[Senate Hearing 112-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[ERRATA]
S. Hrg. 112-51
OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 516 S. 843
S. 916 S. 917
__________
MAY 17, 2011
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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[ERRATA]
S. Hrg. 112-51
The referenced hearing held before the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources was inadvertently printed without
the responses to questions from Secretary Salazar. This errata
provides those responses as part of the hearing record.
Responses of Secretary Salazar to Questions From Senator Murkowski
Question 1. Mr. Secretary, what are the greatest challenges facing
your regional headquarters in the Gulf? Other than critical pay
authority for highly qualified engineers, what can Congress do to
ensure better morale in your agency and aid in recruitment?
Answer. The reforms and organizational changes that we have put in
place since the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill are far-reaching
and their success depends in large part on providing the new agencies
with the financial resources, tools, training and culture to be
effective. Improving the safety of offshore drilling and the
effectiveness of government oversight of this inherently risky activity
will require a substantial infusion of resources into the offshore
regulator. We agree with the Commission's strong recommendation for a
substantial increase in the resources devoted to government oversight
of offshore activities because an effective regulator is so clearly in
the public's--and in industry's--interests. The budget allocation in
the current draft of the Department's FY 2012 appropriations bill falls
short of providing the full funding required to implement the
reorganization of BOEMRE and inadequately funds the operational
capacity required to implement all of our necessary and far-reaching
reforms. For example, it does not provide the requested increase in
offshore inspection fees of $55 million that could help to fund the
additional needs. Increased resources are essential to creating an
efficient, effective, transparent and stable development and regulatory
environment.
Question 2. Mr. Secretary, DOI has now issued a number of deepwater
drilling permits. We all know the issuances started as soon as
operators could prove access to subsea containment. Can you describe
for this committee the process and authorities behind the Notice To
Lessees and this requirement?
Answer. Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C.
1331, et seq.), the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to regulate
the exploration, development, and production of mineral resources on
the Outer Continental Shelf. The Secretary has delegated this authority
to the Director of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement. Notices to Lessees are authorized in the BOEMRE
regulations at 30 CFR 250.103, and have historically been issued by the
bureau as guidance documents to clarify certain bureau regulatory
requirements and to outline the information to be provided in the
various submissions required of lessees on the OCS.
After the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill the Department
began the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and
gas regulation and oversight in U.S. history. These reforms strengthen
requirements in areas ranging from well design and workplace safety to
corporate accountability, and are necessary to ensure that the United
States can safely and responsibly expand development of its energy
resources.
In November, 2010, BOEMRE issued NTL 2010-N10 informing lessees and
operators that a statement, signed by an authorized company official,
is required to be submitted with each application for a well permit
stating that the operator will conduct all authorized activities in
compliance with all applicable regulations. This NTL clarifies,
supplements, and provides more detail about existing regulations,
including 30 CFR 254.5(d), and is intended to assure compliance with
the requirements of 30 CFR 254.23, 254.24 and 254.26(d). In particular,
the NTL provides that BOEMRE will evaluate whether an operator has
submitted adequate information demonstrating access to and ability to
deploy adequate surface and subsea containment resources.
Industry first demonstrated the ability to contain a subsea spill
in mid-February 2011. At that time, we were able to resume issuing
deepwater drilling permits.
Question 3. Mr. Secretary, one of the bills under consideration
would create a joint permitting office for Alaska OCS issues. The
Chukchi Environment Impact Study (``EIS'') is a real driver in our
desire to coordinate better. When will BOEMRE finish this work and
finalize the Chukchi EIS?
Answer. On August 18, 2011, BOEMRE released the final supplemental
environmental impact statement for the Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193, held
in February 2008. The supplemental EIS addresses concerns raised by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska in its July 21, 2010,
decision remanding Lease Sale 193 back to the agency, and incorporates
additional public comment. It also includes a new analysis of the
potential environmental effects of a hypothetical Very Large Oil Spill
scenario.
The final supplemental EIS is available online at: http://
alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS_EA/2011_041_FSEIS/2011--041x.htm. BOEMRE is
now accepting public comments on the document, and any comments
received within the comment period will be considered by the Secretary
in determining whether to affirm, modify, or cancel the Lease Sale. The
final decision is due to the District Court no later than Oct. 3, 2011.
Question 4. Mr. Secretary, there is a pending exploration plan for
work in the Chukchi in 2012. BOEMRE has previously indicated that it
will work on this Exploration Plan in parallel with finalizing the
Chukchi EIS. Is this still the case? BOEMRE has begun to review the
Chukchi exploration plan and provide feedback to the applicant on data
gaps and information needs. Is that right?
Answer. On May 12, 2011, Shell submitted to the Department a
Revised Exploration Plan (EP) and associated Revised Oil Discharge
Prevention and Contingency Plan in support of a proposed exploration
drilling program on its Chukchi Sea leases. However, activities
involving these leases are restricted because of the remand issued by
the Federal Court for the Alaska District on July 21, 2010. Therefore
BOEMRE is treating the Chukchi EP as a draft and will not take any
official action on the draft EP until after a decision is made to
reaffirm Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193.
A copy of the revised plan and related information can be found at:
http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/ProjectHistory/2012_Shell_CK/2012x_.HTM
Question 5. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, the Large Spill
Analysis is quite different and distinct from the Worst Case Discharge
(``WCD'') at the well sites set forth in the Chukchi Exploration Plan.
Is that right?
Answer. Yes. A very large oil spill (VLOS) scenario is
hypothetical, and is not an analysis of a well that any operator has
actually proposed to drill. When an operator submits an Exploration
Plan, that plan must specify the wells it proposes to drill and include
an oil spill response plan that includes Worst Case Discharge values
for these proposed wells. These values take into account specific
depth, pressure, oil and anticipated reservoir properties for the
proposed wells. These values may be lower than the hypothetical VLOS
scenario used for the overall environmental analysis.
The final supplemental SEIS contains further discussion (at p. 126)
of the similarity and differences between the very large oil spill
scenario and the worst case discharge analysis.
Question 6. Mr. Secretary, I am concerned that the BOEMRE's work on
the Very Large Spill analysis is going to create confusion and
backlash, because the general public will not distinguish between this
analysis and the much, much lower WCD of the specific wells. What is
BOEMRE doing to make this distinction clear?
Answer. In general, the values for worst case discharge (WCD) under
the regulations may be higher or lower for a specific well than a very
large oil spill (VLOS) scenario. The revised Draft SEIS for Lease Sale
193, issued in May 2011, was the first National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) document post-Macondo that included an analysis of a VLOS
scenario to more thoroughly address the potential for oil spill
impacts. The discussion in that document and in the final supplemental
EIS, issued on August 18, presents the similarities and differences
between the VLOS scenario and the WCD analysis. Similar and appropriate
discussion will be included in all future NEPA documents.
Question 7. Mr. Secretary, why does every different agency with an
interest in a project have to do its own EIS? For instance there is a
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Marine
Fisheries Service EIS in the works and it seems that a key role of a
coordinating office--whether that's the President's coordinating task
force or one perhaps established by legislation under consideration--
would be reconciling one EIS against another. But, in order to increase
efficiency, couldn't BOEMRE's comprehensive EIS be used for all of
these purposes since other agencies are involved in creating it anyway?
Answer. We have learned through the tragedy of the Deepwater
Horizon event that environmental analysis of the potential impacts of
development activities is both necessary and important. Federal
agencies establish their own National Environmental Policy Act
procedures, in line with requirements of the Council on Environmental
Quality, for the specific agency's authorities and decisionmaking
processes. Agencies are, however, encouraged to incorporate by
reference information, findings, and recommendations from existing
studies and NEPA analyses into subsequent NEPA analyses and documents
in order to make them more concise and focused. Additionally, when it
is possible for one NEPA document to include the analyses to support
decisions for multiple Federal actions, different Agencies may either
work together (dependent upon need, timing, and available resources) as
co-lead agencies on an EIS (as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and BOEMRE are doing in the Gulf of Mexico for
seismic activities), or one Agency may adopt the NEPA document of
another agency (as NOAA preliminarily plans to coordinate on BOEMRE's
Atlantic Coast seismic EIS), if the necessary information is included
to support the decisions of the adopting agency.
On May 23 BOEMRE and NOAA announced a new collaborative effort,
implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding, that will increase
coordination and collaboration between the two agencies to support
environmentally sound offshore energy development. The MOU, which is
consistent with recommendations from the President's Commission on the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, specifies how the
two agencies will cooperate and coordinate by:
1. Defining specific processes to ensure effective and timely
communication of agency priorities and upcoming activities;
2. Identifying and undertaking critical environmental studies
and analyses;
3. Collaborating on scientific, environmental and technical
issues related to the development and deployment of
environmentally sound and sustainable offshore renewable energy
technologies; and
4. Increasing coordination and collaboration on decisions
related to OCS activities, including with respect to research
and scientific priorities.
Question 8. Can you please describe in detail the President's plan
for extending offshore leases affected by the moratorium, including
what classes of leases, which areas, or which specific leases will see
such extensions? Will all extensions be one year?
Answer. The details of this policy, originally announced by
President Obama as part of the Administration's Blueprint for a Secure
Energy Future, were provided by Secretary Salazar in a June 16, 2011,
memorandum directing BOEMRE to issue a Notice to Lessees and Operators
(NTL) describing how operators can request extensions for up to one-
year or until drilling activities commence (whichever is less) on their
qualifying deepwater leases. As described in the memorandum, in order
to qualify for such a suspension, leaseholders must demonstrate that
there was no oil or gas production on the lease as of May 15, 2011;
that the lease is in deepwater (depths greater than 500 feet); and that
the lease is scheduled to expire on or before December 31, 2015. The
lease extensions will provide lessees and operators additional time to
proceed with exploration and development of their leaseholds while
fully complying with important safety, environmental, spill response
and containment requirements. A copy of the memorandum can be found at:
http://www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Implements-Steps-
to-Increase-Responsible-Domestic-Energy-Production.cfm
Responses of Secretary Salazar to Questions From Senator Landrieu
Question 1. Secretary Salazar, as you know, the President on
Saturday announced in his radio address that he would extend ``drilling
leases that were affected by the moratorium.'' When the moratorium was
in place, companies were not allowed to participate in any activity
related to the development of new wells. They could not file permit
applications, they could not explore--they simply couldn't develop
their leases. As such, Senator Hutchison and I introduced the LEASE
ACT, as a matter of fairness to give this time back to these lease
holders. I am very encouraged to hear the President's remarks and I am
hoping you can speak specifically to how the agency is going to extend
these leases? Will all leases in the Gulf be extended? For how long
will they be extended? Please be very specific.
Answer. The details of this policy, originally announced by
President Obama as part of the Administration's Blueprint for a Secure
Energy Future, were provided by Secretary Salazar in a June 16, 2011,
memorandum directing BOEMRE to issue a Notice to Lessees and Operators
(NTL) describing how operators can request one-year extensions for
their qualifying deepwater leases. As described in the memorandum, in
order to qualify for such a suspension, leaseholders must demonstrate
that there was no oil or gas production on the lease as of May 15,
2011; that the lease is in deepwater (depths greater than 500 feet);
and that the lease is scheduled to expire on or before December 31,
2015. The lease extensions will provide lessees and operators
additional time to proceed with exploration and development of their
leaseholds while fully complying with important safety, environmental,
spill response and containment requirements. A copy of the memorandum
can be found at: http://www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-
Implements-Steps-to-Increase-Responsible-Domestic-Energy-Production.cfm
Question 2. On May 2nd, Director Bromwich stated that his agency
has broad authority to regulate service companies who provide services
to oil and gas operators. This is very troublesome to many of my
constituents who provide these services to oil and gas operators. Can
you please explain how BOEM will seek to regulate these service
companies? In addition, can you point to the specific law or regulation
that gives BOEM the authority to regulate offshore service companies?
Answer. Over the past year and in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill, we have been implementing a number of critical reforms to
strengthen the regulation of offshore oil and gas drilling and strike
the appropriate balance between resource development and regulatory
oversight. An important component in this reform strategy is the
judicious exercise of regulatory authority over not only offshore
operators, but contractors as well-as their work must also be done
safely in order for development to proceed responsibly. Our legal
authority encompasses the activities of all entities involved in
developing offshore leases, to be exercised as we deem appropriate and
as safety demands. The reason that the historical practice, has focused
on regulating operators was that it served to preserve clarity and the
singular responsibility of the operator. We believe that we can hold
operators responsible--and in most cases solely responsible--without
sacrificing the ability to pursue regulatory actions against
contractors for the most serious violations of agency rules and
regulations.
Question 3. Secretary Salazar, I would like to take a moment to
discuss with you some of the provisions in S. 917, the OCS Reform Act
of 2011. For instance, Section 4 of the bill seeks to change the
National Policy for the Outer Continental Shelf to be more
environmentally friendly. However, my staff has found that the National
Policy currently in law already has environmental safeguards built in
and in addition, your agency, BOEM has reviewed the environmental
protections under current law and has made changes post Deepwater
Horizon where necessary. As such, in your opinion, do our current laws
and regulations do enough to protect our environment while safely
producing domestic oil and gas? Doesn't the current law already have
enough environmental safeguards, making this provision irrelevant?
Answer. As noted in this question, a number of the changes in S.
917 highlight the need for increased safety of operations and
consideration of the marine and coastal environment, including the need
for integrated programs for both environmental research and
technological research and development. A focus on strengthened safety
and oversight and the environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas
operations are--and have been--priorities of the Administration and
have been reflected in a number of the reforms that the Department has
made since the Deepwater Horizon spill. Statutory changes will ensure
compliance with these important safety and environmental protection
obligations in the future.
Question 3a. In addition, Section 10 of this legislation would
create a ``National Commission'' whose purpose is to examine and report
on the facts and causes relating to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. I
don't necessarily have anything against this, except that establishing
a Commission now seems very untimely and outdated given the President's
Commission and other investigations. This is what I mean about this
legislation needing to be modified. We simply are not in the same place
we were last year. Do you agree that establishing a Commission now is
untimely? Is there a need to establish this Commission?
Answer. Chairman Bingaman's and Ranking Member Murkowski's
amendment in the nature of the substitute for S. 917 did not include
the provision creating a national commission. We note, however, that
over the months during and since containment of the spill associated
with the Deepwater Horizon explosion, multiple reviews and
investigations--some still ongoing--have resulted in reports indicating
the need for change. Bodies ranging from the President's Commission on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, the
Department of the Interior's Inspector General, the Department's own
Safety Oversight Board, to multiple Committees of the House and Senate,
have indicated the need for reform not only of the way the Department
does business but of the way oil and gas operations are carried out on
the Outer Continental Shelf. We believe that these investigations have
been beneficial, and have served to highlight the need for the kinds of
reforms that this Administration is implementing to the way oil and gas
operations are carried out on the OCS.
Question 3b. Finally, this legislation has a conflict of interest
section that puts restrictions on pre and post employment of BOEM
employees, gift restrictions and heightened penalties for employees
that violate these regulations. I know that Director Bromwich is
actively trying to recruit new employees to work at BOEM. The conflict
of interest provisions in this legislation seem very onerous. Can you
please tell me whether the agency has in place regulations to mitigate
conflicts of interest? Or how the Department of Interior addresses
conflicts of interest? If your Department does have these regulations,
is there a need to treat BOEM different from your other agencies? Do
you feel that this section could hamper your Department's efforts to
attract top notch employees?
Answer. BOEMRE Director Bromwich has recently noted that the bureau
issued a tough new recusal policy last year that requires employees in
district offices, where inspections and permitting functions reside, to
notify their supervisors about any potential conflict of interest and
request to be recused from performing any official duty in which such a
potential conflict exists. Examples include: inspectors are now
required to recuse themselves from performing inspections of the
facilities of former employers. Also, our inspectors must report any
attempt by industry or other bureau personnel to inappropriately
influence or interfere with their duties. BOEMRE will also soon be
issuing a broader version of the policy that applies these ethical
standards across the agency.
This policy does present operational challenges for some district
offices in the Gulf region, which are located in small communities
where the primary employers are offshore companies. However, the need
for tough rules defining the boundaries between regulators and the
regulated is compelling and necessary to assure the public that our
inspections and enforcement programs are effective, aggressive, and
independent. Already there is evidence that these new rules are being
followed. An internal review conducted by the bureau found more than 50
instances, from September 2010 through April 2011, in which inspectors
in the Gulf of Mexico appropriately recused themselves from a specific
assignment in compliance with the policy.
We note that the changes in S. 917 would criminalize legal
employment by employees of the two new bureaus even if they did not
violate the behavioral restrictions of 18 USC 207 and 5 CFR 2641.
Current regulations impose no restrictions concerning the organization
from which an employee may seek post Federal employment; instead, all
restrictions pertain to the nature of the work the employee may perform
for the organization as compared to the responsibilities carried out
while employed by the Federal Government. We would like to continue
working with the Committee on this issue.
Question 4. As you know, Mr. Secretary, I have been watching the
permits number very closely. As of yesterday, only 53 shallow water
permits have been issued since June 8, 2010. As a reminder, shallow
water permits were not put under the moratorium and they were not
supposed to be affected by it. However, anyone watching the situation
in the Gulf knows that is not the case. In 2010, from January to April,
42 shallow water permits were issued. In 2009, 48 shallow water permits
were issued during the same time frame. In 2011, BOEM has only issued
25 shallow water permits during the January-April period. This is
almost a 50 percent reduction from 2009 levels. Clearly, the permitting
process has been slowed for the shallow water industry, which wasn't
supposed to be affected by the moratorium. As such, can you please walk
us through the permitting process at BOEM? I am told that the
individual departments do not talk during the permit review, so there
is no collaboration. How many people are involved in the review process
and how do they work together?
In particular, can you explain whether there are inefficiencies in
the system that can be reformed to speed up the process to get our
permit numbers back to historic levels? While it is true that at the
time of the Deepwater Horizon accident offshore production levels were
at an all-time high, the EIA has estimated that production in the Gulf
of Mexico will decline by 680,000 barrels a day by 2012. This is a
significant decline, and is about half of the global exports from
Libya.
Answer. Continuously updated information regarding the status of
drilling permits can be found at: http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/
offshore/safety/well_permits.html
As of September 1, 2011, 70 new shallow water well permits have
been issued since the implementation of new safety and environmental
standards on June 8, 2010, including permit applications submitted
prior to this date. This is an average of more than 7 per month since
fall of 2010, compared to an average of 8 permits per month in 2009.
The permit application review process has always involved a back-
and-forth exchange of documents and information between the applicant
and the BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico Region. In that process, permit
application submittals are initially reviewed by BOEMRE staff, any
deficiencies are identified, and the applications are ``returned'' to
the operators so that the applications can be ``resubmitted'' with the
corrected or missing information. The submission, return, and
resubmission of a permit are accomplished through the eWell system, a
browser-based permit review software application. The eWell system's
submittal, return, and resubmittal process facilitates iterative, on-
going review and communication between the operator and the BOEMRE
drilling engineer reviewing the permit in an efficient manner that
allows the application to be modified and corrected. The process may
include several rounds of submission and return.
Because of this process, the Gulf Region has never had to formally
deny a permit application, though there have been situations in which
an operator has ``withdrawn'' an application because of a decision by
the operator not to move forward with drilling the well. Absent a
withdrawal, the agency and the operator work cooperatively, however
long it may take, to ensure that all regulatory requirements are met so
that the application may be approved. Depending on the specific
characteristics of the well, the applicable regulatory requirements,
and the company's readiness to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements, this process can take anywhere from a few days to many
months.
Before a drilling permit can be approved, there are many direct and
related approvals that must be in place. These may include but are not
limited to: approval of the Exploration Plan (EP) or Development
Operation Coordination Document (DOCD) under which the specific
drilling permit is requested; compliance with regulations requiring an
Oil Spill Response Plan; compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act; approval of an Oil Spill Financial Responsibility (OSFR)
document; a geological and geophysical review of all the relevant
hydrocarbon bearing zones: determination and verification of worst case
discharge scenarios; and a demonstration that blowout preventer control
systems comply with regulations.
The drilling application review process has never involved a
submittal followed by a simple approval or denial. Rather, BOEMRE is
always interactively working with the applicants. Given the additional
regulatory and informational requirements that have been developed and
implemented since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the time required to
prepare and review deepwater permit applications has increased as both
the operators and the reviewing engineers adapt to the changed
landscape. The review process, however, remains on-going, interactive,
and open-ended.
Director Bromwich has devoted a team to reviewing and improving
BOEMRE's drilling permit review and approval process, a central element
to ensuring that proposed drilling operations will be conducted safely.
This review and evaluation process must be rigorous but efficient, so
that proposed operations are not unduly delayed by the process. The
team has been working on plans to address the permitting workload in
light of current resources, and is developing a comprehensive handbook
of related policies and practices. This handbook will be designed to
assist permit reviewers in carrying out their responsibilities and
ensure greater consistency across our offices and clarity for industry.
BOEMRE has also been in constant communication with industry
representatives and individual operators about the permitting process,
and has already addressed specific issues with plan approval and
permitting processes that include:
issuing two guidance documents to provide clarity regarding
the steps in the permitting process and the requirements that
must be satisfied to meet the standards;
issuing a permitting checklist so that operators can confirm
their drilling permit applications are complete before they
submit them, thus minimizing the need to return applications
because necessary information is missing; and
development of information technology solutions to improve
the efficiency of processes while providing operators with
greater transparency into the status of the permit
applications.
The goal through this process has been to provide greater clarity,
transparency and consistency in the permitting process.
Responses of Secretary Salazar to Questions From Senator Hoeven
Question 1. During the May 17, 2011, committee hearing in Energy
and Natural Resources, you testified the Department of Interior has 30
days to approve exploration plans but no deadline to act on permits.
Would 60 days be sufficient to review and either approve or deny a
permit? If not, would 90 days be sufficient to review and either
approve or deny a permit. If neither 60 nor 90 days are sufficient, how
many days would the Interior need to review and make a decision on a
permit and why?
Answer. Operators continue to receive permits in both shallow and
deep water under the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms to
offshore oil and gas regulation and oversight in U.S. history. These
reforms, launched in response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
spill, strengthen requirements in areas ranging from well design and
workplace safety to corporate accountability, and are helping ensure
that the United States can safely and responsibly expand development of
its energy resources. BOEMRE is always interactively working with the
applicants. Given the additional regulatory and informational
requirements that have been developed and implemented since the
Deepwater Horizon incident, the time required to prepare and review
deepwater permit applications has increased for both the operators and
the reviewing engineers. The review process, however, remains on-going,
interactive, and open-ended. Given the importance of ensuring that
permit applicants satisfy these safety and environmental standards,
statutory time constraints on permit approval are not warranted and
could constrain the ability to ensure that permits meet safety
standards.
Continuously updated information regarding the status of drilling
permits can be found at: http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/
safety/well_permits.html
Question 2. On average, how many days does it take the Interior to
either approve or deny an Outer Continental Shelf permit?
Answer. The permit application review process has always involved a
back-and-forth exchange of documents and information between the
applicant and the BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico Region. In that process, permit
application submittals are initially reviewed by BOEMRE staff, any
deficiencies are identified, and the applications are ``returned'' to
the operators so that the applications can be ``resubmitted'' with the
corrected or missing information. The submission, return, and
resubmission of a permit are accomplished through the eWell system, a
browser-based permit review software application. The eWell system's
submittal, return, and resubmittal process facilitates iterative, on-
going review and communication between the operator and the BOEMRE
drilling engineer reviewing the permit in an efficient manner that
allows the application to be modified and corrected. The process may
include several rounds of submission and return. Because of this
process, the Gulf Region has never had to formally deny a permit
application, though there have been situations in which an operator has
``withdrawn'' an application because of a decision by the operator not
to move forward with drilling the well. Absent a withdrawal, the agency
and the operator work cooperatively, however long it may take, to
ensure that all regulatory requirements are met so that the application
may be approved. Depending on the specific characteristics of the well,
the applicable regulatory requirements, and the company's readiness to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements, this process can take
anywhere from a few days to many months.
Responses of Secretary Salazar to Questions From Senator Shaheen
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, the Oil Pollution Act was
enacted, which, among other things, created an Interagency Committee to
focus oil spill research and development activities among various
federal agencies. Yet, the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted the lack
of oil spill technology and response capabilities necessary to address
a spill like the one we saw unfold last summer. There was a perception
that we were still using the same technologies to clean up Deepwater
Horizon that we used twenty years ago to clean up Exxon Valdez.
In developing legislation last year with Sen. Mark Udall and
Chairman Bingaman to address this critical area of need, we heard some
reoccurring themes among those working in oil spill R&D field.
One was the lack of dedicated funding for oil spill R&D activities,
which was reinforced by the President's National Oil Spill Commission.
We attempted to correct this in the legislation Chairman Bingaman, Sen.
Udall and I introduced, setting aside $25 million a year from oil and
gas royalties to fund these critical oil spill R&D activities.
Question 1. Would you agree that we need to find dedicated sources
of funding to pay for oil spill R&D?
Answer. As intended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the companies
that produce and transport oil are supporting research to improve oil
spill response capabilities, with funding for related activities
appropriated from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)-including
funding for R&D. The OSLTF derives funding from:
an 8-cent-per barrel tax, collected from the oil industry on
petroleum produced in or imported to the United States. This is
the largest source of revenue for oil spill research;
transfers from other existing pollution funds. While no
additional funds remain to be transferred, total transfers into
the trust fund since 1990 have exceeded $550 million;
interest on the trust fund principal from U.S. Treasury
investments;
cost recoveries from those responsible for oil incidents;
fines and civil penalties for violations of the Oil
Pollution Act financial responsibility requirements, the Clean
Water Act, the Deepwater Port Act, and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act.
With respect to activities within the Department of the Interior's
jurisdiction, in September 2010, the Administration requested an
additional $8.6 million as a 2011 budget amendment to the Department's
budget for oil spill research to address key research gaps brought to
light by the spill and the associated containment and response efforts.
A total of $11.7 million was enacted in the FY 2011 continuing
resolution, an increase of $5.4 million over FY 2010. The FY 2012
budget request for oil spill research is $14.9 million and 22 full time
employees, which is a net increase of $8.6 million and 4 full time
employees over the FY 2010 enacted level. This increase was needed to
address several key knowledge gaps brought to light by the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill and its troubled and lengthy spill containment and
response efforts. The additional $8.6 million will provide contract
research and four full time employees needed to manage the development
and monitoring of studies.
Other agencies in government have received or requested additional
funding for R&D activities, as well. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agencies received approximately $2 million in the
supplemental appropriation for research on dispersants, and NOAA's
Office of Response and Restoration received a $2.9M increase in the FY
2012 President's Budget Request that would fund competitive external
grants to increase NOAA's spill response capacity and development.
The Department has also announced the formation of the Ocean Energy
Safety Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal
agencies as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, academic
institutions, and other non-governmental organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter,
the former head of the Sandia National Laboratory who was central to
the Macondo well control effort, was selected by the Secretary to chair
this committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with
driving research and development and technical innovation across
government and industry in the areas of drilling safety, well control
and subsea containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has
proposed that Congress pass legislation to formalize this collaboration
by authorizing an Ocean Energy Safety Institute to connect government,
industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-
edge safety, containment, and response capabilities.
Question 2. Since the BP spill, has there been any change in the
amount of money spent, either by government or by industry, on research
and development for new technology that aids in response and clean-up?
Answer. As indicated in the previous response, with respect to
activities within the Department of the Interior's jurisdiction, in
September 2010, the Administration requested an additional $8.6 million
as a 2011 budget amendment to the Department's budget for oil spill
research to address key research gaps brought to light by the spill and
the associated containment and response efforts. A total of $11.7
million was enacted in the FY 2011 continuing resolution, an increase
of $5.4 million over FY 2010. The FY 2012 budget request for oil spill
research is $14.9 million and 22 full time employees, which is a net
increase of $8.6 million and 4 full time employees over the FY 2010
enacted level. This increase was needed to address several key
knowledge gaps brought to light by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
its troubled and lengthy spill containment and response efforts. The
additional $8.6 million will provide contract research and four full
time employees needed to manage the development and monitoring of
studies.
The Department has also announced the formation of the Ocean Energy
Safety Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal
agencies as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, academic
institutions, and other non-governmental organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter,
the former head of the Sandia National Laboratory who was central to
the Macondo well control effort, was selected by the Secretary to chair
this committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with
driving research and development and technical innovation across
government and industry in the areas of drilling safety, well control
and subsea containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has
proposed that Congress pass legislation to formalize this collaboration
by authorizing an Ocean Energy Safety Institute to connect government,
industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-
edge safety, containment, and response capabilities.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill have placed
a renewed emphasis on ensuring the safety and protection of our oceans
and shorelines. Ohmsett laboratory has been operated by BOEMRE for 17
years as part of our mission to ensure that the best and safest
technologies are used in offshore oil and gas operations. It is the
largest outdoor saltwater wave/tow tank facility in North America and
is the only facility where full-scale oil spill response equipment
testing, research, and training can be conducted with oil in a marine
environment under controlled environmental conditions.
Ohmsett plays a critical role in developing effective response
technologies by providing independent and objective performance testing
of full-scale oil spill response equipment, as well as training first
responders who will be using this equipment. Many of today's
commercially available oil spill cleanup systems and services have been
tested at Ohmsett, as have equipment and technology currently under
development. The facility is capable of hosting the testing and
evaluation of a broad range of oil spill response systems and
technologies, including chemical treating agents and dispersants,
fireresistant containment booms, remote sensing and detection
instruments, sorbent materials, temporary storage devices, viscous oil
pumping units and oil water separators.
Ohmsett is the most cost-effective method for companies to obtain
response experience using real oil. The Ohmsett test tank allows
testing of full-scale equipment, and the tank's wave generator
simulates realistic sea environments while state-of-the-art data
collection and video systems record test results.
Question 3. The President's requested FY2012 budget includes a
substantial increase in the funds for oil spill R&D, up to $14 million
from $6 million. What is the plan for how this money would be spent?
Answer. As noted above, this request is intended to provide an
additional $8.6 million to the Oil Spill Research Program for contract
research that will address several key knowledge gaps brought to light
by the Deepwater Horizon spill and its spill containment and response
efforts, as well as four FTEs that are needed to manage the development
and monitoring of these studies.Question 4. Do you feel that the
Department of the Interior should have a central role among other
federal agencies in promoting and funding oil spill R&D efforts?
Answer. The Department, through BOEMRE plays a key role in
initiating applied research to support decision making relating to
offshore energy development, has long conducted research in oil spill
containment and response, and provides response training at its OHMSETT
facility. The Department will continue to play a leadership role in
both technology assessment and stimulation of innovation on a larger
scale than its usual study efforts, and will continue to coordinate its
efforts with other relevant federal agencies.
Oil Spill R&D Planning
Another theme we've frequently heard is that the Interagency
Committee created under the Oil Pollution Act has not worked. There was
a sense among those we spoke to in crafting our bill last year that the
Committee lacked leadership and direction. As one example, the Oil
Pollution Act required the Interagency Committee to develop an oil
spill R&D plan, which they did. However, the plan is dated April 1997
and has not been updated since.
Question 1. In your view, what can we do to better focus and
coordinate our federal oil spill R&D efforts? How can we ensure that
there is a known and understood path forward on federal oil spill R&D
efforts?
Answer. The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution
Research (ICCOPR) continues to serve as a forum for its federal members
to coordinate and maintain awareness of ongoing oil pollution research
activities. Members of the ICCOPR interact in a number of venues,
including conferences, workshops, meetings of the National Response
Team Science and Technology Subcommittee, and through formal meetings.
Formal meetings of the ICCOPR are normally scheduled on a semi-annual
basis. The Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan is currently
being revised.
As noted in the response to question in the previous section, the
Department has announced the formation of an Ocean Energy Safety
Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal agencies
as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, academic institutions,
and other non-governmental organizations. It is intended that this
committee will be a center of excellence charged with driving research
and development and technical innovation across government and industry
in the areas of drilling safety, well control and subsea containment,
and oil spill response.
Building on pre-existing efforts, the Administration has taken
additional efforts to advance R&D efforts in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. For example, as mentioned above, the Department of
the Interior has announced the formation of the Ocean Energy Safety
Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal agencies
as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, academic institutions,
and other non-governmental organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter, the former
head of the Sandia National Laboratory who was central to the Macondo
well control effort, was selected by the Secretary to chair this
committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with driving
research and development and technical innovation across government and
industry in the areas of drilling safety, well control and subsea
containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has proposed
that Congress pass legislation to formalize this collaboration by
authorizing an Ocean Energy Safety Institute to connect government,
industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-
edge safety, containment, and response capabilities.
Question 2. How can we get federal agencies that play a critical
role in oil spill R&D, including the Interior Department, to better
work together?
Answer. As noted in the response to question 1, the Administration
is implementing policies that will assist in focusing and driving
future oil spill R&D efforts.
Role of Science
I think one of the most troubling things we learned from the BP
disaster in the Gulf was that science had taken a back seat in the
permitting process. At the time, one of the scientists who worked for
the Minerals Management Service was quoted in the New York Times as
saying that MMS scientists ``are simply not allowed to conclude that
drilling will have an impact'' on the environment (U.S. Said to Allow
Drilling Without Needed Permits, 5/13/2010).
Question 1. In your opinion, over the past year has there been any
change in the culture within the Department of the Interior to take
science seriously in the decisionmaking process, and, if the answer is
yes, please provide some concrete evidence of that change?
Answer. Significant reforms have taken place at the Department,
including in the offshore program, over the first 2 1/2 years of the
Obama Administration, and a focus on science has played a key role in
these reforms. We have elevated the role of science in bureau decision-
making. One of the guiding principles of our reform agenda for offshore
energy development has been a fundamental change in the approach to
decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop
thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The reorganization
of the bureau will ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of
safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science
efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise.
Toward this end, last September a Secretarial Order was issued
establishing a Scientific Integrity Policy for the Department that will
cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific integrity. In the
offshore program, we have to devote greater resources to, and elevate
the role of, our scientists within the offshore regulators.
For example, in March 2010 the Department announced the proposed
2012-2017 offshore oil and gas leasing program, providing a new
approach to oil and gas activities on the OCS aimed at promoting the
responsible, environmentally-sound, and scientificallygrounded
development of oil and gas resources. Through this proposal, a new
emphasis on both science-based decision-making and public outreach was
announced. This included cancelling certain lease sales and clarifying
that full environmental analysis through an Environmental Impact
Statement will be required prior to any decision to lease in any
additional areas.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill focused our attention on
the Gulf of Mexico and further fueled this drive to reform. The reforms
put in place in response to that disaster have created a strong and
independent agency with the resources, tools and authority it needs to
hold offshore operators accountable. The bar on industry's safety
practices and equipment has been raised, and companies that want to
drill now must explain how they will deal with catastrophic blowouts
and oil spills.
Science has been returned to its rightful place in decisions about
offshore oil and gas development. We are conducting a new environmental
analysis in the Gulf of Mexico that will help provide information to
guide future leasing and development decisions there. We also continue
to work with other federal agencies to conduct thorough environmental
analysis and scientific study, to gather public input and comment, and
to carefully examine the potential safety and spill risks as new areas
are evaluated for potential oil and gas exploration and development on
the OCS.
The science resources available at the Department of the Interior
are some of the most robust in the United States and include thousands
of scientists in the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service and BOEMRE.
The various programs in the USGS and the science and research programs
within BOEMRE also play key roles in providing scientific information
concerning impacts from offshore energy and mineral exploration.
Specific examples of this science-based approach include the
science gap and sufficiency report issued in June 2011 by the USGS.
That report, requested by Secretary Salazar, evaluates the science
needed to better inform decisions regarding oil and natural gas
exploration and development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska
by identifying what the science gaps were in OCS development in the
Arctic. While there is significant potential for development in this
area, it is a frontier area with harsh weather conditions and unique
fish and wildlife resources that Alaska's indigenous people rely on for
subsistence. The report summarizes the large volume of existing
scientific information, much of it conducted under the auspices of the
Environmental Studies Program of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement; identifies where knowledge gaps exist; and
provides initial guidance on new and continuing research that could
improve decision-making.
The information identified in this report, which can be found at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370, will help inform the Department's
determinations about what we need to know to develop our Arctic energy
resources in the right places in the right way. Among the major areas
noted in the report where additional scientific research, analysis and
synthesis could reduce uncertainties include the following:
Developing a better understanding of the effects of climate
change on physical, biological and social conditions as well as
resource management strategies in the Arctic;
Developing foundational geospatial data on the Arctic Outer
Continental Shelf;
Synthesizing existing scientific information on a wide range
of topics on the Arctic;
Building upon advances in spill-risk evaluation and response
knowledge by developing better information on key inputs to
spill models (such as oceanographic, weather, and ecological
data);
Improving dialogue and using collaborative, comprehensive
science planning, both domestically and internationally.
Another recent specific example is the use of the Outer Continental
Shelf Scientific Committee, chartered to advise the Secretary of the
Interior, through BOEMRE, on the feasibility, appropriateness, and
scientific value of the bureau's OCS Environmental Studies Program. The
Scientific Committee is a vital part of the Department's ongoing
efforts to ensure that the appropriate scientific information is
available on which to base decisions affecting offshore energy
production on the OCS.
In February 2011, the Department announced the establishment of a
new policy to ensure and maintain the integrity of scientific and
scholarly activities used in Departmental decision making. The policy
follows on the Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies on
Scientific Integrity issued in December and includes the designation
Dr. Ralph Morgenweck, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Senior Science
Advisor, to serve as the Department's first Science Integrity Officer.
This new policy, which will be updated as necessary, is based on the
principles found in Secretarial Order 3305 and guided by the Office of
Science and Technology Policy memo, issued in December 2010. The policy
applies to all Departmental employees when they engage in, supervise or
manage scientific or scholarly activities; analyze and/or publicly
communicate scientific or scholarly information; or use this
information or analyses to make policy, management or regulatory
decisions. Additionally, the policy includes provisions for
contractors, partners, grantees, leasees, volunteers and others, who
conduct these activities on behalf of the Department.
Under this new policy, the Department will:
Use clear and unambiguous codes of conduct for scientific
and scholarly activities to define expectations for those
covered by this policy.
Facilitate the free flow of scientific and scholarly
information, consistent with privacy and classification
standards, and in keeping with the Department's Open Government
Plan.
Document the scientific and scholarly findings considered in
decision making and ensure public access to that information
and supporting data through established Departmental and Bureau
procedures-except for information and data that are restricted
from disclosure under procedures established in accordance with
statute, regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential
Memorandum.
Ensure that the selection and retention of employees in
scientific and scholarly positions or in positions that rely on
the results of scientific and scholarly activities are based on
the candidate's integrity, knowledge, credentials, and
experience relevant to the responsibility of the position.
Ensure that public communications policies provide
procedures by which scientists and scholars may speak to the
media and the public about scientific and scholarly matters
based on their official work and areas of expertise. In no
circumstance may public affairs officers ask or direct Federal
scientists to alter scientific findings.
Provide information to employees on whistleblower
protections.
Communicate this policy and all related responsibilities to
contractors, cooperators, partners, permittees, leasees,
grantees, and volunteers who assist with 22 developing or
applying the results of scientific and scholarly activities on
behalf of the Department, as appropriate.
Encourage the enhancement of scientific and scholarly
integrity through appropriate, cooperative engagement with the
communities of practice represented by professional societies
and organizations.
Examine, track, and resolve all reasonable allegations of
scientific and scholarly misconduct while ensuring the rights
and privacy of those covered by this policy and ensuring that
unwarranted allegations do not result in slander, libel, or
other damage to them.
Facilitate the sharing of best administrative and management
practices that promote the integrity of the Department's
scientific and scholarly activities.
Question 2. As we restructure the handling of drilling permits
within the Department of the Interior, how can we instill a commitment
to scientific integrity within the new administrative units?
Answer. Director Bromwich has devoted a team to reviewing and
improving BOEMRE's drilling permit review and approval process, a
central element to ensuring that proposed drilling operations will be
conducted safely. This review and evaluation process must be rigorous
but efficient, so that proposed operations are not unduly delayed by
the process. The team has been working on plans to address the
permitting workload in light of current resources, and is developing a
comprehensive handbook of related policies and practices. This handbook
will be designed to assist permit reviewers in carrying out their
responsibilities and ensure greater consistency across our offices and
clarity for industry.
We have also elevated the role of science in bureau decision-
making. One of the guiding principles of our reform agenda for offshore
energy development has been a fundamental change in the approach to
decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop
thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The reorganization
of the bureau will ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of
safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science
efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise.
Toward this end, last September a Secretarial Order was issued that
establishes a Scientific Integrity Policy for the Department that will
cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific integrity. In the
offshore program, we have to devote greater resources to, and elevate
the role of, our scientists within the offshore regulators.
By the end of the current fiscal year, we intend to separate the
former MMS's resource management and leasing functions from its safety
and environmental enforcement responsibilities by establishing the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM).
BSEE will be responsible for overseeing the safety and
environmental and regulatory compliance of offshore oil and gas and
renewable energy operations. The functions of BSEE include oil and gas
permitting, facility inspections, regulations and standards
development, safety research, field operations, environmental
compliance and enforcement, review of operator oil spill response
plans, production and development conservation, and operating a
national training center. This will provide the engineers who review
permit applications and the inspectors who ensure compliance with our
workplace and drilling safety regulations with greater independence,
more budgetary autonomy, and clearer mission focus. The mission of BSEE
will be to independently and rigorously enforce safety and
environmental regulations. Our goal is to create a toughminded, but
fair, regulator that can effectively keep pace with the risks of
offshore drilling and will promote the development of a safety culture
in offshore operators.
BOEM will be responsible for promoting and managing the development
of the nation's offshore resources, including oil, gas and renewable
resources. This mission involves ensuring that the nation's offshore
energy resources are made available for wise and economically sound
development with appropriate protections for the environment. The
structure that we have developed and that we are implementing ensures
that effective reviews of the environmental impacts of proposed
projects in our oceans are closely analyzed and well-understood; that
these impacts are given appropriate weight during decision-making
related to resource management; and that the appropriate balance is
struck. These processes must be both rigorous and efficient so that
operations can go forward in a timely way and with confidence that
appropriate steps to mitigate potential environmental effects are
taken.
We are creating the senior position of Chief Environmental Officer
within BOEM, who will be responsible for ensuring that environmental
concerns are appropriately balanced in leasing and planning decisions
and for coordinating and promoting scientific research relative to our
oceans.
Question 3. There is a need for balance between making sure that
permits are issued in a timely manner and the time it takes to make
sure that the drilling will be done in a safe and environmentally
responsible manner. Do you feel that any of the proposed legislation we
are considering today achieves the correct balance?
Answer. We agree that striking this balance is a key component of
the program. As noted in the Department's testimony for this hearing,
S. 917 includes several new planning requirements intended to promote
safe and responsible development. These include a requirement for
detailed descriptions of equipment and plans to address potential well
blowouts, which is consistent with Notice to Lessees 2010-N06, issued
by BOEMRE and that clarifies that current regulations require that new
filings for drilling permits, exploration plans, or development plans
contain information specifically addressing the possibility of a
blowout and the detailed steps that lessees or operators would take to
prevent blowouts.
The legislation would also extend the deadline for the Department
to review and approve exploration plans; require that lessees obtain a
drilling permit after approval of an exploration plan; and require
that, prior to approval of such a permit, an engineering review of the
well system be completed and reviewed. The Administration supports this
authority providing for longer review time and stronger reviews of
exploration plans prior to drilling.
Question 4. Have we learned anything from the scientific work that
has been done since the spill occurred that will help ensure that
future drilling operations are done safely?
Answer. We are using spill-related scientific work to understand
what happened; to inform our reform and restoration efforts; and to
help guide future development on the OCS.
We have also elevated the role of science in bureau decision-
making. One of the guiding principles of our reform agenda for offshore
energy development has been a fundamental change in the approach to
decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop
thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The reorganization
of the bureau will ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of
safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science
efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise.
Toward this end, last September Secretary Salazar issued a Secretarial
Order establishing a Scientific Integrity Policy for the Department
that will cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific integrity. In
the offshore program, we have to devote greater resources to, and
elevate the role of, our scientists within the offshore regulators.
On the ground, industry has worked through the Marine Well
Containment Company and the Helix Containment Group to develop well
containment systems, cutting edge technology that meet the new, more
stringent, requirements established by BOEMRE in its regulations.
In addition, a significant amount of science has been, and
continues to be, carried out in the Gulf Region as a result of the
spill. This science is contributing, for example, to our knowledge of
the fate of oil released from such depths, as discussed in the response
to the next question. Similarly, information and experiences from the
Deepwater Horizon spill, as well as the Exxon Valdez spill, have been
used by the USGS to evaluate and inform the science needed to better
inform decisions regarding oil and natural gas exploration and
development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska.
Question 5. It appeared in news reports that we had a difficult
time even figuring out where the oil from the spill went. Has there
been any recent scientific work that has helped us determine what
happened to the oil?
Answer. There has been some new work on this topic, and more will
be published by the end of the year in a special issue of the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Although it is still
premature to draw final conclusions regarding details of the fate of
the oil, some of these studies help to shed new light on this question.
Scientists working on the oil flow rate from the well at first were
puzzled by the fact that the apparent flow rate from the oil well, as
measured by the oil on the ocean surface by the USGS estimated much
less than the rate measured directly at the well in the deep sea by the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. A recent publication in the
journal Geophysical Research Letters by a team of NOAA scientists, who
measured hydrocarbons evaporating from the ocean surface to the
atmosphere, may help resolve this paradox indicating a large portion of
the oil remained subsurface. These new data could explain the lower
apparent flow rate at the ocean surface in the earlier USGS estimate.
Also, research publications by David Valentine and colleagues at the
University of California Santa Barbara demonstrate that microbes
rapidly consumed methane in the deep ocean. The USGS has published data
(available at http://www.usgs.gov/oilspill) from shoreline surveys that
will help determine the impact of the oil that made landfall. Research
into the oil's migration and distribution around the Gulf of Mexico is
continuing and may help provide a more complete picture of where the
oil went over time.