[Senate Hearing 112-403]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-403
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 -- 2011
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
A REPORT FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION CHAIRMEN--MARCH 30, 2011
IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?--PART I--MAY 12, 2011
IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?--PART II--MAY 19, 2011
NEXT STEPS FOR SECURING RAIL AND TRANSIT--JUNE 22, 2011
PREVENTING TERRORIST TRAVEL--JULY 13, 2011
IMPROVING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS--JULY 27, 2011
SUCCESSFUL REFORMS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY--SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
ARE WE SAFER?--SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
A STATUS REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING--OCTOBER 12, 2011
PROTECTING AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS--OCTOBER 18, 2011
THE NEXT WAVE IN AVIATION SECURITY--NOVEMBER 2, 2011
----------
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada *
JON TESTER, Montana ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARK BEGICH, Alaska RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JERRY MORAN, Kansas **
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Beth M. Grossman, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Mary Beth Schultz, Associate Staff Director and Chief Counsel for
Homeland Security Preparedness and Response
Gordon N. Lederman, Associate Staff Director and Chief Counsel for
National Security and Investigations
Christian J. Beckner, Associate Staff Director for
Homeland Security Prevention and Protection
Troy H. Cribb, Senior Counsel
Jeffrey D. Ratner, Counsel
Jason M. Yanussi, Senior Professional Staff Member
Seamus A. Hughes, Professional Staff Member
Aaron M. Firoved, Professional Staff Member
Elyse F. Greenwald, Professional Staff Member
Alfred Cumming, Senior Investigator
Robert H. Bradley, Staff Assistant
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Molly A. Wilkinson, Minority General Counsel
Brendan P. Shields, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy
Luke P. Bellocchi, Minority Counsel
Eric B. Heighberger, Minority Professional Staff Member
Jared F. Golden, Minority Professional Staff Member
Heather E. Raiti, Minority Professional Staff Member
Scott K. Lemasters, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
* Senator Ensign resigned on May
3, 2011.
** Senator Moran joined the
Committee on May 11, 2011.
C O N T E N T S
------
Page
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 4
Senator McCain............................................... 6
Senator Akaka................................................ 18
Senator Carper............................................... 20
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 359
Senator Collins.............................................. 361
WITNESSES
Hon. Thomas H. Kean, Former Chairman of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.................... 6
Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Former Vice Chairman of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States......... 9
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Kean, Hon. Thomas H.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 364
Hamilton, Hon. Lee H.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 364
APPENDIX
Letter to the President of the United States, dated April 8,
2011, submitted for the Record by Senator Lieberman............ 387
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton.................................... 389
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 31
Senator Collins.............................................. 32
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 395
Senator Collins.............................................. 398
WITNESSES
Hon. Jane Harman, Former Representative from California and Chair
of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment...................................... 34
Hon. Michael V. Hayden, Former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and Former Director of the National
Security Agency................................................ 37
John C. Gannon, Former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the
Central Intelligence Agency.................................... 40
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Gannon, John C.:
Testimony.................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 406
Harman, Hon. Jane:
Testimony.................................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 400
Hayden, Hon. Michael V.:
Testimony.................................................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 403
THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 59
Senator Collins.............................................. 60
Senator Brown................................................ 69
Senator Carper............................................... 71
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 412
Senator Collins.............................................. 414
WITNESS
Hon. Dennis C. Blair, Former Director of National Intelligence:
Testimony.................................................... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 416
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 83
Senator Collins.............................................. 85
Senator Paul................................................. 101
Senator Landrieu............................................. 104
Senator Carper............................................... 111
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 436
Senator Collins.............................................. 438
Senator Landrieu............................................. 440
WITNESSES
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 87
Hon. Peter J. Boynton, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of
Emergency Management and Homeland Security..................... 90
Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., President, Center for National Policy... 93
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Boynton, Hon. Peter J.:
Testimony.................................................... 90
Prepared statement........................................... 450
Flynn, Ph.D., Stephen E.:
Testimony.................................................... 93
Prepared statement........................................... 454
Pistole, Hon. John S.:
Testimony.................................................... 87
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 442
APPENDIX
Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation Security
Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute, document
submitted for the Record by Senator Lieberman.................. 462
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Pistole.................................................. 467
Mr. Boynton.................................................. 485
Mr. Flynn.................................................... 491
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 117
Senator Collins.............................................. 120
Senator Paul................................................. 136
Senator Brown................................................ 141
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 493
Senator Collins.............................................. 496
WITNESSES
Hon. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and
Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..... 122
Hon. Janice L. Jacobs, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 124
Hon. David F. Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 127
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Beers, Hon. Rand:
Testimony.................................................... 122
Prepared statement........................................... 499
Heyman, Hon. David F.:
Testimony.................................................... 127
Prepared statement........................................... 530
Jacobs, Hon. Janice L.:
Testimony.................................................... 124
Prepared statement........................................... 506
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Beers and Mr. Heyman..................................... 542
Ms. Jacobs................................................... 568
WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 151
Senator Collins.............................................. 154
Senator Brown................................................ 170
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 594
Senator Collins.............................................. 597
WITNESSES
Gregory Schaffer, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National
Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 157
Michael D. Varney, Statewide Interoperability Coordinator,
Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public
Protection..................................................... 159
Robert P. McAleer, Director, Maine Emergency Management Agency... 161
Charles H. Ramsey, Police Commissioner, Philadelphia Police
Department..................................................... 164
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
McAleer, Robert P.:
Testimony.................................................... 161
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 616
Ramsey, Charles H.:
Testimony.................................................... 164
Prepared statement........................................... 627
Schaffer, Gregory:
Testimony.................................................... 157
Prepared statement........................................... 599
Varney, Michael D.:
Testimony.................................................... 159
Prepared statement........................................... 611
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Schaffer................................................. 630
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 179
Senator Collins.............................................. 181
Senator Akaka................................................ 193
Senator Pryor................................................ 195
Senator Carper............................................... 197
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 641
Senator Collins.............................................. 644
WITNESSES
Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 183
Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Cathleen
A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 185
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Dodaro, Hon. Eugene L.:
Testimony.................................................... 185
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 660
Lute, Hon. Jane Holl:
Testimony.................................................... 183
Prepared statement........................................... 647
APPENDIX
Report to Congressional Requesters titled, ``Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in
Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,''
submitted by Mr. Dodaro........................................ 689
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Ms. Lute..................................................... 894
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 207
Senator Collins.............................................. 208
Senator Brown................................................ 224
Senator Carper............................................... 227
Senator Johnson.............................................. 230
Senator Moran................................................ 232
Senator McCain............................................... 233
Senator Akaka................................................ 236
Senator Paul................................................. 238
Senator Levin................................................ 241
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 912
Senator Collins.............................................. 914
Senator Moran................................................ 917
WITNESSES
Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 211
Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 214
Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 216
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Mueller III, Hon. Robert S.:
Testimony.................................................... 214
Prepared statement........................................... 943
Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.:
Testimony.................................................... 211
Prepared statement........................................... 918
Olsen, Hon. Matthew G.:
Testimony.................................................... 216
Prepared statement........................................... 955
APPENDIX
Anti-Defamation League, letter dated September 14, 2011, with an
attachment..................................................... 966
Margaret Huang, Executive Director, Rights Working Group,
prepared statement............................................. 981
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, a U.S. Senator from the State of
West Virginia, prepared statement.............................. 994
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Secretary Napolitano......................................... 996
Mr. Mueller.................................................. 1045
Mr. Olsen.................................................... 1053
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 253
Senator Collins.............................................. 255
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1061
Senator Collins.............................................. 1063
WITNESSES
Hon. John E. McLaughlin, Distinguished Practitioner-In-Residence,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University............................................. 257
Hon. Thomas E. McNamara, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University............ 260
Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department,
District of Columbia........................................... 262
Ronald E. Brooks, Director, Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center............................................ 264
Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner, Arnold and Porter..................... 267
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Brooks, Ronald E.:
Testimony.................................................... 264
Prepared statement........................................... 1085
Lanier, Cathy L.:
Testimony.................................................... 262
Prepared statement........................................... 1078
McLaughlin, Hon. John E.:
Testimony.................................................... 257
Prepared statement........................................... 1065
McNamara, Hon. Thomas E.:
Testimony.................................................... 260
Prepared statement........................................... 1073
Smith, Jeffrey H.:
Testimony.................................................... 267
Prepared statement........................................... 1107
APPENDIX
Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared
statement...................................................... 1115
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. McLaughlin............................................... 1134
Mr. McNamara................................................. 1136
Ms. Lanier................................................... 1137
Mr. Brooks................................................... 1139
Mr. Smith.................................................... 1142
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 281
Senator Collins.............................................. 284
Senator Akaka................................................ 300
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1144
Senator Collins.............................................. 1147
WITNESSES
Hon. Tara J. O'Toole, Under Secretary for Science and Technology,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 286
Hon. Alexander G. Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs
and Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 289
Hon. Nicole Lurie, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services......... 291
Vahid Majidi, Ph.D., Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice.......................................... 294
Thomas V. Inglesby, M.D., Director and Chief Executive Officer,
Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 307
Robert P. Kadlec, M.D., Former Special Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Senior Director for Biological
Defense Policy................................................. 310
Jeffrey Levi, Ph.D., Executive Director, Trust for America's
Health......................................................... 312
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Garza, Hon. Alexander G.:
Testimony.................................................... 289
Prepared statement........................................... 1161
Inglesby, M.D., Thomas V.:
Testimony.................................................... 307
Prepared statement........................................... 1196
Kadlec, M.D., Robert P.:
Testimony.................................................... 310
Prepared statement........................................... 1205
Levi, Ph.D., Jeffrey:
Testimony.................................................... 312
Prepared statement........................................... 1213
Lurie, Hon. Nicole:
Testimony.................................................... 291
Prepared statement........................................... 1167
Majidi, Ph.D., Vahid:
Testimony.................................................... 294
Prepared statement........................................... 1186
O'Toole, Hon. Tara J.:
Testimony.................................................... 286
Prepared statement........................................... 1150
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Dr. Garza.................................................... 1219
Dr. Lurie.................................................... 1220
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011
Opening statements:
Senator Collins.............................................. 323
Senator Lieberman............................................ 329
Senator Paul................................................. 330
Senator Akaka................................................ 335
Senator Pryor................................................ 336
Senator Moran................................................ 351
Senator Landrieu............................................. 353
Senator Carper............................................... 356
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1224
Senator Collins.............................................. 1226
Senator Landrieu............................................. 1228
WITNESSES
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 325
Roger J. Dow, President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Travel
Association.................................................... 340
Kenneth J. Dunlap, Global Director, Security and Travel
Facilitation, International Air Transport Association.......... 343
Charles M. Barclay, President, American Association of Airport
Executives..................................................... 345
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Barclay, Charles M.:
Testimony.................................................... 345
Prepared statement........................................... 1285
Dow, Roger J.:
Testimony.................................................... 340
Prepared statement........................................... 1235
Dunlap, Kenneth J.:
Testimony.................................................... 343
Prepared statement........................................... 1278
Pistole, Hon. John S.:
Testimony.................................................... 325
Prepared statement........................................... 1230
APPENDIX
``A Better Way,'' a report submitted by Mr. Dow, U.S. Travel
Association.................................................... 1241
Gregory Principato, President, Airports Council International-
North America, prepared statement.............................. 1292
Donald Lee Moak, President, Air Line Pilots Association
International, letter submitted for the Record................. 1297
Nicholas E. Calio, President and CEO, Air Transport Association,
letter submitted for the Record................................ 1301
Marcus W. Flagg, President, Federal Flight Deck Officers
Association, prepared statement................................ 1303
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Pistole.................................................. 1311
Mr. Dow...................................................... 1332
Mr. Dunlap................................................... 1337
Mr. Barclay.................................................. 1342
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
9/11--September 11, 2001
9/11 Commission--National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States
AAAE--American Association of Airport Executives
AIT--Advanced Imaging Technology
AOR--area of responsibility
APEC--Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APIS--Advance Passenger Information System
AQ--al-Qaeda
AQAP--al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ASAC--Aviation Security Advisory Committee
ASP--Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
ASPR--Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
ATA--Air Transport Association of America
ATF--Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
ATR--Automated Target Recognition
BARDA--Biomedical Advanced Research Development Authority
BASE--Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
BIDP--Border Interoperability Demonstration Project
BRIDGES--Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance
Sensitivity
BSL--biosafety level
BTRA--Biothreat Risk Assessment
CAARS--Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System
CBP--U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBRN--chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCTV--closed caption television
CDC--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEO--Chief Executive Officer
CIA--Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC--Commander in Chief Pacific Command
CIO--Chief Information Officer
CIS--Citizenship and Immigration Services
CLASS--Closed Loop Artillery Simulation System
CMS--Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
CNN--Cable News Network
COML--Communications Unit Leader
COMT--Communications Technician
CRS--Congressional Research Service
CTAB--Counterterrorism Advisory Board
CTC--Counterterrorism Center
CUI--Controlled Unclassified Information
CVE--Countering Violent Extremism
DARPA--Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCA--Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
DCI--Director of Central Intelligence
DCIA--Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
DEA--Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS--U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNA--deoxyribonucleic acid
DNA--Defense Nuclear Agency
DNDO--Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DNI--Director of National Intelligence
DOD--U.S. Department of Defense
DOJ--U.S. Department of Justice
DOT--U.S. Department of Transportation
DTRA--Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECPC--Emergency Communications Preparedness Center
EMS--emergency medical services
EO--Executive Order
EOC--Emergency Operations Center
EPA--Environmental Protection Agency
ESTA--Electronic System for Travel Authorization
ER--emergency room
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FAMS--Federal Air Marshal Service
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC--Federal Communications Commission
FDA--Food and Drug Administration
FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency
FISA--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FOUO--For official use only
FTA--Federal Transit Administration
GAO--U.S. Government Accountability Office
GETS--Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
Haz-Mat--hazardous material
HHS--U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HIDTA--High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
HIG--High-Value Interrogation Group
HIV/AIDS--human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome
HSDN--Homeland Secure Data Network
HVAC--heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
HVE--homegrown violent extremist
I&A--Intelligence and Analysis
IAFIS--Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
IATA--International Air Transport Association
IC--intelligence community
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
ICD--International Classification of Diseases
ICE--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ID--identification
IDENT--Automated Biometrics Identification System
IECGP--Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program
IED--improvised explosive device
IG--Inspector General
IMF--International Monetary Fund
INA--Immigration and Nationality Act
IPAWS--Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
IRTPA--Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
ISE--Information Sharing Environment
IT--information technology
ITACG--Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
IWN--Intergrated Wireless Network
JTTF--Joint Terrorism Task Force
JSOC--Joint Special Operations Command
LAPD--Los Angeles Police Department
LTTE--Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LWIN--Louisiana Wireless Information Network
MCCA--Major Cities Chiefs Association
MOU--memorandum of understanding
MPD--Metropolitan Police Department
MSCOMMNET--Maine State Communications Network
MTA--Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Navy SEALS--Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams
NBAF--National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility
NBIC--National Biosurveillance Integration Center
NBIS--National Biosurveillance Integration System
NCIC--National Crime Information Center
NCR--National Capital Region
NCS--National Communications System
NCSWIC--National Council of Statewide Interoperability
Coordinators
NCTC--National Counterterrorism Center
NECP--National Emergency Communications Plan
NGA--National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NICS--National Instant Criminal Background Check System
NID--National Intelligence Director
NIEM--National Information Exchange Model
NIH--National Institutes of Health
NIST--National Institute of Standards and Technology
NIP--National Intelligence Program
NPPD--National Protection and Programs Directorate
NSA--National Security Agency
NSC--National Security Council
NSI--National SAR Initiative
NSSE--National Special Security Event
NYPD--New York Police Department
ODNI--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OEC--Office of Emergency Communications
OHA--Office of Health Affairs
OIG--Office of the Inspector General
OIP--Office of Infrastructure Protection
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
OPCON--Operations Control
OPM--Office of Personnel Management
PAG--Policy Advisory Group
PAHPA--Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
PATRIOT Act--Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001
PD-DNI--Principal Deputy, Director of National Intelligence
PDB--President's Daily Brief
PERF--Police Executive Research Forum
PETN--pentaerythritol tetranitrate
PHEMCE--Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise
PNR--passenger name record
PSA--Public Safety Alliance
PSA--public service announcement
PSI--Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
R&D--Research and Development
RF--radio frequency
RFP--request for proposal
RSO--Regional Security Office
S&T--Science and Technology Directorate
SAFECOM--Emergency communications program of DHS
SAR--suspicious activity reporting
SENTRI--Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection
SEVIS--Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SIV--Special Immigrant Visa
SPECTRUM Act--Strengthening Public-Safety and Enhancing
Communications Through Reform, Utilization, and Modernization
Act
SPP--Screening Partnership Program
SWIC--Statewide Interoperability Coordinator
TACON--tactical control
TASC--Transformation and Systems Consolidation
TEKS--Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills
TIC--Tactical Interoperable Communications
TIP--Terrorist Interdiction Program
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
TTIC--Terrorist Threat Integration Center
TTP--Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)
TWIC--Transportation Worker Identification Credential
UASI--Urban Areas Security Initiative
UPMC--University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
UPS--United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
US-CERT--U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
USCIS--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USDA--U.S. Department of Agriculture
USDI--Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USA PATRIOT Act--Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001
US-VISIT--U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
VA--Department of Veterans Affairs
VHF--very high frequency
VIPR--Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
VRVK--visa revoked
VSP--Visa Security Program
VSU--Video Security Unit
WHO--World Health Organization
WIN--Wireless Interoperable Network
WMD--weapons of mass destruction
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: A REPORT FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION CHAIRMEN
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
United States Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Collins, and
McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning. Thank you all for being
here.
The attacks on America by Islamist terrorists on 9/11 took
place almost a decade ago, but the memories of that day are
still searing. The attacks ended thousands of lives, changed
families forever, and forced our country into another worldwide
war.
We all remember that morning, and I know we will until the
moment we leave Earth. The Nation watched on television as
those extraordinary mighty twin towers of the World Trade
Center collapsed into a pile of smoking rubble, taking so many
innocent lives with them.
American Airlines Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon and
set it ablaze. And in the fields near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, we saw the smoldering crash of United Flight 93,
whose brave passengers had fought to retake the plane from the
terrorists who had targeted Washington, DC--probably targeted
this very place where we are, Capitol Hill--and by their
heroism saved hundreds if not thousands of additional lives.
But even as we mourned--and we did--we began to ask--and
when I say ``we,'' I mean not just those of us privileged to
serve here, but people throughout the country and particularly
the families of those who were lost on 9/11--how those attacks
could have happened and what could we do to make sure to the
best of our ability that nothing like that ever happened again.
And so we created the 9/11 Commission to investigate what did
happen on 9/11. What were the flaws in our homeland security
and what could we do to protect our Nation against another such
attack from Islamist terrorists or anyone else who would want
to carry out such a dreadful act?
Coming to the leadership of that Commission were two
extraordinary Americans--gifted, able, and extremely
patriotic--Governor Tom Kean and Congressman Lee Hamilton. We
are really privileged to have them with us as our witnesses
today.
The Commission they led and its staff reviewed 2.5 million
pages of documents, interviewed 1,200 individuals in 12
countries--including every relevant senior official of both the
Clinton and Bush Administrations--and held 19 days of public
hearings across the country with 160 witnesses testifying.
The Commission's recommendations were sweeping and they
were definitive. They were not just general conclusions, but
they were specific recommendations for both immediate actions
we needed to take to defend ourselves against further attack,
but also long-term actions we could take to blunt the
terrorists' message and dry up their recruitment.
In response to the Commission's recommendations, this
Committee authored--and I am honored to see that not only
Senator Collins is here but also Senator McCain, three of the
four original sponsors of the legislation--the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that adopted not
all but most of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
including the creation of a Director of National Intelligence
and the National Counterterrorism Center, which I thought, and
I believe the Commission thought, were the two most substantial
and significant recommendations for change it was making.
That Act was the most sweeping reform of our government's
intelligence apparatus and, together with the adoption of the
Homeland Security Act a couple years before, represented the
most significant changes in our governmental framework since
the end of World War II.
This Committee was privileged to be deeply involved in
drafting these and other pieces of counterterrorism legislation
to implement the Commission's recommendations and further
strengthen our security against terrorism.
But a lot of the hard work in identifying, recommending,
and then adopting the specific reforms was done by the two
gentlemen who are testifying before us today: Then the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, now the co-chairmen
of its successor, the Bipartisan Policy Center's National
Security Preparedness Group. I thank Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton
for being here today, for their hard work and dedication to
public service throughout their lives, and for providing our
Nation with a most compelling reminder of how much we can
accomplish in public life when we put party labels aside and
work together for the national good.
Today, in the exercise of our Committee's responsibility to
constantly evaluate and investigate our homeland defenses, and
also mindful of the approaching 10th anniversary of the 9/11
attacks, we are beginning a series of oversight hearings on all
that we attempted to accomplish after 9/11. Today we are very
privileged to have Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton here
to help us begin our review with their opinion of the state of
America's homeland security. We have already scheduled four
more subject matter hearings for May, June, and July that will
look, among other things, at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the effectiveness of our aviation
security reforms, what we have done to try to keep terrorists
out of the United States, and how we are progressing on the
goal that we all said we had to improve, which is emergency
communications among law enforcement and associated personnel.
I want to say how grateful I am for the prepared testimony
that the two of you have submitted to the Committee, which will
be included in full in the record. You have touched on some of
the concerns that the Committee has and will deal with in
coming hearings. One of the most significant is with regard to
the Director of National Intelligence and how that office has
done and whether it needs further support to help it achieve
the goals that you had for it. Personally, I believe it is
essential to have a strong Director of National Intelligence
who can marshall the full capabilities of the intelligence
community.
I am encouraged by some of the recent changes that the
current DNI, General James Clapper, has carried out toward
further integration, but I must say I am also concerned about
some of the continuing bureaucratic resistance from other
components of the intelligence community, which, under our
vision and I believe yours, were supposed to be under the
supervision of the DNI. I know from your testimony that you
both share some of those concerns, and I am interested in
hearing your comments on those.
I note with appreciation that you have also talked about
the importance of moving more rapidly toward better
interoperable communication systems and that one of your
recommendations is that we set aside the so-called D Block of
the broadband spectrum for funding those public safety
improvements. Senator McCain and I sponsored legislation to
accomplish that in the last session, and we are working to
introduce a similar bill in this session.
So to summarize an awful lot very briefly, I would say that
since the 9/11 Commission reforms were adopted, we have seen a
very significant improvement in our homeland security. We have
had many victories in our battles with terrorists, many plots
broken and attacks planned against America thwarted. We have
also had some close calls such as the case of the Christmas Day
bomber and the other case of the Times Square bomber. And we
have had some tragic failures like the homegrown radical
Islamist Major Nidal Hasan who murdered 13 Americans at Fort
Hood.
So we want to continue to learn from our successes and our
failures, and that is the intention of this series of hearings
that we are beginning today.
May I say finally that we are very proud and grateful to be
joined this morning by some family members of 9/11 victims who
went on to become leading advocates for the creation of the 9/
11 Commission and the implementation of its recommendations and
have continued to play a wonderful oversight role in that work.
Mary Fetchet and Carie Lemack are two of the most likable pests
we have around Capitol Hill. [Laughter.]
Really, I would say lovable and committed. The Commission
would not have been created without their advocacy. We would
not have passed its legislative recommendations without their
most effective lobbying. And its implementation would not be as
good as all of us want it to be if they had not stayed on duty
as they have. So I cannot thank you enough. I know I speak for
everybody on the Committee when I express my gratitude and
admiration for your personal strength, your skill, and your
continuing commitment to America's homeland security.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This year, we will commemorate the worst attack ever on the
United States. In doing so, we must ask ourselves, ``Are we
safer?'' Or are we just safer from the tactics that terrorists
already have tried?
Is our intelligence community better at fitting together
these complex puzzle pieces? Or have we just been lucky? Are we
anticipating the next threat, such as a cyber attack or the use
of poisons? Or are we just looking backward, reacting to
previous plots?
Undoubtedly, compared to where we were on September 10,
2001, we have greatly improved the framework for information
sharing among our intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
But sometimes it has been an inept bomb maker or a faulty fuse
that has spared American lives.
Once again, the two extraordinary leaders of the landmark
9/11 Commission, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Kean, are appearing
before our Committee as we evaluate our progress in securing
our Nation. In September of last year, their ``Assessing the
Terrorist Threat'' report warned of an increasingly wide range
of U.S.-based militants who do not fit any particular ethnic,
economic, educational, or social profile.
The American melting pot, the report said, ``has not
provided a firewall against the radicalization and recruitment
of American citizens and residents, though it has arguably
lulled us into a sense of complacency that homegrown terrorism
could not happen in the United States.''
This report correctly called 2009 a watershed year in U.S.-
based terrorist plots, with 43 American citizens or residents
aligned with violent Islamist extremists charged or convicted
of terrorist crimes in that year alone.
This Committee first sounded the alarm about home-based
terrorism 5 years ago and has held 15 hearings on this topic.
We found that individuals within our country, in both our
prison system and our communities, are being inspired by al-
Qaeda's violent ideology to plan and execute attacks, often
acting as ``lone wolves'' without direct orders or ties to al-
Qaeda.
As Senator Lieberman has indicated, the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which we authored, did
much to improve the management and performance of our
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement agencies.
This most sweeping reform of our Nation's intelligence
community since just after World War II would not have happened
without the leadership of our witnesses and the advocacy of the
families of the victims. The resulting increased collaboration
and information sharing have helped our Nation prevent numerous
attacks.
There have been untold successes. In many cases, the
intelligence community and law enforcement have quietly
connected the dots and thwarted plots. In other cases, alert
citizens have reported suspicious behavior to the authorities
just in time.
Challenges still remain, however. We continue to see
troubling examples of the pre-9/11 stovepiped mindset from some
of our intelligence and law enforcement officers. For example,
as documented in our Committee's recent report on the Fort Hood
attack, the Army and the FBI collectively had ample information
to have detected Major Hasan's radicalization to violent
Islamist extremism, but they failed to act on the many red
flags signaling that he had become a potential threat.
Major Hasan and others seem to find motivation and ideas
online. Technology is transforming our culture, our economy,
and our world in many beneficial ways. Yet we must also be
alert to the fact that terrorists are seeking to exploit the
Internet's potential as well. We have recently witnessed that
the Internet can serve as a platform for extremist propaganda
on the one hand and peaceful revolution on the other.
Other Commission recommendations have not yet come to
fruition, and, of course, the most obvious example of that is
Congress' failure to reform itself. But there are others as
well. We must make more progress, as the Chairman has
indicated, in enhancing first responder communications.
Gaps also remain at our borders and in our cargo inspection
systems. As the news today indicates, the potential to plant an
explosive somewhere within the millions of pieces of air cargo
shipped around the world each day is a real vulnerability.
It is also troubling that the Border Patrol does not have
the ability to detect illegal activity across approximately
three-quarters of the Northern Border. DHS must continue to
work to find a balance that opens our border to our friends
while closing it to those who would do us harm.
Nevertheless, there have been real accomplishments: The
biometric system for screening foreign nationals seeking to
enter the United States, the creation of a consolidated
terrorist watchlist, and the dedicated DHS and State and local
law enforcement employees all deserve recognition.
But even in these areas of progress, improvements are
needed. Biometric screening must be expanded to include foreign
nationals leaving the United States. Screening technology must
be improved to keep up with changing threats and to ensure that
the safest possible screening equipment is deployed.
I hope that this year we can expand protection against
lawsuits for citizens who report suspicious behavior indicating
potential terrorist activity. We must also pass legislation to
ensure that key U.S. intelligence officials are consulted
following a foreign terrorist's detention in the United States.
That did not happen in the case of Abdulmutallab.
And, finally, I continue to have deep concerns that this
Administration refuses to acknowledge that violent Islamist
extremism is the ideology that fuels such attacks. The
Administration should have an overarching national strategy to
counter this growing threat within our own country.
Ten years ago, nearly 3,000 lives were lost on that
terrible day. We cannot become complacent or let our guard down
when every single intelligence briefing that I have ever
attended always warns that the enemy remains determined to
attack our country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that excellent statement. Normally we limit opening
statements to the Chairman and the Ranking Member on the
Committee, but Senator McCain was, as you two know, the
original sponsor of the legislation that created the 9/11
Commission, so, Senator McCain, I would invite you to make an
opening statement if you would like.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN
Senator McCain. I would just briefly like to thank our
witnesses. I think what they did was one of the reasons why
this country has not been attacked since 9/11. They are two
dedicated public servants, an example of bipartisanship, and I
think it is very appropriate that on the 10-year anniversary,
we get their continued input. Thank you again for your service
to the country.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Before we go to the witnesses, I just want to briefly
introduce Charles Dowd, Deputy Chief of the New York Police
Department for Communications. He has been a very strong
proponent of allocating the D Block to public safety, and we
appreciate the fact that he is committed enough to this that he
is here in the room today.
Governor Kean, welcome, and we look forward to your
testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS H. KEAN,\1\ FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Kean. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Collins. We are very pleased to have the opportunity to be here
with you once again today. Nobody has been more important than
you all have been at the center of defending this country from
the terrorist threat that we face. We are deeply grateful for
your sustained support of our 9/11 Commission recommendations
and your leadership in continuing to reform our national
security institutions. Over the last decade, you have done much
to ensure that we are taking the difficult steps necessary to
confront this determined enemy and protect Americans, our
allies, and, for that matter, people throughout the world.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton
appears in the Appendix on page 364.
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Today, we are appearing in our capacity as co-chairmen of
the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness
Group. That is the successor organization to the 9/11
Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of national security
professionals, we work as an independent, bipartisan group to
monitor the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations and to address other emerging national security
issues.
Let me begin by describing the changes in our government
since 9/11, the current threat, and perhaps updating you on
some of our Commission's recommendations. Lee Hamilton will
then continue assessing the status of the implementation of a
number of these recommendations.
So now nearly 10 years after the tragic 9/11 attacks and 7
years since we finished our report, it really is, as the
Committee has decided, a very appropriate time to see just
where we are in national security reform and how we are doing.
The terrorist attacks, as everybody knows, had a profoundly
dramatic impact on our government, on the private sector, and,
for that matter, on our daily lives. The suddenness of that
attack on American soil and the loss of so many lives I think
made a lot of us feel vulnerable in our homes and caused us to
question whether or not our government was properly organized
to protect us from this kind of lethal threat. The economic
damage resulting from the attacks was severe. Businesses in all
sectors have adapted in one way or another to this new reality.
Over the past 10 years, our government's response to the
challenge of transnational terrorism has been equally dramatic.
We have created major new institutions--the Department of
Homeland Security, Cyber Command, and in 2004, with the
leadership of Senator Collins and Lieberman, Congress created
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the
National Counterterrorism Center to make sure we had a unity of
effort in the intelligence community.
Now, despite all this progress, some major 9/11 Commission
recommendations still remain unfulfilled, and we would suggest
today that these require urgent action because the threat from
al-Qaeda, related terrorist groups, and individual adherents to
violent Islamist extremism persists to this day.
Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups continue to pose a
serious threat to all of us. Al-Qaeda Central has been
diminished, but its leadership, Osama bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri, as we know, are still at large. Although a
devastating 9/11-type attack we believe is less likely, the
threat is more complex and diverse than at any time in the last
decade. Al-Qaeda and its allies continue to have the intent and
the reach to kill dozens or even hundreds of Americans in a
single attack. There is a high risk of attacks, but we believe
that they will likely be smaller.
A key change in recent years is the increasingly prominent
role that a number of U.S. citizens and residents have taken in
the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups.
Another development is the increasing diversification of
the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants. Some are
individuals inspired to engage in attacks on their own while
others have been actively recruited by overseas terrorist
groups. Indeed, these would-be jihadists do not fit any
particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile.
The operations they mount, or attempt, range from shootings, to
car bombs, to suicide attacks, to in-flight bombings of
passenger aircraft.
We have seen a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment
of American citizens. In 2009, there were two actual terrorist
attacks on our soil. You referenced the Fort Hood shooting,
which claimed the lives of 13 people, and one U.S. military
recruiter was killed, another wounded, in Little Rock,
Arkansas. Many counterterrorism experts talk about 2010 and
name it the ``year of the homegrown terrorist.'' Self-
radicalization is an alarming development.
Our group issued a report, as you have mentioned, last fall
on radicalization, and we are going to follow up this spring
with a set of recommendations for dealing with this important
and very sensitive problem.
We also face new threats, like the discovery in October
2010 of explosives packed in toner cartridges, addressed to
synagogues in Chicago, and shipped on FedEx and UPS cargo
flights from Yemen.
The cyber threat is also increasingly severe and poses a
real danger to our critical infrastructure. Defending the
United States against such attacks must be an urgent priority.
So we would like to offer our assessment today of where the
government is in implementing 9/11 Commission recommendations.
On emergency preparedness, we have made some progress
toward establishing a unity of command--in other words, one
person responsible for coordinating efforts in a disaster. But
having said that, our recommendations are still a long way from
being fully implemented. We have found too many community
leaders and first responders who have mentioned to us that many
metropolitan areas still have not solved the problem of having
a unified command structure. Moreover, it is unacceptable that
the government still has not allocated the additional 10
megahertz of radio spectrum, the D Block that you mentioned, to
public safety so that our first responders can communicate with
each other in a disaster.
Now, I recognize the efforts and the leadership that you
have shown through your bill. I believe the President supports
such a recommendation, and Congress needs to act.
There have been improvements in transportation security,
but technology still lags in screening passengers for weapons
concealed in their bodies and for detecting explosives
contained in bags. The GAO continues to find holes in virtually
every single security layer that we establish.
Border security remains a top national security priority as
terrorists continue to exploit our border vulnerabilities to
gain entry into the United States. Several attempted attacks
over the past 2 years were perpetrated by terrorists who could
have been detected by the U.S. immigration system. We require a
more streamlined terrorist watchlisting capability and better
sharing of information between intelligence agencies and
immigration authorities.
One area of progress is the deployment of the biometric
entry system known as US-VISIT. We still lack, however, any
comprehensive exit system. We do not know, in other words, when
people leave the country. The Commission recommends that the
government standardize secure identification and the Federal
Government should set standards for the issuance of birth
certificates and driver's licenses.
The REAL ID Act established these standards by statute.
About one-third of the States have complied with this first-
tier benchmark. The deadlines for compliance have been pushed
back now twice. Delay in compliance creates real vulnerability
and makes us less safe. We would ask that no further delays
should be authorized.
Now I will ask my friend and partner, a man I admire as
much as anybody in this country, Lee Hamilton, to continue.
TESTIMONY OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON,\1\ FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Kean. Good morning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton
appears in the Appendix on page 364.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to begin simply by endorsing what Mr. Kean has said
with regard to the leadership not only of this Committee but
specifically of the three Senators in front of me. I can
remember coming to your offices shortly after the 9/11
Commission report was made. Mr. Kean and I spoke to each one of
you. You were very courteous and receptive. But beyond that,
you acted with genuine political leadership, and the country is
very grateful to you.
I think there are a lot of reasons why the 9/11 Commission
had a favorable response, but two of them: First, the families
who gave sustained, sophisticated support for our
recommendations; second, specifically the political leadership
embodied by the three of you was just really quite
extraordinary. And Mr. Kean and I are very grateful to you for
what you have done. And when the Chairman a moment ago outlined
your continuing hearings and investigations, I was immensely
pleased to hear that because I think having been on the inside
and on the outside, you have powers that we do not have in
terms of getting people before you to provide tough oversight,
and that continuing effort by this Committee is just hugely
important because, as we will say often this morning, so much
more needs to be done.
With respect to intelligence reform, the DNI has made
progress in several areas: Increased information sharing,
improved cooperation among agencies and of the analysis of
intelligence, and sharpened collection priorities. Genuine
progress, no doubt about it. Still, it is not clear to us that
the DNI is the driving force for intelligence community
integration that the Commission envisioned.
Some ambiguity probably remains with respect to the DNI's
authority over budget and personnel, although that can be
disputed, I guess. Strengthening the DNI's position would
advance the unity of intelligence effort that we think is still
very much needed.
I do not anticipate new legislation--you would know more
about that than I on this subject--in the very near future. So
we have to live with the statute that we have for an extended
period of time. It may very well be that in the future some
legislation could fortify the office.
Repeated indication from the President that the DNI is the
unequivocal leader of the intelligence community, I think,
would be greatly helpful.
The FBI has gone through dramatic change. I think it is
moving in a positive direction, but in some sense incomplete.
It has had, I believe, very strong leadership from Director
Robert Mueller. It shifted resources to collect and analyze
intelligence to prevent terrorism. That is an enormous cultural
change, as you all know, away from its former focus strictly on
law enforcement. Its progress has been significant but uneven.
The Fort Hood shootings highlight the lingering problems.
Your report, which I have looked over quickly, has spelled that
out, I think, in a very persuasive and compelling way.
Analysts do not appear to be driving intelligence within
the FBI, nor have they achieved status on a par with the
special agents who traditionally rise to management of the
Bureau.
FBI headquarters components did not play a direct role in
analyzing the threat posed by the person who later allegedly
did the shootings. There were miscommunications, as Senator
Collins has indicated in her opening statement, between the
field offices, so the shift taking place within the FBI is
still very much a work in progress. Congress needs to continue
to help the FBI with its difficult transformation.
The CIA has improved its intelligence analysis and removed
barriers between its analysts and operations officers. Our
sense is that there has been more talk than action with respect
to improvement in the CIA's human operations.
Acquiring well-placed sources is very difficult business,
particularly in closed societies and among close-knit terrorist
cells. More money and more personnel do not necessarily result
in better agents.
While the CIA has attempted to recruit officers qualified
in the languages of the greatest interest, that, too, is very
hard. Part of the problem is that young people in our country,
with some exceptions, of course, do not gain proficiency in
foreign languages. Congress can help on that.
The CIA then must continue to rebuild. It will require
strong support from Congress and the Executive Branch. We want
the Agency to take calculated risks to protect the country.
Congressional oversight must be depoliticized so that when the
Agency fails, as it occasionally will, it is not
inappropriately blamed for taking the necessary risks.
Improving information sharing across the Federal Government
and with State and local authorities was a major
recommendation. In some ways, I think the government is doing
better. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion Centers
across the country have certainly improved information sharing.
The National Counterterrorism Center has analysts and other
officers from all agencies of the intelligence community
working side by side and sharing information with their home
organizations.
There have been some failures, as has already been
indicated. There is no question that WikiLeaks' unauthorized
publication of sensitive government documents has raised some
genuine and real concerns. Those are legitimate. But the need
to share information we think still remains highly important,
and we should not backslide on that.
Congress has to help the government strike the right
balance between the need to protect unauthorized disclosures
and the need to share information to defend ourselves against
the threats we face.
Among our major disappointments has been that the
Administration has not empaneled the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board. This was a major recommendation very
strongly supported by all the Commissioners.
I am informed--I am not sure I am quite up to date on
this--that the Administration has nominated two individuals for
the panel. I know one of them personally. As far as we know,
they have not yet been confirmed, and the panel certainly has
not met. The Administration, I believe, needs to push this on a
priority basis because that board has a lot to do, and I think
this Committee can be helpful in pushing the Administration.
We are equally disappointed that Congress has not reformed
itself along the lines we recommended. We recommended that
Congress create a Joint Committee on Intelligence or create
House and Senate committees with combined authorizing and
appropriation powers. Those recommendations may be a bridge too
far.
Last week, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
announced a decision to include three members of the House
Appropriations Committee to participate in House Intelligence
Committee hearings and briefings. That appears to us to be a
positive step, but obviously there is more to do.
Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security is
fractured. That massive Department will be better integrated if
there is better integrated oversight. I know the concerns you
have expressed about that. It is in our country's security
interest that Congress make committee reform a priority.
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons must be a national
priority. The Administration hosted a major nonproliferation
summit last year and announced a new initiative to secure all
nuclear materials by 2013. It plans to spend $14.2 billion over
the next 5 years to secure nuclear and radiological materials.
May I say outside my statement that because of other
responsibilities I have dealing with nuclear power, I have
recently had the occasion to listen to some highly qualified
people within our government, and I believe the access to
nuclear materials and the ability to use those materials and to
explode them is much greater than people generally think. And
so I hope the Congress will keep a hard, sharp focus on this
question of nuclear proliferation. I know there are some
suggestions to cut some of these important programs. Money is
not everything here, but we must not weaken or underfund what
President Bush and President Obama have both said is the
highest priority security need.
Now, at the outset of his Administration, President Obama
issued Executive Orders that brought the United States into
line with international norms for the treatment of detainees.
That fulfilled part of our recommendation. We believe there is
a conflict between the rule of law and holding detainees
indefinitely without resolving their cases. Both Presidents
Bush and Obama have really wrestled with this problem. It is a
tough one. President Obama took a step forward by requiring
periodic reviews of the status of detainees, but there is an
awful lot more to do. The Congress and the Executive Branch
simply have to agree on a statutory base to give us a
comprehensive approach to dealing with the detainees.
Congress and the Executive Branch need to agree on the
rules of evidence and the procedures that should be applied in
determining how to deal with these detainees. I do not think
this is a problem that can just simply go on and on and on. You
need a statutory basis--and I do not suggest it is easy to
reach it--on how to deal with these potentially very dangerous
detainees.
We had a number of foreign policy recommendations in the
report. Events today in the Middle East and North Africa
clearly indicate that the region is in a state of upheaval, and
it is quite unclear to any of us how it will emerge.
We addressed the role that U.S. foreign policy plays in
counterterrorism, but we did it, to be honest about it, with
considerable modesty. We believe that although the countries
share a common religion, their people have many cultural,
national, ethnic, and tribal differences, and therefore, we
have to deal with them on a country-by-country basis. We want
our country always to advance its core values, but a pragmatic
approach for each country, one that supports an agenda of
opportunity for the Islamic world, we think is necessary.
So, to conclude, significant progress has been made since
9/11, and our country is undoubtedly more secure. Yet important
9/11 Commission recommendations remain to be implemented, and
over the next few years, a lot of heavy lifting still needs to
be done.
As Mr. Kean mentioned just a moment ago, the fact that we
have not resolved this radio spectrum problem and have not
resolved the unity of command is just really distressing to us.
Those are two no-brainers with regard to the safety and
security of the country. Some progress has been made in both
areas, but not nearly enough.
Congress has resisted reorganizing its own institutions,
and streamlining congressional oversight of the intelligence
community and the Department of Homeland Security would go far
toward advancing unity of effort in the intelligence community
and within DHS.
Also the DNI needs a clear-eyed appraisal. I think it is
functioning reasonably well. Likewise the FBI. We have concerns
about each, and our goal really should be to strengthen both
the DNI and the FBI.
The terrorist threat will be with us far into the future,
demanding that we be ever vigilant. Our national security
departments require strong leadership and attentive management
at every level to ensure that all parts are working well
together and that there is innovation and imagination. Our
agencies and their dedicated workforces have gone through much
change, and we commend them for their achievements in
protecting the American people. But there is a tendency toward
inertia in all bureaucracies, and vigorous congressional
oversight is just imperative to ensure that they remain
vigilant and continue to pursue needed reforms.
So our task is challenging and difficult. We constantly
have to assess our vulnerabilities and anticipate new and
evolving lines of attack. We have done a lot. We can look back
with some satisfaction, but there is an awful lot more to do.
We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to testify
before this Committee, which has provided longstanding
leadership on these issues, and we will do our best now to
respond to your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you both for those thoughtful
opening statements. I think you really helped us get some
perspective on where we have come in the last several years,
certainly since 2004, when the 9/11 Commission Act was enacted.
But you have also given us a clear statement of unfinished
business and priorities for the future, and I appreciate that.
Before I begin my questioning, I want to note the presence
since we began of Abraham Scott, whose wife, Janice, died at
the Pentagon on 9/11, and he is another one of those family
members who have continued in the battle to do everything they
can to make sure nothing like this happens again.
I thought both of you summarized well where we have come
and also noted that the steps we have taken to improve our
homeland security, including those very significant steps that
were part of your recommendations that we adopted, have
strengthened our security, but that the nature of the threat
has changed. We can never say never, but certainly our defenses
against a sophisticated 9/11-type attack are way up and,
therefore, the prospects of that happening are down, thank God.
There is a high risk right now of smaller attacks than 9/
11, particularly of attacks that come from within the country
because that has become a focus of al-Qaeda and all the other
international Islamist terrorist groups.
I wanted to begin by asking you, Governor Kean, just to
talk a little bit more about the inadequacy of unity of command
at this point and what you think we can do about it.
Mr. Kean. Well, this was one of the real problems on 9/11.
Who was in charge?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kean. And so our recommendation very strongly to all
communities has been there has to be one leader. Now, New York
City made a lot of progress in that regard by putting
everything under the police department. Some cities have
followed that pattern and some have not, and so there are still
a number of communities, some of them fairly sizable, where
people tell us there is still that question. If something
really happens, who is in charge?
Businesses have made more progress. I think almost all
major businesses I know now have somebody who is in charge if
something happens. They know what they should do. They know
where employees ought to go. All that is in place in a lot of
major businesses. But in communities, not as yet, and we think
it is a very serious problem and one that we have to address
and make it, as best we can, a requirement that somebody be in
charge.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I am really interested that you
have focused on the local or metropolitan level, and I think we
have to do some thinking about that to see whether we cannot
create some requirement or incentive to bring about that unity
of command at the local level, perhaps by making it a condition
of some of the homeland security or other grants.
Let me take you to the national level. I am reading from
Section 13.1 of the Commission's report on Unity of Effort
Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide, and this section of the
report notes specifically that during the Commission's
hearings, members of the Commission often asked, ``Who is the
quarterback? The other players are in their positions doing
their jobs. But who is calling the play that assigns the roles
to help them execute as a team?''
To respond to this need, in my interpretation of the
Commission's report, you recommended creating a National
Counterterrorism Center with the responsibility to develop
counterterrorism plans that integrate all the instruments of
national power, and that was, I think, one of the most
significant recommendations and one of the most significant
components of our legislation.
So as you look back nationally now, are you satisfied there
is clarity and unity of command at the national level and that
we now have a quarterback? And is it the National
Counterterrorism Center?
Mr. Kean. Well, it is the National Counterterrorism Center
and, of course, the DNI.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kean. In combination. They are the quarterback. Now,
whether they are being implemented as the quarterback, whether
or not they really have the power that you intended when you
wrote the law and that we intended when we made
recommendations, I do not know.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Kean. Because the signals sometimes are mixed. And we
have to have unity of effort in that regard. We have to have
the quarterback. And I would suggest that you would probe that
area and find out whether or not the quarterback is in place
and whether or not the quarterback has the powers that you
intended him to have in the legislation.
Chairman Lieberman. There is no question that the National
Counterterrorism Center has created unprecedented cooperation
between components of our security and intelligence
communities. In that sense, the dots are all on the same board
now. One of the problems, I say in passing, that we have noted
in some of our earlier hearings and it was a cause of some of
the cases that we have studied that were not as we would want
is that the problem now is there are so many dots on the same
board that it is hard in real time to separate them out to
connect the ones that ought to be connected, but they are not
on separate boards anymore.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word about it?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, please.
Mr. Hamilton. You have two problems there. You have raised
both of them. One is the scene of the disaster.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. And there it is kind of a no-brainer, too,
for me anyway, that someone has to be in charge. Now, that
creates difficult political problems because the governor wants
to be in charge, the mayor wants to be in charge, county
officials want to be in charge. And that is the reason it has
not been resolved because the politicians are unwilling to
address the question because it is a tough one to say who is in
charge.
Now, I do not know whether that barrier can be overcome or
not, but in terms of saving lives, it is an easy question to
answer. You have to have one person making decisions with
regard to sanitation, public health, food, housing, and
transportation.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. They have to make thousands of decisions
within a matter of a few hours, really, at these scenes. And if
you have confusion of command at that locale, you lose
additional lives.
So that is why we think it is an important matter. I really
do not know how well different metropolitan areas around the
country have addressed this problem, but I am very uneasy about
it, and I do not really think it has been solved in most areas.
Now, the second problem relates to a unity of effort in the
Administration, which is the broader question.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. Who is the quarterback? I follow this
reasonably carefully. I do not pretend to know everything about
it. I do not know who the quarterback is. And I will give you
my impression. My impression is that the number one official
within the White House is John Brennan on these matters. That
makes me a little uneasy--not because of him. He is an
extremely dedicated, important, capable man. But he is right in
the center of the policy world at the White House. He is not
removed from it like I generally want intelligence officials to
be. And so I am not sure whether he is the right person to do
it. But if he is, then it seems to me there ought to be a very
clear designation that he is in charge of homeland security and
counterterrorism.
Today, quite frankly, from where I sit, it looks to me like
a number of different people are involved in it, including Mr.
Brennan, including the Director of National Intelligence,
including the DHS Secretary and several others. I do not know
who the quarterback is, and I can identify the Commissioners
who raised that question all the time in the meetings we had,
Mr. Kean.
Mr. Kean. That is right.
Mr. Hamilton. My guess is those same Commissioners would be
raising the same question today, who is the quarterback?
Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful commentary, and I
agree with you that we have the combination--and I am
simplifying here--of the critical role of intelligence in
counterterrorism and homeland security, but also then the other
roles, which are different, of preparedness and prevention and
response. And I agree with you, Mr. Hamilton, that the top
person today in our government is John Brennan, the Deputy
National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism. And, again, I have great respect for his
ability, etc. Whether that is the right place for that role to
be is an important question.
Mr. Hamilton. The President should have the right to
organize his White House he wants to organize it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. And maybe the President is comfortable with
this.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. As an outsider here, who looks at it fairly
carefully, it is not clear to me that the lines of authority
are precise.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and I think you have quite
accurately identified the key players. It is the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. And, of
course, there are others--the FBI Director----
Mr. Hamilton. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. But more than anyone else, Mr. Brennan
seems to us day to day to be coordinating that effort. There
are different roles here, although you could pick one of those
other players and make that person the coordinator. It might be
the Secretary of Homeland Security who has both operating and
intelligence authority. You have given us a good charge for our
review during this year.
My time is up. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me pick up on this very issue of who is in charge. To
me, it was very clear when we passed the Reform Act in 2004
that we wanted the DNI to be in charge. That is why we created
this new quarterback position. And yet I completely agree with
Congressman Hamilton that in this particular Administration,
the person who is in charge is Mr. Brennan at the White House.
And putting aside his enormous capabilities, which we all agree
to, the problem with that situation is there is no
accountability to Congress. It is a member of the President's
staff, so we cannot call Mr. Brennan to testify before us. We
cannot hold him accountable for decisions. And I think that is
another very big problem.
The other area of confusion of command, as Congressman
Hamilton has said and Governor Kean well knows, is when a
disaster strikes or there is a crisis situation. And we saw
this with Abdulmutallab where there was tremendous confusion
over who was in charge and who should make decisions. In that
case, it ended up being the Attorney General who made the
decision on how to treat Abdulmutallab without any consultation
whatsoever with the DNI, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or
any top intelligence official on whether or not Abdulmutallab
should be questioned about whether there were further plots,
and that was a lost intelligence opportunity.
Are these problems that we can fix through legislation? Or
are they problems that depend on an individual President
setting up who is truly going to be in power?
The reason I ask this question is when I go back and review
the language creating the DNI, it is pretty strong language.
Now, we tried to get it to be even stronger in the area of
personnel, but in fact, the DNI has strong authority to set
priorities for the intelligence community, to oversee the
budget formulation, to make some personnel decisions.
Is this really a case where we need to strengthen the law?
Or is it a case where the President needs to empower the person
we intended to be empowered? I would like to hear from both of
you in either order on this question.
Mr. Hamilton. I think the latter--the President has to step
in here. Now, any law, as we all know, can be strengthened. But
as I suggested, this law is not going to be changed in the
immediate future. It took you several years to get it on the
statute books, so maybe in the future it will be clarified.
But, Senator Collins, I basically agree with your comment that
there is sufficient authority in present law. We envisioned, of
course, that the DNI would be the central powerful driver of
the intelligence community. I do not think he has been.
Now, I want to say here, too, you know I have known all of
these men that have held that position. It is a very tough
position. We have had very good men in that position. They
really have been quite strong. But that line of authority is
not as clear as it should be, and so I think given the
circumstances that you now have, your second choice, that is,
the President has to step in and make it very clear with regard
to his authority in the intelligence community, over budget and
over personnel and over transfer of funds within the budget.
And so far as I can see, that really has not been done.
Now, having said that, the DNI deals with some pretty
powerful players--the Secretary of Defense, the CIA Director--
and if they get a decision within the bureaucracy they do not
like, they will go directly to the President. Fair enough. So
the DNI may have authority and he may try to exercise it, but
he has to exercise that authority with extraordinary skill and
discretion. And these are all major players within the
Administration, and so that power has to be very skillfully
exercised.
But I personally think the system is going to work a lot
better if you have someone at the top of it who is the driving
force, who is recognized as the center of power, who has the
authority, and obviously has to have the support of the
President, to do the things that need to be done to get unity
of effort.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Governor Kean.
Mr. Kean. Yes, I remember when the bill was going through.
It was weakened a bit in the House, and I remember talking to
Mr. Hamilton about it at the time, and he said, ``Do not worry
because in the end it is the President. And if the President
gives the DNI the authority, the DNI will be just the way you
want it to be. If not, the law is not going to help.'' And that
is where we are.
My own belief is the law says the DNI ought to be the top
intelligence operative, I think it will work better that way,
and that is probably how it ought to be. But if this President
wants somebody else, then my only recommendation would be that
he make that clear and that both publicly and within the
Administration everybody knows where the lines of authority
are, and if somebody else is going to be in full charge, let us
say who that person is, and then everybody knows, because the
worst thing of all is a vacuum or confusion or lines that are
not clear. The President is the only one who can make those
lines clear, and the President is the only one who could make
it happen.
Senator Collins. I agree that the President's response is
absolutely clear and needs to be clearer here, and that if the
President does not empower the DNI, we can write all the
language in the world, and the DNI is not going to truly be in
charge. But I also remain very concerned about the lack of
accountability to Congress and the public when it is a member
of the President's staff who is running the intelligence
community.
Mr. Hamilton. I just want to support what you said. I think
that is terribly important.
Mr. Kean. Very important.
Mr. Hamilton. The person who is in charge, whoever it is,
ought to be accountable to Congress at all times. That is just
fundamental, it seems to me, to the way this place ought to
operate.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Of
course, I agree with you, and it strikes me that ultimately the
DNI has ample authority--not as much as any of us wanted, but
ample authority in the current statute, but it really requires
the President to make clear that the DNI is the person in
charge of the intelligence community.
We all expected that coming in as a new position to oversee
existing agencies, which have a real life of their own and a
constituency of their own, would be difficult. And it is
interesting that General James Clapper--really to just amplify
a bit on what I said in my opening statement--I think because
of his background in the military and credibility at the
Pentagon, has actually negotiated an agreement with Secretary
Robert Gates, which will enable the DNI to have much more
authority with regard to intelligence budgeting,
appropriations, than was the case at the beginning of the
office, and that is good.
The question of who is on top overall in the
counterterrorism effort is a complicated one because there is
not only the intelligence community but all the others--the
operators, the preventers, and the responders. But I, again,
agree that it has to be somebody at the top--nothing negative
about Mr. Brennan--who is accountable to Congress and the
public. And we have to think about how to deal with that
problem.
Mr. Kean. Yes, I think that is very important. When we
first talked about the position, I think what we envisioned was
a man or woman who would step into that position and stay 5 or
6 years and develop the position, strengthen it and all of
that. We have had this rotating door, really, of very good
people, but in and out.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kean. And that has been one of the problems with the
DNI, and hopefully we have one now who will stay for a while.
Chairman Lieberman. I hope. Thank you. Next in order of
arrival, Senator Akaka and then Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing, and I would like to welcome Governor Kean
and Congressman Hamilton, and thank you for being here today.
Although many of the information-sharing and intelligence
shortfalls that the 9/11 Commission identified have been
addressed, critical work remains to ensure that we have an
agile and well-coordinated response to terrorist threats, and
you have been discussing this. Supporting our Federal workers
at DHS, the intelligence community, and other agencies who make
daily sacrifices to keep us safe is essential to this effort.
Additionally, we must never lose sight of the privacy and civil
liberties implications of our efforts to protect the Nation. In
particular, I agree with our witnesses' comments that the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board must be set up
immediately.
Congressman Hamilton, as you know, I believe that GAO could
assist our efforts to strengthen oversight of the intelligence
community. In response to my question in 2007, you stated that
GAO should have the same authorities within the intelligence
community as it has in other agencies. Key principles of my
Intelligence Community Audit Act were included in the
Intelligence Authorization Act last year. Under this
legislation, the Director of National Intelligence must issue a
directive to facilitate GAO audits and evaluations of the
intelligence community.
What elements should be included in the DNI directive to
promote effective oversight?
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, I am not sure I understand the
question. What elements should the DNI insist upon for
oversight?
Senator Akaka. To include in the directive to promote
effective oversight.
Mr. Hamilton. The DNI's oversight of the intelligence
community or congressional oversight?
Senator Akaka. Well, either one.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I am not sure I have the thrust of the
question in mind, but I am deeply impressed that only you folks
in the Congress can effectively oversee the intelligence
community. The press does not know what is going on. Those of
us outside Congress do not have the information that you have
and your staffs have about what is going on. So unlike most
other areas of our government, the only really effective
independent oversight of the intelligence community can come
from the Congress.
Now, you have the President's Intelligence Advisory Board.
I serve on that. But they are all appointed by the President,
and they are not really an independent group. So in all of the
recommendations we made, we thought that the strengthening and
persistence of congressional oversight was just absolutely
critical to the success of the implementation of the
recommendations.
Now, I know that there is a lot of internal oversight that
takes place within each agency, and I think within the DNI's
office as well, and that can be important to oversee it. But
that is not an independent oversight. That can only come from
Congress. I support giving the GAO ample powers to review the
intelligence community, and I agree with you, Senator Akaka,
that GAO should have a key role. The DNI should issue
directives to intelligence agencies requiring their cooperation
with GAO.
I do want to pick up on your observations about the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board because this has been a
source of enormous frustration to Mr. Kean and to me. I just
cannot figure it out. I do not know what President Bush and
President Obama think. They just have not put an effective
board in place, and I cannot understand why.
Now, this is urgently needed because in homeland security
and intelligence matters, you have greatly accelerated
surveillance. All kinds of provisions are written into the law
that expand the powers of the FBI and the intelligence
agencies, understandably in most cases, I think, to check on
what the American people are doing. And I think somebody needs
to be out there to keep their eye on these folks in a very
aggressive way because the security people within an agency
almost always win the arguments, and you need an independent
source to really keep your eye on them.
So we favored a strong, robust oversight of civil liberties
and privacy with the power to issue subpoenas and a power to
call people in front of them and keep a watchful eye because I
think there has not been enough attention to the question of
civil liberties and privacy in general with regard to homeland
security.
Mr. Kean. I might just add that Mr. Hamilton is right.
Nothing has frustrated me more, of almost all our
recommendations, than the lack of progress on civil liberties
and the board, and I do not know what problems the
administrations have with the bill that you passed. But if
there is a problem with it, if there is something wrong with
the structure, if they think it is intrusive or something, then
tell us and maybe you will change it. But to not appoint
members and to be almost 2 years into an administration which
has not even nominated enough members to make a quorum is
frustrating and makes no sense to me and leaves a big hole in
what we should be doing.
So again, I do not understand it. I am frustrated by it.
But if there is a problem, I wish they would tell us what the
problem is.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for those observations. I really
agree with you that we need to set that up immediately.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Senator Collins
and I were talking. We can address a letter to the White House
to ask what is going on here because I do not think there is
any policy or ideological opposition to the board. I suppose it
is always possible that there are elements within the
intelligence community that do not like the idea, but I
actually have not heard that either. I think we will address a
letter right away and see if we can get you a response.\1\
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\1\ The letter referenced by Chairman Lieberman appears in the
Appendix on page 387.
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Mr. Hamilton. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Next is Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, we have gathered before us today two of my
very favorite people in public life: Mr. Kean, a great governor
of New Jersey, our neighbor across the Delaware River, and
someone for whom we have huge respect in our State; and Mr.
Hamilton with whom I was privileged to serve for 10 years. I
was privileged to think of him as one of my mentors. And it is
just great to see both of you still so active, vibrant, and
contributing on so many different levels.
About once a month I am asked what is wrong in Washington,
and one of the things I always talk about is the lack of
trust--sometimes a lack of trust between parties, sometimes a
lack of trust between the Executive and Legislative branches,
sometimes a lack of trust between Committee chairs and ranking
members, and this Committee is an example of what you can get
done when you have a trusting relationship, with Senators
Lieberman and Collins.
Every month I talk about the trust that the two of you
developed when you assumed your positions as the leaders of the
9/11 Commission and how you provided an example through that
trust to the other members of the Commission and achieved
extraordinary consensus and came to us and enabled us, with
your leadership, to reflect and to follow that example. So I
just wanted to lead off by saying that.
I am fortunate to chair a subcommittee of this Committee.
It has a long name, but it is called Federal Financial
Management for short. We poke in almost every nook and cranny
of the Federal Government to see if there are ways that we can
get better results for less money.
In this hearing room yesterday, we heard from, among
others, the Department of Defense and GAO, and we were looking
at the GAO report that came out yesterday that cited major
weapon systems cost overruns for 2010 of $402 billion, up from
$42 billion a decade earlier. In this room, we have had
hearings in the last month on improper payments--not fraud, but
just mistakes, overpayments for the most part. We have a new
number for improper payments for last year--$125 billion--not
counting the Department of Defense, and not counting the
Medicare prescription drug program.
We have had hearings on surplus property. We have thousands
and thousands of pieces of surplus property we do not use, we
need to get rid of, and they are just a burden on us, $300
billion, plus tax gap monies that are owed and not being
collected. Those are the kinds of things we focus on in this
room.
With that spirit of trying to change the culture around
here or at the Department of Defense or in the Legislative or
Executive Branch throughout the Federal Government, to move
from what I call a culture of spendthrift to a culture of
thrift, would you join with us today maybe just to think about
it and then to come back to us in writing? I know there are
things we are doing, entitlement programs, we have had many
hearings on those as well, and domestic discretionary spending
programs and defense programs, things that we are doing where
we can get a better result for less money or a better result
for not a lot more money. With that spirit in mind, can you
just think out loud with us for a minute or two here today
about if there is some way that we can get a better result in
this area of national security and homeland security without
spending more money or even spending a little bit less?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, no, my impression, Senator, is in the
area of homeland security and intelligence--I know this is not
the Intelligence Committee--the whole question of cost
effectiveness rarely arises.
Senator Carper. That is true.
Mr. Hamilton. We have been set on a course, for
understandable reasons, since 9/11 to create enormous increases
in intelligence budgets and a massive new Department, DHS, and
everybody has hit the full-speed-ahead button. I do not have
the specific figures, but you have had an enormous increase in
the total amount of money spent in intelligence just in the
last few years, for reasons we all understand.
So when you began your comments on cost effectiveness,
getting better results for less money, my response was,
``Bravo,'' because I think you need a hard-headed business
attitude, if you would, in this area, which has been totally
absent for 10 years. There is probably a little exaggeration in
what I have just said, but I think cost effectiveness here
would be important and making these fellows come in who head
these agencies and not only hold their feet to the fire with
regard to homeland security and stopping terrorist attacks, but
making sure this money is being wisely spent. It makes a lot of
sense to me. So I think you perform an enormously important
service as you push the whole business of cost effectiveness.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. Kean. I think there is no question, whether it is
public or private sector, if you ramp up as fast as we felt we
had to ramp up after 9/11, you are going to have problems. You
are going to overspend. You are going to waste some money. And
I am sure that has been done. Spending on non-military
intelligence, that number is now public. I guess the military
intelligence spending is not public yet. I assume, combined, we
are somewhere around $80 billion, I would guess. And that is a
lot of money, and a lot of it ramped up in a great hurry. So I
think what you are doing is very important. We need not only to
do this well, we need to do it efficiently.
Senator Carper. If I could, I am just going to ask you two
to think about this for a while and maybe respond on the record
after you have given it some more thought.
One last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Please.
Senator Carper. Going back to the early 1990s, we have seen
a couple of countries come back and forth across our radar
screen. They include Somalia and Yemen. Both countries have
been in almost perpetual decline for, it seems like, a couple
of decades. And as a result, we have seen two very different
dangerous groups that are proving a clear and present danger to
our country. They are al-Shabaab from Somalia and al-Qaeda from
the Arabian Peninsula operating in Yemen. Both have been
directly and indirectly responsible for the December 25th
Christmas Day bombing attempt, the Fort Hood attacks, and
Alabama and Minnesota terrorism cells. And it is clear that if
these two countries implode, they will not only pose a more
severe threat to us, but maybe to the rest of the world.
Could either of you please describe your thoughts on the
threat that these groups pose to the United States and if our
Federal Government is doing enough to prevent these two
specific terrorist groups from growing into a more powerful
global entity?
Mr. Kean. You are right. It is interesting how this
business has evolved. Years ago, we used to worry about urban
areas and powerful countries and so on. Those were the threat.
Now it is the ungoverned areas of the world. It is the wild
areas. It is the areas where there does not seem to be any kind
of legitimate authority where these organizations develop. And
I think beyond even Yemen and Somalia, we do not know what is
happening now in that area of the world in some other
countries. We do not know what is going to happen if and when
Gaddafi falls and how tribal that will become. We do not know
what is going to happen in some of these other areas that may
or may not disintegrate into these kind of areas.
So this has to continue to be our priority, and with the
government of Yemen collapsing, it is going to be worse before
it gets better. I know we are not doing enough--I know we are
concentrating on it. I know the intelligence communities are
working hard to learn what they can learn. We still do not have
enough people, enough boots on the ground, the boots of
intelligence people on the ground in those areas. We are
depending on other intelligence agencies in that part of the
world, which now may not be able to give us that information
anymore because of what has gone on with their governments.
So it is a continuing and very serious problem, and we have
to be ready to address not only those two areas, but other
areas that may develop.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Congressman Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I think you have put your finger on
maybe the most difficult problem with regard to protecting
ourselves from threats from abroad. You have governments in
these countries that really do not govern throughout the
country. You have all kinds of tribal, ethnic differences. It
is a very hard problem.
I think we have to work as a Nation on developing the
capabilities to deal with these countries, and I must say I am
not quite sure how I would spell out those capabilities.
Supporting the government is often done to try to ensure
stability, but we have surely seen the limits of that in recent
years.
So I think we just have to develop the expertise for these
countries and figure out on an ad hoc basis with each one of
them what kind of capabilities exist within the country to
counter the extremist groups. If you have a government that is
reasonably stable, reasonably competent, then you have to work
with that government for sure. And if you do not have a stable,
competent government, then we may have to insert capabilities
ourselves. You cannot generalize here too much. But the kind of
plots we had that went with the FedEx and UPS packages that
were sent into the United States that originated, I think, in
Yemen indicate to us the challenges that we confront. You have
to have a multi-layered approach, obviously, to deal with these
threats, not just in-country but trying to stop it when it is
in transport, whatever the threat may be.
We described in our report the evolving nature of the
threat, and this is, among other things, exactly what we meant,
and it is a formidable challenge for us.
Mr. Kean. You cannot do it in a public hearing, but when
you have your private hearings with members of the intelligence
community, I would ask: Have our sources of information been
compromised and how much? Where did we find out the information
we have used to stop some plots? We received information from
various governments. Was it the Egyptian government? And can we
still depend on them for that information?
Did we get information out of even Libya? Which, obviously,
we cannot count on anymore. A lot of those people who were
working with us probably are not working with us or do not have
the ability to work with us today, and if we are losing those
sources of information, what are we going to do about it?
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you for those responses.
Mr. Hamilton. I think the Afghanistan experience should
tell us not to ignore these countries as difficult as it may
be. So if we have intelligence that in Yemen or in Somalia
there are groups that are plotting against the United States or
our allies in some way, then I think we have to get our brains
together and figure out the best way to do it. And depending on
the strength of the intelligence, you may want to use drones;
you may want to use special operation forces. Your preference
would be to have the local government deal with it. But if the
local government does not deal with it, then we have to take a
position that it is a threat to our national security and we
have to deal with it.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you for those comments.
Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous with the time.
Chairman Lieberman. No, not at all.
Senator Carper. I just want to say again to both of you,
thanks so much for your continued leadership and for being an
inspiration to us all.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Carper. Excellent
questions.
Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, I have a few more
questions myself.
We have talked about the evolving nature of the threat, and
I know that we agree that one of the most significant
developments in terms of the Islamist terrorist threat since 9/
11 has been the homegrown radicalization and self-
radicalization. It may have existed in some way before 9/11,
but not really in an observable or consequential way, and we
have seen it over and over again now in cases that have
existed, including the two that you mentioned, Governor Kean,
in 2009, in which successful terrorist attacks were carried
out, both the Bledsoe case in Arkansas and the Hasan case at
Fort Hood. Those were both homegrown, self-radicalization
cases. In the case of Bledsoe, he did go to Yemen for a while.
It is not totally clear who he connected with there, but he was
radicalized here.
By coincidence, just this morning I was informed by my
staff that last night the most recent edition of a magazine
called ``Inspire,'' the fifth edition, which is published by
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, appeared. It is quite
remarkable, very slick, printed in English, published in
English, so aimed at an English-speaking audience, including
here in America. Perhaps we should take this as some kind of
compliment, if you will, that we have built up our perimeter
defenses, you might say, to protect the homeland such that our
foreign enemies are now trying to develop within our country
people who can carry out terrorist attacks.
Anyway, we have held a number of hearings and made some
recommendations about this. It is a complicated problem because
unlike 9/11, which we should have detected and stopped, very
often these are people operating as so-called lone wolves. So I
know that your National Security Preparedness Group has focused
on this problem. I wanted first to thank you for that and say
how much I appreciate it. I know you have described the
problem, and as you mentioned, there will be recommendations
coming this spring. I just wanted to give you the opportunity
to comment on this new, very significant threat element in our
attempts to protect the homeland. I do not want you to pre-empt
your recommendations, but is there anything you would like to
say about what more you think the government ought to be doing
to stop the problem.
Mr. Kean. Well, it is extraordinarily difficult because as
you say, our defenses, based on our recommendations in many
cases and on your work, have been to stop people like the 9/11
co-conspirators from coming in from other countries and doing
us harm. Those defenses are not adequate when the dangers come
from somebody who is an American citizen, with an American
driver's license, an American passport, and all of that. They
are inspired, a lot of these people, from the Internet.
One of the missing pieces that we never quite nailed down
in the 9/11 report was whether or not anybody in this country
supported or helped the terrorists in any way, though we had a
suspicion al-Awlaki might have. And we mentioned in our report
that we lacked the staff and the time to really dig into it
further, but he was very suspicious, as were his contacts.
Well, he is now gone, of course, and has become one of the
people who is recruiting from overseas. So he has a definite
connection to even the 9/11 hijackers.
Chairman Lieberman. Correct.
Mr. Kean. So we think it is a terrible problem, a difficult
problem, though we are not talking about a lot of people. We do
not believe there is enormous radicalization taking place. It
is a very small number of people. But these people, many of
whom do not look like your traditional terrorists and have
American passports, present the greatest danger right now, and
we think there ought to be a real effort and a real dedication
by our intelligence communities to implement a strategy to deal
with it. And I am not sure that is in place as yet.
Mr. Hamilton. Obviously it is a lot better to stop
terrorist attacks before they happen and prevent people from
being injured. Our group is working on a radicalization report,
which we hope will have some recommendations for you before too
many weeks go by.
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Hamilton. Two or three things come to mind. One is,
this is a good illustration of how important it is to work with
State and local officials. In my own experience in my State, I
have seen communities that have reached out to the Islamic
community and those that do not. Community leadership makes a
difference here, and that community leadership knows their
community better than anybody else, and I think it is very
important for Federal officials--and I know it is not easy
because there are so many communities in the country--to
strengthen their State and local contacts in order to better
prevent radicalization.
Second, I think there has to be a clear outreach to the
Islamic community leadership. I know there are some
controversial aspects to this, but most of the Islamic leaders
with whom I have had any contact want to help.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. And believe you me, they know their
communities--not perfectly but pretty well. And so good liaison
with those people is very important.
We have a representative today from the NYPD, and he would
know much more about this than I, but I am impressed with the
way the NYPD has contacted various communities within the New
York City region and has reached out to try to understand those
communities better.
Look, the people who cause you trouble are young men, for
the most part, so they are the keys for you. Now, maybe not
exclusively but for the most part. And the community leadership
has to understand their own young people in a sense. And I
think the NYPD has set an example of contacts that other
metropolitan areas could follow.
The other thing we talked about earlier, I guess, is the
coordination of the effort within the Federal Government. If
you ask the question today who is in charge of dealing with
homeland radicalization in our government, I do not think I
could answer that. Maybe someone from the government can, but
it is not very clear to me who it is. But there ought to be
somebody in charge.
Chairman Lieberman. I agree. We have asked that question,
and the answer we received was that the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center is in charge. But that
surprised us, frankly, and there is an attempt to try to
organize this better and a recognition that this is a real
problem. But we will benefit from your recommendations greatly,
and I look forward to them.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, they need operational responsibility.
Chairman Lieberman. That is the problem, and interestingly
enough--and this now goes back a while, maybe 2 years ago, so
it is somewhat dated--we had a hearing with some leaders of the
Muslim-American community, and we asked, Is there any agency of
the Federal Government that has done outreach to your community
or which has done the most? And to me the surprising answer we
received was, yes, the FBI through its State offices had been
reaching out quite a lot and had some communication.
But, Mr. Hamilton, the NYPD sets the standard here. This is
not inexpensive. It is labor intensive. Maybe because they were
so traumatized by 9/11, they have committed a lot of resources,
and they have excellent communications with the Muslim-American
community. I think the LAPD does a good job, too, but then
there are some places in the country with significant Muslim-
American communities where my impression is that the outreach
and communication from local law enforcement is slim to none,
and that is a dangerous situation. So we look forward to your
recommendations on that.
Senator Collins mentioned something at the beginning, and I
am just going to do it quickly because I know we are both
concerned about this, and this is to come back to your report.
You did a great service by identifying the enemy here and
saying, yes, it was al-Qaeda. But more broadly, it is an
ideology, which is violent Islamist extremism. That is what
inspired the attacks of 9/11 and has continued to inspire this
myriad of attacks large and small since then. And I thought you
made a substantial contribution when you said, ``We are not
fighting terrorism, some generic evil.'' We are fighting an
ideology, if you will, a corruption of a theology. You also
said, ``Our strategy must match our means to two ends:
Dismantling the al-Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer
term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.''
That is a direct quote from your report. Talk about
frustration. We have been so frustrated that the Administration
continues to resist identifying the ideology, preferring
instead to say that we are in a conflict with violent
extremism. Well, it is violent extremism, but it is a
particular kind of extremism.
In our report on the Fort Hood attack by Hasan, we pointed
out that the Defense Department has even tried at one point to
characterize the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack as
workplace violence. But, of course, it was a lot more than
that.
So, I guess I understand what is going on here. Somebody
thinks that if we use the term ``Islamist extremism'' it is
offensive to Muslims. But I think it is quite the opposite
because we are talking about, as you said, Mr. Kean, a very
small group within a larger community, certainly here in
America, of people who are followers of Islam, not Islamist
extremism.
Anyway, I invite a response to this continuing problem.
Mr. Kean. Well, we worked on that one. We worked on how to
characterize it. We had debates on the Commission about it, and
we did research.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kean. For instance, some people suggested ``jihadist.''
Well, jihadist has some good connotations, too, in the Muslim
world.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kean. And so we rejected a lot of these terms.
``Islamist'' does not, and Islamist extremism is what it is.
And I think words are important and language is important, and
I think naming the enemy is important. And Islamist extremism
is as good a term as we have been able to find for actually
identifying what the problem is and who the people are. And I
think everything from our research shows that the community
itself accepts that term.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate that answer. I have
continued to use the term that you used because ``Islamist''
makes the point that a political ideology has exploited a
religion. It is not Islam.
Let me ask the last question. The Commission made a great
series of recommendations. We were successful in almost every
one of them of substance, certainly the major ones, in
convincing and wrestling part of the bureaucracy to accept what
you were recommending, but also our colleagues, except when it
came to congressional oversight. And this was very
disappointing. And then Senator Collins and I, who are very
stubborn people, I will say, normally do not yield, but the
reaction had been so overwhelming that we pulled back a bit. I
think that Mary Fetchet and Carie Lemack are ready to take up
this battle again, and I think it is worth trying to do it
because the truth is the oversight in Congress is much too
diffuse and overlapping, and the consequence of that is that we
are taking much too much time of the executives, particularly
in the Department of Homeland Security. So I wanted to ask you
if you have any thoughts about how to go at this again and
about whether there is a way in which we can prioritize this.
We tried to do a lot at the outset, and we got totally
defeated. But just give me your thoughts about whether you
think it still is a problem--I assume you do--and whether you
have any tactical suggestions about how we might take this up
again, knowing that these two irresistible forces are about to
focus on this.
Mr. Kean. Mr. Hamilton mentioned why congressional
oversight is so important and why it has to be effective
because you are the only oversight there is, really, because
the rest of us cannot know the information that you know when
you are doing your oversight. And only you can say how
effective it is. If Administration officials are really
forthcoming in the way that they have to be when they talk to
you, and if you really feel that you get every answer you want
and that the oversight is effective, that is great. But we
thought that it would be much more effective in a number of
ways.
Interestingly enough, we have asked every Director of
Homeland Security we have met: What can we do for you, how can
we help you? Their first response is, Can you do something
about congressional oversight?
Chairman Lieberman. That is important
Mr. Kean. Because I think it is between 80 and 90
committees now that they have some responsibility for, and they
all say they are spending as much time testifying in some cases
when they should be protecting us all. And preparing
congressional testimony takes time, and it takes time
testifying, and they are doing a lot of it. So that is
extraordinarily important, and giving the Intelligence
Committee some fiscal responsibility, so if the Administration
is not paying attention, it will pay attention, is also, we
think, very important. So we think it was a top priority when
we recommended it. We think it is still a top priority, and
anything that increases your ability to oversee these
intelligence agencies and make them perform is a step toward
protecting the country and we think a very important step.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Hamilton, do you have any thoughts
about this?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, let me make two points. One, going back
to your earlier question, how do you deal with Islamist
extremism, your comments are well taken. ``Know your enemy'' is
the first rule of fighting anybody, and I sometimes think we
have a good bit of confusion on who the enemy is.
On the positive side, I want to say that in the war of
ideas, I think we have made some progress, and the progress is
that al-Qaeda is having a hard time. They are identified as
being a violent organization that kills a lot of their own
people, and I think we are making some progress there.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. And it is important progress because they
have not rallied the masses to their support. So that needs to
be said, but your basic point is very much on target.
The second point on the Congress--I think things happen in
the Congress when the leadership does it, and they do not
happen when the leadership does not. My perspective is a little
more from the House, obviously, than from the Senate. And I
wonder whether or not the key national security officials--the
DHS Secretary, the intelligence officials, and so forth--have
been able to sit down in a congenial environment to discuss
this problem with the leadership of both the minority and the
majority parties. It is such an obvious thing that you weaken a
department like the DHS when you have all the time that they
have to spend--you have referred to--testifying. And so I think
we need to focus our attention on the leadership of the bodies.
They have to understand that this is a national security
problem. They are not dealing here with a political problem and
domestic consequences. They are dealing with trying to improve
the national security of the United States, putting it on a
firmer basis. I was told at one time that every single Senator
sits on some committee dealing with homeland security
oversight.
Chairman Lieberman. You are probably right.
Mr. Hamilton. I do not know if that is exactly right or
not, but it is pretty close to it, and if it is, it is an
absolute absurdity. But that is not the problem. The problem is
you are undermining the effectiveness of homeland security. So,
Senator, I just do not know any way to get at it except
impressing upon the leadership the necessity of doing this for
the national security interests of the United States. And the
leadership has enormous problems in both bodies, but if I may
be so blunt, they tend to look at so many of these problems as
an internal political problem they have to solve in order to
maintain their position in the caucus leadership. I am not
naive about that. But this is a different quality problem, I
believe, and we have to get that across to both party
leaderships.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful and something for
us to work on because the truth is the leaders have not made an
attempt at this with everything else going on since the
legislation was first considered in 2004, and the truth is they
did not make much of an attempt at it then, really hardly any
attempt, because they were working so hard at getting the rest
of the legislation passed, that this was why take on this
fight. And it is also true that the people who have the most
interest in seeing this fixed, which is the leadership of the
Homeland Security Department, in some sense the DNI, always
have other priorities.
Mr. Hamilton. Sure.
Chairman Lieberman. It may be the immediate budget
priority. It may be a legislative priority. But we have to work
together to make another try at this, and I agree, it has to
come from the leadership. I thank you for that.
When you were talking both about the reaction of the Muslim
community but also about al-Qaeda and the ideology, it struck
me that we should at least note that in the last few months
there has been this remarkable development in the Arab world,
in the Islamic world that is directly relevant to what we are
talking about. I know that people say, well, where are the
moderate voices within the Muslim world? Well, the truth is
that, though we have not, I think, seen it that way, what
happened in Tunisia and Egypt is really a very loud outcry by--
they are not just moderate. They are not focused on religion.
There may be some who are focused on religion in the movements,
but the leaders in both cases--I had the opportunity with
Senator McCain to visit about a month ago both countries--are
very focused on political freedom, economic opportunity, and
essentially getting their countries into the modern world. And
they view Islamist extremism as regressive.
Now, some of them are religious, of course, but that is
quite different, as we were saying before, and in some sense--I
know this is hopeful thinking, optimistic thinking--what is
happening now I think is a profound repudiation of the ideology
of Islamist extremism, much more widespread than any of us are
capable of. So that is a final statement by me.
I do not know if either of you want to comment on that.
Mr. Hamilton. You articulated it much better than I did,
but I think that is a hugely important development.
Mr. Kean. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. And I think it really cries out to us
to do whatever we can to be supportive.
Mr. Hamilton. That is right.
Chairman Lieberman. These are very proud movements.
Ultimately, the people in Tunisia and Egypt, and hopefully in
Libya soon, will determine their own destiny. But they may need
some technical assistance and economic support. They are
looking for investment from the United States. I think finally
you will both get a kick out of hearing that when Senator
McCain and I were in Tunisia, we met with a group of the
leaders of the uprising there, and one of them said to us,
``Senators, we want to ask you if you could help us to get one
American who we would most like to come and speak to us here in
Tunisia.'' And I thought to myself, ``Now, who is this going to
be?'' And the answer: Mark Zuckerberg. [Laughter.]
Mr. Kean. Really? Modernity.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, first off, he represented the new
world of telecommunications, but in some sense, Facebook had
provided them with what I might call the weapons in their
peaceful revolution. It is quite remarkable.
Mr. Kean. Well, that is a wonderful story.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I am very hopeful.
I cannot thank the two of you enough for everything you
have done and your testimony. It has been very specifically
helpful to focus our review that will go on for the rest of
this year. We are going to keep the record of the hearing open
for 15 days for additional questions and statements.
Thank you again very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING? PART I
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
afternoon and thanks to all of you, particularly our three
witnesses, for being here.
This is one in a series of hearings our Committee is doing
this year as we approach the 10th anniversary of the attacks
against America on September 11, 2001, and the purpose of these
hearings is to examine how well the national security reforms
implemented in the wake of 9/11 are working.
This particular hearing, of course, is being held in the
aftermath of a spectacularly successful collaboration between
our intelligence and military agencies that resulted in
locating and killing Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader who
presided, of course, over the 9/11 attacks on America.
This success required intense and focused cooperation among
key intelligence agencies and the Defense Department, as well
as other related agencies throughout our government.
Each organization, as we go back and are debriefed on this
mission, brought its distinct assets and expertise to bear on
the mission, which was to locate Osama bin Laden and then to
capture or kill him. And when it comes to intelligence,
sufficient material was brought together to reach informed
conclusions with a level of confidence that enabled the
President of the United States to make a tough call, but one
that he felt the evidence enabled him to make decisively, that
resulted in this remarkable success.
I do not believe that all of this would have happened 10
years ago. In fact, in the 9/11 Commission report, the authors
expressed frustration that, as they reviewed our government at
that time, no one was actually in charge of the hunt for Osama
bin Laden, which symbolized to the Commission the dysfunction
and disunity that they concluded contributed to the 9/11
attacks in the first place.
In response to the 9/11 Commission's criticisms, this
Committee drafted and Congress passed the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. There was then, and there
is still today, another body of Congress called the House of
Representatives, and there was another committee there that
drafted similar legislation, headed at the time by one of our
three witnesses, Congresswoman Harman. It results in the most
sweeping intelligence reform since the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency after the Second World War.
I think the most important reform in the 2004 Act was the
creation of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, with the aim of bringing together and
coordinating the efforts of our 16 intelligence agencies and
offices under one leader to make sure they work toward the
single goal of collecting and analyzing intelligence to better
protect our national security. So the purpose of the hearing
today really is to take a look at how the ODNI is doing.
I am going to include the rest of my statement in the
record except to say that I feel particularly grateful that we
have the witnesses that we have before us today, really three
people who are particularly well prepared to assist us in
answering the questions we are posing, which is how has the
ODNI done and what improvements, if any, by statute or
regulation are necessary.
First, as I mentioned, former Representative Jane Harman
was the Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, where she worked closely with us, as I said,
on the 2004 Act. She later chaired the House Homeland Security
Committee's Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and has now gone on to be the
head of the Wilson Center, at which she is already doing a
great job.
General Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, former Director of the National Security
Agency, and former Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, really a great, if I may say so, national asset,
always a help to this Committee in its deliberations.
And John Gannon, former Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Analysis and Production and really one of our
Nation's top experts on intelligence analysis.
We thank all of you for coming today. We look forward to
your testimony about where we are and where we need to go to
ensure that our intelligence community consistently performs at
the high levels, the kind of levels that we saw demonstrated in
the hunt for and taking down of Osama bin Laden.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to follow the Chairman's lead and also do only
an abbreviated version of my opening statement. Let me begin by
echoing his comments about the distinguished panel that we have
before us today. I, too, am particularly delighted to see
former Representative Jane Harman here with us. As the Chairman
has indicated, she was one of the four authors of the 2004
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and worked
very closely with us through extraordinarily intensive
negotiations that spanned several months. General Hayden has
given so much work and effort to his country, and he also was a
key behind-the-scenes player as we drafted that bill. And, of
course, as the Chairman has indicated, Mr. Gannon has had a
stellar career in the intelligence community. I am confident
that all three of our witnesses will help us do the evaluation
that we are undertaking today.
Last week's welcome news that Osama bin Laden was killed
demonstrates exactly the kind of successful collaboration of
intelligence and operations that we envisioned in reforming our
capabilities and restructuring the intelligence community in
the wake of the attacks on our country in 2001. This certainly
was a great victory for our intelligence efforts and a great
blow to al-Qaeda.
But the fact remains that al-Qaeda is not going away, and
that is why it is time for Congress to closely examine and
build upon the successes that have emanated from the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, identify any
shortcomings, and work to correct them and to build in further
reforms.
As the Chairman has indicated, our 2004 law created the
Director of National Intelligence and the National
Counterterrorism Center to foster information sharing and
collaboration among our security partners not only across the
Federal Government but also at all levels of government.
The DNI has made some concrete progress integrating the 16
agencies in the intelligence community. I want to give just two
examples of how that integration is taking place. They are not
the kinds of examples that the public is generally aware of,
but when you talk to those working in the intelligence
community, these frequently come up.
In 2008, the DNI rolled out the innovative ``A-Space,''
which is an intelligence analyst's Facebook. But instead of
being used for social networking, our intelligence experts are
posting, sharing, and asking each other about topical issues.
They can collaborate with colleagues across agencies and around
the world, allowing them to share leads and resources more
easily than ever.
A second example is the National Counterterrorism Center's
creation of ``pursuit teams'' that map terrorist networks,
track threats using information from across intelligence
agencies to bridge the gaps between national and domestic
intelligence and help to put the pieces of the intelligence
puzzle together.
These are just two examples of innovative ways that the
stovepipes have been broken. I completely agree with the
Chairman that I doubt that the kind of integrated operation
that was successful in going after Osama bin Laden could have
existed a decade ago. So I think that we have indeed made
progress, and there are other examples as well. The arrests of
Mr. Zazi and Mr. Headly are two other cases where the dots were
connected.
On the other hand, this Committee's investigation and
report on the Fort Hood shootings showed that we still have a
ways to go in other areas, particularly in information sharing
between the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other members
of the intelligence community. We concluded that the Department
of Defense and the FBI collectively had sufficient information
to have detected Major Hasan's radicalization to violent
Islamist extremism, but that the Department of Defense and the
FBI failed to act effectively together on the many red flags
signaling that he had become a potential threat.
So the bottom line is that almost 10 years since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, and 7 years since our landmark
legislation, our Nation is much safer, but we clearly are not
yet safe. And that is why it is incumbent upon all of us to re-
evaluate the law and to look at where we are and where we need
to go.
Finally, let me just end with one comment that continues to
be of concern to me. When we drafted the Intelligence Reform
Act, we described the DNI as the quarterback that the 9/11
Commission envisioned and that we intended. At our earlier
oversight hearing, the two leaders of that Commission, Governor
Kean and Representative Hamilton, made the point that some of
the functions that we envisioned the DNI carrying out are, in
fact, being done by John Brennan out at the White House. And
that troubles me not due to any doubts about Mr. Brennan's
capabilities, but because that structure undermines the
statutory role of the DNI.
So a basic question that we must ask is whether changes to
the law are required or whether it is simply a matter of more
fidelity to the spirit and the letter of the 2004 law in order
to realize the potential of the DNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Well said.
Congresswoman Harman, it is great to have you here on the
other side of the table. Welcome back.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HARMAN,\1\ FORMER REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA AND CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not used to being
on the other side of the table. You and I, Senator Collins, and
Representative Pete Hoekstra were at the same table day and
night as we crafted what is now called IRTPA, which I think is
probably the worst acronym ever invented.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Harman appears in the Appendix on
page 400.
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Again, it is a pleasure to testify with a good friend
before dear friends and dedicated former colleagues who serve
on one of the most important and bipartisan committees in the
Senate. I now work in a bipartisan institution and pinch myself
every day to be so lucky and to succeed our former colleague,
Lee Hamilton, at that job. I am passionate about the topic of
your hearing; intelligence and intelligence reform were the
focus of my 17 years--which is 119 dog years--in the House of
Representatives. I did not run an intelligence agency like Mike
Hayden, and I was not a top analyst like John Gannon. But I did
try to conduct, as you do, careful oversight over the
intelligence function during my 8 years on the House
Intelligence Committee and my 8 years on the House Homeland
Security Committee.
I agree with both of you that although 24, or perhaps more,
heroic Navy SEALS deserve our Nation's gratitude for the
capture and kill of the world's most wanted man last week, the
information on which their mission was based derived, in most
part, from the integration of people and ``ints'' achieved by
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
We now have proof--I think we had some proof before, but we
now have big-time proof that IRTPA works--that, at its best,
our intelligence community can achieve the seamlessness that
its authors, including me, dreamed of.
In fact, my view is that had we not passed IRTPA and had we
continued to operate the intelligence community using the 1947
business model set out in the National Security Act, we would
probably not have been able to thwart a number of plots or take
down Osama bin Laden.
Let me focus briefly on three issues: First, both of you
have addressed the performance of the Director of National
Intelligence. By the way, I take credit for the name of DNI.
Originally, it was supposed to be National Intelligence
Director, which I thought sounded like a bug.
Chairman Lieberman. It is interesting. I take credit for
that, too. [Laughter.]
We probably had the same thought.
Senator Collins. And I am the one who actually did it.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Harman. It was a good start.
Chairman Lieberman. I think we can all agree that Pete
Hoekstra had nothing to do with it. [Laughter.]
Ms. Harman. Moving along, second, let me talk about
something Senator Collins mentioned, which is the role of
domestic intelligence agencies and, third, some ongoing issues
involving congressional oversight--of course, not involving the
two of you.
As for the DNI, I think the DNI continues to be a work in
progress. Congress intended her or him to be a joint commander.
A quarterback is a good analogy, but I recall our modeling this
after the Goldwater-Nichols law that created the joint command
across four military services, and it works very well, I
believe, at DOD. So we envisioned a joint commander, not a huge
bureaucracy by a joint commander across 16 intelligence
agencies--far more than a coordinator, and a job that clearly
required leadership skills.
IRTPA is not perfect, but I believe it contains adequate
authorities to give the DNI the necessary leverage she or he
needs to get the job done. I have often said that the function
is 50 percent law and 50 percent leadership.
Congress intended, as I think both of you said, that the
DNI serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the
President. Those authorities were, I think, clarified and
enhanced when the President, President Bush, issued Executive
Order 12333, and that was the intention of Congress and clearly
the intention of President Bush as well. This has never really
happened. I believe that during the Bush Administration, Vice
President Cheney was the principal intelligence adviser, and as
Senator Collins said, during this Administration, John Brennan,
the counterterrorism coordinator in the White House, is the
principal intelligence adviser. In my view, neither President
has adequately valued the DNI role, nor has either President
made an adequate effort to support the mission. This is
something I think Congress and those of us who agree with
Congress should push harder on. It is not to diminish the
reputation and power of the people in the White House who have
assumed the role, but we established a person who is confirmed
by Congress and accountable to Congress to take that job, and I
think we should push harder to make certain that person
actually has the full job.
Let me raise a few issues that I think are important that
the DNI is addressing.
First, DNI James Clapper has suggested--and I would urge
that this happen--that the National Intelligence Program be
taken out of the Defense Department and added to the DNI's
budget. I think that this will achieve more efficiency and
promote more accountability.
Second, I think the issue of right-sizing the DNI staff is
being handled well, and we should move on to other topics. We
should also, by the way, reduce the use of outside contractors.
Third, when General David Petraeus moves to the CIA role,
and CIA Director Leon Panetta becomes the Secretary of Defense,
hopefully we will finally cement a good working relationship
between the CIA Director and the Secretary of Defense. This was
impossible in 2004 because the Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld implacably opposed the law and the then-Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter, also did. We
had to work around them to achieve what we did, and I thought
it was pretty darn good.
And, finally DNI Clapper urges that we reduce the number of
reports to Congress. I know how those reports get into
statutes, and I know what they mean politically to the members
who add them. But I think consolidating them will save time and
resources and enhance the focus on the mission.
I want to keep to my time, so let me just move to another
subject, and that is, our domestic intelligence agencies. I
think, as Senator Collins said, that there are ongoing problems
with vertical intelligence sharing. This is going better,
especially because you are doing some great oversight. I think
that the Fort Hood massacre, as you said, could have perhaps
been prevented if there had been better collaboration between
DOD and the FBI, and the especially weak player is the
intelligence and analysis function in the Department of
Homeland Security. We need much more work, and I want to thank
your staff and you for the work you did on helping to pass the
reducing overclassification bill last year, which was signed
into law by President Barack Obama in October.
Finally, on congressional oversight, this Committee, your
Committee, has far more jurisdiction than its House counterpart
on which I served for 8 years. But I do not believe either
committee in the Senate or House has adequate jurisdiction. We
know why this happens. No one wants to give up any
jurisdiction. But I actually think that reorganizing this
function in the Congress would, one, carry out a strong
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission; but also, two, give us a
much better shot of providing the oversight necessary to be
sure that the intelligence community will get the job done and
help us protect our homeland.
I agree with Senator Collins that while last week's news is
fabulous, it will not diminish the threats to our homeland, and
it probably will not diminish the potency of al-Qaeda, although
that potency I believe will now move from Pakistan to other
places like Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is
emerging, in my view as the part of al-Qaeda that is doing the
most work both to inspire and train people to attack us in the
homeland.
Let me finally conclude by saying that there is no way to
make our homeland 100 percent safe. What we can do is minimize
risk, and we are doing that. We need to constantly re-evaluate
the threats against the United States and to prioritize our
investments. We are not making a lot more brain cells. Those
that we have have to be applied against the top threats, and
surely we are in a resource crunch, and our resources must be
carefully marshaled.
Let me close by recognizing the heroically brave women and
men of our intelligence community who put their lives on the
line every day for our country--often in austere places around
the world, living apart from their families. Surely CIA
Director Panetta, DNI Clapper, President Obama, some Members of
Congress, and others, should take a lot of credit for last
week's activities. But the true heroes were those in the field,
not just the Navy SEALs but those in the field who put together
the clues that led to the information, that tracked the
couriers, that found the house, that found Osama bin Laden, and
they deserve our heartfelt thanks. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Hear, hear. Thank you. And if I may,
that gave the President a sufficient level of confidence in the
information he had to order that the raid occur. Thank you for
that excellent statement.
General Hayden, it is great to welcome you back. Thank you
for being here, and we look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN,\1\ FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY
General Hayden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to
see all of you again.
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\1\ The prepared statement of General Hayden appears in the
Appendix on page 403.
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Let me begin by attempting to scope the problem. We
sometimes look as if we are trying to repair a community that
was totally dysfunctional, and what I want to describe is I
think what the legislation attempted to do was to balance two
things, both of which are virtues, and two things which any
complex organization has to balance, and that is, simply the
unity of effort for the whole and autonomy of action for the
parts. And both of those are good things. Both need to be
protected. And I think the macro judgment was that we were more
than a brick shy of a load when it came to unity of effort for
the whole, and that was the intent of the legislation.
The real problem is, I think, what we are trying to do is
to build what some of our younger analysts and case officers
would describe as a networked organization, which very
frequently looks and acts like it is leaderless or has many
leaders. And, unfortunately, the only way we can get from here
to there is to actually have very strong leadership in order to
create this kind of organization.
And so what the Nation decided and what you sponsored and
fostered in 2004 was another path to that balance, not the DCI
path but the DNI path.
I think those of us in the community were a bit nervous
about that. We were quite busy at the time. We actually thought
that the DCI had some real authorities and did provide a fair
amount of glue. But even those of us who had our doubts
recognized that if we needed more glue, if we needed more unity
of effort, the then current model, the DCI, was probably going
to be inadequate simply because the DCI had full-time day work
as the Director of the CIA, and it would be very hard for
anyone, almost superhuman, to reach above that role and both
psychologically and physically play the role of coaching the
entire community.
But you had a real daunting challenge on your hands because
whatever glue we had in 2004, whatever centripetal forces we
were able to create in the community, came from the fact that
the head of the community, the DCI, also headed the CIA, and
that ``C'' still meant ``central'' and that he was in that core
position inside the community. And, of course, the decision was
made, whatever else the DNI was going to be, he was not even
going to have his office at Langley let alone run the CIA. So
you really had a difficult challenge to pull us out of this
course, put us on another, and put enough bricks in his
backpack that he had enough authority to get beyond what the
old model had provided us.
Beyond that, as existentially difficult as that was, this
has actually been harder than it should have been. We were at
war, and, therefore, it is kind of hard to restructure when
your daily operations tempo is so important. But there is
another, I think more subtle challenge because we are at war.
Three or four of those really big organizations that you care a
lot about, and most of whose first initials are ``N,'' are
actually in the Department of Defense. As mentioned, I was the
Director of NSA, and I would not say we were schizophrenic, but
we did have a duality in our personality. We were the National
Security Agency, but we were also directed to act as a combat
support agency.
In many ways, your law was trying to strengthen the
national character, to bring folks, organizations under the
Director of National Intelligence. It is inevitable that after
9 years of war, the combat support character of those
organizations becomes more and more dominant. There is nothing
wrong with that. That is actually a good thing. We would all
agree, we would all foster it. But it is not quite a
convergence with the course of action that you set out in terms
of strengthening the DNI.
There are other things that made this harder. We have had
four DNIs in 6 years. That cannot help. We have had four DCIAs
in 6 years. That cannot help either. I think one of the most
powerful phrases in your legislation was the role you gave to
the DNI to recommend the DCIA to the President. I just told you
we have had four and four. I can think of only one example
where the DNI actually recommended the head of the CIA to the
President of the United States, and that was John Negroponte
recommending me to be DCIA instead of his Deputy, and we
overlapped for only 6 months after I took that job. That is
actually pretty important.
And, finally--and I am fearful of being too self-
referential here--my old job, the PD-DNI, the Principal Deputy,
I think is really important because those two tasks you gave
the DNI, senior intelligence adviser to the President and
smooth functioning of the intelligence community, those are
really hard. And that deputy function is really important. For
over half the life of this legislation, that deputy position
has been vacant. That has real impact on, I think as you said,
Senator Collins, effecting the intent of the law rather than
trying to change the legislation.
Now, all that said, I think there has been some really good
news with regard to the DNI. It exists and is accepted, and,
frankly, in 2005, when I was Principal Deputy, that was not a
given throughout the community.
The NCTC has already been mentioned as a signal success,
and I think that is right, and there will probably be questions
on it as we go further.
Imagine, if you will, trying to create the NCTC, which
fundamentally is characterized by the mingling of foreign
intelligence with domestic law enforcement. Try to picture that
if it reported not to the DNI, but if it reported to the DCI,
who was also the head of CIA, and therefore, was your foreign
espionage chief. American political culture would have rejected
that like a foreign object. And so the DNI structure has
actually enabled the success of the NCTC.
The DNI has also kind of thrown his body from time to time
in front of really big trains. I can recall Director Mike
McConnell spending about 18 months on legislation with which
you are all familiar--FISA reform. That could not have been
done by any sitting Director of NSA. Only the DNI could have
brought the gravitas of the community to that discussion.
This again sounds a bit personal, but it is very real.
Every day I was a DCIA, I thanked God there was a DNI. I had no
idea how anybody could be a DCIA and also be head of the
American intelligence community. You talked about the recent
success and used the term ``quarterback.'' I think I am a
little more comfortable with the term ``coach'' to describe the
DNI. And I think it is clear--I was not on the inside, but from
all the accounting, I think it is clear that Director Panetta
was the quarterback for this effort.
There is an echo of that--if you recall al-Kibar, the
Syrian nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that was ultimately
destroyed. When that came up, Director McConnell and I worked
very closely, but he, in fact, empowered me to act on behalf of
him because this was at the operational level. And I do not
know that we want the DNI routinely playing at that level.
There are other things the DNI has set in motion. Sharing
in something that is called ICD File 502, which sounds like
coded language to most folks in the room, but it is a process
which allows over time the bureaucracies to more readily, more
facilely share information. Joint duty is another thing that
has been set in motion and that over time will change the
culture of the community. Not possible without the current
structure.
There probably are some tinkerings in the law that someone
might consider. I will not suggest any. I think that should
come out of the sitting DNI. But some things that come to mind,
if there is anything you need to do to get the National
Intelligence Program more fully under the DNI and out of the
DOD budget, if there is some legal impediment I am not aware
of, that is probably a very good thing.
We have already mentioned that we are cooperating pretty
well east to west at the national level. But the new threat is
going to require more cooperation north to south. And how
better do we share between national, State, local, and tribal
assets? I do not know that there are legal impediments, but if
there are, I think that would be a great help.
All that said, I think I agree with something that both of
you suggested. We are going to succeed or fail more on
intangibles than we are on the precise letter of the law, as
important as that is. The three intangibles that most come to
mind to me are:
First, the personality of the DNI. That really matters, who
that person is.
Second is the relationship of the DNI with the DCIA. That
has got to work. My shorthand is the DNI owes the DCIA room to
run, and the DCIA owes the DNI total transparency.
Then finally, as already suggested, whatever shortcomings
there may be in the law, everything is fixed if the DNI is--and
everyone knows him to be--the President's senior intelligence
adviser without question.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, General Hayden. That
was great.
Mr. Gannon, thanks again for being here and please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. GANNON,\1\ FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Gannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will also
summarize the statement I provided for the record.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gannon appears in the Appendix on
page 406.
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In my view overall, the performance of the U.S.
Intelligence Community has improved dramatically since 9/11.
Analytic and operational tradecraft have advanced
significantly. Performance in counterterrorism programs has
reached the highest standard of professionalism and dedication.
The application of technology has broadened, deepened, and
accelerated. Interagency collaboration, especially in support
of the warfighter, has improved markedly. And progress toward a
more distributed model of intelligence support to users
anywhere in the world is palpable and encouraging. The fusion
of intelligence, the synergy of well-trained people and
advanced technology, and the interagency teamwork in
Afghanistan and Iraq are at their highest level ever--a level
that seemed unattainable when I left government.
The creation of the DNI has contributed significantly to
this progress, but other leaders and individual agencies--with
administration and congressional support--also have taken
impressive steps on their own. The Department of Defense won
congressional approval to establish in 2002, the position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to improve
management of its considerable intelligence assets and
programs. Most significantly, in my view, the Secretary of
Defense elevated the authority and boosted the budget of the
Joint Special Operations Command to provide in the field a
strong coalescing leadership, a clear chain of command, and a
powerful authority to coordinate focused requirements for
intelligence collection and analysis. I would risk the outside
judgment that the cooperation of CIA, including its
Counterterrorism Center, with the JSOC has never been closer or
more effective. While there is always room for improvement in
the intelligence business, the strong, collaborative
performance of our agencies ``down range'' today is
unprecedented and a source of justifiable pride for the
intelligence community.
The domestic picture, in my view, is mixed. The key
difference with ``down range'' is that there is no JSOC
counterpart in the homeland to integrate intelligence processes
and products. The FBI has built an impressive intelligence
infrastructure and has shifted significant resources, once
wholly devoted to law enforcement, to domestic intelligence
collection and analysis. The National Counterterrorism Center
has made significant progress in integrating foreign and
domestic intelligence and analysis. The Department of Homeland
Security, with its 22 constituent agencies sometimes taking
initiative on their own, has made commendable strides in border
security and some, but uneven, progress in sharing threat-based
information and coordinating policy with State and local
governments and the private sector. Overall, however, domestic
agencies do not show the strong unity of effort that is evident
in theaters of conflict abroad. Domestic intelligence and
security is a much slower work in progress.
The DNI should be seen as a leader with explicit
responsibilities for clearly defined oversight of IC
performance, for the development and application of interagency
program standards, and for the implementation of the National
Intelligence Program. We are not yet there, in my view. I
believe, however, we can do much better. We should recall that
the IRTPA was passed into law after decades of debate about the
inability of successive DCIs to manage the intelligence
community. The IC today is challenged by historic geopolitical
change, a globally dispersed threat environment, and a
technological revolution that is enabling even minor
adversaries to hurt us as never before. The DNI has the
potential to help agencies to achieve a unity of effort in this
challenging environment.
To be optimized, the DNI roles and responsibilities should
be tied clearly to defensible IC strategic priorities and
requirements. The DNI's leadership must be authoritative with
regard to these IC-wide priorities but not intrusive in agency-
specific matters. It must recognize the distributed and
networked nature of intelligence support around the world
today. And, most importantly, in my view, the incumbent must
have the visible and sustained backing of both the White House
and the Congress, and it is questionable whether the DNI has
this now. This in my judgment has been a major obstacle to
progress.
The DNI may need additional authorities. I believe his
management of the NIP, for example, would be strengthened if it
were moved from the defense budget to the ODNI. In a period of
tightening budgets, he will need clearer authorities and
powerful top cover to evaluate and prioritize key programs for
growth, reduction, and elimination, a role he has a unique
potential to perform.
At this juncture, however, rather than simply add
authorities, I believe it would be more useful in a period of
IC leadership transition to take a step back and consider ways
to get the intelligence community, White House, and
congressional priorities aligned to enable and support the DNI
on this hazardous mission.
I would cite several priority areas in addition to the NIP
management and cross-agency program evaluation on which the DNI
is uniquely positioned to help improve IC performance and
enhance U.S. national security:
Balancing strategic versus tactical collection and
analysis, which in my view has gone too far in the tactical
direction.
Equipping trained analysts for the Information Age, meaning
giving them greater and full Internet access to social media
and to outside experts, which I think is essential against the
challenges we face today.
Strengthening commitment to science and technology in an
era when we are subject more than ever to technological
surprise.
Enhancing training and education for the intelligence
profession--that is, with a curriculum that codifies and
conveys the body of knowledge that defines the intelligence
profession itself.
Adapting security and counterintelligence to the 21st
Century, pursing the benefit from innovation and avoiding the
costs of doing it the old way.
And continued promotion of information sharing across all
the agencies, and improving intelligence community procurement
strategies and policies as well as improving government
contract management overall.
I am glad to say that the DNI is working on all these
important priorities, but in my judgment, he will need help to
deliver the best results. And it should matter to all of us
that he succeeds.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Gannon. Your statement
and the others prepared will be part of the record, and we
appreciate the time and thought that you gave to your
statements.
We will do a 7-minute round of questions here.
General Hayden, I think I want to start with you, picking
up on one thing you said, reminding us that the DNI has two
major functions: One is to be the senior intelligence adviser
to the President, and the other is to be, whatever term we
choose, coach, manager, leader, quarterback, of the
intelligence community.
You have been pretty close to the functioning of the DNI
since it came into effect, and first I want to say that you are
absolutely right. One of the shortcomings over the last period
of time, which is not in the law but in its implementation, is
that for too long the Principal Deputy position at the DNI has
been vacant, and that really means that either we are putting
these two functions in a very burdensome way on the DNI
himself, or he is not going to be able to do the two. And
either he is going to do both not as well as it should be done,
or he is going to fail in one or not do as well as he should.
How would you assess the function of the DNI as the senior
intelligence adviser to the President in practice? You talked
about this a little before. The CIA is a big agency with a lot
of history and a lot of assets, so that is the muscle they
have. But from what you know, to the extent you can talk about
it from the inside, has the DNI actually ended up being, since
we created the position, the senior intelligence adviser to the
President?
General Hayden. I think it has gone back and forth. It is
very much dependent upon the personality of the President and
the personality of the DNI.
The first thing is the DNI has to choose where he is going
to shift his weight. Does he shift it downtown? I mean, that
is, frankly, how to draw the picture. Or does he shift it back
out at headquarters?
There is an incredibly powerful gravitational pull
downtown, and that is not out of pride from the DNI. That is
out of the demand of the President and the National Security
Council staff.
My experience, to show you how difficult this was, I was
generally always there--not in the morning briefings. That was
generally a DNI show. But a lot of decisions get made at the
Deputy's level, the Principal's level at the NSC, and I was
almost always invited. And so I am there with Admiral
McConnell. Literally, the President or Steve Hadley would say,
``OK, the two Mikes, you go first.'' And Mike McConnell would
talk, and then if I had anything to add, I would add. But we
were both there.
Admiral McConnell was really disadvantaged. I am sitting on
top the Nation's premier analytical service. Admiral McConnell
is up the road reading books. I am putting somebody in the back
of the car with me explaining the details we are running down
because I have the analytical staff to do that.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
General Hayden. So there is a bit of a tension there, a bit
of an anomaly. But you have to work through it. Remember that
transparency and freedom of action between the two? The DCIA
and the DNI have to be friends, and the DNI does not get to do
job two, which is smooth functioning of the community, unless
everyone believes he is the one responsible for job one. He
gains power for the second task from his performance of the
first.
Chairman Lieberman. I agree. Obviously we wanted the DNI to
be the principal intelligence adviser to the President because
the gathering of intelligence goes beyond the Central
Intelligence Agency, even though it has the most personnel and
the most assets in the community.
Is the DNI's presence at the daily intelligence brief to
the President critically important to this fact? I mean, that
is not in the statute. Well, it is, actually, generally in the
statute. But there is latitude.
General Hayden. First of all, Mr. Chairman, this depends on
the personality of the President. All presidents deal with this
in a different way. President Bush was very interactive, was
face to face, it was that human contact. I think President
Obama is a bit more cerebral and likes printed material and so
on.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
General Hayden. So you have to accommodate the character of
the President. But I do think it is very important--let me be
very precise--that the DNI be represented in those morning
briefings, either he or the Deputy. But on balance, I think it
needs to be the DNI more often than not.
Chairman Lieberman. Congresswoman Harman or Mr. Gannon, do
you want to get into that discussion about the interplay of the
senior adviser to the President and coordinator of the intel
community? Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. We have seen good stories and bad stories.
There was a tension between DNI Dennis Blair and CIA Director
Leon Panetta that wasted a lot of time about what you call
people who are forward deployed in our embassies. I thought
that was a stupid fight, I really did, and certainly nothing we
imagined when we formed the law.
It seems to me that, as I said in my testimony, the DNI
role has never been adequately valued by either president
during the time of the law, either President Bush or President
Obama, and that is something we should push for.
But, second, my term at the DNI is the joint commander. I
think her or his job is to leverage the strengths of the other
agencies. If you are a good CEO, you do not do all the work
yourself. You help those underneath you understand the mission
and perform their missions well, and then you pull it together,
and that is what I see is the DNI role.
Yes, I agree with General Hayden that being part of the
President's daily brief is important, but I do not think the
DNI personally has to do it every time. Again, letting other
people shine and have that face time, too, is the sign of a
secure leader.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. You have said twice now that we
ought to be pushing harder in the face of the fact that neither
President who has had a DNI yet has used that DNI to the full
extent that we hoped. Are you thinking additional statutory
authority to the DNI? Or is it more trying to make the point to
the President, if we could, that this is what we intended and
this will serve him better?
Ms. Harman. Yes, it is the latter. I think that to the
extent that our law left any ambiguity--and, of course, as one
of its authors, I thought it was quite swell--that was
clarified by----
Chairman Lieberman. But not without ambiguity.
Ms. Harman. In the face of implacable opposition by two key
people in the government at the time, I thought we did
extremely well. But Executive Order 12333, issued by President
Bush and supported at the time by then-Candidate Obama, as I
recall, was an attempt to make even clearer that we intended
the DNI to be the principal actor in intelligence.
I mean, you cannot make a President rely on somebody in the
chair, but as General Hayden has said, you can try to help
forge the right chemistry between the President and this
person. And you could also explain as Congress that the person
accountable to Congress for the failures or successes is the
DNI, not the Vice President of the United States or the
principal counterterrorism officer in the White House.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Gannon, do you want to get into
this?
Mr. Gannon. As the former Deputy Director of Intelligence
who ran the PDB staff at CIA, I always regarded this daily
access to the President of the United States as critical to the
intelligence mission and absolutely essential to the role of a
senior intelligence adviser to the President.
By the way, I will add--and I think Mr. Hayden knows this
well--that it takes tremendous analytic resources to perform
this role successfully. The substantive role that one plays in
the PDB forum is very different from the management roles in
the intelligence community. All DCIs struggled with this
tension, and all of them ultimately failed at trying to perform
the two functions.
But I think the problem with the DNI construct now is that
the DNI does not have adequate analytic resources to serve him
in the substantive role. What it takes to produce that book
every day is a tremendous investment of resources and
expertise, and they have to be serving the person who actually
provides the briefing or whose deputy provides the briefing.
Chairman Lieberman. So is the answer to try to provide more
analytical resources to the DNI?
Mr. Gannon. That would be my answer to the question, yes. I
think if the DNI is going to continue to serve in that
substantive role, he needs to have more resources to do the
job.
Chairman Lieberman. Because, otherwise, this will naturally
move to the CIA because they have the analytical----
Mr. Gannon. I think there would be a very strong
gravitational pull in that direction.
Chairman Lieberman. OK, thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I am listening to this debate, it reminds me that in
Washington there are really three levers of power. One is your
relationship with the President, and we have talked about the
fact--and I agree with Representative Harman--that neither
President Bush nor President Obama has fully valued the DNI as
the principal adviser to the President the way we intended in
the law. The second is control over personnel, and I want to
come back to that with an example. And the third is control
over budget.
Now, each of you, I believe, made a budget recommendation
to us. When we wrote the 2004 law, there was a huge dispute
over whether the intelligence community's budget should remain
with DOD and then be doled out, essentially, to the agencies or
whether it should go through the DNI. And I think--but I want
to clarify--that each of you are recommending more authority
for the DNI in this area. So if I could first explore the
budget issue and start with Representative Harman.
Ms. Harman. Yes, moving the so-called NIP into the DNI's
orbit is an active recommendation made by the current DNI, Jim
Clapper, and I think it would be very helpful. I have not
thought about whether that requires a change in the statute. I
am not sure of that. I do not think we know--or what the answer
is now? We do not know. Imagine that. We do not know.
But I am one, as I said, who thinks that this is 50 percent
law, 50 percent leadership, so I think we can accomplish a lot
of what we are trying to achieve unless there is a bar in the
statute by just getting, hopefully, this President to support
DNI Clapper's recommendation.
Chairman Lieberman. I have been advised that we have
actually been in discussion with the DNI about whether there is
a need for statutory action, and they are not sure. So they are
coming back to us with an answer, and then we will reason
together.
Senator Collins. General Hayden.
General Hayden. Yes, ma'am. You have some tension inside
the law on the budget.
Senator Collins. Yes.
General Hayden. The verb you picked is great. ``Determine''
is what you decided. And then you have Section 1018, which says
nothing in here infringes the prerogatives of the cabinet
officers in which these organizations are located. I am not
suggesting to go back in and use a wrench to change any of
that, but to the degree you can in the process foster ``the DNI
determines,'' I think that is a very positive thing.
In terms of shifting the National Intelligence Program out
of the DOD budget and into an independent account under the
DNI, I think most people who look at that say it would actually
strengthen his authorities in the execution year, which is not
a bad thing. It may not do a whole lot in the planning or
programming year. But in the execution year, which is where you
kind of look around and say who is burning money at the rate
they expected and who is not, and let me remind everybody, it
was my money to begin with, that actually might be a very
positive thing.
Senator Collins. Mr. Gannon.
Mr. Gannon. I agree with all that has been said. I think
Jim Clapper has made a very persuasive case that I would have
probably agreed with even before he made it. And I think in an
era now of greater stress on the intelligence budget, I think
it is important in real terms and also symbolically--that he
have that budget control.
Senator Collins. I was smiling as General Hayden was
talking about the language because I remember how difficult it
was and that we did want the DNI to be responsible for
determining the budget. But in order to get the bill through, I
think we did create a compromise or some lack of clarity in
order to get the bill accomplished, which sometimes happens. So
it will be interesting to see if we can perhaps clarify this.
Let me turn to the personnel issue. As Representative
Harman has mentioned, at the start of this current
Administration, shortly after Leon Panetta was confirmed as the
CIA Director, the DNI, Admiral Blair, issued a directive in
which he claims the right to select an individual other than a
CIA station chief to be the DNI's representative in foreign
governments. And this built upon similar but far less public
efforts that were undertaken by previous DNIs Negroponte and
McConnell as well.
But this did blow up into a rather prominent public battle
between the DNI and the CIA Director, and the unfortunate, in
my view, outcome was the White House was forced to choose sides
and sided with the CIA, which in many ways, in my view,
undermined the DNI's ability in the whole area of personnel.
Who should be in charge of the personnel in the
intelligence community in terms of allocating assets? Mr.
Gannon, we will start with you.
Mr. Gannon. First of all, I think that the particular case
that you are citing was badly handled. The outcome need not
have been what it was. I believe that it could have been
managed in a way that all parties to this conflict could have
gone away with a much better feeling. But I think it ended up
publicly undermining the DNI and doing a lot of damage to his
effort to establish authority.
I think that, because of the nature of the complicated and
fast-moving global threat environment that our country now
faces, the intelligence community needs to be able to move
assets, including personnel, quickly and the DNI must have the
authority to do this. I do not have the confidence to say how
precisely this should be crafted into law, but I think the DNI
is the appropriate leader to have this authority.
Senator Collins. Thank you. General Hayden.
General Hayden. Yes, ma'am. Admiral McConnell and I had
that very issue for quite a while when we were in office and,
unfortunately, just could not get it across the finish line.
This is a very emotional issue for CIA, and I was doing my duty
in terms of representing the Agency's views, and very
frequently my senior staff would say, ``You need to take this
to Mr. Hadley,'' or someone else in the White House. And my
response was, ``Guys, we take this to the White House, we
lose.'' I mean, there is no way the White House cannot support
the DNI in this kind of issue.
Now, frankly, I think the DNI was wrong. I think it should
be the station chief. I think our foreign partners expect it to
be the station chief. But the DNI has a right to be wrong
without being overruled in such a public, humiliating way by
the White House. So I agree with Mr. Gannon. It was a very bad
thing.
In terms of moving personnel around in general, falling
back a little bit on the military model, commanders talk to
commanders. All right? Commanders do not command troops inside
other people's organizations. So I think the model we might
want to think of is to make sure the DNI has the authority to
demand capabilities of his component commands, and his
component commands are NSA, NGA, CIA, but to leave those
component commanders the freedom of movement to how they
respond, how they create that capacity where the DNI wants it.
But he fully should have the authority to demand capacity where
he needs it.
Senator Collins. That is a good distinction. Representative
Harman.
Ms. Harman. I strongly support that last point and also
agree with Mr. Hayden's earlier point that the DNI should
carefully pick her or his fights and hopefully pick the right
fights. This was the wrong fight.
All of this feeds the conversation we are having, we have
been having from the start. I felt, again, given the implacable
opposition by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and House Armed
Services Chairman Duncan Hunter, that we did pretty well. We
consulted closely with an unnamed source then in the Bush
Administration to make sure we had adequate authorities for the
DNI to build the budget, not just to execute the budget because
moving money, providing money, is how you give somebody power.
And I believe we had adequate authority there. That Section
1018 was modified or clarified later by Executive Order 12333,
so I am pretty confident that the budget authorities are OK.
In terms of people, even people for the PDB, if I were the
DNI, I would use assets that exist among the 16 intelligence
agencies to help me do what is necessary there. There are
excellent analysts at the CIA, as has been mentioned. John
Gannon knows that extremely well. And they surely were very
good at providing information leading up to the capture and
killing of Osama bin Laden. So those assets can be used by the
DNI. There is no prohibition against using them. They do not
have to move to a different box. I think we should be done with
moving boxes around, and we should insist that the DNI get the
respect that person deserves and do the job by leveraging the
assets of the agencies under her or his command.
Senator Collins. Just one final comment, if you will
indulge me. I also believe that if the intelligence community
more fully adopts the joint model of the military where in
order to advance your career you need joint service, that will
help promote those kinds of exchanges and willingness to give
up talented people as well.
Ms. Harman. Senator Collins, that was in the law.
Senator Collins. Oh, I know.
Ms. Harman. Giving some points for joint service and trying
to break down, as you said, the stovepipes and promote a need-
to-share culture instead of a need-to-know culture.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
One of the other ways in which the law attempted to give
the DNI authority in a way that would help him or her be a
better manager or leader of the intelligence community was in
the recommendation of personnel throughout the intelligence
community.
General Hayden, just as the beginning of a series of
questions, you made, I think, a very good point, which is that,
to the best of your knowledge, the only CIA Director who was
actually recommended by the DNI was yourself. And in the other
cases, I assume what you are saying is the name came from the
President. And while the DNI may have formally put his name to
the bottom of the letter recommending, that is the way it
happened.
General Hayden. That is my understanding, Senator, and,
frankly, there is nothing wrong with that in an objective
sense.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
General Hayden. But if you are going to establish that kind
of relationship--if you have this ideal relationship between
the DNI and the DCIA, starting off with the one owing nothing
to the other for being in the position is not a disqualifier,
but you are not getting out in front of the pack either.
Chairman Lieberman. It makes it harder. You are absolutely
right. Probably none of us here thinks that General Clapper
came up with the idea of General Petraeus being the head of the
CIA. [Laughter.]
Not that he is opposed to it. I have talked to him about
it. I am sure he is happy with it.
This discussion is another piece of evidence, this one that
we have just had, of the way in which the law can express an
aspiration that the Congress has regarding something, but it
all depends ultimately on how the people in the positions
implement it.
So acknowledging that piece of unaccustomed congressional
humility, let me go on to ask you, one other idea that has been
suggested to us as we take this look back at the DNI is that we
ought to extend the authority of the DNI to approve--recommend
and/or approve personnel throughout the intelligence community
below the level of the head of the constituent agency, perhaps
down to the second or third position in the agency.
What do you all think about that? Let us start with Mr.
Gannon.
Mr. Gannon. I would think that is an idea whose time has
not yet come. [Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. General Hayden.
General Hayden. No, that did not have any particular charm
for me either, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Representative Harman.
Ms. Harman. I think there are higher priorities, like
urging the President to fully stand up the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Board, which is required under the law. I would go
there before I would start an opportunity to pick new fights
between the DNI and other agencies.
Chairman Lieberman. Am I right in interpreting the reaction
of you to be that actually consistent with what we have just
said about the DNI relationship to the DCIA, the head of the
constituent agency ought to be able to choose his own second
and third people?
Mr. Gannon. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Just in terms of their ability to work
together.
Let us go back to this extraordinary experience we have
just been through with the intelligence leading to the takedown
of Osama bin Laden. The President designated the Director of
the CIA, Director Panetta, under Title 50 to be in charge of
this operation, even though in the end--and Leon Panetta both
privately and publicly has gone out of his way to say that he
then essentially delegated the final part of it to a Title 10
force, which was the Special Operating Command under Admiral
William McRaven.
I suppose the first question I want to ask is whether,
consistent with what we have been focused on today--I know this
is second-guessing on a spectacular success, but whether the
President, consistent with the intention of the law we are
talking about, really should have designated the DNI to be in
charge of the hunt for Osama bin Laden as opposed to the DCIA.
Ms. Harman, do you want to start that? We will just go down the
row.
Ms. Harman. In organization chart terms, I think the answer
to that is yes. I think this was a highly risky operation, and
there were at least plausible reasons to designate someone
else. I am just guessing that the President has worked longer
with Director Panetta than he has with DNI Clapper on a
personal basis and figured he not only brought a lot of the
assets to the table in terms of preparing the information on
which the special ops team acted, but he also had a strong
relationship with Congress and, therefore, that made him
probably the best guy, especially in the event that something
went wrong. And so I think this was a call based on personal
chemistry more than on an organization chart, and I do not
fault the President for making it, and the result was
spectacular.
Chairman Lieberman. And it worked.
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. General Hayden.
General Hayden. All that is true and I agree with it, but I
do not think it is exclusive. I think it is structural. It is
just not personality based.
If you do it under Title 50, it is a covert action.
Executive Order 12333 says--the President can change this, but
what it says right now is the only organization of the U.S.
Government that conducts covert action is the Central
Intelligence Agency. So I understand why that has gone in that
direction.
I think technically Director Panetta had what is called
OPCON, which means he is ultimately responsible for it, but he
gave Admiral McRaven and his troops TACON. It makes great
sense. I cannot think of any other way of doing it.
With regard to the DNI role in this--we actually had this
discussion in the Bush Administration, and I know Congresswoman
Harman has talked about needing more presidential oomph to the
job. We actually got a fair amount from President Bush based on
my recollection. We had a pretty serious debate about this
role, and we went to the law, and the language in the law is
that the DCIA reports to the DNI for all the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency. And that is the verb: ``reports.''
It is not ``authority,'' ``direction,'' or ``control,'' which
are also English words that were available, but they were not
chosen.
The ultimate decision--and we had this discussion long
before going to Abbottabad--is that the DNI has to have total
transparency. But covert actions are so sensitive, so delicate,
that the President--and I suspect this President--wants no one
between him and the individual carrying out the covert action.
And so in that sense the DNI is here to offer views as a member
of the NSC and in an advisory role but not in that chain. We
discussed this at great length. We really clearly did not want
to make this two hops rather than one.
Chairman Lieberman. Discussing, in other words, this kind
of action.
General Hayden. That is correct. Title 50 covert action.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. And, again, because the CIA
Director is in charge of the operators here.
General Hayden. That is correct.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Gannon.
Mr. Gannon. I have no problem with the way this transpired,
and I do not think it really had any negative impact on the
DNI's authorities.
As a professional intelligence officer, I always regarded
covert action as only partially an intelligence activity. It is
supported by the National Intelligence Program, so the DNI
should play a consultative role. But I think the accountability
for covert action belongs so acutely to the President that
there should not be any layers between him and the CIA
Director.
Chairman Lieberman. Again, if I may go over my time, I am
going to ask you, Mr. Gannon, a somewhat related question. I
was interested in your statement in your testimony that the
intelligence community has moved to what you called a more
distributed model of providing intelligence support in which a
large number of intelligence agencies and offices provide
direct support to policymakers and also work closely with the
military--in fact, with troops on the ground--and that there
could be a conflict between that model and having a strong
central leadership. And I just want to ask you to develop that
a little bit more.
Is there necessarily a conflict there? Isn't there an
argument that DNI should in any case be the leader ultimately
responsible for building the distributed network and ensuring
that it works properly and, of course, is ultimately
accountable for its performance?
Mr. Gannon. The direct answer to your question is I do not
think there is necessarily a conflict. My point is that I think
we do need to understand the evolution of the intelligence
community to a more decentralized distributed model of
intelligence support over the past several years. It is not
going back.
Back in the 1990s, when I was managing intelligence
analysis there really was a preference for the national
customer at CIA, and I could----
Chairman Lieberman. Meaning, just to clarify?
Mr. Gannon. The national customer means the cabinet-level,
Washington-based policymaker with the President, the White
House, at the top and----
Chairman Lieberman. As opposed to the----
Mr. Gannon. As opposed to the warfighter, the military
establishment. So if I have a request for analytic support say
at that time, from CINCPAC, I would probably respond with
something like, ``Well, if you could wait a few days, I will
get a sanitized version of the product to you.'' I saw in the
1990s the environment change and the customer in the field
became more demanding, partly because of the digital
revolution--we actually could provide products in real time;
and, second, because diplomats and military commanders abroad
demanded that we do so. Admiral Dennis Blair, for example, was
at CINCPAC, and he would say, ``Heck, no, I need it now. Look
at the challenges that I face''--this is the post-Cold War
period. I have multiple threats in my AOR. I need to have real-
time intelligence, and I need to have the best that you are
giving to the President.''
So what we saw then was a decentralization of intelligence
support--CIA was less ``central'' and other agencies and
sources of information played larger roles.
In the prolonged Balkans conflict, we saw the demand was
not only to get information out there in realtime, but to
actually have intelligence capability in place in the field
where folks there could levy intelligence requirements and get
a timely, tailored response. That is what I was talking about
with reference to the JSOC model in Afghanistan or about what
Mike Hayden and I meant by the IC's networked environment. So
my point is that I think we can sort of lighten up about how
much we want a DNI to control. The distributed or networked
system is working very well, and a DNI should be nurturing at a
strategic level, not trying to control it at a tactical level.
He should be looking for gaps to close to better enable it, to
better resource it, and to grow capabilities for the
intelligence. But I do not think there is any way we are going
to get back to the old days when you had a centrally controlled
system of intelligence support.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. And I hear you saying that we
should not try to get back to that, but----
Mr. Gannon. No. It is just a question of----
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. The world has gone beyond
that.
Mr. Gannon. I think you can have a very successful
authoritative DNI who is not worried about central control. By
the way, I do not actually see a Secretary of Defense who has
to worry about a lot of what goes on beneath them. A lot of the
success we have had in Afghanistan and Iraq is because we have
developed a distributed system of intelligence support, and
that means we should not have an intrusive central authority
getting in the way.
Chairman Lieberman. That is great. Thank you. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have talked a lot about the DNI this afternoon. I want
to get your assessment of the National Counterterrorism Center.
I remember when President Bush, by Executive Order, created
what was then called TTIC. It was the predecessor agency of
NCTC, and I visited--I believe that Senator Lieberman was with
me. I visited TTIC and I remember being struck by how young the
analysts were and got the distinct impression that agencies
sent over their least experienced analysts to the TTIC. By
contrast, when we visited NCTC, the analysts seemed to be far
more experienced, and there seemed to be competition to be
assigned to the NCTC. Totally different.
But that is my observation as a Senator. I would like to
hear your views of NCTC. Has it been effective? Where does it
need to go? And I will start with you, Mr. Gannon.
Mr. Gannon. I think NCTC has been effective. I think it has
grown from strength to strength. I think it is much better
today than it was 2 or 3 years ago. I think it is doing a
commendable job of integrating foreign and domestic
intelligence and producing analysis for a much broader, really
nationally based customer set.
One issue which I think needs to be addressed by
leadership--and I think it is a leadership issue--is the
tension between NCTC and the CTC at CIA. I was actually around
in 1986 when we created CTC. CTC and NCTC have different,
equally valuable missions, and I do not think it is that
difficult to appreciate. They need to support one another, but
CTC is geared toward support for operations in the field, while
NCTC has a mission to integrate foreign and domestic
intelligence for the U.S. Government as a whole. It is not an
intelligence collection or operations organization. Its primary
role is analalytical.
I think what has happened is that the CTC in the Washington
domain is getting less recognition, less respect. I believe it
deserves a tremendous amount of credit for what it has been
able to do in providing analytic support to operations. I think
the reputation it has in the field, if you talk to special
operations people, for example, is very powerful. I do not
think it has ever done better than it is doing now. So why
would we want to see that organization in any way diminished
because we have created a NCTC? I think you can have both of
them and be glad for it.
The rap against the CTC has been that it provides analysis
in support of operations; it provides less direct support to
the Washington community. Now we have the NCTC that can do that
and does it well. NCTC has the responsibility that CTC does not
have to do the integration of foreign and domestic
intelligence. There has to be appreciation in the White House
and in the Congress that there are distinct missions here, that
both these organizations do well and their people have to be
given credit for what they do. And my perception is that CTC is
not getting the credit in the Washington environment that I
think it deserves.
Senator Collins. Thank you. General Hayden.
General Hayden. Very briefly, I agree with everything that
Mr. Gannon just said. I was asked this question in both the DNI
role, Deputy, and head of CIA. What is the division of labor
between the two? And one thought that is quickly tossed out but
it is wrong is strategic and tactical. It is not. And what I am
going to tell you now is not perfect. It is blurry. But I think
as Mr. Gannon suggested, that is OK. It is a bit offense and
defense. You turn to the NCTC first to deal with threats to the
homeland and what needs to be done about it; hence, the more
powerful blending of foreign and domestic intelligence and law
enforcement.
The CTC has its center of gravity on the offense. We are
going after these people. We need to know where they are. And
so I think we are blessed to have both. We are lucky to live in
a Nation that has the resources that it can afford a little--I
will call it ``redundancy,'' not duplication, or competitive
analysis. But, fundamentally, they are different and they are
focused on different things.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Representative Harman.
Ms. Harman. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center--yes, I
know.
Senator Collins. You remembered.
Ms. Harman. I remembered. It was set up by President Bush I
think out of frustration that the intelligence function of the
Department of Homeland Security was taking so long to be
established. And I think TTIC, which has now become the
National Counterterrorism Center under our 2004 law, has served
us extremely well. I understand this point, but I think our big
threat now is attacks to our homeland, and the piece of this we
need to nurture--and, in fact, it is doing well--is the NCTC.
It is very ably led by Mike Leiter, who is a holdover from
the Bush Administration, a very good call by President Obama to
keep him there, and it along with something called the ITACG--
it is a group of police and first responders who come to
Washington for a year and work at the NCTC--is preparing good
product for local law enforcement so they know what to look for
and what to do. NCTC plays an indispensable role in that
regard.
The other point I would make is that after the
Abdulmutallab plot was finally foiled--that was not a great
moment for our intelligence community--Mike Leiter set up
something called ``pursuit teams.'' He discovered that there
was no one in the U.S. intelligence community who had sole
responsibility for detecting and piecing together disparate
threat information. Talk about offense-defense. That is an
offense we absolutely need in order to protect our homeland,
and NCTC provides that. So I think we have room for both of
these things.
I think the weak actor in this picture is still the
intelligence and analysis function at the Department of
Homeland Security. In the Bush Administration, Charlie Allen
had that job, and he was the legendary CIA Director of
Operations who built, in my view, a kind of mini-CIA at DHS. I
am not sure we needed it there, but I surely think we need more
than what we now have there. In fact, it is kind of telling
that Rand Beers, who is not the Director of I&A but is an Under
Secretary of Homeland Security, has the portfolio for
counterterrorism at the Department of Homeland Security, not
the Director of Intelligence and Analysis.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Is there any recommendation that you would like to make to
us as we look to revise, if necessary, the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act? Mr. Gannon.
Mr. Gannon. Well, I think we are in a period of transition
in the leadership in the intelligence community, and this would
be a great time, I think, to take a step back and talk with
people who have been or still are in the saddle. Robert Gates
is leaving. There is nobody who has more knowledge and more
desire to make things work. He knows both the intelligence and
defense communities intimately. I think Jim Clapper is a man
who works very hard to collaborate work with others. I cannot
imagine having a better DNI for the times we are in.
So I'd suggest that you bring some of the folks who are
leaving, have left, or are still in office, to talk about how
best to proceed from where we are. Mr. Hayden is an example.
Let us admit that we have the need to make the DNI position
work. Let us recognize that we have a terrific guy in Jim
Clapper and a very capable set of leaders today across the
intelligence community. They all can help to drive us forward
in a constructive direction.
Senator Collins. Good idea. Thank you. General Hayden.
General Hayden. I would be receptive to whatever the DNI
brought you when he needs changes in law to go where he has to
go. I do not think they will be numerous, but when they come, I
think you can bet he needs them to get from here to there.
But to echo what has been said at the table before, it is a
lot more dependent on the individuals and taking full advantage
of the law, and those informal structures that get so much done
in such a complex kind of organization. And so I would keep a
close watch on that, and if you do end up with, for want of a
better word, pathologies in terms of process or personalities,
then there is not enough history and there is not enough
structure to overcome that. And, therefore, that is a danger
sign of which we need to be aware.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Representative Harman.
Ms. Harman. I think the law is a good law, and it is
working, and the people in the top positions are excellent. And
we had an enormous success last week, and we have had other
substantial successes over the last several years. We are
getting better and better at this, building on the record of
three administrations. The pursuit of Osama bin Laden started
under the Clinton Administration when he was indicted, and a
unit at the CIA was set up to pursue him. We did not get very
far with that. The then-National Security Advisor's hair was on
fire, but, alas, we did not get the job done. And through the
Bush Administration and now the Obama Administration, with
success of congresses, we are doing better. So I would kind of
say that is in good shape.
A piece of the law that has never really been implemented
is the formation of a robust Privacy and Civil Liberties Board.
I know both of you have written letters. In my last job I wrote
letters. Two people at the top have now been designated by this
Administration, but I do not think the board is filled out, and
I am quite sure it does not function. And why does this matter?
It is not just to check a box so the civil liberties community,
which is a robust community, and should be, is happy. It is to
make certain that there is full vetting of policies that affect
our U.S. Constitution and the implementation of the FISA
amendments that we all worked so hard on and the implementation
of the Patriot Act, and perhaps new policies to deal with
something I know you are both worried about, which is our
vulnerability to cyber attacks.
We want a group of knowledgeable people to screen these
things and then to persuade an anxious public that the policies
are a good idea. I was told today that the Patriot Act
extension may be in trouble on the Hill in both parties because
people do not understand why we need it. I think they would
understand that better if there were a bipartisan Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board to explain this.
And the final point is that our vulnerability in the near-
term future is to our homeland, and that is why the NCTC
matters, and that is why vertical information sharing matters.
We have to think very carefully about the domestic intelligence
space and how we are going to move forward and make sure that
we do not trade off liberty for security. I do not think that
is a zero sum game. I think we will either have both or we will
have neither. And getting from here to there will depend on the
watchdog that the three of us plus Pete Hoekstra insisted be in
the 2004 law that has not yet been fully operational.
Senator Collins. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Just one more item that I want to take up with you while we
have you here. My impression from the testimony, at least of
Representative Harman and Mr. Gannon--using a term, General
Hayden, that you used, ``unity of effort''--is that we do not
have the unity of effort regarding domestic intelligence that
we have regarding foreign intelligence.
I know, Representative Harman, you have been critical--or
you said Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security is not where it should be. I agree. I think
Secretary Janet Napolitano is working on that, and they are
getting better. But I wanted to invite any of you--and we will
start with Mr. Gannon because you made this point. What is the
problem in terms of unity of effort? You were not criticizing
the FBI. You were admiring the improvements they have made in
their counterterrorism. But what do we need to do? And does the
DNI need additional authority or, again, is this one of those
areas, as you said before, that the DNI, looking across the
community, maybe this is an area that the DNI with the
authority he has now ought to focus in on to make sure it works
better?
Mr. Gannon. I will make several points. I think you are
dealing in the domestic arena with, frankly, new agencies, like
the Department of Homeland Security. If you compare it to the
Department of Defense or CIA, they have years of working on the
foreign intelligence side and developing capabilities that are
quite extraordinary. We do not have those capabilities
domestically.
On the FBI, I would actually have some criticism for where
the Bureau is today. But I would also say that we
underestimated the difficulty of transforming a law enforcement
agency into an intelligence agency. If I had been at the CIA
and they told me to transform it into a law enforcement agency,
I would have been horrified. So I think we had to expect it was
going to take some time.
And then some of the constituent agencies of the Department
of Homeland Security, they are doing their own thing, but they
are also dealing with new missions. There is a lot of overlap
in the perceived missions of domestic agencies. But I would
also say that we have fragmented congressional jurisdiction
that I think has been a real problem. There is not what I would
call the ``adult supervision'' needed to encourage all these
agencies to develop a common strategy, to establish clear roles
and responsibilities, and then to measure their progress
against the strategy.
Chairman Lieberman. The adult supervision from Congress.
Mr. Gannon. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. You are not calling us childish,
are you? No, I know what you mean.
Mr. Gannon. I was not talking about you.
Chairman Lieberman. I know. [Laughter.]
This is the most significant failure that we had in working
to adopt the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We were
really pretty good at reforming the Executive Branch, but when
it came to reforming Congress, it just did not work.
Mr. Gannon. On the national side, you have the CIA with
years of practice with counterterrorism to bring forces
together. You have JSOC now in the field, which really has
become a focal point for driving intelligence collection and
anlayses. There is no comparable gravitational pull on the
domestic agencies to work collaboratively.
Chairman Lieberman. Right, and as you said in your
testimony, there is nothing like that.
Mr. Gannon. You do not have any counterpart on the domestic
side, and a lot of what is being done, including with the FBI,
is a work in progress. I do not see an agressive or effective
approach on the part of the Congress to really put quality
measurement on what is going on.
Chairman Lieberman. So what should be done about this?
General Hayden.
General Hayden. Well, first of all, let me just say I agree
totally with everything that Mr. Gannon has just described. It
is not bad people or lack of effort. This is very hard for us
to do because we have not done it historically.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
General Hayden. I recall your legislation sets up the FBI
to be, in essence, a domestic intelligence service.
Chairman Lieberman. Correct.
General Hayden. And everyone says that is great in 2004,
and in late 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey finally
issues the FBI guidelines with regard to working the spaces
between cases as a domestic intelligence service, and you saw
how well that fit inside the popular political culture. It just
unleashed a firestorm of criticism. So this is hard because we
have not done it before and our political culture has a bit of
a rejection for it.
It brings us to the point that Congresswoman Harman brought
up. You make people feel better if you have those mechanisms in
place and working. You give a comfort level that this is being
overseen as well.
I guess to reinforce it, this is a very important if not
the most important area of focus. The new flavor of threat--
homegrown, low threshold, self-radicalized, individual--puts a
lot more weight on domestic as opposed to foreign and a lot
more weight on law enforcement derived as opposed to
intelligence derived. And if we do not begin to perfect our
processes and organizations there, something bad will happen,
and we will overreact and perhaps make it even worse.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Well said.
Go ahead, Representative Harman. I was going to ask you if
you agree with what has been said and, if you do, whether this
is a matter of trying to give new authority again to the DNI or
just urging the DNI to focus in on domestic intelligence as one
of the weaker links in our chain.
Ms. Harman. I think the DNI has adequate authority. I think
we need to have--and this is something you can do--a public
debate about how to do this, not whether to do this. I think
most people get it that the risk of homegrown terror is great.
Maybe the harm from homegrown terror will not be as great as
two towers in New York falling down and killing 3,000 people,
but it is certainly possible--we all know this--that nuclear or
radiological materials not only can be smuggled into this
country, but certainly the radiological materials are already
here and could be assembled into a dirty bomb, or several, and
harm a lot of folks.
But my point is that we need public buy-in. It is not just
making people feel better, Mr. Hayden. At least that is my
view. It is making them agree that our Constitution will be
respected, and it must be; otherwise, the underpinnings of our
country are gone, and we turn into something else, which I
surely do not want us to do.
We have not yet had a robust public debate about a
comprehensive framework, new security framework in a post-9/11
world. We have done it episodically. We amended the Patriot
Act, which I supported. We did FISA amendments. We did surely
intelligence reform. But we have not thought through how all
the pieces fit together, and I do not know that we would agree,
and I do not know that this is the best time for Congress to do
this since there is an excess amount of partisanship in
Congress at the moment. But if ever there was a time to give
this Committee adequate jurisdiction to hold that debate and do
broader legislation, not just moving boxes around for the DNI
but really thinking about in a new world with 21st Century
threats how should Americans living our values deal with
detention, interrogation, and investigation of Americans on
American soil; racial profiling or other activities that are
anathema to some people; and how should we do this
comprehensively. I think this is the time, and this is a huge
service you could perform. I think the hearings you are holding
right now are very helpful, and I am very happy to participate
in one.
But I would urge the Congress to play its role as a co-
equal branch of government--Congress writes the laws--and to
thoroughly assess what is the right way with public buy-in to
fill this domestic intelligence space.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. That is an interesting place
for us to come, but it does point to a kind of top of what
needs to be done next, and it does relate, as you all have
said, to the unique threat, which is to say we did not have
homegrown domestic terrorism in our mind when we adopted the
2004 act. It now becomes a very significant part of the threat
that we face, and we are trying to do this in ways that are
different, as you all said.
For instance, DHS is trying to interact with State and
local law enforcement, literally hundreds of thousands of
people. I mean, they are obviously interacting with the
leadership, but it is potentially a mighty force of gatherers
of intelligence if you can do this well. And we are still
feeling our way.
I do not have any more questions. Senator Collins, do you?
Senator Collins. No. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. I want to thank the three of you. It
has been a very valuable session for us. You have really
brought to bear the quite remarkable and long experience that
you have all had, and we are going to continue these hearings
and then step back and decide whether we think there is any
legislation to propose in this session of Congress to better
achieve the purposes for which the original legislation was
adopted or whether this is a matter where we ought to just
agree on a report or even--in part public and in part maybe
just to meet with some of the key players and say we have taken
a look at this, and here is what we really think based on our
inquiry you ought to be focused on now. It does not require a
new law, but it does require attention and coordination.
With that, I thank you. The record of the hearing will stay
open for 15 days for any additional questions and statements.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING? PART II
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:33 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Collins, and Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
afternoon. This is our second hearing on the topic ``Ten Years
After 9/11: Is Intelligence Reform Working?'' This is part of a
continuing series of hearings that our Committee is convening
this year on how well the security reforms enacted after 9/11
have protected our homeland, obviously with an eye on the 10th
anniversary of 9/11 coming up.
During our hearing last week, we explored a variety of
issues related to intelligence reform. This hearing is really
going to focus on a single big question, but with a lot of sub-
questions, and that is, does the Director of National
Intelligence have the authority needed to lead our sprawling
intelligence community as we want it to be led?
We are very honored to have with us as our sole witness
today the immediate past Director of National Intelligence,
Admiral Dennis Blair.
Admiral Blair is an extraordinarily talented and dedicated
public servant who has had an exemplary career as a senior
military commander and, of course, as a continuing consumer of
intelligence before he overtook its production in one of
Washington's, I would say, most challenging jobs--the Director
of National Intelligence. Therefore, he is uniquely qualified
to help us answer the questions we have about how the DNI has
performed, and his willingness to testify I think is in keeping
with Admiral Blair's lifetime of service to our country. So I
thank you for being here today.
This Committee created the DNI as part of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which concluded that
basically no one was in charge of the U.S. intelligence
community, and that this lack of leadership resulted in
dysfunction and disunity that left us vulnerable to the attacks
that occurred on 9/11.
The nature of the threat has changed certainly from the
post-Second World War period and the Cold War, and even since
9/11 with the dispersion, in a way the metastasizing of the
Islamist terrorist movement and also the development, for
instance, of a very serious cyber threat to our security.
In the midst of all that, our intention was that the DNI
would bring the necessary unity of command and effort to our 16
intelligence agencies.
So we come together today to ask: On a day-to-day basis,
does the DNI have the authorities needed to lead the
intelligence community effectively? Does the DNI have the
ability to forge the unity of effort across the community and
achieve the level of integration that is necessary to meet the
range of security challenges that our Nation faces and the
range of needs for intelligence that various people in our
government have?
These are the overarching questions that I hope we will
have the opportunity to pose to Admiral Blair today.
With that, I am going to put the rest of my opening
statement in the record \1\ and call on Senator Collins.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman appears in the
Appendix on page 412.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The operation that tracked and killed Osama bin Laden
demonstrates the kind of successful collaboration between our
intelligence and operational capacities that we envisioned when
we reformed our intelligence community in the wake of the
attacks on our country on 9/11.
This was undoubtedly a great victory for our intelligence
efforts and a great blow to al-Qaeda. But the fact remains that
al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats are not going away.
That is why it is time for Congress to examine and build
upon the successes since the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act was passed. That bill created the Director of
National Intelligence. It is an opportune time to identify any
shortcomings in that structure and work to correct them.
I look forward to hearing from Admiral Blair about what
worked during his tenure as DNI, what did not work, and what
might be changed about the structure that we designed 7 years
ago.
I would note with great pride that Admiral Blair is a
fellow Mainer--hailing from Kittery, Maine, the home of the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. So either coming from a great Navy
town or following five generations of naval officers perhaps
preordained his career. We all hope that he has what we call a
great Navy Day here as we hear from him about his experiences
as the DNI as well as his recommendations now with the benefit
of actual experience and 20/20 hindsight.
Almost 10 years since September 11, 2001, and 7 years since
our landmark legislation, we are safer as a Nation but not yet
safe. Our intelligence community is stronger and more effective
than ever before, but plenty of turf battles remain. During his
tenure Admiral Blair was at the center of some unusually public
disputes with the CIA.
To help address lingering deficiencies in the intelligence
community, the DNI must be the ``quarterback'' that the 9/11
Commission envisioned and that we intended. At last week's
hearing, General Hayden preferred the term ``coach.'' I will be
interested to hear whether or not Admiral Blair believes the
DNI has been empowered to fill this critical role, regardless
of what you call it.
At the first hearing in this series, the leaders of the 9/
11 Commission, Governor Thomas Kean and Representative Lee
Hamilton, agreed that presidential adviser John Brennan is, in
many respects, performing the role that we envisioned for the
DNI when we authored the law; that troubles me, not due to any
doubts about Mr. Brennan's capabilities, but because that
choice, that structure undermines the statutory role of the
DNI.
We must ask, therefore, the fundamental question: Are
changes in the law required in order to realize the potential
of the DNI? Or is this simply a matter of more fidelity to the
2004 law?
Admiral Blair, thank you for being here today, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
Admiral Blair, it is all yours. Thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DENNIS C. BLAIR,\1\ FORMER DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Blair. Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, thank you
for inviting me here today. It is common to improve the
effectiveness of government after some disaster or crisis, and,
in fact, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act
of 2004 was born of 9/11, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. But I
think that reform in the wake of success also has a history.
Those who led the great victory of World War II knew that there
were major improvements to be made in the national security
organizations, and when the parades were over, they passed bold
legislation to make the country safer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Admiral Blair appears in the Appendix
on page 416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So as we celebrate the brave, dogged, and brilliant work of
those who found and attacked Osama bin Laden in his hideout, I
believe that now is a similar time for bold laws to make this
Nation's intelligence enterprise even more effective than it
is.
And as I look to our future national security challenges
and opportunities, I am absolutely convinced that we need an
intelligence community that operates under authorities that are
relevant to the future, not to the past, an intelligence
community that is organized on a rational basis, and an
intelligence community that is integrated under a strong and
competent Director of National Intelligence.
I left the Administration a year ago frustrated with the
lack of support for a strong DNI, but I was reluctant to appear
publicly before this Committee where my comments could perhaps
be miscast as sour grapes from the loser in some petty
bureaucratic squabble. But I believe that the imperative of an
integrated, effective intelligence community should transcend
policy and politics and personalities. The country needs and
deserves legislation that will establish the best intelligence
capability possible, independent of officials and
Administrations as they come and go. So let me use the rest of
my introductory time to highlight the improvements that I
believe are still needed.
The objective is to make the structure of the intelligence
community worthy of its people, whether in the CIA, NSA, NGA,
FBI, DEA, DIA, the service intelligence organizations, along
with the other seven intelligence elements of our government.
These heroes, these people who are in those organizations, are
every bit as dedicated, patriotic, and skilled as the members
of the armed forces and first responders whose heroism inspires
us and makes us proud. We owe them integrated leadership. So
let me run down areas where I think we can do more.
First, organization. Right now the Department of Defense
and the intelligence community conduct operations together
under separate authorities--Title 10 and Title 50. To be
effective against dangerous, elusive, and quickly adversaries
like al-Qaeda, drug cartels, outlaw States, a new title is
needed authorizing joint interagency task forces that can bring
to bear all the capabilities of both organizations under
unified direction. We need a Title 60.
Right now the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency,
one of the most important of the agencies, is a kludge of one
organization that collects human intelligence and conducts
covert operations and another organization that provides all
sorts of intelligence analysis, of which the greatest
proportion is, in fact, provided by the NSA, a different
agency. But the skills, procedures, competencies, and cultures
of these two sub-organizations are very different, and their
collocation yields little synergy and has major disadvantages.
I recommend that the CIA be broken into an all-source
analytical agency and a national clandestine service, each led
by a career professional with a fixed term, each reporting
separately to the Director of National Intelligence, and I
recommend that some elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency
performing all-source analysis on the one hand, human
intelligence on the other hand, be added to those two new
agencies.
Moving to authorities, current legislation and
constitutional precedents have little application to the
Information Age, and the efforts that I observe to adopt them
have been completely unsuccessful. The National Security Agency
has the world's best ability to provide protection for the
country's Internet domains, yet it is not securing the
important dot-gov domain, which your computers use here in the
Congress, and the vital infrastructure, the dot-com domain.
An official responsible for cyber defense should be dual-
hatted, reporting to both the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Director of NSA with the responsibility for bringing
NSA's capabilities to bear to protect these vital systems.
Right now there is no legislation that clearly authorizes
offensive cyber operations by the United States against enemies
that use the Internet to threaten American lives and property.
Extremist Web sites incite violence, provide practical bomb-
making advice. International drug cartels use the Internet to
arrange deliveries of drugs and to purchase weapons. Foreign
outlaw nations are making cyber plans that threaten vital
interests. Yet because often these threats are carried out on
American Internet servers or because there is a possibility of
collateral damage from attack or because a hostile actor and
illegal action has not yet occurred, the United States has no
basis in current law for the sort of quick, effective action
that we need against these threats. The country needs such
legislation. It should include limitations related to the
proportionality of what is being done, related to avoiding
collateral damage. It needs oversight mechanisms in both the
Executive and the Legislative Branches. But it must provide a
basis for action commensurate with the threat.
And, third, the authority of the DNI within the
intelligence community. The intent of IRTPA was clear, and you
have both stated it. I believe it was correct. The intelligence
community needs a leader, an integrator not a coordinator. The
intelligence community does not self-synchronize. Few
organizations do. We learned that on 9/11. The White House has
neither the staff nor the time to lead it, and it often
approves misguided schemes, as this country has learned to its
sorrow in past instances.
The authority that the Congress intended for the DNI to
exercise is not now intact. Currently, a portion of it has
migrated back to the Director of CIA on the one hand and some
to the National Security Council staff on the other hand. The
result is a confusion of responsibilities, bureaucratic
fiction, but, more important, potential gaps in intelligence
that our adversaries can exploit.
There are several legislative changes that I believe can
strengthen the authority and the accountability of the DNI.
First, personnel. In addition to naming or concurring with
the appointments of the heads of the intelligence elements
currently provided in IRTPA, the DNI should approve the
appointments of second- and third-level officials within the
intelligence elements. This authority will ensure that
community-minded officers occupy the important posts where much
of the real work of intelligence is done.
Second, budget. The DNI's budget authorities in practice
are strong in future budget years but relatively weak in the
current fiscal year. He or she should have the authority to
initiate reprogramming of funding from agency budgets to urgent
and emerging unexpected objectives, for example, network
security against new threats, or simply to higher-priority
objectives or simply to programs that are not making the
progress they should.
So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Senator
Collins, the success against Osama bin Laden should not cause
us to rest on our laurels. We are a long way from an integrated
intelligence community smoothly interacting with the Department
of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, with
integration being driven by a strong DNI and a competent staff,
and I believe congressional action is indispensable to this
goal.
The reform of our intelligence community is an unfinished,
vital piece of business. I find it reassuring that you see fit
to keep this challenge alive and take seriously the progress we
need to make, and I am happy to answer your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Admiral. I
appreciate what you said at the beginning, but honestly, no one
listening to your statement or reading it could think you were
here out of some sort of personal pique. The fact is we asked
you, and the second is, listening to your statement, it is
totally substantive, and truly it is exactly why we asked you
because you are part of a very small group of people who have
actually been the DNI. So you have that perspective, and
obviously you bring to it everything else you have done in your
career.
We are going to do 7-minute rounds of questions.
Let me ask you this question to begin with. It touches
somewhat on something Senator Collins said. In the testimony
last week, I was fascinated that at different points our
witnesses--who were Jane Harman, General Hayden, and John
Gannon--suggested that it may be as critical to accepting the
goal of the strength and legitimacy of the DNI for there to be
adequate support from the President--and to a somewhat lesser
extent Congress in a different way--as it is to add on to the
statutory authorities of the DNI. And I wonder what you think
about that. It may not be an either/or question, but give me
your sense of how important the non-statutory recognition and
authority given for the office is.
Admiral Blair. Senator Lieberman, I would agree with that
observation that active support from the White House and the
Congress makes it a lot easier for a director to fill in the
gaps of authority in legislation, and that would be a good
thing. However, I do not think that is a reason for the
Congress not to continue to strengthen the intelligence
community integration in a way that I think IRTPA was designed
to do because as I mentioned, Administrations and personalities
come and go, but it seems to me it is the responsibility of the
legislation to establish that structure right in accordance
with what we have learned over time.
I think what we have learned over time--and this is not the
only time that the Congress has attempted to integrate related
but not really cooperating agencies. The National Security
legislation of 1947 which brought the services together based
on the results of World War II, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security--
these things are always difficult to bring in children who
think they are happy into an orphanage. That does not always go
easily. But it takes persistence, and it takes a dedication to
believing that this is the right thing. And I think Congress
has a role.
Right now there are two models of an intelligence community
that we have seen in the last 5 years. One is one in which the
Director of National Intelligence is expected to be able to
integrate the community and to be responsible for that; another
in which that authority is sort of spread around among people,
and the White House picks and chooses what it will use.
I think right now we see the model going toward that second
model, which the group that is in the Executive Branch now
believes. I think the first model is more correct, and I think
that is what the Congress intended, and we need to continue to
push that. And I think that 5 years into the DNI we had that--
well, we are actually 6 years now. We are making good progress,
and we need to continue to ring that out.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Let me talk about some of the
authorities that the DNI has and how they might be expanded,
and then later on I would like to come back to some of your
very interesting suggestions.
The 2004 legislation gave budget authority to the DNI, and
that authority includes having the final say over the
intelligence community budget that is presented to the
President; also certain authorities called, as you know, budget
allocation and apportionment authorities related to how the
intelligence community spends its budget during the fiscal
year.
In your prepared testimony, you called for the DNI to have
increased ``comptrollership'' authorities so that agencies
under the DNI could not seek to circumvent the DNI on budget
issues. I want to ask how strong the authorities that the DNI
has had over the budget have been in practice, at least
certainly during your period of time, and whether you think the
DNI has fully utilized those authorities over both budget
development for future fiscal years and resource transfers
during a fiscal year.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, Senator Lieberman. I think there
are two important background points. Firt, is the last 10 years
have been a time of rising budgets for the intelligence
community just as they have been for the Department of Defense.
So the tough budget trade-offs have generally been taken care
of by putting more money on them rather than by
reprioritization. I think those times are coming to an end, and
we will see budgets that are flat and perhaps even decreasing,
and that will make this central ability to make trade-offs even
more important.
The second item was that just due to the number of tasks
that faced the DNI early on, there was not a strong staff
support structure for budget trade-offs. The equivalent of my
experience was in the Department of Defense, the Program
Analysis and Evaluation Office, the strong Comptroller at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense had not been established.
Those were coming into maturity while I was DNI, and I spent a
great deal of time trying to strengthen them.
So I found that I finally, toward the end of my time, had
the tools to use the budget authorities, and let me give you
two examples of the kind of things I am talking about, because
they came up during my final months in the job.
I came back from a trip to Afghanistan horrified by the
lack of language ability that we had among our deployed
officers in that country. I will not give you the numbers, but
the number of Pashtu and Dari speakers was smaller than I
thought was safe.
As you know, language ability was in IRTPA from the
beginning, and the agencies have been chugging along--it was
time to say, ``all right, now, and we are going to move the
money in, we are going to make it happen.'' That is the thing
that I am talking about where well-meaning agencies were making
their own priorities, that sort of allowed a national priority
to drift down, and you needed to be able to punch it.
Chairman Lieberman. Were you able to do that at that point
with the authorities you have?
Admiral Blair. At that point, we had the ``Come to mother''
conversation, and I was going to give them one more chance to
do it themselves before I did it, and then I left. So that is
where it stood.
Chairman Lieberman. But you felt that you had the authority
to carry that out if you needed it.
Admiral Blair. I was going to find out. [Laughter.]
That would have been the first one.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, you were right, of course.
Admiral Blair. And, I mean, the usual thing that I saw was
what happened after the Detroit bombing in December 2009 by
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. We had obvious problems in the
search engines that were available to counterintelligence
analyst that required banks of computers, different skills on
different systems. And as you saw from the final reports, we
missed some of those, and part of it was due to an analyst not
being able to hit just one click to make a query and have the
answer come back. It required a lot of skill, which busy people
often do not have everything they need. What happened is we
received more money to fix that problem, and my job was only to
spread it out.
Now, there were fairly decent battles on how to spread it
out, and, each agency said, ``I am the one who ought to get the
lion's share, and I do the work,'' and so on. But those are
different problems from going in and carving it out and putting
it on the thing, which is what I was talking about in terms of
real comptrollership in which I was used to the Secretary of
Defense's Comptroller being able to do routinely in the year of
execution. So that is really what I am talking about in a
sense.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. Well said. My time is up.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Blair, you were just talking about Abdulmutallab
and some of the problems that were exposed by that intelligence
failure. I am curious. Were you consulted by the Attorney
General on the decision to charge Abdulmutallab as if he were a
criminal suspect?
Admiral Blair. I was not consulted on that particular
decision, Senator Collins, nor do I think I would have had much
to add. I think the key role that the Director of National
Intelligence plays is during the questioning phase of a suspect
once apprehended or arrested. How much do we lean on
intelligence gathering and how much do we lean on gathering
material for prosecution which involves sort of a different set
of protocols? And the most famous one that everybody talks
about is the reading of Miranda rights and the provision of a
lawyer and so on.
On Abdulmutallab, I was not consulted on that either. As
you all know from the hearing that we held here, that set of
decisions was made by the agents at the scene, and it was not
really supervised, and we did not have the High-Value
Interrogation Group stood up well enough to be able to take
that. But I believe strongly that is the point at which the
Director of National Intelligence or his representative should
make an input, and the goal is to be able to do both so that
the Attorney General can make a decision: Military tribunal,
Federal court, or nothing.
If you have to make a trade-off, that is when you need to
say, we are drilling ahead to get intelligence information, and
we are going to back off on perhaps gathering evidence. And I
think that is what I should be involved in.
Senator Collins. I realize that we had gone through that
issue before, but the reason that I brought it up again is I
want to lay the predicate for my next question, which is: What
is the role of the DNI when a terrorist suspect is apprehended?
It seems to me that one of the first calls, if it is a surprise
apprehension, should be to the DNI so that a search can be done
immediately of all databases so that intelligence analysts and
the HIG--which is now, I believe, set up--could be flown out to
wherever they need to go. But I want to hear from you more what
you see as the role. You were starting to get into that. I was
not trying to relive who told what but, rather, for those who
were not around when we explored that before, I wanted to lay
the predicate.
Admiral Blair. Yes, ma'am. The theme you will see
throughout all of my testimony and my thinking that I have
become passionately to believe is that we need to be able to
quickly bring together the skills of anybody in government and
many from outside of government who can apply their skill to
it.
So let us say that we on a surprise apprehend a member of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We should be able to get the
best intelligence Yemen analysts, the best counterterrorist
analysts and at the same time the best FBI interrogators, the
best people in the FBI who have been working terrorism. There
should be a structured process that they have a quick
conversation. The different equities and the different
approaches are laid out on the table. We have a decisionmaking
process so that a call can be made in terms of that balance.
And then under tremendous time pressures--minutes, hours at the
most--the people on the scene go ahead and proceed in
accordance with that guidance. And you have to have practiced
it some first. These people cannot meet each other the first
time when it is a real situation. And it is really setting up
those procedures that can do it.
My experience is that we have such good people across the
board in law enforcement and the intelligence community that
with general guidance from the top they can do the job
perfectly. But there are certain key questions, and you hit a
real one, the balance between gathering evidence and gathering
intelligence, that need to be made at the top when there is a
conflict. And I think in the case of Abdulmutallab, I think we
had all the evidence that this guy had a bomb, tried to blow it
up, which is all we needed. We did not need a lot of self-
incrimination in that category, and probably we should have
leaned harder on intelligence throughout than we did, because
we pretty much had a Federal conviction, I thought.
So that is the kind of decision you need to make, and you
need quick, practiced procedures to do it.
Senator Collins. As I look at the DNI or, indeed, any
position in Washington, there are really three levels of power:
First is access to the President; second is authority over
personnel; and third is control over the budget. And I would
like to talk about those issues with you, starting with the
personnel issue.
Part of our concept was to try to have a Goldwater-Nichols-
like joint approach to service in the intelligence community,
and I am sure it took the military an awful long time to
embrace that. But now, at least from my outside perspective,
the military really has largely embraced jointness.
Where are we in the intelligence community as far as having
that kind of joint approach where personnel is shared among
agencies and where your ability to advance in your career in
the intelligence community depends on joint service?
Admiral Blair. Senator, I think your provisions of the
IRTPA to that end were exactly right, and I think they are
biting within the intelligence community. They are having
effect. If I try to compare it to 5 years into the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, I would say it is sort of comparable in terms of
the effect it is having. And it will take more time, but two
trends really encourage me.
First is, as I talk to people, the younger they are, the
more they get it. Half of the heroes in the intelligence
community joined after 9/11 for the right reasons, and they are
naturally more prone to sharing. They do not carry all that
baggage of bureaucratic prerogatives and all that we all grew
up with, the past bureaucratic wars that we all thought were so
important and which actually did not help the country much. And
so as they age up and get into the jobs, I think the trends are
good.
The second one is that in the field--and you all have taken
many visits out there. You walk into an intelligence center in
Afghanistan, in Iraq, in just about any place in the world, you
find people from NGA, NSA, CIA, and the armed forces in there
working. If somebody has a piece of information, he is expected
to contribute. So they are growing up in this atmosphere, and,
again, as they bring that back stateside, all we have to do, I
think, is provide them a modicum of structure so that you are
not rewarded for bad behavior. You do not have to forget all
that stuff you learned in the field. You ought to bring it back
and use it, and it will take over.
So I think we are headed in the right direction, but like
you I am impatient at the scale. I mean, I thought we decided
this. Let us get on with it.
I think the next generation, the generation that is right
on the cusp of leadership within the agencies is going to be
quite more joint-minded, and if we can get the structures
right, they will fall into it. What you have to realize is that
you can be proud of your own agency, you can say, ``I am a CIA
person,'' but you also need this pride in the team. You also
need this pride in everybody doing well and you do well, too.
And I think when you have not experienced it, you think the
pride is a fixed amount. You know, if somebody else gets some,
it subtracts some from what you have. And I think we found in
the Armed Forces that both pride and effectiveness go up
exponentially when you can sort of get over the hump of that
jointness and working together. And I think we are headed that
way, but the suggestion I made of putting special attention on
second- and third-level people I think is of a piece with that
and would just help it along.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I think your point about the
generational change is absolutely right, and I think we are
seeing that with the use of technology and networking and
sharing of databases, too, because that is just what the next
generation does naturally.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. The other
thing I would add is that I hope that particularly since 9/11
people within the intelligence community understand that they
can come under great public, including congressional, criticism
if in a look back it appears that one or another part of the
community--including the military, but particularly the IC we
are talking about--was not playing on the team, and as a result
the team suffered, and therefore, they will suffer a kind of
rebuke that perhaps they would not have at an earlier time.
Senator Brown, it is all yours.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you. I know the vote started, so I
just have a couple of quick questions.
General Hayden testified last week that the IC needs to
find the critical balance between freedom of action for the
parts and the unity of the effort for the whole. Is that
balance achievable, do you think, given the current structure
of the IC? And in what ways can the relationship between the
DNI and the heads of the 16 intelligence agencies be improved
or strengthened?
Admiral Blair. Senator, freedom of action, and what was the
other pole of that dilemma?
Senator Brown. The freedom of action for the parts and the
unity of the effort as a whole. Is that balance achievable?
Admiral Blair. I think it is very much achievable, and what
you find is in the best organizations that achieve that
balance, people come in as an expert in their own field, but
they are more than just sitting there waiting to say, well, if
you want a piece of human intelligence, I will gather that for
you. If you want a piece of signals intelligence, I will gather
it for you. They come in with an attitude of being able to
contribute what they can do, and based on their much better
understanding of what other people's problems are and what the
total mission is, how they can contribute in ways perhaps that
are not traditional. And I have just seen that work time and
time again. When you form these teams, you bring people into
them with the attitude that everybody needs to contribute all
they can and maybe more, and then magic happens in that
interaction. I have seen it in terms of our teams in the
intelligence community that can gather intelligence against
very difficult targets by using our wondrous collection
capabilities in new ways. I have seen it in action teams. I
think one of the most poignant things I saw was I was off
visiting one of our bases in a very dangerous part of the
world, and a young CIA case officer told me a story that she
had been on her way to a meeting in a restaurant with an asset
to recruit. A complete other agency monitoring the situation
had picked up a warning of danger. They had been able to get a
phone call to her. She turned around, did not go to the
restaurant, life saved, lesson learned. And it is that kind of
teamwork in the field that I think becomes the norm when you
create an atmosphere in which it is expected and it is valued.
Senator Brown. Thank you. And I want to say thank you for
your service, too, in your position. I wanted to just mention
that first.
I know General Hayden testified last week that the creation
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, undermined
Congress' attempt to strengthen the DNI because Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld delegated his authority, direction, and
control of the major defense intelligence agencies to the USDI.
Can you describe your relationship with Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and the USDI? And does the role of the USDI hinder
the DNI's ability to exert his authority over the
counteroperations or future directions of the entire IC?
Admiral Blair. That was not my experience, Senator Brown. I
thought that General James Clapper as Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, and I, as DNI, worked very well
together, and if he were sitting here, I am very confident he
would say the same thing.
I know Senator Lieberman was involved in some of the angst
from the Department when IRTPA was written. I found it largely
to have dissipated by the time that I had the honor of being
DNI.
I think there are two important reasons for this. First is
the really important security challenges we face these days
have so much of the military aspect mixed up with the non-
military aspect--economic, social, others--that the idea that
you can sort of hive off a military aspect of a problem and
say, well, that is for the Pentagon, this other stuff is for
CIA, INR, the civilian groups, is long gone.
If you look at our big problems--Afghanistan, terrorism,
Iraq--the military aspects and the non-military aspects are all
together, and you have to use your intelligence capabilities,
whether they be signals intelligence, which happens to be
collocated in DOD, or geospatial intelligence, which is sort of
a hybrid, to look at the whole question. So we are driving
toward this unity by just the nature of the problem.
Second, the officers or civilians in the case of Letitia
Long, who is now the head of NGA, have grown up in this joint
era that we were discussing earlier, and they understand the
advantages of teamwork and the synergies that can come from
that. I did not have any stronger teammates in community
integration than Admiral Robert Murrett at NGA, General Keith
Alexander at NSA, and General Ronald Burgess at DIA. That
leadership was strong, and the USDI in my observation was part
of the team, also.
So I did not see that, and I know it was the historical
fault line, but it seems to have been helped. And, of course,
Secretary Gates having had some piece of my job previously had
a good understanding, and that helps, too.
Senator Brown. Great. Well, thank you, sir. I appreciate
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Brown.
Incidentally, for the record, General Clapper has said
exactly the same thing to me about how good a working
relationship he had with you. These are interesting comparisons
because this is a case where I think the personalities that
were in these positions under Secretary Rumsfeld and perhaps
the Secretary himself were part of the problem, if I can call
it that, and as you said, correctly, Secretary Gates comes to
his position, after having spent most of his public service in
the intelligence community. But you must have known General
Clapper before, so you had knowledge of each other and just a
willingness to work together, and you did to the Nation's
benefit.
So it is interesting, as I have told you before, I think,
Admiral, that during the legislative battles on the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, the
toughest ones were with the Defense Department about the
changes we were trying to bring about strengthening DNI. And
yet in practice, the tensions between the DNI and the DOD have
been much less than were reflected at the legislative
negotiating table. Without being specific at this moment, I
would say that it was the opposite for other components of the
IC.
So I really apologize for having to break the flow. The
vote is going on on an important judicial nomination, so I am
going to ask that we stand in recess, and I will be back as
soon as I can to continue the questioning. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will reconvene again.
Is that a new staff member? Oh, that is Senator Carper.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper, I can proceed with a round of questions, or
I can call on you first, if you would like. It is up to you.
Senator Carper. You are very kind. I would like to.
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead because I have had one
round. Again, I apologize, Admiral, for having to leave to
vote. But I look forward to asking you some more questions.
Senator Carper, thanks very much for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you. I do have a question. Welcome,
Admiral. I am a retired Navy captain, so I salute you, in more
ways than one.
I understand that today's intelligence reform hearing is
focusing on whether the intelligence community is operating
better, and if this question has already been asked, I
apologize, but I am going to ask it anyway. And if you could
respond, I would be grateful. But since the passage of the
intelligence reform legislation in 2004, after the successful
operation against Osama bin Laden--and as a Navy veteran of 23
years, I salute our SEALs and everybody who was part of that
operation. I said to my colleagues today at another meeting
that while I think there is a sense of justice with respect to
Osama bin Laden and hopefully some closure for a lot of the
families who lost their loved ones on 9/11 and other attacks,
the greater benefit is, I hope, going to be our ability to use
the intelligence that we recovered to better protect folks here
in this country and other countries as well who might also be
at risk.
But after the successful operation against Osama bin Laden
and the thwarting of any number of terrorist attacks that were
directed at our homeland and other places where we have
interests during the last 9 years, I think that things are
working better. I hope you do, too. I also believe we are in a
safer place as a result of this reorganization that we put in
place a number of years ago.
Specifically, I was impressed with, I think, last week's
remarks by the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, on how intelligence information from the raid on
Osama bin Laden's compound was almost immediately being shared
throughout our intelligence community. I am not sure this would
have happened as quickly or as smoothly before the work that
has been done since 9/11. And while it is clear that
institutional reorganizations are needed every now and then,
without the President's national security leadership working
together as a team, I think restructuring our Federal
Government is only going to work partially.
Here is my question, and it really centers on the
relationship between the President, Deputy National Security
Adviser Denis McDonough, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan, and
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper--and whether
the Director of National Intelligence will ever work as it was
intended to with the first two positions being usually
confidants in close physical proximity to the President than
the rest of the Federal Government's national security
leadership. Would you just think about that for a moment and
maybe share some thoughts with us on that?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, Senator Carper. On the first
observations you made, I agree completely. This was a very well
done operation. What I think we need is to make that the norm,
and I think it is understandable that we did well on that
operation, the highest priority task that this Nation has had
for the last 10 years in that area required deep personal
involvement of the President, the high-level Cabinet officers
themselves, and so on. So it is no surprise to me that we did
well on that.
What I think we need to do is to get that same interaction
and legislatively mandate that same interaction and teamwork in
order to get everything done that the intelligence community,
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland
Security are involved in. And I think we have made strides, but
I think we have a ways to go.
On the question of the relationship between the DNI and the
President versus his staff, this is what staff line
relationships are all about. The President should get his
advice from whoever he chooses to seek it from. He has staffers
on his staff who are experts in defense, and I used to be on
the national security staff as a commander in the Navy.
Department of Homeland Security officers serve at the National
Security Council staff. Outside experts are brought in. We all
know how the advice of staff versus the responsibility of line
officers should work, and I think that in the White House
relationships with departments and with the intelligence
community, just the same principles should apply. You should
carry out your main actions and get the recommendations of
those whom you appoint and whom the Senate confirms, and then
you ought to use your staff to evaluate their recommendations
and to check on how they are doing. And there will be tension
between those two at times. You know, no good staff officer but
thinks he can do a better job than this guy who has the job--
until he occupies that job and wisdom occurs. So these tensions
are natural, but I think the formal structure should be that
those responsible officials at the right level should be
carrying out the job and be held responsible for it.
Senator Carper. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, do I have time for
one more question?
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Carper. Thank you, sir.
I chair a subcommittee of this Committee that focuses on
Federal financial management and a host of other areas. But one
of the things that we try to do in the subcommittee, as the
Chairman knows, is we try to look into every nook and cranny of
the Federal Government and ask this question: Is it possible to
get better results for less money, or is it possible to get
better results for the same amount of money? We try to do that
throughout the government. I sort of describe it as a culture
change from a culture of spendthrift to more of a culture of
thrift. It is a little bit like trying to turn an aircraft
carrier. But we know if we try long enough and hard enough, we
can turn aircraft carriers. So we can maybe even change the
culture here.
This Committee is really a great Committee to be on.
Governmental affairs used to be almost our sole focus, and how
to make the government work to get better results for less
money. And now we have this other hat that we wear in homeland
security, which is terribly important, but we have not
forgotten what our bread and butter used to be.
But a couple of weeks ago, I was returning from South Asia
where I had been to, among other places, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and India, reviewing our regional counterterrorism strategy in
Pakistan. One of the glaring success stories that was brought
to my attention was how our intelligence community analysts and
military specialists, both men and women, and special
operations men and women, were sitting side by side each other
and analyzing intelligence information. And I was very
impressed with the cohesion that I saw on the ground.
My question to you is simply that today whether this new
approach is part of a broader counterterrorism strategy in the
region? And then, second, are there lessons learned from your
experiences that you can share with us that you would like to
see our military and intelligence communities implement
tactically?
Admiral Blair. Yes, Senator. I think what you saw is just
as good as you said it was, and I think it is a result of 10
years of the same set of mid-level leaders in the intelligence
agencies and in the Department of Defense, primarily special
forces working together against al-Qaeda and its subordinates.
These extraordinary leaders in all of these agencies and
services have learned to cooperate at the local level.
I would say they do that right now with the tolerance of
the leadership, in some cases with the active support of the
leadership, but there is not a structure that they can fall
into naturally or that new people will fall into naturally when
the urgency and the passion that 9/11 caused passes.
So I recommended in my prepared testimony for this
Committee that we form joint interagency task forces. Let us
pick a place like Yemen where both military counterterrorism
capabilities and intelligence community counterterrorism
capabilities can be brought to bear. I would recommend forming
a joint interagency task force. The boss of it could be, for
example, a military officer and the deputy be an intelligence
community professional or vice versa. I do not really much
care, but they need to be qualified for the job and have
experience and all of the tools. And then instead of this
extraordinary cooperation which now occurs, you can have a
unified effort in which the task force commander, after he has
submitted a plan, has the authorities and can choose to use
intelligence assets one way or military assets, and put them
together, because what we found in our joint task forces in the
Armed Forces is that you come up with new ideas when you put
people together in one space with one mission, with a set of
core competencies that are pretty extraordinary. They find
different ways to do it. ``Oh, that is what you need? That is
easy. We can help you out with that. Why don't we try this?''
That sort of synergy comes much better by putting them
together under one boss than it does by sitting there in their
individual stovepipes, and with all the best will in the world
and if the right people happen to be there, you can work out
some of this stuff. But it is not institutionalized. The
incentives are not right. The rewards are not right. There is a
certain danger in cooperating. And so I vote for
counterterrorism joint interagency task forces pointed at the
key areas where we still face al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much for your responses and
for that analysis. Thanks so much. Thanks for joining us today.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Admiral Blair, let me approach the topic we have been
talking about by sharing this analysis of our 2004 legislation,
which is that it gave the DNI two major responsibilities: One
was to be the leader of the intelligence community, and the
second was to be the senior adviser on intelligence matters to
the President. And I wanted to ask you both from what you know
of your predecessors' and successors' experience and your own,
one, just in terms of responsibility whether that is too much
to ask of one person. Maybe I should leave it at that. But the
second is a bit inconsistent with the first, in some ways
following Senator Carper's question. Is it necessary for the
DNI to be the senior intelligence adviser to the President in
order for the DNI to have the credibility to be the leader of
the intelligence community? Two different questions related to
that same dual responsibility.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I think that the DNI can and
should have both those responsibilities. I do not think the DNI
can have the additional responsibility of directing the CIA. I
mean, that was the hand that we dealt the DCI, as you will
recall.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Blair. And integrating the community and advising
the President, and I think it was extremely wise to cut those
two off. But I also think that it is essential that leading the
community and advising the President be combined in one person
so that the advice can be realistic in terms of what it is the
community can do, one; and, two, so that the Director, seeing
the sorts of information the President needs, can turn around
and say, ``Listen, we have got to work harder on Problem X. I
see this one coming. It is important to the President. We are
not there yet. Do it.''
Sometimes people forget that the intelligence successes of
today are due to a lot of work done over the last several
years, really hard work of collection, integration, spending
money in the right place, language capabilities, and personnel
assignments. And unless you are the person who ensures that all
of that happens well and direct some of it if it is not being
done very well, you are not in a position really to tell the
President how good the stuff that you are telling him is;
otherwise, you are just taking some report from some analyst
and parroting it to him, and you might as well have the analyst
tell him directly.
So I think this combination of being the one who has the
responsibility for making the intelligence good and then
passing it to the President is important. I found it was often
as important to tell the President what we did not know and why
we did not know it than telling him what we knew because making
high-level decisions under conditions of uncertainty is what we
really pay the President for. Sometimes I would tell the
President, ``If I were perfect in intelligence, your job would
not be very difficult. You would just ask me what is going to
happen and choose the obvious course of action.''
But it is that interaction of what the big intelligence
machine can actually do, the burn that you need to do better so
that when the President turns to you in a year and says, ``What
is the situation with nuclear weapons in Country X?'' You have
a good answer. That is essential to the DNI. So I do not think
those two responsibilities can split up.
And, finally, the DNI should have the political sense of
what is important to the President over the long term.
President Grant knew that he had to win a battle before the
Emancipation Proclamation could come out, and so he won one. I
mean, I fully accept that ultimately the will of the people
expressed through their elections has to drive what we do. So
you need to be close to the political sense in that sense, but
not so close that you simply make all the mistakes that
overpoliticized leaders of very difficult national security
enterprises can make.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. That was a good statement. You
have to be mindful of the political realities that the
President is facing, but also obviously tell the President the
truth, as you see it.
One of those little questions that always comes up: How
important to the DNI's strength and credibility is it that the
DNI himself be there at the daily intelligence briefing for the
President?
Admiral Blair. The approach I took--and it felt right for
me and this President--was that I was responsible that the
intelligence--the daily briefing of the President was correct,
but I did not have to be the one to brief it every day. So I
think it is the former responsibility that is the more
important. And then I think that the President--a DNI needs to
attend enough of those sessions so that he gets a sense from
the President and his inner circle as to are the right
questions being answered and so on, and he needs to do that, I
think, on a fairly frequent basis. I would always receive a
memo from the person who gave the briefing, here is what
happened, here is what the President asked and so on. I mean,
that is natural. But it is not quite the same as being there
and seeing, we are just not hitting the mark on this one so we
need to work on it better.
So I think you need to be there for some of the time but
not wear out your welcome.
Chairman Lieberman. Last week, incidentally, at the hearing
everybody agreed, including those who had had most of their
experience at the CIA, that the DCI was an unsustainable
position, it was too much, and that, therefore, creating the
DNI made sense.
I want to say in passing that General Michael Hayden said
something interesting, which was that he thought that he was
probably the only Director of the CIA who was nominated since
we have had a DNI who was actually recommended by the DNI, and
he thought that was not good. He was recommended because he
knew Admiral Mike McConnell or Admiral McConnell chose him, but
that the others had come up, as would naturally happen, through
the White House. I do not know--unless you want to comment, but
I was really saying that more to share it with you as an
interesting historical observation.
Admiral Blair. I just have one comment on that, if I could,
Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Admiral Blair. I strongly believe that the Director of the
CIA, whether it be the CIA as we now know it or the CIA as I
recommended it, with an analytical piece and a clandestine
piece, should be a CIA professional that has come up through
the ranks. I think the record shows that those who have done
that have been some of the Directors of the Central
Intelligence Agency that we think the most highly of their
records.
I think now that we have a DNI position, that is the
position that you should put someone who should have some
intelligence knowledge but does not necessarily have to have
lived and breathed it all his or her life. But I think part of
the confusion in roles that we now have is when you appoint two
people to these two jobs, both of whom are sort of considered
independently rather than one being a professional. We get some
of the jostling that we have seen in recent times, and I think
the political direction can be sent through the DNI, and we
ought to have professional DCIAs.
Chairman Lieberman. I think that is a big insight, and what
it requires is a President having different visions of both
roles and really recognizing that the DNI is the President's
main personal intelligence adviser, and also in the President's
interest, the leader of the community.
General Hayden did not dwell on it, but when he made his
statement, he included the incoming head of the CIA because
there is no one in the world who thinks that General Clapper
came up with the recommendation of General David Petraeus to
head the agency--not that he is opposed to it, but your point
is well taken.
I want to ask you just to dig down a little bit deeper on
it, and then I want to ask you about the split in the Agency
that you recommend.
Talk a little more about what the advantages are of having
a career person at the head of either the CIA as it is now or a
CIA in two parts.
Admiral Blair. I think the main advantage, Mr. Chairman, is
that you have someone who knows the organization. If you choose
the right person, as you should, that person will have instant
credibility and a following. I think with agencies whose jobs
are specialized and difficult, you just cannot walk in and do
them with a general purpose background, that the best leaders
move their organizations a step further, to be more skilled,
more unified, and able to do new things. And I think that is
really best done by somebody who knows the organization.
I am also influenced by what I saw at the CIA in that there
are marvelous people there. I saw any one of four people in
that Agency who I, had I had the chance, would have recommended
to be the Director. You had four good chances, and you could
have flipped a coin among them. So there are good people there
who can do it. And if you have a DNI who is running the
political top cover for them, then you can have your Director
of the CIA being a professional just the way a uniformed
military officer or a police chief is.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
Admiral Blair. I mean, that is what they do. And so I would
say that is part of it.
And, finally, as I said, as I looked back over the history
of Directors of Central Intelligence, although there has been
some brilliant work done by outside officers coming in, if you
had to handicap the odds, those who were remembered as having
done the best at a higher percentage rate are those who have
the background. So that is really what I think the advantages
are.
Chairman Lieberman. Now go in a little bit deeper than you
did in your opening statement about why separate the CIA into
an analytic section or agency and a clandestine agency.
Admiral Blair. Yes, Senator. Starting off with trying to
clean the slate and letting us look at those two different
functions, they are really quite different approaches. An
analyst is skeptical, questioning, uses the academic skills and
all. A case officer or an officer involved in covert operations
has got to be positive, extemporaneous, flexible doing the job.
So you have oil and water here in terms of the sort of people
who do it.
Until I guess about the early 1990s, of course, they were
originally divided out at Langley. This tower was the analyst
tower and this tower was the operators' tower. When they were
thrown together and mixed up, there were some advantages. I
think the main advantages were for the clandestine service, the
operators, because it gave them a closer sense of what was
required, and they could direct their efforts more to that. It
taught them to become a little more reflective in what they
were doing, not just where is the job, let us go do it, where
is the door, I want to run through it. So there were certain
advantages to that. And I would leave an analytical cadre in
the national clandestine service in order to perform that
function.
But also over time the operator ethic prevailed at the
Agency. Being the sort of active can-do people they are, they
were the ones who pretty much set the tone for the Agency. And
I think it, detracted somewhat from the analytical ability and
made it difficult analytically at some times, especially when
the analysis was not supporting the program that the action
side was working on.
In addition, if you look at where the intelligence comes
from now--I do not have the figures right with me. They may
well be classified. But the bulk of information comes from
signals intelligence gathered by the NSA. So it is not that you
have the all-source analyst next to the place where most of the
intelligence is coming from. So I do not see any disadvantage
to having this all-source analytical shop separate and then the
clandestine service would be the specialists in human
intelligence. They would feed it in. Signals intelligence comes
in. Geospatial-intelligence comes in.
In the same way, as you will recall, when the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency was formed, intelligence
analysts were taken out of the CIA, put together with the same
skills from the Defense Mapping Service, and they were the
functional experts on geospatial intelligence, and they now
help the CIA just the way they help others. So it is sort of an
analogous thing of having the functional division of the
collectors fairly pure and the analysts together.
Now, the danger in that thing is that people get back in
their stovepipes and they do not cooperate, and that is where I
think the DNI putting these mission management teams together
with representation from all of these agencies is the norm.
Just a final point. I think you will find that the United
States is completely unusual in having this particular
collection of skills. If you look in other countries--and it is
not that we should be bound by other countries, but it is just
sort of an interesting check of how it happened. It is more a
product of our history than it is a product of how it is
generally done around the world.
Chairman Lieberman. I had not thought about this. There is
a separation between the operators and the analysts in most of
the foreign intelligence.
Admiral Blair. Correct. In most foreign intelligence, they
are separate.
Chairman Lieberman. I must say that I had followed these
things from a distance, but when I came here as a Senator and
started understanding what the CIA was about, I was surprised
at how many people I would interact with in briefings who I
would call basically researchers. It was valuable research.
They were becoming expert in a particular country. But most--
not all, but a lot of what they were doing was from open
sources, and that is necessary. That is actually very
important, but not what I think the public feels is the CIA.
The public thinks of it as the operators and the clandestine
workers. Those are two very interesting suggestions.
Let me talk to you about another one that I think is
interesting, and it does relate to the Osama bin Laden case,
which is, as you indicated briefly in your opening statement,
we have Title 10, which covers traditional military operations
authorized by the President; then you have Title 50 covering
intelligence and covert authorities. As you and I have
discussed and is known, in the case of the Osama bin Laden
search, the President gave the authority to the Director of the
CIA, which was interesting, under Title 50--and Director Leon
Panetta has been very open and enthusiastic about this. He
called on the Joint Special Operations Command, Admiral William
McRaven, operating under Title 10. So you make a very
interesting and I think relevant suggestion here that we
effectively need, as you said, a Title 60 for what you called
joint integrated teskforces.
So let me ask you to develop that a bit. I presume it comes
from the fact that, as you said during these questions and
answers, a lot of what intelligence operators are doing today
is inherently joint, but these actions particularly are. So
what would be the benefit of a Title 60?
Admiral Blair. Sir, let me illustrate it first by a well-
known bad example since I think that is always instructive.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Admiral Blair. If you recall, when we went into Afghanistan
late in 2001 and CIA agents famously rode in rickety old
Russian airplanes with bags of money between their legs, and
when they got out, they started reaching their old contacts,
paying them money, turning the Northern Alliance. Meanwhile,
Secretary Rumsfeld was famously impatient that the special
forces were not there yet. They were slow, they were getting in
place ready to jump, and never again will DOD be second getting
into one of these situations. There was explicit competition
between those two groups to get in and do the same job. And
then, tragically, when a number of CIA agents were killed with
a group of Afghans who had been taken prisoner and the CIA
officials were outnumbered and beaten to death, the military
back-up for that was not readily available. And yet it is one
country, one President, one Congress, one set of authorities.
What we need to do is put the best capabilities of the
Defense Department that applied to this problem together with
the capabilities that the CIA can bring, integrating a staff so
that you have knowledgeable direction, and then using
everything, whether you are utilizing all of the skills that
the CIA has developed in terms of working with foreign
intelligence services--the CIA has a lot more budget
flexibility than DOD does. In those situations I think it is
very useful. But yet having the huge back-up logistics,
planning capability, and fire power that the Department of
Defense can bring to bear is also important.
What I want for the country is let us do them both. Let us
not have the President have to make a decision. Do I give this
one to the CIA or do I give this one to the Department of
Defense?
Now, the other thing that has happened is that the
definition of covert action under Title 50 has really changed
since the Cold War when it was invented. It was basically to
make actions deniable so that we could take lethal action
against the Soviet Union and areas around the world. We could
officially deny it. We would not risk escalation to World War
III. If there was ever an operation which was less intended to
be deniable than the raid 2 weeks ago on Osama bin Laden, I
have no idea what it was. That does not pass, I do not think,
anybody's traditional understanding of what a covert action is.
We were going to do it. There were going to be soldiers
involved. There were going to be sailors involved. The CIA was
going to be involved. Five thousand people were probably
involved in that operation from the very beginning, and we were
going to do it. Why? Because it was a job that was not being
done by a country that we could call on to do it, and we felt
we had to do it ourselves.
That is really the nature, I think, of the challenge we
face now with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, drug cartels, outlaw
operations of various kinds, even some outlaw countries. It is
not the state boundaries Cold War that we invented plausible
deniability to take care of.
In addition, a lot of these campaigns go on for a long
time, like our current campaign in Afghanistan, and, again, if
there is a more publicized CIA action than drones in Pakistan,
I do not know what that is. The CIA officers call reporters and
tell them about what happened on a routine basis. So I think
these definitions are getting in our way, not helping us.
What they do set up is sort of a competition for who is in
charge rather than a mechanism so that both sides can bring it
to bear. So I am for doing it.
Now, there are some very weighty questions involved. Title
10 is part of what entitles soldiers to protection under the
Geneva Convention and under Status of Forces Agreements. So
Title 60 would have to be designed in a way that, yes, this is
still a military action, these are still soldiers, if they are
captured, so on and so on.
Now, again, that provides some protection, but had one of
the helicopters gone down in North Waziristan and the Haqqani
tribe picked up some of our SEAL Team 6 people there, I doubt
if they would have been much motivated by the Geneva
Convention, and that is generally how it is in these
situations.
Similarly, who does this group report to and to whom is it
accountable in Congress?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I was thinking about that. In
Title 50, there is a requirement for quite limited notification
to Congress of covert action. Obviously, under Title 10,
special operators are operating all the time with no
notification for Congress. So how would you balance that?
Admiral Blair. Within Title 60 I would say that both
Intelligence Committees and Armed Services Committees need to
be notified. There was one instance of a somewhat similar
operation that I was involved in when I was in DNI, and we
formed a joint briefing team. We went up and we talked to the
leadership, both Houses, both parties, about a very sensitive
operation that involved military and intelligence community
actions. And, the world did not come to an end. They asked
good, tough questions. We were able to answer them. I think we
can do the notification part of it well.
So I think we need ways to draw those capabilities together
for the country.
Chairman Lieberman. Who would be in charge of one of the
joint task forces?
Admiral Blair. I would look at it and say that you know
this is a mixed set of skills here. On balance, is it 51
percent intelligence and 49 percent military, or is it the
other way around? And I would choose the lead commander on that
basis. But the deputy I would make from the other discipline so
that you have the two top people bring both sets of skills to
bear. And also I would make sure that those two top people had
qualifications and experience with operating with the other
agencies, similar to the way we do it with joint commanders.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Blair. But I would mix them, and I would have the
staff mixed so that you had all the skills available to spark
that synergy and to keep from doing something stupid in either
the intelligence or the military realm.
Chairman Lieberman. Would the DNI be always involved in one
of these joint task forces?
Admiral Blair. I would say that his involvement would be
comparable to that of the Secretary of Defense: Final approval
for the plan, approval of the commander, and concurrence with
the deputy. And then if you are a good DNI, just like if you
are a good Secretary of Defense, if you have chosen good
people, given them good direction, approved a good plan, you
let them roll.
I hand it to the current leadership for what I understood
of what happened during those hours of the raid. They sat there
and let the people who were right there make the decisions, and
that is the way it ought to run.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Those are very interesting ideas.
I think I have, within the rules of the Geneva Convention,
interrogated you enough today. Admiral, you have been extremely
helpful, and Senator Collins and I talked about it briefly on
the floor. You have given us some ideas. I am not quite sure
what we are going to do from here. We may recommend some
additional legislation if it makes sense; I think some of these
really do require it. In other cases, we may issue a report and
make recommendations to the President or to the DNI. But if you
are willing, I reserve the right to reach out and just call you
on the phone or ask you to come in and talk about the direction
in which we are going, because the combination of your
experiences in service of the country is really quite unique
and very helpful. Also, you have had the independence now out
of office to make some of the suggestions that people in office
sometimes do not make. So this is what I have to look forward
to after January 2013.
Admiral Blair. I hope we can call on your wisdom after you
leave that chair, too, Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. You always can do it,
whatever wisdom there is there. I thank you. I thank your wife
for being here with you. I even thank my friend for decades,
Arthur House, and your friend and counselor, for being here.
We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for
any additional questions or statements, but, again, with great
thanks to you for what you have contributed today.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING,
DO SOMETHING: NEXT STEPS FOR
SECURING RAIL AND TRANSIT
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Landrieu, Collins, and
Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order. Thanks very much to our witnesses for being here, and
thanks for coming a bit earlier than we had planned to start
the hearing. Senator Collins and I may be called to the Senate
floor at 11 a.m. when a bill from our Committee is pending.
Mr. Pistole, you will be happy to hear that this is a bill
to reform the process by which nominations are made and
considered by the Senate.
Today, we have come together to discuss the security of our
rail and transit systems and strategies for the future to
improve the defense of these systems, which are historically
open and, therefore, in the post-9/11 world, vulnerable.
This hearing is being held as part of a continuing series
of hearings and investigations our Committee has committed to
do as we approach the 10th commemoration of the attacks against
America on 9/11. But in this particular case, this hearing was
also catalyzed by the reports from the raid on Osama bin
Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, which yielded
documents indicating that Osama bin Laden continued to urge
members of al-Qaeda to attack the rail sector of the United
States, particularly on or about the 10th anniversary of
September 11, 2001. Apparently, one of those documents included
a plan to derail a train. Some of the analysts that we have
talked to have concluded that the most likely form of such an
attack would be multiple operatives acting independently
against separate targets as part of a coordinated attack on the
same system and, of course, usually at peak travel times. There
has also been some reference to Osama bin Laden suggesting that
these kinds of attacks might most dramatically occur on rail
lines over valleys or bridges.
In other words, this again made real the threat to our rail
and transit systems, which we have lived with since 9/11 and,
of course, we have seen carried out in other places like
Mumbai--the first attack--Madrid, London, Moscow, and, of
course, plans which were thwarted to attack rail systems right
here in Washington, DC, and in New York City.
In fact, the Mineta Transportation Institute \1\ issued a
report that concluded that since September 11, 2001,
worldwide--this is a stunning number--1,800 attacks have been
carried out on surface transportation, mostly buses and trains,
obviously not all of them major, causing over 3,900 deaths.
Compare that to the 75 attacks carried out on airplanes and at
airports that have caused about 160 deaths--157 to be exact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The document referenced by Chairman Lieberman appears in the
Appendix on page 462.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other fact here is that 14 million people use mass
transit systems in America every day. In Connecticut, the
Metro-North New Haven Line is one of the busiest rail lines in
our country. Speed, reliability, and convenience are obviously
hallmarks of mass transit, and we support mass transit as part
of broader societal goals. But with so many passengers at so
many stations along so many paths, those systems are very
difficult to secure.
We certainly have not gone unsecured, and since 9/11, we
have increased the presence of surveillance cameras,
explosives-detecting dogs, roving security teams, and, of
course, a greater public awareness. Secretary Janet Napolitano
has energetically promoted--and Mr. Pistole also--the ``See
Something, Say Something'' public education campaign because
the security of our rail system really does hinge in large part
on the awareness and actions of an observant citizenry.
But a decade after 9/11, as one of our witnesses, Dr. Steve
Flynn, correctly suggests, we need to move beyond ``See
Something, Say Something,'' to ``Do Something.''
Rail and transit security has been traditionally the
primary responsibility of State and local law enforcement.
However, the Transportation Security Administration has begun
to play a critically important role. TSA has been working with
State and local governments to improve rail and transit
security. It now has 25 mobile security teams, known as Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response teams--one of the best
acronyms that I think our government has--that it sends into
the field. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget requests 12
more such teams.
TSA also has over 300 security inspectors working with
local transit officials to assess the security of trains,
platforms, and rail yards. But there is more that TSA, State
and local governments, and transit agencies can and, I think,
must do. Let me just mention a few.
First, TSA really needs to fulfill a 2007 legislative
requirement to develop uniform standards for rail and transit
training programs for background checks for front-line
employees and for transit agencies' security plans.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security should step up
its efforts to develop creative, non-intrusive transit security
solutions, especially to detect improvised explosive devices,
which history has shown are the weapons of choice for
disrupting rail and transit systems. The Department of Homeland
Security has a Science and Technology Directorate explicitly to
achieve this, but specific R&D for rail and transit security
innovations, in my opinion, has been much too limited.
Third, TSA has to improve its intelligence sharing with
State and local officials--it has come a long way, but it needs
to come further--and also the private sector, to provide
information that is both current and useful to them, that is,
simplified and easier to manage.
Fourth, all of the stakeholders in transit security need to
be conducting more exercises to accustom rail and transit
officials with the unique requirements of disaster prevention
and response involving mass transit, particularly trains. So I
hope that TSA and FEMA will continue to expand these exercises
and that local and State authorities will become more proactive
and ensure that employees at every level are involved.
And fifth, we have to continue to work with passengers to
make them full partners in securing our rail and transit
systems, and that includes educating them about the risks, how
to report suspicious activities, and how to respond should an
attack occur.
We have the Department of Homeland Security's Transit
Security Grant Program through which approximately $1.8 billion
in rail and transit security grant funds have been distributed
since 2006. These funds are critically important to our State
and local authorities, and that is why I feel that the House
action to zero out these funds is just plain bad policy, and I
hope we will be able to overturn that legislation here in the
Senate.
I do want to stress that our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have successfully thwarted plots against
rail and transit systems, and we should not, in talking about
what more we can do, pass over that without acknowledging
really remarkable work. The 2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi to
explode bombs in the New York subway system was disrupted by
brilliant intelligence and law enforcement work. A threat to
the D.C. Metro system just last year was similarly uncovered
and stopped before anyone was hurt.
So these are some of the subjects I want to take up with
our witnesses. We really have the best in the field before us
in the three witnesses, and I thank them for their commitment
to strengthening the security of our rails and mass transit and
for being with us today.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, it is a pleasure to welcome back to our
Committee Administrator Pistole. It has been about a year since
his confirmation, and I very much appreciate his commitment to
strengthening the safety and security of our transportation
infrastructure and our travelers.
I am also pleased to welcome Commissioner Boynton here from
Connecticut to lend his perspective from the State level and,
of course, Stephen Flynn, who has testified before this
Committee many times and provided us with his insights.
As the Chairman has pointed out, today's hearing on rail
and transit security is timely. Only a few days after our U.S.
Navy SEALs raided Osama bin Laden's compound, the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI released an alert about rail
security. The information was dated from early last year and
was not connected to any particular city or rail line.
Nevertheless, it demonstrated and reminded us that mass transit
remains a terrorist target.
The fact is, soon after 9/11, terrorists began targeting
mass transit systems. In March 2004, 10 bombs exploded on four
commuter trains heading into central Madrid. The attacks left
191 people dead and 1,800 people wounded in what is regarded as
the worst Islamist terrorist attack in European history.
The United States has been subject to rail plots as well.
Since 2004, our government has thwarted five terrorist plots
against our Nation's transit and rail systems. Metro and subway
stations in New York City, here in Washington, DC, and train
tunnels between New York and New Jersey were the intended
targets.
While improvements have been made since 9/11, the challenge
of securing rail and mass transit systems is enormous. As the
Congressional Research Service reported in February, passenger
rail systems, particularly subways, carry about five times as
many passengers each day as the airlines over many thousands of
miles of track, serving hundreds of stations that are designed
for easy access by passengers. The vast network and sheer
volume of riders make it impractical to conduct airline-type
screening. Security at airports is the responsibility of the
Federal Government, but security at subway, bus, and rail
stations is largely under the jurisdiction of mass transit
providers in partnership with State and local governments.
It is vitally important, however, that the Federal
Government act in concert with these local partners, helping to
ensure that transit providers and local officials have the
equipment and the training to plan for and to respond to
terrorist threats while ensuring that taxpayer dollars are
spent efficiently. I would note that the same CRS study says
that much of the training is directed at response rather than
prevention.
In addition, Federal agencies must partner with State and
local law enforcement to develop a process to identify and
report suspicious activity and share that information
nationally so that it can be analyzed to identify broader
trends.
The GAO recently reported that transit administrators and
public transportation professionals currently receive security
information from a variety of sources. Nearly 80 percent of the
respondents used five mechanisms or more to receive security
information. The GAO identified at least 21 mechanisms through
which agencies can receive security-related information. The
GAO noted that those interviews yielded a common desire that
the information should be streamlined to reduce the volume of
overlapping information that public transit agencies receive.
As we work to improve and streamline information sharing,
we need to remember that an alert citizenry remains our first
line of defense against terrorist attacks, whether at
transportation hubs or city parks or airports or in Times
Square. A good example is how an alert street vendor, noticing
smoke coming from a vehicle in Times Square, reported it to
local law enforcement and thus helped to disrupt an attempted
bombing. If not for this concerned citizen, the consequences
could have been deadly.
In 2007, Senator Lieberman and I co-authored a law that
made it easier for alert citizens to report suspicious activity
in the transportation sector indicating potential terrorist
behavior without facing the threat of frivolous lawsuits. This
year, we have reintroduced our See Something, Say Something
bill to expand those protections to reports of such behavior in
all sectors.
The world is a safer place without Osama bin Laden, but we
are not yet safe. We are better prepared for terrorist attacks
across all modes of transportation, but the fact remains that
future attacks, at least attempted attacks, are certain. The
enemy continues to innovate and probe our defenses.
Administrator Pistole and I recently spoke at a forum
conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about these
challenges. One of our greatest assets is the spirit of
innovation and flexibility that is fostered when we partner
with the private sector, State and local governments, and local
law enforcement officials. We are able to benefit from their
eyes, ears, and ideas.
I thank our witnesses for being here, and I look forward to
the discussion today.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
I thank Senator Paul and Senator Carper for being here. We
will go now to Administrator Pistole. John Pistole has spent 28
years in the service of our government. We talk a lot about
service in the military, but people like Administrator Pistole
have served our country with great effect--we appreciate it--
most of that with the FBI and now with the TSA. So we look
forward to your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,\1\ ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Chairman Lieberman, and
Senators Collins, Carper, and Paul. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today with the distinguished
co-witnesses to discuss the efforts of TSA in partnership with
not only DHS and FEMA, of course, but our industry partners and
those who are in the best position to provide the best possible
mass transit and passenger rail security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix
on page 442.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Lieberman, I would just comment on your five goals
for improvement that you noted in your opening statement, and I
agree with each one of those, noting that we have made some
significant improvement in those areas, but we need to do more.
And so I appreciate your highlighting those.
As has been mentioned, last month the President announced
the U.S. operation that resulted in Osama bin Laden's death,
and that effort marked a historic counterterrorism success for
not only the United States, but for the world. And I would add
to that the recently announced deaths of Ilyas Kashmiri, the
leader of an al-Qaeda operational wing out of Pakistan for
Western attacks, including Europe and the United States, and
Harun Fazul, the leader of al-Qaeda in East Africa and, of
course, the leader of the 1998 East Africa bombings and much of
al-Qaeda's work in the Horn of Africa there.
Our efforts to combat terrorism go well beyond those
individuals, as Senator Collins mentioned, and that is why we
remain focused on trying to do what we can do in terms of
enhancing the efforts of others along with our own critical
mission of protecting the traveling public and our
transportation systems.
TSA will continue to evaluate screening measures based on
the latest intelligence, and we will continue to share
information with stakeholders to enable them to enhance
protective measures and surge resources as appropriate.
As we know, mass transit systems and passenger railroads
are a critical part of the transportation network TSA works to
protect as passengers rely on them for over 10 billion trips
annually. They also remain a target for terrorist groups and
have been the subject of numerous attempted plots in the United
States, two of which were mentioned earlier, as well as a
number of successful attacks overseas, which have also been
noted.
Passengers serve as important partners for securing these
systems, and we are encouraging Americans to alert local law
enforcement if they see something that is potentially dangerous
through the nationwide expansion of the ``If you see something,
say something'' campaign, a clear and effective means to raise
public awareness of indicators of terrorism, but also crime and
other threats, and emphasize the importance of reporting
suspicious activity to the proper law enforcement authorities.
Our partnerships with industry and local and regional
stakeholders are a critical component of TSA's security efforts
for mass transit and passenger rail. DHS's comprehensive
Transit Security Grant Program is currently the primary vehicle
for providing funding assistance for security enhancements to
eligible transit agencies, supporting State and local
government initiatives to improve security. TSA works with FEMA
to fund projects that most effectively mitigate risk at the
highest risk systems. In other words, how do we best buy down
risk?
These projects address operational deterrence activities,
the remediation of critical infrastructure in transit, and
other assets critical to surface transportation security. In
2010, DHS awarded nearly $274 million to the transit and
passenger rail industry, bringing the total to over $1.6
billion awarded since 2006.
In addition to grant funding, TSA supports the security of
mass transit and passenger rail systems by deploying those VIPR
teams that Chairman Lieberman mentioned to augment the local
security efforts. We do have 25 dedicated teams in operation,
and we are seeking to expand that to an additional 12 teams in
our request for the 2012 budget.
Now, the VIPR teams work alongside local law enforcement
officers and are typically comprised of personnel with
expertise in inspection, behavior detection, security
screening, and law enforcement for random, unpredictable
deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter
potential terrorist attacks.
VIPR teams enhance TSA's ability to surge resources quickly
anywhere in the country. TSA conducted over 8,000 VIPR
operations in the past 12 months, including over 4,200
operations in mass transit venues across the country. In
addition, TSA performs baseline and collaborative risk
assessments for mass transit and passenger rail, engaging State
and local partners in three critical areas: One, how to reduce
vulnerabilities; two, assess risk; and, three, improve security
efforts.
These assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100
largest mass transit and passenger rail systems in terms of
passenger volume, which collectively account for over 80
percent of the more than 35 million trips taken on mass transit
each weekday. Among these assessments is the Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement, a comprehensive security
assessment program designed to evaluate 17 security and
emergency management action items that form the foundation of
an effective security program. Through the BASE program, TSA
reviews security-related proposals jointly developed by TSA,
the Department of Transportation's Federal Transit
Administration, and private sector partners from mass transit
and passenger rail systems. The assessment results provide
critical data about security priorities, the development of
security enhancement programs, and the allocation of
resources--a critical aspect, obviously--and a compilation of
the most effective security practices for mass transit and
passenger rail agencies. Over 115 mass transit and passenger
rail agencies have participated in the BASE program and used
their assessments to help make their systems even safer and
more secure for their passengers, employees, and
infrastructure.
TSA also provides timely, relevant intelligence and
security information to industry officials and State and local
partners, and we are working with our partners to develop a
unified, comprehensive intelligence and security information-
sharing platform for that mode.
In closing, I would like to stress again that collaboration
is critical for the success of mass transit and passenger rail
security operations, noting that no one single agency can do it
all. TSA will continue to collaborate with law enforcement,
industry, State, local, and tribal officials, first responders,
and Federal partners to foster regional security coordination
and enhanced deterrence for response capabilities.
With that, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, I would
pause for questions and other statements. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much for that opening
statement.
We will next go to Peter Boynton, Commissioner of the
relatively new Connecticut Department of Emergency Management
and Homeland Security. I am really delighted that you could be
here today. We look forward to hearing from you about the State
and local perspective on securing mass transit, particularly in
our State, which, as I said in my opening statement, has such
heavy rail traffic. Thanks for being here, Commissioner, and we
welcome your statement now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. PETER J. BOYNTON,\1\ COMMISSIONER,
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Boynton. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Collins, and Senator Paul. I appreciate the invitation to come
here today. I am here to offer a State perspective, as you
said, Mr. Chairman, and I also come with some other background.
I was the TSA Federal Security Director for a couple years at
Bradley International Airport in Connecticut, the second
largest airport in New England, and I was also the Coast Guard
Captain of the Port in New Haven, Connecticut. So I hope that
does not mean that I cannot hold a job.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Boynton appears in the Appendix
on page 450.
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Chairman Lieberman. No. It really reveals to everyone that
there is a heavy Coast Guard tilt on this panel.
Mr. Boynton. Yes, sir. I am afraid you have broken our
cover. [Laughter.]
I would like to begin by thanking the terrific partnership
that we have in the State of Connecticut, and it is an example
of what I think you and Senator Collins already indicated is a
lot of work already done and achieved. And this includes MTA
and Amtrak police who work with us in Connecticut, TSA in
Connecticut, the Coast Guard, Connecticut State Police,
Connecticut DOT, all the first responders who are there on that
rail line every single day. DHS has done a terrific amount of
work to support the Connecticut Intelligence Center, a State-
run entity that we really rely on DHS to support, and, of
course, all the public who participate in our See Something,
Say Something campaign that we rolled out last summer.
Connecticut does have a mass transit rail system, but it
also has a number of other mass transit forms. We have two
ferries that go to Long Island. They are two of the 14 largest
passenger/auto ferries in the country. They are the only two
that are privately operated. We have a number of bus systems
throughout the State. We have a number of rail systems--the
Northeast Rail Corridor, a rail corridor from New Haven up
through Springfield. But the one I would like to focus on is
the Metro-North New Haven Line.
This system carries 127,000 passengers every day, 289
trains every day, and even so, it is not among the largest. But
what I think is very notable about that the Metro-North New
Haven Line is its connection with New York City. It is part of
the much larger New York City metropolitan system. And every
one of those Connecticut riders go right to the heart of New
York City--Grand Central Station from New Haven and other
points on the line. In 2010, there were over 37 million
passenger trips from Connecticut into New York City.
My point here is that the interconnected nature of mass
transit means that the security of the New York City system is
dependent in part on the security of the Connecticut-based part
of the transit system, and that is not unique to Connecticut.
We see that with communities that surround urban areas with
transit links all around the country.
From the State perspective, however, what we are seeing is
Federal funding increasingly being shifted into the large urban
areas. This is not only happening with transit security, but
also with UASI grants and shifts in port security. The focus on
security for cities makes sense for a lot of reasons, but
shrinking funding for those surrounding communities with
transit links into those urban areas may have the unintended
consequence of pushing the risk out to those surrounding areas.
And Connecticut has real experience with this. The 9/11
terrorists and the attempted bomber in Times Square both spent
time in Connecticut.
So our view is that the challenge is to modify some of the
current Federal Transit Security Grant Program criteria to
include more proportionate funding for those communities
outside of the major urban areas but with transit links into
those major urban areas. We may be a relatively small transit
system, but because we are part of the larger one, their
security depends on our security.
We need additional funding to continue to complete some of
the basic security enhancements that have already begun, and
these are basic things: Fencing, lighting, communications,
cameras. A specific example is that under the new criteria for
the Transit Security Grant Program, Connecticut is unlikely to
continue to receive transit security grant funding this year
except in Category 1 for public awareness, which is very
important. We need more of that money, and we will use that
money well. But we are unlikely to qualify under the new
criteria to complete some of those enhancements that we have
already done. And, again, it makes sense to focus on the urban
areas, but we are part of the urban areas, and there is a
potential vulnerability by pushing that risk out to us.
In addition to modifying the grant criteria, there may be
some utility to using the model used in the Port Security Grant
Program whereby the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port
convenes a group of users to help evaluate and prioritize the
grant submissions. Potentially, the analogous person to do that
might be the TSA Federal Security Director, pulling together
users of the transit system to help us do an evaluation of
those grant proposals. We have produced something like that in
Connecticut that I will talk about a little bit later.
I would also like to note that, at least from our
perspective, balancing the grant criteria for some proportional
funding for the surrounding communities--and we are really
talking about small dollars--is linked to the evolving
terrorist threat. On the one hand, the Federal partners have
helped us understand how this threat is evolving. The
diversification of the threat is essentially requiring more
involvement from the local community level. But, on the other
hand--and this would be the Federal hand with the money--it
seems in some respects to be going in a different direction,
and that is, increasingly focusing funds within the city limits
of large urban areas. And those of us who are connected with
mass transit really have a need not just for our own State and
our own population, but as a partner with that urban area to
help them stay safe as well.
In addition to balancing the grant funding to achieve
transit security, another way is to enhance information
sharing, and this was the point I mentioned earlier. In
Connecticut, we have convened a Transit Security Committee. We
have representatives from every mode of transportation: Rail,
bus, trucking, highway, aviation, maritime, even pipelines, all
working together.
We have all heard of the danger of people operating in
silos. One of our local partners just a couple weeks ago gave
me a new term to use, and the term was ``cylinder of
expertise.'' We all have cylinders of expertise, and those are
not bad things, but the difficulty is pulling them together
with horizontal integration, and this pulling people together
does not happen without effort. We have to take people out of
their comfort zones and get them to work together, and we have
had great success through that committee.
Another example of pulling people together from within
their cylinders of expertise are the VIPR operations that
Administrator Pistole mentioned. In Connecticut, I just have to
give thanks to our TSA partners. In 2009, we had 34 VIPRs. By
the end of this year, we expect to have increased that seven-
fold. These VIPRs do not happen without the leadership of a TSA
Federal Security Director coming out of the comfort zone and
working with other Federal, State, and local partners to make
it happen, and it is a big success in Connecticut. I would like
to see more support on that.
Another example of pulling people out of their silos of
expertise or cylinders of expertise is the intelligence fusion
center. In addition to the traditional partners--State police,
DHS, FBI--we also have a full-time TSA intelligence analyst,
and I do not know how many of the 72 fusion centers have a
full-time TSA analyst. We do in Connecticut. I hope by
mentioning that I have not put that in jeopardy because we want
that person to stay. That is his primary work location, and it
gives us tremendous information exchange, not just with the
State. We have full-time municipal police detectives whose
primary job location is in our fusion center. That allows us to
marry them with the great work of TSA pulling information into
our fusion center.
Last, and probably most importantly, is engaging the
public. We have a very substantial See Something, Say Something
campaign that has been running for 2 years in many different
media routes. But I certainly agree the next step is to go
beyond seeing and saying to doing something. And I think we
have a great example in the area of emergency medical response,
and that is, publicly available defibrillators. If we talked 30
years ago about allowing members of the public to operate a
defibrillator, I think we would react in horror. But today we
do that. We have come that distance. And I think we can do the
same in the area of security by engaging the public not only to
see and say but also to do, and that is a great principle of
resiliency. It is an example of adapting if we can get to that
next step of helping people do something.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, and I
look forward to answering questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Commissioner
Boynton. That was very helpful.
Finally, we will go to Steve Flynn, a former Coast Guard
Commander and now President of the Center for National Policy.
He has been a really terrific resource for this Committee over
the years, and we welcome you back with gratitude for your
testimony today.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN E. FLYNN, PH.D.,\1\ PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR
NATIONAL POLICY
Mr. Flynn. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Collins, Senator Landrieu, and Senator Paul. It is an honor to
be here today. What I would like to do is to offer a bit of an
analytical perspective about the threat, why I think this
hearing is so important, and then speak to a few don'ts I would
suggest about how we approach this issue, and then some ideas
about the do's, where we go from here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Flynn appears in the Appendix on
page 454.
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I would offer up at the outset that we really are still at
the starting line, and as with so much in Washington, we can
always evaluate priority by what we spend, and the numbers are
pretty clear on this one. We spend on average $9 for every
passenger who flies, and the estimate for the amount of money
that we spend on transit is a penny or a little less. So that
kind of tells us where we are in terms of what we have been
willing to invest in.
Now, this is not to say that we should replicate the model
that we are doing in aviation and do a very expensive effort
with regard to transit. The heart of my testimony here today is
to say, in fact, this is an opportunity, since we are still at
the starting line, to essentially recalibrate the approach.
I want to specifically speak to the threat and why I think
that we really need to step up our focus on this area, and it
is not simply because, as was laid out at the very outset of
your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, we know Osama bin Laden
had been plotting and thinking about the transit system. We
have the very explicit examples from around the world of
attacks since 9/11 on those systems. But the threat is
evolving. I think there is a convergence of views on this and
something that I have been part of being able to track as a
result of my being a member of the National Security
Preparedness Group led by former 9/11 Commission Chairmen Tom
Kean and Lee Hamilton.
Essentially what we are seeing is a fundamental evolution
in the terrorist threat with increasingly a homegrown quality,
but also with a focus on smaller-scale attacks. And this is
driven in part because the capacity to take on large-scale
attacks has clearly been hampered. But this has also been
because there has been a bit of an ``a-ha'' moment for al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, which is, they realize you really do not
need big, spectacular attacks to get big results. You can get a
big bang, particularly in terms of disruption, by doing
relatively small-scale things that basically lead to a reaction
or in many cases an overreaction that is very costly and very
disruptive for the society you are targeting.
And so with that we end up with what Commissioner Ray Kelly
of the NYPD has called a ``let a thousands flowers bloom'' kind
of strategy where the recruitment threshold is much lower and
you are willing to essentially allow lone wolves or an
individual with a few allies to go off and cause mischief.
Now, that is the broad backdrop against which to evaluate
the state of transit security. We have both the homegrown
dimension to it and the fact that we are looking at one and two
operatives and not looking for necessarily massive,
catastrophic scale attacks but things of the ilk that are
really disruptive, potentially can achieve mass loss of life,
and are very visible sort of attacks. Mass transit and not
surprisingly rail freight as well become very attractive to
satisfying these two criteria. They are open systems spread
across vast geography that are also accessible to the public
and that are very time sensitive. Therefore, the ability for a
relatively small operation to get into the system is minimal.
The goal is to disrupt the system so you do not need massive
kinds of things. A derailment or taking out commuters in a
single car, if that leads to a shutting down of the system for
a period of time or to Washington then coming up on the fly
with lots of new requirements to reassure the public, can be
very expensive and disruptive.
So what I would suggest is that while we do not have right
now immediate intelligence that I am aware of to say that
something is unfolding in our cities, we do have enough in
terms of general intelligence to say that this is a sector that
is being targeted, we have instances of it being targeted in
the past, and we need to focus on it to a much greater degree.
So now on to my don'ts. What do we not want to do as we
tackle this problem? I essentially would advance here that
overall we need to move away from essentially a law
enforcement-centric, screening-centric approach to tackling
this issue because of both the difficulty of doing so and also
because there is an opportunity to take a much different model.
So my first don't is, we should always avoid in any
homeland security endeavor, I would argue--and certainly in the
case of rail and transit security--alienating the very public
that security officials are obligated to protect. This is
actually something David Petraeus has figured out in Iraq. Its
key is, you need the cooperation and collaboration of the
people that you are protecting, and you want to make sure that
they see themselves as part of the solution and that they
understand the risk and they are playing the collaborative
role. We have a tremendous ability within the transportation
system to essentially coerce people to comply. You want access
to the system, subject yourself to A, B, C. But it is not
necessarily the way you win hearts and minds. And given that we
have limited resources to be able to bring about something of
that scale in the transit system, we should not head down that
path.
The second don't is, avoid promising more than you can
deliver. This is something that I think is fundamental to
governance overall. We do not want to set expectations beyond
what we can deliver, and therefore, it is very important to
acknowledge there is risk and there are limits to what
government can do to eliminate risk when we have an open system
that is time sensitive and spread over a wide geographic
space--there will be limits to what we can do to prevent acts
of terror. And I think the President and the Secretary of
Homeland Security should be applauded when they talk about risk
as something that cannot be eliminated. This is an important
message Americans need to hear.
Now, we also need to avoid the excessive secrecy impulse
because if the overwhelming majority of the people we need to
talk to, particularly those on the front lines of running
trains, are not in the clearance system, then we are keeping
them out of the loop. We really need to work much harder,
pushing beyond the envelope of the very good things that have
been done around information sharing, and encourage Federal
players, law enforcement, State and local and security
officials to get more information out to citizens, the owners
and operators, and the designers of transit systems so that
they can start to be a part of the solution set.
So the last piece here is, we need to be very careful not
to overreact. When essentially something goes wrong and
Americans and elected officials overreact, we are only
motivating the very threat that we are trying to prevent.
So the way forward. Essentially, the overarching message I
would like to convey--and I was happy to hear it in the
testimony provided by both Administrator Pistole and
Commissioner Boynton--is that many of these thoughts are
clearly in the mix, but we need to put them on steroids. We
essentially really need to move away from relying almost
exclusively on Federal screening and law enforcement to an
effort that basically says for mass transit--particularly,
rail, freight, and so forth--we really need to have the public
engaged, empowered, and focused on the issue of resilience of
the system as a key security imperative.
The reason for this is pretty straightforward. The size and
diversity of the system means that we have a lot of passengers
and a lot to protect so we need everyone involved. But also I
think I want to really highlight the extent to which
particularly in transit there is an extraordinary opportunity.
If we think about the nature of transit--and I spend a lot of
time on the Metro-North Line coming into New York
particularly--most transit passengers often end up on the same
train at the same time, and many times even in the same seat.
They end up knowing the rhythm of that system pretty darn well.
I can tell the story of the Metro-North Line. One of the
unofficial rules is, you do not use cell phones before 8:30 in
the morning. Somebody who is not aware of this rule and
actually starts chatting it up at about 7 a.m. on the train to
New York will die of a death glare of 40 other passengers
aboard the train. People immediately know the anomaly. In this
case, it is not enforceable, but it can feel that you are
definitely isolated.
The fact is, folks on that train are aware of their
environment. They know the rhythm of the environment. They are
vested in that environment. And they are folks that are clearly
security assets. It is a little different from aviation. I fly
a lot, but it is different airports, different airplanes. I do
not have that same feeling for normal and abnormal. Passengers
are very much a part of the solution. Of course, conductors,
who in many cases know the same faces--they may not know all
the names. In some cases they do because some of their
passengers are daily commuters. Then there are the people in
the stations. We need to expand our security effort to those
who own, who operate, and who are vested in the system. These
are the passengers and the workers for the transit authorities.
How the Federal Government brings them in is absolutely
essential to going forward.
So what does that mean? We really need to move the public
education effort from ``see something, say something so that
law enforcement can take care of it'' to one that gives them
much more granular detail about what they should be looking
for, what they should be doing, and how they can help. And what
I want to highlight particularly would be the opportunity
perhaps to reach out to the major employers who have lots of
employees dependent on the transit system and who could convene
training that could happen at their workplace to engage those
commuters, not as they run for the train, but when they are not
in a rush, to sit down and talk a little bit more about transit
security. This kind of outreach would certainly be very
helpful.
The final thing I want to also mention here is a program in
Logan Airport in Boston. It is a program called Logan Watch.
Like an airport, the transit system is more than just the
trains and the passengers on the trains. We have train
stations. We have shoeshine boys and newspaper dealers and so
forth, and they should be involved because--again, like we saw
with Shahzad--they understand the rhythm of their work
environment. Getting them involved is a very important way to
go forward.
Logan Watch is a system by which everybody who works in
that terminal is given some training--and the goal should be
annual training--so that they understand the environment they
are in and they can be a help.
I have run out of time, so I just want to conclude by
saying that a focus on resilience, which I have been long
advancing, is not an exercise in resignation and pessimism.
Focusing on our ability to respond and recover to incidents is
a way to deter the incident from happening, and so the extent
to which we can plus-up more investment in response and
recovery, exercises and so forth, for incidents should they
happen, both accidental and man-made, the more I think you are
going to have a safer system. It does not look like a soft
target, going back to what I was saying about the threat. It
is, in fact, something that makes sense pragmatically to do,
but it also has real value in terms of our goal of hopefully
mitigating the risk to the mass transit system.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Flynn. That was very
interesting testimony. I am not a regular commuter on the
Metro-North Line, but when I do get on the train to go to New
York, you are absolutely right that there is a sociology of
train travel. There are people there every morning and every
afternoon. They know each other. There is a certain extent to
which they socialize. There is a certain extent, as you
indicated with the cell phone incident, to which they hardly
talk to each other at certain hours because they are reading
their papers or their memos for the day. Anyway, that was very
practical and insightful testimony.
Let us do a 7-minute question round to start. Administrator
Pistole, let me begin with you and ask you to focus in, to the
extent that you can in open session, on what, if anything, TSA
did after the evidence came out of the Osama bin Laden compound
in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden was urging al-Qaeda to think
specifically about an attack on a rail system in the United
States on or around September 11, 2011.
Mr. Pistole. Mr. Chairman, we started off on Monday
morning, May 2, following the President's announcement Sunday
night, with a conference call to all the key stakeholders and
industry as part of a group that is known as the Policy
Advisory Group to say that this has happened, just be aware of
possible retaliatory action that may be taken either
spontaneously by somebody who is a Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda
sympathizer or that may have always been a triggering mechanism
if Zawahiri, No. 2 in al-Qaeda, moved up to No. 1. So we did
that call just for awareness.
It was then 2\1/2\ days later, late Wednesday/Thursday,
before the media document exploitation from the compound about
that specific threat from February 2010 that noted the rail
attack on the 10th anniversary. As soon as we received that
information and the declassified portion of that information
from the intelligence community, we reconvened that group and
then did an intelligence dissemination to all the stakeholders
and the industry to say, here is specific information. Now it
is over a year old, but it cites an upcoming event, the 10th
anniversary of 9/11, and so be aware that, because of the
death, that may again trigger some activity to move up from the
10th anniversary.
So there are other things, but those are some of the
highlights.
Chairman Lieberman. So is it fair to say that we raised our
guard in response to that information from Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Actually, in terms of other activity, we
also did several things in terms of operational deterrence. For
example, the industry on its own, with information from us,
obviously, conducted what is known as a Rail Safety Day, and
that involved over a thousand law enforcement and security
officials from across the country, major transit agencies, that
stepped up patrols, either uniform patrols, K-9 patrols, and
additional information awareness that given the Osama bin Laden
death there may be something going on. So that was done, I
believe, on Thursday or Friday of that week, and so that was
something that was done based on prior funding from DHS and
TSA, but really done unilaterally. So there are other steps
that were taken.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. How about the suggestion that
there might be an attempt to essentially disable some track
over a valley or a bridge? Do we have a way or are transit
systems raising their surveillance on tracks to prevent that
kind of episode from happening?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and we believe, Mr. Chairman, that this
is consistent with Osama bin Laden's idea of trying to cause
not only the greatest number of casualties, but as has also
been mentioned, the greatest economic impact, plus if you could
get a train to derail into a valley, just the psychological
aspects of that.
As part of that, the transit agencies, Amtrak in
particular, stepped up their patrols of the rails to look at
perimeter fencing where appropriate and especially to look at
the critical areas over bridges and areas that also may be seen
as more vulnerable--obviously to look at CCTV where
appropriate, especially at stations. The concern is not only
the derailment but also the possible attack like we saw at the
Moscow airport where somebody could go into a crowded station,
in this case a train station, whether Union Station, 30th
Street Station, Penn Station, with explosives in suitcases or
bags, and then do a bombing in that regard. So it is not just
limited to the intelligence we have. There has been stepped-up
vigilance across the board.
Chairman Lieberman. That is important to hear. The bottom
line--and I am saying it to anybody who is listening--is that
there is a lot more going on to protect mass transit systems
than is visible. It is very visible in aviation transportation,
of course, but less so with rail and buses.
Commissioner Boynton, give us the response from a State
perspective to the intelligence from the Osama bin Laden
compound and, if you can, how you work with TSA, the Metro-
North Line, and Amtrak in Connecticut.
Mr. Boynton. Mr. Chairman, we used our intelligence fusion
center--it is a State-run entity, one of 72 around the
country--to disseminate that intelligence bulletin, and we did
that in two ways:
First, for those who have security clearances, we provided
a classified briefing. We have tripled the number of people in
Connecticut, like police chiefs, with those clearances, and we
are adding more.
And, second, with the unclassified part, our fusion center
has an existing network to send that out quickly to every
police department, and in this case, since it was not law
enforcement sensitive, also to all first responders. And I
should not say ``police department,'' but all police partners,
so that includes not only municipal police, State agencies with
police forces, but also Amtrak and MTA within Connecticut.
I do want to add that part of our reaction from that
intelligence took place a year ago and prior to that, that we
have been doing things, in my view, that help us now, but we
did not start now. And one example of that is getting that TSA
intelligence analyst into our fusion center as a primary work
site. What that allowed us to do is have someone already in
place in that fusion center who we then could ask to focus on
surface transportation, focus on rail, and we have already had
two cases since then of potential rail tampering, of potential
rail gate tampering in neighboring areas.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Boynton. But through the collaboration between fusion
centers, because we have the luxury of someone who focuses on
that--but that is something that was in place 2 years ago,
which helped us now.
Chairman Lieberman. So was there an event that led to that
occurrence 2 years ago, or was it an administrative decision at
some level, TSA or State?
Mr. Boynton. It was an administrative decision between the
Federal Security Director for TSA at Bradley Airport and the
Commissioner of Homeland Security. It was the previous TSA
Federal Security Director that----
Chairman Lieberman. What was his name?
Mr. Boynton. I think that was Commissioner Boynton.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. My time is up. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, I want to start with something that Dr. Flynn
raised in his testimony. He said that the first rule is to
avoid alienating the very public that security officials are
obligated to protect. As you know, there has been some
criticism of TSA over the years, most recently about the
selection of a small child to be patted down, but also people
have raised questions about why a very elderly woman had to go
through such scrutiny.
Is TSA considering any actions that would focus more on a
risk analysis using intelligence to select individuals for
secondary screening?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, and I agree with that
point in terms of not alienating the public that we are trying
to protect. The challenge, as we know, comes in the practical
application of that. And to your point, we in TSA since last
fall, actually before the Thanksgiving issues arose, have been
looking at a risk-based security initiative to do exactly what
you have described, to try to identify those that we know
something more about, whether they are frequent flyers, whether
they hold top secret security clearances, whether they, based
on the intelligence we know, do not fit in a category such as
the very young or perhaps the very old, who we could expedite
their screening at airport checkpoints. That would then allow
us to spend more time with those that we do not know very much
about other than what is in Secure Flight, the three data
fields, name, date of birth, and gender, which allows us to
compare to the terrorist watchlist. We obviously want to spend
the most time on those who would be selectees, but then in the
next category, I would say we want to spend as much time as
possible on those that we do not know much about and then the
least amount of time, frankly, using a risk-based approach, to
say this person has traveled 100,000 miles in the last year,
she has done that for the last 20 years, what is the
possibility of her being a terrorist? It is very small, so let
us treat her in that regard.
So it incorporates some of the aspects of what is known as
trusted travelers, known traveler programs, and some other
aspects of that. So we have had a fair amount of discussions
with industry about that. There is a great deal of interest,
whether you talk about a checkpoint of the future that one
association is promoting. There are a lot of technology aspects
to it, but a lot can be done right now with enhanced behavior
detection and information that passengers are willing to share
with us.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I support TSA's and DHS's
expansion of the See Something, Say Something campaign, and
indeed, mass transit systems have been using this for many
years. New York City subways, for example, have had it for
nearly a decade.
I mentioned in my opening statement that Senator Lieberman
and I authored the law to give immunity to individuals who make
such reports, as long as they make them to the proper
authorities and act in good faith. This was in response to an
infamous case involving US Airways when passengers did just
that, and then the airline, its crew, and some of the
passengers got sued.
Does TSA or do you personally support extending the law so
that it is not just confined to the transportation sector?
Mr. Pistole. Senator, I think it makes sense. We want to
encourage people to provide information without concern about
liability from something that would come about. That being
said, I know the lawyers at DHS are looking at all of that and
are going to provide a formal response, but, yes, I think it
makes sense.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Commissioner, you have so much experience at the State
level, and one comment that you made that really resonated with
me is when you said that their security, the security of big
cities, depends on our security, that you are feeding people
into those lines. It resonates with me because two of the
hijackers on 9/11 started their journey of death and
destruction from Portland, Maine, and I think that is often
forgotten when some of our colleagues argue that all of the
homeland security money should go to just large urban areas. My
colleague from Kentucky just had the case where two suspicious
individuals in Bowling Green, Kentucky, were arrested. So I
think that we need to understand in this country that security
is everyone's business, that terrorists hide and train and plan
in rural areas and not just in the areas that they are apt to
strike. So thank you for making that important point.
I want to ask you about the training exercises. Like the
Chairman, I have been a huge proponent of having more exercises
that involve Federal, State, county, and local officials
because if disaster strikes, you do not want people meeting
each other for the first time and exchanging business cards in
the middle of it, which is what happened with Hurricane
Katrina, and that is why we restructured FEMA to have regional
offices and have pushed and funded these training sessions.
I want to know from you, however, whether we are striking
the right balance. CRS tells us that the transit security
measures, including training, tend to emphasize managing the
consequences of an attack. In other words, they are focused on
response. And I agree with Dr. Flynn that response and
resiliency are important. But to me, our focus should be on
trying to detect, deter, and prevent the attack in the first
place.
So how do you rate the effectiveness of the training
sessions? Are we striking the right balance between teaching
prevention techniques versus consequence management?
Mr. Boynton. Senator, I can tell you that we have had a
number of exercises in Connecticut--Norwalk, Old Saybrook, and
two other locations--and another one where we sent from
Bridgeport about 40 people to the TEKS Program down in Texas, a
terrific program where they do very well simulated exercises.
And the unusual thing about this was that it included fire,
police, emergency management, emergency medical--all four
disciplines, including the chiefs from each of those
departments--carving out essentially a week of time and moving
30 people down to Texas to do this. So it was a fully
integrated training exercise. That was just within the last
couple months that we did that, and the key thing there was the
fully integrated part of it.
In the case of the exercise in Old Saybrook, which is on
the northeast corridor, that included taking a rail car off on
a siding and then simulating a shooting event, all phases of
the response right to the point of actually taking passengers
out through the windows. Normally something like that is
simulated because you might hurt somebody in the exercise. They
actually went to that level of actually moving people out of
the windows. So really terrific exercises, but I would agree
with you that the focus is on response, and I think perhaps as
part of this not just see something and say something but do
something, that really could be a great trigger for us to then
move into training and exercising not just first responders but
some members of the public to help us with what specifically
are we asking you to look for and how exactly are we asking you
to report it, and then what do you do. And it is not that we
have not done that. We have very robust See Something, Say
Something campaigns, but I think we could use more in that
area.
Senator Collins. Thank you
Mr. Flynn. Senator, could I add just one thing to that?
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. Flynn. One of the reasons why I place such emphasis on
response and recovery is that it helps to get people vested in
couldn't we do more to prevent something in the first place. In
other words, when you get citizens involved in response and
recovery, they become much more vested in how they could be
helpful in prevention efforts. So exercises are so important
because, as a practical matter, we are not going to eliminate
every threat, which could lead us to overreact. But exercises
also very much support prevention and protection efforts as
well.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Flynn, and thanks, Senator
Collins. Senator Paul, you are next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Thank you, and thanks to the panel for coming
today.
I wanted to follow up on Senator Collins' question to Mr.
Pistole. Currently, the invasive patdown searches are random
and not based on risk assessment?
Mr. Pistole. No, actually they are based on intelligence
that we know specifically from Christmas Day, Abdulmutallab,
and the way he concealed that device. There are some random
patdowns, if that is what you are referring to, but it is based
on the intelligence.
Senator Paul. So I guess this little girl would be part of
the random patdown? This is the little girl from Bowling Green,
Kentucky, one of my constituents. They are still quite unhappy
with you, and I and a lot of other Americans think you have
gone overboard and are missing the boat on terrorism because
you are doing these invasive searches on 6-year-old girls.
The same week that this happened, I received a call from
another neighbor of mine in Bowling Green. A little boy had a
broken foot and crutches. They did not want to go through all
the screening, so they took the crutches off and the cast, and
he wanted to hobble through on his broken foot, and his Dad was
helping him. TSA said, ``Back away. Back away.'' Then he had to
go through the special search because he previously had a cast
on even though the cast went through the belt. When the Dad
comes close, they say, ``Back away. Back away. If you do not
back away, you will not fly.'' This kind of gets back to this
whole idea of what are we willing to do, what are we willing to
give up as a country.
In your interview with ABC News, you said, ``I see flying
as a privilege.'' Well, there are those of us who see it
otherwise, the Supreme Court included, and Saenz v. Roe, in
1999, says that although the word travel is not found in the
text of the Constitution, the constitutional right to travel
from one State to another is firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence.
Justice Potter Stewart went on to say in Shapiro v.
Thompson that the right to travel is so important that it is
assertable against private interference as well as governmental
action, a virtually unconditional personal right guaranteed by
the Constitution to us all.
Now, this is not to say we do not believe in safety
procedures, but I think I feel less safe because you are doing
these invasive exams on a 6-year-old. It makes me think that
you are clueless since you think she is going to attack our
country and that you are not doing your research on the people
who would attack our country. It absolutely must involve a risk
assessment of those who are traveling. The fact that she is
being patted down--I do not feel comfortable really with your
response that, ``We are no longer doing it. We may be doing
some risk assessment. We are still doing random patdowns.'' I
think you ought to get rid of the random patdowns. The American
public is unhappy with them. They are unhappy with the
invasiveness of them. The Internet is full of jokes about the
invasiveness of your patdown searches. And we ought to really
just consider whether this is what we are willing to do.
While we are doing ``random patdowns,'' there are examples
where we have had letdowns. When Faisal Shahzad got on the
plane, the alleged Times Square bomber, he was on the
watchlist. Everybody said, ``It was the airline that let us
down.'' Well, he had to go through TSA screening. It was not a
long time, but there were 10 hours, and we ought to be able to
react. His name was on the watchlist, and he went right through
TSA.
Is the TSA looking at flight manifests? Are you doing
background research of people getting off and on planes? Are we
targeting who we are looking at based on who might attack us? I
really get the idea that because our approach is so politically
correct, it has to be so universal that 6-year-olds and 90-
year-olds and people in wheelchairs are agressively screened.
You probably saw in the newspaper the other day the young man
who is mentally handicapped who had a plastic hammer. Because
you are telling your agents to do this, they took away
something the boy had had for 29 years. If you have ever dealt
with a child with autism, there are certain things that comfort
them and keep them calm, and to do that really just shows that
no one is thinking. They are given this rote, automaton message
to crack down, pat people down, and do this. Catching
terrorists should be about police work. Most of these people
are caught by police work. The hijackers who came here were
overstaying their welcome. They were on student visas, but they
were not going to school. We need to be doing better police
work and less of the universal giving up of our freedoms.
I would like you to comment a little bit about the right to
travel as a privilege and then a little bit about the idea of
the universality of insult that we are being given versus
targeting this toward people who might attack us. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. You have raised a number
of important issues. Let me try to take them in order.
In terms of the patdown of the 6-year-old, that, of course,
is something that is done based on intelligence that is
gathered from around the world, not as to a specific
individual, but if there is an anomaly detected or for some
reason the resolution cannot be done other than through a
patdown, that is what is done. Unfortunately, we know that
terrorists have used children under 12 years old as suicide
bombers in other locations--not in aviation, but there have
been two 10-year-olds used. We also know that two
grandparents--one grandmother and one grandfather, 64 years old
in both situations--have chosen to be suicide bombers. So it is
informed by the intelligence.
I agree with you that we need to be smarter in how we go
about doing things. We need to use more common sense. When TSA
was stood up nearly 10 years ago, it was given a mission: Do
not let this happen again. And the men and women of TSA have
taken that very seriously. Secretary Napolitano and I are
working on a risk-based security initiative to say, yes, let us
take what we know, some of the passenger manifest information,
especially those who are willing to share information with us,
so we can make better judgments, better informed decisions as
to this particular person, what risk do they pose? And so how
can we expedite their screening if they are not seen as a risk?
So we are doing a number of things. I would be glad to
provide some more detailed briefings to you in a closed setting
on that.
Senator Paul. Right. And just one follow up on that. I
mean, 10 years is a long time. It has been a decade now. We do
not have a frequent flyer program. We do not have a trusted
traveler program. I do not want this to be against the TSA. I
know most of the agents, and I think they are good people. But
at the same time, they are wasting their time. All these
Congressmen and Senators go back and forth, but to be fair, TSA
agents have to search all of them. They know us by name a lot
of times, and we are getting the same patdown search as
everybody else to be fair. But so are the frequent travelers.
My brother-in-law is on two or three planes a week. He is an
Air Force graduate. He is clearly not a terrorist. And so they
are wasting time on all these people. But I really think as far
as the privacy issue, there were the beginnings of this, let us
turn it over to a private company. We should have a frequent
flyer program that you can voluntarily participate in. Let us
get it done. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Paul.
I want to just clarify about the 6-year-old. Based on the
evidence that children have been used by terrorists, did that
6-year-old set something off in the screening that led to the
patdown? Or was it a random patdown?
Mr. Pistole. No, if I recall correctly on that particular
one, the child moved during the screening so they were not able
to get a clear reading. And so what we have done, just for your
awareness, we have changed the policy to say that there will be
repeated efforts made to resolve that without a patdown.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. Although it is premature, I will be announcing
something in the not-too-distant future about a change in
policy as it relates to children and under.
One of the challenges, as you know, is that we not provide
a road map to terrorists saying here is exactly the criteria.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. And so if this category is exempt from most
screening, then how will terrorists exploit that and game the
system. So that is our challenge and that dynamic between
security and privacy we try to tread.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. Senator Landrieu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Senator
Collins, thank you so much for holding this hearing. I think it
is extremely timely and extremely important.
As you know, I am the Chair now of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and Senator Coats and I are
in the process of writing our bill for this year, and this is a
very important subject and very timely because, unfortunately--
which is why I wanted to come this morning, to call to your
attention since you and Senator Collins have worked so hard on
the reorganization, the development and creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, and have put so much effort
into it--the homeland security bill that has been sent over by
the House of Representatives cuts the exact grants that support
rail and transit security and emergency response by over 60
percent. So I do not know how we accomplish the security
objectives that are the subject of this morning's hearing with
a 60-percent reduction in the grants--transit security, port
security, training and preparation. This cannot be done on the
cheap, and it has to be well resourced and well focused. So I
wanted to bring that to your attention.
In addition, I want to also strongly object to the 35-
percent cut in Science and Technology because, clearly, this is
an area where we need more science, not less, and better
technology, not mediocre or the same technology. We have to
stay ahead of the terrorists, not behind them, and I think
cutting a research and development budget borders on reckless,
and we have received a bill from the House that comes 44
percent below the President's request for this year and 35
percent below where we were in fiscal year 2011.
Let me give you a specific example. The VIPR teams were
described this morning as being highly effective, and the
President included in his budget funding for 12 additional VIPR
teams. Those have been eliminated in the House homeland
security spending bill. So I want to submit for the record the
rest of my statement in writing, but Senator Coats and I have
quite a challenge to put a budget together that supports some
of these efforts and the obvious and evident evolving threat,
particularly since based on the information that we received
from the capture of the documents from the Osama bin Laden
compound, we now have not a direct but a pretty good idea of
where some of this was headed. So I want to just include that
in the record.\1\
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\1\ The pepared statement submitted for the record by Senator
Landrieu appears in the Appendix on page 440.
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I do want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator
Collins and the Senator from Kentucky. I think some of these
patdowns of children--and I have expressed this to you before--
are so contrary to what we are trying to accomplish, and I
surely hope that TSA can be responsive and smarter about what
we are doing.
The travel industry is very important to Louisiana--and to
many places, but our State has a tremendous business and
industry built on travel. We have been hearing a great deal
from the industry about the difficulty, the loss of jobs, the
loss of income, the missed opportunities to get travelers into
our country because it is, frankly, getting so difficult to get
here, people are choosing to go elsewhere. We want terrorists
to go elsewhere. We do not want business people and tourists to
go elsewhere. We want them to come to Connecticut and go to
Maine and come to Louisiana and go to New York.
So what is your timeline for a trusted traveler program? Is
there something that this Committee or the Appropriations
Committee could help you with? Specifically, what is your
timeline for some sort of trusted traveler program?
Mr. Pistole. Well, first, Senator and Madam Chair from the
Appropriations Subcommittee, let me thank you for your
supportive comments on the budget. Those items that you
highlighted are key aspects of what we are trying to do in TSA
and the Department of Homeland Security to protect the
traveling public. So thank you for your strong support of that.
We are doing a number of things, and let me just briefly
outline what we have done thus far in terms of doing a program
with the pilots, those in charge of the aircraft, to say, look,
they are the most trusted people out there. They are in charge
of the aircraft. If they have a small knife or some prohibited
item on them, frankly, that is not what is going to bring down
the aircraft. So we have worked with the airlines and the
Pilots Association to say, yes, let us go through identity-
based screening with them.
We have also changed the policy for the World War II
veterans who come into Washington, DC, to visit the World War
II Memorial on charter flights. You know, the youngest of
these----
Senator Landrieu. We have had the most honor air flights of
any State, and I am so happy to hear that.
Mr. Pistole. So the youngest is 84, and two-thirds are in
wheelchairs, and even though our officers are very respectful,
talking about giving them a massage rather than a patdown, it
is something that I felt was not needed, not common sense, and
so we changed that policy several months ago.
Also, we are looking at children, looking at the elderly,
and recognizing there are challenges there. And then to your
point on the trusted traveler, we hope to be piloting some
initiatives this fall to see how it would work. We are working
with the airlines, U.S. carriers initially, to say for those
willing to share information about themselves, what can we
glean from that that would help us make informed judgments?
Senator Landrieu. But do you have a timeline for the
trusted traveler business flyers, not the pilots, not the Honor
Guard, but----
Mr. Pistole. Right. So for the trusted travelers, whether
we call them trusted traveler, known traveler, as I mentioned,
we hope to start a trial this fall in select airports and
airlines, U.S. carriers again.
Senator Landrieu. With the idea that if it goes well, we
could implement it within 12 months or 24 months or----
Mr. Pistole. I would hope we would see some significant
changes in 2012. I do want to make sure to manage expectations
with the traveling public. It is a complex issue, and so I want
to basically underpromise and overdeliver, but we will be doing
some things that some passengers will see as early as this
fall.
Senator Landrieu. I would hope that as you give pilots some
access, you would consider also the flight attendants who work
these long shifts and sometimes spend so much extra time in the
airport that it just causes the morale of this whole industry
to be at a level that I do not think is appropriate.
So I want to associate myself again with the remarks of
Senator Paul and Senator Collins on this issue, and I thank the
Chairman for his courtesy.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Landrieu. I
appreciate your work on the Appropriations Committee, and I
forget whether you were here, but I was talking about--what is
the gracious adjective? I was about to say ``foolish''--how
foolish it is at this moment to cut the budget of the Science
and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland
Security. These are really investments in our future security.
We all know we are under economic stress and we need to do
things we would not normally do to balance the budget. But
thanks for that and thanks for fighting for the other funding
that you are fighting for, which I am confident will certainly
lead to a higher level of support for homeland security than
exists in the House budget.
We will do a second round of questions. Dr. Flynn, I missed
talking with you on the first round. You are a very interesting
and thought-provoking thinker on these subjects. You said a
couple of things in your opening statement about both moving
beyond screening, if you will, in these kinds of security
matters and avoiding alienating the public that we are trying
to protect. I want to ask you to talk a little bit more about
that, particularly about moving beyond screening. I have
assumed that we are doing screening of airline passengers
because we cannot figure out, frankly, a more effective way to
make sure that somebody does not go on a plane with the
intention of doing harm, of carrying out a terrorist attack.
And sometimes people have been before this Committee and asked
a reasonable question, which is: We know it would be
inconvenient to do airline-type screening on rail travel, but
would we not feel more secure if we knew that everybody had
been through some kind of detector to get on a train,
particularly knowing that trains have been a target of
terrorists?
I want to invite you to speak in a little more detail, to
explain what you meant about moving beyond screening, and also
perhaps to get into this question of what are the alternatives
to screening. Are they as effective? And particularly with
regard to rail, are there other things we could do, including
more screening?
Mr. Flynn. Well, Senator, thank you very much. I want to
say first that, no matter what, screening is always in a
portfolio of tools, but really per this conversation that
preceded your question, one of the things that I am concerned
about, the broad message that I think we need to take away from
mass transit security, is you really need to make the public a
partner in the process. And the face of homeland security for
the overwhelming majority of Americans is what they experience
at airports.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Flynn. And to the extent that they do not understand
what is happening is being based on sound judgment, assessment
of risk, and so forth, they are not likely to be cooperative.
And so that is why I think we really need to speed up efforts
to figure out how we do a risk-based screening approach, less
intrusive for some portion of the population, and so forth.
That is going to be very important, I think, for the broader
effort.
But, the essential problem of relying heavily on a
screening approach is that it largely assumes that everybody
who enters the system poses a threat unless they can be
discerned by a security official that they are not. And that is
not manageable within the mass transit systems for them to work
in most urban areas because it is such a time-sensitive, open
system.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Flynn. As a practical matter, people know that they are
taking risk on any system. There are safety risks, of course,
associated with it, whether it is risk of personal safety in a
busy station, people taking hazardous objects on trains, and so
forth. They have to balance that with the function that they
are trying to do, which is to get from A to B through that
system.
The extent to which we get the public to be seen as both
helping on the prevention side, aware of the environment, and
everybody from the T-shirt vendors, as we saw in Times Square,
the shoeshine boys, and others to be on the lookout for what we
know are core elements of carrying out an attack--surveillance.
Typically, nobody just shows up for the very first time to do
something bad. They want to check out the place first because
they need to be successful. There are typically dry runs that
have to happen before somebody launches an attack.
All that creates opportunity for detection that this is
somebody who is really up to no good, but also creates a
deterrent for that person to come into that space because he is
aware there is that operational kind of awareness and there is
that engagement by the people who are present at the front
lines literally, the passengers, the transit operators, the
folks who are working around the station.
So the extent to which we emphasize screening at the cost
of those engagement efforts, I think what you will end up with
is alienation without perhaps the benefit that these other
strategies would provide. And, again, we know in the case of
aviation there is a portion of the public, the frequent-flyer
public and people of certain backgrounds, that we should be
able to mitigate how much screening we subject them to, it
should be a no-brainer.
We also need to give more discretionary judgment
capabilities to screeners to make the calls versus to work in a
real mechanical way. But, fundamentally, it is about getting
the public more involved, and if they sense that this is solely
the job of external screeners to do this and they do not have
an obligation except to submit to the screening, then we are
not going to get the kind of buy-in that I think we need about
how to manage the risk going forward.
Chairman Lieberman. That helps me understand. So you are
not saying end screening. You are saying it has to be part of a
total approach, and it ought not to be seen as basically giving
the public a pass.
Mr. Flynn. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. I think Dr. Flynn's insight about the
people who essentially work and live in train stations is an
interesting one, and I just wonder whether that is part of our
normal routine. In other words, are train stations and transit
systems training the news stand operators, the people at the
coffee stands, the shoeshine people, etc.? Because they really
do see a lot, and therefore, they can say a lot and do a lot.
Mr. Pistole. There has been a limited amount of that done,
but we would like to expand that, as Dr. Flynn mentions.
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Pistole. I think there is a great force multiplier
available to which we can avail ourselves.
Chairman Lieberman. There is. I know that in air travel, of
course, we do not just have the screeners, but we have people
who are experts in evaluating the behavior of people boarding
the planes. Since the consensus seems to be that because of the
openness, the speed of the trains, etc., that we cannot and
should not apply a screening model from aviation to trains,
should we be using more behavior experts to evaluate people as
they move onto trains or subways?
Mr. Pistole. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a good idea that
we have been able to do on a limited basis. One of the key
aspects of the VIPR teams that we use with random and
unpredictable aspects is to not only have this uniform presence
because we know that terrorists are deterred by uniformed law
enforcement officers, K-9, and CCTV, unless they are a suicide
bomber then they do not care about the CCTV. But those three
things are important layers of security all informed by
intelligence. But when it comes to behavior detection, one of
the best opportunities we have is when there is a VIPR team,
let us say a dozen uniformed officers, K-9, walking through a
train station, to have a plainclothes behavior detection
officer to see people responding to that. I would have loved to
have been in Schiphol Airport on Christmas Eve 2009 to see
Abdulmutallab walking with his underwear bomb toward screening
and to have a K-9 uniformed officer walking toward him, then
with a plainclothes behavior detection person observing how
does he respond to that officer and that K-9. I doubt that he
would have had the audacity to walk right by that person, the
K-9, for fear of detection.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. So that is what is key: How can we deploy
behavior detection in a smart, efficient way? We are not
currently budgeted to do that across the board, but that is how
we try to be force multipliers to State, local, and Amtrak.
Chairman Lieberman. Very smart. That combination I think
would be very effective. Thanks. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole and Commissioner Boynton, I listened to the
exchange with Senator Landrieu, and I, too, am concerned about
the deep cuts in some of the homeland security grant programs.
One challenge that we face, however, is that there has been a
low rate of obligation of the money in the area of mass
transit. And, indeed, there was one audit that was done by
FEMA--and I realize these are FEMA grants, so if you cannot
fully respond, I understand. But back in fiscal year 2006,
something like 90 percent of the money for mass transit and
rail security measures remained unobligated.
Mr. Pistole, are we doing better in getting those funds
out? And, Commissioner Boynton, from the local level or from
the State level, can you give us any insights on why it takes
so long for that money to actually be expended for the purposes
of improving security?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. Let me start off by
saying, yes, we are doing better, but we are still not where we
should be in terms of the whole process. It is something that I
think has frustrated everybody involved. You have correctly
identified that TSA is responsible for identifying with FEMA
and DHS and the industry where the highest risks are and for
awarding the funds, and then the actual drawdown of those funds
and the use of those funds are up to, obviously, industry and
FEMA how that works.
Some of the issues, I think, going back to 2006, were with
multi-year projects that were, if you want to say, not shovel-
ready, if it came to actually critical infrastructure
enhancements and things, whether it is strengthening tunnels or
bridges and things like that. And so I think there has been
additional focus on operational deterrence things, such as
training where even though there is still delayed rulemaking
that is out there, over 90 percent of the people in the
critical high-risk transit areas have been trained. So even
though the rulemaking is still pending, we have gone ahead and
provided the substance of what was to be covered by the
rulemaking. So we are not letting the bureaucracy, if you will,
get in the way of the substance of what, in this case, the 9/11
Commission Act required. I will defer to Commissioner Boynton
on the other parts.
Senator Collins. Commissioner Boynton.
Mr. Boynton. I think I can give a couple examples. In one
case, we have a capital improvement project on the Metro-North
Line where we want to put fiberoptic cable along the entire
line to connect all of the CCTV cameras. We have cameras at a
number of stations, different places along the line, in the
rail yards. Right now most of those cameras--not all of them
but most of them--are localized. And given the governance of
the rail system, that can be problematic, and let me just give
one example.
There are towns along the rail line where there are
multiple stations in the same town, and each one of those
stations is managed differently by different entities, some
with participation by the municipality, even within the same
municipality, some without. So tying these cameras together is
very important to us. We are unable to compete, given the size
of our transit system, to fully fund the project at any point
in time. So the best we have been able to do--since 2006, we
have just over 1.5 percent of the national total of transit
security grants--is to save the money to get the project done.
We think we have saved about half. In the meantime, we are
moving ahead with the design phases of the project with
additional cameras. We are holding the money on purpose because
we cannot afford the project in any 1 year because we are not
able to compete at that level. And I am actually not being
critical. The needs of the much larger transit systems in the
large urban areas are overwhelming. I want them to have more
money than we have, but part of the reason we are holding that
money is on purpose. And then there is a second reason, and it
is not just the transit grants. It is many of the other grants
in our grant portfolio. Many of these grants have 3-year
performance periods. Those are the rules we were given. In all
of our grant planning with, in our case, 169 municipalities,
two tribal nations, dozens of State agencies, we were told,
``You have a 3-year performance period for these grants.'' We
have statewide homeland security strategies, 10 goals, 80
objectives, 403 measurable criteria, all laid out. We have 3
years to spend this wisely. It is coming as a little bit of a
surprise to us now that we are being challenged: Why have you
not spent this money? We have not spent it because we were told
we had 3 years to spend it, and we are using that time wisely.
Senator Collins. Dr. Flynn, do you have anything to add to
this? I know it is more the other two witnesses' purview.
Mr. Flynn. Sure. What I continue to hear about is the
difficulty often of chasing these very small numbers of
dollars, so I guess I would just reinforce the concern of
Senator Landrieu that some folks basically saw there was maybe
a pot of gold that you would have in Washington to advance
homeland security at the State and local level and through
critical infrastructure. I often characterize it as a ``thimble
of gold.'' And what happens here is these decisions are being
made in a kind of triage fashion. At its core we have to look
at these as systems.
I think one of the important points that Commissioner
Boynton made here today is about how the riders who are coming
from Connecticut as far away as New Haven, 90 miles, are going
to the belly of the beast, Grand Central Station in Manhattan.
And assessments about where we apply resources and how we roll
them out, that is going to take time. It is not something you
can just throw together. You have to have the collaborative
mechanisms. And I want to reinforce the idea of using the area
security committee model we have in the maritime world as
potentially a process for managing grants in the other
transportation sectors. It is very important, and we often lose
sight of this. In the case of Connecticut, trains connect
passengers to ferries. It is trains, buses, and trucks, and it
is all there together. And connections by trains to airports,
such as Newark Airport.
We have not really been looking at the system and the
integrated nature of that system, leaving State and local
officials to fight for scraps, and the scraps are not being
used as well as they should be used.
Senator Collins. What worries me--and, Commissioner, I am
going to use your examples--is many of our colleagues look and
see unobligated funds, or funds that have been obligated, but
it is 2 years later and they have not been spent, and they make
two conclusions: The program is overfunded, that money was
never needed in the first place, we can slash that from the
budget; or they conclude that it is being poorly managed and is
not really needed, and thus, they reach the same conclusion
that it can be slashed from the budget.
The desire around here to sweep up unobligated or unspent
funds is enormous, given the budget constraints, and the irony
is that it penalizes projects and good planning and communities
that are actually spending the way you would want them to
spend. They are formulating a careful plan so that they do not
waste the money. And I think this is going to be a real battle
for us. I hear it all the time from our colleagues, ``Well, the
money is not needed because it has not been spent,'' when, in
fact, the careful planning that is going on, which takes time,
ensures that the money is spent wisely and not wasted. But it
is an uphill battle, I will tell you.
Finally, Administrator Pistole, I want to commend you for
keeping your commitment made a year ago to come up with a
Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment. For the
record, I would like you to give us an update on the 20
recommendations that you made as far as what the timeline is
for implementing those recommendations and how it is going. But
I do commend you for completing the project.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I would just indicate to the witnesses, in the
characteristically unpredictable way the U.S. Senate works, we
are not taking up a bill on the Senate floor at 11 a.m., so we
have a little more time.
Senator Carper, thanks very much for being ready to take
the gavel if Senator Collins and I had to leave, and thank you
for being here now to ask your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you. I apologize for being in and
out. We have a Finance Committee hearing going on just one
floor below, and we are focusing on improper payments or
overpayments of about $17 billion a year on unemployment
insurance. So that is important. This is important, too, and I
tried to go back and forth as best I could.
I just want to mention that for about 8 or 9 years, Senator
Biden and I used to ride the train together, a lot of days back
and forth, and before that with Mike Castle, our Congressman.
And I still ride the train almost daily now with Senator Chris
Coons and with Congressman John Carney. I call us ``The Three
Amigos.'' We love to be able to live at home and take the train
to work.
Every morning the train is packed with passengers. In fact,
I sat in the quiet car this morning. Every seat was filled. And
I think Amtrak has set a record again this year. I think last
year it was about 28 million. This year they are, I think,
approaching 30 million people. And I am delighted that so many
fellow Americans have decided to take the train along with the
rest of us.
However, I am also concerned about the threat that those 30
million passengers face, as well as others who ride the rails
with local transit services. I just want to ask how the
Department of Homeland Security is coordinating with Amtrak to
improve train safety. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. We work very closely with
Amtrak. Chief O'Connor and I speak frequently about security
precautions that they take unilaterally and best practices that
we recommend from either here in the United States or from
around the world. We have provided Amtrak nearly $100 million--
$97 million since 2006--for specific security enhancements to
Amtrak to protect those 28 to 30 million people who are
traveling every year, and there are a number of aspects to
that, both on training of Amtrak officers and rail personnel to
look for anomalous activity, obviously the See Something, Say
Something campaign for the general public, the ridership
especially, and enhanced K-9 patrols
Senator Carper. Do people ever say anything? When I am at
Union Station and the station back home, I hear these
announcements all the time. You hear them in airports, too. But
do people ever say anything?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, in fact, I have asked that question
because we are investing in that, and the answer is yes, in
some places more than others. One example I have is in Boston
from the MBTA where from 2010 to 2011 they have seen over a
100-percent increase in people reporting things. Now, they have
taken some interesting initiatives, including one of which I
happen to have a photo of a 16-foot or 12-foot backpack that
they put out in some of their stops, and Chief Paul MacMillan
is standing by that backpack, and the caption is: ``It is never
this obvious.'' So it is not going to be a bomb that just looks
like something huge like that.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The photo referenced by Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on
page 449.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Carper. The folks in the audience cannot see that.
That is a big backpack.
Mr. Pistole. That is a big backpack, right.
Senator Carper. I would certainly say something if somebody
came carrying one of those on their back.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so the idea is it is not as obvious as
that, so let us be alert, let us be attuned to what is around
us, and I think the partnership, which was mentioned on the
panel this morning, is the key criteria. So we can do all the
security enhancements, we can do all those things, but I think
it really will come down to an alert individual, perhaps a
police officer, or perhaps a K-9, who sees something and takes
action to disrupt a possible plot.
The best opportunity we have is like what we saw with
Najabullah Zazi where we were informed by intelligence well
before he got to New York City with the backpacks. That is the
best possible opportunity we had. Or, for example, the Yemen
cargo plot with the toner cartridges, intelligence that helps
inform our judgments. If it gets through all those layers of
intelligence and somebody is actually getting on a train in
Wilmington or Newcastle or wherever, and we know nothing about
them, then it really comes down to somebody seeing something
and taking some action with local law enforcement or Amtrak.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks.
Mr. Boynton, as a State partner, you have, I think, an
interesting perspective on the interaction between Federal,
State, and local security officials. Many of the public
transportation systems that service Connecticut also travel
through other States, such as Amtrak and the Metro-North
railroads. These interconnected systems require coordination
among multiple public safety agencies, as you know. Are we
doing an especially good job of functioning well together? And
how can that be improved?
Mr. Boynton. Senator, we have a couple forums, and I like
to tell people that what we do is we provide a table and ask
people to come to the table. We have created a transit security
committee with representatives from every mode--trucking, bus,
maritime, aviation, pipeline, highway, rail, all of them. And
what we found was, all of the rail people know each other. Same
with the bus people. We think they may never have been in the
room together before, however.
Senator Carper. How do they get along?
Mr. Boynton. Well, it is clear that they are all out of
their comfort zone, actually. We have all heard about people
operating in silos, and one of those partners, just in the last
few weeks, used a term I had not heard, which was ``cylinders
of expertise.'' They are all very good at what they do. It
requires effort to bring them to the table, and the first time
we met, we saved $60,000 in the first 10 minutes. The rail
people were talking about a See Something, Say Something
campaign, and the bus people said, ``We are working on a
campaign. Can we use yours?'' And the answer was yes. They
saved $60,000 in about 2 minutes. They both worked for State
government. They both worked in the same department of State
government. But they were all within their comfort zones, so
this collaboration that the Administrator speaks about, it is
absolutely key. This is one way we do it. The other way we do
it is with our fusion center. We have a full-time TSA analyst
whose primary work site is in that fusion center.
I find examples like that to not necessarily be the norm. I
find that the agencies we work with do a lot of great work,
building capacity and building expertise, but trying to get
people at the same table and to stay there as primary work
sites while not exactly hard to do, takes a special focused
effort. And once you do it, you cannot stop. It has to be sort
of continual to keep people at the table because, by
definition, it is out of their comfort zone. They are not with
their parent agency.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, could I
ask one other question?
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Senator Carper. I understand, Dr. Flynn, that in your
written testimony you provide compelling evidence of the
deficiency of rail and transit security. I think you may have
mentioned in your written testimony that roughly $9 is spent
for safety on every airline passenger, and we spend about one
penny per rail and transit passenger. How can we use limited
resources to improve the Federal Government's existing transit
and rail security programs?
Mr. Flynn. Well, Senator, thank you very much for the
question. The case I tried to make in my testimony and advance
is that there actually are some relatively modest things versus
very expensive things that we can be doing, some around, just
as we are covering here today, the focus on public education
efforts. I mean, if you ask a law enforcement agency to develop
the message of See Something, Say Something, it is going to
come out a little differently than maybe talking to some folks
out in Hollywood who will come up with a different idea.
The big backpack I think is a wonderful illustration of
reaching out to real talent pools that exist, but that takes
some resources to be able to go out and say: ``Here is a
message we are trying to convey. Can you help us with this
message? Because you know what people will listen to and pay
attention to.'' So that is an investment that raises awareness
that hopefully makes sure that we can prevent things by taking
advantage of all those eyes, the 28-30 million on Amtrak
trains. We are not going to get all of them, but we could get
more than relying on a lot more dogs or a lot more--and, again,
not either/or but a huge multiplier by taking that transit
public who is with the rhythm of that train and knows the train
station and gets them involved there.
The other, it takes funds to be conveners, and I guess I
would push a little bit. I think what Connecticut has done is a
model, but it still is largely intra Connecticut--as opposed to
efforts that reach beyond the State. It is very difficult often
to get the States to play well with each other, something that
I know you have some experience with here, because everyone is
fighting for so few resources. And so to the extent to which
these area security committees, regional committees, and so
forth really bring key players together, they can build on what
is a superb State initiative, but make sure there is something
like that going on in the surrounding area so people can
recognize that See Something, Say Something for the buses that
Connecticut is doing could be done also in Delaware.
The challenge is that you cannot get to homeland security
without really dealing with the horizontal, and the horizontal
is dealing with the citizens, the private sector, the
community, State, and locals. But we are still coming at it
vertically and/or episodically, like spitballs on a map, a few
major urban areas, let us try to fix some of those. And this
lack of a holistic approach I think is a serious problem. I am
very worried about the budget climate reversing the few
embryonic steps that we have made to achieve the horizontal,
engage the public a bit more, draw them on board. And if we
lose ground on the science and technology front and so forth,
it will take us years to get back to where we want to go. And
God forbid we have the next major event and people see that we
essentially stopped working on the problem and stopped making
modest investments.
Senator Carper. Mr. Boynton.
Mr. Boynton. Senator, could I just comment on one point
there?
Senator Carper. Sure.
Mr. Boynton. The difficulty of communicating between the
States, I have seen over the last year, 18 months a really
encouraging increased ability for the fusion centers to talk
among each other. These are all 72 fusion centers, State or
locally led, with the Federal participants but an increasingly
good dialogue between these fusion centers, and that helps us
with the regional approach and across-State approach.
Senator Carper. All right. I am glad to hear the kind of
communications you all have started up in Connecticut. That is
the kind of stuff that we do in Delaware. I am proud of it.
Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Thanks to the three witnesses. I think you have been very
helpful. I am reassured from this hearing that there has been a
response to the evidence that came out of Osama bin Laden's
compound about potential attacks on mass transit systems in the
United States on or around September 11 of this year. I
appreciate the continuing work that is being done. We are up
against an enemy that is not smarter than we are, but is
certainly more inhumane and ruthless than we are. To say the
obvious, with regard to the discussion with Senator Paul about
patting down a child, unfortunately there is an evidentiary
basis for doing that, which is that some of these terrorist
groups have used children and have been willing to risk or take
their lives as a result, and they have used grandmothers and
grandfathers to do the same.
So when you are up against this kind of enemy and we are
attempting to maintain freedom of movement in our country and
the openness of our country, it is not easy. So I share the
sentiment that has been expressed across the panel, which is
that we have to be very careful as we cut budgets that we do
not take big risks with our security because in the end that
really is the first responsibility of our government.
I thank each of you for what you are contributing to
homeland security. We are going to leave the record of the
hearing open for an additional 15 days for additional questions
and statements.
With that and the Committee's gratitude, I hereby adjourn
the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PREVENTING TERRORIST TRAVEL
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, Brown, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
Normally I am a few minutes late and Senator Collins is on
time. Today she surprised me, but she is in the hallway, so I
will take the--there you are. I was just saying you are
normally the more punctual one--it is not really an odd couple
relationship we have--so I waited a moment or two.
Senator Collins. I apologize.
Chairman Lieberman. Not at all.
I want to welcome everyone to this hearing, which is the
fifth in a series of hearings that our Committee is holding
this year to review the state of our Nation's terrorist
defenses as we approach the 10th anniversary of the attacks
against America on September 11, 2001.
Denying foreign terrorists the ability to travel to our
country to attack us, as they did on 9/11, obviously is a
continuing homeland security priority, and that is what we are
focusing on today.
As you look back over the 10 years and think of all that we
have done to meet the challenge of preventing terrorists from
coming into the country, you have to say that, thanks to a lot
of people, we have done very well at it. There has not been
another major attack from outside. And yet there have been
attempted attacks in which people have certainly shown they are
still trying to enter the country, or succeeded in doing so,
such as the cases of the shoe bomber, the Christmas Day bomber,
and the Times Square bomber. All plotted outside the United
States with help from al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist
groups, and all involved travel into the United States.
In the years since September 11, 2001, legislation authored
by this Committee has created a number of programs and systems
meant to enhance our government's ability to identify and stop
terrorists among the millions and millions of people who travel
to the United States and who we want to welcome each year. The
terrorists, obviously, we want to prevent from entering our
country.
The Homeland Security Act, which created the Department of
Homeland Security, gave the new Department the authority to set
visa policy and deploy Visa Security Units to overseas consular
posts, working with the State Department to provide an added
layer of security in the issuing of visas.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, which was the original 9/11 Commission recommendations
implementation legislation, called for a biometric entry and
exit system for travelers into and out of the United States,
and also required enhanced travel documents. It required
consular officials to conduct personal interviews with all visa
applicants.
The 2004 Act also directed the President to negotiate
agreements with other nations to share information on lost or
stolen travel documents. And perhaps most important, it
required that domestic and international airline passengers be
screened against terrorist watchlists.
Then the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, in a way the 9/11 Commission Act 2,
created the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, a
program that allows the Department of Homeland Security to
screen travelers from so-called visa waiver countries against
our intelligence and law enforcement databases before they
board an airplane bound for the United States.
These programs are all critical new components of our post-
9/11 efforts to deny terrorists entry into the United States.
And I would say, looking back, for the most part they have been
successful. But as is documented in a series of reports from
the Government Accountability Office, we clearly still have
work to do.
First, some good news: GAO reports that the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization has been well implemented on
our end and is helping to address gaps in the Visa Waiver
Program.
In the same report, however, GAO says that only half of the
visa waiver countries have signed the biometric law enforcement
information-sharing agreements required for participation in
the program, and none--not one--of these agreements has
actually been implemented. So I would say today, looking back
and forward, we really have to get them all signed and
implemented as quickly as possible.
The implementation of the US-VISIT entry system has really
been one of the biggest success stories of our post-9/11
efforts. It ensures that almost all non-U.S. citizens coming to
the United States have their fingerprints registered and
checked against all of our intelligence, immigration, and law
enforcement databases prior to being admitted to the United
States. That is a very significant filter, if you will, set up
to stop terrorists from coming into the United States.
Unfortunately, implementation of an exit system has been
one of our biggest failures. GAO recently reported to this
Committee that US-VISIT's current biographic system has a
backlog of over 1.6 million records of potential overstays that
have not been reviewed. In other words, these are people who
have entered America legally but overstayed the time during
which they were legally authorized to be in this country, and
they become a very significant percentage of the millions of
so-called illegal immigrants or undocumented aliens who are in
our country. And this backlog is growing every day.
Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, the co-chairs of the 9/11
Commission, in testimony before our Committee a few months ago,
reiterated their call for a biometric exit system, and I would
like to hear from our witnesses today about the current plans
at DHS for getting this done because this really is a problem,
knowing when people who come in legally are still here
illegally.
I also continue to be concerned with the slow
implementation of the Visa Security Program. Although the
Department of Homeland Security and the State Department have
identified 57 high-risk consular posts abroad, only 14 of them
have criminal investigators to provide an added layer of
security to the visa-issuing process.
The attempted Christmas Day bomber attack highlighted the
importance of having adequate security measures in place at our
consular posts, as you remember from that fact situation. But
despite pledges by the Department of Homeland Security and the
State Department to continue expanding this really important
security program, the President's budget included no additional
funding for this program for fiscal year 2012. Even in these
obviously tight budgetary times, this is disappointing.
GAO released another report yesterday that found a lack of
coordination and focus in our government's efforts to help our
foreign partners develop their own terrorist travel programs,
and that is something I am sure we will want to talk about
today.
Finally, many of us on this Committee, particularly Senator
Paul, who is here today, are concerned about security gaps in
the Iraqi refugee program that allowed two Iraqi nationals, who
turned out to be terrorists--one whose fingerprints were on an
unexploded improvised explosive device that the FBI had in its
possession from our troops in the field since 2005, so one of
the two Iraqis arrested in Kentucky for planning terrorist acts
actually had his fingerprints on this unexploded IED that was
in the possession of the U.S. Government for over 5 years and
was not processed in the system. Therefore, when this
individual had his fingerprints done when he entered as part of
the US-VISIT program, it was not correlated against this very
implicating fingerprint that was in our possession, and so he
was allowed to enter the country and then plot to send weapons
back to their fellow terrorists in Iraq to use to attack
American troops there.
We really need to know how these two were allowed to enter
our country and why those fingerprints from 2005 have not been
entered into our system. Senator Paul has focused the attention
of this Committee on this matter, and I am sure he will have
questions for the witnesses about it.
In sum, looking back, I think we can say with some
satisfaction that we have made progress in the past 10 years
toward making the entry by terrorists into the United States
much more difficult than it was on 9/11/01. But we have also
had some very unsettling experiences that show they can still
penetrate the defenses that we have set up. And, of course, we
know that they are adapting their mode of operating to our
increased security measures.
Just last week, we saw published reports that al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula is apparently at least considering if not
carrying out the surgical implantation of explosives inside the
body of an individual, which would be undetectable by most of
our screening devices, but I will say clearly not undetectable
by all of our defenses. Given these threats and their
development, we have to continue to focus on this area of our
homeland security, and that is our intention today. I thank the
witnesses for being here. They are all perfectly positioned to
report to us and answer our questions, and I look forward,
after their testimony, to that part of the hearing.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Limiting the travel of terrorists is a key way to protect
our country. As the 9/11 Commission put it, ``Targeting travel
is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as
targeting their money.''
According to the 9/11 Commission's report on terrorist
travel, as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers might have been
intercepted by border authorities if procedures had been in
place to share intelligence data. At the time, however, threat
information-sharing systems and policies were largely absent,
and the hijackers' past terrorist associations were not readily
available to American officials who could have acted.
Today, as the Chairman has pointed out, we have a more
rigorous system at high-risk consulates to help identify those
who should not receive visas, but we need to upgrade the Visa
Security Program so that it can operate more effectively and in
more high-risk posts.
This program deploys Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agents to our high-risk embassies and consulates overseas to
help identify suspected terrorists and criminals before visas
are issued. The problem is that the United States has these
offices at only 14 of the 57 high-risk posts.
It is also troubling that the GAO has found ongoing turf
battles between ICE and the State Department's diplomatic
security at some posts. VSP must implement effective procedures
to help DHS and the State Department resolve questions about
who should and who should not receive a visa to come to our
country. All of those involved in the visa process at these
high-risk locations must be rowing in the same direction for
this program to reach its full potential.
There are other serious challenges and gaps in our
security. As the Chairman mentioned, recently we learned that
terrorists intent on attacking America have shown an interest
in having explosive devices surgically implanted in their
bodies. Yet a young man was able to fly cross-country from New
York to Los Angeles without a valid government ID and with an
expired boarding pass that was not even in his name.
At the other extreme, it troubles many Americans to see TSA
putting the very young and the very elderly through intrusive
and, in most cases, what appear to be unnecessary patdowns. If
we continue to give extra screening to individuals who pose no
threat yet others who should arouse suspicion can bypass
checkpoints without being questioned, our systems clearly are
still not properly calibrated.
As Senator Paul will undoubtedly discuss today, and as
Republican Leader McConnell and our Chairman have all
highlighted, we also need to scrutinize the criteria for
granting asylum. In May, two Iraqi refugees living in Kentucky
were indicted on Federal terrorism charges. That they were
permitted to come to this country on humanitarian grounds is
shocking. How could this happen when there was sufficient
evidence of the terrorist attacks in which they were involved
to indict them? What is being done to close this serious
vulnerability? Is the Administration re-analyzing the
backgrounds of other refugees granted asylum under what appears
to be a flawed process?
On the other hand, the New York Times today reports on
cases of apparently worthy applicants who are not receiving
asylum. Clearly, our system needs to be adjusted to ensure
vetting and careful scrutiny so that those who are in danger of
their lives because they have truly been allies of the American
forces can receive asylum, but those who have been involved in
attacking our troops or working with the Taliban or al-Qaeda do
not receive asylum.
Even with improvements in our own safeguards, the United
States cannot go it alone. Our intelligence reform legislation,
which became law in 2004, directed the National
Counterterrorism Center to establish a strategy to combat
terrorist travel, and part of that strategy, an essential
pillar, was helping to enhance the capacity of other nations to
combat terrorist travel.
A new GAO report provides an update on our progress. While
the United States has many programs to help our partner nations
improve their visa issuance and screening protocols, the GAO
has found that too often these programs lack coordination. The
GAO also found redundancies. In one case, the GAO discovered
that DHS and the State Department were both planning to hold
training on fraudulent travel documents for the same Pakistani
agency during the same month without knowing of each other's
plans.
These programs, in my judgment, also do not focus
sufficiently on corruption in the passport issuance process
overseas, which, according to the GAO, is a significant
obstacle in our efforts to keep terrorists from traveling.
There is, as the Chairman has mentioned, encouraging news
as well as problems. DHS, for example, reports that nearly 450
suspected terrorists that were identified on a watchlist were
blocked from boarding overseas flights bound for the United
States in fiscal years 2010 and so far in 2011. The Customs and
Border Protection is now matching passenger manifests with
terrorist watchlists and not just with the no-fly list. It is
vital to review these lists before departure and not once the
plane is airborne.
Terrorists clearly are going to constantly probe our
defenses and constantly innovate. Therefore, we must never
cease our efforts to keep terrorists from acquiring the
documents and the means to travel to our shores.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Unfortunately, I just heard off the wire, just to show us
how timely all this is, that at least three bombs went off in
different public places in Mumbai today, and this is just the
first report. They are reporting many injuries. No indication
of responsibility yet.
We have a vote around 10:40 and we will have to break at
that point, but let us see if we can get at least some of the
initial testimony in. I again thank the witnesses for being
here.
We will start with Rand Beers, who is Under Secretary,
National Protection and Programs Directorate, at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
TESTIMONY OF HON. RAND BEERS,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL
PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and
Senator Paul. I am pleased to be here before this Committee
which has been so important in the efforts to protect the
homeland.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Beers appears in the Appendix on
page 499.
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Our goal here in this area is to push information to the
front lines, as Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman both
indicated, as quickly as possible to prevent known and
suspected terrorists from traveling to the United States.
Today, I am testifying in two capacities--first as the Under
Secretary for the National Protection and Programs, a position
to which I was appointed by President Obama and confirmed by
this body in June 2009, and am thereby responsible for the US-
VISIT Program. I am also testifying today as the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism at the Department, a role Secretary Janet
Napolitano assigned to me following the December 25, 2009,
bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253. So what I will do is
address what the Department is doing to better coordinate and
prevent terrorist travel, describe the specifics of US-VISIT
activities being done in this area, and also discuss my role as
the Counterterrorism Coordinator.
DHS collects and screens information on who is entering the
country or boarding an aircraft in order to identify possible
links to terrorist activity. In this regard, the Department has
made considerable progress since 9/11 to implement measures to
identify and stop terrorist travel in five general areas:
First, unifying immigration and border management systems
so that we can have the capability to access efficiently and
effectively biometric- and biographic-based information across
the entire homeland security spectrum.
Second, enhancing capabilities for more effectively
identifying fraudulent documents and impostors and implementing
measures to confirm document authenticity and validity.
Third, establishing a system of interoperability and
information sharing that allows Federal partners across the
government to share that information in order to do a better
job identifying those persons of interest and concentrating on
them.
Fourth, streamlining the visa overstay review process to
establish reliable data on individuals who have violated the
terms of their authorized admission.
And, fifth, establishing and maintaining strategic
partnerships with an increasing number of international
partners, sharing appropriate information, providing technical
assistance, and developing commonality in biometric standards
and best practices while investigating and testing emerging
multimodal biometric technologies.
With respect to US-VISIT, let me just identify a few of the
things that I think we have been doing. It is a broad program
with important applications ranging from screening foreign
travelers to immigration adjudication to law enforcement.
Interoperability and information sharing between agencies
and international partners continues to yield significant
results, as demonstrated by three success stories that I want
to briefly mention.
The first occurred in February of this year. Australia sent
us a batch of fingerprints as part of our High Value Data
Sharing program. Within that batch we had a match on an
individual about whom we had some terrorist information. We
provided that information to the Australian government, and
they denied that individual asylum, as they were contemplating.
Second, in November of last year, we assisted in a case of
a Turkish man who was attempting to gain employment at a
nuclear power plant. We were able to identify that he was using
a false document with a false identity in an attempt to
demonstrate his legal status in this country. He was obviously
denied employment, but he was subsequently arrested for
overstay and placed in Federal custody.
The third, which is not so distant from what you just
reported, Senator Lieberman, was in October 2009, when the
Canadians asked us to help them look at a boatload of
undocumented males who were arriving off the coast of British
Columbia. We helped them go through that with biometric
information that they collected and identifying two of the
individuals on that not only as suspected LTTE, Tamil Tiger
terrorists, but also individuals who had sought visa and asylum
status with us and were denied. Obviously, those individuals
were detained.
So I think that represents the kind of thing that
biometrics allow us to do, as you have so fervently supported
on a number of occasions.
With respect to the role of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, what has happened within the Department is,
following the December 25, 2009, failed attempt to bomb
Northwest Flight 253, the Secretary assigned me an additional
responsibility for coordinating counterterrorism activities
from the Department across its directorates, components, and
offices related to detection, prevention, response to, and
recovery from acts of terrorism.
In November of last year, she authorized the stand-up of a
Counterterrorism Advisory Board to further improve coordination
with the Coordinator acting as the Chair and the Under
Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and the Assistant
Secretary for Policy to my left to act as the Vice Chairs. We
have also organized under that a task force working group that
supports this effort, so that what we are basically doing with
respect to support for our mission one counterterrorism
activity is use the Coordinator position, the Counterterrorism
Advisory Board, and the task force to bring together
intelligence, operational matters, policymaking elements within
the headquarters and the components so that we can field a
cohesive and coordinated operational response to any threats
that should arise or in some cases try to anticipate those
threats.
Let me just give you one example of the kind of work that
we have done. Following the death of Osama bin Laden, we began
an even more dedicated review of intelligence. The CTAB was
meeting on an almost daily basis for several weeks after that.
We still meet roughly twice a week to look at these things. In
each meeting, we look at new threat information. So in one
case, we were looking at one particular threat and instituted a
series of new measures that were put in place, taking the
information that our intelligence and analysis office gave us,
developing the countermeasures, creating the outreach to the
various sectors who were affected by that particular piece of
information, implementing those counterterrorism matters,
informing State and local governments as well as other partners
in our efforts, and basically coming up with a major effort to
counter this particular threat. In addition to that, there was
obviously a public affairs component.
This represents a much more coordinated response on the
part of the Department than we have heretofore been able to
produce and I think demonstrates the value.
In this particular case, we also considered whether we
ought to raise the threat level and decided that the
information was not sufficiently imminent and actionable so we
chose not to do that. But that has nothing to do with the fact
that we instituted security measures and had a public outreach
program to ensure that we were adequately positioned, without
having to raise the alert level, to respond to this particular
threat.
In conclusion, we are working hard to address these complex
challenges, and I stand ready to answer the questions from this
Committee. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Under Secretary Beers. That was
a good beginning for us and a good report.
Next we are going to have Janice Jacobs, who is the
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs at the
Department of State. Welcome back.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANICE L. JACOBS,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Collins. It is an honor to appear before you again to
tell you how the Department of State has increased security of
the visa process in response to the December, 25, 2009,
attempted terrorist act. In my previous appearances before this
Committee, I testified about the Department's multilayered
approach to visa security, what I had called ``the five pillars
of visa security'': Technological advances, biometric
innovations, personal interviews, data sharing, and training. I
want to assure you that these pillars are even more relevant
today. Today, after a full year of implementing corrective
actions taken after December 25, 2009, I believe that our visa
processing has reached new levels of security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs appears in the Appendix on
page 506.
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The title of this hearing has a special meaning for the men
and women of the Department of State. We have no higher
priority than the safety of our fellow citizens and the
protection of our borders. In this statement I would like
briefly to highlight key steps we took to respond to the
President's directive to address weaknesses in the systems and
procedures we use to protect the United States.
We improved our Visas Viper Program and related processes
by directing all chiefs of mission to ensure that the Visas
Viper Program was working effectively at their posts and
instructing consular officers to include complete information
about all U.S. visas in Viper cables.
We issued new instructions to officers on visa revocation
procedures and reinforced standing guidance on their
discretionary authority to deny visas under Section 214(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, with specific reference to
cases that raise security and other serious concerns.
We constantly refine and update the technology that
supports our visa process. Before any visa is issued, the
applicants fingerprints are screened against DHS's automatic
biometric identification system called IDENT and against the
FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
We use facial recognition technology to screen visa
applicants against a watchlist of photos obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center as well as visa applicant photos
contained in the Consolidated Consular Database.
We improved the capability of consular systems to match
visa records against new and emerging derogatory information to
support visa revocation in appropriate cases.
We employ sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure
matches to derogatory information contained in the 39 million
records pertaining to 27 million individuals found in the
Consular Lookout and Support System. This layered biometric and
biographic identity verification ensures the security of the
U.S. visa by nearly eliminating the possibility of visa fraud
through counterfeit or photo-substituted visas or through the
use of valid visas by impostors.
We are continuing to match new threat information against
our visa records. We have revoked over 1,000 visas since
December 2009. As soon as a visa is revoked, a VRVK entry code
is added to CLASS and shared in near real time with the DHS
lookout systems used for border screening. CBP uses these VRVK
records to advise airlines that certain passengers should not
be boarded on flights bound for the United States.
We have completed the worldwide rollout of the online DS-
160 non-immigrant visa application form, and we are currently
piloting the online DS-260 immigrant visa application form.
These forms provide consular and fraud prevention officers as
well as our intelligence and law enforcement partners the
opportunity to analyze data in advance of the visa interview.
Consular officers are trained to take all necessary steps
to protect the United States and its citizens during the course
of making visa decisions. Each consular officer completes our
basic consular course, which has a strong emphasis on border
security and fraud prevention, and includes in-depth
interviewing and name-checking technique training. Officers
receive continuing education in all of these disciplines
throughout their careers.
Consular officers receive extensive training on the
Security Advisory Opinion process, which requires them to
suspend visa processing pending interagency review of any case
with possible terrorism ineligibilities. We work closely with
DHS to ensure that no known terrorist receives a visa or is
admitted into our country.
ICE special agents assigned to Visa Security Units provide
timely and on-site vetting of visa applications and other law
enforcement support to our consular officers. Over the past 7
years, the Department and DHS have increased resources
significantly, improved procedures, and upgraded systems
devoted to supporting the visa function.
DHS receives all of the information collected by the
Department during the visa process and has broad access to our
entire visa database. We make our visa information available to
other agencies and specifically designed our systems to
facilitate comprehensive data sharing. In May 2011, almost
22,000 officers from the Departments of Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and Commerce submitted nearly 2 million visa
record queries.
On a regular basis, we engage our foreign partners
bilaterally, regionally, and on a multilateral basis to address
the issue of terrorist travel. We have entered into
arrangements for the sharing of visa information with foreign
governments consistent with the data protection requirements of
Section 222(f) of the INA.
With our partners at the Terrorist Screening Center, we
negotiate Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 agreements
overseas. We are a close partner with DHS in advance passenger
information and passenger name record discussions overseas.
Anne Witkowsky, our Deputy Coordinator for Homeland
Security and Multilateral Affairs in the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is here with me today to
answer any questions you may have on building foreign partner
antiterrorism capacity or the State Department's role in the
overall U.S. Government terrorist travel strategy.
Let me also address the Committee's interest in the process
that brings Iraqi nationals working on behalf of the U.S.
Government in Iraq to this country as recipients of special
immigrant visas or as refugees.
As of mid-June a total of 7,063 Iraqis have been issued
special immigrant visas under one of the two pertinent SIV
programs. Kelly Gauger of the Refugee Affairs Office within the
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration is here to answer
questions about the State Department's role in U.S. refugee
security screening.
Distinguished Members of the Committee, I believe that a
layered approach to border security screening in which each
agency applies its particular strengths and expertise best
serves our border security agenda while furthering traditional
U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade promotion, and the
exchange of ideas. The United States must meet both goals to
guarantee our long-term security.
Thank you and I am ready to answer your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Assistant Secretary Jacobs.
The Senate is in a quorum call, which means that hopefully
we can hear the opening statement of David Heyman, who is the
Assistant Secretary in charge of the Office of Policy at DHS.
Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID F. HEYMAN,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Heyman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator
Paul, this hearing, preventing terrorists from traveling to or
remaining undetected in the United States, remains a top
priority at the Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman appears in the Appendix on
page 530.
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Ten years ago, screening of passengers coming to the United
States was limited to the Department of State visa process, if
applicable, and the inspection of a person by an immigration
officer at the port of entry, plus whatever processes were
applied at foreign airports or by foreign governments. If you
were a terrorist seeking to come to the United States, you
would, for all intents and purposes, apply for a visa, purchase
a ticket, and board an aircraft to America. There would be very
limited checks to see if you were known or suspected of
terrorist activities other than the visa process, limited
checks to see if you may be a security risk based upon your
behavior, no checks to see if you were traveling under a lost
or stolen passport, limited checks on you or your baggage for
explosives, and little to no security on board the aircraft
during the flight, as well as limited checks to see even if you
are admissible to the United States. That was 10 years ago.
Similarly, at that time provision of advance passenger
information was voluntary, and even when provided by air
carriers, it frequently contained inaccurate or incomplete
information. There was no biometric collection for visa
applicants beyond photographs nor for aliens seeking admission
to the United States, and there was very limited pre-departure
screening of passengers seeking to fly to the United States.
Today, a decade later, in response to both 9/11 and
evolving threats, and with the help and support of this
Congress, we have significantly adapted and enhanced our
ability to detect and interdict travel threats at the earliest
opportunity. The systems we have put in place over the past
decade are multilayered and multinational, from the
intelligence we gather on known and suspected terrorists even
before someone decides to travel to the United States to visa
and travel authorization processes, travel document security,
pre-flight screening against criminal and terrorist databases,
checkpoint screening prior to boarding, pre-departure screening
for admissibility to the United States, in-flight security, and
additional screening at ports of entry. We have put in place
multiple layers of security across the spectrum of travel--
before departure, during travel, and upon arrival.
Additionally, we have put in place or are in the process of
piloting recurrent vetting programs to check and recheck the
status and potential risks of all visa holders and immigrants
after they arrive into the United States. Today, all air and
sea passengers intending to travel to the United States must
have valid visas or, if traveling under the Visa Waiver
Program, must now obtain in advance of travel electronic travel
authorization.
Since 2009, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
and in support of key 9/11 Commission recommendations, all
travelers coming across our land borders are required to
establish identity and citizenship. Furthermore, while issuing
visas is the responsibility of the Department of State, as you
have mentioned, at certain embassies and consulates DHS
administers a Visa Security Program through ICE where we assist
the State Department in identifying visa applicants who may
present a security threat.
Prior to 9/11, there was no centralized system or method to
screen airline passengers. Over the past 10 years, the U.S.
Government has stood up the Terrorist Screening Center
administered by the FBI and established a consolidated
terrorist screening database or watchlist to determine who may
be authorized to travel to the United States, who may board a
plane, and who may require further screening.
Additionally, fulfilling another key 9/11 Commission
recommendation, DHS and the TSA have strengthened security
through full implementation of the Secure Flight Program. Under
the Secure Flight Program, DHS now pre-screens 100 percent of
passengers on flights flying to, from, or within the United
States against the no-fly and selectee portions of the known
and suspected terrorist watchlist. Through the Secure Flight
Program, TSA now vets over 2 million passengers daily.
We have expanded our trusted traveler programs from
approximately 80,000 members when DHS was created to well over
a million people today, and by expanding these programs, these
passengers, who provide biometric identification and pass
rigorous recurrent security checks, we are now better able to
focus resources and attention on those who may pose a greater
risk.
DHS also uses passenger name record data which is the
information that travelers provide airlines when they book a
flight. This information, along with the APIS and the
Immigration Advisory Program, allows us to assess a passenger's
level of risk prior to departure, and when necessary, flag them
for further inspection or even prevent them from boarding.
Following the attempted attack of December 25, 2009, DHS
implemented additional enhancements in coordination with other
departments. These include a number of items which I have
complete in my testimony, but let me just list a couple now.
The U.S. Government reformed the criteria and nomination
processes for the terrorist watchlist and enhanced its
information-sharing capabilities.
We updated the Secure Flight Program to use all terrorist
watchlist records containing a full name and a full date of
birth. Travelers are then required for enhanced physical
screening prior to boarding.
Beginning in 2010, DHS began a new initiative with the
Department of State where CBP currently vets approved visa
applications so that as new information is discovered, DHS and
the Department of State are able to proactively identify these
individuals and address them.
Also, beginning earlier this year, DHS began piloting a new
recurrent vetting process for those applying for immigration
benefits. As new derogatory information surfaces, we double-
check those who have approved immigration status against this
information.
In addition, prior to December 25, 2009, CBP conducted
inbound passenger targeting using APIS and PNR data provided by
the airlines but could not easily prevent high-risk travelers
from boarding flights to the United States unless they were
traveling from foreign locations where we had our Immigration
Advisory Program or pre-clearance presence. As of December 25,
CBP re-engineered its inbound targeting operations to identify
high-risk travelers who are likely to be inadmissible and
recommend to carriers at all airports, all last points of
departures, that those individuals not be permitted to board a
commercial aircraft.
DHS has also strengthened the presence and capacity of law
enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks on aviation to include
our Federal air marshals and FAMS coverage.
And, finally, I think the lesson of Abdulmutallab, or one
of them, is that if you have access to one airport anywhere in
the world, you have access to the entire international aviation
system, and so to prevent terrorist travel, we must work
closely with our international partners. We did just that
following December 25, 2012. In the weeks and months that
followed that event, DHS worked with the International Civil
Aviation Organization, and on a bilateral basis, to advance an
unprecedented initiative and to strengthen aviation security.
Those efforts culminated at the ICAO Triennial Assembly in
October 2010 where the assembly adopted the Declaration on
Aviation Security, which forges a new foundation for aviation
security to better protect the entire global aviation system.
The extraordinary global collaboration demonstrated by nearly
190 countries during that assembly has helped to bring about an
aviation security framework that will help make air travel
safer and more secure.
All of this is not to say that there will not be new
threats or that the security architecture is a finished
product. To the contrary, this effort will require continuous
improvement. Terrorist screening is a multiagency effort that
relies on good data, good intelligence and information,
automated capabilities to ensure identification of high-risk
activities and individuals. We must continue to understand the
threat, terrorist tactics, and stay ahead of it. This requires
strong interagency and international partnerships, something
that we are deeply committed to.
As a result of all of these efforts over the last decade,
it is now part of our regular daily experience to identify
potential incoming threats and deny them boarding, deny them
admission, and at a minimum require them to go through enhanced
screening. CBP through its National Targeting Center generates
nearly 200 targets a day of where they have to research whether
they should be boarded or not. They have identified 2,600
passengers that would likely have been found inadmissible upon
arrival and passed that on to air carriers.
TSA now vets over 14 million passengers weekly;
approximately 25 individuals per month are denied boarding on
aircraft through the Secure Flight Program.
Let me conclude by saying that this Nation I think has
taken significant steps to counter and prevent terrorist travel
since 9/11. This has been accomplished as a result of a
historic partnership between Federal agencies, between Federal,
State, and local partners, between multiple Congresses, and
three successive Administrations, and with our international
partners. It entails a multilayered, multifaceted, and
multinational effort that weaves together intelligence,
information sharing, security and law enforcement programs from
across DHS, the interagency, and across multiple partners
around the world. Together they reflect one of the Nation's
most pressing priorities: To ensure the safe, secure, and
efficient movement of literally millions of people traveling
to, from, and around the United States on a daily basis, while
thwarting the few would-be terrorists to who seek to do us
harm.
This concludes my testimony. I have a written statement for
the record, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Assistant Secretary Heyman.
Your statement and that of the other witnesses will be included
in full in the record.
I appreciate your testimony. It was actually quite
revealing to hear the description before and after 9/11 of what
you have to go through to get into the country. We know in this
Committee pretty well what has happened since 9/11, but it was
important to be reminded about how easy it was to get into the
United States prior to 9/11 if you intended to do us harm. And
I think hearing all we have done since then ought to give
people in our country some increased sense of security when
they go about their daily lives but also, of course, when they
travel. But obviously we are never going to achieve everything
we want by way of security and also retain the freedom of
movement that is part of what defines us as Americans. So when
we come back, I am sure we will be asking the three of you
about some things that we think should be done better.
Let us close on this good note and thank you for all you
have done to bring us to the point we are at. I am glad we
could get the three of you in. We will come back as soon as we
can from the two votes.
The hearing is in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come back to order.
Thank you very much for your patience while we were voting. We
will do 7-minute rounds of questions.
Let me begin with a question for you, Assistant Secretary
Jacobs. A recent GAO report, which was a review of the Visa
Security Program, raised some questions about how it was
working. One of the most troubling parts of the report to me
was that GAO found disagreements between consular officers and
Immigration and Custom Enforcement agents, at some posts around
the world concerning how close an association with terrorism
was needed before someone could be denied a visa to come into
the United States. I would guess that most Americans would
share the opinion I have, which is that travel to the United
States is a privilege not a right and that any association with
terrorism should be enough to keep a foreign national from
getting a visa to come into the United States.
So I wanted to ask you to respond to that finding by the
GAO and tell the Committee exactly what the policy of the State
Department is now. What kind of association with terrorism
would be considered significant enough to bar someone from
being issued a visa? And then, Mr. Beers or Mr. Heyman, if you
have anything to add from the perspective of DHS, being the
Department in which ICE is located, I would welcome that
testimony as well. Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Senator. Basically let me start off
by saying that I think that we have very good cooperation
between the VSUs and the consular sections, wherever the Visa
Security Program is in place. And it is true from time to time
that looking at the exact same information, two individuals
might come to different conclusions.
We have found, though, in every single case--first of all,
those are few and far between. In most every instance there is
agreement. But when there is a disagreement, normally it is
worked out at post where people will sit down and really look
at the information and try to decide whether, in fact, it makes
someone either ineligible for a visa or inadmissible to the
United States.
If for some reason they cannot reach agreement there, then
the case is referred back to headquarters where people in
Consular Affairs and people at DHS will take a look at it. And
then it is always resolved there.
When we signed the MOU with DHS back in 2003 on our shared
roles and responsibilities on visas, we actually put in place
there a very formal mechanism if there was a dispute or a
disagreement that could not be resolved at those levels where
the Secretaries would get involved, and then we would resolve
it that way. That has never happened. It has never had to
happen. As I said, most of these are taken care of right at
post.
Chairman Lieberman. So what is the State Department policy
now on this question? And do the disputes go to the weight of
the evidence when there are disputes? I understand you have
said that the disputes between State and Homeland Security are
rare, but is there a State Department policy?
Ms. Jacobs. The policy really is simply to apply the
existing provisions of law, and so if there is information
suggesting that someone might have some kind of connection to
terrorism, the ICE officer might look at it and come to one
conclusion, whereas the consular officer may look at it and
believe that it is not sufficient to find the person ineligible
for a visa. But in any case, we will always give security the
priority when we are adjudicating visas, and if there is any
question or doubt, the burden of proof is on the applicant.
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Ms. Jacobs. The law is written in a way that puts the
burden of proof on the applicant.
Chairman Lieberman. That is important.
Ms. Jacobs. And so we would in almost all instances wind up
denying the visa.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you have anything you want to add to
that, Mr. Beers or Mr. Heyman? It is not necessary.
Mr. Beers. No, sir. I think that is a fair rendition of our
ability to cooperate with one another.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Let me go in the time I have
remaining in this round to this question of the US-VISIT exit
system. This is a source of concern. I know it is no small
task, but this is not only a question that leads to an enormous
number of so-called illegal immigrants who do not come in
illegally but then stay here illegally, but also in some cases
obviously related to terrorist activity. My recollection is
that three of the 9/11 terrorists were here because they had
overstayed legal visas, and, of course, if you think about it,
it is one of the remaining ways somebody who has a nefarious
intent to come in as a tourist or a student and then overstay
and attack the United States.
So this backlog of 1.6 million people, give us your report
on why we are behind on that and what we are doing now to catch
up.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to answer
this question because we have been working hard on dealing with
that issue over the last several weeks, and I think I am in a
position to say that we will have cleared the backlog later
this week or early next week. But let me tell you what we have
done----
Chairman Lieberman. That is significant.
Mr. Beers. So that you actually understand what we have
done.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Beers. We have taken the 1.6 million, and we have run
it against two databases: One which said, Did this individual
leave the United States after they went into an overstay
status? Or did this individual change to a different visa or a
different benefit? And we have basically eliminated 50 percent
of the people in the 1.6 million.
Chairman Lieberman. Just so I understand, that is very
interesting it is that high a percentage. So they either left--
--
Mr. Beers. But in an overstay status.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. So we had some record of that.
And then second is that they had changed their status?
Mr. Beers. They applied for a different visa, or they came
in and applied for a different benefit status.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and in the current state of
recordkeeping we did not know that.
Mr. Beers. What we had not done is when they went into
overstay status, if they were not in the priority category that
we were looking at before we ran this broad check, we did not
look at them. And what we decided we had to do in response both
to our own concerns and your concerns is we needed to get
through all of them.
So what we have done is those people have left--those who
were in an overstay status and left will be caught if they try
to come in again, because having been in an overstay status,
that is a basis for denying them a visa or a basis of refusing
entry to a visa waiver person who seeks to come in again.
With respect to the remaining 50 percent, what we are doing
at this point in time is running them against CBP's travel
history to see whether or not they would have hit any of our
targeting rules and been the basis for having an additional
interrogation. In some cases, sir, this is information that
came in after they entered the United States.
The second thing we are doing is we are sharing the
database with the intelligence community through NCTC to see if
there is any additional derogatory information. As we are able
to transfer this information to ICE, we can allow ICE to be
able to look at not just the original way in which we had
sorted the data, but across all of the people who have come
into the United States or are in an overstay status so that
they can then prioritize those particular individuals that they
want to go after in the first instance.
Obviously, we do not want anybody to overstay in this
country, and as you well know, we have limited resources, and
ICE will, therefore, prioritize who they are going after. But
this will give us a much better picture.
When we have finished with this process, sir, we want to
come up and brief the Committee on the results of this. So I am
telling you is what the process looks like. What I want to come
back to tell you or have staff come back and tell you is what
that process yielded: What did we learn? What are we doing
about it? And how will we do this better?
Chairman Lieberman. I am interested in this--and I think it
is significant. I would like to ask you to come back and brief
Senator Collins and me and anybody else on the Committee who
wants to be there. Do you have a sense of how soon you will be
ready to do that?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I am expecting to review the data either
later this week or early next week. As soon as I have heard the
report, we will put things together and get back to you. I do
not want to promise next week.
Chairman Lieberman. No, that is fine. That gives us a
general sense.
Mr. Beers. Let me say we will get back to you before the
August recess, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine. My time is really over, so maybe
I will come back to this. Now that you have worked to try to
clear up the backlog, how do we get to the end state we want to
get to, including particularly a comprehensive, functioning
biometric exit system? But in deference to my colleagues, I am
going to hold that one and call on Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to leave the majority of the questions about the
Kentucky case to my colleague from Kentucky, but I do want to
ask one general overview question. Assistant Secretary Jacobs,
it is my understanding that since 2007, the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program, which was the program under which these two
alleged terrorists were settled in Kentucky, has approved more
than 84,000 Iraqi nationals for resettlement, and 58,810 Iraqi
refugees have actually arrived in the United States.
What is being done to ensure that there are not other cases
like those two alleged terrorists in Kentucky among those
58,000 that are already here in addition to the 30,000
additional ones that have been approved for resettlement?
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Senator. For the Refugee Admissions
Program, actually we have shared responsibilities with the
Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department does
play a role before people arrive in the United States, and then
once they are here, they are under the purview of the
Department of Homeland Security.
I can tell you just generally that over the past few months
we have put in place more stringent screening requirements for
both refugees and for special immigrant visa applicants who
want to come to the United States, and we can probably give you
more details about exactly what that screening consists of in a
classified briefing. But please know that has happened and
certainly anyone who is currently outside of the United States
wanting to come here is undergoing that new level of scrutiny.
I don't know if one of my DHS colleagues wants to talk
about the actual screening of people once they have arrived
here.
Senator Collins. Well, I am concerned about people being
approved to come, but I am concerned about the 58,000 already
here. Is there a review being done of those who are here to
make sure that there are not other cases of individuals who
should not have been admitted? Assistant Secretary Heyman.
Mr. Heyman. Yes. The answer to your question is yes,
Senator. Several months ago we began a pilot project to enhance
our screening both abroad before individuals come here as part
of the Refugee and Asylee Program, but also looking
retrospectively. The Iraqi program in particular started back
in 2007, and so we have had vetting in place since then to
include looking at holdings from other agencies. And so what we
are doing now is to look again in a recurrent fashion or in an
enhanced re-check fashion, and we are piloting that effort
right now to see the technical capability of doing that and
also what we are finding. That will be concluded at the end of
this month, and we can get back to you and let you know what
results we found.
Senator Collins. The Chairman and I are working on a DHS
reauthorization bill, as Assistant Secretary Beers knows
because he is smiling as I say that. Whether in approval or in
horror, I am not sure. But when I was reading the most recent
GAO report that I requested, which was released today, GAO
found a lot of redundancies, examples of travel offices at the
Department of State being unaware of training programs at the
Department of Homeland Security. And it seems as though there
are several offices that are involved in terrorist travel: The
US-VISIT program, the Screening Coordination Office, and the
Visa Waiver Program.
I have concerns based on GAO's findings about duplication,
a lack of communication, and coordination. As we are looking at
the reauthorization bill, I would like all of you to comment on
whether there should be a single office that deals with
terrorist travel and all of these programs, with the exception
of TSA, which is clearly a different kind of screening program.
Assistant Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. Let me start. We have TSA, we have CBP, we have
USCIS, all of whom are front-line activities that deal directly
with terrorist travel, and we have ICE on top of that, which
has an enforcement function.
What we have tried to do with respect to this kind of an
issue is exactly why the position of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism was established, to try to ask the question
that you are asking and ensure in short order that the
deficiencies that might be occurring in fact are corrected and
that we have this kind of coordination.
With respect to the issue that you asked and with respect
to the GAO report, Assistant Secretary Jacobs and I have also
talked about the coordination that needs to happen between our
Department and her Department. Now, obviously, some of that
should have happened in the embassy when the country team was
aware that there were two different agencies coming in roughly
the same time frame to talk to the same people. That should not
happen. There is no question about that.
So we have certainly agreed that we are going to do a
better job across agencies to do that, but we have to do the
same thing within the Department on training.
The Secretary has asked us specifically to look at these
kinds of overseas positions and overseas travel, so Assistant
Secretary Heyman, who is responsible for the Office of
International Affairs, also has a very important role to play
in that, and he may want to add something on that.
Senator Collins. Assistant Secretary Heyman, should there
be a consolidation of some of these programs within one office?
Mr. Heyman. So, Under Secretary Beers rightly points out
that almost every part of the Department has some role to play
in screening or addressing travel screening as it pertains to
individuals coming into this country. I would add also the U.S.
Coast Guard in the maritime domain as well. And so that is why
we established the Screening Coordination Office from a policy
perspective to make sure that from a policy perspective we have
the right framework and coordination across the Department.
The role of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is to make
sure operationally that these entities are all working together
and there is no duplication or that there are no gaps. And so I
think the combination of a Screening Coordination Office to
make sure that our policies across the Department are uniform,
consistent, and appropriate and a Counterterrorism Coordinator
looking at the symphony of these parts moving is being
conducted in a harmonious way, if I get the metaphor right, I
think that is an approach that I think is quite useful. We have
seen it effective in the short time that the process has been
operational.
Senator Collins. Assistant Secretary Jacobs, if you could
quickly comment since obviously we have heard how DHS is
coordinating with the Department, but the fact is the State
Department plays a considerable role.
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, Senator, that is right. We do. We have our
Office of Counterterrorism where we have a number of regional
and other programs that they oversee. Some of that is capacity
building, some of it is training.
I think the areas where we sometimes run into duplication,
because we have similar missions, is on fraud training, and
that particular example pointed out in the GAO report, as Under
Secretary Beers pointed out, really should not have happened
because it is incumbent upon the country team at a post to know
who is coming in and to prevent that kind of duplication from
taking place.
I think that within the U.S. Government as a whole, again,
our Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism plays a
significant role in the overseas programs. I think that we can
probably do a better job working with our DHS colleagues in the
specific areas where we seem to have similar missions such as,
again, fighting fraud, helping foreign officials identify
fraudulent documents. We have expertise, both of us, in that
area, and perhaps we can even go together and do this kind of
training, which would be even more effective. So I am certainly
willing to sit down and talk to my DHS colleagues about how we
might do a better job with that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins,
for putting these hearings together, and I thank the panel for
coming.
I think the most serious threats to our country from
terrorism probably come from travel visas, refugee visas, and
student visas. Now, some might argue with that, but 16 of the
19 hijackers were here on student visas, were not policed well,
and had overstayed their welcome. I am still concerned we may
not have figured out nor done a good enough job on these
problems.
I believe we continue to have security breaches, and I
think there are two possibilities. We could say, well, there
are so many people visiting that we will have these breaches;
it is inevitable we will have a certain amount. Or you could
say that maybe we are inundated with information and it is our
philosophy that is mistaken.
Perhaps it is that our philosophy is that everyone is
potentially a terrorist and everyone has an equal chance of
being a terrorist. I think if you take that philosophy, you
inundate yourself with information, so much information that
you will never get through it. Nobody can talk to each other
because you are wallowing in electronic and paper information,
and you cannot determine who the people are, which would really
require good police work.
We had the head of the TSA here last week. After we showed
him the outrage--and he has to be reading the newspaper--over
patting down these children, he said TSA was changing its
procedure. But then he sends me a rather curt note and says,
``well, an 8-year-old had a bomb in Afghanistan.''
The problem is there is a logical error there--an 8-year-
old in Afghanistan had a bomb. What does that have to do with
an 8-year-old or a 6-year-old in Bowling Green? Absolutely
nothing. Now, they are the same age, but that is not a risk
factor, and age is not a risk factor. It is where this girl
lived, how she grew up. It is sort of like telling me that if
an 8-year-old in Afghanistan sacrifices a goat, we now have to
be worried about kids sacrificing goats at 8 in America. They
have nothing to do with each other, but that is the logic. But
it is this universal approach that everyone is the same and
everyone is an equal threat. But I think it makes us less safe,
but it makes us more insulted.
This morning, in the airport in Nashville, a 41-year-old
mother was arrested because she did not want TSA agents putting
their hands inside the pants of her 6-year-old girl. They say
they are going to change, but they are not changing. They
continue to pat down 6-year-old girls. The real threat is from
people who are coming here internationally.
So here we get to the situation in Bowling Green. I
compliment the FBI and our local law enforcement for doing a
good job, but I think this person was only caught because an
informant tipped them off, and then we finally started looking,
and eventually we looked through a database that we had not
been looking through.
Chairman Lieberman remarks that this is from the FBI
database. Why wasn't this going on? Why does it take an
informant to find somebody for us for us to do our job? Do we
need to replace people who are not doing their job? It sounds
like no one thought this through since we had to be tipped off
by an informant, and then we are left saying: ``Oh, my
goodness, we let a terrorist in.''
But it gets back to the universal versus the specific. Why
can't we search everybody? Why don't we know everybody's
background? Because we have let 60,000 Iraqis in here in the
last 3 years. It is a policy question. Why do you admit 60,000
people?
Now, here is the point: People will argue, well, it is
dangerous over there. Well, we have 50,000 of our young men and
women putting their lives on the line every day. Some of our
relatives, some of my relatives, are over there putting their
lives on the line for the Iraqis. Do you think maybe they ought
to stay even if it is a dangerous place? It has been dangerous
since the 900 A.D. Karbala massacre--not the recent massacre.
They have hated each other for a millennium. It is not safe.
But should we be admitting 50,000 people over here to our
country?
And then to add insult to injury, one of the alleged
attackers who lived in government housing--most of them do. We
are encouraging them to be on welfare. We have a whole cottage
industry set up to get them in government housing, and on food
stamps. It is insulting to us that we are doing this, but it
would take a policy change. I do not fault you for missing the
needle in the haystack. You have to make the haystack smaller.
We need to admit fewer people. There is no reason we should be
admitting 60,000 people, and we need to address that policy.
I am almost out of breath. Why don't we start with that
question, Mr. Heyman, and tell me: Why do we need 60,000? Are
we going to keep admitting 18,000 a year? Can we possibly know
who these people are?
And just one other example of how we cannot. Even in the
military over there--we have an attack almost every 6 months
where we admit someone into the Iraqi military or the Afghan
military, and then they attack our soldiers on base. It is hard
to know who your friends are and who your foes are because they
will lie to you on the admission statement.
But I would appreciate your comments, Assistant Secretary
Heyman.
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Senator, and I might add this is the
first hearing I have been at where there are two individuals
with the first name of Rand, and I am not sure I will ever
experience that again. [Laughter.]
Senator, the decision, I think, after the war in Iraq to
admit Iraqis who had helped United States and coalition forces
in that endeavor, whether as interpreters, informants, or
otherwise, was a decision that was taken back in, I think, 2006
or 2007. It continues to be the policy of this government that
those individuals who also may be at risk of retribution or
those individuals who supported the United States in such ways,
they and their families would be given an opportunity to come
here.
Senator Paul. Let me interject. Here is the difference,
though. In Vietnam, the war ended and a totalitarian regime
took over, and I have many friends who came here from South
Vietnam who fought with us. I do not have any problem with
that. We should reward people who fought with us, we fought
with them. But it is not a totalitarian regime. We have a
democracy over there. We are supposed to be proud of that
government. It is not perfectly safe over there, but there is
no reason to continue this policy, and the policy should
change.
Mr. Heyman. Let me get also to the really, I think, strong
point you made about a universal policy of terrorists behind
every person versus a possibility of using more discriminating
tactics and approach, which is what we attempt to do. We have
adopted a risk-based approach to security. I believe John
Pistole, the head of TSA, testified to some of the things we
have been trying to do as recently as a month or so ago, which
is to expand the list of those who are, in fact, trusted to us
or known to us, the trusted travelers who do not require the
kind of screening that those who might pose a threat to us do.
And so in terms of moving forward with that, I know that
Administrator Pistole has already brought in the pilots and
pilots association into that trusted program----
Senator Paul. But I do not think he is doing any less
patdowns. He said he was going to change his policy on
patdowns. Every day there are more complaints. It is insulting
our privacy. Our parents do not like it. Our kids do not like
it. It needs to change. Our approach should not be: Because
there was an 8-year-old with a bomb in Afghanistan, all 8-year-
olds in America are a threat to our country. It is not true, it
is a waste of time, and you are not going after the people who
could attack us. We have a guy who gets on a plane with 11
different boarding passes, he gets on with his student ID from
Michigan and a boarding pass with the wrong name on it. TSA
does not catch him, but they are insulting all of the little
children in our country, and it needs to stop. They need to
change the policy. They do not need to come here and tell us
their policy is changing and continue to do the same thing, and
that is what he told me in his letter. He is going to continue
patting them down because he found an 8-year-old with a bomb in
Afghanistan.
I know it is not all your fault, but I have to let off some
steam.
Mr. Heyman. I appreciate that, and actually also just let
me at least recognize that 2 million individuals go through
TSA's screening every day. Our TSA front-line officials have to
make those kinds of difficult judgments, not always
successfully in the cases that you have brought forward, but
they do process 2 million people a day, and I think they do it
at a very high professional rate. Thanks.
Senator Paul. Can I have just a couple more minutes? I have
a couple other questions.
The 59,000 refugees that Senator Collins brought up, you
say you are going to screen them. Right now how many of the
59,000 have been re-screened? And will every individual, all
59,000, be re-screened?
Mr. Heyman. I do not have the numbers. I can get back to
you on the specifics of that.
Mr. Beers. The number we will re-screen is all of them.
Senator Paul. You will screen all 59,000.
Mr. Beers. All have been re-screened at least once. This is
not going to be a one-time-only screening process because, as
you are well aware, information becomes available, even if it
is historical, that does not become available until a time
later. So this is a program that we have instituted which is
both backward-looking and forward-looking. We have been through
the backlog. It is a large number, as you quite correctly said,
and it was not an easy process because it required some
database adjustments and interactions that we had not even
tried before.
So I can tell you, as a result of that, we have had some
important new insights into how we need to have our databases
fit together and be integrated with one another.
Senator Paul. With the student visa program, we admit
40,000 people from the Middle East, 20,000 from Saudi Arabia;
16 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia; 16 of the 19 I
think were also overstaying their student visas.
Are the student visa people initially going through the
better process now that would hopefully catch people who have
fingerprints in there? Are they going through the same kind of
screening before they come here?
Mr. Heyman. All of our visa applicants go through a number
of screening processes that I described, including matches
against the known or suspected terrorist watchlist, targeting
against unknown behavioral patterns, criminal databases, as
well as additional visa violations.
Senator Paul. And supposedly the better screening, not the
screening we did 2 years ago that did not work, we now have
enhanced, and they are doing----
Mr. Heyman. We have had extensive improvements in screening
and in our watchlisting process as recently as in the past 2
years, but also over the last several years.
Senator Paul. Are they re-screened again? If they enroll in
school, do we know they are still in school after 3 months?
Does someone go through all 40,000 and find out if they are
attending classes? Not enrolled. Attending classes.
Ms. Jacobs. All of the foreign students who come here
participate in the SEVIS program, which is basically a program
that monitors their attendance at school when they first
enroll. Any switch in schools is registered in that system.
Consular officers overseas have access to that system, and let
me just add that before they even get their student visa, as a
visa applicant they go through a number of security checks,
including being run through our lookout system, which has about
39 million records, 70 percent of which come from other
agencies, many of those law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. So there is a thorough screening before they come,
and once they get here they have to maintain status. If they
are not registered in this system that I described, SEVIS, then
their names are turned over to ICE.
Senator Paul. So attendance is being recorded by whom? By
the school and then sent back? That is how the system works?
Ms. Jacobs. The school, yes, has the responsibility for----
Senator Paul. If they overstay their welcome, if they
overstay their student visa, are we systematically going
through--like Senator Lieberman talked about with the exit
program, do we have an exit program on all student visas?
Mr. Beers. It is one of all of the visas that we look at,
yes. If they go into overstay status, it is noted, and now we
have this vetting system that will focus on anybody who is an
overstay to ensure that we know as much as possible about it.
What we will end up having to do now is, as this number of
unreviewed overstays goes to zero, we will then have to
continue to do recurrent vetting to make sure that the
individuals who were placed in an overstay status, who then
leave after we have reviewed their files initially, we come
back and make sure that we know that they have actually left
the country so that we can inform ICE that is not a person who
is an overstay status.
Senator Paul. And one quick final question on the Bowling
Green alleged terrorists. If their fingerprints were in an FBI
database, why weren't they checked?
Mr. Beers. We did not have access to that database, sir.
Senator Paul. I am not sure I understand that.
Mr. Beers. We get a lot of fingerprints from a lot of
different sources, including the FBI. We did not have access to
that fingerprint in the US-VISIT system, which is the way that
we then are able to make the identification. That person, had
that information been available, would have immediately come up
on the FBI's radar screen independent of the informant coming
forward.
Senator Paul. That is a real problem. I mean, we got lucky
because of the informant, but I guess that is the real problem,
and I do not understand. See, I do not know all the names of
your watchlists, but I have heard of the FBI. I would think
that would be a pretty prominent watchlist or database
fingerprints where you would be integrating your information.
Mr. Beers. Sir, you need to ask the FBI to explain where
that particular fingerprint was.
Senator Paul. I am going to ask them. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Paul. We will ask the
FBI that. I gather they are far behind--but there is no excuse
for that--on inputting fingerprints of this kind. But I do not
understand why it would be 5 or 6 years.
No need to regret your agitation or letting off steam here.
We share your agitation, and your right to let off steam is
fully protected here in this Committee, and that right has been
exploited by many Members of the Committee over time, one of
which is our next distinguished colleague from Massachusetts.
[Laughter.]
Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Jacobs, due to the recent political
turmoil in Yemen, the State Department has withdrawn most of
the staff from the embassy in Sana'a. However, before this
occurred, earlier in the year, the OIG found that in 2009 and
2010 the embassy in Sana'a was, in fact, critically
understaffed, and fraud prevention, as you know, is critical to
preventing terrorists from getting visas to come to the United
States, and probably one of the most important places that we
need to ensure we have necessary resources to fulfill this
critical function is in Yemen, especially now, where AQAP is
actively plotting to conduct attacks on the United States. Yet
according to the State Department's OIG, the embassy is in
critical need of staffing, in the Fraud Prevention Unit,
especially.
So how can we effectuate counterterrorism policies if the
necessary resources are not being supplied?
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Senator. It is absolutely true that
our embassy in Sana'a, in Yemen, traditionally has been a place
where it has been hard to fill positions. It is a difficult
place and sometimes difficult to get people to those positions
that exist.
The State Department has made it a priority to make sure,
though, that with these critical countries like Yemen we are
getting not just the staffing filling a position, but filling
the position with the right people, and that is a top priority
for the State Department. The truth is we are on ordered
departure right now in Sana'a, so a number of the people who
were at the embassy have had to leave, but that does not mean
that we in any way have cut back in our consular section on
fraud prevention or really screening the applicants.
We understand very well the high risks that exist in Yemen
and the fact that applicants there have to undergo very
extensive scrutiny.
I have made it a personal quest, after visiting Sana'a
almost 2 years ago, to make sure that the consular section in
that embassy is not just properly staffed but has the right
people in it. I have sent a number of my very best officers to
temporarily head the consular section. We now have a permanent
person who just arrived, someone who is one of our best
officers, who is going to be running our operation there.
I have sent in a number of temporary officers to reduce
backlogs, to look especially at fraud and what we are doing to
prevent that.
We have help from our diplomatic security colleagues. We
have an assistant RSO investigator who helps us with our fraud
investigations in Sana'a. We have a Visa Security Unit there. A
lot of different people with the very same concerns, with the
same mission, and that is, to keep out people who might be
coming here to do us harm.
Senator Brown. But even though you are doing that, it is
still understaffed.
Ms. Jacobs. The consular section is not understaffed.
Senator Brown. It is not. How many people do you actually
have working in that section?
Ms. Jacobs. I will get back to you with the exact number.
Senator Brown. Yes, if you could, let me know how many
people are working there, where the shortfall is, if any, and
how many efforts do you process monthly because if there is a
breakdown and there is something that we need to do to help get
that up. I mean, it is no secret that Yemen is in the forefront
of terrorist activity, and to think that we may be, because of
lack of resources, allowing people to sneak through the cracks
is problematic and very troubling. So I would rather be
proactive, and then if there is something that the Chairman, in
his amazing leadership, and Senator Collins can do to provide
the resources to fill that void, that would be helpful.
Assistant Secretary Heyman, thank you, sir. Is it my
understanding that there is a backlog of over--and this may
have been asked, and I apologize. I actually just had a
briefing on Yemen, so I was a little delayed. But is there a
backlog of over 1.6 million potential visa overstays? I think
that is what Mr. Beers was hinting at. Is that number accurate?
Mr. Beers. Sir, that is my bailiwick.
Senator Brown. Oh, I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Beers. That is quite all right. There was a backlog of
1.6 million. Over the last several weeks, we have worked at a
very high level of activity to deal with this.
Senator Brown. So what is the number now, do you think?
Mr. Beers. The number is less than half of that number in
that the people who were included in that 1.6 million, over
half of them have already left the country. They were in an
overstay status when they left the country, but they left the
country after they passed into the overstay status, and we had
not determined that.
There is a much smaller number who have changed status;
that is, they have applied for a different visa or in some
cases they may have had an application for refugee status or
something along those lines.
The remaining people--just to assure you, anybody who left
after they were an overstay will not be admitted again because
we have their biometric data, and if they apply for a visa,
they will be denied a visa because they overstayed on an
earlier visa. And if they come through the Visa Waiver Program,
we have their biometric data in that way, and we will see who
they are when they seek to get off the plane and pass through
immigration. They will not be admitted. They will be returned
to the country from which they came. So that is the first half.
Then the second half----
Senator Brown. Let me just stay on that first half. Is it
true that it is 180 days after their visa expires that they are
considered having overstayed their visa?
Mr. Beers. We know when they overstay on the day that they
have overstayed.
Senator Brown. Yes, but we are a non-visa waiver country
and we do not consider them really overstayed until 180 days.
Isn't that right?
Mr. Beers. Well, because that is the terms of the Visa
Waiver Program entry.
Senator Brown. And why is it so long? It just does not make
sense to me. I know when I go to other countries, we have to go
through hoops to get into the country and then leave the
country. I am a U.S. Senator.
Mr. Beers. Ms. Jacobs, do you want to describe what the
different classes are?
Senator Brown. No, I do not need a lesson on classes. I am
trying to pick up where Mr. Beers was zeroing in on. We have
all these people here that are overstaying, and it does not
seem like we are really zeroing in to either get them
reclassified, helping them out if they want a different type of
visa. What are the efforts? Am I missing something?
Mr. Heyman. Let me just say one thing that Mr. Beers did
not get to say, which is that the number of 1.6 million will be
down to zero in the next week or so, and we have committed to
come back to brief you on that.
Senator Brown. That is fair. See, I asked you the right
question.
Mr. Beers. No, I was going to get there. [Laughter.]
Senator Brown. He is much quicker.
Mr. Beers. The other half are now going through two
databases to determine, first, whether or not there is any
derogatory information that was available before or after they
came into this country; and, second, whether or not they would
be subject to the targeting rules that the Customs and Border
Protection organization runs against people who are in this
country. That will reduce the number from the remaining half to
a smaller number who will be classified as persons of interest.
The entire remaining number will be turned over to ICE with a
notation as to who are the most prominent numbers, and as Mr.
Heyman said, I am expecting a report of the completion of this
process tomorrow. We will get back to the Committee as quickly
as possible, at Senator Lieberman's request.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Brown. We will have
a few more questions each and then let all of you go back to
work.
Let me pick up where Senator Brown ended and where I ended
on my first round. So we understand now what the Department has
done to work through this backlog that existed of overstays,
but let us talk now about what is the ideal state we are
looking forward to in terms of an exit system, as I mentioned,
so we do not develop another backlog and so we have a much more
contemporaneous understanding of where people are after they
come into the country, or at least did they leave when they
were supposed to leave when their legal right to be here ended.
And as I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Kean and
Mr. Hamilton, when they testified before us, again called for a
comprehensive biometric exit system. And then GAO recently
reported that the current biographic system continues to be
full of problems.
So take a minute, because this really is important to the
Committee, and tell us what the biographic system is, how it
works, and whether you agree that we should be working toward a
comprehensive biometric system, how that would work, and what
you need to get there as quickly as possible.
Mr. Beers. Mr. Heyman, do you want to start with the
enhanced biographic that you have been working on?
Mr. Heyman. One of the challenges that we have had with
overstays historically is that the biographic information is
not easy for us to reconcile in terms of who is here and who is
not here.
Chairman Lieberman. So what does ``biographic'' mean?
Mr. Heyman. ``Biographic'' means the name, date of birth,
the textual information that we gather on departure of an
individual.
Chairman Lieberman. So we recorded it when they came in?
Mr. Heyman. We got it when they came in, from the passport
information.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Heyman. And we get it when you leave.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Heyman. And so we actually have real-time biographic
exit, but the question is, over the last several years, we have
been trying to improve the ability and the integrity of that
data so that we can actually be sure that when we think
somebody has left, they have left, or when we think they have
overstayed, they have overstayed. And we have not had that
until recently.
Over the last several months, Mr. Beers' folks have been
doing deep dives into the data on a pilot basis to see if we
cannot get better integrity and be able to do a better job of
actually knowing real-time when people have left using the
biographic analysis. And the answer is we think we can. And the
result of that is that once we complete the backlog and we can
do real-time biographic, that will help us in the near term--in
fact, we are doing that now--be able to accurately assess
overstays on a more real-time basis.
Chairman Lieberman. So that makes sense in that when you
come into the country, not only do you give the biometric data
by putting your fingerprint down, but there is passport
information, so that is in the record. And when you leave the
country, that is in the record, and presumably that is not a
complicated data entry matter to find out who has not left
after the date at which their visa expired, right?
Mr. Heyman. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. So what you are saying is you think you
can do better at working that biographic system.
Mr. Heyman. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. Are you still thinking about going over
to a biometric system?
Mr. Heyman. Yes.
Mr. Beers. Sir, we have not stopped thinking about this. As
you know, we have run some pilot programs and some cost
estimates.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Beers. The last cost estimate we had, the lowest cost
estimate we have ever had, was $3 billion over 10 years. We are
still looking for a more cost-effective solution to close the
gap between the enhanced biographic that we are currently
working with and the validity of the biometric exit.
Chairman Lieberman. Is biometric, just for the record,
largely a fingerprint or----
Mr. Beers. Although we can come up with another solution,
but that is what we have spent our time looking at.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Beers. That is what the $3 billion estimate was
associated with.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you conclude that it is more
effective to have a biometric than a biographic system?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I have said before, before this Committee,
that in the end that is the highest fidelity system that we
would have. The question that we are faced with is whether or
not the highest fidelity system is sufficiently cost-effective
in the current budgetary environment, and that is why we have
asked S&T to look hard and see if they can come up with perhaps
even a new way to approach this problem. We do not have the
results of that yet.
Chairman Lieberman. That is important. So that is the first
step, and it is a significant step. But let us say whether it
is enhanced biographic or biometric, either way you are going
to know, am I right, which of the people who have come into the
country on a visa have overstayed the visa?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. And then what do we do?
Mr. Beers. That is where the visa backlog and the going-
forward system is going to identify in near real time after
they pass into the overstay status whether or not--as a result
of the interrogation of the databases--they are persons of high
interest because of some derogatory information or behavioral
activities which I can talk to you more about in a classified
setting. This information says that we ought to really pay more
attention to this particular person, which is not to say that
the other names will not go to ICE, but then ICE will have to
decide with respect to whom. This goes back to Senator Paul's
concern about focusing on the high-risk persons first, who the
people that we would put in the high-risk category are in order
to do that.
But the thing I want to tell you is that does not stop the
recurrent vetting that we will have to continue to do to ensure
that, as I said earlier, if more information comes in at a
later point in time, even though it is historical information,
we want to get that information to the investigator.
Chairman Lieberman. So this is a question really for ICE,
but maybe you know. This is a very labor intensive, but I
presume in the ideal system that on the day somebody's name
popped up as their visa has expired and they should have left
the country and we do not have a biographic or a biometric
indication that they have, that somebody would begin to look
for them, presumably at their last known address or whatever.
But I assume that is not happening now? Leave aside for a
moment they are screening--which is a very good move, of
course, to try to set a kind of priority based on activities or
suspicions. But right now what does ICE do about all those
people who overstay their visas?
Mr. Beers. Let me focus on the persons of interest because
that will give you a sense of what they can do. They can look,
as you quite correctly said, at the last known address. They
would look to see what other evidence there is in any databases
that they might be able to access that would provide some
further information about where that person was or what that
person was doing. So they would look, for example, at if they
got a driver's license. They would look for whether or not the
person had a phone. They would look for whether or not the
person had a credit card and other kinds of indicators that are
publicly available information which would help establish
location so that they could zero in on that person. So the
front end of that is preparing the case, and then the back end
of that is for the ICE investigator to go out and actually try
to find the person.
Chairman Lieberman. To the best of your knowledge, is ICE
able to do those kinds of checks on everybody who overstays
their visa?
Mr. Beers. Certainly not on everybody who overstays their
visa, no, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. So we have to get to a point where a
person who comes in on a tourist or student visa, or any other
kind of limited-time visa, worries that the odds are that they
are going to be apprehended. I fear that right now the odds are
that they can probably avoid detection, whether they are here
for evil reasons or, as most of them probably are, just here to
work and make a living. Either case is a violation of our law.
My time is up. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Heyman, there is some good news in your
testimony on the issue of applying new data to these holders
now, and I believe your written testimony says that to date,
for this fiscal year, DHS has revoked 782 visas using this
process of using the kinds of new information that Under
Secretary Beers has referred to to revoke visas. And this
brings to mind the Abdulmutallab case where there was a lack of
understanding that the Christmas Day bomber even had a U.S.
visa.
Assistant Secretary Jacobs, this is an issue that we talked
about extensively in April of last year when you testified, and
we talked about the misspelling of Abdulmutallab's name by
embassy officials which resulted, at least initially, in the
failure to realize that he held a U.S. visa.
Now, your testimony today says, ``For visa applications, we
employ strong, sophisticated name-searching algorithms to
ensure matches between names . . . and any derogatory
information. . . .'' And then you go on to say something which
puzzles me. You said, ``This robust searching capability, which
takes into account variations in spelling, has been central to
our procedures since [the] lookout system checks were mandated
following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.'' So I am trying
to reconcile your testimony today when you say that we have had
the capacity to check for variations in spelling since we
instituted these procedures many years ago following the 1993
bombing and what happened in the Abdulmutallab case.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Senator. Actually, we are dealing
with two different databases and so that explains the
difference. What we created after the original attack on the
World Trade Center was our lookout system, or what we call
CLASS, where we develop many algorithms that allow us to search
for names using what we call ``fuzzy logic,'' which basically
means you can misspell a name, if there are differences in how,
for example, an Arabic name is transliterated. Our CLASS system
for many years has had these sophisticated abilities or
algorithms so that no matter what you put in, it would bring up
several different results so that you could look through to see
if it applied to the applicant.
That search capability was not available in our Consular
Consolidated Database when the name was put in for Mr.
Abdulmutallab, and so one of the changes that we made after the
attack Christmas 2009 was to make the same fuzzy logic search
capability available in our Consular Consolidated Database, and
we tell everyone now when they are searching for names or any
other information that they have to use what we call our person
finder search, which involves this fuzzy logic.
So today if that name was misspelled and put into the
Consular Consolidated Database, it would, in fact, have hit on
this name and several others that came close.
Senator Collins. But earlier today you and Under Secretary
Beers indicated that there are still some problems with
databases and their capacity to interrelate. So give me your
assessment--it seems like we have all these databases, and the
FBI example of the fingerprints is a perfect example. That just
seems like such a logical place to look. So what is your
assessment of the compatibility of all of these databases that
are critical to our ability to protect against terrorists
traveling to this country and overstaying visas or all of the
other problems that could cause us to have someone in our midst
who could do harm?
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. That is a very good question. I
would say that one of the issues that we focused on after 9/11,
in addition to the need for Federal agencies to do a better job
of data sharing, we also looked at all of the stand-alone
systems that each of us use and tried to figure out how can
they speak to each other.
When DHS was creating US-VISIT--frankly, I think US-VISIT
is one of the best examples of how agencies can partner
together because one of the first things we did was to make
sure that our visa information was made available to the
inspectors at the ports of entry through US-VISIT. When people
come in, they are able to pull up on their screen the
information from our visa database. They are able to look at
the fingerprints that we collect. It is interoperable. It works
extremely well.
That goes for the FBI as well. We had some issues in the
very beginning, but we have worked through those, so that all
of our visa applicants are checked against a DHS fingerprint
database and the FBI database.
It is true that there are some agencies who did not
participate in this exercise that we all underwent early on
after 9/11. The Department of Defense, for example, has still
some stand-alone systems where certain information resides.
Now, DOD does or is supposed to share any information on known
or suspected terrorists. That should come into these other
systems that do talk to each other. But to the extent that
there are other people in those stand-alone databases that are
not automatically checked against, something might be missed.
What we are doing now in the case of Iraqi refugees and SIV
applicants, for example, is we check all of these existing
systems, but in addition, we are now doing separate checks
against DOD systems. And DOD is working very hard to make their
system interoperable with our systems.
So there is still some work to be done, that is absolutely
true, but I think certainly between the State Department, DHS,
and FBI, it really is a good-news story.
Mr. Beers. Could I add something, Senator?
Senator Collins. Yes, Under Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. We would have interviewed the individual in
question when----
Senator Collins. When he got here.
Mr. Beers [continued]. He got here, based on the
information that was available. Given the new system that we
had, it is quite possible that he would have been denied
boarding overseas. But we did not have that system in place
until after this event. Had that person's visa been revoked, he
would have been denied boarding. That is a system that we have
worked out between ourselves in terms of how to do that because
just because the State Department revokes a visa does not mean
they have any way of telling the person that the visa has been
revoked. They would have to find the person and tell him that,
and the person would still have the visa in the passport. So
that is another improvement that we have had since then by
being able to keep people off the planes rather than having to
wait until they get here before we get a chance to talk to
them.
Senator Collins. That is absolutely critical, but another
aspect of the Abdulmutallab case that was most disturbing to me
was that the derogatory information about Abdulmutallab from
his father to our embassy officials did not trigger the
revocation of his visa and, thus, block him from boarding the
plane in the first place. And I know improvements have been
made so that supposedly that would not happen today, but that
still is so troubling to me that he was not listed on the
watchlist and preferably on the No Fly List, but also that his
visa was not revoked. That was a pretty gaping hole.
If I could just ask one more very quick question, it is
about the Visa Security Program, which we have talked about
many times. We have talked about it over and over in our April
hearing in 2010 and again today in both of our opening
statements, and we have talked about how DHS and the State
Department have identified 57 posts as high risk. But I want to
go to a subcategory of the high-risk posts, and that is, the
GAO tells us that 20 are characterized as the highest-risk
posts. So why aren't we covering at least those 20? We have 19
posts covered now, but 5 of those are not in the highest-risk
posts.
I understand that there are limited resources, but I do not
understand why we would not assign DHS officers to the highest-
risk posts first.
Mr. Heyman. So the process for deciding how to get a visa
security officer to a post includes a joint risk assessment
between the State Department and the Department of Homeland
Security. We do this on an annual basis, and that is where that
ranking comes up. So we have a sense of priority, not
necessarily need per se, but it is a priority ranking.
Last year, as you know, we had additional funding for visa
security officers, and we expanded the program to the extent we
could. When we consult with the State Department either because
of an interest on our part to enhance the visa security and to
provide Visa Security Units or when the State Department talks
to us, that has to be jointly done, and it has to also be done
with the posts. The ambassador has the final say of who can
come to post and whether there is even space available.
So some of the things that we go through are: (A) what is
the priority; (B) what are the resources available; and, (C)
whether there is even space available. We continue to review
that. Last year, I think quite effectively, in the 19 posts we
had about 815,000 applicants for visas of which 105,000
required further review and 1,300 we recommended be refused.
And so there is quite a big tempo on that, and we, as I said,
will continue to review that both in terms of resource
availability and priorities.
Senator Collins. Well, thank you for that response. It
still troubles me very much if an ambassador is blocking the
implementation of this critical program in any of the posts
that have been ranked the highest risk. Security ought to be
No. 1.
Mr. Heyman. In the past year there have not been any
blockings of that nature that I am aware of, but that is one of
the considerations that goes into it, whether a post has space
available.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs. Senator, if I may just add very quickly just
two things. One is that for the existing VSUs and any future
ones, we did sign an MOU with ICE earlier this year that really
defines very well the roles and responsibilities of the visa
security officer, the consular officer, and then if we have
someone from diplomatic security helping in the consular
section. And so we are very pleased about that. It is something
that Assistant Secretary John Morton and I worked on together,
so we know that for the current ones and any ones in the future
that those roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.
And I would also like to add that, in addition to the
reviews that are done by ICE overseas in these Visa Security
Units, in fact, ICE here in Washington has access to all of the
same visa information that is available to the ICE officers in
the field. This comes through our Consular Consolidated
Database. And it is true that every day they are reviewing that
information right here in Washington, and if they see cases of
concern, they notify the post. And these are posts where we do
not even have VSUs. So they are able, in fact, to do that
review back here and have input into cases.
Senator Collins. Well, either the program is needed or it
is not needed. If you can do it remotely, then maybe we should
be questioning the whole program. But if the program is needed,
it does not make sense to me that only 9 of the 20 highest-risk
posts have DHS officials stationed there to review visas. That
just does not make sense to me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins. I agree
with you. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
On the underwear bomber, not only does it perplex me we did
not take his visa away, why didn't we send the Nigerian police
over to his house? His dad is there reporting him. Why wasn't
someone looking for him? I mean, it is really doing police
work. That is what I think more of this has to be about, good
police work, rather than focusing on just database searches and
all that. And we have to take away visas. But when someone's
dad comes and says they are a threat, the police should have
gone over to the guy's dorm or his house or tried to find him
somewhere in Nigeria. I am not aware that there was an active
effort looking for this man before he came over here.
But I wanted to get back to the FBI list and the idea with
the Bowling Green terrorists and the fingerprint on the bomb.
You said we need to ask the FBI, when they came in in 2007, or
2009, there was no FBI database or something called the
Terrorist Screening Database? That did not exist in 2007 and
you did not have access to that?
Mr. Beers. Sir, we had access to that. This particular
file, this particular print, was not in any of the databases
that the FBI had to which we have access.
Senator Paul. That makes it clear. So the problem really
was not that you did not have access to lists. They did not put
the information on the list. I know nobody wants to talk about
it. They just want to say it is better. But there was a problem
then. There obviously was a problem because we let somebody in
with fingerprints on a bomb. It really sounds like the problem
mostly originates in the FBI, that they did not put this
information into the correct database, because you do not now
have new access to a new database. They are just doing a better
job, supposedly, getting the information into the database? Am
I correct?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Paul. Were either of these two Bowling Green
terrorists on any kind of watchlist?
Mr. Beers. At the time that they were put into the asylum
system, no.
Senator Paul. So that would have all occurred after the
whole investigation started?
Mr. Beers. Unless the information had been available
before, and then they would have been on a watchlist.
Senator Paul. All right. That is all I have. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Paul.
Thanks to the three witnesses, Under Secretary Beers,
Assistant Secretary Jacobs, and Assistant Secretary Heyman.
Frankly, thanks up front for all that you and your predecessors
have done to create this quite remarkable and, I think, largely
effective system we have for preventing terrorists from
traveling into the United States to attack us. And I guess I
would say thanks for the work that we are going to continue to
do together to try to close the gaps that continue to exist. It
has been a very informative hearing, and I thank you very much
for your participation.
We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for
additional questions and statements.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IMPROVING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning, and I welcome the
witnesses particularly and urge you to feel comfortable and
take your seats. It is good to have you here.
This is another in a series of hearings that Senator
Collins and I and our Committee have been doing as we approach
the 10th anniversary of 9/11 to essentially evaluate what
lessons we learned from that tragic day and what we have done
to act on those lessons. One of the revelations of that day was
the enormous gaps in our emergency communications
capabilities. The fact is that on 9/11, a lot of first
responders could not coordinate their rescue efforts because
they could not talk to each other.
As one New York City fire chief told the 9/11 Commission,
``People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what
was happening a hundred floors above us than we did in the
lobby [of the World Trade Center].'' And that proved fatal
because many firefighters inside the Twin Towers did not hear
the call to evacuate.
In its report, the 9/11 Commission said, ``The inability to
communicate was a critical problem at the World Trade Center,
Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites, where
multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded. The
occurrence of this at three very different sites is strong
evidence that compatible and adequate communications among
public safety organizations at the local, State, and Federal
levels remains an important problem.''
As a result, the 9/11 Commission recommended the Federal
Government take the lead in helping State and local governments
establish interoperable communications systems.
A year after the Commission issued its report, Hurricane
Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast, and we saw there the
relevance of the critique of the 9/11 Commission not just to
man-made disasters, such as a terrorist attack, but to natural
disasters as well. Because on the Gulf Coast, as a result of
Hurricane Katrina, the lack of interoperable communications was
compounded by an inability of many communications systems to
operate at all under those circumstances.
Phone lines, cell towers, and electrical systems were
destroyed by the storm, knocking many communications systems
offline and making it impossible at times for many first
responders and government officials on the Gulf Coast to talk
to each other.
Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi memorably said, ``My
head of the National Guard might as well have been a Civil War
general . . . because he could only find out what [was] going
on by sending somebody.''
Today at this hearing, we are going to assess what progress
we have made and what gaps remain in making public safety
communications more interoperable and more operable in a
crisis.
In assessing what has happened since 9/11, it is important
to remember, I think, that planning and funding decisions for
emergency communications traditionally have been splintered
across over 55,000 public safety organizations across our
country that operate on many different bands of radio spectrum.
But as we look back almost 10 years now, I would say that
significant progress has been made in bringing these varied
organizations together.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, which was the second wave of legislation from the 9/11
Commission report, which, again, I am proud to say originated
in our Committee, created the Office of Emergency
Communications within the Department of Homeland Security to
coordinate with State and local governments in addressing the
many challenges that come with trying to create interoperable
communications systems.
With assistance from the OEC, each State and territory has
now created a communications interoperability plan and has
appointed a State interoperability coordinator, and I am
pleased to say that these officials meet face to face twice a
year and are in ongoing communication about how to improve
interoperability.
That is very significant because not so many years ago, it
was not always clear who the point person in each State was
when it came to interoperability or if there actually was such
a point person.
In 2008, OEC issued the National Emergency Communications
Plan to establish clear goals for improving interoperability,
and to ensure that the plan is more than just a piece of paper,
OEC has been testing to see if its goals are being met. In
2010, OEC tested 60 urban areas to see if they could
demonstrate that they could rapidly establish communications
among agencies from all levels of government in the event of an
emergency. I am pleased to say that all 60 urban areas met the
goals set by OEC. They are now working with the States to test
the capabilities of the more than 3,000 counties across the
country.
Investments in many State and local communications systems,
which have been significant, supplemented by over $4 billion in
grant funds from the Department of Homeland Security, have
significantly enhanced voice communications and
interoperability of voice communications over what they were a
few years ago. In this regard, it is comforting to report that
one of the greatest success stories actually comes from
Louisiana, which has used State money, DHS grants, and stimulus
dollars to build a single, statewide radio communications
system that provides daily voice communications to more than
60,000 Federal, State, and local users.
This system, incidentally, proved its worth during the
evacuation of almost 2 million people before Hurricane Gustav
in August 2008 and again after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
when the system was the backbone for establishing interoperable
communications among the various first responders in the Gulf
States. So that is real progress.
But despite such progress in voice communications, we still
have failed to fulfill the recommendation of the 9/11
Commission to set aside a portion of the radio spectrum and
dedicate it to create a coast-to-coast, interoperable,
emergency digital communications network for first responders.
We have the opportunity to do that right now, and I think we
need to seize it.
Currently, public safety agencies transmit on narrow slices
of non-contiguous spectrum that cannot handle the kinds of
large chunks of data available to the average smartphone user.
Turning over a large contiguous slice of the broadband
spectrum, which is known as the D Block, to public safety would
give our first responders a 21st Century communications system
with equipment that could share information with any other
department anywhere in the Nation. Right now, as one of my
staff members put it, one of my more eloquent and colorful
staff members, the average firefighter or first responder does
not have the capability that the average teenager with a
smartphone has, and that really is unacceptable.
If we close this gap, as an example, firefighters could get
digital building diagrams from the local building department as
they approach a burning building so they know the floor plan
and exits before they go in.
Paramedics could send a patient's vital signs to the
emergency room so doctors and nurses would know what they were
dealing with before the patient arrived.
A police officer at the scene of a crime could take
electronic fingerprints and immediately compare them to
Federal, State, and local databases. Or the officer who gets a
partial read of a license plate could immediately tap into a
database to help determine who owns the car and whether they
have outstanding warrants against them.
Senator McCain and I have sponsored legislation to set
aside the D Block for first responders, and we are committed
now to working with Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison,
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Commerce Committee, who have
reported similar D Block legislation out of their Committee.
But I will note that Senator Reid, to bring what we are
talking about that began 10 years ago right down to today, in
his proposal to end this debt ceiling crisis that approaches,
that we are in the middle of--and D-Day is next Tuesday,
apparently--has included auction money from the spectrum as
contributing to diminishing the deficit, but has allocated $7
billion of that for these purposes. For reasons that are not
clear to me yet--and we have to talk to him and his staff--that
is $4 billion less than the Rockefeller-Hutchison bill and
Senator McCain and my bill, and we want to see what is going on
there. But all the authorizing language is now in Senator
Reid's debt ceiling proposal, so perhaps one of the witnesses
is either clairvoyant or has been tapping phones and emails and
can predict better than Senator Collins and I can what actually
will happen here in the next 3 or 4 days on the debt ceiling.
But here all of a sudden--and we do not know whether this is in
Speaker Boehner's proposal or not because we have not seen the
language--we have the possibility of actually achieving this as
a resolution of this larger crisis in the next week, and that
would be great.
In this 10th year after 9/11, adopting this legislation I
think is one of the best things to do to show that we have
learned the lessons from 9/11. The bottom line is, our first
responders need a nationwide network giving them the most
modern broadband capabilities.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, as you were talking about the debt crisis, I
could not help but think that it would be good if something
positive came out of this debacle that we find ourselves in.
Good morning to all of our witnesses. Mr. Chairman, I am
not sure that you realize that we not only have a witness from
the State of Maine with us, but that the Connecticut witness
hails from Milo, Maine.
Chairman Lieberman. I would like to say I knew that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Varney, this does not put your credibility in doubt
with me at all. [Laughter.]
It only enhances your credibility.
Senator Collins. I was just going to say, be careful there.
This is a big plus and now gives me great confidence in what
Connecticut is doing as well as what Maine is doing.
The effectiveness of emergency communications has emerged
as a concern due to the failures that occurred in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks and the Hurricane Katrina disaster. As both of
these catastrophes demonstrated, the lack of reliable
communications before, during, and after a disaster can cost
lives, worsen damage, and slow response operations.
Not only did the 9/11 attacks represent a ``failure of
imagination,'' as the 9/11 Commission found, they also revealed
the inadequacy of communications equipment, technology, and
systems. The 9/11 Commission report cited many problems with
communications among firefighters on September 11, 2001, and
found that the technical failure of the fire department's
radios was a ``contributing factor'' to the loss of firefighter
lives, albeit not the primary cause.
Incredibly, when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, we saw
exactly the same kinds of problems that we had witnessed 4
years earlier in the 9/11 attacks. Emergency personnel had
incompatible equipment even within the same Louisiana parish.
Major communications problems arose when towers and electronic
equipment were destroyed, 911 centers were rendered inoperable,
and the FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Systems were
overwhelmed.
A FEMA official who was in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina estimated that the lack of effective communication at
the Superdome reduced FEMA's effectiveness by 90 percent.
This Committee conducted an in-depth investigation into the
failed response to Hurricane Katrina and detailed the various
communication failures associated with that storm. Although
there are numerous examples, one of the most notable
assessments that sticks in my mind is the one that the Chairman
has already cited, and that was from Governor Haley Barbour
when he said that it was as if he were back in the Civil War
because he had to send messengers to communicate. He noted that
he did have helicopters instead of horses, so it was a little
faster, but the same concept.
When seconds and minutes are important, communications
systems must be both operable and interoperable so that first
responders can talk to each other and coordinate their
operations. We never again want to see individuals on rooftops
pleading for help that may be delayed because of an inability
of responders to communicate. We must be especially sensitive
to the ability to communicate with the most vulnerable in our
population, such as children, the elderly, the homebound, and
those with special needs.
As the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, how first
responders communicate with one another and how Americans
receive emergency information remain challenges.
Public safety officials clearly should have access to
state-of-the-art, interoperable communications equipment to use
during emergencies. But we must also be sure that resources are
invested carefully and that an effective and efficient
structure is established to manage emergency communications.
That, too, was a problem after Hurricane Katrina. There was not
a command-and-control structure in place that could be
implemented even if the equipment had been there and had
operated. And that is why plans and systems must be tested
during State, regional, and national level exercises.
Today, the Committee will examine the progress made during
the past decade and explore what more needs to be done. After
Hurricane Katrina, Congress created the Office of Emergency
Communications within DHS, which developed a National Emergency
Communications Plan, stood up Regional Working Groups, and
established goals to measure progress.
The Chairman and I also created an Interoperability
Emergency Communications Grant Program to support State plans.
This program has supplemented other Federal, State, and local
investments. According to CRS, as much as $13 billion in
Federal funding has been spent on emergency communications
during the past 9 years.
What exactly do we have to show for these investments? Are
we making sufficient progress? Is the money being well spent so
that we are better prepared for the next major disaster?
I know from my experience in my home State of Maine that a
great deal has been done to increase the ability of first
responders to communicate with each other. Notably--and I want
to ask our witness, the head of the Maine Emergency Management
Agency, about this today--our State has been working with
Canada to ensure that first responders across our more than
600-mile international border can communicate with each other
in an emergency. When you look at the border of Maine with
Canada, there are communities on both sides, and they often
have assistance packs to allow for help when there is an
emergency, but they have to be able to communicate as well.
The investments, training, new equipment, and planning
clearly have produced some successes. For example, in recent
testimony, the FEMA Administrator testified that interoperable
communications were effectively used after the Joplin,
Missouri, tornado and that the success of State and local
responders reduced the burden on the Federal Government.
Another issue is the importance of effective communication
with the public before, during, and after an incident. This is
an issue that has been of great interest to the Chairman and
me. We have talked about who would be the most credible
spokesperson, who should get information out to the public,
particularly if there were a nuclear disaster and the
instruction might well be to shelter in place, not to flee.
Much like the communication among first responders, the
communication between officials and the public is vitally
important and can save lives. I will soon introduce
legislation, on which I look forward to working with the
Chairman, to strengthen the Nation's public alert and warning
system.
But, again, today I want to thank all of our witnesses for
being here and especially to welcome our two witnesses from the
great State of Maine. [Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Before we get to the first witness, apparently there is a
public safety meeting of some kind in Washington, and we are
honored to have, in addition to our witnesses, a number of
first responder officials. I am going to call out some names
that I have, and I apologize if I have missed anybody, but I
thank you for your service and for being here:
Chief Harlin McEwen, who is Chairman of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police Communications and Technology
Committee; Sheriff Paul Fitzgerald, President of the National
Sheriffs Association, and Sheriff of Story County in Iowa;
Chief Gregg Riddle, incoming President of the Association of
Public Safety Communications Officials International; Chief Al
Gillespie, North Las Vegas Fire Department, incoming President
of the International Association of Fire Chiefs; Chief Gregory
Frederick, President of the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs
Association, from the Louisville Fire Department; Chief Charles
``Chuck'' Dowd, Deputy Chief for Communications of the NYPD, we
welcome you back. You have become not quite a regular but a
frequent visitor here--and Kevin McGinnis, State Trauma
Coordinator and Chief of Mobile Health Services from----
Senator Collins. From the great State of Maine.
Chairman Lieberman. Oh, yes. [Laughter.]
We have an ongoing routine. Anyway, we are honored to have
all of you here.
Our first witness at the table is Greg Schaffer, who is the
Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs
Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Thanks
for being here, and please proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF GREGORY SCHAFFER,\1\ ACTING DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a
pleasure to be here today to talk about the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to support emergency communications
and the emerging capabilities of our State, local, tribal, and
Federal resources in that space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Schaffer appears in the Appendix
on page 599.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's hearing is just the latest in this Committee's
consistently strong support for first responder emergency
communication needs, a tradition that includes the passage of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and the
statutory creation of the Office of Emergency Communications.
There are three offices within the National Protection and
Programs Directorate that directly support emergency management
and interoperable emergency communications capabilities:
The Office of Emergency Communications, which really helps
create the foundation for first responders and public safety
officials at all levels of government to talk to each other
during an emergency.
The National Communications System works in times of
disaster to ensure that there is priority communication
capability for Federal, State, local, and other officials, as
well as creating the ability, along with FEMA, to restore those
communications when they are disrupted by a man-made or natural
disaster.
The third office, the Office of Infrastructure Protection,
works across all sectors of critical infrastructure to ensure
that owners and operators of our most critical infrastructures
have the ability to restore capabilities and that they are
provided with capabilities to communicate with the Federal
Government during a time of disaster.
I am happy to elaborate in all of these areas and answer
your questions, but I would like to focus on some success
stories, as has been noted.
There has been significant progress made in the area of
emergency communications through investments in planning,
governance, training, interagency coordination, and technology
support. As a result of those efforts and work in that area, we
do have a better situation than we have had in the past, but
there is still certainly more progress to be made.
One example is the April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig explosion, which released enormous amounts of oil,
as we know, in the Gulf of Mexico. As noted, the Louisiana
Wireless Information Network was used as a major backbone for
communications for emergency responders after that incident.
Indeed, within 24 hours, the LWIN mobile tower capability was
launched to Mobile, Alabama, and voice communications were
established between area commands in Robert, Louisiana, and two
unified command groups in Houma, Louisiana, and Mobile,
Alabama. Within 48 hours, technicians were working with the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety to connect the statewide
radio system in Mississippi as well as the Orange Beach Fire
Department radio system in Alabama to LWIN through various
motor bridge devices that allowed for effective communications
all the way from the Texas-Louisiana border to the Florida
Panhandle.
Louisiana also issued over 200 portable radios from their
State's cache of 600 to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to
immediately establish voice interoperability, and then within a
week, radio systems in Austin, Houston, and Harrison Counties
in Texas were added to the system through interoperable RF
subsystem interfaces, which extended the network, which was now
called Gulf WIN, all the way to central Texas.
This rapid connectivity of multiple systems was possible
due to the integration of communications unit leaders at all
levels of government, and Louisiana, Mississippi, and Orange
Beach granted access to individual radio IDs in all of these
systems, which essentially allowed the use of one handset to
talk through all of the networks.
That network is still in operation today, and as we come
into hurricane season, it is good to know that we have a
capability that really connects the entire region.
As a second example, as was noted by the Chairman, Joplin,
Missouri, experienced an F-5 tornado that, while tragic, did
display new capabilities or enhanced capabilities of our
communications networks. The investments in standards and in
grant funding for interoperable communications equipment and
training really did yield measurable improved results of our
communications capabilities. The city of Joplin's 10-channel
trunked radio system experienced heavy use, but it continued to
operate throughout the incident response, and the establishment
of an incident command capability reduced the confusion that
can occur after an event of this kind.
Indeed, in the very week before this event occurred, there
was a training by DHS, a national-level exercise, with many of
the responders participating and being brought up to speed on
the way to respond in a mock earthquake scenario. So these
examples really show that we have made critical strides in
strengthening the overall security and national preparedness of
the communications systems over the last decade.
The public safety community, while enhancing their
capabilities on the mission-critical voice side, they do not
have all of the capabilities that they need from a data
capability perspective. The availability of new technologies in
the Long Term Evolution space--4G mobile capabilities to allow
them to use data as mission critical as we do with voice
capabilities today--is something that we believe must be
realized for the community to bring greater operability,
interoperability, and capability across the board.
In order to realize that vision, the Administration is
fully committed to working with Congress to ensure the passage
of legislation that meets the critical needs of the public
safety community to have broadband communications capabilities.
The fact that Congress has been working across several
committees, multiple jurisdictions, including Chairman
Lieberman, Chairman Rockefeller, and Senator McCain, we believe
is a sign that we can indeed get this accomplished.
We will continue to work with you to achieve this goal. We
thank you very much for the opportunity to testify this
morning, and we look forward to ensuring that in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks of 2001, we are taking enormous strides to
make sure that emergency communications capabilities continue
to advance.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Schaffer. That was a good
beginning.
Next we go to the frequently mentioned Michael Varney.
Senator Collins, you will be interested to hear that Mr. Varney
brought with him from Maine not only enormous capability but a
tremendous work ethic. He is here today as the Statewide
Interoperability Coordinator from Connecticut, but he is also
the Director of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications at the
Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, the
Vice Chairman of the National Council of Statewide
Interoperability Coordinators, and the Chief of the Ellington,
Connecticut, Volunteer Fire Department.
Thank you for all your public service.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL D. VARNEY,\1\ STATEWIDE INTEROPERABILITY
COORDINATOR, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND
PUBLIC PROTECTION
Mr. Varney. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I would
like to thank you for allowing me the opportunity to provide
testimony on this important topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Varney appears in the Appendix on
page 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Senator indicated, I am the Statewide
Interoperability Coordinator for the State of Connecticut in
addition to serving as the Vice Chairman of the National
Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators.
Being a local first responder and serving in the capacity
as a fire chief, I can truly appreciate the efforts put toward
solving the nationwide interoperability problems and have seen
their positive impact directly in the field.
Close to 10 years ago since the attacks of September 11,
2001, a priority for States has been improving emergency
responder communications capabilities. Public safety responders
need the ability to have the most accurate, reliable
information and to be able to communicate directly and
instantaneously with their assisting and supporting responders.
Interoperability of public safety communications takes
significant coordination to solve and is being addressed by the
creation and use of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. In
each State and territory, there is a designated SWIC
responsible for a variety of critical planning and coordinating
functions, guided by the initiatives outlined in the National
Emergency Communications Plan and the Statewide Communication
Interoperability Plans, all of which were not coordinated
through a specific designated office prior to 2001.
In Connecticut, our Statewide Public Safety Interoperable
Communications Committee has representatives from each planning
region within our State--law enforcement, emergency medical
services, fire departments, and key State and Federal response
agencies. The abilities and relationships that are leveraged by
this group have been very successful in our efforts to improve
interoperability of public safety communications within the
State of Connecticut.
Each of the Nation's Urban Areas Security Initiative sites
developed a Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan.
Connecticut used this framework to continue to create TIC Plans
for all of the additional regions in our State. This effort was
possible because of the Interoperable Emergency Communications
Grant Program. Since the TIC Plans have been developed, they
have been used in the field by local practitioners to
successfully plan for and respond to events and emergencies
that involve multiple disciplines and jurisdictions.
In early June when tornados struck southern Massachusetts,
the Connecticut fire service was requested and responded with
significant assets, which were coordinated quickly and
efficiently between the two States due to prior planning and
exercises made possible through the IECGP-funded TIC Plan
process.
SWICs serve as members of the National Council of Statewide
Interoperability Coordinators, which was established in 2010 to
assist State and Territory interoperability coordinators with
promoting the critical importance of interoperable
communications and the sharing of best practices. As a SWIC, I
have received excellent support and engagement by the DHS
Office of Emergency Communications. Their technical support and
coordination activities have proven invaluable to our efforts
in Connecticut. Their outreach activities through SAFECOM and
the NCSWIC have listened to our concerns and priorities and
adapted their programs to make them relevant.
As I mentioned earlier, the IECGP funds such as those used
to create TIC Plans in Connecticut have been critical to the
SWICs to provide funding that ensures that federally funded
projects align to strategic plans and to implement and report
on the NECP goals, allowing DHS to measure progress in
emergency communications capabilities nationwide.
In a recent survey of SWICs conducted in June, we found
that over one-third of the SWIC positions were funded in whole
or in part by this grant program. The elimination of this
funding and reduction of related homeland security grant
programs will have a direct impact on the sustainment of the
many programs put in place to increase interoperable
communications.
We support the commitment to develop and deploy a
nationwide interoperable wireless network for public safety
that the Administration has put forward in the President's
Wireless Innovation and Infrastructure Initiative. Many of our
issues are captured within the Rockefeller-Hutchinson bill, and
we are very appreciative of Senators Lieberman and McCain's
leadership and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee in their work to reallocate the D Block for public
safety use. This leadership will ensure successful completion
of this very important milestone.
While maintaining their traditional land mobile radio
systems, our public safety agencies are increasingly using
commercial broadband systems to support their missions. We have
been relying on off-the-shelf broadband systems using laptop
computers in vehicles and communication devices such as
BlackBerrys and smartphones for remote data communications.
Although the present commercial broadband devices have some
functions that go beyond public safety communications devices,
they lack the ruggedness, reliability, and direct device-to-
device connectivity of traditional public safety radio systems.
In other words, the commercial networks do not provide the
public safety control, mission criticality, and capacity needed
for their mission.
The Statewide Interoperability Coordinators believe that
the creation and support of a wireless broadband network for
public safety is critical for interoperability and to allow
first responders to communicate and do their jobs as safely and
efficiently as possible. We appreciate your ongoing support to
make this nationwide network a reality, and the NCSWIC is very
appreciative of the initiatives supported by the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and Commerce Committees to
create a national public safety broadband wireless network.
As Senator Lieberman indicated in his comments earlier,
right now my son and daughter have more broadband capability
than my firefighters do while responding to emergencies every
day. This is a unique time to solve this problem and create a
nationwide public safety wireless broadband network. We look
forward to working with you and your Senate colleagues to pass
this law to meet public safety's needs for interoperable
communications, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
Report.
In conclusion, I again would like to thank the ongoing
tremendous support and activity by your Committee to increase
interoperable communications throughout the United States. The
Federal investment to support interoperable communications over
the past few years will continue to show its value in saving
lives and protecting property while our Nation's first
responders work together to respond to emergencies and
disasters in our homeland.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I
would be pleased to answer your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Varney, for that
excellent statement.
Now we will go to Robert McAleer, who is the Director of
the Maine Emergency Management Agency and who, as far as I
know, was not born in Connecticut. [Laughter.]
Mr. McAleer. No, sir. New Jersey.
Chairman Lieberman. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. MCALEER,\1\ DIRECTOR, MAINE EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. McAleer. Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members of
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to come before you this morning. My
name is Robert McAleer, and I am the director of the Maine
Emergency Management Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McAleer appears in the Appendix
on page 616.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would like to address the issue of communications
interoperability as it relates to the State of Maine and, in
particular, some of the accomplishments we have achieved since
2001, our work that is currently in progress, and existing gaps
that need to be addressed.
By New England standards, Maine is a large State, roughly
equivalent to the rest of the New England States combined. It
is mostly a rural State with vast areas of very limited
population and some very rugged terrain. Maine is also not a
wealthy State. These factors have made improving
interoperability a challenge.
Maine, however, has been fortunate to receive a significant
amount of Federal funding, for which we are very grateful, to
support our efforts. We estimate that approximately $9.5
million or 25 percent of our Homeland Security, Public Safety
Interoperable Communications, and Interoperable Emergency
Communications Grants funds have been dedicated to improving
communications just since 2007. We have used that funding to
leverage whatever local funding municipalities have generated
to make notable improvements.
One advantage that we have had throughout this process is
that the vast majority of our first responders use VHF radios
that transmit and receive on similar frequencies.
Because of the overwhelming similarity in equipment
statewide, our challenge has been to replace old or worn-out
equipment and to acquire new equipment where there was none or
to replace equipment that simply was inadequate to meet our
current needs.
In addition to acquiring a large number of modern radios
for our first responders, we have completed a significant
number of major projects. An attachment to my testimony
contains a detailed compilation of the projects since 2003,
examples of which are as follows: $107,000 to upgrade
communications systems throughout Sagadahoc County and complete
their narrowband transition; about $200,000 to upgrade the
communications infrastructure for the Hancock County Sheriff's
Office; $500,000 for the bulk purchase of narrowband-compliant
fire pagers; and $350,000 to support a countywide microwave
communications project in Cumberland County. The State has also
acquired four large mobile command vehicles that have state-of-
the-art radio, cell phone, internet, and satellite capabilities
for use in incident coordination. In multiple instances, these
vehicles have served as dispatch centers when fixed facilities
were out of service. We have also provided support for
communications vehicles in over half of our counties.
The State has established radio caches at crossing sites
along the U.S.-Canada Border for use by first responders moving
across the border to ensure adequate interoperable equipment is
available. Each county now has portable repeater antennas that
can be deployed to remote areas where coverage may be minimal
or to boost signals that may otherwise be blocked.
We have been able to move our EOC from a facility that was
generally inadequate to a new facility and provide the new EOC
with equipment that meets virtually all of our communications
needs. Our court system and law enforcement agencies now have
access to a data broker system that enables almost instant
access to the various types of critical information.
The majority of our law enforcement and even some fire
departments now have mobile display terminals in their
vehicles, which in many cases provide a better communications
capability than standard radios.
We realize that interoperability is not just a matter of
acquiring equipment. In many instances, process and training
also bring gains. Along those lines, we have established a
Memorandum of Understanding with the owners of six statewide
frequencies to allow incident commanders to request dedicated
use of those frequencies to establish and coordinate
communications at an incident.
We have also dedicated a significant amount of time to
communications unit leader training. This training helps us
ensure that there is sufficient expertise available at a large
event to ensure that the correct agencies are speaking on the
correct channels.
We have worked with our counties to ensure that they have
up-to-date detailed countywide communications plans to identify
all of their communications assets, to ensure that their
procedures are adequate, and to identify any gaps.
Our border with Canada has presented a unique challenge. To
meet that challenge, we have been conducting a series of cross-
border communications working sessions with our local, State,
and Federal partners on both sides of the border. These
sessions are helping us better understand our differences and
plan for how we can overcome those differences when needed.
In addition to these workshops, Maine, with the support of
our Canadian partners, applied for and received a Border
Interoperability Demonstration Pilot grant. Out of 21
applicants nationwide, Maine was one of only seven awardees. We
are using the almost $4 million provided by this grant to
significantly reduce communications gaps along the border and
establish a single common frequency that will be available for
use by first responders from both sides of the border.
Finally, the State of Maine is investing $50 million of
State funding to essentially rebuild and expand the
infrastructure backbone of the State's communication system.
When this project, MSCOMMNET, is completed, the State will have
a series of 42 interconnected transmission towers that will
replace infrastructure that has reached or passed its useful
life expectancy, provide enhanced coverage, and increase
redundancy. Of note is that part of the tower build-out is a
joint effort between the State and our Customs and Border
Patrol partners. We believe this may be the first such
partnership in the Nation. Included with this project is the
replacement of virtually all State-owned portable and mobile
radios.
In general, Maine is in a relatively healthy position with
regard to interoperability. Through the concerted efforts of
many people and the judicious use of available resources, we
have been able to accomplish a great deal. And we have
witnessed those accomplishments coming into play during real
world events. There is, however, more work that needs to be
done.
First and foremost in our view is the requirement to meet
the FCC narrowbanding mandate. While the initial estimates of
the cost to meet this requirement were staggering, we have
dedicated a major portion of available Federal funding to the
requirement as well as a concerted effort to encourage local
communities to recognize their own responsibility to invest in
the solution. Because we will be able to reallocate many of the
State radios that are being replaced as part of MSCOMMNET, we
believe that our first responders will be ready on January 1,
2013. We remain concerned, however, about communities that are
not meeting the National Incident Management System compliancy
requirements because we cannot assist them with Federal funds.
We believe firmly that during an emergency situation if we
do not have solid communications, then we will have no
coordination. We will only have chaos. For that reason,
building a solid communications capability has been a priority
for the State for a number of years. Further strengthening of
that capability and sustaining what we now have will be
priorities moving forward.
That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer
any questions you might have. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much for that good
report.
Finally, we have Charles Ramsey whom we knew here for a
long time as Chief. We welcome back now Commissioner of the
Philadelphia Police Department and President of the Major
Cities Chiefs Association.
Commissioner, it is an honor to have you here. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES H. RAMSEY,\1\ POLICE COMMISSIONER,
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Ramsey. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman
Lieberman, Senator Collins, and all invited speakers and
guests. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss a critical
issue affecting all public safety and law enforcement
organizations across our country and our ability to serve the
public. Having had 42 years in law enforcement, I have
witnessed many important changes in emergency communications
across police departments in three cities: first in Chicago for
30 years, then as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department
here in Washington, DC, for 9 years, and now as Police
Commissioner in Philadelphia for the past 3\1/2\ years. I also
have the privilege of serving as the President of the Major
Cities Chiefs Association and the Police Executive Research
Forum, both of which are members of the Public Safety Alliance.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsey appears in the Appendix on
page 627.
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The PSA is a coalition of the leading national public
safety associations that represent every law enforcement, fire,
EMS, emergency management agency, and first responder
organization in the country. I am here on behalf of first
responders across this country to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
Senator McCain for sponsoring S. 1040, the Broadband for First
Responders Act of 2011. And we hope that you will also continue
to work closely with Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and sponsors of S. 911, the SPECTRUM Act, which
was recently voted out of Committee for consideration by the
Senate.
These bills fulfill an absolutely critical need. They
allocate the D Block to public safety, provide the necessary
funding to build out and expand the nationwide broadband
network, and establish a governance structure in cooperation
with State and local authorities.
Since September 11, 2001, like many other jurisdictions
around the Nation, the Philadelphia region worked diligently to
ensure adequate local, State, and Federal coordination for
emergency communications. We established an Interoperable
Communications Committee within our Southeast Pennsylvania
Regional Task Force. Representatives from the five counties in
the Philadelphia UASI, as well as seven additional regional
counties from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, comprise this
task force. I would also like to take the time to thank
Committee Member Senator Tom Carper for his assistance in
strengthening homeland security in our region.
Let us be very clear in our mission: A terrorist attack or
a major catastrophic event knows no municipal, State, or
Federal boundary. Emergency preparedness spans across lines and
demands that law enforcement and public safety organizations
across the country plan and coordinate their responses.
And as you mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman,
we have an extremely valuable opportunity in front of us to
meet our needs in emergency communications. Seamless
interoperability can only be achieved through a dedicated
public safety nationwide broadband network. The allocation of
the D Block for public safety organizations, with adequate
capacity, control, and funding, is the only proposal that will
meet the challenges and demands that we confront. As President
of MCCA and PERF, I am here to support this solution, which
serves law enforcement and public safety organizations and,
most importantly, helps to protect the American people in the
best way possible.
Commercial networks are not designed to serve our public
safety needs. Past experiences with major national disasters
have demonstrated that these networks are not interchangeable
with dedicated public safety networks. There are fundamental
differences in the architecture that go to the heart of public
safety communications. The Public Safety Alliance will strongly
oppose any legislation or resolution that supports auctioning
the D block. Public safety becomes both less public and less
safe if we auction any part of the D Block to the highest
commercial bidder.
We need the up-front funding to jump-start the investment
and build out of the network and to attract and encourage
commercial interest and competition. We will partner with the
private sector to leverage and make maximum use of the existing
infrastructure, while managing operations locally through a
national governance structure.
This Committee, the House Homeland Security Committee, the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee have all held numerous
hearings over the past 2 years on the proposed public safety
spectrum and the nationwide broadband network. Congress has
asked many good questions, and hopefully you now have the
information you need to make an informed recommendation.
Our first responders, who put their lives on the line every
day, must have the resources that they need to do their jobs
more efficiently and effectively, armed with real-time data,
video, and other critical information. We can only accomplish
this goal if we have the latest in mobile broadband technology
that is fully interoperable on a local, State, and Federal
level. The ability to share mission-critical information
nationwide to coordinate and plan our response to emergencies
depends on having this capability.
I would like to thank all the Members of the Committee for
your continued time and commitment to finding a solution that
will meet the communications needs of our first responders and
will best serve the American people. What Congress decides now
will dictate the future of our emergency response capabilities.
Ten years after 9/11, we urge you to make the decision that
will finally establish a dedicated nationwide public safety
broadband network.
I am happy to answer any questions that you may have, sir.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Commissioner. Very helpful,
very good testimony.
We will now do 7-minute question rounds for each of us.
Mr. Schaffer, let me begin with some of the monetary
implications of what we are talking about since we are all
focused at every level of government on the cost of government,
and let me suggest a point of view to you and ask you to react
to it.
Currently, because public safety agencies operate on so
many systems, equipment costs can be quite high since there is
not much economy of scale for manufacturers. For example, I
gather that a handheld set for a police or fire officer can
cost around $5,000.
So I wonder whether an advantage of building a D Block
network might be that it would create that economy of scale
that would drive down costs, which, of course, would be very
helpful to Federal, State, and local governments. What do you
think?
Mr. Schaffer. Senator, thank you. That is certainly one of
the hopes of this proposal, that, in fact, by aggregating and
getting public safety together on a single standardized set of
equipment based on the commercial standard that is being
deployed by virtually all of the commercial carriers, we create
an opportunity for an economy of scale level that has never
been seen before for the public safety community.
We would love to see a situation where handsets cost a
couple hundred dollars rather than several thousands dollars as
they do today.
Chairman Lieberman. And you think that is an achievable
goal?
Mr. Schaffer. Based on the interactions that we had with
the manufacturing entities over the last year, the economies of
scale are much better with a national network of this sort
where you have millions of potential customers buying from the
same pool rather than a city or a small entity.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me give the other witnesses the
opportunity to comment on that from your own experience.
Obviously, all of us would like to see the cost of the
equipment go down, but is there anything that you want to
reflect based on your own experience in acquisition on this
question? Mr. McAleer.
Mr. McAleer. We are paying significantly less for our
radios up in Maine. However, I think that is probably because
of the nature of the radio that we are talking about here.
These may be P25-compliant radios, whereas the radios that we
are buying at this point just to meet the narrow banding
requirement are not P25. We realize that there are certain
issues there, but that is the best that we can do. So our
radios are from $300 to $500, and we have found that even at
the county level, when there is bulk buying, prices do go down.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Let me ask, beginning with
Commissioner Ramsey, if you could elaborate a bit, again, from
your own on-the-ground experience, on the kinds of uses you
would make of broadband technologies if the D Block is
allocated to public safety.
Mr. Ramsey. Thank you for that question, Senator. I was
listening to some of the testimony earlier, and the issue of
the oil spill came up and how we were able to put together a
network that would allow for some interoperability. And that is
a good bridge, but it is not a permanent solution because as a
police chief, I have to use a network every single day for a
variety of reasons, not just an emergency that may come up on
occasion. So not only do we have the need for voice
interoperability, but we also have computers in all of our
cars. We need to be able to get information out to those cars.
We need to be able to get information from those cars. We need
video. We have video in our vehicles. We have video in our city
that needs to be monitored. You mentioned during your opening
statements fire departments rolling to the scene that need
blueprints for buildings. Well, if we have an active shooter in
a building, we will need those same blueprints for our SWAT
team. If they have video inside that building, we will need to
tap into that in real time so we can see exactly what is going
on: Where are the hostages? Where are the shooters? All those
kinds of things need to be able to take place.
Aside from that, more and more we are using video
conferencing with our courts, with our prosecutors to save time
in moving prisoners from one point to another. There are just
so many different uses, and the way in which technology is
evolving so rapidly, who knows what we will need 10 years from
now? So we have to have the capability to expand and to grow as
our needs grow.
I have been around a long time. Call boxes were still in
use when I started my career, and the radios were still in
police cars. So, it is just unimaginable to me what could
possibly take place over the next four decades in law
enforcement.
Chairman Lieberman. That is true.
Mr. Ramsey. So we need a solution now that is not only
going to meet our current needs, but our future needs as well.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said.
Mr. McAleer, do you want to add anything from your own
perspective about other possible uses of the D Block if it is
allocated to public safety?
Mr. McAleer. Sir, that would go to a level of technical
information that I am not comfortable dealing with.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Varney.
Mr. Varney. In addition to what was said earlier by you and
all of the witnesses, access to facility information, chemical
data and processes, utility services, HVAC systems within the
building would be able to be accessed by the responding units
to try to mitigate incidents, in addition to the access to
inside-building cameras and surveillance systems, which
certainly would add to the safety and enhancement of
operations.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very interesting. Right now you
cannot do any of that easily.
Mr. Varney. No. Certainly not easily.
Chairman Lieberman. That is an interesting thing. You might
be able to access into an inside-the-building camera system.
Mr. Varney. Certainly all of those things could be put in
place with access to a broadband system such as that.
One of the other important things we would want to do in
the future as the next generation 911 systems are built
throughout the United States, we would want to be able to get
the information that is sent from the public in the form of
data, video, or pictures when they report incidents to the
responders while they are en route, which gives them a greater
situational awareness of what they are getting into. More data
make better decisions.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a very interesting point
because we are now all accustomed to viewers sending video into
TV stations, for instance, from the scene of a natural disaster
or a crime scene. And that capability to pick those up is not
there at this point.
Do you want to add something, Mr. Schaffer?
Mr. Schaffer. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I think it is also
important to recognize that there will be uses that we cannot
even imagine today. Five years ago, no one could have imagined
what we have in smartphone technology and a very large universe
of applications that have been developed in a very short period
of time for the commercial sector. I think once this capability
is available to our public safety community, we will see the
opportunity for a whole range of new capabilities that we
cannot imagine or articulate today. We have great examples of
what the art of the possible is now, but what will come when
they have access to the spectrum and capability will be even
beyond what we might be able to articulate now.
Chairman Lieberman. Absolutely right. Thank you. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schaffer, in your testimony, you detailed much of the
progress that we have been able to make, and that is
encouraging. You also said there is a great deal more work to
be done.
It is disappointing to me, therefore, that the President in
his budget chose to terminate the funding for the
Interoperability Emergency Communications Grant program. That
was a program that is near and dear to our hearts because it
was our initiative and was included in the 2007 homeland
security law.
Given that we all agree that more work needs to be done and
given what you have heard today about the use that the money
has been put to and how it has made a big difference in the
State of Maine, for example, why would the President choose to
terminate that program? It is a pretty modest program in the
scheme of things, but it has been really helpful to States.
Mr. Schaffer. Yes, Senator. I think that the opportunity to
have money flow into emergency communications capabilities is
certainly still there through a number of grant programs and
the focus through, for example, the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center of developing grant guidance that applies
across 40 different grant programs that steers those grant
dollars in the direction of the kind of interoperable
communications capabilities that you and the Chairman have
supported in the past.
So I think the focus has been on general grant
opportunities and making sure that all of those grants across
the entire range of opportunities are being directed in a way
that is consistent and that can advance the ball with respect
to what we are doing in land mobile radio today.
Senator Collins. I agree with the goal of having more
consolidation of grant programs, but the fact is, if you do not
have a targeted stream of funding that is aimed at improving
interoperability and sustainability of emergency equipment, you
are not going to reach the goal that we all agree is necessary.
So that is something that I know the Chairman and I have
already communicated to the Appropriations Committee on, but it
is something that I really think is short-sighted given that
every first responder group always says that interoperability
and sustainability of equipment is such an important goal. And
it cuts across every State, every kind of first responder. They
all need that to be effective.
So I hope that is something we can continue to work with
the Department on. I do not mean to put you as much on the spot
as if Secretary Napolitano were here, but I did want to mention
my concern about the termination of that program. It has not
been in operation for very long, and to terminate it before we
reach the goal--someday we will be able to terminate it--seems
to me to be premature.
Mr. McAleer, I want to ask you more about the program that
you have with Canada. I think this is fascinating and far-
sighted. Having grown up 20 minutes from the Canadian border in
northern Maine, I am so aware of the fact that there are mutual
aid packs where our firefighters on the Maine side of the
border assist Canadian firefighters and vice versa. We have a
wonderful Federal program called Operation Stonegarden where
our law enforcement works with Border Patrol officials, which
has been a force multiplier as well. And when you come from a
border State, whether it is the Northern border or the Southern
border, you cannot ignore the fact that you are going to need
your partners on the other side of the border.
So tell us a little more about what the goals are of the
grant programs that you are participating in right now.
Mr. McAleer. The primary cross-border grant program that we
are dealing with is the Border Interoperability Demonstration
Project Program, and that is a program that was sponsored by
the Federal Government that we won the grant for and is helping
us increase our cross-border communications with both our New
Brunswick partners and our partners in Quebec. And our grant
application was supported very strongly by partners in Canada
at the local and provincial levels. So they are very much in
favor of this.
Currently, both New Brunswick and Maine use VHF channels,
and so we are able, when necessary, to use common channels.
What we are trying to do is formalize that process so that
those channels are loaded up on both sides--we have Canadian
channels loaded in our radios, and our channels loaded in their
radios--because as it is right now, we have worked with the
Border Patrol, and the first responder communities come across
very quickly, and there is no stopping them. When they get
there, they need to be able to communicate. In those instances
where we do not have the channels in the radios, we have those
radio caches. We have about 12 caches at sites along the border
already that we established with State Homeland Security Grant
funds, and we are looking to increase that with the BIDP funds,
and then increase our transmission capability in four of our
counties to cover some of those vast gaps that we have out
there in the wilderness.
Senator Collins. Several years ago, before you assumed your
current position, there actually was a problem with the Maine
State troopers having interference from the New Hampshire State
troopers when they were using the same channels in Southern
Maine, and I recall helping to secure some funding to sort that
out.
Is that still a problem, are you aware?
Mr. McAleer. I have not heard of that problem recently,
Senator.
Senator Collins. I think that has been fixed, but that,
too, shows that you can have interference even between two
bordering states that can interfere with the ability to
respond.
Mr. McAleer. Absolutely.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Brown, timely appearance. If you would like to
proceed with questions now, we would welcome them. If not, of
course, I could fill a few moments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. You are going to filibuster a little bit?
No, I am all set. I was at another hearing. We are having a
Veterans Committee hearing upstairs, so I apologize.
Chairman Lieberman. No, not at all. Thanks for coming by.
Senator Brown. I have been getting periodic updates.
Chairman Lieberman. It is all yours.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Schaffer, in Commissioner Ramsey's testimony, he notes
that disasters do not stop at State borders, and witness
testimony has highlighted efforts at the State level, such as
the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans.
Considering that a disaster in the New England region and the
Northeast corridor in general could include multiple
jurisdictions, what is DHS doing to ensure regional
coordination across State lines? And, obviously, we have had
some pretty interesting weather in Massachusetts. As recently
as yesterday, another tornado hit. So I think it is a timely
question.
Mr. Schaffer. Yes, Senator, no question, it has been a very
active season from a weather perspective, and, of course, the
hurricane season is just getting started now, so we are
certainly focused on these issues.
There are several things the Department has been doing to
ensure regional interoperability and coordination. Of course,
the National Emergency Communications Plan is the foundation
for much of that work. The development of Statewide
Communications Interoperability Plans, the appointment of
Statewide Interoperability Coordinators who have banded
together in many regions to form regional coordination groups
to work these issues, all are moving us in the direction of
better capability to be able to cooperate across multiple
jurisdictions. The development of standards like the P25
standard are advantages as well. If we are all buying to the
same standard, we have a better opportunity to have our
equipment work. But we are still in a situation where it does
end up being a project when people arrive on the scene to get
all of those radios tuned to the right frequencies, to the
right interoperability channels, and have them operate the way
we like, which is why the Administration believes that the
development of a national public safety broadband network based
on the same technology across the board will improve things
even further.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Varney, I certainly want to thank the State of
Connecticut for its help in Massachusetts, and I noted that
when the tornado struck, Connecticut Fire Services were there
to quickly coordinate.
What made the coordination possible from a State and local
perspective?
Mr. Varney. It comes from years of work across the border
coordinating efforts.
Senator Brown. Do you have something in writing, or is it
just a custom and courtesy thing?
Mr. Varney. I think it works from relationships that start
initially, but then it becomes more formalized over time. In
Connecticut, what we have done to work with our bordering
States is we put together a system where whenever an
interoperability system or sub-channels is activated for an
event in-State or near a State border, all of our area States
are notified immediately of that, which creates coordination
and alleviates the issue of interference when multiple people
are trying to use the same interoperable channels. And through
the years, we have worked closely on the borders with our
fellow SWICs in the regional States, in our regional
interoperable committees, as Mr. Schaffer indicated, so that we
talk and formalize those issues where we know we are going to
cross borders that happen on a regular mutual aid basis, and
when things escalate to a larger basis, we can quickly
coordinate those assets because we know the types of
information that would be needed and the types of equipment
that would need to be moved across the border.
Senator Brown. So if there was a larger catastrophe, God
forbid, what do you think the greatest challenge would be in
handling a more widespread disaster?
Mr. Varney. The greatest challenge is that coordination
effort. As was mentioned earlier today, the way that public
safety is working in Connecticut and New England is a patchwork
of many different frequencies and many different systems, so in
order for us to handle a large-scale event in any of the
States, we have to bring in some pretty technical pieces of
equipment and expertise through the COML and COMT trained
personnel to patch these systems together, where if we had a
nationwide single system that was standards-based and
completely interoperable from the beginning, it would speed up
that effort and make it less complicated for those problems to
be solved.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Commissioner Ramsey, although Connecticut is right next
door to New York City, Philadelphia is within a couple hours of
it and within 3 hours of Washington, DC. It is conceivable
that--and God forbid a disaster happens--a terrorist strike or
something could impact your city or vice versa. Do you feel
confident that proper coordinating frameworks are in place to
ensure seamless communications within the region?
Mr. Ramsey. It is better than it has been within the
region. We have done a lot in that particular area, but again,
it is not a permanent solution like a nationwide public safety
broadband network would be. We are right across the river from
New Jersey, not very far from Delaware or Maryland. So we
actually could be involved in something where multiple States
would be involved in the same event. There we would have some
problems in terms of interoperability of our systems. We could
probably patch the voice communications, but transmission of
data would be different, and that would be something that would
present even more of a problem.
So I think that a lot of regions across the country have
come together to work out solutions for their communications
problems as a region, but major disasters that require going
beyond that region is where we are going to have a problem. And
if there were a terrorist event for example, when you look at
how they tend to take place in other parts of the world,
usually it is multiple locations hit simultaneously. So now you
have a much wider problem than you had before. It is not just a
regional problem. It is much broader than that.
We need to be able to have lines of communication, and in
an earlier question that Senator Lieberman asked, one of the
other things that would be operating on D Block would be our
fusion centers. We have fusion centers around the country, but
you now have to fuse the fusion centers because it is going to
be necessary for New York to communicate and get information
from Los Angeles or someplace else in a very timely and secure
fashion, either Federal, State, or local.
So, we have done a lot in terms of trying to patch it up
the best we can, but nothing that comes close to a permanent
solution.
Senator Brown. And one final question, Mr. McAleer. You
came from a 30-year career--congratulations--in the Marine
Corps. What lessons did you take from your time commanding
operational elements in the Marines to your job now in regard
to dealing with the communication issues before you?
Mr. McAleer. Well, the one thing you learn right away with
communications systems is, if you do not work with them, they
will not work when you need them. So we try to drill with our
communications as much as we possibly can. For instance, with
our radio network that we have with our counties, we exercise
three times a week, and it is amazing how even with exercising
that many times, we have radios that are down, towers that are
down. If we were not doing that kind of work, that would come
as a surprise to us when the time came.
We also look at redundancy. Where do we have gaps and where
do we have single coverage and where do we have redundancy?
Because it is also my experience that when you are under stress
situations and radios are being used hard, those systems tend
to go down as well. So you have to have backup systems.
So I think probably the two main things that we have
learned are that you have to exercise it and you have to have
redundancy, or it will not be there when you need it.
Senator Brown. Good advice, sir. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, thank you, Senator Brown. Thanks
for coming by. I appreciate it.
Just a few more questions. Mr. Schaffer, I want to focus in
a little bit on the Federal Government interoperability. As you
know, several years ago the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice embarked on a joint project with the
wonderful name of Integrated Wireless Network, which was
shortened to the acronym IWN, which could be stated ``I win.''
Unfortunately, IWN fizzled as a governmentwide effort. I gather
the Department of Justice has continued to pursue the project,
along with the Treasury Department and the U.S. Park Police,
and has recently built out a system to provide interoperability
to the agencies mentioned within the National Capital Region.
However, DOJ got a very small amount of money in the
continuing budget resolution, so I think it is probably going
to make it hard for them to maintain their legacy radio systems
let alone continue or expand IWN.
Meanwhile, DHS component agencies like Customs and Border
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement have
continued to make their own investments in tactical radio
systems.
So I wanted to ask you whether we are doing enough on
interoperability of communications within the Federal system.
In other words, can CBP and FBI talk to each other? Or I
suppose in a more immediate sense, in terms of DHS, can the
different components of DHS talk to each other over these
systems?
Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Senator. The components can talk
to each other as a general proposition, but it is a project as
it is with these jurisdictions. They have to use these
interoperable channels, and they have to program those radios
in order to be able to interoperate.
We are making several steps in the direction of ensuring
better interoperability with the existing technologies today in
a variety of ways. At DHS, we have a committee called the One
DHS Emergency Communications Committee, which for the first
time is coordinating across all of the components of DHS and
looking at how we coordinate our activity in terms of our
investment in communications technology. And that has developed
into a strategy for our tactical communications across the
Department with some pilot projects that are looking at doing
things in a coordinated way.
At the same time, the Emergency Communications Preparedness
Center is trying to coordinate across a number of departments
and agencies, including DOJ, DHS, and several others that have
significant roles in emergency communications, to think about
how to coordinate their activity in areas like new broadband
technology and developing joint requirements across Federal
departments and agencies that can then be used in coordination
with the public safety community as a national public safety
broadband network is developed.
So there are several initiatives underway to try to further
coordinate among the entities in the Federal Government, writ
large, and specifically within the Department of Homeland
Security.
Chairman Lieberman. So the availability of the D Block
would also help components of the Federal Government
communicate better with each other? Is that what I am hearing
you say?
Mr. Schaffer. I think that is absolutely true.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask you one other question. We
had discussed the Office of Emergency Communications and that
it has been measuring progress at the local level in meeting
the goals of the National Emergency Communications Plan. I
wanted to ask you whether you plan on issuing any type of
report card or public statement measuring the results, which
thus far seem to be pretty good.
Mr. Schaffer. The results are good, Senator. As mentioned,
the Goal 1 work showed that all 60 of the large urban areas
were able to establish emergency communications within an hour,
as was the intent with Goal 1 for planned events. We are in the
process of working toward Goal 2, which is a much broader
effort, 3,000 counties as opposed to 60 large urban areas. That
will consist of getting reporting from the counties. We do not
have the resources to go out and examine each county as we did
with the cities. But we will get reporting from the counties,
both in terms of their ability to stand up communications for
events and a broad view of their capabilities from an emergency
communications standpoint.
We try to balance the collection of that data and the
development of reports in this space. Because there is
voluntary reporting coming to the Department, we try to be
careful about having a report card that may make it harder for
cooperative efforts to get that information flowing to us. But
we do aggregate the data and try to give some indication of
where we are and whether progress is being made.
Chairman Lieberman. Very good. I appreciate it.
Mr. Varney, you mentioned the response to the June
tornadoes in Massachusetts as an example of improved
coordination between governments, and Senator Brown mentioned
it as well. I wanted to ask you to just give us a little more
detail on how the response benefited from the planning and
exercises that you have conducted in recent years.
Mr. Varney. It is one of those things that you plan and you
put together an exercise for something you hope will never
happen, but it just so happens that in our north-central
Connecticut region, our emergency planning region, several
years earlier, to validate their tactical interoperable
communications plan, the scenario was such that a tornado went
south to north through a very close area of the State, which
actually affected some correctional facilities in the notional
exercise and went into Massachusetts. So as part of the
validation of that effort that we put together to collect the
data, to identify the systems and personnel that would respond
to an event, bring everyone together to walk through a tabletop
exercise, all funded through IECGP funds with technical support
and assistance from OEC, we were able to bring people from
northern Connecticut and that area of Massachusetts together as
part of this exercise to share equipment and to talk about
those resources, only to have several years later a very
similar event happen in a very close proximity. Although it was
not in Connecticut, we were able to leverage all of those
relationships and expertise that we were able to put together
several years earlier to quickly respond to and enhance the
efforts to support their request.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a great example of the benefit
of planning. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have talked a lot today about the importance of
communications among first responders. However, I do not want
to slight the importance of warning the public prior to a
disaster striking.
Maine has had, like many other States, an extraordinary run
of violent weather this year. In northern Maine, there have
been four tornadoes. I never remember that happening in my
lifetime. And we have seen violent storms throughout our
country.
So getting information to the public before disaster
strikes helps to save lives, reduce property damage, and
prepare people for what is coming. Early warning can truly make
a huge difference.
I noted when I was home that the warning I received of the
violent weather was across my TV screen, and I happened to have
the television on, and it was the old-fashioned emergency alert
system that we have had for as long as I can remember. And I
could not help but think that most people probably did not have
their television on, but they probably had their mobile phone
nearby. They probably were on a computer on Facebook, or there
are so many different ways to communicate today.
So I would like to hear your assessment on the importance
of having a system that embraces today's technologies because
we need to recognize that people get their information in
different ways nowadays. We will start with Commissioner
Ramsey.
Mr. Ramsey. Well, that is a very good point, Senator. In
our department, we text-message a lot of information out to the
public now about crime issues. We are taking advantage of
Twitter. We take advantage of Facebook. We have what we call
reverse 911 where we are able to use telephone calls to certain
specific areas of the city, if there is a burglary pattern or a
con game that is prevalent in a particular area, and we can
reach people and warn them and let them know. So from a police
perspective, we use the technologies that are available to get
information out to the public the best we can, recognizing the
way things have changed--my son, for example, would rather text
me than have me call. If I call him, he says, ``Dad, why did
you call? How come you just did not text me?'' So, that is the
world we are in now. And so to reach a population, I think you
have to do all the above. It is not one in lieu of the other.
You have to do them all because different groups of people use
different ways to communicate, and we have to be able to adapt
very quickly to that and get information out as quickly as we
can.
With regard to a point you made in your opening statement,
I believe that one of the shortcomings in preparedness in this
country is our preparing the communities on a consistent basis
on what to do in the event of an emergency. As first
responders, we can have the best plans in the world. If there
are traffic jams and we cannot get to where we need to get too,
it does not matter how good your plan was, you cannot get there
to deal with the situation because if you have panic among the
public--and a lot of that comes from just not quite knowing
what to do--then that is a problem. And if the FCC set aside 1
hour a month for PSAs for different jurisdictions to do 30-
second or 1-minute PSAs over and over again--and I do not mean
airing it at 3 o'clock in the morning on the Psychic Network
and all that--I mean in prime time, constantly reminding people
of certain things that they need to do, then I think we will
have a better prepared public, which makes us even more
effective if we can rely on the public to do certain things in
the event of an emergency.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Great response. Mr. McAleer.
Mr. McAleer. Senator, I believe that we can to a certain
degree dictate when and what we will transmit to the public,
and I say ``to a certain degree'' because if we do not put out
the right information at the right time, there are so many
other sources of information out there that the public will go
to those sources, and then we in emergency management tend to
become irrelevant.
The thing that I think we cannot do is dictate how we put
that information out. We have to remember that our citizens are
our customers. We have to be able to communicate with them in
the ways that they communicate. It is much like a guy owning a
shop. If you walk in and I try to sell you a T-bone steak and
you are a vegetarian, it could be the best T-bone steak in the
world, but it is irrelevant. So we need to be very careful
about that.
I think this applies both before events and during the
response to events so that we become the center of information
for the public. The challenge becomes, how do we afford to pay
for that because the technology is out there that can do it,
but as you get more technologically advanced, it costs more
money.
On the other side, if we with our systems are chasing the
emerging technology that is out there, we might always be in a
race. So if we could develop some sort of industry standard so
that there was a talk-back means or a talk-forward means as
these new social medias are coming online, that would help us a
great deal, I believe. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Varney.
Mr. Varney. In Connecticut, of course, we maintain and we
leverage the emergency alert system when it is needed. But in
Connecticut, we have also invested significant State funds to
put in a system for our local municipalities and dispatch
centers to use, similar to a reverse 911 type of system, to
alert citizens for any type of incident that a municipality
believes that they need to be alerted to, and we make that
available to all of the local municipalities.
So if somebody wants to sign up to have messages sent to
them via text on their BlackBerry or they want it sent on
traditional voice mail to their phone, they can opt in to do
that, and we will send it in the mode that they have asked for.
That is in addition to having all of the land-line phones into
the system. In case of emergency, a message has to go out to
have people shelter in place, as was mentioned before, or to
evacuate. Those systems are in place in Connecticut, and I
would think that as IPAWS and the alerting systems mature in
the future, they would all become integrated.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Schaffer.
Mr. Schaffer. Yes, Senator, indeed, the Integrated Public
Alert and Warning System really is designed to take advantage
of some of the new technological capabilities of the
smartphones and other devices that almost everyone carries
today. We need to be able to alert people who are in a specific
geographic area, not just people who sign up and give their zip
code, because they may be traveling to another area on a given
day and there may be people who are visiting Washington, DC--we
have tourists right now from all over the country and all over
the world. So this system is designed to give warnings to
people who are proximate to a cell tower, who are nearby, as
opposed to people who have signed up or people who live in a
certain place. And that is an effort not of NPPD, my
organization within DHS, but FEMA working with the FCC. That
solution should come into initial operating capability within
this year, 2011, and have expanded capabilities going out for
Federal, State, and local officials being able to send those
kinds of alerts and warnings to broadcasters through a variety
of digital communications paths sometime in 2012.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins, and I thank
you, all four of you, for your testimony today and obviously
for what you do every day.
The bottom line is, I think you validated our preliminary
conclusion before the hearing that we have made a lot of
progress in the area of interoperability of communications
among first responders since 9/11 and the operability, the
robustness of our communications systems. We obviously have
some gaps yet to fill, and if this D Block legislation can pass
soon, that would be a giant leap forward in assisting you to do
what we ask you to do for all of our communities and States
every day.
So thanks very much. You have really helped to inform the
Committee and also, I think, given some testimony that should
give the public an increased sense of confidence and security
in an age when, because of the unpredictability of the weather,
not to mention extremist and terrorists groups, this kind of
capability is very significant.
I had not thought to mention the terrible tragedy in
Norway, and we are just beginning to understand what happened,
but part of it was that--this goes back to what Senator Collins
quoted earlier from the 9/11 Commission--part of the cause of
9/11 was a failure of imagination by which the Commission meant
that we failed to imagine that anybody could try to do to us
what the attackers did on 9/11. And, of course, I think this is
exactly what people in Norway are going through because of
their shock that anybody would try to do what that individual
apparently did, and therefore, their relative lack of
preparedness to respond to that.
Anyway, we are in much better shape than we were 10 years
ago, thanks to you and a lot of other people. We thank you for
that.
Senator Collins, do you want to add anything?
Senator Collins. I just want to thank our witnesses. I
think this was a very helpful update on an issue that we have
been working on together for many years, so thank you for the
work that you are all doing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. The record of the hearing
will be held open for 15 days for any additional statements or
questions. And with that I thank you again and adjourn the
hearing.
Mr. Ramsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
DEFENDING THE NATION SINCE 9/11:
SUCCESSFUL REFORMS AND CHALLENGES
AHEAD AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Collins,
and Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order. Thanks to our witnesses for being here.
In 4 days, we will commemorate the 10th anniversary of the
attacks of 9/11 and mourn anew the nearly 3,000 lives that were
lost that day at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and on
Flight 93, which, as we all know, of course, crashed into a
field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
But we have already quite appropriately begun and will
continue, I am sure, a look back at September 11, 2001, to both
understand with the clarity of hindsight what that day meant in
American history and to evaluate what our government
particularly and our people have done since that time.
There is no question that, although I think we knew it
then, we can certainly look back and say now that we understand
that on that day, we were drawn into a war which is
increasingly global. We hesitate to use the term ``world war,''
but this is a war that is being fought by violent Islamist
extremists against most of the rest of the world, including
most of the Muslim world. That day's brutal attack, in my own
opinion, in the clarity of hindsight, began that war, although,
in fact, Osama Bin Laden had declared war in 1998 in statements
he had made, and they had been attacking us for some period of
time before that, including the World Trade Center in 1993.
But it really began that day, and in the days and months
following 9/11/01, we in government set out with an urgent
determination to reform the systems that had failed us. I think
the more we knew about how September 11 happened, particularly
informed by the work of the 9/11 Commission headed by Tom Kean
and Lee Hamilton, we learned a lot more. I came to the
conclusion, although one will never be able to know with
certainty, that 9/11 was probably preventable. As I look back
and I think of all we have done to respond to our failures on
that day, I think that if another group of terrorists attempted
a similar attack on the United States today, we would prevent
it, and that, of course, gives me great comfort and a sense of
great gratitude for all that has been done by so many people in
our State and local governments to work together to make sure
we are better secured here at home than we were on 9/11/01.
We put into place measures that reorganized and reformed
our government to prevent another terrorist attack on the
United States. I know that there are some on this 10th
anniversary look-back that are saying that we overreacted to 9/
11, that it was, in fact, not just a substantive overreaction,
but an expensive overreaction. Well, I do not agree. The most
extraordinary bottom-line reality today is that as we look back
over the last 10 years, as we all know, thank God and thanks to
everybody who has worked so hard, there has not been another
mass casualty terrorist attack on the United States by violent
Islamists since 9/11/01. I do not think anybody would have
predicted that on 9/12/01.
But we can say that today not because our enemies stopped
trying. They have tried over and over and over again. But
fortunately, our defenses, our intelligence, all the things
that we have done, really have made us more secure. And,
frankly, a couple of times, just to remind us that we continue
to have work to do, we were just plain lucky, as in the two
glaring cases of the Detroit bomber on Christmas Day on the
airplane and the Times Square bomber, both of whose weapons,
explosives, just did not go off. If they had, I think we would
be looking back with a different sense of these past 10 years.
But overall, there is no question in my mind, we have been
spared another catastrophic terrorist attack like the one on 9/
11 not just as a matter of luck or coincidence but because of a
lot of things a lot of people did. I am very proud of the role
Members of this Committee across party lines played back then
and continue to play in creating these new organizations and
supporting them.
The first, of course, was the cabinet-level Department of
Homeland Security, which we created to lead our efforts to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, and I
believe DHS has significantly contributed to our increased
national safety. I am grateful that the report that the
Government Accountability Office has issued today to our
Committee as we move toward September 11, 2011, essentially
agrees with that, and it is a positive report on the work of
the Department of Homeland Security. It points to some work yet
to be done, and then I think we would all agree with that,
including people at the Department.
But the fact is that 10 years ago, no single agency and no
single official was designated to lead the Federal Government's
efforts to prevent terrorism or, for that matter, to adequately
marshal the resources of the Federal Government to respond to
natural disasters, not just terrorist disasters. Today, there
is clarity about who is in charge, and that is the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, and whose efforts that
Secretary should be coordinating to prepare, respond to, and
recover from disasters. That has made a tremendous difference.
I am going to put the rest of my statement in the record
because I want to hear the witnesses.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Chairman Lieberman appears in the
Appendix on page 641.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I simply want to thank Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute from
DHS who is with us today, and Gene Dodaro, the Comptroller
General of the United States, both to hear DHS's own evaluation
of these past 10 years and the Comptroller General's on behalf
of GAO.
And I repeat, I am heartened that the report that GAO is
issuing today \2\ concludes that, overall, the Department of
Homeland Security has implemented most of its key missions and
achieved most of its important goals, creating a foundation
that will allow the Department to continue to move aggressively
toward its full potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The GAO report titled, ``Progress Made and Work Remaining in
Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,'' appears
in the Appendix on page 689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So we appreciate that very much and look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses. Thank you. Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
thank you for holding today's hearing to review the first 8
years of the Department of Homeland Security, whose vital
mission is to protect our Nation and our people.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George
Bush established the White House Office of Homeland Security
and soon concluded that the Nation needed a more unified
homeland security structure. We envisioned a department that
would secure our borders, improve the security of
transportation and critical infrastructure, meld homeland
security intelligence from multiple sources, and work with
first responders and law enforcement to deter, detect, prepare
for, and respond to terrorist plots.
The law establishing the Department of Homeland Security
was enacted in November 2002. Twenty-two entities and
approximately 180,000 employees were merged into DHS. Not only
was the new Department's mission a challenge, but so was simply
unifying its email systems. Over the past 8 years, the GAO has
repeatedly placed the Department on its High-Risk List. The GAO
has issued approximately 1,500 recommendations and DHS has
adopted only about half of them, although others are in
progress. This July, DHS issued a self-administered report card
noting considerable progress in achieving the goals set out
nearly a decade ago to strengthen our security.
When it comes to our homeland security, however, we are
only as strong as our weakest link. This week, as the Chairman
has indicated, we will commemorate the worst attack ever on the
United States. In doing so, we must ask ourselves some
fundamental questions. Are we safer, or are we just safer from
the tactics terrorists have already tried?
I think the answer is yes to both questions. We are far
safer than we were on September 10, 2001. But terrorists
continue to probe our vulnerabilities and attempt to exploit
gaps in our security. We also face increasing threats from
homegrown terrorists already within our borders.
Today, the GAO concludes that more than 8 years after its
creation and 10 years after September 11, DHS has indeed made
significant strides in protecting our Nation, but has yet to
reach its full potential. The examples are many. TSA has
strengthened airline passenger pre-screening, yet a young man
recently was able to fly cross-country without a valid
government ID and with an expired boarding pass that was not
even issued in his name. At the other extreme, it bothers many
Americans to see TSA screeners putting the very young and the
very elderly through intrusive and in many cases unnecessary
pat-downs.
Although DHS has bolstered the security of U.S. borders and
identification documents, two Iraqi refugees associated with
al-Qaeda were recently arrested in Kentucky. How a known bomb-
maker whose fingerprints we have had on file for some time was
able to enter our country on humanitarian grounds remains an
unanswered and extremely troubling question. Are there other
Iraqi nationals granted asylum who were involved in attacking
our troops? The fact is, we do not know. We still await clear
answers from the Administration, which must do more to ensure
that all relevant databases are used so that we do not let
terrorists and criminals into our country, much less grant them
asylum.
I am pleased that the GAO found that our chemical
facilities and seaports are safer, both priorities of mine and
of this Committee.
The GAO indicates that DHS should make improvements in how
it shares and manages cyber threat information. This is the key
goal of comprehensive cyber security legislation that Chairman
Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I have co-authored. The
Department has also had its fair share and then some of
management problems. Failures in expensive procurements have
cost taxpayers billions of dollars and delayed much-needed
technology.
Now, merging 22 agencies and nearly 180,000 employees is
always going to be a challenge. If DHS is to become a truly
unified Department, its employees in headquarters should not
remain spread over 70 buildings and 40 sites. The lack of a
consolidated headquarters inhibits communication, coordination,
and cooperation among DHS components, and I know the
Administration is working hard to consolidate the headquarters.
I also believe that there are efficiencies that can be
gained by consolidating offices at the regional level, a
recommendation made by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge. We should take a look at consolidating field office
locations to reduce costs and improve coordination.
As this Committee will soon consider a reauthorization of
the Department, it is important to discuss what experts inside
and outside of DHS believe has and has not worked. We must even
answer the fundamental question of whether or not we are safer
because of the creation of DHS.
As has been noted often, the terrorists only have to get it
right once. DHS and its partners have to be right every single
time or we will suffer the devastating consequences of a
terrorist attack. We are much safer than we were 10 years ago,
but we must be tenacious in anticipating the changing tactics
of terrorists. As the successful decade-long search for Osama
bin Laden proved, America's resolve is a powerful weapon
against those who would seek to destroy our way of life.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to review GAO's
report with the Comptroller General today and look forward to
hearing from Deputy Secretary Lute on how DHS can better
fulfill its mission. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much for that statement,
Senator Collins. Deputy Secretary Lute, welcome back. How long
have you been at the Department now?
Ms. Lute. Over 2\1/2\ years.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. So for 2\1/2\ years you have
been on the scene, and the previous years, you were an informed
observer.
Ms. Lute. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HOLL LUTE,\1\ DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member
Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department's progress in keeping our Nation safe from the range
of threats that we face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Lute appears in the Appendix on
page 647.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, you have my full written statement. I request
it be entered into the record.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection.
Ms. Lute. And I would like to highlight some of that
statement here this morning. But first, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to strike a note of remembrance of the lives and memory of
those who were lost on 9/11/2001. I was in New York City that
day. I will never forget it. None of us will ever forget where
we were, how we felt, and how we came together as a Nation,
determined in our resolve to never let that happen again,
determined in the conviction, in the core belief that this
country can protect itself. And nowhere has that commitment
been stronger than in this Committee, Mr. Chairman, with you
and certainly you, Senator Collins, and the other Members of
the Committee, and your steadfast support for the efforts that
we have been taking in homeland security.
I would like to thank our many partners in our effort to
ensure the safety and security and resilience of our Nation.
DHS plays a central role in that effort, but we rely on strong
partnerships throughout all levels of government, law
enforcement, private industry, and with the public. We view
homeland security as a whole community enterprise and we are
fortunate to have strong partners to help us meet our mission.
As I mentioned, Congress is an essential partner.
Particularly this Committee has played an extraordinary role in
creating and equipping DHS and the other institutions with the
authorities and resources necessary to carry out programs to
secure our country. You have carried forward the bipartisan
spirit that marked the days after 9/11, and you have always
held us accountable to maintain that spirit and achieve our
missions.
In the spirit of accountability, we are also very thankful
for the hard work of our partners in GAO, and I say that
sincerely. Along with DHS's Office of the Inspector General,
GAO has audited and reported on the work of the Department and
their work has helped inform us as we mature and grow as an
organization.
As we approach this important anniversary of the 9/11
attacks, we are thankful, too, Mr. Chairman, for the commitment
of the American people. Since 9/11, countless Americans have
stepped up, whether in our military in Afghanistan, Iraq, or in
other posts overseas; in our Federal agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security; and in our States, cities,
tribal communities, and elsewhere, as first responders, law
enforcement officials, reservists, and engaged citizens.
I take great pride, Mr. Chairman, as you know, in my
service in the U.S. Army for the first half of my adult life.
But I am equally proud of my service as a member of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Great progress has been made at the Department and around
the country since the Department was created in 2003. Today, we
are a more capable Nation and a stronger Nation. We can detect
threats sooner with better information and make adjustments
more quickly based on real-time intelligence. Today, we know
more about those who seek to enter our country, the levels of
risk they might pose, and what is needed to prevent potential
threats from reaching our shores. Our borders are stronger,
enhanced by more personnel, technology, and infrastructure, as
well as with stronger partnerships with States, cities, border
communities, and our international partners around the world,
especially in Canada and Mexico.
Our immigration laws, while in need of reform, are being
enforced according to common sense priorities that we have set,
which are to identify and remove criminals and those who are a
threat to the American people. At the same time, we have
strengthened our processes and systems for providing legal
immigration benefits and services while ensuring the security
and integrity of our immigration system.
We have also created a framework for ensuring our cyber
systems, networks, and our critical infrastructure where none
previously existed. As part of this effort, we enhanced our
ability to protect Federal Government networks through better
detection, reporting, and countermeasures. We have engaged
cyber users at all levels, public and private, in our shared
protection, and we have broadened our partnership with the
private sector to protect our critical infrastructure and
established a new regulatory framework to protect high-risk
chemical facilities.
We have built a more ready and resilient Nation that is
able to confront major disasters and emergencies in our States,
cities, and communities. We have helped front-line responders
become more equipped, better trained, and more unified under a
new national response framework and incident command system, as
you have noted. We have improved emergency communications and
we have provided capacity building grants to support our
Nation's first responders.
The response and ongoing recovery effort from Hurricane
Irene is just the most recent testament to the robust
capabilities that you have helped us build.
We have continued to integrate the Department of Homeland
Security by advancing the work that began more than 8 years ago
to refashion our homeland security enterprise and engaged a
full set of partners in the protection of our Nation.
And finally, the Department's commitment to civil rights,
the values of liberty, fairness, and equality under the law are
embodied in all of the Department's programs and activities.
While we have been making much progress, Mr. Chairman, we
know we must continue to improve. As the threat against us
continues to evolve, so do we. Today, then, is an important
opportunity to talk about some of our progress, which GAO notes
in its report, and also to address some of the areas where
there is more work to be done. I look forward to discussing
this with you today so that we may build upon the foundation of
security in place to address our future challenges, and with
this Committee's partnership and support, continue to protect
our Nation, our citizens, our freedom, and our way of life.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Deputy Secretary Lute.
Now, we will hear from Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General of
the United States, and I note for the record that Mr. Dodaro is
accompanied by Cathleen Berrick, who is the Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues at GAO. Good morning, and
please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF HON. EUGENE L. DODARO,\1\ COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
ACCOMPANIED BY CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Dodaro. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins,
and Senator Akaka. I am very pleased to be here today to
discuss GAO's report on the various homeland security issues
and progress made as well as remaining issues and challenges
since the 9/11 event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro appears in the Appendix on
page 660.
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Our report reflects a summary of the work that we have done
over the last decade. It also reflects the constructive
approach we have tried to take in making recommendations to
offer improvements and suggestions to the Department. We are
pleased with the Department's response, although many things,
as Senator Collins mentioned, are still in progress and need to
be implemented. But, generally, I think we have had a good
dialogue and it has enhanced their operations.
The bottom line of our report, as everybody has noted in
their opening comments, is that a lot of progress has been made
since 9/11. That has clearly been demonstrated. But there is
work remaining to address gaps and weaknesses that will enable
DHS to reach its full potential.
Now, on the progress side of the ledger, we have Secure
Flight in place, a system that checks incoming passengers
against terrorist watch lists. We have screening workforces
deployed at 460 commercial airports across the country.
We have a biometric entry system now in place to be able to
check those people entering our borders over time. We have also
established and put more resources, as Deputy Secretary Lute
mentioned, at the ports and along the borders, putting
resources, equipment, and infrastructure in place over time.
There is also the Border Visa Security Program that has
been put in place to have DHS work along with the State
Department in screening visa applications at certain locations
overseas. And we also have put in place an electronic
authorization program for those entering under the Visa Waiver
Program.
There has also been a range of plans and assessments that
have been done on maritime security, surface transportation,
such as rail and mass transit, that have laid an important
foundation for assessments of risk.
I am also pleased that cyber security has been given
increased emphasis in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, and as the Deputy Secretary pointed out, FEMA has issued
a national response framework and associated documents with
that to address emergency preparedness.
Now, on the work remaining side, there are a number of
significant issues and I would like to highlight a few this
morning. There needs to be continuous improvement in the
processes and technologies used in screening operations at
airports, including coming up with a plan to ensure that the
equipment for screening checked baggage meets the current
requirements for detecting explosive devices.
While we have a very effective entry system, we still do
not have an exit system in place, and I know that this is a
very difficult task, but the overstays issue is significant.
The estimates are between four and five million people in the
United States are overstays. Of course, as we know, five of the
19 hijackers on 9/11 had overstay issues. This is something
that is a big challenge but needs to be addressed going
forward.
We also think that the Visa Security Program can be
expanded so that DHS is working with the State Department at
more critical high-risk locations, whether DHS staff are
deployed abroad in countries or working remotely from here in
the United States. That program has a lot of potential for
being strengthened.
There also needs to be a practical approach to screening
cargo and containers before they come to the United States. DHS
has some important programs underway. Of course, there is the
100 percent screening requirement, but there are questions
about its feasibility. We need a practical approach to address
that issue.
Also, Senator Collins, as you mentioned, in the cyber
security area, we have noted that there is a need for more
timely and actionable alerts to the private sector and others
so they can take action over time.
Also, we believe FEMA needs to continue to work to develop
some metrics and a methodology to address jurisdictions'
preparedness. I think the roles have been articulated, but
there is really not a clear assessment of preparedness levels
of various jurisdictions yet.
There is also a need to effectively implement the global
nuclear detection architecture and to strengthen abilities to
detect biological agents.
Now, underpinning a lot of these issues is the ability of
DHS to continue to work with its partners, and as Deputy
Secretary Lute mentioned, DHS has established those
relationships. These partnerships need to continue to develop
and mature and I think they need in some cases to meet the
expectations of those partners, as well. One area is in cyber
security, as I mentioned. But there is also a fundamental need
to continue to evolve and improve the Department's management
processes. The core of why DHS is on our High-Risk List is the
need to develop those management infrastructure processes, in
the acquisition area in particular, and also the development
and testing of technologies before they are deployed, as well
as in the financial management area.
I am very pleased. I have had meetings with Deputy
Secretary Lute. I have talked to Secretary Napolitano and their
team. I know they are committed to addressing these high-risk
issues. They have developed a number of plans. We have an
ongoing, constructive dialogue to try to be as specific as
possible and make recommendations to strengthen these
management areas. We look forward to continuing that dialogue
as they make improvements going forward.
Finally, I would note that another theme that we have
identified is the need for continued risk-based approaches to
these areas and also figuring out what works well from what the
Department has been doing and what is not working so well. We
have had an ongoing dialogue, encouraged by this Committee, on
performance measures to judge DHS's performance, and the
Department has developed a number of measures and they are
preparing a plan to be released shortly to talk about those
issues.
But I think it is terribly important as we enter this
period of budget austerity and dealing with our deficit and
debt issues to really work hard to make sure that we are making
the right investments and using risk-based approaches or
expanding things that are working well and we are operating as
efficiently as possible, because as all of us know, the
resources will not be as abundant, likely, in the coming years
as they have been to date.
That concludes my opening statement. Ms. Berrick and I
would be happy to answer questions that you have about the GAO
work. Thank you very much for your time and attention this
morning.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Those were two good
statements to set the groundwork. We will do 7-minute rounds of
questions.
Let me begin with your last point, Mr. Dodaro, and the
whole question of management is not too fascinating, really, as
it is to discuss individual programs' successes and failures.
But just to put it in context, what we really tried to do in
creating the Department of Homeland Security was to take a lot
of agencies and departments of our Federal Government that
touched on homeland security and disaster response and bring
them together with the aim of making a whole greater than the
sum of the parts, to make sure the dots were all connected,
etc. And I think that was a worthy goal and we have achieved a
lot on that.
But in doing that, we created a very large Department, over
200,000 Federal employees from more than 22 agencies, and
therefore, created a very large management challenge. The
Comptroller General mentions two things particularly, and that
is contract oversight and new technologies. But to the extent
that you can, let me ask you both to comment on the overall
management, which is to say what kind of progress have we made
in the 8 years of the Department's history to really blend
these 22 agencies together, not that they were ever all
intended to become homogenized, but they were intended to work
together. As someone--I think it was the previous Secretary,
maybe it was the current one--said, the aim at DHS is to make
sure that every one of the component agencies is speaking the
same language in their own dialect, their own accent--not
speaking ethnically but speaking in terms of their agency.
So, Mr. Dodaro, how do you evaluate that part of the
management record of DHS?
Mr. Dodaro. Well, I think, clearly, the intent of having a
lot of synergies with that collection of agencies in place has
been evolving and taking place. We pointed out in the past, for
example, there were difficulties in coordination among many of
those agencies, particularly in the law enforcement area, when
they were separate entities, and they had some management
problems when they were merged into DHS. So that was one of the
reasons that we put them on the High-Risk List when they were
formed.
So I think that there has been some progress in this area.
The framework for that progress has been in a lot of cases that
the plans have been developed require the coordination that are
laying out and clearly defining roles and responsibilities.
This is a really important issue, not just within the
Department but across the Federal Government because there are
so many players involved. And if you look at many of our
recommendations, they go to clarifying roles and
responsibilities----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dodaro [continuing]. Writing them down, having written
procedures, and working through communication vehicles to work
both within the Department and across departments.
So I would say it is a work in progress, but there have
been definite improvements. Attention to this area is
constantly needed because of the changing threats and the
changing capabilities. And after Deputy Secretary Lute
responds, I will ask if Ms. Berrick has anything else. I am
sure she will add.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Mr. Dodaro. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Deputy Secretary Lute.
Ms. Lute. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, Mr. Dodaro, for
that. I would say the first thing, Mr. Chairman, that we have
been able to reflect is the common narrative that now exists
across these 22 agencies----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Lute [continuing]. And over the life of the Department.
Everyone has heard of homeland security and people were not
always sure what it meant. We are now very sure what it means,
in part inspired and helped by the work of this Committee. It
means the effort to build a safe, secure, resilient place where
the American way of life can thrive.
What does it take to do that? It requires that we prevent
terrorism, that we secure our borders, that we enforce our
immigration laws, that we ensure our cyber security, and that
we build national resilience. Everyone in homeland security can
find themselves in these missions and in this purpose. So in
the first instance, narrating out the story that was originally
intended these years ago when the Department was first
conceived and formed and having all of the agencies relate the
work that they have been doing, that they continue to do in the
context of those missions and that overarching vision.
What we have had to do over the course of time, again,
building on the work of those who have gone before us, is
continue to operate. DHS is overwhelmingly an operating agency,
every single day. The ``building the plane while flying it''
metaphor is apt here, and in fact, GAO points that out in its
report. It is a huge challenge.
And so the question for us as a Department is how do we add
value in this overarching structure in the day-to-day
management of those operations? And we have done everything, as
Mr. Dodaro mentioned, from improved planning across the range
of threats that we face, improving our information, gathering
and sharing across the enterprise, and equipping the entire
enterprise with the information that it needs. Working on that
front, we need to be developing the ability to do risk
assessments that address threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences, to mobilize the assets of the Department across
agencies when operations require it, as we often do in disaster
response, and to work increasingly on those cross-cutting
areas, whether it is aviation planning for acquisition,
establishing a single point and resource to use for the entire
Department across the range of vetting needs that we have, and
other areas like this, acquisition improvement and
strengthening, which this Committee knows well the work that we
have undertaken under the Under Secretary of Management.
So in the three key areas that this Committee has a right
to expect the Department can perform in, can we execute our
missions, can we run ourselves, and can we account for the
resources that have been entrusted to us? In each of these
areas, as the GAO report makes clear and the numerous IG
reports, as well, the Department has made progress.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Ms. Berrick, do you want to
add anything?
Ms. Berrick. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say in
the area of management, the most progress has absolutely been
in the establishment of plans.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Berrick. For example, if you look at acquisition
management, DHS has a pretty rigorous policy in place that
governs oversight of acquisition programs. It is very similar
in the information technology area. And, in fact, DHS has
efforts underway to improve that.
I think there are three primary areas where they need to
focus. One is making sure that they have the resources in place
to implement those plans. If you look across the range of DHS's
plans and their management areas, they cite available resources
as a No. 1 constraint to implementing them.
I think the second area they should focus on is having
oversight mechanisms in place to make sure that they are
executing those plans as designed. We have identified a number
of these areas, and I will just take acquisition management as
an example. A number of times DHS has routinely not followed
its acquisition guidance. They have not had executive level
oversight over major acquisition programs, and have not
developed cost estimates in accordance with their own guidance.
So they need to have those oversight mechanisms.
And then, finally, I would say it is demonstrating progress
and delivering mission capabilities that they can sustain over
time. This is where we are getting at these major acquisition
programs, making sure that they can field these programs that
meet cost, schedule, and performance expectations and have an
infrastructure to continue to be able to do that.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks for that answer. I will make two
comments briefly in response. The first is on the resources. I
think that is a very important point for management, and
particularly since we are in the middle of it right now as we
go through the process of trying to get back toward some kind
of fiscal balance in our Federal Government and we are
squeezing and squeezing. It is a real temptation to take money
out of the management accounts of a Department like DHS because
the management accounts have inherent advocates for them.
Hopefully, we are. In other words, the programs of the
Department all have constituencies. The management really does
not in that sense. And the danger is that you will gut the
management and, of course, the end result will be that the
programs will not be run very well. So I think that is up to
us, but that is something we have to do.
Senator Collins and I had this conversation once we were
some months into the Obama Administration. We were observing
together that there was a kind of market test of the coherence
of the new Department of Homeland Security because at the
beginning of a new Administration, which was the first new
Administration since the Department had been created, that
would have been the moment for constituent agencies within the
Department to have tried a break-out legislatively or with the
new Administration. There was only a little bit of a flurry,
not widespread and very short-lived, about FEMA coming out of
the Department.
So I think that said that both the first two Secretaries
and now Secretary Napolitano and yourself have created a
coherence to the Department in a fairly short time, at least to
the extent that nobody tried to get out. And I do not mean just
because they could not stand being in the Department, I mean
because a lot of them have big constituencies of their own and
a certain amount of political muscle around here. But none of
them, either through the Administration or to Congress, tried
to break away. And I think it says that for them, the
Department is working as an entity, maybe helping them do their
job better.
And maybe one thing that happened after 9/11 is that the
kind of turf protection that went on before was impossible to
defend after an attack like 9/11, and I think perhaps there is
an attitude now that we had better work together, because, God
forbid, something happens, we do not want the press or the
Congress to come at us and say, ``you were just being
parochial, not sharing information, or not cooperating with
another agency of the Federal Government and that is why this
attack occurred.''
So, anyway, that is a long story to say that though we have
not reached the ultimate destination here, as GAO reminds us,
we have come a long way in the right direction. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dodaro, the GAO has studied DHS extensively, report
after report, recommendation after recommendation. So I want to
ask you a fundamental question, a question that we are going to
be asked as we seek to reauthorize the Department this year,
and that is: Has it worked? Has it made us safer as a Nation?
Was it a good idea to bring all 22 agencies together in terms
of improving our security? What is GAO's assessment and answer
to that very fundamental question?
Mr. Dodaro. Well, I think we are definitely better prepared
as a Nation to address these issues, and to the extent that we
are better prepared, we are safer in that regard, although we
need to be vigilant, we need to be alert, and we need to evolve
to changes.
I think in terms of bringing the 22 agencies together,
there are a lot of different organizational models that could
have been used. That was one that was chosen. Our focus has
been on making sure that model worked as effectively and
efficiently as possible. There were synergies to be gained and
they are beginning to gel and develop over time, and so the
benefits of putting those agencies together are becoming clear,
I think.
With regard to the progress, I would say that the
Department, in our view, and this is reflected in our report,
has made considerable progress in the mission areas. The
management areas that underpin some of the developments really
need additional work to be implemented properly to help the
missions, whether it is developing and acquiring new technology
or looking at cost effectiveness issues and measures over time.
So I think I have addressed all parts of your questions,
Senator Collins. Those are very good questions. But that is our
response.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Deputy Secretary Lute, I want to turn to the management
challenges that both the Comptroller General and Ms. Berrick
have mentioned today, particularly in the area of procurement.
I mentioned in my opening statement that there have been a
string of procurement failures. It spans both Administrations.
It has cost the taxpayers literally billions of dollars. And
equally troubling, it has delayed the deployment of much-needed
technology and equipment.
Here is just a partial list. TSA determined that the
explosive trace detectors, the puffer machines that we saw for
a while at the airport, did not work in a real world
environment. They worked fine in the lab but not at the
airports. There was the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, which
DNDO moved to deploy before proper testing and evaluation had
been completed.
There have been two major consolidated financial data
system failures. With the Emerge II System, $52 million was
spent before the project was cancelled. The Transformation and
Systems Consolidation Project was abandoned this year, in May,
after multiple protests, a GAO ruling against DHS, and a lot of
money spent. This one, in particular, is very frustrating to me
because Senator McCaskill and I repeatedly wrote to Secretary
Napolitano. We received written personal assurances that the
TASC initiative was critical, and it was on track. We were
assured of the soundness of the program's lifecycle cost
estimates. And, yet, it is abandoned.
The SBInet program was cancelled by the Administration
after programmatic failures. Even the Coast Guard, one of my
favorite agencies and one that is very well run, had
extraordinary problems for a while with its Deepwater Program
because of a failed lead system integrator relationship with
the government. In July of this year, the DHS IG issued a
report that found that the Department had not leveraged its
collective buying power across the Department and thus was
paying literally billions more than it needed to.
That is not a great record in the area of procurement. So
my question to you is what is the Department doing to better
define requirements up front, which is one of the major
problems, to ensure real world testing and evaluation, and to
ensure that we do not have these string of failures continue
into the future?
Ms. Lute. Senator, as you know, and I have testified before
this Committee before on certain acquisitions, this has been an
area where we have been working diligently to improve our
record and our practice. We have cancelled non-performing
programs, that is true, and we have had other challenges in our
procurement process, but we have addressed them by looking
comprehensively at the acquisition process and tailoring a
program. We have been planning within that a process that meets
the needs of the Department, which largely, although not
exclusively, resides in the acquisition of services and
important technologies to facilitate our operations at the
border and at airports and across the Homeland Security
enterprise.
We have worked in three key areas in the area of
procurement. First, on requirements. Let me use, for example,
aviation requirements. I now chair a committee composed of
members across the Department, principally with CBP and with
the Coast Guard, to look at our aviation assets and our
aviation fleet, leading toward the reestablishment of a Joint
Requirements Board so that we can sensibly prioritize what we
need in terms of air fleets and seek the air solutions that are
not only the most economical, but the most effective
operationally, first and foremost.
We have improved the process of cost estimates that has
often bedeviled procurements at every stage, not only the
acquisition of items in particular, but the sustainability
costs which are intrinsic to understanding the life cycle of
those acquisitions, as well.
And we have taken a number of steps to strengthen our
procurement workforce--you are very familiar with these--
including establishing a Department-wide Acquisition Training
Program under our head of procurement and enhancing our
internship program. We recently had 60 graduates of that
program and we are training more. We also are establishing an
Acquisition Corps for our senior personnel so that they
understand their responsibilities in the acquisition process.
Importantly in this regard, and something I also know that
you have great interest in, is the intersection of the
operators with the procurers. It makes absolutely no sense to
go down a long, tortured path of procurement without having an
operator's sensibility introduced every step of the way. Do we
know what we need? Are we considering alternatives for what
operationally works? And then are we testing it in an
operational environment? All these are areas where we have made
strong improvements and will continue to do so.
Senator Collins. Is this an area, Mr. Dodaro, where the
Department has to show more progress and control before GAO
will remove the Department from its High-Risk List?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Akaka,
good morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this important hearing updating us on the progress in
implementing the Department of Homeland Security. This is
especially significant as we reflect on the last 10 years since
the terrible events that led to the Department's creation.
The Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
which I chair, has held several hearings on efforts to reform
and improve management of DHS which is vital to executing its
mission. The Department has made a great deal of progress, but
as we have heard from GAO, the important work is not yet
finished. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing and I
will have a few questions.
Ms. Lute, and I would like to ask Mr. Dodaro as well--as
you know, the entire Federal Government, including DHS, has
experienced and will continue to face budget reductions. This
has caused delays in consolidating DHS's headquarters and
forced reductions in the Management Directorate. Please discuss
the challenges DHS faces in effectively executing its mission
to protect the Nation in this budget environment.
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Senator. We are all facing those
challenges. We have articulated, though, that within the budget
guidelines as articulated by the President, the priority for
us, of course, are the five mission areas that we see as
essential to homeland security.
Preventing another terrorist attack, such as we saw on 9/
11, that is job one for us. We do it every day. We will
continue to prioritize that within our budgetary guidelines.
Securing our borders, again, we have achieved significant
progress in securing our border and we will continue to
emphasize that.
Enforcing our immigration laws, conveying immigration
benefits appropriately, as well.
Building our cyber capacity is essential. Developing cyber
security for the Nation and building the Nation's resilience,
as well, to face all risks and hazards.
We will continue to prioritize these. We will also continue
to prioritize the integration of the Department and the
management of the Department. There are some that--no one on
this Committee, I am proud to say--has ever suggested that,
somehow, the management is separate and apart from the line or
the programmatic functions. We are one Department. The entire
Department is operational and we will continue to prioritize
our ability to execute our missions to run ourselves and to
account for the resources that we are given.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Dodaro, I would like to hear you on this, as well. This
GAO report is based on observations over the past several years
at DHS, but in the last year, the Department's budgetary
outlook has dramatically changed. Based on your work, are you
concerned that budgetary challenges will reverse any of the
recent management progress at DHS?
Mr. Dodaro. I think it largely depends on how DHS can
implement its mission in the most cost effective manner, and I
would point out several areas are critical to that. One is in
the acquisition area. It is about 40 percent of the
Department's budget, and so it is very important that the
acquisitions be carried out according to their plans. As Ms.
Lute outlined, they have a lot of efforts underway to try to
improve acquisition management. I think it is very important.
In the IT area, for example, right now, there are 46 projects
at a little over $3 billion that are in need of significant
management attention, according to their IT Dashboard.
Second, I think they need to use the assessments that they
have done on a risk-based approach to make sure that they are
integrated into their plans more. They are beginning to do that
more and more, but in order to be cost effective, you have to
use your risk assessments more effectively.
Third, as I pointed out in my opening statement, the
performance measures, what is working, what is not working, is
really critical if you are going to target your resources on
areas that are in need of greater improvement or to make sure
that you are financing things that are producing the right
types of results.
And last, their financial management systems are still in
need of reform, and if you are going to operate in a cost
effective manner, you need good accounting. You need good cost
management processes.
So I think all those things can help them deal in a more
cost effective manner and it will be critical in this period of
budgetary challenges.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Lute, DHS has committed to empowering the agriculture
mission of CBP with the leadership structure and authorities at
all levels necessary for success. I am concerned that unless we
fully accomplish this important goal, our efforts to safeguard
American agriculture will continue to fall short.
In my home State of Hawaii, invasive species have the
potential to cause economic and environmental catastrophe
there. I plan to introduce a bill to reinforce DHS's efforts to
strengthen agricultural inspection.
Will you commit to work with Congress to make sure CBP is
fully empowered and held accountable for effective agriculture
inspection?
Ms. Lute. I will, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Ms. Lute, last year, the Department released its High-Risk
Management Strategy, which I think is an important step for DHS
to come off the High-Risk List. However, GAO reports that this
plan has not been fully implemented. What more needs to be done
to implement the High-Risk Strategy and are there any barriers
preventing implementation?
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Senator. We have made getting
ourselves off the High-Risk List a priority for us from a
management point of view and I am very pleased to say we have
been working very closely with Mr. Dodaro, Ms. Berrick, and the
team to identify what we actually need to do. GAO has given us
a detailed view on what it takes to get off the High-Risk List
and we have responded with an equally detailed plan for
executing those steps and we have been working very closely
together.
So, I think we are on track. We have issued one report on
our progress in June of this year. We will issue another in
December of this year. And we are going to continue to march
along this track until we succeed.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator
Pryor, good morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Thanks for having this hearing
today and I appreciate all of our witnesses being here.
Let me start, if I may, with you, Deputy Secretary Lute.
According to the GAO, one reason DHS has missed opportunities
to optimize performance across its missions is a lack of
reliable performance information or assessment of existing
information. That concerns me. How has DHS tried to address
this problem and what is the Department doing to try to fix
that?
Ms. Lute. It concerns me, as well, Senator, and we have
made identifying common sense metrics of progress a priority
for us. We have been working, as I mentioned, with GAO across a
range of areas to improve our business intelligence processes
so that we can have a fact-based understanding of how we are
executing and the effect that our operations are having, and
this is across the mission areas and across the components
within DHS, including very pragmatic metrics for understanding
the effectiveness of our emergency response in FEMA, CBP, ICE,
CIS, and TSA, as well.
Senator Pryor. Since you mentioned different parts of your
mission there, let me ask about FEMA. What are you doing to
improve financial management practices at FEMA?
Ms. Lute. Administrator Fugate is very committed to this,
as am I, and we are looking across the range of operations that
FEMA engages with, both on the preparedness side and on the
response side. And I chair, for example, a Department-wide task
force to look at the Administration of grants, for example, to
streamline our processes, improve accountability, and, frankly,
improve the overall performance of the grant program, as well.
But across FEMA, the commitment to management is the commitment
that we have in the Department for responsive, timely,
effective accountability for the resources that have been given
to us in the context of effective delivery of effective
operations.
Senator Pryor. And Mr. Dodaro, is GAO comfortable with the
progress FEMA is making on its financial management?
Mr. Dodaro. We remain concerned about financial management.
We look across the Federal Government and there are only four
agencies right now that are not able to obtain a clean opinion
on their consolidated financial statements, and DHS and DOD are
two of the largest ones on that list of four. There have been a
couple efforts to try to get an integrated financial management
system in place. Most of the problems are in the Coast Guard
area and property accountability at TSA.
So I think the Department is trying to get a good plan
together in that area. We are going to be evaluating that to
see if they make the necessary improvements. But it is one of
the critical areas and reasons for why they are on our High-
Risk List and so we are going to continue to give them advice
on how to move forward and fix the problems.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask this. DHS is a relatively new
department. It seemed to me when it was started a few years
ago, that it would have a chance at a clean slate to set all
the operations up the way they should be done and not inherit a
lot of issues and challenges from the other agencies and
offices that existed before that they brought under the
umbrella. Was DHS not set up the right way? What is the origin
of this problem?
Mr. Dodaro. The origin is--I will ask Ms. Berrick to
elaborate on this, if she would like--basically, they inherited
the 22 agencies. A lot of them had their own definitions and
requirements and systems and methods, and so while it presented
an opportunity to start fresh, it also presented a challenge
because the Department did inherit a lot of the problems and
concerns.
Now, we had mentioned early on and our report reflects that
they made more progress in the mission areas than in the
management area, and we were concerned about management from
day one. We put them on the High-Risk List the day they started
operations in 2003 and we have always advocated for more
management oversight, and eventually the Under Secretary for
Management position was created and that position is now
filled.
And so I think, Senator, there was an opportunity. In the
early days, there was not enough focus on taking advantage of
the opportunity, but they also inherited a lot of problems and
a lot of challenges and so they are working their way through
those still.
Senator Pryor. Ms. Berrick, do you have a comment?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. Thank you, Senator. In addition to
inheriting legacy problems from the different components, just
by the nature that these are disparate systems among the
components that are not integrated together is a challenge in
and of itself because the systems cannot speak to each other,
and at the Department level, senior leadership does not have
the ready access to financial information that they otherwise
would have with an integrated financial management system. So I
think it is both inheriting some existing problems and also
just the fact that these are disparate systems that do not work
well together.
Senator Pryor. And are they actively trying to address
those and fix those problems?
Ms. Berrick. They are trying to do that through the
development of an integrated financial management system. They
have had a couple of attempts that have not been successful so
far, but they are working toward that as their goal.
Senator Pryor. How much money does it cost to try to
integrate a financial system?
Ms. Berrick. About $52 billion has been devoted thus far.
Senator Pryor. Ms. Lute.
Ms. Lute. Senator, the only thing I would add is that is
only one component of this. The Department also have made
steady progress toward the goal of a clean audit, which is
anyone's aspiration. We have gone from over 18 reportable
conditions down to six, and we are on track to make even
further progress this year and look to do so.
Senator Pryor. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I
have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Pryor. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses,
welcome. It is good to see all of you.
I had three questions. The first one dealt with a clean
audit. The second one dealt with a clean audit. And the third
one dealt with a clean audit. So it sounds like we have mined
that field pretty well, plowed that field pretty well.
Let me just ask for the Comptroller General Dodaro, are you
encouraged by the progress that is being reported by Deputy
Secretary Lute? Should we be encouraged?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes. I think, basically, the Department is
committed to trying to make progress in this area. As Ms. Lute
mentioned, the number of material weaknesses are coming down,
but they still have some challenges. Now, they have set some
aggressive targets, I believe, to getting an opinion on a
consolidated balance sheet for 2011 and to try to get an
unqualified opinion or clean opinion by 2014. Those are
aggressive targets and those will be the benchmarks as to
whether they are successful or not. But they are focused on it.
What they really need to continue to focus on is improving
their underlying systems, and recover from a couple of efforts
that have not resulted in success.
Senator Carper. And if they are successful in that, it will
leave one department as an outlier in this, is that correct?
Mr. Dodaro. One major department would be the Department of
Defense.
Senator Carper. I guess as an aside to our colleagues, I
had a chance to meet, I think in the early part of August, with
Secretary Leon Panetta, who indicated that the idea of waiting
until 2017 to reach that goal of audited financials and then
maybe hearing from some of those folks that said they were not
probably going to be able to make that goal. What he said to me
in our conversation--he may have said the same thing to you--is
``I would like to beat that goal'' rather than have to slide
further. Sometimes it is good to have somebody who was the
former Budget Committee Chairman and OMB Director. I mean, he
has done it all. But he brings a real commitment to these
issues which is very much welcome.
Yesterday, Mr. Dodaro, we had another hearing, as you may
know--some of your folks were here--and the issue was the path
forward on the Postal Service and how do we help them get back
on track. I described the situation as dire but not without
hope, and I thought we had a very good hearing.
One of the questions that is before us, and I know it is
not the subject of this hearing, but I want to ask while you
are here, there is reason to believe that the Postal Service
has overpaid its obligation into the Civil Service Retirement
System to the tune of $50 billion, maybe as much as $75 billion
over time, and overpaid the amount that they owe to the Federal
Employee Retirement System by maybe $7 billion or so. We had
yesterday one of the witnesses from Segal and Company Auditing,
a very nationally renowned company, along with the Hay Group,
they have done independent audits to determine what is the
validity of the overpayment, has there really been an
overpayment. The IG at the Postal Service alleges, and both
Segal Company and Hay Group have said, yes, we think there has
been an overpayment, anywhere from at least $50 billion to as
much as $75 billion.
The Administration is not buying that yet, so we had some
discussion there. The head of OPM was here yesterday to talk
about that. We asked the witness from GAO if GAO would be
willing to come in and take a look at the work that has been
done by the two independent auditors to find out if they are
valid. We need that kind of direction. If you will, a good
housekeeping stamp of approval from GAO, I think, would be very
helpful as we try to move and help the Postal Service to dig
out of the hole that they are in and return to profitability.
So if that is something that you all could help us with, we
would be most grateful.
Mr. Dodaro. Definitely, Senator. We will be able to do
that. We have a Chief Actuary at GAO, as well, that will be
integral to figuring out that status. I understand the tasking
and the work.
We will deliver that. And as you know, the Postal Service
is also on our High-Risk List because of the financial
condition situation. So we would be happy to do that.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks very much.
Since my first three questions have already been addressed,
I will turn to the fourth, and that was cyber security, and it
is an issue that the Chairman, Senator Collins, and I have had
a whole lot of interest in, and with the help of our staff, I
think have done some good work. It is hard to get anything
passed around here, but the Administration, I think, has done
good work on this front.
But over the last 10 years, Deputy Secretary Lute, as you
know, we have witnessed an evolving terrorist threat that has
required your Department and other agencies to constantly be
thinking about tomorrow's threat. I like to say as an old Naval
flight officer, we are pretty good at re-fighting the last war.
We are not always very good at looking over the horizon and
preparing to fight the next war. But in my view, the next war
could very well likely be on the cyber security front. But
nowhere is this more evident than in the world of cyber
security, where threats can change almost daily, almost weekly
without a whole lot of notice.
GAO has noted much of the good work that your Department
has undertaken in this area. GAO has also stated that Homeland
Security needs to better secure Internet connections at Federal
agencies and more thoroughly share cyber security information
with the private sector.
Madam Secretary, I understand that the Department of
Homeland Security has a program called Einstein that is helping
Federal agencies detect and prevent cyber intrusion. I would
ask you, if you will, just to discuss the steps that the
Department of Homeland Security is taking to integrate programs
like Einstein across the government and what additional
authorities, resources, or staffing you need to be more
effective. My colleagues here know I like to quote Albert
Einstein from time to time, who once said, among other things,
``that in adversity lies opportunity.'' We have plenty of
adversity in the world and there is hopefully some opportunity,
as well. Maybe this program Einstein can be part of that. But
would you proceed.
Ms. Lute. Thanks very much, Senator. There certainly is
opportunity here. This is an area where I have been spending a
lot of my time lately, as we have in the Department. We have
culled it out as one of the five essential missions of Homeland
Security, which is ensuring our cyber security.
What we can all agree is that the status quo in cyber
security is not acceptable. There are intrusions. There are
threats that we have to address. Cyberspace is an environment
right now where offense wins and we have to change that. And
our vision is one of distributed security, where we have smart
machines and smart users that are supported by intelligent
networks that identify threats, hopefully before they occur,
that prevent them, and that cultivate a community and a
sensibility of cyber hygiene pervasive throughout the United
States and, indeed, throughout the Internet, because we are so
interconnected.
Einstein specifically is a program that we have, as you
know, which is designed to prevent intrusions. We are 84
percent deployed in terms of Einstein II capabilities right
now. But the Federal agencies and offices have a number of
things that they have to do, as well, to bring their traffic
behind Einstein to ensure that they are taking advantage of the
deployment of this technology, and we are working with them. In
fact, I attended a meeting of the President's Management
Council that consists of all the department deputies as the
chief operating officers of the departments and spoke to them
about what they can do to ensure that their agencies are taking
the steps necessary to organize their traffic behind the
Einstein protections.
But there are other things to do, as well. What is on your
networks? How is information traveling? Who is using your
networks? Do they have appropriate levels of access and
controls? There is a whole pyramid of efforts--that is perhaps
one way to think of it--on top of which sits Einstein. It is
only a part of the puzzle necessary to ensure our cyber
security.
We are also working very closely with the Department of
Defense and with industry. And our, again, vision is to have an
environment of distributed security that utilizes all of the
assets of this country in protecting ourselves in cyberspace.
Senator Carper. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, the last part
of my question was what additional resources or staffing do you
need, what additional authorities do you need in the Department
to enable you to be even more effective on this front?
Ms. Lute. The President's budget that was submitted,
Senator, reflects specifics in a number of those areas. We can
address this in a stand-alone, if you would like. We have also
been working with OMB and there has been a legislative proposal
sent to the Hill regarding ways to strengthen our ability to
fulfill our cyber security mission.
Senator Carper. Well, thanks very much. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Carper.
We will do a second round, up to 7 minutes apiece, and
thanks for hanging in there with us.
I wanted to ask you about a particular part of the
Department that the Committee was anxious in the creation of
the Department to put in, and that is the science and
technology section. Our hope had been--a lot of us on this
Committee happened to be on the Armed Services Committee--that
we could develop within and for homeland security something
like DARPA in the Department of Defense. Over the time of the
Department overall, it has appeared to me that the science and
technology section has been below what our hopes were. My
impression is that it is doing better now, and I wonder if
either of you would like to comment on that.
Ms. Lute. I think I would say at the outset, Senator, that
science and technology is a key part of the Department.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Lute. Our ability to innovate, to make use of end-to-
end solutions, not just a particular piece of technology, is a
task that we have given to S&T. It has very able leadership
with Under Secretary Tara O'Toole, who has integrated into
every aspect of our mission performance, working directly with
components to ensure that we have a systems approach and are
making best use of technology within the context of an overall
systems solution.
We also have a very robust cooperation with the other
departments, notably the Department of Defense, looking to
learn from them on such things as tunnel technology, unmanned
sensors, etc., and S&T is critical and important to this and
remains a priority for us at the leadership of the Department,
certainly for the Secretary.
Chairman Lieberman. Comptroller General Dodaro or Ms.
Berrick, have you had any overview of S&T and what is your
sense of it now?
Ms. Berrick. Yes, we do, and I would agree with your
characterization that the Department has been slower in making
progress in the S&T area. However, I would also agree with the
Deputy Secretary that there is a framework in place right now,
I think, for the Directorate to be successful. They have put in
place additional policies. They have created additional units
within S&T to support efforts like test and evaluation
throughout the Department that I think will strengthen the
foundation of that Directorate office and enable some
successes.
Of the two areas that I would mention related to S&T that I
think need continued focus, one is resources. For example, when
we did work looking at the test and evaluation function of S&T,
we found that they were low in terms of resources and it
inhibited the outreach that they could perform with the
components in supporting their testing efforts.
And I think the second area that requires focus in S&T is
coordination within the Department. We found that sometimes S&T
would be pursuing technologies without effectively coordinating
with the end users of those technologies to make sure that what
they were developing was meeting needs. And a quick example of
that is the CAARS program that was being designed to detect
shielded nuclear material in cargo and vehicles. DHS ultimately
decided to stop that program after learning that S&T was
working on developing a system that was not going to fit within
primary inspection lanes. So I think that is an example of the
internal coordination.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Another one is the so-called
virtual fence, is it not? My impression is that there was not
much interaction with Customs and Border Protection in the
development of that.
Ms. Berrick. We did cite that as a concern that CBP's input
on how it was working operationally and challenges that they
were facing, were not always fully considered, at least in
decisions that were made related to the program.
Chairman Lieberman. I think that is one we all want to keep
an eye on because it has tremendous potential both to avoid the
kind of problems that Mr. Dodaro cited in terms of new
technologies being introduced.
And the second, of course, is more affirmative, which is,
as we have seen with DARPA, the ability to leverage Federal
money with private innovation and entrepreneurship to create
new technologies that will more effectively protect our
homeland and also, hopefully, as in DARPA's case, have
remarkable spin-offs into commercial applications that will
create a lot of economic activity.
Let me ask you, Madam Deputy Secretary, about something a
little different, which is the increasing concern that I know
the Department and all of us who care about homeland security
have had in recent years about homegrown terrorism, self-
radicalized people, particularly so-called lone wolves. And I
know that the Administration, through Homeland Security Advisor
John Brennan, put out a report recently. Senator Collins and I,
frankly, were overall--forgive me if I am overstating it--
disappointed by the report. We have our continuing concern
about the reluctance, refusal of the Administration to use the
term ``violent Islamist extremism,'' or something like that, as
opposed to ``violent extremism.'' But I want to focus on a
different aspect of it.
We also did not see in the report a clear allocation or
designation of authority. In other words, who is in charge? And
a lot of different departments should be involved in
interacting affirmatively with the Muslim American community to
gain their assistance in education and noticing the potential
lone wolf behavior, coordinating a lot of the law enforcement
education, etc. I know the National Counterterrorism Center,
interestingly, has been doing some of that. I cannot say, since
that originated in this Committee, too, that we had that kind
of function in mind.
The White House, I suppose, has a natural overview which
might suggest that it should oversee the response or the
prevention of homegrown terrorism, but it has so much that is
in the White House now, I wonder whether this is not something
that DHS should begin to play a more active role in and I just
wanted to give you an opportunity, as now we look back at this
decade but forward to the next decade and seeing homegrown
terrorism rising as a threat, what you think about DHS's record
here and what it might do in the years ahead.
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We certainly have been
playing a very active role. The President's policy that was
announced emphasizes three things. First, we need to understand
more about what generates this threat and how it promulgates
within communities.
Second, we need to engage communities more, break down
barriers that isolate them and engage and understand them,
create pathways of dialogue and understanding and outreach.
And third, and equally as important if not more so, is
strengthen the hand of law enforcement to be able to stop
violent extremism in its tracks. Law enforcement prevent crimes
all the time quite effectively and we need to equip them with
the information and the tools that they need to address this
nature of crime, as well.
And so the Department works very closely with the
Department of Justice, FBI, NCTC, the White House, and other
agencies. We meet regularly on this. We meet as a small group.
I meet with my counterparts on exactly this question, about how
in each of these areas, in terms of understanding the threat,
sharing information, breaking down barriers that isolate
communities, and strengthening the hand of law enforcement,
what we are doing every day to address this trend.
Chairman Lieberman. To me, those are the right goals. So
who would you say is in charge now of that effort on behalf of
the Federal Government?
Ms. Lute. Certainly under the leadership of the President
and the White House, this is coming together, but the work is
distributed, as so much of the work is in homeland security.
Chairman Lieberman. No, that I understand, but again, there
has to be somebody who is in charge to keep driving it. So
would you say it is in the National Security Council?
Ms. Lute. I would say that it is. It is a working system.
Again, I meet with my counterparts in the Department of
Justice, the FBI, and NCTC regularly on this subject and there
is an enormous amount of work going on in each of those
strains.
Chairman Lieberman. We will come back to that. I thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to reemphasize what the Chairman just said. The
strategy produced by the White House does not clearly assign
the responsibility to an individual who we can hold
accountable, whose progress we can measure. And I still do not
hear that from you. You keep talking about, well, we work
together. There are all these agencies involved. That is not
adequate. We need to have a leader of this effort and I hope
you will relay that we are continuing to push on that, as well.
I want to switch to some other issues in my remaining time.
The recent hurricanes and natural disasters in this country
have reminded us of the importance of ensuring that people are
notified as quickly as possible when a natural disaster is
looming. Early warning can make a huge difference in saving
lives and property and that is why I have been working hard on
a bill that would strengthen the Nation's public alert and
warning system.
I would like to ask your assessment, and GAO may have
something to add on this, as well, as far as where are we in
using smart technology so that we are not just relying on the
crawl on a television screen, the emergency alert that comes
across, since many people are not going to have televisions on,
but instead we are using phones, we are using social networking
sites, and we are using tools that are more likely to reach
more people. Deputy Secretary Lute first.
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Senator. The public alert and warning
system now currently reaches about 78 percent of the
population. We have a number of initiatives in play
particularly aimed at making progress this year, rolling out
the Commercial Mobile Alert System, for example, in New York
and Washington, DC, and having the first ever national-level
test of the Emergency Alert System, as well. So we are
absolutely committed to making use of modern technology, social
media, to give people accurate and timely information, because
we know that in a crisis particularly, information is a
commodity and it is essential to having informed individuals
and capable communities.
Senator Collins. Does GAO have anything to add to that?
Mr. Dodaro. We have not looked at this issue, Senator
Collins. It is certainly an important issue and I know we are
dealing with it ourselves and communicating our own results of
our reports, and so it is very important in emergencies. So we
would be happy to take a look at this in the future.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Deputy Secretary Lute, I want
to talk to you about an issue that is related to the homegrown
terrorism threat and that is the insider threat. Certainly, the
Major Nidal Malik Hasan case was an example of the insider
threat. In a report that was released by GAO earlier this year,
GAO took a look at the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential program that is used for access to our seaports, and
its findings were disturbing in terms of protecting us from the
insider threat.
First, GAO found that TSA's background checking process is
not even designed to detect fraud. In other words, GAO found
that it would be easier to obtain a TWIC card with fraudulent
documents than a driver's license. That is very disturbing.
Second, GAO criticized the process as not providing an
ongoing check. In other words, once a worker receives a TWIC
card, he or she has that TWIC card for an indefinite time, even
if there is subsequent information or a conviction or something
that would cause the TWIC card to be revoked, one would hope.
What steps has DHS taken to remedy these critical flaws in
the TWIC program?
Ms. Lute. Senator, we share the concern about the insider
threat and know that it is one that we have to stay constantly
vigilant, and this involves not only those of us in the Federal
Government, but also, for example, in our critical
infrastructure having programs in place in the private sector
so that we know who is working in these facilities and that
they are trustworthy for the responsibilities that they have
been given. TWIC now covers about two million workers and we
have run a number of pilots to ensure that we can strengthen
the system with respect to not only the technology, but the
reliability of the system end to end.
In this regard, the ongoing checks is something that we are
looking at department-wide, because, as we have learned, for
example, in the case of Abdulmutallab, the 12/25 bombing
attempt, that we have to have an ongoing check of visa holders,
for example, and of other credential holders. And I chair an
interdepartmental examination of a common vetting platform to
bring together all of our vetting capabilities and, again, to
deploy them in real time to give accurate, full checks, and
also working with the agencies to ensure that we have the
requirements fully in hand to prevent fraud and other abuses.
Senator Collins. In that regard, that reminds me of the
Bowling Green, Kentucky, case where two suspects have been
arrested, one of whom's fingerprints allegedly were in a
database that should have been checked before the individual
was granted asylum and admitted to this country. The Chairman
and I have written you a letter with a number of detailed
questions since the information that was provided at the
hearing where we explored this issue proved to be inaccurate.
When do you anticipate that the Department will complete its
review of how in the world this could have happened, that an
individual whose fingerprints were on IEDs used to attack our
soldiers in Iraq was granted asylum and allowed to be a
resident of this country?
Ms. Lute. We expect that shortly, Senator. But importantly,
we have taken a number of steps to ensure that cannot happen
again. We have expanded our engagement of databases, working
also closely with DOD to take advantage of the databases of
individuals that they hold. And again, this is part of our
common vetting examination to strengthen the system overall.
Senator Collins. Finally, I want to ask you about the
Department's progress in dealing with chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats. This is an issue that we
have held several hearings on in the past, that GAO has also
examined. And what GAO found echoed the conclusions of our
investigations and that is that there was poor cooperation
between DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services in
assessing the CBRN risk. In particular, it is of great concern
that, under the BioWatch program, a threat agent may not be
identified until more than a day after its release. What is
being done to improve coordination between DHS and HHS in this
area, and also when do you anticipate that the next generation,
a more sensitive BioWatch system, will be deployed?
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Senator. Again, here, we think that we
make progress continually with the other agencies in this
regard. NBIC, for example, does effectively integrate the
information for early warning and response on possible attacks
or pandemics in the biosphere, as well.
As you know, the work that we have done, for example, on
the global nuclear detection architecture is generating work on
an implementation plan to further develop our cooperation with
other agencies in identifying threats to the homeland and
responsibilities for early action to defeat those threats.
So specifically to answer your question, this is a priority
for the Department, one that we are making continual progress
toward, and we believe that it will substantially reduce the
response time inherent in the detection of a dangerous pathogen
and alerting appropriate responses.
Senator Collins. But when? What is the time table?
Ms. Lute. I can get back with you, Senator, on the
specifics of that, but this is a program that we have in place
and it is a priority for the Department.
Senator Collins. If the Chairman would indulge me----
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Senator Collins [continuing]. Just one final question on
the Kentucky case, which really deserves it. Can you assure us
today that the Department has reviewed the files of every Iraqi
national who was admitted under that program to ensure that
there was proper vetting, including matching fingerprints with
databases in possession of the Department of Defense?
Ms. Lute. It is my understanding that every person admitted
under the program has been vetted, Senator. I will confirm that
it complies with the question as you have asked it.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I just want to ask one more brief question. It is about the
St. Elizabeths campus project. The last time I looked at the
statistics, the Department, and we talked about its management
and coordination, was spread through 70 buildings and 40 sites
in the National Capital Region, and, of course, that is what
motivated the plan to coordinate and collect as many of those
as we could on the St. Elizabeths campus. If I am not mistaken,
the next step would be to bring the 10 operations centers of
the Department together there.
So we are in tough budgetary times. The President delayed
some of the projects in his budget. The Senate Appropriations
Homeland Security Subommittee, I think, has appropriated a
third of what the President asked for and the House has cut all
the money out for St. Elizabeths. How bad will that be for the
improved management of the Department? I would ask you, Deputy
Secretary Lute.
And then I do not know whether you have done this or it is
even possible, but Mr. Dodaro or Ms. Berrick, is it possible to
make a judgment about the cost effectiveness of not building--I
do not know whether it is possible to evaluate what costs the
Department being spread out adds to its budget, but go ahead,
Deputy Secretary Lute.
Ms. Lute. Senator, as you know, we believe it is important
and there is a wisdom in consolidating the Department to reduce
the transaction time in engagements, but also to facilitate
coordination, dialogue, information sharing, as well. We remain
committed to that view that this is an important step in the
development and evolution of the Department.
Chairman Lieberman. Anything to add, Mr. Dodaro?
Mr. Dodaro. Well, there certainly would be challenges in
trying to come up with the exact quantification that you are
calling for.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Dodaro. One of the things that we could do is look at
the Department's business case for the consolidation and offer
our thoughts on that.
Chairman Lieberman. I would welcome that, if you could.
Mr. Dodaro. Sure.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks to the three of you
for being here.
Overall, obviously, we have certain almost parental or
possessive interest in this Department because we were
privileged to be there to help in its creation, so we would
like to think it has helped. I do think both the record and the
independent evaluations over the years and the summary that you
have offered here as we approach the 10th commemoration of 9/11
says that the Department of Homeland Security has made a
difference. And again, it is not an accident that we have not
had a major attack on us succeed. Do we have more work to do?
Of course, we do.
I would also say, and one of you mentioned this, that a
different kind of country after 9/11 would have become much
more like a police state. I suppose there are people who feel
that at different times, somebody's civil liberties were
compromised. I think, overall, really, our record is
remarkable. I say that also that in a country as big, open, and
free as we are--and we want to remain always as open and free
as we are--we are never going to achieve 100 percent security.
But we have come a lot more toward that goal, and we should
always aspire to the goal, than we were on 9/11, and it is
thanks to the leadership of the Department over these two
Administrations and the literally hundreds of thousands of men
and women who have worked for the Department, working with
colleagues in other departments, the Department of Defense,
intelligence, NCTC, etc. So it is in a spirit of gratitude and
confidence that both GAO and this Committee will continue to
push you to get as close to 100 percent secure as we possibly
can.
Senator Collins, do you want to add anything?
Senator Collins. No, thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much. We will keep the
record open for 15 days for any additional questions and
answers. Again, thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: ARE WE SAFER?
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Pryor,
Collins, Brown, McCain, Johnson, Paul, and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to our distinguished panel of
witnesses: Secretary Napolitano, Director Mueller, and the new
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew
Olsen.
This past weekend in ceremonies and vigils across the
Nation, we stopped to remember the nearly 3,000 people who were
killed 10 years ago in the attacks of September 11, 2001, and
to appreciate the acts of heroism and service by countless
Americans on that day and every day since to protect our
homeland and defeat the violent Islamist extremists who
attacked us on 9/11 and drew us into the war that we are in.
The ninth anniversary of 9/11 last year did not get,
obviously, the same degree of attention and neither will the
11th anniversary next year, and in some sense, that is why we
are here this morning. This annual status of the threat against
our homeland hearing with the heads of these three critically
important agencies has become a tradition of our Committee.
Senator Collins and I wanted very much to hold it after 9/11 to
look back a little bit but really to look forward and to make
the point that our work in protecting the homeland goes on.
Even though we had fresh warnings that alerted us over the
past few days, over this weekend of commemoration, of a
specific, credible, although unconfirmed, terrorist plot
against the United States, there is already evidence that in a
quite natural reaction, the American people are beginning to
forget how real the threat of Islamist extremism continues to
be.
There was a Gallup Poll taken last year that showed
terrorism ranked at the bottom of six voter concerns--
understandably probably because of the intensity of the
economic concerns that we have today--behind the economy, jobs,
government corruption, Federal spending, and health care.
And in a very different way last week, a study was
published by the Cato Institute calling for the abolition of
the Department of Homeland Security, which essentially would
return us to where we were pre-9/11.
In some ways, I think we may be the victims of the success
that has been achieved in protecting the homeland since there
has obviously not been another mass casualty terrorist attack
on American soil since 9/11--something, a reality, nobody would
have predicted on that day.
Some have taken this lack of another large-scale attack as
further evidence, to them anyway, that the U.S. Government
exaggerated the danger posed by Islamist extremism and
overreacted in the wake of 9/11. I believe this is a profoundly
mistaken and ultimately irresponsible conclusion. We have
weakened our enemies, and we have protected our homeland, but
our enemies are not vanquished, and that is why our vigilance
must be constant and not limited to the understandable public
attention given to a particular anniversary.
As the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, it is our responsibility to make sure our
national focus is not distracted from the threat.
For our witnesses and the tens of thousands of people who
work with them, it is their constant responsibility 24-7, 365
days a year, to protect our homeland. So we welcome them to
this annual threat hearing and thank them for the service and
for all that their respective agencies have had to do with the
fact that we have not had another major terrorist attack
against our homeland in the past 10 years.
But the violent Islamist extremist ideology that motivated
the attacks of 9/11 remains a potent force, though weakened
throughout the world, and increasingly, of course, seems to
have an effect in the radicalization of homegrown terrorists,
including lone wolves.
Today, we have asked our three witnesses to help us answer
at least three big questions. One is to take a quick look back,
to the extent they want, at what the U.S. Government and their
agencies have done since 9/11. Two, of course, the focus of
this hearing is to discuss the current threat, the status of
the threat of Islamist terrorism to our homeland. And then the
third is to discuss what our government currently is doing to
counter that threat.
So for me, the question today is not are we safer than we
were on 9/11. I think it is self-evidently clear that we are
safer. The question is what are we doing and what should we be
doing to make sure that this safety continues to be what it is
and be greater in the face of the threat that we continue to
face.
The 10-year anniversary of 9/11 has passed. The media and
public attention will naturally fade. But this Congress and
future Congresses, and this Administration and future
Administrations, must stay focused on the threat and its ever-
evolving tactics until the ideology is truly vanquished and
gone.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The State of Maine became forever linked to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, when two of the hijackers, including the
ring leader, Mohamed Atta, boarded an early morning flight to
Boston at the Portland International Jetport. From Logan
Airport, they set in motion the worst terrorist attack in our
Nation's history by seizing control of American Airlines Flight
11.
That evening, Members of Congress gathered together on the
steps of the Capitol to express unity. A day that had begun in
shock and anger ended with unity and resolve. We resolved to
ensure that our country had the tools to detect and deter
future plots as well as to identify those who would do us harm.
When Chairman Lieberman and I authored the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, our goal was to
create a strong leader to coordinate the 17 separate agencies
of the intelligence community and to change their culture from
``need to know'' to ``need to share'' so that next time the
dots would be connected in time to stop an attack.
The operation that killed Osama bin Laden represented the
kind of successful collaboration of intelligence and operations
that we envisioned. Information is now being shared more
effectively, both across the Federal Government and among
Federal agencies and their State, local, and tribal partners.
Just last week, DHS and the FBI announced a ``specific,
credible but unconfirmed threat'' related to the 9/11
anniversary. The Administration is taking this threat
seriously, and appropriately so. It has shared information and
intelligence with State and local law enforcement officials in
the targeted locations and with others across the country.
Thankfully, there was not an incident over the weekend, but
we must consider whether this particular threat has truly
passed or whether the terrorists have just gone to ground. We
must evaluate for how long should we remain on heightened
alert.
This threat demonstrates yet again that the terrorists have
not abandoned their quest to harm our country and our people.
They continue to probe for vulnerabilities.
Much has changed in the past decade. We have vastly
improved the sharing of information across agencies at the
Federal level and with State and local emergency and law
enforcement professionals. America's chemical facilities and
seaports were especially vulnerable a decade ago, and we took
important steps to safeguard them. In the case of last week's
terrorist threat, the decision to publicize the threat put
millions of eyes and ears on the lookout for suspicious
behavior on the eve of the September 11 commemoration.
Senator Lieberman and I continue to work to expand our
``See Something, Say Something'' law. The legislation that we
have introduced would provide further protection against
lawsuits for citizens who report suspicious activity indicating
potential terrorist threats.
When it comes to our homeland security, however, we truly
are only as strong as our weakest link. As we saw in 2009 with
the Christmas Day bomber and Major Hasan's attack later on Fort
Hood, when information is not shared and when warning signals
are ignored or overlooked, our security is placed at risk.
The TSA has strengthened airline passenger screening.
Nevertheless, a young man was recently able to fly cross-
country without a valid government-issued ID and with an
expired boarding pass that did not even bear his name.
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has
bolstered the security of America's borders and identification
documents, yet two Iraqi refugees with ties to al-Qaeda were
arrested in Kentucky for allegedly helping to carry out attacks
against our troops. How a known bombmaker, whose fingerprints
we have had for years, was able to enter our country on
humanitarian grounds remains an unanswered and troubling
question. It appears, however, that this case may reflect the
kind of lack of imagination that the 9/11 Commission found to
be a persistent failure. While the FBI's analysis of IEDs
collected in Iraq and Afghanistan has undoubtedly helped U.S.
warfighters, the forensic information being collected from
these devices should also be used to screen those trying to
enter our country, and we must ensure that the FBI has the
resources necessary to do that job.
We must ask this question: Are there other Iraqi nationals
granted asylum who were involved in attacking our troops? I
know that the Administration is reviewing the files of more
than 51,000 Iraqis admitted under this refugee program, but it
is deeply troubling that we are still awaiting clear answers
from the Administration.
Homegrown terrorism is another challenge and evolving
threat. This Committee first sounded the alarm about home-based
terrorism 5 years ago and has held more than a dozen hearings
on this topic.
Over the past 2 years, 31 arrests have been made in
homegrown plots by American citizens or legal permanent
residents--an enormous increase compared to the previous 7
years dating back to 2001. Yet, the Administration's strategy
for countering violent Islamist extremism is insufficient to
meet the threat.
We shall never forget those whom we lost on September 11,
2001. As has been noted often, the terrorists only have to get
it right once. We have to be right every time or suffer the
consequences of an attack. We are surely much safer than we
were a decade ago, but we must be relentless in anticipating
the changing tactics of terrorists. As the successful decade-
long search for Osama bin Laden proved, America's resolve is
our most powerful weapon against those who seek to destroy our
way of life.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Secretary Napolitano is our first witness on the panel.
Before she testifies, last Friday morning, the Department of
Homeland Security held a departmental commemoration of 9/11,
and I was able to attend on the plaza outside the Reagan
Building here in downtown Washington. And the Department showed
a video that had been made by people within the Department
about its history, particularly on that day. I thought it was
very impressive--for me, moving--and I asked the Secretary if
she would bring it today.
So I am sorry not everybody in the room can see. Maybe you
can see that screen over there. But at this point, whoever is
in charge of the machine, please turn on the video. It is only
about 2 or 3 minutes long.
[Video played.]
Chairman Lieberman. I thought that was great. I hope my
colleagues on the Committee agree. Really, it is such a
powerful statement of unity. I thought it was wonderful to
include Secretaries Ridge and Chertoff in it, and all the
component division heads. There was a real sense of unity and
resolve. So I appreciate it very much.
And with that, please proceed, Secretary Napolitano, with
your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET A. NAPOLITANO,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman,
Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today on the Department of Homeland
Security's efforts to keep our Nation safe against ever-
evolving threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the
Appendix on page 918.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This weekend, our Nation observed the 10th anniversary of
9/11 and honored the nearly 3,000 innocent victims as well as
their friends, their colleagues, and their families. We saluted
the many first responders and law enforcement officials who
responded with such courage and conviction on that tragic day
and in the days that followed.
While these past few days remind us that we must remain
vigilant and prepared as threats against our country remain,
the recent anniversary of 9/11 is also a time to consider the
progress that we have made. As Chairman Lieberman noted,
America is a stronger and more secure Nation today. We bounced
back from the worst attack on our soil and have made progress
on every front to better protect ourselves. We have used our
experience to become more resilient, not only to terrorist
attacks but to threats and disasters of all kinds.
Following 9/11, the Federal Government, including many
Members on this Committee, especially Senators Lieberman and
Collins, moved quickly to develop a security framework to
protect the country from large-scale attacks directed from
abroad while enhancing Federal, State, local, and tribal
capabilities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
attacks and disasters here at home.
A key element of this new security framework included the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and over the
past 10 years, DHS and its many partners across the Federal
Government, across public and private sectors, have
strengthened the homeland security enterprise to better
mitigate and defend against ever-present and ever-evolving
threats.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the progress we have
made is to apply today's security architecture to what existed
when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred.
The 9/11 plot, like many terrorist plots, began overseas,
which means our security layers must begin there as well. With
respect to intelligence, planning for 9/11 began several years
before the actual attacks. Osama Bin Laden summoned operatives
to Afghanistan to discuss using commercial aircraft as weapons.
Since then, we have strengthened the depth and breadth of our
intelligence enterprise to get the best information possible
wherever the operational planning may occur.
With respect to visa security, all of the 9/11 hijackers
applied for visas overseas. Today, the DHS Visa Security
Program deploys trained special agents to high-risk posts
around the world to conduct targeted in-depth reviews of visa
applicants before they reach the United States. We have
additional layers of security in place through the Department
of State's visa checks and pre-departure screening measures.
And not only has DHS now reviewed a historic backlog of
overstay leads for national security and public safety
concerns, but this process has helped put an enhanced
biographic exit system on the fast track.
With respect to international information sharing, the
hijackers began preparing for the attack while living abroad.
Today, 18 countries have joined the United States in agreeing
to share information about potential terrorists and criminals
through a series of Preventing and Combating Serious Crime
Agreements, and more are underway.
After 9/11, the Federal Government discovered that
information existed about the hijackers well before and after
they came to the United States, but this information had not
been coordinated, shared, and analyzed. Since 9/11, the Federal
Government, along with its State, local, tribal, and private-
sector partners, has made significant improvements to enhance
information sharing and analysis.
With respect to targeting, the Federal Government, and DHS
in particular, has become more effective at analyzing travel-
related data to better understand and anticipate the travel
patterns of known or suspected terrorists. This analysis has
been essential in identifying, targeting, and interdicting
known and suspected terrorists, and prompting additional
screening, before these individuals travel to the United
States.
We have established 72 fusion centers, which serve as focal
points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of
threat-related information among the Federal, State, local,
tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. Today, the
intelligence community is able to identify the common threads
that can tie a seemingly minor crime to the larger threat
picture, and all but a few of the fusion centers are now
connected to the HSDN, which is a secret level, real-time data
system sharing data across our country.
Once the 9/11 hijackers made it to the United States, they
still required access to aircraft. With respect to flight
schools, prior to 9/11, the hijackers enrolled in flight
schools and conducted cross-country surveillance flights.
Today, the TSA screens all foreign students seeking flight
training against terrorist, criminal history, and immigration
databases.
With respect to passenger screening, 10 years ago, the 9/11
hijackers were able to purchase tickets and board planes
carrying weapons. Today, through the Secure Flight Program, DHS
prescreens 100 percent of the 14 million passengers flying
weekly to, from, and within the United States against
government watch lists.
And Senator Collins, I think I can elaborate, that would
have, if it had been deployed, prevented the situation you
referred to with the boarding pass.
Moreover, Transportation Security Officers at more than 450
airports now screen all checked and carry-on baggage for
explosives, weapons, and other threats using cutting-edge
technologies.
And with respect to behavior detection, even though some of
the 9/11 hijackers were randomly selected for additional
screening and aroused the suspicion of gate agents, they still
made it onto a plane. TSA's Behavior Detection Officers today
work to identify potentially high-risk passengers who exhibit
behaviors that indicate they may be a threat to aviation
security and refer them for additional screening.
The last line of defense against threats to aviation
security is on the plane itself. With respect to airplane
security, today, all commercial aircraft have hardened cockpit
doors and Federal Air Marshals are deployed across the aviation
system based on risk.
And with respect to emergency communications, limitations
in communication and interoperability among air traffic control
operators, military personnel, and first responders hindered
the response on 9/11. Our Nation has since made significant
investments in training and technical assistance to improve
emergency communication capabilities.
Each of these layers combined creates a stronger security
architecture that did not exist on 9/11 and that has helped
keep our Nation, our transportation system, and the American
people safe over the past 10 years.
We would not be where we are today without the direct
involvement and support of the Congress and particularly this
Committee. I want to thank you for your support, your guidance,
and your continued oversight.
We continue to engage the broader homeland security
enterprise in our Nation's protection. We have made great
progress, but more remains to be done. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Secretary Napolitano. That
was an excellent statement. I particularly appreciate the pre-
9/11 comparison to today because it documents in a very
tangible way the progress we have made and it backs up a
conclusion that I have come to over the years, and it is a
painful one, which is that 9/11/01 could have been prevented
and should have been prevented and that if it was tried today,
it would be prevented, and that is a very important thing to be
able to say.
Director Mueller, thanks for being here. Talk about change,
though as compared to the Department of Homeland Security,
which did not exist on 9/11, the FBI obviously is a venerable
American institution, but it has gone through a dramatic
transformation in the last 10 years under your leadership to
become our domestic counterterrorism agency and really a first-
rate one at that, and I appreciate it. Also, we thank you for
agreeing to stay on for 2 more years. I suppose I should also
thank your saintly wife for allowing you to stay on.
Mr. Mueller. Most appropriate, yes. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. So please proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir, and good morning, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. I
thank you for the opportunity to appear here today before you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix
on page 943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As has been pointed out, since September 11, the threat
from terrorism has evolved in ways that present new challenges
for the FBI and our partners. Today, the threat environment is
far more complex and diverse than ever before.
And in response, the FBI has undergone unprecedented
transformation over the past 10 years, as you pointed out, Mr.
Chairman. We have developed new intelligence capabilities
necessary to address terrorist and criminal threats. We have
created the administrative and technological structure to meet
our mission as a national security agency. And we have made
these changes while continuing to safeguard American civil
liberties.
Let me begin by focusing on the most serious threats we
face and then discuss how the FBI has changed since September
11 to counter these threats.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its leader, Anwar al-
Awlaki, have shown a commitment not only to attack the United
States but also to inspire acts of terrorism from overseas. For
the past 2 years, AQAP has undertaken a task directly targeting
the homeland. We saw this with a failed attempt to send package
bombs to the United States on cargo planes and in the attempted
bombing on Christmas Day the year before. And in online media,
al-Awlaki and other AQAP leaders have reaffirmed their
commitment to this type of attack.
They also continue to emphasize lone actor operations in
the West and have sought to radicalize individuals over the
Internet to carry out attacks here and in Europe. And despite
the recent counterterrorism successes abroad, and there have
been many, core al-Qaeda also remains committed to high profile
attacks directed at the West. We saw this with the 2009 plot by
Najibullah Zazi, a plot to attack the New York subway, and we
confirmed this from the materials seized from the raid on Osama
bin Laden's compound last spring.
And as you know, we continue to track the current threat
streams from al-Qaeda, threat streams that became public last
week.
Other groups in the Fatah region of Pakistan, such as TTP,
have similarly shown an intent to target the United States. We
saw this when TTP claimed responsibility for the Times Square
attempted bombing.
And we remain concerned that all these groups encourage
radicalized Westerners, particularly U.S. citizens, to travel
to the Fatah and East Africa for training with the potential to
return to the United States to conduct attacks, and of course,
the threat from homegrown violent extremists is among our most
serious terrorism threats today.
Individuals may be radicalized over the Internet even if
they do not receive direct guidance or training from a
terrorist group. These individuals may have diverse backgrounds
and life experiences as well as differing motives.
Increasingly, they may be acting alone, and for these reasons,
homegrown violent extremists are harder to detect and to
disrupt. And the FBI, along with our partners--NCTC, the
Department of Homeland Security and the other law enforcement
and intelligence communities--are focused on these threats more
than perhaps 8 to 10 years ago.
And of course, the FBI remains concerned about the domestic
terrorist threat as well. Economic and political issues could
motivate white supremacists or militia extremists to violence.
As you know, domestic terrorists can often operate as lone
offenders or in small cells, which are difficult to detect.
Overall, the threat environment has evolved significantly
since September 11 and is more complex and diverse than ever
before, and this requires the Bureau and our partners to change
and adapt constantly to address these threats.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the FBI has undergone
unprecedented change in the years since September 11. Today,
the FBI is a stronger organization as a result, and we continue
to focus on national security threats as our highest priority.
After September 11, the Bureau shifted 2,000 agents from
criminal investigations to national security matters. Over the
years that followed, we centralized management of
counterterrorism and intelligence operations at headquarters to
avoid the stovepiping of information.
Structurally, we created the National Security Branch in
2005 to consolidate and integrate the Bureau's overall national
security mission and gave senior executives the authority to
accelerate the integration of intelligence into our national
security operations.
We established the Directorate of Intelligence at
headquarters to manage our intelligence programs nationwide. We
created Field Intelligence Groups in each of our field offices
to prioritize intelligence collection in each of those field
offices, and we hired and trained thousands of new intelligence
analysts and agents to enhance our intelligence capabilities.
Following September 11, the FBI greatly increased the
number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating around the
Nation. We now have more than 100 of those task forces. These
task forces bring together the expertise from our Federal,
State, and local partners, and this cooperative effort has led
to numerous successes in disrupting terrorist plots and threats
since September 11.
After September 11, the FBI also recognized the need to
recruit, hire, and train the intelligence analyst cadre
necessary to meet the requirements of our national security
mission. In 2001, the Bureau had approximately 1,000
intelligence analysts and fewer than 30 supervisory analysts.
Today, the Bureau has tripled the number of intelligence
analysts to more than 3,000, and we have more than 270
supervisory analysts.
Let me, as an aside, also emphasize the FBI's role in
countering cyber attacks--one of the most significant and
complex threats facing the Nation. With our intelligence and
law enforcement capabilities, the Bureau is positioned to
investigate and disrupt cyber intrusions, and our need to
counter cyber attacks cuts across all of our programs,
including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and the
criminal programs.
Beginning in 2007, we worked with our partners to establish
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, which now
includes 20 Federal and intelligence community agencies.
Through these partnerships, the Bureau has identified,
investigated, and prosecuted an unprecedented number of
intrusion cases, and these intrusions have impacted our
military, other government agencies, the financial and
telecommunications sectors, and other critical infrastructure.
Addressing this cyber threat will be among the FBI's highest
priorities now and in the years to come.
Let me conclude by thanking the Committee for your
continued support of the men and women of the FBI and support
for our mission as it has evolved. This has been essential to
our transformation and our ability to meet today's diverse
threats.
Again, as the Secretary said, I would be happy to answer
any questions that you might have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Director Mueller.
We look forward to the question period with you.
Matthew Olsen, welcome. Obviously, the National
Counterterrorism Center is also one of the most significant new
entities created in our government, to put it simplistically,
to make sure the dots are connected, but obviously, it does
much more than that. This is your first appearance before us
since your confirmation, and we welcome you.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much, sir. Chairman Lieberman,
Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, good morning. As
I begin, let me thank you for taking the time to meet with me
during my confirmation. I appreciate your counsel and support.
I am honored that my first hearing as the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center is before the Committee that
authored the legislation creating NCTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Appendix on
page 955.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I welcome this opportunity to discuss the evolution of the
terrorist threat and our collective efforts to address that
threat. I am also very pleased to be joining Secretary
Napolitano and Director Mueller this morning, and it is
appropriate that we continue to reflect on the day that our
Nation suffered the worst terrorist attack in our history.
After a few weeks as the Director of NCTC, I can report
that the Center is a national asset. It is comprised of
dedicated and talented intelligence professionals representing
a wide array of perspectives and experiences.
I am also proud to lead the Center, continuing the work of
others--Andrew Liepman, Mike Leiter, Scott Redd, and John
Brennan--and my testimony today reflects the thoughtful and
rigorous analysis of the expert workforce at NCTC.
Today's hearing asks the question, ``Ten years after 9/11:
Are we safer?'' Chairman Lieberman, as you said, the bottom
line is we are safer than we were 10 years ago, but al-Qaeda
and its allies and its affiliates continue to pose a
significant threat.
Thanks to the skill and the hard work of thousands of men
and women in the intelligence, homeland security, diplomatic,
and law enforcement communities, as well as our men in uniform,
we have made significant progress in the fight against
terrorism. With the support and guidance of this Committee and
Congress, we have built an enduring counterterrorism
framework--the framework that includes the establishment of
DHS, the transformation of the FBI, and the creation of the
National Counterterrorism Center.
Our Nation has placed relentless pressure on al-Qaeda's
leadership, denied the group safe haven and resources, and as a
result, core al-Qaeda is weakened. But a decade after the
September 11 attacks, we remain at war with al-Qaeda. It is a
resilient and adaptive adversary, and we continue to face an
evolving threat, as Director Mueller mentioned, from its
affiliates and adherents.
In the balance of my remarks, I will briefly describe that
terrorist threat and then discuss a bit about the role of NCTC
and some of the challenges we face.
First, al-Qaeda's core capability to conduct attacks has
been significantly diminished. Again, Chairman Lieberman, in
your words, it is weakened but not vanquished. The group
remains the ideological leader of the global extremist
movement. It continues to influence others through propaganda.
Al-Qaeda's senior leadership has advanced several unsuccessful
smaller-scale Western plots in the past 2 years, and these
plots highlight its ability to continue attack preparations
while under sustained counterterrorism pressure.
And just this past week, we acted in response to
unconfirmed intelligence of a possible threat that the group
was planning an attack in the United States. We, thus, remain
concerned that al-Qaeda may be plotting to strike against the
United States at home or overseas.
Further, since al-Qaeda's relocation to Pakistan, it has
encouraged its militant allies to expand their operational
agendas to include U.S. and Western targets, both within the
region and overseas. For example, Faisal Shahzad's attempted
bombing in Times Square, as Director Mueller mentioned, is a
stark reminder that al-Qaeda's allies, such as the Pakistani
Taliban, continue to threaten U.S. interests in the Afghanistan
and Pakistan region.
Second, 10 years after 9/11, we face a much more diverse
and diffuse threat from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. These
affiliates have increased the scope of their operations,
seeking to strike some U.S. and Western targets both inside and
outside of their respective regions.
The single most capable affiliate is al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula. AQAP's recent gains and Yemen's governing
challenges increase our concerns about the group's capability
to conduct attacks. Further, the group's propaganda efforts are
designed to inspire like-minded Western extremists to conduct
attacks in their home countries.
AQAP's two attempted attacks against the homeland--the
attempted airliner attack in December 2009 and its attempt to
down two U.S.-bound cargo planes in 2010--show that the group
is a determined and capable enemy that is able to adjust its
tactics.
Third, a key element of the evolution of the terrorist
threat since 9/11 is the advent of homegrown violent
extremists, as you mentioned, Senator Collins. These
individuals are inspired by al-Qaeda's global extremist agenda.
Over the past 3 years, we have seen an increase in violent
extremist English content online. This has fostered greater
cohesion among homegrown violent extremists. Plots disrupted
during the past year appear to be unrelated operationally but
may share a common cause, rallying independent extremists to
attack the homeland.
A key feature of this trend has been the development of a
narrative that addresses the unique concerns of U.S.-based
extremists. This narrative includes a blend of al-Qaeda
inspiration, perceived victimization, and a glorification of
homeland plotting. HVEs who independently plan attacks with no
direction inside the United States or overseas are difficult to
detect and disrupt and could advance plotting with little or no
warning.
Now turning to the role of NCTC, as the terrorist threat
has evolved over the past decade, so has the government's
ability to counter that threat. NCTC has proven to be a vital
element of the government-wide effort to counter terrorism.
First, as you know, NCTC has unique responsibility to
examine all international terrorism issues, spanning geographic
boundaries so that we can analyze intelligence regardless of
whether it is collected inside or outside the United States.
NCTC has access to the full catalog of reporting, both foreign
and domestic, on terrorism issues.
Last year, NCTC created the Pursuit Group to develop
tactical leads and pursue terrorism threats. Pursuit Group
analysts look for connections among less obvious details to
help ensure that terrorist threats are fully examined.
NCTC continues to implement important reforms in the watch-
listing process. This includes better processing and sharing of
watchlisting information. Our watchlisting experts work closely
with NCTC's Pursuit Group, with the FBI, and with the
Department of Homeland Security to expedite the sharing of
information and to build more complete terrorist identities.
NCTC also conducts strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities. In this role, NCTC looks beyond
individual department and agency missions toward the
development of a single unified counterterrorism effort across
the Federal Government. We develop plans to help translate high
level strategies and policy direction into coordinated
activities.
Finally, as this Committee is well aware, the Center
continues to be the home to the Interagency Threat Assessment
and Coordination Group. This group is led by DHS in partnership
with FBI, and it brings together Federal and non-Federal
intelligence, law enforcement, and first responder communities
to bridge the intelligence information gap between traditional
intelligence agencies on the one hand and State, local, tribal,
and private-sector partners on the other.
I would like to close today by identifying NCTC's most
important resource, and that is our people. As NCTC redoubles
its effort to meet the terrorist threat, our progress depends
on maintaining and developing our talented and diverse
workforce. We bring together professionals from across the
government to focus on a single mission--counterterrorism--and
we must strive to work collaboratively, to share information,
and to integrate our efforts.
Finally, all of our activities must be consistent with our
core values and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
In everything we do, NCTC must retain the trust of the American
people as it fulfills its critically important
responsibilities.
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Members of the
Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As
you know, perfection is no more possible in counterterrorism
than it is in any other endeavor, and we will always strive to
improve. Your leadership, support, and direction have been
invaluable in helping us move forward to carry out our mission
and to work with resolve and with unity to protect the Nation.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director Olsen. Thank you
very much.
We will go to the questions now. We will start with the
first round of 7 minutes for each Senator.
Let me begin by going to the threat stream that alerted
everyone in government and the Nation last week as we
approached the 10th anniversary weekend. It was described as
specific, credible, but unconfirmed or uncorroborated.
Let me ask you first what is the status of our review of
that threat now. Do we consider it to be an ongoing threat,
Secretary Napolitano or Director Mueller?
Secretary Napolitano. Chairman Lieberman, yes, we consider
it an ongoing threat, and we continue to monitor that threat.
Chairman Lieberman. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, the threat has not been resolved, and
until it is resolved, it is an outstanding threat that we are
following up on. Even though September 11 has now passed, we do
not believe that necessarily means that we should back down.
Consequently, we, the Department of Homeland Security, NCTC,
and the intelligence agencies are pursuing that as hard and
heavily as we have over the last several days and will continue
to do so until it is resolved.
Chairman Lieberman. So it remains, if I hear you correctly,
unconfirmed, but again, the intelligence stream was specific
and credible enough that you are not prepared to dismiss it.
Mr. Mueller. No.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Olsen, do you want to add anything
to that?
Mr. Olsen. I share the views of Director Mueller and
Secretary Napolitano. We are not prepared to say that it has
been resolved, and we are continuing to work to analyze it and
share information about it.
Mr. Mueller. I would like to add one thing if I might, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Mr. Mueller. Since we first had word of that threat, we
have conducted hundreds of interviews; we have been pursuing a
number of leads. Consequently, as a result of that, we now have
been able to eliminate some aspects where we thought that we
ought to be looking in order to determine whether it was indeed
a valid threat, but there is still work to be done.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is reassuring from my
perspective.
I know there were plans already in place--Federal, State
and local--to be prepared to defend against another terrorist
attack on the 10th anniversary weekend and particularly with
regard to homegrown radicals, or lone wolves, and others as
well, but I was impressed by the extent to which so many of the
assets that our government has now in regard to homeland
security and counterterrorism were brought into action on this
threat that we really, I think, would not have been able to do
10 years ago.
One of the things that the 9/11 Commission said was that
when they asked the question, who is in charge of
counterterrorism or a particular response to the terrorist
threat, they did not have an answer. So from my perspective, it
looked like you were all really working together very well, but
I am interested in knowing who was in charge because at some
point somebody has to be overseeing all this.
So who would you say was in charge?
Mr. Mueller. You have on the one hand the intelligence
agencies. You have the domestic agencies--operational, DHS,
FBI, and the like--all of whom have been through this before
any number of times. And the relationships and the organization
comes together very quickly, given our history.
But I would say it is the White House and the Office of the
National Security Advisor that makes certain that everything
has been taken care of generally through the NCTC as the
operational arm or the support arm.
But there is no question about the source of the leadership
and the coordination, and I think that is why we have been,
over the years, effective in terms of coming together, sharing
information, understanding our differing roles, and
complementing each other to make certain that the job gets done
to resolve the particular threats.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very interesting. So the Deputy
National Security Advisor, Mr. Brennan, is in charge of
counterterrorism, homeland security, acting on behalf of the
President, who obviously is in charge, and coordinating all our
assets, but the NCTC plays an operational role on his behalf, a
support role.
Do you want comment on that, Mr. Olsen?
Mr. Olsen. Yes, sir. I would say that, as you put it, John
Brennan played a coordinating role on behalf of the President
in the last few days in response to this threat.
And our role at NCTC is to be the place where information
all comes together because some of the information is coming
from CIA, some information is coming from FBI, and lots of
information is coming from DHS. We play a central clearinghouse
role where we take all of that information, analyze it, and
then share back out what we are seeing from an analytical
standpoint.
Chairman Lieberman. Secretary Napolitano, do you want to
add to that? Does this sound right to you?
Secretary Napolitano. That is right, and it is an amazing
coordination thing that I have seen, and I do not think it
would have been able to be accomplished 10 years ago.
It is ultimately coordinated out of the White House. We all
understand how we fit together. Sometimes it is difficult to
articulate. You kind of know it when you see it. But it does
seem to increase our ability not only to share information
among ourselves, but to share information with the country and
receive information back. And that also is a difference between
now and 10 years ago.
Ten years ago, I was the Attorney General of Arizona, and
it was very difficult to get information as to what was going
on with the attacks and what decisions were going to be made
with respect to air safety, airports, borders, and all the
rest. Now that sort of dislocation does not occur.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you for that.
My time is running out, but I want to ask you, Secretary
Napolitano, one additional question. Probably the most visible
part of the change in homeland security since 9/11 for most
Americans has been the presence of TSA at the airports, and I
think they have done a great job. As you know, it is an
annoyance to people, but they put up with it.
In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Pistole has
indicated that the Department really would like to move away
from a one-size-fits-all approach to a more risk-based aviation
security strategy. I wanted to ask you what the Department is
doing to implement such a risk-based strategy and whether there
are moves that will be made soon in that regard.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. I was fortunate to take Director
Mueller's No. 2 and to bring him over to TSA. So thank you very
much. I owe you a draft choice to be named later, I think.
But with the respect to TSA, we are moving to a more risk-
based approach to screening passengers and trying to streamline
procedures for those passengers who are low risk, which
enhances our ability to focus on passengers who we either do
not know or who are assessed a high risk.
We are piloting several programs to achieve these goals
right now. One of them is the expansion of global entry, which
is essentially a program that facilitates international travel.
It is really a prescreening of a passenger, and we just got our
millionth passenger a couple weeks ago. That really facilitates
crossing borders.
We also have been piloting programs to deal with children
under the age of 12 with respect to not only taking off their
shoes but also pat-down procedures, and we hope over the coming
weeks and months to be able to begin rolling that out. It does
require additional training of all of the thousands of TSA
officers, and that is also underway.
We are, obviously, looking at some of the other procedures
that passengers need to make in order to streamline their
process through the lines. There will always be some
unpredictability built into the system, and there will always
be random checks, even for groups that we are looking at
differently, such as children under the age of 12. But I think
the traveling public will begin to see some of these changes in
the coming months.
Chairman Lieberman. That is good to hear. So that, in the
foreseeable future, if I hear you correctly, we may be moving
to a system where children under 12 would not normally be
subject to pat-downs and the like.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. There will be additional
training for a different pat-down procedure for them and also,
again, allowing them to leave their shoes on.
Chairman Lieberman. Excellent. That is good news. Thank
you.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I want to go back to the Bowling Green
case, which was very troubling to many of us on this Committee.
As I look at the overall statistics, DHS interviewed more than
101,000 Iraqi refugee applicants and approved more than 84,000
for resettlement in this country. This is an approval rate that
exceeds 80 percent. I was surprised at the scope of this
program; 58,810 Iraqi refugees have been resettled and are
living here.
Now I know from previous DHS testimony and from my
conversations with the Director that there is a review of those
who are here to make sure that we have not missed fingerprints
or other data or intelligence that would indicate that a
mistake was made in granting them the right to resettle in this
country. But that leaves 25,625 who have been approved for
resettlement but have not yet been resettled in this country.
Is there a hold on that population until they can be more
stringently vetted to ensure that we are not letting into this
country people who would do us harm?
Secretary Napolitano. Let me, if I might, answer your
question in two parts.
First part, with respect to the 58,000 Iraqi refugees who
were resettled pursuant to the original resettlement program,
they have now all been revetted against all of the DHS and NCTC
databases and the Department of Defense's biometric databases.
So that work has now been done and focused.
Senator Collins. That is completed?
Secretary Napolitano. That is completed.
Moving forward, no one will be resettled without going
through the same sort of vetting procedure. Now I do not know
whether that equates to a hold, as you say, but I can say that
having done the already resettled population, moving forward,
they will all be reviewed against those kinds of databases.
Senator Collins. Director Mueller, it is reassuring to hear
that those 58,000 individuals have been vetted against the
existing databases. But in fact, due to a lack of resources and
the fact that it is not easy to vet, match, and lift latent
fingerprints, do you not have a considerable backlog of
fingerprints that have yet to be uploaded into these databases?
Mr. Mueller. As I think we discussed, there is
prioritization in terms of the explosive devices that we look
at, and with that prioritization, there is a substantial
grouping of devices that have not been looked at. We have taken
the precautions of assuring that we maintain the capability of
looking at it down the road, in other words, assuring that if
there are fingerprints, they can be recaptured down the road.
But as you pointed out before, it is a question of resources,
and we do have to prioritize.
If we get an indication of a name of a person who there is
some question about, we can do that more thorough review by
going into this third tier to determine whether that person's
fingerprints appear on any IEDs, but it requires a triggering
of information in order to go into that backlog.
And it is not just a small grouping, as I think you
understand. It is substantial. And so regardless what
additional resources we are given, and with more resources we
can do more, nonetheless, there would be ultimately a grouping
that we just cannot upload for a variety of reasons.
Senator Collins. What concerns me is in the case of one of
the individuals arrested in Bowling Green, his fingerprints
were in those lower priority IED parts, correct?
Mr. Mueller. Correct, and as I think you understand, we had
to go back and identify where he was and do the additional
research. And we will do that and have done it. We will
continue to do that.
Senator Collins. But that depends on your getting a lead or
the name of an individual where you can try to map out where
that individual was as opposed to DHS being able to run the
fingerprints against the complete database, correct?
Mr. Mueller. Well, they can run the fingerprints against
the complete database, but that database will not have that
information----
Senator Collins. That is my point.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. From the third tier that has not
been uploaded because of the amounts of devices we have and the
necessity to prioritize.
Senator Collins. And that third tier, again, happened to be
where the fingerprints of the individual from Kentucky were
located.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Collins. Madam Secretary, I want to talk to you
about fusion centers. I have been a supporter of fusion
centers. I have visited two of them--one in a large urban area,
one in a rural State. And I have seen the information sharing
that they do, and I have been impressed.
But my enthusiasm is not shared by everyone. There are
individuals on both sides of the aisle who argue that the
fusion centers are duplicative of the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. Why do we need them when we already have this multi-
agency task force, particularly in a time of budget
constraints?
Senator Warner sent you a letter in June on that issue.
Senator Coburn's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is
looking at the effectiveness of fusion centers. And I know that
DHS has conducted a study to identify baseline capabilities
that every fusion center should have.
Tell me why we need fusion centers.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator. I can speak both
as a former U.S. Attorney General and a governor as to the
utility of the fusion centers.
They do not duplicate the JTTFs. They really complement the
JTTFs. They are portals of entry where we can share
information--and as I mentioned in my opening comments, for all
but three, we are now connected at the secret level--and get
information back.
As Director Olsen and Director Mueller mentioned, one
phenomenon that we are dealing with now is the growth of
homegrown terrorists and the so-called lone actor or lone wolf.
We need more eyes on the ground than the Federal Government
itself can supply. The training and ability to share
information about tactics and techniques, early trips that
should be looked for can be very helpful.
And it is not just sharing information, Senator, that is
important with respect to the fusion centers. It is sharing and
expanding analytical capability to different levels of
government.
So we now have the 72 fusion centers. We have moved our own
analysts into the fusion centers so that they can help not only
with the gathering and receipt of information but with the
analysis of information, which is helpful.
If you look at Zazi, Faisal Shahzad, and Paulin-Ramirez,
who was connected with Jihad Jane, in all of those cases, you
would see fusion center activity that was very helpful.
And indeed, these past 3 days, with the ongoing threat that
has been described to you, fusion centers are active in that as
well.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
For the information of my colleagues, Senators will be
called in order of arrival as follows: Senators Brown, Carper,
Johnson, Pryor, Moran, and McCain.
Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Olsen, several of the recent attempted terrorist
attacks against the United States have been carried out by, or
inspired by, AQAP. How would you assess their threat to the
homeland?
Would you put them at the top of the list of threats by
terrorist organizations?
And then as a follow-up, is Yemen on its way to becoming
another Afghanistan, i.e., a safe haven for AQAP to plot
attacks, and do we have a sufficient strategy in place for
Yemen?
Mr. Olsen. Thank you, Senator.
The response to your first question is that AQAP is
certainly among our biggest concerns from a counterterrorism
perspective. It has shown itself to have both the intent and
capability of carrying out attacks against the United States in
the homeland. I mentioned the two examples of that--the
Abdulmutallab attack of Christmas Day 2009 and then the cargo
plane attack in the fall of 2010.
Beyond the actual attempted attacks, one of the biggest
concerns we have about AQAP is its propaganda effort. Anwar al-
Awlaki, an English speaker, dual U.S. citizen, has through
Inspire Magazine sought to inspire potentially radicalized
Westerners. The actual issues of Inspire Magazine have included
step-by-step bombmaking instructions.
Senator Brown. Yes, and it is interesting. That was my next
question. How do they actually get away with that? I mean, how
do they get away with putting bombmaking instructions in a
magazine, which is disseminated widely, if you can just tell
me?
Mr. Olsen. Well, that information is put out through an
online magazine over the Internet, and it is actually
information that is----
Senator Brown. We have no control over anything like that?
Mr. Olsen. Well, some of that information is not
necessarily unique to AQAP. In other words, one of the biggest
concerns about the nature of the information is it is quite
basic. It is easy to follow. It does not require someone to be
particularly sophisticated to follow those instructions.
So in answer to your question, yes, AQAP is at the top of
our list or one of the biggest concerns we have.
With regard to whether Yemen is a safe haven, we are very
concerned about the ability of the Yemeni government at this
point to sustain any strong counterterrorism efforts, given the
governance challenges that it faces. So AQAP has had the
opportunity to recruit inside Yemen and to plan and plot inside
Yemen. We have put extreme pressure on AQ senior leadership. It
has been more difficult for us to put that same pressure on
AQAP leaders in Yemen.
Senator Brown. On the Inspire Magazine, in particular?
Mr. Mueller. Well, let me start by saying we are not
without tools to address it. But the fact of the matter is that
once you upload something on the Internet, it is exceptionally
difficult to try to eradicate it. In fact, I would say
impossible.
So while we have tools, the likelihood, the possibility of
eradicating Inspire from the Internet, understanding it is not
just the United States but every country around the world, is
virtually impossible. And to the extent that we have some
capabilities to address that is something we probably ought to
talk about in closed session.
Senator Brown. Madam Secretary, in your testimony, and I
have heard you address this many other times, you talk about
our Nation's borders and protecting us from illegal entry,
especially in Arizona where you are from. I know it is of great
concern to Senator McCain and a lot of the other Members from
border States. And quite frankly, I could not agree with you
more.
In Massachusetts alone, there are several tragic cases of
Bay State residents being killed by persons in this country
illegally, and then they either flee or are never heard from,
but it really has to stop.
The Secure Communities program is something I believe--I do
not want to misstate--you are in favor of, you have worked
toward, and you would like to see implemented.
How do you deal with States, for example, my State, where
you have a governor or others who do not support it? Is there a
way to convince them, cajole them, or incentivize them to get
with the program, so to speak?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator Brown, I do support
Secure Communities. I think it is a key tool in our immigration
enforcement efforts to identify those in the country illegally
who are also committing other crimes, are fugitives from
existing warrants, are multiple illegal entrants, are security
concerns. In other words, we have to be able to find them, and
going to the jails and prisons of the country is a logical
first place to start.
Senator Brown. How do you do your job if you do not have
the cooperation from the individual States or people in charge?
How do you do it?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, there was some initial
misinformation about Secure Communities, but the plain fact of
the matter is, it is an interoperability agreement between DHS
and the FBI so that when someone is booked and his fingerprints
are run through the FBI, there is also a connection over to run
them against our immigration databases so that ICE can flag an
arrestee before he is released back into the community.
It does not require the specific agreement of a State or
locality in order to deploy Secure Communities. Now it is
helpful when we have cooperation, and so I am using my powers
of persuasion to speak with the governors or mayors or other
officials who have been troubled by the program.
Senator Brown. Yes. It just does not really make sense. We
are all Americans first, and when we tackle a problem together,
we usually prevail. So I am encouraging others that I know back
home in Massachusetts and throughout the country to remember we
are Americans first and to work together on these very real
terrorist threats and concerns.
If someone is arrested and they are here illegally and they
are killing people, whether it is through accident or just
through basic murder and mayhem, we should be able to get them
out and do it with the cooperation of all government entities.
Secretary Napolitano. Secure Communities was begun under my
predecessor. We have actually deployed it now throughout the
country. I think we have it in 1,200 sites, and we will have it
in every jurisdiction by fiscal year 2013.
Senator Brown. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, can I just ask you a question?
Chairman Lieberman. Of course.
Senator Brown. Mr. Mueller also pointed out that there are
folks who are American citizens, and they are going over there,
they are being trained, and they are using their knowledge when
they come back.
What is the status of the Terrorist Expatriation Act that
you and I and Senator Collins and others filed? Are we going to
refile it? Is it something that he would support?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I would be happy to refile that
bill with you because I think it continues to be a problem.
Senator Brown. Great. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Brown.
I will just mention very briefly in terms of what do you do
about extremist material like Inspire Magazine or the other
things on the Internet, and what Director Mueller said, and
other witnesses too, is that there are certain limits on the
Federal Government, but what we have discovered in going over
this, Senator Brown, is that with some of the major sites--like
Google owns YouTube and Blogger, and Facebook is a separate
operation, obviously--if individual citizens complain to them
about a particular site having violent material on it, they all
have standards. They actually have people whose job it is to
review complaints like that.
And on many occasions--let me say that I have at least one
staff member who exercises his individual citizen rights when
he is not in the office to complain about this material--
Google, YouTube, Blogger, Facebook, they take down those
jihadist Web sites. It is quite remarkable.
Now of course--it is the glory and the problem of the
Internet--they can pop up somewhere else, and then you have to
go at it all over again. But there is that ability by
individual citizens.
Senator Brown. Well, as the President encourages people to
call us, I would encourage our citizens, if they feel compelled
and moved, to contact those entities to do just that.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and it is pretty easy to do if you
go on those Web sites. Thank you. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, welcome. Secretary Napolitano, nice to
see you. Director Mueller, thanks so much for your willingness
to sign on for a longer tour of duty. We are grateful for that.
And Mr. Olsen, it is nice to see you as well.
My colleagues have heard me tell this story before, but it
is worth repeating, and I am going to take this questioning in
a little different direction.
About 2 months ago, we had a hearing in the Finance
Committee. The subject of the hearing was deficit reduction,
and one of the witnesses was Alan Blinder who used to be Vice
Chairman of the Federal Reserve when Alan Greenspan was
Chairman. And he said in his testimony, unless we are serious
about doing something about health care costs in this country--
Medicare, Medicaid, and addressing health care costs--we are
not going to really get a handle on the deficit.
So anyway, all the witnesses finished their testimony. We
were doing the question period, like this, and it came to me,
and I said, Mr. Blinder, you said earlier if we do not do
anything about health care costs--that is the 800-pound gorilla
in the room--then we are really just playing around the edges.
And he said, that is right.
And I said, well, what would be your advice? What should we
do?
He teaches now at Princeton. But he said, I am not a health
economist, but here is my advice: I would urge you to find out
what works. Do more of that.
That is all he said: Find out what works. Do more of that.
And I said, I guess the corollary to that would be find out
what does not work and do less of that.
I think the same is true across government as we deal with
the budget deficit. We are happy that the deficit is down. It
is only going to be $1.3 trillion, I think, by the end of the
year, but the red ink is as far as we can see. In everything
that we do, we have to look at it through a prism that says is
there a way to get a better result for less money, or a better
result for the same amount of money.
And I would just ask of you today to talk with us about
some of the things that we are doing that are working, where we
need to invest a little more money, and maybe some things where
we are spending money, frankly, that does not add a whole lot
to our security.
Madam Secretary, would you go first? Here is somebody who
has had to live with balanced budgets in governing your State.
Secretary Napolitano. Right.
Senator Carper. You did a pretty good job, as I recall.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. Yes, we did have to
balance the budget every year.
First of all, I would resist the notion that some
redundancy is wasteful. In the areas with which we deal, some
redundancy is helpful because there is always the possibility
that someone or something will get through one of the many
layers of security that we have in place. So you have to
evaluate redundancy differently in this arena, I think, than in
some others.
Second, we always have to plan for some human error in the
universe with which I deal, which is who or what can get into
the country, and how do we know who or what is in the country.
So one of the major improvements that we have been able to
accomplish over the last several years is to merge more and
more databases that are very robust so that we can look at
abnormal travel patterns and the like and to share that
information. That is the kind of information we can share with
the FBI, with the NCTC, when we are pulling the thread of a
threat.
So that is an improvement that we want to continue to make
more robust and link up, again, as I said before, with the FBI,
NCTC, and other agencies around town.
Senator Carper. All right. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. I would look at it from two perspectives.
First is internally. Every one of us are looking at where we
can make savings----
Senator Carper. Good.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Whether it be contractors or
cutting down in a variety of ways that we are going to have to
continue to do for the foreseeable future.
More importantly for us is prioritization, and real
prioritization. Not everything can be a priority. And for us,
it is programs that we have, the particular crimes and threats
that we see out there, and prioritizing our efforts to address
those threats and assure that as we do that there is a metric
for success as opposed to just arrests, indictments, and the
like.
Senator Carper. We are pretty good at measuring process. We
are not all that good in government in measuring outcomes.
Mr. Mueller. And results. So that is from that perspective.
More generally, within the Federal Government, and
particularly in our line of work, the ability for information
technology to provide us not only the information we need, but
to sort through that information and bring out that which we
really need is something that we are all undergoing. It is part
of having a federated search capability so that you can do
searches across a variety of databases, both internally and
externally.
And by doing that and developing that information
technology capability, we will save a tremendous amount of
money, but more particularly, we share the information across
our agencies and have the ability for our analysts to do the
kind of federated search that does not require them to go into
one database, make a search, come out, and do another one. That
is one of the keys in my mind to both information sharing of
the future but also doing it in a financially responsible way.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Mr. Olsen, do you want
to add anything?
Mr. Olsen. Yes. First, let me just say that we are, like
the rest of the intelligence community, looking for ways to be
more efficient in how we are using our resources, but I would
make two points.
The first follows up on Director Mueller's point, and that
is, at NCTC we are seeking to create what we have called a
counterterrorism data layer, which is to take in all of the
data that we can from DHS, FBI, and other agencies to be able
to take advantage of advances in information technology, to be
able to search across that data, exactly as Director Mueller
said.
The actual advances in technology make that a way to
actually save money, instead of doing searches manually where
you log into one system and then log into a separate system,
having all that information available so you can search across
a variety of databases and make those connections that you
would not otherwise be able to make.
The other initiative that I would identify, which I think
has no real resource expenditure, is we have set up, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, Pursuit Groups, which are
analysts looking at the tactical level for connections that
might not be obvious and then taking that information, those
connections, and handing those off particularly to the FBI and
to DHS as leads to follow up on. That is an area where we are
focusing particularly in the aftermath of the Christmas Day
attack in 2009.
Senator Carper. Good. Let me just conclude by recalling the
words, as we begin a new football season, of Vince Lombardi who
used to say, ``If you are not keeping score, you are just
practicing.''
Another way to say that is, what we measure, we manage, and
the idea of looking throughout the Federal Government to see
what is working well, how can we invest more money there, and
what is not, let us invest a little bit less money there.
Secretary Napolitano, there are two departments in the
Federal Government that I think are operating without audited
financials. One of them is the Department of Defense. Secretary
Panetta said to me that he is going to try to get there by
2017; he is going to push his people as hard as he can. And I
think that is great, and we want to help him.
Your new Department is making good progress, and I
understand this is something you have put a priority on, and I
urge you to keep doing that.
Senator McCain and I have been pushing an idea that you had
as a tool as governor, a line item veto. I had this tool as
governor. We think the President ought to have that tool and
just try it for 4 years, a 4-year test drive, fully
constitutional. I think everybody sitting in this room except
maybe for one person has co-sponsored that, and we have about
40 co-sponsors, and we are going to push that.
And I call it a 4-year test drive of line item veto
authority, and I think that could be part of the solution, not
all of it, but in a day that we are looking for silver bullets,
it is not a bad silver BB.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator
Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I really do want to thank you all for your
service, and I mean that in all sincerity. You do incredibly
important work, and I certainly appreciate the work and effort
that you put into your jobs.
I remember watching the debate over whether you should even
set up this Department. I think it was a very legitimate
debate.
I come from a background in manufacturing where you are
always looking for continuous improvement. So my questions
really are from that basis. So I do not want anybody taking
offense.
Getting ready for this hearing, ``Are We Safer,'' one of
the questions I really asked was, are we as safe as we could be
based on how much resource we are actually putting toward the
problem here within the Department.
So the first thing I was trying to determine is how much
money is really wrapped up in the bureaucracy and the overhead
of the Department of Homeland Security, and I looked for the 22
agencies that were consolidated. Their budget in 2002 was about
$20 billion as best I can come up with. Now we are spending
about $56 billion, almost a three-time increase.
Do you know, I mean, do you have in your mind or in your
budgeting process, how much really is the Department of
Homeland Security bureaucracy versus how much is the expense
based on the mission and putting real assets in place?
Secretary Napolitano. It is a difficult question to answer
because one of the key criticisms of the Department when it was
stood up was that it did not have enough administration so that
things like procurement, acquisitions, and planning were not
adequately performed. That is, as Senator Carper mentioned, one
of the reasons why there was not an audit capability of the
Department. We are making great progress on that score.
So you can call that bureaucracy. You can call it
management. But the idea is to have as little management as
possible to get the maximum out of a very large, complicated
department.
So I can go through component by component and say, when
the Department was created, we had 7,000 border patrol agents.
Now we have 21,000 border patrol agents, and they are in the
field.
I can go through and say, when we started the Department,
the TSA really did not even exist, and that has almost had to
be built from scratch, with the accompanying personnel,
training, and technology.
And I would be happy to sit with you and go through that
and see where we are.
We are trying to keep the administrative arm as thin as
possible, given what we are asked to manage and how we are
asked to manage it. But the goal is, as I said earlier,
Senator, to do that with as thin a layer of management as
possible to enable and empower those in the field to do their
jobs.
Senator Johnson. One thing I would appreciate, if you could
go back and take a look at the head count of the agencies that
were consolidated as a basis. Then I could work it up in terms
of now you have 230,000 employees in the Department; 63 are in
the TSA.
I know in earlier testimony, Director Mueller, we were
concerned about how many FBI agents were really devoted to the
task. I just want to ask your opinion. I do not want to put you
on the spot here. But do you have frustrations in terms of the
resources that are devoted to your activities versus what
resources are necessarily spent in just department overhead?
Mr. Mueller. I had one of those consultants come in several
years ago to look at our structure. We are very a flat-line
structure. We have 56 field offices that really do the work
around the country. And persons from the business community
were saying that because they all report to one individual
basically, you have a real problem in terms of coverage.
They say, well, you are very thin in terms of management,
but you are a very matrixed organization. And so, you do not go
through the hierarchy. If somebody is doing counterterrorism in
the field, they will call the counterterrorism person back at
headquarters.
And traditionally, we want more agents on the street, out
in the various communities, doing the investigation. What we
find from counterterrorism is that I cannot assign the
responsibility for protecting the country to a particular
office, and we have to integrate the information and manage the
cases, not just domestically, but in concert with the CIA, NSA,
and others that are looking at the cases internationally, which
has required us to build up a capability at headquarters that
we did not have before.
That is frustrating. Everybody in my organization would
like to be in the field, but in order to be effective, we have
had to build a capability to coordinate our actions.
Traditionally, bank robberies or white collar crimes will
be in a particular division. In the cyber arena, you can affect
persons in all 50 States. You do not know where they are.
In order to address the cyber intrusions, for instance, it
takes a headquarters-managed oversight in order to do it. That
is working day in and day out with DHS, NSA, CIA, and the other
compartments.
We try to stay as flat as we can be, but given the threats,
we have had to develop new organizational structures to address
them.
Senator Johnson. In hindsight, in terms of coordinating
that information, would possibly a more efficient model have
been utilizing the counterterrorism center for that liaison,
for that coordination effort?
Mr. Mueller. Well, the counterterrorism center is an
analytical agent. What we provide is the immediate response to
a lead any place in the country. If you have a threat such as
we had last week, we have agents following up on aspects of
that lead in every one of the States in the country. And it is
the combination of the analytical capability along with the
operational ability to pursue that lead, interview people, do
wires where appropriate and court orders, to do surveillances
around the country, to do the forensics work that provides the
intelligence, which is absolutely essential to bring to bear.
NCTC has none of those capabilities. It is an analytical
entity.
Senator Johnson. Obviously, one of the tasks of the
Department is response to a terrorism attack. Now you could
take a look at the earthquake here in D.C. as somewhat of a
dress rehearsal. I was not here, but I was told that cell
phones would not work for hours. It was a mess getting out of
town. There was not a real good evacuation plan.
Have you taken a look at that instance and evaluated how
prepared were we and did the Department perform the way you
would have expected it to?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, yes, we look at all those
instances. When you have a disaster that occurs, the private
cell phone capability is often overwhelmed in the first
instance. Everybody is trying to call out.
A key question I asked was: Well, what about the
responders? Were they able to be in touch with each other and
to have effective interoperability? And as far as I know, the
answer is yes.
Now the second question relates to the evacuation of the
Capital Region. We have had that issue with snowstorms. We had
it with this recent earthquake.
We have been working. There is a National Capital Region
group that involves Virginia, Maryland, the District, and our
Department, working with the Office of Personnel Management,
quite frankly, in terms of how do you effect an orderly
evacuation of the District. You do not have enough road
coverage to do it very well, and that is the plain fact of it.
But it can be done better, and that group is in ongoing
sessions looking at how they can at least improve evacuation
procedures, particularly if the Federal Government is going to
go into shutdown.
Senator Johnson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator
Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I would like to express my appreciation to our three
witnesses for their presence here today, but more importantly,
for their efforts to make Americans more safe and secure. I
express gratitude on behalf of all Kansans for what you do.
Madam Secretary, let me focus on an issue that has received
some attention but in my view less than what we normally talk
about in safety and security. We are often talking about
transportation--airports, railroads, those kinds of things.
There has been this genuine concern. In fact, the Graham-
Talent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission talked about
agro-bioscience, the threat that comes from animal disease.
Unfortunately, they gave us an F in their report on our
preparation for that occurrence.
In my view, a real threat exists in our ability to deter,
detect, and quarantine the introduction of any kind of disease
into our food supply.
We have a hearing this afternoon on this topic in which one
of your officials from your Department will testify, but I
would like to know your perspective 10 years later after 9/11.
I think in fact slightly before 9/11, the President of Kansas
State University, Jon Wefald, testified in front of an emerging
threats hearing here in Washington, DC, about this issue. It
was not something that a lot of us thought about.
I would like to have you bring me up to date on where you
think we are in regard to that threat.
Secretary Napolitano. I think that threat is one of the
many evolving threats that we continue to confront. One of the
challenges, Senator, that we have been working on these last
few years is to actually improve and replace our laboratory and
diagnostic capability because one of the problems with these
kinds of threats is exactly that. It is diagnostic, it is
quarantine, and decisions need to be made on a very rapid basis
if one of the sources of our food supply is beginning to be
infected.
We have been working with Kansas on the NBAF. One of, quite
frankly, the concerns I have is that in the fiscal year 2012
budget--somebody will correct me if I am wrong, I am sure--I
think the Department asked for $150 million for fiscal year
2012. The House mark was $75 million. The Senate mark was zero.
I hope that can be explored, and perhaps in the conference
between the House and the Senate, we can rectify that.
That facility is, I think, necessary for really the next
generation, not just for now but also for the future. And we
need to always be thinking not only what is happening now but
what we could be confronting, indeed, 10 years from now.
Senator Moran. I certainly appreciate your comments in
regard to the scientific aspect of this. In addition, is there
any sense across the country of how we are now prepared, or
better prepared, or less prepared to respond to the
introduction of some contaminate?
Secretary Napolitano. I would say overall we are better
prepared. It obviously involves more departments other than
just DHS, but there has been a lot of cross-departmental work.
Some exercises have been done. Also, importantly, Customs and
Border Protection, with respect to inspecting what can come
into the country, has done a lot of work in this arena.
Senator Moran. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Moran. You are next,
Senator McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for their service, and Director
Mueller, thank you very much for your willingness to continue
to serve.
Madam Secretary, are you aware of the Government
Accountability Office report of September 12, 2011, addressed
to Chairman Levin and me on the subject ``Observations on the
Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role
in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border''?
Secretary Napolitano. I am not sure I am familiar with that
particular report, Senator.
Senator McCain. Well, I would refer it to you for your
reading.
In the report it says, agency officials identified a number
of broad issues and concerns surrounding expansion of DOD
assistance in securing the Southwest border. Specifically, DOD
officials expressed concerns about the absence of a
comprehensive strategy for Southwest border security and the
resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role.
Are you aware of the Department of Defense concerns about
the absence of a comprehensive strategy for Southwest border
security?
Secretary Napolitano. As I said, I do not know that report,
but I have spoken both with Secretary Gates and Secretary
Panetta about the fact that we do have a comprehensive border
strategy, what it is and what roles DOD can play to assist us
there.
Senator McCain. So you disagree with the DOD officials'
expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive
strategy for Southwest border security.
Secretary Napolitano. Vehemently.
Senator McCain. Well, I would be glad to hear about your
strategy because I have failed to see one yet, nor have those
residents of my State.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, we have been trying to find
a date to brief you over the last several months, and we just
have not been able to arrive at one. But I am more than happy
to come in and sit down with you again and go through what is
happening.
Senator McCain. Madam Secretary, I would be glad to receive
that briefing. We have had one meeting, which was highly
unsatisfactory, and you might want to broadcast your strategy
to the residents of the Southwest who also, certainly the
governors and Senators, agree that there is no comprehensive
strategy, along with the DOD officials who expressed concern.
I am sure you are familiar, Madam Secretary, with Operation
Fast and Furious. Given the high level of information sharing
between the departments, were you made aware of the operation
while it was underway?
Secretary Napolitano. No.
Senator McCain. Let me be very clear for the record. You
were unfamiliar with Operation Fast and Furious while the
operation was underway.
Secretary Napolitano. That is accurate.
Senator McCain. While weapons were transported from the
Southwest and the State of Arizona to Mexico, obviously, as we
know, with serious flaws in the operation, you were not aware
of it.
When was the first time you or someone within DHS was made
aware of the operation?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I would have to go back and
check, but it was, I think, around the time of the death of our
agent in Southern Arizona.
Senator McCain. And what action did you take at that time,
once you were informed?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, first of all, we want to make
sure that the investigation into the cause of the death and
prosecution was pursued vigorously, and that was being done. I
did meet with the FBI agent in charge in Arizona at the time,
and I was told that DOJ was referring the entire matter to the
Inspector General. So we have reserved judgment until that
report comes out.
Senator McCain. When were you made aware that guns, which
were allowed to walk during Operation Fast and Furious, were
used in the murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry?
Secretary Napolitano. Sometime thereafter. I do not know a
specific date, Senator.
Senator McCain. Maybe you could supply that for the record.
We would be interested.
Have you come to any conclusions, Director Mueller, as to
who was responsible for this operation? You are doing the
investigation, right?
Mr. Mueller. Senator, we are doing the investigation of the
killing of the Border Patrol Agent, and that has been pursued.
There have been submissions made in court pursuant to that
investigation.
The investigation with regard to the approval of the
operation itself is being conducted by the Inspector General's
Office of the Department of Justice.
Senator McCain. And have you reached any conclusion so far?
Mr. Mueller. I am not privy to what the Inspector General's
investigation has shown at this juncture.
I was concerned as I would be in terms of the extent to
which there was FBI involvement, and I have reached the
conclusion to believe that there was not FBI involvement in
that particular operation.
Senator McCain. So your conclusion is, who was involved?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I mean, the fact of the matter is it is
ATF, which was the principal agency involved.
If you are asking about who was involved beyond ATF and the
agents on the ground, or the others in the supervisory line,
that is being investigated by the Inspector General's Office,
and I am not privy to their findings to date.
Senator McCain. So we leave it all to the Inspector
General's Office as to their conclusions. You, as Director, do
not have any role.
Mr. Mueller. Well, we do not have a role in that particular
aspect of the investigation. We have a very important role in
bringing to justice those persons responsible for the death of
the agent.
Senator McCain. But you are awaiting an Inspector General's
report.
Secretary Napolitano. No.
Mr. Mueller. Not on that. We are pursuing that
investigation as to who is responsible, what weapons were used
in the killing of the Border Patrol Agent, and we are working
with the prosecutor to make that----
Senator McCain. And what conclusions have you arrived at?
Mr. Mueller. I believe that there are submissions made in
court in support of--I would have to get back to you on where
it is in terms of charging somebody.
Senator McCain. It would be nice for you to get back to me,
but we have a dead Border Patrol Agent. We have a situation
which at least for a period of time was out of control. It has
been now a number of weeks since this happened. And you would
be glad to get back to me?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I do not know the specifics of what
charges have been brought in Arizona with regard to that
particular shooting.
Senator McCain. Well, can you share with us what
information you have?
Mr. Mueller. We have information relating to individuals
who were there. We have individuals identified as a result of
interviews we have conducted. We have done the forensics of the
scenes. We have identified the weapons. We are pursuing the
weapons.
Senator McCain. And when will all of that information be
made privy to the American people?
Mr. Mueller. Well, it is an ongoing criminal investigation.
My expectation is that much of that information will be made
available in the criminal proceedings that are brought against
the individuals responsible for that killing.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator McCain. Next is
Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing.
I join all Americans across the world in mourning the loss
of the thousands who died as a result of the terrorist attacks
a decade ago. As we commemorate this solemn anniversary, we
must acknowledge the tremendous progress over the past decade
to secure our Nation against terrorist attacks.
I want to commend both Administrations' resolve and
successful strategy to prevent another attack. We must also
commend the men and women who serve bravely in the military, as
well as the Federal, State, and local workers in homeland
security, law enforcement, intelligence, and other fields who
have made essential contributions to combating the terrorist
threat.
This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on how the
attacks still affect our lives today. We must remain vigilant
so that privacy and civil liberties are not sacrificed in the
name of security. As we reaffirm that we will never forget
those who died 10 years ago, let us resolve to continue to take
steps to ensure that such a tragedy will never happen again and
to strengthen the principles upon which our Nation was founded.
The former Chairman of the 9/11 Commission just released a
report listing nine of their recommendations that remain
unfinished, including the absence of a functioning Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board. In April, I joined Senators
Lieberman and Collins in a letter to the President, asking that
he nominate a full slate of members so the board could operate.
And I would like to ask these questions to the panel, and
if any of you can comment, fine. Otherwise, if you can provide
it for the record, that will be fine, too.
What is the status of the board being formed and how are
counterterrorism efforts reviewed--and this is the important
part--for privacy and civil liberty concerns, given that the
board is dormant?
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator Akaka, I do not know the
status of the board itself. I can say that at the Department,
we have a presidentially appointed Privacy Officer who runs a
Privacy Office. They are integrated into all of our program
planning, particularly with respect to information sharing and
how that is done--making sure, for example, that when we enter
into MOUs with the NCTC on the exchange of information, we
include within those limitations on uses and users, audit,
training and also that we, with respect to U.S. persons, put
some special limitations on time of retention of certain types
of records so that those kinds of privacy concerns we think
about before we move forward. They are important to protect.
Mr. Mueller. Senator, we have three ways.
The first is, we have attorney general guidelines--we have
had them for a number of years--that guide our investigative
activities.
Second, we do also have an individual responsible for
overseeing our particular initiatives from the perspective of
impact on privacy and civil liberties.
And third, again, when we have some form of initiative that
is being undertaken, we have a panel review of that initiative,
which has a person certainly from our legal counsel's office
but also from the Department of Justice that oversees that
particular undertaking as being reviewed by the panel.
Mr. Olsen. Senator, I do not know the status of the board,
but I would say that at NCTC, we really have what I would
consider to be three layers of oversight that consider our
activities from a civil liberties and privacy perspective.
First, internally, we have a Civil Liberties and Privacy
Officer assigned to NCTC. The sole purpose of his role is to
review our activities from that perspective. We also have
attorneys within the General Counsel's Office of the DNI who
conduct somewhat the same activities with respect to our work.
Second, all of our handling of U.S. person information is
done pursuant to attorney general guidelines as Director
Mueller made reference to. As well, when we handle information
that was obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, the FISA Court has a role in overseeing that activity.
And then finally, I would mention that we are subject to
very robust congressional oversight through the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano, as you know, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation leaders' meetings will be held in
Honolulu, Hawaii, in November. This high profile event has
raised concerns that Hawaii could be a target of a terrorist
attack. Local residents have also expressed concerns about the
Island of Oahu being locked down as a result of security
measures.
How are the U.S. Secret Service-led security plans
progressing and how will they inform the public about areas to
avoid and businesses impacted by security measures?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator. The meeting you
reference has been designated a National Special Security
Event, a meeting for which the Secret Service will provide lead
organizational responsibilities, but we will work very closely
and are integrated with officials in Hawaii and local law
enforcement. They are an integral part of planning and
execution in any NSSE event.
As the event gets closer, there will be a public relations
plan, for lack of a better phrase, to make the public aware of
what areas will be closed down and the like.
One thing I would say to reassure the residents of Oahu is
when we do these NSSEs, we are very conscious of the fact that
people actually live in these cities and they still need to get
to work and school, and so forth. For example, next week, we
will have the U.N. General Assembly convene, and we will have
many national leaders in New York City, and still New York City
will work and people will be able, and have been able, to get
to where they need to go for the most part.
So we are very sensitive to that. We acknowledge that. I
just use the General Assembly as an example of an event that is
perhaps even more complex than the one in Oahu to say that we
have some experience here and we will deploy our best efforts
in Hawaii.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Senator Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Thank you, and thank you to the panel for
coming today and these presentations.
Secretary Napolitano, we have admitted about 70,000 Iraqis
over the past 3 years. Two of which I think Senator Collins
brought up earlier were arrested recently in Bowling Green on
accusations of conspiring to be involved with terrorism.
I can kind of understand that after we lost the war in
Vietnam, the communists took over and people who sided with us
or fought with us would be executed. But my understanding is we
won the war in Iraq, and we are admitting 70,000 Iraqis when we
won the war and there is a democracy over there.
What reason do we have to be admitting so many, and is the
policy of the Administration to continue to admit so many, and
is it not a danger to our country and overwhelming us with
numbers of folks who have to be screened and apparently
sometimes are not screened properly?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, as I explained
earlier, we have now gone back and rescreened the Iraqi
population who were admitted as refugees against all of the DHS
databases, the NCTC databases, and the Department of Defense
biometric databases, and for any future refugees, we will
continue to do the same.
And then, if there are particular hits or particular
concerns on individuals, we refer them sometimes to the FBI to
do further investigation or checking.
Senator Paul. Does the Administration have a position
though on admitting so many people and continuing to admit so
many people from Iraq?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the refugee program was begun
under the prior Administration, Senator, and many of the
individuals who have been rechecked were admitted then.
With respect to the current time, if people qualify for
refugee status under the law, they will be permitted to come
in, but they will be vetted.
Senator Paul. I understand the number though is determined
by the Administration. Your Administration determines the
number, and if you decided you wanted to have 3,000 next year,
my understanding is under the law you could.
Secretary Napolitano. My understanding, Senator, is that is
being done primarily by the State Department and a number of
considerations are taken into account.
Senator Paul. The argument is that it is unsafe in Iraq,
but I think it is sort of an insult to our soldiers who are
over there to say that it is unsafe. Our soldiers are still
there protecting their country, but it is so unsafe that Iraqis
get to leave and come over here.
I guess really to add insult to injury is not only do we
bring them over here, but both of these people who are accused
of terrorism in our country were living in government housing
and on food stamps.
Now in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, we said that if you
come here legally through immigration, you would not qualify
for welfare. I think we should change that.
Does the Administration have a position on refugee status
and whether or not they should be coming here and immediately
put on welfare?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I cannot answer that
question right now. I will get back to you.
Senator Paul. Bowling Green seems to have been in the
news--Bowling Green, Kentucky, where I am from. We had a little
girl from Bowling Green, who was on Good Morning America, who
had a TSA agent do an invasive search inside of her clothing,
inside of her pants. We had an 8-month-old who had his diaper
inspected. Then we had a 95-year-old who had his diaper taken
off and inspected and stayed, I presume, for hours waiting to
get through the TSA.
Earlier this year, TSA Administrator Pistole said that we
need to do these invasive searches, and he said that we may
slow down or we may not do them as much.
But then he sent me a letter and said that we absolutely
have to because an 8-year-old in Kandahar exploded a bomb.
To me, I think that shows a bit of naivete to think that
somehow there is a similarity between an 8-year-old in Kandahar
and an 8-year-old in Bowling Green, Kentucky. I mean, the only
similarity is their age, and I would not consider age to be a
risk factor. If anything, age might argue against a risk. But
to say that she is the same age as someone who exploded a bomb
in Kandahar--I mean, we have to bring some sense to what we are
doing in this country.
After 10 years, why do we not have a frequent flyer
program?
A big bulk of those traveling are traveling two to three
times a week, and yet, we treat everybody equally as a terror
suspect. In doing so, we take away time that could be spent on
those who would be.
I would have a frequent flyer program. I would have it in a
month, and I would take half of the TSA agents, and I would
have them looking at the manifests of those flying from foreign
countries. I would want to know who is on every flight.
I do not know how far in advance we are doing this, or if
we are doing it, I would like to know a month in advance.
I would make strict rules on those flying internationally.
I think that is the biggest risk.
With those 70,000 people coming from Iraq, we say that we
are going to vet them, but we missed fingerprints that they had
on an IED. Even if we do things perfectly, the haystack is too
big.
Think of our army. We have people about once every couple
of months in Iraq or Afghanistan who we admit into the Army to
help us. They are supposedly our allies, and they turn around
and shoot us. It is hard to vet these people.
This was an extraordinary circumstance that we had a
fingerprint and we missed it, but most of the time they could
be completely lying to us as they go through the vetting
process. We bring them here, put them on government welfare,
and then they are here to attack us.
We have enough problems in our country. We have a lot of
poverty in our country. We do not need to be admitting the
world's poverty problems, and I think the Administration needs
to take a position to lessen the numbers of people coming in
from Iraq.
You need to take a position and move forward on a frequent
flyer program, and we need to not just be told there is some
day going to be risk assessment. We need to start doing risk
assessment and paying attention to the people who could attack
us, and not wasting and diverting our time and resources and
insulting the dignity of those who are traveling.
Secretary Napolitano. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will simply
say with respect to the movement to a risk-assessed based
strategy in the TSA, that is exactly what we are doing. And as
I said earlier in the hearing, we will be rolling out slowly
because you have to train agents as you do this. We move almost
1.8 million passengers a day, and we always have to have a
certain amount of randomness and unpredictability in the system
because the minute you say an entire group is exempt from
screening, they can be exploited as a possibility.
But your point about travelers who are low risk is
something that we accept. We are moving to expand the global
entry, which is for international travelers. We just passed our
1 millionth traveler. We are moving to expand that.
We are moving to loosen restrictions on children under the
age of 12 and also to amend the pat-down procedures that are
used.
So these improvements are underway, but I would caution,
Senator, that when you say do it in a month, we need to move on
a deliberate pace but a careful pace. Our adversaries are very
determined, and they are very determined with respect to the
aviation system. We want to make sure that we do it right.
Senator Paul. One quick follow-up to that. Really, I agree
with you. It is probably not that smart to say absolutely that
we are never going to search anyone under 12 years old. But for
goodness sake, could we not make a difference between an 8-
year-old from Bowling Green and an 8-year-old from Kandahar?
I do not mind if someone is coming from Pakistan or
Afghanistan next week, that you spend a little more time, but
we need to understand and use more common sense with what we
do. And it really would, in practical purpose, mean that
probably 99 percent of kids under 12 would not be patted down,
and that would be a lot better for most of us who are insulted
by what they are doing now.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Paul. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Sorry
that I could not be here for most of this because I was
chairing, as you know and Senator Collins knows, the Armed
Services Committee hearing on the confirmation of Ash Carter.
Let me welcome you all. I join my colleagues in doing that.
Director Olsen, let me start with you. I think you note in
your prepared testimony that the homegrown violent extremist
activity remains elevated with U.S.-based extremists taking
inspiration and instruction from al-Qaeda's global efforts in a
wide range of its English language propaganda. Part of that
propaganda was a recent online video released by an American-
born confirmed al-Qaeda operative in which he urges al-Qaeda
followers and sympathizers to exploit U.S. gun laws and to
purchase firearms.
Now, under current gun laws, individuals are allowed to
purchase a firearm without an FBI background check if they are
buying from a private seller, such as those at gun shows. Does
that loophole make it easier, in your judgment, for homegrown
extremists to purchase firearms for use in a terror attack?
Mr. Olsen. Senator, I have not looked at the gun laws and
after 4 weeks in my position would be reluctant to comment on
that.
Senator Levin. Will you comment on that and get us a
report?
Mr. Olsen. Yes, sir.
MR. OLSEN'S RESPONSE TO SENATOR LEVIN'S QUESTION
Response: As Senator Levin points out, individuals who
purchase firearms from federally licensed firearms dealers are
subject to background checks. Individuals who purchase firearms
from private sellers are not subject to FBI background checks.
Federal law makes it unlawful for certain categories of
persons, such as convicted felons, to transport, possess, or
receive any firearm or ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922. It
is my understanding that the FBI uses the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to determine whether
individuals seeking to purchase firearms from federally
licensed firearms dealers are eligible to make such purchases.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Levin. And with that FBI background check of
individuals purchasing a firearm from private individuals, in
your judgment, would that help reduce the threat to us from
U.S.-based violent extremists?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to put it like this: A background
check is important in identifying those persons who have some
reason for being in the databases, and enhanced coverage of the
purchase of weapons would give us a greater ability to identify
persons who should not have weapons and prevent them from
getting weapons.
Senator Levin. That would include the purchase from private
sellers such as at gun shows?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Fifty States now form nearly 2 million new corporations
each year without knowing who really owns them. The failure to
collect ownership information--the actual owners, so-called
beneficial owners--invites wrongdoers to misuse U.S. companies
for terrorism, money-laundering, tax evasion, and other crimes.
It is a subject this Committee has been examining now for some
years.
In August, Senator Grassley and I introduced S. 1483, the
Incorporation and Transparency in Law Enforcement Assistance
Act that would require disclosure of beneficial ownership
information in the company formation process.
At that time, the Treasury Department was very supportive
and announced the following: ``The bill would substantially
advance the Administration's fundamental interest in ensuring
the availability of meaningful beneficial ownership information
about companies created in the United States.''
And they went on: ``Such legislation is critical to the
Administration's objective of protecting the global financial
system and strategic markets from abuse.''
So we want to first of all thank the Treasury Department
for that support, and we are wondering, Secretary Napolitano,
whether or not the Department of Homeland Security takes the
same supportive position that we need to know for law
enforcement purposes, just for law enforcement purposes, who
the beneficial owners of the corporations are in order to
prevent terrorists and other malfeasers from misusing shell
corporations to launder money or for other nefarious purposes.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we support it.
Senator Levin. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can take
up this bill again. I know you have had it on the agenda a
couple times, and it has, for various reasons, been on and off
our markup.
But I think it is important that we have the testimony from
law enforcement here this morning that we need to do what other
countries do, by the way. We go after these tax havens for
allowing their jurisdictions to be used to avoid taxes from
being paid, but one of the things they do at least is they get
the beneficial owners of corporations on record so that they
know who actually owns the shell corporations, at least in many
cases.
And I would hope that, again, we would be able to take that
up, and the support of the Treasury Department and the
Department of Homeland Security is very helpful. I just wanted
to get that on the record for us.
On the Northern border, the GAO in February reported that
there are serious security threats to the Northern border and
that the risk of terrorist activity is high. It said that DHS
reports--now this is the GAO saying that the DHS reports--that
the terrorist threat on the Northern border is higher than on
the Southern border, given the large, expansive area with
limited law enforcement coverage. That was on page one of that
report.
However, even with that high risk of terrorist and other
illegal activity on the border, the Border Patrol reports that
``only 32 of nearly 4,000 Northern border miles in fiscal year
2010 had reached an acceptable level of security.''
I am wondering if you would tell us here today or for the
record, Secretary Napolitano, whether that number of Northern
border miles has increased.
Secretary Napolitano. I believe it has, and as we have
discussed in other contexts, that use of the phase operational
control is a term of art.
We have a Northern border strategy. It had to be cleared by
OMB. It now has been completed, but we want to update it with
the full fiscal year's statistics prior to publishing. It will
be published shortly.
The other change I think that is very significant is what
is called the Beyond the Border strategy that we now have with
Canada, which is a law enforcement information sharing
perimeter-oriented strategy that really did not exist 2 years
ago when I think a lot of that report was probably researched.
That is going to be of enormous importance because it takes
pressure off of the physical U.S.-Canadian border and allows us
to expand the border outward.
Senator Levin. If you could, in your own words, get us the
number of miles of border that have an acceptable level of
security. I do not mean now. Get it to us for the record, if
you would.
Very quickly, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is
up, but I just have one more question and then I have a thank
you.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative has a very complex
funding allocation formula, and one of the questions is whether
or not a location is on an international waterway. For reasons
which are totally incomprehensible, Detroit is not listed as
being on an international waterway when it is. The Detroit
River is an international waterway between the United States
and Canada, and not only that, it has more commerce crossing
that river at Detroit than any other place probably in the
world, much less in the country, in terms of commerce crossing
that bridge particularly in Detroit.
Will you take a look at that, Madam Secretary, that issue
of whether or not Detroit is on an international waterway? Find
out for us why the City of Detroit is not listed because it
makes a difference in terms of allocation of resources. So will
you take a look at that?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I will drill down on that for
you, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Finally, a thank you. Two days ago we
remembered 9/11. And following 9/11, there was a small group of
people in Detroit representing the Arab-American community and
representing law enforcement that came together and formed a
group called BRIDGES.
And there has been a really strong connection between the
law enforcement community under the leadership of the U.S.
Attorney in Detroit, but including also elements of the
Homeland Security Department, so that the communication is far
better. The trust is far better. They work shoulder to shoulder
now against violence and hatred. It is an important group
because if you have the support of community, whatever
community it is, working with law enforcement, it is a great
source of American security.
And that kind of support in the Arab-American community, in
the Muslim-American community is reflected in that group where
law enforcement--Federal law enforcement and State and local
law enforcement--are represented for frequent meetings. They
also memorialized their anniversary the other day with their
annual dinner.
And it is a very reassuring thing to see law enforcement in
our communities, period, whatever the community is, working so
closely together. That is where security is really enhanced. It
is not just the typical law enforcement security, which is
important--protecting borders and doing other things--but it is
also having the support of the people in our neighborhoods, in
our communities working shoulder to shoulder with law
enforcement.
I just want to commend you both. The FBI is actively
involved in that. The Justice Department, U.S. Attorney, and
also your elements of DHS are very much involved. And it was
kind of heartwarming to see that, and we all feel a lot more
secure when that is true. Thank you.
Thank you. I am sorry I went over.
Chairman Lieberman. No, thank you. I join you in that thank
you. The Bureau actually was out there right after 9/11, and
that probably surprised a lot of people, in outreaching to the
Muslim-American community, and it continues to do that. We
appreciate that.
Senator Collins and I would like to ask just one or two
more questions. You are a very steadfast, resilient group, and
I am sure that you have faced worse challenges than the two of
us, and just for a few minutes more.
I want to ask you a wrap-up question. We have had a lot of
good testimony, good discussion. Of course, I feel very
positively about what we have accomplished over the last 10
years. Looking to the next year, let me know what your top one
or two priorities are of what is not done to your satisfaction
yet in terms of your Department, your Bureau, and your Center.
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, our Department has so
many elements to it, but I think over the next year, we will
continue to improve and expand information sharing and analytic
capability with the FBI, NCTC, and other agencies within the
Department and outside the Capital Area to the rest of the
country.
I believe that cybersecurity will be an increasing area of
focus for us as we deal with, as Director Mueller said, really
that emergent threat in the cyber world.
I think we will see over the next year a movement toward a
more risk-based screening process for passengers, particularly
in the air environment.
And last, we want to move toward, we call it--and you heard
it in the video that you began the hearing with--one DHS. We
are still in the building process, the knitting together
processes involved with putting 22 agencies together, and I
think we will see even more progress in the year ahead.
Chairman Lieberman. All right. You have a busy year ahead
of you. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. First would be the federated searches
capability, both internally and externally, so that while we
have to keep, for a variety of reasons, different database
structures, there has to be the ability to pull information
very easily from those databases.
Chairman Lieberman. Give us a little background for people
listening.
Mr. Mueller. If we have information off a FISA intercept,
there are minimization procedures, or procedures about to whom
that information can be disseminated----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Which requires us to keep it in a
separate database. But what you want to do is give the analysts
the ability to understand if there is anything in that database
on a particular individual, email address, or the like.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller. While for a variety of reasons we have to keep
separate databases, whether it be from security or from
statutory direction, there has to be the ability to do the
federated searches across those databases, both internally as
well as externally, which is where NCTC is putting a great deal
of its effort.
So we all have to get our own houses in order in order to
be the platform for the government as a whole to be able to do
this kind of search capability.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you need statutory changes to do
that?
Mr. Mueller. It would be difficult, if you take the FISA
statute, for instance.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. We have just gone through the update of the
PATRIOT Act, and I am not certain it is something that would
easily get through. So while conceivably you could do it, it is
unlikely to happen very shortly, and consequently, we have to
utilize technology.
Second, as pointed out earlier, is the cyber arena.
Adjusting our organizations to address the cyber threat in new
ways that will make us more effective as a united entity is
going to be a huge issue.
Third, is the necessity for assuring that new mechanisms of
communication that are being developed daily by the new
entrepreneurial information technology capabilities by various
companies--I do not want to necessarily name them here--but it
is not just the communications carriers that carry
communications now. It is Google, Facebook, all of them.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller. And the necessity of assuring that in response
to a court order giving us the right to obtain those
communications, there is the capability of those persons or
those entities to respond to those court orders is something
that I will be addressing. We cannot afford, as we say, to go
dark.
The last thing I would say very quickly is with enhanced
information technology comes additional administrative burdens.
One of the challenges we have is to make certain that our
agents or people are spending their time on the substance----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. And removing some of the
administrative burdens and obstacles to getting out there and
doing the work that we want to pay them to do. That, for us, is
an issue that we continuously fight.
Chairman Lieberman. So it is a substantive list. On that
third one, about gaining access to information from the
unconventional, the new communications media, that might
require legislation?
Mr. Mueller. I think it will. I think you may see some
suggestion with regard to legislation. And I would say most of
the companies are very patriotic and working on capabilities,
but we have to make certain that they have the capability to
respond to the court orders.
Chairman Lieberman. Right, because a lot of times those
recipients of court orders want the statute to make clear their
obligations.
Mr. Mueller. True.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Picking up on the theme of information sharing, it is
similar at NCTC. As you both know very well, the founding
principle of NCTC was to break down the silos of information
and provide a place where information from the CIA, DHS, the
FBI, and NSA could be brought together. We have made
significant progress in doing that, largely through bringing
people together in one place from each of those organizations.
I think the next step in that process is to have that
information. We have much of it but to continue to gather that
information, ingest it, have it available at NCTC where we then
can do exactly what Director Mueller talked about at NCTC--
search across databases, not have an analyst go to one
database, go to another database, and go to a third, but be
able to find the connections that are so elusive by being able
to search seamlessly across all those databases. So that is
one, and that is a significant priority for us.
Second, I mentioned the Pursuit Group. I think that there
is a lot of potential there. This was something started in 2010
to fill a gap by looking for less obvious connections among
pieces of information, among people, and then to be able to tip
those leads off to the operational entities that can follow up,
whether that is CIA, FBI, or DHS. I think there is a lot of
potential there, and I am going to continue to focus on that.
And third is an area I know that is of significance to both
of you, and that is countering violent extremism. This is an
area where NCTC has played a vital role, and I think we will
play an increasingly important role in the next year in
particular as we do a couple of things, but the one I will
highlight right now is to develop the implementation plan for
the Administration's new framework, a strategy for countering
violent extremism.
We have done a number of things on the intelligence side
and on the operational planning side to prepare law enforcement
to understand the radicalization process, to help communities
understand where to look for threats within their neighborhoods
and their communities, but there is a significant amount of
work to do in this area, and I think NCTC is going to play an
important role.
Chairman Lieberman. We agree. As you may know, Senator
Collins and I just sent a letter to Mr. Brennan, expressing
disappointment with a lot of that report, and a lot of the
disappointment had to do with the lack of detail, a lack of
clarity, at least as we read it, about who was in charge but
also what is going to happen.
Insofar as you are going to put some flesh on the bones, or
whatever the metaphor is, clarify that urgently, that would be
very important.
I thank all three of you. It is interesting how much cyber
comes up. And also, these remarkable instruments of data
analysis retention, which have helped us enormously, just were
in play in the last week with the latest threat stream. But we
can yet do better at that, as you have all said. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Olsen, let me take up where you just left off because I
was going to talk to you about who is the lead for countering
violent extremism.
I know that the White House is the lead for policy and put
out what is in our view a disappointingly sketchy strategy. But
is the NCTC going to be the operational lead for
implementation?
Mr. Olsen. We will not be the lead for the operational
implementation. The National Security Staff and the National
Security Council at the White House has the lead for developing
the policy. And we at NCTC play a role and will be front and
center in developing the implementation plan, putting the flesh
on the bones for that broad policy, but the agencies and
departments with specific authorities and responsibilities in
each area will be responsible for operationally implementing
that plan.
I think the overall picture, as I understand it, is
centralized policy development but decentralized operational
implementation because there is a number of agencies and
departments that have a particular expertise or role or set of
authorities that they can take advantage of.
Senator Collins. I share the concern of the Chairman that
we do not have one person who is accountable to Congress, who
is in charge of the strategy. I mean one of the problems of
running it out of the White House is the individuals on the
President's staff are not accountable to Congress. So for us to
exercise oversight in this extremely important area becomes
impossible.
I am going to push with the Chairman to continue to argue
that we need one person accountable to Congress who is clearly
in charge of the strategy for CVE and for homegrown terrorism.
I am glad that NCTC is involved, but it sounds like everybody
has a piece of it. I understand why that can be desirable, but
there has to be one person in charge.
Let me, because I know we are wrapping up, switch to two
other issues I want to touch on before we adjourn. I, too, am
pleased to hear the priority placed on cyber security. When I
look at the threats that we face that I feel we are least
prepared for, cyber attacks, homegrown terrorism, and chemical/
biological weapons top my list.
I read just recently a very interesting piece that General
Michael Hayden wrote in which he argued that government is
being too secretive about cyber security vulnerabilities,
which, in turn, prevents the private sector from sufficiently
addressing the threat and how to address it.
He says, ``Let me be clear: This stuff is overprotected. It
is far easier to learn about physical threats from U.S.
Government agencies than to learn about cyber threats.''
And that is one reason the Chairman and I, along with
Senator Carper, have introduced a bill. It mirrors many of the
recommendations of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Administration to require the government to share actionable
cyber information with the private sector.
I would like to ask the Secretary and you, Director
Mueller, what you see as the biggest impediments to the timely
sharing of cyber threat information and also cyber breaches
with the private sector and with other agencies. I will start
with you, Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. On the one hand, there is some reluctance of
the business community to share breach information with the
government. That, I think, is going to be addressed, and we
would want that to go to DHS and the FBI, so we can act very
quickly on it.
It is interesting to see General Hayden articulating this
particular view. He probably could answer the other side of it,
and if he were here 2 years ago, he would have been answering
the other side of it.
Senator Collins. That is true. I appreciated the irony
also.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, there is a very substantial imperative
that to the extent possible, we share the information that will
allow the private industry to protect itself from cyber
intrusions to the extent that it does not disclose capabilities
that we need elsewhere.
It is not only a criminal case for an intrusion in the
United States, it is also often a national security risk, which
we have to treat as a national security risk, and there are
capabilities out there that you do not want to be disclosed
because you would lose that capability.
And so, it is sometimes a difficult balancing act to make
certain we push out as much information as we can, and we
should. But there are some good reasons often that you cannot
give as much detail as you would like, but you can give a
generalized warning.
But there are some equities on the other side that we
cannot go into here. I do believe--and I think the Secretary
can probably address it--we are making great strides in trying
to make available information that 2 or 3 years ago we would
not have been able to do and are currently doing.
Senator Collins. Madam Secretary, do you have anything to
add?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, first of all, I hope the
legislation moves forward. I think it is a good piece of
legislation and necessary to establish authorities and
jurisdiction, and the like. So we will work with you in that
endeavor.
We need to keep focused on building out our information
sharing capabilities at DHS through the US-CERT, through the
NCIC facility and others. We have worked with the DOD on our
ability to use some of the assets of the NSA under appropriate
circumstances.
But the whole cyber arena, from a DHS perspective, is going
to be a growth area. The information sharing with the private
sector, particularly critical infrastructure aspects of the
private sector, will be key for us, and then as Director
Mueller said, getting information back in a timely fashion. And
all of this needs to move very quickly.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Finally, I want to touch on the
decision to make public the threat of last weekend.
The Sergeant at Arms sent out an email message to, I
believe, all employees of the Senate as well as to all Senators
in which he talks about the announcement and says that the
announcement was ``well intentioned, perhaps helpful, but not
very well coordinated.'' This obviously worries me because the
Sergeant at Arms is a key player when it comes to protecting
the Washington, DC, area.
We followed up with the Sergeant at Arms. First, let me say
that he said that coordination is 100 percent better than it
used to be, that the FBI's local office had worked very closely
with them.
But here is what he said happened. First, he was told--as
we were, I might add--that the information was classified and
closely held, and as he said, that is pretty typical and an
understanding approach.
But then he said that the decision to go public caught them
off guard. They were out of the loop, and essentially, it
sounds like they learned about it on television. What is your
response to this critique?
And again, so that I am not taking this out of context, he
did praise the local FBI office, he did say that coordination
is 100 percent better than it used to be, but he said the
decision to go public took them by surprise. And that, it seems
to me, should not have happened, given what a key player the
Sergeant at Arms is since he controls the Capitol Police. Madam
Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. It is kind of difficult to respond
out of context. The decision was made to share the threat
because it was credible and specific and to share it out
through joint bulletins. There was a Joint Intelligence
Bulletin with the FBI, to share it out through law enforcement,
particularly in the affected areas, which were Washington, DC,
and New York, which were the targets of the threat stream.
There was not a public elevation of the threat because the
information was already getting out and actions were already
being taken in response so that when he says he did not know it
was going public, if he means there was some kind of public
press release, there was not. There was information that was
shared through law enforcement channels, as it should have
been, for law enforcement to be more aware of what the threat
was and what to watch for.
So whether or not he received that information, I do not
know, but the information was put out through law enforcement
channels.
Senator Collins. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. We take the position from September 11. To the
extent that we have threat information and imminent threat
information that is specific to a particular jurisdiction--New
York, Washington, Dubuque, it does not make any difference--the
persons responsible for securing those communities should have
the information. And we find a way to get it to them, whether
it be a bulletin or through the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Inevitably, that opens the circle of persons who have
information on that threat.
Inevitably, the person responsible, whether it be in New
York or Washington, DC, the police chief or otherwise, says, I
have to respond to this threat. And so, you will have actions
taken in each of the jurisdictions that are affected that raise
the public's consciousness.
And often, as a result of the raised public consciousness,
there has to be an explanation of why you are doing car stops
or why you have more people on the street.
And it is that cycle where the information comes out
without a conscious decision at one particular point in time--
we are going to go public. The reports come in. The questions
come in. And the decision is made that you have to give as much
information as you can to put it in particular context.
If it has happened once, it has happened 50 times since
September 11.
And if I get one criticism from State and local law
enforcement officials, it is always: Director, why do I have to
hear about it on CNN?
And the fact of the matter is the combination of wanting to
inform people who are immediately affected by it with the
understanding, as you open the circle, it is going to get on
CNN probably sooner rather than later. It is a fact of life.
Senator Collins. It is, and I do not disagree in any way
with the decision to go public because I think you want more
people on the alert. I think you want the average citizen
watching for suspicious activity. But it does trouble me if a
person such as the Sergeant at Arms, in such a key position,
did not know that there was going to be a decision made to go
public.
So I would be happy to share the email that he sent to all
of us with you.
Mr. Mueller. I would like to see it, and we will be
talking.
Senator Collins. And he does an excellent job.
Mr. Mueller. He is terrific. He is terrific and a great
partner with us.
Senator Collins. Let me just be clear on that, which is why
I brought up his concern. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
And of course, he was previously the Chief before he became
the Sergeant. So he has the background.
So it is interesting. I do not want to keep you any longer
really, but there was not a decision really made, for instance
in the White House, to go public with this information. There
was a decision made, for all the factors you indicate, to
disseminate part of the information that you had on the threat
to State and local law enforcement at a for-official-use-only
level, not classified. But the presumption is, based on
experience, that once you do that, people are going to start
talking and it is going to find its way to the media.
So have I got it right?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, and the person, the recipient, the police
chief, or others responsible for public security in that
community, has to take steps.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. If you take steps to respond to that threat,
the question is going to be asked, why are you taking these
steps?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller. So it is a response to questions that
inevitably build up as you go forward and the local communities
or the Federal community take the steps necessary to address
the threat.
Senator Collins. But, Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Collins. Was there not a press statement actually
put out by the Department of Homeland Security? When we were
briefed by John Brennan, he told us that DHS was going to be
the lead on the public announcement.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, but that was later on in the
sequence. That was not at the immediate time that we put out
the FOUO document, as I recall.
Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Incidentally, I think
Senator Collins already said this. We discussed this. We both
felt that this was a case where the balance of public interest
and safety was in putting this information out, not everything,
but that there had been a specific, credible, unconfirmed
threat.
Before we close, Senator Rockefeller has filed a statement
with the Committee, which I want to include, without objection,
in the record, in which he discusses the importance of
allocating the D-block to first responders, and I agree with
him totally.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller appears in the
Appendix on page 994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to thank all of you again. It is just very
impressive what you and all the people who work with you have
done over the last 10 years.
We are at a time of national pessimism, and a lot of it is
understandable because of the economy. But it just seems to me
if people in the country will think back to 9/11 and think what
we have done since. We stood up two new organizations here, and
the third, the FBI, was dramatically transformed. The benefit
is an enormously improved homeland security.
I do not think there is another country in the world that
could have done it as well as we did. Frankly, without being
too explicit, there are other countries in the world, close
friends of ours, who probably should have done a lot of what we
did and have not yet.
But in any case, really, I think we all have reason to be
grateful to you and, again, everybody who works with you on our
behalf. So I thank you.
It has been a very informative and encouraging hearing. And
the work is not over, as we all know, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you all.
The record of the hearing will be held open for 15 days for
any additional questions or statements.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at approximately 12:38 p.m., the hearing was
adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: A STATUS REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:34 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to all of our witnesses, who I
thank very much for coming here today to help us review the
status of information sharing among law enforcement
intelligence communities at all levels of government in the
United States and to determine what, if anything, we still
should be doing to achieve yet better information integration
and, therefore, a higher level of homeland security.
Just yesterday, we witnessed the stunning outcome of
brilliant information sharing when the Department of Justice
announced it had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador to the United States here in the United States. The
case began apparently with the Drug Enforcement Administration
in Texas and Mexico before it was handed off to the FBI, and
eventually to the Attorney General's Office, I presume, though
it has not been explicitly said. The components of the
intelligence community were also involved at various points.
The system really worked brilliantly and the men and women in
the field did exactly what they were supposed to do, and as a
result, we are all safer, including the Saudi ambassador.
This has not always been the case, which is why we are
holding this hearing. This is the ninth in a year-long series
of hearings, this year being the 10th anniversary, so to speak,
of 9/11, in which we are assessing progress made on key
government functions that the 9/11 Commission recommended we
overhaul. Information sharing was a particularly important
matter to the Commission because it concluded, as we all
remember, that the attacks of 9/11 might have been prevented
had our intelligence and law enforcement agencies shared
intelligence they had gathered and had in their possession
separately to create an overall picture of what was to come on
9/11. Agencies were mired in what the Commission described as a
``need to know'' culture for sharing information, whereas the
Commission said what we should be aspiring to is a ``need to
share'' rule.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, with the focus on this
problem, Congress moved to strengthen information sharing among
critical Federal agencies in the Patriot Act of 2001 and the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Once the 9/11 Commission
released its report and its recommendations, we worked on a
bipartisan basis coming out of this Committee to enact the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
tackled the problem in a comprehensive way, particularly by
establishing the National Counterterrorism Center to analyze
and share information to and from all agencies to better
protect our homeland and by requiring the President to appoint
a Program Manager in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence to coordinate information sharing across the
Federal Government.
In my opinion, there is little question that our government
now operates on a need to share basis much more than it did 10
years ago. As barriers of information have been taken down over
the last decade, the quality, and, in fact, the quantity of
information have improved and grown significantly. I think we
have also integrated important new partners into the
information sharing stream, and in that I mean particularly
State and local agencies and the private sector, as well.
The results of these efforts are visible in game changing
military and counterterrorism successes that have really
protected our security. Shared information, for instance,
between the intelligence community and the military led to the
strikes that killed Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki.
Information sharing among Federal, State, and local agencies
has played a critical role in recent arrests of homegrown
terrorists, some of these really quite remarkable cases of
information sharing and creativity, innovation, just plain hard
work, including particularly Najibullah Zazi, the al-Qaeda
trained operative who was plotting to bomb the New York City
subway in 2009, and then the arrest in Seattle in June of this
year of two homegrown Islamist extremists who were planning to
attack a military recruiting station there.
Unfortunately, we have seen missteps, as well. Even when
government officials and agencies have shared information,
failure to share enough information, combined with human error
and technological limitations, for instance, prevented the
detection of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab before he boarded a
plane Christmas Day 2009 and tried to detonate explosives.
This Committee's January report of the murders at Fort Hood
exposed more serious and ultimately deadly failure of the
Departments of Defense and the FBI to share information about
the growing radicalization of the alleged killer, Major Nidal
Hasan, despite what our Committee investigation found were
multiple red flags about his behavior.
There are other new factors that further complicate efforts
to share information. For instance, the WikiLeaks disclosures
exposed the risks of what might be called over-sharing without
necessary safeguards. New communications technologies have made
it more difficult to ensure that critical information is
retained for appropriate use by law enforcement. And, of
course, we have to ensure that information is shared in a way
that adequately protects the privacy and civil liberties of our
citizens.
Last week, President Obama issued an Executive Order that
acknowledged that effective information sharing is critical to
both national and homeland security, of course, but that in the
aftermath of WikiLeaks, information must be shared in a secure
manner. I think the Executive Order strikes a sensible balance
between protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and
coordinating information sharing across all levels of
government. Now, we need to make sure the Executive Order is
implemented fully and expeditiously.
So, bottom line as we meet today on this subject, I think
we have come a long way since the failures of information
sharing that helped to enable the attacks of 9/11, but
obviously we have to continue to build on that progress if we
are to maintain our security. That is what we hope this hearing
this morning will help us do and why we are so grateful to have
a truly excellent panel of witnesses before us. Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am very
impressed with the caliber of the panel before us, so as you
were delivering your opening statement, I was trying to cut
mine down so that we could get to them, since you said many of
the same points.
Certainly, the results of information sharing and
collaboration within the intelligence community and the law
enforcement community have been evident in the operations that
located, tracked, and killed Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-
Awlaki in the recent months, and just yesterday in the
disruption of a plot by elements of Iran's government which
plotted to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States right
here in Washington. This appears to be yet another victory for
cooperation across departmental boundaries.
When the Chairman and I were working on the Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004, we understood that it would be challenging
to change the culture in the intelligence and law enforcement
communities from ``need to know'' to ``need to share.'' It is
gratifying, therefore, that many intelligence and law
enforcement professionals have embraced this change. In a
recent op-ed, the Director of National Intelligence, Jim
Clapper, observed that the intelligence community now starts
``from the imperative of responsibility to share in order to
collaborate with and better support its intelligence consumers
from the White House to the foxhole.''
U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald put it more colorfully
when he told an audience last month that intelligence and law
enforcement operators now ask themselves, if it is found out
that I have information that I did not share with someone, how
am I going to justify to myself that I sat on it? He could have
added, how will that failure to share be justified to
congressional overseers, or far worse, to the victims of a
successful attack.
I believe that the influx of new analysts that have joined
the intelligence community after 9/11 has had a very beneficial
impact on information sharing because this new generation of
intelligence officers is much more comfortable sharing
information. It is their life. Social media and collaborative
information technology have been a daily part of their lives
and it is much more natural for them to share in the workplace,
as well.
Notwithstanding, the many recent successes and the thwarted
plots for which the intelligence and law enforcement
communities deserve great credit, the GAO continues to rank
terrorism-related information sharing as a high-risk area. As
this Committee saw in the Fort Hood attacks and the attempted
airplane bombing on Christmas Day 2009, when information is not
shared, our Nation's security is placed at risk.
The Bowling Green, Kentucky, case is another recent example
of information apparently not being shared and remains very
troubling to me. It is unsettling that a suspected bomb maker
whose fingerprints we had for many years was able to enter our
country on humanitarian grounds. I have raised this issue
repeatedly with the Department of Homeland Security as well as
with the FBI. Both have told this Committee that the 58,000
individuals who have been resettled in the United States have
been vetted now against existing databases, but what we found
is the problem is that information has not been uploaded into
those databases because of resource constraints. So if you are
vetting people against databases that do not have all the
information, you are obviously going to miss people who may
want to do us harm.
But in some respects, that case demonstrates an evolution
of information sharing. Originally, this information--these
fingerprints that were collected from IEDs--was collected with
the warfighter in mind, not with the idea of sharing them with
Immigration or State Department officials to vet those who were
seeking asylum. That teaches us that it is increasingly
important for agencies to think creatively about other
potential uses of information that we collect and how best to
prioritize, analyze, and act upon that information.
Our investigation of the Fort Hood shootings demonstrated
that the Department of Defense and the FBI collectively had
ample information that Major Hasan had radicalized to the point
where he was a serious threat, but they failed to act
effectively on the many red flags.
The Chairman mentioned the WikiLeaks breach. That
demonstrated that we also need to improve the security of our
data from internal threats. But in doing so, we have to be
vigilant that we do not recreate the old stovepipes in order to
guard against the internal threat. But it is baffling to me
that the individual involved in the WikiLeaks case had easy
access to such a wide variety of highly classified information.
Just last week, the President signed a new Executive Order on
responsible information sharing prompted in part by the
WikiLeaks situation. This hearing will help us assess the
President's new Executive Order.
As we explore the issue of information sharing, we must
also ensure that our Homeland Security partners like local and
State law enforcement and fusion centers are receiving and
sharing information that is useful and that adds value, and it
needs to be a two-way street. Last year, this Committee passed
a law that was written by former Congresswoman Jane Harman to
try to guard against over-classification, and I will be
interested to ask our State and local representatives whether
you have seen any benefits from that new law yet.
The public should be able to share its information, too.
After all, the Times Square bombing was averted by an alert
sidewalk vendor, and that is one reason that Senator Lieberman
and I have introduced our ``See Something, Say Something''
bill, which would broaden the protections from lawsuits from
citizens who in good faith report suspicious activity.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not express my concern
over this Administration's inexplicable failure to fully
appoint and staff the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board that we created as part of our 2004 Act. I am truly
baffled by the Administration's slowness in this regard because
it is an important check as we seek to expand information
sharing.
From the most sophisticated intelligence collection methods
to the police officer on the street to the observant sidewalk
vendor, information sharing is clearly key to keeping our
fellow citizens safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
I thank the panel not only for being here, but for the work
and thought that you put into the statements that you have
prepared for this morning. The full text of all your statements
will be printed in the record as if read, and we will now go to
your testimony before the Committee.
First is John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, and, for an interim period, Acting Director.
He is currently a professor at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins. In 2010, Director
McLaughlin led an internal review for the Director of National
Intelligence and Admiral Dennis Blair of the intelligence
community's role with respect to the Christmas Day and Fort
Hood attacks. We appreciate both your past service and the fact
that you are here this morning and welcome your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN,\1\ DISTINGUISHED
PRACTITIONER-IN-RESIDENCE, PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Senator
Collins. Great to see you both again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin appears in the
Appendix on page 1065.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. McLaughlin. The requirement to share information has
been around since time immemorial, but the key thing about our
time is that we are long past the moment when you can rely on a
single individual or a single brain to sort through the complex
problems that we deal with. In fact, today's world requires an
unprecedented level of cooperation among people with varied
expertise, supported by information systems that make that
easier, and legal systems and procedures that take all of that
complexity into account.
In formulating my thoughts on this, I am relying on two
things, the experience Senator Lieberman referred to when I was
Deputy Director and Acting Director in the period after 9/11,
and also the work I did for Admiral Blair in 2010.
So let me begin with three positive trends, and I think
both of you have alluded to some of these. First, the desire
and willingness to share information is dramatically greater
than it was at the time of 9/11. There are still some who
resist, but the momentum is clearly in the other direction.
Second, the capabilities for sharing information have grown
notably within agencies. Many are world class, but they do not
operate as effectively across agency lines yet. The notable
exception to this might be the National Counterterrorism
Center.
Third, there is an improved policy foundation for access to
and sharing of data, and I am referring to Intelligence
Community Directive 501, which allows officers to discover what
relevant data exists, request access to it, and have such
requests professionally and fairly adjudicated. Implementation
of this is moving along, though not yet complete.
But there are at least three countervailing negative
trends, and again, I think you hinted at these. First, the
volume of data keeps going up with no end in sight. These days,
it is not uncommon at all for an analyst to see his or her
daily take of messages go from hundreds to thousands overnight,
ensuring that those who would do us harm do not really have to
work that hard to hide. They are sometimes just lost in the
noise.
Second, the breakdown in security discipline in our own
government works against sharing of information, and you both
alluded to this. Leaks, authorized and unauthorized, reinforce
arguments made by those who stress the risks of sharing and
pose obstacles to doing so.
And third, despite the progress represented by Intelligence
Community Directive 501, broader policy procedure and law have
been a little slow to keep pace with the challenge.
So given that complicated picture, what is the way forward?
Above all, we need finally to break through the barriers that
have for years kept us from bringing the most advanced
information technology to bear on the problem. Information
technology can prompt humans to look in the right places,
consider pieces of data that might otherwise be missed, expose
relationships that are buried in all the noise that the
avalanche of data represents. What stands in the way? There are
three major issues.
First, there is in the national security community limited
visibility into data that is distributed across multiple agency
systems housed in different agencies.
Second, existing search capabilities do not allow for
exploitation of existing data.
And third, I am not sure there is a common and widely
shared vision among national security specialists on the end
state they want to achieve here.
There are a number of things that deserve attention in the
near and medium term. In the near term, it is important to
strengthen online instruction for national security specialists
on what data exists. Sometimes, they do not know.
In the medium term, we should work to improve search
capabilities and training in how to use them.
And in the longer term, and once basic capabilities are
improved, we need more software capable of exposing the
underlying relationships in large bodies of data.
Faced with challenges like this, one key need is a common
standard across the intelligence community for access to data,
essentially, the virtual equivalent of a community badge that
now allows officers to move physically from agency to agency.
This would mean, for example, that when someone logs on in one
agency, other agencies whose data that person is seeking would
confidently know who this person is and what they are
authorized to access. It is easier to say than do, but it is
achievable over time.
Another broad problem likely to complicate our efforts,
especially the need to identify people involved in terrorism,
is that so many of them are turning out to be Americans. Names
like al-Awlaki, Najibullah Zazi, David Headley, Faisal Shazad,
and just yesterday, Manssor Arbabsiar, are familiar ones in
this room. This is a problem with at least three dimensions.
First, I suspect there is still an inconsistent
understanding of the laws and regulations that govern the
acquisition and sharing of data that touches Americans--these
are complicated laws.
Second, there is an understandable concern not to violate
the laws protecting our citizens' privacy, and this can inspire
a subtle kind of risk aversion in dealing with such data. We
saw this in some cases I have looked at.
Third, terrorists, in my personal view, have figured all
this out. Faisal Shazad, the unsuccessful Times Square bomber,
got his citizenship here within the year before he attempted to
carry out that act. This tells me that these people know that
complicates our task in detecting them.
Finally, I would just say that any misgivings we have about
counterterrorism stand out, and I think you both alluded to
this because they are so at odds with the broad pattern of
success we have experienced since 9/11. Our law enforcement,
intelligence, and military officers have really delivered. As
always, intelligence successes are rarely apparent, not only
because we cannot talk about them, but because they are often
woven kind of invisibly into the fabric of successful policy.
Those are my opening thoughts on this. I thank you for the
opportunity. There is a fuller statement in the record, but
these are the basic points I wanted to make. Thanks.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. Those were
excellent opening thoughts.
Ambassador Ted McNamara served as Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment from 2006 to 2009, where he had
lead responsibility for coordinating the Federal Government
efforts with respect to information sharing. It is a pleasure
to welcome you back to the Committee and we look forward to
your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS E. MCNAMARA,\1\ ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Mr. McNamara. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me start by saying that during my 3\1/2\ years as a Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, I had the
pleasure to work very closely with Members of this Committee
and the staff and I received nothing but encouragement,
constructive criticism, and strong bipartisan support, and for
that, I want to thank the Committee, especially the Chairman
and Senator Collins. The two of you are unsung heroes of what
we got done downtown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McNamara appears in the Appendix
on page 1073.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I think what you probably would like to see from me is the
view from the trenches. I will try and do that.
Two years ago, in my final appearance before the Committee
as the Program Manager, I stated that we had built a strong
foundation for the ISE, but that a fully functional and mature
ISE was still in the future. I am delighted to observe that 2
years later, we have gone well beyond that point.
A truly mature and functioning ISE can only exist when we
have fully standardized and harmonized rules, procedures, and
operating systems to manage the ISE. To get from the start
point to that fully mature system, we now know, as we were not
fully aware of back in 2005, is a long, complex, and difficult
process. Today, 10 years after 9/11 and 5 years after I sent
the required Program Manager's first implementation plan to the
Congress, we are well beyond the foundation, but we are not
near the finish.
What I find most encouraging in the last 2 years is that
the pace and breadth of the change are stronger, more
widespread, and exist among all stakeholders. Concepts and
programs that were hard-fought struggles in those first years
are conventional wisdom now. I will give as one example, the
Controlled Unclassified Information program. It was met with
widespread skepticism and open opposition in 2006 when we set
the goals for building it. Today, there is not a single agency
I know of that opposes the CUI or believes that the old way was
better. From my perspective, that is a huge progress.
At the macro level, my observation is that the ISE is
alive, well, and growing stronger. We spent a lot of time
getting buy-in from the stakeholders. I would equate what
happened with the proverbial supertanker that takes so much
time initially to start turning, but once it turns, the turning
is quite forceful. The problem for the manager, or in this
analogy the captain, is to make sure the turn winds up on
course. I think that we are on course. We still have, however,
incomplete standardization and harmonization. They are central
problems, still, today.
We also have another problem which I did not face, and that
is as the ISE grows, it begins to bump into other programs and
priorities which are out of step with it and which have major
conflicting priorities. A growing ISE interferes with other big
rice bowls. I would say that the incomplete standardization and
harmonization, and the bumping into other priorities are two of
the major causes of the WikiLeaks problem. There are a couple
of others.
What happens, and what happened in the past, I believe, has
been a transformation of attitudes. We have all seen the
absolute necessity now of managing information in the new
information age in a way that responds to the need of that new
age. Let me list just a couple of things that I think were
important to what we have done: A national network of fusion
centers, the Controlled Unclassified Information that I have
already mentioned, Suspicious Activity Reporting, National
Information Exchange Model, and what I am particularly proud
of, the privacy and civil liberties protections. All of those
are accomplished, they are functioning programs.
Let me list a few things that I believe are high
priorities, which still remain. Although all of them have
started down a path, they have a much longer way to go. First
of all is monitoring and auditing. We are not monitoring and
auditing the system with the technology that is available and
in the manner in which we need to do it, which is another
reason for the WikiLeaks.
Second is discovery and authorized use. It is beginning in
the various communities, those stakeholders that I mentioned
earlier, but it is not yet a unified and standardized system.
Interoperability across networks--again, it has begun, but
there is a long way to go. The technology is there; we just
have to spend the time and the resources to get it implemented.
And finally, we need to expand the mandate, something I
said in my last address to this Committee and to other
congressional committees. It is time to expand the mandate of
the Program Manager. It is not possible to set up an
Information Sharing Environment only for terrorism information.
It will not work.
I will close by summing up what I think can be the future
of the ISE. We have built the foundation. Two years ago I
borrowed the Churchillian phrase that we were not at the
beginning of the end, but we were at the end of the beginning.
I think we have gone beyond that now. I would estimate that we
are about halfway there. Quite a bit of progress.
It took us 5 years to get to this point. Fortunately,
because of the changed attitudes, because of the increased pace
and breadth of the changes that are going on, I do not think we
need another 5 years to get to our goal of a fully functioning
and fully mature ISE.
And with that, I will close my remarks. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Ambassador. That is
very encouraging. Thanks for the part that you played in the
progress that we have made in this area.
Chief Cathy Lanier is, of course, the Chief of Police of
the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. As such, she has been
a leading advocate for the importance of effective information
sharing with State and local law enforcement and has had direct
experience on the effectiveness of information sharing
regarding various terrorist threats in Washington, DC.
Chief, thanks for taking the time to be here. Good morning.
TESTIMONY OF CATHY L. LANIER,\1\ CHIEF OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Chief Lanier. Thank you for having me here. Good morning,
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee,
staff, and guests. Thank you for the opportunity to present
this statement on the status of information sharing among
Federal and local partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Chief Lanier appears in the Appendix
on page 1078.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, I am the Chief of Police here in Washington, DC,
of the Metropolitan Police Department. I would like to remind
everybody, that is the primary law enforcement agency here in
Washington, DC. As the chief of police of a major city police
department, I am very pleased to be able to brief you on the
significant progress that has been made in the Federal and
local information sharing and how that has improved our ability
to safeguard the public.
In my testimony, I will elaborate on why it is even more
important now, 10 years later, to recognize the vital role of
law enforcement in our homeland security efforts. With threats
to the Nation constantly evolving, local law enforcement
officers who are on the street every day are uniquely
positioned to detect and prevent terrorist incidents.
There are more than 700,000 law enforcement members across
the Nation that know and are well connected to the communities
that they serve, placing them in the best position to detect
and investigate criminal activity that might be connected to
terrorism or violent extremism. Clearly, information sharing
with local police is essential to countering the threats that
we face going forward.
The success of local law enforcement in fulfilling our role
hinges on the cooperation and support of our Federal partners.
Ten years after the September 11 attack on the United States,
the partnership between Federal and local authorities is very
robust and continues to improve. The 10-year anniversary of 9/
11 presented an excellent case study to illustrate how the
infrastructure and relationships that we have built operates in
a critical situation.
Important groundwork for the anniversary preparations was
established in 2010. With a significant increase in American
residents aligned with violent Islamist extremists who are
arrested or convicted in 2009, the Department of Homeland
Security launched a broad working group on countering violent
extremism. From the outset, the working group included local
law enforcement. Following that effort, the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI committed to a partnership with
the Metropolitan Police Department to go out and engage and
educate our partners in the private sector and the community.
Beginning in 2010, we jointly briefed literally thousands of
government and private sector partners around the National
Capital Region on recognizing and reporting suspicious activity
as well as responding to potential terrorist incidents. Those
briefings certainly paid off, as you will see, when we entered
the high-threat period of the 9/11 10-year anniversary.
Let us fast forward to last month. Early on the morning of
September 8, 2011, I received virtually simultaneously calls
from both my own official on the Joint Terrorism Task Force and
my counterpart at the Department of Homeland Security urging me
to attend a classified briefing on an emerging threat to
Washington, DC, and New York. Within an hour, both the FBI and
DHS provided me with unfettered access to the actual cable
outlining the threat. I continued to receive up-to-the-minute
briefings from the FBI over the next several days. This was
critical, as I continually had to make staffing and deployment
decisions on a shift by shift basis. This shows that not only
have we built strong relationships in the region, but more
importantly, the institutional structures that we have created
are ensuring the flow of information.
What perhaps was even more important was the quality of the
information that was made available to me. The details in the
briefings were far greater than we had received in the past and
enabled me to focus our officers very specifically on threats.
Equally important, within 24 hours, the intelligence
community collectively decided that the public needed to be
informed of this credible threat, a significant departure from
previous experience. This decision helped law enforcement in
several ways. For one, many of the actions of local law
enforcement, as you know, are much more visible than that of
our Federal partners, and in many cases, they are intended to
be. In other words, our community members notice when we take
steps in relation to heightened threats. They see us on the
street, they see us around critical infrastructure, and they
know something unusual is happening. Although this may only be
a local concern, announcing the threat helps local authorities
explain, and sometimes justify, our actions to the public.
Local partners really appreciate that support.
More importantly, making this potential threat public
helped us focus our community on reporting the types of
suspicious activity that may help us detect and deter those who
may be interested in carrying out this threat. Obviously, when
we can effectively harness and direct the attentions of the
public, we can get much more useful information to help us
counter that threat.
In this case, just after the announcement to the public,
our calls for suspicious activities jumped significantly. Most
importantly, this announcement calls many of our private sector
partners that we had educated in the joint briefings much
earlier to start reporting suspicious activity that warranted
further investigation.
For example, on September 10, the Metropolitan Police
Department was contacted by the general manager of a local
hotel who advised that six males from various Middle Eastern
countries had checked into the hotel between September 8 and
10. The last to arrive paid cash for the room, asked for a
specific view of a notable landmark. All six placed ``Do Not
Disturb'' signs or placards on their doors.
A manager at another hotel contacted the MPD on September
11 to report that cleaning personnel had found suspicious items
left in a hotel room. The occupant had departed early without
checking out and leaving cash for the room. In this instance,
the activity was linked to suspicious financial transactions
that had been reported to the MPD earlier in the week. The MPD
and the FBI determined that the case did not have an actual
nexus to terrorism. However, it was linked to criminal
activity.
Although neither instance was related to the 9/11 threat or
to terrorism at all, the hotel managers in both cases took the
right steps in calling the police to report these indicators.
As you can see, providing some of the information to the public
helps our efforts in the long run. It is a recognized principle
in policing that sometimes you need to give a little
information to get information.
With the information about the threat on the
anniversary of 9/11 and the visible government mobilization to
it, the public is reminded of the importance of sharing
information about suspicious activities. It also reinforces the
significance of our ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign,
which has been strongly supported by Federal and local
partners.
Fortunately, our experience here in the District of
Columbia during the threats of 9/11 highlighted several areas
where information sharing has improved. However, in recognizing
that my experience here in Washington, DC, does not represent
all police chiefs, I did reach out to the major city chiefs and
former Chief of the MPD, Commissioner Charles Ramsey, who is
now the current Commissioner in Philadelphia, to see what other
chiefs around the country are seeing. What we are seeing across
the major cities is that there has been significant progress
since 9/11. One person simply and aptly described the fusion
centers and the FBI's field intelligence group as game changers
for local police departments. We would not be able to prepare
for and work together to prevent significant threats facing our
communities without this sea change in government cooperation.
In addition, these cornerstones of Federal-local information
sharing, we continue to work on new links between levels of
government and the private sector.
In the interest of time, I will stop there and you have my
full statement on record.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Chief. That was great. Just a
quick question. Is your main point of contact with the Federal
Government, the Department of Homeland Security?
Chief Lanier. Typically, most of my information comes in
through the FBI.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Chief Lanier. We have heavy participation on the JTTF and I
have daily conversations and twice-a-week briefings from the
JTTF.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Thank you.
Our next witness is Ron Brooks, another important part of
this newly established framework for information sharing and
homeland security, the Director of the Northern California
Regional Intelligence Center, which is the fusion center for
the San Francisco Bay area. Mr. Brooks is also the Chairman of
the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, which is a
State and local advisory group to the Federal Government on
information sharing issues, so he is uniquely qualified to
testify today.
Thank you for coming across the country to be with us.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD E. BROOKS,\1\ DIRECTOR, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Mr. Brooks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. I
appreciate your continued attention to this important issue and
for inviting the National Fusion Center Association to provide
our views.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks appears in the Appendix on
page 1085.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, we are light years ahead of where we
were on 9/11. In fact, we have moved really beyond
information sharing to create a true homeland security
enterprise. Providing for the common defense is a Federal
constitutional responsibility, and in post-9/11 America, the
national network of fusion centers plays a pivotal role in
helping the Federal Government achieve that important goal.
Fusion centers are much more than information sharing hubs.
They embody a process, the fusion process, that has
fundamentally changed how information is gathered, transformed
into actionable intelligence, and shared over both classified
and unclassified networks. They are about putting national
threat information in a local context for action by leveraging
the 840,000 law enforcement officers on the ground to support
the national security mission. Without fusion centers, there is
no mechanism that allows us to do this across all 50 States.
Last month, less than 24 hours after high-level national
intelligence indicated a 9/11-inspired threat, detailed
information was sent through DHS and FBI to the fusion centers
and was put in the hands of local law enforcement. Fusion
center analysts across the Nation worked around the clock
alongside FBI and DHS personnel to review suspicious activity
reports and leads associated with the New York and Washington,
DC, threats and to share actionable intelligence with decision
makers at all levels.
This is much more than information sharing. It is deep
collaboration, and it is essential to effective homeland
security and it is impossible to do without the National
Network of Fusion Centers. In addition to information sharing,
fusion centers give us complex analytic capabilities. Fusion
centers have the ability to catalog critical infrastructure,
leverage a large network of trained terrorism liaison officers
to report suspicious activity, overlay that SAR data on
critical infrastructure and layer in national threat
information. The result is high quality actionable
intelligence.
None of this was possible on 9/11. Even at the Federal
level, agencies do not have the manpower, local knowledge, or
trusted partnerships to handle such an effort, yet it is
happening every day at fusion centers and that adds tremendous
value to the Federal Homeland Security Enterprise.
Last October, an advisory was distributed by the New York
Police Department concerning a suspicious truck whose driver
reportedly diverted its route toward Times Square in exchange
for $10,000. After DHS informed several fusion centers in the
region, analysts at the Rhode Island Fusion Center discovered
that the owner of the truck was a California native and
coordinated with my fusion center to conduct background checks.
Within 2 hours of the initial advisory, information from those
two fusion centers was used to coordinate with the Connecticut
Fusion Center, which enabled the State Police to locate and
stop the truck before it reached New York. If not for the
National Network of Fusion Centers, the dedicated personnel
from DHS and the FBI, we could not have moved from alarming SAR
to a threat resolution within just hours.
Not only do fusion centers enable the Federal
counterterrorism mission, the all crimes approach generates
value in communities every day. This past July, an alert from
the Oklahoma Fusion Center referenced a suspect wanted in
connection with a double homicide who was trying to escape to
Canada. The North Dakota Fusion Center analyzed the suspect's
vehicle and information and connected with the Arkansas Fusion
Center, which quickly provided a photo of the suspect. The
fusion center released the information in an alert to law
enforcement, who apprehended the suspect that same day. Again,
fusion centers were essential to a quick resolution.
The National SAR Initiative is being implemented across the
National Network to gather and analyze tips and leads for
analysis of suspicious activity that might be linked to
terrorism. Fusion centers are linchpins in the implementation
of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.
Without fusion centers, we would not have a portal for the SAR
process or a system that provides SAR-related front-line
officer and analyst training. We would not have a way to share
or request information among the JTTFs, DHS, and local public
safety partners. We would not have the ability to vet SARs
through a national standard that protects civil rights and
civil liberties according to the ISE-compliant privacy policies
that are now enforced in every fusion center.
The value of fusion centers is clear, but that value is at
serious risk. Urban Areas Security and State Homeland Security
Grant programs, the primary DHS programs that support fusion
centers, have been slashed. Each fusion center is operated by
State and local governments. Some centers rely heavily on
Federal funding while others rely on funding from their own
States. In all cases, State and local agencies make major
contributions of full-time personnel that are not reflected in
that budget data.
After 9/11, much of the Federal assistance to State and
local partners supported enhancements to response capabilities.
It is time to reinvest in enhancements to prevention
capabilities in a more focused way, and that includes
supporting fusion centers. Unless Congress and DHS take
measures to focus State and local assistance on fostering
prevention capabilities, the forward progress that we have made
on information sharing and SAR reporting could be reversed.
Mr. Chairman, we have learned some tough lessons. It is
easy to focus on mistakes when they are made, and
unfortunately, we probably will not stop 100 percent of the
threats to this Nation. But the grassroots development of this
decentralized national network of fusion centers, really, that
distributed and decentralized system that was called for in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, is a
tremendous accomplishment. It is generating value every day and
has become a true national homeland security asset.
On behalf of the National Fusion Center Association, we
commend your leadership and the leadership of this Committee
and ask for your continued support, and I have submitted my
full remarks to the Committee.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Captain Brooks. I am a strong
supporter of the fusion centers. I appreciate the case you made
for them, as it were, and I have one or two questions in that
regard when we get to that point.
Finally, Jeff Smith is a partner at the law firm of Arnold
and Porter, former CIA General Counsel, a familiar and trusted
source of counsel for this Committee and me personally. Mr.
Smith is testifying on behalf today of the Markle Task Force
for National Security, which released a series of reports over
the last decade that played a really seminal role in shaping
the policy debate on information sharing.
So, counselor, we welcome you back.
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY H. SMITH,\1\ PARTNER, ARNOLD AND PORTER
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and
Senator Carper, for holding this hearing and for your
leadership on this critical issue. I appear this morning on
behalf of the Markle Task Force on National Security in the
Information Age. My prepared statement is jointly submitted
with Zoe Baird Budinger, the President of the Markle
Foundation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the Appendix on
page 1107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to begin, as my colleagues have, by commending this
Committee and your staff for the significant time and energy
you have devoted to making information sharing a top national
priority. The work of your Committee has helped make this
Nation safer.
Since 2002, the Markle Task Force has worked hard to
provide policy makers, including this Committee, with
recommendations to help accelerate our government's use of
information technology to better understand the threats we
face, to make better decisions, and at the same time protect
our national and vital civil liberties. I am pleased to say
that many of our recommendations have been accepted.
As a result of all of these efforts, substantial change has
occurred throughout government. Information sharing has become
more widespread. That said, progress has been too slow in some
places and has lacked adequate guidance or oversight in others.
Information sharing is like the blocking and tackling in
football. It is not as sexy as a 60-yard pass to a wide
receiver, but at the end of the day, it wins games.
Ten years ago, there was a failure to adapt to a network
world. Our law enforcement and intelligence communities were
driven by the ``need to know'' culture that stovepiped
information. This was in part because of the so-called wall
between law enforcement and intelligence. This failure to
connect the dots has become famous since 9/11, but that phrase
oversimplified a fundamental problem, not only with the sharing
of information, but with the way in which departments and
agencies worked together.
Where are we today? Washington can work, as demonstrated by
the changes that we have talked about and this panel has talked
about. We have had three dramatic successes: The attack that
led to the death of Osama bin Laden; Najibullah Zazi was
arrested on September 29, 2009, in connection with an al-Qaeda
plot to bomb the New York City subway system; and on May 1,
2010, because of improved watchlisting procedures, Faisal
Shazad was successfully apprehended after his attempt to
detonate a car bomb in Times Square. He was arrested 53 hours
and 20 minutes after he left Broadway, largely as a result of
better sharing and cooperation with State and locals.
But we still fall short. The task is enormous. Where should
we be going?
The Markle Foundation Task Force has four critical steps
that we recommend. One is strong leadership from the highest
levels of government is required to sustain the progress since
9/11. There is a risk that this virtual reorganization of the
government will be eroded as a result of bureaucratic turf
battles and fears about information security.
Two, the adoption of discoverability and authorized use
must be expanded. It is possible for relevant data to be
discovered in an automated manner that allows both human users
and data itself to find relevant information. This is often
referred to as data finding data. The concept of authorized use
is being adopted, but it must be expanded. An important
Intelligence Community Directive, ICD 501, was issued in 2009
that represents a substantial step toward enhanced
discoverability and authorized use. Ambassador McNamara talked
about that and the importance of that needs to continue to be
pressed.
Three, privacy and security protections must be increased
simultaneously. WikiLeaks is not an argument for less
information sharing. Doing that would compromise our national
security. As we improve our capabilities to better share
information, we should simultaneously deploy better policies
and technologies to control its access and use. I am pleased
with the new Executive Order the President signed on Friday. It
was a significant step in the right direction and I look
forward to discussing it with the Committee.
I also share Senator Collins' concern about the failure to
appoint persons to the Privacy and Oversight Board. It is a
frustration, and I am happy to talk about that.
Developing this trust is critical so that the American
people will trust that the government will protect its civil
liberties. It is important so that government officials will
share information with one another, confident that it can be
kept confidential.
The fourth point is one that a couple of people have made,
including Ambassador McNamara. Information sharing is a tool
that can help make the entire government more efficient. The
trusting sharing of information in government decisionmaking is
not a unique attempt to counter terrorism. Successful
information sharing is a model that can be used across many
areas of government to improve the effective functioning of
government.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much for that testimony and
for your work with the Markle Task Force.
We will do 7-minute rounds of questions.
Ambassador McNamara, let me pick up where Mr. Smith ended.
I wonder if you could just say a bit more about why you think
it would be valuable to expand the authorities of the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and how you
would do it.
Mr. McNamara. Well, let me go back to the very first year I
was on the job. It was apparent that we were not going to be
able to, for example, create a Controlled Unclassified
Information system, which only handled terrorism information.
No agency managed their data in that manner. So when we sat
down to do CUI, we created CUI for all controlled unclassified
information.
I only had the authority to mandate it to the agencies for
terrorism. Fortunately, terrorism was a high enough priority
that they had to pay attention to me. But, in fact, only a very
small portion of CUI information, I would say a single-digit
percentage, is terrorism information. Most CUI, and it goes all
the way down to State and local authorities, is unrelated to
terrorism. Yet the system works for all of it. We had to build
it that way or it would have failed.
Another example is the Suspicious Activity Reporting. When
I picked that up off the ground, and turned it into--I should
not say ``I,'' I should say ``we,'' because there was an awful
lot of partners that were helping us. We had to do it for
terrorism information. But as I have said so many times, if you
take the Suspicious Activity Reporting mechanisms and you
unplug the database that says ``terrorism information'' and
plug in one that says ``serial killers,'' or unplug that and
plug one in that says ``drug violence,'' or unplug that, you
name it, it works for all suspicious activities. In fact, we
constructed that knowing that if it only worked for terrorism
information, it was not going to last. It would be too small
and disappear.
Another example is the fusion centers. There is only one
fusion center in the United States that handles only terrorism
information and that is the National Counterterrorism Center.
The others all handle all crimes and all hazards.
Chairman Lieberman. So how far would you expand the----
Mr. McNamara. I would like to see that an Information
Executive be created, probably in the Office of the President,
as a manager, not a crisis manager, as I was, in the Program
Manager position.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McNamara. Not doing just a program, but managing
information the way a Chief Information Officer does it, across
the board, with complete authorities. You have to give that
individual some budget clout. I had virtually no budget clout--
--
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McNamara [continuing]. So I had to appeal for agencies
to do it. And the person needs to work very closely with OMB
and with the agencies as an overseer, not a doer.
Chairman Lieberman. That is helpful. Is your preference
that this be done by executive action, or do you think it
requires legislation?
Mr. McNamara. It does not require legislation, as far as I
am concerned.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. I say good because----
Mr. McNamara. But it may require some congressional push to
get the executive action.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, we are glad to do that. We
generally categorize that as oversight.
Director McLaughlin, in your testimony, you note the growth
in the number of Americans participating in terrorism, which
has been a focus of our Committee, and that reality creates a
set of challenges for the intelligence community given rules in
place related to the acquisition and sharing of data that
touches U.S. citizens, and I am quoting from your testimony. We
have strong rules in place to protect such U.S. persons'
information within the intelligence community, but you note
that this can lead, and I agree, to, and I quote again from
your testimony, ``a subtle kind of risk aversion in dealing
with such data.''
So talk to us in a little more detail about that. What kind
of risk aversion are you worried about, and do you think the
intelligence community needs to clarify the framework that it
is operating under now for dealing with information regarding
U.S. persons?
Mr. McLaughlin. I do, Senator. This comes directly out of
the study we did for DNI Blair in 2010.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. McLaughlin. We talked to people in a dozen agencies and
carried out about 70 interviews, and one of the things that
came out of that, because in both the Christmas bombing and in
the Fort Hood shootings you had the involvement of an American
citizen at some level--that was Anwar al-Awlaki having inspired
the Christmas bomber and having played a role in his
communications with Major Hasan--what we discovered was that as
you went agency to agency, you got different interpretations of
what was allowed and not allowed when you encountered U.S.
persons' data. And people, frankly, were very careful,
particularly at the National Security Agency, where this is
most likely to occur, and this results, in part, from some of
the controversies involved with their collection programs and
so forth that you are familiar with.
Chairman Lieberman. This is the risk aversion----
Mr. McLaughlin. This is the risk aversion part of it.
Chairman Lieberman. In other words, to avoid the risk, they
may not be going some places we would actually want them to go
in terms of----
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, the way I would put it is that we
certainly were not pushing them to violate anyone's privacy.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood.
Mr. McLaughlin. What we came away believing, and I had a
civil liberties attorney on my task force, was that in many
cases, intelligence agencies were not going to the limit of
what the law allowed them. In other words, they wanted to err
on the side of not ever crossing that line. And some, frankly,
confessed worrying about punishment of some sort if they did
cross that line.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
Mr. McLaughlin. And without going into the classified
details of that study, I think we came to the conclusion that
this was one of two big reasons why we did not anticipate or
detect Abdulmutallab's intentions here--because as a former
intelligence officer, I know how these things can get kind of
oversimplified, but I came away reluctantly convinced that had
we been more aggressive on this particular score and had we
also had information technology that helped the human brain
connect things up----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. McLaughlin [continuing]. We would have found this guy
and we would have known pretty much what he was intending to
do.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is a very important
conclusion.
Mr. McLaughlin. Another part of this, if I could just add
this final point----
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. McLaughlin [continuing]. Is that sometimes, and this, I
have to be a little careful with because there is some
sensitive stuff involved, but sometimes foreign partners
encounter information about American citizens and they are
often confused about what do we do with that because it is
sensitive. So that is another area that needs to be clarified.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you know whether any changes have
been made as a result of your report?
Mr. McLaughlin. I know the recommendations were taken
seriously and I have been told by people at the White House
that they are working on this. I checked within the last 24
hours and I think people are sensitive to the question, but I
would say that it probably is something that still needs to be
worked on, primarily by someone like the DNI and the Department
of Justice convening people throughout the intelligence
community who have the job of interpreting these regulations to
the workforce and making sure, as a first step, that they are
all on the same page, that everyone is getting the same
message.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful and I promise you
that we will take this on in the Committee as another kind of
oversight responsibility because of the rising significance of
terrorism committed by American citizens or legal residents of
one kind or another. My time is up. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to continue with Director McLaughlin exactly
along the lines of what you just started because we have now
talked a little bit about the Abdulmutallab case, and by the
way, I am informed that he pled guilty today. But our Committee
also looked at the Major Hasan case and the information sharing
or lack thereof in that case, and it was fascinating to talk to
the members of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces both in
Washington and in San Diego and to learn that they chose not to
share all the information that they had due to the requirements
for FBI approval for sharing under the JTTF guidelines and the
Memorandum of Understanding. And thus, you had a situation,
without going into classified information, but let me say it
was widely reported, of contacts with al-Awlaki that were not
passed on to the Army, because even though there was a member
of the Department of Defense represented on the JTTF, because
it could not be passed on without explicit approval by the FBI.
Did your committee, in looking at these cases, take a look
at whether those guidelines and Memoranda of Understanding that
applied to the JTTF's information sharing with the home
agencies need revision, as well?
Mr. McLaughlin. We did. We were a little limited in what we
could do on the Fort Hood case because there were some ongoing
legal questions that inhibited our ability to interview
everyone who was involved, but we did speak with enough members
of both San Diego and Washington to come to similar
conclusions, and the main conclusion we came to was that no
single person had looked at all of the information. Some of it
had been seen in San Diego. Some of it had been seen in
Washington. And there were some follow-up issues that you are
probably familiar with that were not as aggressively pursued as
should have been.
The main thing I was concerned about was if someone has
done something about this, and I got assurances from both the
FBI and the Department of Defense that they now have a way when
something like this occurs to pass information that was not--
the kind of information that was not passed in the Major Hasan
case--to counterparts in law enforcement, or vice-versa, from
law enforcement to counterparts in the Defense Department.
I think I came away as pretty much assured that they have
figured that out. Now, that is always fighting the last war, so
you always have to ask, are there other realms, other
circumstances in which that same issue might arise, and I think
we need to keep our eye on that across the board.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Ambassador, we have just talked about policy obstacles in
the form of restrictions through guidelines or Memoranda of
Understanding that may restrict information sharing. From your
perspective, how much of this is a policy problem versus a
technical problem? I remember the first hearing that we held
after the Abdulmutallab case, and the deputy from the National
Counterterrorism Center told us, much to my amazement, that
they lacked the technology to do the kind of federated searches
that were needed, which amazed me because all of us who go on
Google know that if you type in a name and it is not quite
right, you get the question, ``Did you mean X?'' and any of us
who have ordered on Amazon have seen how information of, you
might like this, that is similar. So it seems like the
technology is out there to be used.
What is your assessment? Is this a technology problem? Is
it a policy problem? Is it still a cultural problem? A
leadership problem?
Mr. McNamara. That is an excellent question. First of all,
it is not a technology problem, strictly speaking, if you mean
by technology the availability of the technology. That is
there.
The policy problem is that the policy does not allow the
technology to work or to be employed because of policy
restrictions. Then, the attitudinal problem (``in the
trenches'' problem) comes when, even though you change the
policy, the work habits and the ingrained methodologies of
those working do not change.
So, I have not seen, in all of the years I have been
involved in this, a true technological problem. In addition to
these problems you have the resource problem. So if NCTC says
that it does not have the technology to do the integration of
the data, it is not because integration technology does not
exist, which can be either taken off the shelf or modified and
used. It is because policies do not allow them to use that
technology, or resources are such that they cannot afford to
put it in until later.
To move out from the Federal Government, I found, and I
cede to both Ms. Lanier and Mr. Brooks as to whether or not my
vision of this is still accurate, but I believe it is. There
are ingrained habits that persist. I am not going to pick on
the FBI or DEA or law enforcement, but if you think about the
need to integrate the activities of the fusion centers with
other fusion center-like activities out there, such as JTTFs
and HIDTAs, there is no reason why those organizations should
not be collocated. As Mr. Brooks referred to, he was having
what he called ``deep collaboration.'' But that only comes with
collocation and with some form of integration of activities.
I looked at the statistics. There is fewer than one full-
time FBI agent, on average, at fusion centers around the United
States. That is liaison. That is not full collaboration. Now, I
know in the large cities--possibly here in Washington, DC, New
York, and other places--that is not the case. It is a much
closer collaboration. But the habits, the ingrained habits,
when not changed by the policy, the resources, or not changed
by the leadership, results in situations where the information
does not get shared. I know of no tech problem that stands in
the way.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins. We will do
one more round of questions.
Chief, I was interested when you said that your main point
of contact with the Federal Government is the FBI. From our
perspective, there is nothing wrong with that, of course. I
will say that when we created the Department of Homeland
Security, and particularly creating within it the Intelligence
and Analysis Section and watching it evolve, one of our hopes,
and I think Secretary Napolitano's hopes now, for I&A was that
it would play a very important role, unique role in the
intelligence community in both transferring and receiving
intelligence from State and local law enforcement.
In fact, DHS and FBI have been working very well together,
but I want to ask you this. One of our visions here, and it was
not just ours alone, was that we have hundreds of thousands of
State and local law enforcers, etc., across the country, that
they, if properly informed, alerted, or involved, would become
hundreds of thousands of additional eyes and ears in our effort
to protect the homeland, particularly from terrorist attack.
And, of course, if that was true anywhere because of the
centrality of Washington, DC, it would be here.
So my question is whether you think, as the Chief of Police
here in Washington, DC, enough has been done to encourage
information sharing from your force, up as opposed to from the
Federal Government down?
Chief Lanier. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. I think you have testified in very
encouraging ways to the way in which there has been cooperation
and more sharing from the Federal Government down, but how
about from the local level up?
Chief Lanier. That is actually a very good point, and
particularly with the threat that we see evolving now of so
many American citizens and people living in the United States
becoming part of this threat because people call the police and
report all kinds of strange behavior by neighbors or people in
the communities and they call us with that.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Chief Lanier. So the way that works, and I want to back up
and clarify a little bit--I have a large contingency of
officers assigned to the JTTF and I receive twice-a-week
briefings from them, and they have full access to cases they
are working here in the NCR--which are most important to me--or
anything relevant to Washington, DC. So that is why I say that,
primarily, the information I get on the counterterrorism side
comes from the FBI.
However, when there are threats or different things that
are going on, DHS does a very good job, and I&A, in putting out
those intelligence bulletins. They have an analyst in my fusion
center who works with all of our other analysts that
continually produce products for us and for us to share with
our forces to do what you described, updating our local police
officers to know what to report.
In terms of two-way information, we started the SAR
Initiative that was talked about by Mr. McNamara 3 years ago
and has now evolved so that we have a way to receive suspicious
activity reporting through text messages, 911 calls, email, and
we just launched iWatch, which is a community public reporting
tool, so people can report suspicious activity. We also have
engaged with Trap Wire, so when those SARs or those suspicious
activities come in, they come into the fusion center, enter
into the system that we have, Trap Wire. They are first
reviewed by analysts in the fusion center. Then there is an
analytical software that also analyzes those suspicious
activity reportings and there is a decision made there whether
it should be bumped up into eGuardian, which is shared space--
--
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Chief Lanier [continuing]. So we can connect the dots with
suspicious activity reporting around sensitive sites or
critical infrastructure around the country. But also, it bumps
it up to the Federal level so that it goes in that shared
eGuardian space. I mean, that is significant progress.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, that is good to hear because
Senator Collins mentioned earlier the bill that we put in
encouraging the See Something, Say Something approach, which is
really an important idea, talking about expanding our forces.
Then you are involving everybody. But the natural place that a
citizen who sees something and wants to say something will call
is the local police department. They are not going to know,
generally speaking, how to get to the JTTF or the fusion
center. Maybe they will call the FBI, but I doubt it. They will
probably dial one of the easy codes that they can dial to get
to a dispatcher.
So your dispatchers are trained as you described, just to
take that suspicious activity report and send it through the
chain of analysis and verification, and then ultimately it will
go up to the Federal Government, I assume, if it is a----
Chief Lanier. If there is a counterterrorism nexus, it will
go into the shared space. If there is a criminal nexus, it will
go in for investigation externally to the law enforcement
community. So there is pretty extensive vetting before it is
pushed into shared space, but it does--if there is a potential
connection to counterterrorism, it goes into shared space,
usually within a short period of time, a couple hours.
Chairman Lieberman. Give me a status report, I suppose, on
this question. At various times, we have talked about the fact
that if a local police officer stops somebody and is suspicious
of them and checks them, goes to the laptop that a lot of them
now carry in their cars and checks the name on databases, we
know that they will naturally plug through the criminal
information database, but it is routine now that they also will
plug into terrorism watch lists?
Chief Lanier. That is correct. We get hits back all the
time----
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Chief Lanier [continuing]. Of all three levels on the
terror watch list, and notifications are made. The officers are
very familiar with it. And in fact, if there is a connection or
a hit, there are instructions for the dispatcher and the
officer in the computer as to who to call and how to make that
call.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. That is great.
Captain Brooks, let me ask you this. You talked about it a
little bit. In this time of budgetary stress, there are some
people, and we have already heard voices who are going to say--
and I want to give you an opportunity on the record to respond
to this--well, do we need both JTTFs and fusion centers? We
really cannot afford them both, so maybe we should either cut
back on or even eliminate the fusion centers. I want to give
you an opportunity to respond to that kind of offensive.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, and that is a great question. It is
one that comes up all the time. JTTFs are an investigative
body. They are the FBI, and in partnership with their local law
enforcement counterparts, that is the FBI's ability to
investigate terror in this country.
Fusion centers play a much different role. They are not
only the information sharing hub. The fusion centers are the
place where we build a cadre of terrorism liaison officers,
where we train not only the 840,000 cops around the country,
but more than a million firefighters around the country and the
EMS workers and our private sector partners on indicators and
warnings and the seven signs of terror. That is where we have
the ability to catalog our critical infrastructure, and as
Chief Lanier talked about, then be able to analyze incoming
suspicious activity reports against the national threat picture
and against what we know about our critical infrastructure. It
is the ability to share, as you saw in a couple of the examples
I gave, between the whole network of fusion centers and then
with the FBI.
Our HIDTA, our fusion center, and our threat squad, our
JTTF are one entity. We are collocated together.
Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. Is that typical or
atypical?
Mr. Brooks. Is it not typical, but there are a lot of
people that have looked at our model.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Brooks. And so we have the ability to sit eyeball to
eyeball, our analysts with the JTTF agents and investigators,
as SAR information is coming in. But as often happens, as Chief
Lanier mentioned, many times, that SAR information has no nexus
to terrorism. It is about drug dealing or gang activity or
firearms trafficking, mortgage fraud. I mean, it could be about
a variety of things. And so the all crimes approach, as
Ambassador McNamara talked about, gives us the ability to take
that information and funnel it to the right place, and we know,
sir, oftentimes, activity that at first blush appears to be
criminal in nature--the Torrance gas station robberies, the
smuggling of the cigarettes in North Carolina----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Brooks [continuing]. The sale of pseudoephedrine in
California--that money is funneling back, or that is a
precursor to a terrorist act. We cannot really separate crime
and terror. We have to knock that wall down. If we are really
going to be effective, we have to make sure that we understand
that the sharing of information makes communities safe. Our end
state is to prevent terrorism, but in my own community, right
across the bay from San Francisco where I work, the City of
Oakland, they have had 740 shootings to date. That is a city of
400,000. That is terror right there in our own community, and
that kind of terror is one that is experienced in big cities
and in small towns across the country.
And so I really think when people are concerned about the
money spent on fusion centers, we are in tough budget times and
we certainly get that. But fusion centers are uniquely situated
to do things that JTTFs or no other program can. They can bring
together disparate resources. In my center, I have emergency
managers, firefighters, EMS workers, public health workers,
cops, and analysts, Federal, State, and local, and private
sector, and we can bring all of that data together. We can
share information on terror, crime, or other threats. We can
make sure that the JTTF gets the information they need, but
that the DEA and the ATF and the local law enforcement gets the
information they need, as well.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks for that excellent answer.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Captain, I, too, want to thank you for a terrific answer to
that question. The Chairman and I have been fighting off
efforts by some of our colleagues to do away with fusion
centers. There is this argument that they are redundant with
the Joint Terrorism Task Forces or that they are ineffective or
they are really not playing much of a role, and your answer
distinguishing among the various roles was just what we need to
counter it. We may send you to see a couple of our colleagues
to better educate them about the differences, but thank you
because that is exactly the question I was going to ask, as
well.
Chief, I want to ask you a question about over-
classification of information. We passed a law last year. It
started out on the House side, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, with Representative Jane Harman who introduced the
Reducing Over-Classification Act. The House bill only applied
to the Department of Homeland Security. It was intended to
prevent the unnecessary classification of information at a
higher level than was warranted. Once it passed the House,
Senator Lieberman and I, in my view, improved the bill by
expanding it beyond the Department of Homeland Security to
cover all Executive Branch agencies, and it became law a year
ago this month.
One of the concepts is to encourage greater use of tear-
lines so a lower level of classification of a report that is
highly classified can be disseminated more widely. Has it made
any difference in the past year?
Chief Lanier. Actually, I followed that through and was
glad to see it pass, and I have seen a significant difference.
The example I gave of the information I was provided during
this last threat, and, in fact, the information I was provided
during the threat that was uncovered yesterday, or at least the
arrest that was revealed yesterday, is a significant
difference.
Back in 2004, when preparing for the fall IMF conference
here in the District--this is where you have 8,000 world
delegates that come here for the IMF-World Bank conference--
there was some specific information that was recovered from a
computer in Pakistan about surveillance that had been done on
the sites, and I was given a briefing that contained little to
no information that would help me to put adequate security in
place based on what information I had. I was briefed initially
2 months before the event. I was planning the event. I was
putting the security plans in place. And it took weeks of
arguing to get access to the information. And when I did
finally get access to the information, which was completely
over-classified, it changed my entire security plan. There were
details in there that were critical to how I planned my
security and I would have never known it if I relied on what I
was briefed.
I do not see that anymore. I actually in this past threat,
during the anniversary, was amazed at how open both the FBI and
DHS were with sharing the information, and then, also, in the
process as the days went on about including me in briefings as
the deliberative process went on about what would be released
and how it would be released and what updates on the
investigation.
So I have seen a significant change here in Washington, DC,
and from talking to Chuck Ramsey and major city chiefs, I
think, at least in major cities, they are seeing a big
difference across the country.
Senator Collins. That is great to hear.
Chief Lanier. Thank you for that.
Senator Collins. Well, thank you for the feedback. It is
nice to know that it has made the kind of difference that we
were looking for, so thank you very much.
Mr. Smith, my final question is for you and it has to do
with the issue I referenced in my opening remarks, and that is
the strange failure of the Administration to appoint a full
complement of people to the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board. Obviously, this board has gone through sort of
a difficult time with members resigning in the previous
Administration, and I continue to believe that as we expand
information sharing, which I think is absolutely critical, that
this board is an important check on the process, just to make
sure people are considering the privacy implications. So what
do you think is the problem?
Mr. Smith. I agree completely with you, Senator, about the
importance of the board. I cannot speak, obviously, for the
White House. I do not know exactly why they have had such a
problem. To some extent, the confused and unfortunate history
of the board may factor into that.
I think two other factors may be involved, and this is
speculation on my part. One is that, by statute, the members
and the chairman serve a 6-year statutory term. That is a long
time to ask somebody to serve----
Senator Collins. Good point.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Particularly the chairman, and I
understand they want the chairman to be full-time.
A second concern may be whether it is adequately funded. I
do not know what the current plans for funding are, but I did
recently happen to look at the statute and it is pretty
modestly funded for an extraordinarily broad set of
responsibilities. So perhaps the Committee should look at some
aspects of this.
I mean, it would be presumptuous to suggest what you might
do, but asking the White House why they have not filled it, I
do not believe it is inattention. I do think they want to do
it, but there may be some structural problems that perhaps the
Committee could look at.
When you contrast that, by the way, with the President's
Intelligence Advisory Board----
Senator Collins. Right.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Which is not subject to Senate
confirmation, reports directly to the President, has
extraordinarily high-powered people on it, and has an awful lot
of influence within the Executive Branch, that may be, frankly,
a better model than the one that is currently in statute.
Senator Collins. That is a great idea and I think we should
look at revamping it. We have written to the Administration
repeatedly on this issue without any notable effect, but I
think a 6-year term is too long and probably we should be
looking at a 3-year term. I personally opposed the move to a
full-time chairman. I do not think that is necessary, and I
think that makes it difficult to get someone. We might want to
have a full-time executive director, but not a full-time
chairman.
Ambassador McNamara.
Mr. McNamara. Just a brief interjection. I strongly
recommended to the former Administration and to this
Administration before I left government that I, as Program
Manager, really wanted that privacy board to be alive, well,
working, and cooperating with me. It is a necessary place, I
feel, for the Program Manager to go to bounce ideas off, to get
an independent view. Sometimes you get so wrapped up in the
problem that you forget that there are other aspects that have
to be taken into account.
I was very disappointed that the good initiative, within 6
months, in fact, had deteriorated, and for all practical
purposes, was moribund.
Senator Collins. Exactly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
this was an excellent hearing because of the extraordinary
witnesses that we have, not to suggest that it would not have
been a good hearing without them. [Laughter.]
But I very much appreciate the expertise that you
assembled.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree with
you totally. It has been very productive. I am going to end up
coming away with a good feeling that we have made significant
progress in information sharing over the last decade. I think
it was you, Ambassador McNamara, who said that we had built a
foundation but we are not finished with what we have to do. In
that regard, you have given us, I think, some very timely
information and counsel and some suggestions that I promise you
the Committee will follow up on to continue to improve the
already improved situation.
Chief Lanier. Can I just add one thing I wanted to get on
the record before we close?
Chairman Lieberman. Chief, you have the full First
Amendment rights. [Laughter.]
Chief Lanier. Thank you. One of the things that is in my
testimony, but I did not get a chance to get to it, is still a
problem with information sharing, is the D-Block.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Chief Lanier. During the earthquake that happened here in
Washington, as you know, just a few weeks ago, literally, there
was no phone service for anyone. I was on the street. I was
with two other police chiefs in downtown Washington. None of
our cell services worked. Using the GETS Card is great. You can
get the GETS emergency service up.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Chief Lanier. It takes time. I do not think we should have
that situation 10 years after 9/11, where you cannot make a
phone call when there is a disaster that is unfolding. So any
help you could give us on the D-Block would be really important
for us.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks for bringing that up and
relating it to this. You cannot share information if you cannot
get information. We both are strong supporters of the D-Block
auction and the commitment of the D-Block to public safety.
There is growing support for it. There still is opposition to
the auction from people who would have to pay, but I think we
have the majority and we have to find a vehicle to get this
through. It almost, believe it or not, got into one of the
versions of the debt ceiling extension over the summer. I hope
and believe that there will be an attempt to put it into the
report of the Joint Special Committee, the so-called
supercommittee created by the Budget Control Act. So I am more
optimistic than not that we are going to find a way in this
session to both have the auction, raise the money, commit the
D-Block to public safety, give you some funding to implement
that, and then also have some money left over to go toward
deficit reduction.
Chief Lanier. Thank you very much. It is very important.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much for your lifetime of
service and for your testimony this morning.
We are going to leave the record open for 15 days for any
additional questions or statements that Members may have.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND THE ANTHRAX
ATTACKS: PROTECTING AGAINST
BIOLOGICAL THREATS
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Collins, Brown, and
Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order. Thanks to our really excellent panel of witnesses for
coming today to discuss this topic, which is our Nation's
record over the past decade in improving our defenses against a
biological attack or a pandemic.
Today's hearing is part of our ``Ten Years after 9/11''
series assessing the status of a number of government homeland
security operations that were singled out as inadequate or
dysfunctional by the 9/11 Commission. The impetus for our
review today, as everyone will remember, actually came a week
after the 9/11 attacks, long before there ever was a 9/11
Commission, when our already traumatized Nation was shaken anew
by the mailing of anthrax spores to five news media
organizations and two U.S. Senators.
All told, five people died from anthrax inhalation. Two
were postal workers. And one close to my home was a 94-year-old
woman from Connecticut. Twenty-two others were sickened, and
thousands--including a lot of Members of Congress and our
staffs--took a course of powerful antibiotics to ward off
possible infection.
We remember those days well around here because one of the
letters was sent to Senator Daschle's office in the Hart
Building, where my office was and is located. The building was
evacuated and closed for months while HazMat teams scoured the
area. We were fortunate that no additional anthrax was found
and that no attacks, of course, have occurred since. But that
is unlikely to remain the case.
Three years ago, the Graham-Talent Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism concluded that a biological weapon was more likely
than any other weapon of mass destruction to be used in an
attack against our country that causes mass casualties. The
Commission predicted that such an attack would probably occur
somewhere in the world within the 5 years after its report,
which was 3 years ago, and concluded then that the Federal
Government was not prepared to respond adequately.
Just last week, the Bipartisan WMD Research Center, which
was a follow-on to that Graham-Talent WMD Commission, reported
that the threat of a bioterror attack remains as strong as
ever. We have no specific credible evidence, I want to make
clear, that terrorists are now plotting such a specific attack.
But they certainly have made it clear in words and action that
they aspire to do so, and technological advances, I am afraid,
are making it easier, faster, and cheaper to carry out such an
attack.
So our question today is: Has the Federal Government
developed the tools we need to respond effectively to a
bioterror attack or naturally occurring pandemic disease, to
develop and disseminate vaccines and antibiotics, and to
respond to the medical consequences that would result from such
a biological disaster?
Over the past several years and past decade, we have spent
billions of dollars on biodefense research; on strengthening
first responder capabilities; and on developing new vaccines,
biosurveillance systems, and forensic science techniques.
Really we have done a lot more than, I would say, the average
American knows we have done to protect their security.
These investments, in my opinion, have made us a Nation far
more prepared to deal with a biological disaster than we ever
have been. Just yesterday, for example, I noticed in the news
that the Connecticut Children's Hospital, which is located in
Hartford, conducted an exercise to test if it could immunize
its employees within a 24-hour period in the event of a virus
outbreak or a bioterror attack. This is typical of preparedness
at the local level which is going on all over the country and
is absolutely key. Communities across the country have
significantly improved their disaster planning since 2001.
But it is also clear from the reports that have been issued
that we are not prepared for a catastrophic biological
incident. We are much better prepared for a smaller WMD
biological attack although there, too, are gaps remaining in
our capabilities, which I would like to talk about during this
hearing.
Since 9/11, Congress has created a remarkable number of new
offices to deal with this bioterror threat, so we have not sat
back.
The Biomedical Advanced Research Development Authority,
established at the Department of Health and Human Services to
fund WMD medical countermeasures--that is what products and
programs do we have to address the questions: What do you do if
there is an outbreak? How do you stop it and protect people? It
has helped greatly increase our preparedness by delivering
medical countermeasures to the National Strategic Stockpile,
which now contains millions of doses of smallpox and anthrax
vaccines; post-exposure therapeutics for anthrax, smallpox, and
botulism; and some basic radiation treatments. As a result, our
ability to treat victims with medical countermeasures has
improved dramatically since 2001.
At the Department of Homeland Security, the National
Bioforensics Analysis Center studies new bioforensic methods
and identifies the DNA of biological agents so that criminal
investigators can pinpoint their source.
The Obama Administration is also tightening security at
laboratories that use the most dangerous pathogens and those
most likely to be capable of being weaponized. I am pleased to
note that legislation, which this Committee produced in October
2009, has helped to facilitate this Administration action.
The government has also deployed--and, again, I mention
this for the benefit and hopefully the greater sense of
security of the public--a network of aerosol sensors called
BioWatch in cities around the country that is designed to
detect anthrax and other biological agents. New technology is
on the horizon that would shorten the amount of time that it
takes these sensors to detect a biothreat.
These are significant advances, in my opinion, in our
biodefense, but they do not tell the whole story. Last week,
the Bipartisan WMD Research Center concluded: ``Although
[government] efforts have yielded considerable progress over
the past decade, the Nation does not yet have adequate
bioresponse capability to meet fundamental expectations during
a large-scale biological event.'' And I stress ``biologial
event.''
We still, as far as I can determine, lack a strategy for
dispensing vaccines and antibiotics in a mass crisis. We do not
have the ability to track the spread of disease in realtime
through a community or quickly reclaim contaminated areas to
get people back to their homes and critical infrastructure up
and running again.
And 10 years after the anthrax attacks of 2001, as far as I
can tell, we still do not have a modern anthrax vaccine that is
more effective than the one developed in the 1950s. Medical
countermeasures for other chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear threats have also not yet been developed.
Tight budgets now have led to an understaffed medical surge
force to respond to a biological attack in communities around
the country. In fact, right now discussions are underway in
Congress to eliminate funding for programs that coordinate the
overall medical response to a bioattack, such as the
Metropolitan Medical Response System, and for centers that
train public officials in emergency response.
So the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and the FBI, working together and in
coordination with State and local governments and the private
sector, have an enormous responsibility to continue to work to
increase our capability to protect the public from biological
attacks. This Committee has been working with those Federal
agencies to make sure that they can fulfill that
responsibility, and we will continue to work with them in that
direction to make sure they can do so in a way that is ever
more effective.
So, bottom line, as I look back over 10 years, we have come
a long way. Perhaps we will never be as fully protected as we
would like to be, but we still have a ways to go. I would like
to focus with the witnesses on both elements of that story.
What have we done since 2001? And what are the most pressing
unmet needs that we have? So I look forward to the thoughts of
this excellent panel of expert witnesses today.
Senator Collins, I really appreciate you coming. I know you
are involved in the appropriations bill on the floor, and you
are probably not going to be able to be with us very long. But
thanks for coming by for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It has been a decade since the anthrax attacks that left 5
people dead and 17 sickened. It has been just 2 weeks since the
operation in Yemen killed Anwar al-Awlaki, who reportedly
sought poisons, including cyanide and ricin, to attack the
United States.
The new leader of al-Qaeda has a medical background, which
raises concerns that he may have an even greater interest in
pursuing chemical and biological terrorism.
Since 2001, more than $65 billion in Federal funds have
been invested in biodefense, but progress has been difficult to
quantify.
With the growth of new technologies and online road maps,
terrorist groups may soon be able to threaten nation states
with biological weapons. And some countries, like Syria, have
never ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.
As the Chairman mentioned, former Senators Graham and
Talent issued a report in 2008 on the prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism. They predicted the use of a weapon
of mass destruction, most likely a biological weapon, in a
terrorist attack by the year 2013. Just last week, they issued
a report card grading improvements in detection and diagnosis
capabilities, medical countermeasures availabilities, and
communications.
Their report card is troubling. While it does show progress
in some areas, they found stagnation on medical management and
on the development, approval, and dispensing of medical
countermeasures. The Members of this Committee have only to
think of our extensive investigation into the difficult time
the Administration had in distributing the flu vaccine to
respond to the naturally occurring H1N1 outbreak.
The Administration received F's from the Commission in
areas such as the attribution of even small-scale events and
the environmental cleanup of large-scale incidents. That is not
acceptable.
To safeguard our citizens against bioterrorism, we must
have the ability to respond effectively after an attack has
occurred. But this is no easy matter. We do not yet have
adequate bioresponse capabilities to meet fundamental
expectations during a large-scale attack. The WMD Prevention
and Preparedness Act that Senator Lieberman and I introduced in
2009 would have required the establishment of a detailed plan
for preventing and responding to such an attack.
A biological attack is especially worrisome because we
likely would not immediately know that we had been attacked.
That is why I remain concerned about the effectiveness of the
BioWatch Program. Secretary Janet Napolitano has touted this
nationwide environmental monitoring system designed to detect
the intentional release of aerosolized biological agents. But
according to the GAO, a threat agent may not be identified
until more than a day after its release.
While the next generation of BioWatch technology could
bring this down to just 4 hours, we are not yet certain that
this technology will be viable.
In addition to the technological upgrades, better
coordination between DHS and HHS is necessary to enhance our
ability to identify a threat agent quickly and to increase the
speed and reliability of attribution so that we can help
prevent follow-on attacks.
Ultimately, our best hope of detecting and containing an
attack is the low-tech, unglamorous, but critically important
system of intelligence combined with a robust public health
surveillance network. This still remains the most effective
system, and we must be careful not to look for technological
magic bullets to relieve us of the duty to maintain and
strengthen our public health surveillance infrastructure.
The Graham-Talent Commission also found serious flaws in
the security of biological labs in this country. A GAO report
in 2009, which I requested, reported alarming deficiencies in
basic perimeter security at facilities that house the world's
most dangerous pathogens, like the Ebola and smallpox viruses.
GAO also found that laboratory regulation ``for the most part
relies on self-policing.''
I was pleased to hear the Chairman say that the
Administration has taken some steps to improve security at
these labs. I look forward to hearing what those are.
While security controls must be improved within our own
country, global security problems are even more daunting. I
mentioned Syria earlier, but the crossroads of terrorism and
proliferation, biology, and technology, in volatile countries
such as Pakistan are also troublesome.
A multitude of Federal agencies--DHS, EPA, HHS, CDC, USDA,
and the FBI, among others--all have some responsibilities for
bioterrorism. I will tell you, it concerns me that so many
different Federal entities could be scrambling to respond
during and after an attack. And that is, of course, in addition
to State and local health officials and first responders that
are a critical part of the system as well.
Yet the Executive Branch does not have one agency or one
official that is the clearly designated leader on all elements
of biodefense, especially the coordination and dissemination to
both law enforcement and public health stakeholders of critical
information.
This appears to me to be a major gap in our prevention and
response capability. If we cannot tell our health providers
what to look for when there is a potential threat, we cannot
properly trigger the public health surveillance system that is
our best hope for early detection, containment, and response.
We need a leader who can direct the response and eliminate
overlap or redundancy. This official should also have the
ability to coordinate across Federal agencies and harness the
assets and expertise of State and local governments, first
responders, and the private sector.
Although, as the Chairman has indicated, I am going to have
to leave early from this hearing to manage a bill on the floor,
I can assure the witnesses that I will follow with great
interest your testimony, and I look forward to reading the
questions and answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins, and if you are
not able to return, as I presume you will not because you are
managing the bill, I am going to make sure to ask the witnesses
to respond particularly to your last couple of questions about
coordination among the many Federal agencies involved here.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Our first witness is Dr. Tara O'Toole. Dr. O'Toole was
before us in an earlier incarnation as a noted biodefense
expert and founder, in fact, of the Center for Biosecurity at
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It is a pleasure
to welcome you back as the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology in the Department of Homeland Security and to
welcome your testimony at this time.
TESTIMONY OF HON. TARA J. O'TOOLE,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. O'Toole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and
Senator Moran. As you have both already eloquently stated,
there really has been a lot of significant cumulative progress
in many of the areas of this complex landscape of biodefense
over the past decade, and I will highlight some of the S&T
Directorate's contributions in understanding the threat,
detection and characterization, response, recovery and
decontamination, bioforensics, and last but not least, defense
against agro-bioterrorism, which is very important even though
we have not experienced such an event before.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. O'Toole appears in the Appendix
on page 1150.
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Senator Collins, as you both noted, at the Federal level
biodefense is an intensely interagency activity. I think the
subject represents such irreducible complexity that at some
level there is no help for learning how to coordinate across
multiple Federal agencies and, indeed, as you said, State and
local governments, the private sector of health care, and
public health.
In particular, in austere budget environments I think
collaboration among the Federal agencies is going to become
even more imperative as we try to conserve resources and make
sure our priorities are correct.
What you see before you today is the beginning of an actual
community of biodefense experts in the government, which we
certainly did not have, at least not as robustly as we do
today, in 2001. I would caution you, however, that some of the
budget cuts being contemplated will do great damage to that
community, and if people do not see career paths in
biosecurity, then this complex melange of technical subjects
may suffer, and so will the Federal Government's expertise in
this area in time to come.
And, finally, I just want to commend this Committee for
your continuing interest in this topic. This Committee is
really one of the only places in Congress that the entire
landscape of biodefense is overseen and examined, so this, I
think, is a very important hearing.
First of all, what is different since 2001? We have a much
better understanding of the risks associated with specific
biothreat agents under particular scenarios. Part of this
understanding comes from S&T's Biothreat Risk Assessment, which
is done biannually. We have done three of these major
probablistic risk assessments, which are strategic assessments,
models, which identify and prioritize the relative risk, as I
say, of different agents and serve as the starting point for
biodefense priorities and investment decisions.
The BTRA, as it is known, also identifies knowledge gaps
that are then pursued by the National Biothreat Center at Fort
Detrick and provides a systematic, science-based framework for
asking ``what if '' questions. What if it was a lot easier to
get hold of this agent? What would that do to the risk? And so
forth.
Every other year when we are not doing this elaborate risk
assessment, we conduct what are called tailored assessments
which focus on more detailed evaluation and hypothesis testing.
For example, what is the impact on producing agents given a
range of judgments from the intelligence community about how
easy that might be to accomplish?
We are also in S&T pursuing detailed and empirical risk
studies on the effects of releasing a biological agent or a
chemical agent in metro systems. We have done this in Boston
and in Washington, using both biological and chemical simulants
to understand what would happen to these structures under
attack and how to recover them quickly.
Chairman Lieberman. What kind of metro systems are you
referring to?
Dr. O'Toole. The Massachusett Bay Transportation Authority
in Boston and the Washington Metro, the oldest and the newest.
Chairman Lieberman. Actual metro transportation.
Dr. O'Toole. Exactly. Subways, as we call them in Boston.
In the category of detection and characterization, as you
noted, in 2001, once it was recognized that letters containing
anthrax had been mailed to media outlets and Congress, there
was an avalanche of reports of suspicious powders causing
thousands of first responder requests and a tsunami of samples
being sent to State labs for analysis. The response was very
disorganized, confused. It engendered a lot of alarming
speculation and repeated calls and responses that ranged from
building evacuations, to stripping people who had been in the
buildings and washing them down, and to closing buildings for
years at a time.
I think the reaction would be much different today. S&T has
led an interagency working group with the same alphabet--CDC,
FBI, HHS, and NIST--to create the Standard Field Protocol for
Rapid Resolution of Suspicious Powders. This guidance basically
walks first responders through how to deal with a visible
powder they suspect of being a bioagent, protecting themselves
and also yielding a sampling strategy that would stand up to
reliable testing and prosecution if necessary. These are also
much more effective and efficient procedures. They are already
being used by the FBI in several States, and they are now being
incorporated into first responder training curricula.
We are also in S&T evaluating the ability of commercially
available technology which would rapidly test powders in the
field to be reliable. These technologies were available in 2001
and were not reliable. There were a lot of false positives
which caused a lot of mayhem.
Because S&T and others have developed reliable standards
for doing assays of microbiological agents, we can now
effectively evaluate these commercial options and tell first
responders what works and what does not.
As Senator Collins says, the Lab Response Network is
critically important to our biodefense. This is a State-
sponsored network of public health labs which are the ones that
carry out the assays that would come to them via the first
responders. They, too, are much more organized and capable than
they were in 2001. They, too, are using standardized assays
developed by S&T and the interagency, and we are working on
technologies that would allow them to surge more effectively if
they were suddenly, again, to encounter large swaths of tests.
I will point out, however, that the robustness of this
important leg of our response is also in peril. Since 2008, we
have lost about 50,000 public health staff in the State and
local public health agencies due to economic pressures.
I will mention a final technology in detection and
characterization category that S&T is working on. This is an
outcome of our work on metro studies. We called it ``Detect to
Protect.'' We are concerned that we need to be able to respond
faster to detection, so we are looking at a two-tiered system,
first, of very fast detectors that would automatically trigger
low-impact action, such as turning off HVAC systems, and at the
same time would trigger a slower but more reliable detector
that would then confirm whether or not this was a true
positive.
We are also working on many other things, including
advanced diagnostics. We have done a lot of work in recovery
and decontamination. We do have initial guidance out there for
how we would do that rapidly. I would point out that
decontamination is really an issue mostly with anthrax, which
is especially hearty. It may not be an issue with other
bioagents, at least not in the long term. And DHS along with
other agencies, in particular DTRA, are now conducting the
aerosolization studies at Dugway Proving Ground to find out
exactly whether or not and to what extent anthrax would come
back up into the air and pose a risk to health after an attack.
We have made great progress in bioforensics, which is one
aspect of attribution. I think this is an area where the WMD
report card was a little bit harsh. I would be happy to talk
about that. But NBAF at Fort Detrick is an enormous national
capability that we are very proud of.
And, finally, agrodefense is also moving forward thanks to
great work at the Plum Island Disease Center off the coast of
Long Island. We are very close and, in fact, are doing field
trials of a new foot-and-mouth disease vaccine, which would
allow us to distinguish animals who were infected from a
disease versus those who were vaccinated. And DHS is very
committed to building the National BioAgro Facility in
Manhattan, Kansas, a BSL-4 facility which Secretary Napolitano
and I believe is essential for U.S. agrodefense. That is
problematic in the fiscal year 2012 budget, and I would be
pleased to take questions on that during the question period.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Secretary O'Toole, for that
excellent beginning. I cannot control myself from asking
whether there is a benign form of the foot-and-mouth vaccine
that you will have available to Members of Congress.
[Laughter.]
Dr. O'Toole. Given the budget, Senator, we would be----
Chairman Lieberman. I apologize, really. But thank you for
laughing quietly.
Our next witness is Hon. Alexander Garza, Assistant
Secretary for Health Affairs and the Chief Medical Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Garza prior to coming
to this position was involved in many aspects of practice,
including serving in the U.S. military in battlefield
circumstances with great honor and effect. He heads the
biodefense strategy and planning effort at Homeland Security
and runs operational components such as the biological
surveillance system I mentioned, BioWatch. So we are very glad
to have you back, and please proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ALEXANDER G. GARZA,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS AND CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Garza. Thank you, sir. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking
Member Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify before you today.
Secretary Napolitano, in submitting the 2011 Progress Report,
highlighted a number of activities that DHS has instituted to
prepare for and protect against biological attacks. The Office
of Health Affairs works on several of these efforts, so I
welcome the opportunity to discuss these with you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Garza appears in the Appendix on
page 1161.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am pleased as well to testify with my counterparts here
from the FBI, HHS ASPR, and the Science and Technology
Directorate. As was mentioned before, biodefense requires a
multidimensional approach if we are to protect the American
people, and we very much value the partnerships with these and
other Federal agencies.
The Committee is also very familiar with OHA's role and
responsibilities. We are the principal medical and health
authority for DHS, including acts of terrorism, and are the
legislative coordinator for biodefense within the Department.
These are responsibilities that I take very seriously as our
mission is imperative to the overall mission of homeland
security.
As has been mentioned already, the risk of a biological
agent being used as a weapon against the United States is both
real and concerning. Just last week, the Bipartisan WMD
Terrorism Research Center released its 2011 bioresponse report
card stating that the threat of biological attack was real and
growing.
Furthermore, rapid advances in biotechnology have lowered
the potential barriers once thought to inhibit would-be
bioterrorists. The Amerithrax incident of 10 years ago,
although significant, was a small-scale attack with limited
casualties. It nonetheless showed that one does not necessarily
need a weapon of mass destruction but only a weapon of mass
disruption to effect severe consequences, and our adversaries
have learned from this model.
The Department has made great strides in protecting and
preparing the Nation to respond to biological attacks since
this incident. We have improved our ability to detect
biological agents, mitigate their effects, speed our recovery,
and, most importantly, to save lives. I will discuss our
initiatives that are instrumental to biodefense for the Nation,
including BioWatch, biosurveillance, and our planning and
exercise efforts.
One of DHS's most significant contributions in biodefense
is in early detection. The prompt identification of a bioattack
accelerates the detect, decide, deliver, and dispense sequence.
Put another way, it buys time, and time saves lives.
Now in its ninth year, OHA's BioWatch program is a
federally managed, locally operated nationwide environmental
surveillance system designed to detect biological agents.
BioWatch is strategically deployed to more than 30 high-risk
metropolitan areas and at national special security events such
as the upcoming APEC summit.
However, BioWatch is much more than a machine. BioWatch has
evolved to become a robust network of Federal, State, and local
individuals that together form the nexus of decisionmakers in
the event of a biological attack.
In 2010, DHS began testing and evaluating the next
generation of biodetection systems, which we call Generation-3,
or Gen-3. The Gen-3 program's goals are to decrease the time to
detection from 4 to 6 hours, increase our population coverage,
and provide greater cost-effectiveness all without losing any
accuracy. We are currently in the process of a rigorous and
well-controlled testing and evaluation program validating this
technology.
Early detection through BioWatch is but one element of an
overall biosurveillance and situational awareness system. OHA
also manages the National Biosurveillance Integration System, a
consortium of Federal partners established to detect and
monitor biological events of national concern.
DHS has developed and continues to refine an integrated,
multidisciplinary, common biosurveillance capability to provide
the Federal Government, State, and local partners with
information and assessments of potential and unfolding
biological events.
Furthermore, understanding that all events are local, we
work directly with State and local public health, emergency
management, and emergency medical services leaders to develop
response capabilities for health security threats, including
biological threats.
For example, we are expanding local public health
participation in the national network of fusion centers, and
OHA together with FEMA conducted a series of anthrax response
exercises in each of the 10 FEMA regions. These exercises were
designed to help coordinate roles, responsibilities, and
critical response actions following a wide-area anthrax attack.
Last, OHA coordinates routinely with our Federal partners,
including those at this hearing, on various medical
countermeasure issues. These efforts include the interagency
development of a Federal rapid response capacity and the DHS
effort to stockpile medical countermeasures for our personnel,
which my office has led.
As demonstrated by these multiple examples, DHS has made
substantial investments and improvements since the 2001 anthrax
attack, and we are much better prepared than we were a decade
ago. There still, however, remains much work to do in
biodefense going forward.
I thank you for your time and look forward to answering
whatever questions you may have. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Dr. Garza, for that
excellent testimony.
Next we have Dr. Nicole Lurie, who we are again glad to
welcome back--we have four doctors on this panel, and it is
reassuring. She is the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response at the Department of Health and Human Services. Dr.
Lurie heads the biodefense strategy and planning efforts at HHS
and in that regard oversees efforts to develop vaccines and
therapeutics under the Project BioShield in BARDA. So thank you
for your work, and we look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. NICOLE LURIE,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
Dr. Lurie. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins,
and Senator Moran, as you heard, I am Dr. Nicole Lurie. I am
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and I am
pleased to talk with you about our Nation's public health
preparedness for a biological event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Lurie appears in the Appendix on
page 1167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we all know, 10 years ago, on the heels of the World
Trade Center attacks, we all dealt with the anthrax letters,
which we have talked about this morning. While we were ill
prepared at the time to face those attacks, today I am pleased
to tell you that our public health preparedness has made steady
and really significant progress. With each emergency, from
hurricanes and tornadoes to a pandemic and an oil spill, we
have continually improved in our planning and our operations.
We now have strategies in place to coordinate our efforts and
have built truly all-hazards capabilities from the local to the
Federal level to ensure that our responses are flexible and can
save lives.
One area of progress is in the medical countermeasures
enterprise, beginning with surveillance running all the way
through to dispensing and evaluating a countermeasure. Yet I
will be the first one to tell you that, despite the gains,
progress has not been fast enough.
In December 2009, Secretary Sebelius requested a review of
the medical countermeasures enterprise to ensure that the
Nation really has a forward-looking, 21st Century system. We
have made many improvements in response to that review,
including strengthening surveillance, laboratories, and
countermeasure distribution plans.
Critical to the success of the whole Public Health
Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise is an integrated
approach with a formal governance structure. And you should
know that this includes all of the components of HHS plus DHS,
VA, DOD, USDA. So it is truly an interagency effort. And that
all parts now of HHS, CDC, FDA, NIH, and the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority work together with
companies from the outset of a contract rather than at the end
of the pipeline.
In this arena, active partnerships with industry have
become really critical, and we have created new opportunities
to communicate our priorities and help companies, especially
new ones, learn how to work more effectively with us.
We have also strengthened our internal processes, making
the government an easier partner to work with, and I am pleased
to report, for example, that we have decreased the time it
takes to announce, review, and award new contracts for our
broad agency announcements by almost 25 percent in the last
year, to under 6 months.
The medical countermeasure review also prioritizes
regulatory science at FDA and proposes innovative partnerships
with industry to support promising new companies and ideas.
Thanks to the BioShield special reserve fund, we have
procured and stockpiled more critical life-saving
countermeasures than at any time in our Nation's history,
including for smallpox, anthrax, botulism, and radiological and
nuclear threats, as you mentioned. Through work in BARDA, we
now have a pipeline of new products, including over 80
candidate products that, if successful, have the potential to
transition to the stockpile. And we continue to make progress
in preparedness for the next influenza pandemic.
Through a long-term partnership with Novartis, for example,
the first U.S. cell-based influenza manufacturing plant will
become operational in the next couple of weeks. This plant will
expand significantly our domestic surge capacity for a pandemic
vaccine and could also make vaccines for other novel emerging
pathogens in an emergency.
Chairman Lieberman. Just tell us a little more about that,
because our Committee was so focused on that during the H1N1
hearings we held. Tell us where it is going to be. This will be
the first inside the United States now.
Dr. Lurie. This is the first cell-based facility inside the
United States. It is in Holly Springs, North Carolina, and it
has been a long-term partnership with Novartis.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Lurie. Then, in addition, we are reviewing applications
now for the Centers for Advanced Development and Manufacturing
called for in the Secretary's medical countermeasure review
which will provide core services to companies and then
additional surge manufacturing capacity. I do not know where
those will be yet because that is still in process.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is really good to hear. I
remember during the outbreak that we were very concerned that
we were dependent on foreign manufacturers, and they would
naturally feel pressure to give first to their local
populations, and quite understandably. So that is very
significant. I am glad to hear that.
Dr. Lurie. Yes. Thanks. I think the progress has really
been remarkable, and I congratulate both Congress for funding
and our team and our partners for really pulling it off.
Yet, as we all know from the WMD Terrorism Research Center
report card, while we have made important progress--and that is
some of it--our preparedness is not yet sufficient. In
particular, they noted that the medical countermeasures
enterprise lacks sufficient and sustained funding. The
reauthorization of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act is one opportunity to provide some new authorities and
resources called for in that report.
On the response side, we are using new technologies,
including electronic medical records to match demand with need,
geographic information systems to identify the needs of
affected populations and available resources, and social media
to communicate and observe developing health trends.
We have also made impressive strides in our Nation, in our
core State, and local public health capabilities. So there was
a time in the not too distant past, in fact, when you and I had
a chance to speak, when getting Internet access for a local
health department was a challenge, and blast fax was a
breakthrough technology. We can all laugh about it now. It was
not very long ago.
Two-thousand-eleven has seen a number of natural disasters
that were ably managed by our State and local partners with
limited or no Federal assistance, and we have heard repeatedly
from them that this would not have been possible 10 years ago.
Two critical tools that underpin State and local response
are the Hospital Preparedness Program and the Public Health
Emergency Preparedness Program, which are being aligned for
greater efficiency. However, without continued support and
funding for our public health and medical systems, the
infrastructure will degrade. In fact, as you heard from Dr.
O'Toole, we are seeing this already in this loss of almost
50,000 jobs. My fear is that as State and local capacity
diminishes, we will see an increase once again in the call for
Federal assistance, but, furthermore, this really puts our
Nation's response capability and community recovery at risk.
Sustaining our community-based response capabilities has to
remain a top priority.
Ultimately, all of our investments and efforts have the
same goal: Building a resilient Nation and saving lives when a
disaster does occur. We have made great strides in the last
decade. I am very proud of what we have accomplished in the
last 2\1/2\ years, but in truth, we have miles to go before we
sleep.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Lurie.
Last on this panel is Dr. Vahid Majidi, who is the
Assistant Director at the FBI in charge of the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Directorate. It says a lot that Dr. Majidi, who has
a very distinguished background as a chemist and worked at the
National Laboratories, now finds himself at the FBI where he is
responsible for investigating suspected cases of WMD terrorism
and proliferation. So I am very glad you are here, and please
proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF VAHID MAJIDI, PH.D.,\1\ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Majidi. Thank you, sir. Good morning. It is my pleasure
to discuss what the FBI has done over the last 10 years and
what we are doing to protect the United States against
bioterrorism threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Majidi appears in the Appendix on
page 1186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI's number one priority is to protect the United
States from terrorist attacks, and within that priority, the
use of weapons of mass destruction is simply unacceptable to
us. In fact, to clearly demonstrate our commitment and to
ensure that we rigorously address WMD issues, the FBI
established a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate in 2006.
The Directorate consolidates WMD investigations and prevention
efforts, creating a unique combination of law enforcement
authorities, intelligence and analysis capabilities, and
technical subject matter expertise focused on chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive matters. My
Directorate's primary mission is prevention of WMD terrorism
and proliferation.
The FBI has the responsibility to investigate WMD threats,
and often we have to use our strong response capabilities to
collect evidence in contaminated areas, disarm hazardous
devices, and provide command and control support for critical
incidents.
Threats are identified through products from the U.S.
intelligence community, which includes FBI's collections
efforts, and leads are provided through the local law
enforcement community as well. Domestic and international
terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates, have
shown unwavering interest in using biological agents and
toxins. It is not unusual for these groups to openly seek
scientists to join their ranks and support their cause.
The FBI addresses bioterrorism threats by identifying
points of vulnerability for biological agents acquisitions,
weapons development, and ultimately the execution phase. This
systematic approach allows for resources prioritization in
light of potential gaps in our biosecurity program. We have a
well-defined framework to design and implement countermeasures
focusing on our outreach and indicators.
There are challenges mounting an effective response to an
act of bioterrorism. These events may go undetected for a long
period of time until victims seek medical treatment or other
key evidences are discovered. As such, the FBI and CDC
developed the Joint Criminal and Epidemiological
Investigations. This is an interactive training program to
improve public health and law enforcement efforts to jointly
identify and investigate intentional or naturally occurring
threats.
As you mentioned earlier, a recent bioresponse report card
published by the Bipartisan WMD Research Center provides an
overall negative view of U.S. Government accomplishments in
bioterror readiness. Nonetheless, they do highlight that CDC
and FBI have made considerable progress in building
partnerships between public health and law enforcement that
will significantly improve cooperation during investigations.
I must emphasize that FBI's program in combating
bioterrorism is based on prevention concepts, which is much
more expansive than leading-edge investigative protocols,
advanced traditional forensics, and microbial forensics
familiar to all. Amongst the pantheon of activities centered on
WMD issues, the FBI is keenly focused on safeguarding
biological organisms and the security of individuals with
access to these materials. We developed the Biological Sciences
and Academic Biosecurity Workshop Initiative to build
partnerships between the FBI and academic research communities.
This initiative improves situational awareness for all
participants and develops a mechanism to report suspicious
activities to prevent emerging national security threats.
As you are aware, the FBI is a Federal partner in the
Select Agent Program with HHS and USDA, and this program is
designed to safeguard entities that store or conduct research
with biological select agents and toxins. The FBI supports this
program by properly vetting individuals prior to access against
any of the 10 prohibitors defined in the USA PATRIOT Act and 18
U.S.C. 175(b).
The FBI has at least one highly trained special agent in
each of our 56 field offices who manages and addresses WMD
threats and events. These special agents are known as WMD
coordinators. The FBI laboratory has developed an extensive
protocol and strong national relationship with U.S. Government
components, including DHS's National Bioforensic Analysis
Center, to deal with WMD evidence. Biologically contaminated
evidence is evaluated by the Laboratory Response Network
established by FBI, CDC, and associated public health
laboratories.
Additionally, the FBI created the Hazardous Evidence
Analysis Team, a cadre of highly trained forensic examiners who
are capable of safely performing traditional forensic analysis
on contaminated evidence in our partner laboratories.
Advancements in science and technology have led to
significant progress in synthetic biology. The FBI has
established a synthetic biology initiative, a proactive
approach to mitigate current and over-the-horizon risks posed
by exploitation of advancements in this arena. In a partnership
with private industry, we have implemented the Screening
Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded
DNA. This framework codifies a notification process for DNA
sequence providers to contact their local WMD coordinator,
which I mentioned earlier, when encountering alarming orders.
Moreover, growing public interest in biological science has
led to the development of an amateur biology movement. In this
community, science and biotechnology is pursued at home or
shared meeting places. The FBI has developed a partnership with
the amateur biology community to garner collaborations in
preventing, detecting, and responding to potentially nefarious
incidents. In short, the FBI is dedicated to protecting our
Nation and will continue to collaborate with the U.S.
Government and scientific community to proactively address new
biological threats on the horizon.
Since the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate, the FBI has successfully managed hundreds of cases
involving biological substances and suspicious powders, leading
to numerous convictions and lengthy sentences.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Doctor.
We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. Senator Moran is
here, and Senator Brown said he would try to come back from
another committee hearing.
Dr. O'Toole, let me begin with you, and thank you for the
work that Science and Technology has done. I want to ask you to
talk to us a little more about the strategic risk assessments
that you have carried out, and tell us in a little more detail
what they show.
Dr. O'Toole. These risk assessments are models. They are
computer models based upon the best scientific data and the
judgments of professionals--including intelligence community
professionals and law enforcement experts--that we can find.
``All models are run, some are useful'' is the rule of thumb,
and the same goes for BTRA.
I would be happy to tell you how the agents themselves rank
and what scenarios we are most worried about in a classified
session. I cannot talk about that now. But what the models
produce is information of that sort: What agents really could
create a mass casualty situation and under what conditions.
It allows you to say, well, if I change this variable, so,
for example, if I made it impossible to get a bioagent such as
smallpox, then that scenario goes away or is greatly mitigated.
What happens if you could have medical countermeasures
against a certain agent under reasonable expectations of
distribution and efficacy and so forth? How many lives would
you save?
So you can ask questions of these models and probe them,
and then take the uncertainties that you uncover and actually
investigate those in laboratories, which we do, and back, in
Frederick, Maryland.
They act in practice as the starting point for decisions
about which biothreat agents do we need to be most worried
about.
Chairman Lieberman. That is the important point. This is a
unique function that you are carrying out.
Dr. O'Toole. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. And the results of these strategic risk
assessments are then shared across the board in our government,
and presumably State, local government, and the private sector,
in terms of how the attacks are most likely to come and,
therefore, I presume, how we should work to develop
countermeasures.
Dr. O'Toole. Yes. The last is particularly important. The
bioagents of greatest concerns are then further studied in
detail. We validate the original assumptions. We make sure we
have up-to-date intelligence. And then the results of that
second analysis are forwarded to HHS, where they consider them
in their own framework in terms of public health impacts.
First of all, the design of the Biological Terrorism Risk
Assessment is an interagency process, and the results are
disseminated through the interagency and find their way into an
array of activities, from what kind of exercise are we going to
pursue in terms of decontamination to what countermeasures are
we going to pursue to a myriad of other things.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me go back to the baseline. I
obviously respect and support your conclusion that you do not
want to describe this in detail in a public setting. But I take
it, generally speaking, that the result of the strategic risk
assessment is that you continue to consider the threat of a
bioterrorist attack to be real. In other words, there is a
second look here around the tenth anniversary of 9/11 where
some people are beginning to say that in general, not just in
terms of bioterrorism, we have overreacted over the last 10
years.
Dr. O'Toole. Can I address that directly?
Chairman Lieberman. That is what I would like you to do.
Dr. O'Toole. The biothreat is real, as Dr. Majidi said. We
know our adversaries are pursuing biological weapons. The
potency and the accessibility of these weapons, as you said,
will increase as the bioscience revolution proceeds.
Just as an example of how fast we are learning how to
manipulate biological organisms, in the 1990s it took a decade
and $1 billion to decode the human genome. We could now do that
for $1,000 in about a week. And that is only one technique.
At the same time, this progress is happening globally. It
is not owned by the U.S. Government or any government. It is
being pursued avidly by huge amounts of capital in biopharma,
biofuels, and all kinds of places, including amateur biologists
and kids who are interested in extracting DNA for fun, similar
to the computer revolution that began the IT industry. So this
is going to proceed apace, and the appeal of asymmetric weapons
is not going to go away either among terrorist groups or among
sovereign states, I would suggest. This threat is not going to
go away. It is going to grow.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Dr. Majidi, you agree with that, I
assume. For instance, the Graham-Talent Commission, as you
probably know, said that they considered a biological attack to
be the most likely of the various forms of weapons of mass
destruction attack because of the relative ease of developing
biological agents and moving them into the country. Do you
agree?
Mr. Majidi. Yes, that is correct, sir. In fact, if you look
at a historical perspective as well as the current case trend,
biological cases tend to be the largest portion of our WMD
cases that we investigate. Many of them tend to be hoaxes, but,
nonetheless, the cases that have real material involved in them
tend to be biologically centered.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I mean, I can tell you that we
have a warning system now in the Capitol, usually on our
BlackBerrys or cell phones, and there is actually a remarkable
number of occasions where the Capitol Police are called to
investigate some kind of substance that they do not identify. I
think every one of them since 2001 has turned out to be benign,
but that is not always going to be the case.
I think it is clear from your testimony that--Dr. Garza or
Dr. Lurie, do you want to add anything about the reality of the
threat?
Dr. Garza. I would concur with both of my partners up here.
Dr. O'Toole hit on this earlier. There is such a thing as the
curve on how quickly biotechnology is growing, and as I
mentioned in my opening statement, this is very concerning. And
she made the analogy to computer technology. There is a law in
computing called Moore's law where you increase the capacity of
your capacitor and the price decreases. Well, the curve for
biotechnology is much steeper than Moore's law, and so that
barrier that a would-be bioterrorist would have in being able
to develop a biological weapon is becoming much easier than it
was in the past.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Lurie.
Dr. Lurie. Nothing really to add. I would say that for some
years I participated as a judge in a contest for high school
students who did epidemiology projects. What they did was
remarkable and, in fact, sometimes much more sophisticated than
many of the other modelers I know.
I think if we were to have such a kind of contest now in
the amateur biology sphere, we would be pretty terrified with
what they would come up with.
Chairman Lieberman. That is sufficient warning in itself.
I want to go back very briefly, Dr. O'Toole. Obviously,
intelligence in the war we are in with the terrorists is more
critical than it has ever been in any other war because of the
nature of the enemy not striking in any conventional way and
also not hesitating--in fact, focusing on civilian populations.
So I take it that the intelligence community is fully and
directly involved certainly in the strategic risk assessments
that your Directorate is doing.
Dr. O'Toole. Yes, they are, more and more actually, and the
intelligence community itself is rethinking its own approach to
the biothreat and putting new emphasis on collection techniques
and so forth.
I would urge all Members of Congress to get a classified
briefing on the biothreat from the intelligence community. I
think that would be very helpful to biosecurity.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a good idea, and I am going to
ask Senator Collins, but it might be good for our Committee to
begin that and do that in a classified setting.
Let me ask you one more question, and then I am going to
yield to Senator Akaka, who I welcome here this morning, and
this picks up in a way from Senator Collins' last statement in
her opening statement, which is here are four different
agencies--well, three with two from DHS--represented and a lot
of other agencies clearly involved. Who is in charge? In other
words, who is coordinating the efforts of the various
departments of the Federal Government involved in both trying
to prevent and respond to a biodisaster? Let me begin with
that. Dr. O'Toole, do you want to start?
Dr. O'Toole. Well, I would have to ask, in charge of what?
I understand the longing for a strong leader, somebody who can
take decisive action in a crisis, and there is an argument for
that. I do think that biosecurity is so complex and involves
equities from so many agencies that a coordinator in the White
House may be of some use, but I think the question is to some
extent a red herring.
In a catastrophic attack, the President is going to be in
charge in about 30 seconds.
Chairman Lieberman. That is what I was going to ask. Who is
in charge in a crisis? Is there somebody within the White House
who will take the key role in coordinating your effort and
advising the President----
Dr. O'Toole. Yes, I mean, I think that would be within the
National Security staff, either John Brennan or his Deputy,
Heidi Avery.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. O'Toole. But we would all have roles to play very
intensely. The interagency approach brings strengths as well as
liabilities, and as we saw in 2001 and during the flu pandemic,
you need a lot of very detailed, specialized knowledge to have
an informed, coherent response to these kinds of events. And we
are going to have more and more of them in this society, like
Deepwater, like Fukushima. We are not going to be able to
predict in advance exactly what constellation of experts we
need. We need to have an agile capacity to assemble and
reassemble and restructure the capacities of the U.S.
Government as needed. That is what we have to learn how to do,
and we have to get very efficient at that.
Chairman Lieberman. Maybe I will turn to you, Dr. Lurie.
What assurance can we give the public, particularly at this
time of tremendous budgetary stress, that there is not a
redundancy that is necessary, in other words, that there is not
an overlap of public investment because of the many agencies
involved in the whole field of preparing for, preventing, and
responding to bioterrorism?
Dr. Lurie. Thank you for that. This is an area where I
actually feel quite comfortable. I think the governance
structure for the countermeasures enterprise is very robust. As
I testified, it includes high-level membership from across the
interagency. So Dr. O'Toole and Dr. Garza both sit on the
PHEMCE steering committee, as do others. We have pretty full
visibility into what people are working on and developing,
whether it is in different HHS components, whether it is in
DOD, whether it is in DHS.
The good part is that we all share expertise and problem-
solve around it. We look and say, well, if you are doing X, I
need to do Y instead. Or for example, in the case of FDA, how
can FDA be at the table earlier with a DOD issue?
So the coordination I think has really grown tremendously
over the past couple years and is quite robust. So going back
to your first question to Dr. O'Toole, we learn from DHS and
get information from DHS about which agents are the threat
agents. We do our own public health assessment of how those are
likely to make people sick and how many people are likely to
either get sick or die. We look at the kinds of products that
we need to make to counteract those. And with that, we work
across the whole interagency, so we want to know how would a
product be used before we even go ahead and make it. Does that
make sense? Is it usable? Is it needed? How would it be
deployed in the field, for example?
In this space, I actually feel quite comfortable that we
have worked very hard to wring redundancy out of the system. In
our Centers for Advanced Development, for example, DOD has sat
at the table with us, helped put the RFP together, will help
provide core funding for it. Again, tremendous opportunities
exist for coordination and collaboration that we have taken
full advantage of.
I want to go back to your question for a minute also to Dr.
O'Toole about this, the sort of ``who is in charge'' piece,
because I think, as she said, this capabilities-based piece is
really important, and we have now a number of structures for
governance and coordination across all of us. But I should also
point out that at the end of the day, with each of the
emergencies that we have faced, whether it was pandemic,
whether it was Deepwater, whether it was the effects of the
Fukushima crisis, we all sat together in the situation room,
led by National Security Council staff, and worked it out,
worked through plans and operational responses. And because we
work so closely together now day to day on all of these other
issues, that has actually been really easy. It is not like you
have needed to corral people to sit them down at the table and
make them talk to each other. We do that all the time.
Chairman Lieberman. I am going to leave it at that now, but
I think your answer, both of your answers, says that you are
working together regularly and that the person in charge is in
the National Security Council, probably Mr. Brennan or his
Deputy, which makes as much sense as anything else. OK. It
makes sense, in other words.
Senator Akaka, thanks for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to add my welcome to
our witnesses here today.
I have long been concerned about biological attacks,
especially against our food and agriculture systems. The
difficulty in tracking the source of the recent E. coli
outbreak in Germany and France reinforces my concerns.
A bioterror attack committed anywhere in the world could
easily spread to the United States. We must detect an attack
early and limit its impact, which is why we need to continue to
strengthen domestic and overseas surveillance capabilities.
Dr. Majidi, last month I held a hearing on how the United
States would respond to an attack on our food and agriculture
systems, and an issue that was raised at the hearing was the
lack of indicators of emerging threats to food and agriculture
within the intelligence community.
How are the Bureau's intelligence activities targeting
biological threats and, in particular, biological threats to
U.S. food and agriculture?
Mr. Majidi. Sir, like most of the intelligence community,
what we have is that annual gap review and ultimately
production of what we call an intelligence requirement. That is
based on what we feel has the highest risk associated with it
and the information that we need to know more about that
particular item.
What we do is to disseminate that particular gap through
the intelligence requirement to our field offices. We share our
concern with our brethren in the intelligence community, and in
many instances we work collectively together to push those gaps
out for additional collection.
The issue of agroterrorism and biological attacks has been
on the forefront of many of our activities, and these gaps have
already been disseminated, and we are still requiring
additional information on many of the items.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Lurie and Dr. Garza, as you know well,
effective global disease surveillance can provide early warning
to the public health community of emerging infectious diseases
in other countries that could potentially threaten the United
States. Would you please comment on what steps your departments
have taken to make sure our Nation is aware of possible threats
overseas?
Dr. Garza. Yes, thank you for that question, Senator. In
terms of biosurveillance, in particular the global reach of
biosurveillance, most of the work that we have done within the
Office of Health Affairs has been through our National
Biosurveillance Integration Center, and in that capacity we
work with many of our Federal partners, many of whom are seated
here today, including the FDA, USDA, HHS, and others. DOD
actually has a fairly substantial global reach in
biosurveillance due to their deployment activities. And so we
work with them to bring that information together into one
place where we can take a look at the data to make sure that
there are no signals coming out that would impart something of
concern to the United States.
I think we work very well with our partners at HHS, DOD,
and others to make sure that we are not missing anything and to
make sure that we are covering the different aspects of
biosurveillance.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Lurie.
Dr. Lurie. I will maybe add that CDC, in particular, has a
very robust global disease detection program, is one of the WHO
coordinating centers for influenza, and has subject matter
experts virtually all over the world helping build capacity in
countries to do surveillance, working on reporting, having the
relationships that give you the earlier heads up that something
is coming. They also have greatly strengthened laboratory
capacity in that regard.
In addition, we work through a number of organizations. The
Global Health Security Initiative, which is a constellation of
a number of developed countries, is actually meeting here next
week. We do a lot of work and coordination with them around
surveillance, preparedness, and response.
Similarly, the international health regulations promulgated
by the WHO are regulations that we support, that we work
through, and a lot of our efforts to strengthen detection and
surveillance in countries around the world are also in support
of these international health regulations.
And, finally, just because you arrived here late and did
not have an opportunity to hear more discussion about this, we
also have to remember that novel infectious diseases certainly
know no borders and can arise anywhere in the world, and we saw
with H1N1 that they arose in this hemisphere. We talked earlier
about the fact that we have lost almost 50,000 jobs in local
and State public health around this country, many in the
surveillance area. So we have to be really careful to have our
guard up and surveillance networks up in every community and
all over the world.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Dr. Garza, Customs and Border Protection is primarily
associated with its mission to prevent terrorists, drugs, and
unauthorized individuals from entering the United States. Too
often the agency's important mission of protecting American
agriculture from the accidental or deliberate introduction of
diseases or pests is overlooked. I have introduced legislation
that would elevate the agriculture mission in CBP to match the
significance of the biological threats approaching our borders.
Do you believe that enhancing agricultural inspection
operations will improve our Nation's biodefenses?
Dr. Garza. Well, I cannot speak for CBP, but I certainly
feel that you are correct, that if there is an increase in the
inspection capacity, that will increase our preparedness for
biodefense for the Nation.
There are many aspects of biodefense that I think get
overlooked somehow in their one-off effects on how they provide
added deterrence or added protection, even outside of the
biodefense world. The technologies and the information that we
get from these different activities absolutely improve
different sectors of both the U.S. Government, but also in our
homeland security posture. So I absolutely think that if we
improve that posture, it will pay dividends for the biothreat.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another
question?
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Akaka. An important potential source of information
is animal health professionals. They are the first line of
response to outbreaks in animal populations. These outbreaks,
whether deliberate or natural, often pose a direct threat to
human health.
How are your departments working with veterinarians and the
animal health community to ensure early and rapid detection of
disease outbreaks? Dr. O'Toole.
Dr. O'Toole. Senator, S&T operates the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center off the coast of Long Island, and among other
things, we regularly train veterinarians in the recognition and
diagnosis of foreign animal diseases that hopefully they do not
see in their regular practice.
In addition, Plum Island is working on developing
diagnostic tests for these more exotic diseases that are not
endemic to our shores, including pen-side tests that we could
use to rapidly screen a lot of animals in the field.
I think your concern about agroterrorism and agriculture
security is well founded. Agrodefense really is the stepchild
of biosecurity. I would argue that the country is
underinvesting in agricultural defense, and we need to make
sure that we have a strategic plan going forward.
I will repeat, I think we should build the National BioAgro
Facility in Kansas. If we do not have such a facility, we will
not be economically competitive in this field, we will not
maintain scientific eminence in this field, and we will not
have the capacity to diagnose or respond to a foreign animal
disease should one occur either through natural causes or
through a deliberate attack.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Garza.
Dr. Garza. Yes, Senator, I think that is an excellent
question. I completely agree with what Dr. O'Toole has just
stated. Within my office we do have our food, agriculature, and
veterinarian branch, which is led by a group of veterinarians,
and they do a couple of things within Homeland Security.
First, they lead a homeland security working group which
spans across the different components on all of these food,
agriculture, and veterinarian issues.
In addition, we have brought Customs and Border Protection
into our information cycle, our National Biosurveillance
Integration System cycle, so that we can share this information
on the effects on animals and plants and things like this.
CBP is currently performing risk-based inspections, and I
know from reading newspaper articles in the last week about
some of the challenges that they have had. I know that you have
been an advocate for improving that service, and I certainly
applaud that. But it is something that the Department of
Homeland Security takes very seriously. We work with many of
our Federal partners, with our Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, and with many other people in the private sector
to try and improve that sort of capability.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Lurie.
Dr. Lurie. Thanks. Your question is important for a whole
host of reasons, including, as we have just talked about,
agroterrorism, but also because so many--in fact, the
preponderance of new emerging diseases in humans, as you
probably know, come one way or another from animals. And so our
vigilance in this area is particularly important.
I think many of our Federal agencies, certainly my office,
CDC, and FDA, our Strategic Information Office, etc., all
employ a number of animal health professionals both to help
with the situational awareness sets of issues and to look at
areas where there are synergies. Not only are there tremendous
synergies in surveillance, such as some of the things Dr.
O'Toole talked about, but also synergies in the countermeasure
development area where many of the same techniques, platforms,
and mechanisms for making countermeasures, for making vaccines,
for example, in humans and animals are shared. We need to, and
do, really work hard to exploit those kinds of defense
synergies as well.
In addition to the surveillance areas, there is that whole
countermeasure development sphere that is just so important.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Majidi.
Mr. Majidi. Thank you. Our activities are actually
multifold in this area. One, the FBI really accomplishes all of
its tasks through its field offices. Every year, we have a
large symposium called International Symposium on Agroterrorism
where we bring some of the largest manufacturers to this
symposium, as well as our local field office WMD coordinators,
to make sure that there is sufficient interactions between
folks who work in the field as well as the major producers.
We work with USDA to make sure of their awareness of
potential outbreaks as well as working with cattle ranchers and
farmers across the United States as a point of interaction.
Much of our work is done through our partner agencies, but we
want to make sure that our involvement is clearly beneficial to
both parties there.
And, last, our WMD coordinators in the field offices are
really responsible for one-on-one contact with all those points
of interest, and that is as part of their requirements, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Thank you very
much for your questions.
Let me just ask a couple more questions because we have
another panel we want to get on to. I want to get a reaction
from each of you quickly to the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism
Research Center report, which was generally positive about
progress in this area of biodefense, but essentially said that
we are not prepared to handle a large biodisaster, whether it
is an attack or a naturally occurring disaster. Since I have
been calling on Dr. O'Toole first all the time, Dr. Majidi,
give us a quick response whether you think there is any truth
to that.
Mr. Majidi. Well, sir, I am not necessarily sure what is
the definition of a large-scale biodisaster because in my book,
while five individuals were killed by the Bacillus anthracis
attack, the response that was required to deal with that so-
called small scale was quite tremendous from a U.S. Government
perspective.
Chairman Lieberman. That is true. That was the anthrax
attack you are talking about.
Mr. Majidi. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Majidi. So the financial effects as well as the
resources by every government organization was quite
substantial in that case.
From that perspective, while the scale is perceived as
large or small, the overall consequence management is
significant in totality.
Chairman Lieberman. So are we prepared?
Mr. Majidi. Sir, I do not think we will ever be prepared
for a pandemic on an incredibly large scale.
Chairman Lieberman. A pandemic or a large-scale attack.
Mr. Majidi. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I think the point you are making
is that though the anthrax attacks of 2001 were in a
comparative sense relatively small, they caused enormous
dislocation and, of course, psychological fear throughout our
country.
Mr. Majidi. Absolutely.
Chairman Lieberman. And that is quite different from the
kind of metro, in terms of subways, modeling that you have
done.
Dr. Lurie, what do you think of what the Bipartisan Center
said?
Dr. Lurie. Well, one area in which they recognized
tremendous progress actually was in the area of communications.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Lurie. And I want to highlight that communicating with
the public and bringing the public along and having them have
confidence in what the government is doing to help mitigate the
effects of such an attack is absolutely critical.
Chairman Lieberman. How communication is during a crisis?
Dr. Lurie. Communications during a crisis I think have
gotten orders of magnitude better. We have a lot of planning,
pre-prepared work, and mechanisms for communication.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very important. That is one of
the things that this Committee, I think, has learned most about
response to a WMD attack, including even a nuclear attack, that
the ability to communicate with people and to tell them what to
do--which may be counterintuitive. The reflex may be to get out
of your house or office and run, which may be exactly the worse
thing to do. So we are much better prepared to communicate to
the public in a crisis, aren't we?
Dr. Lurie. Right. Absolutely. And so the good news first.
I think their observations particularly about the major
large-scale attacks are what have made us focus. One, in the
medical countermeasures area on shifting to this nimble,
flexible capacity to make countermeasures quickly against
something we have never seen before--would that we could all
work at ``Contagion'' speed in getting a vaccine--and to have
that surge manufacturing capacity. We talked about Holly
Springs being the start of that, but to be able to make
countermeasures very quickly in terms of an emergency, and a
huge amount of work going on that sphere. And then we have been
placing a lot of emphasis on the distribution and
administration of those medical countermeasures, being sure
that we have a much faster capability to do that, and that we
are able to support with additional personnel communities that
need additional personnel support and may be overwhelmed.
I think we have made progress there. We are not all the way
there, and particularly because each community is a little bit
different. Again, it is those capabilities and the nimble
adaptable plans that have to be put in place.
And, finally, I would be remiss again if I did not point
out that our ability to respond on the countermeasure side and
have the countermeasures on time is very much tied to our
ability to detect early and that early warning, early
detection, surveillance components that all of our departments
are working on so hard.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Garza, how about ready for a
relatively small incident, not ready for a major biological
attack?
Dr. Garza. Right. I agree with everything that has been
said so far, but I especially agree with Dr. Majidi where it is
not going to take a large event to cause a lot of disruption in
society. We saw examples of this in the past during the 2001
attacks, but also as recently as Fukushima where the country
was basically depleted of potassium iodine within a week. And
so if you use that as a model for what would happen at a
deliberate biological attack, you can understand the sort of
rush to countermeasures that would happen not just within the
area that was affected, but I think nationwide. So I think that
is something that we really need to consider, and that is where
the communication strategy plays a large part on how we would
deal with this.
Second, I am, I guess, somewhat pleased that nothing went
down in the report, so at least we are not sliding back. I
think we have improved a lot on different issues such as
surveillance and detection. And so I am pleased with that.
One of the things, though, that has been mentioned up here
a couple of times is the capacity of the health care industry
to be able to withstand a large-scale attack, I think, is very
troubling. I can just tell you from being an emergency room
physician, I have trouble handling the emergency department
every day just on a regular workload. And so if we take the
Minnesota case from a couple of months ago, a person who had a
case of inhalational anthrax, and the amount of resources that
it took to keep that one person alive, including intensive
care, multiple different physicians, and multiple different
medications, and if you multiply that by the effects of a
large-scale attack, the health care industry is going to be
overwhelmed very quickly. Unfortunate, the paradigm for the
health care industry is just-in-time care, and so there is very
little surge capacity capability.
Chairman Lieberman. That obviously in a difficult time in
our economy, but nonetheless that is high on the list of things
we need to try to do better at, that surge capacity. Dr.
O'Toole.
Dr. O'Toole. Well, no, we are not ready for a global
catastrophe involving a deadly pathogen, whatever its origin.
President Obama implicitly acknowledged this last month when he
called for an international effort in the surveillance and
management of infectious disease, whatever the origin of the
plague.
But in government, one is forced to focus on actionable
priorities, and if I had a magic wand, I would wish for three
things--although Dr. Garza's wish for fewer vulnerabilities and
more surge capacity all across the board in terms of the
response communities is a good start. We know that
communication is improved, and we also know from past
experience that the community's expectations of what they ought
to be doing, of what might happen, are very important. There is
recent research that shows just having a single person assigned
to outreach with the community can make a big difference in
terms of resilience and response. We ought to fund those people
and make sure every State and local health department has
somebody whose job is to do that. That could have a big impact.
We talk about it, but we mostly wave our hands at resilience
thus far.
I also think that having rapid, even point-of-care
diagnostic tests that say you are infected, you are not, in an
outbreak of disease, particularly at scale, is going to be
critically important. The technology for this exists. There is
wondrous technology that might be just within reach that would
be even better. We have got to build these diagnostic tests.
And, finally, I would just offer a caution on the
interagency process and the complexity of biodefense. I do
believe that we have made very significant incremental progress
over the past decade, but the interagency process is inherently
slow and cautious. That might be the right approach when we do
not know what we are doing and we do not want to make major
missteps and we want to carefully husband limited resources. On
the other hand, I think this is an area where the threat is
growing, where the consequences are potentially so dire that
the United States of America ought to make a few big bets and
think about in what areas could we invest where a leap ahead
would make a huge difference. Having a way to rapidly make
medicines and vaccines, to surge, to do that cheaply and with
fidelity, would change the world. We ought to think about that.
Creating a biosurveillance system instead of talking about
it, which would start with electronic links between public
health and hospitals, would make a big difference. NBAF would
make a big difference. If we leave it to the interagency and
biodefense is continuously peanut-buttered across all of these
very hard-working agencies, we are not going to make any leap-
aheads, and that worries me.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is a good challenging note
to end this on.
Do you have any more questions for this panel, Senator
Akaka?
Senator Akaka. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks for your service, thanks for
your testimony. Just putting it all together, really we have
come a long way, but as Dr. Majidi said, in this case even a
relatively small biological incident can have enormous effects.
And when you put that together with what we all acknowledge is
all the evidence we have of the work that our enemies--and then
the people who, as we found out in the anthrax case, apparently
a researcher uses these pathogens for hostile purposes, this is
really something to be concerned about. As we look at the list
of priorities and, as you know, in a big, open, free country
such as ours--and we want most especially to stay that way--it
is very hard to protect against all attacks. But if you started
to list the probabilities with consequences, I would say that
this is an area--that is, biodefense--that really comes right
to the top of certainly my priority list. So in that sense I
thank you for what you are doing, and we will continue to look
forward to working with you to get more and more secure. Thank
you for being here.
We will call the second panel now: Dr. Thomas Inglesby, Dr.
Robert Kadlec, and Dr. Jeff Levi. This means we have a total of
five M.D.'s and two Ph.D.'s testifying today. Thanks to the
three of you for being here and for your patience as we
listened to the first panel.
Our first witness today is Dr. Thomas Inglesby, who is
Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Center for
Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. He
was one of the center's founding members, served as its Deputy
Director and Chief Operating Officer. Whatever happened to the
first director?
Dr. Inglesby. She rose in the world a bit.
Chairman Lieberman. And I know you were recently named
chair of the Board of Scientific Counselors to CDC's Office of
Public Health Preparedness and Response. Thanks for being here,
and we welcome your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS V. INGLESBY, M.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER
Dr. Inglesby. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the chance to speak to you today about U.S.
biopreparedness 10 years after the anthrax attacks. My name is
Tom Inglesby. I am the director of the Center for Biosecurity
of UPMC, and as you requested, I will focus my testimony on
medical countermeasure development, biosurveillance, and other
issues raised in our recent center report, ``Crossroads in
Biosecurity.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Inglesby appears in the Appendix
on page 1196.
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The potential biological threats to the United States are
serious. We could face a new flu pandemic that spreads like
H1N1, but kills like H5N1, or a novel virus that jumps from
animals to humans and spreads across the world quickly, or
another biological weapon.
The anthrax letters of 2001, as shocking as they were, were
a very small case of the use of biological weapons. Attacks in
the future could affect extraordinary numbers of people.
In 2009, President Obama's National Security Council said:
``The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent
within an unprotected population could place at risk the lives
of hundreds of thousands of people. The unmitigated
consequences of such an event could overwhelm our public health
capabilities, potentially causing an untold number of deaths.''
One of the most important components of our defense against
biological threats is the development of medical
countermeasures. DHS has issued 12 Material Threat
Determinations for top biological threats to the American
public. Countermeasures for just three of those--anthrax,
smallpox, and botulism--have so far received the majority of
funding in advanced development and procurement. Here are my
suggestions for making more progress in the future on
countermeasure development.
First, BARDA should convey its specific priorities,
predicted budget requirements, and timelines for delivering
them. Right now it is not clear, or at least it is not clear
from the outside, what the top priority products are, how long
it will take to develop them, or how much it will cost. And for
each priority product that is to be developed, it should be
made clear to what extent its development requires more basic
science versus more advanced development, and the funding for
this work should be allocating accordingly. If specific
regulatory problems are the problem, then funding should be
directed to FDA to resolve them.
When decisions are made to purchase a particular
countermeasure in the National Stockpile, an explanation should
be provided, to the extent possible in the public, that
explains the choice and the quantity and the way it will be
used in crisis.
BARDA's recent Strategic Plan places a priority on broad
spectrum antimicrobials and multi-use platforms. In the long
term, we absolutely do need to develop multi-use platforms and
broad spectrum products. But we also need to make sure
expectations are not unduly raised in the short term. There are
few experts who think a shift like this is likely in the short
term. So in the short term, we need very applied, very directed
advanced development of products that address the greatest
material threats to the country. And we should certainly
stretch our biosecurity resources in the smartest possible
ways, for example, by extending the shelf life of products
already in the stockpile, wherever possible, and by
investigating the feasibility of shortening the course of
antibiotics for various diseases that we might be exposed to,
and by completing dose-sparing studies that could help us
vaccinate more people while decreasing costs.
In the realm of countermeasures, there are serious funding
issues. There has not been enough advanced development funding
as compared to basic science funding in the Federal budget for
this mission, and BARDA has received a small fraction of what a
private company would have required to make the same number of
products. It is also our understanding that the BioShield fund
will be depleted this year, and without a BioShield fund, we
will not get new products procured.
And, finally, FDA was funded properly to deal with medical
countermeasures for the first time this last year, but that
program's budget was reduced from $170 million to $19 million
in the Senate and to zero in the House. Its work would be
significantly set back if the FDA got that budget allocation.
Biosurveillance is also another critical area of U.S.
biopreparedness, and there have been gains but much work
remains to be done. In many places biosurveillance is still too
slow to discover or keep up with fast-moving epidemics. A few
recommendations to improve it:
First, a small portion of the $18 billion that is now going
into the electronic health record incentive program should be
moved to public health in order to allow them to be able to
process and analyze information related to outbreaks.
We also need to improve electronic laboratory reporting.
All notifiable diseases should be automatically reported from
the lab to health departments and continue to be transmitted
throughout the course of an outbreak, and that does not happen
now, although all in public health agree it is a top priority.
In addition, as Dr. O'Toole said, we should place higher
priority on rapid diagnostics. Right now we are investing
heavily in the basic science side of diagnostics, but it trails
off as we get to commercialization and development, and we
could change that and make a big difference.
And, finally, I want to emphasize how important public
health preparedness is to U.S. biosecurity. Prior to 2001, many
health departments lacked even the most basic expertise and
infrastructure, and after 2001, incredible things have happened
in the public health arena. New Federal funding has built a lab
network, funded epidemiologists around the country, developed
24/7 response capacity, and much more. But recent declines in
public health funding have directly, and very directly,
threatened public health gains around the country. Federal
funding for public health preparedness programs has declined by
27 percent since 2005 with a cut of more than $100 million
since fiscal year 2010 alone.
If the proposed cuts take place in this year's CDC
preparedness budget and preparedness efforts around the country
will suffer. For example, the cuts would diminish or eliminate
CDC's ability to prepare for nuclear or radiological terrorism,
CDC's diagnostic program for emerging infectious diseases,
their chemical laboratory and response programs, the Laboratory
Response Network, and all of the academic centers for public
health around the country, which is the only CDC external
funding for preparedness research. I think this would be a real
loss for the country, and I really would urge Congress to
consider reversing the funding cuts that are planned.
So, in conclusion, the country has made real strides in
preparedness over the last 10 years. I have detailed them in my
written testimony--some of them, I should say--but a lot of
work remains to be done. I hope the Committee and its
colleagues working on the reauthorization of the PAHPA bill now
in the Senate and the House will ensure we continue to make
progress in the time ahead.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Inglesby. That
was very direct, in some cases provocative, and some
interesting ideas. I appreciate it.
Dr. Robert Kadlec was a career military officer physician
in the U.S. Air Force--we thank you for your service--and also
served in a number of senior positions at the White House,
Senate, and Department of Defense, and now is a biodefense
consultant to industry and government agencies. His most recent
government position was Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Biological Defense Policy on the Homeland
Security Council.
We are grateful that you are here and welcome your
testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. KADLEC, M.D.,\1\ FORMER SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND SENIOR
DIRECTOR FOR BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE POLICY
Dr. Kadlec. Chairman Lieberman, thank you. I am evidence of
a red herring, I guess is the way to start off my comments
today. I would like to thank Members of the Committee, as well
as staff, and it is really a privilege to testify before you
today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Kadlec appears in the Appendix on
page 1205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One issue to put in historical context is that the efforts
to prepare our country for bioterrorism predated 9/11. And, in
fact, the progress that we have to date is really a testimony
to three consecutive presidential administrations and several
congresses in tandem. The Executive and Legislative Branches
established bipartisan policies, passing vital authorizing
legislation, and appropriating funds over the last dozen years.
And, sir, I would note your leadership in this area. During my
tenure on the Hill, working with Chuck Ludlam, your BioShield
II legislation served as being, if you will, the father of the
PAHPA legislation that ultimately passed.
So it really has been an achievement of bipartisanship over
that period of time, and in many ways Congress has led the way
to ensure improvements in State and local emergency service and
public health preparedness, in research, development, and
procurement of medical countermeasures, and improved hospital
and first responder preparedness.
Despite the progress, I think as has already been
discussed, we are far from being entirely prepared. I think the
point in the question you made earlier, sir, about the
difference between a small and large attack, I think, is worthy
of noting the difficulty discerning the difference between
wide-scale disruption and wide-scale devastation. And, quite
frankly, one of the leaders that you did not have here today,
Dr. Peggy Hamburg, the current Director of the FDA, really
identified the dilemma back in 2005, that if the spores of one
anthrax envelope had been put in the air shaft of the World
Trade Center, there would have been a far larger number of
casualties that died in those towers as they fell.
Chairman Lieberman. That is right. I remember when she said
that. That was chilling.
Dr. Kadlec. And so when you look at today's environment,
and particularly the remarks of the former National
Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter, where he
expressed his concern about the risk from chemical and
biological terrorism, particularly after he left his position
as Director in July 2011, where he said, ``The potential threat
from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is very real. The most
likely . . . are simple forms of chemical or biological weapons
attacks (rather than a nuclear attack).''
I am reminded daily, looking in the papers, as I look at
the casualty list of young Americans who have died in either
Iraq or Afghanistan, to understand that we continue to be at
war with these individuals and groups who are intent on using
these weapons. And I think it is worthy to note, sir, and you
have already commented on the Graham and Talent report, that we
have a long way to go but have covered a lot of ground in terms
of some of our specific capabilities. But I am going to
identify two major obstacles and one critical missing
ingredient leading to improved preparedness. The beauty about
them is, quite frankly, they do not cost a lot of money.
The first obstacle we have to overcome is our understanding
of the difference between bioterrorism, biowarfare, and natural
disease pandemics. Quite frankly, Mother Nature is not a
thinking enemy intent on inflicting grievous harm to our
country, killing our citizens, undermining our government, or
destroying our way of life. Mother Nature does not develop
highly virulent organisms that are resistant to our current
stockpiles of antibiotics or disseminate them in high doses to
result in more rapid onset and a more virulent clinical course
of disease than seen in nature.
Mother Nature does not target our military forces to
undermine our capability, or our civilian population,
undermining our willingness to protect our national interest.
And certainly Mother Nature does not use biological agents to
achieve the lethal equivalence of nuclear weapons.
The second obstacle confronting us is embracing the greater
role for the Federal Government that is inherent in our
Constitution in responding to the risk particularly from
deliberate biological threats. While all disasters are local, a
biological attack is just that--an attack on our Nation--and
our Federal Government needs to commit to a greater role in
supporting and assisting State and local authorities.
And, finally, I firmly believe that the missing critical
ingredient, the secret sauce, to continued progress and future
success is leadership. It was the finding of the 2010 National
Biodefense Science Board report to the Secretary of HHS, as
well as one of the three principal recommendations of the
Graham and Talent report card. Without strong leadership that
emanates from the White House, that is propagated through the
Federal departments to State and local authorities, no amount
of money will make us sufficiently prepared. We saw some of the
leaders that sat on the first panel here today.
The White House has already demonstrated such leadership
with its commitment against the threat from nuclear
proliferation and cyber attacks, but biological weapons can
kill more than cyber attacks and are easier to develop, as you
noted, sir, than nuclear weapons. Without the President's
visible concern and commitment, the best efforts of many
capable people of his Administration will be wanting. White
House involvement is essential to ensure that departments and
agencies live up to their interagency obligations under the
National Response Framework and emergency support functions.
Just to highlight two in particular, the role of the
Department of Defense and the role of the Department of
Veterans Affairs in the response to surge capacity, for
example, the involvement and contribution of those two agencies
have not been entirely optimized.
Visible leadership is not only a requisite for the
Executive Branch, but as you know, sir, Congress has a vital
leadership role as well. Congress can and has effectively
advanced preparedness through legislative initiatives,
oversight, and appropriations, and I understand, sir, your
Committee is considering legislation to complement the bill
created by your colleagues in the House. And I also understand
there are efforts in the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee to reauthorize the Pandemic All-Hazards Act to
complement the bill passed out of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee. Hopefully, Congress will act to pass one or,
ideally, both bills before the end of this session.
Finally, I offer one last observation and thought. The
grades issued by Senators Graham and Talent are useful to
assess where we stand, but they are, frankly, abstract to the
grim reality they represent. As a military physician who served
in two conflicts, Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, I know too
well that in war, grades do not matter. Combat is a pass-fail
test. Simply stated, accepting getting a D or F grade means
many Americans may die needlessly in the event of an attack.
This is not only unacceptable, but as public servants, we would
be derelict in our duty if we did not do everything in our
power to prepare our country and protect our citizens from this
risk.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Dr. Kadlec. That was
excellent and also raised some good questions, which we will
come back to.
Dr. Jeffrey Levi is Executive Director of the Trust for
America's Health.
In January of this year, President Obama appointed Dr. Levi
to the Advisory Group on Prevention, Health Promotion, and
Integrative and Public Health. In April, he was appointed chair
of that group. He is also a professor of health policy at the
George Washington University's School of Public Health, where
his research is focused on HIV/AIDS, Medicaid, and integrating
public health with the health care delivery system.
That is an impressive resume, and thanks for being here
today.
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY LEVI, PH.D.,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRUST
FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH
Mr. Levi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am grateful for
the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the progress
and challenges we face on the 10th anniversary of the terrorist
attacks on our Nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Levi appears in the Appendix on
page 1213.
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I am going to focus on public health's role, which is
crucial, in emergency preparedness and response. Health
departments perform the surveillance that detects the first
cases in an outbreak. Laboratories test the samples.
Epidemiologists conduct the investigation and pinpoint the
source. And public health workers coordinate the medical
response, advise and communicate to the public, and distribute
vaccines or drugs that help save lives.
The anthrax attacks were a great wakeup call to the need
for greater investment in public health preparedness, and over
the last decade we have made dramatic progress in meeting this
responsibility. But, unfortunately, it seems that we have hit
the snooze button because that progress is greatly threatened
by recent funding cutbacks at the Federal, State, and local
level, and we could face the sad irony that if another attack
were to occur today, we may be better prepared than we were 10
years ago, but possibly not as well prepared as 3 years ago.
Last month, Trust for America's Health and the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation released a new report, ``Remembering 9/11
and Anthrax: Public Health's Vital Role in National Defense.''
In developing this report, we learned that the public health
system mounted an extraordinary response to these events
despite limited familiarity with bioterrorism and decades of
underfunding that left it with a deficit in technology,
workforce, and training.
For example, in 2001, there was not a clear public health
response system in place for handling unexpected emergencies;
thus, much of the response was developed on the fly.
There was little to no experience in countermeasures
research and development, and CDC and health departments faced
a crushing demand for information and recommendations that had
not been prepared in advance.
Despite these challenges, public health rose to the
occasion. The Laboratory Response Network, which is now an
integral piece of the BioWatch program, tested 350,000
environmental samples and clinical specimens over an extended
period. CDC provided national surveillance, laboratory
diagnostic support, treatment recommendations, and advice on
post-exposure prophylaxis. And public health helped to calm a
Nation by putting science first in risk communications.
Since fiscal year 2003, Congress has invested over $12
billion in State and local public health preparedness, hospital
preparedness, and State and local pandemic capacity. This
outlay has led to tremendous progress in our ability to prepare
for and respond to an emergency. Now we recognize that
bioterrorism and emergency preparedness are integral to the
role of public health and that public health is integral to
disaster preparedness and response. We have fully developed
rapid response capabilities so that health impacts are
considered and mitigated from day one of an emergency.
Unfortunately, these improvements cannot be maintained with
one-time investments. Training of our public health workforce
must be ongoing; vaccines and antivirals in the Strategic
National Stockpile are expiring; technology is quickly becoming
outdated; and health departments need predictable funding to
operate laboratories, respond to emergencies, and investigate
outbreaks. And yet Federal support for public health
preparedness has been cut by 37 percent since fiscal year 2005.
Moreover, the cuts at the Federal level have been matched or
exceeded at the State and local level. As a result, I worry
deeply, as do my colleagues on the front line of public health
agencies, that our capacity to respond to a new emergency will
be severely diminished in the near future.
These budget cuts are not just about money to purchase
supplies and equipment. They are about the people who are
essential to an effective public health response. Were a major
public health emergency to occur today, even compared to the
demands of the pandemic H1N1 just 2 years ago, there might not
be enough workers to effectively respond. Forty-four thousand
State and local public health positions were lost since 2008.
We simply cannot quickly hire and train a 21st Century public
health emergency workforce after an attack occurs.
There is one silver lining here. Since the creation of the
Prevention and Public Health Fund, we have put over $60 million
in epidemiologial and lab capacity across the country at the
State and local level, but that funding is also at risk, and if
we lose that money as well, we will be in even worse shape.
We also need to fundamentally rethink how we do
surveillance for both emergencies and routine public health
issues. Our disease surveillance system has been built one
disease or crisis at a time, resulting in archaic and static
silos of information. The particular challenge in the field of
preparedness is that we do not necessarily know in advance what
we will need to know. And, thus, the most comprehensive
approach to data collection is needed.
We must also harness the opportunities afforded by the
Nation's transition to health IT systems with electronic health
records at their core, and I think you heard from previous
witnesses the degree to which public health needs to be at the
table in the design and development and implementation of these
processes, or else they will not help us in the area of
preparedness.
Our report found that the United States often takes a band-
aid approach to public health preparedness. As new emergencies
and concerns emerge and attention shifts, resources are
diverted from one pressing priority to another, leaving other
ongoing areas unaddressed. I am encouraged to see this
Committee is taking these threats seriously, and I thank you
again for the opportunity to be here today and look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Levi, very much. I was
really struck by one line from your testimony, which is the
effect of funding cuts: ``. . . the sad irony is that if
another anthrax attack were to occur today, we may be better
prepared than 10 years ago--but possibly not as well as 3 years
ago.'' And this is part of the effect of the budget deficit
crisis we have gotten ourselves into. We have to be very
mindful of it.
I want to ask you at the beginning what you think of, to
me, an interesting idea that Dr. Kadlec mentioned, which is, at
least in part, to try to ameliorate this problem with regard
the need for a public health surge in response to a biodisaster
or a bioattack by being prepared to utilize personnel from the
Department of Defense and/or the VA.
Mr. Levi. I think Dr. Kadlec was referring to health care
personnel, and that is certainly----
Chairman Lieberman. Correct. That was my assumption.
Mr. Levi. Right, and that certainly is appropriate, and I
think there are plans on the table, and how well they have been
exercised is another question. But I think all of those
agencies are committed to doing that kind of collaborative
work.
That is once we have identified what is going on, but my
concern with personnel is that the day-to-day public health
capacities of detecting, identifying a pathogen, communicating
with the public, disseminating countermeasures, those kinds of
things that are a core public health function. We have lost
44,000 workers. We have lost people who are trained. It
requires special expertise, and it requires expertise that is
exercised over and over again so we keep improving. That
capacity is dramatically diminished compared to 3 or 4 years
ago, and if the budget cuts that seem to be on the table now go
forward, it will even be worse.
Chairman Lieberman. I wish I could be encouraging about
that. In the short run, it is very hard to be. Hopefully we
will get the economy going again. But, of course, particularly
in the stress that we are under now in terms of our budget,
this should force us to make priority judgments, and by any
number of standards this is a priority for us. To me it is part
of the constitutional responsibility to provide for the common
defense, really.
Dr. Inglesby, you pointed out something that I think there
is not enough awareness of. It is a fact that over the last 10
years, the Federal Government has made significant progress,
building on progress before, and developing medical
countermeasures such as vaccines and therapeutics to anthrax,
smallpox, and botulinum. But as you point out, those are just 3
of the 12 agents that the Department of Homeland Security
identifies as representing a material threat to our country,
and that does not even include the emerging threats of someone
manipulating substances, for instance, in a laboratory.
Dr. Inglesby. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. So I wanted to ask you, first off, if
you accept the rationale behind the listing of these 12 and
whether you think the prioritization of the medical
countermeasures, that is, on behalf of the Federal Government,
is clear enough.
Dr. Inglesby. I do think the material threat determination
process is very rigorous. As an outsider, I have seen a couple
of the processes play through, and I have been very impressed
with the rigor and the science. The details of the specific
ordering right now I think is not public, so I cannot comment
on that.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Inglesby. But, in general, I think that it is a very
rigorous process, and it is like what is done in other parts of
the government. You set requirements and then the government
reacts accordingly, and you set requirements as scientifically
and rigorously as possible.
So I think it is the right place to start with, actual
requirements that there is wide agreement on in the government,
and then to work backwards from that.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. In the medical countermeasure
review that Health and Human Services released last year, they
pointed out a number of things that they are going to do to
improve the development of medical countermeasures such as
including particularly the one that Dr. Lurie talked about,
creating government manufacturing centers, partnering with the
private sector and strategic investment firms, as well as
moving to products that address multiple threats and, finally,
to streamline FDA regulation.
Give us your reaction to those recommendations, and how
would you prioritize those? Which do you think offer us the
most hope of making more rapid progress?
Dr. Inglesby. Well, starting with the last first, I think
there is total agreement in and out of the government that FDA
needed more resources and a lot more heft behind its program,
and it has gotten it in the past year. So I think that was a
really important development.
I think there was also a part of that review that said
there should be more integration between the various parts of
government, NIH, BARDA, FDA, and CDC. I think that is very
important.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Inglesby. When we have a requirement on the table, have
we sorted out exactly what is required in the realm of basic
science? Does that relate to advanced development? Does it
relate to what is going to go in the stockpile, its regulatory
problems? I think that is a very important facet of the
strategy.
As regards the Centers for Innovation and Advanced
Development, I certainly believe in the principles behind that
program, and we were supportive of that for a number of years
as it was being discussed. In principle, it is a way to engage
large pharmaceutical companies, which would be great for the
country. It is actually probably crucial in the years ahead to
get the talent of large pharmaceutial companies. And, in
principle, it was a way to consolidate the costs and reduce the
costs and concentrate expertise. And, in principle, I think it
was a way to foster innovation.
I do not know how it will play out. I have to say, in terms
of making my conflicts available to your Committee, our mother
institution was a potential competitor for that program and has
decided not to compete.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Inglesby. But I hope that it succeeds. I certainly
favor its original principles, and we will have to see how it
ends.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Kadlec, let me bring you into this
because you mentioned Chuck Ludlam who used to work with me. He
is really creative, and he had an idea which I thought was a
great idea. What do we do to get the big pharmaceutical
companies into this field? Because it is not a naturally
attractive market. So, Mr. Ludlam had the idea--and I put it
forward; I think Senator Orrin Hatch was with me on that one--
to say to big pharmaceutical companies, if you develop a
medical countermeasure that HHS determines has some promise or
passes a threshold, then go ahead with it, and we will give you
the right to choose one of the array of drugs you have and
extend the patent for 2 years.
Well, it was as if we had sounded the trumpet for battle,
and the generic drug manufacturers came marching with great
force over the Hill and killed that idea.
I am not saying it is the only idea out there, but it was,
I think, a creative attempt to deal with this problem. I wonder
with the passage of years whether you have any other thoughts
about how to make sure that we develop medical countermeasures,
beginning with those nine other agents that the Department has
said we have to worry about.
Dr. Kadlec. Well, sir, I certainly was around during the
time of the wild card and certainly do remember. I think I have
a few trample marks on me from the generics. [Laughter.]
But the issue is really about the role of big
pharmaceutical companies here, and their interest and appetite
to be involved seems to involve two areas. One is the issue of
risk and, quite frankly, the other one is the issue of profit.
Obviously, the ``wild card'' option certainly was an incentive
on the profit side, and there has been much, I think, to
address the risk side subject such as the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act, which had to do with liability. So
in some ways, that barrier has been lowered.
The other part of risk is technological risk and, if you
will, where I think the government is trying, and appropriately
so, to establish that there are opportunities for big and small
pharmaceutical companies to get involved in places where co-
development of new technologies. Platform technologies that
could be used for biodefense that have direct commercial
relevance and applicability and the assurance that the FDA
would consider these as not only commercial but also national
security-viable technology approaches is certainly another
incentive. The question is whether that is enough, and, quite
frankly, I think we still face the challenges with big
pharmaceutical companies where they still view the profit
incentives to be somewhat limited.
I do not know if we will ever get over that hurdle, but I
do believe that in some ways engaging them in terms of
opportunities where they can expand their technology set, where
they can defer the risk of development particularly of platform
technologies goes a long way. And there may be other sweeteners
involved subject to some of the orphan drug status that could
be given particularly to biodefense countermeasures. But it is
a very difficult balance to entice them to the table.
Now, the ``wild card'' option here in another sense is the
evolution or natural evolution of the big pharmaceutical
company blockbusters where they seem to be kind of going away,
where they are looking for smaller products.
Chairman Lieberman. That is true.
Dr. Kadlec. And so in some ways there may be a new
landscape to engage them.
Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. Yes, good idea.
Dr. Kadlec. So I would say do not give up the ``wild card''
option just yet.
Chairman Lieberman. But the reality is that if we were
attacked by one of those nine other biological agents, we do
not really have medical countermeasures for those now, do we?
Dr. Kadlec. That is correct. I think the answer is that the
pipeline has been focused deliberately on some of the highest
threats--anthrax, smallpox.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, sure. Right.
Dr. Kadlec. But, yes, the sequencing of other things that
are less notable--tularemia, for example, and other threats on
that list--have not probably been given the appropriate
recognition or resources.
Chairman Lieberman. Did you want to add something, Dr.
Inglesby.
Dr. Inglesby. I was just going to agree with what you just
said, yes.
Chairman Lieberman. That ought to get our attention, and
some of those--am I right?--are not that complicated to make,
to bring together.
Dr. Inglesby. Well, I think any drug or vaccine is
complicated----
Chairman Lieberman. No, I mean the threat.
Dr. Inglesby. Sorry, the threat.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Dr. Inglesby. Yes, I mean, the things on the list--all of
those agents are available in the world to acquire.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Inglesby. And many of them are causing outbreaks in the
world in any given month.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Garza was kind enough to stay, so
there is always a danger inherent in that, but I am going to
quote something from your testimony--Dr. O'Toole is here, too--
and ask the witnesses for a response.
Dr. Garza indicated in his testimony that, following some
kinds of biological attacks, ideally we would need to detect
and start mass dispensing treatments in as little as 1 to 2
days. And I wanted to ask you--and I really should have asked
Dr. Garza, too--whether, to the best of your knowledge, there
is any city, for instance, that is able to meet this
expectation for a wide-area attack for even just one of the
biological threats we face. Dr. Levi, do you know?
Mr. Levi. I cannot answer that question with specificity,
but I think it speaks to the incredible importance of not
losing more of our public health workforce, because you cannot
create this kind of pop-up capacity.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Good. Anybody else?
Dr. Kadlec. Sir, I would just comment I think that there is
still a lot of doubt and concern about it. I know during my
tenure in the White House in late 2008 we had serious concerns.
Just to note that President Obama signed an Executive Order in
December 2009 mobilizing Federal assets to help assist in the
dispensing effort, particularly the role of the U.S. Postal
Service, the Department of Defense, as well as trying to use
other Federal employees and other agencies to also assist.
Quite frankly, there are two challenges here. One is, if
you will, the tyranny of time that is created by, one, the
natural epidemiologies of diseases and the potential effect of
high dose exposures that basically change the normal incubation
period, resulting in some of these diseases to appear much
faster.
The second issue is what will be the public demand and
outcry. You can vividly imagine the CNN moment when this
becomes first realized, an attack has happened, either through
a BioWatch detection or the first case. There will be an
incredible demand on the system for these antibiotics and other
protective measures.
So the sooner the better, and, quite frankly, it is clear
that we are probably not fast enough yet.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Garza, we allow audience
participation here. Do you want to respond to the question,
which is: Is there any city or metropolitan area able to meet
that standard that you raised?
Dr. Garza. I think, Senator, that is an excellent question.
There has been tremendous work that has been done in the past
couple of years, both with the CDC as well as the Federal
interagency, in trying to develop that capacity. Dr. Kadlec is
entirely correct on those challenges to getting the medical
countermeasures out to the population. But we view it as
multidisciplined approach, so you have, for instance, the
postal model; we are trying to engage more to get the private
sector involved. As part of the Executive Order, the President
directed his Administration to develop ways of dispensing
countermeasures to mission-essential people. So it is a multi-
dimensional approach to this problem.
Chairman Lieberman. While I have you there, because we are
focused on the Postal Service, unfortunately, in other ways,
take a minute and tell us where we are in the exploration of
using this remarkable national network of the Postal Service to
help in terms of biodefense.
Dr. Garza. Yes, sir. To my knowledge--and HHS ASPR runs
most of the programs to do this--the program that has been
developed and is the most widely known is the one in
Minneapolis. If I believe correctly, I believe there are three
or four other cities that are exploring the options or have
developed plans to use the postal option. But, again, I would
emphasize that it is one part of a multilayered approach,
albeit an important one, but it has to be thought of as a
multilayered approach.
Chairman Lieberman. And there, just to be specific, we are
looking at the postal men and women delivering vaccines, for
instance, or distributing vaccines.
Dr. Garza. They would be distributing medical
countermeasures, so antibiotics.
Chairman Lieberman. I am sorry. Antibiotics, right.
Dr. Garza. Yes, sir. So they would be delivering
antibiotics to the population's homes.
Chairman Lieberman. I think that is important to continue
to explore.
Dr. Kadlec. Just to put a finer point on that, because
there are three cities that are in line to basically follow
Minneapolis: San Diego, Boston, and Philadelphia. Those cities
have received grants from HHS through the Cities Readiness
Initiative to do so. So it is, again, as Dr. Garza has said,
part of a multipronged approach, but the postal option really
represents a first strike capability, which can in 12 hours to
basically delover a limited supply of antibiotics to every
residence within designated zip codes.
Chairman Lieberman. So obviously the Postal Service is in
real financial trouble, but part of what we are trying to do--
it happened to come under the jurisdiction of this Committee--
with the Postmaster General is to look at ways we can
capitalize on the unique national network they have. As you
probably know, for instance, FedEx and UPS use the U.S. Postal
Service for the last mile of delivery in a lot of cases where
it does not make financial sense for those very successful
companies to do so. And in the same way, this is an existing
network which, as you say, can deliver antibiotics in a crisis
very quickly.
Dr. Inglesby, you made a really interesting suggestion, and
I want to ask you to develop it a bit. It begins with the fact
that in the so-called stimulus act, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, there was appropriated $18 billion
for the improvement and modernization of health recordkeeping,
a general description. So you are suggesting today--and, again,
I presume this is all about priorities--that some part of that
ought to be reallocated to this particular problem. So talk in
a little more detail about what you have in mind.
Dr. Inglesby. So right now, if there is an outbreak in
Washington, DC, the health department, who is going to be asked
to figure out what is going on, has to actually walk over or
phone somebody to try and go through the medical records one by
one on paper. And this new program holds out the hope that you
could connect health departments and clinical outpatient
offices or inpatient in the hospital in an electronic way where
people from their desks in the health department could try and
actually go in and understand what is happening in a hospital
or in a clinic automatically and analyze it and try and figure
out if there are patterns going on in the hospital of this new
outbreak.
The $18 billion is set up to provide incentives to the
hospitals and to the doctors to develop electronic health
records, and there is a series of criteria that are laid out in
order to get that money. If we changed, even modified a few of
those criteria a little bit to say they have to be able to be
read by public health departments in a crisis, then we could
use a little bit of that money to help solve a very big divide
between public health and clinical medicine.
We had a meeting about this recently in our center, and the
public health officials who see all this happening are upset
about it because there has not been a dollar provided. They see
that these electronic health records are being created, but
public health is basically on the sidelines. They do not have
any money to build their own IT systems to receive it. They do
not have any incentive to connect nor any database management
capacity. So a little bit of money could go a long way.
Chairman Lieberman. Excellent idea.
Mr. Levi. If I could add to that, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Levi. I think it is important to think about the money
that is being invested for electronic health records in the
context of health reform--it is certainly a critical piece--and
that the system we are designing is responsive to public health
needs as well. But I think I would also add that we do have a
receipt question as well, which is whether existing
infrastructure in a lot of health departments even with those
requirements would be able to receive and properly analyze the
date. And I think that is a standard-setting and a training
issue for public health agencies.
And I think I would add that we spend, just in the core
work of CDC and the money they send out to the States, a lot of
money on public health surveillance. That whole system needs to
be redesigned, and with the redesign of that system, we may
actually find the capacity and the resources to do a lot of the
things that are needed on the preparedness side as well.
Chairman Lieberman. Those are very constructive
suggestions, and we will see if the Committee cannot move them
into the system.
Dr. Kadlec, a final question. In your testimony you put a
lot of emphasis on leadership, and, of course, I agree with
you. It is always a critical component, sometimes overlooked
because we get focused on details of what you want to do and
forget the leadership. So is there a criticism there? Do you
think we lack effective leadership in this biodefense area
right now?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, I would just put it in--use a football
analogy--we have a lot of great assistant coaches. You saw many
of them. Some are still here.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Kadlec. Where is the head coach? And where is the head
coach basically making this a cause celebre--not to make a
rhetorical statement around this, but as I did in my tenure at
the White House. Someone needs to be the advocate and educate
around this issue, particularly at the political level where
there is little familiarity with it. I think there are many in
the current White House who are experts on the nuclear issues.
Certainly the pressing issues around cyber warfare and cyber
attacks on our country and our economy have driven it in a
different way.
The risk of bioterrorism and biowarfare is one area that,
quite frankly, needs similar kinds of leadership. I think Dr.
O'Toole identified some of the leaders there now. That is very
important. But, literally, you have to have someone 24/7 whose
only job is this. I am convinced, having lived it and breathed
it for a period of time, where you can basically go into those
meetings and fight toe to toe with OMB to ensure that they do
not necessarily decrement your program because they just do not
understand the national security component to it.
A quick example. In the recent budget alignments where OMB
went through the exercise to basically significantly decrement
a variety of different accounts, clearly homeland security and
national security were treated differently. But health programs
were not, and, quite frankly, the biodefense program,
particularly within OMB, is buried in the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services. And so in some ways it takes a greater
haircut than maybe some of the other programs would because
just simply the recognition is not there that this small amount
of money, even though it is not, about $7 billion, is like any
other billion dollars that are devoted to health and other
related programs. And I think that is the challenge that you
have, and unless you have someone at that level to advocate and
to educate--and, literally, I had to bring people sometimes
kicking and screaming to the White House and interagency
meetings, to ensure that they understood the equities for the
country and national security.
Chairman Lieberman. So you are talking about not somebody,
for instance, in the Department of Homeland Security but
somebody in the White House, presumably in the National
Security Council, who would be designated as the person in
charge of biodefense.
Dr. Kadlec. I think that is necessary but not sufficient,
to get to Dr. O'Toole's point. I mean, I think the fact that if
you have the right constellation of leaders across the
interagency, that is also critical. But it also helps to have
someone at the White House level where particularly for some of
these intractable problems, subject to the integration of our
biodefense medical countermeasure portfolio, or the issue of
basically leveraging Department of Defense or VA to make their
medical capabilities available in case of surge, or security
for medical countermeasure distribution by the Postal Service,
those are things that sometimes are best done at a level above
that. But you need all of it. You just cannot have some of it.
Chairman Lieberman. I think we have taken enough of your
time, and I am going to go on to another meeting. This has been
a very constructive hearing. The first panel was excellent. You
built on the first panel with some very good suggestions that I
think will guide the Committee as to where we can try to be
supportive here. I appreciate your testimony and all the work
that you do in this area very much.
We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 15
days for any additional questions or statements for the record.
With that, I thank you again, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE NEXT WAVE IN AVIATION SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor,
Landrieu, Collins, Paul, and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins [presiding]. Good morning. The hearing will
come to order.
Senator Lieberman, the Committee's Chairman, has been
unavoidably delayed. He will be joining us shortly, but he has
asked me to proceed to convene the hearing and delivery my
opening statement. In fact, he suggested that I give a very
lengthy opening statement in order to allow him to proceed with
his before we call on our first witness. [Laughter.]
Nevertheless, we will proceed as normal.
By targeting our airplanes, al-Qaeda succeeded in killing
nearly 3,000 people a decade ago. Aviation security is clearly
critical to homeland security. We Americans have demonstrated
our willingness to endure enhanced security measures at our
airports if those measures appear to be reasonable and related
to real risks. But travelers become frustrated when security
measures inconvenience them, apparently without cause, or when
they appear to be focused on those who pose little or no
threat.
Next month, it will be 10 years since the shoe bomber
failed to take down his flight from Paris bound for Miami, yet
we still take our shoes off. In 2006, British and American
intelligence thwarted an effort to conceal explosives in liquid
bottles. We still cannot carry on a regular-sized tube of
toothpaste onto an airplane. The Christmas Day bomber hid
explosives in his underwear and media reports indicate that
terrorists have shown interest in having explosive devices
surgically implanted in their bodies. These threats have led to
more intrusive pat-down searches, and one wonders what more
will be required of airline passengers in the future.
We see TSA putting the very young and the very old through
intrusive and, in most cases, unnecessary screenings. At the
same time, it troubles many Americans to learn that a young man
was able to fly cross-country without a valid government ID and
with an expired boarding pass that was not even issued in his
name. If we continue to give extra screening to individuals who
appear to pose no threat, yet others who should arouse
suspicion can get past checkpoints without being questioned,
our systems still are not as finely calibrated as they need to
be.
Since our June hearing, the Administration has implemented
a risk analysis to improve the screening process, a welcome
change. This effort should provide a more effective and
efficient use of the government's limited screening resources.
I am encouraged, for example, that this new risk-based approach
is designed to permit TSA to learn more about travelers through
information they choose to provide. Some of the changes will
also respond to several of our most common airport screening
complaints. Secretary Janet Napolitano said in September that
frequent flyers who opt in to a known traveler program will
often be able to keep their shoes on and their laptops in their
bags. TSA, to its credit, and Administrator John Pistole
deserves credit for this, also has changed the screening
procedures for children under 12, a common sense decision that
was overdue.
Nonetheless, questions remain regarding how some security
procedures affect Americans' privacy, their health, and whether
or not the procedures are as effective as they should be. In
August, TSA began installing new software in passenger
screening machines designed to enhance traveler privacy. Using
a generic outline of passengers, Automated Target Recognition,
detects items that could pose a potential threat. I first saw
this less-invasive technology in Amsterdam in 2010 and I
repeatedly raised this issue with Administrator Pistole and
Secretary Napolitano. This technology was implemented at
Schiphol Airport in the wake of the Christmas Day bomber who
was able to go through that airport with his explosives
undetected.
I would parenthetically note that I assumed that this was
some cutting-edge technology that had been developed in
Germany. I asked where it had been developed and was told in
Massachusetts. So, clearly, there are opportunities within our
own country to take advantage of new technology.
I urged consideration of this software, which better
respects travelers' privacy, eliminates the need for a separate
screener in a booth, relies less on human judgment, and
eliminates the inconsistencies associated with human reviewers.
I am very pleased that TSA is rolling out and testing this
technology.
While the ATR technology is currently being used with so-
called Millimeter Wave Machines which use radio frequency
energy to generate images, I would note that other Advanced
Imaging Technology, screening machines use backscatter X-ray
radiation that have continued to raise health concerns. This is
an issue that I hear about from my colleagues all the time
because most of us travel every single week. I also hear about
it from pregnant passengers who are concerned about the
exposure to the babies that they are carrying. DHS, in my view,
should independently evaluate the health effects of that
technology and establish a goal of using radiation-free
screening technology.
Let me underscore my appreciation of the fact that no
single screening technology can ensure our safety. There is no
magic bullet. There is no perfect system. And that is why a
layered system of security is so essential, involving watch
lists, intelligence, and all the tools at our disposal.
The fact is that we face a determined, innovative foe, and
no machines can substitute for good intelligence, well-trained
screeners, and an observant public. The passenger screening
process has received both attention and sometimes anger from
the traveling public. It became clear last year, however, from
the printer cartridge plot, that cargo security is also a
threat that terrorists are investigating. That is why Senator
Lieberman and I intend to introduce an air cargo screening
security bill later this year. Our successes in risk-based
screening of maritime cargo should provide a road map for risk-
based screening of air cargo, and that is what our legislation
is intended to do.
And, of course, just in the past 24 hours, we have learned
of gaps in our security related to certain catering operations
at Atlanta's main airport. Those are very serious concerns
because, obviously, the catering personnel have direct access
to materials that are put on airplanes, and I am sure that is
an issue that we will be talking about this morning.
Our government's first priority is to protect against
terrorism and the public will accept a certain level of
intrusion and inconvenience at our airports, as long as we are
convinced that it is enhancing our safety. But DHS should
continue to expand the use of risk-based approaches to
screening with technology and techniques that are safer, more
effective, and that minimize privacy and health concerns.
Now, at this point, I would usually say, ``Thank you, Mr.
Chairman,'' but in this case I would be thanking myself.
We are going to move to our first witness today. We are
very pleased to have with us John Pistole. He is the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration
within the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Pistole, we welcome you back to the Committee. I, for
one, want to commend you for your hard work and for being very
open to our suggestions and to the recommendations of the
public as you seek to protect the traveling public. Please
proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,\1\ ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Senator Collins, and thank
you for the Committee for your support of our Risk-Based
Security Initiative in terms of how we try to work to provide
the most effective security in the most efficient way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix
on page 1230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So when I last appeared before this Committee, as you
noted, our plans to deploy aspects of this Risk-Based Security
Initiative were still being formulated. I am pleased to report
that we have begun actually implementing several aspects of
risk-based security in some airports and testing other aspects
in other airports around the country, again, with the goal of
providing the most effective security in the most efficient
way.
As this initiative progresses, we must ensure that each
step strengthens security as intelligence informs us of
terrorists' ongoing interests in attacking aviation, and as
noted, because most air travelers present little risk of
committing an act of terrorism, the goal is to focus on those
who present the greatest risk. Anecdotally, we still find four
to five guns at airport security checkpoints every day.
Yesterday, we found six, including one at Chairman Lieberman's
Bradley Airport in Hartford, Connecticut, a loaded gun with
seven rounds in it in a checked bag that was going to try to
get through.
Our success in discovering other non-metallic items is
significantly enhanced through the use of Advanced Imaging
Technology, as you noted, because these machines give us the
best opportunity to find non-metallic threats such as we saw on
Christmas Day 2009 and have successfully detected items as
small as a coin or even a small individual piece of gum that is
wrapped. AIT, of course, is not perfect, as you know, and we
continue working closely with manufacturers to improve its
detection capability, but again noting that it does give us the
best available opportunity from a technology perspective of
detecting those Christmas Day-type bombs.
Additionally, as part of Risk-Based Security Initiative, we
recently deployed TSA Pre-Check, a voluntary passenger pre-
screening initiative with a small known traveler population in
four U.S. airports, placing more focus on pre-screening
individuals who volunteer information about themselves prior to
flying. Because we know more about them, TSA Pre-Check
travelers may move more swiftly through the standard screening
process and be able to divest fewer items, such as leaving
their shoes, belt, and a light jacket on along with keeping
their laptop in their briefcase and keep their liquids,
aerosols, and gels in their carry-on bag. Of course, we will
always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures
throughout the airport. At no point is a traveler guaranteed
expedited screening.
Initial feedback for TSA Pre-Check has been very favorable,
with approximately 40,000 travelers having gone through this
expedited screening process so far. Our first two partner
airlines, American and Delta, have successfully demonstrated
the required technical capabilities and we are working with
other airlines and other airports to expand the program as they
become operationally ready and as more and more people sign up
through Customs and Border Protection's hugely successful
Global Entry Program.
Efforts to expand identity-based screening are also evident
in a new crew member screening system which helps positively
verify the identity and employment status of airline pilots.
Under this program being tested at seven airports currently,
tens of thousands of airline pilots have processed through this
expedited screening, again, all with very positive feedback.
We are also evaluating an expanded Behavior Detection
Initiative that began this fall at Boston Logan Airport and now
Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. In this new
initiative, behavioral analysis techniques are used by
specially trained officers to determine if a traveler should be
referred for additional screening. This additional interaction
used by security agencies worldwide enables officers to better
confirm or dispel suspicious behavior and anomalies.
Preliminary analysis from Boston shows an increase in detecting
high-risk passengers, but additional data is required, both to
understand if that trend is statistically significant and to
measure it against our return on investment.
In August, we implemented, as you noted, a new screening
procedure for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave
their shoes on and go through a less intrusive security
screening, recognizing that intelligence indicates that these
travelers pose little risk to aviation security, although, of
course, it can be used by those who might want to cause harm.
These changes give our officers more options to resolve any
alarms that may occur during the screening process. The results
from this nationwide enhancement to screening show a sharp
reduction, although not elimination, of the need for a physical
pat-down for children and families have responded very
favorably to these changes.
Combined with TSA Pre-Check and known crew member
screening, these new processes help us free up resources to
focus on higher-risk travelers. In essence, risk-based security
helps us strengthen security by reducing the size of the
haystack in which a terrorist might be hiding. I am dedicated
to further identifying additional groups as part of the High-
Risk Security Initiative and I look forward to updating this
Committee as these efforts progress.
So in closing, innovation, partnerships, and a commitment
to the pursuit of excellence, these are the watchwords of TSA
as we move into 2012.
Thank you, Senator Collins and Members of the Committee,
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward
to answering your questions. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole.
As we have seen over the years, terrorists continue to look
for gaps in our aviation security procedures and that is why I
was particularly disturbed to read of a local TV report in
Atlanta, Georgia, where lax airline catering security
procedures were identified through an investigative report and
an undercover video. And specifically, press reports indicate
that the video showed catering employees piggybacking through
security checkpoints. There were unsealed catering carts, which
obviously would allow explosives or weapons to be concealed
among the food in those carts, that were in the staging area
before they were being loaded onto the plane.
What is TSA doing in response to this report? Have we
identified yet another vulnerability, or do you believe this is
an isolated incident?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, and clearly, this is
something that we take seriously and is a concern under the
umbrella of the insider threats. So those who have some type of
special access, either through their work, employment, and
their backgrounds, allow them access in a way that the general
public does not have is something that we focus on. We set
standards for catering companies and airports around the
country, that they have to meet these standards. We inspect to
those standards. So when we get a report such as this, that
there has been some type of breach or vulnerability identified,
we move very quickly.
So in this instance--this was brought to our attention in
the last month--we immediately sent a team to Atlanta to work
with the airport but also the catering company to assess what
vulnerabilities there may be. We are continuing to follow up on
that in terms of an investigation as to what actually happened,
and that is ongoing. The bottom line is you will have all the
facts as to what may have happened and what other
vulnerabilities may need to be addressed, but we are moving
forward in concert with the catering company and the airport on
that.
Senator Collins. Could you explain to the Committee what
kind of vetting TSA does of airport employees and others who
have access to airplanes but are not passengers?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. There is a series of background checks
and a fairly robust system in place to assess whether anybody
who wants access to either the sterile area of the airport or
even the vendors who work in the non-sterile area, and so one
of the first checks, obviously, to do is to make sure they are
not on some type of terrorist watch list. So that is the first
step, obviously. A criminal background check is also done, and
then we do vetting that is recurrent for all those, especially
those who have that additional access to the sterile area.
We work closely with the companies and the airports for all
450 airports around the country to determine from a risk
mitigation perspective, do they see any vulnerabilities in
their employees, and then based on what the U.S. Government
knows, both within TSA and obviously FBI background checks and
the U.S. intelligence community, are there those who may pose a
problem.
The challenge comes, frankly, from the clean skins, those
who have no criminal background. They have not come up on a
terrorist watch list in any way. So that is the challenge that
we are presented. And so we also include random and
unpredictable security checks both for the catering companies,
for example, and for the employees. So we will do random
surprise checks, if you will, on an unpredictable basis so
terrorists cannot game that system. But it is clearly something
that we focus on.
Senator Collins. I would like to now switch to the issue of
cargo security in the final time that I have left, now that our
Chairman, the true Chairman, has joined us. As you may recall,
at a hearing that we held in November of last year, I asked you
the question that if our government had not received the
intelligence tip about explosives hidden in air cargo that was
shipped to Yemen, would our current security systems have
detected those package bombs, and you very candidly replied
that, in your professional opinion, we have not. Could you
bring us up to date on what has been done since that time so
that we have better screening in place for cargo? We are always
going to need intelligence information. That is absolutely
critical and it is part of the layered approach to security.
But it does worry me that if not for the intelligence tip,
these explosives would have made it to their destination, most
likely.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. A great deal has been
done, both by the U.S. Government, foreign governments, foreign
carriers, cargo carriers, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization, along with the National Maritime Organization,
the World Customs Organization, and the Universal Postal Union,
all those groups working together. As you may recall, I was in
Sana'a, Yemen, 5 days after this took place to work with the
Yemeni authorities, but the day that the intelligence came in,
I immediately issued a Security Directive Emergency Amendment
that put a ground stop on any cargo coming out of Yemen, of
course, as a first step.
What we have done, I believe, very collaboratively is work
with industry to assess from a very pragmatic standpoint, what
can you do today, what can you do in the short term, mid-term,
and long term in working with us? I mean, we can issue
regulations day in, day out. The question is, what can they
practically do that does not put a halt to the global supply
chain, which was significantly impacted when I issued those
Security Directive Emergency Amendments?
So what we have done is work with industry to establish
standards well beyond--much more rigorous than ours that
addresses risk mitigation from a business perspective in
addition to the government's perspective. And so, as you know,
100 percent of all cargo coming in on passenger planes from
overseas is now screened. All high-risk cargo is screened. And
we are working with industry as to the other portions that as
we divide, and we work very closely with Customs and Border
Protection, their Advance Targeting System, to say there are
categories of known shippers and known shipments. For those
that are in the unknown category, we need to apply additional
scrutiny, and have that applied before it comes to the United
States.
So that is what we are working through with carriers around
the world, frankly. There are 20 countries that account for 80
percent of all the cargo coming into the U.S. We are working
with countries on national cargo security programs. We have
already recognized several of those and look to recognize
another handful of those here in the not-too-distant future. So
a number of steps have been taken.
Senator Collins. That is good to hear. GAO, as you know,
has been critical that there are still problems with screening
palletized cargo and that is a scenario that we are going to
need to work on.
I want to turn the hearing back over to the Chairman, but
tell the Chairman that Mr. Pistole brought out in his public
testimony that the TSA is still capturing four to five guns per
day as part of its screening of carry-on luggage and
passengers, and he mentioned that just yesterday, the total was
six, and one of those guns was at Bradley International
Airport, and it was a fully-loaded gun.
So I think that is a very good reminder to us that there
still is a need for screening.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman [presiding.] Thanks, Senator Collins.
First, apologies to you, Mr. Pistole. I had to be on the floor
when it convened at 9:30, and thanks to Senator Collins. I was
just thinking about who is the chairman. I said it has been a
real pleasure to work with Senator Collins here, regardless of
who was in the majority or minority, and I said before that all
that would change in this session would be the titles we had,
so I appreciate her holding the gavel and bringing the hearing
to order.
And I agree with what she just said. I know that a lot of
people are taking their shoes off, taking their coats off,
going through the lines who say, well, this is a nuisance, for
what? But when you tell us and the American people that an
average of four or five weapons are found every day at airports
around the country, it reminds us why.
Incidentally, I hasten to say that a traveler can carry a
weapon in a checked bag so long as it is declared and checked,
but these are people who are boarding the plane with a weapon
in their luggage, four or five every day. So thanks for what
you and your folks are doing.
The rule of our Committee is that the first Senator to
arrive goes first, and I think the Chairman ought to apply that
rule to himself, so I am going to call on Senator Paul, and
then I will come after him.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Pistole.
Does the TSA examine flight manifests?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Paul. So when people come through, you have already
looked at whoever is flying that day? Someone has looked at
that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. It is under our Secure Flight Program.
Senator Paul. So there are specific searches then targeted
toward someone you have looked at on the flight manifest and
determined if they may need extra scrutiny?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. That is the whole basis of our watch
list; it is predicated on knowing who is coming. These are
individuals coming to the United States, or flying from the
United States. So I start every day with an intelligence
briefing that looks out 72 hours in advance to say, who are
those individuals who are known as selectees on terrorist watch
lists, where there is some derogatory information about them,
or clearly the no-flys who may want to fly but will not be
allowed to fly, either from the last point of departure to the
United States or in the United States.
Senator Paul. I was just thinking more of people who have
been to Yemen three times and Somalia twice and they are not on
your watch list, but you might want to spend a little more time
with them.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Paul. That kind of screening is occurring, also?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and I would be glad to go into some more
detail in a closed setting, Senator, in terms of some of the
work that we do with the intelligence community.
Senator Paul. I would just like to know that it is
occurring in general terms.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Paul. If you fly from Islamabad into Kennedy
Airport and then you are going to fly on to Chicago, do you go
back through any screening or are you just relying on what
happened in Islamabad?
Mr. Pistole. No. You go back through additional screening
here.
Senator Paul. You do go back?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Paul. So you go back out of the secure area when
you have an international flight, and then you come back
through the TSA screening?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. If you are talking about transiting from
one point in the United States to another?
Senator Paul. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, clearly, the enabling legislation
requires us to screen every passenger here in the United
States.
Senator Paul. And with regard to setting up a frequent
traveler program, you say there are a couple of airports we are
doing it in now?
Mr. Pistole. Four right now, Senator, right.
Senator Paul. And what is the plan for expanding that
program?
Mr. Pistole. We are working very closely with both the
airlines and the airports. I have met with and talked to two
airline CEOs in the last 2 weeks who are very interested, and
so right now, we are doing it with American and Delta and we
are in four of their key airports. So the goal is to, as
quickly that we can do it in an efficient way, expand that with
airlines and other airports, and so, clearly, there will be
some more airports added in the next several months, but more
so as we get into 2012.
Senator Paul. Right. Nashville Airport is not one of those,
is it, because I have noticed there are pilots going through a
separate line now.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. As part of the Known Crew Member
Program----
Senator Paul. That is a separate program----
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. That is a separate part of the
Risk-Based Security Initiative, separate from and apart from
passengers. We have the pilots who, of course, are the most
trusted persons on there. Actually, we are doing that at seven
airports, but as I mentioned, we have had over--well, it is
approximately 80,000 pilots have gone through on this expedited
screening process.
Senator Paul. But it is going to be on an airport-by-
airport basis, is how it works?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, it is, simply because of the checkpoint
configuration layout and if there is an area for either a
dedicated lane or near the exit lane or something that we can
configure for it. But it is in close association with the
Pilots Association and ATA, who are doing all this--at no
taxpayer expense, I would add.
Senator Paul. I would just encourage that we continue to
expand this, that it is long overdue----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Paul [continuing]. And that the smaller we make the
haystack of what we are looking in, the easier your job is to
find people----
Mr. Pistole. Agreed.
Senator Paul [continuing]. And that involves more of making
priority and targeting folks who are more risk to us. And
anything we can do to have fewer pat-downs of 6-year-old
girls--in fact, I do not really think there is any reason why
we should be doing that--we need to get to that point. With an
adult, when an adult goes through and the image is blurred, can
the adult request to go back through again?
Mr. Pistole. Our policy has not been that. That is what we
changed with children, simply because----
Senator Paul. I would change it with adults, too. Ninety-
nine-point-nine percent of us are not terrorists. Let us go
back through the machine rather than get a pat-down. You will
get rid of a lot of the anger an animosity toward the TSA and
toward what you are doing and give us a little more dignity
when we travel. Just let us go back through the screener again.
People do not want to have a pat-down.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I will take that back, Senator.
Senator Paul. We are made to feel like criminals and we do
not want to be made to feel like criminals when we fly on a
plane.
Mr. Pistole. Obviously, the only down side is it slows down
the line and then people--you obviously want to keep moving
along, and so it is a----
Senator Paul. I am not sure it slows it down that much just
to send them back through, particularly if they give them a
choice, they can do a pat-down or a walk back through. But I
think what happens is when you ask any questions, you are
treated like you are guilty of some crime and you are treated
roughly and it is, like, do anything, ask any questions, and we
will pat you down more, or we will be more invasive. That is
sort of what you get sometimes as you go through the airport.
But I think we need to try to continue to do what we can to
isolate and target who could attack us and to try to make it
easier on those who are not going to attack us, which is
recognizably 99.99 percent of us are not terrorists. So we need
to figure out how to get them through in an expedited fashion
and in the most dignified way. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. That is exactly what this
whole Risk-Based Security Initiative is designed to do, so
thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Paul.
Thank you, Administrator Pistole, for all the good work
that you are doing. I am so struck by the example of the four
to five weapons a day that are seized in the lines and I think
it is very important, to the extent that you are able without
jeopardizing security to regularly announce to the public,
generally speaking, what you are finding because there is a
level of impatience. I think people have resigned themselves to
it, but the average person going through the line--I speak for
myself--does not see somebody get stopped with a weapon and it
is very important to remind people why we ask them to go
through this, which is for their own security.
I know you mentioned in your opening statement the ability
of the whole body imaging machines to actually find a Nicorette
in somebody's back pocket. I know from having talked to you
there have been occasions when you found things concealed on a
person which would not show up in a metallic scanner that could
be very dangerous to the other people on the plane. So I do not
know if you want to respond at all to that----
Mr. Pistole. Well, I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. It is a
good reminder. We do post some things on our TSA Web site and
we have a fairly active blog that people interact with us on.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. One of the keys is not providing too much
detail so the terrorists can go to school on what are the
detection capabilities and not, but clearly, just the fact that
we are getting four to five guns every day indicates that there
are people who are not focused on the security protocols.
Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Thank you.
Yesterday, as you probably know, ProPublica, an independent
news reporting organization, in conjunction with Public
Broadcasting, published an investigative report on backscatter
machines, one that has become acceptable to use in airports,
but the article summarizes health concerns raised by experts
over the past 15 years about these machines. I wanted to give
you an opportunity, because I know this has been in the news
the last 24 hours, if you choose to respond to these concerns
at this time.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did see the
article yesterday and it does contain a lot of information. I
am not sure all of it is accurate from the standpoint of
documenting all the different perspectives. Clearly, it is an
issue that we have looked at and continue to look at and work
with safety and health officials to ensure that these
backscatter invasive technology machines are as absolutely safe
as can be, and all the independent studies that we have had
done indicate that they are well below any of the minimum
dosages recommended.
I take Senator Collins's recommendation to heart, to have
DHS do an independent study, and we will take that up and do
that because of these lingering concerns about any additional
exposure. Of course, what the scientific studies that we have
seen indicate is that it is about the same amount of radiation
as approximately 3 minutes of flight at elevation, just
naturally occurring radiation. It is one-one-thousandth of a
time, for example, of a chest X-ray. But that being said, I am
concerned that there is a perception that they are not as safe
as could be, and since we are using different technology, that
would be millimeter wave, that does not have that same
perspective, I will take that back and we will conduct
another--an independent study to address that.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Let me ask you about another matter that has been in the
news. I am sure you know that over the weekend, during the
Winter Storm Alfred, there was a nightmarish series of events
at Bradley Airport. To make a long story short, I and others
have been asking questions of Jet Blue, the FAA, and Bradley
Airport. The reality was that a lot of planes could not land
where they were heading. They were running out of fuel and they
were being diverted to three airports, one of which was Bradley
Airport, which became very crowded and all the gates were full.
They were making judgments about keeping the runways open.
In the worst cases, I am sure, passengers on that Jet Blue
plane stayed 7 hours, no water, no food, no bathrooms working,
really a nightmare. And finally, Jet Blue was able to get a bus
to go out to take the passengers off, and the airline may well
be subject to considerable fines as a result of all that.
That is not directly in TSA's area of responsibility, but I
did want to ask whether you might have contingency plans, or
should, for dealing with an unexpected influx of passengers and
maintaining security at an airport when flights are
unexpectedly diverted from another airport to that airport.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman. We do, within TSA, have
contingency plans. Obviously, with a little bit more head's up,
for example, if there is a hurricane, something like that
coming in, we have a National Deployment Force that we can
actually move individuals on an expedited basis, within hours,
to an affected area that may need additional security regimen,
either for the passengers, pilots, crew, or the workers.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. So we do have that capability and we use that.
We used that in Hurricane Irene. But it is something that was
started going back to Hurricane Katrina, which actually is
where it stemmed from. So, yes, we do have that.
Chairman Lieberman. That may preface an answer to my next
question. It happened that one of the diverted flights to
Bradley Airport was an international flight, and it raised an
interesting question and I want to ask Customs and Border
Protection about it. If the passengers on that international
flight were forced to stay on the plane so long that it was
just humanely impossible and they had to be taken off the plane
and brought into the Bradley Airport, which of course, has a
sizeable contingent of TSA personnel--whether there is any way
TSA and CBP can work together in those unusual circumstances to
process passengers more quickly so that they are not forced to
stay on the plane for an enormous amount of time simply because
they happen to be on an international flight?
Mr. Pistole. I know there are some provisions. I do not
know the details, so I would have to look into that and get
back with you and the Committee on that. For example, if it is
a situation where international travelers are trying to get out
of the country----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. They have already been processed.
If it is a matter of them then being reprocessed, and because
their flight is not going to depart, there are some options,
but they are, frankly, somewhat limited if there is not a good
CBP presence there.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I mean, Bradley Airport is an
international airport, but all of the scheduled international
arrivals currently originate from countries with CBP pre-
clearance stations, so there may not be adequate clearance to
handle some unexpected international arrivals--it may be a rare
circumstance. On the other hand, we have had some extreme
weather lately, so I just ask you to think about that.
Mr. Pistole. I will follow up with Commissioner Alan Bersin
on that and to see what the options may be.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. Thanks. My time is up. Senator
Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing on ``The Next Wave in Aviation Security.''
Mr. Chairman, because Hawaii is located 2,500 miles from
the mainland, we have, of course, unique transportation needs.
Hawaii residents and our many visitors rely heavily on air
transportation when traveling between islands and also to the
mainland or even abroad. Although protecting the public is our
primary goal, we must ensure that security procedures and
technologies safeguard privacy rights and are not so burdensome
that they discourage air travel.
I applaud the Federal employees who have worked tirelessly
to secure our commercial aviation system since September 11,
2001. As we approach the busy holiday travel season, I hope
this hearing will allow us to review whether the workforce has
the tools they need to meet today's security challenges.
Administrator Pistole, your testimony mentioned that TSA is
in the first phase of the expedited passenger screening pilot.
I understand that Honolulu Airport and Hawaiian Airlines are
being considered for the second phase of the pilot. In Hawaii,
many people who take frequent short flights between islands
could benefit from the expedited security procedures. How are
the decisions being made about which additional airports and
airlines will be selected for the second phase of the pilot,
and when will those selections be announced?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Senator Akaka, and thank you
for your support for Federal employees. Clearly, the goal is to
move out as quickly and efficiently as possible. There are a
number of variables that we are working through and those
include things such as the airlines' capability, their
information technology systems. Because the way this expedited
traveler, if you want, TSA Pre-Check works is that we take
information that is embedded on the bar code of the boarding
pass, which the airlines, of course, produce, and so it shows
up in that bar code as the person is a known or trusted
traveler, if you will. Several airlines are going through
mergers right now and they are waiting until those systems are
merged as opposed to having disparate systems that do not talk
and then trying to merge those into a new one. So those will be
after the first of the year. So that is one criteria. Is the
airline ready, capable, and all that.
The second is the airports themselves, and the
configuration of the checkpoint is a key aspect. One of the
goals of this is to have a dedicated lane for those known,
trusted frequent travelers, such as in Global Entry or these
elite tiers and others that we will look at down the road, so
they can go to a dedicated lane, they can be identified through
that bar code on the boarding pass, and then we can have a
separate screening lane for them where they keep a light jacket
on, they keep a belt on, they keep their shoes on, they keep
their laptop in their briefcase, keep their liquids and aerosol
gels in their carry-on bags, and again, keeping random and
unpredictable checks as part of that.
So to directly answer the question, there are a number of
airports and airlines that we are working with to try to get to
that point, so I want to manage expectations as best I can to
say there have been no decisions made. I am waiting on a
presentation for that second round, if you will. I will say
that I met with the CEO of one of the major airlines going
through a merger here the week before last and they are
committed to doing it in the first quarter of 2012, and so we
will use one of the very largest airports in the country as the
basis for that airline, that merged airline, probably in the
February-March time frame. So as soon as we get some additional
information, I will get back with you on that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much.
Administrator Pistole, I applaud TSA's increased use of
Automated Target Recognition software, so that whole-body
scanners no longer generate sensitive images of passengers'
bodies. However, I am concerned that the backscatter machines,
which are not currently compatible with the ATR, are still used
in many airports, including some in Hawaii. Does TSA plan to
implement the privacy-enhancing ATR feature for all whole-body
scanners, and what is the time line for doing so?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator. In fact, we just were approved
to acquire 300 more additional AIT machines and all of those
will have that Automatic Target Recognition. So no new
acquisitions will be without that privacy feature built in. We
should know sometime this month from the manufacturer of the
backscatter whether their technology upgrades, if you will, are
successful in terms of the depiction through the ATR rather
than through the traditional means. But any new acquisition
will have that privacy filter of the ATR as part of that.
Senator Akaka. As you know, the APEC summit will be held in
Honolulu, Hawaii, next week. The high-profile event will
feature President Obama and his fellow APEC leaders from the
Asian region. I recently met with the security steering
committee and toured the command center and event sites. I was
very impressed by the planning. Would you please discuss TSA's
role in securing the safe travel of the 20,000 dignitaries and
guests flying to Hawaii.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, the U.S. Secret
Service, the Diplomatic Security Service, and the State
Department have the lead as far as the dignitaries themselves
and their entourage. It is our responsibility, honestly, to
ensure that everybody traveling to the summit, other
passengers, other attendees, and things, have been thoroughly
screened, whether they are coming from the mainland or from
those last points of departure to the United States that have
to meet our standards. So that is our responsibility, and then,
of course, on the departure, all those people will go through
the TSA security screening.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Pistole, for being here.
Let me start by asking about a March 2010 DHS Inspector
General report entitled, ``Transportation Security
Administration's Acquisition of Support Services Contracts.''
It is DHS IG Report 10-72. The DHS IG made some
recommendations in the report, and I am curious about whether
your agency has made the changes and is now complying with the
recommendations in that report.
Mr. Pistole. Senator, I think I am going to have to be
refreshed on the specifics of that particular report----
Senator Pryor. The three main recommendations that I am
concerned about are: First, a review of inherently governmental
functions as part of contract administration. Second, to
establish evaluation factors and a review process for
requirements identified in the statements of work. And third,
assign dedicated, trained, and certified contracting officers,
technical representatives to manage and oversee the contract
administration function.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that
refresher. So we have taken a number of steps as it relates to
support services and contractors, and working within the
framework of the Department of Homeland Security overall, we
have conducted a review of all of our contractor services and,
frankly, eliminated a number of positions. A number of other
positions that were deemed inherently governmental services
were converted to Federal employees. So the idea is to achieve
greater efficiencies in our use of contractor dollars and
services.
As to the specifics of the acquisition, I think we
identified some areas of improvement, or that were identified,
some areas of improvement that we have implemented. I would
have to get back to you on some of the specifics.
Senator Pryor. When you talk about efficiencies, does that
mean savings?
Mr. Pistole. Savings, yes.
Senator Pryor. And do you have a dollar figure on how much
you are able to save?
Mr. Pistole. I do not offhand. I will be glad to get back
with you on that. I would also say that as a part of an
internal initiative that I started 6 months ago to look at
efficiencies that we could achieve within the agency beyond any
IG, GAO recommendation----
Senator Pryor. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. We have come up with a number of
opportunities to create efficiencies, savings, and cost
avoidance and things that are all important to us and still
provide the same critical security services. It is largely a
headquarter-focused efficiency review, so, for example, I have
put a freeze on hiring in most positions. I have required
additional information about anybody who is at a mid- or
senior-level supervisor position to make sure that they have
requisite subordinates that they are supervising, merging some
IT functions, and doing some other things internally.
Additionally, from the field perspective, I recently
implemented a decision to change our overall structure, where
we had 12 area directors that oversaw the work of the 120
Federal Security Directors for the 450 airports, and I reduced
that from 12 down to six Regional Directors to create some
additional efficiencies in that regard.
Senator Pryor. That is good. I would like to get more on
that in terms of how much you think you can save and how those
efficiencies will work. That would be great.
And the next question would be whether, in the past, TSA
has invested in technology that did not yield the predicted
results, such as puffer machines. So I am curious about what
criteria you all use as you are evaluating technology, and then
how you measure whether the technology is going to achieve the
anticipated goals that you are trying to achieve.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Senator. The first criteria is
what does intelligence tell us about how the terrorists are
trying to hurt us, and so with that as a starting point, then
we work with industry to say, what detection capabilities do
you have currently and what are you working on that either
others are incentivizing worldwide because if somebody comes up
with a gold standard, it is a very important and valuable
commodity. So we use those two criteria and then always push
industry to improve the detection capabilities.
For example, on the AIT, we are working very closely with
industry. The GAO and IG both have reports coming out about
some of the detection capabilities, and there is a distinction
between what is the capability of the machine vice what may be
seen as performance testing. So covert testing versus
performance testing, and so we always try to make that
distinction.
But it has to be intelligence-driven, risk-based, and then
to make sure that it is properly tested and validated, not only
in the lab, as happened with those puffer machines, but then in
the airport environment itself, which did not happen. And so
after the puffer machine issue, we actually created a
Transportation Security Integration Facility, which I know some
staffers and some Members of Congress have visited. It is just
on the South side of the Reagan Airport in Virginia. I would
like to invite all Members and staffers to come out and tour
where we test each new piece of technology in an airport
environment to make sure that it works not only properly, but
rigorously and all those standards that--not just in the lab
setting.
Senator Pryor. It sounds like a lot of that has to do with
training and to making sure the officers are properly trained
on the machines.
Mr. Pistole. That is a good point.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask you another question that relates
to training. You are expanding your Behavior Detection Pilot
Program and I would like to know more about that. It seems
common sense, that behavior obviously would be a strong
indicator, but does it accommodate cultural differences,
language barriers, and physical and mental disabilities? How do
you balance those needs, compared to trying to single out
erroneous folks, who for whatever reason TSA is picking up
erroneously?
Mr. Pistole. Right. So, clearly, training is a key aspect
of this expanded Behavior Detection Initiative that we are
trying, and it is a proof of concept that we are doing in
Boston and Detroit right now, and I want to get the data from
those two airports before I make any decision whether to expand
it or not. But we have, of course, our core Behavior Detection
Officers that we have been using for several years now and we
have taken those individuals who showed the most aptitude and
give them additional training based on some form behavior
detection models, and those individuals then engage in just a
simple question and answer with passengers in these two
airports to make some assessments and judgments as to whether
that person poses any additional risk.
Now, in Boston, we have had over 150,000 people go through
and, just again, answer these basic questions, and we have had
probably a dozen or so people who were referred to law
enforcement because of their response and it turned out some of
these individuals had outstanding warrants for them. Some were
illegal immigrants. So they are not necessarily TSA security
issues, but there was something about the person that we needed
to resolve why are they acting nervously or strangely or
whatever.
So as I get that additional information, I will look
forward to reporting back to the Committee and say, here is
what we are finding and here is what I think would be the best
thing to do moving forward, recognizing that it is simply one
layer of security, that I do not want to have a single point of
failure in any of our layers. If this helps us identify that
one putative terrorist, then I would like to use that.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Pryor.
The late, great Ted Kennedy--I watched him in the Armed
Services Committee and we have a rule, first come, first called
on, so he would arrive a minute or two before the hearing
convened. The Chairman would gavel it down, and then he would
disappear. And, like, 30 seconds before it came his turn, he
would reappear. So he was maximizing his time.
Administrator Pistole, I thank you. We have a second panel
and I think it is probably best that we go on. You are doing a
great job. I think you certainly convinced me that all the
effort we are making continues on a daily basis to be
necessary, and I cannot stress enough, and I know I speak for
Senator Collins, your people are finding four to five weapons
every day, not in checked bags where they are legal, but people
going on the plane. And just think about what could be done to
the other passengers. So what the TSA officers are doing is for
the protection of the general public.
Obviously, we want you--and I know you want--to do your
mission in the most cost effective way that you possibly can
and in the most technologically progressive and imaginative way
that you can. But we thank you for what you are doing. It has,
just point blank, made the American people safer than we would
otherwise be.
Some of us may have questions for you that we will submit
which we did not get a chance to ask you today and ask for your
answers. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Have a good day.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. We will call the second panel, which is
Roger Dow, President and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S.
Travel Association; Kenneth Dunlap, Global Director of Security
and Travel Facilitation at the International Air Transport
Association; and Charles M. Barclay, President of the American
Association of Airport Executives.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for being here. We look forward
to your testimony. Each of you has unique experience and
perspective to add to this discussion. As you just heard me
say, I am grateful for the work that TSA does, but as somebody
said in another capacity, this is a journey without a
destination point. In other words, we are just going to have to
keep getting better and better and better as time goes on.
So let us begin with Mr. Dow.
TESTIMONY OF ROGER J. DOW,\1\ PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Dow. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins, and Senator Moran, thank you very much for this
opportunity to testify.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Dow appears in the Appendix on
page 1235.
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Senator Lieberman, first of all, we want to thank you for
your dedication as you are about to retire. You have pursued
bipartisan support for aviation security and we are going to
miss you.
So thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. Dow. U.S. Travel is a nonprofit organization that
represents every sector of the $1.8 trillion travel industry,
which employs one in nine Americans. Our mission is simple: To
increase travel to and within the United States.
As you all know, travel is a very powerful engine for
increasing economic growth and improving our economy and jobs.
Just in Connecticut, 62,000 Americans work in the industry, and
travel generates $8.8 billion in revenue and $1.4 billion in
taxes. In Maine, 30,000 citizens work in our industry, and
travel generates $2.7 billion in revenue and $334 million in
taxes. But in every city and State, travelers support the
salaries of policemen, firemen, and teachers, all around
America. And I think it is also important to point out that
travel attracts private sector investment, whether it be
airports, hotels, convention centers, or attractions, that
really help the communities build.
When we talk about aviation security, we often talk in
terms of terrorism, personal privacy, and technology, and less
attention gets paid to the economic damage that is inflicted by
the current inefficiency in our passenger screening process.
For the travel community, which supports urban and rural
communities, inefficient screening really causes staggering
costs to the economy, hampering job creation, hampering growth,
and the data suggests the problem is actually getting worse.
A 2008 survey of air travelers showed that of the people
that take more than one flight a year, 28 percent said they
avoided a flight because of the door-to-door hassle of getting
through the airport and delays, etc. That resulted in 41
million flights not taken, or $26 billion in lost spending to
our U.S. economy and $4 billion in lost taxes.
You compare that $26 billion loss with a 2010 survey that
was conducted by Consumer Research and asked travelers, if you
knew that you had a predictable screening system, would you
take more flights. Respondents said they would take two or
three more flights per year, which is $85 billion in revenue
and would support 900,000 jobs.
The costs of TSA's budget are ballooning at a time when we
are trying to find fiscally responsible ways of cutting costs
in government. For example, in 2004, 618 million people went
through an airport. In 2010, it was 623 million, a scant one
percent improvement of the numbers, but yet during the same
time period, TSA's budget increased 68 percent. This trend
cannot continue or security screening is going to fall in on
itself on sheer costs and manpower. The FAA is predicting that
in 10 years we will have a billion travelers. So just think if
the costs keep raising at that rate, what would happen.
Beyond the empirical numbers, there is other evidence. You
all, as Senator Collins said, travel every single week. You see
the inefficiencies and the need for reform in the security
system and it could really stimulate economic growth. Our
current system, while it reduces threats and ensures
passengers' safety, has also been inefficient and there is a
huge hassle factor.
We brought together in 2009, a blue ribbon panel of
bipartisan aviation security experts and travel industry
experts. It was chaired by former Homeland Security Secretary
Tom Ridge, former Congressman Jim Turner, and Sam Gilliland of
Sabre. The goal of the panel was to review the present process
and recommend some reforms in creating a more efficient and
secure and travel-focused system. They had over 20 meetings and
we issued the report called ``A Better Way,'' \1\ and you have
a copy of it, which presents a comprehensive review of what
could be done.
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\1\ The report referenced by Mr. Dow appears in the Appendix on
page 1241.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report lays out a checklist with 14 recommendations so
the Congress and TSA could really have a road map for creating
a secure and efficient system. I am going to focus on three of
those recommendations in my remarks. First, we must create a
risk-based trusted travel program, which Administrator Pistole
spoke about. Second, we must take steps to decrease the number
of carry-on bags. And third, TSA must reconstitute the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee.
Let us go to the first one. The blue ribbon panel said they
wanted Congress and TSA to create a risk-based system, and the
need for that is very clear. The current one-size-fits-all
screening really does not meet the needs of the traveling
public. Currently, travelers have no choice in how the system
works. We have to have security, of course, but in our view, a
trusted traveler program would allow travelers to opt in
voluntarily and provide background information to qualify for a
predictable expedited screening system as long as they meet
certain criteria that are established for these low-risk
passengers, which would be just about everybody in this room,
if you think about it.
The blue ribbon panel recommended three elements of a
trusted traveler program. First, a trusted traveler program
must be secure and accessible program that encourages
reverification and encourages a large number of enrollees, not
just a small number. Having a dedicated screening lane for
trusted travelers, as Administrator Pistole said, is important.
And a confirmation process ensures that these enrollees are
able to use those lanes is also important. And third, the
program should have a screening process that provides
efficiency, security benefits, and an acceptable level of
predictivity. We strongly believe that those three elements can
take place.
Not long after our release, our team met with Administrator
Pistole's team to review these recommendations and get their
feedback. At that meeting, we learned of several initiatives
that are underway at TSA to create a risk-based, intelligence-
based system. For example, Administrator Pistole and TSA are
creating the Pre-Check program. I applaud him for his vision,
his leadership, and undertaking an effort to launch Pre-Check,
which is an important first step. Pre-Check is one of the
critical reforms that is very important. I also applaud all of
you for taking an interest in this area and hope that we can
work with you to begin to oversee the implementation of a
process that is efficient, yet still provides great security.
As the Administrator mentioned, they recently started Pre-
Check and it is going forward with putting passengers in that
program who qualify through their airline or through the CBP
program, Global Entry. Pre-Check allows people to share
information from their frequent traveler program, whether it is
Delta or American Airlines, that qualifies them for expidited
screening.
What we basically would like to see for this to succeed
would be for Pre-Check to allow more people to get into the
program, allows people to take their information from multiple
airlines, not just two airlines, and also use other methods of
enrollment, such as commercial data, criminal history, and the
private registered traveler programs that other people are
administrating.
The second area of improvement is to have dedicated
security lanes. We have talked about that. And also, as
Administrator Pistole said, have random security, which is very
important, but if you are randomly pulled out, you should still
be expedited and have predictability.
The next key area of reform we want to assess is to have
passengers be able to check one bag at no additional cost. Now,
we are not saying at no cost to the passenger. The airline
should be able to put in their standard fee for their airline
ticket a cost for that bag. But if we could reduce the number
of bags, we would reduce those guns that you talked about. We
would reduce the hassle and the ability to quickly go through
the checkpoint. The New York Times said 59 million more bags
came through TSA checkpoints in the past year. TSA estimates an
increse of 87 million carry-on bags in the past year and 29
million more bags next year. So if we could get one bag per
passenger, people would check them and it would improve the
system greatly.
And the last thing I would like to highlight today is the
reinstatement of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. This
has been in place for two decades with the FAA and TSA, but it
really brought in a broad base of people to advise the
government. But unfortunately, as we have seen, since 2006, the
ASAC has not met. Therefore, you cut off valuable input from
the private sector, from the travel community, etc. In July
2011, the TSA Administrator announced they are going to
reconvene that committee and we think that is great and we
would hope that we would have the travel community involved so
we can have the input of the travelers because we do not
believe that having great security and great customer service
and an efficient system are mutually exclusive. You can have
both.
So we are asking your support to allow us to work with you
to have a system that is secure, has trusted travelers, has a
way that we can reduce the number of bags going through the
system, and that we reinstate the broad spectrum of people
providing advice to TSA.
Thanks for what you do. We appreciate your support.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Dow, for an excellent
opening statement and for your kind words.
Mr. Dow. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Next will be Kenneth Dunlap on behalf
of the International Air Transport Association.
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH J. DUNLAP,\1\ GLOBAL DIRECTOR, SECURITY
AND TRAVEL FACILITATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Dunlap. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you very much for
this opportunity to testify at this hearing.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Dunlap appears in the Appendix on
page 1278.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The International Air Transport Association, appreciates
the leadership of the Senate in addressing this critical issue.
It is our hope that today's hearing accelerates the much needed
dialogue on the future of passenger screening post-9/11 in the
United States.
IATA and our 230 U.S. and foreign member airlines have a
vision of future passenger screening that is based on a
paradigm shift in the principles behind checkpoint operations.
We believe next-generation checkpoints must focus on looking
for bad people and not just bad things, and I would ask that
you consider for a moment our vision of an effective airport
checkpoint. Security is enhanced with higher probabilities of
detection. Babies and children with names similar to adults on
the no-fly list pass through screening uneventfully. Harmless
objects, such as toenail scissors and nail clippers, do not
trigger alarms.
In this scenario, the airport security checkpoint is no
longer a stand-alone line of defense against terrorism but
rather part of an integrated system that uses risk-based
analysis as well as advanced screening technology to improve
security and the travel experience for the passenger. We call
this vision, the checkpoint of the future, and many of the key
components are available today. But let me stress, this is a
vision, this is not the vision of moving forward, and we
certainly want to encourage a dialogue on what the next future
checkpoint should look like.
I think the obvious question is, why develop a future
checkpoint? First, as we have heard, aviation remains a target,
and this was demonstrated by the December 2009 attempted
bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit.
Second, air travel is forecast to continue growing and
today's checkpoints are showing their age. IATA expects an
additional 90 million passengers will travel within North
America between now and 2014, and 659 million new passengers
will travel in the entire world. Our long-range projections are
that by 2050, as many as 16 billion people will fly annually.
But the evidence shows that the throughput of today's
checkpoints is decreasing. Our systems just cannot handle the
traffic. At some places across the globe, we have seen a drop
in throughput by as much as 50 percent in the last 2 years.
And third, the aviation security system needs to maintain
the confidence of the traveling public, and unfortunately, the
signs of discontent are growing. Passengers are becoming
increasingly vocal about the inconvenience of security measures
and the threats to their personal privacy. But let me stop and
let me be clear about one thing. We have good systems and the
flying public is safe. But we also need a confident public that
trusts the authorities. If you have good systems combined with
distrustful passengers, you create a toxic combination and a
less secure system.
So what lessons have we learned in the past decade
concerning passenger screening? First, dropping new technology
into an old checkpoint just will not work. That is akin to
placing a new radio in an old car and saying you have a new
car. Essentially, you just still have that same old car.
Second, object finding has served us well, but it does not
represent the future. If we have learned anything in the last
decade, it is that a passenger with toenail clippers is not
automatically a threat to aviation. Alternatively, if you find
toenail clippers, you have not necessarily found a terrorist.
And third, one-size-fits-all screening has outlived its
usefulness. Over 2.8 billion passengers are screened per year
and we cannot continue at this pace without using risk-based
screening measures. IATA strongly supports Secretary Napolitano
and Administrator Pistole's calls for risk-based screening.
So IATA has been working for the last year and a half on
developing a more efficient, more effective and relevant
passenger screening checkpoint, and let me just spend the last
few minutes remaining discussing the core principles and
explain how we propose turning these into a checkpoint.
The checkpoint of the future concept described here relies
on two basic concepts. The first is the introduction of risk-
based screening, using data from travel documents and airline
tickets that is already being used by the U.S. Government and
other governments for customs and immigration purposes. And let
me just stop again and emphasize, this does not involve
profiling of passengers of any kind. We are simply proposing
that rather than using this data only at the end of a journey
for purposes of border control and immigration, we should use
it at the beginning of the journey for security purposes.
And the second concept is the use of advanced screening
technology to enable a seamless journey through screening lanes
without removing items of clothing or unpacking luggage. So,
you might ask, what does this look like at an airport? Well,
for a passenger arriving at an airport checkpoint, the
passenger will biometrically identify himself or herself and
have a brief encounter with a behavior analyst. The passenger
is assigned to a lane based on the results of their electronic
pre-screening or random selection. The passenger proceeds
through the lane and is screened while in motion. Passengers
who voluntarily opt into a known traveler program and agree to
provide additional information about themselves would proceed
through a known traveler lane. Those about whom little is known
or those randomly selected would go through an enhanced
security lane. But let me emphasize, all passengers are
screened to a baseline, and in this concept, no one--no one--
gets a free pass.
So where are we and what have we done? IATA has developed a
high-level blueprint and a road map. We are working with like-
minded associations, manufacturers, academics, and airlines to
refine this concept, and this certainly needs to be a global
effort. To date, ICAO has endorsed the need for a global effort
to study a future checkpoint. Interpol and 12 States have
signed statements of principle that we are headed in the right
direction.
Now, we certainly expect that in 7 to 10 years, all the
necessary components for a walk-through screening process will
be available, but we can repurpose and reintegrate existing
technology into an intermediate checkpoint. That is possible
within the next 2 to 3 years. And this reworked checkpoint uses
existing hardware and combines several essential elements of
the checkpoint of the future, including passenger data already
being used by governments, behavior analysis, and the creation
of new screening lanes.
IATA is committed to making air travel safe, secure, and
more enjoyable, and in summary, we believe the foundation of
the checkpoint of the future should be based on the
lessons learned since 9/11 and the next generation checkpoint
should use passenger data, use behavior detection, screen
passengers based on risk, provide for an uninterrupted journey
from curb to aircraft door, and preserve our investment in our
existing checkpoints. We will not settle for anything less than
a revolution in the way our passengers are treated at the
airports.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Dunlap. That was really
fascinating. You have helped us to, no pun intended, look over
the horizon here, at least in terms of security at the
airports, so I have some questions I will ask you when we get
to that.
Finally, Charles Barclay on behalf of the American
Association of Airport Executives. Thanks very much for being
here.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES M. BARCLAY,\1\ PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES
Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and
Members. It is always a privilege to be here. I am just going
to take a very brief time and make two general points from our
testimony.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Barclay appears in the Appendix
on page 1285.
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The first is that Airport Executives strongly support risk-
based security. We congratulate Administrator Pistole and his
team for bringing that concept forward. It is something that is
essential for the future, as you have heard.
We support Pre-Check and encourage its expansion. Airports
are eager to, as well as airlines, be sponsors of that program
in local areas. We would ask the Committee to encourage TSA to
move as quickly as they can from the pilot programs into
further deployment of Pre-Check.
The rationale behind risk-based security, we think, is
pretty simple. You have to look for dangerous people, not just
dangerous things, in the future. We have to identify the vast,
vast majority of people traveling who are not a threat to the
system so we can focus our limited resources on the people we
do not get to vet in advance. And then, finally, the resources
and facilities. If we continue the current system of treating
everyone the same, they are going to be simply overwhelmed by
passenger growth. So we have to make changes and modernize.
Risk-based security is not a compromise in our point of
view. When you think about the philosophy, a dangerous person
with nothing on them that we vet for, that we screen for, is a
danger to the system while a person with no bad intent with
lots of dangerous things on them is not a threat to the system.
So we need a future security system that implements that
understanding.
My second general point is that airports are unique
partners of TSA. They are all branches of local government,
local or State creatures. They all have local police powers and
they all have branches, divisions, or special units that have
people with precisely the same incentives as the agents of
Federal law enforcement.
My point for emphasizing that is that we have today a
division of responsibilities. Local governments, airports, and
local law enforcement are responsible for things like perimeter
security, the front line of employee vetting and credentialing,
incident response, and other areas that we mentioned in our
testimony. We strongly believe those things should stay with
local law enforcement. The TSA should not take over those areas
because you do have a partnership between Federal law
enforcement and local law enforcement. We need both of them to
avoid focusing on each other. You do not want the good guys
spending lots of time and energy watching each other as a
regulator and a regulated entity.
You want them both pointed outwards looking for bad guys,
and we think that is a key element of having a partnership on
security between local law enforcement and TSA, as opposed to
having the agency take over more areas. TSA has its hands full
with vetting and screening both passengers and cargo, and we
want to see them do that well. It keeps our commerce moving. It
keeps our system moving. We look forward in a future system to
being partners with TSA and hope to carry out that mission as
well as we can. Both groups will make mistakes. We will both
have to learn from those mistakes and get better as time goes
on. But local law enforcement and airports are there to be of
assistance, and there is no higher priority in their view than
the safety of the local citizens they work for.
So thank you and I would be glad to answer any questions I
can from our testimony.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Barclay. Very
interesting testimony.
All of you, and Administrator Pistole, as well, used the
term ``risk-based security.'' Does everybody agree that what we
are saying is that risk-based tends to focus on looking for
dangerous people as opposed to dangerous things, which is the
focus of the current system, right? But I presume that none of
you would say that we should stop looking for dangerous things,
is that correct?
Mr. Dow. Yes. I think, personally, that we have to look for
dangerous things, but there are ways to do that. If you take
trusted travelers and they go through a machine that detects
explosives, that is fine.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dow. But the question is how do you make the system
much more efficient so you can focus on the dangerous people
and the dangerous things.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I mean, this is a real challenge,
because let us just go to the point of Administrator Pistole's
testimony that both Senator Collins and I responded to. So you
have an average of four to five guns found in baggage that
people are sending through the line to carry on, not check. And
I presume most of those are not terrorists. They are, for one
reason or another, people who wanted to carry the gun on with
them, maybe because it was their sense of how they protect
their own security. But, presumably, if you did not have that
kind of screening for dangerous things, somebody who was, in
fact, a terrorist would be able to carry a weapon on.
So what I am getting at is, and I know it is hard to do
everything, and I support moving toward risk-based, which looks
for the dangerous people, but we are not at a point where we
can ignore looking for dangerous things, are we? Mr. Dunlap.
Mr. Dunlap. Mr. Chairman, I think that the presumption is
everybody does, in fact, get screened----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Dunlap [continuing]. So those guns will be found. But
in the new paradigm, some people will get screened more, and
that if you have the opportunity to do things like enhanced
security lanes, you can screen a population of people a little
bit more thoroughly.
So if we start with the presumption that there is a
baseline, then to address your point, those bad objects are
going to be found, as well, but they will not be the entirety
of the focus of the checkpoint screening experience, because,
again, if you spend your resources on looking for toenail
clippers and scissors----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dunlap [continuing]. You are not spending enough time
looking for IED components.
Chairman Lieberman. No, that is a good approach. In other
words, the risk-based is in some sense on top of a more
efficient application of the existing system. I mean, I noticed
in the vision of the future you have that even the known
travelers who have been pre-checked, etc., they go through a
metal detector in that walk-through, that particular tunnel.
Go back a little bit, because it is intriguing to look at
your vision of the future here. I know you quoted some numbers,
but how close are we to that? It looks pretty attractive. I
mean, you have three lines that people walk through.
Presumably, that is it. How close are we technologically to
that?
Mr. Dunlap. So, Senator, if you take a look at the
intermediate checkpoint that was the last slide depicted----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dunlap [continuing]. We are within 2 to 3 years of
that.\1\ Everything that we need to deploy a more effective
security system and a more efficient security system using
existing equipment is there today. So we think within about 2
years, we can have that deployed to any airport, and it will
use passenger data, which we have today, behavior detection,
here today, screening passengers based on risk, we can do it
today. And then if you push the future out and you look at the
tunnels of technology that we are developing, the one thing
that we need is explosives detection that is performed while
the person is in motion. That is probably 7 to 10 years on the
horizon----
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\1\ The slide referenced by Mr. Dunlap appears in the Appendix on
page 1284.
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Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dunlap [continuing]. And we certainly cannot do that
today. But what we are encouraged is that the manufacturers we
are working with are telling us that vision is far closer than
what we realize. So, obviously, technology grows exponentially
and we think if we have a plan that preserves the current
capital investment in our checkpoints, rearranges a little bit
better, that when the time comes for the TSA to make a
decision, what will we spend money on next, that all the
technology and all the pieces for that tunnels of technology
and checkpoint of the future will be there. So we think it is
realistic. It is science fact, not science fiction, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Is there a lot of work going on in the
private sector to develop these new technologies? This is a
very significant global market, so I would think that people
would be investing in it. Are they?
Mr. Dunlap. Absolutely. We know from our experience with
the manufacturers that all these advance technologies are
currently under study. But the problem that we have right now
globally is that every regulator has different technology
standards. So something certified in the United States might
not be accepted in the European Community.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Dunlap. It may not be accepted in Australia. So there
is a good effort, and I would like to pay a lot of credit to
TSA for working with like-minded countries to come up with the
global standards. So if we have global standards of detection,
that will accelerate and incentivize the manufacturers to
invest in the technologies that we need. And then also, I
think, having a common vision, what does the future look like,
that can also incentivize dollars to be directed into a more
predictable vision and a more compact vision of what we need to
have in our airports.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Mr. Barclay, let me ask you this question. As you know,
TSA's Pre-Check pilot program has led to a separate line for
trusted travelers. At this point, the line is managed by either
Delta or American Airlines. Do you think this format will be
successful if it expands to incorporate more passengers and
airlines or should TSA be looking for another administrative
means to expedite the screening of people?
Mr. Barclay. You have totally different facilities in each
of the 450 airports, so airports have been concerned about
continuing to have the ability to manage queues and lines. If
you have been through Denver, they have a great big hall and
the airport actually needs to manage those queues and lines
because of the nature of the facilities. And that is going to
be true at other airports, particularly as passenger levels
grow. So we are going to need to have a partnership to figure
it out as to how do we make a lane available. Our members
strongly support the idea of Pre-Check. We are going to do our
best with facilities, but there is going to be queue management
and airports are going to have to be central to that.
Mr. Dow. Mr. Chairman, if I can add one comment----
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead, Mr. Dow.
Mr. Dow [continuing]. I believe that just having an airline
frequency program is not enough. Through the registered
traveler programs that are out there, the data, the criminal
records, all that, we can build a much broader base, and that
is what we are saying must be done. We need to get a lot of
travelers, folks like us that are trusted and able to get out
of the system, because if you have a long line, that is what
produces the problem. When you are trying to push people
through during the peak times, that is when you have problems.
So if you eliminate that, you have a much better chance of
finding that needle in the haystack.
Chairman Lieberman. Good point. Thanks. My time is up.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dunlap, I am very intrigued by your proposal for the
security screening based on risk and I do think that we need to
move toward a more risk-based system and TSA is doing that, to
Administrator Pistole's credit. I am, however, somewhat worried
about the proposal and it is for this reason. If there is
anything we know about al-Qaeda, it is that its members have
demonstrated extraordinary patience over the years. So I am
wondering, if we move to this system, what would prevent an al-
Qaeda operative, perhaps someone like the Times Square would-be
bomber, who was an American citizen, from traveling a lot,
registering for the known traveler program, passing the
background check, which he would have from everything we know,
and just biding his time. And then, if he is only going through
a lane that X-rays his carry-on bag and has him go through a
metal detector, he could be lining his arms and legs with PETN,
which would not show up.
And that is my worry. We know the patience. I mean, think
of the number of years that elapsed between the first attack on
the World Trade Center and the second. And we know the careful
planning. So what is your response to that?
Mr. Dunlap. Senator, we are acutely aware of the patience
of our adversary and that is why we believe that, regardless of
the concept, every passenger needs to be screened. They need to
be screened for explosives. They need to be screened for
weapons, as well.
So we establish a fairly high baseline within our concept
to make sure that no one gets a free pass. Everyone is going to
get screened.
You know, one of the interesting things about the proposal,
whether you look at the lanes or you look at the tunnels, all
of that incorporates processes that have been demonstrated to
work already. So we have a known traveler lane. We have the
Pre-Check plan that the TSA is piloting right now, which is an
analog. We have Global Entry, which is an analog, and you can
go through SENTRI and NEXUS programs, as well. So there is a
demonstrated history that those type of programs work.
On the other hand, if you take a look at the high-security
lane, that occurs in every airport in the world right now. In
the U.S., you may see a glass booth, and within that glass
booth, you will have a passenger getting swabbed down or have
some other extraordinary security measure being taken to them.
So our concept, it may look a little bit far forward, but that
is what happens when you try to integrate things that are
happening today in one place.
But certainly, we do not want anybody to get a free pass
and we do not want anybody to walk through not getting
screened. Everybody needs that when they get on an airplane.
Senator Collins. But although the known traveler gets
screened, assuming I am reading your passport correctly, the
baggage is screened through the X-ray machine and the passenger
goes through a metal detector, but there would not be the kind
of screening that is done with an AIT or an ATR, where you
would see non-metallic explosives concealed on the body. Is
that correct?
Mr. Dunlap. Well, if you look at our concept over the next
7 years, it is to, in fact, develop walk-through explosive
screening, walk-through imaging, so that can be done without a
person having to spend 45 seconds of their time with their
hands in a position like this getting screened and then going
through the resolution process.
If you take a look at what we are proposing in 2 to 3
years, we are just talking about taking existing equipment,
reordering it, and making it a little bit more efficient,
because in the end, the efficiencies to be gained are by not
having shout-outs in the airport checkpoint saying, take this
bag, take this passenger and move them aside, because that
slows down the lane.
So I think--and I confidently believe in this--is that we
can establish a high enough baseline to ensure security, but
also to do something, and that is to take the level of
detection that we have right now, whatever that number is that
the Committee has, and we can raise it even higher because we
can direct our screening resources on those people that we know
less about, least about, or those who appear on watch lists or
another type of security list that the TSA has.
Mr. Dow. Senator Collins, if I could add one point----
Senator Collins. Yes, Mr. Dow.
Mr. Dow. One of the things that all security people tell us
that deters this long-range planning is randomness, and when
you have a randomness in the system, which Administrator
Pistole adds, that enables us to thwart that in a very big way.
So we are exploring, again, being able to go through this and
having randomness, but when you have the random trusted
traveler go through, just make sure you are able to get them
through that secondary and third screening very efficiently. So
the randomness is very critical.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Barclay, my last question is for you. Earlier this
year, Administrator Pistole decided not to approve an expansion
of the Screening Partnership Program, which allows private
screeners to operate at 16 airports. What is your assessment of
that decision?
Mr. Barclay. Well, our members support a viable and
voluntary SPP program, so we would like to see revisiting that
decision revisited. Most of the airports are not in the
program. It is only 16 out of 450. There are a few others
interested. But having it out there as an option is something
that our members support.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Dow, you indicated that peak times is when there are
problems. I just wanted you to tell me what the problems are.
Are we talking about that it is more likely that someone who is
a security risk will make it through security, or are the
problems more related to the traveling public?
Mr. Dow. No, the problem actually is both. One, when you
have an unpredictable system, you take the efficiency and the
productivity of the American workforce away because you have to
go through DCA an hour and a half in advance. But if you knew
it would take 15 minutes, you would get there 40 minutes in
advance.
But what happens during the peak time periods is the crowds
get big, and you can see the urgency among the TSA sciences of
how do we handle the crowd and move the lines. So if you are a
bad person, you probably would want to go during one of those
peak times. So we are saying, let us not have those large lines
and create the incentive to try and get people through fast
because it just does not work. Let us get an efficient system
at all hours.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Mr. Dunlap, are there countries that we need to have
concerns about the standards when passengers are screened and
security procedures occur that are traveling around the globe,
but particularly to the United States? How uniform are the
standards by which the travelers are having to comply?
Mr. Dunlap. Well, let me start with what I think is a very
positive story that needs to be discussed. Globally, the level
of security across the board has been increased immeasurably
because of the investments of organizations such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization and their efforts to
raise aviation standards. But individually, countries have
looked at the United States, have looked at other regulators,
and have increased their own levels. So in terms of are we much
safer globally than what we were immediately after 9/11?
Unequivocally, yes, Senator.
And what I would say is if there are countries that are of
worry, the best source of who they are and who their names
would be would be with the intelligence community, and we trust
that the men and women of the TSA have identified those
countries and have put in place procedures to deal with those
additional threats that they might have. I would not be the
intelligence specialist that would be able to name those
countries.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Mr. Dunlap.
And Mr. Barclay, I want to follow up on Chairman
Lieberman's question that he raised with you about American and
Delta, and I think your answer was, airports would like to have
a lot of authority on those decisions, how we manage that
program. You all have worked out the public-private partnership
in regard to airport employees and their passage through
security. Has that worked well, and is that what you were
referring to when you were answering Senator Lieberman's
question?
Mr. Barclay. No. They are really separate, but related to
the extent that airports are experienced and do know how to do
employee vetting. They would like to be sponsors of local Pre-
Check programs so that Dulles Airport could have a program
where in addition to the airline signing up people through
frequent flyer programs, the airports could have an opportunity
to have passengers show up, do the vetting necessary, and help
people get enrolled who are not part of the frequent flyer
programs. So airports have experience in how to get that
information into TSA and we have eager members. After 9/11, you
may remember that there was a privately-run registered traveler
program that was sponsored by airports, and over 20 airports
signed up for that and enrolled over a quarter of a million
people. So airports would like to be part of Pre-Check.
The item that you mentioned on the clearinghouse is one
that before 9/11, only about 10 percent of employees had to get
criminal history record checks from the FBI and it was a
nightmare. It was taking over 50 days to get a background check
through the process because they were going through OPM. OPM
was not set up to deal with entities outside of the Federal
Government. They were losing accounting records.
Pre-9/11, we had research that the Bankers Association was
doing criminal history record checks for banking employees.
They had a clearinghouse to make those checks work smoothly for
their industry.
That is what we set up in cooperation with FAA at the time
and the airports. We have since vetted eight million
backgrounds. It has not cost the Federal Government a penny,
compared to the TWIC program, which has cost hundreds of
millions and has vetted two million backgrounds. We have
reduced that 50 days to minutes, which is what is important to
an industry that is 24/7, needs to get employees vetted and out
on the front lines as quickly as possible, to do that in a safe
fashion. And it has really been a model of a public-private
partnership that has worked very well.
The reason that AAAE got involved in that originally was
that FAA ran security back then and Jane Garvey, who was the
Administrator, selected us to do that because it was a co-op
model. The customers of the clearinghouse are also the owners
of the clearinghouse. Airport executives run the clearinghouse,
make the decisions about its charges and operations, and they
are also the customers on the other end. So that was the reason
that we got into that program to begin with.
Senator Moran. And that program has worked well?
Mr. Barclay. Very well.
Senator Moran. And TSA is satisfied?
Mr. Barclay. They are, and they have moved in the last year
to introduce competition so airports will have a choice of
other vendors that can also provide those clearinghouse
services, and we want to compliment TSA because they have moved
on that carefully to make sure you did not undo a program that
was working while you introduced more competition to it. So
aviation workers, unlike truckers or port authority workers,
who only have one program to go through and it is federally
controlled, aviation workers are going to continue to have a
variety, three options to go through, and they are in a program
that costs about a third for the employee of what it costs a
Haz-Mat trucker to get their vet done or a port worker to get
their vet done. So it is a very efficient system and one that
we would like to see TSA certainly continue.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Moran.
Senator Landrieu, good morning. Thanks for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Good morning. Thank you all. I think this
is a very important hearing and I just wanted to highlight for
the Committee's attention five items that are in the Homeland
Security appropriations bill that will help expedite some of
these initiatives.
We added in the Senate bill, Mr. Chairman, $10 million for
TSA to begin to implement the trusted traveler program. It is
in the Senate bill, not, unfortunately, in the House bill. A
requirement for TSA to improve its response to passenger
complaints, along with GAO review of existing procedures, is in
the Senate bill, not in the House bill. Report language
directing TSA to improve training to address passengers with
physical or mental disabilities like autism, is not in the
House bill but in the Senate bill. Eleven million dollars above
the 2011 level to add 175 new Behavior Detection Officers,
again, it is in the Senate bill, not the House bill. And there
is a requirement that the fiscal year 2013 budget request
documents resource allocation on the basis of risk, which is
very important.
There may be others, but this is just a short list that I
had my staff put together because the authorization, which
happens in this Committee, is extremely important, but if it is
not funded, it does not get done. And so I want to just thank
Mr. Dow and Mr. Dunlap particularly for the input that your
organizations have given us both in this Committee and in our
appropriations process. I believe that your associations can
really help us lead the way to the future, where we can have a
very secure system but also a system that is much less
intrusive than the one we have now so we can reduce the
inconvenience and the frustration that is associated with
traveling today.
And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, a 2010 survey by
Consensus Research concluded that American travelers would take
two to three additional flights each year if the hassles of
security screening were eliminated. That would translate into
an additional $85 billion in consumer spending and 900,000 jobs
created in the United States.
So this is an area of interest to us all from a variety of
perspectives. It is for security and the safety of our Nation
to prevent important attacks. But for the State that I
represent that is in large measure dependent on the traveling
public--we are an international destination, and we, like many
communities, rely on those international travelers to sustain
our economy--it is just imperative that we quickly develop the
checkpoint of the future.
So I want to thank you all and I look forward to working
with you.
My first question is on checked baggage, because I intend,
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, to file a bill to
require the airlines, for every ticket purchased to allow one
checked bag for free. If the airlines want to write it into
their ticket costs, that is fine. But this is pushing so many
bags into, as you all testified, carry-on luggage.
I understand that the cost, and if my staff will find this
document, when Secretary Napolitano testified before our
Committee, she testified that their internal study indicated
that it cost TSA about $260 million more because of the
baggage, Mr. Chairman, not being checked and being carried on.
Is that your understanding? Do you have independent data? I
will start with you, Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Dow.
Mr. Dunlap. Well, Senator, that is certainly a very
interesting question. What we do is we look at global trends.
If you take a look globally at what is happening to
checkpoints, the fact that they are slowing down, the fact that
you are getting passengers more inconvenienced, that is
happening regardless of whether or not the local business model
there includes some sort of a la carte pricing, which is always
being blamed for driving more bags into the checkpoints.
If you take a look at what is happening over time, IATA as
far back as August 2005 sounded the alarm that our checkpoints
were slowing down. So as you recall, in 2005, a la carte
pricing or any kind of other pricing models that were
discussed, they really did not exist in any major business
models at all.
And then I think the last thing that you need to consider
is what has been happening at security checkpoints over the
last several years. Shoes have been coming off. Computers have
been coming out. Liquids are being set aside. And now you have
the body scanners where passengers have to take absolutely
everything out of their pockets.
So I think, in all deference to the DHS report, I think
that there are many other factors that are responsible for what
is happening at the checkpoints rather than whatever or not the
passenger puts the bag in the cabin or puts the bag into the
belly of the aircraft.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Dow.
Mr. Dow. Yes, Senator. You made two very important points.
One was on the checked bags. Our research says that if people
knew they could check a bag, if it was included in the price of
their ticket, two-thirds would do so, and your point is right.
You cannot dictate pricing to an airline, but we certainly can
dictate that they should include that in the price of an
airline ticket and it would help.
The second point you made, I thought was outstanding, is on
customer service. TSA has to measure not only security, but
customer satisfaction and efficiency, not on an average but at
peak times, and have those measurements so we can look at them
and know that we are satisfying the customers while improving
security. So we agree.
Senator Landrieu. And Mr. Chairman, I really am very
focused on this issue because I think it is increasing the
public's anxiety and dissatisfaction with government generally.
But Mr. Chairman, and I know it is not the purview of this
Committee but rather the Commerce Committee, but if we do not
do something, the airlines are going to sell a ticket to a
flyer and you are not going to get a seat, you are going to
stand on the airplane and then have to pay extra for the
cushion, and I have about had it, OK? You do not get anything
to eat. You get virtually nothing to drink. At least they give
you water and a Coke or a 7-Up. Everything else costs.
So I think the American people deserve, when they purchase
a ticket from an airline, they get one bag that they can check
and a carry-on item in that ticket price and they absolutely
get a seat and a glass of water. I mean, that should be the
minimum Federal requirement, and I am going to push very hard
to see that it gets done.
But in addition, let me just ask one final question to the
airlines. Mr. Barclay, I flew in from Israel last week and got
to the Newark Airport and was unable to use my cell phone from
the time I exited the plane until I got, I guess, outside the
building. Is that a rule of each individual airport or is that
a TSA rule or where did that rule come from and are you aware
of it?
Mr. Barclay. I will check on that and get back to you with
the folks at Newark Airport. I presume it was just a cell usage
problem that they----
Senator Landrieu. No, absolutely not. It was a restriction.
Mr. Barclay. Oh, you were told you could not----
Senator Landrieu. No one could use a cell phone from the
time they got off the plane until they got their luggage
through Customs and then out into the daylight, which, to me,
when you are trying to manage business travel, the first thing
people want to do when they have been traveling 13 hours on an
international flight is check in with the office, see what they
missed, etc. I wish, Mr. Dow and Mr. Dunlap, you would look at
this. I do not know what the security requirement is for not
being able to use cell phones. And, by the way, Mr. Chairman,
we waited an hour and 10 minutes for our luggage after a 13-
hour flight. And so the airports are going to be hearing from
me about this baggage handling issue, as well, because it is
very disappointing.
So as much as we can make the travel experience safe and
convenient, it has to do with both the way people board their
flight and the way they de-plane, and the exit portion is
getting worse, just as the entrance portion is, so we have a
long way to go.
I know I have exceeded my time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barclay. Senator, if I could just briefly, I am told
that is a CBP rule that you are not allowed to use cell phones
in the arrival area. So you could go back to them on that.
Chairman Lieberman. We will take that up. I was going to
tell you that if we are on the same flight together, I will
give you my seat. I will not make you stand.
Mr. Barclay. You are going to stand?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. [Laughter.]
Senator Landrieu. You can stand up and hold on to the
lavatory----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and the cushion.
Mr. Dow. Senator Landrieu, I want to also thank you and the
Appropriations Committee for what you are doing to help improve
the visa process, because it starts when people start planning
to come here, and the work you are putting forward there is
going to make a huge difference in our economy. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Landrieu. Senator
Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. To our witnesses, thanks so much for
joining us today.
Senators Lieberman, Collins, Brown, and myself have a press
conference in about 5 minutes on the U.S. Postal Service, so I
am going to be very brief. In fact, I am going to pose a couple
of questions and ask you to respond to them for the record.
The first question, Mr. Dunlap, is for you. I was intrigued
by your discussion and images of the checkpoint of the future.
The concept seems simple enough, and that is risk-based
screening driven by information that we already collect from
passengers, the use of advance screening technology, and
separate lanes for different types of passengers. This kind of
checkpoint, I think, could save travelers countless hours and
ultimately increase the travel industry and our local
economies.
Given the financial challenges that we face as a Nation,
what would the checkpoint of the future likely cost taxpayers
and are there programs and technologies in place right now that
can be seamlessly integrated into your vision? That is a
question for the record.
And maybe one more question for the record. This would be
for all of our witnesses. In your testimonies, you discussed
how the current one-size-fits-all screening process at
America's airports does not meet the needs of our traveling
public, and I think you also noted that we need to move to a
system that detects dangerous people instead of dangerous
things. And as you know, this Committee has continually
challenged government officials to work smarter with Federal
dollars and to find efficiencies in our government programs
without compromising security. Our credo is how to get better
results for either less money or the same amount of money
without sacrificing security.
To this end, I understand that TSA has delivered a pilot to
help expedite the flow of trusted travelers--you have had some
discussion of that here today--but there is still much room for
growth and improvement. Could you all discuss on the record for
me the challenges that TSA faces as it looks to expand that
pilot and how industry can help find solutions to these issues?
And I will have one more question, and I am not going to
mention it today, but will submit another question or two for
the record, as well, and if you could respond to those
promptly, I would be most grateful. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Carper, I appreciate that very
much.
I thank Mr. Dow, Mr. Dunlap, and Mr. Barclay. Your
testimony has been very helpful.
We have come a long way. I mean, we are in a new age, and
it is no fun, but as we have all said, the enemy is out there.
The enemy is persistent and they continue to be attracted to
air travel as a way to attack us and hurt us. We are trying
very hard to protect the American people when they travel
because the worst thing of all for airline business would be
obviously if people felt unsafe.
But I think, increasingly, under Administrator Pistole, we
are both trying to leverage new technologies but also move
into, on top of the basics, a more risk-based approach, and
that is exactly what I think all three of you are asking.
Your statements are in the record in full. We are going to
keep the record of this hearing open for another 15 days for
any additional questions or statements on either side of the
bench here.
But I thank you very much for what you do every day and for
the thought and effort that you put into your testimony this
morning.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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