevant in a few years
as they are right now. ISR probably leads the pack with respect
to that.
Senator Nelson. In that regard, we are living the future
right now as we see it develop around us, and I hope that as we
do that, we will continue to find a way to do it, obviously, as
efficiently and as cost effectively as possible but not be
short on personnel simply because we may end up with fewer
pilots, but the piloting is obviously done a different way. So
I hope that you will consider that.
Also, Secretary Gates, in growing the forces and the
capacity of the ANSFs, we have talked about the numbers
increasing and you mentioned sustainability of the numbers and
the range from the lower and we are adding 40,000 and looking
at a higher range of 378,000. Can we establish what we think
would be a sustainable number as we look forward? Because,
obviously, that is a pretty sizable percent of the population.
Now, it is good to have people working. There is no question
about it--fully employed. But do we have some idea of what the
Afghans can support and sustain into their future? Secretary
Gates?
Secretary Gates. The sustainability issue, at least for the
next number of years, is more what the United States can
sustain because the Afghans' ability to sustain a military
force would be a fraction of the size of what they already
have, much less what they may increase to, which is why I think
of the size of their force more in terms of a surge like ours
so that once we have defeated the Taliban or degraded them to a
point that a smaller Afghan force can keep control where it is
almost like the Afghan local police or smaller numbers of the
Army can manage to keep the Taliban or others inside the
country down to the point where they are not a threat to the
stability of the government or to the people of Afghanistan.
They cannot afford a force the size that they already have. So
I think the only way we can think of it or the way we ought to
think of it is something that we would be willing to support
for a few years.
Senator Nelson. In the short term?
Secretary Gates. Yes, for a few years. But then it seems to
me, particularly if there is a political solution to this war,
as we all believe there needs to be ultimately, that they could
get by with a significantly smaller force. We probably would
have to help them even then, but it would be a dramatically
smaller bill than it is now. If it is a smaller bill, we may be
able to get other countries to help us as well.
Senator Nelson. Hopefully, the NATO support would extend to
providing help for the sustainability into the future because
until we secure the country, a political solution is going to
be very difficult.
Secretary Gates. Just as an example, I mean, the Japanese
basically pay the salaries for the Afghan national police. That
is their contribution. They do not have troops there, but that
is not a small thing that they are doing.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I want
to thank you for being here today and commend both of you for
your long and distinguished service to our country.
Before I ask any questions, I just want to say that I
believe our Government's most important responsibility is to
protect the American people. This is a deeply held personal
belief for me. I am from a military family. My husband is in
the Guard and is a veteran of the Iraq war. So I applaud your
efforts to ensure that our brave men and women in uniform have
everything that they need to fight and win our wars. Supporting
our men and women in uniform is certainly a solemn and sacred
responsibility that we have.
As we draw down in Iraq and our country confronts a fiscal
crisis, I think it would be a mistake to drastically cut the
size of our military or our readiness.
That said, you appreciate--and I know based on Admiral
Mullen's comments--that we face a fiscal crisis in this country
and that we face great challenges in balancing the need to
protect our country and to make sure that we serve and provide
for our troops with the need to cut back in all areas. I want
to commend Secretary Gates for proactively going forward to
look for efficiencies and billions of dollars in savings. As a
new member of this committee, I want you to know that I look
forward to working with DOD to bring reforms forward and
efficiencies to fruition and also to look for additional cost
savings.
I have a question based on having the appearance of
Secretary Vickers the other day for his nomination, and that is
that he testified that 25 percent of the detainees that are
being released from Guantanamo are going back into theater and
engaging in hostilities again. I wanted to ask Secretary Gates
whether that is an accurate figure and how that is informing
our release decisions from Guantanamo.
Secretary Gates. That is about the right figure based on
the latest information that I have.
I would say that we have been very selective in terms of
returning people. One of the things we have discovered over
time is that we are not particularly good at predicting which
returnee will be a recidivist. Some of those that we have
considered the most dangerous and who have been released or who
we considered dangerous and potentially going back into the
fight have not, and some that we evaluated as not being much of
a danger or much of a risk we have discovered in the fight.
Then I would say that the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2011 imposes
some additional restrictions on who we can release, and
Congress put me in the uncomfortable position of having to
certify people who get returned, that they are no longer a
danger. So I will tell you that that raises the bar very high
as far as I am concerned.
Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns that I think this
raises as well is if we are able to capture a high-value target
in an area where we may not currently be engaged in a direct
conflict, where are we going to put these individuals if the
President still goes forward to attempt to close Guantanamo?
Secretary Gates. I think the honest answer to that question
is we do not know if we capture them outside of the areas where
we are at war and are not covered by the existing war
authorizations. One possibility is for such a person to be put
in the custody of their home government. Another possibility is
that we bring them to the United States. After all, we have
brought a variety of terrorists to the United States and put
them on trial in Article III courts here over the years, but it
will be a challenge.
Senator Ayotte. Would that cause you to make a different
recommendation to the President on closing Guantanamo given the
challenges that it presents?
Secretary Gates. I think we are in the position, frankly,
that the prospects for closing Guantanamo, as best I can tell,
are very, very low given very broad opposition to doing that
here in Congress.
Senator Ayotte. But we also are not using it to add
additional detainees there that might be appropriate for
holding at Guantanamo either, are we?
Secretary Gates. Not at this point.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to ask you about the reset
equipment for combat within the budget. I am concerned about
the lower funding levels proposed in fiscal year 2012 to reset
equipment for combat units returning from deployments. I wanted
to get your thoughts on that part of the budget.
On September 11, 2010, the New Hampshire National Guard
deployed the largest number of guardsmen and women since World
War II for our State, and these troops will be returning in the
second half of this year. I know that reset is more than just
buying equipment. It includes manning time and time to train.
So restoring readiness levels takes time. But I also know that
the National Guard units have historically been at the end of
the food chain in getting new equipment and resources for
training. This can impact their readiness for Federal missions
but also can impact their responsiveness to State emergencies.
So with this in mind, how confident are you in that the
amounts included in the fiscal year 2012 budget for the
services for reset will allow all units in the Active and
Reserve components to be able to address the critical readiness
needs that we have going forward?
Secretary Gates. One of the things that has happened over
the past 4 years that I am very proud of is that when I assumed
this position, the historic equipment on hand percentage across
the board for the National Guard was about 70 percent, and when
I took this job, it was at about 40 percent. It is now on a
national basis at about 77 percent. What has changed now
compared with the past, just to your point about the food
chain, is the Guard now is getting the same kind of equipment
that the Active Force has. So they are getting much higher
quality equipment. At the same time, they are getting more
equipment.
How fast we can do this for units that are coming back from
conflict is going to be a challenge because it is a lot of
money. One of the concerns that I have about the CR is that
there is some reset money in there, and it is going to be very
difficult for us to execute. One of the things that we will
have to do, if we get a year-long CR, we will have to get
pretty close to shut down the recapitalization of the humvees
at Red River and Letterkenny depots. So all of these things are
tied together, but it is going to be a challenge. Until a year
or 2 ago, we would have testified to you that we will need
reset money for at least a couple of years after the conflict
ends, and we think that is probably now a longer period of
time, longer than 2 years.
The problem is that when the conflicts end, that reset
money for the most part has come out of these OCO budgets, and
finding the dollars for a significant reset after the end of
the conflict, if we are not getting any OCO funding, I think
will be a big challenge for us.
Senator Ayotte. I know that my time is up.
I thank you very much, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen and Secretary
Hale. I want to thank you all for your leadership and service.
Secretary Gates, if this is your final budget testimony before
this committee, I would like to say that I appreciate the
excellent job that you have done leading our military. I want
to also thank the brave men and women of our armed forces and
their families for their service.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I applaud the steps
taken to care for our servicemembers' mental well-being. I
believe that taking care of those defending our Nation is a
responsibility and not a choice. I also believe that the
healing process should also account for families as well.
I am interested in hearing your thoughts on the progress
DOD is making in helping families as a whole as they work
through the challenges of PTSD, TBI, and other stress-inducing
situations for families.
Admiral Mullen. Thanks, Senator Akaka. I know that you have
focused on these issues, and all of us greatly appreciate that.
I think we are in a much better position than we were a few
years ago, but we also have a much better understanding of the
size of the problem.
I will speak specifically to families first. While early on
there was a great deal of focus on spouses, in terms of the
stress that they have undergone, what I have seen certainly
over the course of the last couple years is an increasing
awareness and understanding of the need to address the whole
family, including the kids, as they have been stressed. I mean,
if you are in a high-end, high-rotation unit and you were 10
years old when these wars started, and you had mostly your dad,
but mom and dad, on their fourth or fifth deployment, you just
went off to college and you basically almost have not seen your
dad. There are issues associated with that that I think we are
going to have to deal with in the long run. A 15-year-old in
one of these military families--their whole life has been at
war. That is something a lot of us have never been through.
So there has been an extraordinary amount of effort placed
in terms of prioritizing inside each of the Services to get at
the major issues. It is not just the stress and the mental
stress. We are short health care providers, although we are up
dramatically from where we were in 2001. We were in the 1,000
range in 2001. We are over 7,000 now. We have TRICARE health
providers that are almost 50,000, but we are still short. The
country is short, and we have to figure out a better way to
break through, to join with the VA, another committee I know
that is near and dear to your heart as chairman, and work
together with the VA and, quite frankly, with communities
throughout the country to get at this.
The last thing I would say is the initiative that the First
Lady has undertaken and announced with the President about a
month ago, an extraordinarily important issue focused on
military families across a number of issues to include this--it
is wellness. It is education. It is employment. It is child
care--signed up by all the Secretaries from every department,
16 of them, is a huge step forward in terms of giving this
visibility in a way that we just have not had before.
So I am more optimistic than I have been, but we have some
substantial steps that need to be taken.
Secretary Gates. I would like to just mention two things,
Senator. One is one of the significant changes, I think, we
have made in the last 3 years or so--we have moved virtually--
we used to pay for--most of these family programs associated
with those who are deployed and the challenges that they have
been facing have been in the supplementals and in the OCO
funding. We have over the last 3 years moved virtually all of
that money into the base budget so that long after the war
funding ends, we will be able to sustain these family-oriented
programs. This year, I think we have $8.3 billion in the budget
for these programs, and that is about a $200 million increase
over fiscal year 2011.
Senator Akaka. I know your concern goes back also to the
TRICARE program probably needing more resources than they have
had before.
Secretary Gates, I believe that an electronic medical
record system would be very beneficial to current and former
military families and members, as well as the health care
providers. Mr. Secretary, can you provide an update on where
DOD is on electronic health records?
Secretary Gates. We will get you an answer for the record
that has the details.
Military Health System (MHS) medical facilities use the Armed
Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA), the
Department of Defense's (DOD) current electronic health record (EHR)
capability, as part of a family of systems. AHLTA generates, maintains,
stores and provides secure online access to comprehensive outpatient
records. The current DOD EHR family of systems forms one of the largest
ambulatory EHRs in the world, with documentation of an average of
145,000 clinical encounters each day. The MHS is currently executing a
plan to improve system speed, operational availability and the user
interface to enhance provider satisfaction until interagency EHR (iEHR)
capabilities are delivered. Executing this plan allows MHS to meet
providers' near term needs, while better preparing our applications and
supporting infrastructure for the EHR Way Ahead.
The DOD EHR Way Ahead Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is ongoing.
Because DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are engaged in
concurrent EHR modernization efforts, significant opportunities for
collaboration exist. To achieve common objectives, a DOD-VA EHR Senior
Coordinating Group has been established. The group, which consists of
representatives from DOD, VA, and the White House, is charged with
reaching agreement on a proposed approach to a DOD-VA iEHR.
The Senior Coordinating Group established six teams to reach
agreements on proposed courses of action. The six teams are the
Enterprise Architecture, Data Interoperability, Business Process,
Systems Capabilities Presentation Layer, and Mission Requirements and
Performance Outcomes Teams. The agreements reached by the group will
form the basis for a proposed DOD-VA iEHR approach.
On February 12, 2011, a high-level common data and architecture
approach was presented to and subsequently endorsed by the Deputy
Secretaries of DOD and VA and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Regardless of the alternative selected as a result of the DOD
AoA, the agreements made by the Departments will apply to the iEHR.
Additional meetings between Secretary Shinseki and I will occur to
further define high level plans for the iEHR.
Secretary Gates. I will tell you we have made a lot of
progress, but it is not fast enough as far as Secretary
Shinseki and I are concerned. He and I met, just the two of us,
about 2 weeks ago to try and accelerate this effort. So he and
I will meet again with our staffs in the middle of March to
assess where we are and what needs to be done to move this
forward and get it done. Then we will have a follow-up meeting
at the end of April.
I have found, unfortunately, with these huge bureaucracies,
whether it is Veterans Affairs or DOD, that things like this
that are big projects do not move very fast if they do not get
high-level attention. So Secretary Shinseki and I are both
committed to making as-fast-as-possible progress on this.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates,
Admiral Mullen, I very much appreciate the fact that you opened
your testimony with highlighting the damaging effects of a
year-long CR on DOD. I am very concerned about these impacts.
Senator Bill Nelson and I recently wrote to our leaders
suggesting that we should be working on the defense
appropriations bill right now. I made a similar suggestion to
our leaders last fall, advice that unfortunately they did not
take.
But I will say to my colleagues that it is inconceivable to
me that we have spent the past 10 days debating the Federal
Aviation Administration reauthorization, not to say that that
is not important, but it pales in comparison to the urgency of
acting on the defense appropriations bill.
So I hope our Senate leaders heard you loud and clear today
and that we will return next week and make that our first order
of business. Certainly the impact that you have outlined is a
disaster, and there is just no need for us to be debating a
bill that is not urgent when we should be doing a high priority
bill and certainly the passage of the defense appropriations
bill is the highest priority. So thank you for your testimony
on that.
Admiral Mullen, in your testimony you stated that one of
the greatest success stories this year has been the growth and
development of the ANSFs. You went on to say that that has gone
incredibly well. I understand that that is going well
generally, and I also understand how imperative it is that we
build up those forces so that we can eventually leave
Afghanistan.
But I want you to know that I am concerned that the focus
on so rapidly increasing the number of Afghan security forces
is shortchanging the vetting of those recruits. Recently six
U.S. military personnel, including Private 1st Class Buddy
McClain of Maine, were killed by an Afghan border police
officer. The press have reported that in the past 13 months,
Afghan personnel have attacked our military personnel or our
coalition partners six times.
What are we doing to better vet those Afghan recruits to
ensure that tragic incidents and attacks like this do not
occur?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly it is, Senator Collins, each one
of them, a tragedy.
To go to the overall structure, when I go back 12 months or
15 months with General Caldwell and what we had then versus
what we have now, we have moved incredibly quickly. But we have
also focused on the quality of the move, and by that I mean the
quality of the instructors, the quality of the infrastructure,
a substantial training program that was virtually nonexistent
there before. The Secretary talked earlier about the
improvement in literacy. We are now focused very much on the
need to both train in specific skill sets, and all of this
while we are obviously fighting a war, moving pretty quickly,
moving very quickly to ensure, as best we can, that nothing
like that in the security forces, the military or the police,
occurs. I would assure you there is a tremendous amount of
focus on this with respect to the leadership.
That said, tragically these things do occur on occasion.
They did in Iraq. They do in Afghanistan. While we will do
everything we can to eliminate them, I would not sit here and
tell you that we will be 100 percent successful with respect to
that.
Every one of these is investigated thoroughly. Every one of
them. In fact, the one to which you refer--I went through this
with General Caldwell specifically. What happened? What do we
know about this guy? What was the background? There was not a
lot there with respect to his background that would have led
him to specifically take that action to kill our six troops. So
we take that. We investigate it. We certainly integrate that
back into what we are doing, but it is a big challenge.
Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for holding
accountable both military and civilian personnel who have
failed to perform adequately. On Tuesday, Senator Lieberman and
I met with one of the victims of the Fort Hood massacre,
Sergeant Alonzo Lunsford. He was accompanied by friends and
family members, as well as other family members who had lost
loved ones in this attack. The very first question that they
asked Senator Lieberman and me and the one that I pose to you
today is when will the supervisors that filed such misleading
officer evaluation reports regarding Major Hassan be held
accountable.
These evaluation reports ignored his increasingly erratic
behavior, his poor performance as a physician. We know from our
investigation that one of his commanding officers told the
people at Fort Hood you are getting our worst, and yet when you
read the officer performance evaluations, they are glowing by
and large. So this attack occurred 15 months ago, and what the
victims and their family members are asking us is when will
these individuals be held accountable.
Secretary Gates. At my request, the Secretary of the Army
has undertaken an investigation to address this specifically,
and the latest information that I have is that he is nearing
decisions on this. So I do not have a precise timeline, but I
think in the very near future he will be reaching his
conclusions and taking whatever actions he deems appropriate.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
My time has expired. I am going to submit some questions
for the record.
Admiral Mullen, I do want to mention to you that I am very
concerned about the increase in suicides among the National
Guard. I recently had the honor to welcome back a company of
Maine National Guard men and women who have spent a year in
Afghanistan. It seems to me we are doing a better job in
helping the Active-Duty Force which has those resources more
readily available, but I am really concerned about whether we
are providing that same kind of support to the Guard and
Reserve.
Admiral Mullen. I said this many times. We would be nowhere
close to where we are in these wars without the extraordinary
performance of the Guard and Reserve, and they deserve every
bit the attention that everybody else has gotten.
Certainly on the suicide issue, it is a huge concern to all
of us. The Services are working it and, in particular, the
surge in that over the last year on the Guard side. So there is
a great deal of effort to try to, first of all, understand it
and then address it, as we have in the Services as well.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
I think Senator Collins speaks for all of us on that issue
of suicide. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by associating myself with the remarks of
Chairman Levin and Senator McCain and others about your
extraordinary service, Mr. Secretary, to the Nation throughout
your tenure in difficult times and making difficult judgments.
Thank you for what you have done and we continue to wish you
well as you continue to serve.
Admiral Mullen, I know in October you will finish your
tour, and I will add that commendation to you for your
extraordinary service of 43 years in uniform in the U.S. Navy
and to all your colleagues at DOD.
Let me emphasize what you all have emphasized. It is
absolutely critical to fund the defense budget going forward
not in an ad hoc, every 60 days basis, but over a long period
of time to provide certainty for programs, certainty for
strategy.
But there is another aspect of our national strategy that
is increasingly important and that is the role the DOS will
play in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Secretary, I would assume
that you would stress with the same urgency the need to fund
those types of DOS programs in Iraq and Afghanistan because
otherwise what you have accomplished and, more specifically,
what young men and women in our military forces have
accomplished could be severely jeopardized and our national
security severely threatened if we do not follow through.
A concern that many of us have is that you are able to
summon an almost reflexive response by the American people when
you talk about helping men and women in uniform. That same
response is not elicited when people start criticizing foreign
aid which this could be labeled. I just think it would be
helpful if you would comment on this issue of the need also to
support that effort.
Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that for the
entire time I have been in this job, I have been an advocate
for more money for the DOS. Actually this dates back to my days
in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when we had case
officers collecting information that any good political officer
in the Foreign Service could get, but there were not enough. So
it has been a concern of mine all along.
I would say that right now it is a critically urgent
concern because if DOS does not get the money that they have
requested for the transition in Iraq, we are really going to be
in the soup. We have spent probably close to $800 billion or
$900 billion, perhaps more importantly, more than 4,000 lives,
and here we are at the end game and it reminds me of the final
scene in ``Charlie Wilson's War.'' We have spent billions to
drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, and we could not get a
million dollars to build schools in Afghanistan in 1989 and
1990.
The same thing is going to happen in Iraq. If we cannot
have a transition to DOS and the police training function, if
they do not have a presence in various places throughout Iraq,
much of the investment that we have made in trying to get the
Iraqis to the place they are is at risk in my view. The
chairman mentioned the need for DOS funding in his opening
statement. But you would find, I think, extraordinary support
across the entire DOD for their budget, but more importantly
our real worry that all that we have gained is potentially at
risk if we do not have the kind of DOS presence and DOS
activities in Iraq.
Here is the other piece of the problem and it goes to the
CR. DOS cannot spend the money to get ready right now. This is
getting toward the end of February. There are facilities to be
built. There are people to be hired, and they cannot do any of
that. So we are going to run out of time in terms of being able
to get this accomplished.
So I hope that the passion in this reflects just how
strongly we feel about this. This is really, really important.
Admiral Mullen. Senator Reed, just quickly, you talk about
Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a global issue. This is not a lot
of money invested in places around the world that prevent
conflicts. The military does this. We have to do it with our
partners in DOS, otherwise we are going back for a lot more
investment and a lot more casualties.
Senator Reed. Mr. Hale, please.
Mr. Hale. Let me just offer a brief additional point. For
the first time, in fiscal year 2012, State will request a
budget under the OCO fund. It will be very important for
Congress to enact that and isolate the money that is associated
with these operations, so I hope that's favorably received.
Senator Reed. That's an excellent point, Mr. Secretary.
Just, with Afghanistan, too, you mention ``Charlie Wilson's
War.'' We learned a very expensive lesson about not spending
the million dollars in September 11, 2001, attacks. Frankly,
particularly with Afghanistan, where at a point we might have
to relearn that lesson, because the threats that are being
organized against the United States and our allies are still
emanating from border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
unless I'm mistaken. Is that a fair judgment, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely. The chairman refers to it as
the epicenter of world terrorism. While al Qaeda has
metastasized and has branches in Yemen and North Africa and
elsewhere, the reality is, that border area with Afghanistan
and Pakistan is still the heart of the problem.
Senator Reed. Let me make one follow up point about
Afghanistan, because as the chairman mentioned, we were there
recently. We are building an increasingly credible force there,
but it's a force that the government of Afghanistan cannot
afford indefinitely. It's much cheaper than our troops. But
this is not just a 2- to 3-year commitment. This has to be a
multi-year commitment to support their forces in the field. Not
singly the United States, but the international community. We
have to start now and build that in. Is, I think, is that
another point you would agree with?
Secretary Gates. I made the point earlier. I mean, I think
that the international community and Afghanistan cannot afford
a force of 375,000 Afghan National Security Fund (ANSF)
indefinitely. We have to think of this, I think, more as a
surge for the Afghans. With a political settlement and with the
degrading of the Taliban, perhaps the size of the ANSF can come
down to a point where it's more affordable for us and for
everybody else. But we have, just as an example, I mean, our
fiscal year 2012 budget has in the OCO $12.8 billion to support
the ANSF for 1 fiscal year. We can't sustain that for many
years. So, a lot depends on being successful by 2014 in getting
the transition to the Afghans. Even if we have to support it
for a little after that, if we have most of our troops out of
there, it's still going to be a lot less money for the American
taxpayers.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. When you go to
your NATO meeting, I hope that you would also see what support
we might be able to get for the continuing cost of an Afghan
army from some of our NATO allies. In that regard it would be
helpful as well.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Any chance you'll
reconsider leaving, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Senator Graham. I didn't think so. I just can't thank you
enough for what you've done for the country. Admiral Mullen. I
just want to say something about the administration here. I
know we have our differences. But when it comes to Iraq and
Afghanistan, I think the policies you've created, the policies
the President has supported, have been very sound. We're about
to reap the benefits of operations that have been tough,
difficult, sometimes mismanaged, but that's the nature of war.
We're very close in Iraq. So, I just want to build on what
Senator Reed said. I'm going to be the ranking member of the
Foreign Operations Accounts on Appropriations. I'd like for you
to put in writing to me and Senator Leahy what you said about
this account.
Let's give a real world example. What did it mean in terms
of the Egyptian crisis to have a good dialogue with the
Egyptian military, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. It was huge. It was the benefits of 30
years of investment of the interaction that we've had with
thousands of them in our schools, the values that have rubbed
off over time with them, the ability to sustain those contacts,
and then see them act in such a responsible way.
Senator Graham. I think that's a real world example of
where 30 years of investment really paid off. This account has
been reduced to $45 billion in the House. I do share my House
colleagues' desire to reduce spending, and no account is above
scrutiny. But the $5 billion that is flowing to Pakistan, Iraq,
and Afghanistan on the civilian side of the OCO account, what,
are you telling us that, basically, that should be seen sort of
as emergency spending and not counted against our baseline?
Admiral Mullen. I think, I mean, certainly some of it is
tied to the military. But I think the Kerry-Lugar-Berman piece,
that's a 5-year program at a billion and a half a year. That
isn't military, and that's what we were taking about earlier.
Sustaining that is going to be critical, not just now, but in
the long term.
Senator Graham. I guess the point I'm making, we're surging
on the civilian side as we draw down our troops. The civilian-
military partnership is essential to holding and building.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Graham. There are funds going to Pakistan, Iraq,
and Afghanistan on the civilian side that I think will be just
as important as any brigade, and I would like to treat those
funds as a national security asset. I will do everything I can
on the Republican side in the Senate to make sure that we
protect those funds that you can't hold and build without.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Senator Graham. Now, here's what a waste the American
people--we're talking about fiscal austerity at home. What is
the percentage of GDP spending on defense when you count all
appropriations?
Secretary Gates. Well, two facts. First, the base budget
alone----
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Gates.--is 3.7 percent of GDP. If you take all
the war funding for fiscal year 2011, plus the base budget,
it's about 4.9 percent of GDP.
Senator Graham. Historically----
Secretary Gates. But there's another fact that's worth
noting----
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Gates.--and that is that as a percentage of
Federal outlays----
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Gates.--with the exception of the late 1990s and
early 2000s, at 18.9 percent it is the lowest level of Federal
percentage of outlays since before World War II.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, we need to understand that as a
Congress here, the Secretary of Defense has just told us, and,
since World War II terms, we're on the very low end, at a time
when I think the threats to our Nation are growing
exponentially. Now, as we pull down in Iraq, it is your belief,
if the Iraqi Government would ask for American troops to be
left behind to perform the three functions you suggested, it
would be in our national security interest to say yes?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I believe that.
Senator Graham. Now, there's a fourth component--security
for those who are going to be in the lead. DOS, the Department
of Justice, Agriculture Department, the police trainers. My
concern is, if we don't have a sufficient military footprint,
then DOS literally has to build its own security apparatus,
which will be in excess of $5 billion. Do you think, all things
being equal, it would be better for the U.S. military to be
able to continue to provide security?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I do. I'm, partly because we
would also have the helicopters and things like that. The
private security contractors that State's going to have to hire
to perform that role will not have some of the, quote, unquote,
enablers that we have.
Senator Graham. Well, see, this is the dilemma. We need to
know this soon. Because DOS needs to build capacity. Do they
buy helicopters? Do they buy 54 MRAMs? Is it wise to hire a
private contractor army to replace the American military if the
Iraqis will allow the American military to perform that
function. So, the sooner we know the answer to that question,
the more likely we are to be successful. Because I have grave
concerns about building a DOS army. So, that's must my 2 cents
worth.
Detainees. Admiral Mullen, our special operators are all
over the world as I speak, is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The threat from terrorism is just not
confined to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen. It is not.
Senator Graham. What would we do as a nation if we were
able to capture a high level al Qaeda operative in any country
outside of Iraq or Afghanistan, let's say, Somalia, Yemen, as
examples. What would we do with that detainee?
Admiral Mullen. We don't have an answer to that question.
Senator Graham. See, now, this is a big deal to me. We're
in a war, and capturing people is part of a intelligence
gathering. It's an essential component of this war. Do you
agree with that, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Graham. It is better to capture someone than it is
to kill them in a lot of cases, is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. It is.
Senator Graham. It's hard to capture someone if you don't
have a jail to put them. All those on the other side who want
to stop renditions, we need to come up with an American jail,
because we're in, the only alternative is to kill them or go to
renditions. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that sometimes this year
Republicans and Democrats can have a breakthrough on this issue
to help our men and women fighting this war, because it is a
very spot to put the special, a tough spot to put the special
operators in. Our CIA doesn't interrogate terror suspects any
longer. These are things we need to talk about and get an
answer to.
Afghanistan. Not only is it miraculous what General
Caldwell has done. It's stunning to me that we're in 2009 and
10, and 30 percent of the NCO corps in Afghanistan could read.
When he took over, he tested the Afghanistan army for literacy,
and on paper, every NCO should read at the 3rd grade level.
When they tested the NCO corps, 70 percent could not read at
the 3rd grade level, and he is going about fixing that. So,
you're dead right. But, we need to know, after 8 years of
involvement, 90 percent of the Afghan army could not shoot to
NATO standards 18 months ago. So, after all these years we're
just finally getting it right. In many ways, we've been in
Afghanistan with the right formulation for about 18 months. Is
that a fair statement?
Admiral Mullen. That's a fair statement, and it's a very
difficult discussion to have because it was 10 years ago when
this started.
Senator Graham. I just want the American people to know
that we've made mistakes, but we're finally getting it right.
One last thought. When 2014 comes, I am very optimistic
that there will be a better Afghan police and army than we have
today, that we can transition. But I've been discussing among
my colleagues and others about what an enduring relationship
with Afghanistan would look like. It is my belief, Mr.
Chairman, that a political economic and military alliance with
the Afghan people, at their request, would be incredibly
beneficial to our long-term national security interest and
could be a game-changer in the region.
To both of you, what do you believe the effect of an
enduring military relationship would be on the future security
of Afghanistan and the region as a whole if the Afghans
requested of us to have joint airbases past 2015? Would that be
something you think it would be wise for us to talk about and
consider?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely, Senator. I think that, to go
to, Admiral Mullen's comments about Pakistan a little while
ago, there is a big question in the whole region whether we
will stick around. It's in Afghanistan, it's in Pakistan, it's
all over the area. A security agreement with Afghanistan that
provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of joint
facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism and so
on beyond 2014, I think would be very much in our interest. I
think that it would serve as a barrier to Iranian influence
coming from the West. I think it would serve as a barrier to a
reconstitution of the Taliban and others coming from the border
areas in Pakistan. So, I think it would be a stabilizing, have
a stabilizing effect, not just in Afghanistan, but in the
region.
Senator Graham. Would you also agree that it would give an
edge to the Afghan security forces in perpetuity over the
Taliban, and you might, with that kind of a relationship, get
by with a somewhat smaller army?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Hagan is next.
We have a vote now on the Senate's schedule for 12:10.
We're going to try to work around that vote and to work through
that vote. I'm going to turn the gavel over now to Senator
Udall, because I have to leave for a few minutes as well. But,
we're going to try to keep going right through that vote the
best we can.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will actually cut
my own questions short, because I have to preside over the
capsule that's on the Senate floor at noon. But, I do want to
say to all three of the individuals here, thank you so much for
your service and your testimony, and the excellent work that
you do for our country. I did want to agree with Senator Reed
and Senator Graham on the concern, and Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen, your concern about the funding for DOS and the
foreign aid. I think that is critically important. As you both
said, it certainly was evident as to what has taken place just
recently in Egypt.
I did want to talk a little bit about the health of the
Special Operations Forces (SOF). Admiral Mullen, in your
prepared remarks you acknowledged the continued stress on the
force from 9 years of constant conflict. Last week Admiral
Olson, Commander of the U.S. Special Operation Command (SOCOM),
told an industry group that difficult and repeated deployments
of Special Operations personnel are causing some fraying around
the edges of the force. Admiral Olson also made the point that
demand for SOF will continue to outstrip supply for the
foreseeable future.
Given the demand for these SOFs, not only in U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), but also in other parts of the world, for
partnership and capacity-building activities, how does DOD
intend to address the readiness issues identified by Admiral
Olson? Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates?
Admiral Mullen. I think, actually, the force has expanded,
I think, from, when these wars started, around 30,000 to on a
way to upwards of 56,000. I think there are insatiable
appetites and requirements for Special Forces. The vast
majority of them are in CENTCOM. That said, they actually are
in many, many countries around the world, and they're making
investments for the future so that we don't have to go to war
in other parts of the world. I think his statement about
fraying around the edges is right. They've been on, had a
significant number of deployments. I think in Iraq, actually,
in Iraq and Afghanistan they'll typically be the last forces
out. So, the pressure is going to continue there.
We've worked very, very hard both increasing size to
increased dwell time. But as we do that, quite frankly,
Petraeus asked for more, because they have such an impact. So,
we're on a very, we're on a knife edge there with respect to
this. They're extraordinary in their performance and their
execution. I consider the Care Coalition, which is the group
that takes care of wounded families, families of the fallen, to
be the Gold Standard in our military with respect to how we
approach that. That said, they're pushed very, very hard.
From a readiness standpoint, as they come back and dwell
time will increase, I think we'll be fine in terms of giving
them the time, and then to be able to disperse them to other
parts of the world, which we have not been able to do in the
kinds of numbers and requests, because they've been so tied to
CENTCOM. So, I think we will be able to meet that. But it's
going to be awhile until we get on the down side of both these
conflicts.
Secretary Gates. I would just add that with the increase in
SOCOM and their higher level of activity, another one of the
things that we've tried to do is move a lot of the SOCOM money,
a lot of the Special Forces money, into the base budget, so
that once these wars end we are able to sustain the larger
Special Forces that we have, and properly equip them.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. The international security
environment, particularly in cyberspace, continues to evolve.
Cyber threats to our electrical grid, telecommunications,
military networks, critical infrastructure, and the financial
system pose serious concerns to our national security.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is DOD's strategy
to recruit, train, and retain cyber specialists, and what is
the way forward to centralize the military cyberspace
operations and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), and to
synchronize the defense networks?
Secretary Gates. I think we've made a lot of progress in
this area. The creation of CYBERCOM was in important step. I
directed the Service Secretaries about a year ago to consider
training in the, in cyber, to be their, one of their highest
priorities and to ensure that all the spaces that we have in
our schools for teaching cyber skills be filled at a priority
level. I think they've made a lot of headway. We have a lot of
money in this area. This budget for fiscal year 2012 has a half
a billion dollars for cyber research at the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). So, and I think we're in
pretty good shape in terms of protecting the dot-mil world.
This last summer, Secretary Napolitano and I signed a
memorandum of understanding that give, that begins to move us
in a direction where we can begin to do better at protecting
dot-gov and dot-com. The reality is, there was a big debate,
and it went on in the Bush administration, and it continued in
this administration, of people who did not, for, did not want
to make use of the National Security Agency (NSA) in domestic
cyber protection because of civil liberties and privacy
concerns. What Secretary Napolitano and I did was arrive at an
agreement where Department of Homeland Security senior
officials are now integrated into NSA senior leadership. They
have their own General Counsel, their own firewalls, their own
protections, so that they can exploit and task NSA to begin to
get coverage in the dot-gov and dot-com worlds. This is really
important. I think it's a start. But we still have a long way
to go.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, anything to add to that?
Admiral Mullen. No. Ditto. I mean, it's a huge concern.
Senator Hagan. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. A growing threat. A lot has been done.
Schools are filled. But we have a long way to go.
Senator Hagan. I think it's good that the schools are
filled, it's positive. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Chambliss is next.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I don't know what all this conversation is
about, about saying great things about you because you're
leaving. We're planning on you being, both being around here
for awhile longer to help us make some very critical decisions.
Whether it's voluntary in your case, Secretary Gates, or your
time is up, whatever, Admiral Mullen, to both of you, you
provided a very valuable service to our country over this last
short term. I'm not even counting the years and years and years
that both of you have given. So, thank you very much for that
service. Whether we've agreed or disagreed, you've always
responded to me in a very professional way. I'm very
appreciative of that relationship.
I want to echo what Senator Graham said about this
detention and interrogation issue. I mean, guys, we have a real
problem there that needs to be addressed in the short term. I'm
sure you've probably seen what, the way in which Director
Panetta responded yesterday to a question I asked him about if
we did capture bin Laden or Zawahiri. That just highlights the
fact that we don't have a plan, and we really do have to figure
out something here. We thought Baghram might be the answer. But
it looks like it's obviously not long-term. So, we look forward
to working with you on that.
I continue to have, Secretary Gates, a TACAIR issue that
just really bothers me with respect to where we are now. The
further we get into the F-35, the more I'm concerned about
this.
In May 2009, just to go back a little bit, General
Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified that the
military requirement for the F-22 was 240, or 60 more than DOD
was willing to purchase. That summer there was a concerted
effort made to strip funding for seven additional F-22s out of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. Ultimately, obviously, and
you've taken a lot of credit for the fact in your budget that
the F-22 has been terminated and there's a huge savings out
there.
First, there was an argument that the F-35 would be more
affordable than the F-22. Secretary Gates, on July 16, 2009, in
a speech in Chicago you personally stated that the F-35 would
be less than half the total cost of the F-22. Since that time,
the F-35 experienced a Nunn-McCurdy breach due to cost
increases, and DOD has recently restructured the program again,
delaying deliveries and again driving up the cost.
Last month your own Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Office established that the unit cost of a JSF average over
variance has doubled since the program began to approximately
$116 million per copy in fiscal year 2010 dollars. Things may
even get worse. Of note, the price per copy for the last F-22s
purchased was $130 million.
Second, regarding the threats the United States may face in
the future and our ability to maintain air supremacy, you
downplayed the threat and stated again on July 16, Mr.
Secretary, of 2009 in that Chicago speech that, and I quote,
``China is projected to have no 5th generation aircraft by
2020.'' Well, I heard what you said earlier in response to
Senator Inhofe, but the fact is that last month China flew
their first 5th generation fighter, the J-20, which your own
intelligence experts predict will reach Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) with 20 aircraft, a 20-aircraft squadron well
before 2020. Also, over a year ago Russia flew their 5th
generation fighter, the PAC FA, which, again, your own
intelligence experts predict will have an IOC date well before
2020.
Third, Mr. Secretary, a year ago in this very room, when
DOD was in the process of notifying Congress of an F-35 Nunn-
McCurdy breach, you had just fired the F-35 program manager,
and I asked you if you were going to revisit the issue of
additional F-22 production. You responded, and I quote, ``No,
sir, because the IOCs, based on information that I was given in
preparation for this hearing, the IOCs for the Services, for
the arrival of the training squadron at Eglin all remain pretty
much on track.''
Even though we do have a plane you say that's on schedule
going to Eglin in May, and additional planes going in
September, those are all test airplanes. A few months after you
made that statement, the IOC date for the Air Force version
slipped from 2013 to 2016, the IOC date for the Navy version
slipped from 2014 to 2016, and the Marine Corps version has
gone from a projected IOC date of 2012, or next year, to being
on a 1-year probation and not even having an IOC date.
In light of all these developments, I hope you can
understand why I am extremely concerned as we go into this
budget about where we're headed, gentlemen. In light of General
Schwartz's stated military requirement I need to ask you one
more time, Mr. Secretary, is DOD considering the purchase of
any additional F-22s?
Secretary Gates. No, sir. We are not.
Senator Chambliss. DOD is spending billions of dollars to
buy hundreds more 4th generation fighters, F-18s. DOD has
linked at least some of these additional F-18 purchases
directly to delays in the F-35 program. I can understand that.
Can you explain why it makes sense to invest billions of
taxpayer dollars in buying 4th generation F-18s, which are
basically useless whenever there's contested airspace, rather
than buying additional F-22s, which can fly anywhere, anytime,
in any airspace?
Secretary Gates. Sir, first of all, let me say about the F-
35 that the new program manager, Admiral David Venlet, probably
the best acquisition person we have in uniform, has completed a
comprehensive tactical baseline review. I think we have, now,
it, he took several months to do this. I think we have greater
understanding and granularity in terms of progress on the F-35.
The reality is, both the Navy and Air Force variants have made
substantial progress over the last year. The Air Force version
flew twice as many flight tests as had been originally planned.
It is training aircraft that are going to Eglin, and both
for the Air Force and the Navy. We are investing money in
upgrades to the F-22. There's, there are hundreds of millions
of dollars in the fiscal year 2012 budget to upgrade the F-22.
Some of the lessons learned from the F-35 and the F-22 are
being put into upgrades for our existing 4th generation
aircraft that our people believe with those upgrades can take
on the adversary's best aircraft.
I finally would say that this is China's and Russia's first
low observable aircraft. We've been at this 20 years. I think
that they are likely to run into a number of the same
challenges we did early in our stealth programs. I think that
our tactical air situation will be in good shape.
In addition, the Air Force has realized that they can
upgrade some of their 400 F-16s to give them additional
capability and sustainment, as well as the early block F-16s,
and they're upgrading the most recent blocks of F-16s. So, I
think that combining all these different programs that we have
in modernizing TACAIR, plus getting on with the F-35, now under
new management and new leadership, I think that we're in
reasonably good shape.
I would finally say, the last procurement that is, has been
negotiated with Lockheed Martin, the Low-Rate Initial
Production 4, actually has resulted in a fairly substantial
decrease in the price of the F-35 for that particular buy, and
we hope that we can continue that trend.
Senator Chambliss. There's no question but that you're
increasing the risk, Mr. Secretary, and I hope that we don't
get down the road and realize that was too far a reach for us
from a risk standpoint.
I have a question that I'd like to ask Admiral Mullen for
the record, and it's on a little bit different tack. Admiral
Mullen, we're struggling with this issue of the deficit as well
as debt reduction long-term. I have quoted you several times,
as have a number of us, in saying that the number one national
security interest of the United States is the long-term debt
that we face. Would you mind just sending us a written
statement amplifying on that record? Because your opinion, I
can tell you, resonates around the world with respect to that
issue. I'm thankful that you stood forward and you made that
comment. I'd just like you to amplify it for the record.
Admiral Mullen. I've tried to stay out of trouble in doing
that. But it really in its simplest form focuses on what I
believe would be a shrinking national security budget. We are
now involved in, as we should be, looking at ways to save money
and do it more efficiently and effectively. But at some point
in time, the size of our budget could have a dramatic effect on
the size of our force structure. That's the danger that's
there, given the national security requirements, which seem to
be growing, not reducing, not getting smaller.
[The information referred to follows:]
The ties between the strength of our economy and our Nation's
security are inseparable and incontrovertible. We need a vibrant,
growing economy to exert influence internationally and to provide for
our military and other defense capabilities. In turn, we need the
security provided by our national defenses to underwrite our economic
endeavors and our livelihoods. But today we find both our economy and
our security threatened by our burgeoning national debt.
The U.S. national debt is projected to quickly reach levels with
few precedents for a nation not fully mobilized for war. Continued
future budgetary pressures could make it extremely difficult for us to
maintain the size and readiness of our military forces and to promote
the technological innovation (in all areas not just defense) needed to
preserve an advantage over our competitors. This could threaten our
ability to maintain a credible deterrent against potential adversaries
and to respond to security contingencies--large or small.
In many ways, these budgetary pressures are a present reality, and
we in the military have already started tightening our belts and
working to become a more fiscally responsible Pentagon.
How we should deal with the looming threat of our national debt is
a historically necessary conversation. It will involve tough decisions
with significant trade-offs, opportunity costs, and strategic risks.
What we do, or don't do, will shape our Nation for decades to come.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Chambliss, and thank you,
Senator Chambliss, for your work with Senator Warner on this
very important challenge related to our annual deficits and our
long-term debt. I know there are many senators who are eager to
work with you in this important mission. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal, you're recognized.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the chairman, ranking member, and others on the
committee in thanking you for your extraordinary service,
Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates. In particular, for your
continued commitment to the JSF and the single-engine, and the
submarine building program, which I know was reiterated as
recently as yesterday in remarks in Florida. So, I assume that
will continue. I want to express my thanks. In particular, I'd
like to focus on one area of your prepared testimony, Admiral
Mullen, relating to the injuries of many of these young men and
women returning from these conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Specifically, TBIs that are new in their magnitude and number,
and ask you perhaps to describe more specifically what is being
done in terms of the treatment, both in-service and veterans.
Also, what can be done to enlist the growing number of private
efforts, for example, the Woodruff Foundation, which you may be
familiar with, that could provide resources.
Admiral Mullen. One of the areas we've struggled in
throughout these wars is the stigma issue, will I raise my hand
and ask for help. On my most recent trip into Afghanistan,
which was December, I was with the Command Sergeant Major there
for the 101st, and he relayed to me an extraordinary statistic,
which essentially had those that were in concussive events,
essentially they were returning to duty at about 98 percent.
We have put in place procedures, if you are in a concussive
event, within 50 meters, et cetera, you get pulled out of the
fight. One of the reasons that the return to duty rate is so
high is because we're treating them well literally in the
battlefield, as fast as possible. If they're asked, they're
willing, because they're not going to get sent home, they're
willing to raise their hand and say, I need some help.
Now, we have a long way to go on stigma, in post-traumatic
stress, et cetera, in families with the same challenges. But we
actually have made some progress there. We have, at the same
time, I have been struck, in the TBI, the difficult ones are
the mild ones. The most serious are ones that become very
obvious. But it is the mild ones oftentimes that your, you
don't see your symptoms for months, or you don't admit you have
them. It is those who obviously are in the military, those who
transfer then, who transfer out of the military back to
communities throughout the country.
I've also been struck, I'm going to use a comparison, when
you look at Walter Reed or Balboa, or the Intrepid Center for
the amputees, and where we are, we're, I would argue, leading
the world with respect to that. That's just not the case in TBI
because there's a lot of newness to this that surprised me. We
know a lot about the brain, but we don't know a lot about how
these injuries affect the brain. So, we've tried to reach out,
not just, not to reach and understand it just inside the
military, but reach experts throughout the country who are
contributing in ways--there's a Brain Center at UCLA, for
instance, which has contributed significantly--and to get the
best minds that we can across, throughout the country to help
us work our way through this. But, I'm struck that we're in the
nascent stages of this even at, even in this year, in so many
ways.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there a specific command or a
structure within either the Pentagon or dealing through the VA
that is coordinating this effort?
Admiral Mullen. There is, there's not a single point of
contact. There's, obviously, a significant effort inside the
Pentagon. We have taken steps to try to work with the VA, and
then also understand the capabilities that are out in the
country as we've engaged for those who've transferred back
home. But there's an awful lot we still have to do to make
those connections so we're all working it together, which is
going, which I think would be the most effective. We're just
not there yet.
Senator Blumenthal. To take a related subject, I'm sure you
are familiar with reports about the danger of a combination of
different pharmaceutic drugs----
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal.--in treatment of post-traumatic stress
and similar kinds of phenomenon. I wonder if you or Secretary
Gates could describe efforts being made to address those
dangers.
Admiral Mullen. Sometimes we're slow to need because we've
gone through a time where we have, in too many cases, over-
medicated, too many prescriptions. Not just in the battlefield
or back here when they get back, but also in the VA. What, in
particular, the Army has done recently is put in place a much
more aggressive multifaceted treatment regime which expands
beyond drugs to yoga, to acupuncture, to other forms which have
proven positive to support those who've been through the kind
of combat that they've been through. So, I'm actually
encouraged by that significant effort put forward now to try to
back off of that over-medication. That's not in, that's going
to take us awhile. But, certainly it's a concern we all have.
Secretary Gates. I'd say there are two additional problems
here that we have to deal with. One is servicemembers
stockpiling prescriptions. The second is, the frequency with
which servicemembers will go outside the military healthcare
system and get prescriptions. We don't have any visibility into
that in terms of just how much medication they're taking, or
how those drugs all interact with one another. So, these are
all areas that we're aware of and trying to work on. But we
still have a ways to go.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
here.
I want to add my concern to those that have been expressed
already about the JSF and what is happening with that program.
I appreciated your comments about the efforts to get the
program back on track, and I certainly hope that that is
correct and the program will go forward and it will be
effective with those efforts to readjust it.
I also want to commend DOD on your decision to cancel the
planned purchase and production of the Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) program. I'm new here, so I'm still
getting the acronyms down. But, I think it's important, as DOD
found, that we can't afford to purchase MEADS and make the
critical investments that we need to make in the Patriot over
the next two decades. So, I certainly hope Congress will
support your decision and press for the continued Patriot
modernization.
Admiral Mullen, during the House hearing yesterday you
touched on something that you just referenced a little bit just
now in your exchange with Senator Blumenthal, and that is about
research into what we need to know about brain injuries. You
talked about the importance of consistent and sustained support
for research and development in our military budgets. Can you
talk about whether you feel like the budget that's been
submitted adequately addresses that to prepare us for the
future? What have been the most cost-effective efforts that the
military's used to leverage research and development (R&D) in
the budget?
Admiral Mullen. I'll be very specific to focus on Secretary
Gates because, and he spoke earlier, his frustration that if
you're a leader of one of these bureaucracies, there are things
that, if you really want to get it done you're going to have to
focus on it personally. This is another area, probably 2 years
ago, 3 years ago, that he made a priority to ensure that we
actually were growing in science and technology (S&T) and R&D.
What's happened over the course of the last 2 decades is many
of the programs we've talked about--I'll use JSF--has R&D
money, but what it's really become program money, and it's not
true R&D. So, I think for, particularly as budgets tighten and
we look to capabilities in the future, we can't buy it all, we
can't protect against everything. But having a robust S&T base,
6.1 through 6.5 and 6.6, is really important in terms of being
ready for things in the future. So, even in these times where
there's an extraordinary amount of pressure on the budget, and
I think that will increase, I think we have to continue to get
that right.
You talk about most effective. I think the investment--and
this is not an uncontroversial, sometimes an uncontroversial
investment--but I've watched DARPA over the many years work,
and they really reach at some of the, to get at some of the
most difficult problems. I think we need to be mindful of
sustaining that investment as well, for example. One other
comment is, the S&T or the R&D investment in the medical field
to get at brain research, and that, as I understand this
budget, that actually is in pretty good shape as well.
Secretary Gates. I would just amplify that by saying that
in this budget there is $1.1 billion for and TBI and PTSD
research.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. In New Hampshire we have a very
significant defense industry that has been doing a lot of
cutting edge research, and I know that DARPA's role has been
very important in promoting that research.
The National Guard and Reserves, as you all have said, has
played a huge role in allowing us to be effective in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In New Hampshire, as Senator Ayotte pointed out,
we've seen the largest deployment of our Guard since World War
II. I appreciated everyone's expressed commitment, again, to
the health and well-being of all the servicemen and women and
their families.
One of the things that we have done--and Admiral Mullen,
again, I think you've been briefed personally on the Full Cycle
Deployment program that we have in New Hampshire, that is a
model to help families both as they're preparing for deployment
and when they return, as well as the member who's being
deployed. This program has been supported by congressionally-
directed spending--earmarks--which are not likely to continue.
So, are there, are you looking at models like this as you think
about developing ways to be most effective in supporting Guard
and Reserves who are deploying? Are there ways in which, as the
congressionally-directed spending ends, that we can continue to
support these kinds of programs that have been so effective?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, when you speak to this, and as you
have spoken to the, and the way you've spoken to it, I'm
immediately reminded of the need to be, build resilience in our
people and families, literally from the first day they come
into the Guard, Reserve, or on active duty in all Services.
We've come to understand that. We've actually made some
significant progress there, but we still have a long way to go.
We've built more of it in our members than we have in our
families, and we need to build it in the families as well.
I would need to get back to you with a more specific answer
on, because I want to know more about the, where your program,
where the New Hampshire program is. Because what we do try to
do is canvas the field and look at the best programs that are
out there, and then inspire others to grab those. So, in
particular, I'd be happy to do that and get back to you. As I
speak, I really don't know where there resourcing side of it is
with respect to that kind of, with respect to the program in
New Hampshire.
Senator Shaheen. I withdrawal very much appreciate your
getting back to me. Thank you. My time has expired.
[The information referred to follows:]
The New Hampshire Deployment Cycle Support Program (NH DCSP) has
generated promising results by establishing a support system that
starts as soon as deployments are identified and directly engaging the
individual servicemember and his or her family in their community. The
prevention-based approach allows for assessing risks and resiliencies,
early action to mitigate those risks, and ongoing support throughout
the deployment cycle.
Compared to non-participating New Hampshire Army National Guard
members, those accessing DCSP have shown to have been more favorably
impacted across a number of areas: suicides, resiliency, mental health,
family fitness, readiness to deploy, retention, unemployment, and
homelessness. Among the prominent outcomes are:
Of 30 at risk of suicide (28 servicemembers and 2
spouses), all are using NH DCSP in active prevention with a
licensed clinician and support team
Of 77 servicemembers deemed ``at risk'' of not
deploying due to mental health issues, DCSP intervention
enabled more than half of those (43) to deploy
Over a 2-year period, the percentage of DCSP SMs
choosing to remain in service was four times higher
Being a publicly- and privately-funded service delivery system that
includes utilization of social service capacities in all 234 New
Hampshire communities presents a useful model which warrants emulation.
As fiscal limitations become more pronounced, the Department of Defense
will have to weigh support of NH DCSP against other competing
priorities.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator McCaskill is recognized.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, as always, for being here.
I want to say, Secretary Gates, that I know the President
has an awful lot of hard decisions to make this year. I think
one of the hardest decisions he has is how he's going to
replace you.
Let me start with a topic that is very difficult, I think,
for you all to get your arms around, and that is the incredibly
serious allegations that have been made about sexual assault
within the military. I'm not assuming that the allegations that
are contained in a lawsuit that was recently filed are true.
But if we take them as factual, then we have a real serious
problem, that a woman in our military was raped by more than
one member of the military, and the video shared around the
unit of this rape that had occurred. A woman raped and who goes
to the chaplain, and the chaplain tells her that she needed to
go to church more, if she would attend church more.
The rape kits are only kept for a year. I can't think of a
police department in the country that would only hold onto a
rape kit for a year.
I just think that we have to look at this problem in a
systemic way in terms of, do these women have a safe place they
can go? Are we gathering the evidence quickly? Or, do we have
experts available in terms of prosecuting these cases?
But if someone rapes a woman and the evidence is there, and
that person doesn't end up in prison, then we have failed. I
know that you all feel probably as strongly about this as I do.
But I'd like you to address this and tell me what, who I should
deal with within the military structure to follow up and make
sure that we make some obviously very important changes that
are needed.
Secretary Gates. Senator, it is a problem. It's a serious
problem. I have zero tolerance for any kind of sexual assault,
as do the leaders of all of the Services. I've worked with
Admiral Mullen and the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries
to ensure that we're doing all we can to respond to sexual
assaults.
I've engaged, had a number of meetings myself with the
senior leadership of DOD. I've focused on four areas--reducing
the stigma associated with reporting, ensuring sufficient
commander training, ensuring investigator training and
resourcing, and ensuring trial counsel training and resourcing.
We've made some progress. We've hired dozens more
investigators, field instructors, and prosecutors, and lab
examiners. We've spent almost $2 million over the past 2 years
training our prosecutors better. Generally, the defendants go
to somebody who's specialized in this kind of allegation or
crime, and our prosecutors tend to be generalists, and so we
don't do very well in the court, and so we've spent this money
to try and make our prosecutors effective.
More victims are stepping forward. We have had improvement,
or, an increase in the number of court-martials. We've gone
from about 30 percent of alleged violators being court-
martialed to about 52 percent now. So, at least it's headed in
the right direction.
We've expanded the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and
Victim Advocate Program ten-fold, from about 300 to 3,000. We
now have an advocate at every base and installation around the
world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I heard some suggestions and comments yesterday in the
House hearing that I take very seriously and would like to
pursue. One of them is ensuring the confidentiality of the
relationship between the victim advocate and a victim,
ensuring, or, providing a military lawyer for victims.
Commanders have the authority to move somebody out of a unit.
I'm worried by the press accounts that that hasn't happened,
and so they're considering over on the House side legislation
that would create this as a right for somebody who's been a
victim so they can get out of a unit where the person who
attacked them is in the same unit, and so on. So, I think there
are some ideas that I heard in that hearing yesterday that I
think are definitely worth pursuing. So, we do take it
seriously.
I've taken this seriously, frankly, because sexual assault
is a problem on university campuses.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Secretary Gates. Texas A&M, just like every big public
university in America has a problem with this. One of the
suggestions that I've made to our folks working on this is to
get in touch with some of the universities that have the best
prevention programs in the country, to see if we can learn
something from these universities.
So, I think we have a broad program to try and tackle this.
But there is no question that there's more to do. I just invite
Admiral Mullen to comment.
Admiral Mullen. I testified over here in 2004. I was a vice
chief of the Navy on this subject. There was a lot of work that
needed to be done. It was very obvious in all the Services. I
testified with my three Vice Service Chiefs. So, I agree with
what the Secretary said in terms of our having made progress.
It's not enough. It's completely intolerable. It has to be
answered, I think, on the sort of the skill side, as well as
the leadership side. I still hear too many anecdotal stories
where it's ongoing, including in theater.
With my wife, we visit VA hospitals, and females talk about
trying, having come in the military, previously sexually
assaulted before they came in, coming into the military,
looking for a safe haven, and finding out that it isn't. It's
almost, it's an intensity that certainly is not expected.
This is, Senator, a vastly under-reported offense. So, we
can see the statistics we have, but it's the ones that we don't
have that we have to get after as well.
Senator McCaskill. I guarantee that----
Admiral Mullen. While we've made a lot of progress, there's
a lot left to do.
Senator McCaskill. I guarantee that it's more under-
reported in the military than it is even on a university campus
or in the civilian population at large.
I would just make one suggestion. Having spent many, many,
many, many hours and days in courtrooms prosecuting sexual
assault cases as a young prosecutor, I relied heavily on people
who had specialized in prosecuting those crimes for my
training. I relied heavily on the victim advocacy network that
we had on, in terms of rape victims.
In the civilian sector in any major city you're going to
have a large group of people with great expertise. I know they
would volunteer their time to help train and mentor people that
you need to have this expertise, whether it's people at the
emergency rooms that are gathering rape kits, having a victim
advocate with the victim at the hospital when the rape kit, or
the medical facility, where the rape kit is gathered, whether
it's victim advocacy. I think you could find, and I've
mentioned to General Quantock at Fort Leonard Wood that I would
be happy to assist him getting in touch with this expertise
that exists out there. I think that these people that do this,
they aren't rape prosecutors and sexual assault prosecutors
because they're making big money. They're very much true
believers and want to help in this regard. The same thing is
true of the victim advocacy organizations. I think this is one
where you might be able to get a lot of free training and get
you guys up to the point where the civilian population has
gotten over the last 20 or 30 years.
Thank you for your interest in this. I'll continue to
follow up. I just want to let you know, two questions that I
want to do for the record. One, obviously, is continuing, the
problem we're having auditing the Pentagon. I cannot see how we
can continue to give you what you ask for if we can't see the
measurable progress in terms of auditing the Pentagon. I will
have a series of questions about the financial management
system that's in place.
The last thing is pointing out for the record and questions
for you for the record, that I know the GDP of Afghanistan is
not large enough to pay for the military we're building. I
think it's time that we be very, very honest with the American
people that we're building the Afghan military for the nation.
It costs what, $12 billion a year? Their GDP isn't even that
high. So, once we're gone, I think we're going to be on the
hook to help pay for this military for a long time--cheaper
than our folks being there. But I think we need to begin to
talk about the responsibility for paying for this military down
the line. Because clearly Afghanistan can't afford the army
we're building.
Thank you.
Secretary Gates. Senator, the contact person that you asked
for is Dr. Clifford Stanley, who is the Under Secretary for
Personnel and Readiness.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates.
Thank you all for being here.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Before Senator
McCaskill leaves, I think we would both agree, Mr. Secretary,
that you could take one of those difficult decisions off the
President's desk if you would reenlist for a year or 2 more.
But we'll leave that decision to you, as it properly should be.
But I, too, want to thank both of you and Secretary Hale
for your leadership, and for the courageous decisions that you
continue to make, and for telling the Senate of the United
States the truth as you see it.
I did want to follow up on what Senator McCaskill also just
mentioned about the GDP in Afghanistan. I think you both know
that the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the President,
through the offices of the Pentagon and DOS, to provide an
economic strategy for Afghanistan. Could you speak to where we
are with that process, and how important you think such a
strategy would be to the overall success? Then, specifically,
we have the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations,
and what further role would you see for that particular task
force?
Secretary Gates. I'll take the second part of your question
first.
This task force is one of those things that creates
incredible antibodies in the bureaucracy, because it doesn't
fit anyplace, and, both in DOD and in DOS. I think it's an
honest answer to say that without in effect the protection of
the Secretary of Defense, this operation would not, could not
be sustained.
My belief is that Paul Brinkley and his team have made a
huge contribution, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It was Paul
that took the team to Afghanistan, of private sector
geoscientists and others, and were able to do the estimates of
the extraordinary mineral wealth that exists in Afghanistan, if
only there were the security to exploit it. So, I think they've
made a real contribution, and I hope they will continue to do
that. But, I think it's fair to say that they face a lot of
bureaucratic resistance in doing that.
We talked earlier about the cost of the Afghan security
forces. That's why I believe--and we've talked about it before
in this hearing--that we essentially need to look at the size
of their force as a surge as well, and that once they have a
political settlement inside Afghanistan, and the Taliban is
degraded in terms of their capabilities, the need for the
Afghans to have a smaller military than they have now. Because
we can't sustain $12.8 billion a year for very long.
The economic strategy for Afghanistan is, and the task
force, really go hand-in-hand. I think there's a significant
effort at the Embassy in terms of trying to entice private
sector individuals, as well as foreign investors, to invest in
Afghanistan. But I have to admit that where the economic
strategy for the country stands, I'm just not certain. I'll
have to get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
An economic strategy is an essential component of the overall
success of the Afghan civil-military campaign plan, by focusing efforts
and resources in ways that maximize the effects of U.S. assistance in
Afghanistan, while helping the Afghans become more self-sufficient.
Such a strategy will build on the good work that the Director of the
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, Paul Brinkley, and
his team have already started in key sectors and provide overall
direction for developing Afghanistan's capacity for self-sustainment.
The Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development have participated in discussions,
led by the National Security Staff, on the process by which the
economic strategy report will be produced. The Department of State and
the U.S. Agency for International Development will play a central role
in the drafting process, and they will require support from Congress in
carrying out the important roles they will have in implementing the
strategy. The Department of Defense will also participate in the
drafting of the report, as directed by the Executive Office of the
President, and will pay particular attention to elements of economic
strategy that support the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan,
promote economic stabilization, and enhance the establishment of
sustainable institutions. We plan to complete this report, as required,
in early July 2011.
Senator Udall. Admiral Mullen, do you have any comments to
add?
Admiral Mullen. I would add only that, again, what Paul
Brinkley and his team have done has truly been extraordinary in
both countries, and under incredibly difficult circumstances in
the countries. Although the circumstances back here may have
been more difficult. So, how to sustain that is actually an
open question. I think we do need to do that.
Senator Udall. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. That becomes the heart of, I think, sort
of, the longer-term investment there, not just nationally, but
internationally.
Senator Udall. Yes. I, too, would like to add my
compliments to Mr. Brinkley. I've heard many stories about how
effective he is, how dedicated he is. So, I hope he understands
that many of us here on the Hill, Mr. Secretary, know what
accomplishments he's had.
Secretary Gates. Well, and to Admiral Mullen's point about
the conditions in which they have worked, several members of
Brinkley's team, including Brinkley, have been wounded in
attacks. So, they've been really out there on the front lines
trying to work these problems.
Senator Udall. Could I move to a question about the popular
uprisings in the Middle East that we're seeing in Algeria,
Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere? The people are coming out
on the streets for a variety of reasons. How do you analyze
those countries' leaders' ability to command their security
services?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think it varies from country to
country. We talked at the beginning of the hearing about the
discipline and the professionalism of the Egyptian military,
and the restraint that they exercised under some fairly
difficult circumstances. In Tunisia, the military also stood
aside and, basically, did not defend Ben Ali. So, I think in
each of these countries, though, the circumstances are going to
be different.
But the one thing that these armies seem to have in
common--certainly in Egypt and in Tunisia--is a sense that they
are a national institution, and even though somebody may have
been in power for a long time, they see themselves as having a
special relationship with their people. I know in my
conversations with Minister Tantawi, we talked often about the
relationship that the Egyptian army had with the Egyptian
people, and that it would protect it's people because they were
the people. He delivered, I think, in an exemplary fashion.
Just to defend our intelligence folks a little bit, I think
that they'd done a pretty good job of describing the rising
temperature in a number of these countries, and the economic
and social pressures that were building in a number of these
countries, particularly related to the youth bulge, the 15- to
29-year-olds who have educations and can't get a job. The petty
corruption and nepotism makes life difficult for ordinary
people. Clearly, Ben Ali was quite surprised by what happened
in Tunisia. He didn't expect to, in 2 weeks to be pushed out of
power. I think that President Mubarak was in the same
situation.
I think that the United States, there's been a lot of to-
ing and fro-ing about how we've handled this. But the truth is,
I think the United States has pretty consistently, primarily
privately but also publicly, encouraged these regimes for years
to undertake political and economic reform because these
pressures were building. Now they need to move on with it, and
there is an urgency to this.
Events move very quickly. We were talking at one point, if
Mubarak had given his first speech when he declined to run for
office again in September, when he changed the government, when
he promised constitutional reform--if he had given that speech
3 weeks before, he'd probably still be the president of Egypt.
So, being able to latch onto the speed with which these events
are moving, and have people who have seen, relatively, perceive
a static situation in their countries, to appreciate that it's
not static, that these pressures are building and they do need
to get out in front of it, is, I think, what we've been trying
to do.
Senator Udall. Yes. Our advice and encouragement may hold
more weight in this region and other regions of the world, as
those leaders and those countries look at the example of Egypt
and Tunisia, perhaps others.
I have to wonder, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates,
Secretary Hale, what the British intelligence services were
generating in 1776. I think there are these tipping points that
you talk about that can't be predicted.
Thank you again for your service.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Udall.
I just have one additional point and then we'll close it,
because I know that you folks are running late on your
schedule. That has to do with the size of the Afghanistan army.
I want to give you some statistics about comparing the Iraq
army and the Afghanistan army. I know the situations are
different. But I still want to give you these statistics.
Iraq has fewer people than Afghanistan. The Afghan
population is about 30 million; Iraq about 27 million. But in
Iraq you have 665,000 Iraqi security forces. In Afghanistan you
have a goal, 378,000 would be the new target if it was
accepted. So, it would still be about half the size of the
Iraqi security force, with more people to secure.
So, I would, first of all, I think, probably based on that,
but some other things, not agree that the increase, the
proposal for the increase would be more than they would need,
even if over time there would be a lesser need for security.
Hopefully there will be a lesser need and, obviously, if there
is you could reduce it. But I wouldn't necessarily plan on
there being a need for less than 378,000.
Second, when you describe a surge force, in your mind, Mr.
Secretary, I would hope that the surge force that you believe
it should be looked at, as, would be a, that the surge force
would be the 378, and not the current level. So that it would
be the additional 70 that would be viewed as the surge, and not
the current level, which I believe you spoke at, as a surge
force.
Secretary Gates. I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, the budget
that we have submitted would accommodate the additional growth.
Chairman Levin. All right. That's reassuring.
Finally, I totally agree, both the need for an objective,
an honest view about the cost. I think that is essential.
That's what you pointed to, and rightly so. But I would just
reiterate my hope that when you meet with your colleagues at a
NATO ministerial that you really would drive home the fact that
there's going to be an ongoing need, whether it's at 305,000 or
whether or not it's at 378,000, that there really needs to be a
sharing of that burden among our NATO allies. We cannot carry
the 12 billion alone, I agree with you. But just they way they
have not, it's been kind of spotty, frankly, in terms of NATO
support, on the trainer side, not nearly still what we had
hoped for. But, you're properly giving good grades to those who
have come through. A lot of our NATO allies really have. Some
of them have taken greater losses proportionally than we have,
and we should recognize that.
But, I really would hope that you would reinforce that they
are going to need a significant military and a security force,
that that is the ticket to success, as well as to an exit. Or,
at least, a significantly reduced number of foreign troops
which, in turn, is part of success. That they should come
through financially with some ongoing expected support for the
Afghanistan security forces. That would be my summary. Admiral
Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, just one quick comment. I've been
working NATO pretty hard since 2004. I've never seen them more
together than they have become over the last couple of years in
this mission. Your comment earlier about, out of area--or,
maybe it was Senator Lieberman. But I really do think success
here bodes well for the future of NATO, and not succeeding does
the opposite.
Then, second, we've talked a lot about NATO here. Well,
there are 49 countries total that are providing forces right
now. So, there are an awful lot of non-NATO contributing
countries who've made a difference as well, and are very
focused on sustaining that for a period of time. Some of them
very small numbers. I understand that. But, they've really made
a difference, and we appreciate their contributions as well.
Chairman Levin. Yes. I think, I made the mistake of saying
NATO when I should have said NATO and other coalition forces.
You're absolutely right. A number of those non-NATO countries
have made contributions also way out of proportion to their
population, way out of proportion to their financial ability. I
think we should recognize that, and their losses sometimes have
been out of proportion as well. We do appreciate that.
We want to thank all of you for coming. Again, we're
grateful for your service.
We hope to see a lot more of you than you expect, Secretary
Gates.
Admiral Mullen, we always love to have you here, and know
that you want have too many more visits. But again, we hope,
know that all of them will be as helpful as this one was this
morning.
Secretary Hale, thank you.
We'll stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
HEALTH AND STATUS OF OUR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, in your posture statement, you
expressed concern over the capabilities of our Defense Industrial Base
(DIB) and the ability to produce and support advanced technology
systems for future weapon systems. What is the Department of Defense
(DOD) doing to mitigate these concerns?
Admiral Mullen. In order for the defense industry to remain a
source of strategic advantage well into the future, DOD and our Nation
require a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the
structure and capabilities of the DIB. For example, the fiscal year
2012 budget request contains resources for two providers of the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a result enabled by establishing a
competitive environment in which two competitors have offered
affordable alternatives. Additionally, the Navy continues to pursue the
work share agreement on the Virginia class submarine program. Looking
ahead, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to
undertake a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier assessment of the DIB that
will include space and shipbuilding. This effort will be accomplished
in full partnership with the Military Services. The results of this
analysis will allow us to improve our acquisition strategies and
influence DOD's program and budget review, beginning with the fiscal
year 2013 cycle. Once completed, DOD will continue to map and assess
the industrial base on an ongoing basis. Additionally, as the DIB
evolves through mergers and acquisitions, DOD participates in reviews
conducted by antitrust agencies and in reviews conducted by the
interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to
mitigate consolidation and ownership concerns. The affects of the
continuing resolution on program execution and the resultant impacts on
defense sector production lines remain a concern. What these industrial
bases need more than anything else is a plan and investment strategy
with a certainty and predictability that has here to fore been very
elusive.
DOD is committed to being more forward leaning in its ongoing
assessments of the industrial base--refocusing our efforts on our
future needs, working much more closely with the Services to foster an
integrated approach to the overall industrial base, and placing
transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, while much of the attention in
the personnel sector has been rightfully focused on deployed
warfighters and their families, the success of our military largely
depends upon the effectiveness and reliability of high-technology
weapon systems that give the U.S. military its premier technological
advantage. Fundamental to developing and fielding these weapons systems
is a community of highly trained science and technology (S&T) and
acquisition personnel in DOD. What will you do to ensure that DOD can
continue to attract and retain a highly skilled S&T and acquisition
workforce--especially in today's competitive environment where at the
national level there is a limited pool of skilled scientists and
engineers facing competition from industry, academia, and other Federal
agencies?
Secretary Gates. DOD continues its initiative to grow the
acquisition workforce through fiscal year 2015. Significant emphasis
and progress has been made hiring and supporting the growth of the
technical workforce, but there is much more work to do in this area.
For example, the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation
Scholarship-for-Service program supported 900 students with majors in
DOD relevant science and engineering disciplines. Three hundred of
these students transitioned into the DOD workforce. Another 230 are
expected to transition into the workforce in 2011.
AFGHAN TALIBAN
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in a recent interview, General
Petraeus discussed growing friction between local Taliban fighters
living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban leadership, who are
phoning in orders that the local insurgents should continue to fight
against Afghan and coalition forces through the winter, while the
Afghan leadership remains in the safety of sanctuaries in Quetta and
elsewhere in Pakistan. He said we are seeing a degree of discord among
Afghan Taliban leaders and among the lower-level fighters that we've
not seen in the past. Do you agree with General Petraeus' assessment
that there is friction and discord between local Taliban fighters in
Afghanistan and the Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan, as that
leadership phones in orders for the lower-level fighters to keep up the
fight through the winter?
Secretary Gates. I agree there is tension between Taliban leaders
in Pakistan and the fighters and commanders who remain in Afghanistan.
I do not believe current frustration levels are sufficient to degrade
insurgent capacity or create exploitable fissures. For example,
increased violence levels this winter indicate that this tension did
not undermine the insurgents' desire or ability to conduct attacks.
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, is this level of friction
something that we've not seen in the past?
Secretary Gates. Every winter since 2002, DOD observed tension
between Taliban leaders in Pakistan and the fighters and commanders who
remain in Afghanistan. This also occurred during the 1980s mujahedeen
resistance against the Soviets. The tone of reporting this winter
indicates a heightened level of frustration; however, the multi-faceted
nature of this issue makes it difficult to make a qualitative
comparison to previous years.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are we seeing this friction
contributing to a slow increase in the number of lower-level insurgents
seeking to reintegrate into Afghan society?
Secretary Gates. I do not see evidence that tension with Quetta-
based leaders is eroding local insurgents' motivation to fight or
increasing lower-level insurgents' willingness to reintegrate. Most
insurgents are locals fighting for local issues and not necessarily in
support of Taliban senior leadership; therefore, they are likely to
sustain their efforts regardless of any frustration with Quetta-based
leaders. Emergence of a reintegration program that addresses local
concerns, provides protection for fighters and their families, and
delivers on promises will make reintegration a more viable option.
GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, in Admiral
Mullen's opening statement he made reference to a proposal for a pooled
Department of State (DOS)-DOD security sector assistance initiative,
called the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF). At the hearing, he
indicated this initiative would include $50 million from DOS and an
authority for DOD to transfer up to $450 million into this initiative.
Are you confident that DOS is committed to making this initiative work
jointly beyond the tenures of both of you and Secretary Clinton?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes. Although I cannot speak
for our counterparts at DOS or future leadership of either department,
DOD and DOS are working collaboratively on the development of the GSCF.
This pilot program is designed to demonstrate the ability of both
Departments to respond to emerging requirements rapidly (within the
budget cycle) and in a collaborative manner. The benefit of this
limited pilot is that it allows future senior leaders to evaluate the
GSCF's effectiveness and determine if it should be extended beyond its
initial 3-year term.
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do either of
you have concerns that the joint arrangement will prove too unwieldy?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. No. I am aware of this concern
and would work to address it with the processes and procedures we
establish. We are applying lessons learned from Section 1206 and other
programs in developing the notional processes and procedures. At this
point, we plan to have the GSCF be administered by a small combined
DOS-DOD fund staff that will provide joint program formulation,
decisionmaking, and implementation. That staff would bring in relevant
staff augmentation depending on the expertise needed to meet each
requirement. Throughout the pilot, I expect the GSCF to undergo
continual process improvements as it matures.
8. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do either of
you have any concern that this type of initiative is too much of a
militarization of foreign policy?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Not at all. The GSCF is
designed to enable DOD and DOS to respond to a variety of emerging
global challenges in a collaborative manner. Program formulation for
military and other security forces would be joint, while programs for
justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization assistance would be
formulated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary
of Defense. This ensures that the appropriate Departments retain
primary responsibility for missions within their respective core
competencies, while benefiting from the cooperation the GSCF structure
fosters. This is a force-multiplying authority that maintains DOS
primacy in non-military missions.
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, does the
proposal envision that funds transferred into GSCF would be subject to
the standard reprogramming processes?
Secretary Gates. Not at all. The GSCF is designed to enable DOS and
DOD to respond to a variety of emerging global challenges in a
collaborative manner. Program formulation for military and other
security forces would be joint, while programs for justice sector, rule
of law, and stabilization assistance would be formulated by the
Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. This
ensures that the appropriate Departments retain primary responsibility
for missions within their respective core competencies, while
benefiting from the cooperation the GSCF structure fosters. This is a
force-multiplying authority that maintains DOS primacy in non-military
missions.
Admiral Mullen. The reprogramming of funds into the GSCF would be
conducted in accordance with the legislative proposal that states that
this authority to transfer is in addition to any other transfer
authority available to DOS and DOD. Jointly, the Secretaries of State
and Defense would provide a quarterly report to the specified
congressional committees on obligations of funds or transfers into the
Fund made during the preceding quarter, to include the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate.
MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
10. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you each
lead a bilateral channel of discussion with your respective Russian
counterparts in which you are exploring the possibilities for
cooperation on missile defense. These discussions are consistent with
similar North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts. Please
describe why you believe missile defense cooperation with Russia is in
our interest and what kinds of cooperation you believe are both
desirable and possible.
Secretary Gates. The United States seeks to responsibly sustain a
stable relationship with the Russian Federation as the pace of
military-technical innovation increases and the global security
environment evolves. DOD also hopes to enlist Russia's help in
addressing emerging security challenges from regional actors seeking
illicit capabilities.
DOD has made clear that the system it intends to pursue with Russia
will not be a ``dual-key'' system, and it will not in any way limit
U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities. The U.S. concept for missile
defense cooperation stems from the conviction that NATO must be
responsible for defense of NATO territory and that Russia should be
responsible for defense of Russian territory. The United States and
Russia would operate their missile defense systems independently, but
cooperatively, including sharing sensor data that may improve the
ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks. I believe that
Russian radars could provide data that would improve the capabilities
of U.S. and NATO missile defense systems, and that U.S. sensors could
improve the capability of Russia's missile defense systems. Further
analysis would help to understand how U.S. and Russian interceptor
systems could be mutually supportive in defending our respective
territories.
It is important to note that this process will take time, but I
believe that meaningful cooperation is possible--cooperation that can
strengthen the security of the United States and our NATO Allies as
well as Russia.
Admiral Mullen. The Military Cooperation Working Group is the
military-to-military line of communication between me and the Russian
Chief of Defense. The Missile Defense Sub-Group is the military-to-
military forum that enables bilateral discussion of missile defense
cooperation activities, such as joint exercises. These discussions
correspond to the ones we conduct at the policy and strategic levels,
as well as in multinational NATO-Russia forums. Although attention is
presently focused on the European region, Russia and the United States
share concerns about global ballistic missile threats, such as those in
Northeast Asia. Our bilateral engagement on missile defense issues is
intended to shape awareness of these threats and develop cooperative
long-term responses to them. We have a clear directive to reset our
bilateral relationship with Russia. While missile defense cooperation
between Russia and NATO continues to develop, there will remain a clear
need for the United States and Russia to maintain bilateral dialog on
critical issues and concerns unique to our two countries.
AFGHANISTAN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
11. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, according to published reports,
the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and
Afghan Special Operations Forces (SOF) has increased dramatically in
the last 6 months and demonstrated significant results. Lieutenant
General Rodriguez stated recently that the Afghan people are playing an
increasingly important role in the success of these operations by
``helping to provide significantly more tips because they see Afghan
Security Forces out among them more than they ever had because of the
increase in the number [of Afghan Forces].'' Reportedly, 85 percent of
counterterrorism operations take place without a shot being fired.
Do you agree with Lieutenant General Rodriguez that the increased
presence of Afghan Security Forces has resulted in better intelligence
because the population is more likely to come forward with information?
Secretary Gates. Counterterrorism network targeting operations
increased in the past 6 months, complementing the additional U.S. and
partner nation forces deployed to Afghanistan during this period.
Almost all of these operations are conducted jointly with Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF). I agree with Lieutenant General
Rodriguez that partnered operations with the ANSF in all
counterinsurgency activities result in increased reporting by the local
population and better intelligence.
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, what has been the impact of
this intelligence on the success of counterterrorism operations?
Secretary Gates. The increased trust and confidence the Afghan
people have in the ANSFs, especially in the Afghan National Army (ANA)
and the Afghan Special Forces, has had a significant positive impact on
the success of counterterrorism (CT) network targeting operations.
Afghan civilians feel safer and are more likely to provide information
about insurgent activities when they witness a competent and impartial
ANSF playing a prominent role in protecting the population and
degrading the insurgency. This cooperation enables a higher degree of
success in CT operations, greater precision during the execution of
these operations, and an increased likelihood of receiving information
that can be used to plan future operations.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are news reports accurate that
85 percent of SOF's counterterrorism operations are conducted
successfully without a shot being fired?
Secretary Gates. Yes. During the period from February 1, 2010 to
January 31, 2011, 85 percent of counterterrorism network targeting
operations were conducted without shots being fired. The quality of
intelligence that shapes these operations, the careful and deliberate
planning that precedes each operation, and the unmatched skill of our
operators with their Afghan partners allows us to successfully capture
many terrorists without the use of force.
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ
14. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, in your personal and
professional military view, and from a purely military perspective, if
the Government of Iraq requested the continued presence of U.S.
military forces, including combat forces, would you recommend the
approval of such a request?
Admiral Mullen. I cannot answer that question without knowing
exactly what type of presence or mission the Iraqis would like us to
do. Then, I would have to consider variables like risk to our troops,
our enduring national interests, our long-term strategic partnership
with Iraq, our worldwide military commitments, and Iraq's ability to do
that mission on their own before making a recommendation to the
President. In the meantime, we remain focused on executing a
responsible drawdown of our military forces according to our security
agreement with the Government of Iraq.
VIOLENCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, during my trip to Iraq in
January, I met with leaders of Iraq's Christian religious minorities
who expressed their desire to preserve the Christian communities within
Iraq and the need for greater security so Christians can stay in their
communities without fearing for their lives. What is your assessment of
the Iraqi Government's efforts to ensure the safety of its many
religious minorities?
Secretary Gates. The Iraqi Government took positive steps to
protect religious minorities more effectively, particularly since the
October 31, 2010 bombing of Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad.
The Iraqi Government increased security at virtually all churches and
police patrols in minority-dominated areas. The Iraqi police force
arrested 12 individuals suspected of carrying out the attack on Our
Lady of Salvation Church, including an al Qaeda operative. The Iraqi
security forces (ISF) have endeavored to fortify minority religious
sites and increase check points in minority neighborhoods. This must be
done with the concurrence of minority populations because some of these
communities believe increased security may serve to identify their
facilities as targets. U.S. Forces-Iraq continues to advise, train,
assist, and equip the ISF to enable them to conduct more effective
security operations against violent extremist organizations seeking to
attack minority religious communities. Al Qaeda in Iraq remains the
most enduring threat to Christians and other minorities because it
characterizes churches as legitimate targets of jihadist efforts to rid
the region of western influence, ideology, and theology.
16. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, in your view, what more should
they be doing to improve that protection?
Secretary Gates. In the process of establishing a professional,
reliable security service, the Iraqi Government should also improve
Iraqi rule-of-law institutions, and particularly ensure that the
property rights of Christians and other minorities are protected by
these institutions. The Iraqi Government must also continue to
modernize and professionalize the ISF to ensure that they protect all
Iraqis impartially. Examples include recruiting and training more
minority police, and reliably implementing the process of restoring
property rights to Christians, as well as other minorities, whose lands
were illegally confiscated when they fled their traditional homelands
due to sectarian and other anti-minority violence. Since many
minorities choose resettlement within Iraq, other impediments to
protection and reintegration include lack of adequate educational and
economic opportunities in areas to which minorities are moving and
congregating (such as the Ninewa Plain). These are longer-term
challenges that supplement, rather than replace, improved police
interaction with minorities and the equitable administration of
justice.
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, are the Iraqis recruiting and
training any police units that are comprised exclusively of religious
minorities and, if so, are they deployed exclusively to the areas where
their respective communities reside?
Secretary Gates. Iraqis are recruiting and training police cadets
from the minority communities, which improves police visibility within
those communities and builds trust between police and minority Iraqis.
However, as with most national police forces, Iraq does not create
police units segregated by religious affiliation, which could imply
uneven standards, complicate overall force integration, and limit the
ability to deploy such units or individuals to where they may be needed
to address security concerns elsewhere in Iraq. Matching ISF
individuals or units to minority-dominated areas is further complicated
by the fact that minority demographics are in flux and groups within,
for example, the Christian community, are subdivided among numerous
denominations (Assyrian, Armenian Orthodox, Chaldean, Jacobite, Arab,
and so forth) which do not necessarily share objectives.
SPACE SYSTEMS FUNDING
18. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, the Air Force has proposed to
incrementally fund the acquisition of two large and critical satellite
programs, using multi-year, fixed-prices contracting authority that
will require advanced appropriations. In your view, why is this
authority needed for these two satellite programs?
Secretary Gates. DOD requires authority to use advance
appropriations to fully fund the block buy of Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellites 5 and 6 during fiscal year 2012. After
careful review, DOD determined multiyear procurement authorization is
not required for this acquisition. For AEHF 5 and 6, the Air Force is
procuring two satellites, in a block buy, in a single year. The Air
Force worked closely with the DOD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) office and, based on CAPE independent estimates,
expects to realize unit cost savings from the bulk buy of piece parts,
electronic components, and sub assemblies, as well as from a more
efficient assembly and test process. In order to achieve savings, DOD
needs to order these satellites in blocks of two. However, fully
funding both satellites in a single year is not practically achievable
in today's budget environment. Therefore, I propose a modified approach
whereby DOD fully funds the satellite block buy over a fixed number of
years using advance appropriations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
REPEAL OF ``DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL''
19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, on December 22, 2010, the
President signed legislation that will lead to the eventual repeal of
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''. The Services were directed to provide a plan
by February 4, 2011, indicating how they will prepare their respective
Services for the implementation of the repeal. In your opinion, what
are the biggest challenges the Services face as they prepare for this
change?
Secretary Gates. The biggest challenge will be training those
members who are not co-located with their units or who serve
intermittently. This is why DOD is moving forward in an extremely
deliberate and purposeful manner to develop and deploy our training and
education.
20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how are these challenges being
addressed, and what is the current timeline for certification as you
see it?
Secretary Gates. There is no set date for certification. I am
working closely with the Services to develop multiple ways to train the
Force. Among various approaches, DOD identified that the most preferred
approach is with leadership driven face-to-face training. When that is
not feasible, computer-based training will also be available.
I continue to work purposefully and responsibly toward
certification.
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS
21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, on November 5, 2010, the Under
Secretary for Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. Clifford
Stanley, sent a Memorandum For Record (MFR) titled, ``Updated Plan for
the Removal of Social Security Numbers (SSN) from DOD Identification
(ID) Cards.'' The MFR states that SSNs may not be removed as previously
indicated in 2009 based on concerns raised by DOD stakeholders. What is
DOD's position on the removal of SSNs from ID cards issued to retired
personnel, dependents, and those currently serving?
Secretary Gates. DOD recognizes the ongoing risks and dangers
associated with identity theft and the need to protect Personally
Identifiable Information, such as the SSN.
In 2007, DOD implemented a three-phase plan to remove SSNs from DOD
ID Cards. In a November 5, 2010 Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, DOD updated its implementation
plan. This was due to concern over interruptions to benefits provided
to servicemembers, retirees and their families, and it was due to
adverse impacts to DOD contingency operations. This updated
implementation plan is, as follows:
Phase One--The act of removing the printed dependent
SSNs from all Dependent ID Cards continues, as initiated in
2008 under the original plan. This phase will be completed by
the end of 2012. The standard Dependent ID card life cycle
requires replacement every 4 years.
Phase Two--The act of removing the SSN from all ID
cards and replacing it with a DOD ID Number will be implemented
in June 2011.
Phase Three--The act of removing all SSNs from
barcodes on the ID cards remains on schedule, with
implementation expected in 2012.
22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what are the leading
alternative identifiers which are being considered to replace SSNs?
Secretary Gates. The SSN will be replaced on DOD ID cards by the
DOD ID Number. The DOD ID number is a unique, 10-digit identifier
created upon initial enrollment of the individual into the Defense
Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System database. The DOD ID Number is
permanently fixed--it will not change over time or be contingent on
one's role (e.g. dependent, civilian).
All individuals eligible to receive DOD benefits--such as
commissary, exchange, Morale, Welfare and Recreation or TRICARE
purchased care--will also receive a DOD Benefits Number. The DOD
Benefits number is an 11-digit number. The first nine digits are common
to the sponsor. The last two digits indicate the card holder's
relationship to the sponsor. The DOD Benefits Number has been agreed to
by the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) as an acceptable substitute
for the SSN for management of benefits with no interruption of
services. Similar to the DOD ID number, the DOD Benefits Number will
not change over time.
LITERACY EDUCATION
23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, with a 14 percent literacy rate
among new Afghan recruits, every Afghan soldier and police recruit now
undertakes mandatory literacy education. By October 2011, 128,000
Afghan soldiers are projected to be literate to at least the first-
grade level, further enabling security forces to become self-
sustaining. What are the overall goals of this program and how is it
progressing against the baseline plan?
Secretary Gates. In parallel with DOD's instruction programs for
ANSF recruits is a drive to educate the ``legacy illiterate'' (i.e.,
those serving in the ANA who have not had the benefit of literacy
training). The goal of the literacy program is to bring all ANSF
personnel up to a basic level of literacy (third grade-level). The
program employs 1,800 teachers and provides new recruits with 64 hours
of basic literacy training and an additional 248 hours after they
complete basic training. As of February 2011, approximately 66,600 ANSF
personnel have received literacy training; approximately 34,950 ANSF
personnel have completed first grade-level literacy training, which is
on track toward achieving the goal of 100,000 personnel completing
first grade-level literacy training by October 2011; and approximately
10,187 ANSF personnel have completed third grade-level literacy
training, with the goal of having 14,028 personnel complete third
grade-level training by October 2011.
Literacy remains a major challenge to the development of the ANSF,
as about 86 percent of new recruits entering the force are totally
illiterate. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) instituted a
mandatory literacy program in April 2010, and continues to work with
the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to increase the
literacy of the force.
24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, please describe the importance
of this program to the future ability of the Afghan Government to
succeed.
Secretary Gates. Literacy education is a key component in the
development of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Basic
literacy skills allow Afghan military and police personnel to perform
their duties, including reading maps, writing reports, and calling for
military support in the field. Illiteracy can cost lives in combat and
renders the police ineffective in providing basic public security
functions. Literacy training is also a major incentive for enlistment
and retention and increases the comparative advantage that the ANSF has
over the Taliban in terms of drawing new personnel. Literacy also
contributes to the overall ability of the Afghan government to succeed
by strengthening the professionalism of the ANSF and instituting
longer-term capacity for self-sustainment.
ARMY TROOP REDUCTION
25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, in January, you announced that
in fiscal year 2015, the Army would decrease its permanently authorized
end strength by 27,000 soldiers. In addition, the Army will also shed
22,000 positions by fiscal year 2013, reducing the temporary surge
numbers. This total reduction of 49,000 is very significant. How will
this reduction affect the ability of the force to meet future demands?
Secretary Gates. Two factors will determine how the end-strength
reduction will impact on the Army's ability to meet future demands: the
future demand level and the Army's end-strength reduction
implementation plan. With regard to the demand level, I cannot predict
with certainty when and where contingencies may occur that will require
Army forces. I do believe that Army forces will continue to be required
for a variety of missions, but that near-term demands will not reach
the high level of commitment seen in recent years. As long as this
assumption is valid, the Army will be able to implement the planned
end-strength reductions while meeting demands and improving readiness
and strategic depth. The Army is continuing to ensure accomplishment of
its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future
demands and care for the well-being of its soldiers and their families.
26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, will this result in a potential
realignment of combat forces to better support such demands?
Secretary Gates. The Army is developing options to implement
directed manpower reductions, while satisfying near-term demands and
increasing readiness for unforeseen contingencies. The Army will plan
and implement its end-strength reduction and any associated structure
adjustments in a deliberate fashion with the intent of achieving a
balanced and capable force. The Army is continuing to ensure
accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness
to meet future demands and care for the well-being of its soldiers and
their families.
27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how will it affect our reliance
on Guard and Reserve Forces?
Secretary Gates. The Army depends on access to its Reserve
component to accomplish its assigned missions. The planned Army Active
component end-strength reductions will have modest impacts on Army
Reserve component forces needed to support current and anticipated
operational demand. The Army is developing options to implement the
reductions, while satisfying near-term demands and increasing its
readiness for unforeseen contingencies. The Army is continuing to
ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational
readiness to meet future demands and care for the well-being of its
soldiers and their families.
READINESS IN THE PACIFIC REGION
28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the North Korean shelling of
Yeonpyeong Island, the sinking of the Cheonan, and China's growing
military capability continue to remind us of the importance of our
military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Given the many demands
on the defense budget and the recently announced reductions, how does
the fiscal year 2012 budget impact our military readiness in the
Pacific region?
Secretary Gates. America's forward presence in the region played a
key role in ensuring decades of stability in Asia. The United States
continues to be globally postured in order to secure the homeland and
its citizens from direct attack and to advance American interests
around the world. While there are many demands on U.S. forces in the
Asia Pacific, the fiscal year 2012 defense budget ensures that DOD
remains prepared to meet the challenges and fulfill security
commitments in the region.
The fiscal year 2012 budget makes a number of investments that
enhance the ability of U.S. forces to project power into the Asia-
Pacific region and elsewhere. Chief among these are the commencement of
a new long-range bomber program and increased procurement of
conventional cruise missiles across the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP).
At the same time, DOD has worked, and will continue to work, with
U.S. allies and partners to maintain peace and ensure stability
throughout Asia. With the fiscal year 2012 budget, DOD intends to
enhance its forward military presence in the Pacific, invest in base
resiliency to protect critical infrastructure, and develop new concepts
of operation for how the United States will project power when
challenged with emerging capabilities in the future.
DOD will continue working with Japan to implement the bilateral
Realignment Roadmap agreement and relocate 8,000 marines from Okinawa
to Guam in order to offer strategic flexibility, enhance contingency
response capabilities, and improve peacetime engagement. DOD requested
$181 million in the fiscal year 2012 budget to support military
construction to meet the requirements for the Marine Corps relocation
to Guam.
DOD will enhance the readiness of our forces in Korea with Tour
Normalization. This initiative will further the long-term commitment to
provide greater stability for forward stationed servicemembers and
their families. For fiscal year 2012, the Army allocated $106 million
for Tour Normalization, while the other services have not identified
their allocation amount. DOD will also continue transitioning wartime
operational control to South Korea by December 2015.
Finally, DOD also intends to exercise regularly with our allies and
partners. Examples of these exercises include the annual Ulchi Freedom
Guardian and Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in the Republic of Korea,
the Keen Edge/Keen Sword and Annualex exercises in Japan, Talisman
Sabre with Australia, and the U.S.-Thailand-hosted Cobra Gold which
attracts partners from across the region. The United States continues
to be engaged throughout the region. The earthquake, tsunami, and
nuclear crisis response efforts in Japan are the latest examples, once
again demonstrating the value of being able to work in close
partnership in times of critical need.
FUTURE ISSUES FOR SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you mentioned that this would
most likely be your last defense budget hearing before this committee.
If you were to compile a list of items that ``keep you up at night'',
what would this list look like? In other words, from your perspective
as our 22nd Secretary of Defense, what should your successor be told to
watch out for?
Secretary Gates. As I previously testified to the House Armed
Services Committee, thinking about the future, two issues that worry me
are the defense budget and jurisdictional lines in Congress.
First, I see a growing disconnect between the missions given to the
military and the discussion of the defense budget. It is true that, as
the biggest part of the discretionary Federal budget, DOD cannot
presume to exempt itself from the scrutiny and pressure faced by the
rest of our government. It is imperative to eliminate wasteful,
excessive, and unneeded spending.
Nevertheless, drastic and ill-conceived cuts to the overall defense
budget would be operationally catastrophic, and would have little
impact on the Nation's $1.6 trillion deficit. DOD needs a budget
baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth
that avoids extreme peaks and valleys in defense spending that can be
enormously harmful to readiness, planning, and financial management.
Only then can DOD have the right balance between winning the wars of
today and being prepared for likely future threats. We shrink from our
global security responsibilities at our peril, as retrenchment brought
about by short-sighted cuts could well lead to costlier and more tragic
consequences later--indeed as they always have in the past. The best
way to support our military personnel is to ensure that they have the
tools and training they need to prevail against present and future
adversaries.
Second, I worry that the increasing integration of national
security policy and execution in the executive branch are not
paralleled by the legislative branch of the government. Jurisdictional
lines in Congress prevent congressional leadership from seeing the
overall national security picture that the executive branch sees, and
these lines risk splintering coherent whole-of-government efforts into
multiple lines of authority and disparate agency budget accounts. It is
my hope that efforts to achieve needed integration in Congress can
reinforce our resolve on critical national security policies.
Third, I am concerned that DOS and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) do not have the resources necessary
to contribute to a more integrated, coherent, and successful civil-
military strategy. Ensuring support for whole-of-government efforts,
especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, is critical to creating and
maintaining secure environments in key regions of the world.
LANGUAGE SKILLS AND CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, I have long-supported efforts
to improve the language skills and cultural understanding of our
military and Federal workforce. The United States must have the
language skills and cultural understanding to successfully engage in
this world. Please discuss how DOD's fiscal year 2012 budget ensures
that our military and civilian workers have the language skills
necessary to meet its mission.
Secretary Gates. Baseline funding of $792 million is projected in
fiscal year 2012 to support language and culture instruction to achieve
higher proficiencies.
Programs include the following: increasing pre-accession training,
education and immersion opportunities at the Service Academies and
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); continuing the ROTC Skill
Proficiency Bonus; providing pre-deployment training for general
purpose forces; continuing Language Training Detachments to provide and
sustain commanders' needs for language; regional and cultural training
for the general purpose forces; continuing support to the Afghanistan/
Pakistan Hands program; and enhancing English language training for
partner nation personnel.
DOD is moving ahead to develop strategic direction, to create
effective policies and to refine processes for generating language,
regional and cultural capabilities.
ADDICTION ISSUES
31. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, the Army Inspector General (IG)
report released in January indicates that between 25 and 35 percent of
patients assigned to special wounded-care companies or battalions are
addicted to or dependent on drugs, particularly prescription narcotic
pain relievers. What steps are being taken to address the issue of
potential overmedication or addiction within Wounded Transition Units
(WTU)?
Admiral Mullen. After receiving multiple briefings from scientists
and line leaders with a growing concern about drugs, I have come to the
conclusion that reducing the use of illicit drugs, unprescribed
pharmaceuticals, and excess alcohol requires an integrated approach.
Drug abuse is a systems problem that requires a coordinated medical and
line leadership approach.
The Army Surgeon General LTG Eric B. Schoomaker established an
aggressive program to minimize dependence on narcotics to treat pain
through implementation of the recommendations of the Pain Management
Task Force. The Task Force membership included a variety of medical
specialties and disciplines from the Army, as well as representatives
from the Navy, Air Force, TMA, and Veterans Health Administration
(VHA). Between October 2009 and January 2010 this task force conducted
28 site visits at Army, Navy, and Air Force Medical Centers, Hospitals
and Health Clinics, as well as VHA and civilian hospitals. During site
visits, leadership and staff were asked to assess pain management
capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and best practices at their
respective facilities.
The task force developed 109 recommendations that lead to a
comprehensive pain management strategy that utilizes state-of-the-art/
science modalities and technologies, and provides optimal quality of
life for soldiers with acute and chronic pain. Medical providers are
now informed and encouraged to utilize alternative means of pain
management wherever possible. Such techniques include development and
integration into clinical practice of a common Pain Assessment Tool,
establishing acute pain medicine services across the continuum of care,
implementing a drug abuse assessment strategy in the primary care
setting, providing appropriate pain management and clinical pharmacy
oversight in Warrior Transition Units (WTU), incorporation of pain
related questions into the WTU Satisfaction Survey, and establishing a
tiered pain management approach leveraging techniques such as
osteopathic manipulation, acupuncture, and yoga.
U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has established a number of
policies that also address this issue, including:
1. OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 09-022, WTU High Risk Medication Review and
Sole Provider Program. This has proven to be a highly successful
medication reconciliation policy that has reduced adverse events in
warriors. Providers perform medication reconciliation with each Warrior
within 24 hours of assignment. Clinical pharmacists monitor and support
safe and effective medication treatment and review medication profiles
weekly. Case managers periodically perform clinical risk assessment and
when assigned. Warriors identified as high risk are closely monitored,
dispensed smaller quantities of medications, and are assigned to one
provider and pharmacy.
2. OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 09-064, Use of Opioid Medications in Pain
Management. This policy educates providers regarding the proper
selection of patients and appropriate treatment with opioid analgesics.
Primary Care Managers (PCM) will assess patients face-to-face before
initiating opioid therapy for risk factors and meet with patients every
60-90 days to monitor clinical response and potential adverse effects.
3. MEDCOM published OPORD 10-76, Comprehensive Pain Management
Campaign Plan (CPMCP) in September 2010, a phased operationalization of
Pain Task Force recommendations including:
a. 4.4.1. Establish Regional Medical Commands (RMC) Integrative
Pain Management Centers and expansion/standardization of non-medication
pain management modalities.
b. 4.2.1. Incorporate integrative and alternative therapeutic
modalities into a patient centered plan of care. Standards are being
developed in order to expand/establish standards for alternative
medicine programs (acupuncture, bio-feedback, yoga, osteopathic
manipulation, and mind-body techniques).
Additionally, Dr. Stanley and I have had several discussions
regarding this issue. One outcome of these discussions was a Memorandum
on ``A Systems Approach to Drug Demand Reduction in the Force.'' In
this memorandum I made several recommendations that I believe will
further reduce drug demand. These recommendations included:
Subsume all DOD drug testing efforts under Readiness
and fully fund the program
Fund the expansion of drug testing to include the most
commonly abused prescription drugs
Complete the Prescription Drug Verification Portal to
allow testing labs to instantly verify narcotics prescriptions
in the TRICARE database
As recommended, the Drug Demand Reduction Office is now under the
Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness and has been fully funded,
including funding to complete the Prescription Drug Verification
Portal. As of March 2011 the portal was undergoing connectivity testing
and was scheduled to begin beta testing before the end of the month.
Additionally, a testing method for benzodiazepines is under development
and expected to be implemented during the second quarter of 2012.
It is important, however, to keep in mind that addiction is not the
same as being prescribed narcotics or controlled substances even over a
long period of time. Addiction refers to behaviors as a result of using
or seeking drugs (narcotics) including active behaviors to obtain,
abuse, and persist in a pattern of abuse in spite of adverse
consequences. Tolerance and withdrawal may result after 6-8 weeks of
daily use or years of intermittent use, however this does not equate to
addiction. Consensus among addiction physicians shows development of
narcotic dependence when treating pain in the absence of other risk
factors is rare. Risk factors for addition include:
1. Personal history of addiction to opioids or other mood-altering
substances (i.e. alcohol)
2. Family history of substance use disorders
3. History of poor medication compliance or abuse
4. Co-morbid psychopathology (depression, anxiety, etc) which may
motivate a patient to self-medicate psychological pain.
Returning to the importance of line leadership involvement, I am
also moving forward with a doctrinal change called ``Total Force
Fitness'' which calls upon line leaders to take a proactive role in
setting the conditions for healthy lifestyles in the force.
While the few specific examples I provided represent true progress,
much more is being done. Task forces continue to study the many related
issues and researchers continue to explore alternate pain management
techniques. There will, of course, always be room for improvement, but
we have made significant strides.
32. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, what is your overall assessment
of the effectiveness of these WTUs?
Admiral Mullen. The WTUs have been effective in helping ensure that
our most seriously wounded soldiers are receiving the care they require
and deserve. To some extent, however, WTUs have become victims of their
own success. While intended to focus on our most seriously injured, the
WTUs have become the default unit for our less injured soldiers also.
The Warrior Care and Transition Program (WCTP), overseen by the Army's
Warrior Transition Command, a Major Subordinate Command of the MEDCOM,
currently provides care, support, and advocacy for some 17,000 soldiers
and veterans. This represents a dramatic increase in scope and impact
compared to what preceded the establishment of the WCTP. WTU plays a
central role in the management of the care provided to wounded, ill,
and injured soldiers.
Although a remarkable amount has been accomplished, the WCTP
continues to mature and improve through a coordinated medical and line
leadership effort. Through a vigorous program of organizational
inspections and assistance visits, the Army's Warrior Transition
Command continues to identify areas of the program that can be
improved, as well as best practices that can be implemented across all
WTUs. Additionally, through the Department of the Army's Inspector
General Program, Army leadership recently identified 56 recommendations
for improving the WCTP. The Army, under the leadership of BG Darryl
Williams, Commander of Warrior Transition Command, is currently in the
process of implementing these recommendations as part of a program of
continuous refinement and improvement.
Additionally, the Army's Warrior Transition Command continues to
respond to the requirements and recommendations of the ongoing DOD
Inspector General's review of WTUs. Also, I am aware that the
Congressionally mandated Recovering Warrior Task Force recently
received an entire day of testimony from Brigadier General Williams and
the staff of the Warrior Transition Command on the various aspects of
WTUs and the WCTP and is now conducting site visits at WTU locations. I
look forward to the findings and recommendations of the Task Force and
I am confident Army leadership will continue its commitment both to
transparency and responsiveness to the findings and recommendations of
the Recovering Warrior Task Force.
I commend Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey for his
leadership in ensuring that the care of wounded, ill, and injured
soldiers continues to improve and flourish. As Secretary of Defense
Gates and I have repeatedly stated, after the war itself, we have no
greater responsibility than to care for those who have been wounded,
become ill, or been injured in service to their country.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TROOPS
33. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, upon completing deployments and
prior to returning to the civilian world, Guard and Reserve members are
required to undergo a demobilization process to evaluate each member's
overall health and wellbeing. Oftentimes, mental health issues do not
surface immediately, but rather after the soldier returns to civilian
life. What changes do you plan to make in how these men and women are
evaluated upon return from deployment to better account for their
psychological wellbeing?
Admiral Mullen. It is DOD policy that all returning servicemembers
will receive a Post-Deployment Health Assessment within 30 days of
their return from deployment with the participation of health care
providers. In addition, they should receive a Post-Deployment Health
Reassessment 3 to 6 months following their return. Both of these
assessments have significant portions focusing on the evaluation of
psychological well-being, and both of these assessments are required
for returning Reserve component members.
In addition, DOD is implementing mental health assessments,
described below, which will be required for Guard and Reserve members.
The purpose of the mental health assessment is to identify mental
health conditions including posttraumatic stress disorder, suicidal
tendencies, and other behavioral health conditions that require
referral for additional care and treatment.
On July 19, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (ASD(HA)) issued a policy memorandum to the military
departments to implement the mandatory mental health assessments
following deployment. The Services have requested that the DOD Reserve
Health Readiness Program (RHRP) support their Reserve and Guard
Components by conducting the mental health assessments according to the
HA policy guidance. RHRP has modified its contract to address the
requirement telephonically. RHRP providers will use the DOD mental
health assessment training program and become certified to conduct
mental health assessments for the Reserve components as specified in
the ASD(HA) guidance. The Air Force Reserve component expects to be in
full compliance with the policy no later than April 2011. The other
Service components are currently working with the RHRP to implement the
mandatory mental health assessments in their Reserve components as
quickly as possible.
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE SUICIDE PREVENTION
34. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, DOD appears to be doing a better
job preventing suicides within our Active-Duty Forces than in the past.
At the same time, the suicide rates for National Guard and Reserve
units have increased. Please discuss actions that are being considered
or implemented to help our Guard and Reserve members in this area.
Admiral Mullen. The resilience and suicide prevention programs that
the Services have implemented are also being tailored to fit the unique
needs of the National Guard and Reserve members and their families. The
National Guard in each State has programs that are unique to the state,
which incorporate such approaches as peer support, call centers, or
embedded mental health providers. For Reserve members and their
families who have entered the deployment cycle, the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program provides information and referrals that support
their health and well-being.
DOD also has other tools, such as the online Real Warrior Campaign,
Service-produced video messaging, Military Pathways self-assessment
tools and the National Resource Directory that can enable remote access
to support. This is particularly useful to Reserve component members
and their families since they are dispersed throughout communities
nationwide and not centrally located at an installation.
The following are some examples of ongoing National Guard and
Reserve efforts being made to help members in this area:
The Air National Guard Psychological Health Program
has embedded Wing Directors of Psychological Health (WDPHs) to
provide consultation, information, referral, and case
management for Airmen and their families. WDPHs work with State
Directors of Psychological Health, Joint Family Support
Assistance Program and Military and Family Life Consultants,
serving as consultants to medical personnel conducting pre- and
post-deployment assessments of airmen and provide further
screening, referral and case management as appropriate.
The Army National Guard (ARNG) has distributed
the Resilience and Risk Reduction Campaign Plan, and
the ARNG ``Leader's Guide to Soldier Resilience'' to
State leaders to promote the mental, physical, and
spiritual health of soldiers and families. These guides
complement peer-to-peer support programs, aimed at
building a support network for soldiers in between
traditional drill periods.
The Navy Reserve sponsors a Psychological
Health Outreach Program where counselors provide
education, referrals, and resources to Navy and Marine
Corps reservists and their families, to include those
who may be considered suicide risks. This proactive
outreach to every corner of the country occurs during
the deployment cycle and continues throughout the
reintegration period in a variety of venues.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN
35. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the
President to provide an economic strategy for Afghanistan, one that
supports the counterinsurgency campaign and helps create sustainable
Afghan institutions--but also one that will help the Afghan Government
eventually be able to pay for its own security. When can we expect to
see this strategy, and how important do you believe an economic
strategy is to the success of the overall campaign?
Secretary Gates. An economic strategy will contribute to the
overall success of the civil-military campaign plan by helping USAID
focus its efforts and resources in ways that maximize the effects of
U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. We have participated in discussions,
led by the National Security Staff, on the process by which the report
will be produced. DOS and USAID are part of this process. DOD will
participate in drafting of the report, as directed by the Executive
Office of the President, and will pay particular attention to elements
of economic strategy that support the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign
in Afghanistan, promote economic stabilization, and enhance the
establishment of sustainable institutions. DOD will work, as directed,
to help complete this report as expeditiously as possible, noting the
complexity and difficulty of the task.
Admiral Mullen. An economic strategy is a key element of our whole-
of-government approach to the campaign in Afghanistan in the short and
medium term. Economic development addresses the drivers of instability
in key population areas by providing equitable access to basic
services. A economic strategy is also important to the longer-term
sustainability of the Afghan state by enhancing the government revenue
base and building a robust private sector that underpins job creation,
economic growth and long-term fiscal sustainability.
In a coordinated interagency effort, DOS, USAID, and DOD are
working to develop a U.S. strategy to strengthen Afghanistan's economy.
Other departments and agencies across the U.S. Government, such as the
Department of Treasury, will also be able to provide useful input to
the strategy.
36. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are
likely to be the basic tenets of that economic strategy--the minimum
objectives it should meet in order to complement and support the
overall campaign?
Secretary Gates. DOD plays a supporting role to DOS and USAID in
terms of an economic strategy for Afghanistan. I believe that it is
important, at a minimum, for the economic strategy to address the need
to expand employment opportunities for Afghanistan's bourgeoning
population of young people and increase government revenue, giving hope
that Afghanistan will in the future be able to provide for its own
security with minimum outside assistance.
To reach fiscal sustainability and increase economic growth,
Afghanistan must establish a transparent and accountable regulatory
regime for managing public resources, including those generated by its
natural resource base. The economic strategy should also account for
agricultural growth, which contributes to food security. Finally, an
economic strategy should make the maximum use of the resources that
build towards an economic structure which benefits the majority of
Afghans and does not facilitate the empowerment of a few elites.
Admiral Mullen. While we would defer to DOS and USAID, who have the
real expertise on this area, from DOD view it is important that at a
minimum the economic strategy address the need to provide jobs for
Afghanistan's bourgeoning population of young people. Additionally,
this strategy should chart a way forward that gives hope that
Afghanistan will in the future be able to provide for its own security
with minimum outside assistance to ensure that Afghanistan is never
again a safe haven for extremist to attack the United States. The
strategy should make maximum use of the resources influx we now have to
build towards an economic structure that benefits the majority of
Afghans and does not facilitate the empowerment of exploitive elite.
An economic strategy will be an important element of developing
Afghanistan's long term fiscal sustainability. It will emphasize the
need to move from donor dependency to export-led growth.
37. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, from a DOD
perspective, what should be the further trajectory of engagement and
commitment by the USAID and other elements of the U.S. Government that
provide civilian assistance?
Secretary Gates. The U.S. strategy should take into account both
near-term activities that help stabilize cleared areas, as well as
longer-term considerations that are more typical of traditional
development programs. To that end, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan recently revised the joint civil-military campaign
plan, which spells out the integrated civilian and military efforts
required for our strategy in Afghanistan to succeed. DOS and USAID
contributed additional personnel through the civilian surge, allowing
civilians to partner and share expertise with U.S. military units at
every level of the chain of command, from the national level down to
the district level. I strongly support USAID's continued assistance to
the Afghan Government to build effective governance structures and
effectively deliver services to the Afghan people. Given the importance
of agriculture to the Afghan economy, USAID agricultural experts along
with U.S. Department of Agriculture experts have an important role in
advising Afghans on ways to increase the productivity and income of
Afghan farmers, and in helping to build the capacity of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.
Admiral Mullen. USAID and its civilian partners play a critical
role in Afghanistan, and need more resources to continue to perform the
challenging task of rebuilding Afghanistan. In areas that are more
stable, USAID has demonstrated its value by providing longer-term
economic development projects. We see significant need to preserve and
expand the programs and activities currently undertaken by USAID to
support the stabilization effort, build capacity of the government and
civil society, encourage economic growth, and further the social
development of Afghanistan. As we continue our efforts to develop
Afghanistan's economy, we will consider how best to ensure the unique
capabilities that USAID provides are sustained.
As we begin to thin out our military presence in areas that we
transition to ANSFs, we will rely on our civilian partners to take a
lead role in engaging with Afghan counterparts. The sustainment of
civilian assistance in Afghanistan will be critical to our strategic
partnership with the Afghans, and as Secretary Gates recently observed:
``Economic development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers''.
Note: General Petraeus's testimony on March 15, 2011:
``I am concerned that levels of funding for our DOS and USAID
partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the
hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in
uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners could,
in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. I
offer that assessment, noting that we have just completed a
joint civil-military campaign plan between U.S. Forces
Afghanistan and the U.S. Embassy which emphasizes the critical
integration of civilian and military efforts in an endeavor
such as that in Afghanistan.''
TASK FORCE FOR BUSINESS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
38. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what further
role in Afghanistan do you envisage for the Task Force for Business and
Stability Operations (TFBSO)?
Secretary Gates. TFBSO is an invaluable element of the United
States' comprehensive civil-military effort in Afghanistan. TFBSO's
mission--generating economic growth in conflict areas, specifically in
Afghanistan, including through the mobilization of private investment--
is one that no other part of the U.S. Government is currently able to
perform. I understand the view of some that DOD is not the appropriate
fit for such a mission, but it is important to note that this work is
not currently being carried out by any other U.S. department or agency.
Moreover, senior Afghan officials requested that TFBSO continue its
activities in Afghanistan, and senior U.S. military and civilian
leaders in Afghanistan expressed strong support for TFBSO's activities.
While DOD works to provide options to Congress for the continuation of
TFBSO's mission, I request your support in continuing the TFBSO program
so that it may continue performing its vital role.
Admiral Mullen. The TFBSO has fulfilled an important role in
Afghanistan. There is a large institutional gap in U.S. capability
regarding economic development operations in conflict zones. TFBSO has
demonstrated value to DOD field commanders and U.S. Ambassadors--both
in Iraq and Afghanistan--as filling a vital need for initiating longer-
term economic development projects while the countries are, or were, in
ongoing operations. Specifically, it helps fill the gap between initial
stabilization and longer-term economic development. We see significant
need to preserve the programs and activities currently undertaken by
the TFBSO to support economic stabilization operations in Afghanistan.
As we continue our efforts to develop Afghanistan's economy, we will
consider how best to ensure the unique capabilities the TFBSO provides
are sustained.
39. Senator Udall. Secretary Gates, please share your views on the
requirement in the NDAA to provide a plan for transferring TFBSO's
activities to USAID, whether you would support such a transfer in
fiscal year 2012, and whether you have any concerns regarding the
potential transfer of the TFBSO's activities to USAID.
Secretary Gates. The TFBSO proved to be an invaluable element of
the United States' comprehensive civil-military effort in Afghanistan.
TFBSO's mission--generating economic growth in conflict areas,
specifically in Afghanistan, including through the mobilization of
private investment--is one that no other part of the U.S. Government is
currently able to perform. I understand the view of some that DOD is
not the appropriate fit for such a mission, but it is important to note
that this work is not currently being carried out by any other U.S.
department or agency.
Moreover, senior Afghan officials requested that TFBSO continue its
activities in Afghanistan, and senior U.S. military and civilian
leaders in Afghanistan expressed strong support for TFBSO's activities.
While DOD works to provide options to Congress for the continuation of
TFBSO's mission, I request your support in continuing the TFBSO program
so that it may continue performing its vital role.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
MEDICATION MANAGEMENT
40. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, last week the New York Times
reported on servicemembers that come home from battle caught in a web
of misuse and overuse of prescription drugs--in fact, a young man from
my home State was featured as an example of how the misuse of
medications can lead to disaster. We send our men and women to war on
multiple deployments and give them medications to keep them awake, to
help them sleep, and to help ease the physical and psychological pain
of being in a stressful environment. As a result, many are coming home
broken, not healed. We are finding out that the stories behind many
suicides and unexpected deaths are often complicated by dangerous
cocktails of drugs.
It's been nearly 2 years since the Pentagon was directed in Section
715 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 to study how medications are being
used, and misused, to treat the physical and mental wounds of our
warfighters, and how to decrease the risks to our troops. The study is
now overdue by almost a year. This problem is costing lives and money.
When can we expect to receive this critical study on the management of
medications for physically and psychologically wounded members of the
Armed Forces?
Secretary Gates. I appreciate the sensitivity of this issue and
your concern for a solid prevention strategy. As was indicated in the
interim report, DOD pinpointed certain effective methodologies that
identify dangerous combinations of medications. The scope of this study
is complex and multi-layered, however. It includes both inpatient and
outpatient care at military treatment facilities, service specific
WTUs, community-based WTUs, and private sector care.
Additionally, this protocol must be approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) that oversees the contractor with whom the
Department is engaged in for the study. Likewise, DOD needs approval by
the IRBs of the six multi-Service sites where the contractor would
conduct focus groups and a review of medication practices.
The overall IRB process may take up to a year. At this time, DOD
obtained all of the necessary IRB approvals.
The site visits are scheduled to take place no later than March 31,
2011. These site visits are instrumental in formulating a gap analysis
between current and best practices and in developing policies and
procedures that will carry out the intent of the legislation. DOD
anticipates completion of the final report by November 2011.
Thank you for your continued patience as we develop a comprehensive
report that is thoroughly responsive to the legislative requirements.
41. Senator Manchin. Admiral Mullen, please provide more
information about the growing problem of over-medicating and self-
medicating soldiers and what resources in the fiscal year 2012 budget
are being directed toward this problem.
Admiral Mullen. Increased medication use is a societal problem and
DOD medicine mirrors civilian practice. This problem has been of
increasing concern to Dr. Stanley and me. Our ongoing discussions lead
me to believe that drug abuse represents both a symptom and a problem
that fuels the worsening of other conditions. Senior military leaders
have been aware of the acute need to gain better controls on the
inappropriate use of drugs. However, until recently, we have been
unaware of the hurdles faced by their subordinate commanders and by the
DOD drug testing community. We realize that drug demand reduction
operates within a larger system of readiness and is therefore of great
importance to the Chiefs.
Despite growing concerns among commanders that drug use is a
problem within the ranks, the DOD drug testing programs have remained
at budget flat line for the past several years and are facing an
estimated $11 million shortfall. While the abuse of prescription drugs
has grown substantially since the beginning of the wars, we have only
been capable of testing a fraction of these compounds. Until recently,
the main DOD drug testing program was positioned under the TMA while
its budget was under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Policy (DASD Counternarcotics and Global Threats) within the
Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account. This created a dual loyalty
conflict.
Compared to the 1980s, when highly effective drug testing in the
DOD was first launched, there has been a substantial reduction in
commanders' willingness to take urinalysis positive individuals to
adjudication. This was certainly a concern heard by VCSA Chiarelli
during his visits to installations for a suicide prevention task force
review. Commanders indicated the competing demands of filling ranks for
deployment and removing drug-using troops made random urinalysis
untenable for many. Furthermore, the adjudication process is often long
and is perceived to distract leaders from deployment-specific tasks.
Rising rates of legal narcotics prescriptions without a seamless
capability to quickly verify the prescription means that these actually
cloak the real extent of the problem.
To help alleviate these problems, I recommended that Dr. Stanley
take the following actions:
Subsume the DOD drug testing efforts directly under
Readiness and fully fund the program to the required levels.
Complete the Prescription Drug Verification Portal
(the portal that would allow drug testing labs to instantly
verify narcotics prescriptions in the TRICARE database).
Make drug prosecution statistics part of regular unit
readiness reporting.
Designate several independent drug testing teams
(similar to the approach used by the UK MOD) as mobile units
that can independently obtain specimens at random. This
encourages commanders to remain compliant and introduces a new
variable that is likely to improve deterrence.
Fund the expansion of drug testing to include the most
common prescription drugs of abuse (particularly
benzodiazepines e.g. Valium, this is estimated by the Drug
Demand Reduction Program Office to be a $20 million shortfall).
Preface these changes with an announcement to the
force encouraging drug counseling and treatment 90 days prior
to any launch of a new testing regimen. The objective of the
program should be to drive inappropriate drug use to their
lowest possible levels.
Regularly exchange information between the DOD Drug
Demand Reduction Program and the ongoing suicide prevention
programs and the DOD Joint Pain Task Force.
As previously stated, several of these recommendations have already
been implemented and others are in progress.
In addition to the initiatives above, the Army's new policies and
procedures for identifying and mitigating polypharmacy have reduced the
risk of over-medication and self-medication. These include:
OTSG/MEDCOM Policy 10-076, Guide for Enhancing Patient
Safety and Reducing Risk via the Prevention and Management of
Polypharmacy Involving Psychotropic Medications and Central
Nervous System Depressants: Implementation of this policy has
resulted in improved communication by involving the patient in
the treatment plan. The provider will review medications at
each encounter and refer to a clinical pharmacist for a
comprehensive medication review when the patient is on four or
more medications with at least one a psychotropic or Central
Nervous System depressant.
Revision of MEDCOM Regulation 40-51, Medical Review
Officers and Review of Positive Urinalysis Drug Testing
Results: This revision will limit the authorized use of
controlled substances and clarify the timeframe for determining
legitimate use of controlled substances.
Note: As of the date and time of submission. This response does not
address specific resources included in the fiscal year 2012 budget
request. A revised response will be provided once granularity on this
subject is obtained.
EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES
42. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, I want to applaud your
efforts to, as you've said, ``reform the way the Pentagon does
business--to not only make every defense dollar count, but also to
become a more . . . effective organization.'' The American taxpayers
want us to start making the hard choices--to root out every
inefficiency, cut every bit of waste, and most importantly, change the
culture of endless money.
I am still concerned that we do not have the full audit of DOD.
What are the obstacles preventing this commonsense practice from
occurring, and what can we do to make it happen sooner?
Secretary Gates. DOD's massive size and complexity make it
extremely difficult to achieve full auditability. In addition, DOD
financial processes were established and ingrained in systems long ago.
These processes and systems were designed for budgetary accounting--not
proprietary or commercial accounting called for in the Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act. To meet the commercial accounting standards called
for in the CFO Act, there is a substantial amount of work to be done,
including efforts to address the most difficult challenges:
DOD systems are not integrated--breaking the audit
trail
Systems do not collect data at the transaction level
Many diverse functional organizations must work
together in end-to-end processes
Earlier focus was on information of limited value to
management and was not supported throughout DOD
Meeting these challenges and improving DOD's business processes
receive more attention than ever before. DOD is addressing them by
changing the way it does business. To realize success, DOD is using a
streamlined approach that focuses on improving and auditing the
information we most use to manage. Improving the budgetary and mission
critical asset information used to manage the DOD will allow commanders
and other leaders to better meet mission needs with available
resources. I believe this alignment of operational and financial
objectives is the most effective incentive to improve financial
management.
DOD also established long- and short-term goals, set up a
governance process, and provided funding to the Military Services to
make process and system improvements. These system improvements,
primarily made by deploying Enterprise Resource Planning Systems
(ERPS), have broad operational improvement goals which include
improving business processes in a way to support audited financial
statements. DOD also implemented other effective measures such as
including audit related actions and objectives in Senior Executive
performance plans. Preparing DOD for financial statement audits is a
monumental task, but with leadership focus, accountability, and our
streamlined approach, I believe it can succeed. With this streamlined
approach I believe that DOD can achieve its goal of meeting this
objective by 2017.
CHINA
43. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, during the next 5 to 10
years, how do you see the defense budget changing as a result of
China's predicted rise as a worldwide provider of strategic minerals,
consumer goods, and weapons?
Secretary Gates. The rise of China as a regional political,
economic, and military power with global ambitions is one of the
defining elements of the international strategic and security
environment.
The primary focus of China's military modernization appears to
remain on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. However,
China's military is also exploring missions beyond Taiwan. DOD is
watching carefully, for example, China's development and acquisition of
weapon systems and capabilities that would classify as intended for
anti-access and area denial missions. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review examined operating in an anti-access/area denial environment and
recommended that the United States pursue effective, affordable, and
sustainable U.S. defense posture based on a broad portfolio of military
capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible
spectrum of conflict.
The President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2012 includes $113
billion for DOD to procure the capabilities needed to protect the
United States and its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Included in
this amount are funds to invest in new programs, as well as
modernization efforts for existing equipment. Two specific items of
note are investments in a new bomber for the Air Force and five
additional ships for the Navy.
These investments will enable the United States to sustain our
forward presence in the Western Pacific and to operate in contested
areas in the future.
44. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gates, what does DOD now spend on
goods from China?
Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2010, the DOD purchased a total of
$123,560 in unspecified miscellaneous commercial, industrial, and
professional goods and services directly from Chinese industry. DOD
expects to issue its annual report to Congress on purchases from
foreign entities shortly, presenting in greater detail DOD purchase of
goods and services from all foreign countries, including China.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
AFGHANISTAN
45. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, in December 2010 President
Obama, while discussing the results of his Afghanistan-Pakistan review
policy, said ``the United States is on track to achieve its goals in
the war against terrorism against al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region.'' The review also stated ``as a result of our integrated
efforts in 2010, we are setting the conditions . . . to begin a
responsible, conditions-based U.S. troop reduction in July 2011.'' Now
that we are about 135 days away from that July 2011 objective, how many
troops do you think conditions on the ground will allow us to bring
home this year?
Secretary Gates. General Petraeus will provide options and make a
recommendation for the drawdown of U.S. surge forces in the coming
months. This timing will allow him to take into account important on-
the-ground considerations, including progress in provinces and
districts that are being transitioned to Afghan-security lead. This
analytical process will allow the time needed to provide the President
the best information to inform his ultimate decision on this matter.
Until that time, it is too early to say how many U.S. forces will
redeploy.
46. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, you have budgeted in
fiscal year 2012 for 98,000 troops in Afghanistan--the same force level
you have today. I understand that you wish to leave yourself wiggle
room in case conditions on the ground do not permit a timely
withdrawal, but the American people want to see execution of the
promise to begin withdrawal this summer. At some point we need to
reduce our troop presence and turn security over to the Afghan security
forces. Why could you not have assumed a lower number of troops in
building your fiscal year 2012 budget?
Secretary Gates. There is every indication that conditions will
permit the United States to begin withdrawing forces in July 2011.
General Petraeus will provide options and make a recommendation for the
commencement of the drawdown of U.S. surge forces. General Petraeus may
also recommend, as the transition process continues and the
responsibility for security in selected regions is transitioned to
Afghan security forces, that some U.S. forces be reinvested in other
areas.
DOD's budget request is driven by numerous factors, including
assumptions that may need to be reassessed as conditions evolve in a
dynamic environment. General Petraeus and I continue to assess the
conditions on the ground so that we may provide options and a
recommendation to the President, but I believe that it is premature to
attempt to forecast a budget based on lower U.S. force levels at this
point in time.
47. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, as I assess the situation,
it seems that 135 days out you are still not confident about conditions
on the ground. When will you be confident?
Secretary Gates. I am confident that we are making steady progress
on the ground. I recently returned from my 13th trip to Afghanistan as
Secretary of Defense and the progress made by our forces exceeds my
expectations.
The President and I trust the judgment of General Petraeus, who
will provide us options and make a recommendation in the coming months
for the commencement of the drawdown of U.S. surge forces in July 2011.
48. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, if your assumptions are
ultimately too high, where will the extra funding go?
Secretary Gates. I will consult with Congress to determine the best
course of action.
49. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, are you planning a similar
model in Afghanistan that we executed in Iraq--changing composition of
the forces deployed in Afghanistan, over time, to an ``advise and
assist mission'' in support of Afghan forces?
Secretary Gates. The short answer is yes. As the United States
moves toward transferring lead responsibility for security to the
Afghan security forces in 2014, I expect to continue to conduct
training, advising, and assisting activities and joint counterterrorism
operations, at the request of the Government of Afghanistan, to help
secure U.S. and Afghan mutual national interests. This is particularly
helpful in ensuring that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven from
which terrorists attack the United States. An enduring strategic
partnership with Afghanistan is important to demonstrate to the Afghans
and others in the region that the United States is committed to this
goal.
50. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, how much of that progress
do you expect to accomplish in fiscal year 2012?
Secretary Gates. The situation in Afghanistan is very fluid.
Progress is significant but still fragile and reversible. Based upon
the progress in recent months, however, I am increasingly confident
that alongside our Afghan and international partners, and with
Congressional support, the United States will continue to solidify
security gains and transition lead responsibility for security for
additional geographic areas to Afghan security forces throughout fiscal
year 2012. Concurrently, Afghan security forces will continue to
develop their fighting and support capabilities. I believe that our
strategic partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, including our
willingness to train, advise, assist, and equip the ANSF, and to carry
out joint counterterrorism operations through 2014 and beyond, will
change the strategic calculus of the Taliban and other actors. Combined
with our relentless pursuit of mid-level Taliban commanders, the
increasing competency and professionalism of ANSF will encourage
greater numbers of fighters to reconcile with the Government of
Afghanistan and reintegrate into Afghan society.
51. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the recently published
National Military Strategy (NMS) you stated ``we must continue to
support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches . . . military power
complements economic development, governance, and the rule of law.''
Yet you just said that improvements in Afghanistan's governance and
reconstruction have not kept pace with improving security. Given the
Karzai Government's extensive corruption, including the looming
collapse of the Kabul Bank that pays Afghan military salaries, how do
you hope to sustain the erosion of al Qaeda and the Taliban's support
among the Afghan people no matter what successes our troops obtain?
Admiral Mullen. We will sustain the erosion of al Qaeda and the
Taliban's support among the people by capitalizing on our successes and
momentum gained through the winter 2010 campaign. The new Civilian-
Military Campaign Plan is closely aligned with the Government of
Afghanistan's National Development Strategy and the Joint Afghan NATO
Inteqal Board (JANIB) transition plan. Our objectives are oriented
towards the goals of the Lisbon Conference and transitioning the lead
for security to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. There is a
greater emphasis on interagency coordination and support to our
civilian partners on provincial and district governance, trade,
transportation, infrastructure; counter-narcotics programs; customs and
border-capacity development and sustainable private-sector development.
There will be an emphasis on civilian and diplomatic efforts throughout
transition but we now have the right inputs to make the strategy
successful.
52. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, when I traveled to
Afghanistan and Pakistan a few months ago I heard repeatedly from our
commanders on the ground that our mission in Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to Pakistan's harboring of al Qaeda, Taliban, and
aligned organizations. U.S.-Pakistani relations have chafed greatly
over the past year. How are we going to execute a redeployment strategy
in Afghanistan if Pakistan does not go after the insurgency within its
borders?
Admiral Mullen. Our commanders on the ground accurately
characterize the inextricable linkage of security and counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Peace in the region, and our
mission success, depend on securing populations and denying safe havens
for terrorist groups on both sides of the border. Given the difficult
terrain and sophisticated threats in the border area, observers not in
contact with the Pakistan military may conclude that they are not
pursuing insurgents on their side of the border.
The situation on the ground in Pakistan is complex. The Pakistan
military has made unprecedented progress over the past 2 years in clear
and hold operations against militants in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In the course of those
operations, they have lost roughly 3,000 dead and 8,000 wounded among
security forces fighting militants, with thousands of civilian
casualties as well. While it is true that the Pakistan military has not
gone after Afghanistan-focused insurgents to the same degree it has
taken on those groups targeting their own government this is a function
both of Pakistan's perceptions about the specific threats and the
capabilities of the Pakistan military, which are already stretched by
the need to continue holding areas previously cleared.
Although our bilateral relations with Pakistan have had difficult
moments in the past year, there have also been noteworthy positive
developments such as cooperation between our forces in flood relief
operations and the development of more formal, robust defense planning
ties and security assistance. We have also greatly improved operational
cooperation between our forces in the border regions, reducing safe
havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
DOD continues to plan force level reductions in Afghanistan based
on the increasing capabilities of ANSFs and conditions on the ground.
As our cooperation and coordination with Pakistan in the border area
grows and develops, the greater the conditions will be to secure the
population.
TERRORISM
53. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the NMS it states ``the
intersection between states, state sponsored, and non-state adversaries
is most dangerous in the area of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and nuclear terrorism.'' And then it goes on to say ``the
prospect of multiple nuclear armed regimes in the Middle East with
nascent security and command and control mechanisms amplifies the
threat of conflict, and significantly increases the probability of
miscalculation or the loss of control of a nuclear weapon to non-state
actors.'' How confident are you that al Qaeda or associated insurgent
groups could not acquire or steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials
from Pakistan, that they could in turn use in a nuclear September 11
scenario?
Admiral Mullen. The prospect of unsecure nuclear weapons or
materials, and their acquisition and use by al Qaeda or an affiliate,
is a serious threat that DOD addresses in the NMS as well as in our
operational planning efforts. This scenario presents a formidable
challenge for developing prevention and response strategies; however,
as preventing nuclear-armed terrorism is a top presidential priority,
we have a number of initiatives in place to broadly address this
threat.
With regard to Pakistan specifically, as the Secretary has said
before, we are confident in the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
54. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, how are the growing U.S.-
Pakistan tensions impacting our ability to protect against that
scenario?
Admiral Mullen. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has endured periods
of tension as well as periods of cooperative growth in recent years.
While street protests and negative media coverage frequently complicate
our work in Pakistan, they do not prevent the cooperative efforts that
we and our Pakistan military counterparts see as critical to mutual
security. Compared to 10 years ago, when bilateral relations were
nearly frozen due to sanctions we have far more robust mechanisms for
cooperation and dialogue today. The bilateral relationship reflects a
slow, difficult process of deepening trust and cooperation. Full
transparency may require years to develop. Progress depends on our
ability to identify and build upon areas of mutual concern and mutual
interest; those areas become a platform for effectively preventing
worst case scenarios from materializing in Pakistan.
55. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, I am very concerned about
the growing risk of Yemen's collapse, given the recent protests, the
historical conflicts within and across Yemen's boundaries, and the
country's dire poverty. A year ago, a bomb attempt conceived in Yemen
threatened our Homeland. Last year I asked Secretary Gates why we ought
to focus so many resources on Afghanistan when we face a similar threat
of an unstable state with Al Qaeda or related elements in Yemen. We
seem to be addressing Yemen with a target counter-terrorism mission,
rather than a larger counterinsurgency footprint as in Afghanistan.
Please explain the strategic difference. Which do you think is more
effective?
Admiral Mullen. The largest difference between our strategies in
these two countries lies in the scope and scale of our efforts. Unique
threat contexts in each of these countries have shaped our responses.
We invaded Afghanistan to fight the Islamist Taliban militia and its
terrorist affiliate, al Qaeda, who held control of most of the country.
Our efforts in Yemen, on the other hand, are limited to the cooperative
counter-terrorism assistance we can provide that respects Yemen's
sovereignty. While the scale and scope of the threat is larger in
Afghanistan, our significant military presence allows us to conduct
full-scale military operations. We do not have that liberty in Yemen,
because we cannot operate within the country without Yemeni permission.
Instead, the U.S. military seeks to build Yemeni counter-terrorism
capacity. We have a viable threat in Yemen, and the growing instability
there may allow for greater terrorist activity, but our ability to
combat AQAP is confined to our cooperative arrangements with the
Yemenis. Both our counter-insurgency and counter-terror strategies can
be effective depending on how and where they are applied. In each of
these countries, we are working within our resource and legal
constraints to develop comprehensive approaches to ending terrorism.
Counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan are engaging with communities
to target enemy insurgents while improving security. In Yemen, we are
training counter-terrorism forces while pursuing a range of development
initiatives to reduce the systemic causes of terrorist recruitment.
CYBERSPACE
56. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, the NMS states, ``the
United States faces persistent, widespread, and growing threats from
state and non-state actors in space and cyberspace. Should a large-
scale cyber intrusion or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must
provide a broad range of options to ensure our access and use of the
cyberspace domain and hold malicious actors accountable. We must seek
executive and congressional action to provide new authorities to enable
effective action in cyberspace''. What are the specific authorities you
need to support cyberspace operations?
Admiral Mullen. Foremost, we need to clearly specify the military's
functions and authorities with respect to both offensive and defensive
activities in cyberspace, both to protect DOD networks and in support
of broader national security interests. In the past, network protection
was reactive, limited to implementing ``fixes'' to network
vulnerabilities that had already been exploited by threat actors. Such
a posture is insufficient and cannot be characterized as a effective
``defense'' in a domain where offensive action has clear advantage. In
cyberspace, static defenses are quickly subverted, overwhelmed, and
defeated. DOD is developing a dynamic, agile, active, and informed
defensive capability. I am confident that this approach will result in
more secure, hardened, and resilient DOD networks. Extending similar
capability to the Nation's critical infrastructure and government
functions, as called for in the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative, will require an integrated whole-of-government approach.
57. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, in the strategy you state
that the United States faces growing threats from state and non-state
actors in cyberspace. Are you saying that you are seeing evidence of
terrorist groups gaining the capability of launching a cyber attack or
simply using the Internet for recruitment, motivation, or fundraising?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. Al Qaeda and associated Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEOs) aggressively use the Internet to disseminate their
ideology and propaganda; to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize new
members; to coordinate operations; and, to generate and distribute
funds. A VEO's ability to exploit the Internet complicates our
military's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while posing challenges to
our domestic law enforcement and Homeland Security initiatives.
Additionally, I am concerned that these VEOs may eventually acquire and
use sophisticated cyber tools developed by nation-states, criminal
organizations, or disaffected cyber specialists whom they may recruit.
If this occurs, the U.S. Government will not have the luxury of time
and distance to separate ourselves from the adversary.
58. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mullen, the fiscal year 2012 budget
requests have $2.3 billion for cyber security. Can you explain the
components of that number and how it compares to the last 3 years?
Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2012 budget request for cyber
security of $2.32 billion is made up of core information assurance (IA)
activities [$2.00 billion], the cyber security/DIB initiative [$0.20
billion], and Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) headquarters operations [$0.12
billion] programs. The core IA program includes the following program
elements: Public Key Infrastructure, Key Management Initiative, and
Information System Security Program. DOD must protect and defend
information, information-based processes, and information systems on
the Global Information Grid at all security levels to meet its
strategic goals.
The Department is also working to identify and mature the
capabilities required to support cyber operations and the stand-up of
CYBERCOM. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for cyber
security continues to address computer network defense; cyber identity
and access management; engineering and deployment controls;
cryptographic key production and management; cross domain capabilities;
workforce development; and operational resiliency. The fiscal year 2012
request also initiates the design and construction of a Joint
Operations Center for CYBERCOM; adds resources to monitor and secure
classified networks and information; increases manpower to assess cyber
threats and develop countermeasures; sustains cyber schoolhouses; and
supports evolution of DIB cyber security activities.
The enacted fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 budgets for cyber
security were for $2.32 billion and $2.35 billion, respectively. The
fiscal year 2011 budget request was for $2.50 billion. Cost reductions
in fiscal year 2012 are due to operational changes to include the
removal of initial/one-time facility and equipment costs for
establishing CYBERCOM at Fort Meade in fiscal year 2011, and cyber
security funding transfers into DISA's Working Capital Fund.
HOMELAND DEFENSE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS
59. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gates, the NMS states that ``we
will continue to dedicate, fund, and train a portion of the National
Guard for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities.
Working with Canada and Mexico, we will remain prepared to deter and
defeat direct threats to our North American homeland.'' What is your
assessment of the terrorist infiltration threat along our northern
border and what specific steps are you taking to counter it?
Secretary Gates. This question is best answered by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for preventing
terrorist attacks within the United States (6 U.S.C. Sec. &A(b)(1)(A));
preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism
into the United States (6 U.S.C. Sec. 202(1)); and securing the
borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air,
land, and sea transportation systems of the United States (6 U.S.C.
Sec. 202(2)).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
60. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, U.S. troops
are currently deployed with ISFs and Kurdish peshmerga fighters along
the disputed internal boundaries between Arab and Kurdish communities.
These ``Combined Security Mechanisms'' are easing tensions between
Arabs and Kurds, while contributing to the integration of peshmerga
units into the ISFs. How risky and potentially dangerous is it for
these peacekeeping mechanisms to go away at the end of this year, as
they must under the current security agreement?
Secretary Gates. The U.S. Government continues to implement the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement fully, including completing the drawdown
of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As part of the drawdown,
U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is taking steps to mitigate the potential for
conflict by building confidence at the local, provincial, and national
levels between security forces and political leaders. USF-I is also
working closely with DOS to transition the U.S. military's role as a
mediator and honest broker in northern Iraq to the post-2011 civilian-
led mission.
The Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) consists of a series of
trilateral (U.S. military, ISF, and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF))
coordination centers and checkpoints to facilitate confidence-building
and coordination at the local and national levels in areas of northern
Iraq with Disputed Internal Boundaries. At the same time, Prime
Minister Maliki's 2009 designation of some KSF units as ``Regional
Guard Brigades'' allowed USF-I to advise, train, and assist these
forces so that they are able to integrate into the ISF. USF-I developed
drawdown plans for ending U.S. participation in the CSMs by engaging
with Iraqi and Kurdish military leaders to transition this trilateral
mechanism to a bilateral forum. ISF and KSF modernization efforts also
increased stability, improved communication, and built confidence among
leaders in DIBs areas. These efforts will mitigate the impact of U.S.
forces' drawdown from the CSMs.
DOS plans to establish temporary Embassy Branch Offices in the DIBs
to address local and provincial ethno-sectarian tensions. Even so,
DOS's ability to successfully lead the mediator and honest broker
missions in northern Iraq depends on full funding of its fiscal year
2012 budget request. Without full funding, the achievement of the U.S.
goal to facilitate peaceful, political processes for resolving
outstanding issues in northern Iraq is at risk.
Admiral Mullen. Unresolved Arab-Kurd issues, including the
resolution of Article 140, agreement on a hydrocarbon law, revenue
sharing, and the status of Kirkuk, remain a primary concern. Tensions
are elevated within disputed areas and will remain so until these
issues are resolved. Dialogue among Arab and Kurdish leaders with
international mediation has been helpful but it is highly unlikely
issues will be resolved before U.S. military forces leave Iraq at the
end of the year.
In the short term, the Combined Security Mechanism is an effective
stop gap until these broader issues are resolved and provides a
confidence building measure between the Government of Iraq and the
Kurdish Regional Government. In coordination with the State Department,
we have developed plans to mitigate the risk of U.S. forces leaving the
disputed areas at the end of the year by significantly increasing our
diplomatic presence in the north. We believe this increased diplomatic
presence, if fully funded, will help address Arab-Kurd tensions. The
risk of violent confrontation will increase without an adequately
resourced replacement for the current U.S. military presence.
61. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, please
explain what comparable civilian arrangement will take over the
peacekeeping role now played by U.S. troops operating along the Arab-
Kurd fault lines in Iraq.
Secretary Gates. DOS's plan for its 2012 civilian-led mission
prioritizes engagement in northern Iraqi areas with Disputed Internal
Boundaries by providing for the establishment of Embassy Branch Offices
(EBOs) in Ninewa and Kirkuk Provinces. The EBOs will be staffed by
diplomats, development specialists, and representatives from other U.S.
agencies, such as the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and
Treasury, in order to bring a whole-of-government approach to conflict
prevention and peace building in northern Iraq. The location of the
EBOs along the Arab-Kurd ethnic fault line reflects the concern that
Arab-Kurd tensions remain a leading source of instability in Iraq.
DOS's ability to play a mediating and honest broker role in northern
Iraq depends on full funding of its fiscal year 2012 budget request.
Admiral Mullen. As part of the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq, we
have planned for and are actively transitioning enduring programs to
the State Department and the Government of Iraq. This includes the U.S.
role in the trilateral security relationship we share with the ISF and
the Peshmerga along Arab-Kurd fault lines. While different from the
military's current role, the State Department will utilize the
diplomatic tools inherent to its capabilities in mitigating tensions
between Arabs and Kurds. I am concerned the State Department will
assume increased risk in this very important role if their funding is
further decreased.
IRANIAN INTENT
62. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you agree that the
highest priority of the Iranian government during this year is to
prevent any changes to the security agreement with Iraq so as to ensure
that no U.S. troops will remain in Iraq by January 1, 2012?
Secretary Gates. Iran would almost certainly oppose a continued
U.S. troop presence after 2011. I remain troubled by Iran's continued
support to, and training of, militant groups that target both Iraqi and
U.S. personnel. The United States encourages Iran to maintain
constructive and peaceful relations with its neighbor Iraq, with which
it shares a long history of cultural, religious, and economic ties.
Iran can be a better neighbor by respecting Iraqi sovereignty, and by
ending its support to those who support terrorism in Iraq.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION
63. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in their proposal to fund the
remainder of fiscal year 2011, House appropriators cut $300 million
from the President's request for nuclear weapons modernization. Do you
agree that it is critical that Congress fund the $624 million increase
in fiscal year 2011 and that a long-term commitment to the funding
proposal set forth in connection to the New START treaty, commonly
referred to as the 1251 report, is of the upmost importance to national
security and the viability of our nuclear deterrent?
Secretary Gates. Yes, it is critical that Congress fund the entire
$624 million fiscal year 2011 increase for the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) and sustain the long-term funding
requirements as laid out in the 1251 Report to Congress, which serves
as a roadmap to implementing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and New
START treaty. The treaty is buttressed by credible modernization plans
and long-term funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the
infrastructure that supports it. This administration proposes
significant investments over the next decade to rebuild and sustain
America's aging nuclear infrastructure--especially the national labs,
and the science, technology, and engineering base. This funding not
only begins with a commitment to the long overdue modernization of the
nuclear weapons infrastructure, it continues ongoing activities and
starts the studies necessary to sustain and life-extend the nuclear
deterrent so it remains in a safe, secure, and effective status. In
addition, the funding augments NNSA activities required to sustain the
personnel with key critical skills to continue to sustain our nuclear
arsenal.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
64. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while the fiscal year 2012
budget includes a $200 million increase over the President's fiscal
year 2011 level, overall FYDP funding is cut by $2.6 billion. Given the
President's commitment to missile defense as reaffirmed during our
debate on the New START treaty just a few months ago, how does DOD
justify significant out-year decreases for missile defense?
Secretary Gates. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget for 2011
through 2015 is based on the missile defense priorities set forth in
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The MDA budget strategy in
fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced personnel,
budgetary and management resources within and across its components. In
instituting efficiency initiatives, the MDA will make greater use of
competition across its acquisition programs and realize savings through
a refined approach to contracting for services.
EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION FOR SPACE EFFICIENCY INITIATIVE
65. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while I appreciate the stated
goals of the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency initiative
for procuring satellite systems, I remained concerned with the overall
track record of cost overruns and schedule delays for space systems.
Does DOD intend to follow the requirements set forth by this committee
on multiyear procurements, to include:
A certification that the use of such a contract will
result in substantial savings;
That the minimum need for the property to be purchased
is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the
contemplated contract period;
That the head of the agency will request funding for
the contract at the level required to avoid contract
cancellation;
That there is a stable design for the property to be
acquired and that the technical risks associated with such
property are not excessive; and
That the estimates of both the cost of the contract
and that anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a
multiyear contract are realistic.
Secretary Gates. The DOD discussed the multiyear procurement
provisions at length with the White House and congressional staffs. As
a result of these discussions, DOD determined that multiyear
procurement authorization is not required for this space system.
Therefore, the model DOD is implementing is not multiyear procurement.
The Air Force is procuring two satellites in a block in a single year.
However, full funding for both satellites in a single year is just not
practically achievable in today's budget environment.
I share your concern with the past performance of space programs. I
am bringing the block buy approach forward to address specific root
causes of some of those difficulties. The stability that comes with
buying in quantity, even in quantities of two, will help the prime
contractors, subcontractors, and parts and supplies vendors. These
satellites have thousands of often sophisticated components, tens of
thousands of complex integrated circuits, and many dozens of unique
designs only found in U.S. factories. The people who design and
manufacture these parts and subparts are highly talented but small in
number, and DOD wants to keep them working for its needs. Further, the
government will realize lower unit costs by buying in quantity and by
minimizing production line stops and restarts.
66. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in pursing this contracting
strategy, what sort of accountability does DOD intend to place on the
prime contractor of these satellite systems?
Secretary Gates. The best approach for accountability under the
acquisition strategy for the AEHF communications satellites is the
fixed-price, incentive fee contract. Government liability is
constrained if the contractor experiences problems directly related to
contractor responsibilities within the scope of the contract. Contract
penalties for unmet milestones or premature failure in on-orbit
performance will also apply. Along with these provisions, DOD plans to
bring improved industrial base stability that should help avoid some of
the conditions that contributed to past cost overruns.
In addition, designating block buys as subprograms will provide
congressional insight into actual space vehicle block costs. The
resulting visibility ensures Air Force and DOD accountability for the
costs and funding requirements to which they committed at the block
Milestone Decision.
67. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you share my concern about
using these sorts of contracts for these sorts of programs?
Secretary Gates. While I share your general concern regarding
accountability and space acquisition management in particular, I think
there is merit to the block buy approach for AEHF. The AEHF satellite
program, the first program with which DOD seeks to implement this
approach, is now a well-defined acquisition program with plenty of
execution data around which to design a stable production program. The
operational requirements are well validated; all derived system-level
specifications are clear; and the experienced government/contractor
team is in place. Additionally, one satellite has launched, one is in
storage awaiting launch, and two more are in various stages of
production. I anticipate the block buy of satellites 5 and 6 to be a
smooth continuation of the production line. To support these
contracting efforts, DOD is implementing ``should cost'' analyses to
gain a much more detailed and thorough understanding of the cost
structure for AEHF and other space programs. I believe maturity and
stability lend well to a fixed-price contracting strategy.
68. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you intend to ensure
that these types of contracts are used appropriately and judiciously
for these programs?
Secretary Gates. DOD put a great deal of thought into this overall
approach to include the contracting strategy, focusing on mature
programs that have reached the production phases of their life cycles.
Because development is complete, I do not expect unplanned design or
manufacturing changes. However, an important element of this approach
is sound obsolescence management. The contractor team will have an on-
going effort to identify components set to be discontinued or
superseded. As they identify these parts, their engineers can make
smart adaptations to the assembly or test before the update affects the
production flow. On our end, DOD is ensuring the performance
requirements levied upon these systems do not change, which is critical
over the duration of the block build. In summary, these conditions go
hand-in-hand with a fixed-price contracting approach.
NUCLEAR TRIAD MODERNIZATION
69. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when released last year, the
NPR set forth a broad vision that must not be viewed outside of the
realm of affordability. The cost alone for modernizing both the nuclear
weapons complex and the triad are substantial, and as we move to reduce
the size of our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes
all the more important. Factoring in the cost of missile defense and
prompt global strike--both essential and critical, but also costly,
programs--the overall budget outlook seems to suggest steady increases
for the foreseeable future. The same defense budget which you recently
stated will experience at most long-term growth of 1 percent a year
after inflation. What is the near-term and long-term affordability of
implementing the NPR?
Secretary Gates. The 2010 NPR concluded that a Triad of strategic
forces best maintains strategic stability at reasonable cost, while
hedging against potential technical problems or geopolitical surprise.
The 10-year estimate for sustaining the nuclear deterrent
(approximately $214 billion) was identified in the fiscal year 2012
Annual Update to the report pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010. These costs are larger than the planned overall
growth of 1 percent per year after inflation. This results from the
need to begin the activities necessary to replace or sustain all three
legs of our nuclear Triad over the next 2 to 3 decades. This cost
projection is considered essential to maintaining our nuclear deterrent
and is in accordance with the NPR.
DOD will continue to assess the force size required for an
effective deterrent. While we work to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective arsenal, a wide range of efficiency measures also are being
explored, including a research and development program, which was noted
in the NPR. This program was initiated to focus on commonality between
the military departments' requirements and joint, scalable flight-test
demonstrations. DOD is committed to sustaining and modernizing the
Triad in an efficient and cost-effective manner while maintaining
strategic stability and deterrent capability.
70. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 budget
provides funding for a next generation long-range bomber and the next
generation ballistic missile submarine; however, little has been said
about the next generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
which is needed by 2030. When does DOD intend to provide details on the
funding requirements and timeline for the development, production, and
deployment of a new ICBM?
Secretary Gates. The administration plans to sustain the Minuteman
III ICBM through 2030, as required by section 139 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007. Sustainment programs include ICBM Fuze Refurbishment
for the Mk12A and Mk21 reentry vehicles, Joint Fuze Development on the
Mk21 and Mk12A replacement, the ICBM Cryptography Upgrade II for
nuclear surety, the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle program, the
Propulsion System Rocket Engine Refurbishment Life Extension Program,
the Environmental Control System Replacement Program, the ICBM Security
Modernization Program, and the Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network Program Upgrade. Other sustainment programs may
be necessary, and weapon system requirements are being reviewed to
ensure the viability of the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030.
The preparatory analysis for a follow-on ICBM capability fielded in
the 2030 timeframe began in 2011. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will assess potential materiel
solutions including sustaining the current Minuteman III ICBM weapon
system and supporting infrastructure. During the GBSD AoA review,
concepts will be evaluated for effectiveness, cost, schedule, concepts
of operations, and overall risk in meeting operational requirements.
DOD will recommend a specific way-ahead to the budget for an ICBM
follow-on in fiscal year 2014.
71. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what about a replacement
nuclear capable air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)?
Secretary Gates. The ALCM will be maintained in the inventory until
the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile capability is fielded. The ALCM
will undergo multiple service life-extension programs to ensure the
viability of the propulsion systems, guidance and flight control
systems, and warhead arming components. DOD intends to field an
advanced penetrating LRSO missile to replace the ALCM, and the Air
Force has programmed $0.9 billion for research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) over the next 5 years for the development of the
LRSO.
72. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when should budgets begin to
reflect the steady increases suggested in the NPR?
Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2012, DOD will begin to see more
substantial progress with NPR-driven modernization recommendations.
These include:
(1) Investments in research, development, and test and evaluation
of Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities;
(2) Construction of the Navy's West Coast Explosive Handling Wharf
to ensure safe missile and warhead off/on loading operations and
maintenance for Pacific SSBN operations; and
(3) The Air Force initiation, as directed, of a program for a new
long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber.
The President's fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets
include funding of NPR initiatives. The February 2011 update to the
report submitted pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2010 provides a summary of spending for delivery systems and weapon-
related activities of the NNSA, which total approximately $214 billion
from fiscal year 2012-fiscal year 2021.
73. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the implications for
the strategic deterrent if we don't modernize the triad or find we
cannot afford to?
Secretary Gates. The United States will sustain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. The NPR
calls for making investments in nuclear delivery systems to ensure that
existing capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades
and modifications. Such investments, and the NPR's strategy for
continued delivery system capability, represent a credible
modernization plan necessary to sustain and support our Nation's
deterrent.
2005 BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
74. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as you may know, DOD is
required by law to complete base realignment and closure (BRAC)
resulting from the 2005 BRAC round by September 15, 2011. Is DOD on
track to meet this deadline? If not, why not?
Secretary Gates. While the Department faces scheduling challenges
in a few cases, it is working diligently to ensure we satisfy our BRAC
legal obligations.
75. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in meeting the deadline, will
you have construction completed on all facilities and infrastructure
directly and indirectly required to support the BRAC moves?
Secretary Gates. There are a limited number of direct and indirect
infrastructure projects on which some elements of construction will
continue after September 15. The Department is working diligently to
ensure it satisfies the BRAC legal obligations, even if some
construction continues past the deadline.
76. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the costs incurred by
DOD to complete all 2005 BRAC actions and any unobligated balances you
may have?
Secretary Gates. The overall cost to implement BRAC 2005 is $35.1
billion. I do not anticipate that the Department will have any
significant unobligated balances at the end of the BRAC 2005
implementation period.
77. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, should DOD
conduct another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure? If so,
when should DOD conduct the next round?
Secretary Gates. DOD is not currently seeking authority to
undertake another round of closures and realignments under the Defense
BRAC Act of 1990, as amended. The Department is currently focused on
completing implementation of the 2005 BRAC round.
STATUS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE
78. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, at the NATO Munich Security
Conference that I attended last month, it was clear that the intent for
European members of the alliance is to address fiscal constraints by
slashing their defense budgets, ending drafts, sharing resources, and
increasing their reliance on American military capabilities. How are
you addressing concerns the changes could burden the United States by
reducing the number of European troops available for NATO missions and
other military efforts around the world?
Secretary Gates. Over the past 10 years, most European Allies
increased their deployable and sustainable forces and capabilities, in
spite of steady declines in defense spending. They accomplished this by
reducing the size of forces designed primarily for territorial defense,
and by investing in more capable expeditionary forces. But there are
obviously limits to how long those Allies can rely on reinvesting the
savings from force structure reductions to sustain this type of
transformation. I am now generally urging senior European Ally
officials to avoid reducing force structure as they consider decisions
about how to allocate scarce defense resources, and instead to seek
efficiencies through multinational cooperation and sharing resources.
Most European Allies have told me that they are not planning to make
defense cuts that will affect current operational commitments. Of
course, the realities of the fiscal crisis in Europe and the required
reductions in defense spending are such that preserving force structure
and sustaining the current high operating tempo will probably result in
less investment in future capabilities. As a result, I intend to ask my
Defense counterparts to commit to increasing defense investment once
their military operating tempo decreases after the successful
transition of security responsibility to the Afghan Government.
I do not believe that Europe has descended into an irreversible
fiscal crisis. At their next meeting in March, NATO Defense Ministers
will be asked to agree to Political Guidance for Allied defense
planners. This planning guidance looks forward 10 years. I intend to
push hard for no decrease in NATO's level of ambition, continued
increases in the deployability and sustainability of NATO forces, and a
long-term recommitment to the benchmarks of 2 percent GDP devoted to
defense spending and 20 percent of defense expenditures allocated to
investment in future capabilities.
79. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how is the dynamic nature of
fiscal decisions by members of the alliance affecting U.S. military
planning?
Secretary Gates. DOD must consider the availability and capability
of NATO forces in its planning process. DOD always seeks to mitigate
the risks of assumptions in its contingency plans (including
assumptions about partner participation) by developing multiple options
for plan execution. DOD is also engaged in regular bilateral dialogue
with our Allies (particularly with the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia), and in multilateral discussions to clarify planning
assumptions.
The NATO Alliance has a particularly well-developed defense
planning process to assist Allies in identifying NATO needs. This
process is focused not only on ensuring that Allied military forces
prevail in current operations, but also on ensuring that NATO can
implement the November 2010 Strategic Concept, including the ability to
address 21st century security challenges. This planning process and
these multilateral discussions inform our national decisions on defense
planning and resourcing.
80. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will the reduction of forces
and resources available from other alliance members force the United
States to have to make adjustments in order to meet treaty obligations?
Secretary Gates. The reduction of forces and resources available
from other Alliance members will not force the United States to make
adjustments in order to meet its obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty. In keeping with Article 3 of the Treaty, DOD will continue to
work with America's Allies through the NATO Defense Planning Process to
determine the correct mix of forces and capabilities needed to maintain
and develop our individual and collective capacity to resist armed
attack, and to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. In
addition to treaty obligations, Allied partners agreed in the NATO
Strategic Concept and other strategic-level guidance that NATO must
also have the capability to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response
operations. In the current and projected security environment, meeting
NATO's level of ambition for crisis response operations and security
cooperation with partners is likely to require a much greater share of
Allies' national defense resources than honoring treaty obligations.
81. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the current plan for U.S. Army
force structure in Europe since 2004 has been to drawn down from four
to two Brigades Combat Teams (BCT) by 2014 and to close military bases
at Bamberg and Schweinfurt. This would reduce the Army force posture in
Europe by 8,000 troops, leaving approximately 36,000 Army forces
available in theater for missions and training. You are in the process
of evaluating a request by the Commander of European Command (EUCOM) to
leave the four BCTs in place. In light of the actions of other European
nations to reduce their military resources and forces, why would it be
in the best interest of the United States to reverse our planned
reductions, reverse base closures, and to maintain additional forces in
Europe?
Secretary Gates. As part of a broader review of global defense
posture, the United States is reexamining our capabilities and force
structure in Europe ensuring that our country is well positioned to
support Allies and partners in a 21st century security environment.
NATO's new Strategic Concept reaffirmed NATO's core commitment to
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as its commitment to
crisis management and cooperative security. Allies must be prepared to
meet a broad range of 21st century challenges through work in new
areas, such as missile defense and cyber security, and through
modernizing traditional capabilities. The United States is committed to
a defense posture in Europe that meets its enduring commitment to
NATO's Article 5, ensures a credible deterrent against all forms of
aggression, and maintains a robust capacity to build Allied and partner
capacity for coalition operations. The President is making his decision
about U.S. Army force structure in Europe based on that information.
82. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what does EUCOM gain by having
44,000 Army personnel in Europe vice 36,000 troops assigned and
available for theater security cooperation efforts, particularly given
the realization that the Commanders of Africa Command (AFRICOM),
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), or Central Command (CENTCOM) have very
little or no forces assigned to their commands?
Secretary Gates. U.S. Army force posture in Europe not only enables
theater security cooperation, but it also assures our allies; it is the
cornerstone of NATO; and it supports global requirements, including
those for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past 10 years,
EUCOM-assigned Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) in particular have
rotated consistently into the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Forward-
based forces provide significant flexibility in force management, and
often are more efficient than U.S.-based forces, as demonstrated most
recently by the rapid manner in which EUCOM-assigned forces were
allocated to AFRICOM for Operation Odyssey Dawn. Moreover, CENTCOM
routinely receives forces assigned outside its area of operations,
including from EUCOM.
83. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would this decision actually
validate the intent of the NATO alliance members to increase reliance
on the U.S. forces and capabilities for their regional security
requirements?
Secretary Gates. Almost all of the forces and capabilities
available to NATO, other than the headquarters that are part of the
NATO command structure, are provided by member nations and funded
through their national defense budgets. The principal external
influences on national defense budget decisions are the NATO defense
planning process and bilateral consultations. The NATO defense planning
process allocates force planning targets to nations based on the
principles of burden sharing and reasonable challenge. When a nation
fails to achieve its force planning targets due to insufficient defense
spending, those targets are not reallocated to another nation unless
other Allies determine that the original allocation posed an
unreasonable challenge (the challenge is considered reasonable as long
as it does not require the Nation to spend more than 2 percent of its
GDP on defense).
Although nations may use many excuses for not allocating sufficient
resources to meet NATO objectives, it is unlikely that U.S. decisions
to support our security commitments will prompt other Allies not to
support their commitments. In fact, the opposite is normally true. In
the multilateral reviews of each member's defense plans that occur at
NATO, peer pressure makes it more difficult for nations to reduce their
commitment to NATO further, and the most intense pressure comes from
those nations that are setting an example by meeting their commitments.
The fact that no Allies have pressed to reduce the NATO level of
ambition upon which defense requirements are based, nor the goal of
spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, indicates that they want that
peer pressure to continue. Although I am never happy when European
Allies decide to reduce defense spending, I firmly believe that without
the example set by U.S. leadership within the Alliance, European
Allies' defense spending would be even lower.
COMPETITION AND LIFECYCLE COSTS
84. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, both the Weapon System
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 and DOD's efficiency initiatives
espouse guiding principles of increasing competition to lower lifecycle
costs. While these are commendable goals given the current budget
crisis, I am concerned with the pace and extent of implementation,
particularly given recent DOD data that of $366 billion in total DOD
contract obligations in fiscal year 2010, $188 billion was identified
as not competed or receiving only one bid. Please provide examples from
each of the military departments where competition has been used to
lower lifecycle costs.
Secretary Gates. Life-cycle cost can be defined as the total cost
to the government of a program over its full life, including costs for
research and development; testing; production; facilities; operations;
maintenance; personnel; environmental compliance; energy; and disposal.
Competition can be used to reduce costs in each of the individual
stages but is most effective in reducing procurement/acquisition and
sustainment costs. The following are some examples of competition
reducing cost in these areas:
In the Army, within the Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) portfolio, the Multifunctional Distribution Information
System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) radio program is an
example of how competition has resulted in procurement cost
savings. During the production phase of the MIDS-LVT program,
competition has resulted in approximately 60 percent cost
savings. The initial production cost of the radio was $435,000
per unit and, through ongoing competition between the two
approved vendor production sources, the cost per unit has
steadily decreased to $181,000 per unit. With over 2,600 MIDS-
LVT units purchased to date, the program has achieved hundreds
of millions of dollars in procurement savings through the
successful MIDS-LVT competitive acquisition strategy.
For the Air Force, the MQ-1 Predator Organizational-
level maintenance contract is a good example of how competition
produced acquisition cost savings. The initial contract, issued
in March 2005, was a sole source award to the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), General Atomics Aeronautical
Systems. This decision not to compete the Organization-level
maintenance contract was primarily driven by the lack of
published technical orders. When those technical orders became
available, the contract was recompeted 1 year ahead of schedule
and awarded to Battle Space Flight Services. This competition
resulted in a savings of $102 million. Because of increased and
accelerated wartime demand, the Air Force is anticipating
additional savings over the life of the contract. The ability
to compete between the OEM and the current supplier in the
future will continue to enable cost savings.
For the Navy, the most visible example is the LCS
Program. After receiving proposals from Lockheed Martin and
Austal USA in early 2010 that were deemed unaffordable, the
Navy changed its acquisition strategy to an all-or-nothing
competitive contract award and encouraged the companies to
establish leaner teaming arrangements. After proposals were
submitted, the Navy realized they could achieve competitive
prices, and the requirement was re-solicited for a 10-ship
contract award to each company. In December 2010, Lockheed
Martin and Austal USA were each awarded fixed-price incentive
contracts for the design and construction of 10 ships from
fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015. The benefits of
competition; serial production; employment of mature
technologies; design stability; fixed-price contracting;
commonality; and economies of scale contributed to reduced life
cycle costs and a highly affordable ship construction program.
The approach, self-financed within the program budget by re-
investing a portion of the greater than $2 billion in total
savings through the FYDP, enabled the addition of a year of
ship procurements. The approach also enables the DoN to
efficiently produce the ships at an increased rate to meet
operational requirements sooner.
85. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, have you found areas where DOD
can leverage commercial investment in technology, manufacturing, and
service capability to decrease expenses for lifecycle support
requirements?
Secretary Gates. DOD is leveraging commercial technology,
manufacturing, and service capabilities in many ways to reduce weapons
system life cycle costs. Since 1998, the USD(AT&L) Commercial
Technologies for Maintenance Activities (CTMA) program has been
steadily improving maintenance efficiency and effectiveness by
integrating proven commercial maintenance technologies into DOD
maintenance activities. The Military Departments are undertaking a
variety of initiatives leveraging commercial investments through the
CTMA program. For example:
The Department of Air Force implemented a commercially
developed capability, which replaced legacy pin-to-pin
continuity procedures with the Enhanced Wiring Integrity System
(EWIS). The EWIS gives maintainers the ability to check the
integrity of entire wire bundles within seconds and not only
detects a fault, but also isolates the fault to within inches
of its origin to assist the maintainer in rapidly repairing the
wire. The EWIS is widespread across the Air Force, and it is
transitioning to the U.S. Navy and Army aviation, as well as to
the Marine Corps land systems.
The Department of Navy utilized commercial technology
employed by airports to detect trace amounts of explosives on
passengers and luggage to detect contaminate in lubricants and
hydraulic fluids used across the DOD. The resultant capability
is being employed on Military Sealift Command vessels where
this hand-held tool can assess contamination, viscosity, and
other critical fluid parameters in under a minute per test.
This capability is in transition to the Army, Navy, and Air
Force for diesel oils used in ground vehicles and support
equipment.
The Department of Army is leading the transition of a
commercial technology developed for the automotive maintenance
industry and widely used for commercial airline maintenance.
This capability, the Automated Process and Inspection Guide
(AP&IG), provides accurate point of maintenance technical data
and collects standard inspection and maintenance data. AP&IG
has: reduced inspection times by 40 percent; reduced repair
turn times; and improved overall maintenance quality.
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is a strategy that has been
successful in leveraging company investment in technology and services
throughout commercial industry. This support strategy has transferred
to many applications across the DOD for Weapon System Sustainment. PBL
incentivizes the provider to deliver a guaranteed outcome at a fixed
price. What have traditionally been revenue centers in transactional
relationships between government and industry become cost centers under
PBL. PBL strategies can improve both product reliability and processes
to drive down costs. Industry makes up front investments to lower costs
by improving the product and streamlining sustainment processes. PBL
strategies support the warfighter through increased availability,
reduced logistics footprint, and lower life cycle costs.
86. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how specifically is DOD better
incentivizing and empowering program managers to bring competition into
otherwise previously sole-sourced lifecycle programs, whether termed as
maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); or contractor logistics
support (CLS); or PBL?
Secretary Gates. The USD(AT&L) November 3, 2010 memo to the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies directed immediate action to
increase competition. The acquisition community is addressing this in
the development of Weapon System Acquisition Strategies. Specifically,
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Defense Agency
Directors were directed to implement the following:
Present a competitive acquisition strategy at each
program milestone: Provide a one-page competitive strategy for
each Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program at each milestone
as part of the overall acquisition strategy.
Report to USD(AT&L) in fiscal year 2011 on how their
military department or agency intends to reduce single-bid
competitions--negotiations when only one offer is received. At
a minimum, the report will address market research, restricted
specifications, and adequate time for proposal preparation.
Achieve a 2 percent reduction in single-bid
competitive contracts in fiscal year 2011, with continuing
reductions thereafter.
Remove obstacles to competition: ensure contracting
officers conduct negotiations with all single-bid offerors,
unless this requirement is specifically waived by the Head of
Contracting Activity or Military Department Secretary. The
basis of these negotiations will be cost or price analysis, as
the case may be, using either certified or non-certified cost
or pricing data, as appropriate.
Have their component or agency competition advocate
develop a plan to improve both the overall rate of competition
and the rate of effective competition. These plans establish an
improvement rate of at least 2 percent per year for overall
competition and an improvement rate of at least 10 percent per
year for effective competition.
Require open systems architectures and set rules for
acquisition of technical data rights: Program managers are to
conduct a business case analysis in concert with the
engineering tradeoff analysis presented at Milestone B. The
business case analysis outlines the open systems architecture
approach, combined with technical data rights the Government
pursues in order to ensure a lifetime consideration of
competition in the acquisition of weapon systems. The results
of this analysis will be reported in the Acquisition Strategy
Report and in the competition strategy.
Increase the dynamic small business role in the
defense marketplace competition: All competitive and non-
competitive procurement actions will seek to increase small
business participation through weighting factors in past
performance and fee construct.
These actions apply to all contracts, including MRO, CLS, and PBL
contracts. The result will be program executive officers and program
managers developing a competitive strategy early in acquisition that
spans the program's life and improves the ability to compete MRO, CLS,
and PBL contracts in sustainment. For example, the Navy undertook a
specific initiative to engage each program executive officer, program
manager, and Product Support Manager (PSM) to emphasize real
competition at every stage of acquisition and sustainment.
The Navy directed the program executive officers/
program managers/PSMs to establish a competitive environment
throughout the life cycle of their programs, and to enable
better competitive opportunities in the sustainment phase.
Additionally, program executive officers and program managers
are reviewing their existing portfolios in pursuit of increased
competitive opportunities, including consideration of breakout
opportunities, and expanding open architecture solutions and
small business opportunities that fosters additional
competition.
The Army is emphasizing the conduct of logistics
analyses early to baseline costs and develop technical data
requirements that facilitate competition in sustainment
contracts.
The Air Force is also taking proactive steps to ensure
program managers and PSMs correctly identify and pursue data
rights in their contract negotiations to facilitate competition
in sustainment. The outcome will be required warfighting
capability at a reduced cost to the Government.
87. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the committee spearheaded
legislation which became Section 805 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010
regarding Lifecycle Management and Product Support, calling for PSMs to
maximize competition and make the best possible use of available DOD
and industry resources at the system, subsystem, and component levels.
Section 805 was implemented through Under Secretary Carter's Directive-
Type Memorandum on October 6, 2010. Since then, how has competition at
subsystem and component levels been pursued to reduce lifecycle costs?
Secretary Gates. Since the issuance of the DTM, the military
departments continue to implement section 805 and have made significant
progress identifying PSMs for ACAT I and II programs and issuing the
guidance. One of the PSM's major duties is to promote opportunities to
maximize competition while meeting the objective of best-value, long-
term outcomes for the warfighter.
To this end, the Defense Acquisition University developed and
fielded DOD Life Cycle Management and PSM Rapid Deployment training
with strong attendance across the DOD and the industry acquisition
community, which specifically addresses increased competition.
Additionally, the military departments are undertaking a variety of
initiatives to increase competition. For example:
The Navy engaged each Program Executive Office (PEO)
and program manager to establish a solid foundation for a
competitive environment throughout the life cycle. Therefore,
the PEOs and program managers are reviewing existing portfolios
in pursuit of increased competition opportunities, including
consideration of breakout opportunities at the subsystem and
component levels to reduce lifecycle costs.
The Air Force published regulations and guidebooks
that detail the importance of competition. The Air Force is
specifically focusing on sole-source contracts for software
maintenance, as well as engine repairs and parts, to increase
competition.
The Army plans to review and refine internal practices
and processes over the course of the next year that empower the
PSM to promote competitive opportunities.
COST-SHARING FOR MILITARY HEALTHCARE
88. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, regarding the administration's
healthcare reform proposals, I received a letter signed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) endorsing the administration's reform proposal
and request that this letter be included in the record. I know that we
will hear from many other interested stakeholders, and we must consider
those views as well. Do you agree that we must always remain committed
to ensuring that the quality of healthcare for our military
servicemembers, their families, and veterans is never compromised, even
in tough economic times?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The performance and the quality of care
delivered by the Military Health System (MHS) in austere, combat
environments continue to exceed anything ever witnessed and recorded in
battlefield medicine. For example, increased survival rates from wounds
and decreased loss of personnel from disease and non-battle injuries
are two areas where our medical system established itself as world-
class.
Here at home, our MHS is also among the best in terms of quality
and outcome throughout the Nation.
I stand proudly and strongly by DOD's commitment to military
healthcare quality and excellence and will never compromise or waver
from this standard. This proven commitment to high performance is
separate and distinct from any potential minor changes in TRICARE
enrollment fees or copayments. Our MHS rests on a core principle of
trust with the people DOD serves, and that trust must never be broken.
89. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain how the health
reform proposals that you have put forth fulfill this obligation, and
most especially for our wounded warriors?
Secretary Gates. The overall health budget for fiscal year 2012
represents an increase in the fiscal year 2011 request, as DOD
continues to invest in initiatives that strengthen the military
healthcare system for today and into the future.
DOD continues increasing financial investment in medical research
and development for its wounded warriors, particularly in the areas of
traumatic brain injury, psychological health, extremity injuries,
amputee care, and regenerative medicine. Additionally, DOD is modifying
significantly the Disability Evaluation System to oversee the
disability evaluation process in a manner that best meets the needs of
each servicemember.
These health reform proposals are intended to secure the long-term
financial security of the MHS. By introducing this set of reform
proposals now--reforms that establish internal efficiencies, reforms
that standardize reimbursement policies to civilian network providers
and reforms to beneficiary out-of-pocket costs--DOD continues providing
a comprehensive health benefit for DOD beneficiaries.
90. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what medical index rate would
DOD plan to use for TRICARE fees and why?
Secretary Gates. A final decision on the exact medical index has
not been made. DOD is in ongoing discussions with various stakeholders
on what might serve as the most appropriate index. The aim is to select
an index that is transparent, based on actual market costs, relevant to
the retired population and demographics at issue, clear and
understandable, and one that reflects foreseeable growth in health care
costs.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
91. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in regard to unauthorized
disclosures of classified information, do you believe that changes to
DOD policy (particularly policies governing access to classified
systems) would be sufficient to prevent another Wikileaks event? If
not, what other changes would you recommend?
Secretary Gates. I share your concern regarding the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information and DOD is reviewing policies to
mitigate the risk of future disclosures. As DOD continues efforts to
improve its policies and information sharing capabilities, it will
strive to implement the mechanisms necessary to protect intelligence
information without reverting back to pre-September 11 stovepipes. One
of the major contributing factors in the WikiLeaks incident was the
large amount of data that was accessible with little or no access
controls. Broad access to information can be combined with access
controls to mitigate this vulnerability, without overly restricting
users from obtaining the information they need.
One example of an access control mechanism that DOD has begun is to
issue a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based identity credential on a
hardened smart card. This is very similar to the Common Access Card
(CAC) used on the unclassified network. DOD will complete issuing
500,000 cards to SIPRNet users, along with card readers and software,
by the end of 2012. This will provide very strong identification of the
person accessing the network and requesting data. It will both deter
bad behavior and require absolute identification of who is accessing
data and managing that access.
In conjunction with this effort, all DOD organizations will
configure SIPRNet-based systems to use the PKI credentials to strongly
authenticate end-users who are accessing information in the system.
This provides the link between end users and the specific data they can
access--not just network access. DOD's goal is that by 2013, following
completion of credential issuance, all SIPRNet users will log into
their local computers with their SIPRNet PKI/smart card credential.
92. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you plan to conduct or
oversee a damage assessment on the Wikileaks disclosures?
Secretary Gates. DOD conducted an assessment of the disclosed DOD
information to determine what actions must be taken to mitigate the
disclosures' effect on U.S. forces, the coalition, and host nation
partners. At my direction, the Intelligence Review Task Force (IRTF),
established under the purview of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
reviewed every line of the disclosed information and worked with our
foreign partners and the combatant commands (COCOM) to warn of
potential danger and mitigate the degree of risk or threat resulting
from the compromise.
The IRTF did not conduct a full damage assessment due to the
interagency nature of the disclosed material and of the risk incurred.
The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive in the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has the mandate to
conduct damage assessments in these circumstances and is in the process
of doing so.
93. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what changes need to be made
in the way that DOD conducts background investigations for security
clearances?
Secretary Gates. DOD investigative service provider is the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) which conducts 95 percent of all
background investigations for security clearances across the Federal
Government, including the majority of DOD investigations. The
background investigations are conducted utilizing requirements set
forth in the 1997 Federal Investigative Standards for Background
Investigations for Access to Classified Information, which are
promulgated at the national level.
The Federal Investigative Standards are currently being rewritten
by a working group composed of representatives from the Intelligence
Community, DOD, and other executive branch departments and agencies.
The new Federal Investigative Standards will apply 21st century
technology using an enterprise-wide approach. These technologies will
enable more cost-effective and timely case management and information
sharing.
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you see the need for
increased counterintelligence scrutiny or investigations of cleared DOD
personnel?
Secretary Gates. DOD investigative service provider is the OPM that
conducts 95 percent of all background investigations for security
clearances across the Federal Government, including the majority of DOD
investigations. The background investigations are conducted utilizing
requirements set forth in the 1997 Federal Investigative Standards for
Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information, which
are promulgated at the national level.
Since DOD investigations are conducted in accordance with the
Federal investigative standards, we do not believe additional
investigations are warranted beyond what is required by existing
policies. When the current personnel security investigation develops
indicators requiring security, law enforcement, or counterintelligence
follow-up actions, the information is referred to the appropriate
organization. DOD policies and legal guidelines concerning law
enforcement, security, and counterintelligence investigations identify
what circumstances require investigations.
DOD policy directs that when counterintelligence, security, or
other types of investigations are completed on, or derogatory
information is received regarding personnel with a security clearance,
the information must be provided to the individual's Commander/
Director. Finally, DOD is a champion of the Joint Reform Effort, and
key members of DOD are participating in the development of new
national-level personnel security procedures, which will integrate
counterintelligence and security equities into procedures regarding the
development of derogatory or suspicious information.
95. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do believe that the Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) is as vulnerable
to a Wikileaks-type scenario as the SIPRNET has proven to be?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, if the threat results from an individual in a
position of trust who opts to violate applicable U.S. military
regulations, DOD policy, and Federal law. JWICS does have slightly
greater security controls than SIPRNET, but there remains a possibility
that its contents could also be exploited for unauthorized and illicit
purposes.
96. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if you decide to more tightly
restrict access to classified data on DOD computer systems, how will
you make sure that the right people are still getting the information
they need?
Secretary Gates. DOD is working to improve intelligence information
sharing, while ensuring the appropriate protections and safeguards are
in place. A more resilient information sharing environment can be
achieved through both technological solutions and comprehensive
policies.
Immediately following the first release of documents by WikiLeaks,
I commissioned two internal DOD studies. The first study, led by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, directed a review of DOD
information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff,
focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward
deployed areas.
The information security policies that were in place at the time of
the WikiLeaks disclosures were determined to be adequate. However,
adherence to and implementation of those policies were found to need
improvement. Since then, DOD combined five separate policies into a
single updated version of DOD's Information Security Program policy,
and the Defense Security Service is developing web-enabled information
security training that will become part of the mandatory information
assurance training conducted annually across DOD.
Results of the Joint Staff study showed that forward deployed units
maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media, and
also revealed a limited capability to detect and monitor anomalous
behavior on classified computer networks.
EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
97. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in an August 9, 2010 speech,
you announced an immediate 10 percent reduction in funding for
intelligence advisory and assistance contracts. What effect has this
reduction in intelligence contractors had on the defense intelligence
enterprise?
Secretary Gates. Last August, DOD considered an immediate reduction
in funding for intelligence advisory and assistance contracts, but have
since conducted a DOD-wide review of our reliance on contractors. As
the result of this review, funding used to acquire service support
contracts was reduced 10 percent per year over the next 3 years from
their reported fiscal year 2010 level. Based on the DOD components'
allocation of the efficiency achieved by this action, the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP) was assessed a portion of this reduction.
Contractor funding reductions in the MIP were absorbed by realizing
process efficiencies and moving away from higher-priced contractor
services. The MIP significantly reduced its reliance on contractor
support. Compared to fiscal year 2010 actuals, MIP contractor reliance
declined approximately 19 percent.
98. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in a subsequent January 6,
2011, statement, you mentioned a review of DOD intelligence
organizations conducted in conjunction with the Office of the DNI.
Please provide details on the results of that review for the record.
Secretary Gates. The review of intelligence organizations was an
integrated effort between DOD and DNI. The analysis team consisted of
DOD and DNI members and this partnership was critical for success. The
group reviewed baseline resources across the Intelligence Community,
identifying areas of major investment and significant recent growth and
focusing on analytic organizations.
The decisions made as a result of the review are the following:
1. Resize the Geographic COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations
Centers (JIOCs) for Phase 0/1 operations only.
2. Establish a rotational model for DIA support to the COCOMs.
3. Disestablish the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination
Center (DIOCC) and the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).
4. Consolidate selected DOD Counterterrorism (CT) functions under
the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT).
5. Consolidate selected DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) elements
under a new Joint Intelligence Task Force for CTF (JITF-CTF).
6. Track emerging intelligence organizations and develop plans to
harvest them as they redeploy from theater.
99. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you agree with the review's
overall assessment that many new defense intelligence organizations,
created after September 11, have grown too large and have largely
duplicated work done elsewhere?
Secretary Gates. The number of defense intelligence organizations
has increased since 2001. In the defense arena, large and well-staffed
intelligence structures now exist in the military departments, in the
defense agencies, in the COCOMs, and in the theaters.
The Intelligence Review Study Group (IRSG) identified areas of
major investment and focused on the analytic organizations within the
IC. Although the IRSG findings identified areas where efficiencies can
be gained by consolidating select functions, such as counterterrorism
and CTF, DOD continues to look for areas to increase efficiency and
eliminate redundancy. Several efforts are underway to identify Defense
Intelligence efficiencies and evaluate the impact on intelligence
support to combat operations, if efforts are reduced or eliminated.
Ongoing efficiency efforts within DOD include a working group that is
tracking and reviewing intelligence organizations formed to support
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to identify which of these
would be retained as combat operations draw to a close.
100. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have approved
recommendations to roll up various defense intelligence organizations
that focus on counter-terrorism and terrorism finance into two separate
task forces housed at the DIA. Could these organizations simply be done
away with?
Secretary Gates. No, because they provide different specialized
intelligence that is critical to the current fight in Afghanistan and
U.S. forces deployed in every theater.
My efficiency recommendation regarding JITF-CT at DIA focused on
consolidating analytic functions in one organization to use our
resources more effectively against adversaries that continue to
reinvent themselves and reemerge as threats to U.S. forces around the
world, as recently seen with the attacks on the airmen in Germany. Over
the past 9 years, JITF-CT provided exceptional support to operational
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The leadership, tradecraft, and
efficiencies gained by consolidating smaller analytic elements with
JITF-CT will enhance overall Defense Intelligence capabilities as well
as DOD contributions to the national counter-terrorism mission.
Although the Treasury Department has the lead for the overall U.S.
Government CTF effort, our efficiency studies identified a requirement
for a focal point within DOD to coordinate and lead the disparate CTF
efforts that were already in place. Intelligence support to CTF remains
a core analytic function. Because illicit finance does not exist as an
end in and of itself, the focused work of DIA analysts in Washington
and in Afghanistan will continue to assist commanders in the field in
understanding how adversaries sustain their efforts and help identify
vulnerabilities.
By consolidating the CTF mission within DIA, DOD is improving the
efficiency and efficacy of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. DIA
will streamline the CTF mission by consolidating and realigning DOD
components into a single organization to support both the warfighter
and the policymaker more effectively.
101. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what organizations within the
defense intelligence enterprise would you recommend significantly
reducing or abolishing and what would be the savings to the taxpayer of
these cuts?
Secretary Gates. As part of the Reform Agenda, DOD formed an ISRG
to conduct an extensive examination of the DOD and IC apparatus. The
ISRG identified the DIOCC and JFCC-ISR as redundant organizations that
can be eliminated in fiscal year 2012. The ISRG also recommended that
the AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM's JIOCs be ``right-sized,''
commensurate with their current responsibilities for Phase 0/1
operations. These efficiency initiatives will save DOD approximately
$32 million in fiscal year 2012.
I continue to look for areas of redundancy within Defense
Intelligence. A working group is reviewing existing organizations
providing intelligence support to counterterrorism and CTF with the
goal of consolidating those functions under the DIA. I am also
reviewing intelligence and intelligence-like organizations that have
formed to support combat operations to identify which of these
organizations should be retained as combat operations draw down. None
of these efforts have identified any savings, but savings are possible
as additional efficiencies are identified.
102. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, could further reductions be
made without harming intelligence support to warfighters in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I continue to look for areas in Defense
Intelligence where we can increase efficiency and eliminate redundancy.
Several efforts are underway to identify Defense Intelligence
efficiencies and evaluate the impact on intelligence support to combat
operations, if efforts are reduced or eliminated. Ongoing efficiency
efforts within DOD include a working group that is tracking and
reviewing intelligence and intelligence-like organizations formed to
support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in order to identify which
of these organizations should be retained as combat operations draw to
a close.
I am also reviewing existing organizations providing intelligence
support to counterterrorism and CTF, with the goal of consolidating
those functions under the DIA. All Defense Intelligence efficiency
efforts will ensure that intelligence support to forces conducting
combat operations will continue as long as that support is required.
FORT HOOD INVESTIGATION
103. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Senate Homeland Security
and Government Affairs Committee recently issued a report on Fort Hood
claiming that ``DOD and FBI collectively had sufficient information
necessary to have detected Hasan's radicalization . . . [but failed] to
act on it.'' Do you agree with that conclusion?
Secretary Gates. No. DOD was not notified or otherwise made aware
of Major Hasan's contact with extremists until after the incident. In
terms of Major Hasan's professional behavior, the Army is conducting an
accountability review which will appropriately address what supervisors
knew about his job performance and whether they acted according to Army
policies and procedures. That report is being reviewed by the Secretary
of the Army and should be released in the near future.
104. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the
defense intelligence enterprise has devoted sufficient resources to
understanding and countering the threat from homegrown violent Islamic
extremists like Hasan?
Secretary Gates. Yes. DOD devotes significant resources to
understanding and countering violent extremism among its military
personnel. DOD continues to examine how to address the threat
originating from disaffected individuals within the U.S. Armed Forces
who may commit violent acts, and best apply the resources available.
Specifically, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise details personnel to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) to broaden the understanding of the overall threat within the
United States to our military forces. DOD also completed a full
assessment of newly identified JTTF requirements based on the Fort Hood
incident, and is in the process of resourcing those needs.
105. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that defense
intelligence organizations are adequately represented on the FBI's
JTTF? If not, do you plan to increase that participation?
Secretary Gates. Today, yes. In the aftermath of the shootings at
Fort Hood, I determined that DOD's commitment to the JTTFs and guidance
for sharing force protection information were inadequate. I directed
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to lead oversight of DOD's
contributions to JTTFs by providing policy guidance, and by developing
DOD-wide goals and objectives for DOD's JTTF participation. This has
led to an increase in the Department's contributions to JTTFs through
the DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism. This
enhancement in analytical capabilities and information sharing plays a
critical role in better understanding the terrorist threat to the
United States.
106. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what other steps do you plan
to take to ensure that radicals like Hasan are detected before another
tragedy like Fort Hood occurs?
Secretary Gates. On August 18, 2010, I approved Department-wide
guidance to familiarize leaders with behaviors that may indicate
radicalization or precipitate violence. I also reinforced to commanders
that they are expected to exercise sound judgment and consider the full
range of disciplinary actions when addressing personnel whose behavior
adversely affects good order, discipline, or unit safety.
Current DOD policy prohibits behavior that creates a clear danger
to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of military personnel. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is revising DOD
Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and Protest Activities among
members of the Armed Forces, to ensure it effectively prohibits
behavior that materially interferes with the accomplishment of the
military mission or is incompatible with military service. This policy
authorizes commanders to employ a range of administrative and
disciplinary actions to stop behavior that is incompatible with
military service, regardless of the underlying cause.
DOD made several important steps to improve information sharing and
its ability to ``connect the dots.'' DOD has drafted a new,
consolidated information sharing agreement with the FBI. This new
agreement creates a mechanism for DOD to provide force protection
threat information requirements to the FBI, ensures threat information
is reported to senior defense leadership, and reaffirms the already
excellent working relationships between DOD Provost Marshals and local
FBI JTTFs and Field Offices to ensure that threat information gets to
the defense installation that is threatened. Additionally, DOD and the
FBI established a formal notification process whereby information on
all counterterrorism investigations with a DOD nexus is forwarded
appropriately. DOD also utilizes FBI's eGuardian suspicious activity
reporting system. This secure, unclassified capability enables
information sharing across DOD, as well as with Federal, State, local,
and tribal law enforcement partners. This system provides information
to the FBI's JTTFs.
In the future, DOD will establish the Law Enforcement Defense Data
Exchange (D-DEx) in order to allow our Military Criminal Investigative
Organizations to post, query, retrieve, and share criminal
investigation and other law enforcement data in one database. Another
important step is to supplement military personnel health screenings to
include ``violence risk assessments'' before deployment and three times
after deployment. These ``violence risk assessments'' are conducted
person-to-person by a medical provider trained and certified to conduct
in-depth evaluations. Finally, I have directed the Military Services
and Investigative Agencies to collaborate with Defense intelligence
organizations, facilitating access to investigative information on DOD-
related counterterrorism cases. To most effectively pool DOD's
resources against this threat, the government must overcome information
sharing and cultural challenges between investigative and intelligence
analysis organizations. The combination of enhanced information sharing
and analytic presence in JTTFs plays a critical role in understanding
the ``homegrown'' threat to DOD.
DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES
107. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the budget
submission calls for an increased emphasis on DOD support to Mexico in
its counterdrug activities--a decision I support fully. What's your
assessment of the Mexican Government's current capability to confront
the drug cartels and associated illicit organizations?
Secretary Gates. In recent years, Mexico significantly increased
its willingness to confront transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
and strengthened capabilities to do so through law enforcement,
judicialand military support, and by other means. Mexico also launched
initiatives to promote legitimate economic opportunity that help
diminish illegal activity. The U.S. Government provides significant
support to Mexico through training, equipment, information exchange,
and related cooperation, but Mexican authorities' own efforts have
achieved most of these improvements. In confronting TCOs, the Mexican
people suffer grievously from escalating violence, and I support
Mexico's steadfast resolve to further strengthen the rule of law.
Although Mexico's capability to disrupt TCOs is increasing, TCOs
adapt quickly by escalating violence, dispersing geographically, and
diversifying their criminal activities. As a result, Mexican
authorities activated the Mexican Armed Forces to help disrupt TCOs,
and buy time for the civilian agencies to build capacity. Mexico is
building rule of law capacity through police vetting and training, as
well as anti-money laundering, judicial, penal, statutory, anti-
corruption and related reforms.
Mexico efforts have produced notable successes, including the
arrest or killing of several TCO leaders as well as key members from
all seven of Mexico's major drug organizations, while at the same time
disrupting the TCOs' business environment. Unfortunately, this led to
increased violence, as the criminals fight for territory. As the
illegal drug business is disrupted, TCOs are also diversifying into
other criminal activities and dispersing geographically, including into
Central America.
Despite the Mexican authorities' efforts, the country remains the
primary transit route into the United States for illegal drugs of
foreign origin, as well as a major supplier of heroin,
methamphetamines, and marijuana. Mexico is also the primary destination
for weapons and bulk cash smuggled illegally out of the United States.
Mexico's sustained interdiction efforts made great progress in reducing
cocaine movement directly into Mexico from South America to low levels.
Most cocaine now reaches Central America by air or sea, then transits
Mexico primarily hidden in private vehicles into the United States over
land.
Admiral Mullen. Mexico has identified TCOs as the principal
security challenge we face in the Western Hemisphere. The United States
and Mexico understand this is both a shared challenge and
responsibility between our nations. In recognition of this need, Mexico
has made great strides in its understanding of TCOs and its capability
to counter them. However, much work remains as Mexico is yet able to
overcome the TCOs' grip on Mexico's citizenry, public security and
economy.
In collaboration with Mexico, we continue to work toward improved
information sharing which has enabled the Mexico effort. This has
manifested itself through the Mexican apprehension of key several TCO
senior leaders. Mexican armed forces are making strides with their
public security forces to assume the lead role. These short-term gains
have not come without a cost; drug-related murders have grown to an
annual rate of 15,233--a 61 percent increase from 2009 due largely to
TCO-on-TCO violence. As Mexico's armed and public security forces
follow and exploit these successes we could very well see violence
levels continue to increase as TCOs are forced to operate at greater
risk in an environment increasingly inhospitable to organized crime.
As Mexico consolidates its successes in establishing the rule of
law, we must continue to support them as they deal with the TCOs'
culture of impunity--namely violent intimidation and corruption. In our
daily interactions, we continually stress the importance that Mexico
forces integrity must be above reproach. It is these forces that
represent the government's legitimacy and garner the trust of the
citizens.
Mexico has made progress in its capability to confront TCOs but
will require expansion and deepening of their capabilities and
institutions as it is anticipated violent intimidation and coercion
will worsen.
108. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
priorities have you identified for DOD to pursue regarding support to
Mexico?
Secretary Gates. U.S.-Mexico relations deepened significantly in
recent years, including with respect to security cooperation on matters
of mutual concern such as countering TCOs. DOD provides support for
cooperation under the State Department-led Merida Initiative (MI)
carrying out programs requested by Mexican authorities. DOD executes
$415.5 million in MI Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriated in
fiscal years 2008-2009, including provision of helicopters, maritime
surveillance aircraft, handheld drug and explosives ion scanners, and
other equipment.
The DOD counternarcotics (CN) program also compliments MI with
training, equipment, and information sharing in support of Mexican
military and law enforcement forces. The DOD CN program also provides
logistical, analytic, radar, communications and other support to U.S.
law enforcement agencies' activities. In recent years, DOD's CN support
to Mexico has concentrated on helping Mexican forces improve tactical
and operational proficiency, as well as their air mobility, maritime
law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD
training and information exchanges emphasize interagency-coordinated
operations, and safeguarding human rights. The DOD CN program allocated
$51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico (up from about $3
million per year before 2009), and is working to reinforce this effort.
DOD also works with other U.S. agencies and foreign partners to
integrate cooperation throughout the Americas, recognizing that TCOs
present challenges to all countries in the region.
Admiral Mullen. DOD conducts programs as agreed upon by both United
States' and Mexico's Governments as found in the ``Beyond Merida''
construct. Principally we seek to support Mexico's efforts to directly
confront TCOs and disrupt TCOs' capability to conduct organized
criminal activities, thereby helping Mexico to strengthen the
capabilities necessary to exploit TCO weaknesses while working to help
reduce Mexico's security forces susceptibility to TCO intimidation and
corruption.
To expand Mexico's capabilities, DOD will focus on accelerating
Merida Initiative equipment in coordination with DOS as we move beyond
equipping to truly partnering with our Mexican counterparts to develop
a clear strategy of military support to law enforcement activities.
In addition to provision of equipment, DOD will focus on providing
Mexico with more information sharing thereby helping them develop the
analytical capacity to exploit TCO network vulnerabilities. We
recognize that our bilateral efforts with Mexico must be part of a
wider collaboration with law enforcement agencies as well as diplomatic
efforts.
Beyond these immediate priorities we are simultaneously supporting
the sustainment of our coordinated efforts and building partner
capacity in all pertinent areas. Our military-to-military efforts must
maintain a coherent doctrine, conduct coordinated operations with an
interoperable force, and ensure both adequate and appropriate training
for the forces committed to the defense of Mexican national
sovereignty. Personnel and leader development programs are essential to
ensuring that Mexican initiatives are carefully managed and maintained.
This type of attention is necessary if we are to capitalize on earlier
gains in galvanizing public security institutions' credibility and
longevity in what must be a long-term effort to partner with Mexico to
defeat transnational organized crime.
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, drug
cartels operating from Central and South America have shown an
increasing ability to adapt and continue their operations. For example,
the Ecuadorians and most recently the Colombians have apprehended fully
submersible ``narco-subs.'' Colonel Manuel Hurtado, chief of staff of
Colombia's Pacific Command, told the Associated Press that he estimated
the captured narco-sub could hold 8 tons of drugs and has the capacity
to sail totally underwater and travel to the coast of Mexico without
surfacing. What trends are you seeing in the region and what priorities
have you identified for DOD to pursue with regards to its counterdrug
activities and assistance?
Secretary Gates. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities seized
submersible vessels under construction in Pacific coast jungle areas in
July 2010 and February 2011, respectively. These authorities cooperated
fully with U.S. counterparts in studying the vessels, which appear
intended for fully-submerged operations.
TCOs continue to rely principally on ``go-fast'' boats to smuggle
most cocaine from South to North America. Over the last 10 years,
however, drug traffickers experimented with self-propelled semi-
submersible (SPSS) vessels, also known as low-profile vessels. SPSS
vessels achieve considerable stealth by moving very low in the water,
but cannot actually submerge entirely. The recent emergence of the
self-propelled fully submersible (SPFS) drug-smuggling threat appears
to represent a significant evolutionary step.
DOD and other U.S. Government agencies are refining ways to detect,
monitor, and interdict SPFS and SPSS craft more effectively. United
States authorities are also working with Colombian authorities and
those of other countries to locate the sites where the vessels are
built, loaded, and launched, as well as to identify the logistical,
financial, and associated networks that support them. Likewise,
security cooperation programs with South and Central American
countries, as well as with Mexico, are critical in strengthening those
countries' surveillance and interdiction capabilities and their
capacity to cooperate with U.S. counterparts and with one another.
Admiral Mullen. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities seized narco-
subs in Pacific coast jungle areas in July 2010 and February 2011,
respectively. Ecuadoran and Colombian authorities have cooperated fully
with U.S. counterparts in studying the narco-subs, which appear to have
been intended for limited fully-submerged operations. Drug Trafficking
Organizations continue to rely principally on ``go-fast'' boats to
carry over half of all U.S.-bound cocaine. However, the recent
emergence of the Self-Propelled Fully Submersible (SPFS) drug-smuggling
vessels represents a significant evolutionary step and demonstrates the
trafficking organizations' adaptability, resources, and persistence.
As the lead agency of the Federal Government for detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the
Unites States, DOD continues to refine its technology, tactics,
techniques and procedures to adapt to the law enforcement threat narco-
subs pose to the United States. Additionally, U.S. authorities are
working with Colombian authorities and those of other partner nations
to locate where the narco-subs are built, loaded and launched, domains
which are much more conducive to intercept. We also partner with like-
minded countries to identify the logistical, financial and associated
networks which support such illicit activities. Likewise, U.S. security
cooperation programs with South and Central American countries, as well
as with Mexico, are critical in strengthening those countries'
surveillance and interdiction capabilities, including their capacity to
cooperate with U.S. counterparts and with each other in the Central
American region.
COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING
110. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I am concerned about what I
see as a movement by DOD away from competition. The most egregious
recent example is the Navy's decision to award contracts to both
bidders in the LCS program--a decision I still believe was ill-advised.
But, there are numerous others--outside the context major systems.
In fact, the Congressional Quarterly recently reported that
``according to newly available DOD data . . . more than half the
Pentagon's total budget obligations for contracting last year were
spent without effective competition or with no competition at all.''
Are you aware of this report?
Secretary Gates. DOD actually employed a very effective competitive
procurement strategy in the case of the LCS. The effects of head-to-
head competition resulted in competitive pricing from both offerors
that had not occurred with any previous strategy. This strategy
promotes competition for DOD by establishing multiple options for
conducting future competitions. While I have not read the specific
``Congressional Quarterly'' report, Dr. Ashton Carter, the USD(AT&L),
is aware of the issue and made promoting real competition a major
component of his Better Buying Power Initiative. As part of this
effort, guidance was issued on November 24, 2010 on ``Improving
Competition in Defense Procurements.''
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how concerned are you about
this development and how do you intend to address it?
Secretary Gates. I am concerned about this development and have
undertaken a major reform agenda in DOD to improve business processes
and change the way it acquires goods and services to generate greater
efficiencies and savings. Aspects of this initiative are being
implemented in the USD(AT&L)'s September 14, 2010 memorandum for
``Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense Spending.'' The goal of this initiative is to
achieve more efficient, effective, and affordable ways of conducting
DOD business. Promoting real competition is a focus area within the
initiative that requires the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
to develop plans to improve overall and effective competition by:
reducing the number of single-bid contracts; negotiating better prices
on single-bid contracts and task and delivery orders; and reducing the
dollar value of sole-source contracts and task and delivery orders. On
November 24, 2010 the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy issued guidance on improving competition in Defense procurement.
112. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, since this data was taken
from DOD sources and should have been available to your staff, why
wouldn't increasing completion be the cornerstone of any efficiency
initiative announced by DOD to date?
Secretary Gates. Competition is the cornerstone of the acquisition
process and its benefits are well understood. Competition was re-
emphasized when the USD(AT&L) issued his June 2010 memorandum, ``Better
Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in
Defense Spending'' to underscore the importance of competition. In July
2010, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
established Subcommittee 13 under the Panel on Contracting Integrity to
address opportunities for more effective competition. In September
2010, the USD(AT&L) followed his June memorandum with the ``Better
Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense Spending'' to promote real competition, which
was followed by his November 2010 Implementation Directive that
requires Military Departments and Defense Agencies to improve the
overall rate of competition by 2 percent and the rate of effective
competition by 10 percent. Further direction was provided by the
Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy's November 2010
memorandum ``Improving Competition in Defense Procurements,'' which
instructs contracting officers to resolicit any solicitation that was
open for less than 30 days, and if only one offer is received in the
resolicitation, the contracting officer must conduct negotiations to
achieve the best value for the DOD.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
113. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, soon after you announced that
you wanted to restructure the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program again,
Pentagon officials reportedly said that the program could be delayed by
1 to 3 more years and cost another $5 billion. Is that true?
Secretary Gates. Yes. Following the breach of the Nunn-McCurdy
critical thresholds, rescission of the original October 26, 2001
Milestone B decision, and program recertification in June 2010, DOD set
out to reestablish a firm foundation for the JSF program. The new F-35
PEO conducted an extensive bottom-up Technical Baseline Review (TBR)
involving more than 120 tactical aircraft experts from both the
military Services and DOD to evaluate every aspect of the System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of the program. The TBR
identified the need for an additional $4.6 billion in resources and
schedule duration for execution of the SDD phase. In addition to the
TBR, the PEO will perform a schedule risk assessment this summer, will
conduct an integrated baseline review, and will prepare the integrated
master schedule for the program this fall.
114. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the new estimates on
how much the program and each plane will cost?
Secretary Gates. DOD is currently finalizing its estimates on how
much the program and each aircraft will cost. These estimates are being
prepared in support of the planned Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
Milestone B recertification review scheduled for May 2011. The cost
figures resulting from this review will be reflected in an update to
the Selected Acquisition Report which will be provided to Congress this
summer, subsequent to the DAB review.
115. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will there be another Nunn-
McCurdy breach on the program this year?
Secretary Gates. No, there will not be another Nunn-McCurdy breach
this year. Although DOD added another $4.6 billion to the development
program, and the short-term aircraft price will increase resulting from
the reduction of 124 aircraft within the FYDP, I remain committed to
procuring 2,443 aircraft in total. I believe that the changes to the
development program, together with DOD's long-term commitment to
procurement quantities, provide a reasonable baseline and strong
foundation for program execution going forward. These changes will not
result in a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
116. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under your restructure
proposal, what is the current estimate for the additional time required
to complete developing the aircraft?
Secretary Gates. The development phase of the SDD phase ends with
the completion of development testing, now estimated to be completed in
fiscal year 2016. This estimate was based on the independent Technical
Baseline Review involving 120 tactical aircraft experts from the
Military Services and DOD over a period of months.
117. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you suspended the Marine
Corps version of the JSF, the F-35B, putting the program in a 2-year
probationary period--necessary to get the program back on track. At the
time you stated if cost, development, and schedule overruns could not
be rectified in that 2-year timeframe, you would cancel the program.
However, the PEO of the JSF program, Vice Admiral Venlet,
reportedly said, ``There is no black and white checklist to weigh the
program's performance against.'' Admiral Venlet reportedly said the
future of the Marine Corps version of the JSF will not be judged
against a checklist of hard milestones, but rather by a loose-knit
series of requirements--ranging from the aircraft's weight, propulsion
ratios, its ability to operate in a maritime environment, etc. Do you
agree with Admiral Venlet's assertion? If so, please explain, exactly
what does probation mean for the Marine Corps version of the aircraft?
Secretary Gates. ``Probation'' is not a suspension; ``probation''
is linked to both production and development. First, DOD reduced the
production of the F-35B Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
variant to three aircraft in fiscal year 2011, six aircraft in fiscal
year 2012, and six aircraft in fiscal year 2013. These aircraft numbers
are the minimum numbers required to sustain the F-35B production and
engineering workforce, as well as to sustain the supplier base of
STOVL-unique parts. The F-35A Conventional Take Off and Landing and F-
35C Carrier Variant (CV) aircraft are not dependent on the F-35B
development and flight test to complete their development.
Cost, schedule, and development progress must balance against
warfighter utility. The Commandant of the Marine Corps reviews the F-
35B STOVL progress monthly and separately from the monthly Service
Acquisition Executive (SAE) reviews of the F-35 program as a whole.
These reviews assess metrics ranging from affordability, weight growth,
key STOVL performance requirements, technical performance measures,
flight test status, and risk burn-down plans. These metrics provide a
holistic view of the F-35B progress. None of them provide ``black and
white'' decision criteria. These metrics, taken as a whole, will inform
the Commandant of the Marine Corps and DOD on the continued F-35B
progress at the end of the ``probation'' period.
118. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is success and what is
failure that warrants termination?
Secretary Gates. Termination is not a ``black and white'' decision.
It must be viewed from a holistic viewpoint by assessing cost,
schedule, warfighter utility in performance being delivered, and risk.
The goal of any acquisition program is an affordable system that
provides the desired warfighter utility. Warfighter utility is a
combination of capability delivered in a desirable timeframe. It is
DOD's job to accomplish this at a reasonable level of risk.
The Technical Baseline Review conducted by the new F-35 PEO
establishes a more realistic expectation for the F-35 development
program. The program is continuing its restructure activities for the
SDD phase, production activities, and operations and support. The
program will be assessed monthly by the service acquisition executives,
the warfighters, and DOD leadership to determine that the balance of
cost, schedule, and performance goals do not exceed acceptable risk
levels.
119. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, it appears the program office
has not taken any additional steps to refine the criteria on those key
goals, or established any further metrics on what needs to be done to
remedy the F-35B's serious issues to save it from cancellation, if that
is the right thing to do. As those steps are being taken, it seems to
me that there should be transparent, clear, and measurable milestones
against which performance can be measured against plan. Is that your
vision for determining whether the Marine Corps version of the aircraft
passes probation?
Secretary Gates. DOD is providing individual attention to the F-35B
STOVL variant specific issues to ensure cost and schedule milestones
are achieved in delivering required warfighter capabilities.
Specifically, Navy and the Air Force established a battle rhythm of
monthly Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) reviews with the F-35 PEO
to assess the overall F-35 program, with additional emphasis on F-35B
STOVL variant. These monthly SAE reviews examine the F-35 airframe and
propulsion SDD, production, and sustainment programs with particular
emphasis on cost/affordability, risk, and schedule. In addition, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps established a monthly F-35 review
focused solely on the STOVL variant. This review is also led by the
Navy SAE. The topics and metrics that are assessed include, but are not
limited to, the following:
Cost/Affordability/Earned Value Management (EVM): A
review of Acquisition Procurement Unit Cost, Program
Acquisition Unit Cost, Operations and Support costs, and EVM
cost/schedule indices.
Risk: Monthly assessment of `Program Risk' with
explanations about each risk item, their interactions, and risk
burn-down plans. Assessments include a review of the
assumptions and environment used to determine the risk
evaluations.
F-35B weight/weight growth: weight assessments track
each pound added to the airframe with an understanding of the
underlying reasons for the growth. If there are trades that
need to be made to mitigate weight growth, DoN senior
leadership/warfighters are to be consulted.
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs): review of F-35B
KPPs with a tracking/trending methodology and monthly
discussions of considerations for a Concept of Operations that
might help facilitate achievement of F-35 KPPs and program
goals.
Airframe Technical Performance Measurements:
Assessments of reliability, maintainability, combat radius, and
gross weight (with metrics that indicate the desired value(s),
the current status, margin, and trends).
F-35B Flight Test: review of F-35B flight test data,
to include planned/scheduled test points to be flown versus
achieved test points flown; scheduled test flights flown versus
actual test flights flown (delineated by STOVL variant); and
Clean-Wing Flight Envelope coverage (to assess the progress on
the envelope cleared for flight as a result of Developmental
Test and alignment with software delivery).
As these monthly reviews mature, the Navy will refine key F-35B
metrics to ensure this essential capability is delivered to the Marine
Corps warfighters and to enable the Department to make a decision on
the F-35B STOVL variant probation status.
SHIPBUILDING
120. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, another
area of the Navy's budget that I am very concerned about is the amount
of funding needed for ship construction going forward. With about half
of the construction and development dollars being needed to build
extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines (for example, right now,
Ohio class replacement nuclear ballistic submarines are estimated to
cost at least $7 billion), I am concerned that our commitment to
building new submarines may be crowding out funding needed to modernize
the surface fleet. Do you share that concern? If so, how do you intend
to address it?
Secretary Gates. DOD recognizes that building the required force
structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs
(including combat systems) within an affordable range. I continue to
look for further affordability and efficiency opportunities as DOD goes
forward with the shipbuilding plan, such as revising the acquisition
strategy for the LCS to maximize the advantage of the competitive
pricing received and gain a ship within the FYDP. Additionally, prior
to Milestone A approval for the Ohio replacement submarine, DOD
evaluated numerous capability trades to reduce costs. As a result, the
Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter
of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic
sensors, and other defensive features throughout the design. These
trades made the submarine more affordable, while maintaining the
necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction of the
projected cost to a target cost of $4.9 billion (fiscal year 2010
dollars) for the follow on hulls 2-12. These initiatives support DOD's
ability to provide the capability and flexibility for meeting the
myriad of missions that the Navy is called upon to execute throughout
the world every day.
Admiral Mullen. We developed the shipbuilding plan and this budget
based on averages of about $15.9 billion per year for the early years
of the plan, and then about $2 billion more on average for the years in
the plan when the Ohio replacement submarine is being constructed. This
will support a force structure of about 313 battle force ships,
enabling the Navy to meet its global commitments and to support
contingency operations. We will continue to look for efficiency
opportunities as we go forward with the shipbuilding plan. This will
involve decisions such as we have already made by truncating the DDG-
1000 program to three ships and restarting the DDG 51 production line,
taking advantage of the aggressive pricing we received on LCS to gain a
ship within the FYDP, and pursuing a lower cost alternative for the
Mobile Landing Platform.
Prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio replacement submarine,
numerous capability trades were evaluated to reduce costs. As a result,
the Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the
diameter of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried,
acoustic sensors, and other defensive features throughout the design.
These trades made the submarine more affordable while maintaining the
necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction of the
projected cost from $7 billion to about $5 billion per boat.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND THE NEED FOR AUDITS
121. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain to me how you
can demand fiscal savings and efficiencies across every sector of
operations in DOD without the ability to track expenditures in
financial statements that can be audited?
Secretary Gates. DOD records and reports expenditures associated
with budgeted amounts. While not sufficient to meet audit standards,
this longstanding approach proved to be an effective means of
responsibly managing public funds entrusted to DOD. There are thousands
of well-trained financial management professionals in DOD dedicated to
and motivated by their role in providing the resources to warfighters
necessary to meet the national security mission of the country. These
financial managers know DOD missions cannot be executed without timely
and sufficient resources so are able to track expenditures and report
to managers with an accurate status. Because of this capability, I feel
DOD can demand and track savings from specific operations.
This does not mean that DOD does not take the financial statement
audit requirement seriously. Financial statement audits are also a key
indicator to the public that we have reliable financial management
information. While it is not the intent of financial statement audits
they are a signal to the public that DOD manages funds legally,
effectively, and efficiently. I am dedicated to having fully auditable
financial statements by 2017, the deadline established by Congress.
122. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why is this not your highest
and most critical efficiency initiative?
Secretary Gates. The highest priority for DOD's business enterprise
is to meet the needs of the warfighters executing the national security
mission. Due to potential budgetary constraints, I directed DOD to
eliminate or reduce overhead tasks and transfer the related resources
to meet urgent warfigher needs. In other words, transfer resources from
tail to tooth. This initiative to improve financial management is part
of that effort. Improved financial management information will help DOD
better identify overhead costs and ensure reductions are realized.
123. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how can DOD ensure that
taxpayer dollars are not being wasted, stolen, or otherwise abused
without an audit?
Secretary Gates. I believe that even though DOD cannot currently
meet commercial audit standards, the public can have confidence that it
is spending dollars responsibly. That is a primary task of DOD's
financial management workforce, and DOD has an extensive training
program to ensure financial managers know the proper rules and
processes. In addition, there are thousands of auditors reviewing
programs and payments. These audits find far fewer improper payments
and appropriation law violations in DOD than in other Federal agencies,
after adjusting for the size of the budgets. This is true even though
most other Federal agencies have auditable financial statements.
As mentioned in an earlier question, this does not mean DOD is not
fully committed to achieving full financial statement auditability.
This demonstrated progress will further reinforce confidence in the
positive financial outcomes we already achieve.
124. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how will you ensure that the
savings you have proposed will be achieved?
Secretary Gates. DOD effectively manages operations by tracking
obligations and expenditures against budgeted amounts. The primary
control the Department uses to implement savings efforts is to include
them in the President's budget request. The efficiencies that DOD
defined in response to my initiative have been included in the
President's 2012 budget request. DOD has several management controls,
including regular reviews of obligation rates and detailed program
budget reviews, to ensure it is executing according to the budget.
Through these means DOD will ensure that proposed overhead reductions
are realized.
125. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, over the last few years,
Congress has pushed DOD to reform its financial management practices,
most recently the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, requiring DOD to achieve a
full, unqualified audit by 2017. The law also requires you to submit to
Congress semiannual reports that lay out milestones describing progress
over time. Are you on track to comply with this statutory requirement?
Secretary Gates. As you recognize, preparing DOD for financial
statement audits is a monumental task, but with leadership focus,
accountability, and a streamlined approach, I believe it will succeed.
To realize success, DOD is using a streamlined approach that focuses on
improving and auditing the information most used to manage. DOD
established long- and short-term goals, set up a governance process,
and provided funding to the Military Services to make process and
system improvements. These system improvements, primarily deploying
ERPS, have broad operational improvement goals which include improving
business processes in a way to support audited financial statements.
I am dedicated to having fully auditable financial statements by
2017, the deadline established by Congress. The goal is in our
Strategic Management Plan and is one of eight high priority items DOD
committed to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to achieve.
While it is still early to definitively predict success, I believe DOD
is on track to comply and look forward to reporting progress in the
semi-annual reports.
126. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, given the push for savings,
can you achieve the audit earlier than 2017? If so, what additional
resources would you need?
Secretary Gates. Achieving auditable financial statements is a
massive undertaking requiring changes to the capabilities of our
people, processes and systems. Like any major change management effort
changes take time and a great deal of resources. The extreme size of
DOD complicates change further and requires more time and resources.
DOD is already investing significant amounts in improving its financial
management systems by implementing and integrating ERPS as well as
investing over $200 million a year in improving people and processes. I
feel that the resources allocated are appropriate and the significant
dependency on systems modernization makes achieving the audit earlier
than 2017 impractical.
C-17 GLOBEMASTER
127. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under the continuing
resolution enacted late last year, has DOD been funding the continued
production of C-17 cargo-lift aircraft?
Secretary Gates. No, DOD did not fund the continued production of
new C-17 aircraft beyond the 10 aircraft appropriated in fiscal year
2010 by Congress. However, in accordance with Continuing Resolution
Authority (CRA) guidelines, DOD funded a total of $12.7895 million in
fiscal year 2011 CRA to support transition to sustainment in
preparation for shutdown activities.
128. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are DOD's plans for this
program in the future under the various appropriations scenarios for
fiscal year 2011?
Secretary Gates. DOD determined that the C-17 aircraft already
procured are more than sufficient to satisfy airlift requirements. As I
have previously testified, I do not support the addition of more C-17s.
129. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is your position on the
inclusion of any funding for continued production of C-17s in the 2012
defense bill?
Secretary Gates. Since 2001, DOD conducted four major mobility
studies, all of which support the conclusion that the C-17 and C-5
airlift fleet capacity is more than sufficient to meet current and
foreseeable demands.
1. Mobility Requirements Study-05 (MRS-05) (completed in 2001)
2. Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) (completed in 2005)
3. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study conducted in 2009 as
required by Section 1046 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
110-181)
4. Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16)
(completed in 2010)
The most recent study, the MCRS-16, identified the requirement for
organic airlift as 32.7 million ton miles per day (MTM/D). This level
of airlift capacity meets the most demanding scenario consistent with
the Defense Strategy. The current programmed strategic airlift fleet of
223 C-17s, and 111 C-5s, provides a capacity of 35.9 million ton-miles
per day. The difference (35.9 MTM/D vs. 32.7 MTM/D) is the equivalent
of 25 C-17s or 30 C-5As. The MCRS-16 and the aforementioned studies
clearly show that the Department has more strategic airlift fleet
capacity than needed. Therefore, I believe that it is not in the
national interest to include any funds for continued production of C-
17s in the 2012 defense bill.
President Obama's comments on releasing his administration's fiscal
year 2011 budget request included the following statement:
``We save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs
that do nothing to keep us safe. One example is the $2.5
billion that we're spending to build C-17 transport aircraft.
Four years ago, DOD decided to cease production because it had
acquired the number requested--180. Yet every year since,
Congress had provided unrequested money for more C-17s that the
Pentagon doesn't want or need. It's waste, pure and simple.''
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I echoed
the President, saying that I would not support the addition of more C-
17s. My position today remains unchanged.
SAVINGS-AND-EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES
130. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, given how inherently
unreliable and defective DOD's financial management processes are, I
have serious questions about the projected savings of many of the
efficiencies initiatives. While I certainly commend your attempt to
find $78 billion in cuts over the next 5 years, I have to question how
likely is it that DOD will actually realize the savings it says it will
get.
What is your assessment of how much of the $78 billion in cuts will
result in deferment of bills that must eventually be paid, in contrast
to actual savings from an elimination or a reduction in requirements?
Secretary Gates. The $78 billion reduction to DOD's projected
budget over the next 5 years is achievable and will be closely
monitored and assessed by DOD to ensure savings are fully realized. The
efficiency initiatives include actions to reduce overall requirements
commensurate with the lower rate of growth after the $78 billion cut. I
remain strongly committed to meeting these goals and finding new ways
to improve how DOD conducts business thereby better using the country's
scarce resources.
131. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, which of the elements of
savings and efficiencies that you have identified carry the most risk
of not being realized? Please explain your answer.
Secretary Gates. Experience tells me that some of these initiatives
may not proceed entirely according to plan. DOD has no choice but to
strictly monitor and enforce these efficiencies and make adjustments as
needed with the understanding that it cannot afford to return to past
behavior. At this point, there are no elements that I believe are
especially risky.
132. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain what cost-
based analytical processes and methodologies (such as performance-
based, mission-based, staffing-profile-based government, military,
contractor, etc.) are the efficiencies proposals based on?
Secretary Gates. The majority of these proposals were function or
mission-based. The intent was to focus scarce resources on functions/
missions associated with the provision of military capability. DOD took
an ``unsparing'' look at reducing functions (and costs) associated with
overhead and administrative positions. Even the reductions in contract
costs were motivated and enforced with this principle in mind.
133. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I understand that the COCOMs
and the IC were asked to submit zero-based assessments with
accompanying recommendations for gaining 10 percent efficiencies.
Exactly how did OSD review assessments or analyses of those
submissions?
Secretary Gates. The entire fourth Estate (OSD, the Defense
Agencies, Field Activities, and COCOMs), including the IC, conducted a
zero-based review to identify opportunities to perform more
efficiently, eliminate unnecessary functions, and reduce costs. My
Efficiencies Task Force reviewed each of the zero-based submissions
with a two-fold purpose:
Develop a baseline of each organization's missions,
priorities, and resource allocation
Using this baseline, rebalance resources within and
across components so that they align better with the most
critical challenges and priorities within DOD.
These submissions included a detailed profile of each
organization's missions, functions, and resources. The rebalancing
process involved the critical review, analytical assessment and
evaluation of:
(1) baseline data,
(2) mission and manpower priorities, and
(3) recommendations for organizational restructuring and
reallocation of resources.
This process was conducted by members of the Efficiencies Task
Force, subject matter experts and analysts from responding
organizations, and was reviewed by program, comptroller, and manpower
experts.
134. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, was a broader portfolio
review or trade-off analysis performed to understand and balance cost-
savings with mission performance? If so, please explain.
Secretary Gates. Yes, this year's program and budget review process
focused on preserving critical capabilities by making very targeted
resource allocation decisions. During this cycle, DOD used a series of
front end assessments to address a variety of portfolio-type reviews
such as airborne ISR, long-range strike, global posture and tactical
aviation to better understand the range of options in each area. These
analyses guided investment decisions, while the efficiencies
initiatives focused on trading administrative and overhead expenses for
operational capability--this was a prudent trade.
135. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, additionally, how were the
COCOMs' and the IC's overall annual budget evaluated and compared to
their unique ongoing mission requirements--to devise an accurate
estimate of actual expected savings versus annual budget?
Secretary Gates. Each of these organizations submitted its own
detailed accounting of personnel and missions in priority order. These
submissions explicitly considered the organizations' unique and ongoing
mission requirements. Additionally, every organization also submitted
its own ideas for how it could operate more effectively and
efficiently. In some cases it nominated new and better ways of
performing critical functions. In other cases, it nominated functions
that were of minimal value for either elimination or downgrading. Such
missions were typically either redundant or overhead functions. COCOMs
estimated savings in coordination with OSD budgeting, programming, and
manpower experts. The IC followed a similar process and considered
input from both a supply perspective (analysts from intelligence
organizations) and a demand perspective (combatant commanders).
MANAGING FORCE REDUCTIONS
136. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, reductions in end strength
for all the Active-Duty Forces, not just the Army and Marine Corps,
appear inevitable due to the declining budgets and the rising cost of
personnel. Next month, the Army will begin a year-long plan to cut
7,000 soldiers, and from 2013 through 2014, an additional 14,000. And
that's just the beginning. Cuts of 27,000 in the Army and 15,000 in the
Marine Corps have been forecast to commence in 2015.
During the force drawdown in the 1990s, the availability of force-
shaping authorities, such as early retirement authority and financial
incentives for those voluntarily retiring or resigning, were essential
tools in equitably achieving force reduction goals. In the current
economy, with retention at very high levels, it appears that such
incentives will be necessary. Do you plan to submit legislative
proposals that will facilitate the kinds of force cuts that are being
planned for?
Secretary Gates. Yes. DOD is carefully examining the authorities
required to achieve the legislated end strength, while maintaining
transparency with regard to future requirements. My goal is to submit
legislative authorities that allow targeted reductions and maximum
flexibility.
Leadership is the key to ensuring each individual understands the
needs of DOD so they can make informed choices. This will be no easy
task. But I assure you, DOD will continue to recognize the
contributions of the men and women who served throughout numerous
conflicts, while ensuring that the military departments and the COCOMs
meet their missions in an ever-changing global environment.
137. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, other than force cuts, and
putting aside the Defense Health Program momentarily, do you see any
feasible way to control the costs of personnel as a share of the DOD
budget?
Secretary Gates. Yes. In order to control total personnel costs
across DOD, improvements to the Total Force management of our Active/
Reserve military, government civilians and contracts for services must
be considered. This is critical to control personnel costs as a share
of the budget. To this end, DOD is changing how it strategically views
the Total Force--both as it executes the mission and plans across the
FYDP. DOD is scrutinizing the meaning of the ``demand'' for manpower,
rigorously determining which should be funded and how (e.g., Active/
Reserve military, civilians, or contracts).
Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and
prioritization of work, and the identification and investment in the
most effective and efficient component of the workforce to best
accomplish a specific task. I believe that our military should not be
considered a ``free'' source of labor by organizations within DOD,
while the military services alone ``finance'' their recruitment,
training and development. The true cost of military, government
civilians and/or contractors depends greatly on individual facts and
circumstances. DOD must do more to objectively analyze not only the
demands for manpower but, where appropriate, the best ``Total Force
solution.'' The separate decisions that affect each component of the
Total Force must be better synchronized to achieve the desired outcomes
and to balance operational, fiscal and acquisition risks.
The solution must not only include the development and promulgation
of policies, but also ensure that DOD provides managers with the tools,
resources, training and information necessary to achieve the desired
outcomes. Finally, current business processes must be better
synchronized to achieve a more appropriate balance in the workforce,
aligning inherently governmental activities to military and civilian
workforces, and commercial activities to the most cost effective
service provider--be that military, civilian, or contracted support.
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
138. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, under your leadership,
significant changes have been made in the way the National Guard and
all the Reserve components contribute to the decisionmaking process.
Designating the Guard Bureau as a joint activity and elevating the rank
of the Chief of the Guard Bureau to a four-star general are just two
examples of the recognition that the Army National Guard and Air
National Guard are vital parts of the Army and the Air Force. Despite
this, we continue to see proposals that the Chief of the Guard Bureau
be made one of the JCS. What are your views about the proposal to make
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a member of the Joint
Chiefs?
Admiral Mullen. Over the last 10 years, the National Guard has
provided crucial elements to our Joint Force and their execution of
Army and Air Force missions has been stellar. They are appropriately
represented on the JCS by the respective Army and Air Force Chiefs of
Staff, so I and the other JCS members unanimously do not support the
CNGB being made a member of the JCS. Since the CNGB was elevated to the
four-star rank in 2009, we have included him in our meetings and he has
contributed valuable perspectives regarding the National Guard,
particularly its critical, non-federalized homeland defense mission and
forces. This is congruent with the 2008 NDAA promulgating the CNGB
fulfilling a statutory role and responsibilities as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense through me on these unique matters.
139. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you think such a change
would be harmful? Why or why not?
Admiral Mullen. Adding the CNGB as a member of the JCS would be
redundant and harmful. Like the other Service Chiefs (the JCS members),
the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff organize, train, and equip their
Total Force, including their respective National Guard, to present an
integrated Joint Force to the combatant commanders. They maintain the
independent departmental authorities and budget with which to do so.
Adding CNGB to the JCS would disrupt those lines of authority and
introduce representation inconsistencies. Since the CNGB's
responsibilities are administrative in nature, making him a member
would also create the harmful impression that the National Guard is a
separate Military Service.
EARMARKS
140. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, with the recent pledge for
both chambers to enforce a moratorium on earmarks over the next 2
years, there is a renewed concern that Members of Congress with special
interests will go underground to pressure program managers within DOD
in phonecalls and meetings to steer funds toward their pet projects.
What processes do you have in place to protect DOD program managers
from this kind of pressure?
Secretary Gates. Program managers and contracting officials'
compliance with the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations, and the President's March 2009 Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Contracting all serve
to safeguard the acquisition process from underground earmarks and
congressional pressure--through requiring competition and transparency.
Compliance with the many requirements in the acquisition process
protects program managers from being forced to award contracts
noncompetitively or under the table. Furthermore, the Department
demands ethical behavior from its program managers and would expect the
same of those it deals with in the legislative branch.
141. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what can be done to ensure
taxpayer funds provided to DOD go to the most critical priorities and
are not used to satisfy a specific Member interest?
Secretary Gates. Several actions would provide DOD flexibility to
ensure that its appropriations go to the military's most critical needs
or can be realigned to fund unforeseen emergent requirements.
Eliminate section 8006 in Appropriations bills. That
section is aimed at ensuring that DOD executes the exact
funding for specific programs, projects, and activities--as
listed in the tables in the Explanatory Statement (or Committee
Print or Conference Report) accompanying a bill.
Eliminate bill language or General Provisions that
specify funding for specific programs, projects, or activities.
Approve the transfer authority requested in each
President's budget to give DOD enough flexibility to reprogram
funds to its most critical needs.
Omit legislative direction that restricts DOD
reprogramming, such as prohibiting the reprogramming of funds
added by Congress.
Reform the process by which congressional oversight
committees review reprogrammings to facilitate timely
approval--such as initiating a time limit for review.
Increase the amount of funds that can be reprogrammed
below threshold within an appropriations.
142. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is there an opportunity to
make public the specific requests by Members of Congress made to
representatives of DOD on issues related to contracts, acquisitions,
and fiscal obligations?
Secretary Gates. I believe that would be a counter-productive
effort and detracts from executing the mission. For the majority of
earmarks, DOD does not place each earmark on a funding document by
itself. Most earmarks are incorporated into the funding document for
activities related to it. DOD funding is executed at the field activity
level, and requiring these activities to collect information related to
earmarks would impose a wasteful burden and detract them from focusing
on efficient management of funds.
143. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in recent years, there has
been a proliferation of funding grants and other large amounts
appropriated to DOD for vague requirements (to preclude being called an
earmark) like $300 million for medical transportation infrastructure in
the National Capitol Region, $50 million for private museum
construction, $250 million for repairs to local community schools, and
$500 million for civilian infrastructure projects on Guam. None of
these amounts are included in DOD budget requests, nor are they
considered firm DOD requirements. All of them are added as a result of
decreases to other DOD accounts. So, it would seem logical that in
these times of fiscal austerity where DOD is making hard decisions
about savings and efficiencies, there would be strong opposition to
congressional efforts to fund them from DOD accounts. But there isn't.
What is DOD's position on the use of DOD funds for non-DOD requirements
which are not included in a budget request?
Secretary Gates. DOD's position is that the President's Budget
requests what is required to meet our mission requirements each year.
Upon enactment of an Appropriations Act the Department executes the
enacted programs, complying with reprogramming and transfer
authorities.
Background
In DOD appropriations bills, Section 8006 and general provisions
specifying funding for specific items do not give DOD the flexibility
to decide whether congressional adds are the best use of appropriated
funds. Congressional adds can only be reduced if they are for Federally
Funded Research Development Centers, economic assumptions, or excess
cash balances of the Defense Working Capital Funds, by their
proportionate share. All other reductions in the DOD appropriations
bill result in the President's budget baseline taking those reductions,
thus diverting funding from mission requirements.
144. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if you are presented a
request for a formal position on a particular spending item of this
nature, can I expect a firm and unequivocal position from you stating
why you either oppose or support the spending?
Secretary Gates. Yes, DOD leaders and I are always prepared to
state opposition to unrequested changes to the President's budget
because these changes divert funding from DOD's most pressing
requirements, as detailed in the budget.
Beyond this straightforward opposition to changes to the
President's budget, however, comments on specific congressional adds,
or any other legislative positions, are the purview of the White House
and OMB, and DOD follows their lead, and does not provide a position on
its own.
OKINAWA AND GUAM
145. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the road to a reduced U.S.
presence on the Island of Okinawa has been paved with quite a few speed
bumps. Not only do we have an irate contingent on Okinawa that has
already ushered out one prime minister, but the folks on Guam aren't
exactly excited about the current plan either. I notice that you have
scaled back the request for funds by almost $300 million for Guam
construction for fiscal year 2012 from what you had planned last year.
This is in addition to the $320 million we have deferred in fiscal year
2011 for a host of reasons.
You mentioned that you expect to see a decision in the spring of
2011 on the final location for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
on Okinawa. Will this decision be considered the tangible progress
required by the formal agreement between our Government and the
Government of Japan? If not, when do you expect Japan to demonstrate
tangible progress towards completion of the FRF?
Secretary Gates. I see tangible progress on the FRF, not as a
single specific event, but rather as a series of steps taken roughly in
parallel between Japan and the United States, as spelled out in our
bilateral understandings on realignment. As Japan makes progress on the
FRF, the United States will take associated steps to move forward on
Guam. There are a number of different indicators of this progress,
starting with the decision on the runway configuration that is expected
at the upcoming two-plus-two meeting with Japan, the issuance of the
landfill permit, the construction of the sea wall, and progress on the
landfill itself.
An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is
that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance
of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab.
It is necessary to ensure that when the U.S. is satisfied with the
progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be
available on Guam allowing the phased relocation of Marines from
Okinawa, such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit
cohesion and operational readiness.
146. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your view, should the
movement of marines to Guam take place without the demonstration of
tangible progress regarding Futenma?
Secretary Gates. The realignment of marines to Guam is dependent on
tangible progress towards completion of the FRF at Camp Schwab.
An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is
that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance
of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab.
It is necessary to ensure that when the United States is satisfied with
the progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be
available on Guam allowing the phased relocation of marines from
Okinawa, such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit
cohesion and operational readiness.
147. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Navy's Record of Decision
related to the environmental impact on Guam released last fall
conveniently punted on two major issues--potential damage to coral
reefs in the Apra Harbor and the impact to cultural resources from the
acquisition of private land for Marine Corps training ranges. Both
issues, as well as the adequacy of Guam's civilian infrastructure, are
of significant concern to Guam residents and should be of equal concern
to DOD. Shouldn't we resolve these issues completely before we continue
to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the construction of a new
Marine Corps base on the island?
Secretary Gates. These three issues--the impact to coral reefs
associated with dredging for a proposed nuclear powered aircraft
carrier transient wharf, the management of cultural resources through a
Programmatic Agreement, and the adequacy of Guam's civilian
infrastructure--are of significant concern not only to the Guam
community but also to DOD. DOD is actively working to address all of
these issues, but complete resolution will be an ongoing effort
throughout the buildup process and is not required prior to beginning
military construction.
The Navy recently completed additional surveys of the marine
biology in the alternative sites proposed for the proposed wharf for a
transient nuclear aircraft carrier. It is anticipated the results of
these surveys will be outlined in a report due in November 2011,
allowing for a full assessment of impacts for coral reef resources.
As to the management of cultural resources, DOD and relevant
Federal and local regulatory authorities reached agreement on a
Programmatic Agreement under the National Historic Preservation Act.
This Programmatic Agreement guides how DOD handles impacts to historic
properties as the build-up effort moves forward. DOD is requesting $11
million in PB-12 to fund the development of a repository used to meet
DOD's commitments for preserving artifacts unearthed during military
construction.
Addressing Guam's infrastructure capacity is a priority, as it
directly affects the construction program and DOD is taking steps to
address this issue. With the application of Japanese-provided
financing, Guam's wastewater and power systems will be improved to
support the relocating marines, the influx of off-island workers needed
for the ramp-up of military construction, and Guam's long-term
population growth. DOD contributed $50 million to the Port of Guam and
$116 million in Defense Access Road funding ($49 million appropriated
in fiscal year 2010 and $67 million authorized for appropriation in
fiscal year 2011), both of which contribute to improving infrastructure
off-base to address construction capacity requirements. In the longer
term, an interagency effort, led by the Economic Adjustment Committee,
will continue working with Guam to assess off-base needs and identify
potential Federal funding solutions.
148. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is DOD's plan to rectify
these issues with Guam?
Secretary Gates. As for the potential impacts to coral, the Navy
recently completed additional marine biology surveys regarding the
alternative sites for a transient nuclear aircraft carrier proposed
wharf. It is anticipated that the results of these surveys will be
outlined in a report due in November 2011, allowing for a full
assessment of impacts to coral reef resources.
Following significant public comments, discussions with Guam's
leaders, and 3 years of consultations with the Guam State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO), I understand and appreciate the concerns
regarding cultural resources, and in particular, the potential impact
to Pagat village and cave from the preferred alternative site for a
live fire training range complex discussed in the Final Environmental
Impact Statement. On March 14, 2011 DOD, Guam SHPO, and Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation successfully reached agreement on the
Programmatic Agreement that will guide how DOD deals with impacts to
historic properties as the build-up effort moves forward. As part of
the Programmatic Agreement, DOD committed that access to Pagat village
and cave will remain unfettered and that these sites would not be
within the footprint of the live fire training range complex, should
the Navy select the Route 15 site in a forthcoming Record of Decision
for training on Guam. DOD is requesting $11 million in PB-12 to fund
the development of a repository used to meet the Department's
commitments for preserving artifacts unearthed during military
construction. As the military build-up continues, DOD will remain
engaged with these stakeholders to avoid, protect, and mitigate impacts
to cultural resources.
Improvements to Guam's infrastructure are necessary to support the
relocating Marines, off-island workers needed to ramp up the
construction program, and Guam's long-term civilian population growth.
Japan-provided financing will be applied to make improvements to off-
base power and wastewater systems, and to the Navy's water system on-
base. In its fiscal year 2011 budget, Japan requested $415 million of
its required $740 million contribution in utilities financing. The
projects funded by the fiscal year 2011 financing include upgrades to
the Northern District and Hagatna wastewater treatment plants, and
water production, treatment and transmission on-base. In the meantime,
efforts to address improvements to Guam's roadways and port are
underway. Through the Defense Access Road program, DOD will fund
improvements to Guam's public roadways ($49 million appropriated in
fiscal year 2010 and $67 million authorized for appropriation in fiscal
year 2011). DOD also contributed $50 million to the Port of Guam,
which, when coupled with $54 million in financing from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, will improve the port's capacity to support
the needs of the buildup. DOD continues to work with other Federal
agencies through the Economic Adjustment Committee to identify and
assess Guam's needs and look for Federal funding solutions to address
the island's infrastructure issues.
149. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, we have been asking DOD for a
master plan of the details of construction projects and total costs for
3 years, to no avail. Can we get that masterplan, a revised timeline,
and a total estimate cost to complete the move of 7,000 marines and
their families to Guam?
Secretary Gates. I understand Congress's concerns regarding the
total cost of the Guam realignment and DOD is committed to providing an
accurate picture of current costs. DOD is currently working to develop
an updated estimate, and this estimate will be provided to committee
staff prior to mark-up.
KOREA
150. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on September 23, 2010, you
directed U.S. Forces Korea and the Services to proceed with full tour
normalization for Korea, as affordable, but not according to any
specific timeline. You stated that ``full tour normalization in Korea
will further our long-term commitment to support our forward stationed
troops and their family members.'' Do you have an estimate of the total
costs required to implement this decision? If so, please provide it.
Secretary Gates. I understand the importance of tour normalization
from an operational and quality of life perspective and DOD is working
to better understand the costs of tour normalization. As the costs come
into better focus, DOD will determine the timing for moving forward.
151. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is DOD on track to provide a
plan by March 31, 2011, detailing schedules and costs?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
152. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on November 23, 2010, an
unprovoked and premeditated artillery barrage by North Korea on a South
Korean island killed two South Korean marines, wounded at least 19
other people, and set buildings and forests ablaze, the first time in
years that North Korea has trained the firepower of its 1.1 million-
strong military on South Korea's civilian population. This attack,
coupled with a new revelation about the North Korean nuclear program,
prompted one media outlet to call Korea ``a massive strategic challenge
in one of the most dangerous corners of the world.'' Given the increase
in uncertainty surrounding the security environment on the peninsula,
are you still committed to stationing U.S. military family members in
Korea?
Secretary Gates. DOD is committed to stationing U.S. military
family members in Korea under the Tour Normalization Initiative. DOD
intends to proceed as affordable, but not according to any specific
timeline. Tour Normalization in Korea will further DOD's long-term
commitment to provide greater stability for forward stationed
servicemembers and their families. U.S. Forces Korea, in coordination
with U.S. Pacific Command, the military departments, CAPE, and other
relevant OSD organizations, are working to provide a feasible,
affordable and secure plan to continue toward full Tour Normalization.
153. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would families have the
option of not being stationed in Korea? If so, would they incur any
personal expense?
Secretary Gates. If Korea Tour Normalization is fully implemented,
the assignment tour length for a majority of the locations will be 36-
months accompanied and 24-months unaccompanied. Military families will
still have the option of not accompanying their sponsor to Korea. In
this case, the family can remain where they currently reside, or move
to a place they designate in the United States at government expense.
If the family does not reside in government housing and is entitled to
housing allowance, their housing allowance will be as authorized for
the locality where they have chosen to reside.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
154. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are
your thoughts on providing to General McKinley, CNGB, a three-star
position to serve as his deputy?
Secretary Gates. This matter will be under review until the fall
2011.
Admiral Mullen. I fully support re-establishing the Vice CNGB at
the rank of lieutenant general. Doing so would enable the CNGB to
better administer his diverse duties and expansive portfolio that
includes the unique non-federalized homeland defense equities of the
National Guard. This action would be more purposeful to the National
Guard than making CNGB a member of the JCS.
CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITIES
155. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, you have proposed $2.3 billion
to support improved cybersecurity capabilities within DOD and greater
joint planning efforts between the military and DHS. Are we dangerously
vulnerable to cyber intrusions and cyber attacks as a result of our
dependence on critical infrastructure?
Secretary Gates. The United States is vulnerable to cyber
intrusions and potential cyber attacks on its critical infrastructure.
The capabilities of state and non-state actors to exploit, disrupt, or
even destroy our critical information systems are increasing.
Almost every aspect of civilian life depends on access to the
Internet and other data-transmission networks. With our reliance on
cyberspace comes vulnerability. Because so many of our civilian and
military functions depend on computer networks, any large-scale
interference with our networks represents a potentially significant
threat to national security.
DOD has invested heavily in information technology--$38.4 billion
requested for fiscal year 2012--because information technology is a
force multiplier for military, intelligence, and business operations.
DOD has more than 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices,
across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the
globe. Our networks are attacked thousands of times each day, and
scanned for vulnerabilities millions of times each day. We know that
more than one hundred foreign intelligence agencies are attempting to
get into DOD's networks.
The departments and agencies of the public sector, as well as the
private sector, rely upon cyberspace to accomplish their missions
successfully. Because of the cross-cutting nature of the cyber threat,
U.S. Government departments and agencies must work together to protect
U.S. networks and systems. Our cybersecurity initiatives and
investments will enable DOD to protect its networks more effectively
and to support DHS and other agencies in achieving their cybersecurity
missions. (As a point of clarification, when we consider the full range
of DOD's cybersecurity investments, including CYBERCOM, the Defense
Cyber Crime Center, and the $2.3 billion requested for information
assurance, our comprehensive request for fiscal year 2012 is $3.2
billion.)
Cybersecurity is a top-tier national security issue for the United
States. We have made progress in strengthening our cybersecurity, but
more must be done. DOD looks forward to working with DHS and other
interagency partners, and with Congress, to improve the protection of
U.S. networks and systems.
156. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, if the United States is hit by
a catastrophic cyber attack--as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director Panetta described as the next Pearl Harbor--are we prepared to
respond?
Secretary Gates. DOD is prepared to protect defense critical
infrastructure/key resources from a catastrophic cyber attack and to
respond should such an attack occur. As described in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, DOD is taking several steps to
strengthen capabilities in cyberspace, including:
(1) developing a more comprehensive approach to DOD operations in
cyberspace;
(2) developing greater cyber expertise and awareness;
(3) centralizing command of DOD cyber operations; and
(4) enhancing partnerships with other agencies and governments.
Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection), DOD is
working with its private sector partners in the DIB to facilitate
vulnerability assessments and to encourage risk management strategies
to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks.
DOD is also working closely with its Federal partners to assist in
ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure and the preparedness
of the national cyberspace response system to deal effectively with
cyber attacks. DHS developed a National Cyber Incident Response Plan,
in which DOD is a key partner, to help ensure resiliency in the face of
changing threats and associated technologies. In general, DOD defers to
the DHS to evaluate the current preparedness of the national cyberspace
response system.
157. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, from your perspective, do we
have the necessary resources to prevent such an attack and who would be
in charge of such a response?
Secretary Gates. The United States possesses capabilities to help
prevent a major cyber attack, but they must be enhanced significantly
to cope with a rapidly advancing threat from both state and non-state
actors. DOD continues to work with DHS and others in the U.S.
Government to leverage existing authorities and develop new interagency
processes and capabilities to prevent a cyber attack. DOD is also
working with DHS and other agencies to identify additional authorities
that may be needed to defend the Nation against cybersecurity threats
most effectively.
In the event of an attack, the President has emergency authorities
to direct a unified, national response. Outside of emergency
Presidential authorities, DHS is responsible for coordinating the
national effort to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. critical
infrastructure. DOD is responsible for the security of its networks, is
assigned additional responsibilities for all national security systems,
and is the Federal agency responsible for coordinating with the DIB to
identify and defend against cybersecurity threats. If directed by the
President, DOD can use its capabilities to support DHS and to protect
U.S. Government systems, as well as the private sector systems on which
the U.S. Government relies.
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
158. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, today Iran is producing higher
enriched uranium and is moving closer to possessing the weapons-grade
uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. What is your assessment of Iran's
nuclear intentions?
Secretary Gates. The Iranian nuclear program and Iran's intentions
remain issues of paramount interest and concern, and we continue to
watch them very closely. At this time, DOD believes that Iran is not
nuclear weapons capable. DOD also assesses that Iran is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various
nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such
weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran
will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. As new information
becomes available, and as the Iranian nuclear program evolves, we will
reevaluate and reassess Iran's ultimate intentions and potential
capabilities.
159. Senator Brown. Secretary Gates, do you agree that a nuclear-
armed Iran poses an unacceptable risk to the United States?
Secretary Gates. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. I remain
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. A
nuclear-armed Iran would be highly destabilizing to the Middle East,
and could have significant implications for U.S. interests. However, no
one can say with certainty how the situation might unfold. A nuclear-
armed Iran could provide other States in the Middle East with the
impetus to pursue nuclear programs. Iran also could become more
emboldened in its actions throughout the region, most notably by
expanding its support for proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran could also
cause strategic instability that could eventually lead to a regional
conflict.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
ALTERNATE ENGINE
160. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, with the recent vote against
funding the JSF second engine, the House moved a step closer to
awarding one company a sole source contract for $100 billion lasting 30
years. This seems remarkably shortsighted and this fight for a
competitive process is not over. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has stated that: ``DOD experience with other aircraft engine
programs, including the F-16 fighter in the 1980s, has shown
competitive pressures can generate financial benefits of up to 20
percent during the life cycle of an engine program and/or improved
quality and other benefits.'' In other words, by funding the JSF
competitive engine, we have the chance to save about $20 billion over
time. I am concerned that the short-term financial benefits of
terminating the alternative engine will be dwarfed by the long-term
costs of a sole-source contract for an engine that is 50 percent over
budget.
I believe the F-35 will replace five aircraft currently in the Navy
and Air Force fighter fleet (F-16, F/A-18, AV-8, A-10, and F-117). It
is my understanding that by 2030, the F-35 will make up about 90
percent of the U.S. tactical fighter force. Would you please comment on
whether or not there is historical precedent for being so dependent on
one aircraft?
Secretary Gates. Being a tri-service program with eight
international partners, the scope of the JSF program is without
precedent. While the scope and number of tactical aircraft the JSF
program represents is large, having a single type model series aircraft
to fulfill a mission requirement is not without precedent.
For example, the Air Force will gradually replace the legacy fleet
of F-16s and A-10s as it transitions to a predominantly 5th Generation
fleet. In the 2030 timeframe, the Air Force will still operate a
significant number of legacy tactical assets. Assuming the Air Force
maintains its current fighter force levels, only 58 percent of the Air
Force tactical fighter force will be F-35As in 2030; combined with the
F-22 fleet, 63 percent of the Air Force fighter inventory will be 5th
Generation platforms. The Air Force continues to assess its fighter
force structure and will evaluate alternatives to replace additional
legacy platforms as they reach the end of their service lives.
The Navy's mission of airborne command and control is fulfilled
solely by E-2D/E-2C while search and rescue, anti-submarine, and anti-
surface warfare are fulfilled by MH-60 variants. The Navy's tactical
aviation projected aircraft inventory in 2030 will be comprised of six
Type Model Series (TMS) aircraft: F/A-18E/F, F-35C, F-35B, EA-18G, the
next generation air dominance aircraft, and the replacement for the EA-
18G. Of these aircraft, F-35s are expected to comprise roughly 65
percent of the Navy tactical aircraft inventory.
161. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, given our future dependence
on the F-35, does the failure to have a back-up engine present a risk
to our forces?
Secretary Gates. I believe that the interests of the taxpayer, the
military, our partner nations, and the resource integrity of the
overall F-35 program are best served by not pursuing a second engine.
The benefits which might accrue with a second engine are offset by
additional cost. Additionally, logistics complexity will divert
precious modernization funds from more pressing developmental
priorities.
The F135 engine program completed over 12,000 hours of engine
ground testing, more than 4,300 hours of engine specific flight
testing, and over 850 hours of aircraft flight tests on three variants.
As in any development program, there were technical challenges and
those that have arisen are understood and modifications are in
progress. Throughout SDD, the engine continues to be monitored and any
necessary modifications to ensure safety, reliability, and
specification deficiencies will be made. Dedicated F135 flight testing
will demonstrate performance throughout the flight envelope.
Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost penalties to
both the F135 and F136 engines in the form of significant upfront
investment cost, reduced production line learning curves, and less
efficient economic order quantities. DOD concluded that maintaining a
single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. I
believe the financial risks associated with a single source engine
supplier are manageable, and are less than the investment required to
fund a competitive alternate engine.
162. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, in your testimony you state
that in regard to funding the second engine, ``the Department has been
operating this fiscal year under ambiguous guidance at best.'' And that
given the situation you ``decided to continue to fund the JSF extra
engine effort during this interim period to give Congress the
opportunity to resolve this matter as part of its ongoing debate on the
budget.'' But isn't it the case that OMB concluded that the F-35
alternate engine funding must be funded in fiscal year 2011 even under
the temporary continuing resolution?
Secretary Gates. On December 21, 2010, OMB Director Lew did inform
Senator Brown of Ohio that the then in-effect CR ``would continue
fiscal year 2010 funding, terms, and conditions for the entire Federal
Government.'' Subsequent CRs also continued extending the funding,
terms, and conditions of the 2010 appropriations. However, consistent
with standing OMB guidance on the point, Director Lew also indicated
that DOD was expected to not impinge on congressional full-year funding
prerogatives for fiscal year 2011. Because funding need not be made
available in the course of any single period covered by a continuing
resolution if sufficient opportunity to fully execute would be
available upon the enactment of an appropriation act at the end of a CR
period, the protection of the Congress's fiscal prerogatives does not
require funding in any single CR.
163. Senator Portman. Secretary Gates, do you believe that you have
a choice as to whether or not to fund the alternate engine under a
continuing resolution?
Secretary Gates. During the period of the existing CR, I believe
that DOD has the discretion to issue a stop work order on the alternate
engine program, and given the circumstances the department may
determine that it should issue a stop work order. A stop work order is
temporary in nature and may not exceed 90 days unless extended by
agreement between the government and the contractor.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
U.S. FAMILY HEALTH PLAN RESTRICTIONS
164. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, the President's budget
request precludes enrollment in the U.S. Family Health Plan (USFHP) for
beneficiaries who reach 65 years of age. According to the transcript I
saw and the budget briefing, it is my understanding that DOD is
committed to working with the impacted hospitals on this issue to
ensure that the quality of care is not impacted. I also understand that
no current enrollee in this plan would be affected in terms of their
quality of care or health care costs. Are these accurate
characterizations of DOD's position?
Secretary Gates. Yes. Current enrollees are not affected by this
change.
The Department continues working with the six health plans to
ensure that quality of care is not affected for current or future
enrollees. Upon reaching age 65, USFHP enrollees may opt to enroll in
Medicare Part B and receive the TRICARE for Life (TFL) benefit as a
supplement to their Medicare coverage. The proposal does not result in
a beneficiary's loss of provider access, as long as the USFHP providers
continue to accept Medicare patients. This proposal provides equitable
treatment for all Medicare-eligible retirees by offering a nationwide
uniform plan. Most retirees do not live in one of the USFHP service
areas, and their only option for health care is Medicare and TFL
(requiring payment of their Medicare Part B premium). They and all
others enrolled in USFHP will be taken care of.
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE
165. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, separate from the concerns
about the continuing resolution in the short-term, I noticed in your
written testimony that you raised concerns about maintaining the
capability of the shipbuilding industrial base in the long-term.
Clearly, stability in requirements, procurement plans, and buying ships
at cost-efficient rates go a long way to achieving the necessary force
structure and save money. I am also encouraged that a second DDG-51
ship was included in the fiscal year 2014 budget as I had recommended
to sustain a DDG-51 procurement rate of at least two ships per year,
which should be closer to three ships per year. DDG-1000's construction
is also proceeding very well at Bath Iron Works, and I look forward to
Admiral Roughead's visit on the 23rd of February to see first-hand the
ship's and yard's progress. Please elaborate on the specific concerns
you have for the shipbuilding industrial base.
Admiral Mullen. As I stated last year, I am concerned about the
capabilities of our DIB, particularly in shipbuilding and space. Our
ability to produce and support advanced technology systems for future
weapon systems may be degraded by decreasing modernization budgets as
well as mergers and acquisitions. Left unchecked, this trend will
impact our future warfighting readiness. To ensure that DOD can
continue to rely on a dynamic defense market to meet shifting
requirements, robust competition is vital for producing high quality,
affordable, and innovative products.
My other concern regarding the shipbuilding industrial base has to
do with ship design and production. Six major U.S. shipyards build
nearly all of the Navy's warships, and while they consistently build
extremely capable ships, their production rate pales in comparison with
production rates of leading international shipyards. This places U.S.
shipyards at somewhat of a disadvantage because serial design and
stable production are critical factors to the incorporation of leading
shipyard technologies and decreased cost for DOD. The Virginia class
submarine and the T-AKE auxiliary program show the benefit these
factors can have on shipbuilding cost. Both programs enjoyed
significant cost reductions and improved production schedules as a
result of serial production and a stable design.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
INSTABILITY IN MEXICO
166. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, last month, General Michael
Hayden, a former CIA Director, described the crisis next door in Mexico
as one of six national security challenges that would ``keep him awake
at night'' if he were still in government. At this time, the U.S.
Government does not seem to have a coherent, meaningful strategy in
place to help the Mexican Government regain control over its country
and defeat the drug cartels. What do you see as the risks to our own
national security if the Mexican drug cartels are not defeated?
Secretary Gates. In 2008, the U.S. Government began coordinating
assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative with the goal of
supporting Mexico's efforts to build capacity to combat TCOs,
strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, reduce
violence, and stem the flow of drugs north and arms and illicit money
south. We recognize that, moving forward, U.S. efforts should:
(1) reinforce progress made in disrupting cartels;
(2) begin institutionalizing Mexican capacity to act on public
safety and security issues;
(3) help Mexico meet the challenges of securing its borders while
facilitating trade and travel; and
(4) promote respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a
culture of lawfulness. Although none of these are easy, we know we are
making slow but steady progress.
I admire President Calderon's government for the brave stand taken
against TCOs that seek to operate with impunity inside Mexico. Although
Mexico increased efforts to counter the TCOs, TCOs responded with
increased violence as they fight for turf and attempt to intimidate law
enforcement officers and the Mexican public. Although I am concerned
about the escalating violence in Mexico, I am confident that Mexico's
democracy is strong and that the government maintains control over its
territory.
As DHS Secretary Napolitano noted recently, we do not have evidence
that TCO violence is spilling across the border into the United States.
Still, these dangerous organizations have linkages to illicit groups
operating inside the United States, including drug traffickers and
gangs that pose health, law enforcement, economic, and security
challenges to cities and towns throughout our Nation. Although Mexico
called upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts
to combat TCOs, it continues to see the problem as a law enforcement
issue, as do I. DOD, along with interagency partners, is working
closely with Mexican counterparts to support its efforts to dismantle
TCOs, and DOD will continue to provide assistance as requested by
Mexico.
167. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the Mexican government
reports that over 34,600 people have been killed in drug-related
violence in Mexico since December 2006, including 15,000 deaths in 2010
alone--representing a 60 percent increase over 2009. What common
threads do you see between the cartel-driven unrest in Mexico and the
insurgency-driven violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, which our troops
have been battling for most of the past decade?
Secretary Gates. The challenges facing Mexico are quite different
from those confronting Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the TCOs
operating in Mexico are not attempting to overthrow the Mexican
Government, but instead are fighting for turf and to create a space in
which to carry out their illicit activities. As such, Mexico is dealing
with a law enforcement challenge; DOD is providing support to Mexico as
well as U.S. law enforcement entities in their unprecedented efforts to
confront this challenge, but is not directly engaged in the fight.
168. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, how can the
U.S. Government, and in particular DOD, better support our Mexican
partners?
Secretary Gates. Under President Calderon's leadership, Mexico is
bravely confronting the grave security threats posed by TCOs operating
within Mexican territory. At Mexico's request, through the Merida
Initiative and complementary programs, the U.S. Government, including
DOD, is providing support to Mexico to face these challenges.
Under Merida and other cooperative programs, DOD provides training,
information sharing, and operational support to Mexican military and
other security forces, as well as to U.S. law enforcement agencies'
activities with regard to Mexico. DOD is working with Mexican partners
to find areas in which to increase cooperation. In recent years, DOD
concentrated on assisting Mexican forces to improve tactical and
operational proficiency, as well as air mobility, maritime law
enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD
provided non-intrusive inspection equipment for mobile checkpoints and
eight Bell 412 transport helicopters for the Secretaria de la Defensa
Nacional. Also, DOD is working to deliver three UH-60M Blackhawks and
four Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA 235) maritime surveillance
aircraft. DOD support focused on helping Mexican security forces learn
to mount intelligence-driven and interagency-coordinated operations, as
well as on safeguarding human rights in the context of military
operations in support to law enforcement.
Moving forward, I believe the Department can best support our
Mexican partners by preparing to respond quickly to requests for
continued assistance from Mexico. Domestically, the United States must
also commit to confronting issues on our side of the border that
contribute to the challenges facing Mexico--namely the illicit
trafficking of arms from the United States into Mexico and our
country's demand for illegal drugs. The United States and Mexico have a
shared responsibility in the fight against TCOs, and our success will
depend on our continued partnership.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
169. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Mullen, in your written testimony, you
asked for Congress's help in modifying the laws and regulations
surrounding security cooperation to create an approach that better
integrates our defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence
efforts. In terms of geographic organization, DOS has six regional
bureaus and DOD has six different regional COCOMs, which are not
demarcated along the same lines on the map. At the same time, the IC
defines world regions utilizing a third set of lines on the map. In
your opinion, does this lack of common demarcation of the world's
regions by these Federal agencies hamper effective interagency
cooperation and coordination on national security?
Admiral Mullen. It is true that there is not a common demarcation
of the world's regions among Federal agencies. Many of these
differences are the result of historic ties and relationships, and the
unique focus of each agency. While these differences may create some
challenges, they do not hamper effective interagency cooperation and
coordination on national security. In some cases, the different
regional demarcations are beneficial to interagency cooperation and
coordination. Whenever lines of demarcation are created or utilized on
a map, issues may be created or exist that affect both regions, but are
missed due to their cross-boundary nature. By utilizing differing lines
of demarcation between the agencies, the impact of these seams within
an organization is minimized by working with other agencies to
formulate a cohesive foreign policy.
Additionally, I have a statutory responsibility under Title 10
U.S.C. 161 to review the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which includes the
COCOM areas of responsibility, not less than every 2 years, and
recommend any changes to the President through the Secretary of
Defense. This is a thorough review that includes inputs from Office of
Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, and the Services. The draft
UCP is then reviewed by the interagency via the National Security Staff
prior to receiving Presidential approval. In this process, I have not
received any indication that I should recommend a change to the
President to more closely align our regional designations with that of
other Federal agencies or that such a realignment would overcome any
existing shortfalls in interagency coordination.
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN
170. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, India has
committed some $1.3 billion and 3,500 Indian personnel to relief and
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to date, in recognition of the
fact that stability in Afghanistan is crucial to its own security. As
noted in Admiral Mullen's testimony, the enduring success of our
military operations in Afghanistan is dependent on the ANSF being able
to provide security to the Afghan people. However, reports indicate
that NATO still faces a shortage of 740 trainers needed by this summer
in order for the ANSF to be ready to take the lead by 2014. Given the
clear and immediate demand for more trainers and training options in
Afghanistan, as well as India's willingness to provide substantial
support to stability and security efforts in the region, should we
encourage India to expand its role and help train the Afghan security
forces?
Secretary Gates. The United States and India have shared interests
in a stable and prosperous South Asia region and in preventing
Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.
In the past, India provided scholarships for ANSFs personnel to
study in India, and is currently exploring options to train Afghan
women police in India.
I welcome these efforts, and encourage India to consider further
assistance in Afghanistan through priority infrastructure projects,
additional training and education assistance, and technical assistance
to the agriculture sector. I also encourage India to continue to engage
the Afghan government to identify further areas of cooperation.
During President Obama's visit to India in November 2010, he and
Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation,
and coordination to promote a stable, prosperous, and independent
Afghanistan. They agreed to collaboratively assist the people of
Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative
strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on
agriculture and women's economic development. Eighty-five percent of
Afghans derive their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue
to lack economic, social, and political opportunities.
The shortfall of 740 trainers currently identified by the NATO NTM-
A for filling the NATO's Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
includes a number of specific capabilities that only certain allies and
partners possess. DOD is currently working to match these specific
capacities with the NTM-A requirements.
Admiral Mullen. India already plays a role in training the ANSF.
They have provided training in India to over 400 ANA personnel, are
currently training 90, and have offered training for another 192 this
year. Expansion of further training efforts must be closely coordinated
with NTM-A and Afghanistan to ensure it meets the needs of the ANSF.
Regional political military considerations should be carefully weighed
when considering any expansion of an increased role for the Indian
military in the development of the ANSF, especially the introduction of
Indian Trainers to Afghanistan.
F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
171. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 DOD
budget request includes a major restructuring of the F-35 program that
cuts 124 aircraft from the FYDP, postponing production of these
aircraft until after 2016. I am concerned with the resulting impact to
unit cost to the remaining aircraft in the FYDP, and I believe this
poses the most immediate problem to our Services and our international
partners. What actions will you take to ensure that the restructuring
of this critical fifth-generation fighter program does not itself lead
to a substantial spike in unit cost?
Secretary Gates. In the short-term, I acknowledge there will be an
increase in unit costs as a result of the reduction of 124 aircraft
within the FYDP. DOD is currently assessing the magnitude of this
increase in support of the DAB review scheduled for May 2011, and will
report these figures as part of an update to the Selected Acquisition
Report this summer following completion of the DAB review. Despite the
reduction of aircraft within the FYDP, DOD remains committed to
procuring 2,443 aircraft in total, and this commitment will serve to
lessen the short-term spikes in unit procurement costs. The reduction
of aircraft procurement within the FYDP is prudent given the extension
of the development program, and the need to properly manage the risks
of concurrent development and procurement.
172. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, were our international
partners consulted on the announcement surrounding the restructuring of
the F-35 program? If so, what has been the reaction of our allied
partners, and do you believe this decision will impact when or how many
F-35 aircraft our international partners will ultimately buy?
Secretary Gates. The international partners in the JSF F-35 Program
are integral to our collective effort and were consulted prior to the
announcement regarding the restructuring of the program. The partners'
reaction to the announcement was positive. They appreciated the fact
senior leadership in DOD took the time to contact them ahead of the
formal announcement. There is no indication at this time that the
decision to restructure the JSF F-35 Program will affect the number of
aircraft the partners will ultimately buy or when the buys will occur.
B-1 FLEET
173. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, how are your fiscal year 2012
proposed budget cuts to the B-1 bomber fleet consistent with your
message about the need to sustain the current military force structure
during a time of war?
Secretary Gates. The B-1 fleet faces potential grounding due to
diminishing manufacturing sources and other sustainability issues.
Taking a minimal reduction in fleet size garners savings to increase B-
1 fleet viability through modernization efforts.
The Air Force conducted a review of current bomber force structure,
existing capabilities, and future power projection requirements in
determining the risk associated with a B-1 fleet reduction. The results
of this review, combined with high-fidelity modeling and simulation
analysis conducted by Air Force Studies and Analysis, indicate a
reduction of six B-1 aircraft leaves a more capable fleet that meets
the requirements in currently approved OSD analytic agenda scenarios.
A modest B-1 reduction, while modernizing the remaining fleet, is a
wise reinvestment strategy providing a capabilities-based bridge to the
future long range strike platform.
174. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, how much of the savings
obtained from this cut will be reinvested in sustaining and improving
the current B-1 fleet, to include enhancements such as a new radar
system?
Secretary Gates. The retirement of six B-1s provides a total
savings of $61.9 million in fiscal year 2012 and $357.3 million over
the FYDP in procurement and sustainment funding. Of these savings, the
Air Force is reinvesting $32.9 million in fiscal year 2012 and $125.4
million over the FYDP, into critical B-1 sustainment and modernization
programs to ensure the health of the remaining fleet. These programs
include procurement and installation of Vertical Situation Display
Upgrade and Central Integrated Test System sustainment efforts, Fully
Integrated Data Link capability upgrade and procurement of critical
initial spares for these modifications.
The ongoing Radar Maintainability and Improvement Program will
replace two unsupportable Line Replaceable Units within the current
radar system. The Air Force is assessing the remaining components of
the B-1 radar with consideration to both supportability and
performance. DOD applied the remainder of the savings from the B-1
reduction to other Air Force and DOD priorities to include continuing
to strengthen the nuclear enterprise and investing in Building
Partnerships capacity.
175. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the B-1 bomber has repeatedly
been cited by senior U.S. military commanders as the premier bomber in
Afghanistan. General David Petraeus has emphasized that, ``The B-1 is a
great platform in at least two respects. First, it carries a heck of a
lot of bombs, substantial ordnance. Second, it has very good
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. And it can
loiter for a good time, when it's not being used to drop bombs . . . ''
How will the proposed cuts to the B-1 fleet impact B-1 operations in
Afghanistan in the years to come?
Secretary Gates. There will be no negative impact to operations in
the Afghanistan theater. The fiscal year 2012 budget request reduces
the B-1B force structure by six primary aircraft authorizations leaving
60 B-1Bs in the Air Force inventory. This provides additional funds to
improve the existing B-1B fleet, including the central integrated test
system, fully integrated data link, and vertical situation display
unit. These initiatives will help bridge the gap until the next
generation strike aircraft is operational. However, investing in a new
penetrating bomber is critical to maintaining our long-range strike
capability in the face of increasing risk associated with anti-access
and area-denied environments.
176. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, why was the B-52 fleet, which
currently numbers 76 aircraft and does not provide nearly the utility
of the B-1 in current operations in Afghanistan, not similarly reduced?
Secretary Gates. The answer is two-fold. First, the dual missions
of conventional and nuclear capabilities of the B-52 provide the
flexibility to meet COCOM requirements that the conventional-only B-1
does not provide. Second, the B-52 fleet maintains better maintenance
statistics and requires fewer operational upgrades than the B-1;
therefore, the Air Force was able to provide those upgrades without
sacrificing force structure to pay for sustainment and upgrades.
LONG-RANGE STRIKE
177. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2012 DOD
budget request includes $197 million in Air Force RDT&E funding to
begin development of a new long-range bomber (Long-Range Strike) that
we are told would be penetrating, carry precision-guided conventional
weapons, and be nuclear-capable. Yet last month, Secretary of the Air
Force Michael Donley told reporters that while the new bomber would be
able to carry nuclear weapons, it would not be immediately certified
for nuclear missions.Why will the new bomber not be certified at the
outset to carry nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gates. The new bomber will be nuclear capable. The Air
Force will design and build the system to balance capability priorities
with the need to responsibly and affordably mature a new system.
Detailed timelines for certification will be developed as the program
matures.
178. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, what plans, if any, are being
made to enable the B-2 to be certified to deliver a nuclear ALCM?
Secretary Gates. The Air Force is planning to integrate the LRSO
weapon, which will replace the current nuclear ALCM, on the B-2.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM
179. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, there are now 30 Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California to defend against
Iran and North Korea, but the administration has purchased only 52 GBI
missiles. Following the last two Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system flight test failures, the MDA is down to only 20 GBI missiles,
which is not enough to continue development and improvement of the GMD
system, to conduct annual reliability flight testing, and to maintain
spare missiles for emergency deployment. Yet the fiscal year 2012
budget includes a reduction of $186 million to the GMD system from
fiscal year 2011 levels, while the proposed 5-year funding for GMD is
$1 billion less than that proposed in the fiscal year 2011 budget
request. Given the administration's commitment to continue development
and improving this important capability, how are these reductions
justified when additional testing and GBI missiles are needed?
Secretary Gates. The change from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year
2012 in the President's 2012 budget of $185 million reflects
efficiencies introduced by the Department and the MDA. One of the focus
areas of the efficiencies is cost savings through contract competition
in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program. Another key efficiency
was the consolidation of test events to achieve stated test objectives
with fewer events. These efficiencies execute the same program scope
with fewer program dollars, while continuing to meet the strategic
goals and timelines laid out in the BMDR to ensure the United States
has a reliable and proven system for homeland defense.
IRAQI AIR FORCE
180. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, in your testimony, you cited
the Iraqi Air Force's ability to protect its own air space as one of
three primary areas of U.S. concern with Iraqi military capabilities as
DOD prepares to withdraw the last U.S. troops at the end of 2011. What
steps have you taken to enable the Iraqi Air Force to take over this
key mission, including training and equipping efforts?
Secretary Gates. The Iraqi Air Force is on track to achieve minimal
essential capabilities by the end of 2011 in all mission categories
except airspace control; intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance;
and fixed-wing airlift. With continued support from U.S. advisors and
adequate resourcing from Iraq, improvements in accessions, airlift,
flying and technical training, air staff effectiveness, combat support,
and command and control should demonstrably contribute to internal
security while setting the stage for contributing to external defense
as well.
Iraq funded several Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases that provide
both fixed and rotary wing pilot and ground crew training, including
training to prepare pilots for a fourth generation fighter aircraft.
Additionally, Iraq funded FMS cases that are currently providing
aircraft as well as air surveillance radars.
181. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Gates, the Iraqi Government had
clearly been preparing to purchase 18 American-made F-16s until this
week, when they announced they would postpone their planned purchase in
order to shift funding to other non-military priorities. What steps are
you taking to complete this critical F-16 purchase to help bring the
Iraqi Air Force's air defense capability to proficiency?
Secretary Gates. GoI requested the purchase of 18 F-16s. However,
due to a number of competing priorities that must fit into a limited
Iraqi budget, the Iraqis were not able appropriate funds for an F-16
procurement program in the 2011 budget that was recently approved by
the Council of Representatives. Funds initially earmarked in the 2011
budget request to buy F-16s were shifted to provide critical human
services in the final Council of Representatives approved budget.
The most recent F-16 Letter of Offer and Acceptance tailored to
meet Iraqi funding constraints expired on January 31. USF-I leadership
continues to engage in discussions with Iraqi leadership on the details
of a possible F-16 sale. This continues to remain a top U.S. Government
and Iraq priority.
NATIONAL DEBT
182. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Mullen, in your written testimony, you
state: ``I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our national
security.'' Reckless fiscal policy is not the typical focus of our
military's threat analyses but, frankly, I could not agree more with
your assessment. Last Congress, I introduced a bill called the Foreign-
Held Debt Transparency and Threat Assessment Act, which would have
required regular assessments from the GAO on the national security
risks of the ballooning national debt. In addition to the sheer size of
our national debt (now more than $14 trillion), I am also deeply
concerned about our clear dependence on foreign governments such as
China to fund our deficit spending, so my bill would also require the
President to report quarterly to Congress on the national security
risks posed specifically by foreign holdings. Do you agree that having
this type of analysis is critical to both our fiscal and national
security policies?
Admiral Mullen. The ties between the strength of our economy and
our Nation's security are inseparable and incontrovertible. We need a
vibrant, growing economy to exert influence internationally and to
provide for our military and other defense capabilities. In turn, we
need the security provided by our national defenses to underwrite our
economic endeavors and our livelihoods. But today we find both our
economy and our security threatened by our burgeoning national debt.
In my position, my concerns about our debt stem from its long-term
effects on our Nation's fiscal standing and the difficult trade-offs
associated with restoring our fiscal health, rather than the holders of
our debt. As such, I have taken no position on the nature of the
holders of this debt.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
MISSILE DEFENSE BUDGET
183. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, on February 16, 2011, you
testified before the House Armed Service Committee: ``I do know that
the overall budget for missile defense is going from $10.2 billion to
$10.7 billion, so we're putting another $500 million into it. And there
is money for more--more Aegis ships, more of the transportable radars
like we have in Egypt--like we have in Israel and Japan right now,
and--and then there are also continuing investments in the Ground Based
Interceptor system.''
Of the $500 million increase for missile defense, only $219 million
is going to the MDA, whose budget increases from $8.4 billion in fiscal
year 2011 to $8.6 billion for fiscal year 2012. Despite the $200
million increase for MDA, 5-year funding for MDA declines by $2.6
billion between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2015, as compared to
last year's budget request. Funding for the GMD in fiscal year 2012 is
reduced by about $185 million, as compared to fiscal year 2011. Funding
for the GMD program over fiscal years 2012 to 2015 is reduced by
approximately $590 million, as compared to last year's budget request.
Why does the MDA budget decline by $2.6 billion between fiscal years
2011 and 2015?
Secretary Gates. The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on
the missile defense priorities set forth in the BMDR. The MDA budget
strategy in fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced
personnel, budgetary and management resources within and across its
components. In instituting efficiency initiatives MDA will make greater
use of competition across its acquisition programs and will realize
savings through a refined approach to service contracting.
184. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, why does the GMD budget
decline by $185 million in fiscal year 2012 and by $2.6 billion between
fiscal years 2011 and 2015?
Secretary Gates. The change from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year
2012 in the PB12 budget of $185 million is reflective of efficiencies
introduced by the Department and MDA. One of the efficiencies focus
areas is cost savings through contract competition in the GMD program.
Another key efficiency was the consolidation of test events, achieving
stated test objectives with fewer events. These efficiencies execute
the same program scope with fewer program dollars, while continuing to
meet the strategic goals and timelines laid out in the BMDR to ensure
the United States has a reliable and proven system for homeland
defense.
The $2.6 billion change between fiscal years 2011 and 2015 reflects
the change in funding for MDA as a whole, not GMD specifically.
The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on the missile
defense priorities set forth in the BMDR. The MDA budget strategy in
fiscal year 2012 identified efficiencies and balanced personnel,
budgetary and management resources within and across its components. In
instituting efficiency initiatives MDA will make greater use of
competition across its acquisition programs and will realize savings
through a refined approach to service contracting.
MEADS AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
185. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for your
decision not to proceed to procurement of the Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) air and missile defense system. As noted in the
DOD memo, the program is substantially over budget and behind schedule;
and it would take an extra $974 million to $1.16 billion just to
complete the design and development. But I understand that the decision
is to still proceed to spend approximately $804 million to implement a
proof-of-concept effort. I am concerned that this would mean spending
hundreds of millions of limited dollars on a system that we will not
procure. What is the basis for continued funding on a program that DOD
will ultimately not procure?
Secretary Gates. Although the DOD has decided not to procure MEADS,
the Department determined the technology being developed in the program
will be useful for other DOD programs. The DOD explored viable
potential courses of action, including:
(1) Terminating the program immediately, if the DOD could obtain
the required consent of the other Participants in the MEADS program
under the legally binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the
Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, and the Secretary of
Defense of the United States of America on behalf of DOD concerning
Cooperation on a Project for Design and Development (D&D) of a MEADS
(D&D MOU);
(2) Working with the other D&D MOU Participants to continue MEADS
development within the agreed funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU;
or
(3) Working with the other MEADS D&D MOU Participants to complete
the planned D&D phase by amending the D&D MOU to add the additional
funding and time required to develop and test the system fully for
production and fielding.
The DOD decided that the best option available under the MOU is to
continue to participate in the D&D phase within the funding limits set
forth in the D&D MOU. This decision ensures the DOD: will fulfill its
obligations under the D&D MOU; will avoid a situation where the DOD may
be viewed as reneging on its international obligations; will avoid
requiring the DOD to pay termination costs we expect would be
comparable to the cost of completing the ``proof of concept'' effort
under the D&D MOU; and, will facilitate the maturation of key
technologies useful to the DOD in other programs.
186. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, I applaud you for your
decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS missile defense
system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially over
budget and behind schedule. It would take an additional $974 million
just to complete the design and development of the program. It does not
make sense to continue to waste $800 million on a system we are not
going to procure. Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find
a way to ring out some additional savings out of this $800 million for
MEADS?
Secretary Gates. The DOD will continue to explore opportunities to
minimize cost. The Department explored viable potential courses of
action, including:
(1) Terminating the program immediately, if the DOD could obtain
the required consent of the other MEADS partners under the MOU among
the Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, and the Secretary of
Defense of the United States of America on behalf of DOD concerning
Cooperation on a D&D Project of a MEADS (D&D MOU);
(2) Working with the other D&D MOU Participants to continue
development of MEADS within the agreed funding limits set forth in the
D&D MOU; or
(3) Working with the other MEADS D&D MOU Participants to complete
the planned D&D phase by amending the D&D MOU to add the additional
funding and time required to develop and test the system fully for
production and fielding.
The DOD decided to continue to participate in the D&D phase within
the funding limits set forth in the D&D MOU. This decision ensures the
DOD: will fulfill its obligations under the D&D MO; will avoid a
situation where the DOD may be viewed as reneging on its international
obligations; will avoid requiring the DOD to pay termination costs we
expect would be comparable to the cost of completing the ``proof of
concept'' effort under the D&D MOU; and, importantly, will facilitate
the maturation of key technologies useful to the DOD in other programs.
187. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, DOD's memo indicates that it
will be necessary to allocate funds for Patriot upgrades. At a minimum,
will DOD work to reallocate funds for design and development for
upgrades to the Patriot system?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The Army is working to determine specific
actions to mitigate the loss of MEADS. The Army will then reallocate
funds originally programmed for MEADS beginning in fiscal year 2014 to
improving the Patriot system.
188. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, in the memo accompanying your
recent decision not to proceed to procurement of MEADS, you
specifically highlighted the Army's inability to afford to procure
MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for the decision.
In light of your decision, can you provide your assurance that DOD will
accelerate Patriot modernization efforts?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The Army is working to determine specific
actions to mitigate the loss of MEADS. The Army will then reallocate
funds originally programmed for MEADS beginning in fiscal year 2014 to
efforts accelerating improvements to the Patriot system.
CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
189. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, you recently stated, ``U.S.
senior military leaders monitored very closely all provisions related
to conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) throughout the recent START
treaty negotiation process''. Do you believe there is a current clear
commitment to deployment that allows for adequate U.S. missile
defenses?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. The START treaty allows for deployment and
further development of conventional strike weapons, which are designed
to hit targets any place in the world in 60 minutes or less. Any
warhead--nuclear, high explosive, or high speed kinetic--on an ICBM or
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) would be counted under the
New START treaty central limits. However, deployment of CPGS does not
impede our ability to provide for adequate U.S. missile defenses.
190. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, additionally, condition 6 of
the New START Resolution of Ratification called on the President to
clarify its planning and intent in developing future conventionally-
armed, strategic-range weapons systems (aka, CPGS). The February 2,
2011, report on CPGS, pursuant to Condition 6, lists three efforts
under development (hypersonic technology vehicle (HTV), advanced
hypersonic weapon (AHW), and conventional strike missile CSM)), at a
cost of some $2 billion between now and 2016 for research and
development. Is it still the policy of the administration, as per the
2010 NPR, to develop and field CPGS capabilities? If so, is it the
intent of the administration to make a deployment decision anytime
soon?
Admiral Mullen. Our plan is to continue to strengthen our
conventional capabilities as we reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
deterring non-nuclear attacks. We are continuing to plan for and
develop contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional
deterrence while preserving reassurance goals by avoiding limitations
on missile defenses and maintaining options for using heavy bombers or
long-range missile systems in conventional roles. The success of a CPGS
fielded capability will be dependent on progress made through the
continued RDT&E of critical technologies, formal establishment of
follow-on Service acquisition programs, and a concurrent effort to
improve the Nation's ISR capabilities.
191. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, the February 2 report states
that ``conventionally armed SLBM and conventionally armed ICBM concepts
with traditional ballistic trajectories are not currently being
pursued,'' and that ``DOD at present has no plans to develop and field
these systems.'' Given that these are the most mature technologies, why
isn't the administration pursuing conventionally armed SLBMs and ICBMs
as a near-term CPGS option?
Admiral Mullen. While CPGS capabilities are currently limited, the
current RDT&E approach is consistent with the department's vision of
developing enhanced conventional technologies and capabilities that
will minimize political and operational risks associated with fielding
and employment in the future. The HTV -2 and AHW technology experiments
along with the CSM demonstration are expected to provide more flexible
operational characteristics that will not count (New START treaty)
against a smaller triad of strategic nuclear capabilities. It will also
be important to discriminate these capabilities from current ICBM or
SLBM employment.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal,
McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Portman, Ayotte, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, Counsel; William
G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett and Casey
Howard, assistants to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich;
Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon,
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Brown; Gordon Gray, assistant to Senator Portman; Adam
Hechavarria, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl,
assistant to Senator Collins; and Dave Hanke, assistant to
Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from
Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM).
Today's hearing continues the committee's review of the
missions and operational requirements of our combatant
commanders in light of the priorities set out in the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request.
Nowhere will the President's budget priorities have a
greater impact than with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The men
and women of CENTCOM and SOCOM have been engaged in major
military operations for nearly a decade. Yet, in Afghanistan
and Iraq, our troops' morale is high. They are dedicated to
their mission and serving with courage and distinction.
We have asked so much of them. They have done everything we
have asked and more. That includes not just the servicemembers
themselves, but the families who have served our Nation at home
while their loved ones serve overseas. Admiral Olson and
General Mattis, on behalf of this committee, please pass along
our gratitude to the troops serving under your commands.
Admiral Olson, it is my understanding that you plan to
retire this year after an exceptional career in which, among
other things, you became the first Navy SEAL to attain the rank
of four-star admiral, and you have led SOCOM with great
distinction. Thank you for your outstanding service and that of
your family.
The Department of Defense (DOD), as are all Federal
agencies, is currently operating under a Continuing Resolution
(CR) that expires in a few days. Last week, Secretary Gates
described this as a crisis on his doorstep.
I hope that we will soon be in a position to enact a full-
year appropriation at an appropriate level. I hope, General
Mattis and Admiral Olson, that you will help the committee
better understand the impact of proceeding by CR on the forces
operating under your command.
In Iraq, CENTCOM is continuing to oversee the drawdown of
U.S. forces, as agreed upon by President Bush and Prime
Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement, which requires
all U.S. forces to be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31st of
this year. Because of the ongoing reduction of our general-
purpose forces in Iraq, the importance of the role performed by
our Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a force multiplier,
continuing to build the capacity of Iraqi counterterrorism
forces and enabling their operations against al Qaeda in Iraq
and other terrorist groups, is even more important.
As we reduce our presence, we must make sure that our
special operators receive adequate support, including
intelligence, medical evacuation, and quick-reaction forces.
The transition in Iraq also means that the State Department
will take over the lead for numerous activities in Iraq
previously implemented by DOD, including training the Iraqi
police.
We would be interested in hearing from our witnesses this
morning your views on the importance of providing adequate
resources to the State Department and other civilian agencies
to the success of that transition.
In Afghanistan, it is essential that President Obama holds
to his decision to set July 2011 as the date for the beginning
of reductions in U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates told this committee a few weeks ago that he
supported the decision to set the July 2011 date because it was
necessary to ``grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and
bring a sense of urgency to them of the need for them to step
up to the plate to take ownership of the war and to recruit
their own young men to fight.''
Admiral Mullen said at the same hearing that the July 2011
date ``has given the Afghans a sense of urgency that they
didn't have before the decision was made.''
The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP) have added 70,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
over the last year and will meet the current target of 305,000
ANSF by October of this year. A large, capable, effective
Afghan security presence is what the Taliban fears the most
because it would demonstrate that--contrary to the Taliban's
propaganda, the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda is a war
the Afghan people believe in and it is being fought by an
Afghan security force that they believe in, rather than a war
waged by foreign occupiers, as Taliban propaganda would have
it.
The administration is now considering a request to grow the
ANA and ANP by between 45,000 and 70,000 people, which would
bring the total ANSF levels to a range of 352,000 to 378,000 by
the end of 2012. I have twice recently urged President Obama to
approve this request for additional Afghan troops.
It is a key to the success of our mission and to faster
reductions of U.S. troops. It is also far less costly in terms
of U.S. casualties and taxpayer dollars than keeping large
numbers of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. I hope our witnesses
this morning will tell us whether they support the request to
build the ANSF by up to an additional 70,000 personnel.
The presence of safe havens for terrorists across the
Afghanistan border in Pakistan continues to pose a security
threat to Afghanistan and to the region. While U.S.-Pakistan
military cooperation has improved in some respects, the
Pakistani army has not yet gone after the sanctuaries for the
Haqqani network in North Waziristan or the Afghan Taliban in
and around Quetta, Pakistan.
Over the past month, the status quo in the CENTCOM AOR has
changed dramatically, and this change appears to be ongoing.
The protests in Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Iran, Yemen, and other
countries are examples of what President Obama has correctly
called a ``hunger for freedom.''
Many in the Middle East have been denied their democratic
and human rights for too long, and the past month is a clear
demonstration of the people there demanding those rights. The
United States needs to make constantly clear it supports those
seeking to exercise their fundamental rights in the Middle East
and around the world.
The committee looks forward to hearing from General Mattis
on his assessment and views on these protest movements, how our
security, how our counterterrorism operations, and how our
strategic goals are impacted by the events in the Middle East,
and how, if at all, the nature of our military-to-military
relationships might change in the region as a result of these
events.
In the waters off the coast of Somalia, the flow of
international commerce continues to be impacted by the threat
of increasingly aggressive pirates. Just last week, four
Americans were murdered at the hands of more than a dozen
pirates bent on extracting ransoms in exchange for their lives.
The committee looks forward to hearing from our witnesses about
their assessment of this threat and about ongoing U.S. anti-
piracy operations.
Iran provides the greatest challenge to the United States
and the international community. While continuing to profess
that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, its
actions indicate otherwise. The sanctions that have been
imposed by the United States and most of the international
community under the United Nations (U.N.) sanctions resolutions
as well as domestic laws seem to be having some effect, but
they need to be maintained and ratcheted up.
Admiral Mullen's guidance for 2011, which states that DOD
would ``continue to plan for a broad range of military options
should the President decide to use force to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear arms,'' needs to be reiterated. While not the
preferred option, it is important that Iran understand that
military actions remain on the table.
I am concerned about the fraying of our SOF, as you have
put it, Admiral Olson. While our SOF have seen rapid growth
over the past decade, the demand for such forces and their
unique skills will continue to outpace supply for the
foreseeable future.
This committee stands prepared to support SOCOM's efforts
to provide the best-trained and best-equipped special operators
to our combatant commands, and we look forward to hearing from
you on this matter.
Thank you again, both of you, for your testimony today.
Let me now turn this over to Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our witnesses for joining us this morning.
Admiral Olson, thank you for your many years of courageous
and outstanding service to the United States Navy and to the
Nation.
General Mattis, as always, we look forward to your straight
talk and candid views on the issues that are so important to
us.
This hearing couldn't come at a more important time.
Senator Lieberman and I have spent the past several days
visiting some key countries within the CENTCOM AOR, including
Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as some equally critical
countries that influence events within the AOR, such as
Morocco, Tunisia, and Israel.
In addition, we are all, obviously, focused on the tectonic
changes that are shaking countries and governments in Yemen,
Bahrain, Iran, and, of course, Libya. That is to say nothing of
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which remain the focus of our
military and diplomatic efforts.
Not since the fall of the Soviet Union have we seen a wave
of change destabilize more critical countries all at once than
we are now witnessing. Indeed, the old bargains that have
defined regional order in the Middle East for the past several
decades are now collapsing in front of us.
This is, of course, deeply unsettling, but it is also an
unprecedented opportunity to support the people of the Middle
East in shaping a new regional order that is all at once
reflective of their aspirations, conducive to our interests,
and consistent with our values. The people of the Middle East
are playing the leading role in this historic endeavor, but
America's Armed Forces are playing an indispensable role,
strengthening and defending our friends while deterring and
defeating our enemies.
2011 will be a consequential year for CENTCOM and SOCOM.
Among the vital strategic issues that were in play this year,
we face the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) transition of responsibility for security
in Afghanistan to local and national Afghan forces amid
strained and even deteriorating U.S.-Pakistani relations.
We face hard choices about the future of U.S. defense
assistance to Lebanon after Hezbollah's use of coercion to
become the dominant actor in the government. We face the
Iranian regime's desires to develop a nuclear weapons
capability and to exploit the current regional instability to
expand its hegemonic ambitions.
We face the destabilization of critical counterterrorism
partners like Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain, where the
headquarters of U.S. Fifth Fleet is now caught up in the
broader debate over the people of Bahrain's political future.
Of course, we face the prospect of a complete withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, despite
increasing evidence and recent testimony by the Secretary of
Defense suggesting that such a plan is not consistent with
Iraq's continuing security needs or our enduring interests at
this time.
Amid these and other challenges, this year will also
require increased vigilance on the part of our SOCOM, for the
changes sweeping across North Africa, the Middle East, and
South and Central Asia may open up new ungoverned spaces that
could be exploited by our enemies. While our special operators
continue to perform with remarkable resilience and success, the
effects of nearly 10 years of sustained operations and repeated
deployments appear to be straining this elite force.
Admiral Olson, as the chairman has said, we are concerned
by your recent comment that our SOF are showing signs of
``fraying around the edges.'' It is important that you lay out
today what steps are being taken or need to be taken to
mitigate this strain. We are also interested in SOCOM's
progress in meeting growth targets mandated by the Quadrennial
Defense Review, as well as any associated issues, such as
training or facility constraints that you are facing.
We continue to see al Qaeda and affiliated movements
attempting to expand their reach through the Maghreb, the Horn
of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and beyond. We
are all eager for the assessments of both our distinguished
witnesses about the capabilities of these groups to threaten
America's friends, allies, interests, and Homeland.
What is critical to note is that the historic changes now
reshaping the broader Middle East are a direct repudiation of
al Qaeda and its terrorist allies. The people of this dynamic
and crucial region are rising up to change the character of
their governments, but the revolutions they are making are
largely defined not by violence, but by peaceful protests.
They are inspired not by intolerant and extremist
ideologies, but rather by demands for greater freedom,
democracy, opportunity, and justice. More than any weapon of
war with which this committee must concern itself, it is these
principles and the changes they are inspiring that will
ultimately defeat our terrorist enemies.
If only for that reason alone, these universal values and
those now struggling for them deserve our full support.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our distinguished witnesses
for joining us this morning. General Mattis, Admiral Olson, thank you
for your many decades of faithful service to our Nation, and on behalf
of our entire committee, please convey to the brave men and women you
lead how grateful we are for their sacrifice, and that of their
families.
This posture hearing could not come at a more important time. I
have spent the past several days visiting some key countries within the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, including
Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt--as well as some equally critical countries
that influence events within the AOR, such as Morocco, Tunisia, and
Israel. In addition, we are all obviously focused on the tectonic
changes that are shaking countries and governments in Yemen, Bahrain,
Iran, and of course Libya. That is to say nothing of Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan, which remain the focus of our military and diplomatic
efforts.
Not since the fall of the Soviet Union have we seen a wave of
change destabilize more critical countries all at once than what we are
now witnessing. Indeed, the old bargains that have defined regional
order in the Middle East for the past several decades are now
collapsing in front of us. This is of course deeply unsettling, but it
is also an unprecedented opportunity to support the peoples of the
Middle East in shaping a new regional order that is, all at once,
reflective of their aspirations, conducive to our interests, and
consistent with our values. The people of the Middle East are playing
the leading role in this historic endeavor, but America's Armed Forces
are playing an indispensable role--strengthening and defending our
friends, while deterring and defeating our enemies.
2011 will be a consequential year for CENTCOM and Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). Among the vital strategic issues that are
in play this year, we face the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's transition of responsibility for security in Afghanistan
to local and national Afghan forces, amid strained and even
deteriorating U.S.-Pakistani relations.
We face hard choices about the future of U.S. defense assistance to
Lebanon after Hezbollah's use of coercion to become the dominant actor
in the government.
We face the Iranian regime's desire to develop a nuclear weapons
capability and to exploit the current regional instability to expand
its hegemonic ambitions.
We face the destabilization of critical counterterrorism partners
like Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain, where the headquarters of U.S.
Fifth Fleet is now caught up in the broader debate over the people of
Bahrain's political future.
Of course, we face the prospect of a complete withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, despite increasing
evidence and recent testimony by the Secretary of Defense suggesting
that such a plan is not consistent with Iraq's continuing security
needs or our enduring interests at this time.
Amid these and other challenges, this year will also require
increased vigilance on the part of our special operations command--for
the changes sweeping across North Africa, the Middle East, and South
and Central Asia may open up new ungoverned spaces that could be
exploited by our enemies.
While our special operators continue to perform with remarkable
resilience and success, the effects of nearly 10 years of sustained
operations and repeated deployments appear to be straining this elite
force. Admiral Olson, I am concerned by your recent comment that our
Special Operations Forces are showing signs of ``fraying around the
edges.'' It is important that you lay out today what steps are being
taken to mitigate this strain. We are also interested in SOCOM's
progress in meeting growth targets mandated by the Quadrennial Defense
Review, as well as any associated issues such as training or facility
constraints that you are facing.
We continue to see al Qaeda and affiliated movements attempting to
expand their reach through the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian
Peninsula, Central Asia, and beyond. We are all eager for the
assessments of both our distinguished witnesses about the capabilities
of these groups to threaten America's friends, allies, interests, and
Homeland.
What is critical to note, however, is that the historic changes now
reshaping the broader Middle East are a direct repudiation of al Qaeda
and its terrorist allies. The people of this dynamic and crucial region
are rising up to change the character of their governments, but the
revolutions they are making are largely defined not by violence, but by
peaceful protests. They are inspired not by intolerant and extremist
ideologies, but rather by demands for greater freedom, democracy,
opportunity, and justice. More than any weapon of war with which this
committee must concern itself, it is these principles, and the changes
they are inspiring, that will ultimately defeat our terrorist enemies,
and if only for that reason alone, these universal values and those now
struggling for them deserve our full support.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Admiral Olson, let us start with you.
STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee.
I do thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
present the current posture of SOCOM.
We, at SOCOM, recognize that we were created by Congress
and that our ability to meet our Nation's high expectations is
due, in large part, to this committee's continued strong
support.
I am especially pleased to share this hearing with my
friend and teammate, General Jim Mattis. General Mattis'
headquarters and mine are coincidentally located on the same
base in Tampa, and we and our staffs work together quite
closely.
With your permission, I will submit my written posture
statement for the record and open with some brief remarks.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record in full.
Admiral Olson. The lingering threat of violence in Iraq,
the fragility of the progress in Afghanistan, the complexity of
our relations with Pakistan, the decentralization of al Qaeda's
network, the revolutionary activity across the Maghreb and into
the Middle East, the various destabilizing elements in Latin
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, the increased intertwining
of violent extremism and criminality, and the persistence of
piracy are all among the many daily reminders that we live in a
world that poses many security challenges and some
opportunities.
The SOF are universally recognized as key to our Nation's
ability to address all of these and others. As the Commander of
SOCOM, I am responsible and accountable for the readiness of
all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps SOF.
With a dedicated budget and through my component
commanders, I select, organize, train, equip, and deploy these
forces to serve all of the Geographic Combatant Commanders.
Though with 85 percent of our deployed forces currently in the
CENTCOM area of operations, my colleague to my left is, by far,
the largest customer of our product.
We include many forces of legend: Green Berets, SEALs,
Rangers, Air Force Air Commandos, Army Night Stalker Aviators,
Combat Controllers, Pararescue Jumpers, Combatant-craft
Crewmen--today's version of Marine Raiders--and others. The
active duty practitioners of Civil Affairs operations and
Military Information Support Operations are also in our ranks.
These are special operations careerists.
But they are backed by a magnificent assortment of
administrative, intelligence, communications, engineering,
logistics, and other specialists who serve in special
operations units on a less permanent basis. At our various
headquarters, we also include over 300 representatives from at
least 15 other agencies within and beyond DOD, providing a
senior-level counsel and staff-level expertise that
significantly broadens and deepens us.
I am convinced that the forces we provide to the Geographic
Combatant Commanders are the most culturally attuned partners,
most lethal hunter/killers, and most responsive, agile,
innovative, and efficiently effective advisers, trainers,
problemsolvers, and warriors that any nation has to offer. In
fact, we have become the model for many others.
Our value comes from both our high level of skills and our
nontraditional methods of applying them, which is to say that
our principal asset is the quality of our people. Whether they
are conducting a precision raid, organizing a village police
force, arranging for a new school or clinic, or partnering with
counterpart forces, they do so in a manner that has impressive
effects.
In Afghanistan and Iraq especially, it is undeniable that
they have had impact far above their relatively small numbers.
They are in dozens of other countries every day, contributing
to regional stability by training and advising counterpart
forces. This balance of direct and indirect operations must be
carefully managed. But because SOF live in both of these
worlds, we become the force of first choice for many missions.
As Admiral Mullen said a couple of weeks ago, SOF are typically
first in and last out.
I am very proud of these forces, as we all should be. But I
also acknowledge there are challenges. Key among them is how to
meet the increasing global requirement for their capabilities.
We can't grow them more than a very few percent per year,
but the demand is outpacing the supply. Since September 11, our
manpower has roughly doubled, our budget has roughly tripled,
and our overseas deployments have quadrupled.
I have said that this great force is beginning to fray
around the edges. The fabric is strong. The weave is tight. It
is not unraveling, but it is showing signs of wear.
Partial solutions include finding a process that will
habitually assign units from the Services to train and deploy
with SOF, ensuring that our needs for local training ranges are
fully met, providing buildings and facilities at the standard
that our force needs and deserves, investing more broadly in
the types of enabling capabilities that will relieve SOF from
sending our own people to perform functions that could be
performed by others, and expanding the Services' inventory of
specific assets that are so essential to today's complex and
irregular warfare.
We must ensure that our force has the specialized equipment
and advanced training that they need to survive and succeed in
the complex, ambiguous, and often violent environments in which
we ask them to serve.
Underlying all of it is the need to look after our people
and their families. We must rehabilitate and return to duty
those of our wounded who can, care for those of our wounded who
can't, along with their families and caregivers, and provide
enduring support to the families of those who have died in
action.
I ask for your action to approve a defense budget for
fiscal year 2011 and for your support for the fiscal year 2012
budget proposal. I also ask that you fully fund the special
operations budget, particularly as conventional forces begin to
draw down from major operations, because our forces will most
likely be reallocated at the same levels to areas with pent-up
demand for our unique capabilities.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
You have reason to take great pride in what the men and women
of SOF are accomplishing around the world, today and every day.
I remain humbled by my opportunity to command this
formidable force and to provide it to answer our Nation's most
daunting security needs. As I appear before you in this
capacity for the fourth and very likely the last time, I thank
you for affording me the profound honor of serving my country
in this way.
I stand ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to provide an update on the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) give us
much cause for great pride and it is my deep privilege to represent
them to you, and especially to do so for the fourth time as their
commander.
My intent today is to describe the current status, activities and
requirements of SOF. I'll begin by briefly describing SOCOM and its
assigned SOF.
As many of you know, SOCOM is a creation of Congress, legislated
into being in 1986. A relatively small number of Army, Navy, and Air
Forces units designated as SOF were assigned to SOCOM, with Marine
Corps forces joining the Command just over 5 years ago.
Before the establishment of SOCOM, the Nation's SOF had generally
not been treated as a top priority. They now thrive under the focused
attention of a single headquarters and a dedicated budget. In the 24
years since SOCOM was established, SOF have repeatedly proven their
value, often under extraordinarily demanding conditions.
In many ways, SOCOM is a microcosm of the Department of Defense
(DOD), with ground, air and maritime components, a global presence, and
authorities and responsibilities that mirror the Military Departments,
Military Services, and Defense Agencies. We take pride in the diversity
of our people and our mission.
One of our headquarter's functions is to synchronize DOD planning
against terrorists and their networks globally. This is complex work
that connects us across DOD and into other U.S. Government departments
and other nations' military forces. The effects of this are manifested
in a series of planning documents that guide specific actions by the
Services and combatant commands.
Primarily, SOCOM organizes, trains and equips SOF and provides
those forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders under whose
operational control they serve. The Command also develops special
operations strategy, doctrine and procedures for SOF employment and
develops and procures specialized equipment for the force.
Our key subordinate commands are U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Air Force Special
Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and
Joint Special Operations Command. Within these commands are the
legendary Special Forces or Green Berets, SEALs, Air Commandos,
Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, and the modern version of
yesterday's Marine Raiders. Our force also includes the active duty
practitioners of Civil Affairs Operations and Military Information
Support Operations, and all of the instructors, logisticians,
administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, doctrine writers,
and other specialists who are key to our ability to meet our Nation's
needs. Most are active duty military, but we depend heavily on our
Guard and Reserve units and the government civilians and contractors
who perform duties that don't require a uniformed servicemember.
We now total close to 60,000 people, about a third of whom are
career members of SOF, meaning those who have been selected, trained,
and qualified to earn the Military Occupational Specialty or skill code
identifier of a SOF operator.
The activities of the force are as varied as its character. From
high-risk, high-intensity counterterrorist raids; to meticulous
intelligence analysis; to providing first response during a natural
disaster; to launching from submerged submarines; to training and
accompanying foreign counterparts; to working with local leaders to
determine what will bring value to their village; to providing
supporting precision fires to fighting troops from orbiting aircraft--
SOF personnel are in vital roles, in key places, performing essential
tasks.
Our presence is generally small and agile, inherently joint and
persistent. Our formations normally include an array of attached
capabilities that are necessary to optimize the force--including female
Cultural Support Teams, Tactical Air Controllers, Military Working
Dogs, interpreters, maintenance and repair personnel, Explosive
Ordnance Disposal technicians and others. SOF rarely dominate an area
with their mass, so they must work with indigenous forces and the local
civilian population to accomplish their missions. This is often
complicated, demanding and high-risk.
Each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders who will appear before
you is well served by the SOF that are deployed to his region, although
the balance is heavily weighted towards U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
In fact, about 85 percent of deployed SOF are directly engaged in
Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. I will defer to the regional
commanders to highlight the contributions of SOF in their theaters. I
will just say here that, although the precision counterterrorism
missions certainly receive the most attention, SOF are conducting a
wide range of activities in dozens of countries around the world on any
given day--at the request of the host government, with the approval of
the U.S. Ambassador and under the operational control of the U.S.
Geographic Combatant Commander.
To support these forces and activities, SOCOM invested in many
specialized programs and equipment. As the commander responsible for
the preparation and readiness of SOF, I focus on developing and
sustaining operational skills and capabilities, training and
maintaining the quality of the force, caring for its families, and
ensuring that our people have the right equipment in sufficient
quantity. I also carefully monitor global military and political trends
in my role as the senior advisor on the employment of SOF.
Among SOCOM's most important functions is the management of Major
Force Program-11 (MFP-11). MFP-11 is provided to the Commander of SOCOM
to address requirements that are ``SOF-peculiar'' in nature, and it is
the essential fuel that enables SOF to meet the Nation's needs. It
provides for the conduct of advanced and unique training, the timely
and flexible fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and
effectively project our force. In fiscal year 2012, the request for
MFP-11 funds totals $10.5 billion in baseline and Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding. This is an increase of 7 percent over the
fiscal year 2011 request, and every dollar is necessary to meet the
ever-increasing demands placed on our SOF.
At the forefront of budget discussions is the acknowledgment that
many of the current expenditures funded by OCO are, in fact, part of
SOCOM's baseline requirement in the ``new normal.'' This was
highlighted by the Department last year when a commitment was made to
eventually move funding required to execute OCOs into the baseline as
part of the Secretary of Defense's initiative to ``rebalance'' the
force. However, SOCOM will continue to rely on OCO funding over the
next few years as the phased transfer to the base budget occurs. For
example, in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission 34 percent of the
total MFP-11 request is OCO funding. For some higher intensity SOF
elements, the OCO percentage is greater than 75 percent. SOCOM will
carefully prioritize and manage the OCO to base transition. Overall, we
are in a fiscally satisfactory condition, but the force requires
continued support. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2012,
if approved, is an essential step towards meeting the growing demand on
our force by providing SOCOM the resources required to sustain critical
programs and initiatives. Now, I would like to highlight some of these
key efforts.
PROGRAMS
SOCOM continues to expand and recapitalize its rotary and fixed-
wing aviation fleets. This year we began modification of the last of
the originally planned 61 MH-47G helicopters, while starting
procurement of 8 additional MH-47Gs. We are also fielding the first of
72 planned MH-60M helicopters as part of our recapitalization of MH-60
K/L platforms. The tilt-rotor CV-22, having demonstrated its
capabilities on multiple deployments, must remain on plan to ensure
enhanced future mobility capabilities for SOF. SOCOM's MC-130Ws,
rapidly modified with a Precision Strike Package utilizing SOF's Joint
Acquisition Task Force (JATF), are providing armed overwatch and
mobility to deployed SOF as an interim augmentation to our Vietnam-era
AC-130 gunship fleet. We are on a path to ultimately recapitalize the
gunships with AC-130J models. The MC-130J program is on track to
replace our aging MC-130Es and MC-130Ps. Our Non-Standard Aviation
Program is delivering a variety of smaller aircraft to provide intra-
theater airlift capacity and we continue to grow our aviation foreign
training capability in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders'
engagement plans.
SOCOM is also modernizing its maritime mobility systems. We will
award competitive prototype contracts later this year for Combatant
Craft-Medium as replacements for the Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull
Inflatable Boat. We have realigned resources from the Advanced SEAL
Delivery System and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible to fund the
development of a family of Dry Submersibles as part of our undersea
mobility strategy. These will be launched from surface ships or Dry
Deck Shelter-equipped submarines. As part of this modernization
program, we will explore expansive and flexible approaches that are
supportive of the Secretary of Defense's intent to streamline
acquisition processes and accelerate delivery times.
SOF continue to rely on a wide range of ground mobility vehicles,
often leveraging Service and Department investments. Modified to meet
the wide variety of SOF mission sets and provide enhanced crew
protection, vehicles such as the MRAP have been essential to SOF teams
operating in dispersed and rugged terrain throughout the CENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR). These vehicles, as well as our other ground
mobility systems, will remain relevant well into the future as we
synchronize our long-term sustainment strategy with the Services.
We continue to invest in airborne manned and unmanned Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs, relying heavily on the
Services to expand capabilities and capacity that benefit DOD across
the board. SOCOM is moving toward a relatively small number of manned
and unmanned ISR systems; essential processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (PED) capabilities; and supporting communications
architectures.
One of the most noteworthy improvements within special operations
over the last few years has been the growth of advanced communications
and networking capabilities through our expeditionary SOF Information
Enterprise (SIE). As our portion of the Department's Global Information
Grid, the SIE provides network independence while maintaining
connectivity into the global interface, and links SOF across the globe
into a common network. This connectivity shortens the decision cycle
for SOF operators worldwide and allows more rapid information sharing.
The research and rapid development of these types of technologies is an
inherent strength of special operations.
SOCOM, inherently joint in all it does, is in a unique position to
leverage and apply Service and Department Science and Technology (S&T)
efforts to rapidly field new technologies on the battlefield. SOCOM's
``Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technologies for SOF'' program,
enables innovative new capabilities to be developed and inserted
quickly into the battlefield-advanced ''talk and jam'' capabilities for
SOF vehicles; mobile repair and maintenance ``shops in a box''; to
solar panel energy technology that supports SOF in remote locations.
SOCOM also seeks to expand its biomedical research and development
activities. To date, SOCOM has pushed ``state-of-the-art'' combat
medicine with modest resources through the Tactical Combat Casualty
Care program. However, we also have great need to explore innovative
methods of treating our wounded members so that they may be
reintegrated and returned to duty as rapidly as possible.
As a force that operates from the tropics to the Arctic regions,
from under water to high elevations, and from peaceful areas to violent
combat zones, SOF serve as an ideal ``control group'' for Service R&D
investments that can result in significant benefits across DOD.
SOCOM's development of the JATF concept enabled accelerated
acquisition and fielding of urgent SOF capabilities. First demonstrated
on the MC-130W Dragon Spear program, SOCOM expanded use of the JATF
concept to address many emerging requirements of SOF warfighters.
Innovative approaches such as the JATF, coupled with a professionally
trained and certified SOF acquisition corps that stays in close and
frequent contact with the operators, continue to ensure that SOCOM
remains as a vanguard of rapid acquisition within DOD.
SOCOM's acquisition planning, collaboration, and continuing
dialogue with the Services continues to improve as we become more
efficiently effective while rapidly moving capabilities to the
warfighter. SOCOM, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics initiated a series of
Acquisition Summits with the Military Department Acquisition Executives
to minimize programmatic disconnects and to better align requirements,
co-sponsorship opportunities, funding efficiencies, and contracting
actions among MFP-11 programs and Service-related/dependent programs.
These periodic meetings offer a level of transparency among all our
accounts that enables us to seek common solutions for Service-wide
requirements and to better invest in SOF-peculiar modifications or
special capabilities. This forum identified several opportunities,
which if supported by Congress, would enable more efficient execution
of SOF unique acquisitions.
SOCOM is making a significant investment in Military Construction
(MILCON) to address shortfalls resulting from fielding new
capabilities, a growing force structure and aging infrastructure that
was inherited without a future recapitalization budget. To address the
shortfall, the Command's 2012 budget submission is based on a MILCON
roadmap that identifies over 300 prioritized requirements valued at
more than $5 billion between 2012 and 2025. Specifically, our fiscal
year 2012 submission includes 33 of these projects, valued at $631
million across 8 States and representing 9 percent of the Command's
projected base budget request--a near record level. This investment
demonstrates a commitment to addressing our critical infrastructure
needs. To continue this effort, the Command's new Strategic Planning
and Programming Guidance raised the MILCON funding minimum from 4 to 6
percent to support this priority in future budgets.
A congressional action that enhanced the effectiveness of our force
is our Section 1208 authority. This authority to reallocate limited
MFP-11 funds remains a key tool used by widely dispersed SOF to
leverage indigenous forces in support of counterterrorism operations.
SOCOM is appreciative of the increase to $45 million provided by
Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011, as it provides us the ability to support ongoing operations with
a measure of flexibility should a contingency arise. Continuation of
Section 1208 authority provides enhanced effectiveness to our force
both strategically and tactically.
INITIATIVES
Our primary challenge is the need to carefully manage the growth of
SOF, even in these periods of high demand, in order to ensure the
continued quality the Nation expects. I have stated in my last three
posture hearings that SOF's organic manpower growth should be in the
range of 3-5 percent per year. That is the pace we have sustained to
great effect over the past several years and our fiscal year 2012
budget submission continues this pace. But 3-5 percent growth within
SOCOM will not answer the increasing demand for our force unless it is
matched by the Military Services' commitment to attach supporting and
enabling forces at a commensurate rate. SOF units must include a
limited amount of these enabling forces to ensure rapid response to
emerging requirements, but we were designed and intended to rely on the
Services to meet most of our combat support and combat service support
requirements. In order to establish a predictable demand signal for
these Service-provided capabilities, SOCOM is proposing changes to the
way we build, train, deploy, and sustain a fully enabled force.
To better build the SOF team, we are developing a force generation
system that engages the existing Service systems. In 2011, SOCOM will
strive to create a SOF Force Generation system that will be
synchronized with the Services, matching their capabilities with our
Special Operations core units in time to provide fully optimized force
packages to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. For elements organic
to SOF, such as our Civil Affairs and Military Information Support
Operations, we will expand their capacities to meet the increasing
demand for their capabilities.
Another challenge we face is how to effectively prepare and train
the force to achieve enhanced interoperability with the General Purpose
Forces (GPF). Currently in the CENTCOM AOR, SOF is executing the
counterterrorist strike mission and the Village Stability Operations
mission; two of the primary lines of operation underpinning the
Afghanistan strategy. SOF's key role in both is creating opportunities
for enhanced interoperability with the GPF such as the deployment of
the 1ST Battalion, 16TH Infantry, now assigned to the Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan; a sea change in SOF-GPF
relations. Currently, we are developing initiatives that will increase
inter-operational effectiveness prior to the deployment phase of the
operation.
In 2011, we will continue to review and coordinate changes to
Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key
languages such as Pashto, Dari, and Arabic. We will work to develop
courses of action that allow SOF reliable and predictable access to
Service resources such as training ranges for our ground and aviation
elements. The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently
hampers SOF's ability to meet deployment training timelines and causes
our operators to ``travel to train,'' further increasing their already
excessive time away from home.
Understanding the operational context of the environments in which
we operate is a hallmark of SOF. Developing this knowledge and
experience within our force, and understanding the value of ``micro-
regional'' expertise allows SOF to conduct its activities with more
predictable outcomes. While immersion opportunities enhance our
regional sophistication, our training can never develop the level of
nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous populations. To gain this
high level of cultural knowledge, SOCOM will continue to strongly
support DOD's Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest and
the Army's Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs to recruit and
access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers.
Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow
us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which
was not previously possible. This concept of attaching females to SOF
units is effective and long overdue; we are urging the Services to
recognize the capabilities of CSTs as essential military skills.
Finally, our efforts to become more innovative include studying the
best practices of other organizations. For example, we are inspired by
the ability of the World War II's Office of Strategic Services to
rapidly recruit specialized talent, develop and acquire new
technologies and conduct effective global operations within the period
of its relatively brief existence.
To further our engagement with our international allies and
partners, and within the U.S. interagency community, SOCOM will
continue to expand the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and
Special Operations Support Team programs. Both of these outreach
efforts provide SOF experts to support and enhance their host
organizations while serving as SOF liaisons. Our priority is to assign
SOLO officers wherever a foreign partner has, or is planning to
establish, a SOCOM-like headquarters.
Joint operations and special operations are two growing trends in
many of our partner nation military forces. One manifestation is the
recent establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters. In accordance with
the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Defense
designated SOCOM as the lead component for this Headquarters--a role we
will embrace and expand in an effort to advise and assist an
interoperable network of global SOF.
Importantly, we remain committed to caring for our servicemembers
and their families. I am concerned about the effects of 9 years of
focus on combat operations on the well-being of our extended special
operations community. To support the wounded and injured and their
caregivers, the Command remains committed to our Special Operations
Care Coalition and the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid
Rehabilitation and Reconditioning Program. Both programs are focused on
long term care, rehabilitation and reintegration of our warriors. In an
additional effort to be predictive and preventive, I established a
``Pressure on the Force'' Task Force to survey and analyze the effects
of repetitive combat deployments over nearly a decade. Necessarily
relying on soft data, collective experiences and commanders' instincts,
it will try to determine what initiatives might help ease the strain
and contribute to long-term retention and force stability. I expect to
receive the recommendations from this team within 90 days.
In conclusion, I will reinforce what I believe are the top
challenges to the Command. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recently stated, `` . . . the first forces in are typically Special
Forces. The last ones out are going to be Special Forces.'' As we
expect to remain the force of first choice for many military
operations, SOCOM must:
1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for
SOF.
2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills,
equipment and systems.
3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.
4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided
capabilities.
5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.
6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go,
whether to assist or fight.
7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of
this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.
Today's SOF are the most capable, best prepared SOF in history.
Their ingenuity, perseverance, spirit and skill continue to inspire and
amaze. In significant ways, they have emerged from the shadows to make
visible and dramatic impacts of great magnitude. It is my honor to have
served within SOF for the last 37 years and to represent this
extraordinary force today before this committee.
As always, our success is only possible because of your continued
support and advocacy. Your approval of the President's budget request
will help ensure our continued ability to address some of our Nation's
most daunting security challenges.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
We, again, are grateful to you, the men and women you
command, for all that you and they do. We have that pride,
which you made reference to at the end of your statement, in
them and in you.
General Mattis.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the posture and
priorities of CENTCOM, testifying alongside a friend and
shipmate of many years, Admiral Eric Olson, Commander of SOCOM.
I have submitted a written statement and request it be
accepted into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Mattis. Thank you for supporting our troops and
their families who carry the brunt of the physical and the
emotional burden in this 10th year of war. Our forces today are
among the most dedicated and skilled professionals I have
served alongside in my 39 years in uniform, and they constitute
a national treasure.
I also recognize the commitment and sacrifices of our
international partners, who operate with us from the waters off
Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest
warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged with troops
from 49 nations united in the fight against our common enemy.
The strategic landscape of the broader Middle East has been
altered by recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and
elsewhere. We see pressure on government institutions from the
aspirations of people seeking improved economic and social
conditions. Young people born in the information age are
exchanging ideas in real time.
While the long-term impact of this unrest is unknown, it
presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. The
changes that we are seeing will manifest differently in each
country. People are seeking their rights and, for the most
part, doing so peacefully and bravely.
It is too early to say how it will all turn out. It is
important that we work today with the people and the
governments throughout the region. We don't want to see this
change slide into a new form of authoritarianism.
So while there is both opportunity and danger, it requires
unrelenting engagement by our Nation. The central challenge for
us, I believe, is how to make common cause with our friends
throughout the region.
There is one clear lesson we can draw from the dramatic
changes underway. Now, more than ever, we must remain
relentlessly engaged with our military partners in this region.
While we know each country is different, we remain committed to
strengthening our military bonds and advancing our mutual
interests in peace and opportunity for all.
Notably in Egypt, we have clearly seen the benefit of
mature military-to-military relationships. The Egyptian armed
forces continue to demonstrate exceptional discipline and
restraint under trying circumstances.
As Admiral Mullen recently noted, our assistance has helped
the Egyptian military become the professional force that it is
today, just as our military has learned a great deal from our
Egyptian counterparts, who have contributed a stabilizing
influence in this time of transition.
Of course, we cannot achieve our broader objectives in the
region through military means alone. Our efforts require
coordination and a spirit of collaboration between highly
integrated civilian military teams. Our civilian colleagues
need your full support, even in this difficult fiscal
environment, to undertake their essential role in today's
complex environment.
Robust resourcing for the State Department's mission is one
of the best investments for reducing the need for military
forces to be employed. Together, our military leaders and our
diplomats not only represent a symbol of America's enduring
commitment to the region, but they also build trust through
partnerships that have an important stabilizing effect when
trouble looms.
CENTCOM's main effort is in Afghanistan, where, along with
our Afghan and coalition partners, we are making undeniable
progress, though some of our gains at this time remain fragile
and yet reversible. Al Qaeda in the border region between
Afghanistan and Pakistan is under the most pressure they have
experienced since 2001. Over the past year, our enemies have
lost leaders, battle space, maneuver room, and the initiative.
The enemy's strategy has been undercut by the clear
commitment of the international community and the Afghan
Government to begin this summer a process of fully transiting
responsibility to Afghan lead by 2014. I support the ongoing
analysis for further growth for the ANSF, the greatest success
of our last year their quantifiable and qualifiable growth in
capability.
The range of growth being considered is from 45,000 to
70,000. With the improving quality in combat performance by the
ANSF, we are seeing the enemy's worst nightmare coming of age.
The transition process will start with a limited
conditions-based withdrawal this year. Our overall campaign is
on track in Afghanistan. Our successes, as General Petraeus has
stated, entailed hard fighting and tough losses. I am sure that
there will be tough fighting ahead as the enemy tries to regain
the initiative.
Finally, we must also redouble our efforts to address
challenges in the areas of governance and development in
Afghanistan.
Turning now to Pakistan, we are strengthening and deepening
our security partnership with Islamabad, even as we work to
overcome years of mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides.
The Pakistanis have shifted a quarter of their army, 140,000
troops, to their western border, and we are now conducting
hammer and anvil operations in close coordination with them on
opposite sides of the border.
Pakistan's military has conducted significant
counterinsurgency operations in the past decade and especially
the past 2 years, and they have suffered 2,757 troops killed
and 8,549 wounded while also responding to urgent humanitarian
needs following devastating floods in 2010.
In Iraq, we are helping a new, more stable country emerge
in a turbulent region. Our commitment there is transitioning
from a military to a civilian-led effort. I will note that the
transition underway in Iraq has been enabled in large part
thanks to the vital commitment and support of Congress for our
troops on the ground, and I want to personally offer my thanks
to you.
As we transition to civilian lead in Iraq, it is essential
that the State Department be sufficiently resourced to solidify
relationships between the United States and Iraq for the
future. At CENTCOM, we need congressional authorities that
enable us to continue advising, training, and equipping our
Iraqi partners through the new Office of Security Cooperation-
Iraq.
Looking ahead, we will redeploy our military forces from
Iraq this year, unless asked to stay by the Iraqi Government
and the U.S. Government concurs. I anticipate al Qaeda in Iraq
and Iranian-sponsored proxies will attempt to attack us and
detract from this milestone by executing sensational attacks in
the coming months.
Next, Iran. The greatest threat to long-term regional
security is a defiant Iran in its current state. We are
countering the malign activities of the regime while bolstering
relationships with our partners.
Iran continues to rebuff international efforts for
engagement. It continues to coerce its own population and
pursue activities disruptive to regional peace and stability,
including supplying arms to militant proxies in Iraq and
Afghanistan and supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon.
But for the vibrant people of Iran, the regime is no giant.
The regime's actions have thrown the economy into disarray,
destroyed rapport with the bulk of the world, and spread hate
and discontent across the region, steadily eroding any
international support the regime could once muster.
Despite the shrinking nature of the regime, I have no
reason for optimism about Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability, its growing ballistic missile arsenal, and present
destabilizing course.
Across the region, we are disrupting al Qaeda and other
violent extremist organizations. We are actively focused on the
threat of extremism in Yemen, especially al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group that has twice attempted to
attack our Homeland in recent years.
With our international partners, our SOF are putting our
most violent enemies and related networks under increasingly
intense pressure. At the same time, the populist-inspired
changes that are taking place across the region undercut the
message of al Qaeda and other extremist groups, highlighting
the bankrupt philosophies of terrorists who use violence and
contribute nothing but mayhem to the innocent.
As Senator McCain just noted, the populist-inspired changes
are a direct repudiation of the violent extremists because
these young folks today have achieved more change in 10 weeks
than 10 years of al Qaeda's murderous campaign.
That is a snapshot of our major ongoing operations. We are
focused on a number of other important mission areas to include
countering piracy. There can be no more stark reminder about
the need for more proactive diplomatic, legal, and military
efforts against pirates than the brutal murder of four
Americans by pirates last week.
This is a defining moment for the people of the region and,
by extension, a critical moment for CENTCOM to remain engaged
with our partners and to clear away obstacles to peace and
prosperity. On that note, while Israel and the Palestinian
territories are not in my assigned theater, lack of progress
toward a comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and
CENTCOM security interests in the region.
I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this
region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and
Palestine. This issue is one of many that is exploited by our
adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool
for extremist groups.
The lack of progress also creates friction with regional
partners and creates political challenges for advancing our
interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By
contrast, substantive progress on the peace process would
improve CENTCOM's opportunity to work with our regional
partners and to support multilateral security efforts.
We recognize you face tough decisions in this constrained
fiscal environment. In all of our activities at CENTCOM, we
honor the obligation to be the best stewards possible of our
Nation's monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent
control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to
apply increasingly effective oversight of all programs.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, Senators, we must never forget the
families of those who gave their last full measure in defense
of liberty.
Thank you once again for your support of our men and women
serving in the CENTCOM AOR, and I am prepared to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
INTRODUCTION
A Command at War
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) oversees operations alongside our
allies, partners, and friends in a critically important region of the
world. CENTCOM is engaged throughout the greater Middle East and South
Central Asia across the full spectrum of warfare, standing against
violent aggression and the tyranny of militant extremists, while
contributing to the broader conditions for peace, stability, and
prosperity.
Recognizing our Troops, Civilians, and Partners
Our troops and their families carry the brunt of physical and
emotional burdens in this 10th year of war. Today, over 200,000
American troops and tens of thousands of civilians are deployed to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). These men and women--all
volunteers, no less--defend our freedoms with great courage in the face
of a murderous enemy on harsh terrain. Our troops stand together with
tens of thousands of our international partners, conducting coalition
operations from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan,
where the largest warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged.
Operating in a Dynamic Region
The CENTCOM AOR is more dynamic than I have seen it since first
serving there in 1979. Across our theater, we are required to maintain
a degree of military flexibility such as we have seldom seen before. At
the same time, given the financial realities in Washington, we require
ourselves to exercise the utmost degree of stewardship over every penny
we spend. To operate in this context successfully, we seek to build
strong military-to-military relationships with our partners,
recognizing that CENTCOM's actions represent a tangible signal of
America's continued, long-term commitment to the security and
prosperity of this area.
Throughout the region, we see institutions of government responding
to the aspirations of youthful populations. As the people in the region
have made their voices heard, regional militaries have so far
demonstrated their professionalism, exercising a capability that did
not arise by accident or overnight. The strong security relationship
between the United States and our partners is decades in the making and
has helped them become the professional forces they are today--and in
the process made our forces better as well. While we seek to understand
the unique circumstances that our partners confront, CENTCOM remains
committed to supporting the efforts of our military counterparts and to
strengthening the security partnerships that have proven critical
during this period of political unrest. We do this first by listening,
learning, and understanding, and continue by engaging with our partners
based on mutual respect and shared interests.
Our Mission
Overall, amidst these conditions, we remain committed to carry out
our mission:
With our national and international partners, CENTCOM
promotes security cooperation among nations; responds to
crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression;
supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in
order to establish the conditions for regional security,
stability, and prosperity.
Snapshot of Operations
Our main effort is Afghanistan--and progress there is indisputable,
even if some of our success is fragile and reversible. We and our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition partners are
conducting a comprehensive yet focused counterinsurgency campaign to
ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for
transnational extremists. Our forces are part of a 49-nation
international coalition, led by the NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), and united behind President Karzai's goal of
transitioning the lead of security tasks from the international
community to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. In full
partnership with the Afghan Government, we are inflicting unprecedented
damage on al Qaeda (AQ) and associated extremist groups--a reality
recently affirmed by President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual
Review. Moreover, we confound our enemies by demonstrating our
unambiguous commitment to our long-term strategic partnership with
Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, we continue supporting Pakistan's military
efforts against extremists operating from and threatening that country
and Afghanistan, while contributing to the broader U.S. goal of growing
our strategic partnership with Islamabad. The recent U.S.-Pakistan
Strategic Dialogue and a number of development assistance programs
sponsored by the Department of State are good examples of how the
United States is attempting to build trust with the Pakistani people
and government.
In Iraq, following 7 years of hard fought gains, we are drawing
down our troops as we transition full security responsibilities to our
Iraqi partners. The enemy in Iraq is capable of dramatic attacks but
has proven unable to muster a significant threat to the Iraqi
Government. In coordination with the U.S. Department of State, CENTCOM
is standing up the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct
sustained security assistance and cooperation activities with the
Government of Iraq. We are planning an organization manned and
positioned to support the long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq as
determined by the Iraqi and American Governments, in order to best
advance our civilian-led relationship for the future.
In the broader CENTCOM region, our forces are conducting a theater-
wide campaign alongside our partners in pursuit of AQ and its extremist
allies. Meanwhile, we remain continuously poised and postured to
respond to crises and to conduct contingency operations, while
continuing to forge partnerships in the region and increase the
security capacity of our partners. We continue to rely on our capable
and flexible amphibious forces. For example, over a 36 hour period last
September, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit delivered aid to the
flood-ravaged people of Pakistan, provided close air support from the
skies over Afghanistan, and rescued pirated crews in the Gulf of Aden.
Three months later, two-thirds of our Marines Expeditionary Unit
deployed to Afghanistan on 3 day's notice.
OVERVIEW OF THE CENTCOM AOR
Nature of the AOR
The CENTCOM AOR is comprised of 20 countries spanning over 4
million square miles in 3 diverse subregions from Egypt and the Levant,
to the Arabian Peninsula (including the Gulf nations), and Central and
South Asia. These regions are home to a half-billion people practicing
all of the world's major religions and speaking more than 18 major
languages. Several countries with economic challenges have burgeoning
populations--184 million people in Pakistan, 80 million in Egypt, and
77 million in Iran. In 12 of the 20 countries in the region, 30 or more
percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 24 (at 39
percent, Yemen ranks at the top in this category). In most of those
countries, another 30 percent of the overall population is under 15.
This youth bulge represents tomorrow's future leadership and the
region's greatest challenge in terms of education, employment and
expectations.
The CENTCOM AOR is a region of rich history, distinct culture, and
great potential, encompassing the proud traditions of a wide variety of
ethnic groups, including: Arab, Azeri, Baluch, Gilaki, Hazara, Kurd,
Lur, Mazandarani, Qashqai, Pashtun, Persian, Talysh, Turkmen, and
Uzbek, among others. The AOR contains more than half of the world's
proven oil reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result,
the region contains some of the world's busiest trading routes linking
Europe, Africa, and East Asia to the Gulf. This trade is essential to
continued global economic prosperity and growth. The region's trading
routes contain three of the world's major maritime choke points,
including the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al Mandeb
Strait joining the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. But while the region
contains abundant energy resources, supplies of water and the
availability of arable land are limited and increasingly scarce.
External Influences on the CENTCOM AOR
The region retains its historical tradition as a social, economic,
and cultural crossroads, attracting nations and non-state actors
seeking to advance their interests and influence regional events. Among
a host of external influences on the CENTCOM AOR, the most significant
include:
Middle East Peace: Lack of progress in achieving
comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM
security interests in the region. It is one of many issues that
is exploited by our adversaries in the region and is used as a
recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also
creates friction with regional partners and creates political
challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing
moderate voices in the region. As Secretary Gates noted in July
2010, ``the lack of progress in the peace process has provided
political ammunition to our adversaries in the Middle East and
in the region, and . . . progress in this arena will enable us
not only to perhaps get others to support the peace process,
but also support us in our efforts to try and impose effective
sanctions against Iran.'' In December 2010, Secretary Clinton
observed ``the conflict between Israel and Palestine and
between Israel and its Arab neighbors is a source of tension
and an obstacle to prosperity and opportunity for all of the
people in the region.'' By contrast, substantive progress on
Middle East peace would improve CENTCOM's opportunities to work
with our regional partners and support multilateral security
efforts. Speaking about the need for Middle East peace at the
Manama Dialogue in December 2010, King Abdullah of Jordan
observed ``Our region will not enjoy security and stability
unless we solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Arabs and
Israelis find peace. The stakes are high. As a solution
continues to elude us, faith in negotiations, as the only path
to peace and justice, is eroding. If hope is killed, radical
forces will prevail. The region will sink into more vicious
warfare and instability . . . threatening security far beyond
the borders of the Middle East.''
Bordering Powers. China, Russia, Turkey, and India--
each of which lie outside but border the CENTCOM region--
represent four great gravitational forces influencing various
countries in the AOR. China pursues its many energy-related
interests throughout the region, extending influence from its
traditional partnership with Pakistan, to a $3.5 billion
investment in Afghanistan's Aynak Copper Mine, to building
pipelines for oil and gas from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan.
Chinese activities in the region may begin to compete with the
regional interests of Russia, which maintains a network of
security, economic, and social ties with Central Asian nations
and beyond. India's influence impacts the strategic
calculations of Pakistan and, to some extent, virtually every
other country in the CENTCOM AOR. Turkey increasingly asserts
its interests in the region in keeping with its emergence as a
considerable force within the international community. All four
of these nations have unique relations with Iran, affecting the
international approach to the Iranian situation. We remain
attentive to these dynamics as we seek to ensure that we work
effectively across U.S. Government and combatant command seams
to improve our unity of effort.
Somalia. State failure in Somalia has enabled
extremist and criminal elements to proliferate and spread
northward into the Horn of Africa and Yemen and other areas of
the CENTCOM AOR. At the same time, widespread poverty in
Somalia creates incentives for young men to pursue the
lucrative enterprise of piracy. Additionally, lack of
governance permits extremists to freely migrate to Yemen,
providing opportunities to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). In the past year, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-
Shabaab successfully maintained control of most of southern
Somalia and radicalized factions of this group have sought
alignment with AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and in Pakistan.
U.S. Interests in the Region
Given the centrality and volatility of the CENTCOM AOR, the United
States and nations around the world retain significant interests in the
region. Among others, significant U.S. interests in the region include:
Security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. Homeland
Regional stability
Promotion of effective and legitimate governance,
human rights, the rule of law, and sustained economic growth
and opportunity, and
Free flow of commerce and trade within the region,
through strategic maritime chokepoints, and via land-based
trade routes to international markets
Threats to U.S. Interests in the Region
Violence, instability, and underdevelopment represent the primary
threats to U.S. interests in the region. Some areas face uneven or even
dismal economic development, often coupled with endemic corruption.
Social and economic friction have led to or exacerbated a number of
deep-rooted and longstanding disputes over territory, resources, and
power, many of which remain unresolved due to a lack of adequate
security arrangements on the local or national level. Some areas will
face increasing competition for food, water, mineral deposits, oil, and
other natural resources. The region is also defined by tensions and
sectarian rivalries between many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups.
Such conditions create the potential for broader violence, particularly
in the absence of effective governance and indigenous security forces,
ultimately giving rise to violent extremist organizations that have
attacked us and our friends. We have seen the dangers present within a
security vacuum, where institutions fail to facilitate mediation,
partnership-building, and open dialogue between feuding groups, or to
put down violent extremists.
Connecting Our Strategic Challenges
The challenges of the CENTCOM AOR are inextricably linked and
mutually reinforcing--and thus cannot be treated separately. We have
seen a symbiosis, for example, between extremist groups and other
factions that, in aggregate, tend to strengthen each other and which,
if left unchecked, tend to threaten wider areas of territory and the
stability of civilian governments. Areas in the CENTCOM region,
especially those with a rapidly expanding population of youth, are left
vulnerable to (and often become the victim of) a worsening spiral of
conditions, whereby young people forego meager, but legitimate
opportunities for employment and turn, instead, to a range of criminal
activities, including piracy, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and
narcotics--fueling violent extremist organizations bent on destroying
the lives of innocent people. State and non-state actors operating with
malign intent can readily exploit such conditions, with the most
dangerous scenarios involving a mix of insufficient governance, weapons
proliferation--especially Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)--the
influence of hostile states, and the free flow of extremist elements
across national borders as well as free range in cyberspace. In some
cases, disenchantment with globalization's efforts coupled with a
desire to belong to a movement with a clarion call of purpose can
provide the excitement for young men (and increasingly women) to take
on a violent role in an extremist organization.
PRINCIPAL TASKS
In light of these many challenges, we continuously assess our
strategic and operational approaches in order to achieve our desired
national interests of security, stability, and prosperity in the
CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM is focused on the following tasks:
Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan
Partnering with Pakistan
Countering the Destabilizing Activities of Iran
Enabling Transition in Iraq
Strengthening Partnerships in Central Asia
Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative
Activities
Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Countering Piracy
Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan
Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, connected by a
porous border region historically providing free movement and safe
haven to groups traversing the Durand Line. The senior leadership of AQ
and associated extremists groups--groups that are intent on carrying
out attacks on innocent civilians worldwide--plan, prepare, and direct
operations from this region, making it of critical interest to the
security of the United States and our allies. Currently AQ in the
border region is under the most intense pressure they have experienced
since 2001.
A Clear Objective and a Sound Strategy
With our NATO and coalition partners, we are working to achieve our
core goal of preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a
sanctuary for al Qaeda and associated transnational extremist groups.
President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review affirmed the core
elements of our strategy in Afghanistan, the first imperative of which
is to improve the overall security environment and to reduce violence
levels in Afghanistan. After regaining the initiative from the enemy,
our forces act as a bulwark behind which the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) and the roots of Afghan governance can grow.
Aiming Toward a Common Strategic Vision
Our military objectives and strategy in Afghanistan support the
developing strategic vision between the political leadership of the
United States and Afghanistan, as reflected in Vice President Biden's
comments alongside President Karzai in January: ``It is not our
intention to govern or to nation-build. As President Karzai often
points out, this is the responsibility of the Afghan people, and they
are fully capable of it. We stand ready to help you in that effort. We
will continue to stand ready to help you in that effort after 2014.''
Success in Afghanistan is an Afghan security force able to protect the
people with a government that meets the needs of the people and
prevents safe haven for international terrorists.
The Campaign Plan
We have increased efforts in virtually every facet of the
comprehensive yet focused civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. As
one part of that effort, we have executed an unprecedented pace of
counterterrorist operations to capture or kill insurgents using
enhanced intelligence largely enabled by conventional ground forces.
Our efforts range from major combat operations (in Helmand and
elsewhere, for example), special mission unit operations allowing no
safe haven to the enemy, and concurrent bottom-up and top-down
initiatives (exemplified by expanding Village Stability Operations).
The breadth of our current operations squelches the enemy's ability
to recuperate and threaten the Afghan people. Our forces have partnered
with the Afghan security forces to increase their capabilities; to
expand border security; to conduct robust detainee operations and rule
of law activities; to address and counter corruption by working with
the Afghan Government to target criminal patronage networks; and to
interdict the flow of illegal weapons and narcotics to deny criminals
and insurgent groups a critical source of their operational revenue. We
are capitalizing on our expanded security footprint in the winter
months to retain the initiative, suffocate the enemy, and increase
momentum into the start of the traditional fighting season. Ultimately,
we are working to create an Afghanistan that is hostile to our enemies
and denies them the support of the population, making it untenable for
insurgents to return from their winter safe havens. This is the essence
of counterinsurgency operations. While we will face tough fighting this
spring, the enemy's situation continues to worsen day-by-day.
The Right Inputs
The overall international effort in Afghanistan has transformed
from an economy of force mission 3 years ago to a focused and
reinforced civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, largely assuming
its full strength in September 2010. U.S., coalition, and partner
nations have worked hard to apply the right mix of organizations,
approach, and resources in Afghanistan. Last year at this time, we had
less than 270,000 American, coalition and Afghan forces on the ground
in Afghanistan. This year, we have more than 370,000 total security
forces (American, coalition and Afghan) in the fight, and 109,000
Afghan security forces are projected to be added by this time next
year. Beyond the additional organizations put in place on the ground in
Afghanistan, the Pentagon's Joint Staff Pakistan Afghanistan
Coordination Cell and CENTCOM's Afghanistan Pakistan Center of
Excellence are better organizing our resources at home and providing
mission-critical reach-back support to deployed forces. The CENTCOM
Center of Excellence will provide the cadre of regional experts for the
long haul as we transfer to Afghan lead in 2014 and commit to a long-
term partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Enemy Violence and Coalition Progress
Despite the enemy's efforts to disrupt progress in Afghanistan, we
have achieved the major military objectives we set out to accomplish in
2010 and made considerable progress with respect to governance and
development. As Secretary Gates noted after his December 2010 trip to
Afghanistan: ``The bottom line is that in the last 12 months, we have
come a long way. Frankly, progress--even in the last few months--has
exceeded my expectations.'' We recognize, however, that progress and
violence coexist in this type of war. Our enemies continue to conduct
attacks heavily focused on non-combatants and to intimidate the
population and maintain relevancy, albeit decreasing, in newly-cleared
areas. Enemy-initiated violence is increasingly localized. From
November 2010 until 31 January 2011, 57 percent of the violence in
Afghanistan has been concentrated in 12 of 401 districts. Notably, the
key districts of Maiwand in Kandahar Province and Lashkar Gah in
Helmand Province--which are critical to our efforts to link the Helmand
and Kandahar security bubbles--are no longer among the top-12 most
violent districts. The elevated levels of violence is less a reflection
of increased insurgent capability and more the result of increased
Afghan and ISAF operations in areas previously considered insurgent
strongholds. The enemy is not adapting well to this development. While
we make progress, our enemies continue to make grievous mistakes, to
include: purposefully killing innocent Afghans; leaders fleeing into
Pakistan and leaving subordinates to fight; and killing nearly 5,000
Afghans in the first 10 months of 2010 (more than three quarters of all
civilian casualties in that period). We highlight the ruthless actions
of the enemy, and in recent months Afghan leaders and human rights
groups have stepped forward to condemn insurgent-initiated violence.
Road to Transition in 2014
We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other
Coalition and ANSF partners are improving security for the Afghan
population, increasing the size and quality of the ANSF, and supporting
efforts to improve governance and development throughout Afghanistan.
At last November's NATO Summit in Lisbon, we undercut a key pillar of
the Taliban's strategy by affirming the long-term resolve of the United
States and international community to accomplish the mission in
Afghanistan. We are united in support of President Karzai's goal of
Afghan forces assuming security responsibilities from the international
community by the end of 2014. In partnership with the Afghan
Government, we are working toward President Obama's goal of beginning a
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan beginning in July of this year
at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. The process for
identifying, assessing, and transitioning areas of Afghanistan is based
on recommendations from the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition)
Board (JANIB) to the Government of Afghanistan. ISAF is working closely
with JANIB as we begin the process of transition and methodically move
forward in our campaign.
ANSF Support
Most importantly in the security arena, our investment in the ANSF
is working and the growth of the force is on track. The remarkable
quantity growth of ANSF (rising by an unprecedented 70,000 personnel
while facing a determined enemy) is now being matched by quality
improvements in the force. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is
supporting the efforts of the Afghan Government to build leaders at all
levels, to increase literacy, and to improve capability and training
capacity. Combined, these programs increase the quality of the force,
ultimately helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and
contribute to sustainability. Meanwhile, we are helping the ANSF to
overcome remaining challenges in the recruitment of medical staff and
other enablers, as well as increasing the participation of females and
recruiting more southern Pashtuns. In league with Admiral Stavridis
(Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe),
we are trying to reduce our shortage of trainers.
ANSF in the Lead
The ANSF is increasingly in the lead of operations in many areas of
Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, the ANSF took the lead in mid-
2010 for an operation in Malajat, Kandahar City--with support from ISAF
for additional combat power, close air support and other enablers--
resulting in the capture or killing of several dozen insurgents and the
establishment of a new model for Afghan-led operations. The ANSF also
provided well over half of the combat power for the latter phases of
Operation Hamkari, clearing the insurgency's most vital safe havens in
southern Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, Afghan National Army and
Police conducted joint operations throughout December 2010 with ISAF
forces in northern Balkh Province, and Afghan National Police have
demonstrated considerable capacity by capturing insurgents and
discovering caches of weapons in U.S.-Afghan partnered operations in
Kunduz Province. Additionally, ANSF now leads security efforts in 14 of
15 of Kabul's districts, and have executed coordinated security plans
for several events, including the June Consultative Peace Jirga, the
July Kabul conference, August Independence Day events and the January
seating of the Parliament all without incident, at odds with the
insurgents' claims that it would seek to disrupt them.
Local Security Initiatives
Beyond national level security efforts, the Afghan Government has
steadily expanded the local security initiatives designed to squeeze
extremist elements from their traditional safe havens and cut off their
lines of communication. Clearing operations in key terrain districts
have shifted operational-level momentum and altered village-level
calculus in remote areas. Local elders in dozens of villages throughout
Afghanistan have conducted jirgas to assume increased responsibility
for their own security, and U.S. and coalition forces have supported
the Ministry of Interior's efforts to fortify Afghan villages. The
Afghan Local Police (ALP) program represents one of the most promising
endeavors to wrest local areas from insurgent influence. The ALP and
other Village Stability Operation initiatives work from the bottom-up
and the top-down, connecting the support of local communities with the
capacity of the central government and coalition partnerships. The
Taliban has revealed their concerns that the ALP represents a direct
threat to their existence and operational ability. Today, there are a
total of 63 ALP sites--24 of which the Ministry of Interior has site
validated--and approximately 4,000 ALP are now assigned. These local
efforts buttress security in areas with limited ANSF presence,
complementing the progress made elsewhere (and in ALP locations) by
conventional ISAF and ANSF. Given the initial success of the ALP
program, the Ministry of Interior wants to increase the program beyond
the current projected number of 10,000 with our reinforced special
operations forces providing oversight and mentoring.
Popular Support
Since 2003, AQ and the Taliban have tried with some success to
expand their strength and influence in much of the country. In 2010,
coalition and Afghan forces applied additional resources in all aspects
of the campaign to change the security landscape in much of the
country. As security improves in key areas and we are better able to
protect the people, Afghanistan's population has increasingly supported
efforts to bring development and basic services to their areas. In
recent months, in particular, Afghan security forces have assumed more
of the load in the fight, village elders have encouraged young men to
join the Afghan police, and insurgents in several areas have begun to
put down their weapons and integrate into society. Reintegration
efforts are bearing fruit due to the concerted effort of the Afghan
Government both at the local and national level and the support of
coalition forces (aided, of course, by the momentum in our campaign).
In terms of reconciliation, the process is led by Afghans, with ISAF
partnering with ANSF to set security conditions and dash the enemy's
hopes of victory. These are progressive steps toward building
irreversible momentum in our overall campaign.
Rule of Law Progress
Unlike our enemies, we continue to support the legitimate efforts
of the Afghan Government to improve the Rule of Law for Afghanistan's
more than 29 million inhabitants. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan's Joint Task
Force/Combined Interagency Task Force 435 and our Afghan partners have
achieved considerable progress in the last year: transferring detainees
to the state-of-the-art detention facility in Parwan; implementing
transparent and robust internment processes; strengthening judicial
guarantees for detainees; and expanding robust reintegration programs
that include literacy and vocational training. Moreover, we have
established robust efforts to combat corruption at all levels, even as
we implement best practices to reduce the challenge of corruption in
contracting and in every aspect of our campaign.
Infrastructure Initiatives
We are also pursuing infrastructure initiatives--for example,
building roads, rail, and installing electrical grids and transmission
lines--to capitalize on Afghanistan's potential as a Central Asian
economic hub. A regional transport network facilitates the creation of
private sector jobs and provides additional incentives for reconcilable
elements of the insurgency to abandon the fight. Ultimately, such
economic development reduces the need for U.S. forces and underpins
long-term transition activities and is fundamental to a sound
counterinsurgency campaign.
Congressional Support
Congressional leadership continues to play a critical role in
enabling our efforts in Afghanistan, including the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP),
the authorization of an infrastructure program, and the Afghanistan
Reintegration Program (ARP). Above all, we rely on the ASFF to enable
the eventual full transition of security tasks to a robust, trained
ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in
Afghanistan. In terms of the CERP, our Commanders on the ground
continually comment that the CERP funds are invaluable in carrying out
operations toward our strategic objectives in Afghanistan, undercutting
the enemy's information operations and legitimacy. In 2010, CERP funded
more than 8,300 projects, including, for example, transportation
initiatives to improve freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan;
agriculture production across Afghanistan involving the repair and
improvement of irrigation canals and wells and providing farmers with
higher-quality seeds and fertilizers; education projects such as the
services of more than 200 local Afghan education outreach coordinators;
and water and sanitation projects to install three high-production
groundwater wells that will increase the accessibility of potable water
to over 850,000 Afghans in Kandahar City. Apart from CERP, the new
Afghanistan infrastructure program enables us to work together with the
U.S. State Department to undertake high-priority infrastructure
projects to address critical needs for Afghan security, governance, and
development. The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund will be the vehicle
for the Defense Department's contribution to this integrated program.
To enable our reintegration efforts, we continue to execute the ARP
using funds in support for the Government of Afghanistan's Peace and
Reintegration Program.
Challenges Ahead
Much work remains to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We face a
resilient and determined enemy. The United States and the international
community are positioned to favorably influence reform and synchronize
Rule of Law development to counter corruption within the Afghan
Government. Despite considerable progress in many areas in 2010, we
recognize that there will be hard work ahead as we continue to fight
along with our Afghan partners. But, by progressively and steadily
executing our sound and validated strategy, I believe we can set the
conditions to succeed in Afghanistan.
Partnering with Pakistan
Strategic Partnership
We recognize, of course, that any solution in Afghanistan must
address the regional context. CENTCOM supports President Obama's goal
of strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership through
nascent yet improving military-to-military cooperation with Pakistan.
As Secretary Clinton and other leadership has noted, we must
concentrate on the efforts Pakistan is taking. They have made very
significant moves for going after the terrorist within their own
country.
Over the past year, CENTCOM has strengthened and deepened our
security cooperation with Pakistan by supporting our counterparts
through CENTCOM's Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP).
ODRP is focused on assisting Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts and
this past year, led the U.S. interagency effort to provide disaster
relief and Humanitarian Assistance to areas affected by the flooding.
Additionally, in support of our long-term partnership with Pakistan,
the CENTCOM Center of Excellence continues to deploy subject matter
experts and provide unique reach-back support to ODRP and Special
Operations Command-Pakistan (Forward) in order to deepen analysis and
to provide greater interagency fidelity on critical issues.
Threats in Pakistan
The potential for instability in Pakistan and the free movement of
extremists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region continue to pose a
serious threat to regional and global security. Pakistan's tribal areas
remain the principal sanctuary for al Qaeda and a safe haven for other
extremist groups, enabling them to threaten the population and
coalition forces in Afghanistan, the people and government in Pakistan,
and U.S. and Western interests globally. The Afghanistan-Pakistan
region also faces significant humanitarian concerns, including refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from decades of conflict.
Additionally, roughly three million Afghan refugees still live in
Pakistan, having been displaced by the Russian invasion into
Afghanistan 30 years ago.
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
Last summer's historic flooding in Pakistan was devastating--
effectively equivalent in scope to flooding the entire East Coast of
the United States. The United States responded to the floods by
providing historic levels of Humanitarian Assistance. In all, U.S.
rotary and fixed wing aircraft transported more than 40,000 displaced
persons and delivered more than 26 million pounds of aid supplies to
the people of Pakistan. U.S. helicopters flew more than 5,000 flight
hours during the relief operation. The U.S. Government provided Zodiac
boat kits to the Pakistan Military for use in rescue operations, and
provided eight 50 meter bridges to replace bridges swept away by the
floods.
U.S. Support to Pakistan Military
On the security front, continued U.S. assistance is critical to
enabling Pakistan to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations.
Our forces carry out important partnership and engagement activities in
support of the Pakistan military's improving counterinsurgency
capabilities. As one important example, ODRP supports Pakistan's
Frontier Scouts by providing training support and enabling further
counterinsurgency operations. U.S. personnel also assist in the
procurement of materials and equipment needed to build infrastructure
in support of education, power, and food.
Pakistan Operations and Sacrifice
Pakistan's military has made impressive strides in combating
militants in the FATA, while dealing with the effects of large-scale
flooding that devastated much of the country. Over the last year, the
enemy has lost battlespace to the Pakistan military's sustained efforts
to move against the enemy strongholds. Pakistan's military has suffered
more than 2,500 casualties (enduring more than 500 personnel killed in
action and more than 2,000 wounded in action) since the start of
offensive operations against extremist elements in the Khyber
Pashtunkhwa and the FATA. Since June 2009, the Pakistan Military has
been involved in nearly continuous operations against militants in the
Khyber Pashtunkhwa and the FATA. In total, the Pakistan Military has
deployed upwards of 140,000 troops along Pakistan's western border with
Afghanistan, a significant portion of which were drawn from Pakistan's
border with India.
Regional Context
Our efforts to support Pakistan fit well within the broader
regional context. We recognize that Pakistan's longstanding tensions
with India are an important part of Pakistan's strategic decisionmaking
calculus and military force posture. However, the presence of extremist
sanctuaries in Pakistan significantly impacts our progress in
Afghanistan, and with the Pakistan military's help we are taking
important steps to improve cross-border operations. To address existing
challenges along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, coordination between
ISAF, Afghan security forces, and the Pakistan Military continues to
improve, especially in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR). In Regional Command East, we are planning
coordinated operations with the Pakistan Military. The Pakistan
Military recently began clearing insurgent safe havens in Mohmand
Agency across the border from Kunar Province--where insurgents have
initiated a number of attacks to undermine recent security gains in
Afghanistan. While Pakistan's operations are acting as the ``hammer''
on their side of the border, combined Afghan and ISAF forces are poised
to defeat displaced insurgents, acting as the ``anvil.'' Afghan Border
Police and other combined security forces are manning outposts along
the border and armed drones and close combat aviation are monitoring
previously-identified mountain passes that insurgents will likely use
as they seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.
Congressional Support
Multi-year security assistance is critical to our efforts in
Pakistan. We appreciate continued congressional support for the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which serves as a key
enabler of the Pakistan's military operations against extremists. The
fund also provides for a range of partnership activities with
potentially transformational long-term effects on our relationship with
Pakistan if they can be sustained.
Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities
Iran's Destabilizing Activities
In view of Iran's destabilizing behavior and its persistent pursuit
of a nuclear weapons capability, the Iranian regime's current stance
represents the greatest long-term threat to the region. Iran continues
to rebuff efforts for engagement, further alienating and isolating
itself from much of the rest of the region and from much of the
international community. The actions of Iran's leadership squander the
potential of its own educated populace and sacrifice the free exchange
of ideas for the short-sighted interest of preserving an increasingly
harsh and oppressive regime. Recently, Tehran equated the Egyptian
protests to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, making a fanciful and
wholly false connection.
The Iranian regime relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-
Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to extend influence and create instability across
the region through persuasion, coercion, aggression, and targeted
messaging. In fact, Iran continues to fund, arm, train, and equip a
network of agents, surrogates, and proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza, Afghanistan and elsewhere across the region. In the pivotal
region of the Levant, Iran seeks to expand its influence, in part by
enabling Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in order to weaken legitimate
governance, limit economic development, and undermine security
partnerships. Additionally, Iran delivers weapons and provides military
training to surrogates in an effort to target Israel (a nation Iran's
leadership have vowed to destroy) and undercut the Middle East Peace
Process. Of urgent concern, the IRGC-QF continues to equip militants in
Iraq and Afghanistan that attack U.S. and coalition forces and
undermine stability and governance in each of these countries. The
recent January 2011 large caliber Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar
(IRAM) attack against U.S. forces in Iraq demonstrated Iran's malicious
intent, and ability to escalate violence when they desire.
Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Weapons
In spite of a fourth round of United Nations sponsored sanctions,
Iran appears determined to mature its nuclear weapons program--an
ambition that could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear
materials and spark a nuclear arms race in the region. Admiral Mullen
reinforced this point in December 2010, observing: ``I see Iran
continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that
developing and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the
region.'' Iran also continues to expand and improve its arsenal of over
2,200 ballistic missiles and long-range rockets, and of approximately
225 fixed and mobile launchers, making it the largest ballistic missile
and long-range rocket force in the Middle East. Iran can use these
ballistic missiles and rockets, combined with increasing naval
capabilities, to threaten global commerce.
Countering Destabilizing Iranian Activities and Keeping Peace with
our Partners
Firmly nested within the broader approach of the U. S. Government
toward Iran, CENTCOM is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing
and coercive activities by building confidence with our partners in the
region. As one example, we are working together with our Gulf
Cooperation Council partners and other nations to advance Integrated
Air and Missile Defense. We also conduct activities to reassure our
friends in the region that we are with them, preclude conflict, and
deter Iran's destabilizing activities, while at the same time standing
ready to conduct contingency operations.
Enabling Transition in Iraq
Looking Ahead in Iraq
The year ahead in Iraq presents a significant opportunity for the
United States to solidify our long-term support to this keystone of
regional stability. Our continued investment in Iraq is critical at
this juncture, especially given the significant commitment we have made
in lives and treasure. Now is not the time to be penny wise and pound
foolish with respect to our mission in Iraq. Nested firmly inside the
State Department's vision for an enduring U.S.-Iraq strategic
partnership, CENTCOM is setting conditions to build on the shared
sacrifices between our countries.
The Situation in Iraq
Iraq faces lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions
between political parties, and strained governmental capacity to
provide basic services. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains committed to
undermining the Iraqi Government and is capable of carrying out
orchestrated, high profile attacks. Likewise, Iranian-inspired and
equipped proxies continue to be a threat to Iraqi security and
governance. While the security situation in Iraq is vastly improved
since the peak of sectarian violence there in mid-2007 (violence is
currently at all-time lowest levels since 2003), Iraq continues to face
significant political, economic, and security challenges. Over the
coming year, several factors will determine Iraq's strategic direction,
including the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
the effectiveness of the nascent governing coalition, and the degree to
which the country is influenced by Iran and threatened by AQI and Shi'a
militia elements.
U.S. Forces-Iraq
From now until the end of this year, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is
continuing to partner with ISF during this historic period of
transition. USF-I is undertaking a range of activities, foremost among
these strengthening the ISF, transitioning security-related activities
to Iraq and the U.S. interagency, and contributing to border management
and ministerial development.
Establishing the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
Through USF-I and in partnership with the Embassy country team, we
are planning the initial stand-up of the Office of Security
Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in June of this year and expect it to be fully
operational by this October. OSC-I is the cornerstone of our long-term
mission to build partner capacity with the ISF. Additionally, the OSC-I
will ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships
that advise, train, and assist Iraqi Security Forces.
Iraq's Regional Integration: Iraq is now at a crossroads, poised to
emerge as a positive force for the region after posing security
challenges for its neighbors in past decades. Baghdad's selection as
the location to host the Arab League Summit is a significant testament
to Iraq's re-emergence in the region. Iraq also accepted Egypt's
invitation to participate as an observer in CENTCOM's largest exercise,
Bright Star. Jordan has also exerted considerable positive influence in
Iraq, training over 1,500 Iraqi Army officers, a number of Iraqi Air
Force pilots, and posting a Jordanian defense attache in Baghdad, in
addition to hosting a program to provide extensive training to Iraqi
police. Additionally, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have aided the
economic reintegration of Iraq into commercial activity and regularly
scheduled transportation networks. Finally, the United Arab Emirates
have trained Iraqi police officers in a joint program with Japan and
Germany.
Iraq's constructive integration into the region will also help
blunt destabilizing Iranian influence. If left vulnerable to Tehran's
meddling, Iraq's sovereign future would be imperiled. At the same time
that Iran reconstructs shrines, provides electrical power, and
constructs schools and clinics in Iraq, Iran also undermines Iraqi
political processes, facilitates violence against innocent Iraqi
civilians, and provides lethal support to extremist groups targeting
U.S. forces. For the United States and the international community, a
sovereign Iraq under a stable and inclusive government is fundamental
to regional stability.
Congressional Support
The support of Congress is critical to facilitating an effective
transition in Iraq and in setting the conditions for an enduring U.S.-
Iraq partnership. We seek congressional support in obtaining the
appropriate authorities in fiscal year 2011 to begin immediate facility
and site work for the OSC-I to reach full operating capability by
October 2011. This is an area of critical need as we work to meet our
aggressive timelines. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) critically
enables Iraq to set a foundation for its internal and external defense
capabilities and provides Iraqi Minister of Interior police forces the
training and equipment necessary to maintain internal security without
assistance from the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the ISFF enables
Iraqi Army counterinsurgency capabilities and enhances cooperation
between the government of Iraq and Kurdish police forces to ensure the
consistency of police training and equipment standards throughout Iraq.
Strengthening Central Asian Partnerships
In Central Asia, CENTCOM is committed to strengthening
relationships based on those shared interests and goals that we have in
common with the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our nations seek to
improve broader economic conditions, CENTCOM is working with our
partners to address the migration of extremists in certain areas of
Central Asia and to counter the trade of illicit narcotics and human
trafficking. Often these activities are interrelated.
Northern Distribution Network: Over the past 2 years, the
development of a robust transportation network has been the most
expansive area of cooperation with our Central Asian partners. Our
collective agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan together constitute a logistical system termed the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) used to supply coalition operations in
Afghanistan and taking pressure off the Pakistan lines of supply. This
diverse network supports the transit of about half of all sustainment
cargo to Afghanistan using a variety of sea, air, and land routes. The
remaining supplies are flown directly into Afghanistan, trans-shipped
from sealift to airlift, or arrive via surface routes through Pakistan.
Ultimately, the development and expansion of the NDN and its associated
infrastructure will facilitate long-term economic growth in the region,
representing a new opportunity for export of Central and South Asia raw
materials and exchange of goods in the international marketplace.
Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network
Future NDN efforts are centered on partnering with certain
countries to permit two-way flow of all types of wheeled vehicles and
associated repair parts, and to increase shipment of cargo already
permitted on the NDN (such as building materials). In terms of airlift,
Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan is a key Central Asian location that
supports aerial refueling and passenger transit missions.
Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities
Cooperation Based on Shared Interests
The investment we make in our military-to-military engagement to
build the capabilities of our partner nation security forces is a
critical component of the whole-of-government efforts in the region.
These cost-effective efforts properly place security responsibilities
in the hands of other sovereign governments and help to prevent
conflicts and instability. With a long-term perspective, CENTCOM
carries out partnership activities designed to build strong security
capacity and relationships with our friends in the region.
Training
CENTCOM's training and exchanges with our partners are critical to
our regional cooperation. CENTCOM has spearheaded the establishment of
several Training Centers of Excellence hosted in partner nations,
providing world-class mission-specific training for our allies and
partners. Existing Centers of Excellence include an Air Warfare Center
and an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE); the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center in
Jordan; a NATO Partnership for Peace Combat Engineering and INTERPOL
Counter Narcotics Center hosted in Kazakhstan; and an extensive array
of associations with the other countries' Professional Military
Education programs. Developing Centers include a U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command (NAVCENT) Maritime Center hosted in Bahrain; a new
Explosives Ordinance Disposal school with future Center of Excellence
in Saudi Arabia; a proposed Near East South Asia (NESA) branch Center
of Excellence in Bahrain; and the Gulf Region Communications, Computer,
Command, and Control (C4) Center of Excellence hosted by the Bahraini
Minister of Communications.
Exchanges
CENTCOM manages and conducts focused engagement programs with
specific partner nations located throughout the AOR in support of the
CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The objective is to
understand our friend's views and to strengthen relationships and
regional organizations to defeat violent extremist networks or
situations that threaten the security interests of the region and the
United States. This includes capacity building. Additionally, CENTCOM
Headquarters in Tampa, FL is host to over 193 coalition partners from
58 allied nations who make significant contributions to our efforts,
and receive invaluable experience interacting with both U.S. forces and
our allies.
Equipping
We also provide equipment and security assistance to our regional
partners. These activities are among the most important practical steps
we can take to demonstrate CENTCOM's enduring commitment to our
partners--and to enable interoperable forces in the fight. I ask for
continued congressional support of these efforts, including Global
Train and Equip, as well as the many security assistance programs
managed by the Department of State, including Foreign Military
Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education
and Training Program. As Admiral Mullen noted in his testimony, our
security assistance authorities are inflexible, and process are too
cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a
timely manner. We encourage ongoing efforts to streamline the Foreign
Military Financing process in order to cement training and sustainment
relations with our critical partners. Accomplishing our mission at
CENTCOM requires that we demonstrate our responsiveness to the requests
of our partners when we alone should not carry the increasing costs of
defending the international order.
Exercises
The final pillar of CENTCOM's partnership activities is our
military exercise program. Exercises bolster interoperability between
our forces and those of our partners. Each year, our component commands
conducts more than 50 exercises with our partner nations in the region,
including 5 overseen by CENTCOM component commands.
The Long-Term Value of our Exercise Program
The Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement program provides
critical support to CENTCOM joint training support, exercise and
engagement requirements in support of national-level strategic
priorities, readiness, and building partnerships within the AOR. Since
the beginning of our operations in Afghanistan in 2001, CENTCOM has
seen reductions in our exercise program due to ongoing combat
operations within the AOR. As combat operations are completed or
reduced, restoring sufficient funding levels is critical to support
engagement activities with our partners. Without restored funding
levels, CENTCOM could lose the advantages gained from a robust exercise
engagement program, affecting future access and presence within the AOR
and our Theater Security Cooperation Plan. In the interim, we will work
imaginatively to make the best use of our exercise budget.
Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations across the Region
Terrorists in False Religious Garb
The CENTCOM AOR is home to numerous Violent Extremist Organizations
(VEO) comprising a network that, in its own right, represents a
considerable threat to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. and Western interests,
and our allies in the region. The most significant of these is AQ. AQ
seeks to impose its morally bankrupt ideology worldwide, and has
regional affiliates across the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq, the Maghreb,
and in Somalia (al-Shabaab), with associates including Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), the Afghanistan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).
The growing cross-organizational cooperation between VEOs replicates
mafia syndicates. The organizational success of VEOs is frequently
abetted by operating with near impunity in cyberspace.
Attacking VEOs
Along with our interagency and regional partners, CENTCOM continues
to develop and implement theater-wide responses in the cyber and
physical domains to disrupt and degrade militant networks. Over the
past year, interagency efforts have resulted in designating al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and TTP as foreign terrorist
organizations, obtaining a number of Treasury designations, Justice
Department arrest warrants, Interpol notices, and placing over 100
individuals and entities on the U.S. Department of Commerce Denial
List. Thanks to Congressional funding, the Defense Department Rewards
Program has been used by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal
year 2010 to capture more than 700 high-value individuals, insurgents
and terrorists.
Preventing Security Vacuums
In the long-term, CENTCOM is working as a part of an integrated
civil-military effort to prevent security vacuums that foment extremism
and provide sanctuary to VEOs.
In Yemen, we have forged a tight bond between CENTCOM and our
Embassy team in Sana'a to address the heightened threat of AQAP through
long-term counterterrorism capacity-building. AQAP cemented its role as
a viable and enduring threat to the U.S. Homeland by following-up the
failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 on 25 December
2009 with the ``printer cartridge'' parcel bomb plot in late October
2010. Radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi publicly spearheads AQAP's
campaign against the West, most notably by creating Inspire magazine in
an effort to encourage Western-based Muslims and enable ``lone wolf''
style attacks.
In Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had to navigate a
challenging environment in which it does not yet have the monopoly of
violence in much of the country. Our assistance has had substantive
impact on the ground to include helping the LAF deploy four brigades to
the south since 2006 in support of United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1701--taking up space where Hezbollah had been.
Additionally we have increased the capacity of the LAF Special
Operations Forces that won a hard fought battle in 2007 against the al
Qaeda affiliated Fatah al-Islam movement in the Nahr al-Bared
Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. The LAF sustained almost
200 killed and 2,000 wounded in this operation. We value our close
relationship with the LAF officer corps based on mutual respect and
confidence. We continue to monitor the government formation process in
Lebanon and will need to examine the final composition, policies, and
behaviors of the next government before making any decisions regarding
our relationship, including security assistance, while recognizing that
continued engagement with the LAF is an important step in securing its
status as an apolitical, non-sectarian, and professional organization.
In Syria, the regime's continuing support for terrorist
organizations prevents CENTCOM from developing a military-to-military
relationship and limits the scope of U.S. engagement. Consequently, we
view the recent return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus as a vital
piece of our regional security architecture. We stand ready to support
Ambassador Ford's diplomatic efforts to produce a more constructive
relationship with Syria however we can, and we urge the Senate to
confirm his nomination so that he may continue his important work
beyond 2011.
Across the region, Theater Security Cooperation activities work
against the ability of Iran and extremist elements to destabilize the
region. Absent these programs, there is an increasing potential for
security vacuums to arise and open the door to greater influence from
Iran or violent actors. Our cooperative efforts with regional partners
are essential to the long-term effort to address these threats.
Countering the Enemy's Use of the Information Environment
Our enemies are using every available lever of the information
environment to promulgate and reinforce their ideology--and, in league
with our interagency partners, CENTCOM is committed to countering the
efforts of our adversaries. Our enemies operate within cyberspace (and
its associated relevant physical infrastructure) to plan, coordinate,
recruit, train, equip, execute and garner support for operations
against the United States, its allies, and interests. The recruitment
of Umar Farouk Abdullmutallab, the unsuccessful Christmas Day Bomber,
demonstrates our adversaries' ability to reach across borders, promote
their narrative, and defy traditional military constructs to achieve
their objectives. Clearly, in the information age, our military must
adapt to this new domain of warfare. We ask for the support of Congress
to fund our programs that attempt to counter the enemy in the
information domain, just as we need funding to disrupt violent
extremists in the physical domain.
CENTCOM Activities in the Information Environment
Consistent with the guidance provided by Secretary Gates last
December, we conduct Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which synchronizes
and oversees all of our Information Operations activities. OEV seeks to
disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens
for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda.
Full funding of OEV supports all activities associated with degrading
the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product
distribution capabilities. The effective engagement of our enemies in
cyberspace requires the ability for us to conduct a full-spectrum of
traditional military activities against them in that domain, including
all aspects of Information Operations and Strategic Communication. We
coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Interagency, the Intelligence
Community, and our coalition partners to examine the adversary's use of
cyberspace and identify techniques, tactics and procedures we can use
to counter the adversary in the cyber domain.
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Risk of Weapons of Mass Destruction
At CENTCOM, we recognize the serious risk and potentially
devastating ramifications of a terrorist group, violent extremist
organization, or state actor acquiring, proliferating, or using Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD). The nexus between extremist groups, malign
state actors, and WMD remains a critical concern throughout the AOR and
presents a clear danger to our partners, allies, and the U.S. Homeland.
CENTCOM remains vigilant in executing the nonproliferation, counter
proliferation, and foreign consequence management pillars of America's
National Strategy for Combating WMD.
Countering Proliferation and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Countering the proliferation of WMD-related material is a
fundamental aspect of CENTCOM's overall efforts to combat WMD. In
concert with our regional partners, CENTCOM is involved with the
interagency effort to curtail the ability of adversaries to finance the
acquisition of WMD-related items and to deny malign actors the ability
to transport suspect dual-use materials across national borders. To
this end, CENTCOM plays a key role in containing Iran's evident drive
for nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation
Treaty by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council
Resolutions that sanction the Iranian regime. CENTCOM also supports the
interdiction and counter proliferation framework under the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). CENTCOM's mainstay program for
Combating WMD engagement is the Cooperative Defense Program (CDP). The
CDP provides a series of bilateral and multilateral engagement
activities to improve U.S. and partner nation interoperability while
strengthening partner nations' combating WMD capabilities.
Countering Piracy
The Real and Growing Threat of Piracy
Somali-based pirates continue to prey upon international shipping
in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and on the high seas well into the Indian
Ocean. Pirates are using previously captured vessels as mother ships to
conduct successful attacks as far as 1,400 nautical miles from the
Somali coast. The number of successful pirate attacks has risen from 42
in 2008, to 51 in 2009, to 68 in 2010. Pirates now hold nearly 700
hostages for ransom. Multi-million dollar per ship ransoms ensure
piracy remains lucrative for pirates and others involved in this
criminal enterprise.
A Model for International Cooperation
CENTCOM works with international partners to help patrol the region
and to work with interagency partners to gain the prosecution of
captured pirates (though we currently lack an international legal
framework to detain and prosecute pirates). Piracy is a threat to all,
and has promoted international military cooperation that serves as a
model for cooperation in other areas. We acknowledge, however, that
military action is only one part of the solution, but an essential
element nonetheless. NAVCENT coordinates the efforts of over 25
contributing nations to combat piracy at sea and coordinates with
European Union (EU) Task Force Atalanta and NATO Standing Naval
Maritime Group in Operation Ocean Shield. Pakistan is currently in
command of Combined Task Force 151, the international coalition to
combat piracy. NAVCENT also hosts a monthly Shared Awareness and De-
confliction (SHADE) conference in Bahrain to foster multi-national
cooperation and to encourage maritime industry to adopt best practices
to defend vessels against piracy. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and
EU representation, the conferences also include civilian maritime
organizations, and delegates from China, Russia, Japan, and India.
STRATEGIC APPROACH
Many of our challenges are interconnected and require comprehensive
long-term solutions, prompting us to adopt an overall approach that is
cooperative, integrated, and enduring. As we undertake a diverse range
of operations and activities, three principles guide our efforts:
Adopting Cooperative Approaches by Partnering Based on Shared
Interests
First, we must adopt cooperative approaches to solving shared
challenges. America's strength and security depends on our ability to
help our friends in the region defend themselves, underscoring the
importance of CENTCOM's initiatives to build partner capacity and
pursue bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Starting from our shared
interests, we must capitalize on the comparative advantages of all
participating nations--for instance, by taking advantage of unique
geography or specialized capability. Ideally, such efforts would
combine the political, economic, and security spheres of those who
choose to participate, strengthening the whole to be greater than the
sum of the parts. Our efforts to develop effective solutions for
Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf Region represent a
significant example of the kind of cooperative efforts that are
necessary to deter and defeat our common threats. As mentioned above,
the international coalition to counter piracy in the Somali Basin is a
model for multilateral cooperation in the region that not only
addresses piracy but also offers opportunities for engagement in other
areas.
Our ability to cooperate with our partners depends to a great
extent on trust. As a consequence of the confidential diplomatic and
military reporting made public by Wikileaks, we must patiently
strengthen trust with our partners over time. We are up front with our
partners about this episode--which has informed our enemies about
supportive leaders as well as our tactics, techniques, and procedures.
We remain committed, as ever, to forthright communication in pursuit of
our shared objectives. We are reinforcing our efforts to ensure the
security of our communications and focusing on enhancing mutually
reinforcing objectives with allies and partners.
Integrating Our Efforts by Implementing Civil-Military Solutions
Second, the wars we are fighting today require intensively
integrated, comprehensive approaches from the highest to the lowest
levels, embracing diplomatic, information, military and economics in an
interwoven effort that builds synergy. Promoting security and stability
in the CENTCOM AOR cannot be achieved through military means alone. We
must therefore look beyond just the traditional application of military
power and integrate all elements of national power to address our many
challenges. CENTCOM's experience has shown that military might alone is
not sufficient to deal with the challenges we confront along with our
partners. Diplomacy and Development are just as vital as Defense in
securing our national interests. CENTCOM support efforts to address the
underlying conditions of instability that fuel current conflicts.
Successful application of these instruments of national power, in turn,
depends on our ability to achieve harmony within our civil-military
relationships. As such, it is a security concern for us when diplomatic
posts go unfilled in the region.
The overlapping forces at work in the CENTCOM AOR--those
originating from within and outside the region--require exceptional
cross-combatant command cooperation and coordination. We have achieved
progress across AOR geographic seams, exemplified by cooperation with
PACOM on matters dealing with China and India and cooperation with
European Command on Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East Peace Process.
CENTCOM, and PACOM regularly synchronize efforts to combat mutual
challenges such as piracy, proliferation of WMD, and support to
countering VEOs. Additionally, we continue to work closely with U.S.
Africa Command to address the state-failure in Somalia, as well as
share critical assets to meet time-critical force requirements.
Together we have established a counter-piracy Joint Operating Area in
the Somali Basin. We team with U.S. Cyber Command to support global
relationships in cyberspace and U.S. Northern Command to protect U.S.
borders and domestic security. In all, the cross-combatant command
effort is going very well.
Supporting Enduring Solutions by Demonstrating Long-term Commitment
Finally, our approach to the region must be enduring. Following
through with our long-term commitments in the AOR improves the depth,
breadth and quality of our relationships in the region and increases
the likelihood of cooperation at the outset. In this region of the
world, we are judged by our actions, not words. Individual instances of
demonstrated trustworthiness on our part resonate throughout the region
for decades. Enduring solutions to the problems that we face also
depend on stability, steady economic growth and development in
governance. To that end, CENTCOM supports our partners' long-term
efforts to grow economically and to develop effective and legitimate
institutions of government.
RESOURCING THE FIGHT
Beyond the critical funding authorities highlighted above,
accomplishing our mission requires that we fully and efficiently
resource the following critical enablers. We appreciate Congressional
support to provide our warfighters on the battlefront with the tools
they need to accomplish their challenging missions. As we adapt to a
thinking adversary, we recognize the need to accelerate our acquisition
processes to enable us to out-maneuver our enemies. We also recognize
the obligation to be good stewards of our nation's monetary resources.
CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our
fiscal authorities and to apply the most effective oversight possible
of all of our programs.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
An Indispensable Tool
There is a considerable and justifiable appetite for ISR
capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, persistent ISR
capabilities represent one of the most important and effective force
multipliers and contribute directly to protecting our troops from the
threat of improvised explosive devices through ISR. In cooperation with
the ISR Task Force, we have augmented ISAF forces with a greatly
increased capability to counter the Taliban and understand the
environment in which we operate. Additionally, as we drawdown our
forces from Iraq, we are adjusting the apportionment of ISR in a
measured way to ensure that we retain adequate capability to support
our force in Iraq while we provide the necessary resources to
Afghanistan and elsewhere. We continue to refine our ability to fully
integrate U.S. and coalition ISR to deny transnational extremist
organizations safe haven, training bases, or staging areas to conduct
attacks.
Enhancing ISR Capabilities
We greatly appreciate the support of Congress and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology in meeting the
ongoing demand for more rapidly delivered ISR collection, exploitation,
and dissemination capabilities. Interrelated with our ISR needs, we
recognize a need to further enhance integration and synergy between
aviation and ground elements that is critical to Combat Air Support and
counterinsurgency doctrine. We support a limited objective experiment
to refine the requirement for a manned, armed ISR asset attuned to the
unique challenges of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Continued
investments in ISR technology, infrastructure, architecture, tools, and
personnel (particularly trained ISR managers) help us to build on the
significant gains we have achieved in the CENTCOM AOR--and enable us to
use the arsenal of ISR capabilities currently in the field.
Critical Intelligence Capabilities
Human intelligence and counterintelligence are just as important as
technical solutions to remotely gather intelligence, especially in the
conduct of operations in wars among the people. Such intelligence
activities are inherently government functions that require a long lead
time to develop. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our
human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary
plans and intentions. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of
our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into
adversary plans and intentions. We are also reshaping our
counterintelligence forces to face threats from hostile foreign
intelligence services and VEOs that employ sophisticated cyber
techniques and trusted insiders to penetrate our networks and
compromise our operations.
Improving Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
The Enemy's Weapon of Choice
Now and for the foreseeable future, the enemy is using Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) to kill and maim our troops. These devices
remain the greatest risk facing U.S. and coalition forces deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a threat to U.S. interests and
regional stability throughout the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, IED
attacks account for more than 60 percent of the U.S. and coalition
force casualties, though IED casualties have steadily decreased over
the past 6 months. The flow of lethal aid, migration of IED technology
and materials, and development of new tactics techniques and procedures
represents a global threat. Homemade explosives, which now account for
an estimated 85 percent of all IEDs, coupled with the proliferation of
commercially available IED materials and commercial grade explosives
make them relatively cheap and easy to build and employ.
Ongoing Interagency C-IED Efforts
CENTCOM counters the threat of IEDs by working together with all
Services and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Services
continue to equip U.S. and coalition forces with the latest technology
to mitigate and defeat IEDs. Thanks to Congress and the Department of
Defense, CENTCOM and our national and international partners have
delivered and fielded an unprecedented number of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected family of vehicles throughout Afghanistan. These vehicles
have proven critical to safeguarding the tactical mobility of our
warriors in harm's way. CENTCOM, in conjunction with the C-IED Senior
Integration Group, and JIEDDO have recently fielded a variety of C-IED
enablers that have proven to save lives on the battlefield. As a
result, we are finding and clearing more IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan--
at a rate above 60 percent for the last 12 months and 70 percent over
the last quarter of 2010. These improvements are due in part to more
tips from the population, better tactics, and additional enablers,
including the effective use of additional ISR provided by the Services
to counter this threat.
Attacking the Network
We are going after the entire IED network and insurgent supply
lines. Many of our recent successes have come in the use of persistent
systems emplaced throughout significant threat areas to help develop
insights into the local area. We are concurrently protecting the force
using trained dogs, mine rollers, jammers, and handheld devices; the
Marines in southern Afghanistan now employ nearly one dog per squad,
and soon we will have more than 200 working dogs in Afghanistan. Along
with the Services, JIEDDO, and academia we will continue to do
everything in our power to ensure our servicemembers and coalition
partners have the best technology and training available to defeat the
IED threat.
Supporting Additional C-IED Efforts
We continue to call on the defense industry to provide innovative
solutions to counter the threat of IEDs. Critical airlift and airdrop
sorties dramatically reduce the number of servicemembers exposed to the
IED threat. In fact, the number of pounds of supplies airdropped in
Afghanistan has doubled every year since 2005, with an astonishing
recovery rate of better than 98 percent. Not all critical movements can
be completed by air however. We ask that Congress continue to fund
those organizations that provide research and development for the
evolution of new and existing counter-IED systems and technologies,
especially in areas of predetonation, IED stand-off detection, and non-
lethal weapons to deny the enemy the ability to deliver or emplace
IEDs. We also ask that Congress provide the flexibility to rapidly and
proactively counter new, emerging, and future threats that are either
present on the battle field or potential threats that represent
vulnerability and would be difficult to counter.
Unity of Command and Control of C5 Networks
Coalition, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C5)
networks that meet the challenging demands of our troops in theater are
essential to CENTCOM. Currently, the command and control of networks
available to our deployed forces is divided among Services, agencies,
and combatant commands, resulting in degraded and delayed actions that
have allowed our adversaries to exploit this fundamental cyber
shortfall for too long. One bright network spot, however, is the Afghan
Mission Network, which enables U.S. and coalition forces and civilians
to remain connected and synchronized on the battlefield and linked to
supporting assets throughout the world. We seek congressional support
to enable effective integration and extension of networks to wherever
we fight, from maritime environments to the aerial layer and over
rugged mountainous terrain.
CONCLUSION
In closing, we greatly appreciate the support of Congress on behalf
of America's military personnel serving in the CENTCOM region. The
stalwart Americans in today's force have been fighting two wars for
nearly 10 years in the CENTCOM AOR. With remarkable spirit, they look
beyond the ambiguity and longevity of today's complex, demanding
operations and answer their country's call. Their courage, character
and commitment in the face of repeated deployments are inspiring. As
their commander, I am proud to serve alongside them. Thank you very
much for your unflagging support of our troops in harm's way and their
families here at home.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Mattis.
We will try a 7-minute first round for questions.
General, you made reference to Pakistan and noted that
they, indeed, have gone after some terrorist groups, and they
have suffered losses in that process. What you did not make
reference to, though, is what troubles us a great deal. What
troubles you, I am sure, too, and our leadership, is the
failure of the Pakistanis to go after terrorist groups in North
Waziristan and in Quetta, and those are the groups that cross
the border and attack our force, coalition forces, and the
Afghan people.
Why is it, in your judgment, that Pakistan is not going
after those terrorist groups, including the Haqqani network in
North Waziristan and the Quetta Shura?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, there have been disconnects
where we have not always seen eye-to-eye with Pakistan. Part of
the reason these groups exist is, together with Pakistan, we
helped create some of them.
Any attempt to look at Pakistan's security interests must
include their difficult relationship with India. Over the
years, I believe that Pakistan got into a position where the
very groups that, in some cases, we helped to give birth to,
became part of the landscape, the Kalashnikov culture, for
example.
In many cases, they have moved against these areas, and not
all of it has been cost-free. As I noted, they have lost
thousands of troops, killed and wounded. Especially telling is
the number of junior officers they have lost, indicating an
aggressive effort against these areas.
I think, too, it is the most difficult terrain I have ever
operated in, in my 39 years in uniform. The Pakistan military's
movement against these folks is continuing. We are now into our
24th month of unrelenting campaign against them.
Chairman Levin. But the Pakistanis have not gone after the
two groups that are giving us the most trouble in Afghanistan.
Have you pressed on the Pakistan military the importance of
going after those groups?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I have.
Chairman Levin. There has been a request, as you have
indicated, to increase the size of the ANSF. You made a
reference to the request that is under consideration to be an
increase between 45,000 to 70,000 above the goal set for
October of this year, which will be met. That target of 305,000
is already met or will be met easily by October.
Now when you made reference, when you say you support
further growth of ANSF, did I understand you then to support
the growth beyond the October 2011 target of 305,000 and
somewhere between 45,000 and 70,000 personnel is the target
that you support?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I do. I think, though, we have to
look at whether or not we can sustain it. I believe that
President Karzai last week came out of his National Security
Council and said that he now supports it, and that
recommendation, of course, will have to be considered by the
NATO Council.
Chairman Levin. Right. Now I made reference repeatedly to
the importance of the July 2011 date for the beginning of
reductions of American forces in Afghanistan. We heard, as I
indicated in my opening remarks, from Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen a week or 2 ago that they support the reduction
beginning in July 2011 of U.S. forces with the pace to be
determined by conditions on the ground.
General Mattis, do you support the decision to set the July
2011 date as the beginning point of reductions in U.S. forces
in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, I do support it. I would like
to say that I support it because it undercuts the enemy's
narrative. When they say we are there to occupy Afghanistan,
this helps to deny the enemy that moral victory. I think, too,
that because it is a conditions-based drawdown that begins this
year, I am comfortable with it from a military point of view.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Olson, do you support that date as the beginning of
U.S. reductions?
Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, I do. As a beginning to thin
out the force in order to accomplish a full transition
eventually.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, what has been the effect of the
Afghan Local Police (ALP) effort that the special ops folks are
so deeply involved in, in the villages of Afghanistan where
you, working with the Afghans' military and police, are working
at the local village level to create these local police units?
Can you tell us about these programs?
How successful are they? What is the partnership
arrangement with the Afghans in the operations between our
special operations people and the ALP?
Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, that is a matter, of course,
under General Mattis's operational control, but I was just able
to visit a couple of these ALP sites last week, and my sense is
that this is having real value at a micro regional level. This
is an Afghan Government program that is administered within the
Ministry of the Interior. It is at the local level under the
district governors, and it is local leaders who recruit and
select those who will be members of the ALP forces.
The role of SOF in this is to move to these remote regions
in small numbers, establish the personal relationships that are
so important to gain credibility as an advising force, and then
provide some training and mentorship to these ALP as they gain
the ability to defend their villages.
In my opinion, this has had quite a powerful effect
locally. These are not roaming armies by any means. These are
certainly locals who have organized themselves under local
leadership to protect their own neighborhoods.
Chairman Levin. The partnering issue?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the partnering is in that there is a
small team of U.S. forces in a village that is then the
naturally partnered force with the ALP in that village. They
stay for months at a time there, and so this becomes a very
strong partnership. But again, it is an Afghan Government-
administered program with the U.S. forces strongly supporting
it.
Chairman Levin. Are Afghans with us in any operation that
we are involved in?
Admiral Olson. Sir, in all of the operations that are
conducted in Afghanistan, there are Afghans involved.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman.
As a follow-up to the chairman's question, does it concern
you, General Mattis, that the defense ministers of various
allies who have troops and commitments in Afghanistan have said
to me that, ``Well, if you are going to begin to withdraw, we
will begin to withdraw as well.'' Is that of concern to you?
General Mattis. It would be, sir. It is why we have to
engage with them.
Senator McCain. So we expect them to stay, while we
withdraw?
General Mattis. I think what we want them to do is, as we
look at the transition process, Senator McCain, we make certain
in their area that we follow the transition guidelines, and in
some cases, that may mean withdrawal. In some, it may mean that
they reinvest the people that they have achieved some success
with into another area. Maybe that they go into training, that
sort of thing.
But there is no misunderstanding that the Americans are
carrying the bulk of this fight, over 100,000 troops, and I
think that our commitment is pretty straightforward, both
fiscally and troop wise.
Senator McCain. I know Libya is not within your AOR, but
would you venture an opinion as to the difficulty of
establishing a no-fly zone?
General Mattis. My military opinion is, sir, it would be
challenging. You would have to remove the air defense
capability in order to establish the no-fly zone.
So no illusions here. It would be a military operation. It
wouldn't simply be telling people not to fly airplanes.
Senator McCain. Declaration of a no-fly zone to the enemy
would have a significant deterring effect on their desire to
fly. I think we know that to be the case.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Obviously, the events in Bahrain are of
great concern to you and all of us. How much Iranian
involvement have you seen in these? I fully understand this is
a popular uprising, but isn't it into some respects a proxy
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
General Mattis. I think the current Tehran regime is
incapable of trying to let other nations just take care of
their own issues. They have to meddle and create mischief.
The Bahrain situation I think is a legitimate popular
effort. But I am under no illusions that the Iranians would not
try to take advantage of this issue or any other, whether it be
in Lebanon or anywhere else in the region.
Senator McCain. The loss of the Fifth Fleet headquarters
would be a significant setback?
General Mattis. It would be. But right now, sir, from even
the opposition, our sailors who live out in town, driving to
and from work, have encountered zero anti-Americanism. I was
just there about a week ago, and there is no hostility directed
towards Americans right now--obviously not from the government
with whom we have been very good friends for 40, 50, 60 years,
but not from the opposition either.
It has been heartening, actually. The DOD school has been
open every day. We are on about the 12th day with no violence.
So it is not right now something that concerns me.
Senator McCain. Given the long-term needs of Iraq, how are
the deficiencies of the Iraqi Security Forces--such as
maintenance, readiness, intelligence fusion, and particularly
the building of an air force--going to be addressed absent U.S.
troops?
General Mattis. You hit the three points that we are
concerned with. Under logistics, it is maintenance as well, how
they keep their gear going. The intelligence fusion and the air
sovereignty are critical.
I think right now there are going to be loose ends unless
the Iraqis ask us to stay and work on these issues. Those loose
ends would be difficult for them to overcome on their own, sir.
Senator McCain. Hezbollah is now the dominant actor in the
government of Lebanon. Do you think the United States should
continue providing military assistance to the Lebanese air
forces, armed forces, or is it something we should wait and
see? What is your view of that situation?
General Mattis. Well, we saw Hezbollah use threats of
violence to undercut the government. We are all very much aware
of that. The new government is still in formation, and we will
have to take a very close look at how it is organized and how
it is formed to deal with Lebanon's future.
I think that an inclusive government is the only option
that works with the various confessional groups that try to
share power there. But I believe right now, if we look at the
example of Egypt, and we look at what happened where we were
able to maintain, under some criticism that Congress came under
for giving us the amount of money that we gave to the Egyptian
military, but we were able to maintain a relationship there
that paid off, I think, when it came time to see them either
ethically use their position to help the people of the country
or what we see in Libya.
So as we look at Lebanon, where they have never lost track
of any of the equipment that we have given to them yet--the
equipment given to the Lebanese armed forces, I think we should
look at the quality of the government as it is put together,
recognize that the military can actually be a bulwark against
malign influence, and act in our best interest once we have
made that analysis.
Senator McCain. Have you seen the news reports that a
number of people were arrested in Iraq as a result of
demonstrations?
General Mattis. I have. Yes, sir. The ones on, I think, the
26th? Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So it is of concern that they would be
arresting demonstrators in a country we expect them to allow
demonstrations?
General Mattis. Sir, the demonstrations were not as large
as we expected, but they were spread all over the country. The
demonstrations, by and large, were peaceful. The Iraqi Security
Forces were out, and al Qaeda did not take advantage. I don't
think they could take advantage of this opportunity to kill
more innocent people.
In the midst of that, there were some people who did things
like stone troops. There were about as many people injured on
the Iraqi Security Force side, around 50, as there were injured
total and killed, unfortunately, on the demonstrators' side.
Those appear to be contained in each case where government
buildings were stormed. Prime Minister Maliki has said that he
will investigate each death, each injury, and make certain they
know what happened in each case.
So I think right now what we saw was, by and large, a very
restrained use of force by the Iraqi Security Forces in regards
to the demonstrators. There was no opening fire on them. It was
a much more restrained effort. I don't know what all the
investigations are going to show yet, Senator, but I would like
to get back to you once I see what we can find through our
intel sources.
[The information referred to follows:]
In coordination with U.S. Forces Iraq, we have determined the
protests drew approximately 27,000 Iraqi citizens to 43 demonstrations
across the country. Protestors directed many of their grievances at
provincial governments. The largest demonstrations were in the cities
of Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and Fallujah. Individual demonstrations
ranged from a few hundred up to 8,000 protestors. While the protests
were largely peaceful, 14 of 43 turned violent, usually after the
demonstrators attempted to enter or damage government buildings.
Current reporting has determined that 119 Iraqis and 4 journalists were
detained across Iraq on the day of 25 February. At this time, I do not
know the specifics of each arrest.
In several cases, security forces responded to violent
demonstrators with small arms fire. Prime Minister Maliki has initiated
investigations to determine what happened in these instances. In total,
11 Iraqi citizens were killed; 72 citizens were injured, and 45 members
of the Iraqi Security Forces were wounded.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you. General Mattis, thanks for your
service. Admiral Olson, also let me join those who are thanking
you for your extraordinary career of service to our country and
the time particularly in which you have been the leader of
SOCOM, and through you really to thank everyone who serves
under you in that command.
This is a remarkable group of Americans who I have had the
privilege to meet as I have traveled around, particularly to
battle zones. Honestly, every day they are performing critical
and dangerous missions with a remarkable degree of skill,
bravery, and I would say patriotism, and also, of course,
effect.
A lot of that has grown and developed under your watch. I
can't thank you enough for that, and thank all of them.
Let me just give you an opportunity to develop a little
more your metaphor that the fabric is strong, but around the
edges there may be a little fraying of the SOF. What are the
specific shortfalls that you would like to see us address to
make sure that the whole fabric is as strong as you and we want
it to be?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir.
I got an email not too long ago from an operational
commander forward who said, ``Sir, the good news is that the
demand for SOF is higher than ever. The bad news is the demand
is higher than ever.''
As 100,000 U.S. troops came out of Iraq, only fewer than
1,000 were from SOF. At the same time, we saw a requirement to
move more than 1,500 into Afghanistan. This is the force that,
as you said, has earned its way to real importance in terms of
executing strategies in those conflicts.
It is at the point where for some elements of our force,
time at home with their families has become the abnormal
condition. They have to adjust to being home rather than adjust
to being away. It is those elements of the force that I am
seeking to provide some relief for in terms of 1,000 programs.
There is no magic answer to this. It is gaining a greater
understanding of what the real issues are. It is shaving where
we can the number of days that they are away from home for
training when they are not forward deployed. It is putting more
predictability into their lives. It is relieving every special
operations member of any job that can be performed by anybody
else.
I do believe that the Services--Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps--could invest in capabilities that would provide
more habitual, more timely support to SOF. We are in those
discussions with each of the Services.
I do believe that the quality of the training, the
equipment, and the facilities that we provide them is certainly
a factor in ensuring that this force, in which we have invested
so heavily for 10 years, will still be with us 10 years hence.
Senator Lieberman. Well, I appreciate that answer, and I am
sure the members of the committee look forward to working with
you and your staff to see if we can help you with some of
those.
General Mattis, as Senator McCain said, we had the
opportunity to travel through some of the Arab world last week
where these remarkable changes are occurring. My own feeling is
that while you are right, there is both opportunity and
challenge, that the opportunity here is greater.
It is really remarkable to see these peaceful revolutions
occur, which have to make both the leaders of al Qaeda up in
the mountains feel that history may be passing them by, but
also represent a real direct threat to Iran, which I think you
correctly and characteristically bluntly identify as our
greatest long-term threat in the region.
I want to just come back to Libya briefly because I was
interested that in some of our visits with young people and
others in Tunisia, Egypt, where these revolutions have
succeeded, they are watching how the world responds to
Gaddafi's brutality to his own people. Because they are taking
it as a sign of if Gaddafi can survive, they worry that other
leaders in the Arab world will similarly try to repress
revolutions.
I know the administration is considering a range of options
now with regard to Gaddafi. I know Senator McCain asked you
about the no-fly zone. Have you, in your CENTCOM role, been
asked to prepare for any activities relating to Libya,
including, for instance, the provision of humanitarian
assistance, medical supplies, food, to people in the liberated
areas of Libya?
General Mattis. Senator, as you understand, this comes
under Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, sir.
General Mattis. I have dispatched ships under the order of
the Secretary of Defense that could provide options to the
President. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That is reassuring to hear. I know it is
the AFRICOM. But obviously, you have a lot of assets in the
region, and I am encouraged to hear that they are moving to be
available.
Going back to Iran, for some period of time, there was a
certain uncertainty, if I can put it that way, about the extent
to which the Iranians were assisting the terrorists and
extremists in Afghanistan against us. It was clear that they
were assisting the Shia extremists in Iraq and, unfortunately,
have a lot of American blood on their hands as a result.
Could you tell us a little more now about the state of our
conclusions about what the Iranians are doing to help the
Taliban or other anti-government, anti-American forces in
Afghanistan?
General Mattis. I can give you an incomplete answer,
Senator. They have given low levels of ammunition, money, that
sort of support, improvised explosive device components, to our
enemies in Afghanistan. At one point, the Taliban and Iran were
very much at odds with each other, to include the Taliban
killing a number of Iranian diplomats there in northern
Afghanistan.
But the reason I say I am giving you an incomplete answer
is we are keeping a very sharp eye on some recent information
we have to see if they are, in fact, elevating their support,
which would be very, very unwise for them to do.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, sir. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, we would all echo the remarks about your service,
Admiral Olson. You certainly will be missed.
When we are talking about the withdrawal of troops in
Afghanistan, occasionally the President talks about conditions
on the ground. I am not sure just what is going to happen, what
these timetables are.
But I would say this. I have had the opportunity, going all
the way back to the fall of 2003 when it happened to be the
Oklahoma 45th over in Afghanistan helping the ANA to train
themselves, and they were doing really a great job. But each
year when, we go back and see it, we see this improvement in
training. I think this really has to be recognized.
I don't see Senator Hagan here now, but she and I were
there spending New Year's Eve in Afghanistan and had a chance
to go down to the Kabul military training center. It is almost
like looking at a training center here in the United States. I
am talking about the separation between artillery and infantry,
how they are doing it.
We had individual interviews, with interpreters, where just
at random we would select people, and we saw the enthusiasm
they have for their quality of training. So I see really great
improvements in the quality of training over there, and that
was my personal observation.
General Mattis, are you as excited about that as I am?
General Mattis. Sir, the success of this last year,
especially as we see the Afghan forces coming of age, very much
is depending upon the training, the superb training, and it is
going exactly as you say. We now have metrics in place where we
measure them. Then we are seeing the improved capability in the
field. It has to be the enemy's worst nightmare.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I would say that is true. When we talk
to these individuals, they want this to be a career.
When I saw the position that the Egyptian military is going
to be in during this new transition or whatever we are going
into right now, I was somewhat pleased with it. One reason is
that I have been a staunch supporter up here, probably the most
staunch supporter, of the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program and what it has meant. With Egypt, it
even goes further because we are talking about 3 decades now
that they have done this.
My feeling was that one of the great benefits of the IMET
program is that it develops a relationship between the military
of other countries. I have seen this throughout Africa and
elsewhere, which is why we have been wanting to expand it. So I
felt pretty good about that.
I noticed that in 2010, our Egypt IMET program was at about
$2 million and dropped down to about $1.5 million in 2011. I am
trying to get the figure now as to what is requested for 2012.
I would like just to get you on the record on your feelings
about the IMET program and how much that has benefited us,
particularly with the situation right now as it is in Egypt.
General Mattis. Senator, I think the IMET program is a
strategic asset to us, where we bring those officers to our
country. They go through training and education here. We then
go on joint exchanges with them back in their country,
exercises and all, and we see it pay off there.
But there is a longer-term payoff, and that payoff is when
I walk into a room as a brigadier general back in 2001, and the
first discussion I have with a half dozen officers is them
telling me the best year of their life was in Maxwell Air Force
Base or in Fort Leavenworth--and we immediately start from a
position of common understanding. I think this is a strategic
asset to us that we should certainly maintain full support for.
Senator Inhofe. All right. I appreciate that.
Do you echo those sentiments, Admiral Olson?
Admiral Olson. Absolutely, sir. You can sign me up as a
member of the IMET fan club. I was in a position long ago, a
part of the implementation team of IMET in Tunisia, and that
country was particularly well served by IMET.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We were just a couple of days ago with
Prime Minister Netanyahu. He was referring to the earthquake
that is taking place right now. When Senator Lieberman was
talking about the commands, it occurred to me that when we were
in Stuttgart, we were with European Command, AFRICOM, and
CENTCOM. You have three commands, really, right now that are
dealing with this problem.
Are you guys all talking to each other? Do you feel there
is no problem in that you are dealing with an earthquake that
has taken place in three commands?
General Mattis. Sir, we have a very close working
relationship, and there is strong collaboration between us.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Admiral Olson, we also had the opportunity of spending some
time in Djibouti, and Admiral Losey, I guess it was, spent
quite a bit of time with us. I was certainly impressed with
what they are doing there.
When I look at your statement, it says, ``We now total
close to 60,000, about a third of whom are career members of
SOF, meaning that they have been selected, trained, and
qualified to earn the military occupational specialty or skill
code identifier of the SOF.''
Now that would be a third of the 60,000. Tell me a little
bit about the other two-thirds that are not included in this
category.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. They are the full range of
enabling, technical, supportive capabilities--engineers,
logisticians, administrators, intelligence analysts,
maintenance crews, and the like--that make the rest of it all
possible. We are a broadly capable force. We do have our own
airplanes, our own helicopters, our own boats, our own mini
submarines. So, this requires a supporting crew that has to be
quite expert as well.
Senator Inhofe. Well, we are concerned about your
resources, that you have them, because we know what your
mission is and what you have been able to do. Is everything
going all right in terms of retention and recruiting?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the recruiting is good. The recruiting
has been pretty consistent over the last decade, even
consistent across the 9/11 attacks. Retention has been pretty
good. It has been above the service averages in almost every
category.
Senator Inhofe. Which is very good, too.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Admiral Olson. We are beginning to see at the mid-grade
level, sort of the 8 to 10 years of service point, a slight
leveling off of the retention.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you.
My time has expired. But if you, maybe for the record,
could elaborate a little bit on your numbers that you have
right now as you look into the future and how this--whether the
60,000 is going to be--increasing it, if that is going to be
adequate, for the record.
Admiral Olson. Sir, for the record, in my opinion, it is
adequate. I believe that the key to special operations
capability beyond our current numbers is mostly in terms of
supporting special operations from the much broader range of
capabilities within the department, with habitually assigned
units that are timely in their response, that understand what
special operations is and how to support special operations
requirements.
I am calling this the ``special operations force generation
concept'' and working with each of the services on how they can
contribute to that and how we can contribute to their force
generation cycles, as that is appropriate.
The specific answer to your numbers question is that--and I
am on record before this committee now in 3 previous years as
saying we should not, we ought not grow more than 3 to 5
percent per year in our manpower because of the quality that we
need to maintain as we do that. We are projected to do that for
the next 3 or 4 years.
Senator Inhofe. That is good. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Also let me add my appreciation, Admiral Olson, for your
service and best wishes for your future.
IMET is a very important part of what I would hope to be
our outreach to the world in a way that makes good sense. I
have had military officials from Egypt in my office before who
have been here getting the IMET training, and I have been
impressed with their appreciation and their understanding of
what kind of military--or what the military should do in
connection with government.
My question would be do you think that the difference
between the way the military has behaved in Libya and the way
military behaved in Egypt is, at least in part, due to their
IMET training?
General Mattis?
General Mattis. I think there is no doubt it has
contributed, sir. Each nation has its own history, its own
culture. But I think the ethical performance by the Egyptian
military was impacted by their time spent in our schools over
these last decades.
Senator Nelson. The same would be true in the case of
Tunisia as well?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Do we have any plans to try to expand the
program? I know resources are tight right now. But one of the
best ways of avoiding future expenditures is to have ethical
military operatives in other countries. Are there any plans
that you are aware of to expand this to perhaps some other
countries where there is an interest?
General Mattis. I am not aware of plans to expand it. Of
course, the Secretary of Defense can open the door to different
countries at different times, give them more school seats, that
sort of thing. I think it would be a resourcing issue. You
would have to have more instructors, more classrooms, this sort
of thing. I think it is worth looking at, but I am not aware of
any plans right now to do so, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Well, we will try to take this up with the
Secretary. I appreciate, though, your response.
General Mattis, I have been a strong proponent of
benchmarks with metric measurements for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. I had support for those in Iraq as well, and I am
interested in your evaluation of the benchmarks.
The last report was in November 2010, and it is my
understanding the next report will be provided in April of this
year. So perhaps I am a little ahead of the report progress. I
would like to know whether or not the report in November stated
that the assessment of governance in focus districts showed
that 38 percent of the population lived in the areas rated as
having emerging or full-authority Afghan governance.
It reflects no change through March 2010. I wonder are we
trending up, or are we flat-lined, or are we trending down at
this point? I am talking about both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There may be a difference in each of the countries.
General Mattis. Oh, there is significant difference, sir.
Let me address Afghanistan, where General Petraeus and
Ambassador Eikenberry lead our effort in supporting the Afghan
governance. I will tell you that this is receiving a lot of
attention. We are making progress.
I believe it is lagging behind the security effort. I think
that is somewhat understandable. You don't get governance in
until you get enough security that people can, without concern,
carry out the governmental functions.
At the same time, we are dealing with a country that
probably took several hundred billion dollars' worth of damage
during decades of war, according to the International Monetary
Fund. When you translate that into the human damage and the
damage to the people, the education system, this sort of thing,
it is a long, hard slog to create the kind of governmental
organizations and the right people who can then create the kind
of progress that will reflect in those metrics, sir.
The Pakistan military is where I have most of my
connections. But from what I read, I have concerns about
Pakistan's governance and their ability to meet the needs of
their people. I believe right now that President Karzai may
actually be in a better position on this than the political
leadership in Pakistan.
Senator Nelson. Both Afghanistan and we depend on the
Pakistani military and the Pakistani Government to be able to
take care of those largely isolated areas--I guess Swat and the
particular areas there--where there are safe havens for al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and other hostile operatives. That makes it
much more difficult for us to be able to contain and degrade
and defeat that enemy. Is that fair?
General Mattis. It is very fair, sir. Again, it is the
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), which
constitutionally is under a different sort of governance even
within Pakistan.
Further, I think the impact of the floods this year--we
served alongside the Pakistan military that performed very well
providing relief and life-saving efforts. But those floods,
which were enormous in their impact--the worst in a hundred
years--I don't know that once the Pakistan military had done
what they could do in terms of saving the people from those
floods, that there was a sufficiently robust governmental
response then to help those people put their lives back
together.
Senator Nelson. So the attitude towards the government may
not be as strong as it could be if the government had a strong
follow-up response?
General Mattis. I believe you are right. I don't have the
data. I haven't looked at it specifically. But I believe you
are correct, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Okay. My final question, General, is that
as we trend out of Iraq and we come upon December 31, there is
some concern that maybe the Iraqi Government will ask us to
remain. I don't have any indication of that, but just a general
concern that perhaps their security is not sufficient for them
to be able to self-govern.
If that is the case--and I asked this of Secretary Gates
recently. If that is the case and we are in a position where we
might make the decision to stay, I would hope that we would do
so, recognizing that from that point forward, that we would
expect the Iraqi Government to pick up a bigger share of the
cost that we would incur.
It is my understanding they are dealing with a deficit
there, just as we are here. But it only adds to our deficit. If
I have to choose between mine and theirs, you know what I am
going to choose. If that happens, I would hope that we would be
thinking about how we can make certain that the Iraqi
Government picks up a bigger share of any costs that we would
incur going forward.
That is less a question more than a wish. In that regard, I
hope that you will keep that in mind because, obviously, it
will come indirectly under your jurisdiction. Have you had any
thoughts about that? Should we be asked to stay?
General Mattis. I haven't looked specifically at your
point. However, there is clearly an increasing sense of
responsibility by the Iraqi Government toward resourcing their
own security forces. I think that would be a natural part of
the negotiations between the two governments if we were asked
to stay.
Senator Nelson. Yes, I would hope that we would make that a
part of the negotiations because that is what we would have to
do. We can't just assess it. We would have to have a common
agreement.
General Mattis. I have it, sir. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Well, thank you, General Mattis, and thank
you for your service and all the men and women under your
command. We appreciate their continued sacrifice and service,
and their families as well. Thanks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I also want to commend Admiral Olson and General Mattis for
your distinguished service to our country. Please express our
gratitude to all the troops that serve underneath you for all
that they are doing to protect our country.
In recent hearings, Secretary Gates as well as Secretary
Vickers have testified that approximately one out of four
detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have gotten
back into the fight. Admiral Olson or General Mattis, could you
tell us a little more about what are the details regarding some
of these detainees who are joining the fight?
Have there been examples where some of these detainees have
actually injured or killed American troops that have been
returned back into the fight?
General Mattis. Senator, the best data we have would show
approximately 25 percent have either returned, and we can
confirm it, or we strongly suspect they have returned.
Twenty-five percent is a concern to all of us involved in
this war because it reinforces the enemy. It gives people some
degree of credibility because they have been in our hands. They
have gotten out.
So, yes, ma'am, it is a big concern.
Senator Ayotte. Have there been examples where some of
these detainees who have returned to the fight have actually
injured our soldiers or killed our soldiers?
General Mattis. I don't have a specific example of that.
However, for example, we know one of them is the number two
person in AQAP. Clearly, he is engaged in trying to do so. If
he hasn't, it is just because he hasn't been successful yet,
but his intent is exactly what you are suggesting.
Senator Ayotte. He is obviously directing members of al
Qaeda to kill American troops. That is a deep concern, given
that we released him from our detention facility.
I am deeply concerned about our policy toward detainees and
release back into theater, and I think that the least we can do
for our troops is to hold those who are dangerous and not allow
them to get back into theater to harm our troops. It is
certainly something that I look forward to continuing to work
with others in the Senate to make sure that we have a sensible
detention policy that doesn't allow these terrorists to get
back into theater.
General Mattis, I know that we have emphasized that, of
course, Libya is not directly in your responsibility. However,
you mentioned that recently you have dispatched ships to
provide options and assets in the region itself.
Last week, there were many nations who were sending
military aircraft and ships to Libya in order to evacuate their
own citizens that were in Libya. As I understand it, we sent
and chartered a civilian ferry to try to take the civilians
that were in Libya, U.S. citizens, to get them out of Libya.
Yet that ferry actually couldn't depart port for 2 days due to
high winds and waves.
Are you aware whether certain nations, including Germany
and Great Britian, actually sent military assets to be able to
get its citizens out of Libya?
General Mattis. Senator, I am not aware of the specifics
here. As you will understand, I have been a little busy in my
own theater. But I think what you are saying is about right,
but I can't confirm it.
Senator Ayotte. Do you know if we had wanted to, whether we
could have sent military assets to be able to get our civilians
out of Libya, as other countries did?
General Mattis. Ma'am, again, I don't keep the
Mediterranean picture. I am not current on it. So I don't know
what ships or aircraft were available at what time and where
they were and what airfields were open. I really can't give you
a good answer on that.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. But you are now, of course, sending
some of our CENTCOM assets over to assist in that area, as you
testified earlier?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am. We have. Those were to give
whether it be humanitarian or whatever options the President
may want. Those assets have been sent through the Suez Canal.
Senator Ayotte. Had you been asked to do that last week, is
that something you would have been able to do earlier last
week, as opposed to where we are now?
General Mattis. Yes. Well, ma'am, the way it comes to me is
not as a request, frankly. I get orders. But, yes, ma'am, we
can do it on order. Obviously, I have my own requirements in
the theater. It is always a balancing act that the Secretary
has to go through between different combatant commanders.
Senator Ayotte. General, you would have certainly had the
capability of doing it last week, as opposed to where we are
right now?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate both of
you testifying before the committee today.
Admiral Olson and General Mattis, thank you so much for
your distinguished service to our country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Admiral, greetings. I am hoping that you can help
provide us a little bit of focus in terms of how we are going
to approach similar situations in the future.
Not long after September 11, a coalition of Afghan forces,
assisted by a handful of special operators, Forward Air
Controllers, kicked out the Taliban in a matter of a few weeks.
We were the enablers, for lack of a better term, not the
instruments or the creators, of societal change in that
evolution.
We took a different approach in Iraq. We are taking a
different approach today in Afghanistan. We have undertaken a
duty, I understand, what I would call the concept of negligence
in the law. Once you undertake a duty, if you don't see it all
the way through, you are guilty of negligence. At the same
time, we need to really start looking at the future in terms of
how we are going to use our military.
Secretary Gates made a speech at West Point recently,
indicating that, in his view, this troop-heavy concept read
pretty much nation building is not a model that should be
applied in the future with respect to issues of international
terrorism. At the same time, General Casey, over the past day
or 2, mentioned that he wouldn't be surprised to see 100,000
Army soldiers deployed in these types of operations 10 years
from now.
I would like to hear your thoughts on where should we be
moving here in terms of the use of our ground troops in issues
of combating international terrorism? General?
General Mattis. Senator, I think, as we look toward the
future, I have been a horrible prophet. I have never fought
anywhere I expected to in all my years.
I believe that we have to take each situation on its own,
and we have to define the problem to a Jesuit's level of
acceptability. It has to be defined to a point that the
solution is very clear in terms of what is the strategy we must
adopt. The strategy, of course, is what are the ends, and what
are the means to get there?
The one caution I would give, having studied this problem,
is that we cannot marry one preclusive view of war and preclude
other types and say we just won't do that because the very
nature of war is the enemy will gravitate toward our perceived
weakness. We are going to have to have a force that has a
built-in shock absorber, basically can go anywhere and do
anything, at the same time have a moderating impact on our own
strategy, so we don't try to go anywhere and do everything.
It has to be a vital national interest, and we have to make
sure we have a force that is a general-purpose force that does
not allow the enemy to think that we are leaving some form of
warfare uncovered and then works against us in that direction.
Senator Webb. I wouldn't disagree with you on that at all.
At the same time, I can recall having written a piece the day
after September 11, discussing how to deal with international
terrorism, and two of the concepts in that--you build your
strategy off of operational concepts and the enemy that you are
facing.
Two of the clear concepts in that was, number one, you have
to maintain your maneuverability, and, number two, when you are
fighting a mobile enemy, you are at risk whenever you occupy
territory and then have to defend the territory that you are
occupying. I think that those are the decision points moving
toward the future.
Admiral, do you have any thoughts on that?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think when the enemy is a ponderous,
state-sponsored, uniformed, organized fighting force, it may
require a similar force to defeat it. But I think that is less
likely in the future. I agree with Secretary Gates on that.
We are much more likely to see the less regular kinds of
warfare--the cyber warfare, the terrorist warfare, the non-
state sponsored warfare--to which the best solution is often
enabling another country's forces to deal with it in that
region and being, as you said, the supporting force, not the
supported force in that fight.
Senator Webb. Again, clearly, in terms of international
terrorism, the whole operational concept is to not align
themselves with a state.
By the way, I would not in any way disagree with what
General Mattis just said about keeping all your options on the
table. But it just seems to me with the variety of threats that
face us right now, the type of response that we have made over
the past 8 or 9 years is not a workable model. It concerns me a
good bit.
General, I want to ask you a question about Pakistan. I
have raised a number of questions over the past 2 years about
the transparency of our funding in terms of assistance to
Pakistan. Are you comfortable with the transparency of the
money that is going into Pakistan, and that you know where it
is going?
General Mattis. I am, Senator; they don't do it by
computer. So it is all written out by hand, and we track it
right down to the end user.
I have some of the most aggressive colonels and majors you
can imagine in Islamabad working under my vice admiral there
who track this, and we routinely reject requests from them for
reimbursement.
I know it is not where they just walk in with a bill and we
pay it. Sometimes the ones we want more evidence of outweigh
the numbers that we just accept and say, ``Yes, we know you did
these things. So we are going to pay you.'' For example, fuel
for our forces and that sort of thing that comes in.
So, yes, I think we do have a very good feel for whether or
not we are reimbursing real costs vice any fraudulent costs.
Senator Webb. We have seen news reports that Pakistan has
doubled its nuclear arsenal in recent years, as we have been
providing assistance in other areas. Do you have any worries
that our assistance to Pakistan has allowed them to fund
programs such as their nuclear program?
General Mattis. I am confident there is no direct funding
going to their nuclear program because of my confidence in
tracking the costs we are reimbursing them for now. Obviously,
they have their own funding, and whether or not they would
spend some of that elsewhere, if we weren't reimbursing----
Senator Webb. Right. I understand that direct money would
not be going over there. The concern that I have is that if we
are funding programs that they otherwise would be funding and
they are able to take that money in order to increase their
nuclear arsenal, it is not a healthy situation for the region
and for us, in my view.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
General Mattis, let me follow up on a line of questioning
Senator McCain began. I was not in the room at the time, but I
understand that he got a brief answer to this so-called day of
rage in Iraq.
Let me see if I could explore this a little further. In
particular, I would point out a Washington Post Foreign Service
story that appeared on Saturday, February 26, in which it is
reported that Iraqi Security Forces detained hundreds of
people, including prominent journalists, artists, and
intellectuals, in demonstrations that brought thousands of
Iraqis to the streets and ended with soldiers shooting into
crowds.
It goes on to say that this involved more than a dozen
demonstrations across the country that killed at least 29
people, as crowds stormed provincial buildings, forced local
officials to resign, freed prisoners, and otherwise demanded
more from a government they only recently had a chance to
elect.
Is this, in your judgment, General, an isolated incident?
Or is it an example of the contagion that is sweeping the
entire region? What does it say about the popular support of a
government which recently was subject to election?
I understand the complications after the elections of the
government being formed in a very fragile manner without a
clear consensus. How accurate is this depiction? How worried
should we be that this country, where we have invested so much
of our blood and treasure, might be just as unstable as some
other regimes?
General Mattis. Senator, I can't comment directly on the
accuracy of the story because the word that I have is there
were dozens of demonstrations. But I take that as a positive
sign. Those did not happen 15 years ago under Saddam.
It is a nascent democracy. It is the one that has been
through a very violent era. A critical part of our training of
the Iraqi Security Forces has been the ethical use of force.
They are also still operating against a very capable terrorist
enemy.
For example, the minister of defense of al Qaeda in Iraq
was killed on that day--I believe it was on that day--by Iraqi
Security Forces. It was a very good event for us.
Senator Wicker. Was he part of the protests?
General Mattis. He was not. But my point is that the enemy
operates in this country, even as the people are trying to
exercise their freedom to protest. I believe, from what I am
told, that the number of Iraqi Security Forces injured and the
number of demonstrators injured and killed is about the same.
The reason I bring that up is that that is oftentimes an
indicator of whether or not a military just opened fire on a
crowd. You open fire on a crowd with an automatic weapon, and
the casualties are going to be significantly higher than the
ones reported either by the government or by the newspaper
article.
Frankly, I wasn't ready for your question. I need to go
back and check and see if I missed something in our assessment
of what happened that day. I need to get back to you, Senator,
because the numbers you are citing are higher than what I was
told.
Senator Wicker. I see.
General Mattis. In most cases, it was when a government
building was attacked, and most of the injured soldiers were in
place, were injured by rock throwing. So that is the kind of
the framework I am looking at it through.
Senator Wicker. So I can expect you to supplement your
answer on the record, and I appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
In coordination with U.S. Forces Iraq, we have determined the
protests drew approximately 27,000 Iraqi citizens to 43 demonstrations
across the country. Protestors directed many of their grievances at
provincial governments. The largest demonstrations were in the cities
of Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and Fallujah. Individual demonstrations
ranged from a few hundred up to 8,000 protestors. While the protests
were largely peaceful, 14 of 43 turned violent, usually after the
demonstrators attempted to enter or damage government buildings.
Current reporting has determined that 119 Iraqis and 4 journalists were
detained across Iraq on the day of 25 February. At this time, I do not
know the specifics of each arrest.
In several cases, security forces responded to violent
demonstrators with small arms fire. Prime Minister Maliki has initiated
investigations to determine what happened in these instances. In total,
11 Iraqi citizens were killed; 72 citizens were injured, and 45 members
of the Iraqi Security Forces were wounded.
Senator Wicker. As to the larger question, though, sir, of
whether we need to be concerned about this government falling,
much as governments in the region have toppled and are toppling
one by one, what is your informed judgment as to the larger
question?
General Mattis. Well, the election was very close. It took
months--I think 8, 9 months--to actually get a government
formed. In close elections in a parliamentary system, that is
understandable. I think it is still a work in progress.
The performance of the Iraqi Security Forces during that
long period, when there was just basically a caretaker
government at work, gives me some degree of confidence that the
security forces can protect this nascent democracy as it grows
its roots. But one or two elections doesn't make a democracy,
as we all know, and there is a lot of work that still has to be
done. Right now, I do not think that it is in danger of
falling.
Senator Wicker. To what extent are the supporters of Mr.
Allawi supportive of the government as it finally emerged?
General Mattis. I think that is still a work in progress as
well, as we see where Mr. Allawi falls out in the organization
of the government. I spoke with him about 2 months ago in
Baghdad, and he was still relatively positive at that time that
he was going to have a meaningful role. That would bring the
people you are referring to onboard with him.
Since then, it has been difficult to see progress, but I
think it is always slower than we want to see. I think there is
still progress along those lines, but I don't know where it is
going to fall out right now. I think it is still too early to
say.
Senator Wicker. Finally, to what extent do we need to be
concerned about Iran attempting to influence the foreign policy
of Iraq?
General Mattis. I have no doubt that Iran will attempt to
influence the foreign policy and domestic policy of Iraq.
Senator Wicker. Is this a serious problem or simply one of
the many concerns that we have?
General Mattis. I think Iran is going to be left behind by
this contagion, as you described it, sweeping across the
region, as they find that people are not interested in
exchanging one authoritarian for one like in Tehran. So I think
they have as much to worry about from this contagion.
Actually, I think, in many cases, the Iraqi people are
quite capable of making up their own mind without Iranian help,
and that will continue to manifest. I am not naive about Iran's
intent here.
Senator Wicker. I hope you are correct. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to thank Admiral Olson and General Mattis
for your excellent service to our country. Thank you so much.
The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
was established in 2005 and is headquartered at Camp Lejeune in
North Carolina. Some have suggested that MARSOC personnel
should be special operations for life, rather than rotating
through the command on a rotational basis as they are currently
doing.
They argue that this would help SOCOM create and retain
personnel within the special cultural and language skills that
are critical for success in irregular warfare and the foreign
internal defense missions.
Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the progress made
in standing up and growing MARSOC, and how are they unique
within the SOF? Could you also give me your thoughts on whether
the Marine operators should be special operations just for
life, just as in the Army?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, ma'am.
First, I would say we can be very, very proud of the way
that MARSOC has been established. It did just celebrate its
fifth birthday last month, and they have made tremendous
progress.
They have been deployed at the battalion level now for over
a year with tremendous effects in western Afghanistan and
earning an awful lot of respect from the forces with which they
serve. It has been a very close partnership between SOCOM and
the U.S. Marine Corps in building the MARSOC to the extent that
it has so far.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has recently approved a
military occupation specialty for those who have been through
selection and advanced training to be members of the MARSOC,
which will help us track and retain selected members of that
community. I do believe that SOF for life is a concept that
ought to be limited, that there is great value to circulation,
that it is good for SOCOM to circulate people through its
community back out into the big services and to bring people
from the big services into our community so that we are not
guilty of spinning a cocoon too tightly around ourselves in the
special operations community.
I am quite comfortable with the way it is going now. Even
those who are in for sort of one tour in the MARSOC, that is
now at least a 4-year tour and in some cases 5 years, which
goes beyond some of the other services in many cases.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
On February 17, Secretary Gates indicated during his
testimony before this committee that it is unsustainable for
the United States to fund a sizable ANSF indefinitely. He
suggested that perhaps the United States could temporarily fund
the ANSF as a sort of surge in security assistance and then
reduce that as conditions in Afghanistan improve and as the
ANSF becomes more capable.
General Mattis, can you elaborate on what Secretary Gates
discussed on February 17?
General Mattis. I can, Senator. If you look at what has
happened with the Taliban, beaten down badly in 2001, was able
to regain its balance and come back strongly, and then over
this last year or 2, we have reversed their successes.
So we have surged our own military. NATO has surged. The
troop-contributing nations have--about 100,000 United States,
about 50,000 non-U.S. coalition. We have about double that on
the part of the Afghans.
What you are seeing is we are going into a critical time,
and we are going to have to fight it out. As the enemy loses--
and they will lose--we will succeed. Then there is going to
come a point where you don't need as many international troops
and eventually, perhaps, not as many Afghan troops and police
because the enemy has been taken down. So the idea that
Secretary Gates explained about a surge right now shows the
normal ebb and flow that could result as a result of this kind
of war, as the enemy's fortunes start going backwards.
Senator Hagan. You said that you thought the ANSF could
also, at some point, reduce its numbers?
General Mattis. Well, I believe that at some point after
the country gets more mature, it has more opportunity for young
people. So there is not the breeding ground there for young
guys to go join the extremists. Then the demand, the
requirement for the size of those forces could well drop off.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen has indicated that the longstanding U.S.
military-to-military relationship has contributed to the
professionalism of the Egyptian military. Experts have
indicated that it is important to sustain Egypt's annual
military aid because regardless of how events unfold in Egypt,
the military will likely preserve its unique position within
the governing system.
They have also argued that freezing military aid to Egypt
undermines the leverage that our Government has to promote an
effective transition and to persuade the Egyptian armed forces
to abide by the peace treaty with Israel.
General Mattis, what is your position on the future of the
U.S.-Egyptian military-to-military relationship? How might
restructuring the foreign military financing allocation to
Egypt impact our strategic objectives in the country, as well
as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty?
General Mattis. Senator, I believe that we should remain
relentlessly engaged with the region. This is not the time to
pull back.
I am on the phone, for example, with General Anan, the
chief of defense of the Egyptian military, on a routine basis.
I have seen him in Egypt. There is a degree of professional
respect there that allows us to have very candid discussions.
He has been very proud of the fact that they are a
caretaker military government. They are going to move quickly
toward elections. I don't think you can disconnect that from
the experiences of his officers, who have spent years in our
country going through schools. I think that right now the
military-to-military relationship and the ethical performance
of the Egyptian military are very tightly tied together.
This has to do with regional peace. This has to do with
Middle East peace, as you know so well from decades of peace
between Egypt and Israel. I endorse what we are doing right
now, and I think we should continue.
Senator Hagan. As far as the treaties, do you feel
confident that they will abide by these treaties?
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am, I do. It is in Egypt's best
interest as well. But I am hesitant to get into the political
arena and start forecasting things.
Without a doubt, our military-to-military relationship, I
think, is helpful in terms of being a stabilizing force and, I
might add, with a force that used its authority in an ethical
manner when a crisis came.
Senator Hagan. They did. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join in thanking both of you, Admiral Olson and General
Mattis, for your service and the service of the courageous and
dedicated men and women under your command. I want to ask a
couple of questions about those men and women who are serving
and sacrificing so courageously.
Admiral Olson, last year, I believe you testified that the
SOCOM's Care Coalition was supporting 2,800 wounded SOF
officers through a clearinghouse that works to increase the
likelihood of their returning to service or having lives
afterward. I think that clearinghouse exemplifies one of the
SOF truths, which is that humans are more valuable than
hardware, an emphasis that I certainly appreciate.
I wonder if you could share with the committee an update on
what SOCOM is doing to manage the kind of care, medical care,
counseling, and other kinds of care that are necessary for
these wounded warriors?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator.
I thank you for highlighting the Care Coalition. It was
actually mentioned by Admiral Mullen as the gold standard for
DOD, and we are quite proud of it.
Part of the true value of the Care Coalition is that the
population with which it works is small enough that the
relationships are personal. So that when somebody calls the
Care Coalition for some help, a wounded or a family member,
they are known to the Care Coalition. It is difficult to scale
this up too much, but so far, it is within a manageable level
that has been quite effective.
What they do is serve as advocates for the wounded and
their families. They connect those who have need with those who
are willing to provide for needs. So your term ``brokering''
and ``broker house'' is an accurate one.
In addition to that, we are investing more heavily than in
the past in rehabilitation facilities, in physical therapy
experts, and technicians at the unit level so that those who
need that frequent assistance have access to it on a daily
basis. That has been hugely effective in accelerating the
ability of our people to return to duty.
It is reality that the instinct of virtually all of our
wounded is to ask ``How soon can I get back to my unit?'' So,
providing them accelerated opportunity to do that has become
very important.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Mullen testified not long ago
before this committee about the difficulty of identifying some
of the wounds, particularly when they involve traumatic brain
injury or post traumatic stress. Can you give the committee
your assessment of how adequate, how effective the means are to
diagnose and identify those kinds of problems?
Admiral Olson. Senator, frankly, I think we are very
inadequate. I think the data does not collect in a meaningful
way the information that we need to not only be responsive but,
perhaps more importantly, to be proactive and preventive in
dealing with those who have suffered psychological trauma as
well as physical trauma.
I have established what I call the ``pressure on the force
task force.'' This is a tiger team that is going from unit to
unit now. I will get a report back from them in about 90 days.
What I have asked them to do is ignore the data and do sensing,
rely on leaders, intuition, on the experience of teammates, and
spend real time with the families, to include the children, to
gain an understanding of what really is happening in the force.
I don't want to get out ahead of that because I don't want
to taint the responses to the surveys. But I do look forward
very much to receiving the recommendations from that team.
Senator Blumenthal. Your testimony speaks very powerfully
to the potential of new developments actually on the
battlefield as well as afterward in medical advances, potential
research and development, and technology and so forth. Can you
elaborate on that and also give us your assessment on whether
the resources in the 2012 budget are adequate for that purpose?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would ask that the 2012 budget be
supported. I don't have a strong sense of the adequacy
precisely, but I believe that there is enough request in the
budget to give us room to move with respect to that.
In terms of medical advances, I do believe that biomedical
research is a very important undertaking for the military, that
we have experiences that are unlike civilian medicine and that
any investment in military biomedical research is a good
investment.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Mattis, in light of what we are seeing in the world
today, the recent transit through the Suez Canal of Iranian
naval vessels, the ongoing attacks by Somali pirates, and other
developments that affect our lines of communication and
transport at sea, I wonder if you could share your views on the
adequacy of the Navy's funding request with respect to
submarine operations and undersea warfare for this fiscal year
and the next.
General Mattis. Senator, I have not looked at the Navy's
request because, as a combatant commander, I only look at
whether or not they are filling my requests with those ships
they have today. I am somewhat in the current fight. I will
tell you that I get what I need when I ask for it.
But clearly--CENTCOM's future will be an increasingly naval
future. It will not be one in which we have significant numbers
of ground troops on the ground in various locations. So, how do
we maintain a Navy that has the reach and can sustain our
influence, reassure our friends, and temper any mischief by our
enemies, make certain that they realize there is a cost? I
think that is critical in the CENTCOM future.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. My time has
expired, but I just want to thank both of you.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you. I just returned from
Afghanistan and Pakistan. I can't tell you how impressed I was
at the quality of people that we have--our men and women, all
of you who are leading them, and the job they are doing.
With that being said, I am going to ask some questions. We
will try to keep the answers as brief as possible to try to get
through these.
First of all, I will ask both of you, are we fighting a war
on terror, or are we nation building? I will start, Admiral,
with you.
Admiral Olson. My responsibility is in both arenas. We
present the SOF in two flavors. One is simply the strike
flavor, the man hunting, the hunting aspect of
counterterrorism. But at the same time, we are out in the
villages and remote areas, working with locals to develop their
own resources and look after their own neighborhoods.
Senator Manchin. General?
General Mattis. Sir, we are fighting a war that is unlike
conventional war. It requires both counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency efforts. Part of that would be seen as nation
building, but you have seen it in action over there. Whatever
it is called, it checkmates the enemy's designs.
Senator Manchin. The other thing I would ask is the size.
Can you all identify the size of our enemy and how much our
enemy is being funded by--their cost of their operation against
us?
General Mattis. Identify the size of the enemy?
Senator Manchin. Is there 10,000 of them versus 100,000 of
us? Are they getting $100 million, and we are spending $100
billion?
General Mattis. I will have to take the question for the
record, sir. There is a syndicate of organizations. Al Qaeda
has been--pretty much been pushed down, beaten down. They are
in a kind of hang-on up in the FATA right now.
Haqqani network is still robust, kind of their special
forces. They are linked to the Taliban in Afghanistan, who are
also linked to the Taliban in Pakistan. It is a syndicate. It
comes together. It goes apart. It fights each other. It fights
us. It is hard to get an exact count. It will take me a little
time, but I will get you our best estimate on each of those
groups in that syndicate.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
General Mattis. As far as the cost, I think it is very
difficult to evaluate the cost. But clearly, I think we have to
look in the future to how do we become cost imposing, use cost-
imposing strategies on an enemy, rather than being in the
position that you just described.
[The information referred to follows:]
In coordination with the AF/PAK Center of Excellence at U.S.
Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence
Center Special Operations Command estimates that the Taliban and
insurgent forces inside of Afghanistan is between 22,000 to 32,000
fighters.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say, if I can, the best I
could decipher from what we were getting information is I think
it is fair to say that we have about 10 to 1 of the troops
superior. We have about 10 troops for their 1 identified. We
spend about $10 for their $1. It looks like money is not going
to win this war. Is that a fair statement, Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would have to take, for the record,
your numbers to confirm or deny that. I do believe that the
presence in a variety of capacities and the whole of nation
approach to Afghanistan is very important. I do believe that it
is less expensive to fund an insurgency than a
counterinsurgency, certainly.
Senator Manchin. If I may ask this question, and this will
be to you, Admiral. I was so impressed with special ops. We
were privileged to go through a briefing and watch how they
operate.
With that being said, do you believe that you all are able
to identify the Haqqanis and Quetta Shura tribes, if you will,
and their location within Pakistan and your inability to go get
them or them to assist you in getting them? Is there any break
in that whatsoever?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would say that Pakistan is a
sovereign nation and will, as sovereign nations do, act in its
own best interests first. It does not see itself as threatened
by those groups, as our forces feel they are threatened by
those groups. We are willing to assist Pakistan at the rate
that they are willing to accept our assistance, sir.
Senator Manchin. So, basically, we have an ally who truly
is not acting as an ally. This is just from an outsider's
opinion and looking at the operation of our people being at
risk, knowing where the enemy is, and we can't do anything
about it.
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would say that in many ways Pakistan
is behaving as a great ally and taking much risk upon
themselves. But there is perhaps more that can be done. I think
that the senior-level dialogues that are taking place are very
productive in this regard.
Senator Manchin. To both of you, do you know if the
literacy rate in Afghanistan has improved at all over 10 years?
General Mattis. Yes, it has. I would have to get you the
numbers, sir. It is also one of the primary recruiting tools
for the Afghan army. But today, we have significantly higher
education. I will get you the numbers that can verify this.
Senator Manchin. The numbers that I received show that
literacy in Afghanistan is still only 28 percent.
General Mattis. Sir, well, considering that during the
Taliban's control, they didn't build a single school and they
have been trying to blow up the ones we are building, it has
been difficult. But we are making progress, sir. I will get you
the numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
Afghan literacy rates have indeed improved and are currently
trending upward under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-
led development efforts. In 2008, the Department of State estimated the
adult (over 15 years old) Afghan literacy rate at 43 percent for males
and at 12 percent for females. In September 2009, an ISAF assessment
estimated the adult Afghan literacy rate had climbed to 50 percent (+7
percent) for males and 14 percent (+2 percent) for females.
Based on the October 2010 Congressional Report on Progress Toward
Security and Stability in Afghanistan, most literate Afghans are
concentrated in the cities. In rural areas, 90 percent of women and
more than 60 percent of men remain illiterate. Under the Taliban regime
girls were not allowed to go to school and fewer than 900,000 boys were
enrolled. During the same period, university enrollment was only 7,881
students. In stark contrast, nearly 7,000,000 students are now enrolled
in primary and secondary education facilities (with 37 percent of them
being female) and university enrollment has grown to 62,000.
Senator Manchin. I would ask both of you this question,
too. Do you believe that al Qaeda still poses a threat to the
United States of America? If that is still correct, since they
are not a presence in Afghanistan, with all of our resources
and so much of our money has been dedicated to that arena,
where are they now, and what are we doing to be able--are we
capable of taking the fight to them, wherever it may be?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think al Qaeda is struggling. I think
that its leadership is less experienced. I think its ranks are
more fractured than any time in the last decade, and they
certainly have distributed. There is AQAP, al Qaeda in the
Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, and other al Qaeda associated groups
in the region. So there is a requirement to continue taking the
fight to where they are, sir.
Senator Manchin. General?
General Mattis. They are a threat. They are under terrible
pressure right now. They have gone to ground in the epicenter
of this effort, which is up in the FATA, but they have also
distributed down into AQAP. They have been hit hard in Iraq,
but they are still a threat to the Iraqi Government. We see
links going down into Somalia with al-Shabaab.
Senator Manchin. With the tremendous budget concerns we
have within our own nation, if changes are made or adjustments
are made to the operation as we know it in Afghanistan today,
do you think it will affect the outcome at all, if we reduce
the funding?
General Mattis. Absolutely, it will, sir. It must. I mean,
right now, we have, just in the last year and a half, gotten
the resources, personnel, training, Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funds, that sort of thing correct. We
are right now approaching the time when we are going to see the
results of all that.
We are already seeing the results, but they are going to be
very telling shortly.
Senator Manchin. Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Sir, Afghanistan SOF are operating at the
edge of their people and at the edge of their budget. Any
reduction in either would be detrimental to the effect, sir.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your patience and,
of course, for your service.
I would like to pursue further discussion about the
sanctuaries in Pakistan with this lead-in. General Mattis, I
was in Malajat last October. I know you spoke to, in your
testimony, what had happened there and the positive
developments. Fort Carson troops were there from my home State
of Colorado. So it was particularly special to be there, and it
was very impressive.
My fear is that it is only a matter of time before
insurgents reappear. Their refuge in that part of Pakistan is
only about 4 hours from Kandahar. It is just my sense is as
long as the enemy has sanctuaries, we are fighting with an arm
tied behind our back.
General, you have spoken to why Pakistan isn't doing more
to eliminate the sanctuaries. If they can't or won't address
them, do you believe that the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces working together can make enough
progress on the security front to overcome the challenges
presented by the sanctuaries?
Admiral Olson, I would welcome your thoughts as well after
the General has spoken to this.
General Mattis. Sir, the area the troops from your State
were operating in is, obviously, close to the border area. It
is subject to being impacted by the enemy coming out of safe
havens.
It is not that the Pakistanis have done nothing here. They
have lost thousands of troops. They have had almost 30,000 of
their civilians murdered by these enemies, and they are
probably in a position of saying, ``I don't want to create more
enemies right now than I already have.'' They are engaged in
years of the longest campaign and the most costly campaign that
they have faced.
I think that, while it is not perfect, we have to remind
ourselves that the only thing more difficult than fighting with
allies is fighting without allies. Thank God, we have the 49
nations alongside us, fighting in Afghanistan right now.
With Pakistan, I think we have to look at both what they
are doing and continue to try and close the gap in our
understanding with what they are not doing. We are very candid
in our discussions with the Pakistani leadership about this,
and we will continue to work it.
However, in the area that you are referring to, that kind
of open ground coming from Kandahar over towards the border,
General Petraeus, thanks to the increase that the President
authorized, now has a surveillance brigade from the Army that
is watching over that area.
In other words, it is not just a thoroughfare. The enemy is
going to have a very difficult time come spring when they try
to reintroduce their troops back into the areas of Helmand and
Kandahar, where they have lost the initiative.
We are aware of the situation. We are adapting to it, and
the Pakistanis are doing a lot. There is more they could do,
but there is more we could be doing as well. This is the normal
give-and-take of war, sir.
Senator Udall. Admiral Olson?
Admiral Olson. Sir, we wish they would do more. Perhaps
they could do more. But I don't pretend to understand the
internal dynamics within Pakistan, certainly the strategic
implications of their decision-making process, to be too
critical of them.
Senator Udall. Yes, they do have their hands full. I do
know there is a school of thought that counterinsurgencies have
never been successfully completed if the insurgents have
sanctuaries, and we need to continue to worry that concept.
If I might, General, Admiral, I would like to talk about
some of the analysis that right now we are in a strategic
stalemate in Afghanistan. That is a better situation, some
would argue, than we had a year or 2 or 3 ago. By that, I mean
neither side can achieve its aims through the use of arms
alone.
A follow-on thought is that we will have difficulty
preserving our gains just because we are visitors, if you will,
to the area, without entering into some sort of negotiations. I
know there are still disagreements among many in Afghanistan,
both in the Afghan community and in ISAF, what those
negotiations look like, how quickly they should happen, and
what they might accomplish.
My opinion is--and I have heard this from the military
leadership in our country and the civilian leadership--that the
way home is through a political process and political solution,
ultimately. How do we incentivize the process further and make
reconciliation and reintegration move more quickly?
General Mattis. Senator, I do not think we are in a
strategic stalemate right now. If I was before you a year ago,
I probably would have accepted that. I think that the enemy is
now in a worsening situation. What we are doing is our strategy
is that we have a military component. You have seen that.
Everyone knows what that is--reinforced, well-trained troops,
better strategy. I can go on. Then you have a civilian
component. Those two are married together into a combined
civilian-military effort.
Additionally, there is a diplomatic effort to end the war.
Taliban are going to have to say we will abide by the
constitution, break with al Qaeda and stop using violence. They
are welcome back in.
The reconciliation process has to be a process that is
owned by the Afghans because they are the ones who have to
reconcile. We can support it. We should support it. The
international community is supporting it.
Reintegration is the bottom up, reconciliation being the
top down. Reintegration is where we are getting young fellows
to come over to our side, and there is a process to bring them
onboard.
So you are seeing right now a strategy of how do you
incentivize it? First point, make certain the enemy doesn't
think they are going to win. That is what we have had to
reverse in the last year. Then the diplomats have more of a
chance to get these other efforts--reconciliation,
reintegration--going. I hope that answers your question.
Senator Udall. Admiral Olson, do you have any additional
thoughts?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I certainly agree with what General
Mattis said. I would say that I do think we are on a path to
being able to negotiate from a position of strength. I do
believe that negotiation can accelerate the termination of a
conflict, but you have to be able to do it from a position of
strength.
Senator Udall. Speaking of negotiations, General, India and
Pakistan are reportedly negotiating again over such tough
topics as Kashmir and economic integration. I assume you and
Admiral Willard share perspectives and are working together.
Would you comment on the opportunity there? My opinion, if
India and Pakistan could reach the point at which they had a
little warmer relationship, it would help our efforts in
Afghanistan.
General Mattis. I completely concur with you. Admiral
Willard and I are in routine contact with one another, as we
make certain that seam between the two combatant commands does
not become a gap in our efforts to work together.
At the same time, this India-Pakistan reconciliation has to
be something that they take responsibility for. So we are more
in a mode of making certain that what we are doing militarily
is never seen as contrary to that trend.
Senator Udall. My time has expired. Two brief comments. I
met with some returning civilian and military leaders from
Afghanistan. Interesting ideas taking shape, which is that the
Afghan civilian sector ought to surge into the Afghan rural
communities. That is not a new idea to you, but I wanted to
continue to acknowledge. I know the chairman has really pushed
on that front as well.
Then, second, listening to you, I was reminded of President
Lincoln's great comment that it always seemed like in war the
best generals were working for the newspapers. Listening to you
two today, I think the best generals and admirals are working
for the American people. So, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
I just have a couple questions for a second round, and then
we are going to adjourn over to the Capitol Visitor Center,
room 217, for a closed session. There has been a request by at
least one Senator for that. We should start there, hopefully, 5
minutes to 12:00, if no one else has any additional questions
here.
I just have two questions. One, General, is the question of
whether or not you expect that President Karzai will be
announcing later this month the first phase of provinces and
districts for transition to Afghan security responsibility
based on the joint recommendations of ISAF and Afghan
officials. That is what Defense Minister Wardak told me was
likely to happen, when he met with me in my office. Is that
your understanding?
General Mattis. It is, Mr. Chairman. I believe it will be
on March 21.
Chairman Levin. All right. The other question relates to
the camp in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, where there are Iranian
dissidents who are being continually harassed in various forms
by agents of Iran and also by some of Maliki's people as well.
Now, one of the issues there are the loudspeakers,
apparently large numbers of loudspeakers, which blare
propaganda into that area. I am wondering whether you have
taken this issue up, General, with Prime Minister Maliki and
whether we are pressing this issue because that kind of
psychological abuse is unacceptable. Have you raised this with
Prime Minister Maliki?
General Mattis. I will raise it with him, sir.
Chairman Levin. Has it been raised before, do you know?
General Mattis. I don't know.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Will you make sure that it is raised?
General Mattis. I will.
Chairman Levin. Any other questions? If not, we are going
to adjourn right away to that classified session.
We thank both of you again for your service. We will see
you over at the Capitol Visitor Center.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS/AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, General
Petraeus and others have emphasized the importance of the Village
Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs to
the strategy in Afghanistan. Under the ALP, Special Operations Forces
(SOF) are working with local villagers to empower communities to create
their own protection force answerable to the local elders and under the
oversight of the Ministry of Interior. General Petraeus has discussed
the possibility of dramatically increasing the size of both programs to
more effectively undercut Taliban influence in rural areas while also
better connecting these areas to the central government. What has been
the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has
been the response from the Taliban?
Admiral Olson. VSO and the associated ALP program have offered the
Afghan Government its first steps toward legitimacy in key rural areas.
By contributing to local governance, VSO provides the mechanism by
which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is able to
address security, economic, judicial and developmental grievances. This
has improved popular confidence in the Afghan Government and the
various Afghan Security Forces. It has significantly impacted Taliban
safehavens, freedom of movement, recruiting and operational
effectiveness in the micro-regions where it has been implemented. As a
result, the Taliban are increasing their efforts to intimidate
communities and individuals participating in the VSO and ALP programs.
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, do you believe
the availability of U.S. Special Operations teams is a limiting factor
in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic
impact in Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. The SOF teams have a strategic impact even in small
numbers, but the demand is outpacing the supply.
General Mattis. No. While the VSO/ALP mission initially required
SOF's unique capabilities, the program is now mature enough for
conventional forces to conduct with SOF oversight.
AFGHANISTAN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
3. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, according to
published reports, the tempo of counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan by U.S. and Afghan SOF has increased dramatically in the
last 6 months and demonstrated significant results. Lieutenant General
Rodriguez stated recently that the Afghan people are playing an
increasingly important role in the success of these operations by
``helping to provide significantly more tips because they see Afghan
Security Forces out among them more than they ever had because of the
increase in the number [of Afghan Forces].'' Reportedly, 85 percent of
counterterrorism operations take place without a shot being fired. Do
you agree with Lieutenant General Rodriguez that the increased presence
of Afghan Security Forces has resulted in better intelligence because
the population is more likely to come forward with information?
Admiral Olson. Yes. This is one of the reasons that SOF operations
are partner led and U.S./Coalition missions are no longer unilateral.
General Mattis. Yes. Locally provided intelligence has increased
based on the growth of both Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and
International Security Assistance Forces. A more secure environment has
reduced the threat of retribution and allowed for the establishment of
numerous community-based self-defense programs, multiple ``tip lines''
to harvest indigenous information, and 74 new local police sites that
collectively provide actionable intelligence.
4. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, what has been
the impact of this intelligence on the success of counterterrorism
operations?
Admiral Olson. Further deployment of ANSF has led to better
intelligence collection. Not only is the local population more likely
to report information to the ANSF, the pairing of ANSF and coalition
partners can greatly assist in guiding collection focus and methods.
Specifically, the partnership of Afghan National Army (ANA) Special
Forces with U.S. Special Forces teams has greatly increased the
Operational Detachment Alpha's ability to understand the human terrain
and socio-cultural dynamics at the village and district level.
Similarly, Afghan National Civil Order Police has seen success in
manning checkpoints throughout southern Afghanistan. Their lasting
presence along major roadways helps the Conventional Forces to better
understand local populations and have demonstrated an ability to
support counter IED initiatives in southern Afghanistan.
General Mattis. These operations have facilitated Coalition and
Government of Afghanistan efforts to secure the Afghan populace. The
enhanced security environment has paid great dividends and fostered
popular support and trust in the ANSF, leading to more intelligence
tips from the people.
5. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, are news
reports accurate that 85 percent of SOF counterterrorism operations are
conducted successfully without a shot being fired?
Admiral Olson. Our data for 2010 indicates that, of about 2,000
counterterrorism operations, 86 percent did not include gunfire.
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
6. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, one of the most frequent concerns
related to deployed SOF is the lack of rotary wing airlift to support
their missions, especially in Afghanistan. The two primary concerns are
that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) uses its organic rotary
wing airlift almost exclusively to support kill/capture
counterterrorism missions and that airlift support from the General
Purpose Forces is rarely available. This leaves special operations
personnel performing counterinsurgency missions with very little direct
support. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mandates some action
on this issue by increasing SOCOM's organic capabilities and by
dedicating a limited number of Navy helicopters to support of SOF. Do
you believe the actions directed by the QDR will address SOCOM's
airlift needs?
Admiral Olson. The actions directed by the QDR adequately addressed
SOCOM's longer term organic helicopter needs. Surge operations still
require allocation of General Purpose Force helicopters to support SOF
operations. Further, foreign training requirements may place an
additional demand on SOF rotary wing capabilities.
7. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, do you believe additional
capabilities should be grown within SOCOM or provided by the General
Purpose Forces?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's programs of record, and those we have
planned across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), combined with
General Purpose Forces provided by the Service Departments, are
adequate to fulfill the current and anticipated airlift support
requirements.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES
8. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, some observers
contend that the National intelligence agencies focus their assistance
to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan on special operators
engaged in direct action operations against the Taliban. As a
consequence, it is alleged, General Purpose Forces and SOF engaged in
indirect activities, including VSOs and population security, receive
less intelligence support. Do you believe SOF performing primarily
indirect missions in Afghanistan receive adequate intelligence support?
Admiral Olson. Yes, intelligence support is generally adequate and
responsive.
General Mattis. Yes. All general purpose and SOF are provided the
intelligence support required to accomplish their assigned missions.
9. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM working to build its
organic intelligence gathering and exploitation capabilities?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM is focused on developing an organic airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability with a
corresponding Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) capacity.
The SOCOM J2 (Intelligence) and J6 (Communications) have teamed to
design and build a robust Special Operations Information Enterprise
(SIE) that will facilitate the movement, sharing, and coordination of
information across theaters of operations, from tactical users to
strategic decisionmakers. The intent is to fully integrate with the
Service developed Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) family of
networks, which will enable the rapid sharing of critical information
in a joint-combined operating environment.
SOCOM leads DOD in the employment of Identity Intelligence tools,
tactics, techniques and procedures. Partnering with the Biometric
Identity Management Agency and the ISR Task Force, we received $79.9
million the past 2 years and developed a $26 million (FYDP) training
program at Fort Bragg, NC, resulting in the fielding of 1,426 biometric
systems that led to 2,686 tiered Watchlisted and IED associated persons
of interest. Our Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) program leverages
biometrics, forensics and document/media exploitation as mission
enablers to defeat terrorists and their networks. SOCOM is also a
leader in tagging, tracking, and locating technology, as well as in
providing SOF with a world-class reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition capability that includes still/video, sensor trigger
and unattended ground sensors/unattended maritime sensors (UGS/UMS).
SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
10. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, some have argued that you, as the
Commander of SOCOM, should have greater influence on personnel
management issues which are generally within the purview of the
Services, but which directly impact the assignment, promotion,
compensation, and retention of SOF. Do you believe you are adequately
empowered to influence the personnel management decisions of the
Services as they apply to SOF?
Admiral Olson. Until recently, no. However, DOD Directive 5100.01,
Functions of DOD and its major components, approved by the Secretary of
Defense on 21 December 2010, requires the Services to ``coordinate''
personnel policies with SOCOM, and this has the potential to improve
SOCOM's influence in this regard.
UNDERSEA MOBILITY STRATEGY
11. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, last July, SOCOM cancelled the
Joint Multi-Mission Submersible program and announced a new Undersea
Mobility acquisition strategy focused on the development and fielding
of a family of wet and dry combat submersibles to meet the requirements
of SOF. These actions follow the extremely costly development and
fielding of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, which was ultimately
rendered inoperable by a November 2008 battery fire. Please describe
the decisionmaking process that led to the change in acquisition
strategy.
Admiral Olson. In the programming and budgeting process for fiscal
year 2012, the Department conducted a detailed review of the JMMS
program. Based on the review, it was determined that the planned
program to develop and field a fleet of JMMS was unaffordable due to
current and expected future competing priorities for SOCOM resources.
In addition, during the JMMS material solutions analysis, another
feasible alternative had been identified to develop and field a fleet
of smaller, less-capable dry combat submersibles that could operate
from Dry Deck Shelter equipped submarines and surface ships.
Simultaneously, SOCOM has been looking at alternate commercial
submersible concepts and experimenting with a commercial-off-the-shelf
submersible that showed promising results at reduced cost.
Accordingly, SOCOM revised its undersea mobility acquisition
strategy to use the funds originally programmed for JMMS to develop a
fleet of affordable Dry Combat Submersibles (based on commercial
technologies and practices) and the necessary Dry Deck Shelter and
submarine modifications to support them. This enables SOCOM to field a
larger number of undersea vehicles sooner than the original JMMS
approach.
12. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how would you characterize the
technological, cost, and schedule risks associated with development of
a new family of dry combat submersibles?
Admiral Olson. Technical risk is medium to simultaneously meet the
``iron triangle'' of payload, speed, and range requirements due to
current battery technology. Commercial off-the-shelf and Government
off-the-shelf silver-zinc battery technologies are rated at Technology
Readiness Levels 7-9, so they should be reliable. However, they have
not demonstrated the power required for our ideal submersible in a
realistic environment. Our Dry Combat Submersible program is focused on
identifying what is affordable and achievable within current budgets
and technologies.
Cost and schedule risk are both assessed as medium level risk based
primarily upon the risk associated with safety certification. SOCOM is
using commercial design standards and processes (e.g. American Bureau
of Shipping) wherever possible to help reduce these risks through a
more determinant certification process. SOCOM is also working closely
with the U.S. Navy to properly scope any certifications they require
for operations associated with nuclear submarine.
13. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, how does SOCOM intend to avoid
the costly development and reliability issues that plagued the
development and operation of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM intends to leverage commercial submersible
design, fabrication, and safety certification methodology to provide
timely, reliable, and cost-effective capabilities. Design studies are
also planned to cultivate the submersible industrial base. SOCOM
intends to use American Bureau of Shipping classed competitive
prototypes to affirm speed, range, and payload thresholds prior to
ordering the Dry Combat Submersible-Light lead ship. Additional
economies will accrue from using proven sonar systems and communication
systems from our wet SEAL Delivery Vehicles.
14. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, what is the appropriate role for
the Naval Sea Systems Command in the development and acquisition of
SOCOM's undersea mobility platforms?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM will use the engineering expertise of Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), its shipyards, and laboratories to
support the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) programs, especially in the
areas of engineering and safety certification. We are working with
NAVSEA to identify experts and define roles such as the subsea
engineering found at Naval Surface Warfare Centers. NAVSEA will perform
system safety certification of all submersibles that will operate from
submarines. SOCOM will perform system safety certification of any DCS
submersibles (including prototypes) that will not operate from
submarines. SOCOM is also using the expertise of commercial engineering
and safety certification agencies such as American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) to provide independent review and classification services for DCS
programs. ABS has certified 47 submersibles that operate for extended
periods every day, carrying civilian and non-DOD government personnel
for research, tourism, and the oil industry.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
15. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, DOD recently announced that it
was discontinuing use of the term ``psychological operations'' in favor
of the term ``Military Information Support Operations.'' Why do you
believe such a change was necessary?
Admiral Olson. The U.S. Armed Forces have long recognized the vital
importance of conveying truthful information to influence foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Military
information activities in both wartime and peacetime have been
described as ``psychological warfare'', ``psychological operations''
and PSYOP.
In recent years, the term ``psychological operations'' became
anachronistic and misunderstood. Although PSYOP activities relied on
truthful information credibly conveyed, to some people PSYOP connoted
propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation and deceit. In some cases, the
negative connotations of the term discouraged commanders and our
civilian interagency partners from making use of military PSYOP
capabilities to advance national objectives.
To overcome the stigma of the name and allow DOD to better utilize
these military information capabilities in an interagency environment,
the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, and I recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that we replace the term ``psychological
operations'' or PSYOP with Military Information Support Operations
(MISO) to more accurately convey the nature of the activities. The
Secretary directed DOD to implement the change this fiscal year.
16. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, what operational and doctrinal
impacts do you believe such a change will have?
Admiral Olson. The change will have no operational or doctrinal
impacts. It is only an administrative terminology change. The
definition and all policy, legal, organization, and doctrinal guidance
previously applied to PSYOP remain in effect for MISO.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS
17. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, in recent years, SOF have taken
on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering
violent extremist organizations, including those related to information
and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to SOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
activities SOF are carrying out around the world. What changes, if any,
would you recommend to SOCOM's Title 10 missions?
Admiral Olson. Over the past year, SOCOM has reviewed the set of
special operations activities listed in Title 10 through the Strategic
Capabilities Guidance process. We have identified a set of operations
and activities that better reflect how SOF supports national
strategies, global campaign plans, and theater plans. We have also come
to realize that operations-counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign
internal defense, and others-often blend in today's complex
environment. It is now much more difficult to neatly categorize a
specific operation as one type versus another. Therefore, we see the
need to differentiate between operations and activities.
To provide clarity in how SOF executes its missions, we have
developed a framework for SOF Core Operations and Activities. Core
Operations are the operational contexts within which SOF operate, often
in concert with conventional forces and interagency partners. Core
Activities, however, are unique capabilities that SOF apply in
different combinations tailored for an operational context. A core
special operation activity is a stand-alone, operationally significant,
military capability that SOF can apply independently or in combination
as part of a global, Geographic Combatant Command, or joint force
commander's campaign or operation. I will be reviewing the revised list
of operations and activities over the next few months with SOF senior
leaders. The revised list, which could possibly become the basis for a
Title 10 legislative proposal, includes the following:
Core Operations:
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism
Foreign Internal Defense
Stability Operations
Support to Major Combat Operations and Campaigns
Unconventional Warfare
Core Activities:
Advise and Assist
Civil Affairs Operations
Hostage Rescue and Recovery
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
Interdiction and Offensive Weapons of Mass Destruction
Operations
Military Information Support Operations
Operational Preparation of the Environment
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
SOF Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Strikes and Raids
Support to Insurgency
COUNTERING RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
18. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, in 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al
Qaeda's second-in-command, declared that ``We are in a battle, and more
than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media.'' The
new National Military Strategy lists ``countering violent extremism''
as the first National Military Objective and stresses the importance of
long-term ``whole of nation'' approaches to countering extremism beyond
short-term activities of killing and capturing extremists. However,
earlier this year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S.
strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g.
Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism). What is SOCOM's role in supporting
efforts by the geographic combatant commands to counter the spread of
violent extremist ideology and the radicalization of vulnerable
populations?
Admiral Olson. SOF, specifically MISO support the geographic
combatant commands in countering VEO ideologies and radicalization of
vulnerable populations through several means. SOCOM Military
Information Support units have been deployed in direct support of U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan (OEF), Iraq (New Dawn), and the
Philippines (OEF-Philippines) from the onset of those operations, often
in collaboration with coalition forces and other U.S. Government
Agencies.
Outside the areas of conflict, SOCOM deploys Military Information
Support Teams (MISTs) to countries supporting military objectives to
erode support for extremist ideologies and deter tacit and active
support for VEOs. Deployed at the request of both the GCC and the
respective U.S. Ambassador, MISTs provide the GCCs with a direct
engagement tool to improve partner nation capabilities to combat VEOs
and resist the spread of their associated ideologies.
SOCOM also resources and manages two effective trans-regional
military information support programs: the Trans-Regional Web
Initiative (TRWI), and the Regional Magazine Initiative (RMI). Both
programs provide the GCCs a capability to conduct influence operations
to directly address VEO ideology, facilitation, and radicalization
without putting boots on the ground.
In addition to forces provided and programs executed, SOCOM also
supports the GCCs by providing direct planning support.
19. Senator Levin. Admiral Olson, to what degree does SOCOM draw
upon research conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural
Behavioral Modeling programs?
Admiral Olson.
Minerva Research Initiative (MRI)
MRI is a DOD-sponsored, university based social science program
initiated by the SECDEF in 2008. The program's goal is to improve DOD's
basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political
forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the
US. SOCOM has been an integral part of two of the five projects: (1)
`Finding Allies for the War of Words: Mapping the Diffusion and
Influence of Counter-Radical Muslim Discourse' and (2) `Terrorism,
Governance, and Development'
SOCOM has fostered multiple relationships between DOD project
managers; academics; and SOCOM planners, analysts, and interagency
personnel.
Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program
In 2008, OSD established the HCSB modeling program. The mission of
the 6-year program is to research, develop, and transition
technologies, tools, and systems to help planners, intelligence
analysts, operations analysts, and others represent, understand, and
forecast sociocultural behavior at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. SOCOM representatives have been in close collaboration
with HCSB project managers to garner better insights regarding
objectives, identify those projects that are of importance to SOCOM,
and engage with appropriate academics to ensure they understand our
interests.
SOCOM received funding to write a program called ANTHRO ANALYST
(AA) FOR J2 SOCPAS. AA is an advanced application allowing a user to
quickly input elevation, population density, and intelligence
information to generate and predict human terrain as well as habitable
areas.
SOCOM attends the Air Force Office of Scientific Research annual
program reviews and provides updates to appropriate offices and
directorates within the command. SOCOM continues to leverage the
projects' findings and to incorporate appropriate information into
efforts across the command.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
CAMP ASHRAF
20. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, in recent Senate Armed
Services Committee hearings on U.S. policy in Iraq, as well as during
this hearing before the committee, the plight of residents of Camp
Ashraf in Iraq was discussed. In addition, prominent former government
officials have recently raised concerns about the welfare of the
residents at Ashraf, including former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson,
General Peter Pace (Ret.), and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey.
The approximately 4,000 Iranian dissidents and their advocates continue
to allege abuses and harassment by members of the Iraqi security
services. The harassment includes tactics such as continuous exposure
to loudspeakers, as Chairman Levin remarked, and up to and including
serious physical harm against camp residents. To what extent do U.S.
military forces have contact with the residents of Camp Ashraf?
General Mattis. U.S. military forces had limited contact regarding
Camp Ashraf since Government of Iraq has taken over responsibility. In
the wake of the incident on 8 April that led to a number of deaths and
injuries, we have requested access to Camp Ashraf but so far have been
refused by the Iraqi Government. We have been told the Iraqi Government
is undertaking an investigation on events there, and the U.S.
Ambassador in Baghdad and General Austin are making clear U.S. policy
and the way forward with the Iraqi Government
21. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, has any U.S. military
equipment provided to the Iraqi military or security forces been used
to harass or endanger the residents of Camp Ashraf?
General Mattis. It is possible that any given Iraqi unit which
operated in the vicinity of Camp Ashraf may have had some U.S.-provided
equipment in its inventory, particularly vehicles. Since 2003, the
United States has provided millions of dollars worth of defense
equipment to the Government of Iraq which is widely distributed across
the Iraqi Security Forces.
Overhead photographs taken during the 8 April 2011 events at Camp
Ashraf appear to include images of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs) among the vehicles employed by Iraqi forces. The
HMMWV, which has been supplied in large numbers to the Government of
Iraq, is a characteristic U.S. military vehicle. It is possible that
some at Camp Ashraf on 8 April are among the many which have been
delivered to Iraq by the United States over the course of the past 8
years.
22. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your opinion of the
Government of Iraq's willingness and ability to protect the residents
of Camp Ashraf?
General Mattis. The events of 8 April that led to a number of
deaths and injuries are of serious concern. In the wake of that
incident, we have requested access to Camp Ashraf but so far have been
refused by the Iraqi Government. Most important is the assurance that
residents will NOT be forcibly transferred to a country where there are
grounds for believing the residents would be persecuted, tortured, or
unfairly put on trial based on their political or religious beliefs.
The Government of Iraq (GoI) has also publicly committed to undertake
an investigation as to what exactly happened on April 8 that led to a
number of deaths and injuries. We continue to urge restraint and
nonviolence as means to facilitate an appropriate solution to the
situation. I respectfully defer to the Department of State (DOS) for
any details concerning specific issues.
23. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your assessment of
Prime Minister al-Maliki's long-term plans for Camp Ashraf?
General Mattis. The Government of Iraq's stated policy is that the
People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran must leave Iraq by the end of
2011 with the cooperation of the United Nations and international
organizations. DOS is working to find a negotiated settlement to the
situation. I respectfully defer to DOS for any details concerning
specific issues.
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
24. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, during his testimony on
DOD's 2012 budget request, Secretary Gates stated that he was still
uncertain how the United States was going to continue to train and fund
the ANSF once U.S. forces have withdrawn or been reduced. I believe
that investing in ANSF is extremely important to long-term stability in
Afghanistan. However, I also have concerns that the U.S. Government may
not have adequately come to grips with just how expensive it will be to
sustain ANSF over the long term ($12.8 billon is requested for next
year). The total gross domestic product (GDP) of Afghanistan is about
$29.8 billion a year, so it is unrealistic to expect the Afghans to pay
for full ANSF costs anytime soon. What long-term branch plans are being
developed to sustain the training and funding of the ANSF beyond 2014?
General Mattis. The international community has acknowledged that
while the transition of lead security responsibility will be completed
by December 2014, financial support of the ANSF and other parts of the
Afghan economy will be necessary past 2014. Senior Civilian
Representative Sedwell, as recently as February, commented that the
ANSF will need some level of funding through 2025. U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), in collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies, is
developing economic initiatives to enable more coordinated and
effective international community assistance. This effort will help
transition Afghanistan from an aid based economy to more of a self-
sufficient, trade based economy putting the Government of Afghanistan
on a path to meeting the expenditures of a robust ANSF.
25. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what checks and balances do
you have in place to ensure that U.S. weapons and equipment provided to
the ANSF are accounted for and do not end up in the hands of the
Taliban or other terrorist groups?
General Mattis. In March 2009, the Combined Security Transition
Command in Afghanistan established a functional organization within its
command to register and monitor the transfer of equipment to
Afghanistan. This organization carries out the requirements of Section
1225 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires the
Secretary of Defense to certify that a program of registration and
monitoring is in place in Afghanistan.
26. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, given the repeated and
frequent requests by the United States on the NATO members for
increasing troop and equipment contributions for ANSF trainers, what do
you think is an equitable and reasonable cost-sharing for ANSF training
in terms of manpower and funding?
General Mattis. The North Atlantic Council has agreed to expand the
NATO ANA Trust Fund to include funding for sustainment costs. Timely
provision of these funds will represent a welcome, tangible
demonstration of fiscal cost sharing. We continue to make a concerted
effort to increase NATO and other international partner fiscal
contributions.
Our coalition partners have made good faith efforts to fill manning
requirements for ANSF trainers within their capabilities and national
interests. We will continue to work with our coalition partners, NATO
and others, to meet the needs of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A).
IMPACTS OF MIDDLE EAST TURMOIL
27. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, the political upheaval in
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and elsewhere in CENTCOM's area of
responsibility (AOR) is of great concern. Given the rapidity of the
change and the subsequent fragility of the geo-political status quo,
there seem to be numerous potential impacts on CENTCOM operations.
What, if any, impact do you assess the turmoil in the Middle East could
have on the function of Northern Distribution Network and on the
logistical tail needed to support coalition operations in the region,
especially related to fuel and the cost to transport it?
General Mattis. The current situation in the Middle East is
expected to have minimal impact on fuels operations supported through
the Northern Distribution Network since these fuel sources, both crude
and refined products, originate from Southeastern Europe, Caucasus
Region, Central Asian States, and Russia.
28. Senator McCaskill. General Mattis, what is your opinion of the
effects of the turmoil on some of the more autocratic Central Asian
leaders, including and especially Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan? Do you
anticipate any impact on our air or rail transit agreements as they
stand?
General Mattis. I view the influence of the changes in the Middle
East on Central Asian leaders as minimal in the short term due to the
deep entrenchment of leaders among the social, political and economic
elite, the existence of little political opposition, and the lack of a
coordinated social network capability to organize and implement a
challenge. I consider Uzbekistan to be at low risk for instability
leading to a change in government. I do not anticipate any impacts to
our air or rail agreements as they stand.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
RELIANCE ON FOREIGN FUEL SOURCES
29. Senator Begich. General Mattis, as you noted in your testimony,
countries in your AOR contain more than half of the world's proven oil
reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result, this area
also has some of the world's busiest trade routes. It's also one of the
world's most volatile regions. I am extremely concerned with the
national security implications of relying on foreign sources for fossil
fuels when we have significant reserves in the United States,
specifically in the State of Alaska. I know DOD buys most of its fuel
from local refineries in proximity to Iraq and Afghanistan for the vast
majority of our requirements in the area. In which countries are those
refineries located?
General Mattis. Our contracted suppliers that move fuel through the
various ground lines of communication report that fuel is sourced from
refineries in Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Bahrain,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iraq, and various European
countries.
30. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what would be the impact to
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan if those refineries no longer could
meet our needs?
General Mattis. To mitigate supply chain disruptions, CENTCOM has
developed redundant and complementary fuel supply capability to satisfy
fuel demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Should supply be reduced
because of the loss of a refinery or refineries, our supply chain
managers have the ability to shift fuel orders to alternate sources.
CENTCOM has established minimum storage requirements at current
operating and intermediate storage locations to enable us to continue
operations until alternate means of supply can be implemented.
Additionally, CENTCOM can implement fuel conservation measures,
relocate aircraft, and reduce certain operations in order to mitigate
the effect of reduced fuel availability.
31. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what would the impact be of a
Suez Canal or other trade route disruption on operations in CENTCOM's
AOR?
General Mattis. The Suez Canal is an important trade route and any
interruption to current commercial transit through the Suez could have
an impact on global resupply, as transit times without the use of the
Suez Canal would increase by approximately 10 days. However, temporary
closure of the Suez and ensuing disruption to the transit lanes would
have little to no impact on operations in the CENTCOM AOR. Adequate
stores of fuel are on hand that would provide a buffer until alternate
supply routes are established.
32. Senator Begich. General Mattis, what role do these energy
resources play in regional and internal instability in your area of
operations?
General Mattis. Energy resource problems are prominent in our
region, particularly in States where meeting growing domestic demand
for electricity has become more challenging. For some governments, the
energy resource supply and demand imbalance, and subsequent populace
discontent, come as States continue converting traditional crude oil-
based energy industries to those based on more efficient natural gas.
In other countries, inadequate energy resources and infrastructure
could have a more lasting destabilizing impact.
Competition over shared hydrocarbon resources also has the
potential to undermine regional stability, as challenges to poorly
defined territorial borders where shared energy resources exist can
quickly turn historic accommodation to more volatile, intrusive demands
over ownership.
33. Senator Begich. General Mattis, in your opinion, does U.S.
consumption of oil and natural gas from these countries perpetuate
instability?
General Mattis. No. In my opinion, just the opposite is true. U.S.
consumption boosts economic stability in these countries, as this is a
fundamental exercise of international commerce providing economic
benefit to a lengthy supply and consumer chain.
34. Senator Begich. General Mattis, in your opinion, how do recent
protests, uprisings, and calls for reform in many of the countries in
your AOR potentially impact availability of energy resources to the
United States?
General Mattis. The wave of unrest is currently confined to nations
that are relatively small oil and gas producers. If the wave migrates
to larger energy producing regions, energy resource availability could
be more significantly impacted.
35. Senator Begich. General Mattis, how would potential disruptions
impact operations in CENTCOM?
General Mattis. CENTCOM is well postured to endure an array of
possible disruptions that may occur. We have ample storage at current
operating and intermediate storage locations, fuel conservation
measures, plus the redundant and complimentary fuel supply chain
capabilities that have been developed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS
36. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, in
response to the major uprising against the Qadhafi regime, how would
you rate the risk that a post-Qaddafi Libya turns chaotic and provides
a safe haven for al Qaeda and associated groups to exploit?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to AFRICOM
as Libya is under their area of concern.
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
IRAN
37. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, I am concerned, as I know
you are, with Iran's continuing deployment of hundreds of short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach our forces and our
allies throughout the region. Do you believe you have sufficient
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to defend against this
threat now and in the future?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
38. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, I am concerned with Iran's
mix of conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities and the threat
they pose to U.S. interests in the Gulf. If Iran threatened to close
the Strait of Hormuz, which as you know would drastically affect the
flow of petroleum to the world economy, do you have everything you need
to deter and defeat this threat?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
39. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, do we have sufficient
support from allies to achieve our goals?
General Mattis. Yes. Our regional partners, in particular the Gulf
Cooperation Council nations, increasingly recognize the threat posed by
Iran. We have a shared interest with these partners to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities, and we have seen an increased level of
cooperation in that regard. At the same time, we recognize the
territorial integrity of our partners, continue to act in concert with
them, and relentlessly engage to support mutually reinforcing
objectives.
40. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, two Iranian Navy ships were
permitted by Egypt to sail through the Suez Canal this month. The
Iranians have said they are traveling to Syria for a training mission.
While other military ships have travelled through the Canal, since 1979
no Iranian military ship has done so. What do you think is the reason
for Iran's activity?
General Mattis. Iran increasingly asserts its military capability
across the region in order to expand its influence and to assume the
role of regional hegemon. Iran's regular navy deployed the two ships
through the Canal and to the Mediterranean Sea and Syria as part of
their semi-annual cadet training cruise. These cadet cruises have a
two-fold mission of training the next generation of naval officers and
showing the Iranian flag. The cruises included foreign port visits,
which support Iran's strategic effort to portray itself as a regional
military power.
41. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, what actions are we taking,
if any, in response to Iran's activity?
General Mattis. With respect to Iranian naval vessels transiting
the Suez Canal, we have not responded with any operational actions,
though CENTCOM continues to closely monitor such activity. CENTCOM
maritime operations are clearly observable by Iranian vessels, sending
a clear message of U.S. presence and readiness, but also a sign of
commitment to our partners.
PIRACY
42. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, last
week, as you know, Somali pirates killed four Americans on a yacht they
had captured. Admiral Mullen said in discussing the incident that more
than 30 warships are involved in the anti-piracy drive underscoring the
``significance of the challenge [of piracy] and also the priority in
terms of focus.'' Despite this presence, Somali pirates continue to
hijack vessels, and last year they seized 53 ships and took 1,181
hostages. Admiral Mullen further stated that hunting down the sea
bandits in such vast waters was like searching for a ``needle in a
haystack.'' How are you adapting your tactics to deal with what is now
a more lethal threat to U.S. citizens?
Admiral Olson. I defer to General Mattis on questions concerning
how forces under his operational control are employed. SOCOM is
responsible for equipping SOF and providing the Geographic Combatant
Commands with fully trained SOF. For counter piracy activities, SOF
elements are trained to respond to hostage scenarios in a maritime
environment in a manner that best protects U.S interests and the lives
of U.S. citizens. SOF is generally not brought in unless there exists a
lethal threat to U.S. citizens. I believe our current tactics,
techniques, and procedures, or TTPs, are sound and we have made no
recent significant changes. However, SOCOM will continue to assess the
threat and modify our TTP's appropriately.
General Mattis. We continue to adapt our tactics, as do the
pirates. The scope and scale of the piracy enterprise has expanded
considerably in recent years, and represents a challenge to both
commercial and military elements of the international maritime
community. Working with our Coalition, European, and NATO partners we
have established three Naval Task Forces in the region that have placed
up to 30 military vessels at any given time in key locations to deter
attempted pirate attacks. Our CENTCOM Maritime Component Commander also
hosts a bi-monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)
conference in Bahrain to ensure multi-national deconfliction of
activity and cooperation among all counter piracy activities in the
region. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and European representation,
the conferences also include civilian international maritime
organizations and delegates from non-affiliated countries such as
China, Russia, Japan, and India.
In addition to these international military efforts, we continue to
coordinate closely with the maritime industry on communicating to
merchant vessels the importance of adhering to the International
Maritime Organization's Best Management Practices. Statistics indicate
that the employment of these practices, to include well-trained
embarked security teams, is a significant deterrent against pirates.
43. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis,
considering that this is essentially an international criminal issue,
do you have the authority to respond?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to CENTCOM
and the other combatant commanders as they are responsible for military
operations within their area of control.
General Mattis. Yes, we have several counter-piracy authorities.
Legally speaking, the use of military assets to conduct counter-piracy
operations is permitted under both domestic and international law. U.S.
counter-piracy operations in the CENTCOM AOR are conducted pursuant to
the Counter-Piracy Execute Order and in accordance with the Law of the
Sea and U.N. Security Council Resolutions pertaining to suppressing
piracy in the Horn of Africa Region.
Suppressing piracy has been a traditional maritime military
activity dating back hundreds of years. Counter-piracy operations are
conducted to preserve freedom of navigation on the high seas, ensure
the free flow of commerce, and protect the sea lines of communication.
Criminal prosecution, albeit an effective tool to keep captured pirates
from returning to their activities and deterring other would-be
pirates, is a means to accomplish the military mission of preserving
freedom of navigation.
44. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, the root
cause of piracy is often a failed state. What do you need from
diplomatic and developmental resources to address piracy?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM respectfully defers this question to AFRICOM
as they are working with Department of State on how to deal with the
root causes of piracy emanating from Somalia.
General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with
military action, ultimately the solution to the problem of piracy lies
ashore, with stable governments that can control their sovereign
territory. I fully support ample funding for diplomatic and
developmental resources as part of an integrated civilian-military
effort to maintain international support and unity of effort in
combating issues of mutual concern such as piracy.
45. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, what
steps should the private sector take to protect itself from piracy?
Admiral Olson. I expect they will follow all Legal options
available. SOCOM is not in a position to speak about what the private
sector should or should not do in order to protect itself from piracy.
General Mattis. The most effective deterrent against pirates is to
adhere to the International Maritime Organization's Best Management
Practices. These practices include the use of professional, well-
trained embarked security teams, adherence to established security
routes through the region, notification of sailing intentions to the
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), employing speed and
evasive maneuvering when approached, and construction of onboard
fortified citadels.
46. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, are you
concerned that companies may take overly aggressive measures in
response to piracy?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM is not in a position to comment on what
measures the private sector may take or how those measures could impact
Combatant Command Counter-Piracy efforts.
General Mattis. No. CENTCOM continues to advocate the importance of
adhering to the International Maritime Organization's Best Management
Practices. Statistics indicate that employing these practices, to
include well-trained embarked security teams, provides a deterrent
against piracy. The next iteration of Best Management Practices will
recommend the practice of embarking armed security teams in order to
prevent ship crew members from performing this function.
TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION
47. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, I am
concerned with reports that Iran is acting as an intermediary with
North Korea to supply Syria with various forms of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and missile technology. In April 2010, the Obama
administration called in Syria's ambassador to ask about reports that
Syria had transferred Scud and Fateh 110 missiles to Hezbollah. With
the longer-range Scuds and more accurate Fatah 110s, how do you see
this affecting the strategic balance in the region?
Admiral Olson. [Deleted].
General Mattis. I do not believe Hezballah's acquisition of SCUDs
and Fateh 110s will significantly alter the regional balance of power.
These new weapons enable Hezbollah to strike deeper into Israeli
territory and enhance the group's power projection, but Israel already
defends against comparable missile threats from Syria by maintaining a
high defensive posture and employing modern air defense and offensive
systems.
48. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, this
year's National Military Strategy (NMS) states: ``the intersection
between states, state-sponsored, and non-state adversaries is most
dangerous in the area of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism. And
then it goes on to say the prospect of multiple nuclear armed regimes
in the Middle East with nascent security and command and control
mechanisms amplifies the threat of conflict, and significantly
increases the probability of miscalculation or the loss of control of a
nuclear weapon to non-state actors.'' How confident are you that al
Qaeda or associated insurgent groups could not acquire or steal a
nuclear weapon or nuclear materials from Pakistan that they could then
in turn use in a nuclear September 11 scenario?
Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
General Mattis. The nexus of Violent Extremist Organizations and
WMD proliferation is among my most pressing concerns. CENTCOM, along
with our interagency partners, conducts a range of activities to combat
WMD proliferation. With respect to Pakistan, I know Islamabad regards
its nuclear program as the country's most important strategic asset and
continues to place highest priority on nuclear security. Its nuclear
security program is well established and we remain confident in
Pakistan's ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons and stockpile.
49. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, how are
the growing U.S.-Pakistan tensions impacting our ability to protect
against that scenario?
Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
General Mattis. At this time, I do not believe the present tensions
between the United States and Pakistan will significantly impact the
security of Pakistan's nuclear program. However, continuing tensions
between the United States and Pakistan could undermine the
effectiveness of long-term U.S. support to the Pakistan Army, which
could in turn indirectly impact Pakistan's nuclear program security.
But at this point such connectivity is spectulative and not based on
concrete facts.
AFGHANISTAN
50. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, when I
traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan a few months ago I heard
repeatedly from our commanders on the ground that our mission in
Afghanistan is inextricably linked to Pakistan's harboring of al Qaeda,
Taliban, and aligned organizations. U.S.-Pakistan relations have chafed
greatly over the past year, particularly recently, and while Pakistani
military has indeed suffered casualties in their fight against
insurgency groups, our assessment remains that insurgents enjoy a
relative safe haven in Pakistan. How are we going to execute a
redeployment strategy in Afghanistan if Pakistan does not go after the
insurgency within its borders?
Admiral Olson. I defer this question to the combatant commander
since he has operational responsibility for that area.
General Mattis. Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan somewhat limit
our ability to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. Despite this
considerable challenge, we continue to make significant progress in our
campaign. It is important to note that Pakistan has taken a number of
difficult steps and has suffered over 30,000 casualties in the fight
against insurgents in their Northwest.
Our intent is to simultaneously degrade the enemy's capacity while
we enhance the capacity of our Afghan and Pakistani partners to a point
that they can pursue this effort without direct U.S. intervention. Such
efforts are adversely affected by Pakistani requests that we reduce our
footprint. Despite the challenges we currently face in Pakistan, we are
committed to our long-term strategic relationship with them. We will
continue to transfer the lead for security and governance to our
partners in accordance with ISAF objectives, the Afghan-led transition
process, and U.S. national strategy regarding both Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
LEBANON
51. Senator Gillibrand. General Mattis, you state that you value
the relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and that you
would like to see how the government develops before making a decision
regarding continuing U.S. aid to the LAF, despite Hezbollah's role in
the new government. What factors will you look for with respect to the
new government in Lebanon and the LAF in order to shape your strategic
outlook with respect to Lebanon or the LAF, and particularly the
advisability of continued aid or military-to-military transactions?
General Mattis. [Deleted.]
CENTRAL ASIA
52. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis,
Kyrgyzstan has been a major refueling station for U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network with the other central
Asian republics has provided us with important logistical support. How
solid are the military relationships in Central Asia for the United
States?
Admiral Olson. All of our SOF military relationships with the
Central Asian countries fall under the purview of CENTCOM. SOF elements
under U.S. Special Operations Command-Central Command have established
good tactical level military relationships with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan through Counter-Narcotics Training (CNT) programs.
General Mattis. Our military to military relationships in Central
Asia are generally good and improving, despite being comparatively new.
I have been encouraged by the support of our Central Asian partners. We
have made strides in further developing the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) over the last year in particular. Of course, our Central
Asian partners offer support in accordance with domestic concerns. We
have seen Russia accommodate our NDN efforts, which has helped to allay
a significant concern among our partners. Central Asian states are at
times reluctant to provide public or direct support of our efforts
because of their Soviet-era Afghanistan experiences as well as concerns
about provoking violent extremist organizations. Continued support for
our military-to-military programs, IMET, and exercises is critical to
continuing to improve these relationships. We are committed to
conducting all military-to-military activities in concert with broader
DOS strategy and policy within the Central Asian region.
53. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, does
Russia remain neutral with respect to these relationships or does it
attempt to disrupt them?
Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
General Mattis. Russia's influence is a significant factor in the
strategic calculus of Central Asian states, but has so far not
significantly disrupted U.S. policies in the region. Russia supports
efforts in Afghanistan, most notably by enabling recent enhancements to
the NDN.
Russia is concerned about the growth of violent extremism as well
as the flow of narcotics and other illicit cargo through Central Asia
into Russia. At the same time, Russia is sensitive to the potential
expansion of U.S. influence and the prospects of permanent U.S. bases
in the region, and engages in information operations to counter and
contain U.S. influence. As Central Asia's most influential trading
partner, Russia has substantial influence over most of the Central
Asian nations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS IN IRAQ
54. Senator McCain. General Mattis, I have a question about the
establishment of cooperative security locations in CENTCOM as a vital
tool for your theater security plans. Assuming the current plan for
U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq by December 2011 is carried out, we
should still want to maintain a positive collaborative relationship
with the Government of Iraq in a very strategic location of the region
for our national interests. Is there value to you and the United States
to establish forward operating sites and cooperative security locations
in Iraq for future operations?
General Mattis. While there is potential value to establishing
security assistance sites and cooperative security locations in the
CENTCOM region, the establishment must be balanced against many
factors, to include host nation support, operational need, and possible
future U.S. funding to develop and sustain these locations.
55. Senator McCain. General Mattis, would the establishment of
these locations have an impact on your withdrawal plans?
General Mattis. The establishment of cooperative security locations
would not be consistent with the current U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement
or current U.S. policy for departure of U.S. forces.
56. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what impediments, if any,
preclude you from establishing the agreements necessary to establish
these locations?
General Mattis. The establishment of cooperative security locations
is not consistent with the current U.S.-Iraq security agreement, which
calls for the full withdrawal of U.S. forces by end 2011, and is
consistent with current U.S. policy. It is also worth noting that the
current U.S.-Iraq security agreement, which has authorized the U.S.
military presence in Iraq from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011,
stipulates that ``Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a
launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.''
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION
57. Senator McCain. General Mattis, on the issues of theater
security cooperation plans, I am aware that you have very few forces
assigned to you during peacetime. Any exercises or collaborative
training you plan to accomplish with other nations in your region must
be supported by rotational U.S. forces sourced from the Services.
Realizing that it has been some time since you were able to devote any
significant resources to theater security cooperation in a peaceful
region, are you comfortable with the arrangement to rely on rotational
forces for the overwhelming majority of your security cooperation
requirements? If, not, what changes would you propose?
General Mattis. Yes. I am satisfied we are meeting our theater
security cooperation objectives through a robust program of exercises,
events, and activities across our AOR. The engagements include
individual training utilizing subject matter experts, fielding
equipment through Foreign Military Sales and direct commercial sales,
increasing interoperability via mil-to-mil engagements, and executing
bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises to develop partner
capability and capacity.
One area that does present a problem is the need for sufficient and
sustained Foreign Military Financing and a more responsive Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) system that delivers urgent operational
capabilities to meet our partner requirements. Too often, we are not
able to meet their requirements in a timely manner due to an overly
complicated foreign military sales system. I strongly support the
recent initiatives of the Secretary of Defense directed Security
Cooperation Reform Task Force and believe it is a definitive step in
the right direction.
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
58. Senator McCain. General Mattis, the Office of the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently published a
report questioning the U.S. plan to invest $11.7 billion to construct
facilities for over 300,000 ANSF. Are you aware of that report?
General Mattis. Yes. I am aware of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit released on January 26, 2011.
59. Senator McCain. General Mattis, what are you doing to address
the concerns raised in the report?
General Mattis. We are working with the Combined Security
Transition Command in Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to incorporate the majority
of the report's recommendations to extend our planning horizon and
develop long-range operations and maintenance plans. CSTC-A is
currently updating their guidance documents to incorporate the planning
principles referenced in the report which should improve the
identification of future projects and better document their priorities.
60. Senator McCain. General Mattis, can you provide a long-range
construction plan to meet the facility requirements for Afghan forces
with the funds that Congress has provided?
General Mattis. Afghan National Security Force generation drives
the timeline for the construction planning and execution. Fiscal year
2011 and fiscal year 2012 are significant program years for
construction, with $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $2.4 billion in
fiscal year 2012 from the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This ASFF
funded infrastructure must support the diverse requirements of over
305,000 ANA and Afghan National Police personnel at locations
throughout Afghanistan.
BAHRAIN NAVAL BASES
61. Senator McCain. General Mattis, given the uncertainty in the
region, including Bahrain, as well as the crisis we are facing here at
home with deep deficits, in your opinion, should taxpayer funds
exceeding $370 million continue to be expended this fiscal year on the
complete revitalization of our navy base at Manama, Bahrain, and our
base at Isa, or would a pause be prudent to allow for further
assessment of our requirements in the region?
General Mattis. The CENTCOM AOR presents limited opportunity for
U.S. basing options. Bahrain remains one of our staunchest allies and
provides us an optimum location. Current and future contingency
operations in the region dictate the need to spend military
construction (MILCON) funds now to address shortfalls. The current
MILCON augments ship berthing space due to severe degradation of pier
facilities, and provides critical ammunition storage for current and
future operations. The MILCON program also includes quality of life
improvements to alleviate overcrowding and provide acceptable living
standards. Continued execution of MILCON funds in Bahrain is an
essential CENTCOM mission support requirement and integral to CENTCOM
Global Defense Posture initiatives. Reduced expenditure of MILCON funds
in Bahrain will significantly impact operations now and in the future.
62. Senator McCain. General Mattis, from an operational
perspective, do you currently have an alternative port to Manama for
support of 5th fleet? If not, do you believe it would be wise to use
MILCON funds to develop one?
General Mattis. No. The U.S. relationship with Bahrain remains
strong and we do not currently see the need for an alternative port to
Manama, Bahrain. In the event the situation dramatically changes with
respect to either the bilateral relationship or U.S. policy, we will
present options to DOD and Congress.
SOCOM MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
63. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOCOM has historically relied on
the modification of service common equipment with SOF-peculiar
technology as the basis of its equipping strategy--a strategy that has
proven enormously successful in a number of areas. However, over the
last several years, the command has undertaken efforts internally to
develop major weapons programs, some at significant cost, such as the
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), the Joint Multi-Mission
Submersible (JMMS), and the Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle
(SCAR). While the specific issues and outcomes associated with the
development of these three particular programs differ, they have
brought attention to the ability of SOCOM to develop and ultimately
field major weapon systems, particularly in an increasingly resource
constrained environment. Do you believe SOCOM is properly structured to
successfully undertake the development and fielding of major weapons
systems?
Admiral Olson. The structure of the Special Operations Research,
Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) is not staffed or intended
to be staffed, to support Major Defense Acquisition Programs. For
programs such as the ASDS or JMMS, SORDAC enters into agreements with
Service component acquisition offices to support our efforts.
Traditionally SOCOM relies on the Services to develop major programs
(e.g. ASDS) so that SORDAC can focus organic capabilities on the
integration of new technologies, modifying service platforms, and
developing new capabilities that the Services are not well positioned
to do. SORDAC has had success in using the Joint Acquisition Task Force
model to rapidly field new capability by integrating teams from the
various service offices to meet urgent needs.
64. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what lessons has SOCOM learned,
not just from the aforementioned programs, but as a whole, in its
efforts to develop and field systems to satisfy its requirements?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM has developed its acquisition approach around
the following four key principles which have enabled the successful
acquisition of SOF unique equipment: deliver capability to the user
expeditiously, exploit proven techniques and methods, keep warfighters
involved throughout the process, and take and manage risks. SOCOM has
shown that a dedicated corps of SOF acquirers is essential to rapidly,
agilely, and successfully field SOF unique capability. SOCOM has been
working closely with the Services to improve the synergy of Service and
SOCOM acquisition activities through biannual acquisition summits co-
chaired by the OUSD/AT&L and the SOCOM Commander.
65. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, to what degree is SOCOM looking
to leverage commercially available and proven technology in the
development of solutions to satisfy SOF-peculiar requirements?
Admiral Olson. The SORDAC, the SOCOM acquisition arm, balances the
need for advanced technology with rapid fielding of needed capability.
In an effort to provide Special Operations deployed forces with
required assets, SORDAC Program Executive Offices (PEOs), constantly
evaluate existing technology, service available, and off the shelf
solutions (commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf).
There are a number of venues that provide direct insight into
technology currently available or technology that will be available in
the near term. The Technology and Industry Liaison Office (TILO) serves
as the interface to industry, providing a venue for open dialogue and
market research in support of the command. SOCOM utilizes the TILO as a
conduit for industry to present products and services to the command
for evaluation. Additionally, SORDAC's Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate, constantly evaluates technology with a near term potential
to mature into fielded capability. SORDAC S&T initiated the Rapid
Exploitation of Innovative Technology for SOF (REITS) program in 2010
to expedite technology which had the potential to rapidly transition to
the field. Examples of current technology being evaluated in a Special
Operations environment through the REITS program are; vehicle shock
mitigation systems and mobile solar power generating systems. SORDAC
S&T also sponsors an open experimentation venue which provides an
opportunity for industry to demonstrate emerging technologies and
capabilities which could support SOF. Experimentation creates synergy
among industry partners and connects SOF operators to developers during
concept assessments. The PEOs continually evaluate existing standalone
equipment and package them to provide an enhanced capability to meet a
new capability gap. For example, the Austere Location Force Protection
Commodity Procurement Project packages off-the-shelf equipment to
provide an integrated force protection system to support remotely
deployed SOF Teams. Off-the-shelf equipment is a critical aspect of
SORDAC's strategy to balance capability that will save lives today with
the need to provide a technological leap that will provide SOF
Operators with a significant tactical advantage in the field tomorrow.
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS SHORTFALLS
66. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, does SOCOM have any shortfalls
in the availability of training resources, particularly ranges and
facilities that are affecting the ability of your forces to prepare and
train for specific deployments and missions? If so, please describe in
detail these shortfalls and the effect they have on the ability of your
forces to adequately train for specific deployments and missions.
Admiral Olson. Many SOF units are unable to conduct all of their
training requirements at or within close proximity of their home
stations. Some training requirements, including long-range, full-
mission profile validation exercises for example, require SOF to train
at other installations. It is difficult to conduct training missions
that accurately replicate operations routinely conducted by the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces in Afghanistan, and
previously Iraq. These long-range live-fire exercises generally include
mounted and dismounted ground elements supported by helicopters and
tactical aircraft. Additionally, SOF units may conduct training with
SOF-unique weapons systems that require larger Surface Danger Zones
than weapons systems employed by conventional forces.
Ever increasing competition with conventional ground and aviation
units for limited training range resources is adversely impacting SOF
access to Service-owned ranges. For example, there are a very limited
number of ground tactical ranges on U.S. Navy installations for Navy
SOF to train. The majority of ground tactical ranges within the
Department of the Navy are located on U.S. Marine Corps installations.
This has challenged Navy and Marine Corps leadership to balance the
training requirements of Navy SOF with those of Marine Corps units
vying for use of the same ranges and training areas.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) training continues to be hampered
by the lack of adequate restricted airspace for SOF to execute fully
integrated training events in which the full range of ``shoot, move,
and communicate'' skills are rehearsed with UAS ISR support. Federal
Aviation Administration Certificates of Waiver and Authorization allow
limited access to the National Airspace System; however, the
restrictions placed on UAS flights in these areas do not allow for
adequate training for SOF.
67. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is planned to address these
shortfalls?
Admiral Olson. SOF is working closely with the Services to develop
courses of action that allow SOF reliable and predictable access to
resources such as training ranges for ground and aviation elements.
SOCOM is currently conducting a range study to examine the specific
problems SOF is encountering with respect to ranges and training areas.
The analysis will include SOF range access shortfalls, range saturation
levels at home station, as well as adequacy of master range plans and
existing agreements with the Services. Additionally, the study will
determine if SOCOM components currently have adequate access to
simulators and range simulation devices that could mitigate their
requirements for range access. Findings and recommendations from this
study will be staffed and presented to the SOCOM Commander.
SOCOM is addressing range and training area issues with each
Service during scheduled warfighter talks. SOCOM is also hosting
periodic range conferences and working groups with representatives from
our components as well as the Services. The intent of these conferences
is to exchange ideas, information, and seek solutions to any range
issues identified.
The Navy has established a range working group with Marine Corps,
Naval Special Warfare Command, and SOCOM participation to coordinate
resolution of a request from Navy SOF for increased access to ranges
and training areas on the west coast.
U.S. Army SOCOM is working with the Army to determine the
feasibility of establishing SOF training centers at select ranges on
Army installations. The Army G3/5/7 is analyzing and modeling Army SOF
requirements (specifically, long-range mobility full mission profile
validation exercises) to determine supportability on identified Army
installations.
SOCOM and its components are working in numerous areas to bolster
and support mission training requirements. These include: investment of
MPF-11 dollars to fund SOF-peculiar modifications of existing ranges
and facilities; expanded use of nontraditional training areas such as
contracted facilities; and development of plans for SOF-managed
training areas.
68. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what can Congress do to help you
address and improve the specific training requirements for SOF?
Admiral Olson. DOD faces an increasing challenge from the
cumulative effect of continuing urbanization and the increasing
application of environmental requirements to military readiness
activities--sometimes through novel or overly broad interpretation of
law. Congress will have to balance the two public goods--military
readiness and environmental protection. Some issues may require
congressional action, while others can be relieved by changes within
the regulatory agencies.
Under Title 10, U.S.C., ownership of real property--to include
ranges--is a responsibility of the Services. The Commander, SOCOM
cannot own real property. SOF units are tenants on installations and do
not own the ranges on which they operate and train.
It is therefore critical that Congress adequately fund SOCOM to
continue using home station, as well as other Service installation
ranges and training support. Having sufficient resources also allows
SOCOM to fund range enhancements and improvements, where appropriate,
to meet SOF-unique training requirements.
SOF access to Service ranges can be adversely impacted by
challenges associated with land withdrawal agreements, National
Environmental Policy Act actions, aviation airspace issues, and
civilian encroachment on Federal lands. As Service initiatives
addressing these challenges move forward, congressional advocacy, as
appropriate, may be warranted.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott Brown
IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
69. Senator Brown. General Mattis, today Iran is producing higher
enriched uranium and is moving closer to possessing the weapons-grade
uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Neither economic sanctions nor
diplomacy have worked to diminish Iran's goal to enrich uranium. The
President has stated that he intends to ``use all elements of American
power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.'' What is your
assessment of Iran's role in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Mattis. Iran's persistent destabilizing behavior runs
counter to the United States, and more importantly, regional country
interests. Likewise, Iran uses its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp-
Qods Force to expand soft power influence across the region and beyond
via religious, cultural and humanitarian outreach, while at the same
time executing destabilizing activities. Iran's nuclear program is a
serious, destabilizing factor in the region and is widely believed to
be part of the regime's broader effort to expand its influence.
70. Senator Brown. General Mattis, what would it mean for the
neighbors of Iran and the entire Middle East if Iran were to secure a
nuclear weapon?
General Mattis. A nuclear armed Iran would dramatically shift the
balance of power between Iran and key regional nations. This shift and
perceived failure of the international community in allowing Iran to
develop nuclear weapons, would likely spark a regional arms race as
Iran's neighbors would be apt to redress the balance. In the short
term, the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon will place
tremendous pressure on other countries to follow suit. The effects of
these developments would rapidly extend beyond our region. A nuclear-
armed Iran would most likely be more assertive and more aggressive with
regional states, leading to less stability in an already unstable
region. Possession of a nuclear weapon would likely embolden Iran to
engage in ``saber rattling'' to intimidate or coerce its neighbors and
enhance or increase Iran's perceived status as a leader in the Gulf
region. Iran might not provide nuclear technology or weapons to its
surrogates, due to concerns over control, accountability, and
international repercussions. However, those surrogates, with a nuclear-
armed sponsor, may be emboldened to act more aggressively, though not
necessarily under Iran's control or on Iran's behalf.
71. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do you agree that a nuclear-
armed Iran poses an unacceptable risk to the United States?
General Mattis. Yes. Iran remains the most significant threat to
regional stability. Although the United Nations Security Council has
spoken out against Iranian actions through additional sanctions, the
regime continues its destabilizing activities globally. A nuclear armed
Iran would significantly impede our global priorities of preventing WMD
proliferation, retaining strategic access and ensuring the security and
free flow of global commerce, especially energy resources. This would
create a significantly more complex problem for our national security
team and for the U.S. economy. Also, we could see other countries in
the region finding it necessary to develop nuclear weapons or
significantly increase conventional weapons to deter a nuclear armed
Iran. We should endeavor with our international partners to take strong
measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
TRANSITION IN IRAQ
72. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do we have a contingency plan in
place if Iraq security forces are not making progress by the end of
this year?
General Mattis. We are currently on track to remove U.S. security
forces from Iraq by 1 January 2012 and will be ready to support U.S.
Government led efforts through the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.
If the Government of Iraq requests U.S. forces remain to assist Iraqi
Security Forces after December 31, 2011, and the U.S. Government agrees
to such a request, the U.S. military has the capability to assist.
73. Senator Brown. General Mattis, during the transition in Iraq
how do we prevent a mass exodus of institutional knowledge from
occurring as a result of DOS taking over too abruptly?
General Mattis. The same military personnel with institutional
knowledge assigned to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq are
currently working closely with our partners in DOS to support a smooth
transition. We share a common objective for continuity and stability
during the transition in Iraq. Preparations have been underway for some
time and began with a comprehensive assessment of what was necessary to
ensure a successful transition. A plan was developed and went into
execution in the summer of 2010, including the identification of a
multitude of tasks that will transition from U.S. Forces-Iraq to the
U.S. Embassy-Iraq, CENTCOM, and the Government of Iraq, or be
discontinued altogether.
74. Senator Brown. General Mattis, what is the psychological
dimension of the transition in Iraq?
General Mattis. The psychological impact of the transition in Iraq
varies. The American public may view the transition as positive. For
the majority of the Iraqi people, the transition will be a positive
experience that marks the re-emergence of Iraq in a regional and
international context. Iraqi nationalism and the emergence of a
representative government are all positive trends towards a new and
prosperous future for Iraq. The future security and prosperity of Iraq
now rests with its citizens. At the same time, some citizens in Iraq
may view the transition with angst and uncertainty as the U.S.
transitions from a Defense Department led effort.
75. Senator Brown. General Mattis, will our Iraqi military partners
have the confidence and incentives necessary to keep security tight
after we are gone?
General Mattis. Current assessments project some gaps in the
Government of Iraq security capabilities will continue to exist. The
Iraq Security Forces Fund combined with Foreign Military Sales cases
directly address required equipment and training to deal with
capability requirements. With these efforts, some shortfalls such as an
air sovereignty capability requiring much longer timelines to put in
place will continue to exist. Our primary strategic objective remains
assisting the Government of Iraq in building and forging a
professional, self-reliant, and effective security force capable of
maintaining internal security and deterring external threats.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
U.S. FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN
76. Senator Brown. General Mattis, I understand the number of ANSF
has increased dramatically in the past year. Pending the funding level
provided for 2011, we have committed about $20 billion towards training
and equipping the ANSF in 2010 and 2011. We provided roughly the same
amount in the preceding 7 years. It is unclear to me that Afghanistan
has the budget to sustain these forces once we drawdown in Afghanistan
in 2014 or sometime between now and then. Unlike Iraq, which has
significant oil revenue, Afghanistan's total GDP is about $30
billion.\1\ Are we establishing a long-term U.S. financial commitment
with the Afghan Security Forces Fund, or is there a transition plan
that ensures Afghanistan sustains their security forces once we have
trained and equipped them?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CIA World Fact Book.
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General Mattis. The international community has acknowledged that
while the transition of lead security responsibility will be completed
by December 2014, financial support of the ANSF and other parts of the
Afghan economy will be necessary past 2014. CENTCOM, in collaboration
with other U.S. Government agencies, is developing economic initiatives
to enable more coordinated and effective international community
assistance. This will move Afghanistan from an aid based economy to a
more self-sufficient trade based economy that will put Government of
Afghanistan revenues on a path to eventually meet the expenditures of a
robust ANSF which is capable of both meeting Afghanistan's security
requirements and achieving U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan.
SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN
77. Senator Brown. General Mattis, last week, Admiral Mullen stated
in his written testimony before this committee that one of the
necessary conditions to succeed in achieving sustainable security in
Afghanistan and Pakistan requires neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in
Pakistan.\2\ On the next page he testified that ``Insurgent groups such
as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate unhindered from
sanctuaries in Pakistan.'' \3\ Putting these two comments together, it
leaves me with the impression we are not on a path to success unless
these safe havens in Pakistan are addressed. How confident are you that
coalition or Pakistani forces will neutralize these sanctuaries--
including those sanctuaries utilized by the Haqqani and Quetta Shura
groups--in the next 12 months?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mullen Testimony, SASC Hearing, February 23, 2010: Page 6
``Achieving sustainable security requires developing Afghan governing
capacity, cultivating the conditions needed for conflict resolution,
neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, and countering
corruption. Absent these conditions, we will not succeed.''
\3\ Mullen Testimony, SASC Hearing, February 23, 2010: Page 7.
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General Mattis. I don't believe Pakistan will reverse its current
policy within the next 12 months and eliminate sanctuaries enjoyed by
the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani Network. However, satisfactory
end-states are attainable in Afghanistan even if the sanctuaries
persist. Combined counterinsurgency operations beginning in late 2009
succeeded in ejecting the Taliban from key districts in southern
Afghanistan despite Taliban sanctuary across the Pakistani border.
Continued security gains and Afghanistan Government progress in
security, governance, and development over the next several years have
the potential to neutralize the Taliban as a strategic threat, even if
sanctuaries in Pakistan allow insurgents to maintain influence in
outlying areas and sustain a certain level of violence throughout
Afghanistan.
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
78. Senator Brown. General Mattis, last month, the quarterly report
issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency reiterated concern
about undisclosed nuclear-related activities that Iran has undertaken
since 2004 related to the development of a nuclear payload for a
ballistic missile. Will you update the committee on the latest
estimates for when Iran could develop a nuclear weapon and when it
could launch an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile?
General Mattis. The Iranian regime continues to flout U.N. Security
Council resolutions on its nuclear and missile programs. Iran is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by
developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to
produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. Iran is technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the
next few years, if it chooses to do so. Iran would likely choose
missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear
weapon. It continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of
its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of
carrying a nuclear payload.
PIRACY ATTACKS
79. Senator Brown. General Mattis, I am alarmed at the sharp rise
in piracy attacks on the high seas in the last 4 years. According to
the International Maritime Bureau, the number of pirate attacks against
ships has risen every year for the last 4 years, and ships reported 445
attacks in 2010, up 10 percent from 2009. The number of crew members
taken hostage has increased from 188 in 2006, to nearly 1,200 crew
members in 2010. The recent killing of four Americans traveling on a
sailing yacht demonstrates that the pirates threaten the safety of our
citizens in international waters. In addition, the freedom to safely
travel on the open ocean enables trade, which is the lifeblood for many
American jobs. I certainly can appreciate that anti-piracy missions
require significant resources and present many legal issues because
most of these instances occur in international waters, but what needs
to be done to reverse the increasing trend in piracy attacks?
General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with
military action, ultimately the problem of piracy must be solved on
shore, primarily in Somalia with a stable government which can enforce
the rule of law over its sovereign territory.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
80. Senator Brown. General Mattis, many of us are concerned about
the number of missiles and ships required to deploy an adequate BMD for
our Nation and for our allies. The challenge is that in addition to
protecting the U.S. Homeland, we need to protect our forward based
troops and our allies. As a result, there are likely going to be a
demand for BMD assets in European Command, Pacific Command, and
CENTCOM--which is your AOR. Has CENTCOM established present and future
requirements for both missiles and launchers regarding BMD in your AOR?
General Mattis. Yes. We have identified BMD requirements for the
CENTCOM AOR and they are based on our assessment of potential threats,
present and future.
81. Senator Brown. General Mattis, do you expect that the CENTCOM
requirements for these assets will be fully satisfied now and in the
future?
General Mattis. No, I do not. There simply are not enough assets to
deal with the global threat. As our adversaries improve their
capability both in quality and quantity, the threat becomes ever more
challenging and we must continuously re-examine the gap. Hence, we
advocate for more interceptors now and additional systems as they
become available. However, we are taking other steps to deal with the
growing threat. We have engaged our partners and encouraged them to
invest in their own BMD.
Our adversaries will likely continue to outpace us in terms of
sheer numbers of ballistic missiles compared to our interceptor
inventory. However, we don't need to match them one for one. We believe
we can establish a credible deterrent by establishing an integrated,
interoperable, collective defense with our regional partners.
Therefore, in order to adequately defend against the missile threat in
our region, we must maximize production capacity, to not only close our
own capability gaps, but also to enable rapid delivery of these
critical systems to our partners once they commit to procuring them.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
82. Senator Brown. Admiral Olson and General Mattis, the
information and oversight the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) has provided over the last several years has
been invaluable to my colleagues and I to evaluate the U.S. mission in
Iraq. The most recent SIGIR quarterly report suggests SIGIR has
experienced some challenge in obtaining detailed information from DOD
in the course of fulfilling its congressionally mandated
requirements.\4\ Will you each commit to be forthcoming in providing
information to SIGIR for adequate reporting of the transition during
this year?
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\4\ SIGIR Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to Congress.
Pages 5 and 16.
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Admiral Olson. Yes.
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM has always, and will continue to fully
support SIGIR to the very best of our ability by providing the detailed
information they require to execute their oversight functions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
ROLE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IN FUTURE CONFLICTS
83. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, on February 25, 2011, Secretary
Gates made the following comment regarding the force structure that
will be needed in the years ahead: ``The Army also must confront the
reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S.
military are primarily naval and air engagements--whether in Asia, the
Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . But in my opinion, any future defense
secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land
army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should `have his head
examined'.'' This past week, we had the 20th anniversary of coalition
forces driving Saddam Hussein's Army out of Kuwait. Clearly, land
forces played a huge role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Remarkably, 150,000 coalition ground troops and 1,500 tanks were able
to push the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in just 100 hours. Is that type of
military operation truly a thing of the past?
General Mattis. I agree with the Secretary that the most plausible
scenarios for military intervention involve naval and air engagements.
These forces are particularly well suited to conducting short-notice,
reactive and expeditionary actions to counter threats to our national
interests. However, there remain plausible scenarios today where a U.S.
ally or interests are so threatened by a force that only a joint force
including robust, integrated land forces would be able to defend our
partners and U.S. interests, as we saw in Operation Desert Storm. I
expect this reality will continue to be a dominant feature of my
Command's AOR and for that reason we must always be able to rely on our
Army's core land force capabilities.
84. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, if such a scenario arose again
in the near future, would it be possible to drive the enemy out through
primarily naval and air engagements?
General Mattis. A combination of air, land, and sea engagements is
critical in influencing enemy courses of action and their will as an
opposing force. An example illuminating the limitation of an air power
only campaign includes the NATO air campaigns over Bosnia in 1995.
Successful engagements are derived by concurrent balance of forces that
offer the greatest strategic flexibility while building on momentum to
create opportunities for rapid achievement of objectives.
85. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, would it have been possible to
conduct the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom--in which we
invaded Afghanistan, inflicted severe damage on the Taliban and al
Qaeda, and held key ground in Afghanistan--using primarily naval and
air forces?
General Mattis. No. During the early phases of combat operation in
Afghanistan in October 2001, naval and air forces were largely focused
on disrupting the Taliban and al Qaeda and preventing their use of
terrorism training camps. However, CENTCOM assessed that the indigenous
ground forces could not prevail without U.S. and allied assistance on
the ground.
U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
86. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, several startling recent events
in Iraq call into question the Iraqi Security Forces' ability to
maintain peace, including violent protests and the bombing of the Baiji
Oil Refinery--the largest in Iraq. During your testimony, you alluded
to the possibility that terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda are
behind this recent unrest. How concerned are you that al Qaeda or its
affiliates will return to Iraq and take root again following the
departure of U.S. forces?
General Mattis. The Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) network continues to
suffer setbacks. AQI efforts to reinvigorate a Sunni support base will
likely fall short of achieving its objective. The majority of Sunnis in
Iraq strongly oppose the al Qaeda network for the harsh tactics the
group imposes. The transition to Iraqi-led counterterrorism operations
has already taken place and the Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated
the ability to aggressively and accurately pursue AQI entities. Iraq
will undoubtedly face challenges long after the departure of U.S.
forces; however, the Government of Iraq and its security forces are
demonstrating the ability to prevent AQI from advancing.
87. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, several military and civilian
leaders have expressed serious concern about the Iraqi Air Force's
ability to protect its own air space once U.S. forces redeploy home.
The Iraqis had aggressively pushed to purchase 18 American-made F-16s,
but they announced postponement of the planned purchase in order to
shift that funding to domestic priorities. In light of this unfortunate
delay, what steps have you taken to enable Iraq to adequately defend
its airspace following the U.S. withdrawal?
General Mattis. While current intelligence assessments describe the
threat to Iraqi air sovereignty as minimal, shared contingency planning
addresses any potential threats and provides a framework for mitigation
procedures. Iraq has taken the initial steps towards self-reliance in
air defense with the objective of acquiring two long-range radar
systems that will provide them a capable early warning system. This is
the first piece in the development of a sustainable air sovereignty
posture, of which the F-16 case was to be the next essential step.
These radar systems, one to be provided through Iraqi Security Forces
Funding and the other through an FMS case, will provide a foundational
capability in air defense. We are working with them to have the radar
capability installed and operational by the end of 2011. CENTCOM also
intends to conduct military-to-military bilateral contingency planning
with GoI. The GoI will still need to acquire a capable air defense
weapon system in the future, whether it is the F-16 or another
platform. While the GoI will investigate all options, including a like-
capability from other countries, CENTCOM will continue to encourage a
U.S. manufactured solution as we believe this will provide the best
sustainable capability for Iraqi air defense.
PIRACY
88. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis and Admiral Olson, Somali
pirates are a lingering threat off the Horn of Africa and now even in
the Indian Ocean. The February 22 murder of four Americans on a
private, hijacked vessel near Oman served as a wake-up call. This year
alone, Somali pirates have mounted over 50 attacks, hijacked several
ships, and have taken over 200 crewmembers hostage. It appears that
piracy is increasing in numbers, reach, and determination, despite the
growing number of U.S. and international assets committed to protecting
the maritime commons. In your mind, what is the most effective strategy
to guard against piracy and secure the use of maritime routes off the
east coast of Africa and throughout the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM provides specially trained and equipped forces
to support the counter-piracy strategies of the geographic combatant
commanders.
General Mattis. While we can inhibit piracy on the sea with
military action, ultimately the problem of piracy must be solved on
shore, primarily in Somalia with a stable government that can enforce
the rule of law over its sovereign territory.
SOCOM FUNDING
89. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Olson, in January, Secretary Gates
announced several ``efficiency'' cuts, including $2.3 billion from the
SOCOM budget. At the same time, our Nation asks more than ever of our
SOF. Recently, you stated ``We are doing more with more, but the more
we're doing it with doesn't match the more we've been asked to do . . .
we are beginning to show fraying around the edges.'' You have also
stated that deployment frequency for SOF is exceedingly high, while
SOCOM lacks the resources to meet the current demand. Will losing this
$2.3 billion detrimentally impact SOCOM operations? If so, why?
Admiral Olson. Senator Cornyn, thank you for affording me the
opportunity to answer this extremely important question. Secretary
Gates has directed cost consideration in all we do, and a ``culture of
savings'' to ensure that we optimize the resources entrusted to us. His
direction for improving DOD business operations last summer was clear;
identify our savings and efficiencies initiatives over the next 5 years
under the notion that those savings would be reinvested. The
Department's stated goal was to significantly reduce excess overhead
costs and apply savings to force structure and modernization--not a
reduction of the DOD topline through efficiency cuts.
CDR SOCOM's efforts in resourcing tactical units, divesting of
obsolete and redundant capabilities, and leveraging Service common
capabilities are consistent with the Secretary of Defense efficiency
focus. Realigning the $2.3 billion across the FYDP did not have a
negative impact on SOCOM. In fact, it allowed us to address growing
capability gaps and improve battlefield performance by invigorating our
acquisition agenda. SOCOM was able to realign funding towards Undersea
Mobility and AC-130J Gunship recapitalization. Additionally, we were
able to realign funding to improve SOF operational readiness and
improve our human capital strategy. Key efforts such as Foreign
Language Proficiency Pay, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations
Command sustainment, flying hours funding, and Warrior Rehabilitation
were enhanced.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
90. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, in recent years, our troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly operating in areas outside their
traditional competencies. We have seen examples of combat commanders
standing up agricultural unions, dealing with veterinary issues, water
issues, health issues, human services issues, and conducting elections
in their areas of operations. While most of these tasks have been
executed successfully, due in part to the sheer tenacity and
determination of our military, many have been completed without the
support and expertise of the relevant U.S. Government agencies. Could
you comment on what legislative modifications you think are necessary
in order to improve interagency security cooperation?
General Mattis. Transitioning our military forces out of Iraq and
Afghanistan will become more difficult if we cannot maintain assistance
in the economic and governance areas on the civilian side. Robust
resourcing for the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and other agency and department missions are some of the
best investments for reducing the need for military forces to be
employed.
91. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, do you see the need for a more
comprehensive review or possible reorganization of some government
agencies to better support our expeditionary military?
General Mattis. Improved interagency coordination begins with an
adequate level of resources available to our civilian interagency
associates and partners. It is vitally important to support and fully
fund the requests made by these departments and agencies in the 2011
and 2012 budget requests that address and build the capabilities and
capacity required for the future success of the National Security
Strategy. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review offers
important contributions to both improving efficiencies and allowing us
all to better understand how our partners operate.
92. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, under current DOD organization,
Iraq and Afghanistan fall within CENTCOM's AOR. However, within the DOS
organizational structure, they fall under two separate regional
bureaus. Similarly, Pakistan and India fall under the same DOS regional
bureau, but under two different DOD unified combatant commands. These
problems are not limited to the DOD and DOS maps. It would seem that
this misalignment of geographic regions between Federal agencies would
cause inherent challenges in the area of interagency coordination. In
your opinion, does this lack of common demarcation of the world's
regions hamper effective interagency cooperation and coordination on
national security?
General Mattis. No. Differences in the Areas of Responsibility
geographic demarcations do not restrict accomplishment of assigned
missions among COCOMs and civilian leaders across the Federal
Government, to include diplomatic coordination, interagency
cooperation, advancing U.S. interests, and protecting U.S. national
security.
IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN IRAQ
93. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, you noted in your testimony
that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) is
equipping militants in Iraq and Afghanistan who have attacked U.S. and
coalition forces, undermining stability and governance in both nations.
Through these actions, Iran has essentially been waging a proxy war
against U.S. troops. Your testimony also highlights a recent January
2011 large-caliber improvised rocket-assisted mortar attack against
U.S. forces in Iraq that, in your words, ``demonstrated Iran's
malicious intent and ability to escalate violence when they desire.''
What concerns do you have regarding the potential for the Iranian
regime to obtain a greater, destabilizing influence in Iraq following
the planned withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011?
General Mattis. IRGC-QF will likely continue to support Shia
militant groups in Iraq after U.S. forces withdraw, just as IRGC-QF
continued to support Lebanese Hizballah after the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from Lebanon in 2000. IRGC-QF will likely attempt to replicate
the Hizballah model in Iraq via Shia militia groups such as Kata'ib
Hizballah, Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Muqtada al Sadr's Promise Day Brigade.
Their intent is to have a loyal proxy with legitimate seats in the
Iraqi Government and a capable, responsive militia. These militia
groups, backed by IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah, could collectively
destabilize the security gains made in Iraq should Iran and these
militias believe increased violence would benefit their interests and
increase their influence.
94. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, in your view, what is the best
strategy, short of contingency operations, that the United States can
employ to deter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region?
General Mattis. I believe the most effective strategy is one that
mobilizes the international community to implement sufficient
diplomatic and economic pressure to further isolate Iran forcing the
regime to change its destabilizing behavior. In the meantime, CENTCOM
will continue to work through institutions, alliances, and coalitions
to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. To this end, we will
continue to pursue security cooperation with our allies and regional
partners while helping to strengthen their defensive capabilities. We
will also continue to support interagency efforts that blend economic,
diplomatic, informational, and military tools to deter Iran.
B-1 BOMBERS
95. Senator Cornyn. General Mattis, the B-1 bomber has been
operating over Afghanistan in support of our troops on the ground and
has proven itself a critical component of our long-range strike
operations overseas. Senior U.S. military leaders have consistently
acknowledged that the B-1 fleet is doing an outstanding job. In a
recent confirmation hearing, General David Petraeus stated that the B-1
is a ``great platform'' and a ``very capable bomber.'' In your view,
what role has the B-1 fleet played within CENTCOM's AOR, and what
unique capabilities has it brought to the table, as compared to other
platforms?
General Mattis. The B-1 is a very capable combat aircraft that
combines precision targeting and guided munitions. The B-1 can deliver
up to 48,000 pounds of munitions and can loiter for 7 hours before
needing aerial refueling. During the first 6 months of OEF, the B-1
dropped 38 percent of all weapons delivered while flying only 5 percent
of the overall sorties. In addition, the bomber dropped twice as many
precision munitions as the coalition partners combined. In Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the aircraft flew less than 1 percent of the combat
missions while delivering approximately 43 percent of the precision
munitions.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Webb, McCaskill, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain,
Inhofe, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L.
Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason
W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff
member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F.
Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant
to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan;
Patrick Hayes and Joanne McLaughlin, assistants to Senator
Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Ethan
Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony J. Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator
Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Ryan
Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Taylor Andreae,
assistant to Senator Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Amos to the
committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of
the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year
2012 annual budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
request of the administration. We are pleased to welcome
General Amos to his first posture hearing as Commandant and to
welcome Admiral Roughead for what will probably be his last
posture hearing before the committee as Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO).
We are grateful to each of you for your great service to
our Nation and for the valorous and truly professional service
of the men and women under your command, and we're grateful to
their families for the vital role families play in the success
of careers and missions of our Armed Forces.
As we discuss the budget issues here at home, our eyes are
principally focused on places far from here. Nearly 20,000
marines are partnered with an equal number of Afghan security
forces (ASF) in Helmand Province, in the effort to bring
security and stability to the people of southern Afghanistan.
The marines have seen some tough fighting in clearing those
areas of Taliban. They have also performed brilliantly in
working with ASFs and local Afghan leaders to keep these
communities free of insurgent control and to help the Afghan
people build a better future. These efforts are showing
progress, with villages secured in the central Helmand River
Valley, market bazaars are reopening, and children are
returning to school.
The marines are also helping to establish community watch
groups throughout Helmand Province, which are enabling local
villagers to provide for their own security and to prevent a
return of the Taliban.
When we met for the Navy posture hearing last year, the
Marine Corps was completing its drawdown of forces in Iraq and
was in the midst of its redeployment to Afghanistan. The Navy
has also been contributing directly to the war effort in U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) as well and has 14,000 Active and
Reserve sailors on the ground and another 10,000 at sea in
CENTCOM, including ongoing individual augmentee support to
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
New challenges have emerged in recent days. Two ships with
a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of over 1,000 marines aboard
are in the Mediterranean. Missile-launching ships are available
should the President choose to use them to strike Libyan
targets, including military aircraft, air defenses, airstrips,
command centers, and bases.
Before exercising any use of force option, the President is
appropriately seeking support from the international community,
in particular the support of other countries in the Arab and
Muslim worlds and in the region. It has been reported that some
Arab states are apparently considering coordinating with the
African Union in support of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya.
Also, France and the United Kingdom are drafting a resolution
for possible use at the United Nations (U.N.). Meanwhile,
discussions are ongoing at the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) headquarters in advance of a defense
ministerial meeting on March 10 and 11.
Under the War Powers Act, the administration would need to
consult with Congress before exercising a military option
involving the use of force and to notify Congress promptly if a
decision were made to use force.
The use and possible use of our forces overseas makes it
even more important that our budget provides for their success
and their wellbeing. Our witnesses this morning are faced with
a number of critical issues that confront the Department of the
Navy and the budget, such as balancing modernization needs
against the costs of supporting ongoing operations. We also
know that you are facing serious complications due to the fact
that the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a full year
budget for the current fiscal year.
Many of the ongoing challenges facing the Department of the
Navy (DON) center on acquisition programs. For instance, we
have had great concerns about cost problems in the shipbuilding
arena, including the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since
last year, we approved a revised acquisition strategy for LCS
that will result in $2.9 billion in savings compared to the
previous shipbuilding plan and has also contributed, at least
in part, to the fact the Navy is buying additional ships in
this budget and has added purchases of additional 41 F-18
aircraft to help address a potential shortfall in tactical
aviation.
We will be monitoring closely to ensure that the DON
actually achieves these savings and gets costs under control in
other acquisition programs. The Navy has made modest progress
in achieving the goal of a 313-ship fleet by increasing the
size of the Navy fleet, and that has increased from a low of
274 ships in March 2007 to a planned level of 288 during fiscal
year 2012.
We need to see more success stories, such as the savings
from the LCS program or the savings from more efficient
production of the Virginia-class submarine or the savings from
the F-18 multi-year program if the Navy is going to make
continued progress in building the size of the fleet. The
future strength of the Navy depends on holding firm on these
cost reduction efforts and expanding them across the whole
acquisition portfolio.
The Marine Corps has announced their intention to cancel
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. DON
acknowledges the importance of the Marine Corps' amphibious
assault mission and of the continuing relevance of that mission
and capability to the Nation's defense. This mission in turn
depends on an ability to move ashore from 20 to 30 miles out to
sea with armored vehicles. That has been the purpose of the EFV
program. So we need to hear this morning on the status of the
alternatives to the EFV to achieve that mission.
The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 has
dictated that DOD make significant changes in its regulations
and procedures governing the acquisition system. While I'm
certain that this legislation will help correct past problems,
I also know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts
within the executive branch to implement that legislation and
improve past behavior within DOD. We look forward to hearing
this morning how the Navy is proceeding to implement the
provisions of that act.
Another concern surrounds future ship and aircraft force
levels. As I have previously mentioned, the Navy budget would
buy an additional 41 F-18 aircraft, but the budget would buy
fewer Marine Corps and Navy versions of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). Additionally, the Navy is planning to conduct a
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on some 150 F-18 aircraft
already in our inventory. We need to understand the net effect
of all these changes and how that alters the prospect of having
empty carrier air wings later in this decade.
Readiness continues to be a major concern for our
committee. Without a final fiscal year 2011 appropriations act
to match this committee's 2011 authorization of additional
resources for readiness, the Navy readiness posture is in great
jeopardy. Specifically, the funding needed in this fiscal year,
in addition to the original budget request, is roughly $60
million for aircraft depot maintenance and $34 million for ship
depot maintenance.
During last year's budget review cycle, this committee
authorized those additional resources to meet the CNO's
identified unfunded priorities for fixing shortfalls in the
Navy aircraft and ship depot maintenance accounts in the fiscal
year 2011 budget. While the Senate Appropriations Committee
matched that additional funding, there has been no final
appropriations act. Delaying the final appropriations act for
fiscal year 2011 has already had a negative effect on
readiness. The Navy has cancelled five ship availabilities.
Further delay on appropriations will result in additional
cancellations.
The fiscal year 2012 budget continues an inadequate request
for ship and aircraft depot maintenance, as I mentioned. For
these two areas, the Navy budget request is short some $367
million, which would only exacerbate an already stressed state
of naval readiness.
Turning to operational energy issues, I want to commend
Secretary Mabus for his foresight and aggressive goals and his
successful testing of alternative fuels from renewable sources.
The sooner we can free ourselves from the shackles of fossil
fuels, the better off our Armed Forces will be along with the
Nation.
I understand that last year one Marine company deployed to
Afghanistan with renewable power systems to recharge batteries
and laptops and energy-efficient lighting for tents, among
other items. Since then, fuel use has decreased 90 percent and
two patrol bases now operate entirely upon that renewable
energy. I congratulate you, Secretary Mabus and the Marines,
for that initiative.
I also want to commend Secretary Mabus on his recent
announcement that DOD will take new steps to enhance
cooperation on clean energy and energy security by furthering
last year's Memorandum of Understanding between DOD and the
Department of Energy.
Last year's committee report on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 contained language
expressing this committee's concerns with the planned
relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to
Guam. We recommended a reduction of $320 million from the
request for construction of aircraft parking, site preparation,
and utilities on Guam, since we concluded that these funds were
budgeted ahead of need. The committee also recommended that
authorization for the construction of future projects be
deferred until we were provided with essential and relevant
information. To date, the committee has not received that
information on any of these six items that we requested.
This year's budget request contains $181 million in similar
projects. DOD has not yet shown that tangible progress has been
made to implement a final decision on the replacement facility
that meets the operational requirements for the marines on
Okinawa, and we should not proceed with such an important,
costly endeavor until we have complete, detailed information
and realistic plans. To do otherwise would risk billions in
taxpayers' dollars and could potentially put our strategic
posture in a crucial region in jeopardy.
So we look forward to hearing testimony this morning from
our witnesses on these and other issues that are facing the
Navy, and again we strongly commend you on your great service
to the Nation and on the initiatives that you have taken.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for being here today and I thank them
for their service to the country. They join us in interesting
times. There are a lot of issues that are now before us and the
President and the Joint Chiefs and also our military leadership
have to handle various situations that are unfolding in the
world, some of it on a day-to-day basis. So, I'm very
interested in hearing General Amos' and Admiral Roughead's
assessments of some of these situations.
I remain concerned--by the way, in case--I know that our
witnesses didn't miss it, but the Chinese announced a 12
percent or 12.5 percent increase in their defense budget. We
all know that that is not a true reflection of their defense
spending, and a lot of their recent behavior in my view has
emphasized the need for a naval presence in that part of the
world, a very significant one, which may in future years turn
our attention again to our overall maritime strategy.
The JSF is an issue that we have been over and over and
over again both in hearings and with the witnesses. General
Amos, I would really appreciate it if you would keep us
informed almost on a monthly basis. Secretary Gates has said,
as we all know, that the Marine Corps version of the F-35 is on
``probation.'' This has really been a--I hate to keep throwing
around the word ``disgraceful,'' but the cost overruns and
delays have been unfortunately characteristic of a lot of our
acquisition problems and challenges over the past several
years.
I know, General Amos, that you will keep us informed. But
we don't want to be surprised about anything that happens with
the F-35. In these tough fiscal times, we do have an obligation
to our citizens to make sure that--we always have that
responsibility, but now in these tough times, that
responsibility has even been increased.
General Amos, I appreciate your decision concerning the
EFV. I know it was a tough one for you and I'll be very
interested in hearing your views on what we will do instead of
the EFV in the future, particularly in light of my opening
comments. Our whole shipbuilding costs are really something
which is disturbing us. Secretary Mabus, how you're going to
fit the submarines as well as our other shipbuilding
requirements all into a very tight budget, I would be very
interested in hearing how you're going to approach that.
Finally, on the LCS, I would just quote not my own views,
but from Norman Polmar. Over the years we learn to respect the
views of certain individuals who are experts and I would quote
from an article that Norman Polmar wrote called ``A Crisis in
Leadership'' in January. He basically said: ``And more
recently, the Navy has again changed course on the LCS program.
The program began a decade ago when the Navy awarded contracts
to two industry teams to develop and build competitive LCS
designs `at the speed of light.' As successive CNO and surface
warfare flag officers attested, each team was to build up to
two ships.'' At the last hearing I went through the numbers of
the ships that were begun and cancelled, at huge costs.
``After competitive evaluation, the Navy would select one
design to fulfill the requirement for a total LCS force of
about 55 ships.''
I go on to quote Norman Polmar: ``Into 2010, the Navy
continued to praise this approach to the LCS program, even
though both designs have been late and far above planned costs.
The design selection also was delayed with the penultimate
declaration by the Navy's leadership being that the winning
design would be chosen in November 2010.
``Then, without warning, in November the Navy announced a
`split decision.' The leadership now wants to buy 10 additional
ships from each builder. The claim is made that the existing
competition had driven down costs for both designs.
``That is a questionable claim in view of the more than
doubling of the costs of prototypes of both designs, major
problems in development and producing their mission modules,
and increased costs of supporting a large number of both LCS
configurations in the fleet. The two LCS designs have different
sensors, computers, software, tactical displays, propulsion
systems, et cetera. Those will cause increased maintenance and
support costs, increased personnel training costs, and restrict
flexibility in personnel assignment, an important factor in
view of the small LCS crew size. The different combat systems
of the two LCS designs will create problems related to
operating the mission modules. Developing a new common combat
system for both designs could cost up to $1.8 billion,
according to the Congressional Research Service. Adapting one
of the combat systems to the other design would cost just under
$1 billion.''
That's Norman Polmar's view, and we'll see, Mr. Secretary.
We'll find out. I'll be here for a few more years, and we'll
see whether your decision was correct, or whether Norman Polmar
and I were correct, when you made a snap decision in November
that we had to approve two different shipyards to do the job
that for years you told Congress and the American people that
you were going to select one.
This kind of thing erodes, enormously erodes, the
credibility of the Navy's plans and programs, at least for this
member.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and I thank
them for their service to their country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Mabus, let me call on you first.
Secretary Mabus.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
committee: I have the honor of appearing here today
representing the sailors, marines, civilians, and their
families that make up our Department of the Navy. Today the
Navy and Marine Corps are conducting missions across a full
range of military operations. They remain the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known and,
thanks to your support, they will continue to meet the
multitude of missions entrusted to them by our Nation.
As the chairman pointed out in his opening statement, today
we face an immediate crisis, the absence of a defense
appropriations bill and the increasingly serious problems of
operating under a continuing resolution (CR). The pressure of
the CR has already significantly impacted procurement and
reduced the resources available to maintain readiness. If the
CR continues for the entire year, we will be forced to reduce
aircraft flight hours and ship steaming days, cancel up to 29
of 85 surface ship availabilities, defer maintenance on as many
as 70 aircraft and 290 engines, and defer up to 140 maintenance
and construction projects across the country.
In addition, lack of legislative action will prevent the
construction of two Arleigh Burke destroyers, one Virginia-
class submarine, and one mobile landing platform, prevent
procurement of two nuclear reactor cores, and delay increased
funding for the Ohio-class replacement, reduce Marine Corps
procurement by a third after the Marine Corps rebalances its
manpower accounts, create a $4.6 billion shortfall in
operations and maintenance accounts, and create a nearly $600
million shortfall in combined Navy and Marine Corps manpower
accounts.
These measures not only place additional stress on the
force and on our families; they will weaken the industrial base
and affect over 10,000 private sector jobs. The disruption to
our fleet and shore maintenance and modernization schedules may
take years to recover from and will come at a much greater
cost. We strongly request congressional action to address the
implications of the CR.
This is particularly important when considering that
submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget was based on the
fiscal year 2011 request.
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for the
Navy of $161 billion, an increase of only one-half of 1 percent
from fiscal year 2011, includes funds this year for 10 ships
and 223 aircraft. It maintains our commitment to take care of
our people, build a strong research and development and
industrial base, and to grow the fleet.
The $15 billion request for OCO, which represents a drop of
$3.5 billion from fiscal year 2011, includes funds to sustain
operations, manpower, infrastructure, as well as procure
equipment to support operations in Afghanistan.
During the budget development, we were keenly aware of the
fiscal position of the country and the necessity to be
responsible stewards of taxpayers' dollars. The resulting
request is a strategy-driven document, informed by fiscal
realities. I think it balances competing requirements and does
what is best for the country, the Navy and Marine Corps, and
our sailors and marines.
We began this budget cycle by examining every aspect of
what we do and how we do it. Consequently, $42 billion in the
Navy efficiencies were identified over the 5 years. As a result
of these efficiencies, we have been able to add one Aegis
destroyer, three T-AOX fleet oilers, and one T-AGOS ocean
surveillance ship to our shipbuilding plan. With our dual-block
LCS strategy, this increases the total number of ships in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from 50 to 56, including
one Joint High-Speed Vessel to be built for the Army.
The savings allow us to buy additional F/A-18s, extend the
service life of up to 150 aircraft as a hedge against delays in
the deployment of the F-35B, and allow us to continue investing
in unmanned systems, which are becoming increasingly important
on the battlefield.
The upcoming year will see the deployment of Fire Scout to
Afghanistan and continuing testing of the UCAS-D, the
forerunner of an integrated carrier-based system.
In 2010, one of the most important efforts was the decision
endorsed by Congress to pursue the new LCS through a dual-block
buy procurement strategy. At an average cost of less than $440
million per ship and with the cost reductions we have seen on
LCS-3 and -4, the new strategy will save taxpayers $2.9
billion. This plan is one that's good for the Navy, good for
taxpayers, good for the country, and demonstrates what can be
accomplished when sound acquisition principles are followed and
enforced.
We heard the message from Congress very clearly. We need
more ships, but they have to be affordable. The LCS strategy
supports the industrial base by keeping workers employed at two
shipyards and is indicative of DOD's push to ensure acquisition
excellence. The fixed-price contracts used for LCS, I hope,
will be a model. They are the result of effective competition,
give the government full ownership of the technical data
package used in construction, and afford greater congressional
oversight. With the new strategy, we get more ships, more
quickly, and more affordably.
As was pointed out, significant additional savings were
also achieved through termination of the EFV. It's important to
emphasize that this decision in no way changes our Nation's
commitment to amphibious warfare. We have to maintain an
amphibious assault capability that will put marines ashore
ready for the fight.
But the EFV is simply not the vehicle to do this. Conceived
in the 1980s, the EFV is a two-decade-old solution to a
tactical problem that has since fundamentally changed. Its cost
per unit would have consumed half the Marine Corps' total
procurement from fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2025 and 90
percent of its vehicle-related operation and maintenance
account.
In aviation programs, we, as you, are closely monitoring
the JSF, particularly the Marine Corps variant, the F-35B.
After a 2-year period of focused scrutiny, we'll be able to
make an informed recommendation about resolving the technical
and cost issues.
Ashore, we continue to confront rising health care costs
caused by an increasing number of beneficiaries, expanded
benefits, and increased utilization. To deal with these trends,
we have to implement systematic efficiencies and specific
initiatives to improve quality of care and customer
satisfaction, but at the same time more responsibly manage
costs. We concur with the recommendations made by the Secretary
of Defense to ensure fiscal solvency and benefit equity for our
retirees.
Finally, we are continuing efforts to invest in and develop
alternative energy. The latest headlines from around the world
reinforce the basic point: Energy is first and foremost an
issue of national security. We cannot allow volatile regions of
the world to control the price and affect the supply of the
fuel we use.
Last year, the Navy and Marine Corps took huge steps
forward, including, again as was pointed out earlier, flying an
F-18 Hornet on biofuel, conducting a large expansion of solar
power, and beginning expeditionary energy initiatives in
Afghanistan. The Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, was the outfit
that you talked about, Mr. Chairman, and in the middle of some
of the heaviest fighting in Helmand Province they have
demonstrated not only the ability to reduce their use of fossil
fuels, but also to make them better fighters. One foot patrol
saves 700 pounds of batteries that they don't have to lug
through the battlefield, simply by using some of these
renewable energy devices.
What we're doing there is already saving lives. We will
continue these investments this year and will continue to move
toward our goal of at least 50 percent alternative energy use
by 2020.
In closing, I want to thank you again for your support.
Thank you for always looking out for our sailors, our marines,
their families, and for your support of efforts to make the
Navy and the Marine Corps better, stronger, and better able to
defend our great Nation. It's a solemn privilege to lead the
naval services during an era of protracted war and of national
challenge. I have been profoundly moved by the sacrifice and
devotion that I have witnessed daily in the sailors and marines
who defend us. The Navy and Marine Corps are and will remain
ready to do any mission America gives them.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Raymond E. Mabus, Jr.
Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain, I have the honor of
appearing here today on behalf of the nearly 900,000 sailors, marines,
and civilians that make up the Department of the Navy. I have appeared
before this committee on a number of occasions, and I am happy to be
here again, along with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, to report on the readiness, posture,
progress, and budgetary requests of the Department. We consider
ourselves privileged to lead the dedicated men and women of the
Department who are selflessly serving the United States all around the
world.
Today, your Navy and Marine Corps are conducting missions across
the full range of military operations. They are engaged in combat in
Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, deterrence and ballistic
missile defense (BMD) in the Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and the
Mediterranean, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations across the globe. Our unmatched global reach, endurance, and
presence continue to allow the Navy and Marine Corps--in partnership
with our sister Services--to secure and advance America's interests
wherever challenges or crises have arisen, as well as operate forward
to prevent crises from occurring. We remain the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known, and with your
continued support, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to meet the
multiplicity of threats that endanger international peace and security.
But today we are very concerned about the absence of a Defense
Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2011 and the negative effects of
operating under a continuing resolution for the remainder of the year.
We are equally concerned about passage of a bill that reduces the
topline from the level requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget. Either course of action significantly impacts the resources
available to grow the fleet and jeopardizes recent efforts to restore
and maintain readiness levels commensurate with the standards expected
of the Navy and Marine Corps.
Without legislative action, limiting fiscal year 2011 procurement
accounts to fiscal year 2010 levels will:
Prevent start of construction of one Virginia-class
submarine to be built in Groton and Newport News which will
break the existing multi-year contract.
Prevent start of construction of one Mobile Landing
Platform to be built in San Diego.
Prevent start of construction of one or possibly both
programmed Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to be built in Bath
and Pascagoula due to DDG-1000/DDG-51 swap language that
prevents award of either ship unless both are authorized and
appropriated.
Preclude fourth and final increment of full funding
for construction of CVN-78 (USS Gerald R. Ford) and advance
procurement for CVN-79.
Prevent procurement of two nuclear reactor cores for
refueling of one aircraft carrier and one ballistic missile
submarine, as well as delay increased funding for research and
development of the Ohio-class replacement and replacement of
two Moored Training Ships that provide half of the force's
nuclear training capability.
Prevent completion of one Arleigh Burke-class
modernization.
Reduce Marine Corps procurement by $563 million. This
would add to equipment shortfalls generated by 9 years of
conflict and prevent equipment replacement or purchase of four
H-1 helicopters, numerous LAVs, MTVRs, LVSRs; tech upgrades to
counter IED jammers; communication and intelligence equipment;
tactical fuel systems to power our vehicles and generators;
engineering equipment to move ammo, gear and supplies; air
conditioners and heaters to take care of marines and sensitive
gear; and EOD improvements to protect them.
Reductions to expected procurement levels will create additional
stress on the force, as units in service pick up additional commitments
to cover the seams created by fewer available platforms.
Likewise, fixing fiscal year 2011 operations to fiscal year 2010
levels has created a $4.6 billion shortfall in Navy and Marine Corps
operations, maintenance, and training accounts. Faced with this
prospect, the Department began efforts in January to mitigate the
impacts of operating under the continuing resolution, which over the
course of the fiscal year will cause us to:
Reduce aircraft flight hours and ship steaming days,
including a reduction of four non-deployed air wings' flight
hours to minimal flight-safety levels.
Cancel up to 29 of 85 surface ship availabilities.
Defer maintenance on 70 aircraft and 290 aircraft
engines, bringing the combined backlog of aviation maintenance
close to 1-year redlines.
Defer 41 facilities maintenance projects and 89 new
construction projects in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Guam. These cuts equal an
approximate 50 percent reduction and will eliminate, among many
projects, dry dock certifications, bachelor quarters
maintenance projects, repairs to explosive handling wharves at
Bangor and Kings Bay that support ballistic missile operations,
and modernization projects to support introduction of new
training aircraft.
The combined effects of the continuing resolution will directly
impact the strength of the industrial base and over 10,000 private
sector jobs at shipyards, factories, and Navy and Marine Corps
facilities across the country. The degradation or loss of perishable
skill-sets within our workforce, including many nuclear workers, and
the disruption to both our fleet and shore maintenance and
modernization schedules will take 3 years to recover based on
rotational schedules alone--and only at significantly greater cost than
requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Finally, there is almost a $600 million shortfall in Navy and
Marine Corps manpower accounts. As a result of this shortfall, the
Services must raid other accounts in order to meet payroll for the
duration of the year. We are currently living within funding
constraints by limiting or conducting short-notice permanent change of
station moves; however, this tactic places significant hardship on our
military families and is not sustainable over the entire fiscal year.
We strongly request congressional action to address the
implications of the Continuing Resolution on our forces and our people
by taking action to enact the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITIES
As I testified last year, there are four imperatives I believe the
Department of the Navy must address to maintain preeminence as a
fighting force and successfully meet the challenges of the future. They
are:
(1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their
families
(2) Treating energy as a strategic national security issue
(3) Creating acquisition excellence
(4) Continuing development and deployment of unmanned systems
These priorities underpin every action of the Department, from
supporting current operations to developing the current year's budget
request, finding efficiencies within the Department, and preparing our
Navy and Marine Corps for the future.
Fundamentally, it comes down to a question of resources, of
ensuring that our people have what they need to do their jobs, ensuring
the Nation that the Navy and Marine Corps uses our fiscal and energy
resources wisely, and ensuring that seapower, as a resource, remains
readily available to meet the Nation's policy requirements and the
orders of the Commander in Chief.
SEAPOWER: A CRITICAL STRATEGIC ENABLER
It is clear that we live in a time of sweeping change and an era of
strategic realignment. The President has stated that we ``must pursue a
strategy of national renewal and global leadership--a strategy that
rebuilds the foundation of American strength and influence.'' Seapower
has always been a part of that foundation and will continue to be an
indispensible asset to American leadership and economic strength in the
global community of nations. American seapower, as it has done for
generations, continues to guarantee freedom of navigation and
international maritime trade, underpinning global economic stability
and facilitating continued global economic growth. No other component
of American military power is as flexible or adaptable as seapower. I
see one of my primary responsibilities as Secretary to be ensuring
continuation of this responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability
through the policies we adopt and in the ships, aircraft, and weapons
systems that we build.
Maritime nations have many inherent strategic advantages. Naval
forces operating in the open ocean provide an effective conventional
deterrent to those who threaten regional stability or promote
extremism. Strong expeditionary forces can swiftly respond to crises
and make potential adversaries pause before committing hostile actions.
But should deterrence fail, our combat ready naval forces must be
prepared to conduct sustained combat operations.
The Navy and Marine Corps are America's ``Away Team.'' They exist
primarily to protect our Nation far from home and respond quickly to
crises wherever and whenever they occur. Exploiting their inherent
mobility and maneuverability at sea, naval forces gather information,
perform surveillance of seaborne and airborne threats, defend regional
partners, deter prospective adversaries, interdict weapons of mass
destruction, disrupt terrorist networks, conduct humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, and support the work of American
diplomacy. This variety of capabilities is a primary feature of
seapower, and it provides the President and our Nation with unmatched
flexibility to deter conflict and, if necessary, project power from the
sea to defend U.S. national security interests. The ability to
accomplish these tasks without placing a large presence ashore and
absent concerns of sovereignty is absolutely critical in our world of
increasingly sophisticated threats and growing geopolitical complexity.
It is for these reasons, and in order to improve global force
projection capabilities that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are
working on an Air Sea Battle concept to improve joint capabilities and
cooperation in addressing anti-access/area-denial challenges.
Unique in history, the blanket of maritime security and stability
provided by American maritime power is the first to be used for the
good of the whole world. But in order to ensure continued American
leadership in issues of maritime policy and security, we strongly
recommend accession of the United States to the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, an action that has been similarly and repeatedly
recommended by multiple Secretaries of the Navy and Chiefs of Naval
Operation. Accession by the United States would enhance stability of
the navigational rights inherent to the Convention and would strengthen
our bargaining position in international discussions of Arctic Policy
and access to resources and sea lines of communication.
CURRENT OPERATIONS
Over the past year, our forces have successfully navigated the
world's growing complexity and have consistently demonstrated the
utility, effectiveness, and flexibility of seapower and maritime
forces.
Following completion of the Marines Corps' mission in Iraq, the
primary operational focus of the Department has been supporting the war
effort in Afghanistan. Over 30,000 marines and sailors are committed to
the fight there, working all across the country, with the largest
concentration operating as Regional Command-Southwest along the Helmand
River Valley.
In my visits to the marines on the ground throughout the year, I
had the opportunity to look firsthand at the progress made by our
increased presence in Helmand. In December, I visited three Forward
Operating Bases (FOBs) with increasing levels of stability in three
separate districts of Helmand: Sangin, Marjah, and Nawa--or as the
marines put it, I went to look at where the fight is, where the fight
was, and where there is no fight.
In Nawa, I saw a strong partnership between the local government,
Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, and our Marines--who
have built the capacity of their partners so that they may shortly
assume responsibility for their own security. The district is very
safe, and because of the success of the counter-insurgency effort, Nawa
is growing in both political strength and economic activity.
In Marjah, after successful operations to clear it last spring, the
markets are open, schools are being built, and a local government is
working to build capacity. In my visit just 3 months ago, I personally
walked the streets of Marjah to witness the progress, something that
even in the summer of 2010 would have been unthinkable. Then, just
stepping outside the gates of our FOB would have generated a pitched
battle. Now, it brought out street vendors and men on motorbikes.
I also went to Sangin District near the Kajaki Dam in Northern
Helmand, which has been a Taliban stronghold for years and for the past
few months has been the main effort of the fight in Helmand. Our
marines in Sangin have been conducting intensive combat and security
missions in support of the counterinsurgency strategy, and
concurrently--even in the midst of the fight, have been testing new
solar energy equipment to expand their operational reach. Together with
their partners from the Afghan National Security Forces, they have
taken the fight to the Taliban and are facilitating the Afghan
Government's reestablishment of local control.
Elsewhere across Central Command, the Navy has over 14,000 sailors
on the ground supporting joint and coalition efforts and another 10,000
sailors at sea supporting combat operations, including from our
carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, where we are launching
approximately 30 percent of the strike or close air support missions
that watch over our marines and soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan.
In addition to combat operations, the Navy and Marine Corps remain
globally engaged in a host of other security and stability operations.
On any given day, more than 72,000 sailors and marines are deployed and
almost half of our 286 ships are underway, ready to respond where
needed.
It was the Navy and Marine Corps that were the first on scene after
both the devastating earthquake in Haiti and the summer's catastrophic
floods in Pakistan. Within hours of the January 12th earthquake, both
Navy and Marine Corps assets were en route to Haiti. A total of over
10,000 sailors and marines and 23 ships, including the carrier USS Carl
Vinson, the Bataan and Nassau Amphibious Ready Groups, and the hospital
ship USNS Comfort ultimately participated in Operation Unified
Response.
Halfway around the world, after Pakistan was struck by devastating
August floods that impacted nearly a fifth of its population,
helicopters from the USS Peleliu and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
supported the Government of Pakistan through delivery of 2,000 tons of
relief supplies and by contributing to the rescue of over 10,000
people. Later, the ships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group
deployed early to provide a continuous U.S. humanitarian presence.
In response to the administration's strategic direction, the Navy
is scaling up our BMD force and their deployments to enhance our
deterrent posture, especially in the defense of Europe. Our multi-
mission, BMD-capable, Aegis cruisers and destroyers now routinely
deploy to the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf, as well as the
Western Pacific to extend our deterrent umbrella for our allies. I had
the opportunity a few months ago to visit the destroyer USS Ramage
after she completed her first BMD deployment, and I can assure you that
the sailors on these ships are some of the most professional and
dedicated men and women in the country, and they are incredibly excited
about their work. We appreciate Congress' continued support of the
destroyer and cruiser modernization programs that are bringing
additional BMD capability to the fleet.
Our growing BMD capability is complemented by our traditional sea-
based, strategic nuclear deterrent centered upon our globally deployed
and proficient ballistic missile submarine force.
In the Western Pacific, as an integral part of U.S. diplomatic
actions, several times last year the USS George Washington sortied to
the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan in response to territorial
disputes with North Korea and open North Korean provocation. In late
November, after the North Korean artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong Island
west of Inchon, the George Washington strike group conducted a training
exercise with the South Korean Navy in order to demonstrate the
continuing value and strength of our alliance.
We are also working to build regional capacity and resolve security
issues of common international concern.
In support of our Maritime Strategy, both the Navy and Marine Corps
routinely engage with nations all around the world to build capacity
and forge stronger maritime partnerships. In the ``Rim of the Pacific''
or RIMPAC exercise, 32 ships, 5 submarines, and more than 170 aircraft
from 14 nations participated in the world's largest multinational
maritime exercise encompassing every aspect of traditional naval
warfare.
Global Partnership Stations in Africa, South America, and the
Pacific are training hundreds of sailors, marines, and coastguardsmen
from dozens of nations and are bringing advanced medical and civil
engineering assistance to those in need. The Africa Partnership Station
alone has trained with 32 African and European partners since 2007.
Between them, Pacific Partnership 2010--conducted by the USNS Mercy--
and Continuing Promise 2010--conducted by the USS Iwo Jima--treated
over 100,000 patients and conducted over 20 civil engineering projects.
In the Caribbean and South America, we continue to work with the
Coast Guard-led Joint Interagency Task Force-South to synchronize
forces from 13 nations and interdict the flow of illegal narcotics into
the United States. In 2010 naval forces contributed to the seizure of
over 133.2 tons of cocaine, 3.2 tons of marijuana, 92 boats and
aircraft, and $2.7 billion in drug revenue.
In the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, the Navy remains
committed to counter-piracy efforts with approximately 16 partner
nations. Combined Task Force 151, in cooperation with forces from the
EU, NATO, and other nations deploying individual units or task groups,
is operating off of Yemen and in the Somali Basin to protect the safe
passage of maritime commerce. Where our forces are located, pirate
activity has fallen, but the areas involved are huge, and as Secretary
of State Clinton said in April 2009, the solution to Somalia piracy
lies largely with Somalia, through building its capacity to police
itself and offering young pirates viable alternatives to that way of
life. We are treating the symptoms of piracy, rather than its
fundamental cause: Somalia's failure as a state. Despite the
international community's commitment, piracy has both continued to
increase and move further offshore, a measure of pirate resiliency and
the strong economic incentives that underpin it. Nine of 10 pirates
captured are ultimately freed as there is often insufficient evidence
or political will to prosecute them, or to incarcerate them after
conviction. We strongly endorse additional international efforts to
address these concerns.
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET SUBMISSION
Over the past year, I have visited with thousands of sailors and
marines stationed with our forward operating forces at sea and our
combat forces in Afghanistan. I can report, based on both the direct
observations I mentioned and from personal inputs from Joint and
Combined commanders, that the quality of our sailors and marines is
superb and we are continuing to protect America's interests abroad. But
while we are prevailing today, we must also build the foundation for
the Navy and Marine Corps of tomorrow.
During the development of the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
submission our Navy and Marine Corps leadership team made numerous
difficult tradeoffs to preserve current readiness while better
posturing the Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges of the future. I
believe that the result provides a balanced approach that will enable
the Services we lead to successfully perform our assigned missions,
even while setting a course for future success. It is important,
however, to reiterate that the fiscal year 2012 budget was developed
based upon ultimate passage of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.
If the continuing resolution now in place remains the de facto budget
for the year, or if a Defense Appropriations Bill is passed that
reduces the amounts requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget, the proposed fiscal year 2012 budget will not be sufficient to
recover from delays, cancellations, and mitigations we have been forced
to put in place this year.
Over the past year, we have examined every aspect of what we do and
how we do it in order to eliminate waste and move every resource
possible toward operations and successfully executing our missions now,
and in the future. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, in
June 2010, the Services were formally asked to continue this process
through an efficiencies review, which we developed through three
complementary approaches; buying smarter, streamlining our organization
and operations, and being more efficient in the way we use, produce,
and acquire energy. This effort has had a substantial impact on our
overall budget, allowing us to invest more in our core warfighting
missions and enhance our acquisition plans. Savings were also derived
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-mandated, Defense-
wide efficiencies.
Since the review began, the Department of the Navy has identified
approximately $35 billion in self-generated efficiencies over the next
5 years. When DOD-wide efficiencies are factored in we will achieve $42
billion in savings. These savings will facilitate adding one guided-
missile Aegis destroyer, three T-AO(X) fleet oilers, and one T-AGOS
ocean surveillance ship to our shipbuilding plan, which with our dual-
block LCS strategy will increase the total number of ships in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from 50 to 56, including one joint
high speed vehicle to be built for the Army, an average of more than 11
ships per year. We were also able to accelerate a Mobile Landing
Platform from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2012 and increase R&D
funding to support the accelerated procurement of the T-AO(X), and the
development of the next amphibious dock-landing ship (LSD(X)).
The savings allowed additional investments in the Next Generation
Jammer to provide greater protection for tactical aircraft, electronic
warfare systems, ballistic missile sets, and the new air and missile
defense radar that will equip our DDG-51 Flight III destroyers. The
savings allowed increased funding for a new generation of sea-borne
unmanned strike and surveillance aircraft; and gave us the ability to
buy additional F/A-18s and extend the service life of 150 aircraft as a
hedge against more delays in the deployment of the F-35B, the Short
Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter.
We addressed Marine Corps needs by increasing equipment funding for
units in dwell and for repair and refurbishment of Marine equipment
used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on heavy usage rates, we requested
$2.5 billion for Marine reset in the fiscal year 2012 OCO request, and
estimate a $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict
in Afghanistan. We also added funding for fire and maneuver platforms,
command and control capabilities, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
We found the $35 billion through a close and systematic review of
our programs and by cutting excess capacity in our support
establishment. Over the FYDP, with congressional support we will reduce
Navy manpower ashore and reassign over 6,000 personnel to operational
missions at sea; use multi-year procurement and production efficiencies
to save more than $1.1 billion on the purchase of new airborne
surveillance, jamming, and fighter aircraft; and disestablish both
Second Fleet and excess staffs for submarine, patrol aircraft, and
destroyer squadrons plus one carrier strike group staff.
Programmatically, one of the most important efficiency efforts was
the decision endorsed by Congress to pursue the new Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) through a dual-block buy procurement strategy. Over the past
years the message from Congress has been clear, we must build more
battle force ships as affordably as we can, consistent with the
statutory requirements laid out in the Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009. We heard that message clearly, and are grateful to
the administration for its support and to the many Members of Congress
who worked with the Navy to make the LCS program an example of what can
be done right when strict acquisition standards are laid out and
enforced.
With an average cost of $440 million per ship, and with the cost
reductions we have seen demonstrated on LCS-3 and -4, the Navy will
save taxpayers approximately $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2012 to fiscal
year 2016. More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically
reduced from the initial bids in 2009 will allow us to save an
additional $1 billion--for a total of $2.9 billion--through the dual
award of a 10-ship contract to each bidder. This plan is truly one that
is good for the Navy, good for taxpayers, and good for the country.
At the recommendation of both the Commandant and myself,
significant additional savings were also achieved by the Department of
Defense through termination of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
program. The nation absolutely must retain and rebuild an amphibious
assault capability that will get marines from ship to shore in a
protected amphibious tracked vehicle ready for the fight. This is a
core capability the Marine Corps must have. But the EFV is not the
vehicle to do this. Conceived in the 1980s, the EFV was the previous
generation's solution to a tactical problem that has since
fundamentally changed. Just as importantly, the EFV's cost per unit
would have eaten up over half of the Corps' total procurement account
and 90 percent of the Corps' vehicle-related operation and maintenance
account; the requirements levied on the vehicle outstripped what could
affordably be achieved.
We are committed to developing and fielding an effective,
survivable and affordable amphibious capability that will meet the
Corps' amphibious requirements. This will be done through upgrading
existing vehicles, through service-life extensions, and by working with
OSD and industry to go as fast as possible in the acquisition and
contracting process to develop a successor program to the EFV, one that
will meet today's requirements for this critical Marine Corps
capability.
We are also closely overseeing the Joint Strike Fighter program. In
particular, we are providing additional focused attention on the Marine
Corps variant, the F-35B, which the Secretary of Defense has placed on
a 2-year probation. During this time, solutions to the unique F-35B
technical issues will be engineered and assessed while production will
be held to a minimum sustaining production rate of six aircraft per
year in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. This low-production rate
is required to ensure continuity in the engineering workforce involved
in the design and assembly of the F-35B at the prime contractor and key
vendors without a loss in learning and to sustain the supplier base of
F-35B unique parts. After this 2-year period of focused F-35B scrutiny,
an informed decision will be made about how to proceed with development
and production of this variant, to include the potential for program
cancellation.
I want to point out that it is only the F-35B (STOVL) variant that
is on probation. The F-35C variant, which will be flown off of our
aircraft carriers, is doing satisfactorily and will be procured by both
the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The President's budget request of $161 billion will maintain our
commitment to take care of our people, build a strong R&D and
industrial base, and grow a fleet capable of sustaining our preeminence
as the world's most formidable expeditionary force. The fiscal year
2012 request of $15 billion for contingency operations includes
incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and
infrastructure repair as well as equipment replacement to support our
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request includes funds for
10 Navy battleforce ships, including:
two Virginia-class submarines,
one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer,
one Mobile Landing Platform ship,
one Joint High Speed Vessel,
one Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, and
four Littoral Combat Ships.
In aviation, we have requested 223 aircraft in the fiscal year 2012
baseline budget, including:
13 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for both the Navy and
Marine Corps,
24 MH-60R and
11 P-8As to replace the aging current ASW and maritime
patrol squadrons,
18 MH-60S for logistics support,
one KC-130J,
25 H-1 variant helicopters,
30 MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft,
28 F/A-18E/F fighter/attack planes,
12 EA-18G to continue replacing the veteran EA-6B,
five E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes,
36 Joint Primary Aircraft Trainers for our student
aviators, and
20 Unmanned Aircraft.
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request also contains
funding for the Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System demonstration and
continues development of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
unmanned system.
The individual efficiency initiatives the Department has put in
place will continue to further streamline our organizations and
operations, will reshape and reduce both capacity and personnel
associated with the Department's ``tail,'' and will contribute to the
dramatic transformation already underway in how the Department does its
business. More importantly, they will sharpen the operating ``tooth,''
free up critical resources for maintaining and accelerating our
shipbuilding and aviation acquisition plan, maximize fleet
capabilities, and help preserve a strong industrial base.
TAKING CARE OF SAILORS, MARINES, CIVILIANS, AND THEIR FAMILIES
The Navy and Marine Corps have continued to recruit and retain the
high quality men and women we brought into the Services in the past
years, and 2010 was no exception. Both the Navy and Marine Corps met or
exceeded their mission quotas and quality standards.
We recognize that quality of life programs are important for morale
and the military mission. We recruit sailors and marines, but we retain
families. We continue to provide a wide array of readiness programs,
including deployment support services, morale and welfare services, and
child and teen programs. These award winning career management,
training, and life-work balance programs are nationally recognized for
their excellence not only by respected national human resource
organizations, but even more by the marines and sailors that benefit
directly from them.
Medical care for our Wounded Warriors, already outstanding,
continued to get better throughout the year. Since Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began, over 12,000 marines and sailors have
been wounded in action. Their service and sacrifice mandates that we
provide quality care for those who have given so much for our country.
Our medical community continues to meet this challenge and make
advances in dealing with the signature wounds of the current wars:
traumatic brain injuries, mental health issues, amputation, and
disfiguring injuries, and Navy Medicine continues to reach out to its
colleagues in both civilian and Veterans Affairs hospitals to improve
our understanding and improve overall care for our people.
But care for our Wounded Warriors does not end in the hospital. We
have undertaken a commitment to bring our Veterans back into the
workforce of the Department of the Navy through several Wounded Warrior
outreach programs and hiring conferences. We are not there yet, but we
are moving towards the goal of being able to say to every Wounded
Warrior--if you want a job, we have one for you. As a representative
example, in the past year alone, the Naval Sea Systems Command hired
200 Wounded Warriors. In 2011 we will continue to make employment
opportunities for Wounded Warriors a priority for the Department.
It is important to note that rising health care costs within the
Military Health System continue to present a fiscal challenge for the
Department. Like the Secretary of Defense, both I and Departmental
leadership are particularly concerned that the rate at which health
care costs are increasing and the relative proportion of the
Department's resources devoted to health care cannot be sustained; the
Military Health System is not immune to the pressure of inflation and
market forces evident in the civilian health care sector.
The military faces a growing number of eligible beneficiaries,
expanded benefits, and increased utilization throughout the military
health care system. As a Department, we must be resolute in our
commitment to implement systemic efficiencies and specific initiatives
which will improve quality of care and customer satisfaction but will
at the same time more responsibly manage cost. We have made progress,
but there is more to do. We concur with the recommendations made by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; we must create incentives such as
the Home Delivery Pharmacy Program and implement modest fee increases,
where appropriate, to both ensure the fiscal position of the system and
ensure equity in benefits for our retirees.
Taking care of sailors and marines also means aggressively
addressing the issues of sexual assault prevention and response. Last
year, you supported the establishment of a new Office of Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response (SAPRO) reporting directly to me to focus
attention on the issue, develop effective training, and coordinate
prevention and response programs across the Navy and Marine Corps.
However, it is clear through sexual assault surveys that this crime
remains a significant problem in the Services, and within some
populations we have seen a negative trend of an increased number of
assaults. But I can assure you that we are not accepting this trend,
and we will not rest while any cases of this awful crime continue to
occur.
In 2010, the Department moved forward on expanding the
opportunities for women in the Navy. We established a comprehensive
plan to integrate women into the submarine force, beginning with our
ballistic missile and guided missile Ohio-class submarines. This
summer, the first 21 women officers were selected for nuclear
training--and they have begun their approximately 15-month training
pipeline. The first of these officers will get to their boats beginning
in November 2011.
We are preparing to move forward with successfully implementing
Congressional guidance with respect to repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't
Tell'' in 2011.
Overall, the fiscal year 2012 budget reflects a carefully crafted
request for the fiscal support and resources necessary to sustain the
force in light of the ongoing demands on our people and their families.
Thank you for your continuing support.
ENERGY SECURITY AND LEADERSHIP
Energy consumption in the Navy and Marine Corps has become a
strategic vulnerability, an operational Achilles' heel, and a readiness
challenge. This has made our energy usage a national security issue of
rising importance. As a Department, we rely too much on fossil fuels,
making our forces susceptible to fluctuations in both price and supply.
Dramatic shifts in cost and availability can be caused by a host of
manmade or natural events in volatile areas of the world. Those
potential shocks could have, in turn, strategic, operational, and
tactical effects upon our forces. A survey of headlines around the
world today demonstrates exactly the point we are trying to make--
energy is first and foremost an issue of national security.
Without sustainable and reliable sources of energy and increased
efficiency in our platforms, we may find ourselves paying an exorbitant
price for operating our fleet, training our aviation and ground forces,
and running our installations that support them. The ability to train
and prepare forces for deployment could be curtailed. Worse still, our
naval forces may find that future adversaries target our operational
dependence on petroleum, as we see in attacks on fuel convoys in
Afghanistan today. Our dependence on a fragile fuel distribution
network increases our footprint, drains resources from the tip of the
spear to supporting logistics lines, and ties up combat forces for
security. Thus, energy diversity and efficiency are essential to
maintain our warfighting capabilities and enhance our combat
effectiveness.
This is a topic I have spoken on a great deal, in front of this
committee last year, around the world in speeches to industry and
military audiences, and in conversations with international leaders.
Through these events and discussions, it has become clear that energy
security is not just an American issue--it is an issue that affects
both our allies and potential adversaries alike. History has taught us
that competition for resources has been one of the fundamental causes
of conflict for centuries, and today, competition for energy still
provides one of the most inflammatory sources of potential conflict.
Energy, or more specifically denial of energy, could affect many of
our NATO partners in Europe and indeed the strength of the alliance
itself. Many of our partners are dependent upon external sources for
their energy, so for them--denial of energy is a weapon, one just as
real as the threat of tanks or airplanes.
For all these reasons, and in order to improve our long-term
strategic position and enhance the future operational effectiveness of
our forces, I have charged the Navy and Marine Corps with accelerating
the exploration and exploitation of new ways to procure, produce, and
use energy.
This effort began in October 2009, when I issued my five energy
goals for the Department, the most important of which commits the Navy
and Marine Corps to generate at least 50 percent of all the energy we
use from alternative sources no later than 2020. Alternative sources
include all renewable forms of energy such as solar, wind, geothermal,
and ocean energy, as well as biofuels and nuclear energy.
We are on track to meet all our goals, and throughout 2010, we
demonstrated progress through many energy programs, partnerships, and
initiatives. Throughout the year, we successfully conducted both ground
and airborne tests of an F/A-18 Hornet and MH-60 Seahawk helicopter,
and ran a Riverine Command Boat (experimental) on renewable biofuel
blends made from either camelina or algae. Recently, we also completed
testing of a marine gas turbine engine that will enable us to certify
our frigates, destroyers and cruisers for biofuel operations. In each
case, there was no impact on performance and no degradation to engine
reliability. Together, these tests represent critical milestones for
the Department's goal of demonstrating the Great Green Fleet in 2012
and its planned deployment in 2016. In late 2010, the Navy conducted
concurrent but unrelated tests of a more efficient F/A-18 engine in
order to generate an increase in the aircraft's range.
Afloat, as I discussed last year, the USS Makin Island is using a
hybrid-electric drive to dramatically lower its fuel usage at slow
speeds, which we estimate will generate life-cycle savings of up to
$250 million at today's fuel prices. Over the next few years, we will
continue to move forward with installation of a similar system on new
construction DDGs and look at the feasibility of retrofitting the fleet
with these systems in the course of routine shipyard availabilities.
The Marine Corps is also aggressively exploring energy efficiency
solutions in its operating forces in theater and in the supporting
establishment. The Marines realize that energy as a resource influences
a Commander's operational freedom of maneuver, and its conservation and
wise use can save lives on the battlefield. Reduced logistics support
and fewer convoys for expeditionary forces would free up resources and
limit the exposure of marines to ambush and IEDs. Energy efficiency
equals better combat effectiveness.
At home, the Marine Corps demonstrated their traditional spirit of
innovation by scouring the commercial world for rugged solutions,
building two Experimental Forward Operating Bases (ExFOB) at Quantico
and Twentynine Palms. New alternative energy technologies tested at the
ExFOB deployed this fall with the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (3/5),
posted to Sangin District in the north of Helmand Province. Immediately
upon arrival, they began evaluating expeditionary solar power
generators at their FOBs and combat outposts to supplement or replace
fossil fuels. They have done this even while engaged in near constant
combat against a determined enemy in one of the most hotly contested
districts of the war.
When I visited Sangin, I heard first-hand from a Marine First
Lieutenant about what worked, what did not, and how his marines in
India Company of 3/5 were using the equipment. Two patrol bases are
operating entirely on renewable energy, and another with a 90 percent
reduction. One of the team-portable systems, called GREENS (Ground
Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System), is being used to
provide power for the Operations Center, small radios, and small
electronic equipment. Across the battalion's operating area,
manportable SPACES (Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy
System) are being used by individual squads to recharge their radios
and other combat electronics. This capability made it possible for a
foot patrol to operate for 3 weeks without battery resupply, reducing
their burden by 700 pounds and saving more than $40,000.
By deploying these renewable solar energy technologies the marines
in Sangin have been able to expand their operational reach, eliminate
or minimize their need for fossil fuels in their generators, and
dramatically reduce the need for often dangerous logistic support.
At Camp Leatherneck, the marines have likewise begun a small bio-
fuel pilot project for Helmand Province, purchasing locally produced
cotton oil from an Afghan facility to mix with their own fuel. At
Leatherneck, a standard generator is producing power from a 20-80 mix
of cotton oil to fuel, yielding a 20 percent reduction in demand for
fuel, while simultaneously demonstrating to Afghan farmers that there
are alternatives to opium, and demonstrating to Afghan leaders that
they can power their own economy from within Afghanistan. I am
monitoring its progress closely.
As the ExFOB gets all this feedback from returning marines, our
expeditionary energy systems and programs will continue to improve and
we will move even further down the road of energy efficient, combat
effective forces.
In addition to these tactical and platform applications, we have
implemented a number of energy projects at our facilities ashore. We
are actively exploring for new geothermal resources to augment our
existing 270 MW geothermal power plant at China Lake. Last year we
established the Nation's first grid-connected wave buoy at MCB Kaneohe
Bay, HI. Last December the marines completed a 1.5 MW solar
installation situated atop six acres of a landfill. The installation
was unique because the equipment foundations were designed not to
perforate the membrane covering the garbage below. Our budget request
asks for continued support of these and similar projects in order to
enhance our efficiency and maximize our move to greater independence
and more resilient infrastructure.
Finally, throughout the year we developed partnerships with a
number of Federal agencies, states, academic institutions, and industry
partners including the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, NASA, and
the Small Business Administration.
It is precisely because of the spirit of innovation that these
partnerships embody that our Nation remains a world leader in its
unrivaled capacity to stimulate and exploit cutting-edge ideas and new
technologies. The U.S. Navy has always been a technological leader and
has excelled at embracing change, particularly in propulsion systems
and energy sources. We moved from wind to coal in the 19th century,
from coal to oil early in the 20th century, and added nuclear power 60
years ago. In every transition there were opponents to change, but in
every case these changes increased our combat effectiveness by an order
of magnitude.
I have tasked the Navy and the Marine Corps to once again pioneer
technological change through alternative energy sources. I am pleased
with the progress to date, and expect it to sharply enhance the long-
term strategic agility of our operating forces, as well as better
posture the Department for an age of fiscal austerity and potential
energy volatility. I want to stress, however, that every action and
program we undertake is focused on generating improved warfighting
capability and strategic flexibility, it is not just change for
change's sake.
CREATING ACQUISITION EXCELLENCE
Our future combat readiness is dependent upon the design,
development and acquisition of weapons, platforms, and information
technology. The current ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps
provide decisive advantages over today's threats. But that edge must be
constantly sharpened and modernized against constantly evolving
technologies. We must continue to invest in intelligence, precision
missiles and munitions, networked command systems, stealth technology,
unmanned vehicles and ground fighting systems.
To retain our advantage across multiple warfighting areas, we rely
heavily upon both our dedicated personnel and the expertise resident in
America's private sector. Throughout my tenure, I have taken the
opportunity to visit shipyards, aircraft plants, vehicle factories,
maintenance facilities, and warfare centers for detailed briefings and
a firsthand look at the people responsible for designing and building
our fleet and equipping our sailors and marines with vital weapon
systems and technologies necessary to do their jobs. One cannot fail to
recognize the creativity, dedication, and skills of our Nation's
workforce.
Yet, with government spending increasingly constrained,
affordability, cost containment and total ownership costs are more
important than ever. Because acquisition costs are rising faster than
our top-line and because replacement systems can be more expensive than
the platforms or weapon systems being replaced, we are putting
tomorrow's force at risk.
Both on our own and as a result of Secretary Gates' guidance, the
Department has devoted considerable effort to finding efficiencies,
reducing support costs, and scrubbing our acquisition process to
mitigate this impact. In accordance with the Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act passed by Congress in 2009, we have made the requirements
and acquisition processes more rigorous in order to better manage the
resources entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, and we are working
with OSD to develop a streamlined process for acquiring information
technology in a more responsive manner to better equip the warfighter
with emerging technologies and ward off the cyber threat.
This requires constant examination of every single one of our
policies, practices, priorities, and organizations, with a clear focus
on controlling cost. Our acquisition community has been extensively
engaged with industry and the Services to streamline processes, and
they are ruthlessly evaluating both requirements and the supporting
analyses in order to get more value out of the overall acquisition
system.
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue initiatives already in
place to improve processes and to instill discipline in procurement. In
2010, we strengthened our cost estimating group and met statutory
requirements to obtain independent cost estimates, and we have
incorporated Defense-wide best practices in the formulation of all our
major programs. We have made our cost estimates more realistic and are
using these improved cost and schedule plans to make necessary
capability tradeoffs and difficult investment decisions at the front
end of the requirements process rather than during design or
construction.
A professional acquisition workforce is a key element in our
overall acquisition excellence initiative and a driver in our strategy
to preserve our fighting edge at an affordable cost. Accordingly, and
with your strong support, we are rebuilding the acquisition workforce
within government to fulfill Federal oversight of the acquisition
process and ensure that accountability to taxpayers is the foremost
concern of our employees. In the last year, the Department has added
nearly 1,300 acquisition professionals towards the goal of increasing
the community by 5,090 over the FYDP.
Our acquisition strategies have been shaped to expand the use of
fixed-price contracts, leverage competition, and tighten up on the use
of incentive and award fees to ensure quality systems are consistently
delivered on budget and on schedule. The new acquisition plan for the
LCS epitomizes this strategy, and is indicative of the type of fixed-
price contracts that will be the model for the future. The LCS block-
buy contracts are the result of effective competition and give the
government full ownership of the technical data package used in
construction. This will ensure our ability to pursue competitive
strategies for LCS Seaframe requirements in fiscal year 2016 and beyond
and affords greater congressional oversight of the program. With the
new LCS strategy, we get more ships, at a faster rate, and at less
cost.
The LCS dual-block procurement strategy also contributes to meeting
another acquisition goal of both this Committee and the Navy through
its strong support of the industrial shipbuilding base. Modernizing
today's force and recapitalizing the fleet affordably cannot be
accomplished without a healthy industrial base and strong performance
by our industry partners. We have worked hard to procure our ships,
aircraft, and weapon systems at a rate intended to bring stability to
the industrial base and enable efficient production. The Navy's
shipbuilding and aviation plans were developed with particular regard
to maintaining the unique characteristics and strength of the
industrial base and our efforts have promoted increased competition,
greater innovation, and better capacity within the base.
Over the FYDP, we will continue to build upon our progress to date
and we will work with our shipyards, aircraft manufacturers, weapon
systems providers and systems integrators to build the best possible
fleet for the future.
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS
The complex nature of today's security environment, as well as
current and future anti-access/area-denial threats faced by the United
States, require that the Navy and Marine Corps continue to advance in
unmanned systems and exploit the contributions they make to warfighting
capability. Unmanned systems are unobtrusive, versatile, persistent,
and they reduce the exposure of our sailors and marines to unnecessary
threats or dangerous environments. They can perform a vast array of
tasks such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
hydrographic monitoring, mine detection, targeting, and precision
strike.
Navy and Marine Corps unmanned systems have already made key
contributions to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, unmanned aircraft systems have
flown thousands of flight hours, enhancing the effectiveness of our
combat operations and undoubtedly saving lives. Unmanned ground
vehicles employed by the Marine Corps have conducted thousands of
missions detecting and/or neutralizing improvised explosive devices.
Off the Horn of Africa, unmanned systems contribute to surveillance and
tracking of suspected or confirmed pirate vessels.
The range of tasks that these capabilities may fulfill will grow
substantially over time. I am determined to ensure that your Navy and
Marine Corps are at the cutting edge of this military capability.
Our vision for the future will exploit unmanned systems in every
domain of our operating environment (sea, air, and land) while
maintaining an affordable price. The Department's Unmanned Systems will
move from adjunct capabilities supporting manned systems and platforms
to providing autonomous, networked, and interoperable independent
capabilities--much as naval aviation matured from an adjunct to the
Battle Fleet to a combat capability in its own right in the first half
of the 20th century.
We will field unmanned systems in the near term to:
Provide sensing, influence and effects where manned
systems are limited by range, endurance or risk.
Shift from relying primarily on manned platforms to
accomplish missions to combinations of manned platforms,
robots, augmented human performance, and remotely operated and
unmanned systems that make operational sense.
Increase the combat effectiveness of sailors and
marines, their platforms and combat organizations to better
operate against multiple types of threats.
In implementing this vision, we will embrace Unmanned Systems as
critical tools in our warfighting quiver of capabilities. We will
integrate them into everything we do across the full range of military
operations to enhance our combat effectiveness and efficiency. We will
invest in the infrastructure to ensure we have the capabilities and
capacity to properly task, collect, process, exploit and disseminate
the information so the intelligence data gets to the decision makers
and warfighters. The initiatives and investments contained in the
fiscal year 2012 budget request will continue moving us along this
desired track. I look forward to reporting our progress toward this
vision throughout the year.
CONCLUSION
Today I have laid out our strategic posture as well as the goals
and priorities that guide the Department's investment portfolio and
future direction. These goals and programs will significantly influence
our future capabilities and ensure we remain ready to deter regional
conflict or respond rapidly and decisively to emerging crises. Our
specific requests are reflected in the President's fiscal year 2012
budget submission.
In order to retain a ready and agile force capable of conducting
the full range of military operations, we must carefully weigh risks
and apply our available resources efficiently and carefully. This
year's request reflects our strategy-driven priorities and the
disciplined trade-offs that you and the American taxpayer expect of us.
The Department's efficiency efforts have been beneficial in terms of
enhancing our ability to invest in the future even while preserving and
extending our force structure.
This is not a one-time event, as we will continuously work to
increase efficiencies in every project, program, and operation, afloat
and ashore. The budget request ensures that we will retain the world's
most powerful and agile expeditionary force. The CNO, Commandant, and
myself are committed to that aim and to being effective stewards of the
Nation's resources.
As Secretary, I have seen firsthand the selfless courage of our
young marines and sailors in Helmand; the dedication of our medical
community caring for our wounded; the professionalism of our surface,
submarine and aviation sailors; and the incredible technical skills of
the maintenance crews that sustain them. I have also borne witness to
the sacrifices of our personnel in hospitals in theater and at the
National Naval Medical Center. A single visit to Bethesda will make you
marvel at the resilience of the human spirit and the unflagging
patriotism of our American service men and women.
Your Navy and Marine Corps are performing at a high operational
tempo, at unparalleled levels of skill and dedication, and with
remarkable results afloat, at depth, aloft, in cyberspace, and ashore.
Thanks to your support, this level of performance has been sustained
with the modern platforms, weapons systems, and training necessary to
underwrite our readiness. Your continued support recognizes and
sustains the sacrifice of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their
families. The support of this committee for our key programs and our
people has been instrumental to operational success of the Navy and
Marine Corps and maintenance of the world's most flexible instrument of
national policy--a modernized and ready naval expeditionary force.
It is a solemn privilege to lead the Naval Services during an era
of protracted war and national challenge. I have been honored by the
trust the President and Congress have placed in me, and even more
honored by the sacrifice and sterling devotion I have witnessed by
those sailors and marine who go forward into harm's way to defend us.
Preserving our values and our way of life is ultimately dependent upon
our being prepared to use decisive force against those who threaten
them. The Navy and Marines have been ready to do so for 235 years, and
will continue to be ready. You can count on it.
Thank you again for your support. Godspeed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Roughead.
STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, members of the committee: It's my honor to appear
before you in my 4th year as the CNO, representing more than
600,000 sailors, Navy civilians, and families who operate and
live globally. I appreciate your continued support for them as
they continue to carry out our maritime strategy.
Our Navy continues to meet operational commitments and
respond to crises as they emerge. We're engaged in Afghanistan
and in Iraq, with, as you mentioned, 14,000 sailors on the
ground in those countries and with 2 aircraft carriers now in
the CENTCOM area of operations, 14,000 at sea. From the
carrier, we provide about 30 percent of the fixed wing air
sorties that fly in support of our troops in Afghanistan.
Our presence in the Middle East also gives us the
flexibility to respond to the sweeping changes that we see
taking place there. But our interests extend beyond that, and
so do our operations. Today we have about 65,000 sailors and
about 40 percent of our force deployed. They're globally
present and they're persistently engaged. They provide
deterrence in northeast Asia and presence in the western
Pacific. They conduct counter-piracy operations in the Indian
Ocean and they're building maritime partnerships in Africa,
South American, and the Pacific.
The demand continues to grow for the offshore option our
Navy and our Marine Corps team provides the Nation. We assume
the lead for the first phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach
for ballistic missile defense in Europe and we're working with
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on providing that same
capability ashore.
We created the new Information Dominance Directorate on my
staff, which has enabled us to make better decisions and
investments in countering anti-access and area denial
strategies. We recently established the Tenth Fleet, our cyber
fleet, which has demonstrated its expertise by conducting joint
and naval operations in the cyber network cryptology and space
arenas.
To deliver the above, we've been pushing the fleet hard. We
have 288 ships today. That's the smallest that we have been
since 1916, when our interests and our responsibilities were
nowhere near what they are today. That's why 313 ships remains
the floor of our future force and why sustaining fleet capacity
is essential to reaching that floor.
Since I've become CNO, I've focused on ensuring the Navy is
ready, that our quality of work and quality of life are
fulfilling to the men and women of our Navy, and that we place
underperforming programs back on track. We've introduced
stability, affordability, and capacity into our shipbuilding
and aviation plans, and with the assistance of Congress, we
have advanced capabilities to meet the most likely evolving
threats.
We've secured a fixed-price dual award for 20 LCSs. We've
addressed the strike fighter capacity with a multi-year F-18
procurement, and pending resolution of the CR, we will build
two Virginia-class submarines per year, another DDG-51, start
the Mobile Landing Platform, construct and refuel our aircraft
carriers as planned, and continue the design of our replacement
strategic deterrent submarine.
I'm pleased with our accomplishments and I thank Congress
for their continued support of our acquisition strategy.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is a balanced approach
to increasing fleet capacity, maintaining warfighting
readiness, and developing and enhancing our Navy total force.
This budget goes beyond ships and aircraft. It enhances
electronic warfare, information dominance, integrated air and
missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for
evolving challenges.
It continues to develop a family of unmanned systems that
will work in concert with our manned systems to secure access
and establish maritime superiority when and where we choose. It
continues our effort over the last 2 years to reduce total
ownership costs and leverages the opportunity presented by the
Secretary of Defense's efficiencies to reduce excess overhead,
improve readiness, and reinvest in warfighting capability and
capacity that improves the long-term sustainability of our
force.
Importantly, it supports the Secretary of Defense's health
care initiatives included in the President's budget, which
continue our efforts in health care to improve internal
efficiency, incentivize behavior, ensure all our beneficiaries
are treated equitably, and enhance our ability to deliver high-
quality health care for years to come.
You can be exceptionally proud of our sailors and Navy
civilians, who they are and what they do. Today's sailors are
the best with whom I have ever served. I ask you for your
strong support of our fiscal year 2012 budget request. I thank
you for all you do to support the men and women of the U.S.
Navy, our enduring global force for good.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Gary Roughead, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
my honor and pleasure to appear before you, in my 4th year as Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), representing the more than 600,000 sailors and
civilians of the U.S. Navy. As we have done for more than 235 years,
our Navy is forward-deployed around the world protecting our national
security and prosperity. Today, our dedicated Navy men and women are
operating globally at sea, on land, in the air, and in space and
cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them and their
families.
As the demand for our Navy continues to grow, our Maritime
Strategy, which I issued more than 3 years ago with the Commandants of
the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, continues to guide our Navy's
operations and investments. Its core tenets are enduring and our Navy
is executing daily the six core capabilities it articulates for our sea
Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection,
maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
With your support, since becoming CNO, our Navy has placed
underperforming programs back on track; we have introduced stability,
affordability, and capacity into our shipbuilding and aviation plans;
and we have advanced capabilities to meet the most likely evolving
threats. We improved the performance of several programs, most notably
the Littoral Combat Ship. After cancelling the LCS ships we had planned
for 2007 because of unacceptable costs, last year we were able to
secure a price for 20 ships through a dual award strategy that will add
new and needed capabilities to our Fleet, bring important stability to
the industrial base, and get us closer to the minimum of 313 ships our
Navy needs. I thank Congress for their support of this strategy. We
delivered five new ships in 2010, including one Virginia-class
submarine, two Arleigh Burke destroyers, and two T-AKE logistics ships.
We commenced testing and low-rate initial production of the P-8A
Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft and continued testing and low-
rate initial production of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. Through multi-
year procurement contracts for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and Virginia-class
submarines, and planned multi-year procurements for the MH-60R/S and E-
2D, we are introducing affordability in our aviation and shipbuilding
plans and realizing significant savings. For example, on the Virginia-
class Multi-Year Procurement alone, the savings has been $3.2 billion.
We are advancing capability to meet emerging threats, particularly in
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and information dominance. In BMD, we
assumed lead for the first phase of the President's Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) for BMD of Europe and we are working with the Missile
Defense Agency on providing Aegis Ashore capability to support the
second phase of the PAA. Our newly-established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S.
10th Fleet demonstrated its expertise conducting joint and naval
exercises and operations in the cyber, network, cryptology, signals
intelligence, information warfare, electronic warfare, and space
arenas. We also achieved the early operational deployment of the MQ-8B
Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle,
the first successful flight of our Navy Unmanned Combat Air System
demonstrator, and a memorandum of agreement with the Air Force to
pursue increased commonality between the Global Hawk and Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance programs.
Our Navy continues to meet planned operational commitments and
respond to crises as they emerge globally. We remain engaged in
operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our Navy has more than 14,000
Active and Reserve sailors on the ground and another 10,000 at sea in
Central Command, including ongoing Individual Augmentee support to both
operations. Our aircraft carriers provide about 30 percent of the close
air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and
Marine Corps pilots fly an even greater percentage of electronic attack
missions there.
Because our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,
so do the operations of our Navy. More than 40 percent of our Navy is
underway daily; globally present and persistently engaged. Last year,
our Navy provided deterrence against North Korea; conducted counter-
piracy operations in the Indian Ocean with a coalition of several
nations; trained local forces in maritime security as part of our
Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Africa and the Pacific;
responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the
earthquake in Haiti and the flood in Pakistan; and conducted the
world's largest maritime exercise, which brought together 14 nations
and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and
trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Navy sealift
continues to deliver the lion's share of heavy war and humanitarian
equipment in the Central Command and Pacific Command areas of
responsibility, while Navy logisticians operate the seaport and airport
facilities that ensure this vital materiel arrives on time. Our sailors
remain forward throughout the world, projecting U.S. influence,
responding to contingencies, and building international relationships
that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins
our economic prosperity.
Our Navy's global presence guarantees our access and freedom of
action on and under the sea. We are developing with the Air Force and
Marine Corps the Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the
doctrine, organization, training, procedures, and equipment needed for
our Navy to counter growing military threats to our freedom of action.
This joint effort will inform the conceptual, institutional, and
material actions needed to employ integrated forces that support U.S.
operations to project power and influence, protect allies and partners,
and secure our national objectives in peace and war.
I remain committed to supporting our Active and Reserve sailors,
Navy civilians, and their families. Our Navy continues to be recognized
as a highly-ranked place to work as a result of its workforce planning,
life-work integration, diversity, and training opportunities. We met or
exceeded overall officer and enlisted active recruiting goals last year
and we are accessing a force of extreme high quality. We continue to
move forward on assigning women into our submarine force, with the
first women submariners on track to report aboard SSBNs and SSGNs by
the end of this year. We remain committed to performance as a criterion
for promotion in our Navy, and have successfully transitioned the
majority of our civilian personnel out of the National Security
Personnel System (NSPS). Our remaining NSPS employees are scheduled to
convert by the end of this year. I appreciate the support of Congress
for our Fleet and the dedicated sailors, Navy civilians, and their
families that serve our Nation every day.
My priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow's
Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our
sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. We continue to advance our
Navy in each of these areas thanks to your support.
Our Navy remains the most capable maritime force in the world;
however, we are stretching our force to meet combatant commander
demands. Since 2000, our Navy's ship-underway days have increased by
approximately 15 percent, yet we have about 10 percent fewer ships in
our Fleet. Greater demand for our forces has led to longer deployments
and shorter dwell, or turnaround times, which increase stress on our
sailors and drive up maintenance requirements for our ships and
aircraft. We are implementing force management measures in the near
term to stretch the capacity of our 286-ship force to meet increasing
global requirements while providing the necessary maintenance our Fleet
needs to reach its expected service life. Our Navy is different from
other Services in that we reset our force ``in stride''; that is, we
rely upon regular maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training
and certification of our crews between deployments, to sustain our
force. I thank Congress for their support of our fiscal year 2011
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) request, which would enable our Navy's
continuous reset and translate into decades of service for each ship
and aircraft, a significant return on investment.
Regrettably, the continuing resolution (CR) for fiscal year 2011
prevents us from applying the increased fiscal year 2011 O&M funding to
improve our readiness, and it negatively impacts our ability to procure
our future Navy and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and their
families. It has forced us to take mitigation measures that include:
reducing operations, limiting numerous contracts for base operating
support, slowing civilian hiring, reducing Permanent Change of Station
notifications for our sailors from about 6 months lead time to less
than 2 months, not initiating the Small Business Innovative Research
program, and delaying procurement contracts for new capabilities and
existing production lines. Starting this month, we will cancel or scale
back ship maintenance availabilities in Norfolk, Mayport, and San
Diego, and cancel more than a dozen Military Construction (MILCON)
projects in several States. If the CR lasts all year, we will have no
choice but to make permanent these mitigations and others,
significantly reducing our operations, maintenance, and training. We
will be forced to further reduce facilities sustainment, cancel
training events and additional surface ship availabilities, and defer
maintenance on our aircraft, which would result in almost a 1-year
backlog in aviation maintenance. The impact of these actions will
jeopardize the efforts we made in recent years to restore Fleet
readiness. Without relief, we will procure only one Virginia-class
submarine and break the multiyear contract. Agreements made with our
surface combatant builders, as a result of the DDG-1000/DDG-51 swap,
precludes us from awarding any DDG-51s in fiscal year 2011 unless both
ships are appropriated. In addition, without relief, we will delay the
new start Mobile Landing Platform; we will constrain aircraft carrier
construction and refueling, negatively impacting operational
availability, increasing costs, and delaying CVN-79 delivery by up to 1
year; and we will limit aviation and weapons procurement to fiscal year
2010 quantities, impacting E-2D and Standard Missile production. A
full-year CR will also defer essential research and development in
unmanned aerial systems and significantly delay the design of our
replacement strategic deterrent submarine and the recapitalization of
our nuclear operator training infrastructure. It will eliminate our
ability to source out-of-cycle overseas contingency operations demands
for increased Fleet presence and activated Navy Reserve sailors.
Operating under a continuing resolution for a full year at the fiscal
year 2010 level would have negative effects on our Fleet, on the ship
and aviation industrial base, and on the many workers who support naval
facilities. Your support in addressing this critical current and long
term readiness issue is appreciated greatly.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget submission achieves the optimal balance
among my priorities, but it is based on our funding request for fiscal
year 2011. If the CR lasts all year, we will need to revisit our fiscal
year 2012 request to properly balance our Navy for today and in the
future. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request continues to rely on a
combination of base budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
funding, but it reduces the extent to which we rely on OCO funding for
enduring missions. Our fiscal year 2012 request continues the effort we
started 2 years ago to reduce the cost to own and operate our Fleet. We
leveraged the opportunity presented by the Secretary of Defense to
significantly reduce excess overhead costs, and apply the savings to
warfighting capability and capacity, by executing a deliberate,
thoughtful, and integrated approach to finding efficiencies that
improve the long-term sustainability of our force. We are taking steps
to buy smarter, streamline our organizations and operations, realign
manpower, and pursue energy efficiencies. Through these efforts, and
with your support, we will improve readiness and warfighting
capabilities and optimize organizations and operations, including
increasing the number of ships and aircraft in our procurement plans
and enhancing or accelerating anti-access capabilities, unmanned
systems, and energy initiatives.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget request supports our Maritime Strategy
and continues to support our forces, take care of our people, rebalance
our force to meet current and future challenges, and reform how and
what we buy. Highlights follow.
BUILD TOMORROW'S NAVY
Since the release of our Maritime Strategy, I have stated our Navy
requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements
globally. This minimum remains valid; however, we continue to examine
this requirement to address increased operational demands and expanding
requirements for BMD, intra-theater lift, and forces capable of
confronting irregular challenges. Our fiscal year 2012 submission funds
10 ships, including 2 Virginia-class fast attack submarines, 1 Joint
High Speed Vessel (JHSV), 1 LPD-17, 1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), 1
DDG-51, and 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which reflects our new LCS
procurement plan under the dual award strategy. Our submission also
supports the acquisition of an oceanographic ship. I thank Congress for
their support of our LCS acquisition strategy and for our shipbuilding
program. With your support over the last 3 years, we have been able to
improve the balance among capability, capacity, affordability, and
executabilty in our shipbuilding plan.
As I reported last year, I remain concerned about the capacity of
our Fleet in the future. Starting in the 2020s, many of our existing
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines will reach the end of their
service lives. During this period, it will be particularly critical to
procure sufficient new ships to offset these decommissionings to avoid
a rapid decline in force structure. In the same timeframe, we will
begin to procure the replacement for our Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine, the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear deterrent
triad. While we have reduced the cost of that submarine substantially,
our total shipbuilding budget will be pressurized in that decade as we
seek to recapitalize our surface and submarine forces while sustaining
warfighting readiness and supporting our people. I am confident our
near-term force structure plans provide the capability and capacity we
need to meet demands today, but in this decade we must address how to
best resource the shipbuilding programs required in the 2020s.
Our fiscal year 2012 program funds 203 manned aircraft. We have
increased our procurement of P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft to
provide needed anti-submarine warfare capacity to our Fleet and
facilitate a successful transition from our legacy P-3 Orion aircraft.
Our fiscal year 2012 submission also procures 28 F/A-18 E/F aircraft,
extending the F/A-18 procurement through fiscal year 2014 and
purchasing 41 more aircraft than requested in last year's budget
submission. I remain committed to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),
and was pleased to see the first flight of the F-35C last year. The
timely delivery of the F-35C remains critical to our future carrier
airwing strike fighter capacity; however, we are procuring additional
F/A-18 Super Hornets to address the decrease in strike fighter capacity
we have identified. I thank Congress for their continued support of the
F-35 program and our overall strike fighter fleet.
Our Navy is also looking beyond our ships and aircraft and
investing in information capabilities that span space, cyberspace, and
the electromagnetic spectrum. We moved boldly last year with the
establishment of U.S. 10th Fleet and the Deputy CNO for Information
Dominance. That restructuring has enabled us to focus on enhancing our
electronic warfare, information dominance, integrated air and missile
defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. I request Congress'
support for these programs as they position our Navy to successfully
conduct operations in an evolving anti-access environment today and in
the future.
A viable, highly technical, and specialized industrial base is
essential to sustaining the capability and capacity of our future Navy.
Our shipbuilding and aviation industrial base is a strategic national
asset and a significant contributor to our Nation's economic
prosperity, employing more than 97,000 uniquely-skilled Americans while
indirectly supporting thousands more through second- and third-tier
suppliers. The highly specialized skills in our shipbuilding base take
years to develop; and, if lost, cannot be easily or quickly
reconstituted. A viable shipbuilding industrial base, underpinned by
predictable, level-loaded ship procurement, is essential to meet our
Nation's naval requirements.
I remain committed to delivering a balanced and capable Fleet that
will meet our national security requirements. I seek your support for
the following initiatives and programs:
AVIATION PROGRAMS
Aircraft Carrier Force Structure
Our nuclear-powered aircraft carrier fleet is capable of flexibly
employing capabilities that span from power projection and deterrence
to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Our 11-carrier force
structure is based on worldwide presence and surge requirements, while
also taking into account training and maintenance requirements. Our
Navy has put in place measures to minimize the impact of the 10-carrier
period between the inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and
commissioning of USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). After the delivery of
CVN-78, we will maintain an 11-carrier force by continuing the
refueling program for Nimitz-class ships and delivering our Ford-class
carriers at 5-year intervals starting in 2020.
CVN-78, which is approximately 20 percent complete, is the lead
ship of our first new class of aircraft carriers in nearly 40 years.
These new carriers incorporate an innovative flight deck design that
provides greater operational flexibility, a nuclear propulsion plant
that generates more than 50 percent greater energy while decreasing
maintenance requirements, and a combination of measures that reduce
manning by more than 1,200 sailors. Among the new technologies being
integrated in these ships are the Dual-Band Radar, the Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG),
which will enable the carrier to increase its sortie generation rate by
25 percent and lower total ownership costs. AAG is currently undergoing
commissioning testing at our land-based testing facility and, in
December, EMALS successfully launched an F/A-18 aircraft. Both systems
are on schedule to support delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015.
Strike Fighter Capacity
I remain committed to the F-35 JSF program. The timely delivery of
the F-35C carrier variant is critical to our future carrier airwing
strike fighter capability and capacity. As a result of delays in the F-
35 program, we are closely managing our strike fighter inventory to
address the decrease in strike fighter capacity that is projected to
peak in 2018 as our F/A-18A-D aircraft reach the end of their service
life. Our actions include managing the service life of our A-D
aircraft, extending the service life of our A-D aircraft, buying new F/
A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, and maintaining wholeness in the F-35C
program. With these measures, we can manage our current strike fighter
inventory to meet TACAIR requirements.
F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter
The F-35 program gives us the advanced sensor, precision strike,
firepower, and stealth capabilities our Fleet needs. I continue to base
our Initial Operating Capability (IOC) timeline for the F-35C on the
level of capability delivered at the completion of Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation of the F-35C equipped with Block 3 software. We are
reviewing the results of the in-depth Technical Baseline Review and
restructuring of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase
to determine our IOC. While the overall system demonstration and
development schedule has slipped, we have not reduced the total number
of airplanes we plan to buy. Our fiscal year 2012 request procures
seven F-35C aircraft. We are monitoring the program closely and
managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power projection
demands until the F-35C is delivered. Procurement of an alternate
engine for the F-35 increases our risk in this program. The Navy does
not have a requirement for an alternate engine; indeed, we would only
take one model to sea. Its additional costs threaten our ability to
fund currently planned aircraft procurement quantities, which would
exacerbate our anticipated decrease in strike fighter capacity
throughout the remainder of this decade.
F/A-18A-D Hornet and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
Our F/A-18A-D Hornet aircraft were originally designed for a
service life of 6,000 flight hours. Through a life assessment program
and High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections, which have been in place for 3
years, we have been able to extend the service life of our legacy F/A-
18A-D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours. Our fiscal year 2012 budget
requests funding to pursue a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for
150 F/A-18A-D aircraft, commencing in fiscal year 2012 at a rate of
about 40 per year, that would further extend the service life of these
aircraft to 10,000 flight hours. We are also conducting a life
assessment program for our Super Hornet aircraft to extend their
original 6,000-hour service life design to 9,000 hours. The F/A-18A-D
HFH and SLEP are necessary measures to address our strike fighter
inventory while preserving our investment in F-35C. To further reduce
risk, we are accelerating the transition of 10 legacy F/A-18C squadrons
to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, and our fiscal year 2012 budget requests
funding to procure more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets than we requested last
year. I thank Congress for their support of the F/A-18 program as we
introduce F-35C into our Fleet.
EA-18G Growler
The Navy has been a leader in Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) for
more than half a century and AEA is in high demand. AEA provides one of
the most flexible offensive capabilities available to the joint
warfighter and is becoming increasingly important as technology capable
of manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum matures. We are leveraging
the mature and proven F/A-18E/F Super Hornet airframe to recapitalize
our AEA capability with the EA-18G Growler. Although the EA-18G
currently utilizes the same ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System as the EA-
6B, we are developing a new system, the Next Generation Jammer, as a
replacement for the aging ALQ-99. The Next Generation Jammer will
incorporate a Modular Open System Architecture and improved reliability
and maintainability to provide a robust, flexible jamming capability
that can evolve to address emerging threats. The EA-18G is in full rate
production and we have accepted delivery of 43 aircraft. We have
transitioned three EA-6B Prowler squadrons to EA-18G Growlers and two
more squadrons are currently in transition. Our first EA-18G squadron
deployed in November to Iraq. Our program of record will buy 114 total
EA-18G aircraft, recapitalizing 10 carrier-based EA-6B squadrons and 4
expeditionary squadrons, all to be stationed at NAS Whidbey Island. The
program continues to deliver on schedule and our fiscal year 2012
budget requests funding for 12 EA-18Gs.
P-3C Orion and P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft
Our P-3C Orion aircraft remain in high demand today across a range
of missions including Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, and
time-critical Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Our
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) force is a direct enabler for troops on
the ground in Central Command while also ensuring access and
battlespace awareness at sea. Because we are operating our P-3Cs at a
high rate, about 100 P-3 aircraft have been grounded since February
2005 for fatigue life and we anticipate continued groundings through
the remainder of the P-3 program. Through significant Congressional
support for P-3C wing repairs and sustainment, as of February, we have
a current inventory of 84 mission aircraft; a 58 percent increase since
last year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests about $100 million to
continue our P-3C sustainment program. Continued investment in this
program and in the modernization of our P-3s is critical to ensure we
retain sufficient capacity to conduct maritime battlespace awareness
and support to land forces in Central Command, while successfully
transitioning to the P-8A.
The P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft is ideally suited
for regional and littoral operations, and is our pre-eminent airborne
capability against submarine threats. Procurement of P-8A will deliver
needed capacity for these missions. The P-8A is scheduled to reach
initial operating capability and will begin replacing our aging P-3
Fleet in 2013. The current delivery schedule enables transition of two
squadrons per year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 11
P-8A aircraft. I request Congress' support for the P-8A program
schedule and for our P-3 sustainment and modernization program, the
combination of which is essential to our transition to the next
generation of MPA capability while avoiding future gaps in our MPA
force.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, will replace the E-2C and
represents a two-generation leap in airborne radar surveillance
capability. The E-2D will improve nearly every facet of tactical air
operations and add overland and littoral surveillance to support
theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) against air threats
in high clutter, complex electro-magnetic and jamming environments. The
airborne radar on the E-2D, with its improved surveillance capability,
is a key pillar of the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-
CA) concept. Four test aircraft have been delivered to the Navy and we
will commence operational test and evaluation in late 2011. The first
Fleet squadron transition is planned for 2013, with an IOC scheduled
for late 2014. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests six E-2D aircraft.
We plan to procure 75 aircraft, with the final aircraft procurement in
2019 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2022.
MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter
The MH-60R and MH-60S are in full rate production. The MH-60R
multi-mission helicopter replaces the surface combatant-based SH-60B
and carrier-based SH-60F with a newly manufactured airframe and
enhanced mission systems. With these systems, the MH-60R provides
focused surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for our
strike groups and individual ships. The MH-60S supports surface
warfare, combat logistics, vertical replenishment, search and rescue,
air ambulance, airborne mine counter-measures, and naval special
warfare mission areas. We have delivered 85 MH-60R and 187 MH-60S to
our Fleet and our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 24 MH-
60R and 18 MH-60S helicopters.
SURFACE SHIP PROGRAMS
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
LCS is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant optimized to
support naval and joint force operations in the littorals with
capability to support open-ocean operations. It will operate with
focused-mission packages to counter mine, small boat, and submarine
threats in the littorals. The modular design and open architecture of
the seaframe and mission modules provide the inherent flexibility to
add or adapt capabilities as new technologies mature or to counter
threats that emerge beyond the Mine Countermeasures, Surface Warfare,
and Anti-Submarine missions currently planned for LCS. These ships will
employ a combination of manned helicopters and unmanned aerial,
surface, and undersea vehicles.
USS Freedom (LCS-1) completed her first operational deployment to
the Southern and Pacific Commands in April 2010, 2 years early. While
deployed, USS Freedom successfully conducted counter-drug missions and
validated its open ocean capability, allowing us to learn valuable
lessons from these real-world operations. USS Independence (LCS-2) was
commissioned in January 2010 and is currently in Norfolk undergoing
post-delivery tests and trials. We are seeing demonstrated performance
and stability in the construction of LCS-3 and LCS-4 that captures
lessons learned from the first ships. PCU Fort Worth (LCS-3) was
launched and christened in December and is completing final
construction. PCU Coronado (LCS-4) is almost 50 percent complete and is
scheduled to be launched and christened later this year. Both LCS-3 and
LCS-4 are experiencing minimal change and are scheduled to be delivered
to the Navy in 2012 on cost and on schedule.
I thank Congress for approving the Navy's dual award strategy in
December 2010. This strategy enables the Navy to save over $2 billion
in acquisition costs and acquire these ships well below the
congressionally-mandated $480 million cost cap set in 2009. It allows
our Navy to acquire an additional Littoral Combat ship, increasing
needed capacity in our Fleet. I am impressed and satisfied with the
capabilities of both LCS designs and remain committed to procuring 55
of these ships. Consistent with the dual award strategy, our fiscal
year 2012 budget requests four LCS seaframes at a total cost of $1.8
billion. The budget also requests two mission packages in fiscal year
2012. These packages provide the vital center for LCS's combat
capability and we have aligned LCS mission module procurement with that
of our LCS seaframes. I request your continued support as we continue
to acquire the future capacity and capability the Fleet requires.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Navy's mature and proven maritime BMD capability will play a
primary role in the first phase of our Nation's Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) for the missile defense of our NATO Allies in Europe.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding to increase our current
BMD ship capacity from 21 ships (5 cruisers and 16 destroyers) to 41
BMD capable ships by 2016. This planned capacity expansion will
eventually include all of the Navy's Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and
nine Ticonderoga-class cruisers. Until we grow our BMD ship capacity,
our existing BMD ships may experience longer deployment lengths and
less time between deployments as we stretch our existing capacity to
meet growing demands.
As part of the PAA, we are working with the Missile Defense Agency
to adapt Navy's proven and flexible Aegis BMD capability for use in an
ashore configuration by repackaging components of the afloat Aegis
Weapons System into modular containers for deployment to pre-prepared
forward sites. The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex is
currently under development, with fabrication to begin in Kauai, HI, in
2013. This complex is a key enabler of the Aegis Ashore capability,
which will be tested prior to shore placement overseas in 2015. This
phased approach provides needed technology and capacity to pace the
threat; it serves as a conventional counter to trends in global
ballistic missile technology; and it allows for technological
maturation through 2020.
DDG-51 Flight IIA and Flight III
To keep pace with the evolving air and missile defense threats, we
restarted the DDG-51 Flight IIA production line in the fiscal year 2010
and fiscal year 2011 budgets with advanced procurement buys for DDG-
113, -114, and -115. The restarted DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers provide
Navy with a proven multi-mission combatant that fills critical
warfighting needs across the spectrum, and is the first warship built
from the keel up to conduct maritime BMD. They will be the first Aegis
ships to be built with the Open Architecture Advanced Capability Build
(ACB)-12 Aegis Combat System. ACB-12 will allow these surface
combatants to be updated and maintained with commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) technology, yielding reduced Total Ownership Cost and enhancing
the ability to adapt to future military threats. Our fiscal year 2012
budget requests funding for the construction of DDG-116 as part of our
plan to build seven more of the Flight IIA class over the FYDP (an
increase of one DDG-51 over last year's budget). We also request just
over $75 million to support research and development for ACB-12, which
will support the integration of this critical system on DDG-113 and our
development of Aegis Ashore.
The follow-on to DDG-51 Flight IIA is the DDG-51 Flight III, which
will commence with the construction of DDG-123. Flight III ships will
be tailored for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and include
the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), upgraded command and control
software and hardware, and enhanced electrical power and cooling. Our
fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for a total of eight DDG-51
Class ships, including funding for the first Flight III ship in fiscal
year 2016.
Modernization
To counter emerging threats, we continue to make significant
investments in cruiser and destroyer modernization to sustain our
combat effectiveness and to achieve the 35 year service life of our
Aegis fleet. Our destroyer and cruiser modernization program includes
Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades, as well as advances
in warfighting capability and open architecture to reduce total
ownership costs and expand mission capability for current and future
combat capabilities. In addition to HM&E upgrades, key aspects of our
destroyer and cruiser modernization programs include the installation
or upgrade of the Aegis weapons system to include an open architecture
computing environment, addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and
improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated
Fire Control-Counter Air capability. Our destroyers also receive
integration of the SM-6 missile, while our cruisers receive
installation of the AN/SPQ-9B radar and an upgrade to Close-In Weapon
System (CIWS) Block 1B. Maintaining the stability of the cruiser and
destroyer modernization program is critical to our ability to provide
relevant capability and capacity in our future Fleet. Our fiscal year
2012 budget requests funding for the modernization of four cruisers
(three Combat Systems and one HM&E) and three destroyers (one Combat
System and two HM&E).
DDG-1000
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally
crewed, multi-mission surface combatant optimized for long-range
precision land attack. In addition to providing offensive, distributed
and precision fires in support of forces ashore, these ships will serve
as test-beds for advanced technology, such as integrated power systems,
a sophisticated X-Band radar, and advanced survivability features,
which can inform future ship designs. Following a Nunn-McCurdy breach
due to the reduction in procurement to three ships, we restructured the
DDG-1000 program to remove the highest risk technology, the Volume
Search Radar, from integration into the platform. DDG-1000 is more than
37 percent complete and is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2014
with an initial operating capability in fiscal year 2016.
Joint High Speed Vessel
The JHSV will deliver a new level of organic logistic and maneuver
flexibility for combatant commanders. JHSV is a high speed, shallow
draft ship. Its unique design allows the ship to transport medium
payloads of cargo and/or personnel to austere ports without reliance on
port infrastructure. JHSV-1 and -2 are currently under construction by
Austal USA in Mobile, AL and are scheduled to be delivered in fiscal
year 2012 and 2013. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for
the construction of the third JHSV. We are currently developing a
Memorandum of Agreement with the Army that would transfer programmatic
oversight and responsibility for the entire JHSV program, including
operations and maintenance, to the Navy. Upon the signing of the
agreement, all JHSVs when delivered would be operated by the Navy's
Military Sealift Command and manned by civilian or contract mariners.
SUBMARINE PROGRAMS
Virginia-class SSN
The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine designed
to dominate the undersea domain in the littorals, access denied
environments, and the open ocean. Now in its 14th year of construction,
the Virginia program is demonstrating its continued ability to deliver
this critical undersea asset affordably and on time. The Navy continues
to realize a return on investment in the Virginia cost reduction
program and construction process improvements through enhanced
shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. A majority of the
submarines contracted via multiyear procurement have delivered under
budget and ahead of schedule, and their performance continues to exceed
expectations with every ship delivered. I am pleased with the
accomplishments of the combined Navy-Industry team and anticipate
additional improvements as we ramp up production to two submarines per
year, as requested in our fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget submissions.
SSBN and Ohio Replacement
The Navy remains committed to recapitalizing the Nation's sea-based
strategic deterrent, the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad. With
a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), we have
been able to meet the strategic needs of the Nation since 1980. This
class will begin retirement after more than 40 years of service in
2027.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed that our Nation will
continue to rely on a reliable and survivable sea-based strategic
deterrent for the foreseeable future. To ensure the Navy is able to
meet the Nation's demand in this critical capability, our fiscal year
2012 budget requests research and development funds for the design of
the Ohio-class replacement, enabling construction of the class
beginning in 2019. The Ohio replacement will possess the endurance and
stealth required for continuous, survivable strategic deterrence for
decades to come. Appropriate R&D investment is essential to design a
reliable and survivable submarine capable of deterring all potential
adversaries. Over the past year, the Ohio replacement program has been
thoroughly reviewed and all aspects of the program were aggressively
challenged to drive down engineering and construction costs. Our fiscal
year 2012 request represents best balance of needed warfighting
capabilities with cost. The Ohio replacement program will leverage the
many successes of the Virginia SSN program to achieve acquisition and
total ownership cost goals. These efficiencies and a record of
acquisition excellence are critical to minimize risk to our total force
structure while recapitalizing sea-based strategic deterrence between
fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2033.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS
LPD-17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship
The San Antonio-class LPD (LPD-17) amphibious warfare ships provide
the Navy and Marine Corps the ability to embark, transport, control,
insert, sustain, and extract combat marines and sailors on missions
that range from forcible entry to forward deployed crisis response.
These ships have a 40-year expected service life and will replace four
classes of older ships: the LKA, LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4. Of the 11
ships in our program of record, 5 ships have been delivered, 3 have
completed their initial deployments, and 4 are under construction. We
continue to resolve material reliability concerns with the class and
apply the lessons learned during initial operation of the early ships
to those under construction. Quality continues to improve with each
ship delivered as we work closely with the shipbuilder to address cost,
schedule, and performance issues. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests
funding to procure the final ship in the program.
LHA Replacement (LHA(R))
LHA(R) is the replacement for our aging Tarawa-class ships, which
will reach the end of their extended service life between 2011-2015.
LHA(R) will provide flexible, multi-mission amphibious capabilities by
leveraging the LHD-8 design. The America (LHA-6) is now more than 30
percent complete and on schedule for delivery in fiscal year 2014.
Beginning with LHA-8, the Navy will reintegrate the well deck into the
large deck amphibious assault ships. Our fiscal year 2012 budget
requests funding for research and development to support reintegration
of the well deck into the design of the large deck amphibious ship and
the construction of LHA-8 in fiscal year 2016.
Mobile Landing Platform
Based on commercial technology, the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)
will enable the transfer of equipment, personnel, and sustainment at-
sea, and delivery ashore in support of a wide range of contingency
operations. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for one MLP
and we intend to procure a total of three MLPs. We expect the first
ship to deliver in fiscal year 2013 and project initial operating
capability and incorporation into the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF) for 2015. In the Maritime Preposition Force, each of our existing
Maritime Preposition Squadrons will be augmented by one MLP, one T-AKE
combat logistics ship, and a Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off cargo
ship. The three T-AKE are all under contract with projected delivery
dates beginning this year and going through fiscal year 2013.
INFORMATION DOMINANCE PROGRAMS
Unmanned Systems
Our Navy is developing a ``family'' of unmanned systems over, on,
and under the sea to provide unique capability, in concert with our
manned platforms, to rapidly secure access and establish maritime
superiority at the time and place of our choosing. We are developing
information architecture that will allow us to rapidly assimilate data
into information for our commanders, enabling shorter decision cycles
that will give us an advantage in joint and maritime operations.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Our unmanned aircraft family of systems includes the Broad Area
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS, which will enhance our situational
awareness and shorten the sensor-to-shooter kill chain by providing
persistent, multiple-sensor capabilities to Fleet and Joint Commanders.
Through our recent memorandum of agreement with the Air Force, we are
pursuing greater commonality and interoperability between BAMS and the
Air Force's Global Hawk UAV. Our Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical
Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) is on its second deployment aboard the USS
Halyburton (FFG-40) and will deploy in an expeditionary role to support
combat operations in Afghanistan later this year. Our fiscal year 2012
budget includes about $12 million in research and development funding
to facilitate development of a weapons-capable VTUAV ready for
deployment in late fiscal year 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 request also
includes funding to develop a medium range maritime-based UAS and a
Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System that will support a variety of
ships, Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
units, and Marine Corps elements.
The Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System Demonstration (NUCAS-D)
will prove carrier suitability of an autonomous, unmanned, low-
observable, carrier-based aircraft. This effort includes maturing
technologies for aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested
landings, as well as integration into carrier-controlled airspace.
Initial flight tests to demonstrate carrier suitability are scheduled
to start next year and autonomous aerial refueling demonstrations are
planned for 2014. We will leverage the lessons learned from operating
the demonstrator in developing a low-observable unmanned carrier-
launched airborne surveillance and strike system (UCLASS). The UCLASS
program will shorten the timeline to find, fix, track, target, engage,
and assess time sensitive targets. UCLASS will integrate with the
carrier air wings and increase the flexibility, versatility, and
capability of the carrier force. We are currently developing the UCLASS
acquisition strategy with OSD.
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) provide an innovative
technological solution to augment manned platforms. Our Navy has logged
more than 85,000 hours of UUV operations to improve battlespace
awareness. Our small-body Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS)
oceanographic autonomous undersea gliders have demonstrated the ability
to conduct 6-month long autonomous operations and will achieve Initial
Operating Capability this year. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests
about $13million for research, development, and procurement of the LBS
glider. We are also developing Large Diameter UUVs (LDUUV) with the
capability to autonomously deploy and manage a variety of sensors and
payloads. The development of these highly capable vehicles will require
investment in commercially and militarily beneficial alternative energy
technologies, including refinement of fuel cell technology and cutting
edge battery technologies. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests about
$47 million to develop an LDUUV, and I remain committed to conduct
fully independent UUV missions with durations of 2 months by 2017. This
capability will allow full scale employment and deployment of LDUUV
squadrons in the 2020s.
Mobile User Objective System
Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure
global communications capability that can support the command and
control requirements of highly mobile and distributed U.S. and
coalition forces. Satellite communications give deployed forces a
decisive military advantage and often offer the only communication
means to support ongoing operations. Rapidly expanding joint demand for
more access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond our
current legacy Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite capabilities. The
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) will help satisfy those demands
when initial operational capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. The
first satellite in our planned constellation of five is scheduled for
on-orbit capability in May 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 budget submission
continues our investment in MUOS to replace the aging UHF Follow-On
(UFO) constellation. I request your continued support of MUOS and the
critical narrowband communication capability it will provide to the
joint warfighter.
Next Generation Enterprise Network
The Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) is a Department of
the Navy enterprise network that will provide secure, net-centric data
and services to Navy and Marine Corps personnel after the current Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) network stands down. In July, Navy awarded
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services with the NMCI continuity of
services contract to transition the Navy out of NMCI and into NGEN.
NGEN will sustain the services currently provided by NMCI, while
increasing government command and control of our network and enabling
secure, reliable, and adaptable global information exchange. The
initial NGEN contracts are expected to be awarded in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2012. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests an additional
$22 million to support government command and control of our networks
and improve our network situational awareness and defense.
Remain Ready to Fight Today
Our Navy continues to experience a high tempo of global operations
which I expect to continue even as combat forces draw down in
Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and
climate change portend an increased demand for maritime power and
influence. America's prosperity depends upon the seas: 90 percent of
world trade moves on the world's oceans and underwater
telecommunications cables facilitate about $3.2 trillion of commerce
each year. As new trade patterns emerge, such as those that will result
from the expansion of the Panama Canal and the opening of the Arctic,
and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment,
maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our Nation to
maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary,
project power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint
ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence around
the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our
allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional
and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to
crises.
High operational demand for our force over the last decade has led
to longer deployments, lower dwell time, and reduced maintenance time
for our surface ships. If these trends continue, our force will be less
ready and less available than it is today because of increased stress
on our sailors and a reduction in our Fleet capacity as ships fail to
reach their expected service lives. We have initiatives currently
underway to address these trends. We are moving approximately 1,900
sailors from shore billets onto our ships to meet operational demands
while maintaining acceptable Fleet readiness levels and sailor dwell
time. To enhance the material readiness of our Fleet, we are improving
our ability to plan and execute maintenance by increasing manning at
our Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), and by institutionalizing our
engineered approach to surface ship maintenance, converting the
successes of our Surface Ship Lifecycle Maintenance initiative I began
2 years ago into the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program
Activity. I remain focused on ensuring our Navy has a force that is
maintained and trained to provide the capability and forward presence
required in the two areas of interest identified in our Maritime
Strategy, the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf, while preserving
our ability to immediately swing from those regions and our Fleet
concentration areas in the United States to respond to contingencies
globally.
Our fiscal year 2012 base budget and Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding requests balance the need to meet increasing
operational requirements, sustain our sailors' proficiency, and conduct
the maintenance required to ensure our ships and aircraft reach their
full service lives. It does not address the potential impacts of a
full-year continuing resolution on our ongoing operations and
maintenance afloat and ashore. Highlights follow of initiatives that
ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today.
Depot Level Maintenance
Our ships and aircraft are valuable capital assets that operate in
unforgiving environments. Keeping these assets in acceptable operating
condition is vital to their ability to accomplish assigned missions and
reach their expected service lives. Timely depot level maintenance,
based on an engineered assessment of expected material durability and
scoped by actual physical condition, will preserve our existing force
structure. Continued investment in depot level maintenance is essential
in achieving and sustaining the force structure required to implement
our Maritime Strategy. Our combined fiscal year 2012 base budget and
OCO funding requests fulfill 94 percent of the projected ship depot
maintenance requirements necessary to sustain our Navy's global
presence and 95 percent of our aviation depot maintenance requirements,
servicing 742 airframes and 2,577 engines. The actual extent of our
depot maintenance requirements will be determined by the final funding
levels for fiscal year 2011. I request that you fully support our
baseline and contingency funding requests for operations and
maintenance to ensure the effectiveness of our force, safety of our
sailors, and longevity of our ships and aircraft.
Shore Readiness
Our shore infrastructure enables our operational and combat
readiness, and is essential to the quality of life and quality of work
for our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. High operational
demands, rising manpower costs, and an aging fleet of ships and
aircraft cause us to take deliberate risk in shore readiness,
specifically in sustaining our shore infrastructure. We have focused
our facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds on
improving our housing for unaccompanied sailors and investing in energy
efficient building modifications. To source these enhancements, we have
temporarily cancelled our demolition program and reduced our facilities
sustainment posture to 80 percent of the modeled requirement. We have
targeted our shore readiness investments in areas that have the
greatest impact on achieving our strategic and operational objectives.
These areas include support to our warfighting missions and
capabilities, nuclear weapons security, quality of life for our sailors
and their families, and energy enhancements. We remain on track in our
Homeport Ashore initiative to provide sufficient accommodations to our
junior single sailors by 2016, and we continue our support for family
services. We plan to complete an expansion of 7,000 child care spaces
in fiscal year 2011, allowing us to meet OSD's mandate of providing
child care for 80 percent of the potential need in fiscal year 2012.
Training Readiness
Our Navy is leveraging modeling and simulation (M&S) extensively
across the Fleet training continuum to reduce at-sea training
requirements and associated operating costs and energy use. These
virtual environments stress critical command and control warfare skills
and fine tune basic warfighting competencies without going to sea. They
provide synthetic events that are scalable and repeatable, including
the ability to train multiple strike groups simultaneously. Synthetic
training provides a complex, multi-faceted threat environment that
cannot be efficiently recreated at sea on a routine basis. Ship command
and control simulations, in conjunction with the Fleet Synthetic
Training (FST) program, support unit level and integrated pre-
deployment training and certification, including Joint Task Force
Exercises, Ballistic Missile Defense Exercises, and LCS qualification
and certification training. In fiscal year 2012, our Navy's use of
simulators will reduce steaming days by 603 days for a savings of $30
million, and flying hours by 5,400 hours, for a savings of $35 million.
The Fleet has placed FST as a top training priority with the objective
to increase simulator use and synthetic training to reduce Fleet
operating costs.
Although we are maximizing our use of synthetic training, it cannot
completely replace our need to conduct live training. Simulators cannot
replicate the physical environment, risks, stress, or experiences that
live training provides. Naval units must be able to practice and hone
their skills in the air and at sea. Having the right facilities and the
ability to practice skill sets in a live operating environment are
necessary for the proficiency and safety of our sailors and for the
warfighting effectiveness of our Fleet.
The proliferation of advanced, stealthy submarines continues to
challenge our Navy's ability to guarantee the access and sustainment of
joint forces. Robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training with active
sonar systems is vital for our Navy to effectively address this threat.
The Navy remains a world leader in marine mammal research and we will
continue our investment in this research in fiscal year 2012 and
beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and cooperation
with other Federal agencies, we have developed effective measures that
protect marine mammals and the ocean environment from adverse impacts
of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar while not precluding critical Navy
training. We continue to work closely with our interagency partners to
further refine our protective measures as scientific knowledge evolves.
It is vitally important that any such measures ensure the continued
flexibility necessary to respond to future national security
requirements.
In January, we announced our plan to initially focus JSF homebasing
on the west coast in accordance with 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
direction and the JSF Transition Plan. We also announced that we are
suspending work on the Outlying Landing Field (OLF) draft environmental
impact statement (EIS) planned for the East Coast until at least 2014.
At that time, we will re-evaluate the requirement for an OLF based on
our east coast JSF basing and training requirements. We continue to
experience capacity shortfalls at our current East Coast field carrier
landing practice sites that present challenges to meeting our current
training requirements under both routine and surge conditions for
existing Navy aircraft. We will continue to ensure we meet all our
training requirements by implementing the measures necessary to use all
available facilities.
Energy and Climate Change
The Secretary of the Navy and I are committed to advancing our
energy security. I consider energy an operational imperative and I
established the Navy's Task Force Energy more than 2 years ago to
improve combat capability, assure mobility, and green our footprint. We
will achieve these goals through energy efficiency improvements,
consumption reduction initiatives, and the aggressive adoption of
alternative energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on fossil fuels
will improve our combat capability by increasing time on station,
reducing time spent alongside replenishment ships, and producing more
effective and powerful future weapons.
Our tactical energy efforts fall into two categories: technical and
behavioral changes that use energy more efficiently, and testing/
certification of alternative fuels. We are making good progress on our
efficiency initiatives. The USS Makin Island (LHD-8) uses hybrid
propulsion and we are installing the same system on LHA-6 and LHA-7. We
are developing a hybrid electric drive system for the DDG-51 class and
I anticipate a land-based test as early as this summer. We continue to
introduce advanced hull and propeller coatings and solid state lighting
in our ships, and we are developing the Smart Voyage Planning Decision
Aid to achieve more efficient ship routing. We are also implementing
policies that encourage sailors to reduce their personal energy usage.
These incremental initiatives add up to significant efficiency
improvements.
Our alternative energy programs are progressing. We are
aggressively certifying elements of our operational force for biofuel
use. To date we have operated the ``Green Hornet'' F/A-18 and MH-60S on
camelina-based JP-5 fuel and the RCB-X riverine craft on algal-based F-
76 fuel. Operational testing of energy efficiency upgrades to the
Allison 501k engine completed last month and is a key milestone toward
certification of our Navy combatants with marine gas turbine engines.
We have reduced our energy use ashore by more than 14 percent since
2003, as a result of our energy efficiency efforts, including energy
efficiency building upgrades, energy management systems, procurement of
alternative fuel vehicles, and achievement of sustainable building
standards for all new construction and major renovation projects. Our
continued investments in advanced metering and energy audits will help
identify further opportunities for efficiency gains and alternative
energy use. Our approach remains focused on integrating the right
technology at the right time in the right place while transforming Navy
culture and behavior for long term sustainability.
Since establishing Task Force Climate Change in 2009, our Navy has
taken several actions to better understand and address the potential
impacts of climate change on our Navy. We have increased our
operational engagement in the Arctic, participating this past summer in
Operation Nanook/Natsiq with Canada. We are re-assessing regional
security cooperation, through our African, Southern, and Pacific
Partnership station missions to include consideration of climate change
adaptation, especially with respect to improving water security. We are
also participating with the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration and other Federal agencies to survey in the Arctic and
improve our environmental observation and prediction capability
worldwide. Scientific observations indicate that current changes to the
climate are occurring on a decadal scale, giving our Navy enough time
to conduct the studies and assessments necessary to inform future
investment decisions.
Second East Coast Carrier-Capable Homeport
The Navy continues to focus on achieving the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review direction to upgrade the carrier port of Mayport. Much
like the dispersal of west coast aircraft carriers between California
and Washington, a second homeport on the east coast to maintain
aircraft carriers is prudent in the event of a natural or man-made
disaster in Hampton Roads. The dredging project funded in fiscal year
2010 is underway and will ensure unimpeded access to Mayport. Our
fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for the Massey Avenue corridor
improvement projects. We plan to request funding for the Wharf F
recapitalization in fiscal year 2013, and the remaining projects within
the FYDP, to establish Naval Station Mayport as a nuclear carrier-
capable homeport by 2019.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Navy has consistently supported a comprehensive and stable
legal regime for the exercise of navigational rights and other
traditional uses of the oceans. The Law of the Sea Convention provides
such a regime with robust global mobility rules. I believe it essential
that the United States become a full Party to the treaty. The
Convention promotes our strategic goal of free access to and public
order on the oceans under the rule of law. It also has strategic
effects for global maritime partnerships and American maritime
leadership and influence. Creating partnerships that are in the
strategic interests of our Nation must be based on relationships of
mutual respect, understanding, and trust. For the 160 nations who are
parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, a basis for trust and mutual
understanding is codified in that document. The treaty provides a solid
foundation for the United States to assert its sovereign rights to the
natural resources of the sea floor out to 200 nautical miles and on the
extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which in the
Arctic Ocean is likely to extend at least 600 nautical miles north of
Alaska. As a non-Party to the treaty, the United States undermines its
ability to influence the future direction of the law of the sea. As the
only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council outside the
Convention, and one of the few nations still remaining outside one of
the most widely subscribed international agreements, our non-Party
status hinders our ability to lead in this important area and could,
over time, reduce the United States' influence in shaping global
maritime law and policy. The Law of the Sea Convention provides the
norms our sailors need to do their jobs around the world every day. It
is in the best interest of our Nation and our Navy to ratify the Law of
the Sea Convention. We must demonstrate leadership and provide to the
men and women who serve in our Navy the most solid legal footing
possible to carry out the missions that our Nation requires of them.
DEVELOP AND SUPPORT OUR SAILORS, NAVY CIVILIANS, AND THEIR FAMILIES
Our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families are the backbone of
our Maritime Strategy. They make us who we are. Their skill,
innovation, and dedication turn our ships, aircraft, weapons and
systems into global capabilities that prevent conflict, build
partnerships, and, when necessary, project combat power to prevail in
war. Our investment in our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families
ensures our Navy's continued maritime dominance today and in the
future.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests authorization and funding for
325,700 Active and 66,200 Reserve end strength. This request includes
the migration of more than 1,800 military billets from shore and staff
activities into the Fleet to man new ships and squadrons, restore
optimal manning cuts, add needed information technology and nuclear
operators to our force, and restore billets for fiscal year 2013 to
extend USS Peleliu in commission. This migration will enhance our
forces afloat; however, the transition will present challenges to our
ability to maintain sea-shore flow for some of our enlisted sailors and
sustain manning levels across the force. We are aware of these
challenges and believe the transition is manageable. Our fiscal year
2012 end strength request also begins to move end strength previously
supported by OCO funding, namely our Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs),
into our baseline program. We will execute a phased draw down of our
OCO end strength as we project a gradual reduction of IA demands in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels, or
increase over time, we will be challenged to meet manning requirements
for our Fleet. Our Navy continues to size, shape, and stabilize our
force through a series of performance-based measures designed to retain
the skills, pay grades, and experience mix necessary to meet current
and future requirements.
Our fiscal year 2012 end strength reflects efficiencies in our
manpower account that reduce excess overhead by disestablishing several
staffs, but not their associated ships and aircraft, for submarine,
patrol aircraft, and destroyer squadrons, as well as one Carrier Strike
Group staff. We are disestablishing the headquarters of Second Fleet
and transferring responsibility for its mission to U.S. Fleet Forces
Command. These efficiencies streamline our organizations and allow us
to reinvest the savings into warfighting capability and capacity.
I would like to touch briefly on the issue of changes to the health
care benefit. Navy Medicine has been a leader in implementing pilot
testing for the Department in a new concept called the Patient-Centered
Medical Home. Beneficiaries have welcomed Navy Medicine's Medical Home
Port initiative and it shows in their satisfaction scores. I am
convinced that our beneficiaries will readily accept very modest
changes to copayments as long as we continue to invest in these
transformational approaches to delivering high quality health care. The
proposals in the President's budget are consistent with our efforts
over the last several years: a focus on internal efficiency,
incentivizing the health behaviors we want, and ensuring all of our
beneficiaries are treated equitably. I request you support these timely
and appropriate efforts.
The tone of our force continues to be positive. In 2010, we
conducted the Navy Total Force Survey, which was the first of its kind
to assess the work-related attitudes and experiences of Active and
Reserve sailors and Navy civilians. The survey reported that Navy
personnel are, overall, satisfied with the quality of their leadership,
benefits, compensation, and opportunities within the Navy for personal
growth and development. The survey results reaffirmed what more than 20
national awards have recognized: that our Navy is a ``Top 50''
organization and an employer of choice among today's workforce.
Our fiscal year 2012 budget request represents a balanced approach
to supporting our sailors and their families, sustaining the high tempo
of current operations, and preserving Fleet and family readiness.
Highlights follow of our efforts to develop and support our sailors,
Navy civilians, and their families.
Recruiting and Retention
Our Navy has enjoyed strong recruiting success over the past 3
years, and we expect this trend to continue through fiscal year 2011.
Fiscal year 2010 marked the third consecutive year Navy met or exceeded
its overall enlisted recruiting goals in both the Active and Reserve
components and we continue to exceed Department of Defense quality
standards in all recruit categories. We accessed the highest quality
enlisted force in history last year, with more than 97 percent having
traditional high school diplomas. Active officer recruiting for fiscal
year 2010 also exceeded our overall goals. Reserve officer recruiting
exceeded our fiscal year 2009 levels, but achieved only 95 percent of
our fiscal year 2010 goal. Reserve medical officer recruiting continues
to be our greatest challenge as the requirement for medical officers
has increased by more than 100 percent since fiscal year 2008. We
continue to explore new avenues for recruiting, including expanding our
social media engagement to maintain a dialogue with potential
applicants and influencers nationwide.
Navy will remain competitive in the employment market through the
disciplined use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Using a
targeted approach, we will continue our recruiting and retention
initiatives to attract and retain our best sailors, especially those
within high-demand, critical skill areas that remain insulated from
economic conditions. We are taking advantage of current high retention
rates and success in accessions by reevaluating all special and
incentive pays and bonuses and reducing them where possible. Judicious
use of special and incentive pays remains essential to recruiting and
retaining skilled professionals in the current economic environment,
and will increase in importance as the economic recovery continues. Our
goal remains to maintain a balanced force, in which seniority,
experience, and skills are matched to requirements.
To ensure we stay within our congressionally-authorized end
strength, we are executing force stabilization measures that include
Perform-to-Serve (PTS) for enlisted sailors and a series of Selective
Early Retirement (SER) boards for Unrestricted Line (URL) captains and
commanders. PTS considers the manning levels in each enlisted rating
and reviews the record of sailors eligible for reenlistment to
determine if the sailor should remain in the rating, convert to an
undermanned specialty, transition to the Reserves, or separate from the
Navy. The SER boards will address the excess inventory of Active
component captain (O6) and commander (O5) URL officers in our Navy to
ensure sufficient senior officers are available at the right time in
their careers to serve in critical fleet billets. We project
approximately 100 URL captains and 100 URL commanders will be selected
for early retirement through this process. With these performance-based
measures, we expect to meet our fiscal year 2011 authorized Active end
strength of 328,700 and Reserve end strength of 65,500 by the end of
the fiscal year. We will be challenged to meet our Active and Reserve
end strength targets in fiscal year 2012 using existing force shaping
measures. As a result of continued high retention and low attrition
across the force, we are facing increasing pressure to use involuntary
force shaping measures to remain within our authorized end strength.
Diversity
Demographic projections estimate that today's minorities will make
up more than one third of our Nation's workforce by 2020; by 2050, that
projection increases to about half of our workforce. Our ability to
access and retain the talents of every component group in our society
is critical to our mission success. Recruiting and retaining a diverse
workforce, reflective of the Nation's demographics at all levels of the
chain of command, remains a strategic imperative and a focus area for
leaders throughout our Navy. To foster a Navy Total Force composition
that reflects America's diversity, we are focusing our efforts on
outreach, mentoring, leadership accountability, training, and
communication. Our diversity outreach efforts have contributed to our
2014 U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps
classes being the most diverse student bodies in our history. We have
increased diverse accessions through targeted recruiting in diverse
markets, developing relationships with key influencers in the top
diverse metropolitan markets, and aligning Navy assets and
organizations to maximize our connection with educators, business
leaders and government officials to increase our influencer base. We
continue to expand our relationships with key influencers and science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics-based affinity groups to
inform our Nation's youth about the unique opportunities available in
our Navy. We are also building and sustaining a continuum of mentorship
opportunities that includes the chain of command, individual
communities, social networking, peer-to-peer relationships, and
affinity groups. We will continue to ensure that all sailors are
provided with opportunities to develop personally and professionally.
Women on Submarines
After notifying Congress last year of our intent to assign women to
submarines, the Secretary of the Navy and I have authorized female
officers to serve aboard Ohio-class SSBN and SSGN submarines. This will
enable our submarine force to leverage the tremendous talent and
potential of the women serving in our Navy. The first 18 female
submarine officers commenced the standard 15-month nuclear and
submarine training pipeline in 2010, and will begin arriving at their
submarines at the end of this year. These officers will be assigned to
two ballistic missile (SSBN) and two guided missile (SSGN) submarines
which have the space to accommodate female officers without structural
modification. The plan also integrates female supply corps officers
onto SSBNs and SSGNs at the department head level. In December, the
Secretary of Defense notified Congress of Navy's intent to expend funds
to commence design and study efforts regarding reconfiguration of
existing submarines to accommodate female crew members, as well as to
design the Ohio replacement SSBN with the flexibility to accommodate
female crew members.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell
I am pleased Congress voted to repeal section 654 of title 10,
U.S.C., commonly referred to as the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT)
statute. Legislative repeal affords us the time and structured process
needed to effectively implement this significant change within our
Armed Forces. As I testified in December, we will be able to implement
a repeal of DADT in our Navy. I assess the risk to readiness,
effectiveness, and cohesion of the Navy to be low. Our implementation
process will be thorough, but timely. We are preparing the necessary
policies and regulations to implement this change in law and training
sailors and leaders at all levels to ensure they understand what repeal
means to them, their families, and the Navy. Before repeal can occur,
the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
must certify that the change can be made in a manner consistent with
the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit
cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. I will
provide Navy's input to the certification process and I remain
personally engaged in this process.
Sailor and Family Continuum of Care
We remain committed to providing our sailors and their families a
comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical,
physical, psychological, and family readiness. Our fiscal year 2012
budget request expands this network of services and caregivers to
ensure that all sailors and their families receive the highest quality
healthcare available.
Navy Safe Harbor is at the forefront in Navy's non-medical care for
all seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors, coastguardsmen, and
their families. We have expanded our network of Recovery Care
Coordinators and non-medical Care Managers to 12 locations across the
country. Safe Harbor continues to provide exceptional, individually
tailored assistance to a growing enrolled population of more than 600
individuals. Over 116,000 sailors and their spouses have participated
in Operational Stress Control (OSC) training, which actively promotes
the psychological health of sailors and their families by encouraging
them to seek help for stress reactions early, before they become
problems. The Warrior Transition Program (WTP) and Returning Warrior
Workshops (RWW) are essential to post-deployment reintegration efforts.
The WTP offers an opportunity for IA sailors redeploying from a combat
zone to decompress, turn in their gear, and receive tools that will
help them ease their transition back to their home and families. The
RWW is designed to address personal stress that may be generated by
deployment activities and it supports and facilitates the reintegration
of the deployed sailor with his/her spouse and family. The RWW also
provides a safe, relaxed atmosphere in which to identify and address
potential issues that may arise during post-deployment reintegration.
Stress on the Force
While the overall tone of our force remains positive, current
trends suggest that high operational tempo, increasing mission demands,
lean manning, force shaping, and economic conditions are placing
increased stress on our Navy personnel. Our fiscal year 2012 budget
requests increased funding to improve our program manager-level support
of our suicide prevention and stress control programs.
Suicide dramatically affects individuals, commands and families.
Over the last year, we expanded our approach to preventing suicides
from historic suicide surveillance and annual awareness training to
include more comprehensive resilience building and tailored suicide
prevention training, peer intervention, research and analysis. We saw a
reduction in our number of suicides from 46 in calendar year 2009 to 38
in calendar year 2010. Our calendar year suicide rate also decreased
from 13.3 per 100,000 sailors in 2009 to 10.9 per 100,000 sailors in
2010. Our 2010 suicide rate is below the national rate of 19.0 per
100,000 individuals for the same age and gender demographic; however,
any loss of life as a result of suicide is unacceptable. Suicide
prevention is an ``all hands, all the time'' effort involving our
sailors, families, peers, and leaders. We continue to work towards a
greater understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that
our policies, training, interventions, and communications are meeting
intended objectives.
We are integrating our suicide prevention efforts into the broader
array of programs we offer to improve the resilience of our force.
These programs, aimed at reducing individual stress, address issues,
such as substance abuse prevention, financial management, positive
family relationships, physical readiness, and family support.
We continue our efforts to eliminate sexual assault by fostering a
culture of prevention, victim response and offender accountability.
Sexual assault is incompatible with our Navy core values, high
standards of professionalism, and personal discipline. We have
organized our efforts in this critical area under the Navy Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program. The SAPR program and
the Naval Safety Center and Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program are
currently developing an integrated approach to sexual assault
prevention that includes clear leadership communication, bystander
intervention training for sailors to help them recognize and interrupt
risky situations, and training for military investigators and lawyers
on issues specific to sexual assault investigation and prosecution.
Learning and Development
Education and training are strategic investments that give us an
asymmetric advantage over adversaries. To develop the highly-skilled,
combat-ready force necessary to meet the demands of the Maritime
Strategy and the Joint Force, we have 15 learning centers around the
country providing top-notch training to our sailors, Navy civilians and
members of the other Services. In fiscal year 2010, we completed
learning and development roadmaps for all enlisted ratings, providing
sailors with detailed information about the required training,
education, qualifications and assignments they need to succeed in their
career fields. We continue to leverage a blended training approach,
integrating experienced instructors, advanced technology, and state-of-
the-art delivery systems with modularized content in order to provide
the right training at the right time in a sailor's career. We are
balancing existing education and training requirements with growth in
important mission areas such as cyber defense, missile defense, and
anti-submarine warfare. Cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise
remain essential to successfully accomplishing the Navy's global
mission, and our budget request supports our Language, Regional
Expertise, and Culture (LREC) program as well as the Afghanistan-
Pakistan Hands Program sponsored by the Joint Staff. Last year the LREC
program provided language and cultural training to more than 120,000
sailors en route to overseas assignments. We recognize the importance
of providing our people meaningful and relevant education, particularly
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which develops leaders
who are strategically-minded, capable of critical thinking, and adept
in naval and joint warfare. Our resident courses at Naval War College,
non-resident courses at Naval Postgraduate School and in the Fleet
Seminar program, and distance offerings provide ample opportunity for
achievement of this vital education.
CONCLUSION
You can be exceptionally proud of our sailors. They are our
Nation's preeminent force at sea, on land, and in air, space, and
cyberspace. While the future is not without challenges, I am optimistic
about our future and the global opportunities our Navy provides our
Nation. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request represents a balanced
approach to increasing Fleet capacity, maintaining our warfighting
readiness, and developing and enhancing our Navy Total Force. I ask for
your strong support of our fiscal year 2012 budget request and my
identified priorities. Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our
sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, and for all you do to make
our U.S. Navy an effective and enduring global force for good.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral, and again,
thank you for your extraordinary service over the decades.
General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
General Amos. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
members of the committee: It is indeed my honor to appear
before you today for the very first time as the Commandant of
the Marine Corps to articulate the posture of your Corps. Today
the Corps serves as America's expeditionary force in readiness,
a balanced air, ground, logistics team of 202,000 Active,
39,000 Reserve, and 35,000 civilian marines. Our ability to
serve as our Nation's principal crisis response force is due in
large part to this committee's and Congress' continued strong
support. Thank you for that.
Today, there are over 32,000 marines forward-deployed
around the world. As we sit here, it's half past 7 in the
evening in Afghanistan. The rainy season has hit. The evenings
remain cold and damp in this nation, where 20,000 of our young
men and women are engaged in full-spectrum combat and
counterinsurgency operations.
I'm encouraged by the significant progress they have made
in the Helmand Province and you have my assurance that this
effort remains my top priority. Sergeant Major Kent and I spent
Christmas with our marines and sailors in Afghanistan and I am
happy to report that their morale is high and their belief in
their mission is strong.
Partnered with the U.S. Navy, we are forward deployed and
forward engaged. This past year alone, our afloat forces
conducted humanitarian assistance operations in Pakistan,
Haiti, and the Philippines. They recaptured the pirated ship
Magellan Star, rescuing its crew from Somali pirates, and
partnered with allied forces in engagement missions in the
Pacific Rim, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.
Right now over 400 marines from the First Battalion, Second
Marine Regiment, who deployed last week from Camp Lejeune, NC,
within 20 hours of notification, are embarked aboard two
amphibious vessels with a full complement of fixed and rotary
wing assets. These marines are poised in the Mediterranean,
prepared to do our Nation's bidding.
Our role as America's crisis response force necessitates
that we maintain a high state of readiness. You're either ready
to respond to today's crisis with today's force today or you
risk being late and thus irrelevant.
I am keenly aware of the fiscal realities confronting our
Nation. During these times of constrained resources, the Marine
Corps remains committed to being the best stewards of scarce
public funds. We maintain a longstanding tradition with
Congress as DOD's penny-pinchers. Our institutionalized culture
of frugality positions us as the best value for the defense
dollar. For approximately 8.5 percent of the annual defense
budget, the Marine Corps provides the Nation 31 percent of its
ground operating forces, 12 percent of its fixed wing tactical
aircraft, and 19 percent of its attack helicopters.
This year's budget submission was framed by my four
service-level priorities. We will: number one, continue to
provide the best trained and equipped marines in Afghanistan;
number two, rebalance our core and posture it for the future;
number three, better educate and train our marines to succeed
in increasingly complex environments; and lastly, number four,
we will keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and our
families.
While these priorities will guide our long-term plan for
the Marine Corps, there are pressing issues facing our Corps
today that concern me, issues for which I ask Congress'
continued assistance in solving. Our equipment abroad and at
home stations has been heavily taxed in the nearly 10 years of
constant combat operations. The price tag for reset is $10.6
billion, of which $3.1 billion has been requested in fiscal
year 2011 and $2.5 billion is being sought in fiscal year 2012.
The remaining $5 billion will be needed upon the completion of
our mission in Afghanistan.
The F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF is
vital to our ability to conduct expeditionary operations.
Continued funding and support from Congress for this program is
of utmost importance. During the next 2 years of F-35B
scrutiny, I will be personally involved with the program and
closely supervising it.
Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy
have reaffirmed the necessity of the Marine Corps' amphibious
assault mission. We must develop an affordable and capable
amphibious combat vehicle to project marines from sea to land
in permissive, uncertain, and in hostile environments. I ask
for your continued support to reach this goal.
To ensure the Marine Corps remains a relevant force with a
capacity and capability to respond to the demands of future
security environments, we recently conducted a detailed
internally-driven force structure review. The results of this
effort provide America a strategically mobile, middleweight
force, optimized for forward presence, and rapid crisis
response.
As we look to the future, the Marine Corps is committed to
finding ways to be more energy efficient. Since 2009, we have
aggressively pursued energy-efficient capabilities that will
make marine units more energy self-sufficient, increase our
combat effectiveness, and protect the lives of our young men
and women. Two weeks ago, I signed our new bases to battlefield
energy planning guidance, with such goals, metrics, and a plan
for implementation.
Finally, I would like to comment on the impact of the
current CR as it has impacted our operations and our programs.
As of today, $567 million in military construction (MILCON)
contracts have not been awarded. $2.4 billion of MILCON is at
risk for the remainder of this year. These projects impact the
lives of marines, the local economies of the communities around
our bases and stations, and are projected to generate over
63,000 jobs from the Carolinas to Hawaii.
If the CR extends through the entire fiscal year, 13
bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ) totaling 5,000 affected spaces
will not be built, thus stymieing our BEQ modernization
efforts. These 13 BEQs will allow 8 infantry battalions to move
out of 50-year-old Cold War barracks.
Finally, the CR could prove catastrophic to our procurement
accounts, resulting in the loss of almost one-third of our
procurement budget capabilities.
Lastly, you have my promise that in these challenging times
ahead, the Marine Corps will only ask for what it needs, not
what it might want. We will make the hard decisions before
coming to Congress and we will redouble our efforts toward our
traditional culture of frugality.
As has been the case for over 235 years, your Marine Corps
stands ready to respond whenever the Nation calls, wherever the
President may direct.
Once again, I thank each of you for your continued support.
I'm prepared to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
AMERICA'S EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN READINESS
The Marine Corps is America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness--a
balanced air-ground-logistics team. We are forward-deployed and
forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all
manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision
space for our Nation's leaders. Alert and ready, we respond to today's
crisis, with today's force . . . TODAY. Responsive and scalable, we
team with other Services, allies and interagency partners. We enable
and participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude. A
middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy
enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating
independent of local infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum
of threats--irregular, hybrid, conventional--or the shady areas where
they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the Nation calls .
. . wherever the President may direct.
--General James F. Amos
America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness
Today, your U.S. Marine Corps is foremost America's Expeditionary
Force in Readiness. Established originally by an act of the Second
Continental Congress on November 10, 1775, your Marine Corps has
evolved over 235 years into a balanced air-ground-logistics team that
is forward deployed and forward engaged: shaping, training, deterring,
and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies.
Through the ongoing support of Congress and the American people,
your Marine Corps is a cohesive force of 202,100 Active Duty marines;
39,600 Selected Reserve marines; and 35,000 civilian marines. At any
given time, approximately 30,000 marines are forward deployed in
operations supporting our Nation's defense.\1\ This year, as our Nation
recognizes a decade since the tragic events of September 11, your
Marine Corps has been conducting Overseas Contingency Operations for an
equal amount of time. From Task Force 58 with 4,400 marines launching
from 6 amphibious ships to secure critical lodgments in Afghanistan in
late 2001 to our counterinsurgency efforts in the Al Anbar province of
Iraq and to our current operations in the Helmand River Valley of
Afghanistan, your marines have been forward deployed in the Service of
our Nation.
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\1\ As of December 2010, there were approximately 20,700 marines in
Afghanistan including marines serving in external billets (e.g.
transition teams and joint/interagency support, et cetera); 6,200 at
sea on Marine Expeditionary Units; and 1,600 marines engaged in various
other missions, operations and exercises. The 30,000 statistic excludes
over 18,000 marines assigned to garrison locations outside the
continental United States such as in Europe, the Pacific, et cetera.
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Yet, during this time the Marine Corps has not been confined solely
to major combat operations and campaigns. From our rapid response
aiding fellow Americans and enabling joint and interagency relief
efforts following Hurricane Katrina's floods, to our noncombatant
evacuation operation of 14,000 American citizens from Lebanon in 2006,
to our numerous and ongoing security cooperation missions with nations
of Africa, Eastern Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Latin America, the U.S.
Marine Corps continues to demonstrate the agility and flexibility
expected of America's principal crisis response force. Over the course
of the past year alone, your brave men and women who wear the Marine
uniform and who bring a diversity of talent in service to our Nation,
have simultaneously:
Waged an aggressive full-spectrum counterinsurgency
operation in Afghanistan while concurrently increasing combat
power nearly two-fold (i.e. from 10,600 to 19,400) in
accordance with the President's December 2009 Afghanistan-
Pakistan strategy;
Successfully completed our mission in Iraq, bringing
stability to Al Anbar province. This achievement was not
without sacrifice and suffering in that 1,022 \2\ marines gave
their lives and 8,626 marines were wounded in action;
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\2\ 1022 deaths = 851 killed in action (hostile) and 171 deceased
(non-hostile).
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Partnered with allied forces in engagement missions
throughout every Geographic Combatant Commander's Area of
Responsibility;
Conducted foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief missions in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines;
Participated in maritime security operations to ensure
freedom of navigation along vital sea lines of communication,
to include the recapture of the vessel Magellan Star and rescue
of its crew from Somali pirates; and
Rapidly reinforced U.S. Embassies in Port au Prince,
Haiti; Conakry, Guinea; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and most recently
Cairo, Egypt to assist and protect diplomatic personnel amidst
crises in these foreign capitals.
Their actions align with the functions of our Corps as seen in the
new Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.01, Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components, and are a critical link
to the continued prosperity and security of our Nation and the survival
of our friends, allies, and partners. The performance of your marines
on the global stage adds to our storied legacy of sacrifice and
success--under even the most adverse conditions--inspiring a sense of
pride and confidence in the American public that their marines are able
to respond quickly, ensuring the Nation's interests will be protected.
Future Security Environment
Public law, defense policy, our doctrine and operating concepts,
and the future security environment shape how we organize, train, and
equip our forces. As we look ahead, we see a world of increasing
instability, failed or failing states, and conflict characterized by:
Poverty, unemployment, urbanization, overpopulation,
and extremism;
Competition for scarce natural resources; and
Rapid proliferation of new technologies to include
capabilities to disrupt cyber networks, advanced precision
weaponry, and weapons of mass destruction.
These troubling socio-economic and geopolitical trends converge in
the littorals--regions along the world's coastline where the sea joins
with the land. The majority of the world's population lives near the
sea. The trend towards accelerated birth rates in the developing world,
coupled with ongoing migration from rural to urban landscapes, results
in hyper-populated coastal regions, burdened by the cumulative
stressors of criminality, extremism, and violence.
Littoral cities increasingly may assume what some have called feral
qualities, raising the potential for conflict, providing a measure of
sanctuary for our adversaries, and posing challenges to governmental
sovereignty and regional security. It is in this complex environment
that your U.S. Marine Corps will operate. We stand optimally postured
to conduct a range of operations for Joint Force commanders, bridging
the gap between operations at sea and on land.
Nonetheless, we are committed to the prevention of conflict as we
are to responding to it. Indeed, 21st century security challenges
require expansion of global engagement--facilitated through persistent
forward naval presence--to promote collective approaches to addressing
common security concerns. Accordingly, forward deployed Marine forces
will increasingly conduct theater security cooperation activities and
will build partnership capacity through security force assistance
missions with our allies and partners around the globe. The goal of our
engagement initiatives is to minimize conditions for conflict and
enable host nation forces to effectively address instability as it
occurs.
Role of the Marine Corps
The United States is a maritime nation with global
responsibilities. With a naval tradition as the foundation of our
existence, we remain firmly partnered with the U.S. Navy. Forward
deployed, we retain the ability to come from the sea rapidly to conduct
missions across the range of military operations. Our persistent
forward presence and multi-mission capability present an unparalleled
ability to rapidly project U.S. power across the global commons--land,
sea, air, space, and cyber.
Amphibious forces with robust and organic logistical sustainment
provide a maritime Super Power significant advantages, including the
ability to overcome the tyranny of distance and to project power where
there is no basing or infrastructure--a strong deterrent capability for
our Nation. To Marines, `expeditionary' is a state of mind that drives
the way we organize our forces, train, develop and procure equipment.
By definition, our role as America's crisis response force necessitates
a high state of unit readiness and an ability to sustain ourselves
logistically. We must be ready to deploy today and begin operating upon
arrival, even in the most austere environments. The U.S. Marine Corps
affords the following three strategic advantages for our Nation:
A versatile ``middleweight'' capability to respond
across the range of military operations. We fill the gap in our
Nation's defense as an agile force capable of operating at the
high and low ends of the threat spectrum or the indistinct
areas in between.
An inherent speed and agility that buys time for
national leaders. Our flexibility and rapid response capability
present unique opportunities to develop strategic options,
shape the environment, and set conditions to deploy the full
capabilities of the Joint Force and other elements of national
power.
An enabling and partnering capability in joint and
combined operations. Our unique forward posture aboard
amphibious ships, manned by well-trained, uniformed sailors,
positions us to be the `first to fight.'
USMC Priorities
My four service level priorities informed this year's budget
submission. These priorities were influenced by and derived from a
number of factors to include our understanding of the 21st century
battlefield based on lessons learned over nearly a decade at war, our
examination of the future security environment, our doctrine and
operating concepts, and our current and future budgetary and
programmatic requirements.
These priorities are aligned with the principal recommendations of
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, meeting its end state of ensuring
that the Marine Corps is able to ``prevail in today's wars, prevent and
deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide
range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer
Force.'' My priorities also support America's four enduring strategic
interests as identified in the 2010 National Security Strategy.\3\ To
that end, we will:
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\3\ (1) Security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S.
allies and partners; (2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy
in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and
prosperity; (3) respect for universal values at home and around the
world; and (4) an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that
promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation
to meet global challenges. 2010 National Security Strategy Pg, 7.
Continue to provide the best trained and equipped
Marine units to Afghanistan;
Rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future, and
aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and
organizations;
Better educate and train our marines to succeed in
distributed operations and increasingly complex environments;
and
Keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and our
families.
The above priorities guide my long-term plan for the Marine Corps;
however, there are pressing issues facing our Corps today that give
cause for concern.
Equipment: Our equipment abroad and at home station
has been ``heavily taxed'' in the nearly 10 years of constant
combat operations. We require funding to reset equipment being
utilized overseas and to reconstitute home-station equipment
and modernize for the future. This is critical to maintaining
readiness throughout the Corps.
The Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing F-35B Joint
Strike Fighter: The F-35B is vital to our ability to conduct
combined arms operations in expeditionary environments.
Continued funding and support from Congress for this program is
of utmost importance.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle: We will begin the
development of an affordable and capable amphibious combat
vehicle to replace the recently-cancelled Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle program. The capability inherent in a ship-to-
shore connector is critical to our expeditionary nature, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Defense.
End Strength: The drawdown of our Active component
from 202,100 to 186,800 must be conditions-based, and only
after completion of our mission in Afghanistan. We must keep
faith with our Marine Corps family by allowing appropriate time
and support for those departing the force and to ensure the
resiliency of our units still engaged in war.
Family Readiness Programs: Like our equipment, marines
and their families have been ``heavily taxed'' since September
11. We will continue to fund family readiness and family
support programs that are vital to the health and welfare of
our entire Marine Corps family.
Amphibious Ships: The Navy and Marine Corps have
determined a minimum force of 33 ships represents the limit of
acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force
requirement for the Assault Echelon. Marines are best postured
to engage and respond to the Nation's security interests from
amphibious ships.
The Marine Corps needs the continued support of Congress in
confronting these critical issues and the many others discussed below.
My promise to Congress is that we will do our part by continuing to be
good stewards of our taxpayers' dollars.
Fiscal Year 2012 Budgetary Submission
The Marine Corps maintains a longstanding tradition in DOD as being
``Penny Pinchers.'' A prime example of our many noteworthy cost-saving
measures is our practice of units deploying to Afghanistan utilizing
equipment sets maintained and repaired in country--a measure saving
significant funds annually on costs associated with the cycle of
deployment and redeployment. Our institutionalized culture of
frugality, streamlined business practices, lean structure, and multi-
mission capability, position us as the ``best value'' for the defense
dollar. This fiscal year we are seeking over $40 billion \4\ to fund
ongoing operations, provide quality resources for our marines, sailors,
and their families, conduct reset of equipment stressed from nearly 10
years at war, and prepare our forces for future missions. For
approximately 8.5 percent \5\ of the annual Defense budget, the Marine
Corps provides the Nation approximately 31 percent of its ground
operating forces (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support),
12 percent of its fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of its
attack helicopters.
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\4\ This sum includes both ``Blue in Support of Green'' funding,
Overseas Contingency Operation funding, and other Navy funding for USMC
needs (e.g. chaplains, medical personnel, amphibious ships, et cetera.)
\5\ Based on provisions of the National Defense Authorization and
Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Year 2010.
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During these times of constrained resources, the Marine Corps
remains committed to streamlining operations, identifying efficiencies,
and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce public funds. At the
direction of the Secretary of Defense in June 2010, the Services
conducted an efficiencies review and our fiscal year 2012 budget is the
result of a thorough study of all of our business activities. Already
one of the most economical of the Military Services, we achieved our
DOD efficiency goal. We captured overhead efficiency savings by
focusing on three main efforts:
Buying smarter through acquiring platforms more
intelligently
Streamlining our operations
Being more efficient in the way we use, produce, and
acquire energy
This effort has had a marked impact on our overall budget, allowing
us to invest more in our core warfighting missions and enhancing our
acquisition plans. The efficiency initiative drove adjustments to our
programs and ensured restoration of funding in areas where needed most.
Additionally, we used funds realized from efficiencies to support
programs originally not funded. We reinvested savings into critical
warfighting programs to enhance readiness. We anticipate unit equipment
readiness to increase by fiscal year 2014 through the purchase of
additional equipment beginning in fiscal year 2012. This readiness
increase will allow the Marine Corps to equip, train, and prepare units
earlier in the pre-deployment cycle. Other expansions that we were able
to address include enhancing funding for facilities with direct
operational impact, energy and water investments at bases and
installations, command and control and logistics programs, and
equipment modernization.
In addition to our frugality and aggressive pursuit of finding
efficiencies to enhance our warfighting capacity inherent in our budget
request, your Marine Corps remains the first and only military Service
whose financial statements have been deemed audit ready. We are
continually striving to be good stewards of the public trust and know
the ongoing financial audit will serve to both strengthen our financial
management practices and give us actionable business intelligence to
support our decisionmaking process in supporting our operational forces
at home, abroad, and in harm's way.
PRIORITY #1: CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE BEST TRAINED AND EQUIPPED UNITS TO
AFGHANISTAN
Operation Enduring Freedom
We have made great progress in Afghanistan; this effort remains our
number one priority until we attain our national objectives. At present
over 20,000 marines are deployed in Afghanistan. This mission
ultimately involves almost 60,000 marines, or just under one-third of
our Active-Duty Force, factoring in deployment, redeployment, training
cycles and other direct support. We will continue providing forces in
Afghanistan capable of full-spectrum combat and counterinsurgency
operations, while balancing our capabilities to perform what the Nation
will likely ask of us in the future. We will ensure that marines,
sailors, and the units in which they serve, receive the best possible
training and equipment to succeed in the many types of missions we are
conducting in this complex, dynamic environment.
Our successes within Helmand Province are paving the way for
economic development and governance. Marine commanders on the ground
and Afghan officials indicate that freedom of movement for the local
populace has improved. Bazaars and markets are flourishing; critical
infrastructure projects are underway. Today, 10 of 13 districts in
Helmand Province are under the control of the Afghan central
government. Daily, 135,000 children attend school, which is more than a
60 percent increase from 2008 levels. Formerly dangerous places like
Marjah, Now Zad, and Garmsir, untrafficable due to improvised explosive
devices just 1 year ago, now have significant activity occurring in
commercial centers. Yet, other challenges remain as we now seek to
capitalize on our 2010 successes. We are currently expanding battle-
space northward into other hostile locations such as the district of
Sangin, where our forces are going ``head-to-head'' with Taliban
resistance.
As America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we are ready to
execute any mission assigned in support of crisis and contingency
response. In addition to our Afghanistan commitment, we continue to
source forward-based and deployed forces to meet Geographic Combatant
Commander requirements. In light of our operational demands, and
through the support of Congress in authorizing our end strength of
202,100 Active-Duty Forces, our combat units are beginning to realize
an approximate 1:2 dwell time.\6\ Other units vary at more favorable
dwell-time levels depending on their mission. We anticipate the 1:2
dwell ratio for combat units to remain relatively stable provided
current deployed force levels are not increased; however, increased
operational demands in Afghanistan or elsewhere may result in dwell
times inconsistent with fostering a resilient Total Force.
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\6\ Infantry battalions will continue to remain just below 1:2
dwell time due to relief in place/transfer of authority requirements.
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Some marines in select military occupational specialties continue
to fall into what is known as a high-demand, low-density status. This
is a key indicator that the combat demand for Marines with these skills
does not match, or exceeds, the current manpower requirement and/or
inventory. In addition, there are currently 14 of 211 occupational
specialties where the on-hand number of marines is less than 90 percent
of what is required.\7\ Our recently completed force structure review
addressed all these concerns. We are working actively to recruit,
promote, and retain the right number of Marines in the right
occupational specialties thus promoting resiliency of our Total Force.
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\7\ Our most stressed occupational specialties based on percentage
of marines beyond a 1:2 dwell are: (1) Geographic Intelligence
Specialist, (2) Imaging Analyst/Specialists, (3) Signals Collection
Operator/Analyst, (4) Unmanned Aerial Systems Operator/Mechanic, and
(5) European, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguists.
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Training for Full Spectrum Counterinsurgency Operations
Our comprehensive training program conducted at our premiere desert
training base in Twentynine Palms, CA, has been credited by leaders
throughout the Corps with providing a dynamic environment that
replicates the many tasks, challenges, and requirements required of
units in a counterinsurgency setting. Our newly-instituted Infantry
Immersion Trainers are realistic, reconfigurable, and provide
comprehensive training environments that develop small unit tactics and
individual skills for deploying infantry squads. The Infantry Immersion
Trainer supports essential training such as control of supporting arms,
language, improvised explosive device recognition and defeat measures,
human terrain understanding and close quarters battle. Introducing
battlefield effects simulators, culturally appropriate role players,
and interactive avatars at the Infantry Immersive Trainers teaches
marines to make legally, morally, ethically, and tactically sound
decisions under situations of great stress. It also contributes to
reducing the effects of combat stress. I view this training program to
be of vital importance to our Operating Forces.
Equipping for the Afghan Effort
Marine units are operating in Afghanistan with high rates of ground
equipment readiness. Through the generosity of Congress, we have
received funds for the rapid fielding of urgent need items in support
of our Afghanistan effort. The Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
vehicle program continues to meet urgent requirements while we actively
pursue vehicle upgrades to outpace emerging threats, enhance mobility,
and improve vehicle performance. We can accomplish this goal through
engineering changes and capability insertions in current production,
planned orders, and fielded vehicles. We have a requirement for 3,362
vehicles in the family of MRAP vehicles, including 1,454 MRAP All-
Terrain Vehicles. To date, we have fielded 1,214 MRAP All-Terrain
Vehicles to our units in Afghanistan and have met the theater
requirement.
To date, we have fielded 34 Assault Breacher Vehicles, 5 of which
are in Afghanistan, to enhance the mobility of the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF). We plan to field a total of 52 Assault Breacher
Vehicles. Production of the remaining 18 vehicles remains on schedule
and is fully funded with final delivery scheduled for the second
quarter of fiscal year 2012.
In our continuing efforts to find improvised explosive devices by
all possible means, we are tripling our successful Improvised Explosive
Device Dog Detection program and are also undertaking a research and
development effort to train dogs with improved detection capabilities
with fielding expected this fall. This year, we will have fielded 647
specially trained Labrador retrievers who work off-leash, supporting
our infantry units in ground combat operations. We also have fielded a
wide array of intelligence collection sensors and analytic and
processing systems to include the Multimedia Archival Analysis System,
the Ground Based Observational Surveillance System, the Tactical Remote
Sensor System, the Communication Emitter Sensing and Attacking System,
and improvements to the Tactical Exploitation Group, to name a few.
Lastly, in December 2010, we deployed a reinforced company of 17
M1A1 Main Battle Tanks to join our efforts in Regional Command
SouthWest to provide increased force protection and firepower. Today,
these tanks are fully integrated with our forces operating in our most
highly-contested regions, and are rapidly proving their utility in this
environment by enabling our marines to increase operational tempo. They
also demonstrate the commitment of Coalition Forces to the security of
Southern Afghanistan.
PRIORITY #2: REBALANCE THE CORPS, POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE, AND
AGGRESSIVELY EXPERIMENT WITH AND IMPLEMENT NEW CAPABILITIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS
Posture for the Future and Force Structure Review
The Marine Corps has deployed MAGTFs in support of irregular
warfare missions such as our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Pakistan, Haiti,
and the Philippines, and engagement missions such as our theater
security cooperation exercises in support of every Geographic Combatant
Commander.
Despite these and many other operational successes over the past
decade, new challenges await us requiring the same spirit of innovation
and institutional flexibility that have been the bedrock of our Corps
for 235 years. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights an
expanding need over the next two decades for military forces skilled at
countering irregular threats,\8\ and the 2010 National Security
Strategy signals a need for increased engagement activities. Both of
these thrusts necessitate marines who are not only fighters, but also
trainers, mentors, and advisors. The 2011 National Military Strategy
advances the idea that ``strengthening international and regional
security requires that our forces be globally available, yet regionally
focused.'' \9\ Likewise, Geographic Combatant Commanders have continued
to register their growing need for forward-postured amphibious forces
capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and
crisis response.\10\
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\8\ ``The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future
security environment together demand that the United States retain and
enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale
counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in
environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-
cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions.''
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Pg. 20.
\9\ 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States, pg. 10.
\10\ In the past 20 years, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to
crises and contingencies 114 times--a response rate double that during
the Cold War.
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This past fall, we conducted a detailed force structure review to
develop the optimum mix of capabilities for our role as America's
Expeditionary Force in Readiness in the post-Afghanistan security
environment. The force structure review addressed 21st century
challenges confronting our Nation and its Marine Corps, aiming to build
on our historic role as the Nation's crisis response force. The review
sought to provide the ``best value'' in terms of capability, cost, and
readiness relative to the operational requirements of our forward-
engaged Geographic Combatant Commanders. The results of that effort
provide for a strategically mobile, ``middleweight'' force optimized
for forward-presence and rapid crisis response. We will be light enough
to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious ships, yet heavy
enough to accomplish the mission when we get there. Sea-based forces,
in particular, will be invaluable for discreet engagement activities,
rapid crisis response, and sustainable power projection.
Our review also aimed for a force structure that provides
capability and capacity across the range of military operations, while
simultaneously providing for resiliency in our Total Force. With likely
reductions in forward basing and strategic transportation, the
importance of regionally-focused headquarters and forces, both forward-
postured and immediately deployable with a minimum of strategic lift,
is paramount. We have thus built a Joint Task Force-capable
headquarters at several Geographic Combatant Command locations. As we
aim to implement signature outcomes of the force structure review,
marines on a day-to-day basis will be forward-deployed and engaged,
working closely with our joint and allied partners. When crises or
contingencies arise, these same marines will respond--locally,
regionally, or globally if necessary--to accomplish whatever mission
the Nation asks of us.
To best meet Geographic Combatant Commander needs and ensure
optimal configuration as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we
require Congressional support to reset our equipment, develop new
organizational structures, and begin implementing initiatives from our
force structure review. These measures ultimately will improve our
ability to function within the Joint Force, execute distributed
operations, command and control in complex environments, and conduct
persistent engagement missions. As we are entrusted with the resources
and funding to posture ourselves for the future, we will continue to
conduct responsible examination required of a disciplined force to
ensure that we implement every refinement--from the smallest to the
most sweeping--in a manner that provides the Nation with a lean force,
capable of rapidly projecting the Nation's power and strategic
influence.
EQUIPPING
Reset of the Total Force. Resetting the Marine Corps for the future
after nearly a decade at war is my number one equipping priority. This
past year, we completed our mission in Iraq, effecting the retrograde
of more than 25,000 marines,\11\ 382,000 items of equipment, 10,800
short tons of aviation support equipment, and nearly 11,000 containers
from Al Anbar province via Jordan and Kuwait to the U.S. and elsewhere.
This drawdown of equipment over the course of 1 year was a significant
logistical and operational achievement. We also accomplished the rapid
shift of critical equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the
deployment of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This shift of
materiel within a theater of operation became one of the largest
redeployments in U.S. history, both in terms of equipment moved and
distances involved.
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\11\ At present, approximately 100 marines remain in Iraq serving
in individual augment, transition team and other miscellaneous billets.
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The Marine Corps is currently sourcing highly-trained and ready
forces to meet global combatant commander requirements.
Approximately 98 percent of deployed units report the
highest levels of readiness for their assigned mission.
However, high deployed-unit readiness has come at the expense of
home-station, nondeployed units, which have sourced organic equipment
and personnel to meet the needs of our deployed forces.
Approximately 68 percent of nondeployed units report
degraded levels of readiness. The largest contributing factor
is equipment; approximately 37 percent of nondeployed forces
report degraded levels of equipment supply. This lack of
equipment impacts the ability of nondeployed forces to respond
rapidly to other potential contingencies and represents lost
core training opportunities early in the deployment cycle in
preparation for Overseas Contingency Operations.
The equipment redeployed from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the
2009 surge included most of our deployed medium tactical fleet, the
majority of our fleet of MRAP vehicles, light armored reconnaissance
vehicles, other hard-to-move equipment, and theater-specific items.
While shifting this equipment directly to Afghanistan enabled the
Marine Corps to meet critical operational timelines, it resulted in the
deferment of previously-planned post-Operation Iraqi Freedom reset
actions. These same assets comprise a significant portion of the Marine
Corps' total reset liability and depot maintenance costs. Thus, a
consequence of delaying reset actions on this equipment is the
acceptance of considerable risk in the long-term readiness and future
availability of our ground equipment. In addition, increased usage
rates of our ground equipment and harsh operating environments over
these many years at war have resulted in our ground equipment far
exceeding planned peacetime usage rates by a factor of six.
It is vital that we reset our equipment from nearly 10 years at war
to maintain the necessary levels of readiness to posture ourselves for
the future.
We estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to
be $10.6 billion. $3.1 billion has been requested in fiscal
year 2011 to reduce this liability, leaving a $7.5 billion
deficit. $5 billion of the $7.5 billion reset liability will be
incurred upon termination of the conflict in Afghanistan.
(Note: $2.5 billion has been requested for reset in fiscal year
2012. These estimates assume no reset generation beyond fiscal
year 2012 and thus do not include any reset requirements for
fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.)
This funding will support the depot-level maintenance of our
Operation Enduring Freedom equipment, procurement of combat vehicles
and major weapons systems, engineering equipment, ammunition
expenditures, and combat losses. The reset estimate is based on current
circumstances and will change as operational requirements are re-
evaluated. Moreover, as long as the war continues, our costs for reset
will grow accordingly.
Reconstitution of Equipment
Our experiences in combat operations over the past decade have
shown us that our legacy 20th century tables of equipment are
inadequate with regard to the demands of the modern battlefield. As we
move towards finalizing our force structure review by conducting a
thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities assessment, we will finalize
determination on the costs associated with modernization of equipment
sets necessary to support our future operations.
However, at this time, our initial estimate of
reconstituting our tables of equipment is $5 billion, which is
an amount entirely separate from our reset costs. We have begun
to address our reconstitution shortfall by requesting $253
million in fiscal year 2012 for equipment procurement.
As our force structure review is implemented, we will continue with
deliberate assessments of the modernization requirements for equipment
that optimizes our post-Afghanistan posture while simultaneously
reinforcing our frugal and responsible roots. Our Service
Reconstitution Equipment Strategy will guide the identification of
emerging requirements for refining the capabilities of our status as a
middleweight force, our support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders,
our service level prioritization, and resource allocation.
Marine Aviation
We are transitioning our entire inventory of fixed and rotary wing
aircraft to support our future force and require ongoing support from
Congress for this comprehensive aviation modernization effort. The
continued development and fielding of the short take-off and vertical
landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the centerpiece of
this effort. The capability inherent in a STOVL jet facilitates our
maneuver warfare doctrine and fills our need for close air support in
the many austere conditions and locations where we will likely operate
in the future. Around the world, there are 10 times as many 3,000-foot
runways capable of handling a STOVL jet as there are 8,000-foot runways
required of conventional fighter aircraft. Additionally, we maintain
the organic ability to build an expeditionary 3,000-foot runway in a
matter of days in support of aviation operations. The capabilities of
the STOVL F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy
aircraft types--F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B--which once fielded will save
DOD approximately $1 billion per year in operations and maintenance
costs. The F-35B program has made significant progress to date
including 22 successful vertical landings so far this year which is
more than double that achieved all last year. I am confident that we
will field this aircraft in accordance with responsible timelines. This
matter has my unwavering attention, and I am personally overseeing this
program. With a fully-fielded fleet of F-35Bs, the Nation will maintain
22 capital ships--11 carrier and 11 amphibious assault--with fifth
generation strike assets aboard--a significant deterrent and response
capability for our Nation.
Our legacy aircraft supporting operational missions are consuming
service life at a rate up to three times faster than scheduled.
Averaged across our complete fleet, we are consuming aircraft service
life at a rate 1.85 times faster than planned. This reality results in
compressed timelines between re-work events and in earlier retirement
of aircraft than originally programmed. The majority of our legacy
platforms are nearing the end of their service lives, and most
production lines are closed. New aircraft with low average ages and
robust service life projections are the future of our aviation force
and its support of Marine Corps and joint operations. As we transition
to these new capabilities, we are mindful of the need to ensure a
fully-integrated and networked force to provide Marine aviation to the
MAGTF and the Joint Force.
We are exploring the viability of transformational platforms such
as the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System. The Cargo UAS will facilitate
the delivery of logistics to remote locations when weather or threat
systems preclude manned aviation sorties or overland resupply convoys.
Our new aircraft will provide increased range, speed, standoff,
time on station, lift capability, and will be critical to tomorrow's
MAGTF. By 2020, we will transition more than 50 percent of our aviation
squadrons to new aircraft and complete fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22
Osprey assault support aircraft and the upgraded UH-1Y Huey utility
helicopter. We will field new close air support platforms such as the
AH-1Z attack helicopter and the STOVL F-35B. We also will have new
platforms for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an
entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Lastly, we will
introduce greater lifting power to the MAGTF with a new model of the
heavy-lift CH-53 cargo helicopter.
Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy
The priority for our Ground Combat Element is our ship-to-shore
tactical mobility. The seamless transition of our Operating Forces from
the sea to conduct sustained operations ashore, in particular to
support three balanced Marine Expeditionary Brigades (i.e. two sea-
based Joint Forcible Entry Marine Expeditionary Brigades reinforced by
a third Maritime Prepositioning Force-based Marine Expeditionary
Brigade) as well as for conducting irregular warfare missions,
necessitates an appropriate mix of ground combat vehicles. We are
focusing our efforts on developing and fielding a family of vehicles
with a balance of performance, protection, payload, transportability,
fuel efficiency, and affordability that supports the rapid
concentration and dispersion of combat power, supports strategic
deployment concepts and meets our worldwide operational commitments.
Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy is currently in its
third phase of development. Its overall goal is to field a ground
combat vehicle portfolio structured to support the ground combat
element. Vehicles in this portfolio include the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle, the Marine Personnel Carrier, and a new amphibious combat
vehicle.
In the complex future security environment, the execution of
amphibious operations requires the use of the sea as maneuver space. An
amphibious combat vehicle is essential to our ability to conduct
surface littoral maneuver and seamlessly project ready-to-fight Marine
units from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile
environments. As the Secretary of Defense affirmed earlier this year,
the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is by no
means a rejection of the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission.
The standing, validated requirement for, and development of, an
amphibious combat vehicle will ensure we continue to develop the right
platform--at the right price--to support rapid ship-to-shore movement.
To that end, we are now pursuing an integrated new vehicle program with
three components, crafted from inception for affordability and
leveraging the investment made in the EFV. We intend to mitigate risks
associated with a new vehicle program and to maximize value by use of
an integrated acquisition portfolio approach. This approach will have
three synchronized efforts:
Acceleration of the procurement of Marine Personnel
Carriers
Investment in a service life extension program and
upgrades for a portion of the existing amphibious assault
vehicles
Development of a new amphibious combat vehicle
We intend to manage these complementary capabilities, requirements
and acquisitions from a portfolio perspective.
NAVY SUPPORT
The Navy Marine Corps Team. As part of the Joint Force, the Marine
Corps and the Navy partner to leverage the significant advantages
provided by amphibious forces--a point reinforced by joint
doctrine.\12\ The Navy and Marine Corps team will be postured and
engaged forward to be most operationally relevant to the needs of our
Nation. Together, we provide the capability for massing potent forces
close to a foreign shore while maintain a diplomatically sensitive
profile. When needed, we are able to project this power ashore across
the range of military operations at a time of our Nation's choosing,
collectively demonstrating the essence of naval deterrence.
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\12\ ``Timely response to crisis situations is critical to U.S.
deterrent and warfighting capabilities. The timeliness of U.S. response
is a function of U.S. forward deployed forces and prepositioned forces
with adequate organic movement capability . . . .'' Joint Publication
3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 May 2007, pg I-8.
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Amphibious Shipping
The Marine Corps' requirement to deploy globally, rapidly respond
regionally, and train locally necessitates a combination of tactical
airlift, high-speed vessels, amphibious ships, maritime preposition
shipping, organic tactical aviation, and strategic airlift. The
inherent flexibility and utility of amphibious ships is not widely
understood, as evidenced by the frequent--and erroneous--assumption
that ``forcible entry capabilities'' alone define the requirement for
amphibious ships. The same capabilities that allow an amphibious task
force to deliver and support a landing force on a hostile shore enables
it to support forward engagement and crisis response. In fact the most
frequent employment of amphibious forces is for steady state engagement
and crisis response. The Geographic Combatant Commanders have increased
demand for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting
security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis response
reflecting the operational value of amphibious forces for missions
across the range of military operations.\13\ In an era of declining
access and strategic uncertainty, I anticipate that this upward demand
trend will continue.
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\13\ Since September 11, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to
crises and contingencies at least 50 times, a response rate more than
double that of the Cold War.
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Our principal contribution to U.S. Global Defense Posture is our
``rotationally responsive'' forces aboard amphibious ships. These
forces combine the advantages of an immediate, yet temporary, presence,
graduated visibility, and tailored, scalable force packages structured
around the MAGTF. Rotational Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine
Expeditionary Units forward deployed in three Geographic Combatant
Command areas of responsibility, not only provide the capability for
crisis response, but also present a means for day-to-day engagement
with partner nations. Rotational forces also offer additional
flexibility for decisionmakers in the event that forces are required to
rapidly re-deploy across divergent regions and conflicts.
In January 2009, the Navy and Marine Corps agreed that the force
structure requirement to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade
lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. In light of the fiscal
constraints, the Department of the Navy agreed to sustain a minimum of
33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This number gives a
capability needed for steady state operations and represents the
minimum number of ships needed to provide the Nation with a sea based
power projection capability for full spectrum amphibious operations--
including the amphibious assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary
Brigades.
The Marine Corps is committed to the spiral development of the
America Class LHA (R), which is 27 percent complete. We expect the Navy
to take delivery of LHA-6 in fiscal year 2014 with availability to
deploy beginning in fiscal year 2017. In terms of LHA-7, we anticipate
the contract award in late fiscal year 2011 with fabrication commencing
the following year. These two ships are maximized for aviation, and I
believe it is essential that a well-deck be reintroduced in LHA-8 as
currently planned. The ongoing procurement and commissioning of the
final two of our planned 11 San Antonio-class LPD-17 ``Common Hull
Forms'' is critical to providing the lift capacities and operational
capabilities to support the full range of military operations up to and
including forcible entry.
Maritime Prepositioning Assets
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) program exists to enable
the rapid deployment and engagement of a Marine Air Ground Task Force
anywhere in the world in support of our National Military Strategy. The
current MPF, which has been employed 55 times since 1985, is composed
of a fleet of 16 ships divided into 3 Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Squadrons located in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean (Diego
Garcia), and Pacific Ocean (Guam and Saipan). With the restructure of
the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future, the Marine Corps and Navy
have focused on an interim solution to enhance current MPF with three
new ships to enable future sea-basing concepts. The addition of three
Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) and three T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo
ships to the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, coupled with
existing Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On, Roll-Off (LMSR) cargo ships,
will enable the MPS squadrons to conduct at-sea, sea-state three,
selective offload of vehicles, personnel, and equipment without
complete reliance on fixed ports ashore. The introduction of MLPs, T-
AKEs, and LMSRs provide the Navy and Marine Corps team a substantial
step in enhancing our current sea-basing capabilities.
The Department of the Navy is currently funding the full MPF
program of 16 ships through fiscal year 2012; however, the DoN POM-13
places one Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (6 ships) in a Reduced
Operational Status beginning in fiscal year 2013. We will continue to
optimize the MPF program to remain responsive and relevant to
Geographic Combatant Commander requirements.
Naval Surface Fire Support
The Marine Corps has an enduring requirement for fire support from
naval vessels in the range of 41-63 nautical miles to support
amphibious operations in the littorals. These fires are needed by
tactical commanders to maneuver towards battlefield objectives once
ashore, contributing to joint doctrine for assured access. They serve
as a component of the balanced and complementary joint triad of fires.
Yet, unlike tactical aviation and ground fire systems, naval surface
fires are unique and vital for their volume, lethality, accuracy, and
all-weather capability.
Planned reductions in the procurement of certain naval ships along
with cancellation of specific weapons programs over the past few years
have led to a deficiency in systems available for naval surface fires.
Completed in 2009, the Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of
Alternatives identified the optimum U.S. Navy programs to support
Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. This study
established the baseline capabilities of the current naval surface fire
support program of record (13nm projectile of the 5-inch gun and the
Advance Gun System of the DDG-1000) to be insufficient in mitigating
fire support gaps. The study determined that extended range 5-inch
munitions would serve as a complementary alternative to the three DDG-
1000s. Dramatic improvements in 5-inch projectiles can extend the naval
surface fire support maximum range, across the 106 guns in the surface
fleet, from 13 to 52 nautical miles with precision, high angle attack
for use in operations in urban terrain, and potential effectiveness
against moving targets. We also support ongoing research and
development of transformational technologies like the electromagnetic
rail gun with its potential to revolutionize the reach, coverage, and
responsiveness of ship-based naval gunfire to ranges in excess of 200
nautical miles.
Assured Access
We remain vigilant of burgeoning anti-access/area denial threats
proliferating around the globe, particularly in the Pacific Rim. The
family of guided rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles and subsurface
systems like mines and quiet submarines, pose a challenge to the power
projection capability of seaborne expeditionary forces and threatens
DOD's ability to prevent and deter conflicts and prepare for a wide
range of contingencies.
Marine Air Ground Task Forces ashore and aboard amphibious shipping
will support operations to ensure the freedom of action of U.S. and
Allied forces by establishing expeditionary bases and airfields or
defending advance bases. Marine Short Take-off and Vertical Landing
aviation assets will be of particular value in overcoming adversary
anti-access and area denial capabilities since they can operate from
short or degraded airfields, can be rapidly dispersed, and can utilize
both large carriers and amphibious ships for attack, maintenance, force
protection, and dispersal purposes. The Joint Force Commander can
leverage these unique capabilities to ensure the sea control necessary
for the conduct of subsequent joint operations, whether they be power
projection, forcible entry, or freedom of navigation.
In this regard, we are partnered with the joint community to
develop an overarching concept to attain operational access. This year,
we will employ our wargaming capability in Expeditionary Warrior 2011
to examine operations designed to overcome anti-access challenges. We
are partners with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in the
development of the Air-Sea Battle Concept aimed at integrating
capabilities to defeat these advanced weapon systems in maritime areas
of strategic interest. We also continue to participate in the U.S.
Army's Joint Forcible Entry Warfighting Experiment, examining
capabilities to conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entry
operations.
PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATONAL INITIATIVES
People. Today's Marine Corps represents less than 1/10 of 1 percent
of the U.S. population, and the individual Marine remains our most
valuable asset. Our 202,100 Active Duty and 39,600 Selected Reserve end
strength allow us to meet current operational commitments while
promoting resiliency throughout our Total Force. In fiscal year 2010
Marine Corps Recruiting Command accessed 1,703 officers (100.18 percent
of the 1,700 officer goal). Our fiscal year 2011 accession mission is
1,650 active duty officer accessions with the same goal projected in
fiscal year 2012. In terms of enlisted accessions, we are exceeding our
internal quality standards of 95 percent enlisted recruits entering the
Marine Corps possessing a high school diploma and 63 percent qualifying
in the DOD I-IIIA mental group categories (DOD quality standards are 90
percent and 60 percent respectively). We will achieve our mission of
31,500 enlisted Active component non-prior service recruits in fiscal
year 2011. Enlistment Bonuses remain vital to meeting the continuing
requirement for high demand skills. We are continuing to experience
unprecedented retention in both first-term and career marines.
We will continue to shape our Total Force to provide the ideal
grade and military occupational specialty mix needed for sustainment.
Our force structure review developed ways to increase unit readiness
within our operating forces to ensure 99 percent manning of enlisted
billets and 95 percent manning of officer billets. At the close of the
Future Years Defense Program, we will work with the Secretary of
Defense on a responsible drawdown of our end strength that is aligned
with the future mission demands of a post-Operation Enduring Freedom
security environment. I am determined to ``keep faith'' with our
marines and their families by designing and executing a responsible
drawdown from our current 202,100 end strength such that we avoid
reduction-in-force actions and early retirement boards.
The Marine Corps is committed to making concerted efforts to
attract, mentor, and retain the most talented men and women who bring a
diversity of background, culture and skill in service to our Nation.
Our diversity effort is structured with the understanding that the
objective of diversity is not merely to achieve representational
parity, but to raise total capability through leveraging the strengths
and talents of each and every marine. The success of our pioneering
Female Engagement Team program in Afghanistan, which is an offshoot of
a similar effort we employed in Iraq, is one way that the Marine Corps
utilizes diversity within our ranks for operational benefit.
We are currently developing a comprehensive, Service-wide strategy
on diversity, an effort facilitated through our standing Diversity
Review Board and a Diversity Executive Steering Committee chartered to
establish the foundations for diversity success in the Total Force. The
Marine Corps has established minority officer recruiting and mentoring
as the highest priority in our recruiting efforts. Along with the other
Services, we have provided timely input to the congressionally-
sanctioned Military Leadership Diversity Commission and look forward to
release of the Commission's final report scheduled for March 2011.
Marine Air Ground Task Force Enhancements
To further posture ourselves for the future, we are evaluating the
internal workings of our MAGTFs to account for the distributed
operations, decentralized command and control, dispersed forces and
diffuse threats inherent on the modern battlefield. We are implementing
a diverse suite of command and control systems within all elements of
the MAGTF. We continue to work to build the capacity of new
organizations like the Marine Corps Information Operations Center to
achieve non-lethal effects in today's irregular and complex
environments. We are ensuring the rapid analysis, fusion, and
dissemination of intelligence down to the tactical level by continuing
implementation of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Enterprise. We also aim to reorganize our intelligence
collection and exploitation capabilities, increasing the ratio of
resources to users. We will also capitalize on the capabilities of
unmanned aircraft systems via an increase in capacity.
We are developing regionally-focused Marine Expeditionary Brigade
command elements that are joint task force capable, with habitually
aligned subordinate elements, to improve Geographic Combatant Commander
effectiveness and speed of response. We have recently stood up one such
element in Bahrain in support of U.S. Central Command. To better
standardize operations and training for units and staff in our ground
combat element, we established the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations
Group, which reached full operational capability in May 2010. Among
other measures, this organization's mission is to support the
refinement of our doctrine, including how our infantry companies will
fight in the future. Building on the successes of the Marine Corps
Tactics and Operations Group for the ground combat element, we are also
developing and establishing a Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group
capability for the Logistics Combat Element along with reorganizing
Marine Logistics Groups to establish standing Combat Logistics
Battalions habitually aligned to specific Marine Expeditionary Units
and infantry regiments.
Over the past decade, we have become more reliant on equipment sets
resulting from the emergence of new threats, perhaps most notably the
improvised explosive device. This trend has resulted in the acquisition
of some resources that are incompatible with the ethos of an agile,
expeditionary force. To that end, we have begun an effort known as
``Lightening the MAGTF,'' a measure aimed at reducing the size, weight,
and energy expenditure of our forces from the individual rifleman to
wholesale components of the MAGTF.
Sustained combat operations and worldwide theater security
cooperation and training commitments over the last decade point towards
an essential requirement for the Marine Corps Reserve to continue
focusing at the operational, rather than strategic level of warfare.
Since September 11, our Marine Corps Reserve has engaged continuously
in combat operations as well as in regional security cooperation and
crisis prevention activities in support of the Geographical Combatant
Commanders. This operational tempo has built a momentum among our
warfighters and a depth of experience throughout the ranks that is
unprecedented in generations of Marine Corps reservists. In fact,
today's Marine Corps Reserve is more highly trained, capable, and
battle-tested than at any time since the Korean War.
The transition in utilization of the Marine Corps Reserve from a
strategic to operational Reserve, as affirmed by our force structure
review, expands our ability to perform as America's Expeditionary Force
in Readiness. Sharing the culture of deployment and expeditionary
mindset that has dominated Marine Corps culture, ethos and thinking
since our beginning more than 2 centuries ago, the Marine Corps Reserve
is optimally organized, equipped, and trained to perform as an
Operational Reserve.
Institutions for Irregular Warfare
Irregular operations (e.g. Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations,
Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare and Counterterrorism)
often occur in response to crisis and are executed in austere
conditions--situations often entailing employment of marines. Our
experiences countering irregular threats in ``Small Wars'' is a result
of responding to complex crises involving a mix of security, economic,
political, and social issues--usually under austere physical
conditions. Our approach to irregular warfare is based on the
understanding that people, ideas and organizations--not platforms and
advanced technology--are the keys to success in operating in complex
and irregular warfare environments. Naval forces conducting theater
security operations and security force assistance to build partnership
capacity also provide the Nation the potential for immediate crisis
response capability and options for escalation or de-escalation.
Building on our lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are
developing options to re-organize, consolidate, and strengthen our
institutions that emphasize our irregular warfare and multi-mission
capability such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and
Learning, the Security Cooperation Training and Education Center, and
the Center for Irregular Warfare. The objective is to gain unity of
effort, increase effectiveness and efficiency, and reduce redundant
capacity.
We established the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG)
within the past 5 years to train, equip, and deploy Marines for
Security Force Assistance missions in support of Geographic Combatant
Commander theater security cooperation plans. The MCTAG provides
conventional training and advisor support to Host Nation Security
Forces. This organization also offers planning assistance to Marine
regional component commands in developing and executing partner nation
training programs. The MCTAG is scheduled to reach full operating
capability in September 2011 and to date has directly trained more than
180 marines and sailors and assisted in the training of more than 600
marines and sailors, who themselves have conducted in excess of 150
deployments to more than 50 countries worldwide. The MCTAG has also
developed programs of instruction to train joint service advisors/
trainers deploying on theater security cooperation missions as well as
programs of instruction to train light infantry battalions from the
Republic of Georgia in executing combat operations in Afghanistan.
Because the Marine Corps functions in an integrated fashion
throughout all traditional domains--land, sea, air, and space--it is a
logical step forward for us to be optimally organized, trained and
equipped to operate synergistically on the modern battlefield, which
now includes the cyber domain. As U.S. Cyber Command matures and
sponsors initiatives to increase cyber operational capacity, we are
taking deliberate steps to build additional Marine Corps cyber
capability and capacity to meet joint and service-level demands.
We see the continued development of organic cyber capabilities,
capacities, and awareness as a critical element to retain speed,
precision, and lethality across the entire spectrum of operations. We
are working to incorporate scenarios into our exercises to increase
opportunities for marines to leverage cyber capabilities while also
training marines to operate where cyber-enabled warfighting capability
may be degraded and/or contested. Additionally, we are integrating
tailored cyber education into our officer and enlisted professional
education programs. We are continuing to examine our options for
recruiting, training and retaining our cyber workforce. This is
especially challenging given the highly specialized skill sets and the
competition for such in both the Federal and Private sectors.
Formed in 2006, Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is
currently conducting an internal reorganization into three mirrored
battalions. Upon completion of this reorganization in fiscal year 2014,
MARSOC will have one regiment consisting of 3 battalions, 12 companies,
and 48 Marine Special Operations Teams. Since December 2009, MARSOC has
maintained an enduring battalion-level Special Operations Task Force
headquarters and 2 companies in Afghanistan along with persistent
Marine Special Operations Team engagements in other high priority
regions.
Since its inception, the Marine Corps has resourced MARSOC with
significant investments in military construction for training
facilities, barracks and headquarters. In the near term, MARSOC will
have 2,678 personnel. Our force structure review recently evaluated
ways to increase the number of combat support and combat service
support marines (e.g. logisticians, intelligence personnel, et cetera)
enabling MARSOC's operations. I intend to add 1,001 marines to MARSOC,
which will increase its capacity by 44 percent. These marines, who are
above and beyond the planned fiscal year 2014 personnel increase, will
better enable it for effective special operations.
The Marine Corps serves as the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Executive
Agent responsible for developing program recommendations and
stimulating non-lethal weapons requirements. Non-lethal effects are
part of the DOD portfolio of capabilities that enhance the Joint Force
Commander's ability to act in a timely manner to detect, deter,
prevent, defeat, or, if necessary, mitigate the effects of an attack.
Non-lethal capabilities provide the Joint Force the ability to
selectively target hostile threats, covered or concealed by civilian
assets, while avoiding collateral damage. Geographic Combatant Commands
are registering increased demand for non-lethal weapons options to
include items such as arresting nets, dazzler lasers, acoustic hailing
devices, electric stun guns, blunt impact munitions, and non-lethal
warning munitions. The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program continues to
support joint and combined non-lethal weapons research, development,
training and exercises in support of all Geographic Combatant Commands.
Expeditionary Energy
The Marine Corps is leading the development of expeditionary energy
solutions for DOD and the Department of the Navy--reducing energy
demand in our platforms and systems, increasing the use of renewable
energy, and instilling an ethos of energy and water efficiency in every
marine. Our priority is force protection--saving lives by reducing the
number of marines at risk on the road hauling fuel and water. We also
aim to help marines travel lighter and move faster through the
reduction in size and amount of equipment and the dependence on bulk
supplies.
In February 2011, we issued a ``Bases to Battlefield''
Expeditionary Energy Strategy Implementation Planning Guidance, which
sets goals, performance metrics, and a plan for implementation by 2025.
This strategy supports congressional and Department of the Navy goals
to increase energy security through the use of alternative fuels and
energy efficiency. Since 2009 we have aggressively pursued renewable
energy and energy efficient capabilities that will make Marine units
more energy self-sufficient, and ultimately increase our combat
effectiveness.
Within a year, we stood up an Experimental Forward Operating Base,
sourced commercial and government technologies, trained an infantry
company with renewable energy technology, and deployed them to
Afghanistan in the winter of 2010 where they operated two patrol bases
entirely on renewable energy. As a result, our forces required less
fuel and batteries, reducing risk to marines and saving money. This
year, the Experimental Forward Operating Base will focus on the
requirements of a major battlefield energy user--the Command Operations
Center and the Command Element--and will evaluate a second round of
energy technologies to support expeditionary operations.
In fiscal year 2012 we are devoting more resources--in current
programs and new areas--to build a foundation to achieve our goals for
increased energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2025. As a starting
point, we anticipate savings of petroleum over the Future Years Defense
Program in our Overseas Contingency Operations of 100,000 to 150,000
barrels. For example this year, we are procuring mobile electric power
sources to achieve 17 percent fuel efficiency using U.S. Army-funded
development and Marine Corps-funded procurement monies. We are also
fielding Enhanced Efficiency Environmental Control Units to achieve 15-
30 percent power efficiency improvements.
Installation Energy
We are also devoting more resources to our Energy Investment
Program than ever before. These funds will be used to implement the
results of recent and ongoing energy audits at our installations;
install more efficient systems and reduce overall energy consumption.
Additionally, new facilities will continue to incorporate the latest
energy sustainability and efficiency features. This effort aboard our
installations complements our Corps-wide initiative to develop an
energy ethos and culture of conservation.
TRAINING
Training MAGTFs. We are utilizing our Marine Corps Service Campaign
Plan as a roadmap to strengthen and maintain our core competencies and
to ensure we remain America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness well
into the future. This effort also will also help synchronize our
Service level security cooperation activities in support of national
strategy and guide the type of training and exercises we must conduct,
in particular at the Marine Expeditionary Brigade level.
Our amphibious core competency figures prominently in our Service
Campaign Plan, and as a result we have undertaken an array of exercise
planning in this critical skill area. We will soon be conducting a
MAGTF large scale exercise that will refine our capability to conduct
amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in a joint
and interagency environment. In late-2010 we conducted Exercise Bold
Alligator 2011, the first large-scale amphibious training exercise with
the Navy on the east coast in almost 10 years. This synthetic training
event practiced planning for forcible entry operations against
conventional and asymmetric threats and a large scale non-combatant
evacuation operation. We will take lessons learned from this exercise
and build upon them for the next iteration of this important exercise
with the U.S. Navy scheduled in the coming year.
We are reviewing the core functions of our organizations and, where
appropriate, adding irregular warfare capabilities to reflect the full
spectrum of possible employment options as a core task set for the
Marine Expeditionary Brigade. We view integration with other government
agencies and coordination with nongovernment organizations as essential
to our success in irregular warfare and have significantly increased
interagency participation in numerous exercises and training venues
such as Expeditionary Warrior-09/10, Emerald Express, Joint Urban
Warrior-09, and Joint Irregular Warrior-10. We aim to capitalize on our
current theater security cooperation and partnership capacity building
activities with our allies and partners in all operational environments
providing our national leaders with strategic options to shape
outcomes, prevent and deter conflicts, strengthen ``at risk'' states,
and deny enemy safe-havens.
PRIORITY #3: BETTER EDUCATE AND TRAIN OUR MARINES TO SUCCEED IN
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
Professional Military Education and Small Unit Leader Development
We are planning more investments in the education of our
noncommissioned officers and junior officers, as they have assumed
vastly greater responsibilities in both combat and garrison. This focus
on education will better train them for decisionmaking during
distributed operations against more diffused threats over broader areas
of the battlefield. The primary initiative to address this priority is
to increase markedly their opportunities to attend resident
professional military education. We are currently evaluating ways to
increase throughput at resident professional military education courses
with options for both constrained and unconstrained manpower and
resource increases. We are evaluating traditional paradigms relative to
course lengths and instructional methodology, with the specific
objectives of tripling throughput at the Expeditionary Warfare School
(career level) and doubling resident Command and Staff College
(intermediate level) throughput.
These key leaders also impact unit cohesion and our overall
effectiveness in combat. Introducing these leaders into a unit at the
right time and stabilizing them in a life cycle continuum of a unit
positively impacts a unit's effective training, performance and
resiliency during pre-deployment training and post combat. These
leaders are in the best position to influence our cultural ethos with
its emphasis on intangible qualities such as esprit de corps,
integrity, and ``service to country during time of war.'' We are
currently reviewing manpower policies and models and will ensure these
key leaders are present and able to lead a cohesive unit throughout its
life-cycle continuum, including rigorous predeployment training and
post-deployment actions. This effort will ready our units for any
fight, whether irregular or combat.
We also intend to infuse Values Based Training, rooted in our core
values of Honor, Courage and Commitment, at all levels of professional
development to foster resilience and to enable effective operations,
especially in complex irregular environments. Our overall goal is to
institutionalize efforts to develop more mature, educated, and capable
non-commissioned officers and maneuver unit squad leaders. As these
concepts mature, there will be costs in terms of military instruction
and facilities for which we will require congressional support.
Regionalization and Specialization
The increased call for engagement, as seen in our force structure
review and in strategic guidance, requires marines with improved
cultural and language skills and formal education. To develop better
specialization for anticipated future missions and operating
environments, we will expand our Foreign Area Officer and Regional
Affairs Officer programs, as well as opportunities to send more
officers through graduate level training, fellowships and research
opportunities--ideas supported by findings and recommendations of the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Independent Panel Report.\14\ This effort will extend to our ``Whole of
Government'' approach toward irregular warfare as we seek greater
exchanges and fellowships with the elements of the Interagency.
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\14\ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pg 54; 2010 QDR
Independent Panel Report, pgs 75-77.
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Marine Corps University
We are continuing to implement recommendations of our 2006 Officer
Professional Military Education Study (the Wilhelm Report) and are
making significant strides in terms of resources and facilities
enhancing the campus of the Marine Corps University (MCU). We have
programmed approximately $125 million in Military Construction between
fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 for new academic facilities for
the Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, and the School
of Advanced Warfighting. In addition, we will expand the Staff
Noncommissioned Officer Academy at the main campus in Quantico. These
funds represent only a down payment on a larger commitment to double
the size of the University campus and to upgrade our enlisted academies
worldwide. Completion of the MCU master plan will require the
demolition and relocation of tenant units aboard the campus. Detailed
documentation of costs associated is ongoing; however, we estimate over
$400 million is needed to complete the master plan. Our ultimate goal
is to develop the MCU into a premier institution with world-class
faculty, facilities, students, and curricula; we will require the
assistance of Congress in this goal.
priority #4: keep faith with our marines, our sailors and our families
Keeping Faith
We expect and demand extraordinary loyalty from our marines--a
loyalty to Country, family, and Corps. Our Nation has been at war for a
decade, placing unprecedented burdens on marines, sailors, families,
wounded warriors, and the families of the fallen. They have all made
tremendous sacrifices in the face of danger. We owe them all a
reciprocal level of loyalty. Our approach to caring for their needs is
based on the same unwavering faithfulness they have demonstrated to the
Marine Corps. We will ensure their needs are met during times of
deployment and in garrison by providing the services, facilities, and
programs to develop the strength and skills to thrive on the challenges
of operational tempo. When needed, we will restore them to health. We
will also transition them back to civilian life, and in the cases of
our fallen marines, we will support and protect their surviving spouses
and dependents. We will do this by focusing on several areas this
fiscal year.
Combat Stress, Resiliency, Medical, and Mental Health Care
We continue to advocate for the highest quality medical care and
facilities for our servicemembers, retirees, and their families. To
ensure the Department can continue to provide the finest health care
benefits in the country to our beneficiaries, we fully support the
medical efficiencies and adjustments in TRICARE included in the
President's budget proposal.
The evolving security environment requires a physically and
mentally resilient marine able to endure extended exposure to
ambiguous, stressful, and ever-changing situations. Young leaders find
themselves on the vanguard of a protracted war, adapting to a variety
of situations and scenarios. To improve their resilience, we are
working aggressively and creatively to build a training continuum that
better prepares them for the inevitable stress of combat operations and
to equip them with the necessary skills required to cope with the
challenges of life as a marine.
Instruction founded and focused on our core values helps provide
some of this resilience, especially in irregular warfare and complex
environments. A program combining the ``best practices'' of mental,
emotional and physical fitness will best instill in our marines the
resiliency needed to endure the stressors of combat and enhance their
ability to perform effectively across the range of military operations.
We are developing a comprehensive program to improve the resiliency of
our marines both in garrison and in combat.
We are partnered with the Navy to address the Nation-wide dearth of
qualified mental health care providers, which challenges our ability to
provide care at some of our bases and stations and, in some cases, to
our reservists in remote locations. During calendar year 2010, we saw a
nearly 30 percent decrease in the number of suicides within our Total
Force.\15\ We are too early in our suicide studies to identify what
specific initiative(s) have resulted in this dramatic turnaround.
However, we have implemented a number of measures on multiple fronts.
Some of these include the following:
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\15\ Calendar year 2010 suicides = 37 whereas calendar year 2009
suicides = 52.
Evocative Peer-led Training Program: ``Never Leave a
Marine Behind'' suicide prevention program for noncommissioned
officers and junior marines. We are expanding this training to
include staff noncommissioned officers and commissioned
officers this year.
DSTRESS Line Pilot Program with TRICARE West: ``By
Marines--For Marines'' call center designed to assist with
problems at an early stage. The call center is staffed by
veteran marines, providing anonymous service to all current
marines, veteran marines, their families, and loved ones.
Combat and Operational Stress Control and Operational
Stress Control and Readiness Teams: Utilizing unique training
programs across the Total Force and ensuring the presence of
mental health professionals in front-line units as a primary
prevention tool to help Marines identify and mitigate stress.
Marine Resilience Study to Assess Risk and Resilience:
We are participating in a longitudinal research study that will
examine risk across three domains: biological, psychological
and social. The outcome of this study will inform our future
work in the area of building and maintain resiliency across the
Corps.
We will continue advocating to the medical community for better
diagnostic and increased treatment options for marines with severe
injuries including post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury. In
collaboration with the other Services, we developed a set of events-
based parameters, mandating that our leaders search out marines who
have experienced a concussive event. This measure no longer relies on
identification of impacted servicemembers solely on their willingness
to seek help on their own initiative. These protocols are in place now
in Afghanistan, and we are already seeing a culture change in the
attitude of marines about being treated early for a traumatic brain
injury.
We have established an in-theater Restoration Center that brings
comprehensive concussion diagnosis and management as close to the front
lines as possible to ensure that appropriate care is available as
quickly as possible. We are currently developing policy and
applications to track traumatic brain injury from ``point of injury''
to ``return to full duty'' separately but in parallel with medical
documentation. These measures will empower commanders with the
information they need to monitor the health of a marine who has
suffered a concussive event and intervene appropriately for the
duration of a marine's career and long after the initial injury.''
Transition Assistance
We believe transition assistance should be a process not an event.
We have established a goal to make the Marine Corps Transition
Assistance Management Program more value added for our departing
marines. From 2009 to 2010, we conducted functionality assessments of
the Transition Assistance Management Program and the Lifelong Learning
Program and noted many deficiencies. In response, we established two
Transition Assistance Operational Planning Teams in 2010 to assess
existing programs. We have developed an ``end-to-end'' process
improvement plan that will begin at the point of initial accession into
the Marine Corps and continue through post separation. We are
initiating actions and integrating existing capabilities that will most
directly improve the quality of support provided to marines within 6
months prior to separation and those who have been separated at least 6
months.
Marines have expressed a desire for assistance navigating
Department of Veterans Affairs benefit processes such as in cases of
enrollment for and access to education benefits. We will modify
existing websites to improve access and enhance opportunity for
separating marines to speak directly to Marine Corps support personnel
who are trained to remove administrative benefit processing barriers.
We will improve networking opportunities to help marines find
meaningful employment and are adapting our current job fairs to support
increased networking opportunities that will allow them to meet mentors
and employers.
Marines have asked for an opportunity to connect with employers and
learn how to translate their intangible and tangible attributes. Our
transition workshops will be overhauled to address these needs. Marines
are also seeking help to simplify enrollment processes for the Post-9/
11 Montgomery GI bill and to gain access to academic institutions that
will provide the quality and level of business education and skills
private industry demands. We have initiated a Leader-Scholar Program,
which includes academic institutions who value marines' service
commitment and pledge special enrollment consideration. While the
support varies from school to school, we now have 75 participating
institutions with the goal of an additional 25 by the end of this year.
As we gain momentum, we will continue to change the transition
assistance program from its current event focus to that of a process
that reintegrates marines into the civilian sector with the knowledge,
skills, and abilities to leverage and communicate their Marine Corps
time and experience.
Family Readiness Programs
We increased baseline funding for family support programs beginning
in fiscal year 2010 to ensure appropriate wartime footing. Programs
benefitting from this measure include the Unit, Personal and Family
Readiness Program; Marine Corps Family Team Building Program;
Exceptional Family Member Program; School Liaison Program; and other
miscellaneous Marine Corps Community Services Programs supporting
remote and isolated commands, deployed marines, and independent duty
marines and families. We are currently conducting a complete review to
ensure effectiveness and efficiency of these programs. Our goal is to
determine where expansion may be needed to further assist our families
and where programs can be streamlined to reduce redundancy.
Wounded Warrior Care
Marines continue to suffer numerous wounds, trauma, and injuries
during operations in combat and during training missions. Many of these
brave heroes with significant injuries are convalescing at military
treatment facilities here in the National Capital Region and across our
Nation at other major military treatment facilities. Our Wounded
Warrior Regiment provides non-medical care management services to
wounded, ill, and injured marines and their families. The Wounded
Warrior Regiment continues to improve existing programs and add new
support mechanisms. We have increased support to wounded, injured, and
ill Reserve marines through additional Recovery Care Coordinators,
enhanced family support at military treatment facilities, and one-on-
one orientation sessions. We also provide Integrated Disability
Evaluation System Support through Regional Limited Duty Coordinators
and Wounded Warrior Attorneys. We have also initiated a mandatory
Warrior Athlete Reconditioning Program. Outreach is an important aspect
of the Regiment's nonmedical care delivery and management. The Sergeant
Merlin German Wounded Warrior Call Center extends support to marines
and families through advocacy, resource identification and referral,
information distribution, and care coordination, 24 hours a day, 7 days
per week.
The comprehensive care coordination provided by the Wounded Warrior
Regiment throughout the phases of recovery has been highly successful.
The results of internal assessments have substantiated that creation of
the Wounded Warrior Regiment has had a positive impact on the support
offered wounded, injured, and ill marines and families. The Marine
Corps will continue to honor the commitment to our Wounded Warriors and
to help them return to full duty or successfully reintegrate into their
communities.
Behavioral Health Integration
Behavioral health needs since September 11 have become increasingly
complex with individuals often requiring assistance in a number of
areas at one time. Marines with more than two deployments have been
identified as a higher risk population. According to the Joint Mental
Health Assessment Team, psychological health problems remain steady at
11 percent of marines for the first and second deployments, but
increase to 22 percent for those who have deployed three or more times.
Sixty-five percent of marines are under 25 years old. Associated with
this young force are high-risk factors that include communication and
coping skills, isolation, combat-related wounds and substance abuse.
Drawdown of end strength following Operation Enduring Freedom and
return to garrison life will likely result in additional behavioral
healthcare requirements as marines redeploy and adjust to the garrison
environment. We continue to move forward with our integration of
prevention and intervention programs initiated in 2009. We have
established a Behavioral Health Branch at our headquarters for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs. Headquarters Marine Corps Health Services also has
created and filled a new billet for a Director of Psychological Health.
Military Construction
The Marine Corps maintains its commitment to facilities and
infrastructure supporting both operations and quality of life. Our
military construction and family programs are important to success in
achieving and sustaining our force structure and maintaining readiness.
For many years, we funded only our most critical facility needs. As a
result, our installations were challenged to properly house and operate
the additional forces required to meet our planned end strength
increase. Between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2010, we received
$6.9 billion in new construction and design. With this funding, we are
providing new quality of life facilities, improved operational and
training facilities, and more modern utility infrastructure systems.
Our fiscal year 2012 military construction budget request is $1.4
billion. With these requested funds, we will provide bachelor enlisted
quarters, aviation support facilities, and improvements to quality of
life, utilities and infrastructure, and professional military education
facilities. Additional family housing efforts in fiscal year 2012
include improvements to existing housing units and funding for the
operations, maintenance, and leasing of 1,100 units worldwide and
oversight of 22,000 privatized units.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Marine Corps remains the Nation's crisis response force-
of-choice. Our continued success in Afghanistan and throughout the
globe is made possible by the loyal sacrifice of our incredible men and
women in uniform, civilian marines, and our Marine Corps family. The
personnel, equipment, and training that have given us success over the
nearly past 10 years at war has come through the ongoing support of
Congress and the American people. I promise that your Marine Corps
understands the value of each dollar provided and will continue to
provide maximum return for every dollar spent.
In the coming year, we will begin a deliberate transformation into
a force optimized for the likely threats of the next 2 decades. We
understand and appreciate the contribution that each marine has made
for this great Nation, and we recognize the heavy burden it has placed
on their loved ones. We remain ``Always Faithful'' to our Marine Corps
family, to Congress, to our chain of command, and to the American
people.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Amos.
Let's start with a 7-minute first round.
General, over the weekend there was reported, and it's been
reaffirmed here today, that 400 marines from Camp Lejeune have
arrived in Greece. Have they now joined the 1,300 marines of
the 26th MEU on those two amphibious ships? I know they went to
Greece, but are they on board those two ships now?
General Amos. Yes, sir, they're on board and the ships are
at sea.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The newspapers reported yesterday--and this goes to both
you, Admiral Roughead and General Amos--that some of the
capabilities of the two amphibious assault ships as follows:
Harrier jump jets that can engage in air-to-ground and air-to-
air combat, as well as maintain surveillance on ground
positions. They have attack helicopters on board; transport
aircraft, including cargo helicopters and the V-22 Osprey, so
you have a capability there for long-range transport; as well
as landing craft capable of reaching the Libyan coast.
Are there any other capabilities, major capabilities, that
I've left out, and is what I have just described accurate?
Admiral Roughead, why don't we start with you.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, those are accurate
capabilities, and I would say that in addition to that on board
the large amphibious ships there is a medical team with
operating room capabilities. So there's significant capacity
there, and also they're quite well loaded with humanitarian
assistance items as well.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General?
General Amos. Chairman, that's an accurate portrayal of the
physical equipment and those capabilities therein. That force
is capable of performing a variety of missions. They're
trained. They can do everything from a raid to an amphibious
assault, to a noncombatant evacuation, forcible entry, trap
mission, those kinds of things. So there's a lot of capability
that resides in those two vessels.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral, is it also correct that, in addition to those two
ships, we have in the Mediterranean ships that are currently
available that have missile-launching capability against land
targets?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Chairman Levin. General, let me switch to Afghanistan. Can
you give us your assessment of what's called the Interim
Security for Critical Infrastructure, which is a separate
program I understand from the Afghan local police program? Can
you tell us about that program, the Interim Security for
Critical Infrastructure? Is that a name which resonates at all
with you?
General Amos. Sir, it does not. I'm going to have to take
that for the record and get back to you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. It didn't resonate with me either, and we
read about it and I was curious about it. But if you could get
us that for the record that would be helpful.
Secretary Mabus, can you tell us where we are in the
process of moving marines from Okinawa to Guam, and how we are
going to complete the program given the strong opposition to it
in Okinawa?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. To echo what the Secretary of Defense
said earlier, we are waiting for substantive movement on the
Futenma replacement facility by the Japanese before taking any
major substantive steps of our own. But in the interim we have
signed the record of decision on the environmental impact
statement. We held a lot of hearings. We had a lot of
interaction with the people of Guam.
My under secretary has been to Guam numerous times to meet
with the Government of Guam and with the people of Guam, and he
has identified four overarching goals for Guam.
First, is a one Guam and one U.S. Government response to
Guam. Second, is that whatever resources are put there should
be renewable type energy projects, or a green Guam. Third, is
that we will be sensitive to cultural matters, such as Pagat
Cave and Pagat Village, the Guam cultural items that have been
identified as crucial. Fourth, is that at the end of the day
that there will be a net negative footprint, so that we will
use less land for military purposes than we are using today.
But again, before we take substantive moves to implement
the road map that was agreed to several years ago we are
awaiting Japanese Government moves on the Futenma replacement
facility.
The last thing I will say is that the Japanese Government
has deposited the amounts of money that it had committed to
into our Treasury up until this point.
Chairman Levin. Now, the Japanese Government moves that you
refer to include a signature on a document, is that correct?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, and also something substantive in
terms of beginning the construction of a replacement facility
for our Futenma Air Base.
Chairman Levin. That is what the opposition in Okinawa
strongly opposes, is that signature on that document, as I
understand.
Mr. Mabus. I understand there's opposition to that in
Okinawa. I also understand there's opposition to Futenma in
Okinawa.
Chairman Levin. Right, both. The opposition is so strong--I
think it was unanimous in the Okinawa legislative body. The
prospects it seems to me are not great that this is going to
happen this fiscal year. Can you comment on the likelihood that
we're going to get the Japanese sign-off on both the
replacement facility and on the signature for that document?
Mr. Mabus. I will simply quote what Secretary Gates said in
previous hearings, which he said that he was hopeful that
progress would be made soon, and I believe by ``soon'' he meant
in this fiscal year.
Chairman Levin. Hopeful, but not necessarily optimistic; is
that fair?
Mr. Mabus. I believe his word was ``hopeful.'' I don't want
to put words in his mouth. But he expressed that he was--I
can't think of a different word than ``hopeful''--to go
forward.
Chairman Levin. All right. Are you personally optimistic
it's going to happen this year?
Mr. Mabus. I believe that the Japanese Government
understands what our position is and that, absent movement,
that we cannot go forward. So they understand the urgency.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, have you had a chance to look at the air
capabilities that the Libyans have now as far as fixed wing and
helicopters?
General Amos. Senator, yes, sir. I've looked at what they
have.
Senator McCain. What has been your assessment?
General Amos. I think it's modest. I think their greatest
threat is their helicopter-type forces. That's just my
assessment standing from afar.
Senator McCain. Their air defenses?
General Amos. They have air defenses, sir. I'm unfamiliar
with the depth of those air defenses, but they have some.
Senator McCain. But my information--I wonder if you have
the same thing--they are Soviet-style, somewhat older versions
of surface-to-air missile capability.
General Amos. Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.
Senator McCain. Isn't it true that the air assets are
concentrated in about four air bases right around Tripoli?
General Amos. I believe that's correct, Senator.
Senator McCain. So the air assets, both fixed wing and
helicopter, are going out of a relatively small area around
Tripoli, operating out of those areas; is that true?
General Amos. Yes, sir, predominantly. I believe that's
correct.
Senator McCain. Do you have any assessment of the numbers
of aircraft that they have, both fixed wing and helicopter?
General Amos. Senator, I just know the general
capabilities. I've not spent time looking at the precise
numbers.
Senator McCain. Has it been your experience in combat that
if the enemy controls the air above, particularly in terrain
like Libya, it gives them an enormous advantage?
General Amos. Sir, I think there are several things that
will give the enemy an enormous advantage. One is the ground
movement of forces, vehicles, military on the ground. I think
it's a very complex environment, where the Gaddafi forces are
predominantly located. So I think it's more than just aviation.
I think it's very complex.
Senator McCain. But you have very little doubt that control
of the air above, particularly in an untrained enemy, gives you
an enormous advantage in any conflict? True?
General Amos. Sir, I would say it would give you an
advantage. I'm not sure about his air force.
Senator McCain. Have you heard that Gaddafi is still flying
in mercenaries in to Tripoli from other countries?
General Amos. No, sir, I have not heard that.
Senator McCain. Did you hear that he has two Airbuses that
are shuttling back and forth?
General Amos. No, sir, I have not heard that.
Senator McCain. You have been getting regular briefings?
General Amos. We do, sir.
Senator McCain. The ships that are offshore, the Harriers,
they also have surveillance pod capability?
General Amos. They do, sir. The Harriers are carrying an
ISR pod.
Senator McCain. Do they have jamming capability?
General Amos. Yes, sir, they do.
Senator McCain. So we could jam Gaddafi's communications,
including television?
General Amos. Sir, excuse me. I misunderstood you. I
thought you said camera capability. You're talking jamming
capability?
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Amos. They do not.
Senator McCain. What assets would have those, the jamming
capability? Airborne Warning and Control System?
General Amos. Sir, it would be that, and I'd have to refer
to the CNO, but it would probably be aircraft, EA-6Bs off the
carrier.
Senator McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, the jamming that would be
required, whether for communications or for their air defense
system, I believe you would require EA-6Bs or the Growlers that
we're now introducing to the fleet.
Senator McCain. How far away are those?
Admiral Roughead. The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise is
the closest capability. The USS Enterprise is currently in the
Red Sea.
Senator McCain. Are there plans to move it?
Admiral Roughead. At the present time, plans are for her to
remain in the CENTCOM area of operations, sir.
Senator McCain. Not move into the Mediterranean?
Admiral Roughead. There has been no order issued to do
that, no, sir.
Senator McCain. General Amos, in the withdrawal from Iraq
is it your personal opinion that Iraq will be able to take over
logistics, intelligence, and air sovereignty missions that the
United States has been carrying out?
General Amos. Senator, I've always believed that--I can't
speak to the degree of where they are today because the marines
are out of there and we're focused primarily in Afghanistan and
other parts of the world. But we were certainly on a glide
slope to make that happen.
Senator McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. I believe we are on that path, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So you're not concerned about a complete
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as far as logistics,
intelligence, and training of an air force, or a navy? None of
that is of concern?
Admiral Roughead. As of my most recent visit there,
Senator, where I focused primarily on the navy, I see very good
progress. In addition to that, because that navy will operate
offshore, our Fifth Fleet that operates in the Arabian Gulf,
and I believe it will be a very supportive relationship,
addressing the needs of Iraq from the naval perspective.
Senator McCain. So they need no other assistance?
Admiral Roughead. I believe that assistance will continue
through the way that we interact with all navies in the region
with our Fifth Fleet headquarters and the ships that deploy
there, the exercise programs that we have. That will continue
on with the Iraqi navy, and not have to have people ashore.
Senator McCain. General Amos, have you been requested to
identify any drawdown from Afghanistan, to begin the middle of
July of this year?
General Amos. Senator, no, we have not been asked to
identify any forces.
Senator McCain. So we really have no plans yet that you
have been made aware of of the beginning of our drawdown in
Afghanistan?
General Amos. Senator, all I'm aware of is that there will
be a drawdown. The President has announced it, beginning in
July of some forces. The Secretary of Defense spoke about that
yesterday in Afghanistan. I can't tell you whether it'll be
marine forces. I would have to defer to General Mattis and
General Petraeus.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the three of you for your service and for your
testimony today. Before I get to my questions, I just want to
begin by thanking the three of you for the leadership role that
you're playing in the implementation of the repeal of Don't
Ask, Don't Tell. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, I recently
watched the opening portions of training videos that you have
filmed for sailors and marines, and I just want to express my
gratitude for the leadership that you display there.
As you indicate in those videos, this is all about values,
values that are deep and inherent in your Services, values of
leadership, discipline, professionalism, and respect. I think--
and I really thank you, based on looking at these videos, for
leading your Services, as the two of you have throughout your
career, by example. I appreciate that very much.
I want to get to a couple of questions about Libya. I just
want to pick up from something Senator McCain asked and the
inference from it, which is, no one's saying that a no-fly zone
is uncomplicated, but the fact is that we have some experience
doing this and, though people have said Libya is a large
country, it is of course a large country, but the activity here
is mostly along a strip of land along the coast. So if there's
a decision to do this--and I appreciate what Secretary Gates
said in his testimony, though it's the part that's less quoted,
which was that, if asked to implement, hopefully with our
allies and others, a no-fly zone, we're perfectly capable of
doing it.
But the point I want to make from what Senator McCain asked
is that the air defense systems of the Libyans are modest and
air capabilities are modest, and the activity, though the
country is large, is happening mostly along the strip along the
north of the country, along the coast.
The question I wanted to ask is this. The chairman and
Senator McCain have asked about our resources in the region.
We're all following this very closely. I was interested that
our Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, said--has been quoted as
saying that ``The United States has been conducting round-the-
clock air and ground surveillance in Libya.''
I wanted to ask you, Admiral, and you, General, whether you
have any knowledge about that, and toward what end are we
conducting that surveillance? Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, the ability to monitor the level
of activity, the disposition of the forces, is something that
is within our capabilities to do and we have been following the
fighting that's been taking place through a variety of means
that we have. So we have some insight into what's going on
there.
Senator Lieberman. General, do you have anything to add to
that?
General Amos. Sir, I don't. I know that, just as we do in
many other places around the world where there's hostile action
taking place, we pay very close attention through a variety of
means and capabilities.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Amos. Some national and some organic.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral, based on what we know or what
you know, do you think this is now settling into a kind of
stalemate situation? I know it's always hard to predict--where
we may end up but, unless something surprising happens, we may
end up with a long-term civil war type conflict in Libya.
Admiral Roughead. Having spent some time in the Middle
East, to include actually living in Libya, I am always hesitant
to predict what the future may be there. I think it's still a
very uncertain period that bears watching. Then as some of the
thoughts are discussed and debated, I believe, at least from a
military perspective, that looking at what some of those
details may be ahead of time is very important, issues such as
a no-fly zone, restrictions on use of force, and what basing
and access that might be required.
I think all of those need to be sorted through.
Senator Lieberman. Understood.
I understand that, and it's, I believe, been publicly
acknowledged, that the State Department at least has opened up
channels of communications with the Temporary National Council
or provisional anti-Gaddafi Government, which is headquartered
in Benghazi. As far as you know, is there any military-to-
military contact going on through DOD with the military
leadership of the anti-Gaddafi forces?
Admiral Roughead. I'm not aware of any, sir.
Senator Lieberman. General, do you know?
General Amos. No.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
Let me go to something--Secretary Mabus, I noted in the
statement you made in your prepared testimony that the F-35C
variant of the JSF will be procured for both the Navy and the
Marine Corps. I think it's been the general understanding that
the Marine Corps would want to see produced and would procure a
pure F-35B STOVL fleet variant of the F-35, and that in fact is
the plan that's reflected in the current FYDP.
Did I read this correctly in your prepared statement, and
could you speak therefore to the future mix, if that is the
correct interpretation, of the F-35B and the F-35C in the
Marine Corps inventory?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. It has always been true that the F-35B
was solely a Marine aircraft.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mabus. But it's also been true that the C version, the
carrier version, the naval version, was going to have marines
flying those as well. Today we have three Marine squadrons
aboard carriers and we are currently undergoing a tactical air
integration look across the Navy and the Marine Corps to see
what the proper mix is of Cs for the Navy and Marine Corps, to
make sure that we continue that integration and make sure that
marines continue to fly off carriers in strike fighters, as
well as in vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.
Senator Lieberman. General, could you give me your reaction
to this? Is that mix at this point acceptable to the Marine
Corps? Am I wrong that you had originally hoped for a pure
STOVL variant fleet?
General Amos. Senator, you are correct that that was the
initial plan. Let me back up just a little bit. We have always
been fans of tactical air (TACAIR) integration. As the
Secretary said, we have Marine squadrons right now on Navy
carriers. On the USS Enterprise right now, we have Marine F-
18s. So we do that. We like that. It's good for both our
Services and the naval force.
But when we set the requirement in for STOVL aircraft, our
hope was we would be able to some day fly those versions off of
CVNs, naval aircraft carriers. That's yet to be seen, whether
that will be possible. So in the meantime, it would seem
prudent that we would buy some number of C variants, even early
on, so that we can begin to transition our force there. But it
will be a proportional number in the overall buy of the STOVL.
The STOVL is still our primary focus.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, good enough.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Admiral Roughead, let me follow up on Senator McCain and
Senator Lieberman. Given the testimony that we've received
today that Libya's air capabilities are relatively modest, that
their air defenses are concentrated in a relatively small area,
what would General Gaddafi's options be if the United States
imposed a no-fly zone? Why would we not expect it to be
completely successful?
Admiral Roughead. I think the first question, Senator, is,
as a precursor, you would be entering into combat operations
there.
Senator Wicker. We would be entering into air combat
operations?
Admiral Roughead. I think that in addressing a no-fly zone
you want to suppress or destroy any of the air defense systems
that could put friendly forces at risk. So that's the first
element, I believe, of entering into a no-fly zone, is likely
combat operations on Libya.
So I think in talking about a no-fly zone there are some
precursor steps that have to be taken.
Senator Wicker. What would General Gaddafi's options be?
Admiral Roughead. To try to defend against that would be
the primary options. But the fact is that that would be the
first step that would have to be taken.
Then it's also the issue of, what forces would be used,
where are they postured, what are the basing and the overflight
issues. I think all of those have to be sorted through. We've
done no-fly zones before and there is a significant
infrastructure that backs them up, whether it's naval or land-
based.
Senator Wicker. That infrastructure is available to us and
to our allies, is that not correct?
Admiral Roughead. I think that's a function of the
countries that would be involved, to make that decision.
Senator Wicker. Are you involved in the discussions with
the Secretary of Defense as to whether we proceed with a no-fly
zone?
Admiral Roughead. We have had discussions on Libya in the
tank among the Joint Chiefs, and we are involved in positioning
our forces to support the efforts that are currently being
undertaken in Libya. We're looking at the situation there on a
daily basis.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much for getting further
into the details about that.
Let me shift gears to Navy Week and mention to both Admiral
Roughead and to Secretary Mabus how much we appreciate being
able to host Navy Week in the State of Mississippi during the
week of March 19 through 27.
As both of you know, 2012 will mark the 60th anniversary of
the founding of the Seabees and their presence in Gulfport, MS,
with our four naval construction battalions based in Gulfport.
Let me start with Admiral Roughead. What is the past, current,
and future contribution of the Seabees? What role do you see
the Seabees playing in your vision of the future of the Navy?
Admiral Roughead. Sir, as a matter of fact, I was in
Gulfport last Friday meeting with about 3,000 Seabees. If that
doesn't energize you, nothing does.
But the Seabees I think in the Navy are legendary, and I
would even say, beyond that within the military, for their
combat engineering skills, their ability to go into unimproved
areas and provide the facilities that forces need to operate. I
know they're linked very closely to the Marine Corps in that
regard. They've been very busy over the past few years,
particularly in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In fact, we currently
have as many Seabees deployed now as we did during the Vietnam
War. So they are extraordinarily busy.
But they also function in a humanitarian role, where they
will go into countries and develop infrastructure, train some
of the indigenous forces that are there. So that's what they
have been doing, and I see Seabees doing that well into the
future.
Senator Wicker. Do you see their role diminishing in the
future or increasing in the future?
Admiral Roughead. I think the skills and the talent and the
competence of the Seabees will prevail. It will be a question
of how much usage the combatant commanders demand with regard
to Seabees, combat engineers. Clearly, I would predict that as
we eventually bring the level of forces down in Afghanistan, of
course, Seabees are part of that, so they'll be coming out. So
they're probably at a fairly high level right now. But I think
the future is yet to be borne out.
Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus?
Mr. Mabus. I concur with everything the CNO said. I visited
with Seabees in Afghanistan and I've joked with them that if
you give them a piece of plywood and a Skilsaw they can build
anything, maybe even our fleet.
But I do think that the skills that they have for the
missions that are coming in the future, whether it's combat
missions or whether, as the CNO pointed out, humanitarian
assistance mission, partnership-building sorts of things, that
those skills will be in demand and will be needed.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
In the few seconds I have remaining, Secretary Mabus, in
your verbal testimony and also in prepared testimony, I wanted
to make sure that we understand precisely what you're saying
about the effect of a year-long CR. You say it will prevent
procurement of two nuclear reactor cores. Will it delay it or
will it prevent it? And prevent completion of one Arleigh
Burke-class modernization. Are you being precise that it will
block these two advances?
Mr. Mabus. If a year-long CR occurs, we cannot spend any
money on either those nuclear reactors or either of the new
start Arleigh Burke destroyers.
Senator Wicker. It will in effect be a delay, would it not?
Mr. Mabus. That assumes that at some point we are allowed
to begin spending that money. Under a year-long CR for the
remainder of the fiscal year, we would not be able to do that.
Senator Wicker. I understand. I would simply observe there
are concerns about spending, but I don't see why on a
bipartisan basis and a bicameral basis we can't decide as a
Congress to fund the military capabilities of this Nation on a
permanent basis and then deal with the rest of the
discretionary budget at a later time. I don't see a reason why
we shouldn't go forward this week or next week with a full
defense appropriation aspect of our funding and deal with the
other aspects of it later on.
So thank you very much, and thank you all for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I can't help but follow up my colleague from Mississippi
and the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee by
commending the Seabees. They were organized in Rhode Island in
1942 and one of their signature contributions to construction
was the Quonset hut, named after Quonset, RI. So thank you,
Senator. I'm glad we could help out the Gulf Coast.
First, Admiral Roughead and Secretary Mabus, one of the
critical issues, but it doesn't get a lot of attention, is
maintenance of the fleet. Could you comment upon the stress
that you're under now in terms of maintenance? We have seen
reports that there's an increasing number of failures in the
Bureau of Inspection Survey, up dramatically from about 3
percent in the mid-1990s to now 13 percent in terms of ships
that are coming in and being inspected, and that the life of
the ships, the DDGs especially, is now 25 to 27 years, not 30
or perhaps even 40.
Admiral Roughead, you might start and then, Mr. Secretary,
your comments.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Looking at that when I came
into this position, I looked at the whole approach to
maintenance, how are we maintaining our ships. We did several
things. We reintroduced the engineered based maintenance cycle
for our ships, put resources to the teams that do that work.
We're beginning to see the benefit of that now.
We also are putting more sailors back on the ships. We had
taken them off. With the generosity of Congress, we were able
to increase our operation and maintenance funding, so we were
able to build that up to the point where we're spending
hundreds of millions of dollars now more on maintenance than we
were just a couple of years ago. We've taken sailors and put
them back into our intermediate maintenance activities, so that
more maintenance can be done proximate to the ships in the
piers.
So I think all of that adds into improving the maintenance
of the ships. We've seen some positive trends in our inspection
and survey reports and results. So I think we're doing
substantive things. We're investing the money in the right
place to improve that ship maintenance.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, everything, the details that the CNO
just said, have been put in place and, as he said, we're
beginning to see some improvements. The Navy, unlike other
Services, maintenance is our reset. We reset in stride. So if
we're going to get to the fleet that we need to get to, if
we're going to get the numbers of ships that we need to get to,
we simply have to make them get to the end of their normal or
extended service lives.
It's one of the things that the CNO has focused on the most
closely. It's one of the things that I watch most closely. I do
believe that with some of these efforts, putting more
intermediate maintenance on the pier, putting more sailors on
ships, 2,200 more on our ships, with the specific goal of doing
preventative maintenance, so that when a ship comes in for a
maintenance period it is more ready and the maintenance will
mean more.
Finally, I do want to reiterate one thing that I said about
the CR. The chairman pointed out that we've already cancelled
five availabilities. We face having to cancel up to 29 ship
availabilities, and these, to go to what Senator Wicker said,
are not postponements. These are cancellations, because we have
other ships in queue waiting behind them.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Again let me address a question first to General Amos and
if the Secretary would like to comment. That's on the F-35B.
It's slipped in terms of its timeframe. There are some
technical challenges. I had the chance to go down to Pax River
and talk to your very impressive group of test pilots and
program managers.
What is the probability that this is the last major
schedule change and that we're finally on track? I know that's
a judgment call, but any advice, since you're an aviator and
you have great expertise, Commandant? Please comment.
General Amos. Thank you, sir. Obviously, with that
introduction, you know I pay very close attention to it. This,
as I said in my opening statement, is critical to our
expeditionary capability, and we've talked about that before.
My sense right now is that the program management has
absolutely the right guy in there with Admiral Venlet running
it. I think the oversight at OSD is appropriate. Certainly the
oversight in the Department of the Navy is appropriate. I will
promise you, as you and I have talked before, the oversight at
the headquarters Marine Corps level and at my desk is very
appropriate.
So my sense where we are now is that, with the generosity
of both Congress and the wisdom of Secretary Gates, putting
more money back into this, trading some tails so that we could
get this program back on track, things are lined up now for
success. I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about.
Right now the STOVL variant, which is the one that everybody
refers to, has flown 140 percent of its scheduled test flights
since January 1. So in the last 70 days, the airplane has flown
40 percent more of its scheduled test flights. It's flown about
another 200 percent of its scheduled test points. Within each
flight it's designed to get five or six specific points of
flight test.
So it's performing better there. It's already flown I think
something like four or five times the number of vertical
landings just this year than it did all last year. I took a
brief yesterday on the structural issues, the bulkheads, the
weight gain. These things are progressing well.
So from my perspective as I look at it, I'm going to pay
attention to the aircraft performance, how it's doing in
flight, both in vertical and horizontal flight, the weight
growth in the airplane, which in a vertical landing airplane is
very critical. Right now we're on a good glide slope in the
weight growth, and we're not going to add a pound that I'm not
aware of to that airplane. We have to talk about it.
Then, finally, the engineering challenges and the test
performance. So my sense is I'm optimistic. We are on a 2-year
watch. It's my hope that we can get off that well before 2
years, and it's my intent to some time this spring offer to the
Secretary of Defense a set of metrics that he might consider as
the threshold for getting the airplane off of probation and
getting it back into the regular mindset of production.
Senator Reed. Any comments, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Mabus. I can't improve on that answer, Senator.
Senator Reed. That's why you're such a good Secretary and a
good lawyer.
A final question to Admiral Roughead and the Secretary, the
Ohio replacement program. I know this is a major issue. It not
only touches the fleet, but also our strategic posture,
particularly after the recent START Treaty. It's the future of
deterrence, nuclear deterrence for the Nation. It's the most
survivable aspect of nuclear deterrence.
I think you have made significant progress in ensuring that
we design a ship that is not only capable, but affordable. But
there's still this issue of sharing the costs, because this
program is a Navy program, but it has huge, huge implications
for the overall strategic posture of the United States,
particularly the deterrence posture with nuclear weapons. So
why don't you comment on any efforts to provide support, as
we've done on other programs like the missile defense program
from DOD, not just from the Navy.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the question.
Clearly the Ohio replacement is, as you said, the most
survivable. What we're doing is we're building a submarine that
will be on patrol for this Nation in 2080. So that's where the
research and development is going, and our focus on stealth and
mission capability is where we have to go.
We also know we'll be introducing that submarine at a time
when there are other significant costs being imposed on the
shipbuilding budget. While we're early on in the program, I do
believe that there has to be a discussion about how the
submarine is resourced in the context of everything else. I
think we're at the front end of having some of those
discussions.
Mr. Mabus. In the research and development that's going on
now to begin to build the first of the Ohio-class replacements
in 2019 to go on its first patrol about 10 years later, we've
already taken a billion dollars a boat out of the cost to build
this submarine. We're looking to take more money out.
Right now we're at about $5.4 billion per boat. The number
needs to start with a four in some way for these boats. But
even at $4.9 billion per boat, to build 12 of these beginning
in 2019 and continuing throughout the decade of the 20s will
require substantial resources that, if they all come from the
Navy, would put a dent in the rest of our shipbuilding
programs.
That's one of the reasons we have put it in and tried to be
exactly honest and exactly precise about how much this ship
will cost and what it will do to the rest of the fleet, so that
these discussions, these debates, and these decisions can be
made with the facts of what will happen clearly in mind.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, General, Admiral.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, first let me join everyone in thanking you for
your extraordinary service. It's very difficult for those of us
who have worked with you for a number of years to recognize
that this is most likely your last Navy posture hearing. I want
to thank you for your decades of service.
I want to pick up on the issue that Senator Reed just
raised. Secretary Gates recently testified that a number of our
surface ships that were built during the Reagan years will
basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and
that coincides with the time that we will be bringing on the
new ballistic missile submarine. Obviously, we need both, but
that new submarine is going to swallow up a great deal of the
shipbuilding budget.
I understand that there are several precedents for national
strategic programs that are funded through defense-wide budget
lines. For example, ships supporting sealift for all of the
military Services are funded through the National Sealift
Defense Fund. As has been mentioned, the MDA budget funds for
activities related to ballistic missile defense irrespective of
the military Service involved.
So if we're going to proceed, as we must, with the new
submarine, but not harm the shipbuilding budget, which is
already below the optimum number that you have said repeatedly
is the floor of 313--I believe we're at only 286 or 287 right
now--would an alternative worth pursuing be looking at a
defense-wide budget line, rather than trying to fund this
submarine out of shipbuilding?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
your very kind comments. It's been my pleasure to work with you
over these years, not just as CNO, but even before, and thank
you for your great support of the Navy.
But I do believe that, in addition to the points that you
mentioned, in the 20s we're also going to still be refueling
our aircraft carriers. To make all of us feel a little bit
older, we will also in that decade be taking out of service
some of the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers as they reach the
end of their 50-year life.
So there are those two costs that have to get put in there
as well. So there's a significant pressure on shipbuilding. Yet
the Nation I believe will still need the global Navy that it
has today. Whether it's a defense-wide fund or whether there is
consideration for those expenses that are being taken into
account, I do believe that that has to be addressed, because if
it's not taken on and if it's not thought through with a
solution that's different than what we have today, we as a
Nation are going to find ourselves shorted in a Navy.
Senator Collins. I agree with you and I look forward to
working with you and the Secretary and my colleagues trying to
come up with a solution.
Secretary Mabus, it was so appropriate that you began your
testimony today reminding us of the dire impact on the Navy,
indeed on all of DOD, of continuing to operate under a CR,
particularly one that is extended 2 weeks at a time. That
really is an impossible situation.
Just last week I filed the defense appropriations bill, the
entire bill, as a modification to an unrelated piece of
legislation, to try to emphasize to the Senate leaders that
this should be our priority, completing work which should have
been done prior to October 1 of last year.
You mentioned the dire impact on readiness, the effect on
our sailors and marines, the fact that we are putting in
jeopardy as many as 10,000 private sector jobs at a time when
our economy is very, very weak. But isn't there also another
adverse impact, and that is that these delays cause disruptions
in the supply chain that are costly? They're not only depriving
our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of needed technology
and equipment, but they're increasing the ultimate costs that
we're going to pay.
You're going to have to renegotiate contracts. There are
disruptions in the supply chain that are costly. Isn't this the
case where the longer that we operate under a CR, the more
you're likely to have to pay for needed equipment?
Mr. Mabus. I think that's absolutely correct, Senator. The
ripple effects of this, we're beginning to feel some now. The
longer it goes on, the more those effects take place. Senator
Wicker pointed out that we're delaying ship starts, perhaps not
cancelling them. But if you delay ship starts this year, we
have other ship starts due next year and the year after that,
and, as I said in my testimony, it will take us years to
recover from this, from the second and third order effects of
this and the ripples that go out from it. The supply chain is
certainly one of them. Breaking multi-year procurements is
another that we are saving money on today. If we are unable to
fulfill our part of the multi-year, we'll have to go in and
renegotiate that, for example on shipbuilding.
Senator Collins. I think that's a very important point.
Some of my colleagues who are supporting a CR are arguing that
it saves money. I think it not only is disruptive, but it's
going to end up costing us more money in the long run.
Admiral Roughead, just a very quick final question for you.
As you may know, Senator Webb and I along with some of our
colleagues commissioned a recent Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report that found that the Navy's modernization
program for our public shipyards, which includes the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard in Kittery, have been underfunded. Indeed, the
Navy's own estimate of the backlog at the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard alone exceeds $500 million.
Are you looking at whether you could use some reprogramming
or shifting of funds to try to meet some of the more urgent
needs, which also would translate directly into increased
efficiency and productivity? So again, it's an investment that
saves you money in the long run.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. We're always looking at our
MILCON and where do we get the most bang for the buck, and it
goes beyond the shipyards. But we do look at the shipyards and
in fact, even though there is what is considered a backlog of
maintenance, we are investing above the percentage that's
required by Congress to a certain degree.
But I'm always looking at projects, individual ones, to
your point, that if we pay a little bit today maybe we can gain
in productivity later on, and we're always looking at that.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, if I might add that one of the
exemptions to the civilian hiring freeze that DOD announced was
for shipyards, to meet exactly what you were talking about.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, let me add my own congratulations and appreciation
to you for all the service that you have given our country.
It's been my pleasure to have known you and worked with you in
a number of different capacities for a good 15 years or more. I
appreciate the stewardship that you've shown, even in your
testimony today, for the people who come after us and what we
leave behind.
There's been a number of comments today about the situation
in Libya. I think it's important for me to at least express my
support for the position that Secretary Gates has taken on this
issue, and others in DOD. We all know that military
commitments, however small, are easily begun and in this region
particularly very difficult to end. History shows that. This is
a region full of surprises.
I, for one, am of the opinion it's not a good idea to give
weapons and military support to people who you don't know. When
it comes to the opposition in Libya, we don't know them.
Secretary Clinton was very clear on that last week in her
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So
it's very important, I think, to proceed responsibly and very
carefully as we approach that particular issue.
Admiral, I, as you would expect, strongly agree with your
position about the number of ships that we should be providing
in the Navy, that 313 should be a floor. I've been very
concerned and vocal about my worry that we've taken our eye off
of our strategic forces in general as we have spent so much of
our money, energy, and people in Afghanistan and Iraq over the
past 8 or 9 years.
This is particularly true in East Asia, which I view to be
the central focus of our long-term strategic goals. We can't
ignore what the Chinese military has been doing, not only in
this area but in other areas. They've been very active over the
last year particularly. But we have an obligation to position
ourselves properly in terms of our military forces and our
basing systems.
In that regard, I'd like to mention my hope that we can do
a better job on this situation with Okinawa and Guam. As you
may know, Secretary Mabus, I worked as a military planner on
this issue many years ago. The attempt at a solution of the
Okinawan situation as it moves into the Guamanian situation has
now been on the table for 15 years.
I was recently last month the keynote speaker at Shimoda
conference in Tokyo, which was a gathering of the minds in
terms of how we are going to reshape and strengthen the United
States' relations with Japan. I can tell you that this issue is
one of the most serious problems in our relationships with the
Japanese, but also in Japanese domestic priorities. You can see
the turbulence that it has put at the very top of the Japanese
Government because we have not yet resolved this issue.
It also is one of our principal challenges in terms of the
structuring of our presence in East Asia. I was out there last
year on Okinawa and Guam. I think I'm going with the chairman
next month also on a visit there.
I just really strongly believe we have to put this on the
front burner. It's one of these types of issues that, since
it's not hitting us in the face every day, we tend to push it
away. But it's now been 15 years. We need answers. Whatever the
answers are, we need answers for the stability of our
relationships with Japan and for our future in the Pacific.
I'm not sure actually who's carrying the ball on this in
DOD. I think the Marine Corps--at least they're heavily present
when we go out there and talk to people. But, Secretary Mabus,
I'm not sure. Who's the executive agent here, and how do we get
this thing resolved?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, we're the executive agent for Guam.
You're right that the Marine Corps is heavily involved. But it
is not simply a Navy issue. It rises to the top leadership of
DOD.
I can assure you from the Marine Corps, from the Navy, and
from DOD, it's on the front burner. It takes up a large part of
our focus, for exactly the reasons you talked about. It affects
our laydown in the entire Pacific. It affects our presence in
the western Pacific for the next decades. We had an agreement
with the Government of Japan on a way forward. That agreement
is several years old now. One of the key components before we
begin to move is Government of Japan and the Government of
Okinawa movement on replacing our airfield at Futenma. The
Marines have to have that air capability on Okinawa regardless
of what happens going forward.
So we are focused on it. I will quote Secretary Gates in
his hearing when he said that he was ``hopeful that progress
would be made soon on this issue,'' as we all are.
Senator Webb. This is an enormously complex issue in terms
of all the moving parts, and I know that there's been some good
adjustments already in terms of the Marine Corps footprint on
Okinawa, moving it further away from the industrial areas, and
also the environmental aspects, particularly on Guam.
But I can't say strongly enough how important it is we put
good minds and good leaders on this, for all the reasons that I
said: the future of our relationships with Japan. I hear it all
the time when I'm with the foreign ministry, the defense
ministry in Japan, and with their political leaders, and for
our future. So I hope we can have some good discussions before
the chairman and I go to Japan and Guam next month, and maybe
we can come up with a better way to approach this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I was
bouncing back and forth. I had a Senate Small Business and
Entrepreneurship Committee hearing as well.
Mr. Secretary, first of all, and Admiral, thank you also,
just to reiterate. I appreciate your service and family
sacrifice.
Mr. Secretary, just to touch on what Senator Collins was
saying, the CR, the 2 weeks, do you think that jeopardizes the
safety and security of our country in any way, that continuing
on in sporadic means and measures?
Mr. Mabus. I think that it, as I tried to lay out in my
opening statement, it has some profound implications for the
Navy and the Marine Corps. If the CR continues for the whole
year, as we said, flying hours will go down, ship steaming days
will go down, the availabilities that we have for maintenance
for naval ships. The procurement account for the Marine Corps
could go down by as much as a third.
We will not be able to meet payroll by the end of the
fiscal year without moving monies from other accounts, and
procurement is one of the few places we can get that. In terms
of shipbuilding, we will not be able to start the second
Virginia-class submarine, which will break the multi-year on
that, which will make those submarines more expensive. We will
not be able to start the two Aegis-class destroyers.
Senator Brown. In plain English, do you think our safety
and security is in jeopardy as a result of the delay?
Mr. Mabus. I think that today the Navy and Marine Corps
will meet whatever safety and security needs America has. The
danger is what happens in the future, what happens to us
because of these shortfalls now.
Senator Brown. To take it a little step further, do you
think the lives of our soldiers are in jeopardy as a result of
the delay. If it continues?
Mr. Mabus. No, I don't think it risks lives of our marines
and our soldiers, because the OCOs are being funded. But I do
think--and I know I'm beginning to sound like a broken record,
but it's the effects on the future.
Senator Brown. I understand. I appreciate your honesty.
One of the best ways, I've always felt, and I've heard
through testimony from many of you and others, is the open and
honest competition. With regard to the LCS, the dual
procurement strategy is a perfect example of that type of
savings if we strictly enforce competition. Mr. Secretary, can
you comment on the importance of implementing competition in
our Nation's acquisition strategy, where appropriate,
especially when we're deciding to buy massive amounts of
equipment costing taxpayers billions of dollars over the course
of several years?
Mr. Mabus. Competition certainly worked in terms of the
LCS. When we competed two manufacturers against each other with
two different variants, the price came down pretty
dramatically. Now, I will say that the LCS program was unique
in the sense that we had always planned on having two
suppliers. We had never looked at this program, regardless of
how many variants we had, as coming from one shipyard, because
we wanted to keep competition in the program.
Senator Brown. You're ultimately going to award a contract
to one of them, though, based on the specifications, the
capabilities, and the like, correct?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. But whoever--if we had down-selected
to one variant, whichever shipyard won had to give us the
technical data package, all the drawings, all the engineering,
so that we would then the next year bid it out to a second
shipyard. We were always going to have two shipyards competing
on the LCS.
Senator Brown. So competition saved $2.9 billion and a 27
percent reduction on the original cost of that savings
estimate. The third and fourth ships are scheduled to be
delivered in 2012 on cost and on schedule. I guess I'm trying
to wrestle the fact that we have that fair and open competition
with a relatively small quantity purchase like the LCS and yet
we're dealing with a $100 billion purchase of over 4,000 JSF
engines for the U.S. and international partners spanning a
period of 20 years, which the GAO has twice concluded will save
the taxpayers $20 billion.
So I'm wondering if you could explain. Am I missing
something in terms of having a sole producer of the engine? For
example, what happens if they decide to raise the price? Why is
it good for one and not the other? I really haven't gotten a
good answer.
Mr. Mabus. Two things set those two programs apart. One is
what I talked about, about the fact that we always anticipated
having two different suppliers for the LCS, regardless of how
many variants we had.
Second, we have paid for most of the engineering, the
research and development, the up-front cost of both variants of
this ship, unlike the alternate engine, which has only paid for
the research and development upfront costs for one of them. So
I think there are two major differences between those.
The last thing I would say is, from the Navy vantage point
we have rarely had two engines for any of our aircraft, simply
because of space concerns. We can't carry two engines on our
carriers. We can't carry two engines on our big-deck amphibs.
We simply don't have the space for it. We will only be able to
buy one engine for these aircraft, as we do today for our F-
18s.
Senator Brown. One of the things I'm always concerned is
about cost overruns and delivering weaponry on time. My concern
is, obviously, about doing that with that particular program.
I'd like to just shift gears for a minute. I'm thankful, I
think it's about time, that Harvard and the Navy once again are
having Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) on their campus.
I think it's long overdue. I'm wondering if you could just
comment on what your feelings are about the importance of ROTC
on our Nation's campuses?
Mr. Mabus. I was very happy to sign the agreement with
Harvard last Friday to bring ROTC back there. As I pointed out
there, Harvard trails only West Point and Annapolis in Medal of
Honor recipients. I agree with you, it had been gone for too
long.
I believe that ROTC and the ability to have different
viewpoints coming into our military officer corps, different
geography, different viewpoints, different backgrounds, is
absolutely crucial. We're continuing to reach out to schools
that have, for whatever reason, ended ROTC, to bring it back.
The military that protects the Nation ought to be reflective of
the entire Nation.
Senator Brown. So noted. I'm anxious to see whether and how
the military science classes will be taking place on or off
campus, and hoping that they will be fully implemented in the
ordinary course like every other organization has that
opportunity.
But I want to thank you for wrapping that up. I saw you
smiling a lot in the pictures.
Admiral and General, I'm okay with you. I know we've spoken
off-line many times about issues, so thank you for your
continued service and the good information.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Just on two of the statements that you made in response to
Senator Brown, if you for the record would confirm or not
confirm the following: First, that more than half the
development costs on the second engine have already been sunk;
second, that the original acquisition strategy did assume two
engines for the F-35. Can you confirm or not, for the record,
not now?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Yes, more than one-half of the F136 development costs are
sunk-costs ($2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 of an
estimated $4.2 billion development program). The estimate
includes only those costs required to complete development of
the F136 engine and does not include all TBD costs necessary to
get the F136 to a competitive procurement posture. With regard
to the acquisition strategy, yes, the Department of Defense
assumed two engines as part of the original acquisition
strategy if funding was available for the F136 program.
Chairman Levin. It's not my turn yet.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to state how pleased I am to see all three of you
gentlemen here today and once again thank you for your service.
My late father-in-law, who passed away a little over a year ago
at the wonderful age of 96, was a major general in the Marine
Corps Reserve, and he was always very interested in everything
that you had to say and your actions, especially during these
committee hearings.
But, speaking about the ROTC, my husband participated in
the ROTC at Chapel Hill, and I think too that it's a wonderful
movement forward that Harvard has reinitiated their program. So
I think that's great.
I did want to ask about the amphibious assault ships. I'm a
big supporter of the Marine Corps amphibious capabilities. It's
the bread and butter of the Marine Corps to have the ability to
conduct forcible entry operations from the sea. I think it's
important that the Navy not decommission amphibious assault
ships earlier than their expected service lifespans without
replacements.
I'm concerned that the Marine Corps will not have the
sufficient amphibious capabilities to fully support the
combatant commanders' requirements within an acceptable level
of risk. I'm concerned that the Marine Corps will not have the
sufficient amphibious capabilities to meet the demands for all
the operational deployments that we're seeing.
General Amos, can you discuss how the amphibious forces
have been employed during this past year and talk about how
this has helped to inform the recently completed force
structure review?
General Amos. Senator, I'll be happy to. I'm pretty proud
of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Just in the last 12 months, you
remember, just about a month or 2 from now we had 7 amphibious
ships full of 5,000 marines and sailors off the coast of Haiti.
When you could only put one airplane or two airplanes on the
ground in the airport, everything else was clogged, it was the
naval amphibious force that was providing the relief--water,
food, medical supplies, evacuation--for 45 days.
So that's where the last year began. The 15th MEU sailed
off the coast of Pakistan and supported the Pakistan relief
operation, flying their CH-53 Echo heavy lift helicopters 400
miles deep into Pakistan, up to the very northern part of
Pakistan, to move folks around, provide relief efforts.
While that was going on, the Harriers off the amphibious
ships were flying combat sorties into Afghanistan in support of
the joint force. Interestingly, one of the ships departed, went
1,000 miles due west, captured the Somalia pirates off the
Magellan Star.
About the same time, the 26th MEU, from your great State,
sailed 30 days early. They hadn't even finished their
certification yet, and they were able to certify en route. They
joined the 15th MEU with their three ships to help support the
Pakistani operations.
1,400 marines off of the 26th MEU are now ashore in the
Helmand Province, reinforcing success for our forces on the
ground there.
As you've just seen, the 26th MEU sailed two ships up
through the Suez and into the Mediterranean, now joined by
marines from your great State as well, the First Battalion,
Second Marines, poised off of the Mediterranean.
I haven't counted the 31st MEU in the western Pacific, that
came on the back side of that super typhoon in the Philippines.
So lots--there is no shortage of work for the marine
expeditionary amphibious units. They are very successful.
Senator Hagan. Certainly.
Secretary Mabus, in light of those comments, is the Navy
reviewing and reconciling the amphibious requirements, ship
retirement schedules, and the 30-year shipbuilding plans?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, we keep a close eye on that. We have
extended the USS Peleliu for a year, its retirement date. But
the amount of effort, the amount of money, and the amount of
people it would take to continue some of these very old
amphibious ships now--the people are needed for other ships
coming on line. The amount of money would take away from the
newer ships we're building.
We're building toward, and we're in sight of getting there,
to having the 33 amphibious ship capacity, 11 big deck amphibs,
LHAs, LHA(R)s, 11 LPDs, 11 LSDs. If Congress approves our
shipbuilding plan, we will have 11, 11, 11 by 2017.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Mabus.
I also understand that the Department's restructuring of
the JSF program, including the recent 2-year probation of the
Marine Corps' STOVL, the F-35B. The F-35B is fundamental to the
expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and this aircraft is
also essential to how the Marine Corps deploys and utilizes its
aviation assets in theater.
This aircraft also provides the Marine Corps with the
capability to land on the improvised airstrips and launch from
the large-deck amphibious assault ships. It also provides the
Marine Corps with the ability to rearm and refuel in the
forward operating bases (FOB).
Currently the AV-8B Harriers are approaching the end of
their service life and the aircraft and its parts are no longer
being produced. I know that the Fleet Readiness Center in
Cherry Point in North Carolina, the engineers there, they
actually engineer the replacement parts.
Secretary Mabus and General Amos, what would be the impact
of terminating the F-35B on the Marine Corps' ability to
actually project the power that is necessary in some of these
remote expeditionary environments? What effect will that have
on the joint force capabilities in theater, as well as the
Marine Corps' force structure? What would be some of the near-
term milestones that you would expect for the Marine Corps to
achieve to get the F-35B back on track?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I will give a very brief overview and
then turn it over to the Commandant, who is far more eloquent
than I am about the F-35B.
The Commandant earlier today pointed out that the F-35B is
a critical capability for the Marine Corps, the vertical
takeoff and landing, for all the reasons that you have laid
out. The 2-year intense look at it, or the probationary period,
I think is going to give us an opportunity to focus on it and
to make sure that the issues associated with it can be fixed
within weight limits and cost limits.
The Commandant has stated that he is now a program officer
on this, and he gets updates on a very frequent and very
routine basis. Some of the milestones that we're looking at:
the number of test flights this year, this calendar year, is at
about 140 percent of where we expected to be, so we're ahead of
schedule there. The number of test points on those test
flights, we're almost 200 percent there.
They have achieved vertical takeoff and landings, more
vertical takeoffs and landings so far in the first a little
over 2 months of this year than they did all of last year. It's
at least my understanding, and then I'm going to turn it over
to the Commandant, that the issues associated with the B
version are engineering in nature, and the question is whether
those engineering issues can be solved inside weight limits and
inside financial boundaries, and that that is what we're
concentrating on.
General Amos. Thank you, Secretary.
Secretary, as I said in my opening statement, the way we
employ our airplanes in the Marine Corps, we're the blue collar
aviation for the United States of America. We get out, we get
dirty. We fly in places where there are unimproved strips. We
did it all the way to Tikrit when we crossed the border in
March 2003. We had Harriers landing on highways. We flew off of
narrow roads. We flew off of bombed-out runways and taxiways,
all the way past Baghdad into Tikrit.
So that's the way we operate. There are roughly 10 times
the number of small airports around the world than there are
larger ones. That fits us. We build our own runways when we
have to. We have two of them in southern Afghanistan right now.
One of them was Poys. We built it in about 30 days out of
aluminum matting, so we could fight the fight for Marja a year
ago at this time.
So that's the way we employ it. We also fly them off the
large-deck amphibious ships. So today, with 11 carriers and 11
large-deck amphibious ships, our Nation--this is a national
capability--has 22 capital ships flying TACAIR aviation off of
them. Now, imagine a couple of years from now being able to
have F-35Cs on board those 11 aircraft carriers and F-35Bs
flying off of those 11 large-deck amphibs. So our Nation would
have for the very first time 22 capital ships with fifth
generation capability flying off of them.
So this is more than just the Marine Corps. If we lose the
F-35B, there is no plan B for fixed wing airplanes on the
large-deck amphibs. Our Nation's capability to project power
and influence situations will be cut immeasurably, not in half.
Certainly there are more airplanes on an aircraft carrier than
there are--or fixed wings, than there are on an amphib. But it
would be significant, and there is no plan B for that, ma'am.
So the F-35B is a requirement. I'm optimistic. What I'm
seeing now is very encouraging.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to begin by again thanking all of the three
witnesses for your very distinguished service to our Nation.
Admiral, I'm new to the committee, but I'm sorry that I'm here
for the last of your testimony on this issue, and simply say
thank you and congratulate you on your extraordinary service to
our Nation.
I'd like to pick up, General Amos, if I may, on the last
answer that you gave. I assume from your testimony that you
would prefer to see the resources that might be devoted to an
alternative engine for the JSF devoted instead to the F-35B
alternative?
General Amos. Sir, we made a decision, the Marine Corps
made a decision, in the late 1990s to skip a generation of
airplanes, to skip a fourth generation of airplanes, going from
our F-18s, which is what we would call a third generation
capability, and go on a procurement kind of diet for about 10
or 12 years to buy the F-35B. So that position has not changed,
Senator, and that's where we are today.
We need the airplane. We're confident in it and it fits the
way we operate our airplanes.
Senator Blumenthal. You would forego that alternative
engine, the second engine, as it's been called, and instead
devote those resources to that plane that you need so much?
General Amos. Senator, I would, because we are a Navy-
Marine Corps team and we operate off of naval vessels, and for
the very same reason that the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy
articulated earlier, there's just simply not enough room to
have different types of engines, different types of test
equipment, tool sets, procedures, and that kind of thing on
naval vessels.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I apologize if I may seem to be repeating one or more of
the questions that have already been asked, but I want to
return to the Virginia-class submarine procurement program, if
I may, Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead. Could you outline
for us what the impact would be on the procurement program for
the Virginia-class submarine if there is no budget for the
fiscal years 2011 and 2012 and we continue with a CR? I have in
mind particularly the Admiral's testimony that so far the
submarines have been delivered under budget and ahead of
schedule. So I'm wondering if there could be continuing
negotiations, as you've outlined, to continue the two-sub
procurement program even with a CR.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, under the rules of a CR as they are in
place today we could only begin to build one Virginia-class
submarine this year. We are scheduled to build two, two each
year for the next 5 years. We have entered into a multi-year
procurement on the Virginia-class submarine, which has driven
the price down even further, giving the contractor some
stability in terms of their base, their training, their
infrastructure.
So if we are unable to begin the second Virginia-class
submarine, which would be the case under the current CR, not
only would we jeopardize the total number of ships that we
have; we would also break the multi-year agreement, which would
cause the cost of those ships to rise. We would have to re-
enter negotiations because we would not have ordered the number
of ships we committed to under the multi-year.
Senator Blumenthal. So even with the best of intentions,
very likely the cost of that Virginia-class submarine program
would rise as a result of continuing with the CR, as opposed to
having a budget in place?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. If we are not given relief on new
starts, we will not be able to build the second one and the
cost would almost certainly rise.
Senator Blumenthal. General Amos, in the time that I have
left I'd like to focus on an area that hasn't been covered so
far, and that is the very impressive part of the report that
you've given us today on some of the work that's ongoing with
respect to the diagnosis and treatment of traumatic brain
injury and post-traumatic stress. I am tremendously impressed
by the general description that you've given in this report on
the focus, the increased priority given to this very troubling
area, and in particular the in-theater restoration center that
provides comprehensive diagnosis and the proactive outreach
that the Marine Corps has undertaken whenever any member of the
Marine Corps is involved in a concussive event.
I would appreciate further details, perhaps in a later
session or in written form, whichever you find best to do, and
invite you now just to provide some additional details if you
wish. But I would very much appreciate a more detailed
briefing, because I think that for all the Services this is a
major challenge going forward in this conflict and setting an
example for future conflicts.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Marine Corps is undertaking a proactive, comprehensive approach
to address the challenge of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)/Post-Traumatic
Stress (PTS) including prevention, education, early identification,
treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We are working closely
with the Defense Center of Excellence, which is the Department of
Defense lead agency on efforts to improve the prevention,
identification, and treatment of TBI/PTS. We are actively implementing
the requirements of Directive Type Memorandum 09-033 regarding mild
TBI/concussion and have launched a mandatory screening protocol for
marines exposed to blast events in theater.
Our Navy medical personnel and leaders are receiving training on
new event-based protocols and Marine personnel receive TBI/concussion
training prior to deployment. Marines exposed to a potentially
concussive event receive a mandatory medical evaluation and
requirements are in place for Marine leaders to report on personnel who
are exposed to potentially concussive events. Medical evaluation
results are documented in medical records, and extra precautions and
evaluations are in place for marines with repeat/multiple concussions.
The Marine Corps, with Navy support, has established a Concussion
and Musculoskeletal Restoration Care Center (CRCC) in theater. This
center provides front-line care to patients with mild TBI/concussion
and has dramatically improved identification, diagnosis, treatment,
outcomes, and return to duty rates. CRCC provides comprehensive
interdisciplinary care for concussion, psychological health, and
musculoskeletal injuries. Interdisciplinary services include Family
Medicine, Sports Medicine, Mental Health, Physical Therapy,
Occupational Therapy, Acupuncture, and Spiritual therapy.
Since its inception in August 2010, the CRCC has logged over 8,000
patient encounters, including evaluation and treatment of over 560
patients with concussion. Over 96 percent of patients treated for
concussion at the CRCC have had favorable outcomes with return to full
duty. In the past, these patients would have required evacuation to
Kandahar or Bagram hospitals and/or evacuation out of theater.
Processes are in place to screen all marines for TBI/PTS upon
returning from deployment. Every marine evacuated from theater for
injuries receives a TBI screen. This is primarily done via the Post-
Deployment Health Assessment/Post-Deployment Health Reassessment.
We are exploring new measures to measure blast exposure and improve
detection of TBI, including biomarkers, imaging tools, and neuro-
cognitive testing. The Marine Corps continues to pursue advances in
personal protective equipment, including next-generation helmet
technology to mitigate blast effects. Education about TBI has been
shown to reduce morbidity following injury, and we are making efforts
to ensure education is provided during predeployment briefs and at all
levels of leadership training, from small unit leaders up to senior
leaders.
General Amos. Senator, I'll be happy to provide you the
details, in fact, all the members of the committee, because I
think it's encouraging. It hasn't solved it. The whole
recognition of what happens to the brain is certainly not a
mystery, but it is not clear because it doesn't happen in the
same way to every single person.
But there was recognition over 2 years ago, and it was
really a collaborative effort by myself, or by the U.S. Army
and the U.S. Marine Corps--so I want to give credit to General
Chiarelli and the Army--to try to figure out what happens to
the brain when it's rattled as a result of an IED or some type
of concussive event, and then what are the net effects.
The net effects are not necessarily long-range PTS, but it
could be. But clearly there was a correlation between getting
your brain hit hard with a concussive event and the requirement
to let the brain rest. In some cases it's 48 hours, in some
cases it's a week, maybe 2 weeks. But the very best thing you
can do to prevent further damage is to put that brain in some
semblance of rest.
So that's what we did. We built a concussive protocol, the
one you're referring to in Afghanistan. Marines, soldiers,
sailors, when that event happens, they come right back into
what we call the wire. They're looked at by a corpsman if
that's all we have there. We have cyber technology that allows
the doctor at Camp Leatherneck to look in the eye of the
wounded marine or soldier or sailor. Then we eventually will
move them to that restoration care center at Camp Leatherneck,
if required.
The whole idea now is to just provide them the ability to
step back, let their brain heal, to prevent further damage.
Marines are tough. We lie. When a young lance corporal is asked
by his company gunnie, how do you feel, he says: I'm good to
go; when in fact, the very best thing the leadership can do is
say: We're going to stop right here, young devil dog, and we're
going to let you sit inside the wire for a day or so.
We believe--it's too soon to tell; we don't have the
empirical data. But we know in our hearts that this is the
right thing to do. We'll be happy to provide you more
information.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
My time is up, but I would like to thank you for returning
ROTC to Harvard as you've done and simply offer to be helpful
anywhere on any campus, certainly in Connecticut, where I can
be helpful if there's any way that we can restore ROTC anyplace
where it's lacking now.
Thank you. Thank you all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say to you that I am excited about Marine
Week in St. Louis in June, and I want to thank, commander, your
decision to come to St. Louis. We will welcome the marines with
open arms and, since our State has proudly contributed so many
brave marines over the history of our military, we are thrilled
to host you for that important event.
Secretary Mabus, I know that our military is the best in
the world at combat readiness, but we are really bad at audit
readiness. I am continuing to be very frustrated with the
business systems within DOD and the ability for us to get a
handle on tracking our money and the various services being
able to be transparent and viewable across systems.
It is a continuing level of frustration. I do want to
applaud the Navy and Marine Corps for making some important
progress on service-level auditability. I know you have been
working on it, and I know you've identified some net savings by
improving your financial management processes.
The program I want to focus in on today is the enterprise
resource planning. You are slated to spend about a billion
dollars on that in a supply system called the Global Command
Support System. The Army is currently fielding a similar system
called Global Combat Support System-Army. Theirs will cost
nearly $4 billion.
Now, I know you share equipment in theater. That is a
reality of the fight, is the sharing of equipment. But these
two systems have the same goal, that is tracking supply and
equipment, but they're not even going to run on the same
software. The Marines are using Oracle and the Army is running
on SAP. There's a $3 billion cost differential.
My understanding is that the two systems as designed are
not even naturally compatible and that DOD will have to
continue to pay just to develop interfaces between these two
systems.
I get a headache when I think about all the money that we
have thrown away in the Federal Government on data systems and
information technology. Now, part of this is unavoidable
because the technology has developed so quickly that when we've
tried to develop great big systems, by the time it gets ready
to be deployed it's already out of date and antiquated.
Some of it is the nature of the rapid transition we've had
in this country with technology. But I think particularly
within the military there is a problem in acknowledging when
we're throwing bad money after good or when we're setting up
systems that frankly make no sense in terms of what the
ultimate goals are.
Tell me your position on what could be done to make the
effort at tracking our equipment, at least the ability to track
it between the two branches of our Services that are sharing
the same equipment? This is just hard for me to imagine, that
we're going to continue down this multi-billion dollar road.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, you and I share a lot of things. One of
them is I know my first elected jobs and one of yours was as
State auditor of our respective States. I understand the
importance not only of auditability, but of these enterprise
resource systems to track the things we do.
If you'll also allow me one more moment of personal thing,
a friend of mine once described my father as someone who threw
nickels around like they were manhole covers, and I am my
father's son. I think that we have to be good stewards of the
taxpayers' money.
In terms of auditability, what you said, we are making some
progress on that and we are focused on that. In terms of the
overall resource, the enterprise resource, that system began
several years ago to try to get real-time information on things
like inventory on things like equipment, on things, as it moved
through the system.
I'll be very frank. I don't know what the interface issues
are with the Army. But I will find out, as a result of this. We
are spending a lot of money to ensure that we can track on a
real-time basis, not a week later or a month later, what's
happening to all the assets that the Navy and the Marine Corps
have.
We should always look for opportunities, though, to be
joint, to do things defense-wide.
Senator McCaskill. As we are making really difficult
decisions in this government over the next decade and we think
the hard ones are today and tomorrow and next week, we're going
to have hard decisions to make for a long time. What would be
an amazing moment would be for the Army and the Marine Corps to
sit down, decide whose system is further along, whose system is
the easiest to be trained on, whose system is going to have the
least amount of support costs ongoing, and to make a decision
to use one for both.
I don't know that it matters whether it's the Marine Corps
system or the Army system. But it just seems unbelievable to me
that we are paying for the development of two separate systems
that don't speak to each other. This would be a moment that we
could save. Since the Army's is more expensive, I'm hoping that
yours is the one that could be utilized. This could be a $3
billion moment, and we're looking for $3 billion moments right
now.
This is the kind of thing that I think, until we can
demonstrate to the American people that we can at least do
these kinds of savings, I don't think they're going to take us
seriously on our ability to deal with our long-term debt. So I
would love to see--and I will be following up with Secretary
Gates and with Admiral Mullen in terms of seeing how many
places are there that we could do something like this.
Now, I know this is hard to do, because you've been working
on this for a long time, and so has the Army, and there's some
separateness been going on for several years, and sometimes
it's not wanting to step in and say, okay, all the money we've
spent, we're going to abandon that and go forward in a
different way. But sometimes that's the smartest thing to do.
General Amos?
General Amos. Senator, I'm familiar with the GCCS Marine
Corps software by Oracle. That effort began--let me back up,
just maybe give you a ray of hope. There is a what we call an
Army-Marine Corps Board. It's chaired by the three-stars, the
head of requirements and the comptroller. So it's the budget
and requirements folks. They meet as required, typically about
twice a month, and they resolve an awful lot of these issues
where both Services come up. It can be a helmet, it can be
something like a service weapon, it can be a piece of
equipment.
Now, we all have different--not all our equipment is the
same, and you know that. But a lot of that compatibility and
who's going to buy what, what's going to jump on whose program,
is solved right there at the three-star level. So there is an
effort that is under way.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), chaired by
all the Service Vices and the Vice Chairman, also looks at
compatibility across the joint force.
But back to this GCCS, we got halfway through Iraq. We're
talking about 2006, and the truth of the matter is we had a lot
of equipment on the ground to satisfy those 35,000 marines and
sailors. We thought we knew how much we had and we had a
variety of systems, about 15, that were tracking. We said we
have to come up with something different. Ergo the birth of the
requirement from Oracle.
The system right now, I can't speak to the Army's system,
but our system is fielding right now in Okinawa and it is
probably, of all the software efforts we've ever done in the
Marine Corps and spent a lot of money and been disappointed
often, this one probably has the greatest hope of all the ones
we have.
So let us check with the Army. Let us come back to you with
a ``here's where we are as two Services.'' We owe you that,
ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army and the Marines Corps both used the competitive
contracting process to select their respective software applications
based on their specific Service requirements. Although the Army and the
Marines Corps may share similar logistics requirements, at the highest
level they differ in terms of: people; process/mission execution;
technology-interfaces; and data.
Although at first glance it seems logical and compelling to have
different Services use the same solution, as the Defense Integrated
Military Human Resources System taught the Department of Defense, it is
enormously difficult, expensive, and very high risk. In 2005, the IT
consulting firm Gartner analyzed this question and concluded it was
appropriate, cost effective, and logical for the Services to have
chosen two different solutions. Also, there was never a requirement for
Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps and Global Combat Support
System-Army to be interoperable and pass information, so consequently,
at the present time they don't. However, if such a requirement arose,
the two systems could be made interoperable through the use of an
interface.
Senator McCaskill. I understand that JROC was designed to
do this, but in other hearings we have had some admissions that
the culture of JROC had unfortunately too often been, we'll
give you what you want if you'll give us what I want; that
there had been some of that, as opposed to, okay, we're going
to give up what we want and you're going to give up what you
want and see if we can't do it together.
I know, because I worked on this in a previous National
Defense Authorization bill trying to provide maybe some input
from somewhere other than the branches, because it did appear
too often that everybody was going along to get along.
General Amos. Ma'am, having been the Assistant Commandant
for 27 months and been a member of the JROC, I found it almost
painful sometimes, how we worked our way through situations.
But I will also tell you it's more than culture; it's also the
way we deploy, in other words, the kind of systems we need. The
software has to support the ability to go aboard ship, to
deploy expeditionary in places in North Africa, if required. So
there are some differences. But we owe you an answer, ma'am. I
understand.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Amos----
Chairman Levin. Your mike.
Senator Shaheen. It's on. Is that better?
Chairman Levin. No. Maybe you better change your seat.
Senator McCaskill. Change that name tag from Senator
Manchin.
Chairman Levin. For your sake, not for his.
Senator Shaheen. I was assuming it was for my sake, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
--I apologize for missing your testimony. I had to preside
over the Senate. But I am pleased that you're still here and
hopefully I won't take too much time.
I know that Senator Collins earlier today raised the
question about the backlog of restoration and modernization
projects at the four public shipyards. It's a major concern to
Senator Collins, being from Maine, and to me, being from New
Hampshire, because of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I know
that a recent GAO report that was requested by Senators Collins
and Webb made four recommendations to improve the visibility of
the Navy shipyards restoration and modernization needs and
quality of life issues.
I would just hope, Secretary Mabus and all of you, that you
will take those recommendations very seriously, and look
forward to working with you to implement those. Specifically,
as I said, I'm concerned about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
the fact that no MILCON funds have been allocated to the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard by the executive branch in the last 5
years. So that that means in previous years the shipyard has
had to rely on congressionally-directed spending, which
included $39.2 million in fiscal year 2008 and $17.2 million in
previous proposed fiscal year 2011 spending.
So given the current spending environment and the
moratorium that currently exists on congressionally-directed
spending, or earmarks, how does the Navy intend to support
critical MILCON investments at Portsmouth and at the other
public shipyards? Perhaps as part of your answer you could talk
a little about how you might prioritize those investments and
support modernization.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, if it's acceptable to you, I'll let the
CNO answer this, since he answered Senator Collins, so that we
can have an absolute continuity of answers.
Senator Shaheen. Shoot, I was going to see if you could
answer it the same way. [Laughter.]
Admiral Roughead. I'm sure he could, Senator.
The shipyards, particularly our four public shipyards, are
going to be very critical for us in the future, simply because
of the amount of nuclear work that we have coming into the
window. Accordingly, we are looking at what must be done,
primarily for the safety and security issues, particularly as
it applies to our nuclear enterprise, and then productivity and
quality of life.
Even though we do have the backlog, in point of fact we are
investing above what has been the congressional level of
sustainment for the shipyards. But we're always looking at what
needs to be done for those four areas that I mentioned.
I would also, being perfectly honest, that as we have
looked at the level of funding going into the shipyards and as
circumstances have changed, we're going to have to take a look
at what the future looks like and how we apportion the MILCON
money, not just across shipyards, but really across all of the
facilities that we have.
But I think the public shipyards are going to be in a very
good position in the coming years from a workforce standpoint,
as the Secretary mentioned, being exempt from the hiring
limitations, but also they're going to be very busy and very
critical to our future.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that and am pleased
to hear that you're thinking about that. Can I just press you a
little more on, as you point out, you're going to have to
prioritize those investments. So have you thought about the
factors that you'll take into consideration in doing that?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. Clearly, nuclear safety and
nuclear security are foremost, and that applies to the four
public yards that we have, and then also the safety of our
workforce is paramount. So those are the opening arguments for
me.
Mr. Mabus. Senator, in terms of setting priorities, the CNO
mentioned this, there is a civilian hiring freeze at DOD right
now. Because of the importance of shipyards, we asked for and
received an exemption for shipyard hiring, so that we can
continue to maintain our industrial base and the work that the
shipyards are doing.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I do appreciate that and think
that was very important. I know that at Portsmouth we've had a
very competent, productive workforce and we're going to be
losing many of those folks because many of them are close to
retirement age. So being able to bring on younger people who
can start training for those jobs is going to be very important
to productivity.
On another issue, Secretary Mabus, I certainly applaud your
focus on trying to be more energy independent within the
jurisdiction that you control. I wonder if you could talk a
little bit more about the kinds of steps that you're taking in
the Navy to be more energy efficient. It is a critical security
issue, as you've pointed out, and I think it's important for us
in Congress and for the public to know that we're moving in a
direction to make us more energy independent, especially these
days as we're watching what's happening in the Middle East.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. As you pointed out, you
don't have to look any further than the headlines to know why
we need to do this. We've made a lot of progress toward our
goal, which we're going to reach, of by no later than 2020 at
least half our energy usage will come from non-fossil fuel
sources. We've flown the F-18 on biofuels. We've certified our
helicopters also on biofuels, as well as our Swift boats. We
are currently working on our large surface combatants in that
regard.
We are doing a lot of work on efficiencies. We've launched
the first hybrid ship. We're looking at putting the electric
drive that is on that ship on our new builds as well as
retrofitting some of our DDG-51s.
On shore, we have vastly expanded our solar capacity. We've
done stuff like smart meters so that we know where our energy's
going.
Finally, I want to particularly brag on the Marine Corps,
because, like they normally do, they're leaders in this. They
have established two expeditionary FOBs, experimental FOBs, one
at Quantico, one at Twentynine Palms, to develop the
alternative energy that our warfighters need.
What we import the most into Afghanistan is gasoline. The
Army did a study that showed that for every 24 convoys of
gasoline, we lose a soldier or a marine killed or wounded
guarding that convoy. It also takes marines away from doing
what they were sent there to do, which is to fight, to engage,
to rebuild.
The first unit that took some of these things that
experimental FOBs designed was 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines,
which I got to visit right before Christmas in Sangin. Now,
they're in some of the toughest fighting in Afghanistan right
now, but even in that fight they have taken solar panels and
are using them for their command headquarters. They've taken
these rollable solar panels and stuck them in their packs.
I was talking to a lieutenant there. A foot patrol now
saves 700 pounds of batteries that they don't have to take
because of this. They are reducing dramatically their usage of
fossil fuels.
The Commandant has just signed out a requirement, an order,
that is going to integrate the training on alternative energy
as part of the routine training that marines get before they
deploy, so that they'll better be able to use these. But we are
seeing real advances. We're saving lives, we're using less
fuel, and we're making marines better fighters just because
they don't have to lug around so much stuff.
Senator Shaheen. That's very impressive. Thank you. Perhaps
you can share some of those technologies with the rest of us in
government, so that we can be more efficient and more energy
independent.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
I think the figure you used on that point was that that
unit was saving 90 percent? Is that the right number, of its
fossil fuel? The fuel used decreased 90 percent with that
company, I believe.
Mr. Mabus. That company is saving a lot. It's probably not
90 percent.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Mr. Mabus. But I can get you a very specific number, but
its energy usage, in some of its combat outposts, it's 100
percent; they're using nothing but alternative fuels. Overall
for the unit, it's significant, but I don't think it reaches 90
percent.
Chairman Levin. What we will do, following Senator
Shaheen's suggestion, is to get that experience, if it's not
already there, to the other, to the Army as well, because we
have the same issue, goal, with the Army, as Senator Shaheen
mentioned.
[The information referred to follows:]
While deployed to the Sangin Province Afghanistan, India Company
Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (3/5) operated two patrol bases
completely on renewable energy, offsetting 100 percent of their
potential fuel use. Based on reports from Marines in the field it is
estimated that each patrol base saved 12 gallons per day per location.
This means that each month these two patrol bases would have offset
approximately 744 gallons per month (31 days 24 gals) or
8,928 gallons per year. It is evident that a small savings at a remote
patrol base has significant impacts over the long term, not to mention
immediate reduction in risk to our marines moving fuel in a very
dangerous area.
In addition to the patrol bases operated by India 3/5, they also
employed renewable and energy efficient technologies at a company
location too. At the company location, fuel use was reduced from 25
gallons per day to 2.5 gallons per day or an initial savings of 90
percent. Targeting renewable and energy efficient technologies at
remote outpost immediately reduces the risks to our forces and
increases our combat effectiveness.
Chairman Levin. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses here today, Admiral Roughead,
Secretary Mabus, and General Amos, for your distinguished
service to our country. We're deeply grateful for what you're
doing. I also want to thank you for all of those that serve
underneath you, for the sacrifices that they and their families
are making for our country at a time of conflict.
I wanted to follow up on, Admiral, on the questions that
were asked by Senator Shaheen. I wanted to join in her comments
about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the importance of that
shipyard. I wanted to ask you specifically about the project to
consolidate structural workshops at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
This project is a very important one because it would
ultimately save taxpayers' dollars through efficiency measures
at the shipyard and it would certainly improve efficiency of
shipyard operations, reduce cost, and duration of submarine
maintenance.
Currently, this project is scheduled to be completed in
fiscal year 2015. But, given the importance of the project to
naval readiness and taxpayers' savings that I believe that we
could accomplish with this, given added efficiencies, I think
this project should be moved up to fiscal year 2012. Admiral,
does the Navy's fiscal year 2012 budget proposal include this
project to consolidate structural workshops at the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, right now it is in the program
for 2015. But it has several segments to it. To your point, if
we do it by segment it will actually cost us more money. So we
can consolidate two of the phases and actually save money, and
we're looking at the ability to do that because we see some
potential changes taking place in some other MILCON, and my
staff knows to look at that, to see if there is the potential
to pull it up into 2012.
Senator Ayotte. So if we were to consolidate and pull it up
into 2012, it actually would result in cost savings, rather
than segmenting the project, as it is right now?
Admiral Roughead. The way that I see the project, it would
cost us about another $8 million if we don't do the
consolidation.
Senator Ayotte. So I appreciate that you and your staff are
looking at this. It also seems to me not only important in
terms of the shipyard, but a way to save taxpayers' dollars to
achieve efficiencies at the shipyard with the important work
that they're doing there.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. I'm always looking for
efficiencies.
Senator Ayotte. We deeply appreciate that. Obviously, the
shipyard is very important in the Navy's mission and we
appreciate your bringing that forward. I'd be happy to work
with you on that if you need any assistance.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus, in your written statement
you had noted that rising health care costs within the military
health system continue to present a fiscal challenge to DOD,
and you've written that DOD's resources devoted to health care
costs cannot be sustained. According to a recent March GAO
report, there are tremendous opportunities to reduce potential
duplication in government programs among the Services in terms
of looking at military health care costs. I want you to tell me
what steps you thought were appropriate to take in addressing
the findings of the GAO report on duplication.
Mr. Mabus. I think it's important to separate a couple of
things here. One is Active Duty health care. There have been no
changes in terms of amounts of money spent or things like that
recommended for Active Duty servicemembers. There have been
recommendations in terms of more service-wide efficiencies that
the GAO report did on that.
In terms of my comments that the health care costs were
going up, were aimed mainly at health care costs for retirees
under the Medicare age, that the Secretary of Defense has made
some recommendations on. We fully concur in that. That's where
our costs are going up. That, I think, will become
unsustainable in the future.
The Secretary of Defense on a defense-wide basis has
recommended that the costs for a single person go up $2.50 per
month, for a family, $5 per month. We're talking about going
for a family, from $460 a year to $520 a year in terms of
premiums--a very modest increase. It's still far, far below
what a Federal employee who is not a military retiree would
have to pay.
There are also overhead reductions in this. We do think
that there can be some savings in overhead in terms of the way
we deliver our health care costs. But those two major things,
we think, are necessary to keep us sustainable just in terms of
how much money we're spending on health care.
Senator Ayotte. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to follow up,
because obviously with respect to our retirees and our veterans
we also have a solemn duty to make sure that we follow through
on the promises that we've made to them with respect to health
care and other promises, given their service to our country. So
this committee certainly will be looking at those proposals.
I also wanted to just follow up on the idea of greater
coordination to eliminate duplication within the system, to try
to save administrative costs, and what your thoughts are, and
what some of the issues that were identified in the GAO report
were, and what measure you thought that we could take among the
branches and even within the Navy to try to save some
administrative costs in that area?
Mr. Mabus. There are clearly some areas that you can save
some administrative costs. We're looking not only between
Services, but also between the Services and the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) system, for example. We're going to an
integrated disability evaluation system so that a servicemember
who is disabled doesn't have to go through that twice, once for
the Service, once for the VA. That saves one step. That
obviously saves some overhead costs.
Because of the previous Base Realignment and Closure
Commission, Walter Reed, and Bethesda are being merged into one
health care center, and we are actively promoting some savings
in overhead there. We think that, very frankly, there's too
much overhead in the joining of those two very critical
military facilities.
So you and the GAO are correct that there are efficiencies
that we can find just in terms of administrative overhead. We
have found some of them based on the efficiencies that
Secretary Gates asked us to find. But we are continuing that
look, not only in health care, but across DOD, but specifically
in health care.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much for your answer.
My time is up. I wanted to thank all of you for the work
that you're doing on behalf of our country. I just offer that I
certainly am willing to work with you on making sure that we
achieve these efficiencies so that we continue to support our
soldiers and those who have sacrificed so much for us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
In your answer to Senator Ayotte, Mr. Secretary, you made
reference to the budget's proposed increase in the enrollment
fees for retirees under 65. When was the last time those fees
were increased, do you know offhand?
Mr. Mabus. I believe it was 1995, Senator.
Chairman Levin. I'm wondering if I could ask you, Admiral,
and you, General, do you support the budget proposal that those
fees be increased?
Admiral Roughead. I do, sir. I think it's appropriate. I do
not believe it is an onerous cost and I'm fully supportive of
those changes.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Amos. Chairman, I absolutely support them.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you about the no-fly zone issue.
Our NATO allies, including U.K., France, and Italy, are looking
at U.N. resolutions and what the role of NATO might be in any
no-fly zone. So that my question is the following: Even without
direct U.S. involvement, do our NATO allies have the capability
of implementing a no-fly zone over Libya, presumably with the
support of members of the international community? Do they have
the capability of dealing with any threat by the Libyan air
force, such as it is, and by Libyan air defenses, such as they
are?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, I think that whatever group
comes together if, in fact, this were to proceed would have to
look at the individual capabilities of that country or those
countries and see what it was. But the NATO air capability is
significant, sophisticated. I think you have to see what the
final outcome is.
Chairman Levin. So that in terms of the specific
capabilities of those air forces even without our involvement,
you're not able to say now whether or not they could
successfully carry out that mission?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, I think the capabilities reside
within the NATO air forces. It's who comes together and
contributes what that would determine the effectiveness of that
package.
Chairman Levin. On the question of Guam and Okinawa, you
mentioned, Mr. Secretary, that there need to be some Japanese
Government decisions. Do you know whether there are any
discussions or negotiations scheduled with the Japanese
Government relative to that issue?
Mr. Mabus. I know that Secretary Gates in his previous
discussions earlier this year was very frank with the Japanese
Government on what those decisions need to be, and I think that
the Japanese Government understands exactly what actions need
to be taken before we can begin to take some substantive steps.
Chairman Levin. Do you know whether there are any scheduled
negotiations or discussions?
Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I don't.
Chairman Levin. That's fair. If there are, would you let us
know?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Webb mentioned that the two of us
will be heading out that way in about a month and that we
should know the status. We'll be briefed, obviously, by you and
your folks before we go, but on that issue particularly, if
there's anything scheduled, if you'll let us know.
[The information referred to follows:]
In response to the request for notification of negotiations
scheduled between the United States and Government of Japan, although a
2+2 (Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Minister of Defense,
Minister of Foreign Affairs) had been tentatively scheduled for April
29 in Washington, due to the senior level focus of the Government of
Japan and especially the Ministry of Defense, on managing the response
to the natural disaster and nuclear crisis, this meeting has been
postponed. We are seeking acceptable dates for all parties in the near
future. We do not yet have a firm timetable from the Japanese for the
landfill permit process, but in our judgment they remain committed to
the Roadmap, both for the Guam move as well as the Futenma Replacement
Facility and Okinawa.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Roughead, you've testified on a
number of occasions about your support of the United States
signing onto the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). You reiterate that support in your written statement
this morning. I think, Mr. Secretary, you've also testified
before this committee in support of our supporting that treaty
and acceding to it.
Is there anything that's happened in the last year that has
either changed or strengthened either of your positions on
that? Mr. Secretary, let me start with you.
Mr. Mabus. It has strengthened my idea that we should
accede to this treaty, for a couple of reasons. One is, as
other nations who are signatories try to restrict our freedom
of navigation, we are less able to push back with as much force
as we should be able to were we a signatory to this. I think
that you're only going to see that increase, as it has over the
past year.
Second, I've seen firsthand some of the implications of the
Arctic and the perhaps ice-free Arctic in the next couple of
decades. The only way we can have a claim to an outer
continental shelf area that we can explore for minerals, that
we can use as part of our exclusive economic zone, is if we are
signatories to the UNCLOS.
Those two things have strengthened my stand that we very
much need to be signatories.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. I would echo those statements, Senator. I
think we are letting an opportunity and time pass us by. On top
of those two, where the claims in the Pacific in particular
have the potential to become more contentious. The opening of
the Arctic, where resolution of claims and disagreements will
be done through UNCLOS, we will not be there.
On top of that, I would submit that our international
leadership to those countries that view the seas the same way
that we do, that as they come together to address these issues
we are not there, and they look to us for that leadership and
we are abrogating that leadership.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I indicated to you that there was a couple
of questions on that second engine that I asked you to respond
to for the record. In addition to those two questions, let me
add a third and a fourth just for the record, if you would. One
would be how much development money has gone into the first
engine and what is the $400 million, I believe, additional
request for the Pratt engine development due to the business
case, and how much total has gone into that engine in terms of
development costs.
Finally, I have a long question which I'll get to you both,
both you, Mr. Secretary, and you, Admiral, about this issue of
special support requirements if there is a second engine. It's
a lengthy question raising issues with your responses. I think
also you, General, responded on that as well. So I would ask
all three of you to take a look at that question that I will
get to you, and then you can submit your answer for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Amos. The F135 and F136
engines constitute two different designs by two different
manufacturers. The large size of the F135 and F136 (approximately 18.7
feet and weighs 9,300 lbs in its container) necessitates greater
sparing aboard ships as neither the assembled engine nor the power
section module can currently be replenished underway. Similarly, due to
the weight and height of critical engine spares, it is not feasible to
store all Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) engine spares in legacy store
rooms or stack them aboard ships as is done for the legacy system. This
would necessitate work-around in hangar deck spaces normally reserved
to store and maintain tactical aircraft. Adding an alternate engine
makes the shipboard logistics even more challenging as it is not a one-
for-one exchange.
While the F136 engine would be interchangeable, there are several
engine components that are not interchangeable. The fan, gear box, and
power section modules are unique by F135 and F136 propulsion systems.
Only the augmenter and exhaust nozzle modules are common by F-35
variant. Supporting two engines would require unique spares, unique
support equipment, and unique training. The JSF specification only
requires engines to perform to specified criteria and physically fit
into the F-35. Maintenance/repair technical requirements are different,
requiring different instructions and training with differences in
assembly hardware and special tools for off-aircraft repair.
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. I must leave. Senator Ayotte, you're more
than welcome to take the gavel and conclude if you have
additional questions, if that's all right. I'll hand it to you
on the way out.
Thank you all. All three of you have performed
extraordinary service for this country. Admiral, since this is
probably your last appearance here, I just want to reinforce
what my colleagues have said about you and that service. We
just wish you well if we don't see you again.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. It's been my honor.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and General,
thank you both.
Senator Ayotte [presiding]. I just have a couple of brief
questions and then I will wrap this up for sure. I appreciate
your patience.
Admiral Roughead, I wanted to ask you about the maintenance
portion of the budget. Secretary Gates said on March 4 that a
lot of our surface ships that were built in the Reagan era will
be aging out in coming years pretty quickly. In your written
testimony you've echoed this concern, saying: ``Many of our
existing cruisers, destroyers, and submarines will reach the
end of their service life.''
I notice in the budget proposal for fiscal year 2012 you've
funded ship depot maintenance at 94 percent, and wanted to hear
from you if you could provide some examples of what type of
maintenance would not be accomplished at that level versus 100
percent maintenance level, understanding that in order for us
to preserve our fleet we are probably going to have to be doing
additional maintenance, given the aging of the fleet.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. We are spending
much more on maintenance now than we did just a couple of years
ago. So with the support of Congress, we've been able to boost
that up.
As we got into putting the final touches on the budget,
because we have done that little bit of a boost-up and we
looked at ship availabilities, maintenance periods, and the
ones that are not included in there are not the complex types
of work. They tend to be smaller availabilities. Clearly they
don't include any nuclear work, nor do they include any of the
work that's done in the public shipyards. These are all
availabilities in the private sector, relatively small, and I
believe that where we have been--some of the changes that we're
putting into place with regard to putting more sailors on ships
and in maintenance centers, that I consider this a reasonable
approach to take.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Amos, I had a question about our detention policy.
I had the privilege of going over to visit some of your
soldiers in January. I also want to say the work being done by
the Marines is just tremendous and so wanted to commend you for
your leadership and also just thank the soldiers that serve
underneath you.
If tomorrow we were able to capture the number two in al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that was actually formerly a
detainee at Guantanamo--I believe his name is Saeed al-Shehri--
where would we put him?
General Amos. Senator, that's way above my pay grade. I
wouldn't know where we would put him. Truly, the truth of the
matter is that that would be resolved at a level with much
discussion. In fact, I doubt if the Commandant of the Marine
Corps would even be part of that discussion. It would be at the
very highest levels of our government.
Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns that I have is that
I've heard testimony now from Secretary Gates as well as
Secretary Vickers that because we're in a position where the
President wants to close Guantanamo, there is no detention
facility to put that type of high-value target that we have
under our control. Are you aware of a facility we would have
under our control that would be appropriate and not located in
the United States, to be able to not only interrogate that
individual, but make sure that he doesn't again rejoin the
battlefield?
General Amos. Ma'am, I am not aware of another facility.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of
you being here and I'm sure you're all anxious for lunch, so I
will conclude this hearing. I thank you all for your service to
our country. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPEAL OF ``DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL''
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, last December, Admiral Roughead
testified that, ``with the exception of the moderate risk associated
with projected retention in some Navy irregular warfare specialties, I
assess the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion of the Navy
to be low. Based on my professional judgment and informed by the inputs
from our Navy, I recommend repeal of 10 U.S.C. section 654.'' General
Amos testified: ``based on what I know about the very tough fight in
Afghanistan, the almost singular focus of our combat forces as they
train up and deploy to theater, the necessary tightly woven culture of
those combat forces that we are asking so much of at this time, and
finally the direct feedback from the survey, my recommendation is that
we should not implement repeal at this time.'' Since that hearing, the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy have been working on policy
changes and developing training plans needed to implement the repeal.
What are your observations of how Navy personnel are dealing with
possible repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)?
Mr. Mabus. Our Master Mobile Training Teams and command leadership
teams continue to provide regular reports capturing the ``tone of the
force'' during this training period. Feedback from our sailors
indicates the training they are receiving is comprehensive, well-
delivered, and effective. Additionally, we have not observed any
impacts to readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, recruiting, or
retention.
2. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, what are your
current assessments of the risk to readiness, effectiveness, and
cohesion in the Navy and Marine Corps if DADT is repealed?
Admiral Roughead. I assess the risk to readiness, effectiveness,
and cohesion in the Navy to be low and acceptable. According to the
results of the Comprehensive Review Working Group servicemember survey,
approximately 76 percent of sailors believe the impacts on
effectiveness, readiness, unit cohesion, and morale will be neutral or
positive. There is approximately 24 percent who believe the impact of
repeal will be negative. I am mindful of the concerns expressed by
these individuals. However, I believe their concerns can be effectively
mitigated through engaged leadership, effective communications,
training and education, and clear and concise standards of conduct.
Since we have begun training, our commanders have reported no impacts
to readiness, effectiveness, or cohesion. I have the utmost confidence
in the ability of the men and women of the U.S. Navy to implement this
change in the law while setting a positive tone, creating an inclusive
and respectful work environment, and maintaining high standards of
conduct, mutual respect, and military decorum.
General Amos. I currently believe the risk is low to moderate.
However, we will not know the actual impact of repeal until it is
effected. During the current training phase, we have not observed
significant anxiety or push-back from our marines. I am confident that
Marine leaders at all levels will ensure our Corps understands the
impending change and will ensure that marines treat each other with
dignity and respect, thereby mitigating any impact on readiness,
effectiveness, and unit cohesion.
3. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, please
describe the status of training and education of sailors and marines
regarding the repeal of DADT.
Admiral Roughead. Navy is on track to meet our training completion
goal of 1 July 2011 for all naval personnel. Commander, U.S. Fleet
Forces has been appointed the Executive Agent for delivery and tracking
of DADT training. Master Mobile Training Teams have been deployed to
our Fleet worldwide to deliver training to our command leadership teams
(commanding officer, executive officer, command master chief). These
individuals will be responsible in turn to conduct the training for all
personnel within their command. To date, more than 90 percent of our
command leadership personnel (Tier 2) have been trained and are
conducting training Navy-wide for all remaining personnel (Tier 3).
Specific training for recruiters, military law enforcement, chaplains,
legal, Fleet and Family Support Centers, personnel support
professionals, housing, senior human resource personnel, equal
opportunity, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) personnel
(Tier 1) has been commenced and will be completed by the 1 July 2011
deadline.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is complete with Tier 1 (special
staff) and Tier 2 (leadership) training. As of 30 June 2011, Tier 3
(Marines) training is 95 percent complete. Our primary method of
instruction is face-to-face where leaders are able to interact with
their marines, provide information and then have a frank and open
discussion about any questions or concerns they may have.
4. Senator Levin. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, have you
discovered any unanticipated issues as you initiated the training? If
so, how are you addressing these issues?
Admiral Roughead. Navy has not experienced any unanticipated issues
during the training process. Feedback from our sailors indicates the
training they are receiving is comprehensive, well-delivered, and
effective. Additionally, we have not observed any impacts to readiness,
effectiveness, cohesion, recruiting, or retention during the training
period.
General Amos. We have not observed any significant unanticipated
issues during training. The framework for the training is very
comprehensive and anticipates many common questions and concerns.
SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, 17 current and former service
men and women recently filed a lawsuit in Federal Court alleging that
DOD ``failed to prevent plaintiffs and others from being raped and
sexually assaulted.'' Four of the plaintiffs were from the Navy and two
from the Marine Corps. Among other things, the plaintiffs allege that
DOD failed to investigate rapes and sexual assaults and failed to
prosecute the perpetrators. Some reports suggest that up to one-third
of the women serving in the military are victims of sexual assault.
What is your assessment of the Navy's Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response (SAPR) program?
Mr. Mabus. Nothing has a more corrosive effect on readiness, good
order, and discipline than sexual assault. We seek nothing less than a
culture of gender respect where sexual assault is completely eliminated
and never tolerated. The ``Navy Sexual Assault Prevention Summit''
brought together senior military and civilian Navy leaders to interact
with recognized experts in the field. I established a new Navy Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office (DON-SAPRO), led by a Senior
Executive Service civilian who reports directly to me. DON-SAPRO is my
primary agent for developing Secretariat-level policy and for
monitoring, coordinating, and assessing the Navy-wide efforts to
prevent sexual assaults.
The Department of the Navy and its two military Services--the U.S.
Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps continue our commitment to reduce the
incidence of sexual assault, provide compassionate support to sexual
assault survivors, and focus on prevention. Senior department
leadership provide a consistent top-down leadership message,
underscored by their actions that sexual assault is incompatible with
our core values. Examples of the many initiatives taken by the Navy in
fiscal year 2010 include:
``Bystander Intervention'' pilot programs at four
locations--educated sailors and marines on recognizing and
interrupting risky situations. Further implementation is
planned for fiscal year 2011.
Engaged a nationally-recognized civilian expert to
advise departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and to
help update sexual assault training curricula.
Expanded training for military investigators and
prosecutors and sponsored ``Sexual Assault Investigation and
Prosecution'' mobile training teams.
The Marine Corps has revised its training curriculum
for Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs), and Victim Advocates (UVAs/VAs).
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Mabus, have you made any changes in the
Navy to improve accountability for Navy personnel who commit sexual
assaults?
Mr. Mabus. Sexual assaults are crimes that devastate victims,
undermine teamwork, threaten unit cohesiveness, and ultimately reduce
fleet readiness. Navy has a ``zero tolerance'' sexual assault policy.
Expectations of senior leadership for SAPR are outlined in policy and
in Naval and Marine administrative messages sent worldwide.
Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG), Marine Corps Judge Advocate
Division, and NCIS partnered to review cases, analyze characteristics
of typical cases, and develop best practices for investigation,
evaluation, and prosecution of sexual assault cases. Trends were
evaluated to determine the type of training necessary to improve the
quality of investigation and prosecution of sexual assault cases. This
training was then delivered using mobile training teams throughout the
Navy and Marine Corps.
Specific Department and Service-level initiatives:
Hired two Sexual Assault Litigation Specialists
(nationally recognized experts)
Developed new courses: Prosecuting Alcohol-Facilitated
Sexual Assault; Sexual Assault Litigation and Mentoring Skills;
and Trial Advocacy taught by AEquitas
Navy JAG Corps implemented the Military Justice
Litigation Career Track
Marine Corps Trial Counsel Assistance Program
implemented