[Senate Hearing 112-451]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-451
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
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HEARINGS
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
H.R. 2017
AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
Department of Homeland Security
Nondepartmental witnesses
U.S. Coast Guard
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
TOM HARKIN, Iowa MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
PATTY MURRAY, Washington LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana MARK KIRK, Illinois
JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL COATS, Indiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROY BLUNT, Missouri
BEN NELSON, Nebraska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
JON TESTER, Montana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
Charles J. Houy, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, Vice Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii DANIEL COATS, Indiana
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
JON TESTER, Montana LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Professional Staff
Charles Kieffer
Chip Walgren
Scott Nance
Drenan E. Dudley
Rebecca Davies (Minority)
Carol Cribbs (Minority)
Administrative Support
Nora Martin
Courtney Stevens (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Page
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 1
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Coast Guard................ 155
Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................ 195
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary L. Landrieu (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Landrieu, Lautenberg, Coats, Cochran,
Murkowski, and Moran.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY
opening statement of senator mary l. landrieu
Senator Landrieu. Good morning. I would like to call our
subcommittee to order for the purpose of considering the
Department's budget for 2012.
Let me first welcome our new ranking member, Senator Coats.
I am pleased to work with Senator Coats in the next 2 years and
really appreciate his leadership in this area.
Welcome, Madam Secretary. We are happy to have you present
your budget this morning. You lead a Department of 221,000 men
and women who are on the front lines every day protecting our
Nation and our citizens. And we commend those employees for
their dedication and their hard work. They are in our airports,
our ports, along our borders, considering the intelligence
coming in all over our country, we appreciate their work and we
appreciate your leadership.
My goal is to produce a bipartisan, fiscally responsible
Homeland Security bill for fiscal year 2012 that provides this
Department with the resources it needs to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from all threats, manmade and natural. I share
your commitment to the goals established in the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review: preventing terrorism, securing our
borders, enforcing our immigration laws, safeguarding
cyberspace, and ensuring resiliency in the face of natural or
manmade disasters.
Securing this Nation is not just, as you know, Madam
Secretary, a Federal Government responsibility. State and local
governments share that responsibility, and frankly, as well as
many of our corporations who are doing their part and
individual citizens as they are trained to recognize threats
that potentially are occurring in their local communities. This
Department must--I believe--serve as leaders and educators in
helping our State and local governments and corporations,
serving as a model for them, as well as encouraging our private
citizens to do their part.
As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks,
the 8th anniversary of the creation of the Department, and the
6th anniversary of the catastrophic levee failures which caused
horrific destruction in and around the city of New Orleans, the
hurricanes of Katrina and Rita along the gulf coast, we must
not let our guard down. We must remember the lessons of those
horrific events and, even without the imminent threat right
before us, not fail to remember what we learned on those
terrible occasions. We must have the fortitude and the
discipline and the tenacity I think, Senator Coats and others,
to continue to fund adequately this effort and not become lax
or distracted.
In the State of the Union Address, the President said that
al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to plan attacks against
us. He said, ``as extremists try to inspire acts of violence
within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our
communities and with respect to the rule of law.'' Secretary
Napolitano, you have stated that the terrorism threat is at the
highest level since 9/11. That is a statement that we should
pay attention to.
We will be mindful of those statements as we consider the
President's request for this 2012 year. I am supportive of
reducing spending where we can, obviously eliminating mediocre
programs or duplicative programs. But I do not believe the
notion of reducing spending arbitrarily to a 2008 level for
this Department makes any sense.
The Coast Guard would have to eliminate 2,400 personnel and
its recapitalization program would be terminated. We saw what
the Coast Guard did in responding to the BP oil spill. I do not
believe a cutback there is smart.
We would have to eliminate the national security cutter
(NSC), the fast response cutter (FRC), and the marine patrol
aircraft. The number of customs officers at our ports of entry
would be reduced by more than 1,600. The number of Border
Patrol agents--Senator McCain has fought very hard, along with
others, to secure more personnel at our borders, not less, and
I will not support a budget that reduces that number by 3,500.
Reducing funding for the Transportation Security
Administration to levels before the Christmas Day bombing
attempt would be reckless. We know that there are attempts to
take down aircraft in America that are ongoing. We have been
successful in preventing it so far. This budget supports our
effort to continue to be successful.
We would have 775 fewer scanners at our airports, 4,000
fewer screeners, 330 fewer air cargo inspectors, and 235 fewer
canine teams. Under my leadership, we will not go in that
direction.
I believe the President has submitted a fiscally
responsible budget for this Department. Of course, we will have
some issues within the Department. I look forward to working
with my ranking member to find a way forward that provides the
resources necessary, however, to keep our Nation and our
citizens safe.
prepared statement
Following Senator Coats's opening statement, we will hear
from you Madam Secretary, because our schedule has changed. I
wanted the members to have time for opening statements, but I
am going to ask them to submit them for the record because a
vote has been called for 11 o'clock.
But let me turn to my ranking member and thank Senator
Cochran for joining us this morning.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Good morning.
Secretary Napolitano, you lead a Department of 221,000 men and
women who are on the front lines every day protecting our citizens. We
commend those employees for their dedication and their service and we
welcome you to this subcommittee hearing today. I also welcome Senator
Dan Coats, our new ranking member. I look forward to working with you
and hearing from all of our subcommittee members this year.
My goal is to produce a bipartisan, fiscally responsible Homeland
Security bill for fiscal year 2012 that provides the Department with
the resources it needs to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all
threats, both man-made and natural. I share your commitment to the
goals established in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
preventing terrorism, securing the borders, enforcing our immigration
laws, safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters.
Securing this Nation is not just about the Federal Government. We
must also serve as leaders and educators in helping State and local
governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and our citizens in
achieving these goals.
As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the 8th
anniversary of the creation of this Department, and the 6th anniversary
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we must all learn from history while
confronting the evolving threats to this Nation.
In the State of the Union Address, the President said that al Qaeda
and its affiliates continue to plan attacks against us. He said, ``as
extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are
responding with the strength of our communities, and with respect for
the rule of law''. Secretary Napolitano, you have stated that the
terrorism threat is at its highest level since 9/11.
We will be mindful of those statements as we consider the
President's request for fiscal year 2012. While I am supportive of
reducing spending, I do not believe the notion of reducing spending to
2008 levels is either appropriate or responsible for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The Coast Guard would have to eliminate 2,400
personnel and its recapitalization program would be terminated,
including the national security cutter, the fast response cutter, and
the maritime patrol aircraft. The number of Customs officers at our
ports of entry would be reduced by more than 1,600, reducing security
and extending wait times. The number of Border Patrol agents would be
reduced by more than 3,500, reversing the progress we have made in
securing our borders. Reducing funding for the Transportation Security
Administration to levels before the Christmas Day bombing attempt would
be absurd. We would have 775 fewer scanners at our airports, 4,000
fewer screeners, 330 fewer air cargo inspectors, and 235 fewer canine
teams. Under my leadership, we will not go down that road.
I believe the President has submitted a responsible, fiscally
prudent budget for DHS. Of course, we have some issues with the budget
which we will discuss today, and I look forward to hearing from the
Secretary.
Following Senator Coats' opening statement, each member will be
recognized for up to 3 minutes for opening remarks. After the opening
remarks, we will hear from Secretary Napolitano. After, we hear from
the Secretary, each member will be recognized, based on order of
arrival, for up to 5 minutes for questions. I now recognize Senator
Coats for any opening remarks he may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL COATS
Senator Coats. Madam Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to
join you on this subcommittee, my first venture here. So I will
probably have more questions than answers, but I look forward
to the testimony.
Secretary Napolitano, thank you for being here this morning
and reaching out yesterday with a courtesy call for me and
being willing to sit down and talk through difficult,
challenging issues at a difficult, challenging time. So I
appreciate that very much.
I never thought I would be sitting in a superior position
to Senator Cochran on any committee anywhere, including lunch.
But it is a pleasure to be with you, Thad, and I appreciate
your leadership over the years of this subcommittee and ranking
membership is duly noted.
Madam Secretary, I do not think any of us question that we
are in difficult fiscal times. Also no one questions whether or
not we have security threats that we need to address and need
to protect the American people from incursions and unwanted
terrorist activity and to do everything we can to provide for
homeland security. So there comes the challenge for all of us.
The current budget that the President has announced is an
increase over previous years. As you know, the Congress is
looking for ways to try to do more with less. The question I
think comes in terms of how we can provide effective service
and fulfill our obligations in providing for the security of
our country, at the same time trying to do it in a more
efficient way. We are not asking for no Government here. We are
asking for more efficient Government, and working together, I
think, to try to achieve that should be one of our goals.
As I look at your budget, a couple of things come to mind,
and I just might mention those and we can discuss them during
the hearing and afterwards.
The budget indicates--I think assumes--that there will be
an increase in aviation passenger security fees and that those
fees will start rolling in in the third quarter of fiscal year
2012. Yet, none of that is assured yet, and I am told that that
is a mark of nearly $590 million in additional collections. And
so I would like to pursue that question with you.
Second, the budget continues to request operations for
disaster relief based on historical obligations for
noncatastrophic events and assumes that large catastrophic
events are rare and should be funded strictly by supplemental
emergency appropriations. As you know, the reality is that
those large catastrophic events result in year after year after
year of follow-up funding, and whether that should be done by
emergency supplemental or budgeted is, I think, a fundamental
question that we have to address. My understanding is that for
fiscal year 2011, the amount necessary to provide for
continuing work post-Katrina, post other catastrophic
occurrences is $1.6 billion, an amount that is not put into the
President's budget. And so when you add all this up, I think it
totals around $3 billion not included in the 2012 request. How
we are going to reconcile that, I think, is going to be a
challenge for us all.
And of course, those assumptions often come in low. We have
seen occurrences of more and more violent storms and
catastrophic events, whether it is flooding, wildfires,
hurricanes, or other disasters.
There are a couple of other areas that I would like to talk
about, but we can wait until question time. Again, I thank you
for being here and look forward to a year of good, solid work
in terms of trying to do more with less funds, but do it more
efficiently. Every family in America, every business in
America, almost every State in the Union has had to face up to
this challenge, and the Federal Government is going to need to
do so also.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator, for those remarks.
I want to acknowledge Senator Lautenberg who has joined us.
He chaired this subcommittee in the interim after the death of
Chairman Byrd, and Senator, thank you for your leadership.
DISASTER RELIEF FUND
We are going to go right into questions in the order of
appearance. Let me begin following up on what Senator Coats
said about the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), Madam Secretary,
which is particularly of interest to gulf coast leaders. But
frankly, with the catastrophes in Rhode Island, the flooding in
Tennessee, and fires and tornadoes in other parts of the
country, there are many members that are very concerned.
For fiscal year 2011, the current year we are in, we are
facing a $1.6 billion gap in the DRF. If the President does not
request and the Congress does not approve supplemental funding,
that account under our calculations will literally run out of
money in June, only a few months from now, just as we are
entering hurricane season.
For fiscal year 2012, the problem is even worse because we
are facing a $3 billion gap based on known costs. These are not
projections or speculations. These are known costs of past
disasters.
In fiscal year 2010, there was a similar shortfall. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had to stop
providing assistance for rebuilding and recovery projects. Many
of those were in my home State. Some of them were in Senator
Cochran's home State of Mississippi, but they were all over the
country. Unfortunately, this problem looks like it is repeating
itself, and I would like to head it off, if we can, at the
pass.
During the last hearing before the authorizing committee,
you said it is ``really nonnegotiable'' when asked about the
looming crisis. You said we have to pay for these disasters. It
is our responsibility.
Do you believe that the President is going to send up a
supplemental to request this funding, and if so, when? Because
if we have to cut $1.6 billion out of the base Homeland
Security budget, that will cut the Coast Guard, that will cut
FEMA, that will cut grants to State and local responders, and
basically, we will be cutting current disaster response teams
to pay for past disasters. To me that does not make any sense.
Do you think the President will send up a supplemental and
would you support it?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank
you for this hearing. I am pleased to be here before you,
Ranking Member Coats, other members of the subcommittee.
I do have an opening statement and I will just simply ask
that that be inserted.
Senator Landrieu. Please go right ahead with your opening
statement.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I am happy to go right to
questions, if you want to do that.
Senator Landrieu. No, no, no. You go right to your opening
statement. I am very sorry. And then you can take that
question.
Secretary Napolitano. All right.
Senator Coats. Maybe it will be happier.
Senator Landrieu. Yes. Maybe it will be easier than my
question.
Senator Landrieu. Go right ahead.
Senator Coats. Whatever works best.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, why don't I answer the question
and then I will give the opening statement?
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. You have identified one of the issues
that we will have to work together on and we look forward to
working with the subcommittee on.
One of the things that the numbers do not reflect yet is
our effort to deobligate funds that have been set aside to pay
for past disasters that no longer are necessary. In other
words, we have been able to go backwards and say, well, we set
aside this amount and in fact we did not need that amount of
money. So in fiscal year 2010, for example, we restored $2
billion to the DRF by process of deobligation. That is what it
is called. And so we look forward to continuing that strategy
as we move forward to refill the DRF with deobligated funds.
Now, will that be enough to cover expenses for fiscal year
2011 and fiscal year 2012? Probably not without a supplemental
of some sort. So we anticipate that the administration will
submit a supplemental for the DRF. This has been the historical
practice under Republican and Democratic administrations. I
think the reason the practice started was because of the
difficulty of predicting ultimately what the DRF will be
required to cover. So the administration has carried forward
with that historical practice, but nonetheless, I think it is
fair to say, Madam Chair, that a supplemental will be
necessary.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you and please go on with your
opening statement.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF JANET NAPOLITANO
Secretary Napolitano. Well, let me begin again by thanking
you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year
2012 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
I think it is fair to say that the demands on DHS have
never been greater. This is especially true as we remember
those at the Department who have given their lives in service
of the mission of securing our country, including just in the
past weeks and months, Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime
Zapata.
Now, Mexico is leading the investigation into the death of
Agent Zapata. We are supporting them through a joint Department
of Justice (DOJ)/DHS task force that the Attorney General and I
announced 2 weeks ago. Recently, Mexican authorities have
apprehended some of the alleged killers of Agent Zapata, and we
are conducting a number of operations in the United States
related to the drug cartels that plague that country.
I can speak for the entire administration when I say we are
not only saddened by the loss of an agent, we are outraged by
this act of violence against an officer of the United States.
And make no mistake, justice will be brought to all of those
involved. We owe nothing less to the memory of our agent, Agent
Zapata, and to those who are still on the job in Mexico.
But the loss of these great agents is a stark reminder of
the sacrifices made by the men and women of DHS every day. It
also strengthens our resolve to continue to do everything in
our power to protect against, mitigate, and respond to threats
and to make our Nation more resilient for years to come.
Today's threat picture features adversaries who evolve
quickly and are determined to strike us here at home--from the
aviation system and the global supply chain to surface
transportation, critical infrastructure, and our cyber
networks.
We are leading the administration's unprecedented effort to
secure our Southwest Border, coupled with a smart and effective
approach to enforcing immigration laws in the interior of our
country. And we continue to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from disasters of all types.
President Obama's fiscal year 2012 budget for the
Department allows us to continue to meet these evolving threats
and challenges by prioritizing our essential operational
requirements while reflecting an unprecedented commitment to
fiscal discipline that maximizes the effectiveness of every
security dollar that we receive.
Reflecting the current fiscal environment, in building the
fiscal year 2012 budget, all DHS components identified savings
associated with the Department's 33 efficiency review
initiatives, and we cut administration and overhead, including
my own office's budget, by more than $800 million. Savings were
realized through efficiencies in acquisition, asset, and real
property management, as well as employee vetting and
credentialing, hiring and on-boarding, and information
technology. We cut professional services contracts, travel, and
nonmission-critical training.
We also delayed construction of FEMA at the new DHS
headquarters at St. Elizabeths and deferred office
collocations, as well as building maintenance and enhancements.
My written statement includes a comprehensive list of the
operational priorities in the budget request, and today I would
like to highlight a few of them for you here, even as I request
that the full statement be admitted in your record.
First, preventing terrorism and enhancing security was the
founding mission of DHS. It remains our top priority today.
This budget safeguards transportation modes through a layered
detection system, including the deployment of additional
transportation security officers, behavioral detection
officers, canine teams, and advanced imaging technology
machines at domestic airports while expanding watch list
vetting through the secure flight program and enhancing
screening and targeting of international travelers before they
board U.S.-bound flights through the immigration advisory
program.
The budget also strengthens surface transportation security
by supporting 12 new multimodal VIPR teams. The acronym stands
for visible intermodal prevention and response. These teams
conduct operations throughout the transportation sector to
prevent potential terrorist activity.
The request also provides funding for the Securing the
Cities program to protect our highest risk cities from a
radiological or a nuclear attack and makes a significant
investment in the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility which
will provide enhanced diagnostic capabilities to protect our
country from foreign animal and emerging diseases.
The request expands support for the national network of
State and local fusion centers to enhance baseline capabilities
and local law enforcement with the tools they need to address
threats in their communities.
Now, to secure and manage our borders, the request
continues the administration's historic border security efforts
by supporting 21,370 Border Patrol agents and 21,186 Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) officers, both all-time highs. The
budget also includes $242 million for the continued deployment
of proven, effective surveillance technology along the highest
trafficked areas of the Southwest Border to better meet the
operational requirements of our agents on the front lines.
For the Northern Border, this budget request supports
investments in technology tailored to the maritime and cold
weather environment, including proven standalone technology to
provide immediate operational benefits.
And for our Nation's maritime borders, this budget includes
funding to continue the essential NSC program and makes
historic investments to recapitalize the Coast Guard's aging
assets, including 6 FRCs, 40 response boats, as well as a
sizable investment in the renovation and restoration of aging
shore facilities.
The budget request also continues the Department's focus on
smart and effective enforcement of our U.S. immigration laws,
while streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration
process. Building on our record over the past 2 years, the
Department will continue to prioritize the identification and
removal of criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety,
and target employers who knowingly and repeatedly break the
law. This request enables ICE to fund 33,400 detention beds,
remove more than 200,000 criminal aliens, and deploy Secure
Communities to 96 percent of all jurisdictions nationally in
fiscal year 2012, while promoting compliance with worksite-
related laws through criminal prosecution of egregious
employers. Form I-9 inspections and continued expansion and
enhancements of E-Verify are included.
The request funds integration efforts, including programs
supporting English-language and citizenship education, and
continues detention reform efforts currently underway.
Now, to safeguard and secure cyberspace, the budget
increases resources to identify and reduce vulnerabilities in
our Nation's key cyber networks. It includes significant
investments to expedite the deployment of Einstein 3 to prevent
and detect intrusions on Government computer systems, increase
Federal network security of large and small agencies, and
continue to develop a robust cybersecurity workforce to protect
against and respond to cybersecurity threats. The budget also
focuses on combating cyber crime and preventing attacks against
United States critical infrastructure.
Now, to ensure resilience to disasters, as you mentioned,
Madam Chair, the budget request focuses on moving resources out
of Washington, DC, and into the hands of State and local
responders who are often best positioned to detect and respond
to terrorism, to natural disasters, and to other threats by
sustaining Federal funding for State and local preparedness
grants, providing $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2012. The funding
also includes $670 million for assistance to firefighter
grants, including $420 million to rehire an estimated 2,300
laid-off firefighters and retain veteran first responders.
Now, to lead and support essential national security and
economic security efforts, the budget expands the Coast Guard's
operational capacity by funding 50,682 military and civilian
positions and establishing the Coast Guard's first incident
management assistance team, which will be deployed rapidly to
support incidents of national significance.
It also continues to support ICE and CBP's enforcement and
investigative efforts to protect U.S. intellectual property
rights, as well as the Secret Service's state-of-the-art
forensic support for the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children.
Madam Chair, this budget is the culmination of a major,
first-of-its-kind effort by the Department through the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and the associated Bottom-
Up Review to align our resources with a comprehensive strategy
to ensure a safe, secure, and resilient homeland while making
an unprecedented commitment to fiscal discipline.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I would be remiss, however, if I did not note all of this
progress is at risk in the continuing resolution passed by the
House. This is the full fiscal year 2011 resolution. That
proposal cuts technology investments and security improvements
on the Southwest and Northern Borders. It cuts aviation
security measures. It cuts funding to sustain the progress that
has been made in enforcing the Nation's immigration laws. It
cuts critical cybersecurity tools and operations. It cuts
intelligence personnel. It cuts Coast Guard funding to support
our war efforts abroad, and it cuts grants that support
counter-terrorism and disaster response capabilities at the
local level.
Chairman Landrieu, Senator Coats, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am
happy to continue to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Janet Napolitano
Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, and members of the
subcommittee: Let me begin by saying thank you to this subcommittee for
the strong support you have provided me and the Department over the
past 2 years. I look forward to continuing to work with you in the
coming year to protect the homeland and the American people.
I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee today to present
President Obama's fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
The demands on DHS have never been greater and the threats we face
pose new challenges that require an innovative and focused response.
Today's threat picture features an adversary who evolves and adapts
quickly and who is determined to strike us here at home--from the
aviation system and the global supply chain to surface transportation
systems, critical infrastructure, and cyber networks. The Department's
fiscal year 2012 budget allows us to continue to meet these evolving
threats and challenges by prioritizing our essential operational
requirements--while reflecting an unprecedented commitment to fiscal
discipline that maximizes the effectiveness of every security dollar we
receive.
Reflecting the current economic environment, we are preserving
essential frontline operations and bolstering our operational strength
by decreasing administration and overhead, including the overall budget
for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management. All DHS
components identified reductions associated with the Efficiency Review
initiatives currently underway as well as administrative savings
totaling nearly $800 million to strengthen mission-critical activities
across the Department. Savings were accomplished through efficiencies
in acquisition, asset, and real property management as well as employee
vetting/credentialing, hiring/on-boarding, and information technology;
and administrative savings through reductions to professional services
contracts, printing, supplies and materials, travel, and training. The
Department also proposes to delay construction of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters at St. Elizabeths as well as the
deferral of other office colocations, and building maintenance and
enhancements to prioritize frontline security operations.
fiscal year 2012 budget request
The fiscal year 2012 budget request for DHS is $57.0 billion in
total funding, $47.4 billion in gross discretionary funding, and $43.2
billion in net discretionary funding.\1\
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\1\ For purposes of comparison to prior year funding levels,
funding for overseas contingency operations and National Science
Foundation transfers are not included in these figures.
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DHS's fiscal year 2012 budget request is the culmination of a
major, first of its kind effort undertaken by the Department to align
DHS resources with a comprehensive strategy to meet our Nation's
homeland security needs. Last year, DHS completed the first ever
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which established a
unified, strategic framework for Homeland Security missions and goals,
as well as the first ever Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which aligned DHS'
programmatic activities and organizational structure to better serve
those missions and goals. The third and final step of this process is
the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, which begins the next phase in
strengthening DHS efforts to ensure a safe, secure, and resilient
homeland.
This process identified six DHS missions, each of which is
strengthened by this budget:
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security.--
Protecting the United States from terrorism is the cornerstone
of Homeland Security. DHS's counterterrorism responsibilities
focus on three goals:
--preventing terrorist attacks;
--preventing the unauthorized acquisition, importation, movement,
or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
materials and capabilities within the United States; and
--reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key
resources, essential leadership, and major events to
terrorist attacks and other hazards.
Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders.--DHS secures the
Nation's air, land, and sea borders to prevent illegal activity
while facilitating lawful travel and trade. The Department's
border security and management efforts focus on three
interrelated goals:
--effectively securing U.S. air, land, and sea borders;
--safeguarding and streamlining lawful trade and travel; and
--disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist
organizations.
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws.--DHS
is focused on smart and effective enforcement of U.S.
immigration laws while streamlining and facilitating the legal
immigration process. The Department has fundamentally reformed
immigration enforcement, focusing on identifying and removing
criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety and
targeting employers who knowingly and repeatedly break the law.
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace.--By statute and
Presidential Directive, DHS has the lead for the Federal
Government to secure civilian government computer systems and
works with industry and State, local, tribal, and territorial
governments to secure critical infrastructure and information
systems. DHS analyzes and reduces cyber threats and
vulnerabilities; distributes threat warnings; and coordinates
the response to cyber incidents to ensure that our computers,
networks, and cyber systems remain safe.
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.--DHS provides the
coordinated, comprehensive Federal response in the event of a
terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale
emergency while working with Federal, State, local, and private
sector partners to ensure a swift and effective recovery
effort. The Department's efforts to build a ready and resilient
Nation include fostering a community-oriented approach;
bolstering information sharing; improving the capability to
plan; and providing grants and training to our Homeland
Security and law enforcement partners.
Mission 6: Providing Essential Support to National and Economic
Security.--DHS leads and supports many activities that provide
essential support to national and economic security including,
but not limited to:
--maximizing collection of customs revenue;
--maintaining the safety of the marine transportation system;
--preventing the exploitation of children;
--providing law enforcement training; and
--coordinating the Federal Government's response to global
intellectual property theft. DHS contributes in many ways
to these elements of broader U.S. national and economic
security while fulfilling its other five Homeland Security
missions.
The following are highlights of the fiscal year 2012 budget:
preventing terrorism and enhancing security
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT).--$105.2 million and 535
positions are included for the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to purchase, install, and operate 275 AITs at airport
checkpoints. The fiscal year 2012 request, combined with prior
requests, will result in 1,275 AIT units deployed by the end of 2012.
The requested funding covers the cost of new Transportation Screening
officers and managers to operate the new AITs, as well as the
associated support and airport management costs. Continuing to increase
AIT deployments while ensuring privacy safeguards are in place is
critical to address the current threat by safely screening passengers
for metallic and nonmetallic threats--including weapons, explosives and
other objects concealed under layers of clothing.
Explosives Detection Systems (EDS).--$273 million is requested to
support the recapitalization and deployment of state-of-the-art EDS for
checked baggage to efficiently screen baggage for explosives, reducing
the number of rescans and physical bag searches. Beginning in fiscal
year 2012, more than 800 EDS in our largest airports will exceed their
planned 10-year service life.
Assistant Field Security Directors-Law Enforcement (AFSD-LEs).--
Requested funding of $22.5 million supports 82 AFSD-LEs currently
deployed and provides 22 additional AFSD-LEs for major airports, where
they serve as the primary liaison to local law enforcement as AIT
expansion continues.
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).--The fiscal year 2012 budget
requests funds to maintain the FAMS surge deployment levels for
domestic and international flight coverage that began in response to
the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009. Members of the
FAMS, TSA's law enforcement entity, are deployed on flights around the
world and the United States based on risk in order to detect, deter,
and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports,
passengers, and crews.
Enhanced Watchlist Vetting.--$12.4 million is proposed for
maintaining the expanded watchlist vetting initiative, which, through
the Secure Flight program, enables TSA to identify individuals who may
present a threat to passenger air travel. Through Secure Flight, TSA
prescreens passenger name, date of birth, and gender against terrorist
watchlists before passengers receive their boarding passes. In addition
to facilitating secure travel for all passengers, the program helps
prevent the misidentification of passengers who have names similar to
individuals on government watchlists.
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP).--A total request of $14.1
million will permit the IAP to expand in Paris, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and
Amman. IAP is a part of Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) layered
risk-based security approach, which includes working with international
partners to post CBP officers at foreign airports and use advanced
targeting and passenger analysis information to identify high-risk
travelers at foreign airports before they board U.S.-bound flights.
Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs).--The fiscal year 2012 budget
request of $236.9 million funds 3,336 BDOs, which includes 350 new
positions. BDOs serve as an additional layer of security in airports by
providing a nonintrusive means of identifying individuals who may pose
a risk of terrorism or criminal activity.
Canine Teams.--Requested funding of $125.7 million allows TSA to
sustain the deployment of 900 canine teams supported by reallocations
made under the continuing resolution, providing an important layer of
security to complement passenger checkpoint screening at airports,
assist in air cargo screening and enhance security in the mass transit
environment.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams.--$109
million requested supports 37 VIPR teams and includes 12 new multi-
modal VIPR Teams proposed in the fiscal year 2012 request in addition
to the 10 existing teams in Aviation and the 15 VIPR teams dedicated to
surface transportation added in the fiscal year 2010 budget. VIPR teams
are comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior
detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random,
unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter
potential terrorist and criminal acts.
Passenger Security Fee.--The fiscal year 2012 budget reflects a
proposal to increase the Aviation Passenger Security Fee by $1.50 per
enplanement beginning in 2012. The Aviation Passenger Security fee has
not changed since the TSA was established following the events of 9/11,
even though the overall cost of aviation security has grown by more
than 400 percent. The administration's proposal makes progress toward
fulfilling the intent of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
to cover the costs of aviation security through fees and not by the
general taxpayers.
BioWatch Gen 1/2.--$90 million is requested to continue operating
the Gen 1/2 BioWatch detection network, a federally managed, locally
operated, nationwide bio-surveillance system designed to detect the
intentional release of aerosolized biological agents in more than 30
cities.
BioWatch Gen-3.--The fiscal year 2012 budget provides $25 million
to continue Gen-3 development, which is expected to significantly
reduce the time between a release of a biothreat agent and confirmation
of that release by BioWatch technology. Operational testing and
evaluation of Gen-3 technology will begin in 1-of-4 test cities in
fiscal year 2012 with full deployment expected in fiscal year 2014.
Securing the Cities.--$27 million is requested for Securing the
Cities to continue the build-out of the domestic portion of the global
nuclear detection architecture, the multi-layered system of detection
technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the Nation's
ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in our
highest risk cities.
Radiological/Nuclear Detection Systems.--The fiscal year 2012
budget requests $57 million for the procurement and deployment of
radiation portal monitors and human portable radiation detection
systems, providing vital detection equipment to CBP and the Coast Guard
to scan for radiological and nuclear threats.
Countermeasures and 2012 Presidential Candidate Nominee
Protection.--The fiscal year 2012 request funds critical Secret Service
operations and countermeasures to protect the first family and visiting
dignitaries, including the 2012 presidential campaign and three
anticipated National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The budget also
restores the Secret Service's base funding--supporting the replacement
of protective equipment, vehicles, training of personnel, and other
infrastructure to allow the Secret Service to improve the execution of
its protective and investigatory missions.
National Network of Fusion Centers.--The fiscal year 2012 budget
expands support for the national network of fusion centers in order to
provide State and local law enforcement with the tools they need to
address threats in their communities. The request focuses on
integrating and coordinating cross-department and cross-government
interaction with fusion centers focused on enhancing baseline
capabilities.
State and Local Law Enforcement Training.--The fiscal year 2012
budget provides funding to train 64,000 individual Federal, State, and
local law enforcement personnel through the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center and its total budget of $276 million.
National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).--$150 million is
requested to begin construction of the NBAF, which will serve as a new,
state-of-the-art biosafety level 3 and 4 facility. Work performed at
NBAF will lead to the development of vaccines and antivirals and
enhanced diagnostic capabilities for protecting our country from
numerous foreign animal and emerging diseases.
securing and managing our borders
CBP Law Enforcement.--The fiscal year 2012 budget supports 21,370
Border Patrol agents and 21,186 CBP officers at our ports of entry who
work 24/7 with State, local, and Federal law enforcement in targeting
illicit networks trafficking in people, drugs, illegal weapons, and
money. This reflects the largest deployment of law enforcement officers
to the front line in the agency's history. The request annualizes
positions supported by the fiscal year 2010 Emergency Border Security
Supplemental for the Southwest Border, including 1,000 Border Patrol
agents and 250 CBP officers. Funding is provided to support 300 new CBP
officers above the fiscal year 2011 budget and additional canine assets
to support Port of Entry operations. The request supports the mobile
response surge teams created with the supplemental funding to respond
rapidly to emergent situations without depleting Border Patrol staffing
from other locations.
New Southwest Border Technology.--$242 million is requested to
support the continued deployment of proven, effective surveillance
technology along the highest trafficked areas of the Southwest Border.
Funds will be used to procure and deploy commercially available
technology tailored to the operational requirements of the Border
Patrol, distinct terrain, and population density of each border region.
These funds will allow CBP to fully deploy a mix of integrated fixed
towers and other mobile equipment in three of the five Border Patrol
stations' areas of responsibility in Arizona.
Northern Border Technology.--The request includes $55 million to
support investments in technology systems which address security needs
for the Northern Border maritime and cold weather environment, as well
as innovative technology pilots. It will also deploy proven, standalone
technology that provides immediate operational benefits. These
demonstrations and deployments explore how best to integrate various
sensors, border security organizations, and mission operations in order
to optimize border security in this challenging environment.
CBP Journeyman.--The request includes $229 million to fully fund
the increase in journeyman grade level for frontline CBP officers,
Border Patrol agents, and CBP agricultural specialists from GS-11 to
GS-12.
Tactical Communications (TACCOM).--The fiscal year 2012 budget
includes $40 million to continue the transition of the TACCOM program
to a robust, open architecture system that will increase
interoperability with other law enforcement, expand coverage, and
improve agent safety in the Houlton, El Paso, Laredo, and Rio Grande
Valley sectors.
National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P).--A total of $47
million is requested to enhance CBP's ability to interdict dangerous
individuals or terrorists traveling from foreign locations before
boarding flights destined for the United States. The funds will be used
to hire additional staff and implement enhancements in targeting
priorities.
U.S. Coast Guard Recapitalization.--The fiscal year 2012 request
fully funds the fifth national security cutter (NSC), supports 40
response boats and 6 fast response cutters, as well as a sizable
investment in the renovation and restoration of shore facilities. The
budget also provides resources to ensure that the Coast Guard's
aviation fleet is mission-ready through the acquisition of two maritime
patrol aircraft, one HH-60 helicopter, and conversion and sustainment
projects of multiple aircraft. Funding for the NSC underscores the
Department's support of this program which is important to the Coast
Guard's long-term recapitalization effort and, most importantly, to
allow the Coast Guard to replace its aged, obsolete high endurance
cutter fleet as quickly as possible. The total request for Coast Guard
acquisition, construction, and improvements is $1.4 billion.
Maritime Safety and Response.--$115.5 million remains in the Coast
Guard's base resources for 11 maritime safety and security teams and
their associated 921 personnel, who conduct port security activities
and provide support to NSSEs.
enforcing and administering our immigration laws
Detention Beds.--The fiscal year 2012 budget increases Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Custody Operations funding by $157.7
million to support 33,400 detention beds and remove more than 200,000
criminal aliens in fiscal year 2012.
Detention Reform.--ICE plans to continue building on its detention
reform efforts in fiscal year 2012 by improving detainee access to
quality healthcare, reducing the average length of stay, and
facilitating access to family members and legal representation by
adding functionality to the recently released online detainee locator
system.
Worksite Enforcement.--Requested funds continue the Department's
focus on worksite enforcement, promoting compliance with worksite-
related laws through criminal prosecutions of egregious employers, Form
I-9 inspections, civil fines, and debarment, as well as education and
compliance tools.
E-Verify.--The fiscal year 2012 request continues support for E-
Verify operations and enhancements, including continued funding for new
monitoring, compliance, and outreach positions necessitated by program
expansion. The continued success of E-Verify demonstrated by recent
independent reports reflect the administration's commitment to smart,
tough, and effective strategies that build a strong foundation upon
which immigrants can exercise their rights and responsibilities as
Americans.
Secure Communities.--A total of $184 million is requested for
Secure Communities--which uses biometric information and services to
identify and remove criminal aliens in State prisons and local jails.
The $64 million program increase will expand deployment to 96 percent
of all jurisdictions nationally in fiscal year 2012 and provide
resources to confirm the identification of an estimated 199,000 more
criminal aliens through interoperability in fiscal year 2012 than
fiscal year 2010 and transport more than 44,000 criminal aliens from
State and local jails into the custody of ICE following the completion
of their sentences. ICE will work with DHS's Office of Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties and the Department of Justice to develop a robust
oversight and evaluation process of Secure Communities and to provide
training to State and local law enforcement. Secure Communities is on
track for nationwide deployment by 2013.
Visa Security Program.--The budget requests $29 million to continue
the Visa Security Program at current locations. This program enhances
national security by preventing terrorists, criminals, and other
ineligible applicants from receiving visas.
Immigrant Integration.--The fiscal year 2012 request expands U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) effort to support
immigrant integration efforts, including funding for new programs
supporting English language acquisition and citizenship education.
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE).--The fiscal
year 2012 request continues support for USCIS SAVE operations and
enhancements to assist State, local, and Federal agencies in
determining individuals' eligibility for public benefits based on their
immigration status.
USCIS Business Transformation.--The fiscal year 2012 request
continues the multi-year effort to transform USCIS from a paper-based
filing system to a customer-focused electronic filing system.
safeguarding and securing cyberspace
Federal Network Protection.--$233.6 million is requested to
expedite the deployment of Einstein 3 to prevent and detect intrusions
on computer systems and to upgrade the National Cyber Security
Protection System, building an intrusion detection capability and
analysis capabilities to protect Federal networks.
Federal IT Security Assessments.--A total of $40.9 million in
requested funds will support the Department's efforts to strengthen
Federal network security of large and small agencies by conducting an
estimated 66 network assessments to improve security across the Federal
executive branch.
Cybersecurity Workforce Needs.--$24.5 million is proposed to
provide high-quality, cost-effective virtual cybersecurity education
and training to develop and grow a robust cybersecurity workforce that
is able to protect against and respond to national cybersecurity
threats and hazards.
Cyber Investigations.--The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to
support cyber investigations conducted through the Secret Service and
ICE, targeting large-scale producers and distributors of child
pornography and preventing attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure
through financial crimes task forces.
Cyber Mission Integration.--The fiscal year 2012 request includes
$1.3 million to enable DHS to coordinate national cybersecurity
operations and interface with the Department of Defense's (DOD)
National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland. This funding
will support a landmark memorandum of agreement signed by Secretary
Napolitano and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that aligns and
enhances America's capabilities to protect against threats to critical
civilian and military computer systems and networks.
Cybersecurity Research.--The fiscal year 2012 request includes an
increase of $18 million for the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative to support research and development projects focused on
strengthening the Nation's cybersecurity.
ensuring resilience to disasters
State and Local Grants.--The fiscal year 2012 request sustains
Federal funding for State and local preparedness grants totaling more
than $3.8 billion, highlighting the Department's commitment to moving
resources out of Washington, DC and into the hands of State and local
first responders who are often best positioned to detect and respond to
terrorism, other threats, and natural disasters.
Assistance to Firefighters Grants.--The fiscal year 2012 request
includes $670 million. Included in this amount are $420 million for
Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants to
rehire laid off firefighters and retain veteran first responders--
totaling 2,300 firefighter positions--and $250 million for equipment,
training, vehicles, and related materials.
Disaster Relief Fund.--$1.8 billion is requested for the DRF to
allow FEMA to continue to address the impacts of a disaster on
individuals and communities across the Nation. The DRF provides a
significant portion of the total Federal response to victims in
presidentially declared disasters or emergencies.
Regional Catastrophic Event Planning.--$8.5 million is requested to
continue development of catastrophic plans, with a focus on plans for
response to biological events and earthquakes.
National Exercises.--FEMA's participation in National Level
Exercise-12, an exercise to test FEMA's ability to respond to a
catastrophic cyber attack, is funded with $3 million through the
request.
Emergency Management Oversight.--The fiscal year 2012 request
includes $20 million for the Office of the Inspector General to
continue its Emergency Management Oversight operations.
providing essential support to national and economic security
Patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zone.--The Coast Guard patrols
the U.S. exclusive economic zone boundary areas to reduce the threat of
foreign poaching of U.S. fish stocks and ensure compliance with
international living marine resource agreements. The budget includes
$47 million to extend the service life of five medium endurance cutters
critical in support of this mission.
U.S. Coast Guard Staffing.--The request strengthens the Coast
Guard's operational capacity by funding a total of 50,682 civilian and
military personnel in fiscal year 2012.
Enhancing Maritime Safety.--The fiscal year 2012 budget requests
$686.3 million and 4,717 full-time equivalents (FTEs) for the Coast
Guard's maritime safety activities. The fiscal year 2012 budget
provides 105 new Marine Safety Inspectors and Investigators to staff
ship inspections and post-incident investigations.
Enhancing Marine Environmental Protection and Response.--The fiscal
year 2012 budget requests $225.2 million and 1,362 FTE to enable the
Coast Guard to conduct Marine Environmental Response. This includes 87
new environmental response personnel and creates the Coast Guard's
first incident management assistance team, a highly trained team that
will be deployed rapidly to augment the Coast Guard command structure
when an incident of national significance occurs.
Investigate Cultural Antiquity Trafficking and Coordinate
Repatriation.--The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to support ICE
seizures and repatriation of cultural property, art and antiquities
illegally imported into the United States and the investigation of
illegal trafficking of artwork, especially works that have been
reported lost or stolen.
Forensic Support for Missing and Exploited Children.--Funding is
requested for the Secret Service to provide forensic support to the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which provides
state-of-the-art forensics support for investigations involving missing
and exploited children and grant funds for activities related to the
investigations of missing and exploited children.
Collect Customs Revenue.--Funds are requested to support CBP's role
as a revenue collector for the U.S. Treasury--customs revenue remains
the second-largest source of revenue for the U.S. Government. CBP has
set revenue collection as a priority trade issue to ensure effective
internal controls that protect the duties and taxes (more than $29
billion in 2009) collected for the U.S. Government.
Protect U.S. Intellectual Property Rights.--The fiscal year 2012
budget request funds to support CBP's enforcement program to prevent
trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, and enforce exclusion orders on
patent-infringing and other intellectual property rights violative
goods. The ICE HSI Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Center
investigates the smuggling and distribution of counterfeit goods and
products that pose risks to public safety and security. Counterfeit
pharmaceuticals and critical technology components, such as computer
chips for defense systems and airplane equipment, were among the top
seized commodities in IPR investigations.
maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise
Maturing and strengthening the Homeland Security enterprise--the
collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State,
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector
partners, as well as individuals, families, and communities--is
critical to the Department's success in carrying out its core missions
and operational objectives. This includes enhancing shared awareness of
risks and threats, building capable communities, and fostering
innovative approaches and solutions through cutting-edge science and
technology, while continuing to foster a culture of efficiency,
sustainability in accordance with Executive Order 13514 and fiscal
responsibility and streamline management across the Department.
While the Department proposes significant cuts to administrative
support across all components in order to maintain frontline
operations, the following activities are supported through the fiscal
year 2012 budget:
St. Elizabeths.--$159.7 million is requested for the St.
Elizabeths project. This funding enables DHS to complete the
Coast Guard headquarters facility and to continue work on the
National Operations Center. The request, however, will defer
the FEMA headquarters consolidation.
Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC).--The fiscal year
2012 budget proposes $11 million to fund the TASC program,
which supports the modernization of the Department's financial,
asset, and acquisition management systems--a key priority for
the Department and a step toward addressing recommendations on
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) high-risk list.
Acquisition Workforce.--$24.2 million in requested funds will
increase the Department's acquisition workforce capacity by 150
positions, including additional systems engineers, program
managers, logisticians and business cost estimators, to ensure
operational requirements are properly developed and included in
DHS contracts and to provide greater oversight and
accountability. This too, is consistent with previous
recommendations from GAO and the Inspector General.
Information Security and Infrastructure.--$32.3 million is
requested to establish a unified email network for DHS-wide
use, and provide Single Sign-On and other capabilities. These
activities will leverage technologies to strengthen DHS
operations and enhance communications with Federal, State,
local, and private sector partners.
U.S. Coast Guard Housing and Child Care.--The health and welfare
of military families is the heart of Coast Guard operational
readiness. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $29 million to
address critical housing shortfalls and improve access to
affordable, quality childcare. These initiatives will ensure
Coast Guard members can maintain both strong families and a
high state of readiness.
conclusion
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposal reflects this administration's
strong commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people
through the effective and efficient use of DHS resources. As outlined
in my testimony today, the Department will continue to build upon past
successes in several areas including securing U.S. air, land, and sea
borders; safeguarding lawful trade and travel; securing Federal
networks; and disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal and
terrorist organizations that engage in cross-border criminal activity
while maximizing every taxpayer dollar we receive.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the
Department's fiscal year 2012 budget request and other Homeland
Security issues.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
And since I have asked one question, I am just going to ask
two additional ones and then turn it over to my co-chair, to
the ranking member.
CONTINUING RESOLUTION
I want to follow up on just your last statement--the House
recently passed a continuing resolution that cut funding by
$2.5 billion in this Department, which is 6 percent below the
fiscal year 2010 budget. As you stated, it cuts port security
grants, deep cuts to the Coast Guard, which are particularly
troubling to myself and I think Senator Cochran as well. And
there are other aspects.
Could you give a little bit more detail, if we are not able
to modify some of these cuts, what consequences it will
actually have in your Department?
Secretary Napolitano. Madam Chair, here are a few of the
details. It cuts the number of advanced imaging technology
(AIT) machines we can deploy to our Nation's airports. And
these are necessary because our adversaries, al Qaeda/al Qaeda-
related, continue to seek aviation as a target and continue to
target it by means other than something that would be picked
only by a magnetometer. So we need to move to the next
generation, and that is the AIT machine. It cuts those by 250
and the 500 requested, cuts the number of portable ETD
machines, explosive trace detection machines, by one-half. It
cuts the number of canine teams by two-thirds. It cuts the
personnel responsible for background investigations,
intelligence redress, and air cargo and surface inspections. It
will probably result in an increase in wait times for
passengers in the air environment, and those could be
significant.
It cuts the deployment of intelligence personnel to State
and local fusion centers. This is a network of 72 centers that
we have installed as really the portals of entry through which
intelligence can be shared at the Secret and above level out to
our States and localities, and intelligence can be received
back so that we really have a Homeland Security intelligence
capability. It cuts that very, very deeply.
In addition, it cuts funding for at least 250 ICE agents
along the border. Agent Zapata, by the way, the agent who was
just murdered in Mexico, was an ICE special agent. It
eliminates or if the cuts are annualized in the 2012--and that
is a concern I have that the House continuing resolution for
2011 then becomes the budget for 2012. If it does that, it will
not annualize the additional Border Patrol agents this Congress
approved of in a supplemental not too long ago. So those will
go away.
I could go into more detail, Madam Chair, but you get a
sense of what this would do to us.
Senator Landrieu. It gives us a sense of what the challenge
is. And as I was with you just yesterday at Georgetown for that
really remarkable gathering of the past two Homeland Security
Secretaries, as we saw, Secretary Ridge, Secretary Chertoff,
and yourself there, it reminded me that this was the largest
reorganization of the Federal Government since President Harry
S. Truman organized the aspects of the military, the branches
of the military, into the Department of Defense (DOD). And so
this is the youngest of all the Federal Departments.
So as we are looking, Senator Coats, for efficiencies,
which we all want to look for in streamlining, we have to be
mindful that we are building, not streamlining this Department.
We are building and potentially streamlining, but we are not
taking down. We are building this agency, and that takes
investments and resources.
AIRLINE FEES
My final question, if you could answer this very shortly. I
have been becoming very concerned with the airlines and the
charges that they are charging to passengers. And particularly,
I know this is under the Department of Commerce, but under our
jurisdiction is the way it affects TSA. And I have asked the
staff to get some information.
Checked baggage fees are increasing. It looks like, the
cost to TSA is also increasing because people do not want to
pay the fees. So they are not checking bags, putting more on
the planes, slowing down actually the seating, of course. But I
understand that it is a $250 million annual cost to TSA because
of those extra bags.
My question is, do the taxpayers have to pick up this cost
or should we be looking to the airlines to give us some of the
profits that they are making from these fees to offset the cost
to the taxpayer?
Secretary Napolitano. Madam Chair, the answer is that when
you have to pay to check a bag, it increases carry-on luggage,
and that means that there is more to inspect at the gate and so
forth for passengers getting on the planes. We do have an
estimate. That is roughly $260 million.
One of the reasons we requested the ability to charge a
security fee for travelers--I think, Senator Coats, you
referenced that in your statement--was because we need to be
able to pay for this additional security that TSA must have.
And if we do not have the ability to have a security fee, which
by the way has not been adjusted since 2002, that is at least a
$600 million bite that we have to eat somewhere. And as you can
tell from my opening statement, everywhere you hit in this
Department, it is going to have an operational impact.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
CONTINUING RESOLUTION
I have got some specific questions here, but really in
looking at the larger picture, the reality is that we do have
this significant deficit problem and it is going to be
addressed one way or another. The Congress can address it as it
has done through current efforts on the continuing resolution
for the remainder of the current fiscal year, but also
structuring how next year's functions of Government will be
funded.
The reality is, I think, that no one is going to get
everything that they would like to get. And the question I have
for you is--and I know you have scrubbed your budget--but if
you start with the assumption that you may not get in your
budget all the requests that have been made, have you scrubbed
the system to, in a sense, categorize those requests? If you
have to come back to us and say, okay, this is all we are going
to get--have you scrubbed your budget in a way that you could
say we deem these to be absolutely essential? We have the next
category that are very important but not absolutely essential;
another category that says these potentially can be deferred
until revenues increase or we are able to do better with the
budget; and these are ones that we think could be nice to have
but not really necessary to have and could potentially be
terminated to gain those savings. It might be accompanied with,
say, a provision which you just discussed, an increase in fees
on the enplaning.
But I guess my question is, have you done this? Do you
contemplate having to move to a plan B should the Congress not
be able to fund the budget as presented? And if you have, can
you share that with us? And if you have not, is that something
in the plans?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator Coats, we went through
that analysis in working with the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) on what the President's budget request would be
and finding places or things that could be put off or delayed.
For example, postponing the move to a real Department
headquarters at St. Elizabeths was something that we
recommended, going through kind of the analysis you just
suggested. Now, if you saw where our headquarters are now and
the office that I have and others have, you would know that we
made a tough choice there. That means that we cannot have all
our components collocated. It means that from a managerial
standpoint, we still are spread out. We postponed all
collocations in other cities across the country because of the
associated costs of moving people, and that has a managerial
impact to it as well.
So I believe the President's budget reflects the analysis
that you have just suggested and that real choices have been
made in it already.
BUDGET
Senator Coats. Well, I am sure that is what the President's
budget projects and thinks, but I mean, obviously, we are going
to have a congressional budget I hope. And we are certainly
going to have congressional appropriations, and they may not
match what the President has proposed. Every agency is going to
come here and say exactly what you have said. We are cut to the
bone. The President's budget is as low as we can go. The
reality in this Congress is that we are going to appropriate--I
believe, going to end up appropriating less than what that
budget asks for.
And so it seems to me that it would be prudent for every
agency to simply kind of red team your current budget and
basically say if what happens probably happens, then where do
we go? Will we have something that we can bring back to the
Congress and present and say we do not like it, but these are
the consequences, but this is what we will have to do if we
come in at this number?
Secretary Napolitano. We look forward to, Senator, to
working with you on the budget. I just would respectfully
suggest that this Department is somewhat unique. It is new. It
is virtually all operations. And so when you look at this
budget, it really is tied to the five priorities I identified
for you in my opening statement.
Senator Coats. Well, I agree with that. I mean, along with
national defense, homeland security, a couple of others are
essential functions of the U.S. Government. I could not agree
more. But there just are fiscal realities that we have to deal
with, and I think right now the method going forward is to take
a look at every area to see if we can find efficiencies.
Doing as much or more with less is something, again, that
all of America has had to do in these last 2 years, and it is
easier for some than others. But everyone has been forced to
make those hard decisions, and I think in this case the reality
is that there will probably be some hard decisions that will
have to be made.
I do not look forward to working on this together; it is
not something either of us relish, but I think it is something
that we are going to have to do.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I think, first of all, we
are always willing to supply information. As you go through the
budget request and have questions about things, we are more
than happy to work with you on that.
Senator Coats. My time is about to expire. Given the fact
that we have a vote coming up and some other members may want
to talk, I will wait.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Coats.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Madam Chairman, thank you. Congratulations
on your leadership of this subcommittee.
Madam Secretary, welcome. We look forward to working
closely with you to identify our budget needs and to try to
respond to them in a thoughtful and expeditious manner.
One of the difficulties I know that you face is the lack of
predictability about when funds are available for this program
or that. I wonder if you could share with us some specific
examples of what problems you might encounter if we do not move
quickly to provide you certainty with respect to your budget
needs.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think from a management
perspective, managing by small continuing resolutions is very
difficult. It affects your ability to undertake key
acquisitions. It affects your ability to hire personnel. It
affects your ability to make investments in things that you
kind of think will be ultimately in the budget, but those funds
are not yet available. So from a management perspective, it
makes a difficult management job even more difficult.
COAST GUARD SHIPBUILDING
Senator Cochran. One of the things we are proud of in our
State is the fact we have a shipbuilding capability on the
Mississippi gulf coast at Pascagoula, and part of the mission
there is to fulfill contracts that are made with the Department
that you lead for Coast Guard cutters. What is the status of
our shipbuilding progress in meeting those needs, and what can
we do to work more effectively with you predicting what the
future is going to hold?
Secretary Napolitano. Here is what we are requesting for
the Coast Guard, that ultimately we have eight large NSCs. The
budget between 2011 and 2012 fully funds cutter No. 5. We do
not provide in the 2012 budget what is called long lead funding
for No. 6. We have instead a commitment--I think it is actually
in writing--by OMB that we will fund No. 6, but those funds
will not be spent until fiscal year 2013. So we did not park
them in fiscal year 2012. We did not think that was an
efficient use of them.
So we fully expect to build out the eight cutters. In
exchange for not funding lead time for No. 6 in 2012, we buy a
combination of 46 smaller vessels, FRCs and so forth, that
could be used in other missions for the Coast Guard and for
their lay-down. And then there is some funding in there for
aircraft, but those are not made in Mississippi.
DISASTER RELIEF FUND
Senator Cochran. Are you satisfied with the request being
submitted to the Congress for funding that the FEMA DRF will
have money to respond to emergencies that occur? We think of
the hurricanes that hit the Gulf of Mexico, the oil spill that
occurred down there. We have had some really serious challenges
in that part of the country. What about that disaster fund? Do
we have enough money requested in here to meet your needs?
Secretary Napolitano. The disaster fund request for 2012 is
based on the historical practice which is to take a 5-year
average of noncatastrophic disasters and roll that forward as
the number and then rely on a supplemental for catastrophic
disasters. So the fiscal year 2012 budget would cover that
practice.
As the chair noted earlier this morning, we do have some
costs that will necessitate a supplemental. We have been
deobligating money. We have been repaying money into the DRF.
So what the amount of that supplemental ultimately will need to
be I cannot tell you right now.
Senator Cochran. Madam Chairman, I think I will reserve the
balance of my time.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I talk to you now as the vice chairman of
this subcommittee, and I am happy to serve in that capacity.
You have unique experience. You have been on the front
lines in terms of your past service as Governor and know how
important security, law enforcement is.
FUNDING CUTS
We face urgent threats to our homeland security. It comes
from our friends in the House who want to cut funding for
programs at DHS to keep us safe. While the Republicans want to
make unreasonable cuts to Government, the fact of the matter is
when it hits people's lives, it makes a huge difference, and
their plan would slash funding for valuable Homeland Security
grant programs like port security, public transportation
security by 66 percent. These funds go to our States, cities,
and towns. They are the front lines of protecting our homeland.
Cuts to these two programs alone would mean approximately $60
million in Homeland Security support would vanish in my State
of New Jersey.
And New Jersey is home to what law enforcement has
identified as the country's most at-risk 2-mile area for
terrorists, the stretch between the Port of Newark and the
Newark Liberty International Airport. It is a region that has
contact with 12 million persons, and it is irresponsible to
take vital resources away from our most threatened area.
Now, President Obama and you, Madam Secretary, recognize
this, and the administration's request takes a more thoughtful
approach to funding DHS. The budget recommends slight increases
for urban area security initiatives, State Homeland Security
grant programs. These provide vital support to keep our
residents safe. But the budget request level for funding port
security and a slight decrease for rail transit and bus
security accompanies the fact that the Coast Guard, one of our
most valuable resources in our need to protect ourselves, also
continues to be asked to do more with less. And we have got to
provide the Coast Guard with the resources it needs to
effectively handle its many missions.
Although I have some concerns about the request I am going
to address in my questions, it will go to you in writing. We
are very much out of time. We will go as far as we can right
now, however.
This is not a time to cut back on our homeland security. We
have seen an increased risk of homegrown terrorism, the Fort
Hood massacre, the Time Square bombing attempt, and the New
York City subway plot, which was uncovered by our law
enforcement people. Incidents like this remind us that the
threat of terrorism is as real as ever and we are doing more
than skimping on public safety. Are we simply cutting resources
or are we cutting the throats of the people in our society?
So, Madam Secretary, I ask how we can continue our work to
make vital investments in homeland security.
We talked about the bag charges and what burdens that
imposes on the screening process. I look at Newark Airport, one
of the largest in the country, and there have been six security
breaches at Newark Airport in the last couple of months. Now, I
understand that TSA is almost 70 employees short of its
allocated number for Newark Airport. What is DHS doing to fully
staff Newark Airport and give transportation security officers
and managers the training they need?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I will respond in writing to
the specific question on Newark Airport.
[The information follows:]
In close coordination with the Federal Security Director and staff
at Newark Airport (EWR), the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) has initiated a robust and multi-layered effort to address EWR
staffing vacancies. EWR is currently scheduled to reach near-100
percent staffing by May 1, and, in the interim, TSA has been providing
additional resources as needed. For example, TSA deployed additional
supervisory training instructors to train new hires, additional AIT-
certified transportation security officers (TSOs) to conduct daily
operations while EWR TSOs are being trained, and additional staff
resources to assist in human resources and training operations.
Following a breach, a complete review of the incident is conducted
and each action is broken down in detail to ascertain the reasons
behind the breach. Every TSA individual involved in the activity and
their response is included in this review. TSA employees identified as
not having followed standard operating procedures or whose actions are
the result of inattention to duty are immediately removed from their
position, and can only return to their positions if retraining and
recertification for their positions is determined sufficient and is
satisfactorily accomplished.
Secretary Napolitano. But, Senator Lautenberg, I think that
the President's budget request was designed to meet the threats
as we see the threats. One of the things we ask for in there to
achieve an efficiency is combining or consolidating grant
programs. We have 17 grant programs. We would like to
consolidate that significantly to reduce overhead to the
grantees, as well as to the grantor. That was something we
asked for last year. We did not achieve it, but it is a
suggestion that we make to the subcommittee as one area where
we could possibly achieve some savings and yet operationally
make sure that we are getting money to where it is needed.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, that is a big stretch. Having to
do more with less is something we have gotten accustomed to
here in these years of difficulty. But we also have to
recognize that there are some minimum resources that we have to
have to assure the public that we are taking care of their
safety.
The House Republicans have proposed cutting port security
by two-thirds--the grants. The Port of New York/New Jersey, the
largest port on the east coast, the second-largest port in the
country, directly linked to what the FBI deemed the most
dangerous area in America for terrorist attack, and yet we lose
$33 million in security funding under the House bill. What
would be the impact on the New Jersey and New York region on
our Nation's economy if there was to be a terrorist attack on
one of our largest ports? It is almost unimaginable. The
financial center of the world is included in that
circumference, as I mentioned before, 12 million people, a
large presence of chemical manufacturing in this area, very,
very dangerous to the surrounding population. And what are we
doing about that? How can we assure the public that they are
being well protected, Madam Secretary?
Because time is precious and fleeting here, I will take an
answer in writing, and I will have a couple of other questions
that I will submit to you and ask for a prompt response,
please.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, all I can say about the
House budget for fiscal year 2011 is that it is not a good
budget for security. It will have impacts on things like
protecting the critical infrastructure along that mile in New
Jersey through reductions in grants, through reductions in our
personnel. And if that budget becomes the basis for the fiscal
year 2012 budget, then I think the Congress needs to
understand--and I think my job is to help it understand--that
that in all likelihood will have a security impact.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chairperson Landrieu, thank you very much
for the opportunity to join you and Mr. Coats and other members
of the subcommittee.
Secretary Napolitano, thank you for your testimony. I look
forward to being a responsible and diligent member of this
subcommittee and the Appropriations Committee, and I am honored
to be here today.
NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
In the short time that I have, I wanted to highlight one of
the things that is included in your budget that I am very
supportive of and want to give you the chance to comment on.
You mentioned in your written, as well as your verbal testimony
about the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). It is
my understanding that the request was initially for $200
million, now in your budget, having been scrubbed by OMB, at
$150 million. And I would like to express my support and
willingness to work with you to see that that is accomplished.
I represent a State in which we are often thought of as the
Wheat State, and we are clearly that. But we are very much a
livestock, particularly a cattle, State, and we have genuine
concern recognized by DHS about the possibility of animal
diseases. Whether they are naturally occurring, accidental, or
intentional, they have a dramatic impact upon the economy of
Kansas and certainly the country.
We have a very aging facility located on Plum Island that
your Department, through a selection process, has concluded a
site. In fact, I was there at the announcement in December 2008
about the site for this new facility. And I want to make
certain that this Congress and this administration finally
fulfill the next step toward building that facility for the
safety and security of the American consumer and citizen in
light of the risk that we face in this country.
So I just would like to have you reiterate the Department's
position, your position, express to the Congress the value of
this facility, and how important the timing is for its
completion.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator Moran, first of all,
the NBAF is something that we are very supportive of. In fact,
I saw Governor Brownback Sunday evening and we talked about it
and our support for this again.
I would note, however, for you that the House continuing
resolution for fiscal year 2011--the part of our Department
that is hit the hardest in that resolution is the Science and
Technology Directorate. That is where NBAF is located in our
budget. It is reduced by one-half in that House continuing
resolution. That is also where we are doing research on new
breathing apparatuses for firefighters and research with our
national labs on an airport checkpoint of the future, you know,
trying to design something so that people do not have to take
off their shoes and limit the amount of liquid they can carry
on, that sort of thing. But the NBAF is in there as well.
We are very supportive. Plum Island does not meet the
Nation's needs in this area. Kansas was the winner of a very
highly contested peer-reviewed competition, and we look forward
to its continued construction in Kansas. But I must share with
you that things are at risk based on the House budget.
Senator Moran. I would respond, Madam Secretary, that a
piece of good news in the debate on the House floor in
discussing H.R. 1, the amendment was made to provide that no
funding be authorized for this project, and that amendment was
defeated. So I was pleased to see the support by a majority of
House Members for this project.
I also would add that the State of Kansas has already
committed dollars, has already expended resources, and I would
guess that there is a bit of reluctance on our part to continue
the funding. We have committed $140 million toward the
completion of this project, and we would have--I cannot speak
for Senator Brownback, but I know that there would be reticence
on the part of many in Kansas in continuing to fund this
project in the absence of the Federal commitment. We are
anxious for the day in which the first shovelful of dirt--we
would love to have you there and join us with the shovels that
begin the Federal commitment on that day.
Secretary Napolitano. And, Senator, I think we share that
commitment. We believe in the NBAF, and it should be in Kansas,
and we need to get on with it.
Senator Moran. I appreciate those sentiments and I thank
the chairperson for allowing me to have this conversation.
COAST GUARD CUTS
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
Madam Secretary, the DOD budget this year is being
increased by $23 billion, a 4-percent increase, and that is
excluding the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Coast Guard's discretionary budget has increased less
than 1 percent. The Coast Guard is 1-of-the-5 armed forces of
the United States. Some of us are having difficulty
understanding how it can be treated almost as a stepchild given
the work that it is asked to do in direct protection of our
Nation, whether it is intercepting drugs, responding to
disasters, responding to catastrophic oil pollution incidents,
which just occurred.
Can you shed any light as to why the sixth security cutter
was deferred? I mean, I understand we have budget constraints
but could you comment just about the importance of maintaining
Coast Guard operations for the security of our Nation?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, the sixth security
cutter was not deferred in the sense of unnecessarily delayed,
but the plain fact of the matter is that by the time we
actually need to expend money for six, given the time it will
take to finish four and five, we will be into fiscal year 2013.
And our plan is rather than set aside unusable money for six in
fiscal year 2012, that we would request the amount in the year
we needed to expend it, which would be fiscal year 2013.
Senator Landrieu. Okay. Well, let us continue to focus on
that.
GULF COAST DUMPING
Another issue that is of particular interest--and I hate to
be so parochial because I do have my eyes on the whole country.
But right now along the gulf coast, we are having such serious
issues, you know, with the moratorium, the gulf coast spill,
still recovering from Katrina and Rita, and this is the whole
gulf coast from Florida to Texas.
But another issue--and it may be affecting some of the
other coastal States as well--is the illegal dumping of seafood
wrecking our domestic markets. We are having a terrible time in
this area. Customs in my view is simply not doing enough to
collect the dumping duties that importers owe to the Federal
Government. Since 2005, for example, importers of shrimp from
China have failed to pay more than $58 million in dumping
duties.
So, Senator Coats, when we are looking for some additional
funding, we could be more efficiently collecting some of the
money that China or Vietnam or others owe us, using that money
to invest or support or give, if not rebates--according to WTO,
that may be inappropriate--but in some way capturing those
funds.
So could you comment on what is in your budget to enforce
these antidumping rules and regulations on that subject?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think it would be better if
we addressed those in writing for you. I know there was some
concern. I believe there is a rule on crawfish, if I am not
mistaken, among other types of seafood. I would like to discuss
with my component heads what the problem is, if there is a
problem, and come back to you with a detailed answer.
[The information follows:]
Antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) enforcement is a
priority trade issue (PTI) for Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP
takes a concerted, systematic approach to detect and deter
circumvention of the AD/CVD law, administer entries of AD/CVD
merchandise, and to issue and collect bills for AD/CVD duties owed to
the U.S. Government. CBP coordinates its AD/CVD enforcement activities
through an intra-office AD/CVD PTI Working Group. CBP works closely
with the Department of Commerce, the administering authority for AD/CVD
determinations under U.S. law, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) to enforce AD/CVD laws and regulations.
When CBP issues a bill for final AD/CVD duties, CBP makes every
effort to collect all duties, taxes, and fees legally due to the
Government. However, some importers, or their agents, are unable to pay
the final duties. In addition, at least two sureties issuing bonds
covering substantial amounts of AD/CVD duties are currently in
receivership, further complicating collection. Other importers are
simply unwilling to pay, or no longer exist by the time CBP issues a
bill. CBP pursues collection action against importers and sureties who
are simply unwilling to pay. CBP's Revenue Division in the Office of
Administration initiates an administrative collections process in order
to recover past-due amounts from the importers and sureties. This
process may include dunning letters and the suspension of the immediate
delivery process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which
the Revenue Division's collections process is ineffective are referred
to CBP's Office of Chief Counsel.
The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the
importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the
underlying debt. Further, a review is done to determine if there is a
viable importer (or available surety coverage) from which the debt may
be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, searches
of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available
leads. In addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19
U.S.C. 1592 against any party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or
negligence submits a material false statement or omission on
importation into the United States, including those cases in which a
false statement or omission is made concerning the applicability of an
antidumping duty order to a particular entry. If administrative
attempts to collect the debt are unsuccessful and a viable importer
and/or surety can be found, the Office of Chief Counsel drafts a
complaint and refers the matter to the Department of Justice for
possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If the Office
of Chief Counsel is not successful in locating a viable entity to be
pursued, the matter will be referred back to the Revenue Division for
appropriate action. This may include referral to ICE for further
investigation. If the debt is without legal merit or no viable entity
can be located to pursue further collection action, CBP may ultimately
be forced to write off the debt.
CBP has taken steps to specifically improve the collection of AD/
CVD duties on shrimp imports and continues to explore statutory and
nonstatutory changes to enhance bonding requirements. CBP is also
actively pursuing collection of the balance of the open bills against
delinquent importers and sureties.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
And I want to submit for the record--then I will turn it
over to Senator Coats. I think he may have another question or
two. Senator Murkowski has joined us--but for the record about
the DRF. I asked the staff to provide--and I am going to submit
for the record--a 20-year history of emergency supplemental
funding. Out of the $128 billion that has been allocated by the
Federal Government for emergency response to all sorts of
disasters, $110 billion has been appropriated through the
supplemental process. So $110 billion out of $128 billion.
And when you look at this list, you can understand why that
occurs because these sums range from a low of $143 million
budgeted one year to $50 billion another year. So there are
wild fluctuations and very difficult to predict what is going
to happen. And as Senator Coats and I were saying, these storms
seem to be getting more frequent, flooding more frequent,
levels of flooding higher, more aggressive kind of storms and
weather patterns.
So I submit this for the record because I actually think
this subcommittee is going to have to push hard to get this
emergency funding in a supplemental and use the base funding of
Homeland Security to manage the operations of this important
function of Government. So if I can have unanimous consent to
submit that to the record.
[The information follows:]
DISASTER RELIEF NONEMERGENCY/EMERGENCY HISTORY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
Fiscal year Public Law Annual or ----------------------------------------
supplemental Nonemergency Emergency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992........................... 102-139........... Annual............ $185,000,000 ...................
1992........................... 102-229........... Supplemental...... 800,000,000 $143,000,000
1992........................... 102-302........... Supplemental...... .................. 300,000,000
1992........................... 102-368........... Supplemental...... .................. 2,893,000,000
1993........................... 102-389........... Annual............ 292,095,000 ...................
1993........................... 103-75............ Supplemental...... .................. 2,000,000,000
1994........................... 103-124........... Annual............ 292,000,000 ...................
1994........................... 103-211........... Supplemental...... .................. 4,709,000,000
1995........................... 103-327........... Annual............ 320,000,000 ...................
1995........................... 104-19............ Supplemental...... .................. 3,275,000,000
1996........................... 104-134........... Annual............ 222,000,000 ...................
1996........................... 104-19............ Supplemental...... .................. 3,275,000,000
1996........................... 104-134........... Annual .................. (1,000,000,000)
(rescission).
1997........................... 104-204........... Annual............ 1,320,000,000 ...................
1997........................... 105-18............ Supplemental...... .................. 3,300,000,000
1998........................... 105-65............ Annual............ 320,000,000 ...................
1998........................... 105-174........... Supplemental...... .................. 1,600,000,000
1999........................... 105-276........... Annual............ 307,745,000 ...................
1999........................... 105-277........... Supplemental...... .................. 906,000,000
1999........................... 106-31............ Supplemental...... .................. 900,000,000
2000........................... 106-74............ Annual............ 300,000,000 ...................
2000........................... 106-74............ Supplemental...... .................. 2,480,425,000
2001........................... 106-377 (H.R. Annual............ 300,000,000 1,300,000,000
5482).
2001........................... 107-38 \1\........ Supplemental...... .................. 1,791,000,000
2002........................... 107-73............ Annual............ 664,000,000 1,500,000,000
2002........................... 107-117 \2\....... Supplemental...... .................. 4,356,871,000
2002........................... 107-206........... Supplemental...... .................. 2,650,700,000
2002........................... 107-206........... Supplemental...... .................. 23,200,000
2003........................... 108-7............. Annual............ 800,000,000 ...................
2003........................... 108-69............ Supplemental...... .................. 983,600,000
2004........................... 108-90............ Annual............ 1,800,000,000 ...................
2004........................... 108-83............ Supplemental...... .................. 441,700,000
2004........................... 108-106........... Supplemental...... .................. 500,000,000
2004........................... 108-303........... Supplemental...... .................. 2,000,000,000
2005........................... 108-334........... Annual............ 2,042,380,000 ...................
2005........................... 108-324........... Supplemental...... .................. 6,500,000,000
2005........................... 109-61............ Supplemental...... .................. 10,000,000,000
2005........................... 109-62............ Supplemental...... .................. 50,000,000,000
2005........................... 109-148........... Supplemental .................. (23,409,300,000)
(rescission).
2006........................... 109-90............ Annual............ 1,770,000,000 ...................
2006........................... 109-234........... Supplemental...... .................. 6,000,000,000
2007........................... 109-295........... Annual............ 1,500,000,000 ...................
2007........................... 110-28............ Supplemental...... .................. 3,400,000,000
2007........................... 110-28............ Supplemental...... .................. 710,000,000
2008........................... 110-161........... Annual............ 1,400,000,000 ...................
2008........................... 110-116........... Supplemental...... .................. 2,900,000,000
2008........................... 110-252........... Supplemental...... .................. 897,000,000
2008........................... 110-329........... Supplemental...... .................. 7,960,000,000
2009........................... 110-329........... Annual............ 1,400,000,000 ...................
2010........................... 111-83............ Annual............ 1,600,000,000 ...................
2010........................... 111-212........... Supplemental...... .................. 5,100,000,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................... .................. .................. 17,635,220,000 110,386,196,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Amount provided by FEMA law is not specific by agency.
\2\ From amounts appropriated but not originally specified in Public Law 107-38.
Senator Landrieu. Let me recognize Senator Coats for a
second round, then Senator Murkowski, and then Senator Moran.
Senator Coats. Madam Chairman, thank you. Just one question
and then I will submit some questions also for you to respond
back.
Senator Landrieu. And then we are going to have a break in
about 5 minutes to----
Secretary Napolitano. I will try to keep my answers short.
Senator Coats. I will try to keep my question short.
STATE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, GRANTS
Looking at the grants to States and local communities, I
think the total in the budget request is $3.8 billion, which is
about 9 percent of the Department's total discretionary
request. That will be in addition to $28 billion, as I
understand it, that has been appropriated since fiscal year
2004.
The question is, it is my understanding that we have not
really been able to fully assess--although FEMA is undertaking
something to this effect--how effective these are and
particularly whether the distribution of these funds is
appropriate. The problem usually arises on grants and
distributions as the political animal raises its head and
basically says I got to get my share.
So I am sympathetic to what Senator Lautenberg was saying
relative to representing an area that is a significantly high-
threat area with the consequences being very, very significant.
That obviously is going to be a more significant and higher
priority area than several of my rural towns or New Jersey's
rural towns.
But if we keep insisting on a revenue-sharing program in
which everybody gets a slice, it may be that given this fairly
extraordinary amount of money that has been spent to upgrade
and prepare local responders and so forth needs to be triaged
in a more effective way.
Now, I say that meaning that there may be some communities
in Indiana that might not get what they otherwise would have
gotten in deference to the fact that we have identified some
more-highly targeted, more-significant consequences if we have
an attack here or in a particular area and so forth.
Could you comment on that in terms of, one, how we best
assess the impact and the effectiveness of that $28 billion
that has already been spent and whether or not we need to make
an effort at looking at prioritizing or triaging areas which
ought to get more funds and others that should get less?
Senator Landrieu. Let me interrupt just 1 minute. In the
spirit of bipartisanship, I am actually going to pass the gavel
to Senator Coats so he can continue. I am going to go vote and
in 5 minutes you all could take a recess, and then I will be
right back. But you all continue.
Senator Coats [presiding]. All right.
Secretary Napolitano. I am glad because this requires a
longer answer I think than perhaps the buzzer would permit.
In the area of grants, one of the things we need to do as a
country is--I call it a homeland security architecture that
begins with small towns, cities, States, et cetera. The Federal
Government cannot do it by itself. And I think the theory
underlying a lot of the grants is that being the case, we need
to make sure that there is a certain baseline capability
throughout the country.
And then second, in the area of focusing Federal grants on
the areas of highest risk, there I think there needs to be and
can be and should be a dialogue with the executive branch and
the legislative branch. I will share with you, Senator, that
one person's rural community is another person's--subject to an
ag or a bio-attack and the need to have things like the NBAF
located there.
So on the issue of interoperability of emergency response
equipment, rural America is the toughest problem. In urban
areas, interoperability can be achieved and is being achieved
because the lines are there, the towers are there, and so
forth. In rural America or the area along the Southwest Border
or along the Northern Border, it is some of our most difficult
areas to cover just because of the lack of capital and
infrastructure. So these are kind of the nuts and bolts things
we are going through when we talk about awarding grants for
interoperability or for this or for that.
But I think you are right to suggest that there can be a
useful dialogue on how grants are done. That is why we have
recommended that some of these programs be consolidated because
we think that that would be a better way to manage them and so
forth. So we look forward to working with the subcommittee on
that.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Senator Coats.
Secretary, welcome. I apologize I was not here for the full
hearing. I will make my comments quick, hopefully, and will get
out of here to the vote. And I do not know whether you have to
stay until we get back or not. But let me go very, very
quickly.
TSA PAT-DOWNS
I was up in Alaska this past weekend, and all of the news
was centered around one of our State House Representatives,
Representative Sharon Cissna, a woman that I have served with,
a woman who has undergone breast cancer and had a mastectomy.
And you do not need to know her personal history, but her
personal history is now part of the discussion in Alaska
because she was subjected to what she felt was a very intrusive
pat-down coming back from Seattle to go to work in Juneau after
her medical appointments. And apparently the full-body scanners
detected some scars, and apparently State Representative Cissna
is not the only individual where scars from medical procedures
are picked up and the individual is subjected to what is
described as a very intrusive pat-down.
She had made the determination that she was not going to
put herself through this again. She had done it once. And as a
consequence, this individual, in order to get back to work,
drove a car, took a small airplane, went through Canada, and
eventually got onto the ferry. It took her 4 days to get from
Seattle to Juneau. Our State's capital is on an island in
Alaska. We cannot get anywhere without flying.
I have sent a letter to the Administrator of the TSA asking
him for clarification as to what the process will be for those
that have had medical procedures, those that have prosthetics
that go through this screening process where they are subjected
to enhanced pat-downs and the intrusion on their dignity is
such that they are making choices like Representative Cissna
did to not fly. In my State, as you know, that is a pretty
difficult decision to make.
I have not heard anything back from the Administrator about
this yet, but it is an issue that as we work to protect the
safety of all Americans and the safety of our skies, the safety
of our Nation, there is that balancing between how we ensure
for that and how we ensure for an individual's privacy and
dignity.
I wanted to make sure that you were fully aware of this
because this is an issue that has taken on a life beyond its
own. And I do not know whether you have an answer for me today
in terms of what those protocols may be, but it is something
that I believe the issue will not die down until there is a
better resolve than what we saw happen, at least with one
particular constituent in the Seattle Airport.
Senator Coats. Madam Secretary, if I could, just in the
interest of time here, I am going to pass the gavel to my
colleague and let you answer her. I think by the time Senator
Murkowski is done, the chairman will be back. I just got a note
she is returning. So if there is a little break, we will just
take a temporary recess.
Secretary Napolitano. Fair enough.
Senator Murkowski [presiding]. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. I can chair the subcommittee if you
want.
Just kidding.
All right. First of all, Senator, we will look into this
particular matter. It strikes me as a highly unique one, but we
will----
Senator Murkowski. I am told it is not and that is why----
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we will find out.
Senator Murkowski [continuing]. So I think it is important.
Secretary Napolitano. We will find out----
Senator Murkowski. Good.
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. Because I will share
with you that this is not designed to be invasive in the sense
of unnecessary or a harassment of any sort. And we want to make
sure we work through this particular issue. So we will do that.
I will also share with you, however, that overall we are
finding that the AIT process, which is the new technology we
are using--99.9 percent of the passengers who have been through
it since Thanksgiving have gone through it, no opt-outs, no
anything. People with artificial joints, artificial hips, for
example, love it because it can clearly distinguish that versus
the magnetometer where they always were getting pulled aside.
The particular issue you raised--this is something that I
am more than prepared to look into. We will provide you with a
response. No one with a medical condition should feel like
every time they have to go through the screener, they are going
to get pulled aside because of their medical condition. What we
want to pull aside are individuals for whom we cannot resolve
an anomaly on the screen. This is our last line of protection
for an aircraft. There are a lot of things that go on before
you get to that point, but that is our last line. So we will
get back to you on that.
[The information follows:]
tsa screening process for persons who have had medical procedures
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) spoke with Senator
Murkowski's staff and discussed TSA's working relationships with groups
like Susan G. Komen for the Cure to address issues raised by Alaska
Representative Cissna for women who've undergone mastectomies and how
TSA integrates their suggestions into training. Also shared were TSA's
conference calls and other outreach with Representative Cissna about
her experience. The following summarizes this information:
Does scarring from a mastectomy regularly cause an advanced imaging
technology (AIT) alarm?
There are many possible factors that may generate anomalies during
an AIT screening, including breast prosthetics or surgical scarring.
When an anomaly is discovered during AIT screening, the
transportation security officer (TSO) must resolve the alarm using
additional screening procedures. TSA's procedures do not require that
passengers remove their breast prosthesis as part of the security
screening process. If a pat-down is required to resolve the anomaly, it
may be done in a private screening area and will be performed by an
officer of the same gender. A TSA witness will be present if the pat-
down is conducted in the private screening area. The passenger may have
a witness of their choosing accompany them throughout the screening
process regardless of whether the screening occurs in the public or a
private screening area.
What training do TSOs receive related to this issue?
TSOs are instructed, as part of their training and standard
operating procedures, to use extreme care and sensitivity when
screening or performing pat-downs of sensitive or painful areas. We
also urge travelers to tell TSOs about any specific issues TSOs should
be aware of before such screening measures begin, including painful or
sore areas, or past and current medical conditions. To ensure the
greatest level of privacy possible while conveying sensitive
information, TSA has also made a notification template available for
passengers to discreetly provide information about their medical
condition or disability to TSOs at airports. The template is available
at TSA.gov and TSA has proactively shared it with a coalition of 70
advocacy groups representing a variety of segments of the population
with whom TSA maintains an ongoing dialogue. A number of cancer-related
groups have been a part of the coalition, including Susan G. Komen for
the Cure and Cancer Treatment Centers of America. Based on input we
received from groups such as these over the last year, we have
augmented the training provided to our TSOs to make them better attuned
to the needs of cancer survivors and those who have recently undergone
cancer treatment.
Senator Murkowski. And I appreciate you looking into that.
The Alaska State legislature--excuse me--the House of
Representatives has passed a resolution in support of
Representative Cissna's effort to get some clarification to the
process. I will forward all of this to you and look forward to
working with you, sharing some of the information that I have
raised.
COAST GUARD ICEBREAKERS
Very quickly then a second question, and then I will submit
a third for the record. This is as it relates to our Coast
Guard to our ability to respond in an ever-growing Arctic. I
was pleased to see that the fiscal year 2012 budget restored
the funding for the operational control for our icebreaker
fleet to the Coast Guard. I think that that makes sense. That
is important.
But contained within that budget is the decommissioning of
the Polar Sea in fiscal year 2011. It provides for completion
for the maintenance of the Polar Star, but that will not be
complete until 2013. So we have got a situation here where at
least for the next couple years we have the Healy out there in
the waters, but we do not have any polar class icebreakers, and
it leaves us without the capacity to do any heavy icebreaking
capability until then.
So the question to you is with the fact that the Coast
Guard will only have one heavy icebreaker once the Polar Sea is
down and the Polar Star is up, what are the Department's plans?
What are the Coast Guard's plans for the future of this
country's heavy icebreaking fleet? If you can give me the
status of the Coast Guard's high-latitude study and when you
might expect that that might be available for release to us
here in the Congress.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. First of all, my
understanding is the Healy, which is a medium-sized cutter,
will remain operational in 2011-2012. The problem is you have
the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, both of which are old vessels
and need to have heavy maintenance. And so you have this--it
looks like a bare period in fiscal year 2012.
Our plan is during that period for the National Science
Foundation to lease a heavy icebreaker to take the place----
Senator Murkowski. Who do we lease from?
Secretary Napolitano. There are at least two countries that
we can lease from. I would prefer to give that to you in
writing--or not in writing, but not in an open session. But we
have identified at least two countries that we could lease from
during that fiscal year 2012 period.
[The information follows:]
The National Science Foundation (NSF) has leased polar icebreakers
from both Russia and Sweden in the past. NSF is continuing to negotiate
their specific polar icebreaking requirements lease plans for 2012 and
the details of that lease should be directed to NSF.
Secretary Napolitano. Now, as you said in your question,
you got the funding for operational control up there, $39
million moved over to the Coast Guard. That is where it should
go.
We also have in the fiscal year 2012 budget a sum set aside
for an Arctic study. One of the things this country really
needs is to really look at the Arctic and what is necessary to
protect U.S. interests there. So that is in the Coast Guard
budget as well.
With respect to the work--you wanted to know when the other
study would be finished. Let me check with the Commandant and
we will get you the date.
Senator Murkowski. I appreciate that.
And I appreciate the information on what we do to fill the
gap here with the heavy icebreaker. I do hope that we are not
moving in a direction where we view that as our option to lease
basically commercially. I think we need to remember that we are
an Arctic nation. The United States is an Arctic nation, and
the fact that we have just barely one-and-a-half icebreakers,
if you will, when you think about the medium and the heavy, it
is a situation where we look to our ability to respond as an
Arctic nation whether it is the level of shipping traffic that
we are seeing going on up north, the level of exploration
activity that may be at hand. We have got cruise ships going
back and forth up in the Arctic right now. We are woefully
unprepared, I believe, at this point in time. So I would love
to discuss kind of the future of where we go and how we build
this out so that we are able to respond as necessary. But
again, we are behaving as an Arctic nation and assuming that
international role that I think that we should as a Nation.
Secretary Napolitano. I could not agree more.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
And I guess we are at ease until Senator Landrieu comes
back.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Landrieu [presiding]. Our meeting will come back to
order after a brief recess, Homeland Security Subcommittee
Appropriations meeting.
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN
Let me begin with just another question about the
potential--and I hope we can avoid this, Madam Secretary, but
the potential shutdown of the Government and what that might
mean for DHS. The Government was shut down for 27 days in 1995
and 1996. The front-line personnel for Customs Service, Border
Patrol, and Secret Service continued to work, but their workers
were not immediately paid. I understand their support
operations or administrative operations did not continue to
work. So you have to question how effective their work can be
without any back-office support.
But if the Government were to shut down again--and again,
we are all working hard to see that that does not happen and
coming to some compromise with the House on this--what would be
the impacts to the Department? I am sure you have given some
thought to this.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair. Yes, I have
in part because this Department did not exist in 1995 during
the prior shut-downs, and so we have had to be looking at this
afresh, anew because the Department is only 8 years old.
Thank you again, by the way, for coming to the program
yesterday. It was really great to see you there.
I think you put your finger on one of the important points.
The front-line personnel who are related to security would fall
within the exception of the shutdown and they would stay on
duty, but the back-room personnel that are necessary to fully
utilize the front-line personnel would not in all likelihood.
And our TSOs, our transportation security officers, our front-
line personnel, tend to be at the lower end of the pay scale
and tend to be ones that I would be very concerned about having
to live paycheck-to-paycheck. And so you would have your front-
line personnel who were working but not getting paid and being
under some financial duress because of that. So we have parts
of the Department that would probably have to shut down
virtually 100 percent, but the security-related part would
operate, but as you say, they would not have the full backing
of the Department that they would otherwise have.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. I do think that is something
that we need to keep in mind as we press forward on these
negotiations.
OFFICER CORRUPTION
My next question--I only have three additional questions,
and I think we can get through them in the next few minutes--is
about the officer integrity, the issue of integrity in our
operations. I think not only in trying to streamline where we
can is important without undercutting our defense and homeland
security, but also we want to have an honest and open and
transparent Government, which is always so important. And of
course, America is really a model in the world. We are proud of
that. We are not perfect, but we are a model in that regard.
But there have been some concerns that this subcommittee
has expressed, and I want to just state that with the support
of this subcommittee, CBP has hired 16,000 new employees, a 37-
percent increase in the last 5 years. ICE has hired more than
8,200 new personnel. This has been required to stand up this
Department and meet the goals and objectives of securing our
borders and enforcing our immigration laws.
This subcommittee has been concerned, however, due to the
rapid hiring, that there is a potential increase for officer
corruption. So toward this end, the subcommittee has provided
additional resources for integrity training, investigations,
conducting hearings about misconduct, background
investigations. I am pleased to see your budget requests an
additional $26 million for this. This is the right thing to do.
I support the funding.
But it is our understanding that some of the people in
charge of this from CBP to ICE and the Inspector General are
experiencing some difficulty working together. Could you
comment about if you are aware of this situation? Do you agree
that it is somewhat of a problem? And if so, what are you doing
to correct it? Will you and the Deputy Secretary work with me
on establishing clear lines of authority for these important
internal investigations?
Secretary Napolitano. Madam Chair, I think that it is fair
to say that with that rapid increase, we need to have
appropriate oversight and supervision for a number of reasons,
one of which is related to officer integrity. And so we have
ramped up efforts there.
I think it is also accurate to say that we have been
working both with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and
with CBP on the implementation of appropriate oversight, what
does that mean, who does what when. How do we make sure that
cases are resolved swiftly so that agents are not unduly
impugned or taken off the line and that if and when we find an
agent who has become corrupt, that we deal with that
immediately and very firmly? We will not stand for corruption
among our troops and we do not want that bad seed to take root
in this staffing increase. So we are all very committed to that
goal.
The issue is how do you operationalize that between the OIG
and what the CBP does and what ICE does, and that is an issue
of which I am very aware, have been personally involved in, and
we continue to work on.
Senator Landrieu. And do you have the money and resources
you need for the polygraph and the initial checks before hiring
people? Are you able to process your hirees pretty quickly, do
you believe?
Secretary Napolitano. The President's budget contains
adequate resources for that, yes.
MEXICO
Senator Landrieu. My next question--and this is a growing
concern among, I think, people in our country, and that is the
escalating violence in Mexico. You alluded to, of course, we
lost one of our special agents, Zapata, just recently and
another was wounded. This really brought to light the fact that
our agents are prohibited from carrying service weapons in
their defense, which is a side issue.
But the more important issue--and that is important as
well--is that 33,000 Mexican citizens have died during the
Mexican Government's admirable, but very difficult campaign
against drug trafficking. But what are the top one, two, or
three directives that you are taking to try to contain this
violence? And when we are sending agents, is it appropriate to
send agents into Mexico without being able to defend
themselves?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, first of all, I would suggest,
Madam Chair, that some of this be discussed in a classified
setting and that includes how the agents are armed and under
what circumstances.
I will say that the violence in Mexico is something we are
very concerned about. It is one of the things that we work on
very closely with Mexico. President Calderon is scheduled for a
visit to the United States this week. I believe that will be
something that he and President Obama discuss. And it is
something that we are working with Mexico on.
Some of our priorities are to assist Mexico in any way that
we can and as requested to defeat the cartels.
Second, to make sure that we have adequate resources along
our Southwest Border to prevent the cartels from bringing their
violence over and trying to take over areas along the Southwest
Border, so preventing spillover violence.
And then third, making sure that we have adequate manpower,
technology, and infrastructure along the Southwest Border as a
whole so that it can be a safe and secure zone for the trade
and travel that has to occur between Mexico and the United
States. This is something that often gets overlooked in the
discussion, but Mexico is the No. 1 or 2 trading partner of
something like 23 States in the United States. There are a lot
of jobs associated with that commerce with Mexico. So both
countries need to work to make sure that the travel and trade
that occurs can go smoothly and efficiently through the ports
of entry.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
CYBER THREAT
I think my last question will be about the cyber threat,
which is something that I am not sure that the public really
sees. I think they see and read about the violence in Mexico. I
think they understand some of the border issues. I think they
understand the challenges of immigration. I think they most
certainly can understand the airline attacks and the New York
incident. But cyber is something that I am not sure the public
really can understand the consequences, really, of such an
attack, should it occur in a more successful way because we are
actually being attacked through this new method.
So my question is, President Obama said that cyber threat
is one of the most serious economic and national security
challenges that we face. I actually agree with that. You
included safeguarding and securing cyberspace as 1 of the 5
missions. This budget request appears to respond to this alarm
by requesting a robust level of funding for U.S. operations,
Federal network, security network, and security deployment.
These are important areas. I was pleased to see some of the
upticks that you have.
As you know, there are several locations around the country
that are really leaning toward actually working in conjunction
with non-Federal partners. Corporations have really stepped up.
The National Guard has shown an inclination to put some
resources toward this.
We have created in Louisiana--in Shreveport, in Bossier
Parish to be exact, in the northwest corner of Louisiana--the
Cyber Innovation Center. The center has built a strong regional
network among universities and colleges to leverage
cybersecurity systems.
I would like to ask you for a general comment about the
cyber threat and then ask you if you would join me for a trip
there and to perhaps a few other locations around the country
to see what some of the new initiatives are to actually stand
up the technology and personnel necessary to respond to this
very serious and I think underestimated threat to our country.
Secretary Napolitano. Madam Chair, yes, we have increased
our cyber budget. Between DHS and DOD, you really have between
those two Departments 95 percent of the cybersecurity
responsibilities identified by the President's cyber review. So
you have seen that area of DHS expand fairly dramatically over
the last 2 years. This is another area where we believe that
the United States has real security interests involved. We are
working with the private sector on this. We also are working
with the universities on this, and we are increasing our
outreach trying to identify persons who have a cyber background
to come work at DHS. That is one of our key challenges is to
get enough personnel who are cyber-experienced to work in the
public service as opposed to the private sector. So that is
underway as well.
With respect to your invitation to come to Shreveport and
to do some other cyber site visits, I would be happy to do so,
particularly if there is a good Louisiana meal involved.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I think we
can rustle one up for you.
Secretary Napolitano. There you go.
CLOSING
Senator Landrieu. I am going to end the meeting, but I do
want to comment that there are a few other issues that our
subcommittee is going to be focused on.
The TSA screener cap provision at 46,000. I do not know if
that is going to be effective.
International adoptions is an important issue to me to make
sure that we are doing the very best we can in customs to
support the great work that our nonprofits and individual
citizens are doing in that humanitarian area.
Improving the entry process for visitors to the United
States I think is important, whether they are just tourists or
whether they are business people traveling because of just the
economy of the world, and we have just got to be a very
forward-leaning service agency to support that work.
The flood maps are of great concern to myself, Senator
Cochran, and other Senators up along the Mississippi River
which comes under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
So those are some questions that I will defer and submit to
you in writing.
And I believe that will end our session for today. I thank
you for your testimony and for your patience during the floor
vote.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Landrieu. Other questions for the record should be
submitted to the subcommittee staff by close of business on
Thursday.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
departmental acquisitions
Question. For each of fiscal year's 2010-2012, how much funding is
dedicated to major acquisitions? For each year, provide details on the
classification level of each acquisition, i.e., how many are designated
as level 1, level 2, or level 3 as defined by the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) acquisition management directive? Provide a
DHS major acquisition status tracking chart listing each program and
milestone necessary to achieve approval for full-scale procurement.
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011 Fiscal year 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding dedicated to major $11,671,000,000........ $11,068,000,000........ $10,457,000,000
acquisitions.
Level 1.............................. 46 programs............ 45 programs............ Information not yet
available.
Level 2.............................. 40 programs............ 37 programs............ Information not yet
available.
Level 3.............................. Not reported \1\....... Not reported \1\....... Information not yet
available.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In accordance with Directive 102-01 (D 102-01), non-IT level 3 programs are not reported; however, guidance
will be changed April 30, 2011, to require inclusion of all level 1, 2, and 3 acquisition programs in the Next
Generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS).
The following chart lists the 82 DHS level 1 and 2 programs along
with their current phase in the acquisition life cycle. Programs in
phase 4 should be considered approved for ``full-scale production''.
The phases as defined in the D 102-01 are:
--Phase 1. Need.
--Phase 2. Analyze/Select.
--Phase 3. Obtain.
--Phase 4. Produce/Deploy/Support.
Please note that the list identifies many programs as being in
multiple stages. Typically, these programs are comprised of smaller
projects and these projects are in various stages. Accordingly the list
identifies such programs as being ``mixed'' and the lists identifies
each stage the program is in.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase
Program-Project-Service -------------------------------
1 2 3 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP--Advance Passenger Information ...... ...... ...... x
(APIS) (P) \1\.........................
CBP--Automated Commercial Environment ...... ...... x x
(ACE)/International Trade Data System
(ITDS) (P)............................
CBP--Automated Targeting System (ATS) ...... ...... ...... x
Maintenance (P)........................
CBP--Border Patrol Facilities (P)....... ...... ...... x x
CBP--Facilities Management and ...... ...... x x
Engineering Tactical Infrastructure
(FM&E TI) (P)..........................
CBP--Fleet Management (FMP) (P)......... ...... ...... ...... x
CBP--Land Ports of Entry Modernization ...... ...... x x
(P)....................................
CBP--Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) ...... ...... x x
Systems Program (P)....................
CBP--SAP (P)............................ ...... ...... ...... x
CBP--Strategic Air and Marine Plan (P).. ...... ...... x x
CBP--Tactical Communication (TAC-COM) x ...... ...... x
(P)....................................
CBP--TECS Modernization (P)............. ...... ...... x x
CBP--Transportation (P)................. ...... ...... ...... x
CBP--Western Hemisphere Travel ...... ...... ...... x
Initiative (WHTI) (P)..................
DHS--A&O--Common Operational Picture ...... ...... x x
(COP) (P)..............................
DHS--A&O--Homeland Security Information ...... ...... x x
Network (HSIN) (P).....................
DHS--CAO--Electronic Records Management x ...... ...... ......
System (ERMS) (P)......................
DHS--CAO--St. Elizabeths (P)............ ...... ...... x ......
DHS--CFO--Transformation and Systems ...... x ...... ......
Consolidation (TASC) (P)...............
DHS--CHCO--HR-IT (P).................... ...... ...... x x
DHS--CIO--Infrastructure Transformation ...... ...... x x
Program (ITP) (P)......................
DNDO--Advanced Spectroscopic Portal ...... ...... x ......
(ASP) Program (P)......................
FEMA--Grants Management Integrated ...... x ...... ......
Environment (GMIE) (P).................
FEMA--Housing Inspection Services (HIS) ...... ...... x x
(P)....................................
FEMA--Integrated Public Alert and x ...... ...... ......
Warning System (IPAWS) (P).............
FEMA--Logistics Supply Chain Management ...... x ...... ......
System (LSCMS) (previously TAV) (P)....
FEMA--Risk Mapping, Analysis and ...... ...... ...... x
Planning (Risk Map) (P)................
A&O--National Security System Program ...... x ...... ......
(NSSP) (P).............................
A&O--Online Tracking Information System ...... ...... x x
(OTIS) \2\ (S) \3\.....................
ICE--Atlas (P).......................... ...... ...... x ......
ICE--Detention and Removal Operations ...... x ...... ......
(DRO) (S)..............................
ICE--Detention and Removal Operations ...... ...... x x
Modernization (DROM) (P)...............
ICE--DRO Electronic Health Record (EHR) x ...... ...... ......
System (P).............................
ICE--Enforcement Information Sharing x ...... ...... ......
(EIS) (P)..............................
ICE--Student and Exchange Visitor ...... x ...... x
Information System (SEVIS I and II) (P)
(SEVIS I=4, SEVIS II=2)................
ICE--Tactical Communication (TAC-COM) ...... ...... x ......
(P)....................................
ICE--TECS Modernization (P)............. ...... x ...... ......
NPPD--Federal Protective Services (S)... ...... ...... ...... x
NPPD--IICV (Infrastructure Information ...... ...... x x
Collection Program and Visualization)--
IICP (P)...............................
NPPD--National Cybersecurity and ...... ...... x x
Protection System (NCPS) (P)...........
NPPD--Next Generation Network (NGN) (P). ...... x x ......
NPPD--United States Visitor and x ...... x x
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) (P).........................
OHA--Bio Watch Gen-3 (P)................ ...... x ...... ......
S&T--National Bio and Agro-Defense ...... x ...... ......
Facility (NBAF) (P)....................
S&T--National Biodefense Analysis and ...... ...... x ......
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) Facility
(P)....................................
TSA--Electronic Baggage Screening ...... ...... x x
Program (EBSP) (P).....................
TSA--Field Real Estate Management (FREM) ...... ...... ...... x
(P)....................................
TSA--HR Access (P)...................... ...... ...... ...... x
TSA--Information Technology ...... ...... ...... x
Infrastructure Program (ITIP) (P)......
TSA--National Explosives Detection ...... ...... ...... x
Canine Team Program (K9) System (P)....
TSA--Passenger Screening Program (PSP) ...... ...... x x
(P)....................................
TSA--Screening Partnership Program (P).. ...... ...... ...... x
TSA--Secure Flight (P).................. ...... ...... x ......
TSA--Security Technology Integrated ...... ...... x x
Program (STIP) (P).....................
TSA--Specialized Training (P)........... ...... ...... ...... x
TSA--Transportation Worker ...... ...... ...... x
Identification Credentialing (TWIC) (P)
TSA--TTAC Infrastructure Modernization ...... x ...... ......
Program (TIM) (P)......................
USCG--C4ISR (P)......................... ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--CG Logistics Information ...... x ...... ......
Management System (CG-LIMS) (P)........
USCG--Coastal Patrol Boat (P)........... ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--Core Accounting System (CAS) (P).. ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--Fast Response Cutter (FRC) (P).... ...... ...... x ......
USCG--HC-130H Conversion/Sustainment ...... ...... x ......
Projects (P)...........................
USCG--HC-130J Fleet Introduction (P).... ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--HC-144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft ...... ...... x ......
(MPA) (P)..............................
USCG--HH-60 Conversion Projects (P)..... ...... ...... x ......
USCG--HH-65 Conversion/Sustainment ...... ...... x ......
Projects (P)...........................
USCG--Interagency Operations Centers ...... x ...... ......
(IOC) (P)..............................
USCG--Medium Endurance Cutter ...... ...... ...... x
Sustainment (P)........................
USCG--National Security Cutter (NSC) (P) ...... ...... x ......
USCG--Nationwide Automatic ...... ...... x x
Identification System (NAIS) (P).......
USCG--Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) (P).. ...... x ...... ......
USCG--Patrol Boats Sustainment (P)...... ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--Rescue 21 (P)..................... ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--Response Boat--Medium (RB-M) (P).. ...... ...... ...... x
USCG--Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) x ...... ...... ......
(P)....................................
USCIS--Application Support Centers (ASC) ...... x ...... ......
(P)....................................
USCIS--Benefits Provision--Verification ...... ...... x x
Information System (VIS) (P)...........
USCIS--Integration Document Production ...... ...... ...... x
(IDP) (P)..............................
USCIS--Transformation (P)............... ...... x ...... ......
USSS--IT Modernization (ITM) (P)........ x ...... ...... ......
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (P) indicates Program.
\2\ (S) indicates Services.
\3\ Per I&A, OTIS Program has been canceled.
Question. The request includes $24.2 million and 150 positions to
strengthen the Department's acquisition workforce. Based on the
Department's assessment of its acquisition workforce, does the request
completely fill the gap in acquisition workforce needs? What is the
long-term plan to address known gaps?
Answer. The 150 positions are based on a survey conducted in fiscal
year 2010 of the major acquisition programs and acquisition oversight
offices to identify gaps in the acquisition workforce and represent the
number of positions required to fill gaps to ensure successful program
execution, including risk mitigation.
DHS continues our concerted recruitment efforts with the use of
direct hire authority and centralized vacancy announcements. As of
December 31, 2010, these efforts have resulted in a 136 percent
increase in our contracting specialists. We are also graduating the
first 30 Acquisition Professional Career Program participants in fiscal
year 2011 who will be trained, certified contracting specialists and
placed within the Department's nine contracting activities throughout
fiscal year 2011. Additionally, we have expanded the Acquisition
Professional Career Program to include additional fields in program
management, business cost estimating, systems engineering, life-cycle
logistics, and information technology. DHS has also established new
certification programs for the test and evaluation (T&E), logistics,
business cost estimating, and acquisition financial management career
fields, and will have new programs in place in fiscal year 2012 for
systems engineers and information technology specialists.
Question. What is the status of the Department's plans to develop a
formal Technology Readiness Level (TRL) process? The purpose of the
process is to require TRL assessments of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear detection, and other technologies prior to
appropriate acquisition decision points. Has a management directive on
this initiative been finalized? If so, provide a copy to the
subcommittee.
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Office of
Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis is dedicated to assisting
the DHS components with their acquisition programs, including T&E
master plans, systems integration and technology maturity assessments.
This office is charged with engaging the components and executing S&T's
portions of Acquisition Directive 102-01 and facilitating the
deployment of technology. There is no current plan to create a separate
TRL Management Directive.
--DHS S&T Test and Evaluation and Standards Division/Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been closely
involved with SBInet throughout the acquisition process:
--Assisted with developing an integrated T&E strategy for SBInet as
codified in the DHS DOT&E's approved T&E master plan.
--Assisted with selection of, and ultimately approved the Army Test
and Evaluation Command (ATEC) as the Operational Test Agent
(OTA), an agency with demonstrated capabilities in the T&E
of command and control and surveillance systems.
--Observed SBInet user assessment testing at Playas, New Mexico.
Reviewed developmental testing documentation related to T&E
at the system and subsystem levels, to help ensure both the
credibility of T&E results and the confidence in the
understanding of system performance and overall system
maturity.
--Participated in SBInet monthly program reviews.
--Member of the SBInet AoA Executive Leadership Team and Working
Group.
--Participated in SBInet's operational test readiness review and
Acquisition Review Board providing risk information to
program executives and decisionmakers.
--Approved ATECs operational test plan for SBInet Tucson One
sector.
--Observed and monitored SBInet TUS1 Operational Testing (OT) and
OT dry run (mid-October 2010 through mid-November 2010.
--Participated in ATEC's OT emerging results briefing on March 2,
2011. The final OT evaluation report is due early April
2011.
--Drafting DOT&E's Letter of Assessment (LOA) that assesses the
adequacy of the Army's independent operational T&E results.
This LOA will be submitted to the Under Secretary for
Management and used to support future decisions on border
technologies.
--Currently working with Customs and Border Patrol on the Land Border
Integrated Fixed Tower program to ensure adequate T&E is
planned, executed and reported as required by DHS directive.
workforce balancing
Question. What is the total number of contractor full-time
equivalents (FTEs) providing services in support of DHS programs?
Across departmental components, the request proposes to move resources
from contract service providers to in-house staff. Provide a
departmentwide chart for this effort by component for fiscal year 2011
and fiscal year 2012, including the shift in personnel from contractor
to Federal FTE and associated cost savings. Since the Balanced
Workforce Strategy began, how many contractor conversions has the
Department realized? How will you measure the success of the Balanced
Workforce Strategy?
Answer. After the Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) Departmental
Working Group was formed, it reviewed information provided by the firm
(LMI) that developed the algorithm and identified a math error that
caused the number of contractors to be significantly overstated. The
Department worked with the firm to reexamine the algorithm and
assumptions. The firm informed the Department that the initial 210,000
contractor work-year equivalent estimate was overstated by 100,000 or
more.
The BWS Tool, an automated survey that leads a component official
through the analysis process of the Department's contracts and mission
needs, is a key element of our strategy to reduce expenditures on
professional services contracts in order to more effectively and
efficiently achieve our mission.
Some of the results of our efforts thus far include reducing
spending on professional services contracts by 11 percent, or $420
million, from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010. The Department's
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes an additional $106 million in
cuts to professional services contracts across the Department,
demonstrating our commitment to better managing contracts and ensuring
the appropriate mix of personnel.
Ultimately, the BWS will be considered successful if it:
--Ensures compliance with current statutes, regulations, and
Government and DHS policies by documenting components' reviews
of current contracts; and
--Objectively assesses the proper sourcing decisions for performing
work that advances the mission of DHS.
small boat strategy
Question. The Department released its small vessel security
strategy on April 28, 2008. Nearly 3 years later, an implementation
plan to carry out the strategy has not been released. In response to a
question for the record from the Secretary's 2010 budget hearing, the
subcommittee was informed that DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation
Plan was to be released in 2010. When will the implementation plan be
provided to the Congress?
Answer. The Small Vessel Security Strategy Implementation Plan was
released on March 11, 2011. The public report is available on the DHS
Web site at: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1299623119339.shtm.
air domain awareness--c2 gap filler
Question. The request includes $11 million for an air domain
awareness initiative called C2 Gap Filler. Does this program replicate
existing DHS capabilities? If not, what additional benefits to DHS
would this program provide if successful? The total DHS contribution to
this multi-agency effort is $16 million, but only $11 million has been
identified. The Operations Coordination budget request indicates that
the $11 million is a ``one-time'' cost. How will the Department pay for
the remaining $5 million? If approved, what are the additional costs in
fiscal years 2013-2016?
Answer. [Follows:]
State and Local Efforts
DHS's National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) collaborates with
State, local, tribal, and territorial governments to share and
implement sound cybersecurity policies, practices, and strategies to
improve preparedness against cyber threats and attacks.
Due to the increasingly important role of State, local, tribal, and
territorial governments in cybersecurity, NCSD has resources committed
solely to interacting with officials at these levels. The mission of
NCSD's State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Engagement program
is to build partnerships with non-Federal public stakeholders,
including each State's Homeland Security Advisor, Chief Information
Officer (CIO) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The
following provides an overview of NCSD interactions with States.
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
maintains a formal relationship and works closely with mission
partners, including State and local governments, on a daily basis to
resolve threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. US-CERT provides a
variety of daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly communication
exchanges to maintain situational awareness and share critical
information with collective cybersecurity partners. Federal and SLTT
incident response personnel have access to the Government Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST) portal for information
sharing and discussion.
US-CERT also sponsors the GFIRST National Conference, a forum that
promotes cooperation among Federal agencies, State, local, tribal, and
territorial governments, the private sector, and international partners
across the cybersecurity spectrum, from preparedness and prevention to
incident response. The conference supports the dissemination and
promulgation of proactive and preventive security practices. US-CERT
funding is executed toward planning, preparation, communication, and
coordination of this conference and other conference expos.
Specifically, $1.55 million is directed to support requirements such as
administration, logistics, and security. Additional funding
(approximately $3 million) provides support to the interactive
demonstration system at the GFIRST National Conference.
US-CERT also provides support ($1 million annually) to the
Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and
Technology, which provides system integration and product development
support for enhancement of the National Vulnerability Database and
search engine. This database enables US-CERT partners, including State,
local, tribal, and territorial governments, to secure government
systems.
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
Created in 2003, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (MS-ISAC) is an invaluable tool when dealing with SLTT
governments. The MS-ISAC supports NCSD's efforts to secure cyberspace
by disseminating early warnings of cyber threats to SLTT governments.
In addition, the MS-ISAC shares security incident information,
identifies trends, and conducts other analysis for security planning.
NCSD provides programmatic support ($3.55 million for the 12-month
period from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2011) to the MS-ISAC. The
fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations act provided an additional $3
million for DHS to fund and work with the MS-ISAC to provide managed
security services (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion
prevention systems firewalls) for 18 State and local governments. The
MS-ISAC has selected State, county, and local governments for
participation. The MS-ISAC, consistent with the objectives of NCSD,
provides a common mechanism for raising the level of SLTT government
cybersecurity readiness and response. It is a central resource for
gathering information regarding cyber threats to critical
infrastructure facilities. Other MS-ISAC programs/activities include:
--Operation of a 24/7 Cyber Security and Analysis Center.--The MS-
ISAC runs a 24-hour watch and warning Security Operations
Center (SOC) that provides real-time network monitoring,
dissemination of early cyber threat warnings, and vulnerability
identification and mitigation, along with education and
outreach aimed at reducing risk to the Nation's SLTT government
cyber domain. The SOC shares and coordinates real-time risk
information to support national cybersecurity situational
awareness with DHS (NCSD and US-CERT).
The SOC performs 24/7 monitoring of the Internet and other
sources, including incident reports received from members and
others regarding cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. The
SOC staff evaluates and correlates information and distributes
advisories and bulletins as appropriate, including mitigation
strategies and steps that can be taken to protect critical
infrastructure.
--Managed and Monitored Security Services.--The MS-ISAC contracts
with the States of Alaska, Montana, and New York, along with
the Los Angeles World Airports, to provide cybersecurity
monitoring and managed services. This collective view across
multiple entities helps enhance situational awareness regarding
cyber threats.
During 2010, the MS-ISAC reviewed more than 78 billion logs
through the 24/7 operations center. Approximately 138 MS-ISAC
advisories were issued.
Additionally, through funding in the fiscal year 2010 DHS
appropriations act, the MS-ISAC is expanding its monitoring
services with an additional 10 State governments, 7 local
governments, and 1 territorial government. This expanded
infrastructure will provide a representative sample of system
and network activity for enhancing situational awareness of
SLTT government networks across the country. It will also
improve cyber incident identification and response while
providing more resources for developing and implementing
appropriate mitigation strategies tailored specifically to SLTT
government cyber resources.
--Participation in Cyber Security Exercises--Cyber Storm I, II, and
III.--The MS-ISAC has participated in each of the three Cyber
Storm exercises, most recently Cyber Storm III in September
2010. The MS-ISAC was a full player during the Cyber Storm III
exercise; its SOC was active, and it coordinated with 11 States
that participated in the exercise. The MS-ISAC hosted 19
visitors from five States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
New York State law enforcement, Homeland Security and military
personnel, and observers from the University of Texas at San
Antonio.
National Cyber Incident Response Plan
The President's Cybersecurity Policy Review called for ``a
comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by
Government, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber
incident.'' DHS coordinated the interagency, State and local
government, and private-sector working group that developed the
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). The plan provides a
framework for effective incident response capabilities and coordination
among Federal agencies, State and local governments, the private
sector, and international partners during significant cyber incidents.
It is designed to be flexible and adaptable to allow synchronization of
response activities across jurisdictional lines.
The NCIRP is undergoing final DHS review to incorporate lessons
learned during the Cyber Storm III exercise. Upon conclusion of this
review, DHS will send the NCIRP out to State, local, and private-sector
partners (including the National Governors Association and the MS-ISAC)
for review. DHS will work with State and local partners (and partners
in the private sector) to align their incident response plans and
procedures with the NCIRP. The MS-ISAC and National Governors
Association will be key partners in this effort.
DHS has designated the MS-ISAC as the ISAC for SLTT governments and
has identified the MS-ISAC as a key stakeholder in the development and
implementation of the NCIRP.
NCSD Cyber Security Evaluation Program
Under the 2009 Appropriations Act, NCSD's Cyber Security Evaluation
Program (CSEP) was tasked with completing a Nationwide Cyber Security
Review (NCSR). The NCSR is a voluntary self-assessment of State and
major urban area government Information Technology (IT) services and is
designed to measure cybersecurity preparedness and resilience. Through
the NCSR, CSEP examines relationships, interactions, and processes
governing IT management and the ability to manage operational risk
effectively. CSEP also conducts voluntary cybersecurity assessments to
evaluate and enhance the implementation of key cybersecurity capacities
and capabilities of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)
Sector members. This assessment is the Cyber Resilience Review, which
is designed for each of the 18 CIKR sectors and for use within SLTT
governments. Since fiscal year 2009, CSEP has completed 45 cyber
resilience reviews with SLTT partners.
NCSD Cyber Exercise Program
NCSD's Cyber Exercise Program (CEP) works with Federal, State,
local, international, and private sector partners to conduct regional
and sector-specific exercises designed to develop and improve the
capabilities of DHS and its infrastructure partners. Such exercises aid
participants in preparing for, preventing, mitigating, responding to,
and recovering from cyber incidents. NCSD plans, coordinates, and
conducts cyber exercises to develop, evaluate, improve, and refine the
capabilities of State and local partners. CEP assists State and local
partners by facilitating the design of tabletop and functional
exercises at the State and local levels.
DHS hosted Cyber Storm III from September 26, 2010, through October
1, 2010. The Cyber Storm exercise series is a key element of ongoing
efforts to assess cyber preparedness; examine incident response
processes, procedures, and information sharing mechanisms; and identify
areas for improvement absent the consequences of an actual incident.
Cyber Storm III included participation from 11 States.
In 2009 and 2010, NCSD, the MS-ISAC, and the Microsoft Corporation
jointly sponsored the Defend the Flag Exercises to provide State
government network security professionals greater technical security
skills and practical experience with implementing the principles of
defense-in-depth while securing Windows-based operating systems.
Thirteen States participated from 2009-2010.
Grants
DHS provides grants for cybersecurity through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), such as the Homeland Security Grant Program
(HSGP), which provides States the opportunity to work with DHS to
acquire cybersecurity capabilities. During the last 2 years, NCSD has
worked with FEMA to modify the language in the HSGP to better clarify
how funds can be used to improve cybersecurity.
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
DHS is engaged in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE), leading Track 1 (Cybersecurity Awareness), leading
Track 3 (Cybersecurity Workforce Structure), and coleading Track 4
(Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development).
Through NICE, DHS is reaching out across the cybersecurity community--
including academia, the private sector, and Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners--to integrate current efforts into a
foundation of information that creates mutual understanding and
partnerships across all aspects of national cybersecurity.
In fiscal year 2010, DHS facilitated the efforts of six State
government CIOs to develop a State government workforce development
model, based on the existing DHS-issued Essential Body of Knowledge.
This State government model was presented to the MS-ISAC, which
included the model in its membership-based portal and on its public Web
site.
Other NCSD SLTT Programs/Activities
--National Cyber Security Awareness Month.--To recognize the
importance of cybersecurity awareness, October is designated as
National Cyber Security Awareness Month. NCSD, with the help of
the MS-ISAC, works with funded partners and other parties to
sponsor events and activities throughout the country and
disseminate Awareness Month key messages and event information
to State and local partners. Due to the efforts of NCSD and MS-
ISAC, in 2009 and 2010, all of the Nation's Governors signed
letters officially proclaiming October as National Cyber
Security Awareness Month.
--Stop. Think. Connect. Campaign.--DHS bears primary responsibility
for raising public awareness about threats to the Nation's
cyber systems and networks. To that end, in October 2010, DHS
launched the National Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign, Stop.
Think. Connect. It is a national public-education effort to
engage and empower Americans to take charge of their online
safety and security. By providing Americans with easy-to-
understand online safety tips and resources, the campaign is
helping them establish smart habits that will lead to increased
protection online. Stop. Think. Connect. fulfills a key element
of President Obama's 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review, which
tasked DHS to develop a public-awareness campaign to inform
Americans about ways to use technology safely.
--Security Clearances for State Information Security Officers.--NCSD,
in partnership with colleagues from DHS Office of Security,
initiated a plan to clear, starting at the Secret level, each
State CIO and CISO, and the MS-ISAC executive committee. NCSD
is confident this is an important step in sharing valuable
sensitive information with State partners.
--Cyber Partner Local Access Plan.--NCSD, in cooperation with the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, developed the
Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan (CPLAP) to share
classified cybersecurity threat information with cleared State
cybersecurity officials and private-sector partners at State
and major urban area fusion centers nationwide. The CPLAP
enables more effective and efficient classified cybersecurity
information sharing among Federal, SLTT, and private-sector
partners, and supports an information-sharing model that
eliminates partners' air travel to and from the Washington, DC,
area to receive classified cybersecurity briefings. The CPLAP
will be piloted at five fusion centers by mid-2011, with plans
to expand the program to a broader audience and additional
fusion centers on a regional basis by the end of 2011.
--Cyber Summits.--In an effort to educate SLTT leaders and the
public, NCSD coordinates and plans Cyber Summits. These
summits, which are held regularly throughout the year and
hosted across the country, focus on opportunities and
vulnerabilities to promote discussion on how public and
private-sector officials can best leverage technology to reduce
risk. Frequent attendance and contribution by nongovernmental
cyber associations, such as the MS-ISAC and National
Association of State Chief Information Officers, significantly
contributes to the information sharing, capacity building, and
coordination efforts necessary to develop robust and effective
cybersecurity capabilities on all levels. DHS identified
cybersecurity as a top departmental priority, and Federal,
State, and local government officials share a responsibility to
promote a healthy cyber ecosystem and to encourage individuals
to protect themselves and their families at home, work, and
school.
--Virginia Operational Integration Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence.--NCSD is helping the Virginia Operational
Integration Cyber Center of Excellence (VOICCE) create a
Municipal Cyber Lab that will be used to support and train SLTT
government officials to better understand cybersecurity issues.
VOICCE focuses on incorporating cyber attacks into the
mainstream of emergency operations at the local level and
creating a virtual municipality of randomly generated Internet
protocol addresses. The concept will allow for development of
vital cybersecurity capabilities, processes, and procedures.
The VOICCE node or laboratory will allow local governments and
first responders to plug into State and Federal entities and
participate in simulated cyber attacks. The lab will be both
physical and virtual in structure, allowing many types of
simulation and providing an effective environment to share
ideas among stakeholders across the Nation. Participants will
brainstorm, identify, and respond to diverse cyber attack
scenarios.
This activity was required by the fiscal year 2010 Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act.
NCSD will continue many of the programs listed above. In addition,
in fiscal year 2012, NCSD will commit funding to expand the MS-ISAC's
managed and monitor security services.
Curricula
The Software Assurance (SwA) curriculum project, which produced the
Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) curriculum and associated
undergraduate course outlines, is a recent NCSD effort to cosponsor
public-private collaboration for government, industry, and academia
through its SwA forum. To facilitate implementation, the MSwA project
team is offering assistance, free of charge, to educational
institutions looking to launch an MSwA degree program.
Through the Software Assurance (SwA) forum, the SwA program has
encouraged Federal, State, and local involvement in public-private
collaboration efforts associated with the advancement of SwA resources.
As part of that collaboration, the SwA curriculum project released the
Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) reference curriculum and nine-
course syllabi for public use. The MSwA curriculum is recognized by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Computer
Society and the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) as the first
curriculum of its kind to focus on assuring the functionality,
dependability, and security of software and systems. The materials are
available at http://www.cert.org/mswa/.
More information on the SwA Curriculum Project and the MSwA is
available at https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/1165-BSI.html.
Virtual Education
The SwA forum, sponsored by NCSD's SwA program, posts Web casts of
SwA tutorials and pocket guides that are publicly available for free
online use, including links via virtual training environments.
One aspect under NICE track 4 is functional area 4, which concerns
specialized cybersecurity operations. The scope of this effort includes
those Federal civilian employees, members of the uniformed services,
and contractor personnel employed by departments and agencies who are
engaged in highly specialized and largely classified cybersecurity
operations. Work associated with this functional area is classified,
but a classified briefing to discuss the work associated with this
topic can be arranged upon request.
homeland security information network
Question. Please describe the Department's efforts to consolidate
DHS information portals into the Homeland Security Information Network.
How many portals will migrate to HSIN in fiscal year 2011 and how many
are anticipated to migrate in fiscal year 2012? What are the cost
savings associated with the migrations in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal
year 2012 as well as the long-term cost savings for other portals?
Answer. The Department plans to migrate three portals in fiscal
year 2011, and seven portals in fiscal year 2012. Details on the
portals to be consolidated, as well as 1-year savings and the 5-year
savings by portal are provided below. We continue to evaluate other
portals for migration to HSIN.
HSIN PORTAL CONSOLIDATION AND PROJECTED COST-SAVINGS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 5-year
Portal name Year 1 savings savings Target year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2011
Fire Services Portal......................... $200,000 $1,000,000 Fiscal year 2011 (completed)
TSA--Exercise Information System (EXIS)...... 132,760 1,075,092 Fiscal year 2011
NPPD--Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure (350,284) 2,310,491 Fiscal year 2011
Portal.
FISCAL YEAR 2012
I&A--Homeland Security--State and Local Intel 673,368 6,428,728 Fiscal year 2012
Community (HS-SLIC).
NPPD--National Cybersecurity Protection 1,410,103 10,941,546 Fiscal year 2012
System (NCPS).
FLETC--FLETC Partners and FLETC Registration (1,563,498) (659,896) Fiscal year 2012
\1\.
DNDO--Joint Analysis Center Collaborative 500,000 1,300,000 Fiscal year 2012
Information System (JACCIS)--Partial
Consolidation.
FEMA--Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation 2,148,402 5,713,724 Fiscal year 2012
Program--Corrective Action Planning System
(HSEEP--CAPS).
NPPD--Technical Resource for Incident (1,575,548) 2,125,952 Fiscal year 2012
Prevention (TRIPwire).
USCG--HomePort Portal........................ (680,232) 12,412,802 Fiscal year 2012
-----------------------------------
Totals................................. 895,072 42,648,440 ...............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pending verification of FLETC portals budget figures.
financial systems consolidation
Question. Please provide an update on the Department's efforts to
implement the recommendations made in the July 2010 Inspector General's
report on the transformation and systems consolidation effort.
Answer. Through extensive efforts with the Chief Financial Officer,
Chief Procurement Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief
Administrative Officer, and DHS components over the past year, we have
made significant progress in DHS's integrated financial acquisition
strategy.
The Department has clearly defined and documented its strategy,
plan, and concept of operations in the Transformation and Systems
Consolidation (TASC) program management documentation. To help ensure
the success of the program, the Department formulated a number of
cross-functional oversight and management mechanisms for TASC,
including the TASC Executive Steering Committee which is chaired by the
Undersecretary for Management, that serves as the governing board
regarding strategy, policy, funding, and risks for the TASC program.
The TASC procurement strategy was a single-award indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract allowing multiple contract
types for task orders (firm fixed price, time and materials, cost plus
award fee, and cost plus fixed fee).
On November 19, 2010, DHS issued a contract for the TASC program.
However, on March 9, 2011, DHS received the decision from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) that while two protests to the
TASC contract had been dismissed, one had been upheld. In light of GAO
ruling a stop work order was issued for the TASC IDIQ contract and for
the first task order on that contract. We are currently assessing GAO's
findings and recommendations to determine the appropriate way forward.
icebreaking acquisitions analysis
Question. The funding request for the icebreaking acquisition
analysis will not be considered until the Polar High Latitude Study is
submitted to the subcommittee. Please provide a summary of the
``numerous existing and ongoing studies'' referenced in the budget
request. How will this study be different than those studies? What is
the $5 million request based on? How will the funding be used? Why has
the High Latitude Study, which was funded in the fiscal year 2009
budget request, been delayed? When will it be submitted to the
subcommittee?
Answer. The most recent of the studies referenced in the budget
justification was completed in 2007 at the request of the Coast Guard
by the National Academy of Sciences sponsored by the National Research
Council. This study's objective was to assess the Coast Guard's polar
icebreaker roles and future needs. Additionally, DHS's Office of
Inspector General recently completed an analysis to assess the Coast
Guard's polar icebreaking missions.
This polar icebreaking analysis will differ from those studies by
taking a broader look at polar icebreaking requirements across all
Federal agencies, and by taking a deeper look at operational
alternatives to determine the best method to deliver the required
capability. The closest model for this effort is the Polar Icebreaker
Requirements Report prepared for the President in 1990. Fiscal year
2012 funding will support an interagency working group to define Terms
of Reference and the approach to be used for the preacquisition
analysis of 21st century icebreaking capabilities. The working group
will be under the direction of the Under Secretary for Management.
The $5 million request for the Icebreaker Acquisition Analysis is
based on historical costs of analyses with similar size and scope.
The results of the High Latitude Study have been compiled by the
Coast Guard and their summary report is currently in the final stages
of review and will be provided to the subcommittee in the near future.
Question. Included in the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2010
for Polar Icebreaker Sustainment was funding for the Coast Guard to
begin a business case analysis for either a new heavy polar icebreaker
class or a major service life extension project for exiting polar
icebreakers. What is the status of this effort?
Answer. Coast Guard-specific business case analysis directed in the
fiscal year 2010 appropriation is in final review. The President's
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding for the completion of
a Government-wide analysis for future icebreaking requirements in the
polar regions. Acquisition of 21st century icebreaking capabilities
will be based on these final requirements.
officer integrity
Question. Since fiscal year 2006, with the support of this
subcommittee, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has hired 16,000 new
employees--a 37 percent increase. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has hired more than 8,200 new personnel--a 31 percent increase.
This subcommittee has been concerned that due to the rapid hiring at
CBP and ICE, there is a potential for increased opportunities for
officer corruption. Toward that end, for the past 3 years, this
subcommittee has provided additional resources for integrity training,
investigations of misconduct allegations, and background
investigations. I am pleased to see that your budget requests an
additional $26 million for CBP to address these efforts and meet the
legislative mandate of the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010.
This is the right thing to do and I support this funding. However,
I understand that CBP, ICE, and the Inspector General are experiencing
difficulties working together on workforce integrity because of an
apparent lack of clear lines of authority regarding which departmental
entity is to conduct differing types of investigations and when. There
have been reports that a Border Patrol agent was charged with harboring
illegal aliens but because the DHS Inspector General chose not to
participate in a specific Border Corruption Task Force (BCTF), the
investigation into the alleged activity was impeded.
The American taxpayer's trust in the integrity of Federal law
enforcement officers is too important to be subject to stovepipes and
petty bureaucratic behavior in Washington. In your response to my
question during the hearing, you indicated that this was a priority for
your Department and that you and the Deputy Secretary would commit to
work with me on establishing clear lines of authority for integrity
investigations.
What specific steps have been taken in this regard to date and what
further actions can your Department take to improve this process?
Please provide a schedule for this review and a date by which you or
the Deputy Secretary will report back to the subcommittee on the
recommendations to improve the process. What additional funds beyond
the $26 million requested in the fiscal year 2012 request are required
for full implementation of the Anti-Border Corruption Act?
Answer. We are fully committed to fighting corruption and
maintaining the integrity of our workforce across the Department. The
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request provides sufficient funding
for workforce integrity in support of the Anti-Border Corruption Act
(Public Law 111-376). The request includes a $26 million enhancement
for CBP to enhance its polygraph program and ensure timely background
and periodic reinvestigations as mandated by the Anti-Border Corruption
Act of 2010 while maintaining all other aspects of CBP's integrity
programs, including oversight of CBP operations, personnel, and
facilities. Resources will also be used to improve the Office of
Internal Affairs' ability to detect and deter insider and cyber
threats, including the growing threats posed by Foreign Intelligence
Services, terrorists, and foreign criminal organizations. Additionally,
the base budget requests for CBP and ICE include $142 million and $94
million, respectively, to support anticorruption activities.
DHS and our components have taken several actions to ensure that
all parts of the Department are working together effectively to fight
corruption.
First, in 2004, CBP and ICE created the Joint Intake Center (JIC),
which was designed to serve as the central clearinghouse for receiving,
documenting, and processing all allegations of misconduct involving ICE
and CBP employees and to ensure that the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) receives appropriate and timely notification through the
Joint Integrity Case Management System (JICMS).
Second, I have directed CBP and ICE to adhere to the DHS Management
directive, which requires CBP and ICE to promptly advise the OIG
regarding allegations of employee misconduct. CBP leadership has taken
prompt action to ensure strong cooperation between CBP's Office of
Internal Affairs (CBP IA) and OIG. In October 2009 and July 2010, CBP
IA issued guidance to all CBP IA special agents-in-charge requiring
that detailed information regarding any allegation of wrongdoing on the
part of a CBP employee be entered into JICMS on the same day or the day
after receiving the information. The guidance extends specifically to
CBP IA agents serving on BCTFs.
Third, this past January, CBP and ICE entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) establishing a program whereby CBP would augment
ICE investigations of criminal misconduct by CBP employees through the
detail of CBP IA agents to ICE's Office of Professional Responsibility.
Since the MOU became effective on January 1, 2011, CBP has detailed 24
special agents to ICE OPR. Pursuant to the MOU, CBP IA has begun
working collaboratively with ICE OPR on 160 potential criminal cases
targeting CBP personnel.
The Department will continue to work closely with its components
and OIG to ensure allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as
allegations of corruption within the DHS workforce, are addressed in an
effective and timely manner. We will continually review our processes
for ensuring officer integrity, and make any adjustments to those
processes as necessary.
real id act compliance
Question. This subcommittee has committed significant resources to
make driver's licenses and identification cards more secure. This
security measure was recommended by the 9/11 Commission and is required
through the REAL ID Act. Of the $190 million appropriated to FEMA for
REAL ID-related grants to date, approximately $161.2 million has been
obligated to individual States for security improvements to individual
State credentials and licensing processes and $28.8 million to
information sharing and verification capability improvements. Of the
$60 million appropriated to USCIS, approximately $6.3 million has been
obligated by USCIS to immigration status verification projects and
$28.5 million has been obligated to FEMA to supplement existing FEMA
grants for information sharing and verification capability
improvements. On March 7, 2011, the date for final compliance with the
REAL ID Act was changed from May 11, 2011, to January 15, 2013, through
a Federal Register notice. The change was made citing the difficulty
States are still having meeting all of the statutory requirements. The
notice also recognizes significant progress has been made by States in
some areas.
Please provide a copy of the notice for the record.
How many States are currently in compliance with the act, how many
are expected to be in compliance this fiscal year, and how many are
estimated to be in compliance in fiscal year 2012?
Please outline why the Nation is safer because of the investments
and progress made to date and detail how the fiscal year 2012 budget
request continues the progress of this effort. Will the Department
resubmit PASS ID?
Answer. [The final rule is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2011-03-07/pdf/2011-5002.pdf (Federal Register/Monday, March 7,
2011/Vol. 76/No. 44/pgs 12269-12271/Rules and Regulations).]
To address concerns raised by the States over various aspects of
REAL ID, DHS supported PASS ID legislation introduced in the last
Congress. PASS ID would have made a number of changes to the REAL ID
Act to facilitate State compliance. Since this bill was not approved by
the Congress we have made considerable progress in implementing REAL
ID.
To date, five States have submitted for DHS review, full-compliance
certification packages. Additionally, a number of States are making
progress in meeting the requirements of the REAL ID Act. A majority of
States have self-certified that they either already or plan to: verify
lawful status using the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
(SAVE) system; conduct background checks and fraudulent document
training for employees; incorporate safeguards to improve the physical
security of driver's license production facilities; and implement
technology linking DMV employees to the credentials they issue.
Moreover, by the end of 2011, nearly all of the reporting States will
have implemented additional security enhancements related to DMV
employees, physical security, technology, and card security. By
implementing these security enhancements, States can more effectively
mitigate fraud associated with State-issued credentials, and make it
more difficult for individuals to obtain identity documents they are
not entitled to.
REAL ID STATUS OF STATES AS OF MARCH 29, 2011 \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
States that have submitted full Maryland, Tennessee,
compliance certification packages to Connecticut, South Dakota,
DHS (5). Delaware.
States issuing materially compliant Alabama, Florida, Indiana,
documents with gold star (4) (Self- Utah.
certified).
States that are materially compliant Arkansas, District of Columbia,
but not issuing compliant gold star Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
documents (7) (Self-certified). Mississippi, New Jersey.
States committed to meet material Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois,
compliance but need additional time Nebraska, Ohio, Puerto Rico,
(12). Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
States with comparable EDL programs (4) New York (issues EDL), Michigan
(issues EDL), Vermont (issues
EDL), Washington (issues EDL).
States committed to meet 15 of 18 Arizona, California, Georgia,
benchmarks (12). Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Virgin
Islands.
States that have indicated they will Alaska, American Samoa, Guam,
not meet four or more benchmarks Idaho, Louisiana, Maine,
within the next 12 months (12). Massachusetts, Montana, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Northern Marianas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This information was compiled from documentation submitted by the
States in response to DHS requirement to submit Material Compliance
benchmark data or Full Compliance Certification information. All of
the information is self-reported by the States so all conclusions
based on this information may not accurately reflect a State's actual
progress in complying with the requirements of the REAL ID regulation.
Note.--Italic text denotes States with legislation preventing REAL ID
compliance.
States may use funds provided through the State Homeland Security
Grants Program to continue to improve the security of their driver's
license program.
coordination of federal chemical security efforts
Question. The Senate Report (111-31) accompanying the fiscal year
2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Public Law
111-83) directed the Department to report quarterly on its efforts to
coordinate chemical security across departments. The fourth quarter
report received on March 4, 2011, outlines several memorandums of
agreements, regulatory reviews, and regulatory amendments that are
under development. Please provide a specific timeline for each of these
efforts and identify any obstacles to meeting the timelines
expeditiously. In particular, please update the subcommittee on efforts
to establish standardized risk assessments for facilities under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act and the Chemical Facilities Anti-
Terrorism Standards.
Answer. [Follows:]
Infrastructure Protection/Coast Guard Coordination
The National Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD) Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the Coast Guard continue to work
toward harmonization of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS) and Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulatory
programs under the auspices of the chartered CFATS-MTSA Harmonization
Working Group. In November 2010, senior leadership from NPPD and the
Coast Guard signed the charter. As stated in the activities detailed in
the Fourth Quarter Report to Congress, the CFATS-MTSA Working Group
continued ``the development of a full regulatory review of the security
regimes established under MTSA and CFATS.''
In November 2010, the Working Group presented a comprehensive
regulatory review to NPPD Under Secretary Rand Beers and Rear Admiral
(RADM) Brian Salerno, the Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations.
This review was designed to inform leadership regarding options for
seeking consistency of security across all high-risk chemical
facilities. The findings of this review have been approved by NPPD/IP
and Coast Guard leadership; NPPD/IP's Infrastructure Security
Compliance Division (ISCD) and the Coast Guard are currently working to
further a number of initiatives both independently and through the
Working Group and designated subgroups. Also noted in the Fourth
Quarter Report to Congress, NPPD and the Coast Guard are working toward
the ``Refinement of a [memorandum of agreement (MOA)] to enable data
sharing and sharing of risk methodologies between ISCD's Chemical
Security Assessment Tool and the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Risk
Analysis Model . . . '' Consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the Working Group, NPPD and the Coast Guard are
establishing a Risk and Information Sharing Sub-Group designed to
complete development of the referenced MOA, which will relate to the
exchange of specific risk information and an assessment of the
approaches to risk management currently employed by ISCD and the Coast
Guard for their respective programs. Execution of the MOA is expected
by summer 2011.
In order to help DHS develop a more comprehensive picture of
security issues at the Nation's chemical facilities, and to help DHS
evaluate whether any regulatory gaps exist that may pose an
unacceptable security risk, the Department has begun the process, with
close cooperation between NPPD and the Coast Guard, for determining
whether and how to require MTSA-covered facilities that possess CFATS
chemicals of interest to complete and submit CFATS Top-Screens.
DHS/Federal Bureau of Investigation Coordination.--With regard to
the Department's efforts to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), NPPD is developing an operational-level MOA with
the FBI specific to chemical security and related national security
issues. As noted in the Fourth Quarterly Report to Congress, ``This MOA
will establish proactive guidelines that build upon our current working
relationships and allow for additional interagency activities (such as
information sharing on high-risk chemical facilities and field
component interaction) and will resolve any potential jurisdictional
issues proactively.'' As the MOA is developed, NPPD/IP and the FBI are
also leveraging a formal agreement, entered into between the
Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the FBI in
September 2010, regarding the development of joint intelligence
products (such as intelligence bulletins). NPPD/IP and the FBI are
currently leveraging this agreement in relation to products jointly
developed for chemical security-related issues.
DHS/Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordination
As stated in the Fourth Quarterly Report to Congress, ``At the
staff level, DHS and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)]
finalized and submitted to DHS and NRC leadership for review and
execution a jointly developed draft MOU designed to help define the
types of facilities that are wholly or partially exempt from CFATS due
to NRC-regulatory authority, as well as processes for identifying those
facilities.'' NPPD Under Secretary Rand Beers formally endorsed the
DHS-NRC MOU in August 2010, and the MOU is currently with NRC senior
leadership for final review and execution.
office of the inspector general
Question. In January 2011, a San Diego-area Border Patrol agent,
Marcos Manzano was arrested for harboring illegal immigrants. One of
OIG's missions is to investigate allegations of criminal, civil, and
administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, and to work with the
U.S. Attorneys, other law enforcement agencies, and investigate
activities of DHS Internal Affairs offices to ensure violators are
prosecuted, fined, and/or civil action is taken. In this particular
case, the FBI BCTF had the lead on the investigation, but reports show
that the DHS OIG was not involved due to the fact that the OIG has not
signed on to the BCTF MOU.
Why isn't the DHS OIG part of the BCTF?
Answer. Despite the lack of any formal written agreement, DHS OIG
has always tried to participate fully with the BCTF. Since its
beginning in 2003, DHS OIG has worked cooperatively with the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies on border corruption matters involving
DHS employees without any formal written agreement. In March 2010, DHS
OIG assigned a Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations to
act as a liaison to the FBI's National BCTF in an effort to achieve
full participation in all of the FBI BCTF's investigations. In
addition, this Deputy Assistant Inspector General was tasked with
negotiating an MOU that reflects the OIG's statutory responsibilities
with respect to:
--Investigating allegations of criminal misconduct against DHS
employees and
--Providing oversight of the internal affairs offices within DHS,
while ensuring the representation of departmental interests in
the course of these investigations.
In May 2010, the FBI in San Diego presented the OIG with an MOU
that contained provisions that place significant restrictions on the
OIG's independence, and were therefore unacceptable. We worked locally
and at FBI headquarters to resolve differences and craft language to
which all parties could agree. In November 2010, we proposed
alternative language for the local BCTF MOU that both recognized the
significance of border corruption offenses committed by DHS employees
and respected the legislated authorities that define and govern roles
and responsibilities of the member agencies that include the FBI, CBP
Internal Affairs (IA), CBP Office of Field Operations (OPO), Border
Patrol, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of
Investigations.
Our proposal was rejected by the FBI because the FBI failed to
recognize that DHS has a system of tiered authority with respect to the
investigation of allegations of criminal misconduct against DHS
employees and that, within that system of tiered authority, OIG has
primacy. Moreover, we were asked to remove the agent we had assigned to
the San Diego task force because we had not signed the version of the
MOU that was unilaterally drafted by the FBI. We honored the FBI's
request and removed our agent on November 12, 2010. Since that time,
several significant border corruption cases that DHS OIG has presented
to the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) in San Diego have been declined
because the investigations were not conducted by the local BCTF.
The OIG has been prevented from participating in the FBI BCTF in
San Diego because of the insistence that we sign an agreement we
consider to be fundamentally flawed, and in conflict with our
legislated mandate as the primary authority within DHS for
investigating allegations that DHS employees have committed criminal
misconduct. This authority is clearly specified in the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended, and further articulated in the
Secretary of Homeland Security's Management Directive (MD) 0810.1.
We have continued to negotiate with the USAO in San Diego to reach
accord on an MOU that will preserve the OIG's independence and
authority, but otherwise satisfies the general terms of the BCTF MOU.
OIG continues to open and aggressively investigate all allegations
relating to the corruption of DHS employees or the compromise of
systems related to the security of our borders and transportation
networks.
Question.Why hasn't the OIG signed the MOU? Is there something in
the MOU that is counter to the Inspector General Act or DHS Management
Directive?
Answer. The BCTF MOU places serious limitations on the independence
of the OIG. First it requires that all allegations of DHS employee
corruption, without exception, be referred to the BCTF. Second, it
fails to address the authority within DHS to investigate allegations of
criminal misconduct by DHS employees and the role of the OIG in
oversight of DHS component internal affairs offices.
Inspectors General play a critical role in assuring transparent,
honest, effective, and accountable government. Both the personal and
organizational independence of OIG investigators is essential to
maintaining the public trust in not only the work of the OIG, but also
in the DHS workforce as a whole. The American public wants to know that
Government employees are held accountable for their misconduct by an
independent fact finder, such as the OIG.
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, establish a clear line of authority
for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct by DHS employees.
The statutes vest primary criminal investigative authority for employee
misconduct with DHS OIG. Within DHS, Management Directive 0810.1
outlines the roles of the various offices of internal affairs with
respect to support for the OIG, including investigation of noncriminal
misconduct allegations.
In contrast, the BCTF MOU specifies that each participating DHS
agency is an equal partner that shares overall responsibility for
policy, operation, and direction of the BCTF; coordination of
investigations; and for providing management and oversight of the BCTF.
The San Diego BCTF includes the field operational elements of CBP and
Border Patrol, in addition to CBP internal affairs and TSA's internal
affairs. In fact, in the investigation of Border Patrol Agent Manzano,
the FBI assigned a Border Patrol agent member of the BCTF to work as
the co-case agent along with the FBI.
This shared management responsibility between DHS OIG and internal
affairs units (and operational units) of other DHS components usurps
the OIG's statutory responsibility for supervising, leading, and
coordinating criminal investigations of DHS employees and interferes
with our oversight responsibility with respect to component internal
affairs units. Many aspects of the MOU interfere with the OIG's ability
to investigate cases independently of the DHS component members of the
BCTFs.
With respect to information sharing, the OIG and FBI have a mutual
responsibility under the Attorney General's Guidelines for Offices of
Inspector General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority to promptly
notify one another upon initiation of any criminal investigation, a
responsibility the OIG meets in a timely way. Within DHS, all
allegations of criminal misconduct by employees must be referred to
OIG. The MOU would require DHS participating agencies to provide the
same information directly to the FBI. This duplication in reporting is
not an efficient use of DHS or FBI resources, and opens the door for
dual parallel investigations.
The MOU contains a provision under which the Executive Board, which
is comprised of representatives of all participating agencies (in this
case DHS components), who vote on whether or not the OIG could
investigate an allegation unilaterally. Allowing DHS components to vote
on whether and how the OIG pursues an investigation is contrary to the
concept of statutory independence, and would result in the erosion of
public confidence in any outcome.
Question. Describe the OIG's leadership role as it relates to the
internal affairs division of each of the Department's agencies.
Answer. DHS OIG has strong working relationships with most offices
of internal affairs within DHS. We communicate daily on allegations and
ongoing cases, and routinely work collaboratively. DHS OIG has an
established inspection process for reviewing the work of the internal
affairs units at least once every 3 years. The inspections review
compliance with investigative standards, personnel training and
qualifications, and investigative case files in order to ensure that
the work of the internal affairs units reflects the quality expected by
DHS senior leadership, the Congress, and the public. Each inspection
results in a written report and if recommendations are made for
corrective actions or improvements, OIG follows up to confirm that the
recommendations in fact have been implemented.
An OIG agent is assigned as a desk officer to each component
internal affairs office and reviews allegations referred to OIG by that
internal affairs office. OIG refers allegations that are purely
administrative in nature back to the component, who then takes lead on
the investigation. In certain instances of sensitive or significant
matters, we exercise active oversight of a case referred back to the
component and review the findings. DHS OIG also recently initiated a
program to review case management statistics from each of the internal
affairs units in order to reconcile OIG's case management records with
those of the components, to track trends and patterns in allegations,
and to ensure that components take appropriate action when misconduct
is found.
Question. Should all internal affairs personnel work for the DHS
OIG?
Answer. When the DHS was initially organized, it was done so on the
basis of realignment of existing governmental resources. The premise
was that the DHS would streamline operations by eliminating
redundancies while increasing communication, information sharing,
transparency, and accountability. Since that time, the component
elements have inappropriately stratified operations by devoting
personnel and resources that compete with, rather than compliment, the
OIG. Although the internal affairs offices have an important mission to
conduct noncriminal misconduct inquiries, pre-employment screening of
applicants, and background investigations of employees and provide
integrity and security briefings that help employees recognize
corruption signs and dangers, transferring some number of experienced
criminal investigators from the internal affairs offices to DHS OIG
would allow OIG to more effectively address its workload growth
resulting from increases in DHS component workforces. It is our belief
that a realignment of these resources by transfer of the positions to
the OIG would be responsible stewardship. Alternatively, funding for
increased OIG staffing that reflects the growth within the DHS
workforce is needed.
The Department was also founded with intent to forsake
jurisdictional rivalries in favor of operational efficiency. Just as
DHS presents one face at the border, the Homeland Security Act mandates
one face when dealing with criminal allegations against departmental
employees. The OIG, which has primary authority to investigative those
criminal misconduct allegations, should be the single point of contact
with regard to those allegations.
One of the most important factors in detecting, deterring, and
discouraging corruption is employee awareness of where and how to
report and their comfort in doing so. Centralizing complaint intake in
the OIG, as a separate office from a complainant's agency of
employment, would provide DHS employees with increased assurance that
their information will be treated confidentially and acted upon
professionally; eliminate redundancies in the reporting of allegations;
and ensure the timely reporting of employee complaints to the OIG
hotline would more effectively direct resources to combat corruption
and would promote better intelligence, trend analysis, and
prioritization of investigative leads.
The OIG continues to work the vast majority of allegations of the
most serious criminal misconduct and corruption, and has accounted for
an overwhelming majority of all arrests and convictions of DHS
employees since 2003. We believe that DHS's criminal investigative
resources should be deployed accordingly.
cbp--container security
Question. The 9/11 Act requires 100 percent of U.S.-bound maritime
cargo to be scanned before departing to our ports. In testimony before
the Congress last year, CBP Commissioner Bersin stated that only 4
percent to 5 percent of cargo is currently scanned. The act allows the
Secretary to waive this 2012 requirement in a 2-year increment if
conditions indicate this requirement cannot be met, and you have
indicated that you will do so. However, even before you have officially
waived these requirements, the budget request for fiscal year 2012--and
the realities in this fiscal year--show significant reductions to the
international cargo screening programs. Funds have been eliminated for
Secure Freight pilots in all places except Pakistan and CBP has closed
or is ceasing operations at many of the 58 Container Security
Initiative (CSI) ports. In fiscal year 2009, there were 167 CBP
officials located overseas at CSI ports. By the end of fiscal year
2010--and continuing today--the number of individuals has dropped to
86.
With overseas personnel for this effort essentially cut in one-
half, how does this increase cargo security at the same time it appears
that no real steps are being taken to meet a legislative mandate that
the Department has known has been coming since September 2006--more
than 4 years ago?
Much of this scanning will be handled domestically by the targeting
center. However, the 2012 budget includes $7.5 million to fund the
implementation of two pilots to test the 100-percent scanning mandate.
In fact, one of the proposed pilots appears to replicate the Secure
Freight Initiative model used in Pakistan in a different, high-threat
corridor--likely on the Arabian Peninsula.
What new information does the Department believe it can obtain by
repeating the same project in a different location? How will this
information be used to determine the best steps to meet the scanning
requirement? What developments in scanning technology might lead DHS to
decide to implement the overseas scanning requirement called for in the
9/11 Act?
Answer. Presently, and as required by the SAFE Port Act, DHS and
other Federal partners are working collaboratively with the National
Security Staff to develop a national-level strategy that will provide a
unified vision that the U.S. Government sees for global supply chain
security across air, land, and sea modes of transportation, which will
also address the necessary level of cargo scanned to provide effective
detection and deterrence. The administration anticipates completing
this strategy development effort in 2011 and DHS remains confident that
it will include guidance and additional details on how DHS, other
Departments, and agencies will address the 100 percent cargo scanning
provision.
Throughout this process, we will remain mindful of our need to
properly balance security concerns with facilitating the flow of
commerce. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for
CBP to conduct a cargo screening pilot to assess alternatives to the
100 percent maritime cargo scanning, enabling CBP to test alternatives
to extend the zone of security beyond our physical borders, strengthen
global supply chain security, and enhance CBP's multi-layered security
strategy. CBP is in a unique position to work toward deterring
malicious actors from exploiting the system, protecting infrastructure
and embedding resilience in the system to aid in recovering from
disruptions by virtue of having access to vast amounts of historical
and transactional data from all modes of cargo shipments. This data
includes the parties involved, trade routes and other information which
can be used in assessing risk. Coupled with this is CBP's expertise in
risk targeting that has been developed over the past decade. The
proposed Supply Chain Security Pilot would include next-generation
targeting to employ predictive models to assess threats and detect
anomalies in the supply chain; and the utilization of tools and
technologies that are currently not in use at the National Targeting
Center. For example, analysts will be provided analytic tools that
allow them to perform link analysis, commodity analysis, and entity
resolution, along with visualization tools to represent vessel
movements, geo-location of addresses, and social network diagrams.
CBP's multi-layered security strategy seeks to identify high-risk
cargo as early as possible in the supply chain. The Trade Act of 2002
and its implementing regulations require industry to submit electronic
manifest data to CBP 24 hours prior to the cargo being laden on a
vessel destined for the United States. CBP's predeparture manifest data
was enhanced further with the implementation of the Importer Security
Filing and Additional Carrier requirements, commonly known as ``10+2,''
which requires importers to provide specific information on their cargo
prior to arrival in the United States. CBP also utilizes the Automated
Targeting System (ATS) to screen advanced manifest data and assist CBP
officers in identifying high-risk cargo. Upon screening, CBP can issue
``Do Not Load'' messages for shipments deemed high-risk until the risk
can be mitigated or resolved.
Through the CSI, CBP works to identify and inspect high-risk cargo
before it is laden on a vessel destined for the United States. As a
result of new and improved technology and increased international
partnerships, CBP is now able to conduct a greater portion of the CSI
targeting from the National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C)--increasing
efficiency and reducing cost. As a result, in early fiscal year 2009,
CSI began reducing the number of CBP officers deployed to foreign
seaports. While there has been decrease in the staffing of CSI officers
abroad, CSI has increased the staffing level at the NTC-C to support
targeting functions in overseas ports. The decrease in the CSI staffing
at foreign locations has not compromised the CSI mission because CBP
has been able to accomplish the CSI mission more efficiently and in a
more cost-effective manner through the increased staffing and resources
at the NTC-C. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to fund CSI at the
same level.
CBP and DHS are committed to ensuring the security of the
international supply chain and will work to support the global supply
chain security strategy utilizing a risk-based, multi-layered approach
across all modes of transit.
air cargo screening
Question. What specific steps is the Department taking to improve
the screening of articles entering the United States via air? Is the
Department taking steps to have shipping manifest requirements for air
cargo more closely match the current ones for seaborne cargo? Can CBP
ensure that all cargo information requiring a shippers' export
declaration is provided to CBP within a reasonable security timeframe?
If so, what is that timeframe? Does CBP currently have the ability to
enforce a no-load decision or require additional screening for any
U.S.-bound air cargo?
Answer. Today, 100 percent of high-risk cargo on international
flights bound for the United States is prohibited from being
transported on passenger aircraft and goes through enhanced security
procedures before being shipped on all cargo aircraft. DHS and TSA
recently announced a proposed deadline of December 31, 2011, for
industry to screen 100 percent of air cargo on international inbound
passenger aircraft--2 years earlier than previously anticipated.
DHS is also working closely with industry and international
partners to expedite the receipt of advanced cargo data for
international flights to the United States prior to departure in order
to identify and screen items based on risk and current intelligence
before they are airborne. In December 2010, CBP, TSA, and the air cargo
industry launched a new joint technology pilot project to enhance the
sharing of electronic shipping information to improve the
identification of high-risk shipments.
Further, in January, I announced a new partnership with the World
Customs Organization to enlist other nations, international bodies, and
the private sector in increasing the security of the global supply
chain--outlining a series of new initiatives to make the system
stronger, smarter and more resilient.
CBP exercises the same border authority over exports and imports
and has the authority to inspect and detain goods and order their
redelivery from any person, such as the carrier, in possession of the
goods. CBP is currently collaborating with TSA to utilize their
regulatory authority to have high-risk shipments screened prior to
being laden at last port of departure.
Question. The Department has been working with industry to develop
a process for receiving air cargo manifest information prior to
departure. What is the status of this effort? When will the system be
operational? What resources are required by CBP and TSA to develop and
operate this system? Are funds requested in the fiscal year 2012 budget
for this effort?
Answer. DHS is working closely with industry and international
partners to expedite the receipt of advanced cargo data for
international flights to the United States prior to departure in order
to identify and screen items based on risk and current intelligence
before they are airborne. In December 2010, CBP, TSA, and the air cargo
industry launched a new joint technology pilot project (the Air Cargo
Advance Screening Pilot) to enhance the sharing of electronic shipping
information to improve the identification of high-risk shipments.
CBP and TSA have made significant progress on this pilot and expect
to have the first phase--which focuses on the express consignment
environment--fully operational in the late spring 2011. The passenger
phase of the pilot is tentatively scheduled for implementation in early
summer 2011.
CBP and TSA estimate that the total costs for the development and
maintenance of the Air Cargo Advance Screening system and staffing
through fiscal year 2012 will be approximately $20 million. Funding is
included within the CBP salaries and expenses appropriation,
specifically in the Inspections, Trade and Travel, and Trusted Traveler
Program PPAs, in the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
impact of customs enforcement on the seafood industry
Question. When foreign producers send dumped or unfairly subsidized
goods into our country, vigorous enforcement of our trade laws is the
only way that American businesses can compete on a level playing field.
In Louisiana and the gulf region, the domestic shrimp industry is
fighting a tough battle against unfairly dumped shrimp imports, and
they won antidumping orders against shrimp from six countries in 2005.
Unfortunately, Customs is simply not doing enough to collect the
dumping duties that importers owe to the Federal Government. Since
2005, for example, importers of shrimp from China have failed to pay
more than $58 million in dumping duties, some of which is supposed to
be redistributed to injured shrimp producers here in the United States.
Continued failure to collect these duties is fiscally irresponsible,
and it further threatens a vulnerable gulf seafood industry that is
struggling to recover from the impact of four major hurricanes and a
devastating oil spill.
How can Customs improve its performance to ensure that our laws are
fully enforced and that importers are held accountable for all of the
duties they owe? Could we enforce duty payment requirements on
individuals, rather than companies that often go bankrupt? Will you
work with me to increase transparency so that domestic producers can
track the enforcement actions Customs is undertaking against importers
and the results of those actions?
Answer. Antidumping/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) enforcement is a
priority trade issue (PTI) for CBP. CBP takes a concerted, systematic
approach to detect and deter circumvention of the AD/CVD law,
administer entries of AD/CVD merchandise, and to issue and collect
bills for AD/CVD duties owed to the U.S. Government. CBP coordinates
its AD/CVD enforcement activities through an intra-office AD/CVD PTI
Working Group. CBP works closely with the Department of Commerce (DOC),
the administering authority for AD/CVD determinations under U.S. law,
and ICE to enforce AD/CVD laws and regulations.
When CBP issues a bill for final AD/CVD duties, CBP makes every
effort to collect all duties, taxes and fees legally due to the
Government. However, some importers, or their agents, are unable to pay
the final duties. In addition, at least two sureties issuing bonds
covering substantial amounts of AD/CVD duties are currently in
receivership, further complicating collection. Other importers are
simply unwilling to pay, or no longer exist by the time CBP issues a
bill. CBP pursues collection action against importers and sureties who
are simply unwilling to pay. CBP's Revenue Division in the Office of
Administration initiates an administrative collections process in order
to recover past-due amounts from the importers and sureties. This
process may include dunning letters and the suspension of the immediate
delivery process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which
the Revenue Division's collections process is ineffective are referred
to CBP's Office of Chief Counsel.
The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the
importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the
underlying debt. Further, a review is done to determine if there is a
viable importer (or available surety coverage) from which the debt may
be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, searches
of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available
leads. In addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19
U.S.C. 1592 against any party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or
negligence submits a material false statement or omission on
importation into the United States, including those cases in which a
false statement or omission is made concerning the applicability of an
antidumping duty order to a particular entry. If administrative
attempts to collect the debt are unsuccessful and a viable importer
and/or surety can be found, the Office of Chief Counsel drafts a
complaint and refers the matter to the Department of Justice for
possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If the Office
of Chief Counsel is not successful in locating a viable entity to be
pursued, the matter will be referred back to the Revenue Division for
appropriate action. This may include referral to ICE for further
investigation. If the debt is without legal merit or no viable entity
can be located to pursue further collection action, CBP may ultimately
be forced to write off the debt.
CBP has taken steps to specifically improve the collection of AD/
CVD duties on shrimp imports and continues to explore statutory and
nonstatutory changes to enhance bonding requirements. CBP is also
actively pursuing collection of the balance of the open bills against
delinquent importers and sureties.
antidumping authorities
Question. Please detail the legal process for antidumping
activities (claims, investigations, collections, etc.) under the
specific jurisdiction of CBP from beginning of the process to final
resolution.
What parts of this process are not under the control or
jurisdiction of CBP? What roles do other U.S. agencies or departments
play in this process and at what intervals? How long can the duty
collection process take once a determination is made that a shipper has
``dumped'' goods adversely affecting a U.S. producer? What legal
impediments, if any, prevent CBP from being able to use a portion of
the fines it collects to cover the costs of increased investigations?
Are all antidumping fines collected distributed to dumped-upon U.S.
producers and/or companies?
Under current law, the U.S. Government assesses antidumping fines
against a particular company or corporation. What prevents our
Government from going after the individual owner(s) of the company or
corporation? If there is a legal prohibition in doing so, what specific
law prohibits it?
Answer. [Follows:]
Legal Process for Antidumping Activities
Once DOC makes an affirmative determination in an Antidumping or
Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) investigation, it issues instructions to
CBP specifically identifying the covered product and requiring the
applicable AD/CVD duty rates for each foreign producer. An importer
must indicate that its entry is covered by an antidumping duty or
countervailing duty order on its entry forms and deposit the applicable
cash deposit. Because the United States has a retrospective system for
determining antidumping and countervailing duties, the liquidation of
these entries is suspended until DOC reaches a final decision of the
rate of antidumping or countervailing duty. Thus, the amount deposited
at the time of entry is only an estimate of what duties may ultimately
be owed.
Once DOC sends CBP liquidation instructions indicating the final
rate of duty that is owed on these entries, CBP liquidates them in
accordance with those instructions. If additional duties are owed, the
importer must pay them at that time, with interest. Conversely, if the
rate of duty decreased, the importer would receive a refund with any
applicable interest. CBP's role in this process is purely ministerial
as CBP implements the instructions received from DOC.
An importer who disagrees with the imposition of antidumping or
countervailing duties may file a protest with CBP that concerns a
decision that was made by CBP at the time of entry (not the underlying
determination by DOC). Such a protest must be filed with the port
within 180 days of liquidation.
If the protest includes a request for further review that satisfies
19 CFR 174.24, CBP headquarters reviews the protest and issues a
binding decision. If the port improperly denied the request for further
review, the protestant may seek to have the denial set aside.
Alternatively, if a protest is denied, the protestant may file suit in
the Court of International Trade, which is the U.S. Court with subject
matter jurisdiction over these matters.
If the protestant does not seek judicial review of a denied protest
(or if no protest was filed), CBP's Revenue Division in the Office of
Administration initiates an administrative collections process in order
to recover past-due amounts from the importers and sureties. This
process may include dunning letters and the suspension of immediate
delivery process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which
the Revenue Division's collections process is ineffective are referred
to CBP's Office of Chief Counsel.
The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the
importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the
underlying debt. Further, a review is done to determine if there is a
viable importer (or available surety coverage) from which the debt may
be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, searches
of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available
leads. If administrative attempts to collect the debt are unsuccessful
and a viable importer and/or surety can be found, the Office of Chief
Counsel drafts a complaint and refers the matter to the Department of
Justice for possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If
the Office of Chief Counsel is not successful in locating a viable
entity to be pursued, the matter will be referred back to the Revenue
Division for appropriate action. This may include referral to ICE for
further investigation.
Parts of the Process Not Under the Control or Jurisdiction of CBP
CBP's role in administering the antidumping duty and countervailing
duty orders is purely ministerial. DOC establishes which products are
covered by the orders and what the applicable duty rates are for
foreign producers and U.S. importers. CBP is in charge of the
collection of the cash deposits, reviewing entries to ensure that
importers are properly reporting their goods as subject to an order and
paying the correct rate of duty, and liquidating those entries and
assessing the final duty rate that is owed for those entries. CBP does
not, however, liquidate any entry subject to an antidumping duty or
countervailing duty order until it receives specific instructions from
DOC indicating that it is appropriate to do so.
Roles Other U.S. Agencies Play
DOC, the AD/CVD administering authority under U.S. law, and the
U.S. International Trade Commission are responsible for investigating
petitions alleging that goods being imported into the United States are
dumped or subsidized. DOC determines at what rate the goods are being
dumped or subsidized and the International Trade Commission determines
whether the U.S. industry has been injured or whether there is threat
of injury resulting from the importation of these dumped or subsidized
goods. If both agencies make affirmative preliminary determinations,
DOC issues instructions to CBP specifically identifying the covered
product and the applicable required duty rates for each foreign
producer. After both agencies make affirmative final determinations,
DOC publishes an antidumping duty order and/or countervailing duty
order in the Federal Register. Thereafter, DOC may conduct annual
administrative reviews to determine the actual rate of dumping or
subsidization of the previous year's entries.
Every 5 years, DOC and the International Trade Commission conduct
sunset reviews of AD/CVD orders to determine if a case should be
continued or revoked, and DOC instructs CBP accordingly if a case is
revoked. DOC also has other ad hoc proceedings that may result in
instructions to CBP to begin or stop collecting AD/CVD duties on
specified subcategories of merchandise or specific companies.
ICE investigates criminal violations of AD/CVD laws. CBP works
closely with ICE and regularly refers suspected criminal violations
involving AD/CVD circumvention and fraud to ICE for investigation. In
addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592
against any party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence,
submits or aids and abets another in submitting a material false
statement or omission on importation into the United States, including
those cases in which a false statement or omission is made concerning
the applicability of an antidumping duty order to a particular entry.
Steps in the Process Once a Determination Is Made
As soon as DOC instructs CBP to collect estimated AD/CVD duties for
a commodity from a specified country, CBP will collect these estimated
duties upon entries of the merchandise into the United States. CBP will
then hold these entries in suspension until DOC instructs CBP to
collect the final amount of duties due on these entries. CBP often does
not receive these final liquidation instructions from DOC for several
years after the original entry of merchandise. CBP then works to take
timely action to apply the liquidation instructions and bill the
importers for the final AD/CVD duties due. Importers may legally
protest the liquidation of an entry and delay paying a bill until the
protest is decided. If a protest is denied, the protestant may file
suit in the Court of International Trade.
Fines as a Funding Source
Generally speaking, fines must be deposited in the Treasury as
miscellaneous receipts pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3302(b). Absent statutory
authority, CBP's use of these funds to cover the costs of
investigations would constitute an improper augmentation of CBP's
appropriations. Where goods are seized and forfeited for AD related
violations, those proceeds from the sale of forfeited goods are
deposited in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and available for reimbursing
costs of the investigations, among other uses.
Distribution of Fines
The ``Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000'' was
enacted on October 28, 2000, as part of the ``Agriculture, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act''. The act was repealed by section 7601(a) of the
``Deficit Reduction Act of 2005'', but remains in place for AD/CVD
duties collected on entries made before October 1, 2007.
Money collected on an entry filed before October 1, 2007, will
continue to be subject to the distribution procedures under former
section 1675c. The duty on an entry is not available for distribution
until the entry is liquidated pursuant to the direction of DOC and the
duty is collected and deposited into the special account; therefore,
the distribution process will continue until all entries made before
October 1, 2007 are liquidated and the duties are collected. As a
result of the statutory constraints in the assessment of antidumping
and countervailing duties, the distribution process will continue for
an undetermined period; however, the amount of money available for
distribution can be expected to diminish over time.
Enforcement on Individuals Rather Than Companies
The law makes it difficult to impose personal liability. While
there is no express legal prohibition against taking collection action
against individuals involved with corporate importers that incur
dumping duty debts, most individuals involved with such debtor
corporations are in other countries outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, as is their valuable real and personal property.
However, CBP does have the authority to assess civil penalties
against individual owners of particular companies or corporations.
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592, CBP is authorized to assess penalties and
recover lost duties (including antidumping duties) against any party
who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence, enters or introduces,
or attempts to enter or introduce, any merchandise into the commerce of
the United States by means of a false statement or omission, or aids or
abets another person to do so. See 19 U.S.C. 1592(a)-(d). CBP may
exercise this authority in cases in which a false statement or omission
is made on an entry involving merchandise subject to an antidumping
duty order.
improved antidumping revenue collections
Question. In March 2008, GAO reported that, as of September 2007,
CBP has been unable to collect more than $600 million owed in
antidumping and countervailing duties imposed to remedy injurious
unfair foreign trade practices. These include duties imposed on
products exported to the United States at unfairly low prices (i.e.,
dumped) and duties on products exported to the United States that were
subsidized by foreign governments. In addition to the substantial
amount of lost revenue, the uncollected duties cause concern that the
U.S. Government has not fully remedied the unfair trade practices.
Since 2005, GAO has reported several times on the U.S. Government's
inability to collect substantial amounts of antidumping and
countervailing duties and, in 2008, proposed a variety of options for
improving the system for collecting these duties. Two key components of
the antidumping and countervailing duty system have received particular
attention. One is its retrospective nature, which means that-- though
importers pay estimated duties at the time of importation--final duties
are not assessed until after products enter the country. Another
component is the ``new shipper'' review process that allows new
manufacturers or exporters to petition for their own separate
antidumping and countervailing duty rate. Despite other efforts by the
Congress and CBP, these components of the system have not been
addressed and the collection of antidumping and countervailing duties
remains a problem.
The March 2008, GAO report identified several options for the
Congress to consider for improving the collection of antidumping and
countervailing duties. And by adjusting features of the antidumping or
countervailing duty system that create the risk that companies can
evade paying duties, the Congress could further protect Government
revenue, while also minimizing incentives for companies to pursue
unfair trade practices. These options included eliminating the
retrospective component of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty
system and adjusting requirements for new shipper reviews.
What specific laws does CBP recommend should be changed or amended
to enhance CBP's antidumping investigations and increase antidumping
collections? Can CBP take administrative actions to improve antidumping
collections in the absence of legislation? In the absence of changes in
legislative authorities to existing laws and practices, can CBP do more
to collect and distribute antidumping receipts to injured U.S.
businesses if it was provided with additional resources? If so, what
resources would be required and what more could be achieved?
Answer. CBP has a longstanding administrative collection process
that employs all of the authority available to CBP. CBP makes every
effort to collect all duties, taxes and fees legally due to the
Government.
In appendix V of the March 2008, GAO report, DHS commented that of
the options identified by GAO to improve the collection of AD/CVD
duties, the first option CBP preferred for addressing uncollected AD/
CVD duties would be for the U.S. Congress to change U.S. law to
eliminate the retrospective component of the U.S. AD/CVD system and
make the U.S. AD/CVD system prospective. DHS noted that a prospective
AD/CVD system would alleviate the collection issues faced by CBP since
the amount of duty assessed at entry would be the final amount owed.
This would also substantially alleviate the administrative burden on
CBP resources associated with a retrospective system, and allow CBP
resources to more fully focus on AD/CVD enforcement issues, such as
circumvention of the AD/CVD law. In this appendix to the March 2008,
GAO report, DHS also commented that the majority of the other options
identified by GAO to improve the collection of AD/CVD duties would
perpetuate and exacerbate the shortcomings of the U.S. retrospective
system.
jones act enforcement
Question. CBP is charged with enforcing our Nation's cabotage laws,
including the Jones Act, which requires that any goods transported by
water between two coastwise points in the United States must be carried
on ships that are built in America and crewed by Americans. This law
promotes our economic and national security by ensuring the existence
of a robust merchant marine fleet.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1974 extended Jones Act
requirements to offshore points within the exclusive economic zone of
the United States. It is therefore imperative that CBP have both the
resources and the authorities it needs to enforce the Jones Act
offshore, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico, where more than 25
percent of America's domestic energy production occurs.
Does CBP have the resources, authorities, and information it needs
to investigate alleged Jones Act violations offshore? How is CBP
partnering with the Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) industry, which
supports offshore energy facilities and operations, to carry out its
enforcement mission?
Answer. Yes, CBP has the resources, authorities, and information
needed to take appropriate action for alleged Jones Act violations
committed offshore.
air and marine
Question. What are the operational impacts on performing CBP's
mission of the CBP plan to retire 18 single-engine, fixed wing aircraft
in fiscal year 2011?
Answer. CBP is scheduled to retire 16 single-engine, fixed wing
aircraft, 15 PA-18s and 1 C-172 in fiscal year-2011. The decision to
retire these aircraft was based on their advanced age and the desire to
operate more efficient, effective, and capably equipped aircraft. The
PA-18 and C-172 have limited capability to fly low-level missions over
hazardous terrain during the day and virtually no capability for
operational missions at night. Recently purchased light enforcement
helicopters (AS-350) are equipped with sophisticated sensors and are
considerably better suited to perform the variety of required law
enforcement missions supported by OAM.
when will we know the border is secure?
Question. Debates have raged in the Congress and around the country
over how secure our border is--especially our border with Mexico. Many
people assert that they will not support immigration reform until they
are confident the borders are ``secure''. I look forward to visiting
the border this spring to see what has been accomplished and to listen
to the men and women who work to secure the border about what more
needs to be done.
But there appears to be no consensus on what constitutes a secure
border. As I understand it, the Border Patrol for years has used
metrics such as ``effective control'' or ``less monitored'' in defining
border security. Approximately 657 miles of fencing and vehicle
barriers have been constructed along the Southwest Border to date. And
as of June 30, 2010, the Border Patrol determined that 774 miles of
that border were under ``effective control''.
In testimony earlier this year, you stated ``the term `operational
control' is a very narrow term of art, and it does not reflect the
infrastructure and technology and all the other things that happen at
the border''. I would assume that 657 miles of fencing would certainly
contribute to control of the border.
Are you modifying the metrics used to define ``border control''? Do
you believe our borders are secure? Which agency or entity determines
where, how much, and what kind of tactical infrastructure is required
to obtain control of our borders? What is the required number of miles
of fencing to be constructed mandated by the Secure Fence Act, as
amended?
Answer. The ``Operational Control'' measure did not accurately
represent the Border Patrol's significant investments in personnel,
technology, and resources or the efforts of other DHS components who
are engaged in border security such as ICE and the Coast Guard. The
Border Patrol is currently taking steps to replace this outdated
measure with performance metrics that more accurately depict the state
of border security.
This administration has made unprecedented investments in border
security and on every metric that measures progress, we're heading in
the right direction. Apprehensions are down and seizures--across the
board--are up.
The types, amount and location of tactical infrastructure are
determined through a combination of the operational assessment made by
Border Patrol agents conducting daily operations in the field,
available funding, and an overall determination of current operational
priorities.
To date, DHS/CBP has constructed a total of 649 miles out of nearly
652 miles required by the Congress. The fence mileage language of the
Secure Fence Act, as amended, is currently the subject of pending
litigation (United States v. The State of Arizona; United States
District Court, District of Arizona; Case No. 10-cv-01413).
border patrol agents
Question. Your budget request supports funding to sustain the
21,370 Border Patrol agents which CBP intends to hire by the end of
this fiscal year. This number reflects the additional 1,000 agents the
Congress funded as part of the Fiscal Year 2010 Emergency Border
Security Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted last August. No new
agents, however, are requested in the President's budget.
Are 21,370 Border Patrol agents the right number of agents needed
to protect our borders? What happens when the 1,200 National Guardsmen
and women currently assisting our border agencies along the Southwest
Border leave as planned this summer?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request supports 21,370 Border
Patrol agents and 21,186 CBP officers--the largest deployment of law
enforcement officers to the front line in the agency's history. The
request annualizes positions supported by the fiscal year 2010
Southwest Border supplemental, including 1,000 new Border Patrol agents
and 250 new CBP officers. Additional funding is provided to support 300
more CBP officers and canine assets at ports of entry. The request also
supports the mobile response surge teams created with the supplemental
funding to respond rapidly to emergent situations without depleting
Border Patrol staffing from other locations. The 1,200 National Guard
deployed to the Southwest Border have been contributing additional
capabilities and capacity to assist law enforcement agencies including
providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
counternarcotics enforcement support as CBP hires and deploys the 1,000
BP agents included in the Southwest Border supplemental.
improving the entry process for visitors to the united states
Question. In your statement, you say the second Homeland Security
mission is to secure the Nation's borders ``to prevent illegal activity
while facilitating lawful travel and trade.'' We want to welcome
visitors to the United States, but I frequently hear from constituents
who travel internationally that the entry process coming into this
country is lengthy and daunting. It often takes hours for passengers to
be processed once arriving at an airport. There are long lines, not all
lanes are open and staffed, and the information provided to arriving
passengers is often confusing. I understand that your Department has
initiated a few programs to try and address some of these symptoms,
such as the Model Ports of Entry program and the Global Entry Program.
Your budget proposes funding to add more than 300 new CBP officers
to staff newly opened or expanded land border ports. What is being done
to make the entry process for visitors and U.S. citizens more welcoming
without degrading security? Please explain how these existing programs,
and others, have reduced wait times and made the process more welcoming
for travelers. How much money has been directed to these improved entry
programs for each of fiscal years 2008-2011, and how much is requested
for these and other programs for 2012?
The Department has implemented a number of the recommendations
proposed by the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee
(SBODAC)--such as the International Registered Traveler program and
those programs listed above. In an October, 28, 2008, letter to now
former Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Rice and Chertoff,
respectively, the SBODAC urged that additional actions recommended in
the Committee's January 2008 report also be implemented.
Has the Department implemented any additional recommendations of
that Committee since 2008? If so, please describe them. If not, please
explain why it has not?
One of the frequent complaints made by visitors to the United
States, especially in the air environment, concerns the way they are
treated by CBP officers upon arrival at the airport. The visitors are
often tired and there may be language barriers, but unfortunately what
makes the media reports is that the CBP officers are brusque and treat
the visitor as if he or she is guilty while performing the entry
inspection. Understanding that the CBP officers' primary duty is
security and ensuring that the individual before them is eligible for
entry into the country, the officer is also the first impression the
traveler has of America and Americans.
Please describe the training CBPOs are provided regarding
``welcoming'' visitors as they are being processed. Are aspects of
courtesy and customer service, in addition to security, stressed as
part of their training? Are they instructed to greet the visitor with a
statement such as ``Welcome to the United States'' as the traveler
approaches the inspection kiosk? If not, are there reasons why the
officer should not be provided such instruction?
Answer. [Follows:]
Programs To Welcome Travelers
CBP developed the Model Ports Initiative in partnership with
industry stakeholders, launching the pilot program in 2007 at
Washington/Dulles and Houston International Airports. The program
expanded to 18 additional model ports in 2008, including Atlanta,
Boston, Dallas/Fort Worth, Chicago, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale, Honolulu,
Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York (JFK), Orlando,
Philadelphia, Sanford (FL), San Juan, San Francisco, and Seattle
airports.
The Model Ports Initiative is the key component of efforts to
strengthen border security through advanced technologies and procedures
while providing a more welcoming experience, reduced wait times and
better customer service. CBP has increased staffing and professional
training at ports of entry, installed new bilingual signage, updated
the travel section of its public Web site and introduced a variety of
trusted traveler programs, such as Global Entry, to expedite entry into
the country.
The Passenger Service Manager (PSM) program continues to be an
important focus of the Model Ports Initiative to welcome travelers,
provide appropriate assistance, and explain CBP procedures in order to
minimize wait times.
All Model Ports signage have been completed and delivered. These
signs inform travelers of the CBP mission, pledge to treat people with
respect and provide clear directions to travelers to minimize delays.
The audio and video displays which run the updated ``Welcome to the
United States'' video, and a 1-minute Global Entry promotional video,
have been installed at all locations. These videos provide a welcome
experience to arriving travelers, inform them of CBP procedures to
reduce delays and burdens for legitimate travelers, and promote the
Global Entry program to reduce wait times. Global Entry, one of CBP's
trusted traveler programs designed to expedite clearance of
preapproved, low-risk, recurrently vetted air travelers entering the
United States, is available at all 20 model ports. This program
utilizes automated kiosks that scan members' fingerprints to bypass the
regular passport control queues (unless chosen for a selective or
random secondary referral).
In order to make meaningful and responsive changes to the arrivals
processes where practical, and apply resources where needed, CBP is
conducting a traveler satisfaction survey in the spring of 2011 to
benchmark passenger satisfaction at the 20 model ports of entry.
Working with the Department of State, CBP improved the diplomatic
arrival processes and has ensured that every model airport and terminal
has dedicated diplomatic processing lanes to welcome and expedite the
entry of foreign dignitaries and diplomats. This represents at least 36
dedicated passport primary lanes at the Nation's airports.
As part of the emergency border security appropriations in fiscal
year 2008 CBP received $40 million for the Model Ports of Entry
program, which included 235 additional CBP officers, and funding for
overtime, video equipment, and services at the model ports. CBP spent
$22,900,000 to hire the additional staff, $2.1 million for training,
$8.5 million for equipment and $6.5 million for overtime at the model
ports. Excluding the continuing resources used to maintain the
additional CBP officers, CBP spent approximately $692,000 for Model
Ports program in fiscal year 2009 and an additional $250,000 in fiscal
year 2010. For fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 there is an
annualization in the base for the position costs as well as $1.3
million for nonpersonnel costs for Model Ports.
For Global Entry, CBP spent approximately $800,000 in fiscal year
2009 and $1.7 million in fiscal year 2010, including for kiosks, IT,
and video. In addition, CBP spent $2.1 million for fiscal year 2008-
2009 for fingerprinting applicants for all Trusted Traveler programs.
The cost for fingerprinting for Trusted Traveler programs was $4.1
million in fiscal year 2010, and CBP anticipates it will cost
approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
Although CBP recovers a portion of the costs in the fees for this
program, it does not recover the full amount.
In November 2009, CBP issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
established an application fee for participants in the Global Entry
program. This fee was authorized to recover the full cost of processing
an application. The chart below shows the collections from Global Entry
applicants in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 and projected
revenues in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
--Fiscal year 2009 actual: $1,993,546.
--Fiscal year 2010 actual: $4,989,847.
--Fiscal year 2011 (estimate): $5,099,624.
--Fiscal year 2012 (estimate): $5,201,616.
Secure Border and Open Doors Advisory Committee
The Secure Border and Open Doors Advisory Committee (SBODAC) was an
ad hoc subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC),
an advisory body to the Secretary of Homeland Security that was
established under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(5 U.S.C. Appendix). The SBODAC prepared and provided reports to the
HSAC on important issues that affect our country's ability to attract
and treat visitors in a secure and welcoming manner, completing its
work on December 1, 2008. The HSAC recommended, and DHS is continuing
to implement, recommendations from the HSAC's final report, including:
Visa Policy and Processing
--The Departments of Homeland Security and State should fix a
longstanding obstacle to reliable business traveler entry from
Canada by increasing visa training for CBP officers and
establishing an optional pretravel approval process for
qualified Canadian business visa applicants.
Status.--The NEXUS program allows prescreened travelers expedited
processing by United States (CBP) and Canadian (Canada Border
Services Agency) officials at dedicated processing lanes at
designated Northern Border ports of entry, at NEXUS kiosks at
Canadian preclearance airports, and at marine reporting
locations. Individuals approved to participate in NEXUS receive
an identification card.
--The Departments of Homeland Security and State should continue to
improve the reliability, responsiveness, and integration of
processes to ensure that visa-related errors in the consular
and port-of-entry systems are corrected in a timely and
effective manner.
Status.--DHS has a strong relationship with the Department of
State and the two agencies continue to work together to improve
the systems that transmit and receive visa data. Errors in
transmission are quickly detected and resolved through
interagency technical working groups.
Ports of Entry
--Airports.--DHS should establish a pilot program for International
Registered Travelers as soon as possible and promptly expand
the program to the top 20 international airports.
Status.--CBP has established and currently operates such an
international trusted traveler pilot program: Global Entry.
Global Entry began operations on June 6, 2008 at 3 airports,
and has since been expanded by CBP to the top 20 U.S. airports.
Additionally, CBP has implemented arrangements with the
Governments of the Netherlands and Mexico to expand eligibility
for Global Entry to qualified citizens of those countries who
meet program requirements, as well provided access to Global
Entry benefits to Canadians who are members of the NEXUS
trusted traveler program.
CBP has enrolled more than 120,000 participants, as well as
390,000 persons able to use Global Entry as members of NEXUS
and 89,000 as members of Secure Electronic Network for
Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI).
DHS conducted a statistical analysis of wait times for Global
Entry pilot participants, which indicated that Global Entry
reduces a passenger's wait time by up to 70 percent--or an
estimated 7 minutes on average. Wait time is defined as the
time interval between the arrival of the aircraft (the block
time) and the processing of the passenger by a CBP officer at
the primary booth, less the walk time.
--Airports.--DHS and State should accelerate and expand the Model
Ports program and fully include TSA to eliminate redundant
rescreening of baggage and passengers.
Status.--CBP continues to expand the Model Ports program, which
provides a more welcoming arrival experience at the 20 top U.S.
airports for international arrival. Since the SBODAC report was
issued, the Model Ports program has launched and expanded
several initiatives. Improved signage communicates clear,
accessible instructions to incoming passengers as they enter
the CBP area. A new, improved airport wait-time monitoring
system gives the traveling public better information on
expected wait times upon arriving at the airport. CBP has
deployed additional officers at the Model Ports, as well as
provided enhanced professionalism training as part of the
officer academy and field refresher training curricula. CBP has
deployed Passenger Service Managers to greet travelers and
serve as a point of contact at the airport to deal with
passenger complaints and concerns. CBP has completed deployment
of audio and video equipment that displays a welcome video
donated by Walt Disney Parks and Resorts called ``Welcome:
Portraits of America'' and a CBP instructional video called
``Welcome to the United States: Simple as 1, 2, 3.'' CBP
continues to collaborate with its partners in the private
sector, municipalities, and the Federal Government to improve
the entire arrivals process, including making the queuing area
more welcoming, improving wait-times and baggage delivery and
being available to address travelers' questions and concerns.
--Airports.--DHS should continue to improve security performance
while reducing the average amount of time CBP officers spend
with each traveler to less than pre-September 11 levels and
staff ports of entry sufficiently to complete primary
inspection of foreign passengers in less than 30 minutes by
December 2009.
Status.--CBP is committed to processing incoming travelers as
efficiently as possible consistent with meeting the Nation's
security needs. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2011, the
vast majority of air passengers admitted into the United States
experienced wait times of less than 30 minutes at the CBP
inspection area.
--Land Borders.--CBP should increase the effectiveness of NEXUS,
SENTRI, and FAST trusted traveler programs.
Status.--Our NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid
Inspection (SENTRI), and Fast and Secure Trade (FAST) trusted
traveler programs are very effective, and enrollment has been
growing. CBP has increased effectiveness by harmonizing
enrollment infrastructure, as well as expanding membership
benefits. All programs use the Global Enrollment System, as
well as harmonized requirements for enrollment data, vetting,
and disqualifying offenses. TSA now recognizes trusted traveler
identity documents at domestic airport checkpoints. NEXUS and
SENTRI members can automatically use Global Entry kiosks, where
available, when entering the United States by air.
--Land Borders.--The Departments should implement the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) and US-VISIT on the land
border without degrading the travel experience.
Status.--DHS implemented WHTI at the land ports of entry in June
2009. Compliance with document requirements is high, and many
individuals (almost 9 million so far) are obtaining documents
enhanced by radio frequency identification (RFID) technology
that increases the efficiency of the inspection process. This
technology allows law enforcement queries 60 percent faster
than relying on manual entry and 20 percent faster than
``swiping'' the document's machine readable zone. New license
plate readers have been installed, reducing erroneous reads and
saving 10 million manual corrections per year. WHTI also
supports lane flow optimization that can adapt to traffic
patterns and port needs, is installing new signage to help
travelers advance more smoothly, and is instituting ``ready
lanes'' used by travelers with RFID-enabled documents to
further facilitate border crossing.
Implementation of WHTI has made travel more secure by limiting
the number of documents that can be presented at the port of
entry and allowing CBP to conduct law enforcement queries on an
increased number of higher risk travelers.
--DHS should assess its traveler screening programs within 9 months
to share and harmonize best practices and technology among
agencies.
Status.--DHS continually reviews its traveler screening programs
to ensure that the business processes and underlying systems
support the mission needs and to pursue harmonization. In July
2006, DHS established the Screening Coordination Office (SCO)
in the Office of Policy to identify and promote best practices
and ensure a coordinated approach to investments in screening
programs.
Training
CBP officers receive extensive training on professionalism and
cultural diversity awareness, including appropriately greeting
travelers, to ensure they interact with the traveling public with
courtesy and respect. This begins as soon as new hires enter on duty
and continues throughout their career. Incumbent officers and
supervisory officers are reminded of these core values through Web-
based training, classroom training, and musters to ensure personnel
treat travelers with dignity and respect. Professionalism is also a
performance evaluation measure for the officer position. Officers are
instructed through training and musters to be courteous to the
traveler, emphasizing establishment of rapport as a key interview and
observation techniques tools for the detection of admissibility,
counter-terrorism, and/or smuggling issues.
overtime pay reform
Question. The budget includes a placeholder for a legislative
proposal to reform overtime pay for CBP. This is an authorization issue
which must first be addressed by the appropriate authorizing
committees.
Please provide a copy of the legislative proposal. Please provide
copies of any formal requests to the authorizing committees to take
action on this proposal. What is the long-term impact on agents of
implementing this proposal? Will implementation of this proposal have
cascading effects on future pay costs for agents or other CBP or DHS
personnel in the out-years and have any impacts been considering in
formulating this proposal? What cuts to the budget, if any, would you
propose be made if overtime pay reform is not enacted?
Answer. The administration continues to work to develop the
legislative proposal referenced in the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2012 regarding CBP's personnel system. The reforms being
proposed eliminate redundancies and other inefficiencies that resulted
from merging three different workforces from three different legacy
agencies and make it easier for CBP employees to take positions across
the agency, ensuring that CBP makes the most efficient use of taxpayer
dollars. DHS will provide the legislative proposal as soon as it is
finalized.
border patrol construction
Question. Are any funds requested in the budget for construction of
new Border Patrol facilities, including checkpoints?
Answer. Fiscal year 2012 budget does not include resources for the
construction of new facilities.
advanced training center
Question. How much is requested in the President's budget for
training activities and training operations at the Advanced Training
Center (ATC) in fiscal year 2012? Also, what is the staffing target for
the ATC?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 projected programmatic expenses for
the ATC total $47,663,341, which includes salaries and benefits and
other programmatic expenses. The fiscal year 2012 staffing target is
157 positions.
air and marine
Question. What specific types of aircraft and in what quantities
are proposed to be procured by this budget request? Will all of the
previously funded unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) be fully outfitted
with prior year funds and the funds requested in this budget? If not,
what additional funds are required to make these systems fully
operational?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 proposed budget provides funding for
two P-3 replacement wing sets in continuation of the P-3 Service Life
Extension Program, six AS-350 light enforcement helicopters, and to
induct two UH60 Black Hawk helicopters in the A to L model conversion
program. The two replacement wing sets funded in the fiscal year 2012
budget will complete the acquisition objective for 14 new sets for the
16 P-3 aircraft in the OAM fleet.
In addition, funds provided in the fiscal year 2010 Southwest
Border supplemental are being used to acquire two additional UASs. The
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $4 million to complete this
acquisition. The first of the two Predator B UASs purchased with the
supplemental funding should be delivered in October 2011.
ice--violence in mexico
Question. The tragic and senseless murder of ICE Special Agent
Zapata and the wounding of his partner Special Agent Avila on February
15, brought to light the fact that our agents are prohibited from
carrying service weapons for their own defense. More than 33,400
Mexican citizens have died during the Mexican Government's admirable
campaign against the drug trafficking organizations. It is our
Government's policy to assist the Mexicans in this effort. But as we
put United States personnel in Mexico to help that government, our
people can become targets.
Why are our special agents and other personnel not allowed to carry
weapons to protect themselves? Is this prohibition limited to ICE
personnel, all Homeland Security personnel, or does it apply to all
American Government law enforcement working with Mexican authorities in
that country? I want to ensure that the same rules apply to all U.S.
law enforcement. Do ICE special agents receive hazardous duty pay
during their assignment in Mexico, the way that other United States law
enforcement do when working in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan?
Are special agents permitted to turn down overseas assignments such as
these if they fear for their personal safety? What has been the special
agent force reaction to serving in Mexico since the Zapata killing?
Media reports claim that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) estimates that 90 percent of the guns seized by the
Mexican Government are eventually found to have been purchased in the
United States. Is this a valid statistic? Does this represent all guns
seized by the Mexican Government, or only the portion of seized guns
United States officials are given access to? Are guns used by the drug
cartels found to come from countries other than the United States? If
so, from which countries are these guns coming?
Answer. Sadly, the tragedy you mention involving two special agents
assigned to ICE's attache office in Mexico City is a stark reminder of
the dangers confronted and the sacrifices made every day by our
Nation's law enforcement officers. Special Agent Jaime J. Zapata lost
his life and Special Agent Victor Avila, Jr. was critically injured in
service of our country. While these remain ongoing investigations,
Mexican authorities have apprehended some of the individuals involved
in the murder of ICE Agent Jaime Zapata. We will continue to assist the
ongoing Mexican investigation with every resource at our disposal and
to ensure that all those responsible for these murders face justice. In
coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, we have
announced a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the
arrest and/or conviction of additional individuals responsible for the
murder of Special Agent Jaime Zapata and the attempted murder of
Special Agent Victor Avila. In addition, the FBI, in conjunction with
ICE, has established a 24-hour tip line based in the United States to
process the information.
It is our understanding that, in general, the Department of State
(DOS), through the Chief of Mission (Ambassador), determines whether
U.S. law enforcement officers may carry firearms overseas and under
what conditions, in accordance with 22 U.S.C. 3927 and host country
laws and agreements, and that the Chief of Mission's authority would
apply to all American law enforcement personnel.
While DOS is the authority on specific questions regarding their
policy for hazardous duty pay in war zones, ICE personnel do receive
the same hardship pay as other United States civilian personnel in
Mexico. However, ICE personnel only receive danger pay in certain
locations in Mexico (Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Monterrey). Location
based danger pay varies among the United States law enforcement
agencies with personnel in Mexico due to the statutory authority for
danger pay allowance, which is set forth in 5 U.S.C. 5928. Currently,
there are locations in Mexico, specifically Mexico City and Hermosillo,
where Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) personnel receive danger pay and ICE personnel do
not. The following table shows the current rates established by DOS of
hardship pay and danger pay received by personnel assigned to Mexico:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post
(hardship) Danger pay
differential percent of
Location percent of basic
basic compensation
compensation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico........ 10 20
Mexico City, D.F., Mexico............... 15 ..............
Tijuana, Mexico......................... 5 15
Hermosillo, Mexico...................... 15 ..............
Monterrey, Mexico....................... 5 20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All ICE overseas positions are considered voluntary. ICE posts
announcements to advertise overseas positions and interested personnel
respond to the announcements and undergo the necessary application
procedures. Applicants may withdraw from the selection process at any
time.
In response to Special Agent Zapata's murder, ICE has sent 29
special agents, 1 criminal research specialist, 2 victim/witness
counselors, and 2 technical enforcement officers on temporary duty
assignments to Mexico City and Monterrey to directly assist the FBI and
the Government of Mexico in the investigation. ICE personnel in Mexico
also implemented rigorous security measures designed to protect ICE
employees and their families. Additionally, ICE met with other Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States to
coordinate a domestic investigative and law enforcement response
against the organization believed to be responsible for the attack, and
its criminal associates.
In regard to the ATF statistic, we respectfully defer to the ATF.
removal statistics
Question. Some have called the administration's claim of achieving
a ``record'' number of deportations for fiscal year 2010 inflated,
citing findings from the Center for Investigative Reporting. Those
findings allege that ICE included 19,000 immigrants who departed the
previous year, and 6,500 from a Mexican repatriation program that ran 5
weeks longer than it had previously. They also claim that nearly 65,000
of the deportations were voluntary and that the agency pushed the
voluntary-departure option in deportation figures just long enough to
make its annual goal for removals.
Are these allegations accurate? Please provide the statistics for
each of these categories for fiscal years 2008-2010. Also, please
provide the metrics used by the administration to measure increased
rates of removal for the same 3 fiscal years.
Answer. In fiscal year 2010, ICE set a record for overall removals
of illegal aliens, with more than 392,000 removals nationwide. One-half
of those removed--more than 195,000--were convicted criminals. The
fiscal year 2010 statistics represent increases of more than 23,000
removals overall and 81,000 criminal removals compared to fiscal year
2008--a more than 70 percent increase in removal of criminal aliens
from the previous administration.
When compared to fiscal year 2009, ICE returned 6,527 more aliens
through fiscal year 2010's Mexican Interior Repatriation Program
(MIRP). Since 2008, MIRP statistics have been included in ICE's overall
removal numbers. MIRP is a seasonal program designed to run during the
summer months; however, the actual dates of the program fluctuate each
year dependent upon completion of annual negotiations between DHS and
the Government of Mexico, and the identification of requisite funding.
Please see the charts below which address statistics for removal
categories in fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010 and metrics
used by the administration to measure increased rates of removal for
fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
2008 2009 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL ICE REMOVALS/RETURNS
Actual Fiscal Year Removals/Returns............................. $369,221 $387,790 $373,440
Case Closure Lag \1\............................................ ( \2\ ) 2,044 19,422
-----------------------------------------------
Total ICE Removals/Returns...................................... 369,221 389,834 392,862
===============================================
HISTORICAL STATISTICS FOR VOLUNTARY RETURNS AND THE MEXICAN INTERIOR REPATRIATION PROGRAM
(Voluntary returns and Mexican repatriation program removals/returns are a subset of the actual fiscal year
removals/returns included in the previous chart.)
Voluntary Returns............................................... 84,466 70,211 64,876
Mexican Interior Repatriation Program Removals/Returns.......... 18,464 10,560 23,384
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal years 2008-2010 data is historical and remains static. Fiscal year 2010 data is as of October 5, 2010.
\1\ Fiscal year data lag/case closure lag is defined as the physical removal of an alien that occurs in a given
fiscal year but the information is not recorded in EARM nor is the case closed in EARM during that fiscal
year. Because the data in EARM is locked at the end of each fiscal year, the removal is recorded for the month
the case was closed but reported in the following fiscal year removals.
\2\ Not available.
secure communities
Question. There is confusion as to whether ICE considers local
participation in Secure Communities mandatory. What is your policy? If
it is not mandatory, on what basis do you assert that all communities
will be enrolled by 2013?
Answer. There has been confusion as to what is meant by ``opting
out'' in the context of Secure Communities and whether ``opting out''
is possible. Once a State signs an agreement with ICE to implement
Secure Communities, it is mandatory that all fingerprints collected by
law enforcement agencies in that State and submitted to the FBI be
shared with ICE. Once Secure Communities is activated in a
jurisdiction, the fingerprints that jurisdiction submits to the
Department of Justice's biometric system to check for criminal history
records are automatically sent to DHS's biometric system to check
against its immigration and law enforcement records. The U.S.
Government has determined that a jurisdiction cannot choose to have the
fingerprints it submits to the Federal Government processed only for
criminal history checks. Nor can a jurisdiction demand that the
identifications that result from DHS's processing of the fingerprints
be withheld from local ICE field offices in that jurisdiction. The ICE
local field office, and not the State or local law enforcement agency,
determines what immigration enforcement action, if any, is appropriate.
A jurisdiction may, however, choose not to receive the
identifications that result from processing the fingerprints through
DHS's biometric system. A jurisdiction's decision not to receive this
information does not affect whether the local ICE field office in that
jurisdiction will or will not take enforcement action based on those
identifications. In that sense, jurisdictions may ``opt out'' of
receiving the results of Secure Communities biometrics checks.
detention reform
Question. The Department has made impressive gains in detaining and
removing criminal aliens who pose a danger to people lawfully present
in the United States. I understand your budget request provides
sufficient funds to maintain the mandated level of 33,400 detention
beds. And the request also includes an increase of $6.5 million for the
alternatives to detention program to expand the number of individuals
who need to be monitored but not necessarily held in custody prior to
resolution of their immigration status. But while the administration
has claimed it is pursuing detention reform, your budget for this
activity is essentially flat.
How can you achieve improvements in meeting your third mission
goal--enforcing and administering our immigration laws--if your budget
request remains flat for a third year in a row? How does the
administration define ``detention reform'' and what specific programs,
changes, and other activities does the administration are directed to
implement detention reform? What specific increases in the ICE budget
does the administration count as meeting the planned detention reforms?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes the resources
necessary to meet ICE detention and removal goals, including detention
reform. In order to make the most efficient use of taxpayer resources,
ICE is seeking efficiencies in detention and removal through targeted
efforts that allow ICE to use its resources as efficiently and
effectively as possible. These efficiencies include the suspension of
detention operations at costly facilities, converting contractors to
Federal staff where this will improve service and cut costs, and
reducing the average length of stay to allow more detainees to be
removed using the same number of beds.
Detention reforms facilitate the detention of individual aliens in
settings commensurate with factors such as threat to the community,
criminal history, risk of flight, immigration status, stage in the
removal process, and medical and mental health. ICE has made
substantial progress in a number of critical areas, including access to
family and legal visitation, consolidation of facilities, aligning bed
space with apprehensions, reducing transfers, improving medical
delivery, reducing costs, and developing safe and secure civil
detention principles. The following reflect accomplishments and
continuing work on detention reform:
--Established an Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) to
plan and design a detention system better tailored to ICE's
needs and reforms.
--Consolidated the number of facilities at which ICE detains
individuals from 341 to 270 based on state-of-the-art
forecasting tools.
--Developed a procurement plan to ensure that future bed space is
aligned with apprehensions, thus limiting the need for
transfers and ensuring detainees remain closer to their
families and attorneys.
--Launched the online detainee locator system, a public, easy to use
Internet-based tool designed to assist family members,
attorneys and other interested parties in locating detained
aliens in ICE custody.
--Hired and trained 42 full-time equivalent (FTE) detention service
managers to monitor conditions at detention facilities, which
house 85 percent of the detained population.
--Improved medical services by simplifying the process for the
delivery and auditing of authorized healthcare treatments.
--Initiated the creation of a new civil detention facility in Karnes
County, Texas, through an intergovernmental service agreement,
incorporating new civil detention principles.
--Opened two new facilities in Orange County, California, to reduce
the number, costs, and deportation delays associated with
detainee transfers.
--Formed two advisory groups of local and national organizations that
are stakeholders in the immigration detention system to provide
feedback and input to the ICE Director.
--Established an ICE Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) within the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). ODO has regional
offices to ensure agents and personnel have more ready access
to facilities to conduct routine and random inspections more
frequently.
--Evaluated and initiated procurements for securing new detention bed
space where it is needed most.
--Designed and tested a new detainee intake risk assessment process
to provide transparency and uniformity in the detention and
classification processes to ensure the prioritization of
detention resources.
--Drafted a policy to reduce out-of-region transfers of detainees who
have community ties or attorneys of record.
--Drafted revised performance-based national detention standards, in
collaboration with members of the Assistant Secretary's
Detention Advisory Group, which detail guidelines for the
custody and care of ICE detainees.
ICE is committed to instituting detention reform in a fiscally
responsible manner that represents the most efficient use of taxpayer
resources.
worksite enforcement
Question. The administration claims that significant strides have
been taken in the past 2 years to increase worksite enforcement
efforts. These have focused almost exclusively on the so-called I-9
(employment form) document inspections. While it is important to target
and take punitive legal action against unscrupulous employers who
knowingly hire illegal aliens, this is largely a paper-based
enforcement process. In many cases, the employers claim innocence and
fire the undocumented workers. But as one employer commented to the
media during the recent investigations of a national fast food
company's hiring practices, ``The illegal workers just go down the
street and get a job at the next food place.'' In order to ensure that
enforcement serves as a deterrent, the administration must also take
action against the illegal workers as well as those who seek to
knowingly employ them.
Please describe the I-9 process. For the record, please describe
the difference between a criminal and administrative arrest in the
context of worksite enforcement. How many of each occurred in fiscal
years 2006-2010, and how many are estimated to occur in fiscal years
2011 and 2012? How many employers received jail time/sentences as a
result of these actions in each of these fiscal years? How many workers
were removed or otherwise left the country as a result of these actions
in each of these fiscal years (estimates, if necessary). How much in
fines was collected as a result of these actions in each of these
fiscal years? For fiscal year 2010, the Congress directed ICE to
achieve a level of worksite enforcement effort of $134 million. Is it
ICE's intention to meet this goal in fiscal year 2011 as well? Please
describe how the agents achieve this level of effort?
Answer. [Follows:]
Form I-9 Inspection Overview
Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
codified in 8 U.S.C. 1324a (b), requires employers to verify the
identity and employment eligibility of all individuals hired in the
United States after November 6, 1986. 8 C.F.R. 274a.2 designates the
Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 (Form I-9) as the means of
documenting this verification. Employers are required by law to
maintain for inspection original Forms I-9 for all current employees.
In the case of former employees, retention of Forms I-9 are required
for a period of at least 3 years from the date of hire or 1 year after
the employee is no longer employed, whichever is longer.
The administrative inspection process is initiated by the service
of a Notice of Inspection (NOI) upon an employer resulting in the
facilitation of Forms I-9 to ICE officials. ICE typically will allow
the employer 3 business days to present the Forms I-9. Often, ICE will
request the employer provide supporting documentation, which may
include a copy of the payroll, list of current employees, Articles of
Incorporation, and business licenses.
ICE agents or auditors then conduct an inspection of the Forms I-9
for compliance. When technical or procedural violations are found, an
employer is given 10 business days to make corrections. An employer may
receive a monetary fine for all substantive and uncorrected technical
violations.
Employers determined to have knowingly hired or continued to employ
unauthorized workers will be required to cease the unlawful activity,
may be fined, and may be prosecuted criminally. Additionally, an
employer found to have knowingly hired or continued to employ
unauthorized workers may be subject to debarment by ICE, meaning that
the employer will be prevented from participating in future Federal
contracts and from receiving other Government benefits. Monetary
penalties for knowingly hire and continuing to employ violations range
from $375 to $16,000 per violation, with repeat offenders receiving
penalties at the higher end. Penalties for substantive violations,
including the failure to produce a Form I-9, range from $110 to $1,100
per violation. In determining penalty amounts, ICE considers five
factors:
--the size of the business;
--good faith effort to comply;
--seriousness of violation;
--whether the violation involved unauthorized workers, and
--history of previous violations.
ICE will notify the audited party, in writing, of the results of
the inspection once completed.
In instances where a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF) is served,
charging documents will be provided specifying the violations committed
by the employer. The employer has the opportunity to either negotiate a
settlement with ICE or request a hearing before the Office of the Chief
Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) within 30 days of receipt of the
NIF. If the employer takes no action after receiving a NIF, ICE will
issue a Final Order. If a hearing is requested, OCAHO assigns the case
to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and sends all parties a copy of a
Notice of Hearing and Government's complaint, thus setting the
adjudicative process in motion.
The Notice of Hearing spells out the procedural requirements for
answering the complaint and the potential consequences of failure to
file a timely response. Many OCAHO cases never reach the evidentiary
hearing stage because the parties either reach a settlement, subject to
the approval of the ALJ, or the ALJ reaches a decision on the merits
through dispositive prehearing rulings. Employers determined to have
knowingly hire or continuing to employ violations shall be required to
cease the unlawful activity and may be fined.
Employer Arrests
ICE tracks criminal arrests of employers (inclusive of managers,
supervisors, and owners) for worksite enforcement related crimes:
--Fiscal year 2010 = 196 criminally arrested.
--Fiscal year 2009 = 114 criminally arrested.
--Fiscal year 2008 = 135 criminally arrested.
--Fiscal year 2007 = 92 criminally arrested.
--Fiscal year 2006 = 110 criminally arrested.
In fiscal year 2010, ICE's Office of Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) arrested 196 employers for worksite related
crimes. As of February 8, 2011:
--42 were sentenced to prison. Sentences ranged from time served to
42 months.
--Note.--125 cases are still pending a disposition.
DHS defers to the Department of Justice to answer jail time/
sentences prior to fiscal year 2010, as criminal sentencing falls under
the auspices of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and ICE did not track
sentencing of worksite enforcement violators prior to fiscal year 2010.
Removals
ICE does not track the specific number of illegal aliens removed as
a result of being identified during a worksite enforcement operations.
Due to the complexity of analyzing the data--hand tabulation and
manually crosschecking against several unique law enforcement
databases--identifying the removals that resulted from worksite
enforcement actions is not available to be included in this response.
Fines Collected
Civil fines resulting from Form I-9 inspections (the final judgment
is referred to as a Final Order).
--Fiscal year 2010 = 237 Final Orders $6,956,026.
--Fiscal year 2009 = 52 Final Orders $1,033,291.
--Fiscal year 2008 = 18 Final Orders $675,209.
--Fiscal year 2007 = 2 Final Orders $26,560.
--Fiscal year 2006 = 0.
Criminal investigations worked in coordination with the Department
of Justice, (worksite judicial fines, forfeitures, or restitutions).
--Fiscal year 2010 = $36,611,320.
--Fiscal year 2009 = $32,578,945.
--Fiscal year 2008 = $21,978,917.
--Fiscal year 2007 = $31,426,443.
--Fiscal year 2006 = $233,044.
Worksite Enforcement
Since January 2009, ICE has audited more than 4,600 employers
suspected of hiring illegal labor, debarred more than 315 companies and
individuals, and imposed approximately $59 million in financial
sanctions--more than the total amount of audits and debarments than
during the entire previous administration.
ICE expended $127,436,000 for worksite enforcement related
investigations in fiscal year 2010. ICE is projecting for fiscal year
2011 it will expend approximately $135.2 million. ICE has communicated
to the field that worksite enforcement is a high investigative priority
for fiscal year 2011.
tsa screener cap
Question. The House passed a continuing resolution for fiscal year
2011 includes a provision that would limit the number of TSA screeners
at 46,000 FTE screeners. The budget request for fiscal year 2012
includes 48,537 FTE screeners, not including managers. How would this
cap limit TSA's ability to provide security at airports? Explain how
advances in technology have allowed screener resources to be used more
efficiently. Please quantify how screeners have been reassigned to
other security duties as a result of these efficiency gains.
Answer. The continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 contains a
provision limiting the number of FTEs and does not include part-time
personnel. Since TSA employs a substantial number of part-time
personnel, its fiscal year 2012 budget request for additional
transportation security officers (TSOs) to staff advanced imaging
technology (AIT) machines will not be affected. Future growth of full-
time personnel may be limited because of the cap, thus restricting
TSA's options to reduce attrition and improve the workforce.
Advances in technology most often result in improved effectiveness
of the TSOs more so than improved efficiency. One area that TSA has
seen improvements in effectiveness and efficiency is the installation
of inline baggage screening systems. Inline explosive detection systems
are the main technology used in the checked baggage screening process.
This equipment automates what was previously a manually intensive
baggage inspection, allowing faster bag throughput (up to 300 percent)
and improved threat detection capabilities. These savings have been
used to fund other security initiatives and have been considered in the
budget request.
The below reflects examples of other security initiatives that
efficiency savings have been applied as of fiscal year 2010:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
Total Self- of FTE
budgeted funded self-
FTE FTE funded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel Document Checker................ 2,001 1,086 54
Target Random Security Plays........... 1,654 904 55
Behavior Detection Officers............ 2,986 2,326 78
Bomb Appraisal Officers................ 352 297 84
--------------------------------
Total............................ 6,993 4,613 66
------------------------------------------------------------------------
automated target recognition
Question. TSA has a delicate balance to maintain when it comes to
security and maintaining the privacy of passengers. According to TSA,
AIT units being deployed to airports across the country are the most
effective passenger screening technology currently available because
they can detect metallic and nonmetallic threats. However, the images
these machines produce of the human body are revealing. TSA is testing
a software upgrade to the AIT machines, called Automated Target
Recognition (ATR), that would do away with the more revealing image and
replace it with a generic outline of a person. How is this testing
progressing and when do you expect this software to be deployed to
airports? TSA's budget request includes funding for 275 additional AIT
units in fiscal year 2012 for a total of 1,275. What percentage of
passengers will be screened by AIT if the request is funded?
Answer. ATR is currently being tested at Las Vegas McCarran
International Airport (LAS), Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA), and
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL). This testing
allows TSA to ensure the new software continues to provide a high level
of security, while further enhancing privacy protections. By the end of
fiscal year 2012, TSA estimates that 1,275 AITs will be deployed.
baggage fees
Question. In recent years, airlines began to charge fees for
services that did not previously exist, such as charges for checked
baggage. As a result of the new checked baggage fees, more passengers
are opting to carry their bags onboard the aircraft causing a strain on
security operations at airport checkpoints.
When you testified before the subcommittee, you mentioned that the
cost of additional staffing and equipment required to handle the
increase in carry-on bags is approximately $260 million annually. I
asked if you thought the airlines should help defray the additional
security costs associated with their baggage fees. You responded by
saying passenger security fees needed to be adjusted upward. What is
your position on whether the airlines should help defray the additional
security costs associated with their baggage fees? Without adding more
staff and equipment to handle the increase in carry-on bags, will wait
times increase because of the baggage fees?
Answer. TSA agrees that increased aviation security costs should
not be paid solely by air travelers. When TSA was created, the Congress
authorized the establishment of two separate security fees to fund the
Federal aviation security costs. One fee was to be paid by air
passengers and the other paid by air carriers.
The September 11th Security Fee (Passenger Fee), to be paid by air
passengers, was authorized by the Congress to not exceed $2.50 per
enplanement. The revenue generated from this security fee was intended
to offset the Federal cost for passenger and property screening. To the
extent that revenue derived from the Passenger Fee was not sufficient
to cover the Federal cost of passenger and property screening, the
Congress authorized the collection of a second security fee to be paid
by air carriers.
The Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee (Carrier Fee) was
authorized in an amount not to exceed the costs air carriers incurred
for passenger and property screening in calendar year 2000. That exact
cost total, which TSA originally estimated at $750 million, has been
the subject of much debate and multiple legal proceedings. After an
April 2005 GAO review of the costs in question, TSA established the
overall cap of the Carrier Fee at $448 million. The Congress then made
this TSA determination subject to judicial review. TSA is still working
through the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to achieve a final resolution of the overall Air Carrier Fee
industry cap that currently stands at $420 million.
With respect to adjusting the Air Carrier Fee, it is clear that the
aviation security enhancements implemented by the TSA since 2001 have
made commercial air travel safer for passengers, air carriers and the
United States in general. Further, TSA has seen a notable change in
carryon baggage volume--increasing checkpoint requirements and
processing times--since baggage fees were introduced by air carriers.
Under TSA's current staffing model, wait times will likely increase and
remain above historical levels that were achieved prior to airline
baggage fees. This air carrier action could result in growing passenger
wait times and larger concentrations of passengers waiting at
checkpoint. To sustain passenger throughput, TSA would need to divert
resources from other important security layers or add new personnel to
open lanes faster and keep them open longer. TSA has taken some steps
to assist in managing wait times. TSA estimates it would cost
approximately $260 million in additional resources to support passenger
throughput rates and not detract from other security programs.
dhs fee proposals
Question. The President's budget proposes that the Appropriations
Committee increase aviation security fees on airline passengers by $590
million and border inspection fees by $110 million. Both of these are
legislative matters under the jurisdiction of other committees.
Your entire $459 million proposed increase for TSA and $55 million
of your CBP budget are predicated on our approving these requests.
If the House fails to include these fee increases in their bill,
our entire bill would be out of order on the Senate floor if we
approved them. The border inspection fee could result in our bill being
blue-slipped in the House.
This is a high-risk strategy to support needed security
improvements, such as additional AIT machines at our airports and
improved passenger and cargo inspections on our borders.
What specific steps are you taking to get the House and Senate
authorizing committees to request that the House and Senate
appropriations subcommittees to approve these legislative proposals?
If the authorizing committees object to our approving these changes
in law, will you modify your budget requests to either provide more
funding or identify proposed cuts?
Please submit for the record the letters written to the committees
of jurisdiction requesting the legislative changes for these requests.
Answer. The President's budget request includes closely related
fiscal and policy matters for the Congress's consideration, and the
Department looks forward to working with the Congress to provide
funding to meet these important security needs.
I fully appreciate the constraints of the current fiscal
environment, and it is precisely because of the current economic
situation that nothing should be left off the table to fund the
Department's critical frontline operations. While airlines have
increased fees across the board--from checked baggage and extra leg
room to refreshments, we have never adjusted how we fund security
measures to protect the traveling public.
Despite the Congress's original intent that the Security Fee covers
nearly all costs related to passenger and property screening, the fee
currently offsets less than one-third of the total cost of aviation
security. At the same time, costs of security have continued to
increase. In 2000, it cost less than $1 to screen each passenger. In
fiscal year 2010, the average cost for TSA to screen a passenger and
baggage has increased to nearly $9, in part to airline imposed checked
baggage fees that have resulted in TSA screening 56 million additional
carry-on bags at airport checkpoints annually.
As such, I have personally discussed with members of congressional
authorizing committees the request to permit DHS to increase the
Security Fee, and the Department will continue this outreach. The
Department will also continue to engage members of the authorizing
committees on all legislative provisions necessary to support the
budget request to ensure passage of stand alone legislation or to help
secure support for provisions which may be carried in appropriations
measures, whichever occurs first.
With regard to the proposed CBP fee change, the country exemptions
currently in place for Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean cost the
Government $110 million annually in user fees that would otherwise be
collected for customs inspections at the border. While travelers from
other countries are subject to this fee, the costs of processing the
travelers coming from Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean are subsidized
by United States taxpayers. CBP's budget assumes elimination of these
exemptions by the third quarter of fiscal year 2012, equating to $55
million in fiscal year 2012 (half-year cost).
aviation security capital fund
Question. The request includes a legislative proposal to alter the
manner in which offsetting collections from the Aviation Security
Capital Fund are allocated. Has the Department made a request to the
subcommittee with jurisdiction over this matter? If so, please submit
the request for the record. The language states that the funds ``may be
distributed in any manner deemed necessary to ensure aviation
security.'' Would any of these funds be used for purposes other than
checked baggage security? Please be more specific on how the funds
would be distributed to support aviation security in fiscal year 2012.
What is the impact of not receiving this language adjustment in fiscal
year 2012?
Answer. The Department's request for this legislative proposal to
provide the Department with the required flexibility to sustain current
security measures and adapt to emerging threats was transmitted to each
committee with oversight of DHS along with the fiscal year 2012
President's budget request. Due to the importance of this proposal, I
have had discussions with members of the authorizing committees and
representatives of the Department's Office of the Chief Financial
Officer have briefed committee staff on the request to permit the
Department to increase the Security Fee. We will continue to engage
members of the authorizing committees on all legislative provisions
necessary to support the budget request as long as necessary to ensure
passage of stand alone legislation or to help secure support for
provisions which may be carried in appropriations measures, whichever
occurs first.
The current law requires that the first $250 million derived from
passenger and air carrier security fees in each of the fiscal years
2004 through 2028 be deposited in an Aviation Security Capital Fund
(ASCF) to be available for grants to airport sponsors for airport
security improvement projects such as facility modifications. The
language currently does not allow for the procurement and installation
of EDS equipment for the security improvement projects. The legislative
proposal included in the fiscal year 2012 budget request would permit
approximately $125 million of the ASCF to support the recapitalization
and deployment of state-of-the-art EDS for checked baggage to
efficiently screen baggage for explosives, reducing the number of
rescans and physical bag searches. The remaining $125 million would be
used for airport facility modification projects. The current notional
plan is summarized in the following table:
BREAKDOWN OF PLANNED ACSF OBLIGATIONS \1\
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projects/equipment Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium Speed EDS Purchase.................................... 94
Medium Speed EDS Installation................................ 31
Facility Modifications....................................... 125
----------
Total.................................................. 250
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers based on notional plans as of February 9, 2011, and are
subject to change.
By 2013, nearly one-half of the 2,000 EDS units deployed nationwide
will have exceeded their planned 10-year service life. Limiting TSA's
ability to purchase and install equipment as needed could increase the
risk of equipment failure and lead to increased delays at airports due
to the need to rescan baggage and conduct physical bag searches.
explosives detection systems
Question. The request states that of the 2,000 explosives detection
system units currently deployed nationwide, almost one-half will have
reached the end of their useful life of 10 years by 2013. How much of
the $273 million discretionary request for explosives detection systems
would be used for this purpose in fiscal year 2012. How many machines
would be replaced? If the legislative proposal to adjust the manner in
which offsetting collections from the Aviation Security Capital Fund
are allocated is approved, how much of the $250 million would be used
for this purpose in fiscal year 2012. How many machines would be
replaced?
Answer. Of the $273 million in discretionary funding requested in
fiscal year 2012, TSA would use $14 million to replace 26 reduced size
explosives detection system (EDS) units that have reached the end of
their useful life. With approval of the Aviation Security Capital Fund
(ASCF) legislative proposal, TSA would use $125 million of the $250
million fund to replace the 63 medium-speed EDS units that have reached
the end of their useful life.
The remaining $259 million of the EDS discretionary funds would be
used for the following manner:
--$130 million for the purchase and installation equipment for
facility modifications that have already been executed or plan
to be executed in fiscal year 2012.
--$129 million for technology and engineering initiatives and program
operations and management (PO&M) support, which includes $40
million for testing and engineering support; $24 million for
program support to include warehouse leasing and TSIF
operations; $18 million to support cargo and surface; and $19
million for Federal personnel compensation and benefits.
If the legislative proposal is not adopted TSA's recapitalization
of equipment would be delayed.
Question. The budget request indicates that 55 of the top 85
airports had optimal checked baggage screening systems throughout the
entire airport and another 22 have optimal screening systems in some
part of the airport. With the $523 million in discretionary and
mandatory funds requested in 2012, how will these figures change? When
does TSA estimate having optimal systems at all 85 airports? What are
the main drivers preventing completion of systems at the remaining
airports?
Answer. Given that more than two-thirds of the explosives detection
systems (EDS) in the field will reach the end of their useful life in
the next 5 years, TSA has shifted its priorities from completing
optimal systems to the recapitalization of the aging EDS fleet. The
$523 million in fiscal year 2012 funding and prior year carryover funds
will primarily be used to accommodate airport growth, recapitalization
and/or optimization of existing equipment at multiple airports. Optimal
systems are expected to be completed at two additional category X and I
airports with fiscal year 2012 and prior year funds.
behavior detection officers
Question. The request includes funding for an additional 350
Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs). GAO released a critical report on
this program in 2010. Please explain the steps TSA has taken to address
the concerns raised by GAO.
Answer. TSA's BDOs are an important layer of aviation security.
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) builds on and is
based on other established, successful behavioral analysis programs
that have been employed by law enforcement and security personnel both
in the United States and around the world. DHS's S&T Directorate led a
comprehensive study to validate the validity of TSA's SPOT Referral
Report. Data collection was completed by TSA in late 2010 and provided
to the American Institutes for Research for analysis and reporting. The
validation study report is undergoing final review and S&T testified
before the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight on this topic on April 6. Preliminary
briefings on the validation study data indicated that SPOT identifies
high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate than random
selection.
Additionally, TSA's risk analysis of SPOT indicates that the
program can be effective in multiple threat scenarios and expanding the
SPOT program increases TSA's ability to adapt to evolving threats. S&T
completed a preliminary study on suicide bomber indicators in July 2009
that illustrates overlap between some operationally reported suicide
bomber indicators and certain TSA SPOT behaviors. As such, SPOT
represents the best practices from defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement organizations.
TSA also began piloting SPOT refresher training for BDOs in March
2011 and plans to deploy this training to all BDOs during fiscal year
2011 and fiscal year 2012.
screening procedures
Question. The Administrator has said publicly that he intends to
introduce new screening measures this year that would be different than
the ``one-size-fits-all'' approach. Does the fiscal year 2012 budget
request account for these changes? Please explain in more detail how
this new screening process will work and the schedule to implement it.
Answer. TSA will introduce new risk-based screening procedures and
enhance current technology for passenger screening as it continually
evolves its layered approach to transportation security. TSA is
exploring the possibility of piloting these concepts later this year.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request will not require adjustment to
incorporate additional risk-based screening principles.
checkpoint security
Question. TSA is in the process of updated its checkpoint security
strategic plan. What is the timeline for its completion?
Answer. TSA anticipates completing the updated Passenger Screening
Program Strategic Plan by summer 2011.
civil rights and civil liberties
Question. What is the funding level and associated staffing for
TSA's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties? Describe TSA's
coordination with the Department's Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties? How many civil rights and civil liberties investigations did
TSA conduct in 2010? How many of those investigations were conducted
jointly with the Department Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties? What training standards must a TSO meet with regard to civil
rights and civil liberties?
Answer. The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $8.7 million total
funding for TSA's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRL)
which demonstrates our commitment to ensuring the traveling public's
civil rights and civil liberties are protected throughout the screening
process. The TSA OCRL coordinates closely with DHS CRCL to address
concerns and complaints of the traveling public through meetings with
community groups, employee training, policy reviews, and investigations
into traveler complaints. In fiscal year 2010, TSA conducted 217
internal investigations and 42 external investigations. There were no
investigations conducted jointly in fiscal year 2010 by the Department
and TSA. To date in fiscal year 2011, there are four joint
investigations open. TSOs must complete training annually focusing on
cultural awareness, civil rights and civil liberties. Additionally, No
FEAR Act Training must be completed within 90 days of entering service.
This training is required pursuant to the Notification and Federal
Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 and provides an
overview of Federal antidiscrimination and whistleblower protection
laws. This training regimen is repeated every 2 years.
tsa internal affairs
Question. How many people are in TSA's Internal Affairs Office? Is
TSA adding new positions in fiscal year 2011? Are any new positions
requested in the President's budget for fiscal year 2012? Is TSA
creating an Office of Professional Responsibility? What role will this
office serve? How is TSA funding this effort and how many people will
staff the office?
Answer. TSA currently has 130 personnel that conduct internal
investigations in the Office of Inspection (OOI). Under the proposed
fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, no new positions will be funded
and there are no new positions requested for the OOI in the fiscal year
2012 President's budget.
TSA established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in
the fall of 2010 to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty
determinations and a more expeditious and standardized adjudication
process. Through a combination of adjudication and oversight, OPR
ensures that discipline is appropriate and fair for all TSA employees,
regardless of the assignment or seniority of the employee involved.
In addition, to promote consistency, TSA is transferring to OPR
from the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) the responsibility for
resolving TSO's appeals of adverse actions, including suspensions of 15
days or greater, removal, or reduction in pay band or basic rate of
pay. This will preserve the rights of TSOs to appeal actions taken by
management while enabling OPR to ensure that discipline is consistent
across the board, from senior-level officials to TSOs.
TSA is funding OPR from within existing sources. OPR has 15
positions that are being filled through a combination of vacancy
announcements and internal detail opportunities. OPR is also absorbing
four positions from the Disciplinary Review Board, for a total of 19
OPR positions.
surface transportation
Question. How much of TSA's surface transportation appropriation is
dedicated to each surface transportation mode for fiscal year 2011
compared to the fiscal year 2012 estimate?
Answer. Under the funding that is currently available, the TSA
surface transportation appropriation is dedicated to each surface mode
in the following ways:
--28 percent to surface inspectors and program oversight;
--25 percent to visible intermodal prevention and response teams;
--13 percent to freight rail and pipeline;
--12 percent to ports (maritime) and intermodal security;
--11 percent to highway and motor carrier;
--8 percent to mass transit; and
--3 percent to other services.
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request includes $134.7
million to support TSA's surface transportation efforts and also
includes $300 million for the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to
support State and local surface transportation efforts. TSA will
allocate the funding to each surface transportation mode based on
current security efforts to reduce risk once the funds have been
appropriated.
Question. How much of TSA's budget in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal
year 2011 was dedicated to mass transit enhanced screening? Where the
pilots successful? Does TSA have plans to continue the pilots? Does the
fiscal year 2012 budget include funding for this purpose?
Answer. In fiscal year 2010, the Congress provided TSA $25 million
for partial year funding to stand-up an additional 15 visible
intermodal prevention and response (VIPR) teams for dedicated surface
transportation operations. This was in addition to TSA's 10 multimodal
VIPR teams already operational. During fiscal year 2010, approximately
51 percent of TSA's VIPR resources were spent conducting operations in
the surface modes of transportation, which equates to approximately $22
million. The primary objective of VIPR operations is to prevent acts of
terrorism through the exercise of random, unpredictable security asset
deployments in all modes of transportation and this may include mass
transit enhanced screening.
In fiscal year 2010, TSA entered into an agreement with New York
City to conduct pilot or proof of concept operations with New York City
law enforcement for mass transit screening. This effort involved
approximately 35 TSA TSOs teamed with New York City law enforcement
officers operating in shifts with approximately 3 TSOs. This proof of
concept was successful in terms of demonstrating the ability to work
together in teams and build expertise in the environment to allow for
improved security in response to specific threats requiring surge
operations or in response operations. TSA has no plans to continue or
expand this proof of concept.
Such efforts will continue to be supported by other TSA surface
transportation initiatives, including the additional VIPR teams and
funding available through the TSGP, which supports local efforts to
conduct enhanced screening. Such physical screening can be conducted as
necessary by applicable State, local, or private personnel with
equipment available through the TSGP (e.g., explosives trace detection
equipment).
The fiscal year 2012 budget request seeks funding for 12 new multi-
modal VIPR teams. With these additional teams, the VIPR program
anticipates an increase in tempo for a total number of 11,500
operations to be conducted annually beginning with fiscal year 2013.
These operations would be conducted throughout the transportation
sector to deter potential terrorist acts.
federal air marshals
Question. Please provide the most recent definitions of high-risk
flight categories for flights covered by Federal Air Marshals (FAMs).
Are these definitions being revised, and if so, how will the changes
impact the deployment of FAMs.
On March 8, 2011, the Department submitted a report on Federal Air
Marshals (FAMS) long-term staffing levels in response to a fiscal year
2010 congressional requirement in the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act. The report
failed to address the congressional requirements for a long-term
staffing plan and pointed to an assessment TSA will undertake to review
FAMS risk-level definitions in order to inform an assessment of the
long-term staffing needs of the FAMS. When will this assessment be
completed? The results of this assessment and associated staffing
impacts are to be supplied to the subcommittee expeditiously.
Answer. The TSA has commenced a review of FAMS risk-level
definitions, which will be provided to the subcommittee upon its
completion. The review will inform any decisions pertaining to the
long-term staffing levels needed in the future.
coast guard--administrative savings
Question. The fiscal year 2012 request for the Coast Guard's
operating budget includes a reduction of $83.5 million as part of the
Department's Administrative Savings Initiative. When you read the fine
print, the Coast Guard's budget states that these cuts ``do not come
without impact to readiness and operations.'' The Coast Guard is
already facing readiness challenges and operational shortfalls. How are
these cuts prudent? Can you provide more specifics on how these cuts
will impact readiness and operations?
Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2012 budget leverages savings
generated through management efficiencies and offsets to prioritize
frontline operations and investments in vital recapitalization
projects. The Coast Guard will not reduce front-line operations to
achieve these savings. The fiscal year 2012 budget request addresses
the long-term recapitalization needs of the Coast Guard and expands its
operational capacity by funding 50,682 military and civilian positions,
including additional personnel focused on strengthening Marine Safety
inspections and investigations as well as a new Incident Management
Assistance Team, which will be deployed rapidly to support large-scale
emergencies.
impact of 2010 coast guard surge operations
Question. In 2010, the Coast Guard's operational budget was
stretched with two significant surge operations, the Haiti earthquake
and Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Given the size of these surge
operations, what was the impact on spending for other priorities? What
was deferred or eliminated to pay for these response efforts?
Answer. The Coast Guard allocates its multi-mission assets to the
Nation's highest order needs. In the cases of the operational responses
to the Haiti earthquake and Deepwater Horizon oil spill, assets were
diverted from other lower priority mission assignments at the time to
provide the initial search and rescue response and long-term mission
support for the disasters.
The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-212)
provided $50 million in operating expenses for the Coast Guard related
to expenses for disaster response activities for the Haiti earthquake.
The funding provided relief to the Coast Guard for operating and
personnel costs expended for the response.
For the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard's direct
costs, including supplies purchased for the spill, contractors hired,
travel orders, and reservist pay and benefits were reimbursed from the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) Emergency Fund and the Fund
recovered those costs from the Responsible Party. Consistent with the
Coast Guard's multi-mission responsibilities, costs to operate assets
diverted from regular operations to the oil spill response were funded
by regular appropriations. Due to the unusually long engagement period
for response, regular maintenance for some assets was deferred, which
could result in higher maintenance costs.
coast guard asset decommissionings
Question. Provide a chart of all assets proposed to be
decommissioned in the fiscal year 2012 budget, including the name and
location of each asset and timeline for decommissioning.
Answer. The chart below depicts Coast Guard assets proposed for
decommissioning in fiscal year 2012 President's budget.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asset type Vessel name Homeport Decommissioning date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
179-ft patrol coastal (WPC) \1\...... USCGC Shamal........... Pascagoula, Mississippi WPCs will be returned
USCGC Tornado to the United States
USCGC Zephyr Navy no later than
October 1, 2011.
378-ft high endurance cutter (WHEC) To be determined....... To be determined....... To be determined.
\2\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Three vessels are being decommissioned per a signed memorandum of agreement with the Navy in January 2007.
\2\ The Coast Guard is conducting and updated engineering assessment on the 10 remaining WHECs (2 decommissioned
in fiscal year 2011) to determine which WHEC will be decommissioned in fiscal year 2012. Factors being
considered include operational capabilities and effectiveness of the current fleet and existing structural and
engineering conditions of the ships.
polar icebreakers
Question. The budget request includes $39 million for operations
and maintenance of the Coast Guard's polar icebreaking fleet. The
Commandant of the Coast Guard has expressed concern that he doesn't
have the resources to respond to a major emergency in the Arctic. He
has publicly stated that funding is needed to repair or replace its two
heavy icebreakers that are currently out of service. But the Coast
Guard's budget indicates that one of the Coast Guard's two heavy polar
icebreakers, the Polar Sea, will be decommissioned in fiscal year 2011.
The other heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star, is not scheduled to
be reactivated until 2013. Why is the Department planning to
decommission the Polar Sea when long-term requirements for the polar
regions have not been determined? If an emergency occurs in the Arctic,
is the Coast Guard prepared to respond? What other response
capabilities exist? Has the Coast Guard considered leasing polar
icebreakers to meet mission requirements?
Answer. Based on current Federal requirements, maintaining and
operating one icebreaker (U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Healy) will
allow the Coast Guard to meet current operational requirements in the
Arctic. Based on the rising costs to maintain the polar icebreakers,
which have exceeded their life expectancy, the current condition of
USCGC Polar Sea and her limited remaining service life, leveraging
resources to reactivate USCGC Polar Star as a backup is the proper
course of action until long-term requirements decisions are made and
capabilities are acquired. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $5
million for an analysis of Government-wide icebreaking requirements in
the polar regions.
deployable security teams
Question. Section 804 of the Fiscal Year 2010 Coast Guard
Authorization Act requires no less than two enhanced deployable
security teams. The Coast Guard currently has one maritime security
response team located in Portsmouth, Virginia. What are the Coast
Guard's plans to comply with section 804? Has a second location been
determined?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not determined a location for a second
enhanced team.
canine teams
Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to comply with section 805
of the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act regarding canine teams? How
many certified canine teams does the Coast Guard currently have and
where are they located? Does the Coast Guard have plans to increase
capacity in fiscal year 2012? If so, what locations will receive
additional canine teams?
Answer. There are currently 12 canine teams certified for duty in
the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has programmed for 14 canine teams
that are located in pairs at seven locations:
--MSST Seattle, Washington.
--MSST San Francisco, California.
--MSST Los Angeles, California.
--MSST Galveston, Texas.
--MSST King's Bay, Georgia.
--MSRT Chesapeake, Virginia.
--MSST New York, New York.
Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) San Francisco and King's
Bay currently have one of their two teams certified. Expected
completion of training and certification for the remaining two teams is
early calendar year 2012. The Coast Guard does not have plans to
increase canine capacity beyond these levels in fiscal year 2012.
marine environmental protection
Question. Please provide more details on the Coast Guard's
investment in the National Center of Expertise. How much of the $11.5
million increase for Marine Environmental Protection is dedicated for
this purpose? How is the funding for the National Center of Expertise
allocated in the request, to what organization, and where?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding to
establish the National Incident Management Assist Team (IMAT). Although
the National IMAT could be a core component of a future MER National
Center of Expertise (NCOE), as a stand-alone unit, the National IMAT
will also significantly enhance the Coast Guard's ability to respond to
complex, large-scale events in the maritime domain. Specifically, the
IMAT investment provides dedicated, trained, and experienced personnel
to directly respond to oil and hazardous substance spill incidents, and
to support the Coast Guard Federal On Scene Coordinators during such
incidents. They will also provide planning, training, and exercise
support across the Coast Guard. Through establishment of the IMAT, the
Coast Guard will improve standardization and proficiency in MER across
the Coast Guard and its partners.
The fiscal year 2012 cost of the IMAT enhancement is approximately
$5.5 million. Of that, approximately $3 million will be budgeted to
cover personnel expenses associated with 33 full-time positions, and
$2.5 million will be budgeted for operations and maintenance.
port security training
Question. Describe the process for complying with section 821 of
the Coast Guard Authorization Act regarding port security training and
certification.
Answer. The Coast Guard plans to implement the training provisions
discussed in section 821 via the rulemaking process, pending DHS's
review and approval to the Updates to Title 33 Code of Federal
Regulations Subchapter H--Maritime Security Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM is scheduled for publication in calendar
year 2011. Once published, the Final Rule, along with clarifying
guidance from the Coast Guard, will be the basis for third party
providers' course development and Quality Standards System review and
acceptance on behalf of the Coast Guard.
coast guard acquisitions
Question. The budget request includes a significant increase for
shore facilities improvements when compared to previous requests. The
Coast Guard estimates that the current backlog of shore facility
infrastructure improvements is $600 million. Is the entire request
associated with this backlog?
Answer. $94.5 million of this request is to support shore facility
infrastructure modifications and construction associated with the
delivery of new cutters, boats, and aircraft. The remaining $99,200,000
of the $193.7 million request for shore facilities, plus the $20
million requested for military family housing, help address the backlog
in the prioritized Shore Facility Requirements List.
Question. The budget proposes to eliminate the Integrated Deepwater
Construct. Is there a plan for tracking the Coast Guard's ongoing
acquisition costs in relation to the original Deepwater baseline? If
so, what assets will be included in the baseline?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget proposes the
elimination and disaggregation of the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)
subappropriation from the Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction and
Improvement (AC&I) appropriation. The restructuring of this
appropriation better enables the service to justify and meet a
sustainable, stable, and continuous recapitalization program while
effectively managing cost, schedule, and performance of individual
asset-based acquisitions. Enacting this proposal will further enhance
acquisition management and accountability by aligning the
appropriations structure with how the projects are managed. This
initiative improves transparency and accountability by establishing a
stronger linkage between appropriations and specific asset acquisition
projects, and will better enable the Coast Guard, DHS headquarters, and
the Congress to monitor cost, schedule and performance of individual
projects. Finally, disaggregation of the IDS subappropriation will
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-cutting functions,
such as systems integration, testing, and performance monitoring,
enabling uniformity across all acquisition projects. The Coast Guard
will retain its ability to track to the Deepwater baseline in
aggregate.
Question. What is the rationale for changing funding availability
for all Acquisition, Construction and Improvements appropriations to 5
years?
Answer. The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) appropriation (which
included ``deepwater'' vessels, aircraft and other equipment), was
available for 5 years. The proposal to disaggregate the IDS
subappropriation in fiscal year 2012 is intended to standardize funds
availability for each of the individual vessel, aircraft, other and
shore subappropriations, which will ensure consistency in funds
availability across the entire portfolio of projects, and enhance the
Coast Guard's ability to maintain project cost, schedule and
performance goals.
Specifically, the Coast Guard has increased its use of fixed-price
contracts for major acquisitions, moving away from cost-reimbursement
contracts. This change in strategy decreases overall risk to the
Government, but requires the Coast Guard to set aside funds for
antecedent liability (a requirement that does not exist for cost-
reimbursement contracts). GAO's Redbook cites that fixed-price contract
antecedent liabilities shall be funded by the appropriation that funded
the original transaction, to cover within-scope changes associated with
the original contract. The amount of unobligated funding (set aside for
antecedent liability) can be adjusted and reallocated over time as the
contract nears completion, provided that the funds are used within the
scope of the project and Congressional intent. The net effect is to
avoid the need for additional future appropriations by minimizing
expired, unused funds. Moreover, given the complexity of many of the
Coast Guard's vessel, shore, aircraft and electronics systems
acquisitions, 5-year availability is particularly beneficial
considering the time it takes to design, contract, and deliver these
assets.
Question. Has the Coast Guard spent any of the $45 million
anticipated for the offshore patrol cutter (OPC) in fiscal year 2011?
Is it premature to fund another $25 million in fiscal year 2012 if none
of the fiscal year 2011 money has been obligated? Is the Coast Guard on
track to release the request for proposal for the preliminary contract
and design in fiscal year 2011?
Answer. The offshore patrol cutter (OPC) is a critical aspect of
the Coast Guard's long-term recapitalization plan. Of the funding made
available to the OPC project to date under the current series of
continuing resolutions, $1 million has been obligated. The majority of
the fiscal year 2011 funding, approximately $36 million, will support
preliminary and contract designs; the remaining funding will support
project management activities, acquisition studies and life-cycle cost
analysis still planned in fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2012 budget
request of $25 million will support the award of Preliminary and
Contract Design contracts to three industry teams in fiscal year 2012.
The Coast Guard plans to release a draft Request for Proposal in fiscal
year 2011.
Question. Will DHS' requirement for the Coast Guard to conduct a
verification study of the OPC requirements affect the timeframe for the
request for proposal?
Answer. No, the project has proceeded in parallel with the
verification study of OPC requirements.
Question. Based on the fiscal year 2012 Capital Improvement Plan
(CIP), the cost of the OPC is $640 million in fiscal year 2015 and $760
million in fiscal year 2016. Provide a breakdown of the OPC costs in
those budget estimates? Why is the second OPC planned to cost $120
million more than the lead ship?
Answer. The program amounts shown in the fiscal year 2012-2016
Capital Investment Plan for the OPC are planning estimates. These
planning estimates may change as DHS completes the fiscal year HSP.
Question. In the fiscal year 2011 CIP, the Coast Guard estimated
the national security cutter's (NSC) completion date as 2016. In this
year's CIP, the Coast Guard is estimating a completion date of 2018.
What are the main drivers behind this 2-year delay? To what extent is
the decision to not request long-lead time materials (LLTM) for NSC No.
6 in fiscal year 2012 contributing to this delay? Would there be cost
savings if LLTM were funded in fiscal year 2012? If so, provide the
estimated savings.
Answer. The project completion dates shown in the fiscal year 2012-
2016 CIP are estimated for planning purposes, based on best available
data at the time of budget preparation. The NSC schedule is derived
from the Deepwater Implementation Plan Review Report to Congress, dated
May 13, 2010, which contains a more recent assessment of NSC delivery
schedules, considering actual appropriations and acquisition status to
the date of the report. One factor in the delay in the NSC acquisition
was the transition from a cost-plus contract to a fixed-price
construct. The Coast Guard spent nearly a year negotiating the
production contract for NSC No. 4, which was awarded in November 2010.
As a result of this negotiation and successful transition to a fixed-
price construct, the Coast Guard believes it is now in a position in
which future costs are more predictable than they have ever been, which
is in the best interests of the program and of taxpayers.
The funding associated with NSC No. 6 is not required until fiscal
year 2013.
Question. At the hearing, you made reference to a letter from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that committed funding for NSC
No. 6. Please provide the letter for the record.
Answer. In accordance with the requirements of Public Law 111-83,
the Coast Guard submits a future-years capital investment plan at the
time that the President's budget is submitted. This plan, the fiscal
year 2012-2016 CIP, was included in the fiscal year 2012 Coast Guard
Congressional Justification within the Acquisition, Construction and
Improvements (AC&I) appropriation request. The CIP projects planned
AC&I funding levels from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016 for
the program of record for each AC&I program, including the NSC program.
These estimates are in accordance with the latest DHS-approved
Acquisition Program Baseline. As noted in the CIP footnotes, fiscal
year 2013-2016 funding levels are subject to change based upon
adjustment to out-year fiscal guidance and finalization of the fiscal
year 2012-2016 Future Year Homeland Security Program.
Question. Based on the fiscal year 2012-2016 CIP, the Coast Guard
is planning the budget for NSC to be $775 million in fiscal year 2013,
$795 million in fiscal year 2014, and $853 million in fiscal year 2015.
Provide a breakdown of the NSC costs in those budget estimates? Why are
NSC costs becoming more expensive for each cutter in the outyears?
Answer. The program amounts shown in the fiscal year 2012-2016
Capital Investment Plan are planning estimates and subject to change as
DHS completes the fiscal year HSP. The following table shows the
estimated costs used as the basis for NSC projections:
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2015
2013 2014 -------------------------------
NSC cost categories -------------------------------- NSC No. 1/No.
NSC No. 6 NSC No. 7 NSC No. 8 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-lead time materials (LLTM)................. 114 119 124 ..............
Production contract............................. 578 587 598 ..............
Production (noncontract) and post delivery 83 89 93 ..............
activi- ties..................................
Structural enhancement (NSC No. 1 and No. 2 .............. .............. .............. 38
only)..........................................
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... 775 795 815 38
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assuming the new fixed-price construct, the budget estimates for
NSCs No. 6-8 are estimated as the production cost for NSC No. 4
adjusted for inflation. NSC No. 7 and No. 8 costs are projected to
continue to increase due to labor and material inflation and increases
in projected overhead rates.
Question. The budget proposes to fund production of both the NSC
and OPC in fiscal year 2015. Is this a realistic request given the
current fiscal environment?
Answer. DHS is committed to recapitalizing the Coast Guard's cutter
fleet as quickly as possible through the acquisition of NSC and OPC and
fast response cutters (FRCs).
Question. The original plan for the NSC included ship-based UAS to
expand the NSC's coverage capabilities. The Coast Guard's Capital
Investment Plan for fiscal years 2012-2016 includes no UAS funding. Has
the Coast Guard abandoned this effort? What over the horizon search
capabilities does the NSC provide over that of a WHEC without UAS? The
Coast Guard expected to complete the UAS ``Need Phase'' (Acquisition
Decision Event-1) in fiscal year 2011. What is the status of this
effort and, if completed, what were the conclusions from this event?
Answer. DHS and the Coast Guard remain committed to employing both
land and cutter-based UAS to meet mission requirements. The Coast Guard
is in the preacquisition need phase of the UAS acquisition, which works
to define the problem through a mission needs statement and the
development of a Concept of Operations. In addition, the Coast Guard is
currently leveraging prior-year Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation funding to continue UAS technology demonstration. Further,
within the Federal Government, the Coast Guard has established formal
partnerships with CBP to collaborate with their maritime Predator UAS
(Guardian) program and the Navy's UAS program offices to collaborate on
the Fire Scout program.
An NSC without a UAS, relying solely on its organic detection
equipment and manned aircraft patrols, has a far greater surveillance
area than that of a high endurance cutter (WHEC). The NSC has the
following organic surveillance capabilities that exceed those of the
WHEC:
--Ability to operate with a HH-60 enabling greater cutter-based
surveillance range and on scene time.
--Ability to deploy and operate with two HH-65 aircraft instead of
one from a WHEC.
--Two over-the-horizon (OTH) small boats instead of one from a WHEC.
--Three-dimensional capable air search radar instead of WHEC's two
dimensional air search radar.
--Sensitive compartmentalized intelligence facility (SCIF) to improve
sensor and intelligence analysis and fusion.
--Enhanced electronics surveillance measures (ESM).
Question. Compare the availability of the national security cutters
(Bertholf/Waesche) to the 12 WHECs in terms of days away from homeport
(DAFHP).
Answer. The operational target for the WHEC fleet is 185 DAFHP
annually per cutter. In fiscal year 2010, the WHEC fleet achieved 137
DAFHP primarily as a result of casualties to hull and mechanical
systems.
There is not yet substantive DAFHP data for USCGC Bertholf and
USCGC Waesche. In fiscal year 2010, both assets spent time in planned
inport availabilities for Secure Compartmentalized Intelligence
Facility installations and Ready for Operations preparations. The Coast
Guard will have operational availability data for USCGC Bertholf after
it completes its first full year of operations in fiscal year 2011 for
which it is programmed to achieve 185 DAFHP.
Question. In fiscal year 2010, because of delays in the planned
delivery of national security cutters, the Congress provided $4 million
for the Coast Guard to conduct a preacquisition survey and design to
determine the requirements for a maintenance effectiveness project for
the Coast Guard's legacy high endurance cutters. What is the status of
this effort and has any of the $4 million been obligated? What is the
timeline for completing this effort?
Answer. A total of $468,819 has been obligated through March 10,
2011. This funding will be used to adequately assess current WHEC
material condition, assess requirements of a potential future
sustainment project and inform decisions pertaining to the WHEC
decommissioning sequence, and evaluate cutter safety conditions. The
Coast Guard anticipates it will take approximately 2 years to complete
this effort.
Question. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $129.5 million for
two maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) airframes and five mission system
pallets (MSPs) and spares. Does the Coast Guard plan to buys these
pallets through the ICGS contract, use another contracting source, or
build them in-house? What is the cost difference for each option?
Answer. The Coast Guard contract with Integrated Coast Guard
Systems expired in January 2011 and no additional MSPs will be procured
using that contract vehicle. The Coast Guard does not currently possess
sufficient in-house processes and capabilities to be able to produce
MSPs ``in-house'' by 2012. Therefore, acquiring MSPs through a
commercial source is the preferred option.
Question. The fiscal year 2012 CIP indicates a 5-year delay in
completing procurement of the MPAs when compared to the fiscal year
2011 CIP. What is the cause of this delay?
Answer. The project completion dates for the MPA shown in the
fiscal year 2012-2016 CIP are estimated for planning purposes, based on
best available data at the time of budget preparation. The MPA schedule
is derived from the Deepwater Implementation Plan Review Report to
Congress, dated May 13, 2010, which contains a more recent assessment
of MPA delivery schedules.
Question. The request includes funding for five MPA mission
pallets. What is the cost savings from purchasing multiple mission
pallets in fiscal year 2012?
Answer. Ordering five MSPs instead of two is estimated to reduce
the MSP unit price by as much as 30-35 percent based upon previous
negotiations.
Question. Does purchasing six FRCs in fiscal year 2012 maximize the
contract? What is the cost savings by maximizing the contract in fiscal
year 2012?
Answer. Yes, procuring six FRCs in fiscal year 2012 maximizes the
contract. The average cost savings per hull is approximately $5 million
including production costs, economic price adjustments associated with
spare parts, antecedent liabilities and other scalable program costs
(e.g., project management, testing, certification, etc.).
united states secret service--presidential campaigns
Question. Provide the number of candidates and number of protection
days for Presidential campaigns going back to 1996, including costs.
Answer. [Follows:]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protection Candidates/ Spouses/adult
Campaign (fiscal year) days nominees children Cost \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008............................................ 1,115 5 6 $70,304,000
2004............................................ 454 3 2 38,686,000
2000............................................ 452 4 3 27,787,000
1996............................................ 364 4 2 16,459,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Presidential campaign costs do not reflect the ``labor shift'' of existing base resources from investigative
programs to support the protection demands of the campaign.
asia-pacific economic cooperation summit costs
Question. Provide detail on how much funding is needed in fiscal
year 2011 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Answer. Total estimated cost that the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
will incur in fiscal year 2011 for the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Summit is $5.4 million. These cost include airfare,
vehicle rental, housing, and per diem cost of personnel who have been
temporarily reassigned (TDY) to Honolulu, Hawaii since October 2010 to
prepare for this National Special Security Event (NSSE). Additionally,
these costs include the rental/build-out cost of the Multi-Agency
Communications Center (MACC), the Coordinating Center and Credentialing
Center.
The USSS will not be able to utilize the Presidential Assistance
Act and therefore will not have access to military aircraft to
transport vehicles, critical protective equipment and IT assets to this
location. We will have to contract with a commercial vendor to
transport these critical assets and ensure that they are available.
information integration and transformation program
Question. Provide a detailed crosswalk of the original
modernization plan (schedule and budget) for the Information
Integration and Transformation Program versus where we are with the
program at current funding levels. Please detail any modernization
funds that have been redirected for other purposes, including the
amount and why they were redirected.
Answer. [The response is For Official Use Only and Procurement
Sensitive--See FAR 3.104 and the answer will be submitted under a
separate cover.]
operational mission support
Question. Please prioritize your Operational Mission Support
requests ($65 million).
Answer. Here is a list of the highest-priority operational mission
support requirements. Each of these protective counter measures
addresses a specific vulnerability or known threat that requires
mitigation in order to provide a safe environment for the President and
other national leaders. The protective counter measures are used
individually and in combination to address specific types of threats,
creating a high level of interdependence between the proposed systems.
The counter measures provide enhanced security surveillance
capabilities and defenses to known threats for the President at the
White House and while traveling throughout the world. These assets will
provide not only enhanced situational awareness capabilities, but also
will enable notification systems to share critical information and
activate emergency response protocols. They are listed below:
--Enhanced explosive detection systems, $8,683,000 (51 positions).
--Enhanced chemical, biological, and radiological detection systems,
$4,626,000 (3 positions).
--White House physical protection upgrades, $12,826,000 (3
positions).
--Enhanced White House camera system, $6,375,000 (1 position).
--Development of next generation Presidential limousine, $10,226,000
(3 positions).
--Presidential audio countermeasures, $2,451,000 (2 positions).
--Cyber protection activities, $12,775,000 (1 position).
--National master plan studies, $1,375,000 (1 position).
--Protective systems and weapons testing program, $6,477,000 (5
positions).
anticounterfeit operations in colombia and peru
Question. Please describe current anticounterfeit operations in
Colombia and Peru. Has counterfeiting in Colombia decreased since the
inception of USSS cooperative presence with the Colombian Government?
Is opening an overseas office in Peru under consideration?
Answer. [Follows:]
Colombia.--The USSS Bogota Resident Office currently oversees the
Vetted Anti-Counterfeit Force (VACF) composed of approximately 50
Colombian law enforcement officers divided among 8 offices in Bogota,
Pereira, Cali, and Medellin. In addition, two Colombian district
attorneys are exclusively working United States currency counterfeiting
cases in conjunction with the VACF and USSS.
While overall statistics indicate steady attempts at counterfeit
production within Colombia, the combined efforts of the USSS and
Colombian VACF have been able to greatly reduce or interdict the export
to, and subsequent passing of counterfeit within, the United States.
Passing activity has decreased 81 percent since the inception of the
USSS/Colombian cooperative anticounterfeiting effort.
Peru.--The Peru Counterfeit Task Force (PCTF) was formed in March
2009 and is currently working directly with the Peru National Police
(PNP). The task force is composed of two agents on 2-week TDY
assignment rotations. The USSS also started the process of selecting
Peru National Police (PNP) officers with the goal of making a vetted
anticounterfeit unit that closely mirrors the Colombian model. To date,
PCTF efforts have led to the arrests of 50 suspects, the suppression of
22 counterfeit plant operations, and the seizure of more than $36
million in counterfeit currency.
On February 15, 2011, DHS approved the National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 38 related to the opening of the Lima, Peru office. On
March 7, 2011, the NSDD 38 was officially submitted to the U.S. State
Department. At this time, the USSS is awaiting review and approval from
the U.S. State Department.
state and local cyber activity
Question. President Obama has said, ``the cyber threat is one of
the most serious economic and national security challenges we face''.
Secretary Napolitano, you included safeguarding and securing cyberspace
as 1 of the 5 missions defined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request appears to respond to this
alarm by requesting a robust level of funding for US-CERT operations;
Federal network security; and network security deployment. These are
important areas to invest in and I take this request seriously. I was
especially pleased to see that there is a $9 million increase for
outreach, education, and training activities. Many State, local, and
private sector entities are struggling with and finding solutions to
the same issues the Federal Government faces. Sharing solutions and
expertise is imperative to our defense.
Please describe each cyber program underway that includes State and
local efforts in fiscal year 2010, fiscal year 2011, and proposed
programs for fiscal year 2012.
Further, what is the current status of cybersecurity and systems
assurance curricula; and what capacity does DHS currently have to
provide virtual education for specialized and classified education
requirements?
Answer. DHS's National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) collaborates
with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments to share and
implement sound cybersecurity policies, practices, and strategies to
improve preparedness against cyber threats and attacks.
Due to the increasingly important role of State, local, tribal, and
territorial governments in cybersecurity, NCSD has resources committed
solely to interacting with officials at these levels. The mission of
NCSD's State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Engagement program
is to build partnerships with non-Federal public stakeholders,
including each State's Homeland Security Advisor, Chief Information
Officer (CIO) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The
following provides an overview of NCSD interactions with States.
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
maintains a formal relationship and works closely with mission
partners, including State and local governments, on a daily basis to
resolve threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. US-CERT provides a
variety of daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly communication
exchanges to maintain situational awareness and share critical
information with collective cybersecurity partners. Federal and SLTT
incident response personnel have access to the Government Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST) portal for information
sharing and discussion.
US-CERT also sponsors the GFIRST National Conference, a forum that
promotes cooperation among Federal agencies, State, local, tribal, and
territorial governments, the private sector, and international partners
across the cybersecurity spectrum, from preparedness and prevention to
incident response. The conference supports the dissemination and
promulgation of proactive and preventive security practices. US-CERT
funding is executed toward planning, preparation, communication, and
coordination of this conference and other conference expos.
Specifically, $1.55 million is directed to support requirements such as
administration, logistics, and security. Additional funding
(approximately $3 million) provides support to the interactive
demonstration system at the GFIRST National Conference.
US-CERT also provides support ($1 million annually) to the
Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and
Technology, which provides system integration and product development
support for enhancement of the National Vulnerability Database and
search engine. This database enables US-CERT partners, including State,
local, tribal, and territorial governments, to secure government
systems.
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
Created in 2003, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (MS-ISAC) is an invaluable tool when dealing with SLTT
governments. The MS-ISAC supports NCSD's efforts to secure cyberspace
by disseminating early warnings of cyber threats to SLTT governments.
In addition, the MS-ISAC shares security incident information,
identifies trends, and conducts other analysis for security planning.
NCSD provides programmatic support ($3.55 million for the 12-month
period from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2011) to the MS-ISAC. The
fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act provided an additional $3
million for DHS to fund and work with the MS-ISAC to provide managed
security services (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion
prevention systems firewalls) for 18 State and local governments. The
MS-ISAC has selected State, county, and local governments for
participation. The MS-ISAC, consistent with the objectives of NCSD,
provides a common mechanism for raising the level of SLTT government
cybersecurity readiness and response. It is a central resource for
gathering information regarding cyber threats to critical
infrastructure facilities. Other MS-ISAC programs/activities include:
Operation of a 24/7 Cyber Security and Analysis Center
The MS-ISAC runs a 24-hour watch and warning Security Operations
Center (SOC) that provides real-time network monitoring, dissemination
of early cyber threat warnings, and vulnerability identification and
mitigation, along with education and outreach aimed at reducing risk to
the Nation's SLTT government cyber domain. The SOC shares and
coordinates real-time risk information to support national
cybersecurity situational awareness with DHS (NCSD and US-CERT).
The SOC performs 24/7 monitoring of the Internet and other sources,
including incident reports received from members and others regarding
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. The SOC staff evaluates and
correlates information and distributes advisories and bulletins as
appropriate, including mitigation strategies and steps that can be
taken to protect critical infrastructure.
Managed and Monitored Security Services
The MS-ISAC contracts with the States of Alaska, Montana, and New
York, along with the Los Angeles World Airports, to provide
cybersecurity monitoring and managed services. This collective view
across multiple entities helps enhance situational awareness regarding
cyber threats.
During 2010, the MS-ISAC reviewed more than 78 billion logs through
the 24/7 operations center. Approximately 138 MS-ISAC advisories were
issued.
Additionally, through funding in the fiscal year 2010 DHS
Appropriations Act, the MS-ISAC is expanding its monitoring services
with an additional 10 State governments, 7 local governments, and 1
territorial government. This expanded infrastructure will provide a
representative sample of system and network activity for enhancing
situational awareness of SLTT government networks across the country.
It will also improve cyber incident identification and response while
providing more resources for developing and implementing appropriate
mitigation strategies tailored specifically to SLTT government cyber
resources.
Participation in Cyber Security Exercises--Cyber Storm I,
II, and III
The MS-ISAC has participated in each of the three Cyber Storm
exercises, most recently Cyber Storm III in September 2010. The MS-ISAC
was a full player during the Cyber Storm III exercise; its SOC was
active, and it coordinated with 11 States that participated in the
exercise. The MS-ISAC hosted 19 visitors from five States, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, New York State law enforcement, Homeland
Security and military personnel, and observers from the University of
Texas at San Antonio.
National Cyber Incident Response Plan
The President's Cybersecurity Policy Review called for ``a
comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by
Government, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber
incident.'' DHS coordinated the interagency, State and local
government, and private-sector working group that developed the
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). The Plan provides a
framework for effective incident response capabilities and coordination
among Federal agencies, State and local governments, the private
sector, and international partners during significant cyber incidents.
It is designed to be flexible and adaptable to allow synchronization of
response activities across jurisdictional lines.
The NCIRP is undergoing final DHS review to incorporate lessons
learned during the Cyber Storm III exercise. Upon conclusion of this
review, DHS will send the NCIRP out to State, local and private-sector
partners (including the National Governors Association and the MS-ISAC)
for review. DHS will work with State and local partners (and partners
in the private sector) to align their incident response plans and
procedures with the NCIRP. The MS-ISAC and National Governors
Association will be key partners in this effort.
DHS has designated the MS-ISAC as the ISAC for SLTT governments and
has identified the MS-ISAC as a key stakeholder in the development and
implementation of the NCIRP.
NCSD Cyber Security Evaluation Program
Under the 2009 appropriations act, NCSD's Cyber Security Evaluation
Program (CSEP) was tasked with completing a Nationwide Cyber Security
Review (NCSR). The NCSR is a voluntary self-assessment of State and
major urban area government information technology (IT) services and is
designed to measure cybersecurity preparedness and resilience. Through
the NCSR, CSEP examines relationships, interactions, and processes
governing IT management and the ability to manage operational risk
effectively. CSEP also conducts voluntary cybersecurity assessments to
evaluate and enhance the implementation of key cybersecurity capacities
and capabilities of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR)
sector members. This assessment is the Cyber Resilience Review, which
is designed for each of the 18 CIKR sectors and for use within SLTT
governments. Since fiscal year 2009, CSEP has completed 45 cyber
resilience reviews with SLTT partners.
NCSD Cyber Exercise Program
NCSD's Cyber Exercise Program (CEP) works with Federal, State,
local, international, and private sector partners to conduct regional
and sector-specific exercises designed to develop and improve the
capabilities of DHS and its infrastructure partners. Such exercises aid
participants in preparing for, preventing, mitigating, responding to,
and recovering from cyber incidents. NCSD plans, coordinates, and
conducts cyber exercises to develop, evaluate, improve, and refine the
capabilities of State and local partners. CEP assists State and local
partners by facilitating the design of tabletop and functional
exercises at the State and local levels.
DHS hosted Cyber Storm III from September 26 through October 1,
2010. The Cyber Storm exercise series is a key element of ongoing
efforts to assess cyber preparedness; examine incident response
processes, procedures, and information sharing mechanisms; and identify
areas for improvement absent the consequences of an actual incident.
Cyber Storm III included participation from 11 States.
In 2009 and 2010, NCSD, the MS-ISAC, and the Microsoft Corporation
jointly sponsored the Defend the Flag Exercises to provide State
government network security professionals greater technical security
skills and practical experience with implementing the principles of
defense-in-depth while securing Windows-based operating systems.
Thirteen States participated from 2009-2010.
Grants
DHS provides grants for cybersecurity through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), such as the Homeland Security Grant Program
(HSGP), which provides States the opportunity to work with DHS to
acquire cybersecurity capabilities. During the last 2 years, NCSD has
worked with FEMA to modify the language in the HSGP to better clarify
how funds can be used to improve cybersecurity.
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
DHS is engaged in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE), leading Track 1 (Cybersecurity Awareness), leading
Track 3 (Cybersecurity Workforce Structure), and coleading Track 4
(Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development).
Through NICE, DHS is reaching out across the cybersecurity community--
including academia, the private sector, and Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners--to integrate current efforts into a
foundation of information that creates mutual understanding and
partnerships across all aspects of national cybersecurity.
In fiscal year 2010, DHS facilitated the efforts of six State
government CIOs to develop a State government workforce development
model, based on the existing DHS-issued Essential Body of Knowledge.
This State government model was presented to the MS-ISAC, which
included the model in its membership-based portal and on its public Web
site.
Other NCSD SLTT Programs/Activities
National Cyber Security Awareness Month
To recognize the importance of cybersecurity awareness, October is
designated as National Cyber Security Awareness Month. NCSD, with the
help of the MS-ISAC, works with funded partners and other parties to
sponsor events and activities throughout the country and disseminate
Awareness Month key messages and event information to State and local
partners. Due to the efforts of NCSD and MS ISAC, in 2009 and 2010, all
of the Nation's governors signed letters officially proclaiming October
as National Cyber Security Awareness Month.
Stop. Think. Connect. Campaign
DHS bears primary responsibility for raising public awareness about
threats to the Nation's cyber systems and networks. To that end, in
October 2010, DHS launched the National Cybersecurity Awareness
Campaign, Stop. Think. Connect. It is a national public-education
effort to engage and empower Americans to take charge of their online
safety and security. By providing Americans with easy-to-understand
online safety tips and resources, the campaign is helping them
establish smart habits that will lead to increased protection online.
Stop. Think. Connect. fulfills a key element of President Obama's 2009
Cyberspace Policy Review, which tasked DHS to develop a public-
awareness campaign to inform Americans about ways to use technology
safely.
Security Clearances for State Information Security Officers
NCSD, in partnership with colleagues from DHS Office of Security,
initiated a plan to clear, starting at the Secret level, each State CIO
and CISO, and the MS-ISAC executive committee. NCSD is confident this
is an important step in sharing valuable sensitive information with
State partners.
Cyber Partner Local Access Plan
NCSD, in cooperation with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
developed the Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan (CPLAP) to share
classified cybersecurity threat information with cleared State
cybersecurity officials and private-sector partners at State and major
urban area fusion centers nationwide. The CPLAP enables more effective
and efficient classified cybersecurity information sharing among
Federal, SLTT, and private-sector partners, and supports an
information-sharing model that eliminates partners' air travel to and
from the Washington, DC, area to receive classified cybersecurity
briefings. The CPLAP will be piloted at five fusion centers by mid-
2011, with plans to expand the program to a broader audience and
additional fusion centers on a regional basis by the end of 2011.
Cyber Summits
In an effort to educate SLTT leaders and the public, NCSD
coordinates and plans Cyber Summits. These summits, which are held
regularly throughout the year and hosted across the country, focus on
opportunities and vulnerabilities to promote discussion on how public
and private-sector officials can best leverage technology to reduce
risk. Frequent attendance and contribution by nongovernmental cyber
associations, such as the MS-ISAC and National Association of State
Chief Information Officers, significantly contributes to the
information sharing, capacity building, and coordination efforts
necessary to develop robust and effective cybersecurity capabilities on
all levels. DHS identified cybersecurity as a top departmental
priority, and Federal, State, and local government officials share a
responsibility to promote a healthy cyber ecosystem and to encourage
individuals to protect themselves and their families at home, work, and
school.
Virginia Operational Integration Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence
NCSD is helping the Virginia Operational Integration Cyber Center
of Excellence (VOICCE) create a Municipal Cyber Lab that will be used
to support and train SLTT government officials to better understand
cybersecurity issues. VOICCE focuses on incorporating cyber attacks
into the mainstream of emergency operations at the local level and
creating a virtual municipality of randomly generated Internet protocol
addresses. The concept will allow for development of vital
cybersecurity capabilities, processes, and procedures. The VOICCE node
or laboratory will allow local governments and first responders to plug
into State and Federal entities and participate in simulated cyber
attacks. The lab will be both physical and virtual in structure,
allowing many types of simulation and providing an effective
environment to share ideas among stakeholders across the Nation.
Participants will brainstorm, identify, and respond to diverse cyber
attack scenarios.
This activity was required by the fiscal year 2010 DHS
Appropriations Act.
NCSD will continue many of the programs listed above. In addition,
in fiscal year 2012, NCSD will commit funding to expand the MS-ISAC's
managed and monitor security services.
Curricula
The Software Assurance (SwA) curriculum project, which produced the
Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) curriculum and associated
undergraduate course outlines, is a recent NCSD effort to cosponsor
public-private collaboration for government, industry, and academia
through its SwA Forum. To facilitate implementation, the MSwA project
team is offering assistance, free of charge, to educational
institutions looking to launch an MSwA degree program.
Through the Software Assurance (SwA) forum, the SwA program has
encouraged Federal, State, and local involvement in public-private
collaboration efforts associated with the advancement of SwA resources.
As part of that collaboration, the SwA curriculum project released the
Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) reference curriculum and nine-
course syllabi for public use. The MSwA curriculum is recognized by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Computer
Society and the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) as the first
curriculum of its kind to focus on assuring the functionality,
dependability, and security of software and systems. The materials are
available at http://www.cert.org/mswa/.
More information on the SwA curriculum project and the MSwA is
available at https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/1165-BSI.html.
Virtual Education
The SwA Forum, sponsored by NCSD's SwA Program, posts Web casts of
SwA tutorials and pocket guides that are publicly available for free
online use, including links via virtual training environments.
One aspect under NICE Track 4 is Functional Area 4, which concerns
Specialized Cybersecurity Operations. The scope of this effort includes
those Federal civilian employees, members of the uniformed services,
and contractor personnel employed by departments and agencies who are
engaged in highly specialized and largely classified cybersecurity
operations. Work associated with this functional area is classified,
but a classified briefing to discuss the work associated with this
topic can be arranged upon request.
risk assessment process for informed decision making
Question. NPPD began development of the Risk Assessment Process for
Informed Decision Making (RAPID) to aid the Department in making policy
and budgetary decisions based on risk. Which DHS components (or other
entities) have used RAPID to date? What impact did it have on
operations? What proposals in the fiscal year 2012 budget used RAPID as
the foundation for the request? What is the next phase for RAPID and
when will it be used departmentwide?
Answer. [Follows:]
Components That Have Used RAPID to Date
The Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) is
the Federal Government's first quantitative, multi-mission, multi-
hazards assessment of homeland security risk. RAPID assesses the risk
of various types of terrorism, natural disasters, and transnational
crimes in terms of annualized expected fatalities and economic losses.
The goal of RAPID is to provide information about these homeland
security risks and the extent to which DHS programs and activities
contribute to the reduction of these risks to support DHS leadership
decisionmaking during the annual planning, programming, budgeting and
execution (PPBE) process cycle and supporting processes.
To date, RAPID analysis has supported the planning phase of the
annual DHS PPBE cycle through the development of the Office of Policy's
Integrated Planning Guidance by highlighting key risks and providing
qualitative analysis of possible risk-mitigation strategies. In
addition, RAPID analysis has proven helpful in facilitating more robust
evaluation of alternatives within the Program Review Board issue teams.
In addition to supporting the departmentwide PPBE process, RAPID
has supported a number of DHS components in prioritizing their
activities, as described below.
Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Program
The Coast Guard's ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS)
risk-based performance module has been developed to:
--Assess risk in the PWCS mission;
--Evaluate Coast Guard performance within the mission; and
--Evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard planning, programming,
and budgeting recommendations in terms of risk reduction.
To achieve those objectives, the model considers a wide array of
maritime terrorism scenarios. The risk data for the vast majority of
scenarios comes directly from the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Risk
Analysis Model; however, the risk of transferring terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through the maritime domain is
currently outside of the model's scope.
To establish the risk associated with these scenarios, the Coast
Guard/PWCS team requested RAPID data from the National Protection and
Programs Directorate's (NPPD) Office of Risk Management and Analysis
(RMA) related to the following:
--Frequency estimates from RAPID's structured elicitation of the
intelligence community in the following areas:
--Maritime-related WMD transfers, both through ports of entry and
between ports of entry;
--Maritime-related terrorist transfers, both through ports of entry
and between ports of entry;
--Maritime-related direct attacks; and
--Maritime-related direct exploitation attacks.
--Casualty and economic consequence estimates for a variety of WMD
attacks.
DHS Office of Policy's Office of Strategic Plans
The Office of Strategic Plans within the Department's Office of
Policy requested information and analysis related to:
--The overall flows of four types of drugs that malefactors are
attempting to introduce into the United States;
--Estimates of drugs seized based on the reported sources; and
--How these reported estimates compare with RAPID estimates.
In response to this request, RMA provided overall drug-flow estimates,
as well as drug-seizure estimates from both RAPID and other reported
sources.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security
Investigations
In response to the GAO report, ``Better Management Practices Could
Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources'' (GAO-06-
462T), the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations has been seeking a way to use risk management to inform
its resource allocation decisions (i.e., analyze its primary
enforcement areas and allocate its resources according to the
likelihood of potential consequences to the United States). As a
result, ICE developed a strategic risk assessment whose methodology was
peer-reviewed at multiple stages by RMA, and RMA provided RAPID
analysis for use in this assessment. Specifically, RMA provided RAPID
analysis of residual drug-flow estimates, consequences as a result of
foreign-produced drugs, and consequences due to illegal migration. ICE
used the RAPID data to augment and validate its own estimates.
CBP Agro/Bio-Terror Countermeasures
RMA has been asked by CBP's Agro/Bio-Terror Countermeasures (ABTC)
to provide bioterrorism/agroterrorism risk information to inform its
targeting processes. Specifically, ABTC is interested in using RAPID in
the following areas:
--Assist in improved use of targeting resources by either:
--Using existing RAPID risk results tailored to provide information
regarding risk by ``mode and point of entry'' for
biological material to inform ABTC's decisions regarding
the allocation of its resources among air, land, and sea
border crossings; or
--Building a new ``risk factor'' category into ABTC's existing
targeting rulesets that includes RAPID ``mode and point of
entry'' risk data; and
--Help design probabilistic red-team scenarios to test targeting and
response procedures.
Impact on Operations
As noted in the Secretary's policy statement on Integrated Risk
Management signed in May 2010, DHS uses risk information and analysis:
``. . . to inform decisionmaking, striving to better understand risks
and capabilities to manage them, while remaining flexible to changing
risks. Homeland security risks are inherently uncertain, and risk
analysis will not always yield precise answers. The Department uses
risk information and analysis to make its assumptions more transparent,
encourage creative thinking, and provide defensible decisions, made
with the best available tools and information, for the best achievable
outcomes.''
Using risk analysis to inform decisions, particularly operational
ones, is a complicated process that involves making difficult tradeoffs
among often highly uncertain risk reduction benefits, costs, the unique
risk tolerance of the decisionmaker, logistical constraints, and policy
priorities. Terrorism risk analysis in particular involves a great deal
of uncertainty that affects our ability to estimate the range of
potential benefits of different alternatives.
Fiscal Year 2012 Proposals That Used RAPID as the Foundation for the
Request
During the fiscal year 2012 budget build, RAPID was not completed
in time to serve as the foundation for any specific budget requests. It
is expected in the future, however, that RAPID will reach a sufficient
level of maturity to be leveraged more broadly and will increasingly
provide greater input into the budgeting process.
Next Phase for RAPID
Following the execution of RAPID 2010, NPPD/RMA conducted a formal
lessons-learned process to prioritize enhancements to future iterations
of the assessment. This process led to a formal confirmation of
strategic requirements and reinforced the focus for RAPID in 2011-2012
to better understand customer needs and the decision environment.
Initial RAPID 2010 analysis provides a baseline view of homeland
security risk and risk reduction across the Department's mission-
oriented programs, portfolios, and activities. In 2011, RMA plans to
invest most of its effort in improving model and data quality, bringing
all RAPID analysis in house so that it can be conducted by Federal
staff on Federal computing equipment, and conducting tailored analysis
to support the fiscal year 2013-2017 budget build, including support to
NPPD's budget request, study of the effectiveness of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, and more
effective allocation of aviation security and air domain awareness
resources.
progress in interoperability
Question. The 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, is only 6 months away. The failure of
communications during that incident has been cited in the 9/11
Commission report and has been the subject of many recommendations for
improvement. During Hurricane Katrina, we once again witnessed a
failure in communications during a catastrophe. The Federal Government
and DHS have devoted significant resources to solving the interoperable
communications problem; more than $4.5 billion in Federal homeland
security grants alone. State and local governments have contributed an
untold amount. Progress has been made; however, interoperable emergency
communications remain inadequate.
The emergence of broadband services provides emergency responders
with new opportunities to improve communications. Despite this
potential, public safety officials face several challenges in
integrating new technologies and proving their reliability. What
progress has been made since September 11, 2001, to improve emergency
communications and what challenges lie ahead? Does the National
Emergency Communications Plan need to be updated for emerging
technologies and services? What is the plan to develop and disseminate
training and best practices on governance, standard operating
procedures, equipment purchases, and related issues for emerging
technologies and services and to deliver technical assistance to public
safety agencies on broadband technologies?
Answer. [Follows:]
Progress Made Since September 11, 2001
Improving communications for the Nation's emergency responders has
been a top priority for DHS. Since its establishment, DHS has worked
with its partners at the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial
levels to build and sustain the communications capabilities that public
safety personnel require at all times to coordinate response and
recovery operations effectively. Creation of the Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) within the National Protection and Programs
Directorate in 2007 and its subsequent release of the National
Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) have been key drivers of progress
in this mission. To date, the Department has achieved 78 of the 92
milestones in the NECP, or 85 percent.
The Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) within the
S&T Directorate was created in 2004 to strengthen and integrate
interoperable communications. Working closely with the emergency
response community, OIC developed foundational tools, methodologies,
and standards to strengthen interoperability. For example, OIC improved
command-level interoperability capabilities in 10 high-threat urban
areas through the RapidCom initiative. OIC also supported RapidCom 2
which accelerated the completion of Tactical Interoperability
Communications Plans in the largest 75 urban/metropolitan areas across
the Nation. A scorecard was developed to help all levels of government
measure their current state of interoperability and lay the foundation
for establishing accountability for future progress. Additionally, OIC
launched two regional communications interoperability pilots in Nevada
and Kentucky which resulted in guidance documents on governance,
funding, and procurement that now serve as tools for States and
territories in support of their statewide planning efforts.
Prior to the creation of OEC and release of the NECP, emergency
response agencies often pursued disparate emergency communications
activities and lacked coordinated solutions and protocols. Few plans
existed at the State level to guide activities within or across States
and with Federal efforts, and inter-agency coordination at the Federal
level was not as effective as it needed to be. In addition, Federal
grant programs supported the acquisition of communications equipment--
but without common governance and statewide plans in place, individual
communities often made equipment investments without coordinating with
their neighboring communities or regions.
To address these and other interoperability challenges, OEC
developed the NECP in coordination with more than 150 representatives
from all major emergency response organizations across the country,
including the SAFECOM Executive Committee/Emergency Response Council,
Federal departments and agencies through the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center (ECPC), and private-sector and nongovernmental
organizations. The NECP set out a clear strategy for building
capabilities in key areas identified by public safety as needed for
improving emergency communications and has since greatly influenced
planning, governance, operating procedures, and training for responders
nationwide.
Indicators of Emergency Communications Progress
NPPD/OEC's efforts to coordinate with stakeholders from the
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial responder communities
and the private sector to improve interoperable emergency
communications capabilities have resulted in:
--Enhanced Statewide Coordination.--The creation of 56 statewide
communication interoperability plans (SCIPs) and 44 statewide
interoperability coordinators (SWICs) is improving coordination
of emergency communications activities and investments
throughout all 56 States and territories. All 56 States and
territories have identified a point of contact for statewide
interoperability coordination, and 44 States and territories
have full-time SWIC or equivalent positions. These important
leadership roles and planning mechanisms are critical for the
continued funding, accountability, and execution of emergency
communications activities at the State, local, tribal, and
territorial levels.
--Common Plans and Procedures.--The creation and increased use of
standardized plans, protocols, and procedures is driving
improved command, control, and communications among emergency
response agencies in the field. NPPD/OEC and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have worked with more than
140 jurisdictions to develop Tactical Interoperable
Communications Plans (TICPs) that document formalized
interoperability governance groups, standardized policies and
procedures, and emergency communications equipment inventories.
DHS continues to work with stakeholders to update, implement,
and develop new TICPs as part of the NECP. In addition, more
than 30 States are implementing plain-language protocols to
simplify and standardize the language used to share information
and communicate during an emergency.
--Targeted Technical Assistance.--As part of the NECP, NPPD/OEC has
implemented a technical assistance strategy to ensure that all
States and territories can request and receive emergency
communications assistance while also focusing support on the
States and urban areas most in need. This technical support
provides improvements in all areas of emergency communications,
including the development of governance structures, tactical
and strategic planning, and a variety of engineering services.
Since 2008, the 56 States and territories have requested more
than 750 individual technical assistance services from NPPD/
OEC. These services support the priorities in each State or
territory's SCIP and the objectives of the NECP.
The 2011 Technical Assistance Catalog has 13 new or updated
offerings to provide support to States across the entire
Interoperability Continuum, one of which is focused on the
planning for and incorporation of 700MHz Wireless Broadband
technologies into the Public Safety community. In addition,
NPPD/OEC is conducting at least five focused Technical
Assistance engagements with jurisdictions granted waivers by
the Federal Communications Commission for conditional use of
currently allocated 700 MHz spectrum to help them migrate to
the new 700MHz Long-Term Evolution network and share best
practices with the Nation. Last, NPPD/OEC facilitates a weekly
call with the Public Safety Spectrum Trust Operator Advisory
Committee, a group comprising all the jurisdictions receiving
such FCC waivers, to encourage information sharing and
collaboration.
--Increased Training Opportunities.--To improve emergency responders'
capabilities in this area, OEC's communications unit leader
(COML) training program has resulted in the training of more
than 3,500 responders, technicians, and planners to lead
communications during incidents across the Nation, including
local floods, blizzards, and wildfires. Effective training and
exercise programs can increase emergency responders'
proficiency with equipment and help them coordinate roles and
responsibilities more effectively during an event. Trained
COMLs also contributed to recovery efforts outside of the
United States, such as the response to the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti.
--Improved Governance and Coordination.--Building on the success of
governance and coordination mechanisms such as the SAFECOM
Executive Committee/Emergency Response Council, NPPD/OEC has
worked with Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial
agencies to stand up formal decisionmaking structures that
increase coordination, information sharing, and oversight of
interoperability:
--Statewide Interoperability Governing Bodies now exist in every
State and territory and include representatives from all
levels of government to coordinate and support statewide
interoperability. In addition, many States have created
regional interoperability committees to provide insight
into the statewide strategy from an operational
perspective.
--NPPD/OEC established the National Council of Statewide
Interoperability Coordinators to serve as a governing body
for SWICs. The council meets twice a year to share best
practices, lessons learned, successes, and challenges
related to SCIP implementation.
--DHS established Regional Emergency Communications Coordination
Working Groups and placed individual regional coordinators
from FEMA, NPPD/OEC, and the National Communications System
in each of the 10 FEMA regions to coordinate interstate
emergency communications efforts.
--The Emergency Communications Preparedness Center represents the
Federal Government's broad role in emergency
communications, including regulation, policy, operations,
and grants. The ECPC, which comprises members from 14
Federal departments and agencies, is driving more effective
coordination of grants, technical assistance, and planning
activities for emergency communications.
NECP Goals Performance Measurement.--The NECP goals serve as
performance benchmarks for assessing public safety agencies' progress
toward achieving a baseline-level of interoperable emergency
communications. OEC is measuring them through a process that engages
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial emergency responders.
The three NECP goals are as follows:
Goal 1.--By the end of 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban
areas designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) can
demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 1 hour for
routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
Goal 2.--By the end of 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions
can demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 1 hour
for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
Goal 3.--By the end of 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions can
demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 3 hours of a
significant event, as outlined in the department's national planning
scenarios.
--To evaluate NECP goal 1, NPPD/OEC conducted an assessment of
response-level emergency communications among public safety
agencies during a planned event held in each UASI region. Based
on the interoperable communications capabilities documented at
each event, all 60 UASI regions were able to demonstrate
response level communications, achieving NECP goal 1. The goal
1 assessments also identified areas for continued improvement.
NPPD/OEC will use the results of the goal assessments--
including goal 2, scheduled for completion in 2011 and goal 3,
scheduled for completion in 2013--to better target resources,
such as training and planning, for improving interoperable
emergency communications nationwide.
Updating the National Emergency Communications Plan
NPPD/OEC is leading efforts to update the NECP to address the
integration of broadband with traditional Land Mobile Radio (LMR)
technologies. OEC is coordinating with Federal, State, local, tribal,
and territorial agencies, major public-safety organizations, and the
private sector to develop a strategy for incorporating new technology,
such as broadband, while maintaining the mission-critical voice-over
LMR that responders use every day to save lives. The NECP update will
focus on key issues that must be addressed, such as partnerships,
planning, user requirements, standards, research and development, and
funding.
Acceleration of Standards and Technology Developments
OIC has worked to provide stakeholders (local, State, and Federal),
with the optimal mix of standards, tools, technologies, methodologies,
and guidance to enable improved communications interoperability at all
levels. For example, OIC facilitates the development of Emergency Data
Exchange Language (EDXL) standards through a practitioner-driven
approach. These standards enable the emergency response community to
share data seamlessly and securely during an incident. Once
standardized, any technology vendor or organization can easily develop
EDXL-based applications and products to facilitate information exchange
across disparate public safety systems across local, tribal, State,
Federal, and nongovernmental emergency response and management
disciplines. The EDXL family of standards is developed through input
from the OIC-Sponsored Practitioner Steering Group (PSG) and Standards
Working Group (SWG). The PSG and SWG represent multiple disciplines,
ensuring that the requirements reflect an all-hazards perspective. The
standards are then vetted by an international standards development
organization. The EDXL project is a public-private partnership
established to create an information sharing capability between
disparate emergency response software applications, systems, and
devices.
An example of the Department's promotion of voice standards is
OIC's Project 25 Compliance Assessment Program (P25 CAP), which
established a process for ensuring that emergency communications
equipment complies with P25 standards and is capable of interoperating
across manufacturers. P25 standards make it possible for radios to
interoperate regardless of manufacturer, enabling emergency responders
to communicate. Currently, P25 CAP has 12 participating manufacturers,
representing more than 80 percent of the land mobile radio market. The
program, a partnership between DHS S&T and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, provides local, State, and Federal emergency
responders with an independent and transparent process to formally
assess communications equipment against a select group of requirements
within the suite of P25 standards. The results from this testing are
published on FEMA's Responder Knowledge Base Web site. The P25 CAP will
allow emergency responders to purchase and use P25-compliant products.
Recognizing the emergency response community's need for standards-
based, Internet protocol-enabled backbones that improve mission-
critical information sharing and allows for the interconnection of
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) based networks with neighboring
agencies, OIC established a Public Safety VoIP Working Group. This
Working Group, consisting of public safety practitioners, industry
representatives, and Federal partners, created the Bridging System
Interface (BSI) core profile. The BSI allows emergency response
agencies to seamlessly connect radio systems over an IP network--
regardless of the manufacturer. Thirteen manufacturers voluntarily
adopted the BSI platform and others have committed to doing so in their
next product cycle. Ultimately, the BSI core profile provides emergency
response agencies with a reduction in cost for system design and
installation.
The introduction of Multi-Band Radio (MBR) technology to the
emergency response community offers an opportunity to improve
interoperability across agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions by
providing the capability to communicate on all public safety radio
bands. OIC's MBR technology project evaluates, tests, demonstrates, and
pilots MBR technology to ensure that equipment meets the mission
requirements identified by the emergency response community. Finally,
compiling the data and user feedback from the T&E phases, OIC will
produce a detailed procurement guide that will assist emergency
response agencies in the identification of equipment functionality
offered by various manufacturers that meets their radio communication
interoperability requirements. DHS believes that their efforts with
this project will continue to stimulate the marketplace and encourage
additional manufacturers to research, develop, design, and manufacture
similar technology.
OIC also developed a Technology Roadmap for Interoperable
Communications to provide stakeholders with a strategy to incorporate
new and emerging technologies into existing communications
capabilities.
Broadband
DHS is deeply involved in coordinating public-safety broadband
efforts at the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial levels.
NPPD/OEC is helping to set the broad policy framework for public-safety
broadband networks and ensuring that it aligns with existing emergency
communications policy. NPPD/OEC is offering technical assistance to the
jurisdictions that received FCC waivers to allow early deployment of
broadband public safety facilities and other early adopters of
broadband solutions to ensure that their activities remain aligned with
the vision of a nationally interoperable network. NPPD/OEC is also
developing guidance documents geared toward elected officials, SWICs,
and UASI/regional coordinators within a State to provide an overview of
broadband technology, guidance on interoperability planning for
broadband, best practices from the waiver jurisdictions, and regional
governance considerations. NPPD/OEC is also coordinating Federal
broadband efforts to develop requirements and influence standards
associated with potential Federal user participation in the National
Public Safety Broadband Network.
private sector coordination and information sharing
Question. NPPD has various methods for coordinating and sharing
information with the private sector related to critical infrastructure.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposal indicates that NPPD will
streamline the process. Please provide a list of each coordination
group (i.e., national infrastructure protection plan management,
critical infrastructure key resources coordination, sector-specific
agency management); their authority or reason for creation (law,
regulation, Presidential directive, department initiative); how often
each group meets; and what each produces or accomplishes. Please
describe in detail how the fiscal year 2012 budget will streamline the
current process and how it will be coordinated with the private sector
coordination office in FEMA.
Answer. The following chart lists each coordination group,
authority, engagement frequency, products/accomplishments, and
membership. In addition, the Partnerships project has tracked the
following growth in the use of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP) partnership structures:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
year 2008 year 2009 year 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Partnership member institutions........ 492 643 861
Partnership councils and working groups 57 78 79
Individual meeting participants........ 1,530 1,723 2,197
Council and working group meetings..... 258 475 628
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION GROUPS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engagement Products and
Organization Authority frequency accomplishments Membership
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education, training and outreach National Meets three times Information DHS and SSAs
awareness working group. Infrastructure per year. sharing with
Protection Plan sector-specific
(NIPP). agencies (SSAs)
on education,
training and
outreach
activities.
IP-SSA biweekly coordination Department Occurs every other Regular SSA
call. initiative Thursday. communication and representatives
supporting HSPD- coordination
7, NIPP. mechanism between
IP and the SSAs
to discuss
ongoing
initiatives and
issues.
Risk Management Enhancement Department Monthly........... Supports the SSA
Initiative Working Group. initiative development of representatives
supporting HSPD- the improved NAR/
7, NIPP. SARs/metrics, the
new Critical
Infrastructure
Risk Management
Plan (CIRMP), and
the National Risk
Profile (NRP).
North American Electric Supports NIPP and Ad hoc............ Provides insight DHS, NERC
Reliability Corp (NERC) Pilot HSPD-7 reporting into measuring
Program. requirements. and evaluating
resilience within
the electric
industry.
Sector Annual Report/National Supports NIPP and Annually.......... Meetings are DHS, SSA
Annual Report (SAR/NAR) HSPD-7 reporting conducted at the representatives
technical assistance sessions requirements. beginning of the
(for each sector-specific SAR/NAR reporting
agency). cycle in order to
discuss sector
writing,
development, and
metrics guidance
as it applies.
SLTTGCC and RCCC technical Supports NIPP and Annually.......... Meetings are DHS, SLTTGCC, RCCC
assistance sessions. HSPD-7 reporting conducted to representatives
requirements. discuss SLTT
writing,
development, and
metrics guidance.
Federal Senior Leadership HSPD-7, NIPP...... Quarterly......... Cross-sector SSA leadership or
Council meetings. coordination. their
representatives
CIKR Cross-Sector Council HSPD-7, NIPP...... Quarterly......... Cross-sector SCC leadership
meetings. coordination.
Agriculture and food sector..... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: Trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual Associations and
GCC meetings report, sector Owner/Operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Banking and finance sector...... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Chemical sector................. HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Commercial facilities sector.... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Communications sector........... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Critical Manufacturing sector... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Dam, Locks, and Levees sector... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Defense Industrial Base sector.. HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Emergency Services sector....... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Energy sector................... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Healthcare and Public Health HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
sector. minimum. products (annual associations and
SCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
GCC meetings roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC representatives
Information Technology sector... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
Waste sector. minimum. products (annual associations and
SCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
GCC meetings roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC representatives
Postal and shipping sector...... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
Transportation systems sector... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings (sub-SCCs for minimum. products (annual associations and
aviation, maritime, rail, report, sector owner/operators
highway and motor carrier) roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
GCC meetings representatives
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC
Water sector.................... HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector SCC: trade
SCC meetings minimum. products (annual associations and
GCC meetings report, sector owner/operators
Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC roadmaps, etc.). GCC: government
representatives
National monuments and icons HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector Government
sector GCC. minimum. products (annual representatives
report, sector
roadmaps, etc.).
Government facilities sector GCC HSPD-7, NIPP...... Each quarterly at Various sector Government
minimum. products (annual representatives
report, sector
roadmaps, etc.).
State, local, tribal, and NIPP, NIPP........ Biannual.......... Various products Representatives
territorial government (annual report, from State,
coordinating council meetings. etc.). local, tribal,
and territorial
governments
Regional Consortium Coordinating NIPP, NIPP........ Ad hoc............ Various products Members of
Council meetings. (annual report, regional
etc.). consortiums with
missions related
to critical
infrastructure
protection and
resilience
National Council of Information NIPP.............. Monthly........... .................. Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers Sharing and
(NCI) meetings. Analysis Centers
National Infrastructure Advisory NIAC Charter Quarterly......... 19 reports since Critical
Council (NIAC) meetings. (Presidential). inception. infrastructure
stakeholders
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the fiscal year 2012 budget, information sharing and
coordination activities for the National Protection and Programs
Directorate's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) planned for
fiscal year 2012 are designed to improve the effectiveness and
coordination of the councils and expand the participation in
information-sharing activities by critical infrastructure stakeholders.
One key aspect is enhancing the critical infrastructure information
sharing environment and the use of the Homeland Security Information
Network-Critical Sectors.
NPPD/IP routinely coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's Private Sector Division and others, especially related to
training and education activities that are appropriate for the full
private-sector community. In addition, NPPD/IP, in coordination with
DHS's Private Sector Office and the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, began a private-sector information-sharing improvement
initiative in the spring of 2010. The initiative focuses on adopting a
``One DHS'' private-sector information-sharing approach and seeks to:
--Enhance strategic communications coordination;
--Strengthen regionally focused information-sharing efforts; and
--Enhance information sharing and accountability.
Through this initiative, DHS will work to increase coordination
with interagency private-sector information-sharing efforts, evaluate
and enhance existing processes and methods of information sharing with
critical infrastructure owners and operators, and improve cross-sector
information visibility and collaboration within the Critical
Infrastructure Key Resources Information Sharing Environment. All DHS
components with private-sector information-sharing activities are
participating in this initiative.
federal protective service workforce analysis
Question. Recent events demonstrate that Federal employees are at
greater risk. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is charged with
protecting employees on Federal property from those who threaten harm
to the workforce. Yet, FPS has struggled with providing optimal
service. Balancing its workforce needs against risk is critical to
ensuring FPS evolves into a premier agency. Senate Report 111-222,
accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2011 directs the National Protection and Programs Directorate to
provide a workforce staffing model to the subcommittee and to GAO
within 45 days. To date, the staffing model as not been provided.
Please provide a copy of the staffing model to the subcommittee and to
GAO.
Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate prepared a
Federal Protective Service staffing plan which is currently being
finalized.
us-visit--carryover balances
Question. A portion of the fiscal year 2012 budget request assumes
that a significant level of carryover balances of prior year funds will
be available to hire staff and perform other activities.
What impact will there be on US-VISIT if the assumed carryover
balances are not available for these intended purposes? What changes to
the program or to US-VISIT operations will have to be made?
Answer. In this fiscally constrained environment, some difficult
choices had to be made--one of which was to use the $25.642 million as
an offset to provide funding for other departmental priorities. Looking
toward fiscal year 2012, a realignment of funds will be necessary in
order to enhance the collection and use of biographic exit data and the
review of potential overstay records--both of which will increase our
current capabilities and lay a strong foundation for other exit
measures in the future. The President's budget proposes the realignment
of $24.358 million in carryover balance in order to hire temporary
staff to eliminate the existing overstay backlog, as a prerequisite for
any future biometric exit capability. If the carryover balances were
not available for this purpose, US-VISIT will not be able to clear the
existing backlog.
fema--disaster relief
Question. The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) provides financial support
for both response and recovery in States that are overwhelmed by the
devastation of a disaster. For fiscal year 2011, we are facing a $1.6
billion gap in the DRF. If the President does not request and the
Congress does not approve supplemental funding, the account will run
out of money in June, just as we are entering the hurricane season. For
fiscal year 2012, the problem is even worse because we are facing a $3
billion gap between the President's request and the known costs of past
disasters. These shortfalls are specifically the result of past major
disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, the
Midwest floods of 2008, and the Tennessee floods of 2010.
In fiscal year 2010, there was a similar shortfall. FEMA had to
stop providing assistance for rebuilding and recovery projects to
ensure it had enough for immediate needs for disaster response to new
events. For 5 months, recovery projects all over the Nation stopped. In
this economy it was not welcome news. Plus, the delays only make the
projects more expensive.
Unfortunately, history is repeating itself.
Please provide a report with quarterly estimates of funding
requirements for the DRF for the current fiscal year, fiscal year 2012,
and fiscal year 2013. The report should include an estimate for the
costs of all previously designated disasters by quarter; the cost of
future disasters based on a 5-year average, excluding catastrophic
disasters, by quarter; and a projected date on which the DRF will reach
a balance of $500 million.
When will the President submit an emergency supplemental request
for the known shortfalls?
In lieu of a supplemental request, the House responded to this
shortfall by cutting $1.6 billion out of the base Homeland Security
budget in H.R. 1. They cut the Coast Guard. They cut FEMA. They cut
grants to State and local first responders and emergency managers. Do
you believe the House approach to funding the shortfall is the right
approach?
If we do not receive an emergency supplemental request, what
specific cuts will the President propose below his requests for fiscal
year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 to pay for this shortfall? Or is it your
policy that FEMA should do what it did last year and simply stop making
recovery payments?
Answer. The $1.8 billion requested for the DRF, per standard annual
practice, reflects the 5-year rolling average of historical obligations
for noncatastrophic events (those less than $500 million in estimated
obligations), less estimated recoveries for fiscal year 2012. This
methodology is one that the administration has proposed in its fiscal
year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budgets and represents the best use of
available information in developing the DRF request. We also have a
robust strategy in place to deobligate funds from past contracts and
projects that are now complete and where we did not spend all the money
originally obligated. Based on our experience in actively managing the
unliquidated contract obligations in fiscal year 2010, we are taking
the same approach for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance
grants in fiscal year 2011, and anticipate that our projected
recoveries may be higher than previously estimated. Regardless, we are
committed to working with the Congress to ensure that the DRF remains
solvent through fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
proposed cuts to fema
Question. I am very pleased to see that you have taken a hard look
at the budget and found places to save on administrative cost such as
travel and supplies. While I encourage you to continue to find ways to
create efficiencies, I am concerned that some areas go beyond
efficiencies and become deep cuts that inhibit performance.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposes a $68 million cut to FEMA's
Management and Administration account (including all transfers). No
other component in the Department was subjected to such a significant
cut to its base operations. This proposal looks like the beginning of a
trend of previous cycles that FEMA has been through. In tough budget
times and when major disaster responses are a distance memory--at least
for some inside the beltway--we trim back our readiness efforts.
The budget proposal cites cuts to facility improvements,
information systems, and communications systems. Deferred maintenance
of facilities, turns into deferred maintenance of programs, turns into
deferred capabilities. Unfortunately, this has not worked well in the
past.
In fact, there are a series of reports that show a disturbing cycle
of building up an emergency management capacity after a failed disaster
response, letting the capacity wither away when there hasn't been a
major event for awhile, and then building the capacity back up again
after another failed response.
For example, in 1983, a GAO report found that FEMA suffered from a
variety of management and program problems. Ten years later and after
the devastation of Hurricane Andrew, the National Academy of Public
Administration--citing the 1983 GAO report--found many of the same
problems. Twelve years after Hurricane Andrew, a myriad of reports
found that the very same problems crippled the response to Hurricane
Katrina.
Immediately after each of these disasters, FEMA improved only to
devolve again within a 10-year period. This is a costly way to do
business.
This subcommittee has done its part to ensure the resources FEMA
needs to rebuild itself once again have been provided since Hurricane
Katrina. Since 2005, FEMA's workforce has been increased by 50 percent
to 4,700 strong. Catastrophic planning is more integrated among the
levels of government. Shelter facility data is better managed between
the public and private sectors. The disaster contract acquisition
process is now proactive, not reactive.
But we have to maintain these improvements. And we still have
serious work to do--FEMA is not done rebuilding itself. The national
disaster recovery framework has not been completed; an effective risk
and preparedness assessment system is not in place; FEMA information
systems are not sufficient; and the human resources study is not
complete.
While not all of these are big expenses, each effort requires a
strong FEMA base. I am afraid this budget marks the beginning of
letting FEMA wither on the vine again--just as it did before Hurricane
Katrina.
Please provide a complete breakdown of the cuts by FEMA component,
an explanation of the impact, and a distinction between which cuts are
onetime costs from fiscal year 2010 and which cuts will delay programs
and by how long. Why are you satisfied that FEMA can sustain such cuts
and not only maintain its recent improvements but also keep pace with
evolving risks?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget provides the
resources required to support the Agency's ability to fulfill its
emergency management mission. In light of the current fiscal climate
and through pursuit of identified efficiencies, FEMA cut administrative
costs and professional services contracts by streamlining current
business processes, harnessing the use of innovative technologies, and
eliminating nonmission-critical spending in order to preserve essential
operational activities.
For example, the proposed decrease of $1.6 million in fiscal year
2012 to FEMA's Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer
(OCCHCO) programs in the Management and Administration (M&A) account
will not adversely affect the regional offices' abilities to handle the
expected workloads with regard to hazard mitigation or grants
management activities, nor does the decrease directly affect any
staffing levels in the agency.
Specifically, $900,000 of the decrease represents the elimination
of funding for the Building Engagement, Strengths, and Talent (BEST)
contract. FEMA found that the data garnered from the BEST surveys and
analysis is available from other agency workforce development data
sources.
The balance of the budget cuts are split equally between the
following three areas:
--Finding general operational efficiencies within less costly general
operational requirements, such as enhanced use of video
teleconferencing vs. travel expenditures;
--Leveraging training cost savings by deconflicting separate but
similar agency training offered in the separate FEMA
Qualification System training programs; and
--By shifting contract support costs, which directly support the
disaster workforce, to the DRF appropriation.
The proposed funding in the fiscal year 2012 budget request
supports robust oversight of emergency management operations; national-
level exercises to test FEMA's ability to respond to a catastrophic
cyber attack; the development of catastrophic plans focused on response
to biological events and earthquakes; and emergency preparedness,
coordination, and planning at the local level.
The following chart provides the requested information. Unless
otherwise noted, all cuts are reoccurring.
FISCAL YEAR 2012 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION REDUCTIONS
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
2011 to
Directorate/office fiscal year Impact statement
2012
reductions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Response and Recovery (ORR)--Front
Office:
Disaster Management Support Environment (2,690) FEMA will move as much of the activity as
(DMSE). possible to other sources of funding, leveraging
the assistance of DHS S&T, and sharing the
burden across applicable appropriations.
Response:
Travel...................................... (2,645) While mission-critical travel will not be
affected, this cut will reduce general and
conference attendance by leveraging Web
conferencing and other technology tools.
Contracts................................... (5,562) In-source several Directorate-wide contracts and
convert onsite contractor support positions to
FTEs.
Recovery:
Travel...................................... (812) Eliminate nonmission-critical travel; maximize
use of conference calls and Web-based training
and meetings.
Contracts................................... (6,578) Reduce selected projects funding through
efficiencies.
Equipment................................... (454) $453,800 reductions to Quality Assurance
Recording System (QARS) because procurement is
complete.
Salary...................................... (2,437) Reduce overtime and level of awards, specifically
funding for merit promotions and regional
overtime.
Logistics:
Contracts................................... (2,360) No anticipated impact due to significant progress
made in enhancing logistics capability.
Salary...................................... (1,626) Institute systemwide salary cap, limiting
overtime, awards, etc.
Mitigation:
Contracts................................... (2,524) While this will not impact operations, this cut
will reduce research, assessment, technology,
and support contracts.
Grants/cooperative agreements............... (826) Reduce dam safety and earthquake assistance
funding.
Salary...................................... (1,624) Institute systemwide salary cap, limiting
overtime, awards, etc.
National continuity programs:
Travel...................................... (760) Reduce general and conference travel.
Contracts................................... (13,740) Nonrecur funding for one-time costs for IPAWS and
classified program; reduce program support to
discussion--based exercises.
Office of the Administrator:
Travel...................................... (1,816) Reduce general and conference travel by
leveraging Web conferencing and other technology
tools to continue outreach activities and
sustain training with State and local partners.
Contracts................................... (2,046) Reduce program support contract and professional
services, specifically for OCFO by leveraging
existing in-house capabilities.
Equipment................................... (596) Reduce nonmission-critical equipment purchases.
Salary...................................... (236) Institute system wide salary cap, limiting
overtime, awards, etc.
Mission Support Bureau:
Facilities enhancement...................... (23,300) Nonrecur one-time increase.
Business systems investment................. (5,000) Reduce investment--operate in maintenance mode.
Contractual in-sourcing..................... (7,503) Convert contracts to permanent positions/in-
source.
Travel...................................... (1,428) Reduce general and conference travel by
leveraging Web conferencing and other technology
tools to continue outreach activities and
sustain training with State and local partners.
Contracts................................... (5,808) Reduce program office support and contract
services by leveraging existing in-house
capabilities.
Equipment................................... (4,106) Reduce non mission-critical equipment purchases;
institute telecommunications efficiencies.
Office of National Capital Region Coordination:
Contracts................................... (1,200) Nonrecur funding for the completion of knowledge
management system (a la Wikipedia) for risk and
reduce contracts.
Salary...................................... (302) Institute system-wide salary cap, limiting
overtime, awards, etc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Annual national level exercises may be funded differently depending upon the exercise. Integrated Public
Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) retrofitting would be delayed.
fema staffing
Question. What method is used to calculate FEMA full-time
equivalent (FTE) usage? Does it vary from the simple calculation of
number of hours worked divided by an FTE? Is there a unique calculation
for FTE usage funded from disaster relief?
Answer. FEMA FTE usage is based upon actuals (for fiscal year 2010)
and projections (for fiscal year 2011 and 2012) of hours worked divided
by the number of hours for one FTE. There is no unique calculation for
FTE usage funded from the DRF.
categories of expenditure for grant programs
Question. For the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI), the Port Security Grant Program, and
the Public Transportation Security Assistance Program please provide
the amount spent in each capability category such as communications;
planning; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
(CBRNE) detection; intelligence and information sharing; and volunteer
management and donations for fiscal years 2005-2009.
Answer. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), UASI, Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP), TSGP Supplemental, and TSGP ferry grant
funding are comprised of 38 principal capabilities that provided more
than $6.5 billion in funding from fiscal year 2006-2009.
The table below provides the information requested to the extent
possible under the Grant Reporting Tool:
SELECT GRANT PROGRAMS TARGET CAPABILITY FUNDING REPORT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2006-
Capabilities \1\ 2009 Funding
amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Animal disease emergency support..................... $20,743,442.08
CBRNE detection...................................... 386,704,474.13
Citizen evacuation and shelter-in-place.............. 31,075,070.88
Communications....................................... 1,367,698,117.53
Community preparedness and participation............. 185,274,333.67
Counter-terror investigation and law enforcement..... 304,083,757.85
Critical infrastructure protection................... 1,116,113,358.21
Critical resource logistics and distribution......... 75,601,714.40
Economic and community recovery...................... 10,568,637.65
Emergency operations center management............... 191,436,101.57
Emergency public information and warning............. 41,524,731.18
Emergency public safety and security................. 248,819,560.09
Emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment.......... 25,344,823.98
Environmental health................................. 1,764,190.73
Epidemiological surveillance and investigation....... 11,453,350.84
Explosive device response operations................. 138,614,977.97
Fatality management.................................. 13,842,672.26
Fire incident response support....................... 133,775,284.91
Food and agriculture safety and defense.............. 18,742,044.82
Information gathering and recognition of indicators 68,173,961.12
and warnings........................................
Intelligence analysis and production................. 98,482,865.34
Intelligence and information sharing and 282,124,151.92
dissemination.......................................
Isolation and quarantine............................. 3,479,732.45
Laboratory testing................................... 4,893,098.88
Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services) 46,925,998.01
Mass prophylaxis..................................... 28,444,288.70
Medical supplies management and distribution......... 25,236,254.98
Medical surge........................................ 92,422,098.42
Onsite incident management........................... 169,964,547.36
Planning............................................. 898,629,834.82
Responder safety and health.......................... 54,272,195.33
Restoration of lifelines............................. 6,585,975.25
Risk management...................................... 33,036,019.11
Search and rescue (land-based)....................... 70,162,612.74
Structural damage assessment......................... 1,039,802.34
Volunteer management and donations................... 4,143,404.68
Weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials 307,023,005.21
response and decontamination........................
------------------
Grand total.................................... 6,518,220,491.41
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This table includes FEMA SHSP and UASI.
grants to state and local governments for first responders
Question. In this Nation we have set up a system whereby, the
smallest level of government is responsible for responding to a
disaster until it is overwhelmed and then it must work with other
communities, States, the private sector, and the Federal Government
depending on the size of the disaster. No doubt, State and local first
responders will be the first on the scene during an incident. When
there is a catastrophic event, the whole Nation will have to respond.
Because of this, few disagree that each level of government has to
contribute resources to prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and
recover from such events. However, many disagree on how much should be
contributed and from what entity. This disagreement has been further
highlighted as resources at all levels become more limited. Each year
the President's budget is submitted with the same proposal purporting
to streamline grant programs. Each time that proposal has been rejected
due to a lack of understanding of how it will actually be implemented,
its inconsistency with the underlying authorization law, and concerns
from stakeholders. Further, the Department has yet to submit a metric
to demonstrate how the grants are best targeted to needed capabilities.
Since our emergency management environment is continually evolving, the
issue of Federal grants to support State and local preparedness is also
dynamic. For this reason, the report accompanying the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 created a preparedness task
force which made specific recommendations related to funding grants and
measuring their performance. Further, the specific authorized funding
levels for many of the grant programs authorized in the 9/11 Act will
end in fiscal year 2012. The next step is for the executive branch to
provide leadership for an innovative approach to grant programs that
can be supported by stakeholders. Yet there is very little evidence
that a commitment to this effort is real by FEMA or the Department.
Secretary Napolitano, this issue is not only one of citizen safety and
security but it is also an economic imperative to make the Nation more
resilient through better preparedness and more efficient recovery.
Will the Department propose legislation to reform the grant
programs?
What innovative approaches can you introduce which will also be
supported by stakeholders, to ensure our State and local partners in
homeland security and emergency management are sustaining the right
capabilities for our known and anticipated risks?
Who specifically in your agency is responsible to lead the issue of
preparedness and Federal grants and what products will you require of
them in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 to ensure policy and
requested funds are meeting the Nation's needs? What timeframe will you
hold them to on these products?
Answer. In its last two budgets, the administration has proposed
consolidating grant programs where activities are allowable under
multiple grants. Specifically, the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets
propose to consolidate a number of individual grant programs (including
driver's license security/REAL ID, interoperable emergency
communications, emergency operations centers, and buses) and make them
part of larger/broader grant programs such as UASI and SHSP. This
consolidation will reduce the number of separate grant programs, which
provides the Secretary flexibility to direct funding to the most urgent
priorities and reduces the number of applications a State will need to
submit and that FEMA will need to process.
FEMA agrees with recommendation No. 14 in the Local, State, Tribal,
and Federal Preparedness Task Force's report to the Congress, which
calls for ``Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation
to justify preparedness improvements.'' The detailed recommendation
came directly from the stakeholder community.
FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Protection and National
Preparedness (PNP), Timothy Manning, is responsible for the Agency's
preparedness and Federal grant responsibilities. Within FEMA/PNP, the
Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) is responsible for the administration
of preparedness grants; and the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD)
is responsible for preparedness activities, including individual and
community preparedness, planning guidance, technical assistance,
training, exercises, preparedness doctrine and policy, and preparedness
assessments.
FEMA has taken the recommendations from the Local, State, Tribal,
and Federal Preparedness Task Force report into consideration while
working to improve coordination and consolidation of FEMA's grant
programs, including coordinating interagency grant programs and more
closely linking capability assessments to grant activities. FEMA has
also contracted with the National Association of Public Administration
(NAPA) to conduct a study to develop a core set of performance measures
that can be used to track performance of the SHSP and UASI grants.
national domestic preparedness consortium
Question. The President's budget request proposes deep cuts, 56
percent, to first responder training through the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium (NDPC). It proposes to cut funding for four
members of the NDPC who train emergency personnel from all over the
country to respond to weapons of mass destruction, including chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives attacks. Further, it
completely eliminates funding for two members: one that provides
training for response to natural disasters and one that provides
training specific to transit related incidents. I do not understand
these cuts, especially when the NDPC uses a cost-effective model that
sends instructors to the community receiving training when possible
reducing the travel, accommodations, and backfill expenses of first
responders. What is the Department's justification for cutting funding
to this highly regarded training for first responders? Further, in
light of the fact that the United States was struck by more than 106
natural disasters last year and there have been more than 1,300
attacks, killing or injuring more than 18,000 people worldwide on
trains and subways over the last 7 years worldwide why is training
funding eliminated for natural disaster response training and transit
response training when these are clearly known risks?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget is consistent with
the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 proposals, and the resources
requested are sufficient to meet training needs. The two recipients
whose funding was eliminated represent congressional earmarks. In
addition, States are assuming increased responsibility for awareness
level, refresher, and sustainment training, allowing our institutional
partners to focus resources on more advanced, specialized training
consistent with their respective expertise. Further, States are
permitted to support hazard-specific training efforts with SHSP and
UASI grant programs funds, both subject to proposed fiscal year 2012
increases overall.
urban area security initiative
Question. The House fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution includes
a provision that limits the number of UASI grant recipients to 25. Some
argue that the list should be even shorter and only support the cities
in the top tier of risk. The 9/11 Act requires the FEMA Administrator
to complete an annual risk assessment of the 100 most populous urban
areas and to determine grant awards based on that risk review. Last
year 64 urban areas received funding based on your risk assessment.
What specifically led you to determine that risk is more widespread
than some others believe? What is your position on the House amendment
to reduce the number of urban areas from 64 to 25? How will the House
amendment impact how risk is addressed in the Nation?
Answer. Historically, al Qaeda has focused on prominent political,
economic, and infrastructure targets to produce mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and
fear among the population. The UASI program was authorized and
implemented to reduce the vulnerabilities of our key metropolitan areas
to these types of terrorist threats. While mostly outside the scope of
the UASI program, recent events suggest a trend in which terrorists
seek to conduct smaller, more achievable attacks against easily
accessible targets. Within the past year, attempted attacks and plots
in the United States progressed to an advanced stage largely because of
these groups' ability to use operatives that have access to and
familiarity with the United States as well as their use of new and
varied attack patterns.
DHS and FEMA leadership have awarded grants to UASI-eligible cities
using an allocation methodology that was a continuation of prior
approaches to awarding these types of grants. To determine the UASI-
eligible cities, DHS and FEMA apply a risk formula that incorporates
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The administration is committed
to working with the Congress, as it seeks to improve upon current risk-
informed approaches.
The fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security full-year appropriations
bill did not limit the number of eligible UASI cities to 25. As
directed in section 101 of the 9/11 Act, which amends title XX,
sections 2003 and 2007 of the Homeland Security Act, FEMA will continue
to assess on an annual basis the relative risk of the 100 most populous
metropolitan statistical areas.
emergency food and shelter program
Question. I understand the Emergency Food and Shelter Program uses
a very specific formula to distribute funding based on unemployment
data and poverty figures. While there are signs that the economy is
improving, the recovery has not yet reached those who are the hurting
the most the unemployed and the poor. What economic data was used as
the basis for the proposed reduction to $100 million?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget for the Emergency
Food and Shelter (EFS) Program at the $100 million level is consistent
with the level requested in the President's budget for fiscal year 2010
and fiscal year 2011.
FEMA awards the total funds appropriated by the Congress to the
National Board for the EFS Program, as required by the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act. The National Board then allocates the funding
to approximately 2,500 local jurisdictions in all States and
territories using a formula based on the latest 12-month statistical
data on national unemployment and poverty provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
national flood insurance program and flood maps
Question. Annual flood losses in the United States total more than
$2.4 billion. More than 5.5 million people currently hold flood
insurance policies in more than 20,500 communities across the United
States.
The Nation's flood maps, managed by FEMA, help us assess the risk a
community faces and determine how to insure against that risk.
Unfortunately, the process used to develop these maps is cumbersome and
lacks an ability to apply common sense solutions to a community's
unique factors. I understand that we have to insure against floods, but
in this day and time, it also has to be affordable.
Recognizing that the Congress, through the Banking Committee which
has jurisdiction over this matter, is considering significant reform to
the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA began a critical review of
the program. The review is projected to be completed as late as June
2012. I just don't think people can wait that long for reform. The
National Committee on Levee Safety, which was established by the
Congress and includes representatives from FEMA and the Corps of
Engineers, issued recommendations for reforms back in January 2009.
Some have called for stopping the mapping process altogether and others
want to move forward but include measures that improve local capacity
and map accuracy. Twenty-seven Senators, including myself, and 49 House
Members, wrote to you last month to express concerns about the program
and to propose specific reforms.
Are you satisfied that the Nation is moving as quickly as possible
on this matter? What can be done to expedite the executive branch's
proposal for reform?
Answer. Currently, FEMA is executing the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) Reform work plan, and is evaluating changes to the
program. This process was designed to engage program stakeholders from
a variety of perspectives, and to date has included hundreds of
stakeholders in a series of public meetings and generated thousands of
public comments on reform possibilities.
The original NFIP reform work plan envisioned an 18-month process,
to ensure thorough and transparent engagement with a wide variety of
program stakeholders. Based on feedback from the Congress, FEMA has
accelerated this schedule, and hopes to report findings before the end
of this 18 months timeframe. This will allow for consideration of
program reforms by decisionmakers prior to the expiration of the
current NFIP authorization in September 2011.
flood hazard map risk analysis and modernization
Question. To date, $1.65 billion has been provided to digitize
flood maps, and in many cases, improve the data used to create maps.
How many maps, by State, still need to have significantly improved
engineering data/validated data added to the maps? Please provide a
comparison of the number of maps that will be produced if the budget
request of $103 million is provided for Flood Hazard Map Risk Analysis
(FHMRA) compared to the fiscal year 2010 level.
Answer. FEMA tracks the flood hazard inventory by stream and
coastal miles. Our total modernized inventory is comprised of about
900,000 miles. The national need stands at 59 percent of stream miles
(currently 41-percent valid). This means about 530,000 miles of the
inventory needs updating to reach 100 percent valid. The goal in the
Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) Multi-Year Plan was
to reach 80 percent valid. This equates to 350,000 miles. As a
percentage of the modernized map inventory of about 100,000 maps, about
59,000 maps need updating to reach 100 percent, 39,000 maps need
updating to reach 80 percent valid.
At the fiscal year 2010 funding level, FEMA would begin updating
9,000-12,000 maps. Under the proposed funding level for fiscal year
2012, FEMA estimates 6,000 to 8,400 maps less per year will be
produced. FEMA will adapt its project sequencing process in an aim to
keep pace with the eroding reliability of the flood hazard analyses and
maps.
The data presented below is from a data collection done on January
28, 2011, and shows the percentage of miles by State that are currently
invalid. This information is improving regularly. The national need
stands at 59 percent of stream miles (currently 41-percent valid).
FEMA NATIONAL FLOOD HAZARD INVENTORY
[Percentage of stream and coastal miles by State currently needing
updates]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of
miles needing
significantly
State improved
engineering
data/validated
data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama................................................ 42
Alaska................................................. ( \1\ )
Arizona................................................ 99
Arkansas............................................... 69
California............................................. 93
Colorado............................................... 70
Connecticut............................................ 98
District of Columbia................................... 12
Delaware............................................... 58
Florida................................................ 88
Georgia................................................ 39
Hawaii................................................. 99
Idaho.................................................. 99
Illinois............................................... 93
Indiana................................................ 85
Iowa................................................... 13
Kansas................................................. 30
Kentucky............................................... 14
Louisiana.............................................. 86
Maine.................................................. 99
Maryland............................................... 37
Massachusetts.......................................... 98
Michigan............................................... 30
Minnesota.............................................. 37
Mississippi............................................ 51
Missouri............................................... 47
Montana................................................ 81
Nebraska............................................... 10
Nevada................................................. 92
New Hampshire.......................................... 96
New Jersey............................................. 73
New Mexico............................................. 43
New York............................................... 38
North Carolina......................................... 57
North Dakota........................................... 72
Ohio................................................... 39
Oklahoma............................................... 60
Oregon................................................. 95
Pennsylvania........................................... 38
Rhode Island........................................... 98
South Carolina......................................... 37
South Dakota........................................... 92
Tennessee.............................................. 23
Texas.................................................. 83
Utah................................................... 94
Vermont................................................ 94
Virginia............................................... 79
Washington............................................. 95
West Virginia.......................................... 75
Wisconsin.............................................. 83
Wyoming................................................ 99
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Not yet available.
citizenship and immigration services--international adoptions--haiti
Question. The Help HAITI Act, which was enacted in December 2010,
responded to the need for the families of the 1,400 Haitian orphans who
were granted humanitarian parole in the aftermath of the January, 2010,
earthquake, to immediately apply to adjust the immigration status from
parolee to legal permanent resident. Prior to the enactment of the Help
HAITI Act, these orphans, upon finalizing their adoptions by American
families in U.S. State courts, would have had to wait for 2 or more
years to adjust their immigration status to legal permanent resident.
During this 2-year period, these vulnerable children would have
remained in limbo, leaving them with fewer legal protections,
potentially ineligible for critical resources, and at risk of being
returned to Haiti.
Several Members, including myself, sent you a letter asking for the
swift implementation of the Help HAITI law, to ensure that families are
able to move toward naturalization as soon as possible. You responded
to our letter on February 7, 2011, and noted that many of the
suggestions we had made to streamline the process for the adoptive
families have already been implemented by the Department. I appreciate
what has been done to date in this regard.
Can you please identify the specific steps you have taken toward
the implementation of the Help HAITI Act? Are there additional steps
that the Congress needs to take legislatively to assist these families
with these adoptions?
As you know, I am deeply concerned about how the Congress can work
with your Department--and other Departments involved in the
international adoption process--to safely and efficiently improve this
process so that adoptive parents can be joined with children eligible
for adoption. I hope you will commit to working with me on this issue.
Answer. The following is a timeline of steps U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) took to implement this law:
--Sent a letter to each of the parents/sponsors of paroled Haitian
children to advise them of the passage of the act. The letter
also informed them that additional information would be sent to
them and that the USCIS Web site would be updated with
information about filing under the act. (12/16/2010)
--Implemented an interim policy for implementation of the act. (12/
21/2010)
--USCIS Web site announcement posted about the act's implementation.
(1/3/2011)
--Filing instructions posted on the USCIS Web site. (1/4/2011)
--A follow-up letter was sent out to the parents/sponsors of paroled
Haitian children with instructions on how to apply under the
act. (1/5/2011)
--Teleconference held for families of paroled Haitian children and
other external stakeholders. (2/9/2011)
--USCIS systems updated to produce the Green Cards reflecting the
newly established class of admission code HH-6. (2/27/2011)
Through March 14, 2011, approximately 30 individuals had filed
applications to adjust status under the act. The act established a cap
of 1,400 through December 9, 2013. USCIS is closely monitoring the
number of applicants and approvals. USCIS will contact at a later date
the parents/sponsors of the children that have not yet filed to remind
them of the act.
As the provisions of the act will permit all children authorized
parole under the Special Humanitarian Parole Program to obtain lawful
permanent status in the United States, the Department does not believe
additional steps or legislation is needed.
international adoptions--cambodia and nepal
Question. USCIS has played a central role in the processing of
orphan visas for the nearly approximately 200,000 children adopted by
United States citizens over the last decade. I know that this role is
not one that is taken lightly and appreciate the work that you and your
Department have done to make the adoption of children from other
countries both efficient and ethical. That being said, I remain
concerned that USCIS has felt there was no alternative in at least two
countries, almost 10 years ago in Cambodia and most recently in Nepal,
than to suspend orphan visa processing altogether. To me, suspending
adoptions in response to allegations of fraud is like shutting down the
international banking system because of a bank robbery. We need to find
a better more targeted way of using the law to preventing abuse and
then actively prosecuting those who abuse the law.
Please provide the subcommittee with examples of ways we might work
together to provide the Department with alternative measures to protect
children, their birth families, and their potential adoptive families?
Answer. The Department believes that the best way to respond to
concerns about abuse in the intercountry adoption context is through
implementing better safeguards and protections in the process. I share
your concerns about the total suspension adoption processing in certain
countries. Where possible, the better approach is to identify and seek
to address specific problems in adoption programs without suspending
them completely. The Hague Adoption Convention, which entered into
force for the United States in 2008, implements procedures for
intercountry adoption processing that include many important safeguards
helping guarantee the transparency and integrity of the adoptions
process.
The Department supports a U.S. Government approach of working
proactively with countries of origin that have not yet signed or
ratified the Hague Adoption Convention to assist them in developing the
appropriate child welfare infrastructure needed for Hague
implementation. In the meantime, DHS also supports making changes to
U.S. non-Hague adoption immigration processing policy and procedures
that include some of the protections of Hague policy and processing,
particularly those that enhance transparency and integrity in
intercountry adoption.
In August 2010, the Department of State (DOS) identified a serious
concern in the processing of adoption cases from Nepal involving
children presented as abandoned--namely that the documentation provided
by the Nepali police validating the abandonments of the children was
unreliable and not credible. DOS and USCIS conducted a joint
investigation which resulted in the suspension of processing of new
abandonment cases for Nepali children. Since then, DOS and USCIS have
been processing the 64 abandonment cases that were already in progress
as of the suspension date, all but 6 of which have required detailed
Requests for Additional Evidence because the initial documentation
provided with the adoption petitions failed to establish that the
children could be defined as orphans under U.S. law. This suspension
affected only abandonment cases in Nepal, and the program remains open
for cases involving relinquished children. The processing of the 64
abandonment cases is ongoing.
The Department will continue to look for ways to strengthen
international adoption policies and operational practices to the
benefit of children and families, and looks forward to working with
closely with the Subcommittee on this issue.
e-verify
Question. What activities did funds provided to E-Verify for
Monitoring and Compliance support in fiscal year 2010? What metrics are
in place to track the success of the Monitoring and Compliance division
in ensuring employer compliance with system rules?
What steps can a worker currently take to challenge an erroneous
final nonconfirmation? Are there any forms of redress, reconsideration,
or protections in place for workers who lose their job as a result of
an erroneous final nonconfirmation? What is the estimated cost of
making E-Verify mandatory nationally?
A recent GAO report called USCIS's prior cost estimate ``minimally
credible''. What steps are being taken to further improve the accuracy
of cost assessments? What fiscal impact would making E-Verify mandatory
have on small businesses?
Bloomberg Government reported that if E-Verify had been mandatory
for all employers in 2010, it would have cost businesses $2.7-$2.6
billion of which would have been borne by the small businesses that
drive our economy. Does USCIS concur in that estimate? If not, please
explain why?
Answer. In fiscal year 2010, the E-Verify Monitoring and Compliance
(M&C) program continued to expand in terms of capacity, compliance and
initiatives to enhance the integrity of the E-Verify system. Hiring and
recruitment were underway for an additional 44 M&C staff. As of the
beginning of March 2011, 13 were on board and 20 are in clearance. To
increase M&C staff's capacity to process more cases, an enhancement was
made to the Compliance Tracking and Management System, which helped to
streamline processing and decrease manual data entry. System
requirements for an enhanced data analytics tool were completed in
fiscal year 2010 in anticipation of fiscal year 2011 procurement,
allowing more detailed and full analysis of employer behavior. In terms
of compliance activities, M&C contacted approximately 15,000 employers
related to noncompliance.
M&C also started tracking additional employer actions. These
actions include monitoring for:
--Duplicate Social Security numbers (two reports);
--Verifying employees hired before November 7, 1986 (employers must
complete the Form I-9 before using E-Verify, and employers may
not use the Form I-9 for employees hired before November 7,
1986);
--Nonuse of E-Verify;
--Terminating employees following a Tentative Nonconfirmation (TNC);
--Verifying an employee more than 3 days after he or she was hired;
and
--Verifying existing employees.
M&C also executed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to
sharing of information and monitoring employer actions referred to it
by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division's Office of Special
Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices.
More than 45,000 employers who have signed new agreements with E-
Verify have been vetted through Dun & Bradstreet to ensure that
companies enrolling in E-Verify are legal and active corporate
entities. This further strengthens the integrity of the system by
verifying the legitimacy of employers using the system. USCIS plans to
ensure all of the 250,000 employers are vetted in the coming year.
E-Verify system enhancements have also included new closure codes
to be used by employers to ensure resources are devoted to cases that
may point to possible misuse of the system. For example, this change
helps M&C analysts have more insight as to whether an employee run
through E-Verify was terminated as a result of an E-Verify finding or
if they quit voluntarily.
An important enhancement to E-Verify was the addition of passport
data and photos as part of our continuing efforts to address identity
fraud and employee use of falsified documents.
Regarding metrics, M&C monitors employers who were subject to
compliance action. Fiscal year 2010 data indicate that 90 percent of
employers corrected past processes and are now in compliance with E-
Verify program rules and policies for which they received compliance
assistance.
USCIS is committed to ensuring that workers who receive a final
nonconfirmation in error are treated equitably. Even if an employee
receives a final nonconfirmation, the employer may retain the employee
provided that it notifies DHS. Section c.6 of the E-Verify MOU signed
by the employer states, ``The employer must notify DHS if it continues
to employ any employee after receiving a final nonconfirmation, and is
subject to a civil penalty between $550 and $1,100 for each failure to
notify DHS of continued employment following a final nonconfirmation.''
The employer may notify DHS by selecting the following option when
closing out the case in the E-Verify system:
--The employee continues to work for the employer after receiving a
final nonconfirmation result. E-Verify cannot verify that this
employee is authorized to work in the United States. The
employee had contested the tentative nonconfirmation, but was
unable to resolve it. The employer chooses to exercise its
legal right to allow the employee to continue to work.
Employees who believe that they received a final nonconfirmation in
error have called either the E-Verify employee hotline or the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC) for Unfair Immigration-Related Employment
Practices. USCIS and OSC have a coordinated process for intervening on
the employees' behalf. Both telephone numbers are found on employee
tentative nonconfirmation notices and referral letters.
E-Verify staff will assist the small number of employees who
receive a final nonconfirmation in error and intervene on their behalf.
Specifically, USCIS and OSC have helped employees return to their jobs
after they were terminated for receiving a final nonconfirmation by
contacting their employers and explaining to them that the final
nonconfirmation was issued in error. In a minority of overturned final
nonconfirmation cases, OSC was also able to get back pay for employees
in addition to getting them reinstated.
To help employees avoid the adverse consequences associated with
erroneous final nonconfirmations, USCIS will begin a phased deployment
of Self Check in March, 2011. Self Check provides individuals with the
ability to confirm their own employment eligibility status. For those
individuals who will be working for an E-Verify employer, Self Check
will enable them to identify any potential data mismatches before
employment begins and the employer runs an E-Verify check. E-Verify
Self Check is not for employer use. Employers may not require workers
to use Self Check or show Self Check results.
The estimated cost of making E-Verify mandatory would depend on the
details of legislation making the system mandatory, fully considering
all relevant factors and cost drivers.
The recent GAO findings were based solely on cost estimates related
to the Verification Information System's (VIS--the IT system that
supports E-Verify) Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE). Significant
revisions have been made since the review by GAO. In addition to
performing sensitivity and risk analyses of the data, an independent
reviewer (i.e., the MITRE Corporation) analyzed the revisions to
determine whether the new estimates possessed the four characteristics
identified by GAO as being reliable cost estimates:
--Comprehensive.--According to MITRE's analysis, the current version
of the estimate now breaks each enhancement project into
smaller elements using the phases of the Systems Engineering
Life Cycle (SELC) as a model. The estimate now incorporates
historical cost data, but still does not include some external
program costs for activities such as Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) and security costs which are funded by the USCIS Office
of Information Technology (OIT). There is ongoing effort
related to this evaluation to include these costs.
--Well Documented.--Methods used to develop the estimate are now
clearly documented and presented in a manner as to be recreated
by someone unfamiliar with the estimate. The current version of
the estimate now contains an accompanying workbook detailing
the data and calculations used in deriving all estimates and a
risk register was created that identifies specific program
risks.
--Accurate.--The current LCCE has been updated to reflect
programmatic changes as of the second quarter of fiscal year
2011, including actual Social Security Administration (SSA)
cost projections.
--Credible.--The estimate now contains both sensitivity and risk
analysis sections consistent with best practices outlined by
GAO. The MITRE review also found that an underestimation of the
cost risk. This issue has been addressed and a more realistic
method of correlation estimation has been used.
Regarding the fiscal impact on small businesses of making E-Verify
mandatory, at this time, USCIS does not have data and analysis that
would specify the potential impact. USCIS will consider conducting
analysis on this matter in the future.
federal law enforcement training center
Question. At the February 17, 2011, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs hearing, the Secretary said the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) recently piloted a test curriculum
on homegrown violent extremism with participation from local police and
sheriff departments. Please provide more information about this pilot
program. How will this change or expand FLETC's current missions and
curricula focus? What is the plan to continue pilot testing, rolling
out the program? Who will the training focus on? State and local?
Rural, urban, Federal law enforcement?
Answer. In February 2010, I tasked the Homeland Security Advisory
Council (HSAC) to work with State and local law enforcement as well as
relevant community groups to develop recommendations on how the
Department can better support community-based efforts to combat violent
extremism domestically. To this end, HSAC established a Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) working group consisting of law enforcement,
community leaders, State and local government officials, youth leaders,
academic leaders, and other subject-matter experts to provide a series
of recommendations.
In response to these recommendations, DHS has been working with
Federal partners as well as State and local law enforcement
organizations to develop guidance for the development of CVE training.
A proof of concept session, based on the newly drafted curriculum
guidance, was hosted at FLETC in Glynco, Georgia from February 8-10 and
included State, local, and tribal law enforcement officials from around
the country. Participants received preexisting FLETC CVE related
training, after which they discussed the training and provided
feedback. A training needs assessment was conducted during the session
to identify the appropriate scope and direction of the CVE training.
Findings were compared against nationally recognized and emergent best
practices for similar topics. The participants identified four crucial
topical areas:
--Community-oriented policing;
--Cultural awareness;
--Information sharing, including suspicious activity reporting and
intelligence-related information processes; and
--Civil rights and privacy.
In addition, the participants identified the need for at least two
versions of the CVE training: an executive level course, targeting
command level law enforcement leadership; and a line officers course,
targeting patrol officers and investigators.
As a result of the curriculum development session, the FLETC will
develop the Countering Violent Extremism Training Program (CVETP), in
collaboration with State and local police stakeholders and subject
matter experts. The training will focus on State, local, and tribal law
enforcement officers who serve in urban and/or rural environments. In
addition, CVE training will be incorporated into existing training
programs for Federal officers and agents conducted at the FLETC.
Next steps in rolling out the program include the Design Phase,
which involves a Curriculum Development Conference (CDC) to finalize
training topics, write performance objectives and outline the training
schedule; the Development Phase, which will encompass resource
identification, lesson plan and training materials development, and
determination of instructional methodologies; and the pilot program,
which will test the validity of the established CVETP goals and
objectives. Delivery of the pilot program is expected within 120 days
following the CDC.
Following delivery of the pilot program, the CVETP will begin the
Evaluation Phase to determine program content and criterion validity.
Participant feedback will be collected, instructors will be evaluated,
and any adjustments to the curriculum identified as a result of the
delivery of the pilot will be incorporated into the CVETP prior to full
implementation. Using a combination of delivery mechanisms, 400-600
students are expected to be trained during fiscal year 2011 and 2,400-
3,600 in fiscal year 2012. By fiscal year 2013, instructor-led content
will be converted to a digital format to allow interactive delivery
using an electronic learning portal. As a result, an unlimited number
of law enforcement students can potentially be trained using available
technologies.
science and technology--laboratory facilities
Question. Provide the distribution of the $276.5 million request
for laboratory facilities, by facility and purpose.
Answer. The table below provides the distribution of the $276.5
million request for laboratory facilities, by facility and purpose.
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
2012
President's
budget request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Construction:
Infrastructure upgrades \1\......................... 18.2
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)....... 150.0
Operations:
Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC)............ 0.8
National Urban Security Technology Laboratory 2.3
(NUSTL)............................................
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)........... 40.8
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)............ 13.4
National Biodefense and Analysis and Countermeasures 30.9
Center (NBACC).....................................
Laboratory salaries and benefits........................ 20.1
---------------
Total............................................. 276.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In fiscal year 2012, S&T plans infrastructure upgrades at TSL.
aviation security research--automated target recognition
Question. Provide an assessment by the S&T Directorate of the
Automated Target Resolution (ATR) technology that is being tested as a
software upgrade to advanced imaging technology units? Based on S&T's
assessment of this technology, will it be ready for deployment in
fiscal year 2011? What is the schedule for certification?
Answer. The S&T Directorate's Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
project develops advanced software capabilities for AIT units to detect
explosives and concealed weapons. This project also will introduce new
standalone or adjunct imaging technologies, such as computed
tomography, to continue the improvement of detection performance and
the detection of novel explosives. This is critical to improve
detection, lower false alarm rates, and reduce privacy concerns. S&T is
currently evaluating advanced threat recognition software to guide
further enhancements to reach full-scale development and deployment.
One millimeter-wave based ATR system recently completed
qualification testing at the DHS Transportation Security Laboratory.
Based on these results, the TSA granted authority to pilot the system
for passenger screening purposes at three aviation checkpoint test
sites (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport, and Las Vegas-McCarran International
Airport). S&T has approved the system's T&E master plan addendum and
the operational test plan. TSA has concluded operational testing and
evaluation and the results are currently being compiled and reviewed.
The final operational test report is scheduled for May 2011. Once all
reports are received, S&T will complete a letter of assessment for the
testing.
dndo--radiation portal monitor program
Question. Provide a status update of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM)
requirements by vector including total RPMs required by vector, systems
deployed, and the percentage completed. Indicate gaps where solutions
do not exist. The request includes $37.4 million for RPM acquisitions.
How will this money, in addition to unobligated balances, reduce the
gap in RPMs necessary at each vector? Provide a plan for RPM
unobligated balances and the $37.4 million requested for fiscal year
2012. Distinguish between current generation and ASP deployments. How
is the Helium-3 shortage impacting this program? Has a solution been
identified?
Answer. The response to this question is designated as For Official
Use Only. The Department will submit the response under separate cover.
human portable radiation detection systems
Question. For Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS),
provide a chart showing the notional fiscal year 2012 acquisition plan
by technology, the quantity, and by DHS component. What is the total
number of HPRDS needed by each component?
Answer. The chart below provides the notional fiscal year 2012
acquisition plan by technology, the quantity, and by DHS component.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (in
Fiscal year 2012 Cost Quantity millions of
dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP:
(LaBr) next generation handhelds......................... $30,000 340 $10.0
(HPGe) next generation advanced handheld (upgrade)....... 100,000 2 0.20
USCG:
(LaBr) next generation handhelds......................... 30,000 100 3.00
Personal radiation detectors............................. 2,800 700 1.94
DNDO:
TSA-VIPR Procurement: \1\
Recapitalization......................................... .............. .............. 1.00
MDDP Procurement:
Radio-Isotope Identification Devices (RIID) handhelds.... 23,000 51 1.17
Personal radiation detectors............................. 2,800 72 0.20
Backpacks................................................ 34,000 33 1.12
Communication equipment.................................. .............. .............. 0.37
\3\ He Procurement........................................... .............. .............. 1.00
--------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................. .............. .............. 20.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Equipment replacement is due to damage. If substantive damage does not occur, new next gen handhelds will be
procured.
Based on present requests, the following is the estimated number of
HPRDS needed by component and type of equipment for fiscal year 2011-
2017:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
2011-2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP:
Next generation advanced handhelds.................. 20
Next generation advanced handheld (upgrades)........ 2
Next generation handhelds........................... 3,200
Personal radiation detectors........................ 4,400
HPT \1\............................................. 150
TSA:
Backpacks........................................... 80
Next generation handhelds........................... 160
Personal radiation detectors........................ 300
HPT \1\............................................. 150
USCG:
Next generation advanced handheld (upgrades)........ 8
Next generation handhelds........................... 1,000
Personal radiation detectors........................ 4,000
Backpacks........................................... 250
HPT \1\............................................. 1,600
DNDO (MDDP): Upgrade equipment (number of teams) 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note.--Human Portable Tripwire (HPT).--The current-generation of
human portable systems is predominantly composed of personal radiation
detectors (PRDs). The tripwire role is intended to increase the
opportunity and likelihood of detecting radiological and nuclear
materials (rad/nuc) through constant, nondeliberate rad/nuc scans. HPT
detection systems used to perform passive monitoring should be
considered standard operational equipment capable of being worn by
operators at all times. These systems should also be easy to use and
cost-effective so they can be easily deployed to a large number of
operators, increasing the opportunity for detection. These units will
likely occur between fiscal year 2011-2017, subsequent to the
completion of HPT development efforts.
small boat stand-off detection system/on-dock rail program
Question. According to the request, the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) will complete an Alternatives of Analysis (AoA) for the
Small Boat Stand-Off Detection system and the On-Dock Rail (ODR)
program in fiscal year 2011. When will the AoA be completed? If
completed, provide a summary of the AoA findings.
Answer. The Small Vessel Stand-Off Detection (SVSD) AoA is
scheduled for completion in December 2011. Due to funding delays
associated with the continuing resolutions for fiscal year 2011, this
project was delayed by 3 months.
As described in DNDO's CJ, the ODR AoA is planned for completion in
fiscal year 2012 and is currently scheduled to be completed on March
2012.
radiation detection straddle carrier
Question. According to the request, DNDO will complete an
Operational Assessment of a Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier at the
Port of Tacoma, Washington in fiscal year 2011. Has this assessment
been completed? What did DNDO conclude from this assessment?
Answer. DNDO is poised to begin this assessment immediately,
pending settlement of final support details with operational users.
Once begun, the assessment will last about 6 weeks. DNDO will provide
the results of this assessment when completed.
radiation detection for air cargo and checked baggage
Question. Describe the work DNDO is conducting with TSA or on
behalf of TSA to detect illicit nuclear material in air cargo and
baggage.
Answer. In close collaboration with the DHS S&T Directorate's
Transportation Security Laboratory, DNDO is evaluating whether computed
tomography (CT) x ray systems, currently deployed throughout aviation
pathways to detect explosives, can also be used to detect radiological
and nuclear (rad/nuc) materials in baggage and small cargo. The program
will begin with a baseline system evaluation to determine the basic
technical feasibility of supporting our rad/nuc mission. The initial
tests, currently underway, will focus on determining if the existing,
certified CT systems may be able to be leveraged to also detect rad/nuc
materials and test objects of interest. Following analysis of test data
and determination of feasibility, DNDO, S&T, and TSA will discuss
options for potential next steps.
research and development project summaries
Question. For each individual project funded under DNDO's Research,
Development, and Operations appropriation, submit quad charts that
include a project description, the technology readiness level, planned
demos and deliverables, and a timeline for transition.
Answer. Research and development project summaries follow.
dndo--systems engineering program
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--This program provides assistance to maintain
the high quality and consistency of the application of systems
engineering principles across the multiple DNDO programs, and in
implementing both the DHS acquisition directive 102-1 and DNDO's
solutions development process. This includes program management,
financial administration, customer service and quality assurance tasks,
as well as an on-site liaison to facilitate customer service and
coordination for the Systems Engineering Support Program contract.
Objectives:
--Institutionalize a systems engineering mindset across DNDO programs
and mission areas.
--Assist DNDO program managers and mission area managers in
compliance with systems engineering requirements found in DHS
Acquisition Directive 102-01.
--Provide engineering support for Aviation Ports of Entry (APOEs).
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Key Deliverables:
--Leadership and administration will satisfy the commitments of the
systems engineering support contract.
--Development of alternatives analysis and operational requirements
document for limited deployment of existing technologies to
APOEs.
--Conduct analysis of alternatives, characterization testing, and
modeling and simulation activities for development of systems
for other APOE operational environments.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--Systems
engineering program, $5,400,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment:
--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3,
and 9.3.
--This task supports all GNDA detection development and deployment
goals.
dndo--rad/nuc detection standards
Program Description
Program Description.--Support for the development and maintenance
of domestic and international consensus standards as well as
Government-unique standards for rad/nuc detection systems. DNDO was
directed by the Safe Port Act of 2006 to collaborate with NIST and
develop Technical Capability Standards (TCS) for nonintrusive imaging
and radiation detection equipment to be published by the Secretary of
Homeland Security as Government-unique standards. TCS focus on the
capability to detect special nuclear material. DNDO and NIST lead an
inter-agency standards working group that aims to produce a suite of
TCS for various detection systems.
Objectives:
--Aid U.S. Government leadership in the development of national and
international standards relating to rad/nuc detection.
--Develop Government-unique TCS for nonintrusive imaging and rad/nuc
detection systems.
--Develop and maintain national consensus standards for rad/nuc
detection systems.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Key Deliverables.--Guidance on required rad/nuc detection
capability for users and development programs. Informed by classified
threat information not available to entire consensus standard
community.
Schedule Goals:
--Develop and revise rad/nuc consensus standards as appropriate.
--Draft two technical capability standards annually until all
required standards are published (estimate approximately 12
needed).
--Goal is to complete each TCS in 2 years.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--Rad/Nuc detection
standards, $1,840,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 1.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2,
5.1, 5.2, and 9.3.
dndo--information sharing, mission critical messaging
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--The DNDO Information Sharing Program
establishes and maintains the necessary enterprise and data
architectures that enable programs in DNDO, DHS, and our Federal,
State, local, and commercial partners to effectively share rad/nuc
information for the purpose of preventing terrorism and enhancing
National Security. Mission Critical Messaging (MCM) will connect
Federal, State, local, and tribal radiological and nuclear detection
systems to share information for the purpose of increasing the
effectiveness of counter terrorism capabilities and facilitate the
development of a rad/nuc information-sharing environment. MCM will
leverage existing information sharing standards, commercially available
technology, and DNDO's Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information
System (JACCIS) to connect elements of the GNDA together to share
situational awareness and enable a managed coordinated response.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Key Deliverables:
--Create and update cost-effective, compliant enterprise
architecture, data management, and systems engineering
artifacts.
--Update and maintain the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear domain, in
conjunction with the domain co-steward.
--Update and maintain Information Exchange Package Documentation
(IEPD) N.25 standard for rad/nuc information exchange.
--Stand-up the Mission Critical Messaging Project: Plan, analyze, and
develop the project approach.
--Establish a test interface between the DNDO Joint Analysis Center
(JAC) and at least one Federal, State, local or tribal entity.
Objectives:
--Provide architecture guidance and support to the DNDO programs that
support GNDA definition and implementation.
--Improve rad/nuc threat situational awareness among Federal, State,
local, and tribal partners.
--Enhance system interoperability to enable faster mission-critical
integration.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--Information
sharing, MCM, $5,160,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--TRL will be assessed as part of SDP
stage 2a.
Timeline for Transition.--Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2012.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4.2, 5.2, 6.3, 7.1, and
7.2.
dndo--gnda development: annual planning, modeling, and analysis
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Strategic planning and evolving risk
evaluations contribute to an a Joint Inter-agency Annual Review and
Annual Report on the GNDA that provides:
--Status of current detection architecture capabilities.
--Strategic direction for further GNDA enhancements.
Objectives.--The strategic planning, modeling and risk analyses are
intended to:
--Reduce the technical and programmatic risk of new efforts.
--Enhance the integration and interoperability of new efforts within
the GNDA.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Annual GNDA development study plan.
--Update GNDA ``baseline'' architecture.
--Implement Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) process:
--Study plan;
--Inter-agency working group meetings; and
--Gaps and solutions.
--Risk-based architecture gaps and solutions prioritization.
--Joint Annual Review and Annual Report.
--Update GNDA strategic plan as required.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--Annual planning,
modeling, and analysis, $5,100,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 1 through 10.
dndo--gnda development: international domain
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--The goal of the international layer is to
improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials
by increasing the national and regional-level detection capability
efforts and encouraging the development and implementation of PRND
capabilities in other countries. Emphasis is placed on detection
efforts in all pathways (air, land, maritime, commercial, and private
transportation). International engagement fosters national-level
detection architectures in other countries/regions that compliment and
reinforce the detection capabilities of the United States.
Objectives:
--Foster bilateral and multilateral relationships to enhance national
and regional-level architecture development and PRND
capabilities.
--Build on U.S. Government and international assistance efforts to
create a multi-layered rad/nuc detection capability.
--Leverage international engagement efforts to further enhance the
domestic implementation of more robust rad/nuc detection
architectures that contribute to an expanded GNDA.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Conduct two ``Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Implementation Workshops'' to follow on Model Guidelines
Document (MGD) development and implementation.
--Conduct one regional GNDA workshop.
--Conduct three regional architectural analyses.
--Continue bilateral and multilateral engagements with key foreign
partners on nuclear detection architectures, to include the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other partners.
International GNDA Studies
Work on international geographical architectural analyses to
recommend improvements in our national or regional-level detection
capacity in foreign countries is expanding.
International engagements are prioritized and conducted in both
bilateral and multilateral fora through agreements and arrangements
(e.g., S&T Agreements, UNSCR 1540, GICNT) and with existing
institutions (e.g., IAEA, World Customs Organization, Interpol,
International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime
Organization, etc) as a means to bolster the GNDA.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--GNDA development--
international, $3,530,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
dndo--gnda development: land border domain
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--DNDO develops time-phased strategies and
plans for improving the probability of preventing and deterring rad/nuc
attacks through the land border pathway. In general, studies will be
commissioned to identify and characterize trade-offs, risks, and costs
before deciding on specific implementation paths. DNDO works with our
front-line end-user components to assess and implement solutions to
mitigate these threats.
Objectives:
--Continue to support analyses of detection strategies between the
Ports of Entry (POEs) and remaining vulnerabilities at POEs.
--Continue to support modeling and risk assessments focused on
characterizing the threat and identifying opportunities for
detection and interdiction at the border.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Land Border GNDA Requirements Development Studies:
--Complete the Land Border Optimum POE Strategy study.
--Document gaps and priorities based on the Land Border Optimum POE
Strategy study and the Probability of Encounter study.
Land Border Pathways:
--Develop supporting documentation (e.g., mission needs statement)
for at least one concept, including giving consideration to
those concepts for which analysis plans were developed in
fiscal year 2011.
--Develop a final report describing radiation detector types,
operational procedures, and policy provisions that might be
suitable for improving the land border elements of the GNDA.
Land Border GNDA Studies
The Land Border Pathways is an iterative program that leverages
existing and emerging technologies and findings from laboratory and
field evaluations against capability gaps and mission requirements
generated from studies and direct input from user representatives.
Objective.--Continue to support the CBP Office of Border Patrol
(OBP) with improvements to its rad/nuc detection capabilities, both in
developing the next generation of detectors as well as procuring
detectors for OBP, as funds are available.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--GNDA development--
Land border pathways, $3,330,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2 and 3.
dndo--gnda development: aviation domain
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--This effort determines the bounding
requirements for critical Aviation mission area projects to optimize
mobility, agility, and adversary cost; to develop holistic airport
solutions; and to address International General Aviation (IGA) and
domestic general aviation scanning.
Objectives:
--Examine the intersection of International Commercial Aviation (ICA)
Pax/Bag, ICA Air Cargo, and IGA pathways, including the
commonality of systems and processes that can be leveraged and
shared.
--Reduce long-term burdens of system acquisition, maintenance, and
operation by seeking cumulative benefits gained from enhanced
efficiencies across national and global operations.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Begin regional, cross-border aircraft vulnerability mitigation
analysis of Northern Border and Caribbean aviation traffic.
--Assess feasibility of developing software that will assist
operations centers in detecting flight anomalies that pose
direct-to-target threats.
--Begin development of IGA security gap solutions (for inbound IGA).
--Complete DHS-AMD-102-1 activities to document capability gaps for
domestic APOEs, and document solution options.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--GNDA development--
Aviation domain, $2,470,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, and 5.1.
dndo--gnda development: maritime domain
Program Description/Objectives
Maritime GNDA Requirements Development Program Description.--
Conduct architectural studies and Capability-Based Assessments (CBAs)
to ascertain gaps and define the interagency PRND capabilities needed
to strengthen maritime pathways against rad/nuc threats (materials,
weapons, and conveyances) and formulate recommendations to mitigate
waterway/seaport vulnerabilities to achieve the maximum risk reduction
within the constraints of the available budget.
Objectives:
--Determine gaps and vulnerabilities.
--Formulate recommendations and plans to deny entry of unauthorized
rad/nuc materials and weapons into the United States at
seaports, waterways, and between POEs.
--Develop a well-coordinated network to integrate the GNDA with the
national plan to achieve maritime domain awareness (MDA) and
understand interrelationships within the multi-layered
structure of GNDA.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Continue MDA CBAs that design and integrate maritime PRND data and
information into the MDA enterprise-wide network; recommend
options that improve small vessel surveillance, detection,
analysis, and awareness of incidents and activities.
--Initiate CBA of the cruise line industry (cruise ships and terminal
operations).
--Continue maritime modeling and operations analysis framework that
integrates a wide range of threats and countermeasures; conduct
tradeoff studies to support future planning decisions; and
integrate estimates of detection/interdiction probabilities and
consequences of attack.
Maritime Capability Development Program Description.--This program
builds on lessons learned from the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) to
develop or enhance State, local, and tribal PRND capabilities.
Programmatic support includes CONOPS and SOP development, training
program assistance, exercise and drill support, and assistance with
equipment selection decisions.
Objectives:
--Assist Federal, State, local, and tribal government stakeholders
and area maritime security committees on operational protocols,
training, and exercises that support small vessel PRND
capabilities.
--Assess geographic port configurations to maximize interdiction.
--Improve scanning of small maritime craft by planning to increase
detection systems for maritime forces.
--Increase port security grant requests for PRND programs.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--GNDA development--
Maritime domain, maritime PA, $3,350,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2 through 10.
dndo--gnda development: interior domain
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Guided by the GNDA, DNDO supports the
assessment and mitigation of threats in the land borders, aviation,
maritime and interior mission areas through the development of specific
architecture studies, CONOPS analyses, detector modeling studies, and
enterprise architecture support that are specific to each mission area.
These studies typically focus on specific programs and directly support
DNDO pilot and Research and Development (R&D) initiatives. These
preliminary studies are intended to reduce the technical and
programmatic risk of new efforts and enhance their integration and
interoperability with the overall GNDA.
Objectives:
--Determine gaps and vulnerabilities and formulate recommendations
and plans to mitigate them.
--Develop a well-defined and carefully coordinated network of
interrelationships by studying the multi-layered structure of
the rad/nuc detection architecture.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Conduct three foundational analyses on the application of PRND
capabilities, including whether or where to employ 100 percent
or randomized screening concepts at strategic locations. Three
studies related to the domestic layer are expected to be
completed by the end of fiscal year 2012.
--Continue work on detection modeling, data fusion, and analysis to
enhance detection capabilities in support of various fixed and
mobile operational detection programs and in the support of
``surge'' operations.
Interior Studies:
--DNDO will focus efforts to develop capabilities to detect threats
with limited or imperfect intelligence.
--These capabilities rely on the multiple State and local law
enforcement agencies that are available to perform rad/nuc
detection operations using mobile and human-portable sensors.
--U.S. Government surge efforts will require interactions with
relevant State and local and Federal agency activities to
develop coordinated architectures and CONOPs.
--Foundational architecture analyses will be performed to identify
and prioritize PRND capabilities and deployment and search
strategies based on the effectiveness of each.
RD&O--Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.--GNDA development--
Interior domain, $1,680,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2 through 10.
dndo--state and local initiatives rad/nuc challenge
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--The SAFE Port Act charges DNDO with enhancing
and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of Federal, State, and
local officials in order to ensure a managed, coordinated adjudication
of rad/nuc threats.
DNDO is promoting an opportunity to emphasize the rad/nuc detection
capabilities and operations at the State, local, and tribal levels
through a competition among the PRND community, with industry
demonstrations and information exchange forums.
Objective.--Measurably advance the operational expertise and
technical capabilities of those assets that would be involved in
coordinated surge or intelligence informed deployments.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Competition Rodeo.--Creates productive, spirited competition among
individuals and teams at all levels of the PRND community.
Information Exchange Forum.--Scheduled activities including
workshops, briefings, panel meetings, and the presentation of case
studies and other papers sponsored by members of the PRND community who
wish to share their lessons learned, ideas, and insights.
System/Capability Expo.--Includes exhibit booths, system, and
CONOPS demonstrations, hands-on experiences, and showcases.
Projected Outcomes:
--Sharing of successes and lessons learned.
--Shaping independent research and development programs by exposing
industry and academia to the Government's needs and upcoming
opportunities.
--Encouraging a dialog between the equipment development community
and State, local, and tribal law enforcement and first
responders involved in PRND.
--Fostering more effective community-wide competition and advancement
by establishing a greater awareness of the current state-of-
the-art technology and CONOPS.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--Rad/Nuc challenge, $2,630,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4 and 7.
dndo--human portable tripwire
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--Investigates the technology around small,
wearable systems that provide passive monitoring capability to increase
the likelihood of detecting rad/nuc material through constant,
nondeliberate rad/nuc scans. The human portable tripwire (HPT)
detection system should be considered standard operating equipment
capable of being worn by key operators at all times, cost-effective and
deployed to a large number of operators to increase the opportunity for
detection.
The proposed HPT concept has improved performance and added
capabilities over commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) personal radiation
detectors currently used by law enforcement in the field. Additionally,
it will have capabilities such as isotope identification and data
communication. The device will also have the capability of ``wired''
and ``wireless'' interface to networks, laptops, satellite phones, and
other devices as required. HPT will build on lessons learned from the
Intelligent Personnel Radiation Locator Advanced Technology
Demonstration, in addition to many other support COTS technologies such
as handheld data processor devices, communications and data transfer.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Initiate the development of an HPT system designed to meet user
requirements.
--Conduct data collection efforts against special nuclear material
(SNM) to improve algorithm performance of HPT systems.
--Conduct an Early Operational Assessment of the HPT system in a
simulated operational environment.
Objectives.--Develop a low-cost approach to increase passive,
nondeliberate detection, and provide spectroscopic identification and
data transfer.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--HPT, $9,060,000.
Technology Readiness Level:
--Basic Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is 9.
--Application to this mission is at TRL 4.
Timeline for Transition.--Transition to full-scale development, TRL
7, is funding dependant, but considered feasible by 2014.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 6.1, and
6.3.
dndo--cargo imaging for shielded nuclear threats
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--Program will evaluate and develop as
appropriate nonintrusive inspection radiography capability that can
identify and discriminate special nuclear materials and shielded
material contained in full-size trucks, cargo containers, and rail
cars. In doing so, cargo imaging for shielded nuclear threats (CISNT)
will leverage the findings from past and current Transformational
Applied Research programs. This program was initiated as the Advanced
Cargo Imaging program and included in the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2011. The name change reflects the objectives of the
program.
Objective.--To develop a capability to identify shielded nuclear
material in cargo to act as a companion capability with passive
radiation portal monitors.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Refine operational requirements and perform an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA).
--Begin the technology demonstration and characterization (TD&C)
process for a selected set of systems; collect data to
characterize the operational environment; and determine the
limits of technical approach.
--Complete draft AoA for CISNT.
--Continue to evaluate competing alternatives.
--Develop an operational requirements document leveraging lessons
learned from previous related programs and TD&C.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--CISNT, $13,470,000.
Technology Readiness Level:
--Basic TRL is 9.
--Application to this mission is at TRL 6.
Timeline for Transition.--Transition to full-scale development, TRL
7, is funding dependant, but considered feasible by 2013.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 6.1, and 6.3.
dndo--long-range radiation detection
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--Determine if a passive long-range rad/nuc
detection system should be developed and fielded, building upon
technologies demonstrated by Stand-Off Radiation Detection System and
Roadside Tracker. To avoid redundancies with preexisting programs,
long-range radiation detection (LRRD) is focused on Interior needs and
stakeholders.
Objective.--Provide detectors with better sensitivity, and with
ability to identify and localize sources.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Develop operational requirements document.
--Develop concepts of operations.
--Develop integrated logistics support plan.
--Develop the acquisition program baseline.
--Develop the LRRD T&E master plan.
--Finalize LRRD limited use experiment final report.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--LRRD, $5,480,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--TRL will be assessed as part of stage
2a.
Timeline for Transition.--Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2012.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 5.1.
dndo--international rail program
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--International Rail is referenced in Public
Law 110-28 and Public Law 110-53. Previous efforts characterized the
rail operating environment, identified user needs, conducted stream of
commerce data collection efforts at a lower volume POE site, and
conducted evaluations of architecture alternatives. Current efforts are
focused on an additional stream of commerce characterization,
Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 documentation development, and
detector testing.
Objective.--Develop implementable solution to detect and identify
illicit rad/nuc materials entering the United States via freight rail
cargo through the 31 POEs identified in the Trade Act of 2002.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Complete an analysis of alternatives for the Rail Cargo Scanning
project for International Rail.
--Continue implementation of any cooperative project(s) identified as
working in concert with Second Line of Defense.
--Document--in concert with CBP--lessons learned from operational
experiences with rad/nuc detection system(s) utilizing passive
and active detection at rail crossings.
--Document the performance of candidate international rail systems.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--International rail, $3,120,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--No specific technology has been
identified for this mission; TRL is undetermined.
Timeline for Transition.--Identification of appropriate technology
and its transition to full-scale development, TRL 7, is projected to
occur by 2015.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, and 9.3.
dndo--on-dock rail program
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--The On-Dock Rail (ODR) program analyzes
alternative solutions for scanning the 2 percent of intermodal cargo
containers arriving in the United States via ship that are directly
transferred to rail cars at the ports. These containers are currently
being scanned by mobile radiation portal monitors, which involves a
time-consuming process of unstacking and restacking the containers. The
other 98 percent of ship cargo is transferred directly to trucks which
are subsequently scanned at the exit gates by radiation portal
monitors.
Objective.--To develop a capability to effectively and efficiently
scan containerized cargo that is transferred directly from ship to rail
at sea ports of entry, without an adverse impact to the flow of
commerce.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Collect straddle portal prototype stream-of-commerce data.
--Complete alternatives analysis.
--Perform the system engineering review.
--Transition from requirements and alternatives analysis to solution
development.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--ODR, $10,280,000.
Technology Readiness Level:
--Basic TRL is 7.
--Application to this mission is TRL 7.
Timeline for Transition.--Transition to full-scale development is
projected to occur in 2012.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 6.1, and 6.3.
dndo--small vessel stand-off detection program
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Seeks to develop and field a capability to
provide standoff boat-to-boat, aerial, and fixed-site rad/nuc detection
systems in U.S. port areas and maritime regions. This program will
address the need of Federal, State, and local maritime officers to
conduct PRND screening missions against the small vessel threat without
the need to board each encountered vessel.
Objectives:
--Initially develop a capability for scanning small vessels from
maritime law enforcement vessels on the water.
--Follow-on projects will address aerial and land-based deployment of
sensors to complement the boat-to-boat system.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Complete Acquisition Management Directive (AMD) 102-01 activities
to receive milestone 2B approval for boat-to-boat systems.
Systems delivered to the Coast Guard and CBP Office of Air and
Marine for operational evaluation.
--Complete AMD 102-01 activities to receive milestone 1 approval for
aerial-mounted systems.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--SVSD, $6,610,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--TRL will be assessed as part of stage
2a.
Timeline for Transition.--Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2014.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 3.2 and 5.1.
dndo--non-helium-3 neutron detection alternatives program
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--Addresses the impact of the shortage of
Helium-3 (\3\ He) upon the cost and availability of rad/nuc detection
systems. Current efforts are focused on the Neutron Detector
Replacement Project (NDRP), qualifying near-term technologies as
suitable to replace \3\ He for Neutron Detection Modules (NDM) in
various applications, including Radiation Portal Monitor Systems (RPMS)
and backpack systems.
Objective.--To develop cost-effective alternatives to \3\ He for
broad-based neutron detection applications.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Conduct market research and release a request for information (RFI)
on backpack systems under development for commercial
application using non-\3\ He-based neutron detectors.
--Conduct testing of products responding to the RFI and release
results of tests to vendors to accelerate non-\3\ HE based
neutron detection technology for backpack systems.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--Neutron detector replacement,
$5,180,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--Several TRL 6 and 7 approaches are
available.
Timeline for Transition.--Transition of selected approaches to
full-scale development is funding dependant.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, and 6.1.
dndo--aviation multi-pathway scanning integration
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--The first component of the program is the
holistic airport deployments effort, which examines international air
cargo (IAC) and international general aviation (IGA) pathways at
domestic air POEs. The second component involves evaluating the
feasibility of using computed tomography (CT) and advanced technology
(AT) x ray systems, currently deployed throughout aviation pathways to
detect explosives, to detect rad/nuc materials in baggage and small
cargo.
Objective.--Identify options for the aviation pathway to leverage
existing capabilities, and to improve deterrence against aviation
threats.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Complete analysis for the deployment of RPMs to a limited number of
APOEs for targeted air cargo scanning.
--Initiate Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process for APOEs,
addressing the full scope of APOE operations.
--Initiate modeling/simulation activities to support AoA process.
--Initiate characterization testing of detection systems to support
AoA process and modeling/simulation activities.
--Pending feasibility results of baseline CT/AT tests, continue
partnering with S&T and TSA on path forward.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--Aviation multi-pathway scanning
integration, $9,660,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--TRL will be assessed as part of stage
2a.
Timeline for Transition.--Stage 2a scheduled after fiscal year
2016.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1,
5.1, and 9.3.
dndo--algorithm improvement
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Improves overall mission performance of
algorithms employed in rad/nuc detection and reporting systems. The
current effort focuses on developing, deploying and maintaining the DHS
isotope ID reach-back analysis tool, which enables field agents to
quickly and easily engage on-call scientific experts to identify
isotopes that cannot be identified on location. Current efforts also
include energy windowing and injection studies. Future efforts are
planned to drive the creation of more robust algorithms by challenging
industry partners to identify specific isotopes against known spectra
and have the ability to score their performance.
Objectives:
--To cost effectively ensure that rad/nuc detection algorithms are
improved to remain current with emerging technologies and
concepts of operations.
--Provide an infrastructure that makes gamma spectra benchmarks
available to develop new (or upgrade) isotope identification
algorithms while allowing the Government to score algorithms
objectively.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
--Define benchmarks to measure algorithm performance.
--With high-purity Germanium (HPGe) and Sodium Iodide (NaI)
detectors, collect and validate source spectra for open and
closed benchmark data sets to develop new algorithms and score
existing ones.
--Promulgate benchmarks throughout Government, assess existing
algorithms, and target improvements.
--Define algorithm replay tool interface requirements, reference
electronic packages, isotopes of interest, and algorithm
scoring criteria.
RD&O--Systems Development PPA.--Algorithm improvement, $4,200,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--Basic TRL is 9.
Timeline for Transition.--Initial solutions are deployed. Spiral
advancements continue.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, and 6.1.
dndo--t&e operations
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Provide operational capabilities needed to
plan and execute the DNDO T&E program. Capability includes working with
subject matter experts from national laboratories to ensure
scientifically defensible test designs and engineering support to plan
and execute tests, including formal test milestone reviews, oversight
of field test activities, and analysis support to evaluate performance
and write test high-quality reports.
Objectives:
--Develop timely and credible T&E campaigns in support of internal
and external (international, Federal, State, local, and other
entities) customers' rad/nuc detection requirements.
--Develop repeatable, evolutionary, and controlled processes for
planning and conducting tests.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
--Maintain the expertise and resources necessary to plan and execute
up to 15 individual test campaigns.
--Document formal test milestone reviews.
--Issue test reports within 90 days of completion of data validation.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--T&E operations, $8,390,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goal 9.3 (also supports 3.1, 3.2,
and 5.1).
dndo--t&e infrastructure
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Provide development, operation, and
maintenance of the infrastructure required to execute DNDO T&E efforts
including facilities, technical support staff, test equipment, data
collection technology, and design and fabrication of SNM test objects.
DNDO test facilities include the Rad/Nuc Countermeasures Test and
Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC) at the Nevada National Security Site
(N2S2), the Rail Test Center (RTC) at the Port of Tacoma, and other
limited-term infrastructure needs at test locations across the national
laboratory complex.
Objectives:
--Establish and develop an integrated T&E infrastructure of
facilities, equipment, test objects, processes, and personnel
to meet U.S. Government rad/nuc T&E needs.
--Engage the multi-agency rad/nuc community for future test
instrumentation and infrastructure needs.
--Design and fabricate appropriate SNM and radiological sources and
materials for realistic threat-based testing.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--O&M of RNCTEC and RTC.
--Continue physical security upgrades, including procurement and
deployment of sensors, vehicle barriers, and perimeter fencing
to RNCTEC to reduce costs for force protection in preparation
for testing activities using category I and II SNM sources.
--Complete fabrication SNM test sources:
--Two additional sizes (No. 3 and No. 4) of HEU spheres;
--Two reactor grade Pu sealed sources; and
--Four additional sizes of weapons grade Pu sealed sources.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--T&E infrastructure, $9,500,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goal 9.3.
dndo--t&e data management and algorithm test bed
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Provides for the collection, analysis,
reporting, and archiving of test data collected during DNDO test
campaigns, as well as the collection of similar test reports by other
agencies. Includes maintaining and enhancing two data management
systems: Archive and Retrieval Management System (ARMS) and Report
Analysis and Archive System (RAAS).
The Algorithm Test Bed (ATB) provides the capability to evaluate
the baseline performance of detector algorithms, and compare new and
existing detector algorithms against standardized sets of both modeled
and measured threats in a virtual environment.
Objectives:
--Develop an independent and peer-reviewed framework for evaluating
performance of detection and identification algorithms for all
handheld, mobile, and fixed systems against realistic
operational threats.
--Develop, operate and maintain the ARMS and the RAAS.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Continue to perform ATB studies that allow programs to make
informed program-wide decisions for increased performance and
deployment of detection systems.
--Accept spectroscopic algorithms from developers and assess using
the generic algorithm test bed.
--Review, evaluate, and add 150 radiation and radiograph reports to
expand the content of RAAS.
--Continue information sharing of test data, analysis, studies, and
tools to expand the content and capabilities of ARMS across the
DNDO user community and with peer organizations.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--T&E data management and algorithm test bed,
$4,200,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, and 9.3.
dndo--t&e-directed test
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Planning and execution of test campaigns to
characterize currently available equipment in operationally relevant
environments and CONOPS to inform State and local entities in the
development of effective Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection
(PRND) programs at the State, local, and tribal level.
Objectives:
--Provide comprehensive performance data on rad/nuc detection
systems, based on operationally relevant threats and scenarios,
to State, local, and tribal users.
--Provide opportunities for State, local, and tribal users to learn
from hands-on operation of rad/nuc detections systems against
actual SNM threat sources in operationally relevant conditions
and scenarios.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Complete test and final report for Gryphon test campaign to inform
Federal, State, and local operational entities of the
performance of aerial detection systems.
--Complete testing and produce joint European Union/United States
Illicit Trafficking Radiological Assessment Program (ITRAP) +10
report.
--Initiate the next directed test dependent on highest priority
determined in fiscal year 2011.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--T&E-directed test, $4,810,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 9.3.
dndo--graduated rad/nuc detector evaluation and reporting (grader
SM)
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Provide a vendor-driven framework to
independently test commercially available radiation detection and
identification products against standards to help Federal, State, and
local stakeholders make informed PRND equipment procurements.
Objectives:
--Standardize instrument testing and test results reporting to assure
valid comparisons.
--Inform State, local, and tribal entities on performance of COTS
systems in making FEMA grant purchases of rad/nuc detection
systems.
--Encourage vendors to develop better radiation detection and
identification products.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Initiate Phase II of GRaDER and begin testing against Technical
Capability Standards.
--Continue Phase I of the GRaDER program for manufacturer-financed
testing of COTS rad/nuc detection systems by National Voluntary
Laboratory Accredited Program accredited laboratories.
--Maintain the GRaDER Evaluated Equipment List on the FEMA Responder
Knowledge Base.
--Begin implementing the GRaDER postmarket surveillance program to
verify continued compliance for previously tested COTS
instruments.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--GRaDER, $820,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 9.3.
dndo--prnd pilot programs
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--Provide a defensible and repeatable framework
to evaluate operational utility of mature rad/nuc detection technology
in new operational environments. Assists users to establish venue
specific CONOPs and procedures, command and control, and technical
reachback protocols. Provides an initial set of appropriate rad/nuc
detection systems to establish an initial operating capability.
Objectives.--Develop and execute a repeatable and defensible pilot
program that provides technical and operational assessments resulting
in the transition of new and improved operational capabilities for
preventative rad/nuc detection to Federal, State, local, and tribal
users.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.--In
coordination with stakeholders, conduct a series of exercises including
drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises to train, test
and evaluate CONOPS. Training and equipment deployed during the pilot
will be provided to the stakeholders.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--PRND pilot programs, $3,930,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, and
9.3.
dndo--red team and net assessments
Program Description/Objective
Red Team Program Description.--Conducts adversarial-based
assessments from an outside perspective without using any ``inside''
information of current or planned capabilities. Executes overt and
covert tests to intentionally introduce radioactive sources against
known defenses to assess the performance of fielded technology,
training, and protocols.
Net Assessments Program Description.--Assesses the effectiveness of
planned and deployed elements of the GNDA and supporting programs.
Objective.--Identify vulnerabilities and best practices in deployed
PRND systems and DNDO programs to include technologies, procedures,
training, and communication pathways.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones
Fiscal Year 2012 Focus.--Under IAW Director DNDO Guidance, RTNA
will work to increase support to State and local PRND programs.
RD&O--Assessments PPA.--RTNA, $11,460,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
Timeline for Transition.--N/A--Not a systems development effort.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 7.3,
and 9.2.
dndo--joint analysis center
Program Description/Objective
Program Description.--Interagency coordination mechanism and
central monitoring point for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture,
maintains situational awareness for the GNDA--to include status of
radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) detection assets, visibility into
the status of rad/nuc alarms, and awareness of rad/nuc-related
incidents and events.
Secondary Reachback (SRB).--Accurate and actionable assessments of
illicit nuclear trafficking events and trends, the credibility of
nuclear threat communications and other nuclear terrorism indicators.
The project serves DNDO's entire community of interest and also
provides deep dive on topics of interest for internal use.
Objective.--To provide integrated and centralized alarm
adjudication, data collection, and information-sharing services.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Sustained capability.
--Service metrics (as applicable).
--Responsiveness to adjudication, responsiveness to RFI, proactive
event situational awareness, rapid situational awareness of
given incidents.
--Support the radiation detection community with rapid spectral data
analysis and reports.
--Prepare up to 10 technical reports that inform PRND community on
detector performance, detection phenomena trends, triggers that
may indicate threat material is present and operational aspects
of detector performance.
RD&O--Operations Support PPA.--JAC Ops, NAP, and SRB, $15,850,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--This is an analytical capability in
place, TRL 8.
Timeline for Transition.--Sustained capability.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2,
6.3, 6.4, 7.1, 7.2, 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3.
dndo--joint analysis center collaborative information system
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--To maintain threat-space awareness and
execute the operational analysis and reporting function of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture.
Goals.--Analyze, process, and synthesize information collected
through all detection mechanisms and related intelligence.
Objectives:
--Assist State, local, and tribal governments in analyzing and
reporting on any unauthorized nuclear and radiological
materials in their jurisdictions.
--Process and synthesize information collected through detection
mechanisms.
--Receive information from, and disseminate information to relevant
authorities.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Complete development.
--Testing (OT).
--System migration (SPAWAR to DC2).
--Test bed migration to DC-2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline
Key performance parameters ---------------------------------------
Threshold Objective
------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Simultaneous users........... 15 users.......... 75 users
#2 Number of Detector Systems 1................. 2
Connected.
#3 Number of Situation Awareness 1................. 2
Display Systems Connected.
#4 Mean Time Between Operational 4,000 hours 20,000 hours
Failure (MTBF) (Minimum of 1 (approximately (approximately
year of monitoring to verify 5.6 months). 2.3 years)
threshold. To be annually
assessed.).
#5 Operational Availability..... 99%............... 99.9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RD&O--Operations support PPA.--JACCIS, $5,030,000.
Technology Readiness Level:
--All COTs software, DHS Technology Reference Model (TRM) approved
TRL8.
--Basic TRL is 8.
Timeline for Transition:
--JACCIS program delivered to user in second quarter fiscal year
2011.
--IOC--fiscal year 2011 third quarter.
--Formal operational testing is planned for first quarter fiscal year
2012.
GNDA Alignment:
--GNDA performance objectives 1, 2, 3, and 4.
--GNDA performance goals 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, 7.1, 7.2, and 8.1.
dndo--prnd training and exercises program
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--The Training and Exercises Program develops
and implements rad/nuc training and exercise execution for Federal,
State, and local law enforcement and public safety professionals to
increase PRND operational capabilities.
Objectives.--The program's main objectives are:
--Increase operational capabilities for Federal, State, and local
users.
--Develop and exercise protocols and standards for effective use of
radiation detection equipment and associated alarm resolution
and reporting processes.
--Develop training curricula for emerging detection technologies.
--Foster organic capabilities by assisting Federal, State, and local
agencies in institutionalizing training courses in their
academies.
--Support national security special events, DHS special events, and
elevated threat conditions, as required.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones:
--Computer-based training (CBT) for PRD and RIIDs in July 11.
--Complete curricula for sbile systems (PRDs, RIIDs, backpacks,
vehicle model) and fixed systems by end of calendar year 2012.
--Annually:
--Directly and indirectly train 5,000 participants in rad/nuc
detection operations.
--Assist States in establishing PRND exercise programs.
--Participate in the Federal national level exercise.
--Provide domestic State and local exercise support as requested.
RD&O--Operations Support PPA.--PRND training and exercises,
$8,100,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--These are current services, TRL 8.
Timeline for Transition.--Services currently in-place, improving
and expanding over time.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance objectives 1, 2, 3, and 4.
dndo--interior capability development
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--The Interior Capability Development (ICD)
program utilizes various levels of engagement and program assistance to
develop PRND capability among State, local, and tribal jurisdictions.
Our goal is to provide program assistance and engagements that work
with all other jurisdictions.
The SLSWG supports the development of DNDO programs and products
and serves as the principle collaboration opportunity for members of
the PRND community to share best practices and lessons learned.
Objectives.--To catalyze and increase PRND capability nationwide,
thereby increasing probability of encountering and detecting rad/nuc
materials.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.--The National
Capitol Region is on the verge of purchasing approximately $3.5 million
worth of PRND equipment using HSPG funds and standing up a regional
data sharing network for alarm adjudication and tracking. Through
facilitated workshops, subject matter expertise, and lessons learned
from other programs across the Nation, DNDO is enabling the NCR to
execute a program that meets the specific jurisdictional needs that is
also interoperable with other Federal, State, and local PRND programs.
RD&O--Operations Support PPA.--Interior capability development,
$5,120,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--This is a current program development
service.
Timeline for Transition.--Currently engage in ICD activities in
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California, and Washington, and
reaching out to other States and cities interested in developing PRND
capabilities.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance objectives 4.1, 4.2, and 7.1.
dndo--mobile detection deployment program
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--In conjunction with DOE/Radiological
Assistance Program (RAP), provide Mobile Detection Deployment Program
(MDDP) assets as a national nuclear detection ``surge'' capability to
provide increased security in periods of heightened alert or if
specific threats are identified. There are currently five MDDP response
systems collocated with DOE RAP teams.
Objectives.--To develop specialized capabilities to augment State
and local operations, and to foster and develop comprehensive,
integrated, and regional approaches to PRND programs, including surge
and intelligence informed events.
Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.--Upgrade three
small MDDP systems and add additional equipment. Additional funds
requested to upgrade RIIDS as part of fiscal year 2012 State and local
options.
Relevant R&D Programs:
--Human-portable systems (including tripwire).
--Long-Range Radiation Detection program.
--PRND target capability and NIMS resource typing.
--\3\ He alternative development.
RD&O--Operations Support PPA.--MDDP (sustainment), $2,740,000.
Technology Readiness Level.--MDDP is a current operational support
capability, TRL 8.
Timeline for Transition.--Five MDDUs will be operational and
stationed across the Nation by the end of fiscal year 2011.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance objectives 5.1 and 5.2.
dndo--national technical nuclear forensics center--technology
advancement
Program Description/Objectives
Program Description.--National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
(NTNFC) leads the development of the U.S. Government capability to
rapidly, accurately, and credibly identify the origin and history of
rad/nuc materials obtained or intercepted before a detonation.
Objectives.--Our focus:
--Advancing and validating lab analysis methods.
--Identifying discriminating signatures.
--Creating foundational standard reference materials.
--Developing tools to interpret and link lab measurements.
--Developing predictive models.
fiscal year 2012 planned accomplishments/milestones
--Develop standard reference materials that will aid in the
validation of analytical methodologies, including the standard
for trace actinides in bulk SNM.
--Continue development of benchmark analytical methodologies for
determining trace actinides in bulk SNM.
--Continue to develop and validate predictive models and techniques
to improve understanding of how lab-scale uranium processing
capability for signature development and modeling purposes
becomes operational.
GNDA Alignment.--GNDA performance goals--Aligns to national
strategic 5-year plan for improving the nuclear forensics attribution
capabilities of the United States (signed by the President April 30,
2010).
Methodology Benchmarking
RD&O--NTNFC PPA
--Technology advancement, $14,670,000.
--Operational readiness, $4,360,000. (Not a systems development
effort.)
--Expertise development, $5,740,000. (Not a systems development
effort.)
Technology Readiness Level.--All activities within the methodology
development and signature development areas of Technology Advancement
fall within TRL 3-7. Most of the activities fall within TRL 4-6, with
transition to DOE or other interagency partners upon completion.
Timeline for Transition:
--One analytical method is scheduled for transition to operational
use per year over the next 5 years.
--Uranium processing for signature development is scheduled for
operational implementation in fiscal year 2012.
--Plutonium processing for signature development is scheduled for
operational implementation in fiscal year 2016.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
transportation security administration
Question. There have been at least six security breaches at Newark
Airport (EWR) in the last 2 months. I understand that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is almost 70 employees
short of its allocated number for EWR. What is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) doing to fully staff EWR? Based on these
incidents, what steps has TSA taken to improve training for
transportation security officers and managers?
Answer. In close partnership with the Federal Security Director and
staff at EWR, TSA has initiated a robust and comprehensive effort to
address EWR staffing vacancies, and EWR is currently scheduled to reach
near-100 percent staffing by May 1. In the interim, TSA has been
providing additional resources as needed. For example, TSA deployed
additional Supervisory Training Instructors to train new--hires,
additional advanced imaging technology (AIT)-certified transportation
security officers (TSOs) to conduct daily operations while EWR TSOs are
being trained, and additional staff resources to assist in human
resources and training operations.
Following a breach, a complete review of the incident is conducted
and each action is broken down in detail to ascertain the reasons
behind the breach. Every TSA individual involved in the activity and
their response is included in this review. TSA employees identified as
not having followed standard operating procedures or whose actions are
the result of inattention to duty are immediately removed from their
position, and can only return to their positions if retraining and
recertification for their positions is determined sufficient and is
satisfactorily accomplished.
Question. TSA recently participated in a program at EWR to help
autistic children and their families prepare for air travel. The
program included a flight simulation for the families as well as a
well-attended voluntary training to increase autism awareness among
TSOs and airline personnel. Currently, I understand that TSA provides 3
hours of disability-related training for new hires. Does TSA have any
plans to improve coverage of autism and other types of
neurodevelopmental disorders and cognitive disabilities in the new-hire
and ongoing training for TSOs? What steps will be taken to improve the
travel experience for passengers with autism and other types of
neurodevelopmental disorders or cognitive disabilities?
Answer. TSA is in the process of updating all of its training with
regard to persons with disabilities. In addition, TSA is working with
Autism Explores and other similar programs to develop core training on
autism for our screening personnel. This training focuses on the skills
to screen those with disabilities with compassion, respect, and
sensitivity while maintaining transportation security. TSA is also
working with the Administration on Developmental Disabilities to ensure
that information about TSA's screening procedures is accessible to
people with cognitive disabilities.
mass transit
Question. The Department's assessment of the Nation's passenger
rail and mass transit systems--completed in October 2010--found that a
significant security risk exists. Yet, surface transportation security
continues to make up a very small percentage of the TSA's overall
budget. Why doesn't the budget request for TSA reflect the risk to rail
and transit?
Answer. In the aviation sector, the Federal Government has the
primary role to provide security. This is accomplished primarily by
funneling traffic at security checkpoints and by screening the
passengers and baggage. In the surface modes, the primary
responsibility of providing security rests with the local responders
and the system operators, who are supported by TSA.
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget includes funding to enhance
TSA's surface transportation efforts. The budget supports programs that
are designed to assist the industry and State and local governments and
transportation authorities to identify their vulnerabilities and
provide guidance and tools to help close critical security gaps in
high-risk systems. Specifically, the fiscal year 2012 request includes
$109 million to support 37 visible intermodal prevention and response
teams, including 15 teams dedicated to surface transportation security.
The request also includes $300 million for the Transit Security Grant
Program to support State and local surface transportation efforts.
transportation security laboratory
Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic
City, New Jersey creates technology to mitigate impacts of potential
terrorist attacks against our transportation system, but it is
currently operating beyond its maximum designed capacity. While the
budget requests $18 million for facility renovations, the TSL needs
additional funds to complete the renovations. Will you commit to
providing all of the funds necessary to upgrade this facility and help
TSA meet its safety mandates?
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has a long-
term plan for completing necessary upgrades to TSL. S&T's 5-year plan
for TSL upgrades began in fiscal year 2010 and will continue through
fiscal year 2014, pending available appropriations. The high-priority
upgrades are targeted for completion first. The 5-year program will
provide TSL with the critical infrastructure needed to ensure its role
as a leader in transportation security, and to meet its mission of
researching, developing, engineering, testing, and evaluating solutions
to detect and mitigate the explosives threat and weapons used against
our Nation's transportation systems.
port security grants
Question. House Republicans have proposed cutting port security
grants by two-thirds. The Port of New York/New Jersey is the largest
port on the east coast and the second-largest port in the country. It
is directly linked to what the FBI deemed the most dangerous area in
America for a terrorist attack. Yet it would lose $33 million in
security funding under the House bill. What would be the impact on the
New Jersey-New York region and our Nation's economy if there were to be
a terrorist attack on one of our largest ports?
Answer. Various studies indicate that the economic impact of a
major terrorist attack on one of the Nation's largest ports could total
in the tens of billions of dollars--though the impact would depend on
the degree and severity of a terrorist attack. The goal of the Port
Security Grant Program (PSGP) is to mitigate port security risks and
address the gaps and vulnerabilities that may expose our ports to
terrorist attack. Toward that end, the program has been highly
successful; all large ports have made substantial progress toward
addressing the risks identified in their port-wide risk management
plans. Under significant budgetary constraints, DHS must prioritize
funding allocation to those areas where it is most needed.
In 2007, our Nation's largest ports areas having the most risk
developed port-wide risk management plans with PSGP dollars. These
plans were developed to support the area maritime security plans and
facility security plans. Through these plans, security vulnerabilities
were identified and prioritized lists of projects to reduce these
vulnerabilities were developed (spend plan). More than $1 billion in
PSGP funding has been allocated to planning and executing projects from
these plans, with many more security risk mitigation projects yet to
start and urgently dependent on future year funding. While the majority
of PSGP funding goes to the largest port areas the program is equally
vital to the smaller port areas and facilities to offset their
associated security costs as well.
Below are examples of security activities and security risk
mitigation projects that will be in jeopardy if funding is reduced:
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE)
response vehicles, the most common being small boats and the
associated equipment, such as Forward Looking Infrared Radar.
--Increasing the security of facilities by improving access control
systems, monitoring and recording devices such as CCTV,
fencing, bollards, and other perimeter security measures.
--Providing new capabilities for maritime law enforcement, including
K-9 explosives detection teams, maritime security training, and
patrol vessel tactical operations.
--Specialized maritime training and exercises such as dive training,
suicide bomber, and active shooter training, and CBRNE
response.
--Interoperable communications projects, including infrastructure
upgrades, and mobile, portable, and base communications.
--Creating and enhancing interagency operations centers.
state and local grants
Question. The State and local grant programs put funding where it
is most critical--on the front lines in the hands of first responders.
I was pleased to see an increase in both of these programs in the
President's request, but I was concerned that the House proposal for
fiscal year 2011 would make cuts to both the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program. What
kinds of homeland security programs would receive less funding if those
cuts were to take place?
Answer. There are two issues related to a potential reduction in
funding for the UASI and the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)
grants. First, because there are statutory minimum allocations in the
SHSP grants, funding for the highest-risk States could be reduced.
Furthermore, any reduction in funding for these programs will result in
the reduction or elimination of funding that historically goes toward
planning, intelligence analysts, equipment (such as interoperable
communications equipment), first responder training, and exercises.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Coats
aviation security fees
Question. The budget proposes a new general appropriations bill
provision to amend current law to allow aviation passenger security
fees to be increased above the current statutory maximums. The fiscal
year 2012 budget assumes the enactment of this provision and a fee
increase of $1.50 per enplanement beginning the third quarter of the
fiscal year generating an additional $589,940,000 in offsetting
collections. Even if the requested authority was granted to you by the
start of the new fiscal year, how realistic is it that a rulemaking
could be executed and completed in time to enable an additional
$589,940,000 in fee collections to be generated in fiscal year 2012?
If the requested authority to allow you to increase the fee amount
is not provided, what impact will this have on your fiscal year 2012
request? What specific reductions would you propose from the levels
requested to make up for this nearly $590 million budget shortfall?
Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request proposes the fee
increase in the third quarter of fiscal year 2012 to provide sufficient
time for the rulemaking process, assuming the Congress passes this
proposal prior to end of fiscal year 2011.
Despite the Congress's original intent that the security fee covers
nearly all costs related to passenger and property screening, the fee
currently offsets less than one-third of the total cost of aviation
security. At the same time, costs of security have continued to
increase. In 2000, it cost less than $1 to screen each passenger. In
fiscal year 2010, the average cost for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to screen a passenger and baggage has increased to
nearly $9, in part to airline imposed checked baggage fees that have
resulted in TSA screening 56 million additional carry-on bags at
airport checkpoints annually.
I fully appreciate the constraints of the current fiscal
environment, and it is precisely because of the current economic
situation that I feel nothing should be left off the table to fund the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) critical frontline operations.
While airlines have increased fees across the board--from checked
baggage and extra leg room to refreshments, we have never adjusted how
we fund security measures to protect the traveling public.
I ask for your support of the administration's proposal to ensure
that we are able to continue the significant progress we have made in
enhancing aviation security while fulfilling the Congress's intent to
do so in a fiscally responsible manner that does not penalize American
taxpayers. I look forward to working with you on this matter in the
coming months.
grants effectiveness
Question. What steps has the Department taken and planning to
implement the recommendations made by the local, State, tribal, and
Federal preparedness task force regarding developing measurements of
the effectiveness of grants?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) agrees with
recommendation No. 14 in the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
Preparedness Task Force's report to the Congress, which calls for
``Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to
justify preparedness improvements.'' The detailed recommendation came
directly from the stakeholder community.
FEMA has taken the recommendations from the local, State, tribal,
and Federal preparedness task force report into consideration while
working to improve coordination and consolidation of FEMA's grant
programs, including coordinating interagency grant programs and more
closely linking capability assessments to grant activities. FEMA has
also contracted with the National Association of Public Administration
(NAPA) to conduct a study to develop a core set of performance measures
that can be used to track performance of the State Homeland Security
Program (SHSP) and UASI grants.
visa waiver program/biometric air exit implementation
Question. When does the administration plan to make a decision on
implementing biometric air exit, or will it be officially proposing to
repeal the biometric air exit requirement currently in statute?
Answer. Since the Congress enacted the statute that included a
mandate for biometric air exit, DHS has implemented several automated
systems based on biographic data that much more effectively capture
arrival and exit information as compared to the processes in use at the
time.
Additionally, DHS has conducted a number of pilots and studies
since 2003 to assess options on how to meet the biometric exit mandate.
The pilots have demonstrated that while the technology exists to
collect biometrics--the costs associated with the operational
facilities and staffing needs necessary to achieve effective compliance
with biometric air exit requirements using currently available
technology and processes are quite high, particularly when compared to
any potential security gains. DHS does not invest money into solutions
where the benefits are not commensurate with the costs incurred.
Accordingly, DHS will explore new biometric exit solutions that can
be implemented in a cost-effective way, while simultaneously
implementing enhancements to existing biographic exit systems. These
enhancements will focus on strengthening Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)
information collection and carrier compliance auditing; enhancing US-
VISIT's automated matching of arrival and departure records, review of
records of potential overstays, and posting of ``lookouts'' for those
who have overstayed.
Question. On December 8, 2010, President Obama met with Polish
President Komorowski. During a press availability after the meeting,
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) came up. President Obama said: ``I am
well aware that this is a source of irritation between two great
friends and allies, and we should resolve it. The challenge I have
right now is, is that there is a congressional law that prevents my
administration from taking unilateral executive action. So we're going
to have to work with the Congress to make some modifications
potentially on the law. In the meantime, what I indicated to President
Komorowski is that I am going to make this a priority. And I want to
solve this issue before very long. My expectation is, is that this
problem will be solved during my presidency.'' How does the
administration plan to fulfill the commitment President Obama made to
the President of Poland in December 2010--to resolve the issues
preventing Poland's entry into VWP--with the fiscal year 2012 budget
proposal of no funding for biometric air exit?
Answer. As the President stated, the administration supports the
inclusion of Poland in VWP. However, as the President also indicated,
the administration cannot take unilateral action on including Poland in
VWP due to the current rate of visa refusals from Poland pursuant to
section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In addition, Poland
has not yet met the other important requirements for designation in
VWP, such as concluding agreements to share criminal and terrorism
screening data with the United States and entering into an agreement on
reporting lost and stolen passports to Interpol.
recapitalization of the customs and border protection air and marine
fleet
Question. At the level of funding requested for fiscal year 2012
which funds two UH-60 helicopter conversions, CBP will still have to
take as many as nine UH-60 helicopters out of service by 2014 due to
age. What is DHS doing to mitigate this situation? Will other assets be
redeployed?
Answer. CBP is continuing to pursue the aged aircraft engineering
analyses, physical inspections, and service life risk assessments
initiated in late fiscal year 2009 to determine how to keep the
aircraft flying safely beyond current projections. Through this
initiative, each aircraft is evaluated to determine if additional
maintenance can extend the service life the aircraft beyond current
projections. CBP is also considering an expansion of the mandatory 720-
flight-hour inspection to include the inspection or replacement of
selected high stress components and structural components to keep the
aircraft in service longer. If an aircraft is not operational, it will
be placed in controlled storage until it can be inducted into the Army
conversion line, and the remaining assets will be reallocated to the
agency's highest-priority missions.
Question. What number of UH-60s would need to be converted from A
to L in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 to eliminate the need to
take out of service nine UH-60 helicopters due to age in 2014?
Answer. CBP will continue its aged aircraft engineering analyses,
physical inspections, and service life risk assessments to determine
how to keep the aircraft flying safely beyond current projections. At
CBP's request, the Army recently provided updated costs and possible
induction schedules to mitigate the impact of the projected groundings.
Based on the Army estimates, it is possible to induct up to three
aircraft per year without a negative impact to the factory production
schedule.
Question. What are the results of the investigations conducted by
CBP into the age-related problems of the UH-60s? Are there revised
estimates as to the cost of converting two UH-60s from A to L?
Answer. The Army has recently provided updated costs and possible
induction schedules to mitigate the impact of the aged-aircraft
situation. The costs are based on the age of CBP's UH-60 Black Hawks
and actual experience gained during the conversion of the first two
aircraft over the past 2 years. The quantity of aircraft per year shows
how CBPs assets might fit into the planned factory production schedule
without an impact on the Army's helicopter program. This accelerated
schedule is expected to reduce the number of age-related groundings of
CBP aircraft.
tactical border infrastructure
Question. In January of this year, the decision was made not to
extend the Boeing contract for SBInet. Yet, the budget requests funds
for three additional deployments of integrated towers with cameras and
radars for fiscal year 2012. Are the contracts in place today to
acquire these systems and deploy them?
Answer. The Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems are not
``additional deployments'' of the SBInet Block 1 system that was
procured under the Boeing contract. Following a departmentwide review
of the SBInet program, I directed CBP to end SBInet as originally
conceived and implement a new border security technology plan that will
utilize existing, proven technology tailored to the distinct terrain
and population density of each border region. Where appropriate, this
technology plan will include elements of the former SBInet program that
have proven successful, such as stationary radar and infrared and
optical sensor towers. The Department does not intend to use the
existing Boeing contract for procurement of any of the technology
systems included in the new Southwest Border technology plan. In the
future, the Department will conduct full and open competition of the
elements in the new border security plan, including any expansion of
the integrated fixed towers.
Question. If no contracts are in place now, is there a high level
of risk that CBP will not be able to execute three deployments in
fiscal year 2012?
Answer. There are certainly normal risks associated with awarding
any contract, but we do not believe there is a high risk to being able
to award the new Integrated Fixed Tower system contract during fiscal
year 2012. Program planning is under way and CBP has already engaged
industry and has conducted a significant amount of market research.
There are multiple companies who have an integrated tower system
already designed, developed, and in use today.
dhs headquarters consolidation
Question. What is the General Services Administration (GSA) cost
associated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) building
at St. Elizabeths? What is the DHS fiscal year 2012 cost being
deferred? Show original project phases and funding estimates and how
these will change with the deferral of the FEMA project. What is the
impact of deferring the FEMA building? Provide the total current
estimate of the St. Elizabeths DHS headquarters consolidation project.
Is it still $3.4 billion or has the estimate been revised?
Answer. The GSA costs for the FEMA building excluding parking and
infrastructure on the east campus is approximately $215 million, which
includes design and management and inspection (M&I).
The Department deferred $108 million of the DHS costs associated
directly with FEMA headquarters on the east campus in order to fund
frontline operations within the current budget environment.
The current St. Elizabeths development estimate is $3.56 billion
($1.37 billion for DHS and $2.19 billion for GSA), subject to receipt
of fiscal year 2011 appropriations as requested. This is a revision of
the earlier development estimated costs and is based on the GSA
prospectus submission for fiscal year 2011.
While the DHS estimate remains within the original programmatic
estimate, GSA costs have increased from $2.04 billion to $2.19 billion
due to the following:
--Stabilization of buildings as part of the site's designation as a
National Historic Landmark;
--Additional east campus infrastructure to disperse the density
originally planned for the west campus as requested by
consulting parties;
--Malcolm X/Interstate-295 highway interchange;
--Historic preservation measures per the programmatic agreement
signed with consulting parties;
--New energy target mandates that were not required when the original
cost estimates were made.
Significant delays caused by a lack of funding in fiscal year 2011
are expected to increase St. Elizabeths project costs GSA and DHS
continue to evaluate ongoing construction activities in light of
resources provided in 2011 and will be able to provide new project cost
estimates at a later date. Without full funding of the President's
fiscal year 2012 request, the cost and schedule impacts will be even
greater.
DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATE AT THE INITIATION OF CONSTRUCTION FUNDING WITH FISCAL YEAR 2009 APPROPRIATIONS
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Prior 2009 ARRA 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSA................................ 64,447 346,639 ........... 447,773 277,875 312,875 288,375 298,375 ........... ........... 2,036,359 ( \1\ )
DHS................................ ........... 100,278 ........... 248,116 347,575 209,734 277,860 203,839 9,754 19,405 1,416,561 ( \1\ \2\ )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................ 64,447 446,917 ........... ........... 625,450 522,609 566,235 502,214 9,754 19,405 3,452,920 ( \1\ )
============================================================================================================================================================
Phase 1............................ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ( \6\ )
Phase 2A........................... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ( \7\ )
Phase 2B........................... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ( \8\ )
Phase 3............................ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ( \9\ )
REVISED DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATE BASED UPON FISCAL YEAR 2011 PROSPECTUS AND FISCAL YEAR 2012 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET SUBMISSION
GSA................................ 64,447 346,639 450,000 ........... 380,296 217,706 440,101 290,561 ........... ........... 2,189,750 (\1\ \3\ \5\
)
DHS................................ ........... 100,278 200,000 ........... 287,800 159,643 396,090 211,854 3,508 13,438 1,372,611 (\1\ \3\ \4\
\5\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................ 64,447 446,917 650,000 ........... 668,096 377,349 836,191 502,415 3,508 13,438 3,562,361 (\1\)
============================================================================================================================================================
Phase 1............................ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... (\6\)
Phase 2A........................... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... (\7\)
Phase 2B........................... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... (\8\)
Phase 3............................ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... (\9\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Indicates appropriations received prior fiscal year's through ARRA.
\2\ Fiscal year 2009 DHS budget request was $120 million. Received $97.578 million in the Coast Guard and $2.7 million in DHS appropriations.
\3\ Outyear estimates were adjusted based on receipt of ARRA funding.
\4\ DHS reduction from 2009 to current result of project team salaries and benefits moved to the CAO base.
\5\ Fiscal year 2012 President's request deferred FEMA by 1 year.
\6\ Indicates Phase 1 (Coast Guard) completion schedule.
\7\ Indicates Phase 2A (DHS HQ and DHS operations centers (DOC)) facility completion schedule.
\8\ Indicates Phase 2B (FEMA) completion schedule.
\9\ Indicates Phase 3 (remaining components) completion schedule.
domestic nuclear detection office
Question. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request again
proposes to transfer the funding for Transformational Research and
Development from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to the
S&T Directorate. In addition, there have been a number of critical
assessments of DNDO over the years, including its management of the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program and the Cargo Advanced Automated
Radiography System (CAARS). Given the difficulties that DNDO has had in
the past with project management, what steps have been taken to improve
project management at DNDO?
Answer. Over the last 2 years, DNDO has implemented a new process
called the Solution Development Process (SDP) to implement DHS
Acquisition Directive (AD) 102-01. The SDP provides an effective
strategy for program oversight by aligning strategic analysis,
planning, and investment decisionmaking with a complementary process to
design, develop, test, and deploy specific detection solutions. All of
the projects within DNDO are being formally reviewed by DNDO senior
management as part of the SDP process. The reviews are chaired by the
DNDO Deputy Director, who also serves as the Component Acquisition
Executive (CAE). These reviews address issues related to funding,
staffing, scheduling, technical development, and risk. A formal SDP
training program has been developed by DNDO so that all Program
Managers fully understand the SDP and implement it correctly to ensure
improved oversight and governance. The SDP, which is both calendar and
milestone driven, comprises a series of development stages separated by
formal stage gate decision reviews.
--Stage 0.--Key strategic planning and gap identification.
--Stage 1a.--DNDO-wide budgeting and needs prioritization.
--Stage 1b.--Needs justification and capabilities development
planning.
--Stage 2a.--Alternatives analysis, piloting, operational
requirements, and solution selection.
--Stage 2b.--Detailed program planning and cost estimation.
--Stage 3.--Detailed solution design, development, and testing.
--Stage 4.--Production, deployment, and operation.
The first two stages (stage 0 and 1a) are conducted annually when
the gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) are
reviewed and needs are identified. The remaining stages are milestone
driven and are not completed until all of the requirements of their
respective stage gates are met. Detailed worksheets inform efforts at
each stage to ensure that all aspects of the program are properly
evaluated. The SDP accommodates materiel and nonmateriel solutions.
Additionally, DHS has implemented a departmentwide initiative to
ensure that Program Managers are trained and certified at levels
commensurate with the size, funding, and complexity of the programs
they manage. This effort, intended to create a cadre of officially
certified Program Management Professionals, is embraced by DNDO and
enhanced thought the SDP reviews. Achieving and maintaining the
appropriate certification is included in the DNDO Program Managers
performance goals. The combination of increased individual skill of
those engaged in the acquisition process along with more rigorous
procedures and oversight, as directed by DHS AD 102-01 and DNDO's SDP,
help to ensure that DNDO's project management capabilities continue to
improve.
Question. How will DNDO formalize the relationship with S&T to
competently handle the movement of programs from Transformation
Research and Development to Systems Development, which will remain with
DNDO?
Answer. In order to maintain and improve the current levels of
integration for transformational research and development activities
and transitions of technologies for use by operators, DNDO will work
closely with S&T to ensure that the pipeline for technological
advancements remains coordinated to address gaps in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture and operational needs by utilizing the
integrated project team process to integrate research projects into
future acquisition plans and develop formal technology transition
agreements (TTAs). TTAs define the level of maturity of the technology
at transition, ranging from commercially available to less mature
stages, and solidify the expectations of the technology developer and
the component who receives the technology. This arrangement will ensure
a smooth integration of S&T developed technologies into the DNDO
systems development process.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
departmental management
Question. Your Department has been operating under a continuing
resolution for 5 months. Yesterday, Department of Defense (DOD)
officials testified to our subcommittee that operating in such a manner
has ``brutal'' effects on the readiness of our Nation's defense. Like
DOD, your Department's ability to operate efficiently also has
significant implications on our Nation's security interests. What types
of effects has operating under a continuing resolution for so long had
on your Department?
Answer. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act enacted on April 15, 2011, provides resources to the
Department for the rest of the fiscal year. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) will be able to accomplish its mission within the
funding levels provided in the continuing resolution.
Question. If the Congress is unable to enact some form of a
Homeland Security appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011, what are
some of the specific effects operating under a year-long continuing
resolution would have on your Department's missions?
Answer. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act enacted on April 15, 2011, provides resources to the
Department for the rest of the fiscal year.
coast guard
Question. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request included
funding to complete the fifth national security cutter (NSC), yet there
are funds requested in the fiscal year 2012 budget to finish out NSC
No. 5. If there was a certainty that the Congress would appropriate
these funds by October 1 of this year, this might be a reasonable plan.
But understanding our current condition and recent history, would
getting NSC No. 5 under contract before the end of fiscal year 2011 as
previously planned create efficiencies and savings in the shipbuilding
process?
Answer. The Coast Guard is prepared to efficiently complete a
contract for construction of NSC No. 5 as soon as full funding
authority is enacted by the Congress.
national security cutter
Question. What does the timely acquisition of NSCs mean to the
Coast Guard's fleet in terms of the retirement of other vessels,
operations and maintenance costs, and personnel costs? How have the
current NSCs improved your capabilities?
Answer. The Coast Guard is committed to meeting its surface
operational hours baseline to execute statutorily required missions in
the deepwater environment. The Coast Guard is able to meet this
baseline through the delivery of new assets to replace aging cutters.
The sooner the Coast Guard can bring NSCs, offshore patrol cutters
(OPCs) and fast response cutters (FRCs) online, the sooner it can
decommission its aging, legacy cutters. Furthermore, maintenance and
repairs that are increasingly above programmed levels draw critical
depot level maintenance funds from other assets, thereby impacting
readiness across the fleet.
The following specific, unique and improved, operational features
and capabilities allow NSCs to execute required missions:
--Long-range exclusive economic zone and border enforcement
capability, with the endurance to remain on station for
extended periods along with the speed and range to reach any
area of operation.
--Long-range, high-speed counterterrorism, counter-drug intercept
capability.
--Capabilities for continued operations in a contaminated environment
(e.g., chemical, radiation).
--Three dimensional capable air-search radar, providing the
capability to manage the air domain during regular or disaster
operations.
--Three cutter boats. The stern ramp allows for extremely quick
launching with only one or two persons on deck to conduct the
launch. Fast action response teams are ready to respond to a
tactical situation with very little advance notice.
--Two aircraft hangars allow the cutter to deploy with two aircraft,
increasing aviation capabilities for prolonged aviation
presence and increased redundancy for continued operations.
--Ability to exploit information on-scene, and exchange secure data
to and from the national intelligence network. This capability
is critical in conducting homeland security missions, including
interdicting drug and human smuggling networks that benefit
from increasing sophistication of IT systems.
As an example of the capabilities of the NSC, during her first
patrol, utilizing advanced sensors, communications, and onboard cutter
boats, the NSC Bertholf interdicted 12,500 kilograms of cocaine with a
street value of nearly $400 million and detained nine suspected drug
smugglers in the Eastern Pacific.
acquisition long-lead time material
Question. How would acquisition of long-lead time materials (LLTM)
for NSC No. 6 during fiscal year 2012 affect overall acquisition
efficiency and contractor workload? Does the current plan to buy LLTM
in fiscal year 2013 at the same time you buy the ship itself and
conceivably sign a construction contract reduce or raise the overall
price of the ship as opposed to buying LLTM in advance?
Answer. The funding associated with the sixth NSC is not required
until fiscal year 2013.
disaster relief
Question. Over the past 20 years, more than $4 out of every $5
appropriated by the Congress to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) have
been provided through supplemental appropriations bills. Over the past
20 years, an average of nearly $7 billion annually has been
appropriated for disaster relief, yet you requested only $1.95 billion
for fiscal year 2011 and $1.8 billion for fiscal year 2012. Your budget
documents state that these requested funds are only for
``noncatastrophic disaster activity.''
Many experts I've talked to say that true catastrophes only occur
once every 20-25 years. What is your definition of catastrophe? Does it
match the definition of catastrophe as provided in the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act? How often do catastrophes occur in
your mind? Are we budgeting wisely for disasters?
Answer. A total of 22 events that qualify as catastrophes have
occurred in 14 of the last 23 fiscal years. While no hard definition
currently exists, FEMA currently believes that an event qualifies as a
catastrophe if the estimated cost-threshold to the Federal Government
is more than $500 million.
The $1.8 billion requested for the DRF, per standard annual
practice, reflects the 5-year rolling average of historical obligations
for noncatastrophic events (those less than $500 million in estimated
obligations), less estimated recoveries for fiscal year 2012. This
methodology is one that the administration has proposed in its fiscal
year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budgets and represents the best use of
available information in developing the DRF request. We also have a
robust strategy in place to deobligate funds from past contracts and
projects that are now complete and where we did not spend all the money
originally obligated. Based on our experience in actively managing the
unliquidated contract obligations in fiscal year 2010, we are taking
the same approach for individual assistance and public assistance
grants in fiscal year 2011, and anticipate that our projected
recoveries may be higher than previously estimated. Regardless, we are
committed to working with the Congress to ensure that the DRF remains
solvent through fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
citizenship and immigration services--data center consolidation
Question. Your Department has received recognition for its data
center consolidation efforts. These efforts are particularly impressive
when considering the number of previously unaffiliated agencies your
Department has brought together.
What types of efficiencies will your Department gain from these
efforts? Can you quantify current or future taxpayer savings as a
result of these efforts?
Answer. The following are types of efficiencies that DHS expects to
gain from the data center consolidation efforts:
--Provide operational efficiencies and economies of scale through the
consolidation of more than 30 locations to 2;
--Facilitate management, sharing and dissemination of data;
--Provide improved disaster recovery and continuity of operations
(COOP) capabilities;
--Enhance Department's ability to quickly launch new departmentwide
capabilities;
--Provide components single storefront for ordering of services;
--Improve server (CPU) utilization (percent); rack space utilization
(percent); rack floor utilization (percent); power usage/square
foot; and power usage effectiveness;
--Standardize IT resource acquisitions across components, as well as
streamline maintenance and support contracts that will allow
for less complex vendor support to expedite response times in
the event of an emergency.
To date, five legacy data centers have completed their migrations
to the DHS Enterprise Data Centers of a total of 43 identified primary
sites for a combined short-term savings of $16.3 million/year. The
long-term return on investment (ROI) analysis, which factors in legacy
data center costs, costs to migrate to the two DHS data centers, and
projected operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, anticipates
cumulative savings/cost avoidance from our Break Even Point in fiscal
year 2017 through fiscal year 2030 of $4.8 billion.
coast guard unmanned aerial vehicles
Question. With the successes of unmanned systems in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, why doesn't your fiscal year 2012 budget request
contain funding to move the Coast Guard closer to using unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) in its operations?
Answer. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Navy and Customs
and Border Protection to advance application of these capabilities in
the maritime domain. As these technologies and capabilities are further
researched and developed for maritime applications, the Coast Guard is
focusing capital resources toward high priorities within the Coast
Guard Air Domain, including extending service life and enhancing the
capability of current airframes such as the H-65, H-60, and C-130H as
well as recapitalizing aged air assets (e.g., replacing the HU-25
Falcon with the HC-144A Ocean Sentry).
Question. As the Coast Guard continues to analyze options for land-
based UAVs, has it considered any fee-for-service maritime surveillance
UAV options as demonstrated in SOUTHCOM's Project Cazador that could
mitigate immediate risk to the Coast Guard with regard to acquisition,
training, basing, and the like?
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard had representatives from the Research
and Development and Requirement and Capabilities staffs on site during
the 2010 Project Cazador and considers fee-for-service to be one of
several means to conduct a land-based unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
technology demonstration. The Coast Guard continues to work with DHS
partners to leverage their experience and investments in land-based UAS
technology.
tsa advanced imaging technology
Question. Following the Christmas Day bombing attempt of 2009, your
Department moved quickly to aggressively procure advanced imaging
technology (AIT) in an attempt to keep up with current air travel
threats. Could you update the subcommittee on the progress of that
effort and whether these machines are providing both enhanced detection
capability and sufficient passenger privacy?
Answer. AIT units detect a wide range of metallic and nonmetallic
threats, including explosives, on passengers. By the end of fiscal year
2012, assuming full funding of the Department's fiscal year 2011 and
fiscal year 2012 budget requests, TSA estimates that 1,275 AITs will be
deployed.
Rigorous privacy safeguards are also in place to protect the
traveling public. All images generated by imaging technology are viewed
in a walled-off location not visible to the public. The officer
assisting the passenger never sees the image, and the officer viewing
the image never interacts with the passenger. The imaging technology
that TSA uses cannot store, export, print, or transmit images.
Furthermore, to further enhance privacy protections in place for AIT
screening, TSA is currently testing Automated Target Recognition
technology, which generates a generic outline of a person and
identifies the approximate area on the figure where an anomaly is
detected.
fema's map modernization
Question. As you know, much of my State of Mississippi and Senator
Landrieu's State of Louisiana is protected from flood waters by levees.
Having intimately experienced Hurricane Katrina, we take seriously the
need of the National Flood Insurance Program to accurately reflect risk
to the public. However, Senators from all over the Nation are hearing
from their constituents regarding FEMA's Map Modernization efforts. Do
you share my view there are practical changes we can make to FEMA
policy that might mitigate some of the concerns of communities without
adversely affecting risk identification or the solvency of the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2009, we have been implementing the Risk
Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program, which not only
addresses gaps in flood hazard data, but uses that updated data to form
a solid foundation for risk assessment and floodplain management, and
to provide State, local, and tribal entities with information needed to
mitigate flood related risks. Risk MAP is introducing new products and
services extending beyond the traditional digital flood maps produced
in Flood Map Modernization, including visual illustration of flood
risk, analysis of the probability of flooding, economic consequences of
flooding, and greater public engagement tools. FEMA is increasing its
work with officials to help use flood risk data and tools to
effectively communicate risk to citizens, and enable communities to
enhance their mitigation plans.
Currently, FEMA is executing the NFIP reform work plan, and is
considering proposed legislative, regulatory, and administrative
changes to the program. This process was designed to engage program
stakeholders from a variety of perspectives, and to date has included
hundreds of stakeholders in a series of public meetings and generated
thousands of public comments on reform possibilities.
The original NFIP reform work plan envisioned an 18-month process,
to ensure thorough and transparent engagement with a wide variety of
program stakeholders. Based on feedback from the Congress, FEMA has
accelerated this schedule by 6 months, and expects to report findings
by the end of the fiscal year. This will allow for consideration of
program reforms by decisionmakers prior to the expiration of the
current NFIP authorization in September 2011.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
coast guard maritime coverage in alaska
Question. In Alaska, we are very concerned with the President's
decision to decommission another high endurance cutter in the fiscal
year 2012 budget. Given the vast maritime environment that the Coast
Guard is responsible for protecting in Alaska, I am concerned that the
decommissioning of these cutters will have significantly negative
impacts on the safety and security of the Alaskan commercial fishing
industry. The Coast Guard is tasked with conducting operations in
Alaska that encompasses more than 3.8 million square miles, which is
larger than the land mass of the continental United States, and more
than 33,000 miles of coastline. With the Alaskan fishing industry
producing more than 60 percent of the national fishing totals each
year, the cumulative loss of another cutter potentially from the west
coast could place a significant portion of the Alaskan fishing fleet
that routinely operate in the Bering Sea and gulf of Alaska in danger
as well as preventing the Coast Guard from effectively ensuring that
the safety and commercial fisheries regulations are adequately
enforced.
Previously you testified that your Department and the Coast Guard
were committed to a plan to recapitalize the current high endurance
cutter (WHEC) fleet with new national security cutters (NSCs), an
effort that was designed to maintain current cutter coverage levels
while quickly brining the new class of cutters online. However, the
fiscal year 2012 proposed budget does not have any funding for the
long-lead time items for the sixth national security cutter. Yet your
Department supports the President's proposed budget to decommission
another high endurance cutter before a suitable replacement comes
online. By delaying the purchase of the long lead time items, it
appears to me that your Department and the administration are not fully
committed to the Coast Guard's recapitalization efforts. It seems
unfeasible for the Coast Guard to be able to protect the maritime
public of Alaska with the continued pace of their cutter
decommissionings. What plan do you have in place to assure that there
is adequate cutter coverage in Alaska?
Answer. The Coast Guard has and will continue to serve in Alaska
with the existing fleet of WHECs and new NSCs. The U.S. Coast Guard
cutter (USCGC) Bertholf has been certified ready for operations and is
conducting its first 110-day patrol in Alaska this spring. USCGC
Waesche will be ready for operations by November 2011. USCGC Stratton
will be delivered in September 2011 and ready for operations in the
spring of 2013. These NSCs will be homeported on the west coast and
will provide greater operational availability than the aging WHEC hulls
they are replacing. The Coast Guard will leverage these and other
assets to meet Bering Sea presence requirements in order to execute
critical living marine resources, other law enforcement, and search and
rescue missions.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Landrieu. Unless there are further comments or
questions, which I do not think there will be, this meeting is
recessed.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., Wednesday, March 2, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary Landrieu (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Landrieu, Lautenberg, Coats, and Cochran.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Coast Guard
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Good morning. I'd like to call our
subcommittee to order.
And the purpose of this meeting is to review the Coast
Guard budget and priorities for the coming year.
And I welcome Admiral Robert Papp to discuss these issues.
And, thank you, Admiral, for being with us today. I'm joined by
my ranking member, Senator Coats, and the vice chair of the
subcommittee, Senator Lautenberg. So, I'm really pleased to
welcome you this morning.
This is to review the budget request and examine the
agency's operations and recapitalization requirements.
This is your first appearance before this subcommittee, so,
welcome, and congratulations on your new role as Commandant of
the Coast Guard.
The importance of the Coast Guard to our Nation cannot be
overstated. It's 1 of the 5 branches of the military and is
responsible for the safety and security of our maritime
interest in U.S. ports, waterways, and on the high seas.
We will never forget--and, particularly, this Senator--the
heroic efforts of the Coast Guard men and women who came to our
aid after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the gulf coast and
rescued 33,000 citizens during the largest search and rescue
mission in the Coast Guard's history. Last year the Coast Guard
was first on the scene in response to the earthquake in Haiti,
coordinated the response and cleanup efforts following the
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig and subsequent oil
spill, which was also the largest of its kind in the history of
our country. The Coast Guard--gentlemen that I serve with--has
been extremely busy in missions along the southern part of our
State and all over the United States.
However, the Coast Guard's ability to fulfill its mission
requirements has reached a critical juncture due to
deteriorating assets, aging infrastructure, and workforce gaps.
The former Commandant, Admiral Thad W. Allen, who I had a
tremendous amount of respect for, said, ``With every passing
year, our operating capacity erodes, putting our people at risk
and endangering our ability to execute our statutory
responsibilities.''
Admiral Papp has been equally candid about the state of the
Coast Guard and recently said, ``We may need to reduce the
number and range of our capabilities we've added since 9/11
until properly resourced.''
Frankly, the Coast Guard has not been properly resourced in
its budget requests to the Congress. This has been a failure of
both the current and previous administrations. Over the past 5
years, this subcommittee, with my support, has increased the
Coast Guard budget by $160 million annually above the White
House request levels to fill operation recapitalization
shortfalls.
However, continuing such increases may not be sustainable
in today's constrained fiscal environments, of which we're all
aware, and this subcommittee intends to do what it can to
eliminate the waste and the fat, and focus on our central
missions. However, we've been calling on the Coast Guard to do
more and more things with less and less. At some point, which
you're going to see in this hearing, things start to
deteriorate.
With that in mind, today we focus on the Coast Guard's 2012
request, which is only a 1-percent increase above last year.
Specifically, we'll be examining whether the Coast Guard is
properly resourced to execute its many missions.
Before turning to Senator Coats, I want to take this
opportunity to stress my concern about the status of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund
(DRF). For several months I've been pressing the White House on
the need to submit to the Congress an emergency funding request
for the DRF. There is currently a $3 billion shortfall for
2012. If the President does not seek emergency funding, it is
likely that this fund will be exhausted in spring 2012,
stopping disaster recovery efforts in 49 States, including the
States impacted by the devastating and historic recent
tornadoes, primarily in the South, but in other States as well,
particularly in the State of Alabama that was so hard-hit, and
by States currently facing historic flooding along the
Mississippi River, which is truly the breadth and the width of
our country.
It makes no sense to cut funding for agencies that prepare
for and respond to future disasters to pay for the cost of past
disasters. Those are clearly emergencies. They are over the
allotted base amount that we allocate to the best of our
judgment on a 5-year average. We cannot predict disasters.
There is no crystal ball sitting on this desk. I cannot predict
where future storms will be. I could not predict the recent
tornadoes. I could not predict the Mississippi River flooding.
All I can do is budget a reasonable amount of money based on a
5-year average and then expect that the President will send an
emergency request when it truly is needed. I believe the
evidence is in to support that action.
Following Senator Coats' remarks, we'll go to Vice Chairman
Lautenberg, and then other members will be recognized as they
come in.
I thank our ranking member for his support and his
cooperation. He too is a great supporter of the Coast Guard,
and I appreciate that.
Senator Coats.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL COATS
Senator Coats. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Admiral, thank you--first, for your call a few weeks ago,
and the opportunity to work with you.
I did have the privilege of serving for 10 years on the
Senate Armed Services Committee, and I always viewed the Coast
Guard as the fifth service. But it's as essential as the first
four. And I think since 9/11 you've had to take on even greater
responsibilities. So, I commend the Coast Guard for its
participation in our Nation's defense, and wish you the best in
your leadership.
I'm sure that you breathed at least a sharp sigh of relief
when the Congress finally gave you some direction on what your
funding would be for the remainder of fiscal year 2011.
Unfortunately, we may be in a situation for the 2012 budget
that again leaves some uncertainty in terms of just exactly
what the funding will be. I'm sorry for that, and I know it
makes it difficult in terms of planning and preparing your
goals, and meeting those goals.
In any event, you're pretty much faced with a no-growth
budget for this next year. I'm looking forward to your
testimony in terms of outlining how you're going to have to
manage your priorities as a result of that. And if you don't
mind, I'll give you a little spiel that I've said several
times. I'm sure the chair is tired of hearing me say this, but
we face the kind of debt and deficit situation today that I
think none of us had anticipated, and it's going to require
some pretty serious action in terms of how we deal with it.
My concern has been, and continues to be, that we are
limiting our focus on just a small part of the overall budget,
and therefore, the discretionary--including defense--spending
is subject to taking a disproportionate share of the burden of
addressing this debt and deficit problem. So, I've been trying
to encourage a so-called ``Coalition of the Discretionary''
that will encourage Members of the Congress and the executive
branch to broaden the look in dealing with the real drivers of
our deficit and debt, and that's some of the mandatory
spending.
I know this is outside your jurisdiction. I'm just raising
the point here that you are the recipient of, perhaps, a
disproportionate share of the burden, and lower funding than
you need to accomplish some of your priorities, because we have
not yet come to a consensus in terms of moving forward on
mandatory spending, so that the focus has continued to be on a
slice of the budget of which you are a part.
So, I just say that for the record. I'm not asking you to
necessarily do anything about that. But I do look forward to
your testimony.
Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership with this. You
certainly have much more at stake relative to the Coast Guard
than the State of Indiana does. But I do want to state for the
record that we do have a Coast Guard station in Michigan City--
small, but necessary. And we're glad to be a State that
participates just a little bit in the efforts of the Coast
Guard. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much, Senator Coats.
Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Admiral Papp, and all of your colleagues for
the wonderful service the Coast Guard gives the country. I
think it's well-known that in all of my years in the U.S.
Senate, the Coast Guard has been a principal focus of my views
about what we ought to do to take care of our security--so many
other responsibilities that the Coast Guard has--I don't know
whether it goes from fish to fowl. But I start out with
safeguarding our supplies, fish, protecting the quality of the
water, being there for security duty.
It's just an amazing thing, Madam Chair. The Coast Guard is
one of those organizations that, the more good they do, the
less we give them. And it's the kind of contrast that gives me
some cause of concern.
We are all so proud of what our people did when they went
to get Osama bin Laden, and proud of the President's decision
and courage to take that kind of a chance. Because obviously,
great personal feeling goes along with putting people in harm's
way. But there we are. And we learned one thing: When we put
the resources into a mission, we can succeed. And this is a
mission--the attack on Osama bin Laden was in the works for
years.
So when I look at the things that we're asking the Coast
Guard to do, and see that prior to 9/11 the Coast Guard
invested only 2 percent of its operating budget in security
activities--immediately following 9/11, it shifted its
resources dramatically, spending approximately 50 percent of
its operating budget on a security mission--there are lots of
positive things in the budget for the Coast Guard, including
the funding to modernize the aging fleet and bolster its
ability to respond to disasters. I'm also pleased that the
budget includes funding to rebuild the dilapidated pier port at
the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, New Jersey. The
facility supports the patrol boats that protect our coastline,
and trains Coast Guard recruits. I hope we can provide the
resources the training center desperately needs.
PREPARED STATEMENT
And Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the
aforementioned statement would go in the record.
Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Madam Chairman, Osama bin Laden is dead--but the fight against
terrorists who want to harm us is far from over. We must remain
vigilant and keep our defenses strong to prevent another terrorist
attack in our country. The Coast Guard is vital to fulfilling that
mission of protecting our shores.
This is particularly important in my home State of New Jersey,
which is a tempting target for our enemies. We are home to the most at-
risk area in the country for a terrorist attack: A stretch that
includes Newark Liberty International Airport, the Port of Newark,
chemical plants, refineries, railways, and more. Protecting this region
also protects the economy: The Port of New York and New Jersey--the
largest on the east coast--handled more than $140 billion in cargo last
year.
There are a lot of positives in the President's proposed budget for
the Coast Guard, including funding to modernize its aging fleet and
bolster its ability to respond to disasters. I am also pleased that the
budget includes funding to rebuild the dilapidated pier 4 at the Coast
Guard Training Center in Cape May, New Jersey. This facility supports
the patrol boats that protect our coastline and trains the Coast
Guard's recruits. I hope we can provide the resources the training
center deserves.
Despite the funding for these projects, the administration's
overall budget plan doesn't go far enough. The Coast Guard is
consistently put at the back of the line for resources--and is
consistently forced to do more with less. The men and women of the
Coast Guard are America's eyes and ears on the seas, and we remain safe
because of them.
So, I look forward to working with this subcommittee to make sure
the Coast Guard has the funding it needs to keep up the great job that
it does each day.
Senator Lautenberg. And I would just say that my respect
for the Coast Guard continues to evolve. I look from the window
of my apartment in New Jersey, and I see a small patrol boat
going around to make sure that things are all right in the
Hudson River and the harbor, and I can imagine what it's like
to have to take care of all the ports, the security duties, and
the military duties. Frankly, the Coast Guard is required to do
so. Thank you. And we're going to work hard to make sure you
have the resources.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Madam Chair, thank you very much for
convening this hearing.
I want to join you and the other members of the
subcommittee in welcoming the Commandant to review the budget
request for the next fiscal year.
The Coast Guard is really front and center right now on
everybody's mind and on everybody's TV screen, with activities
of search and rescue, protecting our coastlines, our inlet
waterway entrances into our country--a very complex challenge
that the Coast Guard is facing.
But from my vantage point, I've been very pleased and
impressed with the leadership and the hard work that's being
devoted to the mission of the Coast Guard by everyone involved,
from the Commandant, throughout the corps of people--men and
women--who serve so gallantly and impressively in our Coast
Guard today.
I look forward to your comments about the budget request,
and taking our questions that we may have.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
Admiral, proceed, please.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR.
Admiral Papp. Good morning, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member
Coats, and also, two longtime supporters of the Coast Guard--
Senator Lautenberg and Senator Cochran.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today before
you, and thank you for your unwavering support of the men and
women of the Coast Guard.
It's my great honor and privilege to represent and lead
these outstanding patriots.
America is a maritime Nation. Ninety percent of our goods
arrive by or are shipped by sea. The safety and security of our
maritime impacts the daily lives of every American, regardless
of whether they live on or near the water.
In the past year our citizens have witnessed the Coast
Guard in action like never before. The Coast Guard has been
conducting drug and migrant interdictions in the Caribbean, and
instantly transitioned to respond to the devastating Haitian
earthquake. Then, with the dust of Haiti still on its boots, it
responded with agility to the unprecedented Deepwater Horizon
oil rig explosion and spill. These all-hands-on-deck evolutions
demonstrated the value of our unique, versatile, and adaptable
maritime multi-mission and military capabilities.
While we surged to meet these challenges, we continued to
perform our many other persistent missions, just as thousands
of coastguardsmen are doing today as we speak. In the flood-
ravaged Ohio and Mississippi River valleys, Coast Guard
personnel are assisting State and local officials to protect
our citizens. On the Great Lakes, Coast Guard icebreakers freed
the flow of $2 billion worth of job-sustaining commerce,
facilitating, among other things, the start of the 41st
international shipping season into the port of Indiana Burns
Harbor, allowing stevedores, longshoremen, truckers, and small
businessmen to get back to work.
Deep in the eastern Pacific Ocean, the cutter Midgett--one
of our 40-year-old high endurance cutters (WHECs) based in
Seattle--interdicted a drug submarine loaded with 6.6 tons of
cocaine worth $138 million. In the Arabian Gulf, several
hundred of our coastguardsmen serve, including six patrol boats
and a port security unit, and they're protecting the oil
platforms that provide 85 percent of Iraq's revenue.
Coastguardsmen are also deployed off the coast of Africa as
part of the joint anti-piracy task force. And in Alaska, Coast
Guard helicopter crews deployed from Kodiak, Alaska to Cordova
for the spring and summer fishing season have rescued four
people in two separate plane crashes just this week. And as I
speak this morning, the cutter Campbell is off the coast of
Honduras with a fishing vessel on the Caribbean, and they just
located 31 bales of cocaine aboard the boat.
These coastguardsmen, as their predecessors have done for
more than 220 years, are working tirelessly to safeguard our
Nation's maritime interests on our rivers, our ports, along our
coasts, and on the high seas.
Yet today, we find our Coast Guard at a critical inflection
point in its history. I'm well aware of our Nation's current
economic and budget challenges. However, I also know that
decisions made today will do one of two things: They'll either
sustain a Coast Guard capable of meeting its missions and
responding to future manmade or natural disasters. And as you
mentioned, Madam Chair, we can't predict where and when they
will happen, so it takes our versatile and adaptable forces, in
sufficient quantities, to be prepared for those unpredictable
events.
The other result could be a Coast Guard that is less
capable and diminished in force.
Your steadfast support, as most recently demonstrated to
the fiscal year 2011 appropriation, enables us to continue to
perform our challenging maritime missions at the level the
Nation demands.
Senator Coats, you said I must have breathed a sigh of
relief. Quite frankly, I wanted to do a high five when I got
this budget, because it addresses our most pressing
requirements--the major cutter recapitalization, and sustaining
current operations. By fully funding national security cutter
No. 5, you enabled us to deliver the ship up to 1 year earlier,
potentially saving taxpayers millions of dollars.
It was ironic that this morning when I did my daily
readings, there was a quote in there that says, ``When we pay
later, the price is greater.'' And certainly, when we buy it
earlier, we get it at a better price, and we will have savings
for our taxpayers.
Our acquisitions momentum must continue. Gaps in funding
our recapitalization are costly and jeopardize our ability to
protect the Nation's high seas sovereignty.
The 2012 budget request responds to our Nation's budget
challenges. I had to make some tough tradeoffs, and I directed
management efficiencies, reductions in administrative costs,
and professional services, totaling about $140 million. I will
reinvest these savings into sustaining our frontline operations
as the American citizens expect, to rebuilding the Coast Guard,
enhancing our maritime incident prevention and response, and
supporting our Coast Guard families.
I'm requesting more than $1.4 billion to continue our
recapitalization effort, including funding for national
security cutters (NSCs), fast response cutters (FRCs), response
boats, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), and sustainment of our
aging ships and aircraft.
I recently decommissioned two antiquated WHECs and our
oldest commissioned cutter--affectionately known as the Queen
of the Fleet--Acushnet, which was almost 68 years old. Now,
this allowed me the privilege of bestowing the Queen of the
Fleet status to another Coast Guard cutter, Smilax, which is
merely 67 years old.
But at some point it becomes unfair to keep asking our
crews to expend countless hours fixing old machinery. Our crews
deserve state-of-the-art equipment and decent living conditions
to do their jobs. And the American people deserve the
capability of a modern Coast Guard fleet to preserve and
protect our maritime sovereignty.
The good news is, because of your support, our
recapitalization is starting to pay dividends. The first of our
eight NSCs, the cutter Bertholf, is currently conducting its
first Alaska patrol. Bertholf's patrol marks the beginning of
decades of service the NSC fleet will provide in the Bering Sea
and throughout the vast maritime approaches to our shores. And
the first of 58 FRCs, our new patrol boat fleet, was just
launched in Lockport, Louisiana. This is a critical step toward
replacing our tired but venerable workforce, the Iowa-class
patrol boat fleet.
The fiscal year 2012 budget also invests $22.7 million to
ensure the safe and efficient flow of commerce, protecting our
natural resources, and effectively managing pollution incidents
when they occur.
Finally, you can't have a strong military workforce without
healthy families. This budget also requests funding for
military housing projects and increases access to childcare
services for Coast Guard families.
As the maritime component of DHS, the 2012 budget will
ensure the Coast Guard is able to continue to perform our vital
maritime missions.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr.
Good morning Madam Chair and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the continuing support you have shown to
the men and women of the Coast Guard, including the recent passage of
the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, which provided full-year
resources for the Coast Guard.
I am here today to discuss the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2012
budget request. Before I discuss the details of the request, I would
like to take this opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's value and
role, some of our recent operations, including our recent response to
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the current budget environment.
For more than 220 years, the Coast Guard has safeguarded the
Nation's maritime interests and natural resources on our rivers and
ports, in the littoral regions, on the high seas, and around the world.
The Coast Guard saves those in peril and protects the Nation's maritime
border, marine transportation system, natural resources, and the
environment. Over the past year, Coast Guard men and women--active
duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliarists alike--continued to deliver
premier service to the public. They saved more than 4,000 lives,
protected our borders by stopping the flow of drugs and illegal
migrants, and performed admirably in response to the largest spill in
our Nation's history--the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
How does the Coast Guard operating model serve our public? The
Coast Guard is an adaptable, responsive, military force of maritime
professionals whose broad legal authorities, assets, geographic
diversity, and expansive partnerships provide a persistent presence in
the inland waters, ports, coastal regions, and far offshore areas of
operations. This presence, coupled with more than 220 years of
experience as the Nation's maritime first responder, provides our
Nation with tremendous value in service to the public.
The Coast Guard's value and role:
--We protect those on the sea: Leading responses to maritime
disasters and threats, ensuring a safe and secure maritime
transportation system, preventing incidents, and rescuing those
in distress.
--We protect America from threats delivered by sea: Enforcing laws
and treaties, securing our ocean resources, and ensuring the
integrity of our maritime domain from illegal activity.
--We protect the sea itself: Regulating hazardous cargo
transportation, holding responsible parties accountable for
environmental damage and cleanup, and protecting living marine
and natural resources.
The Coast Guard, working through DHS, led the administration's
response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the first-ever Spill of
National Significance, leveraging resources from across the country and
around the world. The Coast Guard was the first agency on scene the
night the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon exploded,
searching for those in distress and providing Federal on-scene
presence. During the response, the Coast Guard worked closely with our
Federal partners and industry to leverage resources where needed while
carrying out our other missions throughout the world. From nearly every
corner of the country, the Coast Guard surged more than 7,000 people,
including members of the Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary, to support
the response. Coast Guard members served in cutters and boats, in fixed
and rotary-wing aircraft, and in the shore-side incident command
system. The Coast Guard's adaptive operational model allowed for the:
--Integration of Government and industry to contain the spill,
recover more than 34.7 million gallons of oil-water mix, and
perform controlled burns to remove more than 11 million gallons
of oil from open water to protect the shoreline and wildlife.
--Deployment of 46 cutters and 22 aircraft. Surface assets included
medium endurance cutters (210-ft and 270-ft); sea-going and
coastal buoy tenders (225-ft and 175-ft); ice-breaking tugs
(140-ft); and patrol boats (179-ft, 110-ft and 87-ft). Air
assets included long- and medium-range surveillance aircraft
(HC-130 and HC-144A) and short- and medium-range helicopters
(HH-60 and HH-65).
While 2010 was another exceptional ``operational year'' by any
standard, these operations further stressed existing aged and obsolete
cutters, boats, aircraft, and support infrastructure that are in dire
need of recapitalization. Furthermore, these extended surge operations
strained workforce readiness due to increased op-tempo and deferred
training. Even in the current fiscal environment where resources are
scarce, we must continue to rebuild the Coast Guard, support frontline
operations, invest in our people and families, and enhance maritime
incident prevention and response capabilities to meet mission demands
and ensure resiliency in the maritime domain.
fiscal year 2012 request
In fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard will focus resources to
advance strategic priorities. Through tough decisions and resource
trade-offs, the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2012 budget leverages savings
generated through management efficiencies and offsets, and allocates
funding toward higher order needs to support frontline operations.
These offsets and reductions supported implementation of the following
fiscal year 2012 budget priorities:
--Rebuild the Coast Guard;
--Sustain frontline operations;
--Enhance maritime incident prevention and response; and
--Support military families.
Highlights from our request are included in appendix I.
Rebuild the Coast Guard
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2012 budget requests $1.4 billion to
continue recapitalization of cutters; boats; aircraft; command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; and infrastructure to improve mission
readiness by replacing aged, obsolete, and unreliable assets. The
fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 40 response boats and 6
fast response cutters (FRCs), as well as a sizable investment in the
renovation and restoration of shore facilities. This budget also
provides resources to ensure that the Coast Guard's aviation fleet is
mission-ready through the acquisition of two maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA), one HH-60 helicopter, and conversion and sustainment projects of
multiple aircraft. Investment in Coast Guard recapitalization is
essential to mission execution.
sustain frontline operations
To ensure the Coast Guard is able to meet the needs of the Nation,
the fiscal year 2012 budget balances resources between investments in
capital assets, initiatives to sustain frontline operations, and
measures to enhance mission execution. The fiscal year 2012 budget
requests $67.7 million to operate new assets delivered through asset
recapitalization programs and provides funding to support personnel and
in-service assets. Moreover, funding is included to operate U.S. Coast
Guard cutter (USCGC) Healy and support the operational reactivation of
USCGC Polar Star. The Coast Guard plans to decommission USCGC Polar Sea
in fiscal year 2011 and transition her crew to USCGC Polar Star,
enabling orderly transition to USCGC Polar Star and facilitating her
return to operations in fiscal year 2013.
enhance maritime incident prevention and response
Coast Guard marine safety and environmental response personnel
promote safe and efficient travel, facilitate the flow of commerce in
the maritime domain, and protect our natural resources. The fiscal year
2012 budget requests $22.2 million to advance implementation of the
Coast Guard's marine safety performance plan and marine environmental
response mission performance plan. During the response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard incident responders established and
executed the Incident Command System to lead an effective, unified
effort. The Coast Guard will enhance these core competencies in fiscal
year 2012 to keep pace with an ever-growing and evolving maritime
industry and ensure continued proactive leadership to prevent disasters
on the Nation's waters and remain ready to respond if they occur.
Additionally, funding requested in the fiscal year 2012 budget will
assist in meeting Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 requirements
regarding dockside examinations by adding examiners to improve fishing
vessel safety.
support military families
The administration is committed to improving the quality of life
for military members and their families. The health and welfare of
families is the heart of operational readiness. The fiscal year 2012
budget includes $29.3 million to address critical housing shortfalls
and improve access to affordable, quality childcare. These initiatives
will ensure Coast Guard members are semper paratus for all hazards and
all threats.
conclusion
The demands on the Coast Guard remain high. As we have for more
than 220 years, we remain ready to meet the Nation's many maritime
needs supported by the fiscal year 2012 request. We will always fulfill
our duties and obligations to the American people, true to ``semper
paratus, always ready.'' I request your full support for the
President's fiscal year 2012 request. Again, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I am pleased to answer your
questions.
Appendix I--Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request
rebuild the coast guard
Surface Assets--$642 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $642 million for surface asset recapitalization
and sustainment initiatives, including:
--National Security Cutter (NSC).--Fully funds NSC-5 (anticipates
$615 million provided for NSC-5 in 2011). The NSC is replacing
the high endurance class.
--Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC).--Sustains initial acquisition work
and design of the OPC. The OPC will replace the medium
endurance cutter class to conduct missions on the high seas and
coastal approaches.
--Fast Response Cutter (FRC).--Provides production funding for six
FRCs to replace the 110-foot island class patrol boat.
--Response Boat-Medium (RB-M).--Provides production funding for 40
boats.
--Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC).--Provides for operational
enhancement of five WMECs at the Coast Guard Yard through the
Mission Effectiveness Program.
Air Assets--$289.9 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $289.9 million for the following air asset
recapitalization or enhancement initiatives, including:
--MH-60T--Replaces one Jayhawk lost in an operational crash in 2010.
--HC-144--Funds production of two MPA and procurement of up to five
mission system pallets and associated spare parts to complete
outfitting of the fleet.
--HH-60--Funds service life extension and component upgrades for
eight aircraft.
--HH-65--Funds sustainment of key components.
--HC-130H--Funds avionics upgrade and center wing box (CWB)
replacements.
Asset Recapitalization--Other--$166.1 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $166.1 million for the following equipment and
services:
--Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).--Deploys standardized
C4ISR capability to newly fielded NSCs and MPAs, and develops
C4ISR capability for the OPC. Interoperable and integrated
C4ISR is essential to the efficient and effective operation of
these assets.
--CG-Logistics Information Management System (CG-LIMS).--Continues
development and prototype deployment to Coast Guard operational
assets and support facilities.
--Rescue 21.--Completes deployment at Sectors Lake Michigan; San
Juan, Puerto Rico; Honolulu, Hawaii; Guam--and continues
replacement of legacy VHF systems in the Western Rivers.
--Interagency Operations Center (IOC).--Deploys WatchKeeper
information-sharing capability to three IOC locations.
Commences deployment of the sensor management capability;
resulting in improved capability to see, understand, and share
tactical information critical to security and interagency
coordination in vulnerable ports and coastal areas.
Shore Units and Aids to Navigation (ATON)--$193.7 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $193.7 million to recapitalize shore
infrastructure for safe, functional, and modern shore facilities that
effectively support Coast Guard assets and personnel:
--Cape May, New Jersey.--Replaces a condemned pier critical to
execution of patrol boat missions.
--Corpus Christi, Texas.--Implements Sector/Air Station Corpus
Christi consolidation in order to properly hangar, maintain and
operate MPA, and enhance mission effectiveness.
--Chase Hall Barracks, New London, Connecticut.--Continues
renovations at the Coast Guard Academy by modernizing cadet
barracks.
--Commences construction of Nos. 3-6 FRC homeports, C4ISR training
facility, and continues modifications to Air Station Miami to
accommodate new MPA.
--Station Memensha Boathouse, Chilmark, Massachusetts.--Replaces the
boathouse destroyed by a fire in July 2010 essential to
supporting coastal law enforcement, security, and safety
operations.
--TRACEN Petaluma, California Wastewater Treatment Plant.--
Recapitalizes and expands the capability of the Wastewater
Treatment Plant to ensure compliance with environmental
regulations.
--Station Fairport, Ohio.--Recapitalizes multi-mission boat station,
originally constructed in 1918, to facilitate current-day
operations.
--ATON Infrastructure.--Improves short-range aids and infrastructure
to promote the safety of maritime transportation.
Personnel and Management--$110.2 Million (794 FTE)
The budget provides $110.2 million to provide pay and benefits for
the Coast Guard's acquisition workforce. The budget includes additional
resources to support the governmentwide Acquisition Workforce
Initiative to bolster the professional development and capacity of the
acquisition workforce.
sustain frontline operations
Pay and Allowances--$66.1 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $66.1 million to maintain parity of military
pay, allowances, and healthcare with the Department of Defense (DOD).
As a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Coast Guard
is subject to the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), which includes pay and personnel benefits for the military
workforce.
Annualization of Fiscal Year 2011--$53.9 Million (194 FTE)
The budget provides $53.9 million to continue new initiatives begun
in the prior year, including increased counternarcotics enforcement
through enhanced Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) capacity and
follow-on funding for new assets (e.g., NSC, FRC, MPA, etc.).
Surface and Air Asset Follow-on--$50.8 Million (220 FTE)
The budget provides a total of $50.8 million to fund operations and
maintenance of cutters, boats, aircraft, and associated subsystems
delivered through major cutter, aircraft, and associated C4ISR
acquisition efforts. Funding is requested for the following assets:
--RB-M.--Funding for maintenance, repair, and operational costs.
--FRC.--Operating and maintenance funding for FRC Nos. 6-8 and
funding for crew Nos. 9-10. These assets will be homeported in
Miami and Key West, Florida. Funding is also requested for
shore-side maintenance personnel needed to support FRCs.
--NSC.--Signals intelligence capability follow-on and crew rotational
concept implementation for three NSCs located in Alameda,
California.
--HC-144A MPA.--Operating and maintenance funding for aircraft No.
14; support and maintenance of mission system pallets 1-12.
--C4ISR Follow-on.--Funding to maintain more than 200 C4ISR systems
deployed and delivered by the Coast Guard C4ISR program.
--Helicopter Systems.--Funding to operate and maintain communications
and sensor systems for HH-60 and HH-65 helicopters.
--Asset Training System Engineering Personnel.--Funding to support
NSC and FRC training requirements at training center Yorktown.
Polar Icebreaking Program--$39 Million (180 FTE)
The budget requests $39 million in polar icebreaking budget
authority. Funding will support the operation and maintenance of U.S.
Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Healy and prepare for the operational
reactivation of USCGC Polar Star. The Coast Guard plans to decommission
USCGC Polar Sea in fiscal year 2011 and transition her crew to USCGC
Polar Star, enabling efficient transition to USCGC Polar Star and
facilitating her return to operations in fiscal year 2013.
Critical Depot Level Maintenance--$28.7 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $28.7 million for critical depot level
maintenance and asset sustainment for vessels, aircraft, and shore
infrastructure. Funding will increase support levels for the 140-, 175-
, and 225-foot classes of cutters, restore aircraft spare parts, and
provide sustainment for aging shore infrastructure.
Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS)--$6.3 Million (1 FTE)
The budget provides $6.3 million to begin replacement of the Search
and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking (SARSAT) system with DASS. This
multi-agency partnership also includes the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). Recapitalization
of the SARSAT system beginning in fiscal year 2012 is critical to
ensure no loss of coverage in distress notification and life saving
response during the planned deactivation of the legacy SARSAT system.
Coast Guard Network Security--$8.6 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides funding for the Coast Guard to transition from
its commercially provided Internet Access Points (IAPs) to DOD IAPs via
the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to ensure security of
vital networks and meet cybersecurity requirements.
enhance maritime incident prevention and response
Marine Safety Enhancement--$10.7 Million (53 FTE)
The budget provides $10.7 million and 105 personnel to implement
the next segment of the marine safety performance plan by investing in
marine safety inspectors, investigators, and fishing vessel safety
examiners at Coast Guard sectors. This initiative furthers the Coast
Guard's efforts to achieve an appropriate mix of military and civilian
personnel with the necessary skill sets and experience to perform
marine safety inspections and investigations.
Marine Environmental Response Enhancement--$11.5 Million (44 FTE)
The budget provides $11.5 million and 87 personnel to enhance
Marine Environmental Response (MER) capacity. This initiative supports
the marine environmental protection mission by providing funding for an
MER Incident Management and Assist Team (IMAT) and increasing technical
expertise and strengthening MER career paths at Coast Guard sectors and
strike teams. The request is the initial investment in the Coast
Guard's initiative to improve mission performance in accordance with
the MER mission performance plan.
support military families
Child Development Services--$9.3 Million (6 FTE)
The budget provides $9.3 million to increase access to childcare
services for Coast Guard families with dependents under the age of 12,
better aligning the Coast Guard with the DOD childcare standards.
Additionally, this request funds 12 new positions critical to ensuring
continued accreditation of the Coast Guard's nine child development
centers by the National Association for the Education of Young
Children.
Military Housing--$20 Million (0 FTE)
The budget provides $20 million to build family housing units at
Sector Columbia River and recapitalize the Air Station Cape Cod
unaccompanied personnel housing, the highest priority housing projects,
critical to the well-being of military personnel and their families
assigned to these geographic regions.
decommissionings, efficiencies, and savings
High Endurance Cutter Decommissioning---$6.7 Million (-92 FTE)
As part of its long-term recapitalization plan, the Coast Guard is
decommissioning high endurance cutters (WHECs) as NSCs are delivered
and made operational. The average age of the WHEC fleet is 43 years and
these assets are failing at an increased rate resulting in lost
operational days and increased maintenance costs. The Coast Guard will
decommission one WHEC in fiscal year 2012.
PC-179 Patrol Coastal Decommissioning---$16.4 Million (-108 FTE)
The three remaining 179-foot patrol coastal (PC) vessels will be
decommissioned per a January 2007, memorandum of agreement with the
U.S. Navy. These vessels will be returned to the U.S. Navy in fiscal
year 2012.
Standard Workstation Help Desk Consolidation---$6.9 Million (0 FTE)
Consolidates computer workstation support into two regional
centers, eliminating 56 contractors.
Program Support Reduction---$13.6 Million (0 FTE)
Reduction in programmatic support across the Coast Guard including
support reductions for:
--small boat replacement,
--reservist, and
--contract support for audit remediation, innovation program funding,
recruiting, and training opportunities.
administrative savings initiatives
In fiscal year 2012 the Coast Guard will seek efficiencies and make
targeted reductions in order to sustain frontline operational capacity
and invest in critical recapitalization initiatives.
Management Efficiencies---$61.1 Million (0 FTE)
Consistent with the Secretary of Homeland Security's efficiency
review and building upon efforts in previous fiscal years, efficiencies
will be generated by leveraging centralized purchasing and software
licensing agreements, reductions in printing and publications,
reductions in shipping and the transportation of things, reductions in
advisory and assistance contracts, minimizing purchases of supplies and
materials, office equipment consolidation, implementing automation and
energy conservation/savings measures, and limiting Government usage of
commercial facilities.
Professional Services Reduction---$15.2 Million (0 FTE)
A reduction in professional services contracts for enterprisewide
mission support and operational support activities.
Nonoperational Travel Reduction---$10 Million (0 FTE)
A 25-percent reduction in Coast Guard-wide nonoperational travel,
including travel for training, professional development, conferences,
and international engagement.
COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Admiral, very much, and I
appreciate it.
It's also, I think, appropriate to note Coast Guard facts
and figures that are available on its Web site, some of the
extraordinary work that you just touched on in your opening
remarks about what the Coast Guard accomplishes in an average
day. Just to say a few, the Coast Guard saves 13 lives,
responds to 65 search and rescue cases, provides a presence in
all major ports, and screens 679 commercial vessels and 170,000
crew passengers. It tracked 1,200 icebergs that had drifted in
the transatlantic shipping lanes last year. I could go on and
on. And other testimony the Commandant has put into the record.
I recently gave a speech on these capabilities, and it was
an impressive part of what was prepared for me. It really is
quite amazing, Admiral, the breadth of services the Coast Guard
provides to our country on a daily basis and looking back over
last year. We commend you.
Let me start with a few questions.
You have publicly expressed, despite your very positive
statement this morning, some concerns about the Coast Guard's
ability to carry out its 11 statutory missions. Recently, in
February you said, ``We need to reduce the number and range of
capabilities, unless we're properly resourced.''
I know that you're pleased with several aspects of the
budget. Can you elaborate on the capabilities to which you were
referring in that statement? You've ordered a stem-to-stern
review of Coast Guard capabilities. When will this review be
completed?
And if provided additional resources above the requested
level, where would you invest your next dollar?
So, it's three questions in one: Elaborate on the
capability shortfalls, if you would. You've ordered a stem-to-
stern review. When will that review be completed, and when will
those recommendations be reported to this subcommittee? And if
additional resources became available, where would you invest
your next dollar?
Admiral Papp. Thank you, ma'am. Those are three great
questions, the first of which is this review of capabilities
and whether we need to cut back on some of those capabilities.
I think we generally acknowledge across the board that
prior to 9/11, the Coast Guard was under-resourced to do all
the missions it had then. And since 9/11 we've picked up
additional responsibilities through the Maritime Transportation
Safety Act and the Safe Port Act. And we're grateful to the
Congress for the increase of people, first of all. We gained
about 6,000 people total, which has brought us back up to where
the service was in approximately 1990. But we've also picked up
these additional duties.
Also culturally, this service, bless it, has this attitude
of ``can do'', and it's both a blessing and a curse. And as we
have looked across the security responsibilities and the
threats facing our country, oftentimes because of this can-do
attitude, we start doing things that no one really asked us to
do. Examples of that would be, in some cases, rotary-wing air
intercept in which we're now training our helicopter pilots to
intercept low, slow threats that might approach a national
security event. We are resourced to do that in the Washington,
DC area, but we're not resourced to do it elsewhere. Yet, we're
doing it.
Vertical insertion of coastguardsmen onto ships is among
other tactical operations that we've looked at, perceived a
need, and started doing on our own, without the proper
resources to do it. And, unfortunately, we've experienced some
accidents over the last couple of years as we've trained for
these activities.
This has given me cause for concern and to take a pause,
and to order this stem-to-stern review, which will look at all
the capabilities out there, decide which ones are absolutely
the highest priority, then make sure that we're properly
resourced to carry out those activities, and properly trained
to be the best possible to do those things.
Inevitably, we will find some gaps that exist. And if it's
a job that the Coast Guard should be doing, it's my
responsibility to identify that to the administration and to
the Congress, and to seek the proper resources to do it. If
it's something that can be filled by another Government agency
working through partnerships, then I think it's reasonable to
go out to other Government agencies and ask them to fill that
void in cooperation with the Coast Guard.
That's the two first questions I think I've answered. And
then last is, where would I invest my next dollar? Clearly, in
recapitalization. We cannot continue to ask these young
patriots to go out to sea in 40-year-old ships, living in
conditions that were World War II vintage and stacked three-
high in berthing areas where there's condensation, darkness,
and extremes of heat and cold.
Plus, we need to give them the proper tools to work
effectively out there. New sensors, new radars, and survivable
ships that will take them out in these very dangerous
conditions, like the Bering Sea, the Gulf of Alaska, the vast
reaches of the Pacific. We need to be about the business of
getting those ships built as quickly as possible.
Senator Landrieu. And Admiral, I understand that the
average age of a Navy ship is 14 years, but the average age of
a Coast Guard ship is 40. Is that correct?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. Generally the Navy plans on a 20-
year service life, generally. In fact, our WHECs, the Hamilton
class, were used as a model for the Spruance class for the
United States Navy, which was built years later. And all the
Spruance class have been decommissioned. We're still running
our original 12 WHECs, with the exception of the two--Hamilton
and Chase--that we just decommissioned.
OIL SPILLS
Senator Landrieu. Let me ask you one other question. We
have many, so this will be the first round. Coast Guard policy
requires an incident-specific preparedness review to assess
lessons learned from major oil spills. The 2010 review was
recently completed in March. However, it is reported that many
lessons learned from prior spills, such as the 2008 Cosco Busan
spill, and the Cape Mohican spill 11 years earlier, had not
been addressed or implemented before the Deepwater Horizon
spill. So now we have those two previous spills, which were
much smaller; now Deepwater Horizon.
Where are you in your review of what it's going to take?
Because it is a priority for, I think, the majority of the
Members of the Senate--maybe not everyone, but the majority--to
get deepwater drilling back up and operational in the Gulf of
Mexico as soon as possible, recognizing that there are some
additional safety requirements. Where are you in that task? And
can you explain briefly the role of the Coast Guard in making
sure that spills are prevented and then responded to
adequately?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. I'm very proud of the Incident
Specific Performance Review (ISPR). As you've mentioned, we did
it for Cosco Busan, and we've done it now for the Deepwater
Horizon spill. It's an introspective review that I order for
our service to take a look at how we did the job, and to reveal
all the challenges, problems, and shortfalls that we might
have.
I just received that report, and we're in the process of
evaluating that. We also need to make comparisons to the
President's Commission report and other reports that are being
prepared, including our marine casualty investigation, which
has just been wrapped up.
We will look across all those reports and come up with a
comprehensive plan on what we need to do. But we're not sitting
back, waiting on that. We're already moving ahead. In fact, the
$22.7 million that we put in the fiscal year 2012 budget builds
on a plan that we already started after Cosco Busan, which is
to enhance our marine safety program with additional
inspectors, marine environmental responders, and other people.
It's a measured look, making sure that we grow slowly to make
sure that we're doing the right thing. And the 2012 budget
continues that process and, in addition, puts in there an
incident management assist team of about 33 people, which we
will forward deploy when a spill happens.
One of the things that came across very clearly in the
Deepwater Horizon spill is the lack of capacity that we have
for a sustained operation like that.
We're also not sitting back in terms of our efforts. We've
directed all our Captains of the Port to review all their spill
plans, particularly for those facilities that are offshore, and
do a complete review of those. We're working with our area
committees to look at worst-case scenarios and how we bring
industry, Federal, State, and local together to combat those
things.
And all these things are in progress as we continue to
evaluate and----
Senator Landrieu. And finally, and specifically, when will
you have that report to us? Do you think it will be 30 or 60
days in time for us to consider it in this budget cycle?
Admiral Papp. I think, certainly, the report has been
published. It's out there. We made sure that the report itself
went out. And it has a number of recommendations there.
Clearly, I can't do every recommendation that's in the report,
but we're going to assign some priorities to those. But the
report is available, and we'll make sure you get a copy.
Senator Landrieu. As soon as you assign your priorities,
let us know.
Senator Coats.
BUDGET CUTS
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Admiral, thanks for your testimony.
You mentioned tough tradeoffs, and garnering $140 million
in savings, which you had to and that you tried to reinvest in
frontline operations. Give me some examples of those tough
tradeoffs, particularly that generated that $140 million. What
did you have to take away?
Admiral Papp. Sir, we really need to go back to the 2011
budget. Once again, I have to thank this subcommittee for
restoring money in the 2011 budget. We were facing some rather
drastic cuts in there, including maritime safety and security
teams and cutters. That's a quick way to get savings, but it
unfortunately cuts back on your frontline operations.
As we went into the 2012 budget cycle--my first budget in
preparation to go forward--my guiding principal was, ``We will
sustain our frontline operations.'' I don't want to lose any
Coast Guard people or any Coast Guard resources that deliver
services to the American people. So, we would look at
administrative overhead, where we could find redundancies and
some fat to carve away. We didn't find a lot of fat. We're
scraping a little bit of the muscle. But most of it is in
administrative services, operational support reductions,
travel, conferences, and other things that are enhancements
that we would like to be doing--because I think it helps us to
keep a healthy workforce--but the alternative is to cut back
operations or cut back aircraft and ships. And I just don't
want to do that.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Senator Coats. We've had a lot of interest here, obviously,
in strengthening the Border Patrol regarding illegal
immigration. There have been some significant successes at a
considerable cost.
There is some thought that, as we strengthen our border
security on illegal immigration, there may be more attempts to
use the oceans and the seas as entering points. Is this
something that you've looked at, and that you anticipate more
responsibilities coming your way?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. It's like squeezing the balloon. If
you make the border, the land border, more secure, there is the
possibility of going around it by going out to sea. But we've
got that fairly well covered by a persistent presence, both on
the gulf and Pacific sides of the Mexican-American border. We
have patrol boats out there, and we have larger cutters further
out to sea.
Frankly, most of our migrant vectors are down in terms of
numbers of people. We've seen a slight rise in the last few
months in Haitians. But whether it's Cubans, Dominicans,
Haitians, or migrants from across the Pacific, all those
numbers are down. I believe everything points back to us having
a persistent presence out there, maintaining those cutters and
aircraft out there. And people know they're there--and a policy
of returning migrants to their home country when we pick them
up. The Coast Guard is very good at doing this, but we're
finding ourselves increasingly challenged because of the
difficulty in keeping these old ships running out there and
keeping them out on station.
Senator Coats. Describe the process for me, if you would.
You're in the gulf, you come across a makeshift boat. There are
45 illegal immigrants trying to reach land. You intercept that.
What happens from that point forward in terms of those
individuals? They're brought on the boat? They're brought on
shore? Where are they detained? How are they? What's the
process that you have to go through?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. That is the value of these multi-
mission cutters we have that have flight decks for landing
helicopters, but we also can accommodate large groups of
migrants.
It's not unusual, first, to find a group of 45, whether
it's Cubans or Haitians. What we do is we bring them aboard; we
treat them humanely; we feed them; we make sure they have
facilities to protect them; and we have agreements in place
with both Cuba and Haiti to repatriate them to their countries.
We also interview these migrants to make sure there are not
any articulable concerns about political repression or
punishment that they might receive when they go back. Sometimes
there are people that may have some political concerns in terms
of going back. We interview these people, and if we find that
there's an articulable threat or belief, then we will work with
Customs and Border Patrol, or Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and bring them back, and they'll get further
interviews.
But for the most part, we repatriate them to their
countries.
Senator Coats. I'm new to the subcommittee, so I don't know
the answer to this, but when you repatriate those immigrants,
illegal immigrants, you take them back yourself? Or do they go
through some process system on land first?
Admiral Papp. No, sir. If they are interdicted at sea we
bring them on; we treat them; and then we bring them back
directly. For Haiti, we take our ships into Cap-Haitien, which
is a delivery point when we turn them over to Haitian officials
overseen by United Nations people who are there and working
with the Red Cross. And we have an agreement with Cuba. We
generally have to transfer them to a smaller Coast Guard cutter
to go into the Port of Cabanas, which is on the north coast of
Cuba, to return them there.
Just this morning, though, we had four Cubans who were able
to voice what they perceived as a threat. What we did was, we
took them around to Guantanamo Bay and delivered them there.
And we have a migrant holding facility that does further
interviews on shore to decide whether they go back to Cuba or
they are brought to the United States.
Senator Coats. I have more questions. But I think we'll do
a second round, so----
Senator Landrieu. Yes, we will. Thank you. Senator----
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu [continuing]. Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Admiral, you're now a seasoned Commandant, and I can tell
you that you have won respect for the kind of leadership that
you have shown with the Coast Guard since the time that you
have become the Commandant, and we thank you----
Admiral Papp. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lautenberg [continuing]. For that.
TERRORIST ATTACKS
According to the FBI, New Jersey is home for the most at-
risk terrorist attack in the United States. The area has
targets ranging from a port, to airports, and chlorine gas
plants. An attack in this area could endanger 12 million who
live within a fairly short radius.
With the administration's decreased budget requests, will
any efforts in the Port of New York and New Jersey area be
affected in terms of its supervision by the Coast Guard?
Admiral Papp. No, Senator. As I said earlier, my emphasis
on the 2012 budget is sustaining at the current level our
operations in the field, delivering those services that the
American citizens expect of our Coast Guard.
New York, I believe, is well covered. As you know, we have
Sector New York, which is one of our most robust sectors in the
Coast Guard, located out on Staten Island; Station New York,
where over the last 10 years we've basically doubled the number
of boats and the number of people at the station; and the
Maritime Safety and Security Team New York, which is there to
provide response to terrorist events or provide additional
security when there are security events in process.
The other thing that's very important, though, is the
active partnerships that we have. Through our Area Maritime
Security Committee, we bring together all the State and local
port partners, plus industry. And I would say probably one of
the biggest allies is Commissioner Ray Kelly of the city of New
York. They have pretty robust services themselves. But they're
all complementary. We try not to be redundant. And I think New
York is well covered.
CAPE MAY TRAINING CENTER PIER RECONSTRUCTION
Senator Lautenberg. The pier, port, the Cape May Coast
Guard Training Center is in pretty bad shape. It presents a
safety hazard. The pier supports patrol boats that are
responsible for performing the critical safety and security
missions in the mid-Atlantic region. Your budget request
includes $11 million for the reconstruction of that pier.
What kind of an impediment might follow on, to a lack of
funding for that mission?
Admiral Papp. I've been up there, and I've walked that
pier, sir, and we cannot take heavy equipment out there. We
have two major cutters that call that home port. And
ultimately, you need to take cranes out there to do work on the
ships when they're in port. As it stands right now, you can't
move heavy equipment out there, so you actually have to move
the ships in order to get any work done. And it affects daily
work like delivering supplies and things if you can't take a
truck down the pier.
So, getting that replaced and giving us the versatility to
be able to do pier-side work, keeping our cutters sustained
that are in home port there, and not having to put extra
burdens on our people to have to move the ship if work is to be
done after they've already come in off long patrols are of
great benefit to us.
PIRATE ATTACKS
Senator Lautenberg. Admiral, you know the Coast Guard
represents the United States before the International Maritime
Organization in our efforts to prevent and respond to acts of
piracy. Pirate attacks have been rising steadily in recent
months, leading to some call for the increased use of arms on
merchant ships.
What's the Coast Guard thinking about that? It sounds like
our ships ought to be able to defend themselves.
Admiral Papp. What we do know, sir, is that I think the
pirates are 0 for 12, 13, or 14 whenever they've tried to
attack and take a ship that has a security team onboard. So, we
have evidence to validate the fact that if you have a security
team onboard, you're most likely going to survive.
How those security teams are provided is what the real
question is, and some countries still prohibit the use of
security teams onboard ships that fly their flag. There are
some shipping companies that are actually changing their flag
to other countries now so that they can bring security teams
aboard. And there seems to be a fairly robust activity out
there in terms of companies that are willing to provide those
services, and the shipping companies seem to be able to afford
them.
I encourage the use of security teams. But we also have
other measures that work, as well, including safety procedures
for the crews that are onboard; increasing speed; and trying to
make the ship less accessible to pirates coming aboard. It's a
full range of activities that you can do. But ultimately what
we've found is, security teams work.
Senator Lautenberg. And I close with this, Madam Chair.
I would hope that you wouldn't keep using a reference to
``as old as World War II.''
Some of the parts that still remain are functioning quite
well.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Cochran.
NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER
Senator Cochran. Welcome again, Commandant, to our hearing.
We appreciate the fact that in our State of Mississippi we're
building Coast Guard vessels, and we're very proud of the fact
that Ingalls Shipbuilding has produced two cutters--I think
cutter Nos. 5 and 6--and they're looking to continue the
construction of these cutters. And my question is, what is your
assessment of the workman contribution to this project? And
what are your assessments of the efficiencies that are gained
by long lead procurement of these vessels?
Admiral Papp. Sir, that's a great question. I have been out
to San Francisco just a few weeks ago, and I spent a full day
riding NSC No. 2, the Waesche. It is an outstanding ship. I am
almost willing to give up these stripes if I could get that job
to be the captain of one of those ships. It is that
outstanding.
On the other hand, it's not extravagant, either. It gives
us enhanced capabilities to better carry out our mission in a
broader range of weather conditions, a longer range, and speed,
and to do it more economically with fewer crew members, better
fuel efficiency, and better environmental conditions as well.
I was totally impressed with the smooth functioning of that
ship and the capabilities that it brings to bear for all Coast
Guard missions.
Proving it is another thing. And right now, the cutter
Bertholf--the first--is up in the Bering Sea. I read a report
from its commanding officer, Captain John Prince, just this
morning. They are out in 20-foot seas with up to 60 knots of
wind, and still are able to launch and recover their
helicopter--unheard of in the past to be able to do that from
one of our WHECs up in the Bering Sea. They are launching boats
in worse conditions than we were able to in the past because of
the stern-launch capability. They are able to stay out there
longer because the engines are more economical to run--even at
higher speeds--than the ships that it replaces. We're doing it
with about 40 fewer people in the crew. They're living better.
The ship rides better because we have segregated ballast tanks
now, instead of fuel tanks that you had to mix water in before,
which gives you a better, more stable ride. It is proving the
solid design and all the work that went in. And I couldn't be
more pleased with these ships.
No. 3 is nearing completion--the Dorothy Stratton. And
she'll be delivered to the Coast Guard later this year. We were
able to award the contract on No. 4 just recently, and because
of the generosity and the work of this subcommittee, we have
the money in the 2011 budget now to award the contract on No.
5.
And to your final question on long-lead time materials,
whenever we can keep a stable and predictable flow of funding
going, the shipyard gains confidence, we gain confidence,
prices are lower, and we save money in the long run.
Senator Cochran. That's a very impressive report. And it
makes me very proud of the workers and officials of Ingalls,
and the Coast Guard, who've devoted such a strong workman-like
performance into the building of these ships, and getting them
to sea where we need them operating.
I know too that there are plans to build additional
cutters, and long-lead-time materials are needed for those
ships. Are those requests contained in your budget request
before the subcommittee? Or do we need to have a conference
with you to see what you need, what you can use, and what would
be efficient and appropriate for this subcommittee to support?
Admiral Papp. Sir, ultimately, in my original plans and in
the Coast Guard's overall plans, we would have liked to have
requested funding for NSC No. 6 in this budget that's going
forward.
We were confronted with a very difficult situation. I will
admit that we had some problems early on because we had a lead
systems integrator, and we ran into difficulties there. We took
the contract in-house for the Coast Guard. And the first thing
we needed to do was negotiate a fixed-price contract for cutter
Nos. 4-8. It took us a little long to hammer out that deal, to
get the fixed-price contract. Ultimately, I believe we came up
with a good price on No. 4. And the shipyard, I think, is
negotiating in very good faith on No. 5, which we'll see
awarded here very soon.
But because we didn't have a price for No. 4, we were
uncertain what it would cost, what No. 5 would cost, and we
thought that we would need some additional money, given our
estimates for NSC No. 5. We could not fit that additional money
for No. 5 plus the full cost of No. 6 in the 2012 budget.
So, I made what I thought was a reasonable decision at the
time, which was just to ask for the additional money to
complete NSC No. 5, and we would defer the full funding.
What I'm confronted with now is OMB Circular A-11 requires
full funding, long-lead production, and postproduction costs
all in the same year. This is a challenge for us, because it
eats up almost one-half our acquisition budget. So, I can't fit
that in until the 2013 budget.
Now, we did ask for $77 million in the 2012 budget to
complete No. 5. You gave us the money within the 2011 budget,
so that leaves a little bit of a bogey there in the 2012 budget
as it goes forward. The current fixed-price contract is for NSC
Nos. 4 and 5, and long-lead time materials for NSC No. 6.
Senator Cochran. What is a fogey bear? What?
Admiral Papp. I said, a little--a bogey is a target of
either opportunity or a problem.
Senator Cochran. Okay.
Admiral Papp. Because it sits there, originally, as the
President's budget goes forward, it's $77 million to complete
the funding for NSC No. 5. So, it sits there right now with no
assignment.
Senator Cochran. I hope the subcommittee can work with you
and your team, the House, and our House counterparts to try to
figure out the most efficient and effective thing we can do in
this cycle. But you're open to further consultation and
discussion of this issue, I hope.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
Senator Cochran. Madam Chair, I have other questions, but
particularly, I'm impressed. If I have time to ask about the
unmanned aerial systems, the Coast Guard's been analyzing
various unmanned aerial systems. I wonder what the status is of
potential requests for next year's budget, or a supplemental
request dealing with unmanned aerial assets.
Admiral Papp. Clearly, when we devised the system of
cutters and aircraft, unmanned aerial systems was a part of
that--to make it, to enhance the effectiveness of the system,
and to compensate for having, ultimately, fewer ships out
there.
Right now I am searching for room on where we might fit
that in. Plus, I have to look at other partnerships as well to
see if we might leverage them. The Navy is experimenting with a
tactical ship-launched unmanned aircraft system (UAS), Fire
Scout, which I think holds promise. But I don't have the money
to move forward with that right now. So, we're leveraging off
the Navy's work, and we're hopeful that they will work with us
to experiment with one of the NSCs to see if that's the
direction to go.
The other is more a Predator-type UAS that would cover,
which would do wide-area coverage. And right now, Customs and
Border Protection is working with some Predators. We're
experimenting with them, using some Coast Guard pilots to look
at the effectiveness of that system and how it might be
employed with our ships and cutters.
Right now ultimately, we're doing better because the NSC
gives us better sensors and coverage, and working with our
current manned aircraft, it makes us no less capable than we
have been in the past. But we would look forward to the future
when we can identify the systems we need and then work them
into our budget.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
DRUG INTERDICTION
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Let me just follow up on that. The question is, what is the
most effective way to catch the bad guys? You know, is it with
ship patrols? Is it with unmanned aircraft?
I'm concerned about the increased reliance by these major
drug dealers to basically build their own submarines.
Without going into classified information, what is the
Coast Guard's current response to some of these new, emerging,
and more sophisticated operations?
Admiral Papp. They're clearly presenting us with a
challenge. But the drug trafficking organizations are still
using a wide range of conveyances. Sometimes just slow fishing
vessels--sometimes go-fasts. They're also, as we know, using
semi-submersibles, and now fully submersibles. They will move
depending--it's basically a chess game. And when we come up
with a new tactic, they will move to another new tactic, and we
have to react to that.
When you ask, what's the most effective? It's really a
combination of all those things, and then another element,
which you didn't mention, is intelligence. We can't do nearly
as well as we do now if it was not for active intelligence,
working with our partners, bilateral and multilateral
agreements that we have with South and Central American
countries that allow us to share information, work together,
train together, and also actually, conduct operations together
on the water, and sometimes even allow us to go into other
sovereign waters based upon the agreements that we've come up
with.
So, intelligence is probably one of the most important
things for us, because it will tell us oftentimes not only
where to go, but what ship to look at and oftentimes what
compartment in that ship to look at.
I'm not divulging--I'm talking in generalities; that's how
sophisticated our intelligence is. And it's a combination of
that with our operational assets that are out there.
Senator Landrieu. I'm so glad you mentioned that, Admiral.
Because I was recently down in Guatemala on a trip focused on
another issue, but took the opportunity to get a security
briefing by our Embassy, and this is exactly what they were
talking about. The Guatemalan Government was very complimentary
of the Coast Guard and your partnerships. I want this
subcommittee to know that we just can't stop drugs at the
border, along the Southwest Border. They're coming through
maritime channels, ship channels, oceans, and bayous.
And getting the right intelligence before they leave the
ports or intercepting them well before they get into our ports
is a smart strategy. It's a combination of the right kind of
materials and platforms. The intelligence aspect and the
partnership with some of these governments, such as Honduras,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are extremely important.
And do you want to comment on that? And I have one more
question----
Admiral Papp. Just to----
Senator Landrieu [continuing]. And then I'll go to Senator
Coats.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. Just a quick one, as well. But
another thing that I'd like to brag a little bit about is that
it's not just the Coast Guard cooperating with those South and
Central American countries. We also facilitate cooperation
among Federal agencies as well. One of my collateral duties is
the chairman of the Interdiction Committee, where we bring
together Justice, the Department of Defense, and a full range
of the interagency to share and to work together, and to come
up with strategies.
At our last meeting we brought in General Fraser, who's the
Commander of SouthCom. He has a deep and abiding interest in
what goes on in Central America.
But at the end of the day, you're absolutely right. We need
to stop these drugs in the transit zone where we can pick up
that 6.6 million tons of cocaine at one time, before it gets
ashore in Central America, is broken down into thousands of
packages to come across our border at various locations, and of
course, also fueling the violence that we're seeing down there
in Mexico.
AVIATION SAFETY
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
And one more question. Since 2008--and you slightly touched
on this, but I want to go a little deeper--14 Coast Guard
aviators have died in recent accidents while conducting routine
missions. Keeping the men and women of the Coast Guard safe,
I'm sure, is your highest priority. I understand the Coast
Guard has reviewed the cause of these incidents, the adequacy
of aviation training, and operational maintenance. But what
recommendations are you making in this budget? What have you
recommended that we can support in our efforts to keep these
men and women safe on these routine training missions?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that. I was asked a
couple of days ago, ``What keeps you awake at night?'' And I
said, ``Actually, I sleep pretty good. We've got good Coast
Guard people out there, and good leaders that are getting the
job done.'' But one of the sleepless nights that I can count is
the loss of our helicopter 6017 very shortly after I became
Commandant.
Fortunately, we had already started our aviation safety
study. And we are well along in terms of--and I want to thank
Senator Lautenberg for calling me at the time and pointing us
toward an investigation that the Army did on some helicopter
losses.
What we found out is that there was not a connection. The
Army was mostly mechanical. Ours is really head work. And what
I mean by that is, we've seen a lot of rapid cultural change
within our aviation community over the last 10 years. We've
picked up additional new responsibilities. The rotary wing air
intercept that I talked about--tactical vertical insertion and
other things, other than search and rescue, that we didn't do
10 years ago.
You can't necessarily point it on just that either. We've
also gone through a rapid progression of upgrades and
instrument and equipment changes within our helicopters. So,
there's been change there. And I think also perhaps a little
bit of complacency has slipped into our aviation culture across
the Coast Guard; perhaps a diversion of focus away from safety
concerns, leaders getting out on the flight deck and spending
time with their young pilots, having them focused on their
qualifications, and crew management within the cockpit. It's a
whole collection of things that came together and resulted in
what were very, very unfortunate accidents under very routine
circumstances. And it was not mechanical. It was human failure.
We're working very hard right now, taking our most senior
aviators and going around to every air station. And we've got a
number of other things in the works to improve upon an aviation
culture in the Coast Guard that has produced the best maritime
pilots in the world, making them even better.
There's no cost in the budget for this. It's something we
have to take on as leaders, and we're about the business of
doing that.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Coats.
PERSONAL LOCATOR DEVICES
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Admiral, I'm aware that the Navy has placed on every ship
afloat, and every sailor on that ship, a locating device that
if there's a man overboard, woman overboard, they have an
instant alert and GPS location. I mean, we all think of going
out on a Sunday in the Chesapeake Bay, and someone falls
overboard, and the boat just simply turns around and picks them
up. But, obviously that's not the case in the open ocean.
Do you have a similar system in place?
Admiral Papp. What we have----
Senator Coats. With your guardsmen.
Admiral Papp. I'm not sure if we have something similar
because I'm not familiar with the system that the Navy has
employed, and I haven't read anything about that.
There are a number of small personal systems that are out
there on the market right now. In fact, we just did a rescue in
Alaska where an airplane crashed, and somebody was able to
light off their personal device, which gave us an alert and----
Senator Coats. A vector.
Admiral Papp [continuing]. Vectored us into it.
We put a number of what we call personal protective
equipment on our people whenever they're involved in dangerous
operations. There are a full range of things from signaling
devices to strobe lights and other things. What I'll have to do
is look at a comparison of what the Navy is issuing right now
and see if there are any enhancements that we can do for our
people as well.
Senator Coats. Yes. I don't even know the name of it, the
company, or what the market is. It's just that I've run into
someone that told me about it, and he indicated that there's
been a dramatic reduction in sailors lost at sea as a result of
this thing.
Admiral Papp. I'll look it up, sir, and we'll get back to
you.
[The information follows:]
The Navy's utilizes the Man Overboard Indicator (MOBI). The MOBI is
a water- or manually activated personal alarm system designed to
improve the safety of sailors involved in operational situations with
the potential for falling overboard. MOBI uses a transmitter to aid in
the detection, location, and recovery of sailors who fall overboard.
MOBI is a Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)-managed program.
While the Coast Guard does not utilize the Navy's MOBI, we do
utilize a similar device, the Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) or
Personnel Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon (P-EPIRB). These
devices are worn on the boat crew survival vest by all coxswains,
crewmembers, boarding officers, and boarding team members in accordance
with the Rescue and Survival Systems Manual (COMDTINST M10740.10F).
LIVING CONDITIONS
Senator Coats. Talk a little bit to me about your living
conditions. What percent of your forces are married?
Admiral Papp. We are one of the highest, and I don't have
the exact figure, but my recollection is, it's up close to 50
percent, which we actually have the highest rate of people that
are married, compared to the other four services.
Senator Coats. And married with children, I assume.
Admiral Papp. Most of them. Yes, sir.
Senator Coats. I mentioned then your concerns about
housing, adequate housing, and childcare. Where are you in that
process? And where do you rank? We all know the Air Force has
the best facilities, including golf courses. We all know that
the Navy does pretty well, and the Army has improved
dramatically. Marines are happy with a slab of cement and a
tarp. But where does the Coast Guard fit in the list of
services here in terms of what you would call the kind of
housing that you're proud to have your people live in? Are you
really deficient? Are you bottom of the ladder or----
Admiral Papp. We're clearly at the bottom of the ladder.
But what I have to qualify that with is that we have fewer
people who live on big bases. We are locally dispersed, and
it's very hard to come up with Coast Guard housing because
we're at so many small stations around the country. So, we look
at a combination of Government leases.
We, of course, have housing allowances for all of our
people. One of the things that we have picked up--I declared
this during my state of the Coast Guard speech. This is the
year of the Coast Guard family. And my wife Linda and I have
traveled around. She's met with literally thousands of Coast
Guard people. We've chosen to focus on those things we think we
can make a difference on, which is housing, childcare,
ombudsman services, and spouses helping spouses.
Housing is a challenge for us because where we do have
bases--for instance, Cape May, New Jersey, or Kodiak, Alaska--
we have done okay in terms of trying to maintain them. But
they're very costly.
The other services were facing the same challenges, and
they got authorities and the money to enter into public-private
ventures. That is----
Senator Coats. Do you have that authority?
Admiral Papp. We do not have that authority. Also, we've
had it in the past, but it requires us to escrow a large amount
of money, which we never are able to get in our budget.
So what we've done, sir, is we've actually leveraged off
the other services. Out in Hawaii what we did was we ceded some
of our land that we had for our old housing to the Army. They
brought in their public-private authorities and built houses,
which now our Coast Guard takes part in.
At the other end of the spectrum, I actually live in a
privatized house over at Bolling Air Force Base right now.
We're selling the Commandant's house, which we owned for 40
years, in Chevy Chase because it costs a lot of money, and we
do have authorities to take the proceeds from those sales and
turn them back into housing for our servicemembers.
So, we're selling the Commandant's house, and I've moved
into a place that I pay rent on to a private company on Bolling
Air Force Base, and it is up to Air Force standards, sir.
That's what we need to do for the rest of our workforce.
I'd love to be able to have those public-private venture
authorities, but it costs a lot, so what we're doing is, we've
got a mixture of Coast Guard-supported housing; we're looking
where we can leverage off the other services, to take advantage
of their authorities; and we're coming up with a comprehensive
plan on the way ahead.
Senator Coats. I think you should keep us advised. I mean,
morale and quality of service are directly related to the
quality of life that is provided for family and children. Your
people are out doing dangerous work and away from home. And
they want, they need, to have some sense of comfort that their
loved ones are taken care of.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator.
I'd like to follow up on that as well, and I'll recognize
Senator Lautenberg in a moment.
I helped to lead the effort to privatize the Army housing,
which has been really successful with the family housing. And
at one point, Senators, it was estimated that it would take
nearly, at the rate we were going, 200 years or more to provide
housing for some of our men and women in uniform, according to
what the budgets look like. So, we had to change the paradigm.
And this private housing has been phenomenally successful. I'm
a member of the Subcommittee on Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies.
So perhaps, Senator Coats, you and I could really work
together on this subcommittee to see new strategies that we
might be able to employ--the partnerships you suggested and
other avenues to provide really stepped-up housing
opportunities for our men and women in the Coast Guard. And I'd
like to commit to you to try to do that with your help and
assistance.
Senator Lautenberg.
RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Madam Chair.
I can tell you that for the people in the Coast Guard who
are at Cape May, New Jersey, that it's a wonderful place to be.
If we could enlarge that facility, then we could take care of
more. And then this summer--that's right on the beach--we could
put up some tents and accommodate people, and then the rest of
the year they'd have the--it's wonderful.
They deserve better. I can tell you that. And when I look
at the deteriorated situation with the quarters there now, that
makes me unhappy. I'm so proud that you're so able to do the
recruiting that you have to do, as mentioned earlier.
I want to go on to something a little touchy, Admiral Papp.
The recent report on the Coast Guard's response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill found that the Coast Guard's
ability to respond to environmental disasters had ``atrophied
over the past decade.'' How has the Coast Guard planned? How do
you respond to that? And what can you do to improve your plans
for better security missions and the need to improve the
environmental response?
Admiral Papp. Sir, I agree that it had atrophied over the
last, probably, decade to 20 years. And part of that is because
we've been very good at prevention. You have prevention and
response. You hope that you don't have to respond because
you've prevented the spills from happening in the first place.
And we've been so good at the prevention side that I think, I
don't know whether we just became complacent--part of it is
complacency. And once complacency slips in, perhaps you're not
looking as far forward in terms of new technology and other
things that might be able to help you in the future for a
response.
I think that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 placed most of
the responsibility for maintaining equipment with private
industry, and I don't think private industry has looked that
far forward either, or considered the implications of a worst-
case scenario spill like we experienced in Deepwater Horizon.
So, I think it's incumbent upon us to take a look at what's
the proper balance between Federal and industry, in terms of
maintaining equipment and preparation. Ultimately, the answer
is, working together.
The Coast Guard has already started----
Senator Lautenberg. Forgive the interruption. Does that
include developing better specs for drilling and accident
prevention? Is that something the Coast Guard would be taking
on? I don't know how you do the preventive side and make it the
rule.
Admiral Papp. Organic to the Coast Guard, we do not have
the expertise in terms of drilling.
I think we all learned an awful lot through that. That
falls under the Department of the Interior right now. And what
we're doing is we're working very close with the Department of
the Interior to make sure that we collaborate as we go forward.
The Coast Guard has expertise in firefighting, stability,
construction of the mobile platforms, and other things. But
we've got zero organic technical expertise in the drilling
operations, particularly in the deep sea.
I'm unwilling to volunteer to take on additional
responsibilities to bring that organic technical expertise to
the Coast Guard. I think it exists within the Department of the
Interior. And what we need to do is make sure we're doing
exactly what we do now, which is we work very close with our
Federal partners----
Senator Lautenberg. So you can encourage them to
participate more actively in the prevention side.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
MARINE ECOLOGY
Senator Lautenberg. I want to ask you this. We've seen
incredible changes in our marine ecology as a result of
changing temperatures. Does the Coast Guard have the ability to
either recognize changes in marine functioning--the fish, the
undersea plants, coral, and those kinds of things that all make
part of the ecology. Is there any awareness of the Coast Guard
about what is taking place as a result of what is obviously the
climate change that we're seeing?
Admiral Papp. We're certainly interested in it. And no, we
don't have organic expertise or staffs that are applied to
that. We're more reactive in nature in terms of carrying out
our current authorities when, for instance, in the Arctic we
have much more open water now, and the potential for commerce
and shipping to increase in those areas. We rely upon the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and other
Government agencies that do have that focus of the scientific
study of our waters and the changes that are happening. The
results of those changes are something that we have to deal
with.
Senator Lautenberg. Now, it's just that you have so many
people on the sea, and there are changes that are occurring.
And I don't know whether you see these changes in makeup,
quantity, or things that just fall your way. I know that when
we put an embargo on striped bass years ago and so forth, the
Coast Guard had some part in maintaining the rules for catches.
And it worked wonders. I mean, we replaced the quantity, and it
improved the quality as well.
So, I ask that because I'm like all of us that are
concerned about what is taking place in the environments and
the climate change. And if there's any way that there is
information flow without giving you another task because you're
so close to the reality out in the sea.
Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. I have no further----
OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER
Senator Landrieu. Okay. Thank you.
I think we're about complete. If you all would just be
patient, one more question from me, then we're going to end the
meeting.
You recently released a draft request for information for
the offshore patrol cutter (OPC). I understand this is arguably
the most important acquisition for these particular boats--the
backbone of the Coast Guard.
Your future-years capital investment budget includes
funding for both the OPC and the NSC. It reaches almost $2.3
billion. You've never requested more than $1.4 billion in any
fiscal year. Can you just briefly comment? And we'll use that
question to close the meeting.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. It's an interesting turn of
events because I've watched Commandants come up here for years
and always being accused of not asking for what they need or
not asking for enough.
We're asking for what we need. And we need to be about the
business of designing and selecting, and then building those
OPCs--25 of them in our project baseline. They will provide the
capabilities--the NSC is the high end, with the most
capabilities. And then of course, the FRC, our patrol boat,
which will be inshore, doesn't have a flight deck and is less
capable.
The OPC will provide the connection between those two and
in the outer zone of our defenses for security as you come to
the country. It's got to be capable, though, of operating in
the north Atlantic, the Bering Sea, and the Gulf of Alaska,
which most of our medium endurance cutters (WMECs) do not right
now. They are just not stout or capable enough to survive those
types of elements.
So, we need something that's going to probably perform in
about Sea State 5, be able to launch helicopters, and recover
boats in more challenging conditions. The OPC is that ship.
I've looked at the basic specs that we've put out recently. I
think it will be a very good ship to provide that, to fill that
gap. We also have to be mindful that ultimately, with the 8
NSCs and the 25 OPCs, that's 33 ships replacing the 41 that we
have right now.
So, we're pressing ahead. My job is to identify what we
need in those years. And the administration signed off on our
capital investment plan so I'm very hopeful we'll follow
through with that.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Admiral. And again, thank you
for your testimony today, for your forthrightness, for asking
for what you really need. We look forward to working with you.
And thank you for what your men and women do, amazing work
every day. Thank you.
Admiral Papp. Thank you, ma'am.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
2010 oil spill--incident-specific preparedness review
Question. Coast Guard policy requires an incident-specific
preparedness review to assess lessons learned from major spill events.
The review of the 2010 oil spill in the gulf was recently completed in
March. A primary conclusion of the independent review was that ``the
Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Response (MER) preparedness and
response programs have atrophied over the past decade''. It found that
the Coast Guard's area contingency plans were inadequate, there was a
lack of engagement with State and local governments on national
contingency plan responsibilities, environmentally sensitive areas were
given uneven and inadequate attention in area contingency plans, and
more research is necessary for alternative response technologies. The
report also noted that many lessons learned from prior spills, such as
the 2008 Cosco Busan spill and the Cape Mohican spill 11 years earlier,
have not been addressed or implemented effectively by the Coast Guard.
What is the Coast Guard doing to implement the recommendations of
the review and ensure the lessons learned are institutionalized?
How will you oversee and measure the effectiveness of these
changes?
The budget request includes $11.5 million to enhance MER capacity.
Your written testimony notes this is an ``initial investment''. Do you
have a long-term financial plan for this effort? Please provide the
plan to the subcommittee when it is completed.
Answer. While the report does not necessarily reflect the views of
the Coast Guard, the Incident Specific Preparedness Review's (ISPR)
process of critical analysis, review, and outside perspective will be a
useful tool in helping the Coast Guard continuously improve coastal oil
spill response for the American people. The ISPR is one of several
reports that have been completed following the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill. The Coast Guard is also conducting a comprehensive review of the
President's National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
and offshore drilling's findings, the National Incident Commander's
Report along with the other Deepwater Horizon reports that provide a
body of lessons learned, perspectives, and opinions. The Coast Guard is
carefully reviewing these reports to identify areas of positive and
effective preparedness improvements to develop effective and
appropriate national implementation strategies. The Coast Guard has
already taken several actions to address areas where planning and
preparedness will be improved, including directing Captains of the Port
to review oil spill response plans for offshore facilities, requiring
area committees to include worst case discharge scenarios for offshore
facilities in their respective area contingency plans, increasing State
and local outreach and participation in area committee meetings and
activities, and participating in a Coast Guard, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency workgroup to
develop recommendations to harmonize the national contingency plan and
national response framework governance constructs.
The Coast Guard is carefully evaluating the body of perspectives
and opinions provided in the various reports. As changes are
implemented, the Coast Guard will use a formal lessons learned program
that is designed to document, assess, and implement lessons learned
from oil spill exercises and real events, including the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Coast Guard leadership will leverage this program to
monitor execution of any changes resulting from the ongoing reviews.
Developing measures of effectiveness is an important part of evaluating
and implementing proposed changes. However, effective response is only
part of the equation. Due to the progress the Coast Guard has made as a
result of prevention efforts, there has been a consistent reduction in
the average number of chemical discharge incidents and oil spills in
the maritime environment between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2010.
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding to
immediately increase the Coast Guard's marine environmental response
and marine safety capabilities. Included in the fiscal year 2012
request are 87 marine environmental response personnel, including 33
personnel dedicated to an incident management assist team (IMAT),
additional marine environmental responders at sectors, and additional
strike team personnel. As part of these efforts, the Coast Guard will
fully develop an investment plan to ensure these new resources are
effectively installed. The nature of future investment will depend on
how the Coast Guard decides to address the recommendations put forth in
Deepwater Horizon after action reports and to implement the lessons
learned from other past response efforts. The Coast Guard will work
diligently within the organization and with government partners and
industry to implement meaningful improvements for future oil spill
planning, preparedness, organization, and response.
fleet mix analysis
Question. The Coast Guard recently completed the first phase of a
study called the Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA) that updated the mix of
offshore assets necessary to meet mission performance requirements. The
study took an unconstrained resource approach, resulting in an increase
in total assets with a cost approaching $65 billion, nearly $40 billion
higher than the current estimate. A second FMA is underway that
considers the effects of fiscal constraints.
According to recent testimony by the Government Accountability
Office, the second analysis being conducted will not assess options
lower than the current mix of assets the Coast Guard determined as
necessary in 2004. With Federal agencies facing a much leaner fiscal
future, don't you think it would be wise to fully understand the trade-
offs above and below the current mix?
I understand that the Department of Homeland Security is conducting
its own study called the Cutter Fleet Mix Analysis. This appears to be
a redundant effort to the Coast Guard's FMA. Why are multiple studies
being conducted, when will the results be shared with the Congress, and
how will the Coast Guard use the results of the studies?
Answer. FMA phase 2 was developed to validate key assumptions in
FMA phase 1 and to take a very specific look at the performance of the
Program of Record under constrained investment levels. The analysis of
trade-offs is the focus of the Department of Homeland Security Cutter
Study.
While the FMA analyzes the current program, the Department of
Homeland Security Cutter Study includes an analysis of trade-offs under
various assumptions for the mission requirements of the fleet. The
Department of Homeland Security Cutter Study benefits from the FMA
validation of modeling methodologies and will be used to inform near-
term investment decisions. The results of these studies do not stand
alone, but taken together they inform the Department's acquisition
analysis and will be reflected in fiscal year 2013 and future years'
budget requests.
high endurance cutter decommissioning
Question. Your budget proposes to decommission a third high
endurance cutter (WHEC) in fiscal year 2012, but the third national
security cutter (NSC) won't be ready for operations until fiscal year
2013. That equates to a net loss of 3,300 operational hours or 185
steaming days.
How will this impact the Coast Guard's ability to conduct critical
missions, such as drug interdiction and migrant interdiction?
Answer. The fleet of WHECs is achieving approximately 140 of their
programmed 185 patrol days per year, which is unsustainable for the
long-term as the costs to keep these vessels operational continually
increase. The Coast Guard is currently expending more than three times
what is budgeted to maintain them with diminishing returns on
investment. The Coast Guard will replace these assets with NSCs as soon
as possible.
NSCs offer improved capability over the legacy WHECs. Currently,
there are two NSCs in service--U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Bertholf
and USCGC Waesche. In April 2011, USCGC Bertholf commenced its first
patrol in the Bering Sea. USCGC Waesche is currently completing ready
for operations testing and evaluation, and will be ready to join the
fleet very soon. USCGC Stratton is nearly complete and we anticipate it
will be ready for operations in spring 2013. The introduction of NSCs
will improve operational availability of the major cutter fleet as aged
and obsolete WHECs are decommissioned.
The Coast Guard will leverage these and the remaining WHECs and
medium endurance cutters (WMECs) to meet all statutory mission
requirements, including drug and migrant interdiction.
budget planning
Question. The Coast Guard's Blueprint for Continuous Improvement
includes an action item that the Coast Guard develop a list of
priorities for major acquisitions.
What steps has the Coast Guard taken to develop this priority list,
and how will the Coast Guard use it?
Will the Coast Guard's acquisition, resources, and capabilities
directorates all be involved equally?
What additional major investments are on the horizon that will need
to be factored into Coast Guard acquisition budgets over the next 5
years?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Acquisition Blueprint requires completion
of a project priority list to assist with management of acquisition
resources and activities within the Acquisition Directorate. The
assigned completion date for the acquisition project priority list is
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011.
A separate but linked resource governance process, overseen by the
Coast Guard's most senior leadership, is used to prioritize resources
needs including requests for acquisition, construction and improvements
(AC&I) funding, across the entire service. This is an ongoing effort,
and is part of the Coast Guard's planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution cycle. Coast Guard recapitalization priorities are included
in the fiscal years 2012-2016 Capital Investment Plan (CIP).
Yes, the linked resource governance process, overseen by the Coast
Guard's most senior leadership with equal representation across all
Coast Guard directorates, is used to prioritize resources needs
including requests for AC&I funding, across the entire service.
Based on the best available information used to develop the Coast
Guard's fiscal years 2012-2016 CIP, there are no new assets expected to
join the major acquisition queue beyond those that are already
specified in the Coast Guard's Program of Record.
fast response cutter
Question. If fiscal year 2012 funding is provided for four FRCs,
instead of six as requested, would that increase the costs of each FRC?
What would be the increased cost per ship?
Answer. Yes. Overall, the average cost increase per hull is
approximately $5 million, including production costs, economic price
adjustments associated with spare parts, antecedent liabilities, and
other scalable program costs (e.g., project management, testing,
certification, etc.).
vessel security
Question. Please describe Coast Guard activities (assets used,
location, and associated costs) in support of the mission to protect
tankers and other vessels in foreign waters.
Answer. The Coast Guard conducts domestic operations to protect
tankers or other vessels in or near U.S. ports. However, it does not
have the authority to conduct such operations in foreign waters. The
primary responsibility for the protection of tankers and other vessels
in foreign waters is the port state receiving these vessels.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. Admiral Papp, the fiscal year 2012 budget justification
documents indicate that the United States will remove one of our heavy
polar icebreakers from service and return to contracting with other
nations for icebreaking operations. As the melting of the polar ice
caps in the summer months reveals new natural resources, navigational
routes and introduces new national security considerations, the United
States will be subcontracting critical icebreaking duties with nations
who may ultimately be in direct competition with us for these
resources. Furthermore, we continue to operate without a comprehensive
assessment or a workable plan to address this lack of a strategic
asset.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request indicates that ``[t]o help
define the capability that is needed to meet long-term Federal needs in
the changing Arctic environment, Coast Guard will participate in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led interagency working group,
funded in fiscal year 2012 to develop final requirements for
acquisition of the 21st century icebreaking capability.'' As far back
as 2008, the Coast Guard has indicated that it is assessing the United
States' national interests in the arctic regions and the corresponding
capabilities needed in the region. Most notable among these efforts is
the High Latitude Study, which the Coast Guard has not yet released.
What is the status of the High Latitude Study, as well as the polar
business case analysis, and is there a timeframe when these reports
will be completed and available?
What are the key differences between the composition of and the
anticipated outcomes of this working group and the various studies,
including the High Latitude Study, that the Coast Guard has already
been tasked to produce?
Answer. The Coast Guard's contractor has completed the High
Latitude Study and it will be transmitted to the Congress to meet the
reporting requirement set forth in Public Law 111-281. In accordance
with Public Law 111-281, the Coast Guard is conducting a polar business
case analysis.
The High Latitude Study is a Coast Guard-sponsored assessment of
Arctic and Antarctic mission requirements, including the polar
icebreaking needs.
The DHS-led acquisition analysis will consider the icebreaking
requirements across the Government and analyze agency-specific
solutions, such as those identified by the High Latitude Study, to
determine whether a coordinated acquisition of new icebreaking
capability would provide greater benefit to the Nation. The analysis
will consider a broader set of alternatives, including the mode of
icebreaker operation and functional ownership across the Federal
Government. The results of this effort will produce the acquisition
strategy and funding plan for procuring 21st century icebreaking
capability.
Question. The Coast Guard anticipates relying on foreign nations to
perform ice-breaking duties, some of which may be in competition with
the United States for energy resources, fishing rights, navigational
lanes, and national security. This is not the first time that the
United States has been forced to rely on foreign nations.
In the past, what was the annual cost to the United States to
contract polar icebreaking services with a foreign entity?
What is the estimated annual cost for this activity under the
President's budget proposal?
In previous testimony, Secretary Napolitano referenced two
countries with which we could contract our icebreaking operations.
Would you please advise the subcommittee of the two countries by name
and give us your assessment of any conflicting interests they may have
with the United States in the polar regions, specifically referencing
energy resources, navigation, fishing rights, and national security?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not historically contracted polar
icebreaking services with a foreign entity. The National Science
Foundation (NSF) has done so the past 4 years to provide the McMurdo
break-out in Antarctica in support of scientific activities and for
other scientific studies, and for scientific studies in the Arctic
Ocean.
There are no funds included in the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2012
budget proposal to lease foreign icebreakers. Specific questions on
icebreaker leasing should be directed to NSF.
The two countries referenced by Secretary Napolitano are Russia and
Sweden. No U.S. agency has contracted polar icebreaking services to
perform duties, to the extent they exist, related to energy resources,
fishing rights, navigational lanes, and national security. The Coast
Guard is not in a position to comment on specific competing interests
that foreign countries may have with the United States in the Arctic.
This question would be better addressed by the State Department.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. Please describe the ways in which the Coast Guard is
involved in response to the ongoing Mississippi River flooding.
Answer. The Coast Guard continues to conduct statutory missions on
the Western Rivers and respond to ongoing flooding events. To date, the
Coast Guard has activated 47 reservists to support 2011 flood response
operations. During the most recent Mississippi River flooding, the
Coast Guard has deployed assets (e.g., personnel, boats, aircraft) in
support of Search and Rescue (SAR), Marine Environmental Response
(MER), and Aids to Navigation (ATON) missions. The Coast Guard is
coordinating with Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations to
render assistance to persons in distress, as well as to protect
property.
The Coast Guard Marine Transportation Recovery Unit (MTSRU)
monitored impacts and kept the maritime industry appraised and briefed
on developments through the dissemination of a daily summary report.
The Coast Guard was very proactive in coordinating all potential
actions with industry through daily River Industry Executive Task
Force, New Orleans Port Coordination Team, and Lower Mississippi River
Commission conference calls.
Additionally, Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) are
continually reviewing and implementing, when necessary, safety zones.
The COTP are also issuing marine safety information bulletins to ensure
the safe navigation of marine traffic. The Coast Guard continues to
monitor the water levels and is implementing river closures and re-
openings, as appropriate, and working closely with the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers as they manage their responsibilities for flood control.
Question. Please describe the ways in which Coast Guard assets were
used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
Answer. The Coast Guard was involved in every phase of the response
to the Deepwater Horizon incident, including the initial SAR response.
Sixty Coast Guard vessels were used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon
incident. These vessels included 210-foot and 270-foot WMECs, sea-going
and coastal buoy tenders, icebreaking tugs, and patrol boats. After the
explosion, Coast Guard vessels were engaged in SAR operations. When
operations shifted from rescue to oil spill response, Coast Guard
vessels were used in the recovery of oil, using onboard assets such as
the Spilled Oil Recovery System (SORS) and Vessel of Opportunity
Skimming System (VOSS).
Twenty-two Coast Guard aircraft, including long- and medium-range
surveillance aircraft and short- and medium-range helicopters, were
used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Initially, as with
Coast Guard vessels, Coast Guard aircraft were used in SAR operations,
evacuating injured crew members and searching for missing crew members.
During the aircraft SAR operations, the first evidence of oil sheen was
observed. Coast Guard aircraft were then used for surveillance, oil
spotting, and overflights.
More than 7,000 Coast Guard personnel, including active duty,
reserve, auxiliary, and civilians, participated in all phases of the
response. Today, almost 200 Coast Guard personnel continue to support
oil spill recovery operations in the gulf. Coast Guard personnel were
involved in SAR operations, Incident Command System (ICS) coordination
and staffing, oversight of offshore and onshore cleanup activities,
public affairs, coordination with Federal, State, and local officials,
and many other aspects of the response. Specialized personnel and
equipment were also deployed from the Coast Guard's National Strike
Force and other deployable support forces.
Question. Are there any particular stories of heroic activities by
your men and women during the Deepwater Horizon response that you would
like to share with the subcommittee?
Answer. Yes. In particular, the Coast Guard would like to share the
story of the first men and women on the scene of the Deepwater Horizon
incident--helicopter pilot Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Tom Hickey,
Coast Guard rescue swimmer Aviation Survival Technician Third Class
(AST3) Dustin Bernatovich and the air crews of Coast Guard number
(CGNR) helicopters 6605, 6508, and 6576. The following is a summary of
their actions on the evening of April 20, 2010, following the
catastrophic explosion on the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore
drilling unit, 110 miles southeast of New Orleans, Louisiana.
After a failure of the rig's drilling systems 5,000 feet below the
sea surface, a rush of oil and flammable gas surfaced and ignited the
platform, ultimately crippling the structure, killing 11 and forcing
workers onboard to abandon the rig. The aircrews aboard the CGNR 6605,
6508, and 6576, led by LCDR Hickey, immediately assumed on-scene
coordinator duties for numerous aircraft and vessels converging on the
disaster site. They quickly determined that the offshore supply vessel
Damon B. Bankston had embarked 115 rig workers in need of rescue.
Rescue swimmer AST3 Bernatovich was deployed to the vessel, and LCDR
Hickey then tasked seven additional arriving aircraft to conduct search
patterns around the rig, and sequenced helicopters to the Damon B.
Bankston to evacuate the most severely wounded victims. Despite 600-
foot flames, explosions on the rig, and intense heat felt in the cabin,
the crews of the CGNR 6605, 6508, and 6576 made numerous low passes
within 150 feet of the rig to search for any possible survivors as the
rescue swimmer conducted triage of the injured mariners. While
communicating constantly with the other aircraft, LCDR Hickey provided
critical safety pilot duties as Coast Guard helicopters hoisted five
survivors and transferred them to awaiting paramedics back at Air
Station New Orleans. The leadership and superior actions of LCDR
Hickey, AST3 Banatovich, and the aircrews of the CGNR 6605, 6508, and
6576 ensured the success of a major rescue operation, which saved 14
lives and assisted 101 others.
Question. If the Congress provided you with the flexibility of
multi-year procurement authority and then adequate follow-on
appropriations, could it provide for savings to the taxpayer in the
acquisition of NCSs Nos. 6-8?
Answer. We cannot execute the NSC project under a multi-year
procurement construct given the current NSC contract structure.
Question. What are the specific advantages of purchasing long-lead
time materials (LLTM) in advance of the construction of a Coast Guard
vessel?
Answer. Purchasing these materials in advance allows for optimal
sequencing of production activities by ensuring that LLTM will be on
hand when needed.
Question. The Congress provided funding to complete NSC No. 5 in
fiscal year 2011, rather than in fiscal year 2012 as assumed in the
budget request. Understanding this change, if the Congress were to
instead provide funding for LLTM for NSC No. 6 in fiscal year 2012,
would the Coast Guard be able to purchase these materials in fiscal
year 2012 and take advantage of the resulting efficiencies?
Answer. If NSC No. 6 were fully funded in fiscal year 2012, the
Coast Guard could award NSC No. 6 LLTM in fiscal year 2012.
Question. Could you characterize the current operations and
maintenance costs associated with the WHECs you plan to retire as you
acquire NSCs?
Answer. The programmed cost to operate and maintain each WHEC is
approximately $20 million. Of the $20 million, $1.2 million is
programmed for depot level maintenance. In fiscal year 2010, the WHEC
fleet expended, on average, $3.96 million per hull on depot level
maintenance, or $2.76 million above programmed levels.
Question. Do the Bertholf's recent operations around Alaska provide
you with additional confidence in the NSC's ability to operate in
arctic areas of responsibility?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Bertholf's current
Alaskan patrol has subjected the cutter to 20-foot seas, 60 knot winds
and temperatures below freezing, all testing the NSC's operational
capabilities in Arctic sea conditions. USCGC Bertholf's economical
propulsion plant and enhanced endurance allowed for 24 days at sea
without replenishment and provided for sustained cutter presence
offshore. The large flight deck and stable sea keeping capabilities
allowed for a broad weather envelope to launch and recover aircraft,
and also supported more than 20 safe and effective law enforcement
boardings in seas up to 8 feet. The Coast Guard is very pleased with
the operational performance of the NSC in the Bering Sea thus far.
Question. I understand that the Coast Guard has been analyzing
various unmanned aerial systems to determine which existing systems
might provide a solution for both your land-based and ship-based aerial
missions. What added capabilities and cost avoidance could these
unmanned systems provide that current manned aircraft platforms are not
providing?
Answer. Aircraft persistence; sensor payloads; and command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) suites unique to unmanned aircraft systems
(UASs) are expected to significantly increase maritime surveillance and
detection capability for strategic and tactical commanders.
Additionally, unmanned capabilities may permit the Coast Guard to
employ airborne sensors when and where they are needed most, and for
extended periods, regardless of risks that would prevent the employment
of manned aircraft (e.g., areas where chemical, biological,
radioactive, and other hazards are present). Finally, UASs allow more
versatile manned aircraft to be employed elsewhere to maximize mission
outcomes. By one estimate, the UAS has a lower life-cycle cost when
compared to manned aircraft operations (``Cost Comparison Potential of
Coast Guard Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Coast Guard Manned Aircraft
Systems'' study, prepared by Wyle Laboratories, Inc., in support of the
Coast Guard Office of Aviation Acquisition (CG-931), in August 2010).
This study estimates a cost per flight hour savings of 15 percent for
ship-based UAS as compared to the H-65 and 50 percent for land-based
UAS, as compared to C-130H.
Question. Do you believe that it is important to make these assets
available to the Coast Guard as soon as possible?
Answer. Yes. The UAS acquisition is a significant component of the
Coast Guard's solution to eliminate the current MPA gap. However, while
UAS is a priority for the Coast Guard, the highest priorities of Coast
Guard Air Domain are to extend current aircraft service life, enhance
the capability of current airframes, and recapitalize aged and obsolete
air assets.
Question. What specific funds are requested in the fiscal year 2012
budget that would move the Coast Guard closer to the acquisition of its
own unmanned aerial assets?
Answer. The Coast Guard continues to advance its plan for UAS
acquisition through its partnerships with other Government agencies
that are developing and implementing the UAS concept of operations. In
2012, Coast Guard will apply multi-year funds to continue its UAS
acquisition research projects.
Question. What is the Coast Guard's assessment of SouthCom's
Project Cazador, which was carried out in cooperation with Panama?
Answer. The Coast Guard did not have any direct involvement with
the planning and execution phases of Project Cazador; this was a
SouthCom-led initiative that occurred in summer 2010 over a 120-day
period. The project was conducted in cooperation with Panama and
provided additional Detection and Monitoring (D&M) capacity along the
littorals of Panama. The program complemented Joint Interagency Task
Force South's D&M efforts that occurred further offshore, which the
Coast Guard plays a substantial role in. Initiatives such as Project
Cazador are considered of high value to the Coast Guard given the
synergy with the aforementioned Coast Guard operations. The UAS, Heron
I, was demonstrated during Project Cazador. Coast Guard personnel
deployed to observe Heron I gained valuable UAS experience. It was
observed that Heron I's slow cruise speed is both a strength and
weakness. It was observed that Heron I is very capable of long-
endurance missions in limited areas or over a specific target. When
attempting to classify and identify targets at the outer edge of its
radar range, it was observed that airspeed was a limiting factor. As
such, Heron I would likely have limited operational effectiveness when
patrolling the extensive smuggling routes south of Panama.
Question. How do the illicit cargo interdicted during Project
Cazador compare to amounts seized in recent Coast Guard operations?
Answer. During the same 4-month period (June 2010 through September
2010), the Coast Guard sized 28 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in the
transit zone, while Project Cazador seized a total of 10 MT of cocaine.
Question. If Coast Guard assets had not been tied up responding so
bravely to the Deepwater Horizon incident, do you believe Project
Cazador would have yielded additional interdiction of illicit cargo?
Answer. Project Cazador could have possibly yielded additional
interdictions had the Coast Guard not diverted assets to support
Deepwater Horizon operations. During much of Deepwater Horizon,
Airborne Use of Force (AUF) helicopters were diverted from counter drug
deployments to support the response efforts. In one specific case, a
Project Cazador detection and monitoring asset located and tracked a
``go-fast'' in the Western Caribbean near Costa Rica. A Coast Guard
cutter conducting a Joint Interagency Task Force South patrol was
diverted to intercept the ``go-fast'', which was suspected of
trafficking cocaine. The Coast Guard cutter did not have an AUF capable
helicopter deployed onboard, and the ``go-fast'' evaded the cutter and
escaped into Costa Rican territorial waters.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
coast guard maritime coverage in alaska
Question. In Alaska, we are very concerned with the President's
decision to decommission another high endurance cutter (WHEC) in the
fiscal year 2012 budget. Given the vast maritime environment that the
Coast Guard is responsible for protecting in Alaska, I am concerned
that the decommissioning of these cutters will have significantly
negative impacts on the safety and security of the Alaskan commercial
fishing industry. The Coast Guard is tasked with conducting operations
in Alaska that encompasses more than 3.8 million square miles, which is
larger than the land mass of the continental United States, and more
than 33,000 miles of coastline. With the Alaskan fishing industry
producing more than 50 percent of the national fishing totals each
year, the cumulative loss of another cutter from the Coast Guard's
fleet could place a significant portion of the Alaskan fishing fleet
that routinely operate in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska in danger
as well as preventing the Coast Guard from effectively ensuring that
the safety and commercial fisheries regulations are adequately
enforced.
Previously you testified that the Coast Guard was committed to a
plan to recapitalize the current WHEC fleet with new NSCs, an effort
that was designed to maintain current cutter coverage levels while
quickly bringing the new class of cutters online. However, the fiscal
year 2012 proposed budget does not have any funding for long-lead time
materials (LLTM) for the sixth NSC. During Secretary Napolitano's
fiscal year 2012 budget hearing in March, she emphasized her commitment
to building out eight NSCs. NSC No. 5 is now fully funded. However, I
note that there is no funding for NSC No. 6 in the fiscal year 2012
request. The Coast Guard previously funded LLTM for the NSC in advance
of production. Would the total cost of NSC No. 6 be reduced if LLTM are
funded in fiscal year 2012 versus fiscal year 2013? If so, by how much?
Also, what plan do you have in place to assure that there is adequate
cutter coverage in Alaska?
As you are aware, there are only seven HH-60 helicopters in
Alaska--four in Kodiak and three in Sitka. These assets, given their
durability in harsh weather environments, are essential to the Coast
Guard's ability to rescue those in need in Alaska. However, each year
helicopters are repositioned in Alaska to cover the fishing fleets in
the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. That repositioning moves assets from
other Coast Guard facilities, leaving those areas with resource gaps.
What is the Coast Guard's plan to close this aviation resource gap?
Does the Coast Guard have the aviation assets it requires to complete
is missions in Alaska and the rest of the United States?
Answer. If NSC No. 6 were fully funded in fiscal year 2012, the
Coast Guard could award NSC No. 6 LLTM in fiscal year 2012. The
possibility for total cost savings would depend on several factors.
The Coast Guard has a proud history of serving the maritime
interests in Alaska and will continue to do so, including maintaining a
major flight deck equipped cutter presence in the Bering Sea. The NSC
will replace the aging and obsolete WHECs and provide greater
operational availability to the fleet of major cutters. NSCs are
already having an operational impact. In fact, the first NSC, USCGC
Bertholf (maritime security cutter large (WMSL) 750), commenced its
first patrol in Alaska in April 2011. Additionally, USCGC Waesche (WMSL
751), also home-ported on the west coast, will be ready for operations
by November 2011 and available for worldwide assignment. Moreover,
USCGC Stratton (WMSL 752) will be delivered in September 2011 and ready
for operations in spring 2013. Patrolling Alaskan waters remains a high
priority and the Coast Guard is committed to providing coverage to meet
the most-pressing operational needs, including coverage for missions in
the Bering Sea.
The Coast Guard has partnered with the U.S. Navy Sundown program to
receive, at no cost, retired H-60F model airframes, which can be
converted to Coast Guard MH-60T helicopters. Funding was provided in
the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-222) to
convert one Navy H-60F airframe to a Coast Guard MH-60T helicopter as a
replacement for one of two HH-60J Coast Guard helicopters (CGNR 6028
and 6017) lost in operational crashes. This conversion is expected to
be completed in November 2011. Funding has been requested in the Coast
Guard's fiscal year 2012 budget to convert a second H-60F airframe,
completing the restoration of HH-60 capacity. The Coast Guard continues
to balance rotary wing needs based on operational risks, which is why
the Coast Guard continues to rotate HH-60s to Alaska during critical
fishing and crabbing seasons.
Of the four rotary-wing aircraft lost due to mishaps in the past 3
years, to date one has been funded for replacement, and the second is
requested in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget. With these
planned replacements, there remains a two aircraft gap in the aviation
fleet. However, the Coast Guard moves assets to ensure coverage for
highest priority missions.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Landrieu. The subcommittee stands in recess,
subject to the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., Tuesday, May 10, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2012 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
overview
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to submit written testimony to the subcommittee on the
fiscal year 2012 funding needs for public transportation security
within the budgets of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
State and local grants program, and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), Transportation Sector Network Management Mass
Transit Division, and throughout the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) urges the
Congress to increase appropriations for the fiscal year 2012 Rail and
Public Transportation Security grants within the FEMA State and local
grants. Past appropriations have not come close to the levels
authorized under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53). We appreciate the funding
that the Congress has provided to date, but at the recent levels, grant
allocations to regions, and ultimately the awards to the individual
transit agencies are inadequate.
Recent cuts to the public transportation security grant program
continue a disappointing trend on support for surface transportation
security programs. These grants are critical to transit agencies in
meeting security improvement needs. Transit provides 18 times as many
passenger trips as aviation, but aviation receives 12 times as much
security funding as surface transportation security. Spending per
passenger for transit security is 4 cents; for aviation it's $8.67.
Aviation security receives 215 times as much Federal funding per
passenger as transit. Threats to public transportation continue to
exist as we were reminded again last week with the terrorist bombing of
the subway in Minsk, Belarus. Public transportation security investment
should be increased, not decreased and I urge the Congress to find the
resources to appropriate to levels consistent with those authorized in
the 9/11 Commission Act.
about apta
APTA is a nonprofit international association of nearly 1,500
public and private-member organizations, including transit systems and
commuter, intercity and high-speed rail operators; planning, design,
construction, and finance firms; product and service providers;
academic institutions; transit associations and State departments of
transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing
safe, efficient, and economical public transportation services and
products. More than 90 percent of the people using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA-
member systems. In accordance with the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, APTA is recognized by DHS as serving in the capacity
of the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council.
greater investments in transit security are required
Safety and security have always been the top priority of the public
transportation industry. Since 9/11, transit systems have taken many
steps to further improve security. Public transit agencies with State
and local governments, have invested billions of dollars on security
and emergency preparedness programs. While we recognize that as an open
public infrastructure there are limitations on what specific steps can
be taken to secure transit facilities and operations, I want to
emphasize that there are still many steps that must be taken and many
security improvements that can be made to improve the security of our
systems and enhance the safety of our Nation's transit riders.
I have testified on numerous occasions of the well-established and
significant risks that transportation and public transportation
specifically, continue to face. As detailed below, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Mineta Transportation Institute
have chronicled the history of attacks on public transportation and the
members of the subcommittee are certainly well aware of the history of
attacks and the thwarted plots and continuing investigations that
clearly make the case. However, the Congress continues to look at the
issue of transportation security in the rigid structure of agency
budget silos. I urge the subcommittee to evaluate the modal security
needs independent of history or agency budget structure. While $5.1
billion in budgetary resources are directed toward aviation security
within the budget of the TSA, the priority budget for public
transportation is within the FEMA State and local programs account. The
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is the principal source of
security assistance for transit agencies and these grant funds can do
more to enhance security than additional funds directed to the Federal
agencies. At a level of $250 million in fiscal year 2011, the
commitment to surface transportation security does not register a fair
comparison, even when including the TSA Surface Transportation account
and excluding aviation security fees. The Congress seems to have locked
Rail and Public Transportation Security grants into a budgetary pattern
that is not based in any true evaluation of risk or need.
As I have testified previously, a study released by APTA in 2010
showed U.S. transit security needs nationwide at $6.4 billion. Despite
billions of dollars already invested from Federal, State, and local
sources, these needs persist as our understanding of risk, consequence,
response and recovery has changed, and technology and operational
approaches are also different today.
Despite wide recognition of the risk to surface transportation and
public transportation security, only $1.25 billion of the $3.4 billion
authorized by the 9/11 act for public transportation security
improvements has been appropriated. That legislation authorized $3.4
billion and authorized additional funding for the security of rail
carriers (freight, passenger, and commuter rail) over a 4-year period.
Again, we find ourselves asking, why are important public
transportation security needs going unfunded?
In 2010, Americans took more than 10.2 billion transit trips.
People use public transportation vehicles more than 35 million times
each weekday. As previously stated, this is 18 times the number of
daily boardings on the Nation's domestic airlines. The consequences of
a successful terrorist attack on a single high-capacity urban rail
system during peak travel time will result in a devastating number of
fatalities and injuries. It will have a crippling affect on the economy
of that entire metropolitan area, with a potential ripple effect
nationwide. We cannot avoid talking about the consequences, as the
resources are not being dedicated where our needs truly exist.
transit security needs are real and require attention
As we have stated before, and as the members of this subcommittee
well know, authoritative sources have acknowledged that the risk to
public transportation systems is real, and it has not diminished:
--GAO released a 2002 report stating ``about one-third of terrorist
attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit
systems are the mode most commonly attacked.''
--In 2007, GAO reported to the Congress that ``the characteristics of
some passenger rail systems--high ridership, expensive
infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--make them
attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for
mass casualties and economic damage and disruption.''
--On February 29, 2008, the Office of Intelligence of TSA released a
report concluding that public transportation in America remains
vulnerable to terrorist attack. The report states: ``The volume
of previous attacks and recent plotting against mass transit
systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist
interest in targeting this sector.'' The report further states
that: ``Previous rail attacks in Madrid, London, and Mumbai
could inspire terrorists to conduct similar attacks in the
United States.''
--On September 30, 2009, the Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Director,
National Counterterrorism Center, testified in the Senate that
``al-Qa`ida continues to pursue plans for Homeland attacks and
is likely focusing on prominent political, economic, and
infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the population. The group also
likely remains interested in targeting mass transit systems,
and other public venues, viewed as relatively soft targets as
evidenced by past al-Qa`ida attacks in London.''
--The federally funded and chartered, independent Mineta
Transportation Institute has collected data on worldwide terror
incidents and found more than 2,000 separate attacks on surface
transportation--1,223 involving bombs and incendiaries--since
1970. These attacks caused 6,190 deaths and approximately
19,000 injuries.
This history calls for continued vigilance and continued
investments in surface transportation security.
grant program structure and other resource needs
We once again ask that the subcommittee include language that
directs DHS to award funds directly to transit agencies and prohibits
DHS from imposing a local match requirement, consistent with
congressional intent expressed in the conference report of the 9/11
act. APTA has no objection to language included in the fiscal year 2010
conference report which directed FEMA to allow transit agencies to
permit States to act as subgrantees. We believe that as long as transit
agencies affirmatively choose to have their grants administered by
their State administrative agencies, they should have that option.
Fiscal Year 2011 TSGP Grant Guidance
It is important that we emphasize here that there exist significant
concerns among our Nation's transit providers concerning the direction
of the draft fiscal year 2011 TSGP Grant Guidance. APTA believes that a
proposal to shift the grant program to an approach that targets a pre-
designated list of specific critical infrastructures is ill-advised,
and would preclude important system-wide security improvements, while
also undermining the regional collaboration that exists under the
current grant program. APTA and its members have urged the TSA to
reconsider this proposal.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, once again we find ourselves calling attention to
another major terrorist attack against mass transit riders. The deadly
bombing of the subway in Minsk, Belarus has left security experts
confused given the lack of significant ethnic or religious divides, nor
history of violent political upheaval. Yet, unknown terrorists chose to
set off a bomb in a crowded metro station in Minsk last week killing 12
people and wounding more than 150. We urge the subcommittee to never
forget the several foiled plots against U.S. public transportation
systems and the attacks on Madrid's commuter trains, on London's
subways, or the seven bombs on Mumbai's commuter trains. Those three
international incidents alone resulted in 452 deaths and 3,000
injuries. We should not ignore those potential incidents that we have
been fortunate to thwart here in the United States and we urge the
Congress to recognize the need for continued vigilance in surface
transportation security, by appropriating funds consistent with the
levels authorized under the 9/11 Commission Act.
I thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify and we
look forward to working with you and the Congress to advance our mutual
goals of safety and security for the traveling public.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
overview
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony
to the subcommittee on the fiscal year 2011 funding needs for public
transportation security within the budgets of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) State and local grants program, and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Transportation Sector
Network Management (TSNM) Mass Transit Division, and throughout the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) asks the subcommittee to provide
appropriations for the fiscal year 2011 Transit Security Grant Program
(TSGP) in the amount of $1.1 billion, the level authorized under the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
Law 110-53). We appreciate the funding that this subcommittee has
provided, but at the recent levels, grant allocations to regions, and
ultimately the awards to the individual transit agencies have limited
what projects can be pursued and implemented. We urge the Congress to
find the resources to appropriate the levels authorized in the 9/11
act.
about apta
APTA is a nonprofit international association of nearly 1,500
public and private-member organizations, including transit systems and
commuter, intercity, and high-speed rail operators; planning, design,
construction, and finance firms; product and service providers;
academic institutions; transit associations and State departments of
transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing
safe, efficient, and economical public transportation services and
products. More than 90 percent of the people using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA-
member systems. In accordance with the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, APTA is recognized by DHS as serving in the capacity
of the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council.
greater investments in transit security are required
As I will discuss later in my testimony, it is well established
that transportation and public transportation specifically, continue to
face significant security risks. One only needs to look to the recent
attacks in Moscow and the ongoing investigation and prosecution of
conspirators in New York to be reminded of this. Safety and security
have always been the top priority of the public transportation
industry. Since 9/11, transit systems have taken many steps to further
improve security. Public transit agencies with State and local
governments, have invested billions of dollars on security and
emergency preparedness programs. While we recognize that as an open
public infrastructure there are limitations on what specific steps can
be taken to secure transit facilities and operations, I want to
emphasize that there are still many steps that must be taken and many
security improvements that can be made to improve the security of our
systems and enhance the safety of our Nation's transit riders.
In 2009, APTA conducted a new survey of U.S. transit agencies to
update their security investment needs and their experience with the
current program. The results of the survey demonstrate that security
investment needs persist nationwide, with total needs for all transit
agencies exceeding $6.4 billion. Our previous survey in 2004 identified
needs in excess of $6 billion. Despite billions of dollars already
invested from Federal, State, and local sources, it is important to
understand that facilities have changed and expanded; our understanding
of risk, consequence, response, and recovery has changed; and
technology and operational approaches are also different than they were
in 2004.
The Congress recognized the need to enhance the focus of DHS on
surface transportation and public transportation security when it
enacted the 9/11 act. That legislation authorized $3.4 billion for
public transportation security improvements, and authorized additional
funding for the security of rail carriers (freight, passenger, and
commuter rail) over a 4-year period. And yet, over the period covered
by the 9/11 act authorizations, only $1.25 billion of the $3.4 billion
authorized has been appropriated, and even less has ultimately been
directed in grants to transit agencies. This is simply unacceptable. We
must increase investments and meet our security needs now--before we
are forced to ask the question ``what could have been done?''
The legislation also set in place a number of the structural
elements that APTA and the Nation's transit systems continue to
emphasize as priorities, including broad eligibility for capital and
operational improvements, a rejection of a ``one-size fits all''
approach to transit security, a recognition of the open nature of
transit facilities and services, interagency coordination between DHS
and the Department of Transportation (DOT), consultation and
coordination at all levels of government and with industry
stakeholders, and support for information sharing and intelligence
analysis, standard development, and research and technology
development.
transit security needs are real and require attention
As we have stated before, and as the members of this subcommittee
well know, authoritative sources have acknowledged that the risk to
public transportation systems is real, and it has not diminished:
--The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a 2002 report
stating ``about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target
transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most
commonly attacked.''
--In 2007, GAO reported to the Congress that ``the characteristics of
some passenger rail systems--high ridership, expensive
infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--make them
attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for
mass casualties and economic damage and disruption.''
--On February 29, 2008, the Office of Intelligence of TSA released a
report concluding that public transportation in America remains
vulnerable to terrorist attack. The report states: ``The volume
of previous attacks and recent plotting against mass transit
systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist
interest in targeting this sector.'' The report further states
that: ``Previous rail attacks in Madrid, London, and Mumbai
could inspire terrorists to conduct similar attacks in the
United States.''
--On September 30, 2009, the Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Director,
National Counterterrorism Center testified in the Senate that
``al-Qa`ida continues to pursue plans for Homeland attacks and
is likely focusing on prominent political, economic, and
infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the population. The group also
likely remains interested in targeting mass transit systems,
and other public venues, viewed as relatively soft targets as
evidenced by past al-Qa`ida attacks in London.''
--The TSA Office of the Inspector General released a March 2010
report highlighting the need for greater attention by TSA in
surface transportation emergency planning and response
capabilities.
--The federally funded and chartered, independent Mineta
Transportation Institute has collected data on worldwide terror
incidents and found more than 2,000 separate attacks on surface
transportation--1,223 involving bombs and incendiaries--since
1970. These attacks caused 6,190 deaths and approximately
19,000 injuries.
DHS has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security. All
of the official Government and independent analyses of risk and threat
cite transportation modes as a potential target for terrorism. As a
result, it is the mission of the TSA to protect ``the Nation's
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and
commerce.'' We couldn't agree more vigorously with that mission
statement! However, one only needs to look at the TSA Web site to
realize that the agency continues to focus in a sizable and
disproportionate manner on one mode of transportation above all others.
There is no mention of surface transportation anywhere to be found at
the forefront of the TSA Web site.
Let me be very clear--and we have been consistent in our views on
this--no one questions the security requirements of our Nation's
aviation system. But the scope and scale of the disproportionate
attention and dedication of resources to one mode of travel over all
others is hard to ignore. In 2009, Americans took more than 10.2
billion transit trips. People use public transportation vehicles more
than 35 million times each weekday. This is 18 times the number of
daily boardings on the Nation's domestic airlines. Make no mistake; a
successful terrorist attack on a single high capacity urban rail system
during peak travel time could result in a devastating number of
fatalities and injuries. In addition, it would have a crippling affect
on the economy of that entire metropolitan area, with a potential
ripple effect nationwide. We do not want to scare anyone, but at the
same time we cannot continue to avoid talking about the consequences,
as the resources are not being dedicated where our needs truly exist.
other program requirements and resource needs
We further ask that you again include language that directs DHS to
award funds directly to transit agencies and prohibits DHS from
imposing a local match requirement, consistent with congressional
intent expressed in the conference report of the 9/11 act. APTA has no
objection to language included in last year's conference report which
directed FEMA to allow transit agencies to permit States to act as
subgrantees. We believe that as long as transit agencies affirmatively
choose to have their grants administered by their State administrative
agencies, they should have that option.
We are pleased that many steps have been taken at FEMA and TSA to
improve the TSGP application and award process, and we appreciate the
attention that the Congress has placed on the difficulties inherent in
this process. However, we urge your continued oversight and attention
to opportunities to simplify and streamline the process. We are hopeful
that the oversight efforts of the Congress, which have led to recent
proposed reforms in the TSGP grant process, will achieve the desired
results and expedite the delivery of funds to transit agencies with
security improvement needs.
In addition to grant funding, we urge the Congress to provide
$600,000 to TSA TSNM Mass Transit Division for the continued operations
of the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).
Funding for this program was authorized in the 9/11 act bill under
section 1410 (d), which provides for the sharing of security
information between transit agencies and DHS. The ability to share
vital information is crucial in preventing and mitigating potential
terrorist attacks. We have been advised by TSA that resources for the
Public Transit ISAC are part of the TSA budget for TSNM. Further, a
joint industry/government working group formed under the auspices of
the Mass Transit SCC/Government Coordinating Council is currently
refining a proposal for security information sharing that would look to
the PT-ISAC to becoming a permanent, expanded system that would
coordinate the dissemination of all relevant security information to
the public transit industry.
We also urge the Congress to provide $500,000 to DHS for the
development of transit security standards. Over the last several years,
APTA has worked closely with DOT, DHS, and industry leaders to develop
standards that help transit agencies use available resources as
effectively as possible. It is our understanding that resources are
factored into the TSA budget for this continuing effort, but we urge
the subcommittee to support the TSA in this regard. The ISAC and
security standards are two important national programs that, although
modest in funding needs, can significantly enhance transit security at
the local level.
Finally, with regard to technology research and development,
resource allocation issues within DHS have failed to adequately address
the research and development needs of transit. In September 2008, the
Mass Transit SCC Security Technology Working Group issued draft
recommendations which identified concerns over the lack of a formal
structure that brings the Federal Government and transit industry
together to discuss transit security technology priorities, needs and
areas of potential interest for technology advancement and research.
There is a general view that TSA research and development, and DHS
science and technology do not conduct adequate early outreach with the
industry to determine needs ahead of actual technology development and
deployment efforts. Transit security professionals believe that early
and active engagement of industry could lead to a better understanding
of varying transit agency needs, as well as better research and
development overall.
Finally, resources such as technical assistance and the like may be
necessary for support of transit industry efforts in the area of
cybersecurity. Concerns over cybersecurity have increased across the
Federal Government and throughout the country over recent years, and
transit agencies are no different. As significant users of power and
computerized control systems, cybersecurity will remain a significant
concern for an industry responsible for the safe and secure movement of
35 million daily riders.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the recent suicide bomb attacks in Moscow provided an
unwanted but graphic reminder of the threats our industry continues to
face. We cannot forget the attacks on Madrid's commuter trains, on
London's subways, or the seven bombs on Mumbai's commuter trains. Those
three incidents alone resulted in 452 deaths and 3,000 injuries. We
should also not ignore those potential incidents that we have been
fortunate to thwart. More details have emerged about the plans involved
in the al Qaeda-inspired New York subway bomb plot, and the reports
surrounding this plot alone should emphasize the need for continued
vigilance in surface transportation security.
I thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify and we
look forward to working with you and the Congress to advance our mutual
goals of safety and security for the traveling public.
______
Attachment, APTA Survey of United States Transit System Security Needs
summary and principal findings
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) conducted a
survey of 35 of its transit agency members during 2009 and early 2010
to determine agency security funding requirements, grants received in
prior fiscal years, and the projects advanced through prior year
grants. The participating transit systems were selected from APTA
members who are eligible recipients of Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funding. Additional
estimates of national needs were expanded beyond the survey respondents
based on the portion of transit operations represented by the
responding systems in six categories that represent equipment,
infrastructure, and activity that requires security efforts. The
principal findings of that survey are:
--Total security needs far surpass funding provided to date. Transit
agency security-related investment needs are $6.4 billion. This
amount is a 5-year estimate and includes $4.4 billion for
transit agency security-related capital investment plus $2
billion for security-related personnel and other security-
related operational expenses. Federal funding provided in
fiscal year 2010 for public transportation security was $253
million.
--Capital security needs remain a top priority, but many agencies
cite operating needs. Respondents to the survey estimated
capital needs as exceeding operating needs by more than a 3-to-
1 ratio. Disparities in priorities between large and small
systems are indicative of the differences in infrastructure and
assets requiring protection. Security operations needs are more
likely to comprise a larger percentage of need for smaller
systems.
--Transit security priorities vary from agency to agency. Survey
responses demonstrate that security priorities are unique to
each individual agency, just as each individual agency's
infrastructure, operations and governance is unique. Transit
agencies seek more flexibility in the uses of funds and a
streamlined application process. A broad list of eligible
projects formed the basis for the National Transit Systems
Security Act of 2007 as contained within the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (Public Law 110-53).
--Transit security resources are required beyond grant funds. Beyond
the grant funding sought by transit agencies, resources are
needed in a variety of components within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), including funding for information
sharing and intelligence, security standards development,
research and technology development, technical assistance, and
the broader approaches towards cybersecurity and resiliency
(all-hazards response).
apta survey of united states transit system security needs
APTA conducted a survey of 35 of its transit agency members during
2009 and early 2010 to determine agency security funding requirements,
grants received in prior fiscal years, and the projects advanced
through prior year grants. The participating transit systems were
selected from APTA members who are eligible recipients of FEMA TSGP
funding. The sample of systems operates 43.0 percent of all transit
vehicles that were reported in the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
National Transit Database in 2008, operates 52.4 percent of all revenue
vehicle miles, operates 64.0 percent of all passenger stations and 62.9
percent of all rail transit right-of-way measured by directional-route
miles, and carries 71.8 percent of all passenger trips and 68.1 percent
of all passenger miles of travel.
transit funding needs
Respondents were asked to report their 5-year security funding
needs for capital and for operations. Table 1 shows those needs as
reported by the participating agency and expanded to include other
transit agencies.
TABLE 1.--FIVE-YEAR SECURITY FUNDING NEEDS
[Millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five-year funding needs
Transit systems included in estimate -----------------------------------------------
Capital Operating Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondents to survey for these questions....................... 2,204 655 2,859
Systems eligible for TSGP funds................................. 3,286 1,518 4,804
All transit agencies in any location............................ 4,419 2,018 6,437
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The security funding needs over the next 5 years for all transit
systems are $6.4 billion, $4.4 billion for capital, and $2.0 billion
for operating. Among all transit systems eligible for TSGP funding
these needs are $4.8 billion, $3.3 billion for capital, and $1.5
billion for operations.
These needs are based on the 34 survey respondents who were able to
forecast capital funding needs and the 33 who were able to forecast
operating funding needs. Respondents which provided needs estimates
found a total security-related funding need of $2.9 billion for their
systems, $2.2 billion for capital uses, and $0.7 billion for
operations. The responses were expanded to estimate needs for other
transit agencies. The expansions were based on the portion of transit
operations represented by the responding systems in six categories that
represent equipment, infrastructure, and activity that requires
security efforts. These categories are the following:
--total vehicles operated,
--vehicle miles in revenue service,
--unlinked passenger trips,
--passenger miles,
--stations, and
--directional miles of rail routes.
Data are taken from the 2008 National Transit Database and APTA's
2009 Public Transportation Fact Book.
APTA published a survey of transit systems security needs in April
2004. That survey was used to project security funding needs for the
entire transit industry. Capital needs to ``maintain, modernize, and
expand'' the security function were $5.2 billion without a specified
time period. Annual operating needs were $800 million which included
existing security operating expenses. Those needs are most comparable
to the $6.4 billion need for all agencies for the next 5 years
estimated in this survey.
security funds received during the past 3 years
Respondents were asked the amount of funds they received during
each of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 for security-related projects
regardless of the source. Because these amounts are not expected to be
of a similar amount for nonparticipating systems in any consistent
manner, no funding estimates are made for nonparticipating systems.
Transit security grants were also distributed during fiscal years 2003,
2004, and 2005; however, this survey limited the request to the most
recent 3 fiscal years for ease of reporting. Data regarding fiscal year
2009 grants was not available at the time of this survey.
TABLE 2.--SECURITY PROJECT FUNDING FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
[Millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding amount for participating systems only
-----------------------------------------------
Funding source Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
2006 2007 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSGP grants..................................................... 103.8 146.3 143.2
Agency match for TSGP grants.................................... 0.6 5.5 4.8
State, local security grants.................................... 46.6 41.5 41.1
Agency match for State, local grants............................ 26.7 19.7 18.2
-----------------------------------------------
Total security funding.................................... 177.7 213.0 207.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
use of funds defined by project effectiveness group descriptions
FEMA groups security projects into five categories termed project
effectiveness group descriptions (PEGD) which are used to prioritize
investments. The five groups and the project types they include, as
described in the fiscal year 2010 Transit Security Grant Program
Guidance and Application Kit December 2009, are:
--Priority group A, ``training, operational deterrence, drills, and
public awareness activities'' which includes: developing
security plans; training (basic before follow-on) for security
awareness, DHS-approved behavior recognition detection courses,
counter-surveillance and immediate actions for security
threats/incidents; operational deterrence for canine teams,
mobile explosives screening teams, and anti-terrorism teams;
crowd assessment; and public awareness.
--Priority group B, ``multi-user high-density key infrastructure
protection'' which includes: anti-terrorism security
enhancement measures, such as intrusion detection, visual
surveillance with live monitoring, alarms tied to visual
surveillance system, recognition software, tunnel ventilation
and drainage system protection, flood gates and plugs, portal
lighting, and similar hardening actions for: tunnel hardening;
high-density elevated operations, multi-user high-density
stations, and hardening of supervisory control and data
acquisition systems.
--Priority group C, ``single-user high-density key infrastructure
protection'' which includes: anti-terrorism security
enhancement measures for high-density stations, and high-
density bridges.
--Priority group D, ``key operating asset protection'' which
includes: physical hardening/security of control centers;
secure stored/parked trains, engines, and buses; bus/rail
yards; and maintenance facilities.
--Priority group E, ``other mitigation activities'' which includes
interoperable communications, evacuation plans, and anti-
terrorism security enhancement measures for low-density
stations.
In addition, larger systems in high-risk areas meeting activity
criteria are eligible for funding for operational activities with
Operational Package (OPack) funds.
Table 3 reports the number of agencies in the sample which received
TSGP funds and matching funds for use for each PEGD category for fiscal
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 in the columns to the left and the use of
funds from other sources in similar categories for the same years in
the columns to the right. Thirty-five systems answered each question.
TABLE 3.--USE OF FUNDS BY PEGD CATEGORY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Use of TSGP--number of grants Use of non-Federal funding
by category sources, number of grants using
Project effectiveness group description --------------------------------- funds by category
category --------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
year 2006 year 2007 year 2008 year 2006 year 2007 year 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training, operational deference, drill, public 8 24 20 6 8 8
awareness....................................
Multi-user high-density key infrastructure 12 13 16 8 8 8
protection...................................
Single-user high density key infrastructure 7 5 5 5 5 7
protection...................................
Key operating asset protection................ 19 16 11 11 12 10
Other mitigation activities................... 5 6 7 7 9 8
Operational Packages (OPacks)................. ......... 8 5 5 6 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
use of funds by project descriptions
Participating transit systems were asked an open-ended question to
list examples of the types of projects for which they used security
funding. The question was repeated for each year for both TSGP and
matching funds and State and local funding. Table 4 counts those
answers in generalized categories into which they appeared to fit. Not
all answers are included and many participants did not answer for each
year. This table is thus a list of project types and should not be
considered a count of the number of each project type actually
undertaken.
TABLE 4.--GENERAL TYPES OF PROJECTS REPORTED BY PARTICIPANTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projects implemented--categorized by general types (open-ended
question, not all systems answered question for each year and
not all uses were listed)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Type of project TSGP and matching funds State and local funding
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
year 2006 year 2007 year 2008 year 2006 year 2007 year 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Closed circuit TV and CCTV support............ 15 7 10 7 7 7
Access control................................ 5 2 3 2 3 2
Intrusion/perimeter monitoring/protection..... 2 6 4 2 4 2
Chemical detection equipment.................. 2 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Awareness training............................ 4 1 2 ......... ......... .........
Behavior recognition software................. 1 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
K-9 related equipment/training................ 1 ......... ......... 1 1 2
Training and exercises........................ 7 14 15 ......... ......... 1
Public awareness.............................. 1 2 3 ......... ......... .........
Communications improvements and equipment 3 ......... 2 2 1 5
upgrades.....................................
Tunnel communications......................... 1 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Security planning............................. 1 1 3 ......... 1 .........
Infrastructure protection/fencing/lighting.... 1 ......... ......... 2 2 3
Control center and control equipment 2 1 ......... ......... ......... .........
redundancy/improvement.......................
Tunnel protection and tunnel access equip- 2 3 2 ......... ......... .........
ment.........................................
Vehicle location system....................... 1 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Portal security............................... 1 ......... 2 ......... ......... .........
Station security.............................. 1 1 1 1 1 .........
Passenger information systems................. ......... 1 ......... ......... ......... .........
Risk assessment............................... ......... 1 3 ......... ......... .........
License plate recognition equipment........... ......... ......... 1 ......... ......... .........
Electronic security........................... ......... ......... 1 ......... ......... .........
Guards, police................................ ......... ......... ......... 4 4 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
use of funds vs. actual needs
It is important to note that survey responses on funding uses
should not be seen as indicators of transit agency security funding
priorities. Instead they are provided to simply demonstrate where
funding has been spent. APTA and many of its members continue to have
concerns that the categorical prioritization of funding within the TSGP
unnecessarily restricts agencies from applying for security grants for
projects they would otherwise deem more important to their specific
agency security mission. The statutory provisions of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act which outlined the eligible
use of funds did so in a broad and generic manner in order to specify
the wide range of eligible uses, and not in the restrictive and
prioritized manner prescribed by TSGP grant guidance.
respondents views on the administration of the tsgp \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note.--Changes to TSGP administration have been implemented in
response to grantee concerns since APTA's survey was conducted, some of
which are reflected in the Fiscal Year 2010 Grant Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration of the TSGP has been of significant concern to
the transit industry over the last several years, with changes to
policy and priorities occurring each year creating challenges for
grantees to implement their own security budgets, plans and programs in
a consistent manner. APTA's survey asked open-ended questions regarding
grantees views on the TSGP administration.
Many agencies sought additional availability of funds for
operational security needs, while other agencies felt the program
should be limited to capital security improvements. It was widely
viewed that TSGP grants should be comprised of 100 percent Federal
funding, so as not to jeopardize important security projects because of
other budget limitations. Multiple comments were received calling for
operating and maintenance costs of TSGP-funded equipment to be
considered an eligible expense.
The grant process timeline was widely perceived as too long and
time consuming given the amount of funds available to agencies. Early
release of grant guidance was a recommendation that would allow for
timelier grant application submission.
Concerns were expressed that the TSGP did not allow ``pre-award''
authority. This inconsistency with Federal Transit Program grants not
only added to confusion in agency dealings with FEMA and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but also had the
potential to lead certain project expenditures to be ineligible because
of relatively minor administrative details, thereby affecting the
transit agency's ability to expend the funds as programmed.
A variety of administrative process recommendations were made in
the comments section, such as urging DHS to follow the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) practice of utilizing annual audits for agencies
with certified grantees business systems and practices. Many of the
paperwork requirements and record keeping processes in place were seen
as duplicative.
Additional projects that have been excluded or overly restricted
include consequence management projects, continued sustenance and life-
cycle maintenance of security projects, interoperable communications,
and redundant power systems. Current allocations for management and
administration are not sufficient for long-term capital endeavors.
Agencies require more flexibility in the assignment of in-house
flagging and escort crews for work tied to security projects. Some
agencies argued for allowable costs to include program administration
and project management. Several respondents argued that the guidance
was unnecessarily restrictive as to the use of funds, since threats and
technology are regularly subject to change. As well, needs vary from
transit agency to transit agency according to inherent risk exposures
and current state of infrastructure and technological applications.
Many agencies commented that operational funding should be
available for projects and purposes other than the currently defined
OPacks. Not all transit agencies control their own sworn law
enforcement, and as such often contract for services--often with
private contractors or sworn forces of surrounding jurisdictions. The
unavailability of funds for these purposes is seen as an unnecessary
restriction.
Some agencies felt that the current grouping of agencies into tiers
did not adequately correlate their tier to their risk, due to perceived
unique regional security concerns. Smaller systems complained that
despite their eligibility under the tier system, they either had not
been successful at obtaining grant funding. Some smaller agencies felt
that minimum project amounts should be eliminated.
The wide variety of comments from agencies supports APTA's
consistent call for less restrictive security grants and for a process
that avoid the one-size-fits-all approach.
other security needs not identified in this survey
The funding needs and uses identified through this survey do not
include Department-centric budgetary resources, such as those required
for intelligence and information sharing, security standards
development, and research and development.
Information and Intelligence
A high priority for the transit industry in the area of information
sharing and intelligence is the continuation of a small but critical
amount of annual funding for the annual maintenance of the Public
Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC).
Established in response to Presidential Decision Directive 63 and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the PT ISAC is
seen by transit security professionals as a highly valuable interactive
resource for the dissemination and sharing of industry specific
information and intelligence. A joint industry/government working group
formed under the auspices of the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating
Council (SCC)/Government Coordinating Council (GCC) is currently
refining a proposal for security information sharing that would look to
the PT-ISAC to becoming a permanent, expanded system that would
coordinate the dissemination of all relevant security information to
the public transit industry.
Security Standards
A similar high priority for the industry requiring continued, but
relatively small amounts of funding is the transit security standards
development program. Produced through the consensus-based process
recommended by the American National Standards Institute and fully
inclusive of Federal stakeholders including the TSA, FTA, and Federal
Railroad Administration, the transit security standards program serves
an extremely important guiding role for future policies and investments
in transit security.
Research and Development
Additionally, resource allocation issues within DHS have failed to
adequately address the research and development needs of transit. In
September 2008, the Mass Transit SCC Security Technology Working Group
issued draft recommendations which identified concerns over the lack of
a formal structure that brings the Federal Government and transit
industry together to discuss transit security technology priorities,
needs, and areas of potential interest for technology advancement and
research. There is a general view that TSA research and development,
and DHS science and technology do not conduct adequate early outreach
with the industry to determine needs ahead of actual technology
development and deployment efforts. Transit security professionals
believe that early and active engagement of industry could lead to a
better understanding of varying transit agency needs, as well as better
research and development overall.
Cybersecurity
Also, resources such as technical assistance and the like may be
necessary for support of transit industry efforts in the area of
cybersecurity. Concerns over cybersecurity have increased across the
Federal Government and throughout the country over recent years, and
transit agencies are no different. As significant users of power and
computerized control systems, cybersecurity will remain a significant
concern for an industry responsible for the safe and secure movement of
35 million daily riders.
Technical Support
Since September 11, 2001, the FTA initially and DHS subsequently
have offered technical support from time to time to assist transit
agencies in the ongoing development and strengthening of their security
plans, processes, procedures and resources. This level of Federal
support continues to be an imperative need and necessitates DHS to
ensure that such technical assistance is appropriately funded.
Resiliency and All-Hazards
Finally, as DHS and many others in the homeland security policy
arena discuss issues of resiliency and ``all hazards'' approaches to
security and emergency management policy, transit agencies are
increasingly looked to as instruments for disaster response and
evacuation, and as such have repeatedly responded to major incidents
ranging from 9/11 to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Views on the
resources made available to the Department for its overall budget
should not overlook the potential transit needs in ``all-hazards''
response to the resiliency question.
about public transportation in the united states
The United States transit industry carries more than 10 billion
riders a year for more than 50 billion passengers miles. In 2008, 7.2
million people used transit as their primary means of commuting to
work, 23 percent more than commuted on transit in 2000.
Transit service is provided by more than 387,000 employees
operating 137,000 vehicles in the peak service period each weekday.
Transit rail cars, buses, and vans provide 4.6 billion miles of revenue
service in a year. Twenty-six commuter rail systems, 15 heavy rail
systems, and 35 light rail systems provide service more than 11,270
directional miles of routes, and along with bus service stop at 4,500
stations and numerous street locations.
APTA's Security Affairs Steering Committee serves in the role of
the Mass Transit SCC.
______
Letter From Marine Conservation Biology Institute
April 19, 2011.
Hon. Mary L. Landrieu,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: Marine
Conservation Biology Institute (MCBI), based in Bellevue, WA, is a
nonprofit conservation organization whose mission is to protect ocean
ecosystems. We use science to identify places in peril and advocate for
bountiful, healthy oceans for current and future generations. I wish to
thank the members of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee
for the opportunity to submit written testimony on the fiscal year 2012
appropriations for the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). MCBI recommends $10.791
billion for the USCG in fiscal year 2012. This amount would reinstate
fiscal year 2010 funding levels, with an additional $2 million to
combat marine debris as mandated by law.
The USCG is a multi-mission agency, stretched by many demands. MCBI
supports the USCG in their efforts to reach their goals in providing
maritime safety, security, mobility, national defense, and protection
of natural resources. The fiscal year 2012 President's request has
decreased the USCG's overall budget by more than $450 million,
including a decrease of $147 million for marine environmental
protection, one of the USCG's 11 missions. We are concerned about this
decrease and what it portends in terms of the further degradation our
oceans.
marine debris
Marine debris has become one of the most widespread pollution
problems affecting the world's oceans and coasts. As highlighted by the
``Great Pacific Garbage Patch'' in the North Pacific Ocean, and garbage
patch in the Atlantic Ocean, marine debris is a growing problem that is
manifesting itself in all United States waters, including in Hawaii,
Alaska, Louisiana, and the Caribbean. Research has shown that debris
seriously effects the marine environment, marine wildlife, the economy,
and human health and safety.
Marine debris harms marine and coastal communities by damaging
marine habitat like coral reefs, transporting non-native and invasive
species to new habitats, causing navigational hazards and vessel
damage, and harming and entangling wildlife. Some of the most common
types of marine debris are discarded or lost fishing lines and nets,
household plastics such as disposable lighters, six-pack rings, plastic
bags, and Styrofoam pellets. The number of marine debris-related
entanglement deaths of endangered and threatened seals, sea turtles,
and seabirds continues to grow. For example, entanglement in debris is
major cause of death for Hawaiian monk seals (population estimate:
<1,200).
To combat marine debris, the Congress responded in a bipartisan
manner and enacted the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and
Reduction Act in 2006 which established national efforts to identify,
assess, reduce, and prevent marine debris and its effects on the marine
environment. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
and the USCG work together to undertake these activities. The USCG's
marine debris efforts fall under its marine environmental protection
mission, 1 of 11 missions.
The USCG plays a crucial role combating marine debris by monitoring
and enforcing compliance with MARPOL Annex V and the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships. Under this authority, the USCG monitors discharge
of waste from ships and oversees port waste receptor facilities. In
addition, the USCG provides critical support and leadership for a
variety of anti-marine debris activities. For example, the USCG has
partnered primarily with NOAA, starting in 1998, to remove an estimated
667 metric tons (mt) of marine debris (mostly derelict fishing gear)
from the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands where marine debris kills
endangered Hawaiian monk seals and seabirds. In 2009, NOAA and the USCG
removed an estimated 68 mt of debris. With the recent earthquake in
Japan, an influx of debris has been introduced to the marine
environment. University of Hawaii scientists believe that we will start
to see the impacts of this debris in the Hawaiian Islands in about 18
months.
The Marine Debris Act authorizes $10 million annually for NOAA's
Marine Debris Program and $2 million for the USCG's marine debris
efforts. NOAA has been level funded at $4 million since 2008, but the
USCG has never requested nor received any direct funding for its marine
debris efforts.
As the Nation continues to deal with economic challenges, MCBI
recognizes that allocating new funds for projects may be difficult.
However, the economic costs of marine debris on our marine resources,
tourism, human health and safety far outweigh the cost of marine debris
removal activities. Therefore, we encourage the subcommittee to
minimally reinstate the USGS funding levels to fiscal year 2010 enacted
levels to maintain the service's operating capabilities, and include an
additional $2 million for the USCG to meet its responsibilities under
the Marine Debris Act. Adequate and sustained funding is needed to
maintain and enhance the ability of the USCG to support current removal
projects, develop best management practices, reduce derelict fishing
gear, and conduct education and outreach measures.
In summary, MCBI respectfully requests that the subcommittee
augment the USCG funding to support the critical role it plays in
fighting marine debris.
Sincerely,
William Chandler,
Vice President for Government Affairs,
Marine Conservation Biology Institute.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Association for Public Health
Statistics and Information Systems
The National Association for Public Health Statistics and
Information Systems (NAPHSIS) welcomes the opportunity to provide this
written statement for the public record as the Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee prepares its fiscal year 2012
appropriations legislation.\1\ In 2005, the Congress passed the REAL ID
Act in response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations that the
Federal Government ensure a person ``is who they claim to be'' when
applying for an official ID. Yet, 6 years later implementation remains
stalled due to strained State budgets and a lack of Federal investment.
As the nonprofit, national association for the 57 vital records offices
that are critical partners in the security of our homeland, NAPHSIS
recommends you provide the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
$100 million over a period of 3-5 years to modernize vital records in
support of REAL ID through grants to States.
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\1\ NAPHSIS represents the 57 vital records jurisdictions that
collect, process, and issue birth and death records in the United
States and its territories, including the 50 States, New York City, the
District of Columbia, and the five territories. NAPHSIS coordinates and
enhances the activities of the vital records jurisdictions by
developing standards, promoting consistent policies, working with
Federal partners, and providing technical assistance.
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preventing fraud, identity theft, and terrorism through verification
Prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, all but one of the terrorist hijackers acquired some form of
identification document, some by fraud, and used these forms of
identification to assist them in boarding commercial flights, renting
cars, and other necessary activities leading up to the attacks. In its
final report, the 9/11 Commission recommended implementing more secure
sources of identification, stating that ``Federal Government should set
standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of
identification, such as driver's licenses. Fraud in identification
documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources
of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are
who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.'' \2\
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\2\ The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 2004, p.
390.
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Heeding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Congress
enacted the REAL ID Act in May 2005. Among other provisions, the REAL
ID Act and its corresponding regulations (6 CFR part 37) require that
applicants for a driver's license present their birth certificate to
the motor vehicle agency to validate their U.S. citizenship and their
date of birth, and that birth certificates must be verified by the
State. Section 37.13 of the identification standards regulations
recommends that States through their departments of motor vehicles
(DMV) should use the Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE)
system, operated by NAPHSIS, to verify birth certificates presented by
applicants.
EVVE is an online system operated by NAPHSIS that verifies birth
certificate information. It provides authorized users at participating
agencies with a single interface to quickly, reliably, and securely
validate birth and death information at any jurisdiction in the
country. In so doing, no personal information is divulged to the person
verifying information--EVVE simply relays a message that there was or
was not a match with the birth and death records maintained by the
State, city, or territory.
need for verification persists
Many Federal and State agencies rely on birth certificates for
proof of age, proof of citizenship, identification for employment
purposes, to issue benefits or other documents (e.g., driver's
licenses, Social Security cards, and passports), and to assist in
determining eligibility for public programs or benefits (e.g.,
Medicaid). Unfortunately, there are cases where individuals have
obtained birth certificates of deceased persons and assumed their
identity, created fraudulent birth certificates, and altered the
information on a birth certificate, as documented in a Department of
Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General Report of
2000.\3\
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\3\ Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General, Birth Certificate Fraud, Sept. 2009 (OEI-07-99-00570).
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In 2009 and 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
documented several cases in which investigators created fraudulent
birth certificates and were able to obtain passports based upon the
fraudulent records because the passport office did not verify the birth
certificate information.\4\ Just recently, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari for ``attempted use
of a weapon of mass destruction''. When the FBI searched Aldawsari's
apartment, agents discovered that Aldawsari had plans to obtain a
forged U.S. birth certificate and obtain multiple drivers' licenses for
the purpose of renting several different cars to carry out his attacks.
Aldawsari recognized that birth certificates can be used to obtain
multiple identification documents such as passports and driver's
licenses.
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\4\ Government Accountability Office, Department of State:
Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State's Passport
Issuance Process, Mar. 2009 (GAO-09-447) and State Department:
Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains Vulnerable to
Fraud, July 2010 (GAO-10-922T).
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Passport fraud prevention managers commenced using the EVVE system
in March 2009 for birth certificate verifications. In their first 6
weeks of use, there were two instances where the fraud prevention
managers used the EVVE system to electronically verify the birth
certificates, and EVVE returned a ``no match''. Upon further follow up
with the vital records offices that ``issued'' the birth certificates
it was determined that indeed the birth certificates presented with
those passport applications were fraudulent. Based on these and other
successes, NAPHSIS is working with the Department of State to integrate
EVVE into the standard passport adjudication process.
states need federal support to implement real id
EVVE is now installed in 30 vital records jurisdictions and is used
by select State DMVs and Medicaid Offices, the Social Security
Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Department
of State fraud prevention managers in select jurisdictions. Users of
EVVE are enthusiastic about the system, citing its capacity for:
--Providing protection against the potential use of birth
certificates for fraudulent activities.
--Improving customer service by facilitating rapid access to accurate
and verifiable vital record data in real-time.
--Safeguarding the confidentiality of birth and death data.
--Offering a secure mechanism for communication between agencies and
vital records offices via the Internet.
--Easily integrating with current legacy systems that the Federal or
State agencies may already be using, and for serving as a user-
friendly interface for agencies that seek a stand-alone query
system.
NAPHSIS has completed upgrades to the EVVE system to meet the REAL
ID requirements and is working to install EVVE in the remaining 27
jurisdictions before the now extended, REAL ID deadline. NAPHSIS has
also procured a data analysis and quality control tool that all
jurisdictions can utilize to analyze their EVVE database for anomalies,
inconsistencies, accuracy, and completeness. This tool and the analysis
of EVVE data has been completed in 17 jurisdictions to-date.
Despite EVVE's security, speed, and ease of use, the system is only
as good as the underlying data infrastructure upon which it relies.
Digitizing paper-based birth and death records, then cleaning and
linking those records, will provide for secure, reliable, real-time
identity verification using EVVE. Specifically,
--The majority of the 57 vital records jurisdictions have electronic
birth records that extend back more than 7 decades. To
recognize EVVE's full potential to verify birth certificates,
100 percent of jurisdictions should have their records in
electronic form.
--There are cases where an individual has assumed a false identity by
obtaining a birth certificate of a person who has died.
Therefore, it is also important that all jurisdictions' death
and birth records be linked to flag individuals who are
deceased and identify fraudulent birth documentation.
recommended action: invest in infrastructure to facilitate id
verification
The jurisdictions' efforts to digitize, clean, and link vital
records have been hindered by State budget shortfalls. In short, the
jurisdictions need the Federal Government's help to complete building a
secure data infrastructure and support identity verification required
by REAL ID. Under the current authority established through REAL ID, we
ask that the Congress provide $100 million to FEMA to support a new
grants-to-States program for the purpose of modernizing vital records.
Specifically, these funds would be used by vital records jurisdictions
to digitize their birth records back to 1945, to clean these data to
support electronic queries, and link birth and death records. We
recommend the funding be appropriated over time according to one of two
schedules:
--Option 1.--$33 million per year over 3 years. This option would
provide roughly $580,000 in fiscal year 2012 to each vital
records jurisdiction, on average.
--Option 2.--$20 million per year over 5 years, providing roughly
$350,000 in fiscal year 2012 to each vital records
jurisdiction, on average. The vital records modernization would
progress more slowly than under option 1, but the funding would
nevertheless significantly enhance the ability of States and
territories to support the goals of REAL ID.
The terrorist attack the FBI thwarted in the apprehension of Khalid
Ali-M Aldawsari brings to mind the September 11 tragedy, and reminds us
of the need to secure official forms of identification. We feel
strongly that an investment of $100 million is a small price to pay to
strengthen Americans' safety and security by accurately, efficiently,
and securely verifying birth data on the 245 million driver's licenses
issued annually. Six years after REAL ID's enactment, isn't it time to
implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and invest in the goals
of REAL ID and identity verification?
NAPHSIS appreciates the opportunity to submit this statement for
the record and looks forward to working with the subcommittee.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the
record regarding the fiscal year 2012 budget for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). As president of the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA) I represent the emergency management
directors of all 50 States, territories, and the District of Columbia.
Members of NEMA are responsible to the Governors for myriad
responsibilities including emergency preparedness, homeland security,
mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural or terrorism-
related disasters.
emergency management performance grants
The highest priority for NEMA within the President's request is
funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG). EMPG
assists State and local governments in managing a variety of disasters
and hazards providing the only source of Federal assistance to State
and local government for all-hazards emergency management capacity
building. Grantees utilize EMPG funds for personnel, planning,
training, exercises, warning systems, public outreach, and other
essential functions in establishing effective preparedness, mitigation,
response, and recovery. This program is of considerable economic value
to the Federal Government as all Federal funds are matched 50-50 by
State and local governments. Such a matching requirement increases
accountability and supplements the impact of valuable Federal dollars.
This year, NEMA fully supports the President's requested funding
level and House Appropriations Committee recommendation of $350 million
for EMPG. We appreciate the resource constrained environment, but when
compared to other grant programs, the 50-50 match allows EMPG to stand
alone as a worthwhile investment of Federal funds. In many ways, EMPG
offers a cost-savings by allowing States to manage disasters which
would otherwise need to be addressed by the Federal Government.
NEMA, in conjunction with the International Association of
Emergency Managers, has taken the most significant step forward to-date
in attempting to measure the effectiveness of EMPG. In March 2011, the
two associations combined to release Emergency Management Performance
Grants: Providing Returns on a Nation's Investment. The report measures
the effectiveness of funding provided EMPG in fiscal year 2010. It also
ties individual State and local efforts into the far larger picture of
overall preparedness by demonstrating how a truly national emergency
management system is developed and supported.
A copy of the report is available online at: http://
www.nemaweb.org/index.php?
option=com_pollydoc&format=raw&id=2583&view=doc
homeland security grant program
NEMA members remain alarmed at the significant cuts proposed by the
House Appropriations Committee to the State Homeland Security Grant
Program (SHSGP). This program provides funds to build capabilities at
the State and local levels and to implement the goals and objectives
included in State homeland security strategies and initiatives in the
State Preparedness Report. Funding amounts must remain at pre-
consolidation levels, and these grants must be used in support of
building an all-hazard capability. Furthermore, providing sole
discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security allows far too many
opportunities for ``politics'' to be played with these critical grant
programs. While in theory, combining grant programs and consolidation
may appear sound; in practice such efforts remain impractical.
We urge the subcommittee to provide States greater flexibility in
use of homeland security funds for all-hazards activities. Such
flexibility allows the grant funding to be utilized by each State
according to need, existing resources, and capabilities. This
flexibility will serve to increase preparedness for all hazards
including terrorism. The effort to enhance and build the national
emergency response system is a national effort and Federal resources
should continue at the current level to maintain effectiveness. As the
subcommittee considers funding for the SHSGP, NEMA urges sustained
appropriations levels on a multi-year basis to allow for long-range
planning, maintenance, implementation, and measurement.
pre-disaster mitigation
The administration's request of $85 million for the Pre-Disaster
Mitigation (PDM) grant program reflects the amount normally available
for programmatic activities after congressionally directed funding has
been allocated out of a $100 million appropriation. Since fiscal year
2002, PDM has been a competitively awarded grant program. The PDM
program continues to be over-subscribed as more projects become
eligible than can be funded in any given fiscal year at present funding
levels.
NEMA supports the President's request of $85 million provided the
ban on congressionally directed funding from the recent reauthorization
language is followed. Should targeted funding continue to be a part of
this program, we would request appropriate funds above the $85 million
to off-set the programmatic impacts.
emergency operations centers
There remains a shortfall in the ability for States to build,
retrofit, and upgrade primary and alternate emergency operations
centers (EOC). According to the 2010 NEMA Biennial Survey, an estimated
$398 million in requirements exist to bridge the shortfall. The current
EOC Grant Program is intended to improve emergency management and
preparedness capabilities by supporting flexible, sustainable, secure,
and interoperable EOCs with a focus on addressing identified
deficiencies and needs. Fully capable emergency operations facilities
at the State and local levels stand as an essential element of a
comprehensive national emergency management system and are necessary to
ensure continuity of operations and continuity of government in major
disasters caused by any hazard. The continued viability of a strong and
robust EOC Grant Program remains in the Nation's best interest.
emergency management assistance compact
Finally, I wish to address funding for the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). When States and the U.S. territories joined
together and the Congress ratified EMAC (Public Law 104-321) in 1996,
it created a legal and procedural mechanism whereby emergency response
resources such as urban search and rescue teams can quickly move
throughout the country to meet disaster needs. All 50 States, the
District of Columbia, and three territories are members of EMAC and
have committed their emergency resources in helping neighboring States
and territories.
EMAC has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of
resources it provides over the years. Since 2004, the volume and types
of resources requested under EMAC has grown considerably. For example,
26 emergency management personnel responded to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. Conversely, more than 66,000 personnel from a
variety of disciplines deployed to the gulf coast in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 12,279 personnel to Texas and Louisiana
during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. The 2009 spring flooding in North
Dakota and Minnesota resulted in States deploying equipment, sandbags,
and 1,029 personnel to North Dakota. In all, 727 National Guard
personnel and 302 civilians were sent to assist via the compact.
The capabilities of EMAC remain sustained by the efforts of all the
States and would be bolstered by direct support of EMAC. While EMAC
currently receives FEMA grant funding, fulfilling NEMA's request for a
$2 million line item appropriation would codify the program for use in
future disasters. In the past, NEMA has advocated for $4 million of 2-
year funding, but pursuant to an agreement with FEMA programmatic
personnel, our position is now one of single-year funding of $2
million. Please note these funds do not represent an earmark as they
provide numerous benefits directly to the States to build and maintain
a national mutual aid system.
As the opportunity is afforded, EMAC intends to develop, maintain,
and exercise State and regional mutual aid capabilities, train State
and local emergency response personnel who may be deployed through
EMAC, support the development of specialized emergency response
capabilities among the regions, and ensure EMAC remains a viable
resource for the States now and in the future. In my opinion, $2
million in Federal funds stands as a minimal investment for maintaining
a proven national emergency response capacity that day-to-day is
equipped, trained, and ready to provide critical disaster response
resources and support between States. All members of EMAC rely on this
asset as a critical tool in their response and recovery arsenal.
conclusion
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these issues
critical to the emergency management community. This subcommittee
regularly affirms support for ensuring preparedness for our Nation's
vulnerabilities against all-hazards with additional investments in EMPG
and EOCs. As you develop the fiscal year 2012 budget for DHS, we
encourage you to utilize our membership as a resource and continue
efforts to build a strong and robust emergency management baseline in
our country. Together, we will carry-on the initiatives so thoughtfully
developed by this subcommittee over the years. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your continued
partnership.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this
testimony. As president of the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents more than
24,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, agriculture
specialists, and trade enforcement and compliance specialists who are
stationed at 331 land, sea, and air ports of entry across the United
States.
CBP entry specialists, import specialists, paralegal specialists
that determines fines, penalties and forfeitures, customs auditors and
attorneys and other trade compliance personnel are the frontline of
defense against illegal imports and contraband. These employees enforce
more than 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations in order to
ensure a fair and competitive trade environment pursuant to existing
international agreements and treaties, as well as stemming the flow of
illegal imports, such as pirated intellectual property and counterfeit
goods, and contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons
of mass destruction, and laundered money. CBP is also a revenue
collection agency--collecting $32 billion in duties and fees on imports
valued at more than $2 trillion in 2007.
Along with facilitating legitimate trade and enforcing trade and
security laws, CBP trade personnel are responsible for stopping illegal
transshipments, goods with falsified country of origin, goods that are
misclassified and for collecting antidumping and countervailing duties.
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Customs
Revenue Functions (GAO-07-529), CBP collected nearly $30 billion
customs duties in fiscal year 2006, but did not collect approximately
$150 million in antidumping duties alone in 2006. In addition, it is
estimated that $500 million in antidumping duties were left uncollected
between 2001 and 2006. (See GAO-07-529, page 23 and pages 29-30.)
trade enforcement and compliance staffing
When CBP was created, it was given a dual mission of not only
safeguarding our Nation's borders and ports from terrorist attacks, but
also the mission of regulating and facilitating international trade.
CBP is responsible for collecting import duties and ensuring importers
fully comply with applicable laws, regulations, quotas, Free Trade
Agreement requirements, and intellectual property provisions.
Customs revenues are the second largest source of Federal revenues
collected by the U.S. Government after tax revenues. This revenue funds
other Federal priority programs. NTEU is deeply concerned with the lack
of resources, both in dollars and manpower, devoted to CBP's trade
functions. Lack of sufficient focus and resources costs the U.S.
Treasury in terms of customs duties and revenue loss and costs American
companies in terms of lost business to unlawful imports.
Because of continuing staffing shortages, inequitable compensation,
and lack of mission focus, experienced CBP commercial operations
professionals at all levels, who long have made the system work, are
leaving or have left the agency. Twenty-five percent of CBP import
specialists will retire or be eligible to retire within the next few
years.
When the Congress created the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees included
section 412(b) in the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 (Public Law
107-296). This section mandates that ``the Secretary [of Homeland
Security] may not consolidate, discontinue, or diminish those functions
. . . performed by the United States Customs Service . . . on or after
the effective date of this [a]ct, reduce the staffing level, or reduce
the resources attributable to such functions, and the Secretary shall
ensure that an appropriate management structure is implemented to carry
out such functions''.
In October 2006, the Congress enacted the Security and
Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act (Public Law 109-347). Section
401(b)(4) of the SAFE Port Act directed the DHS Secretary to ensure
that requirements of section 412(b) of the HSA (6 U.S.C. 212(b)) are
fully satisfied.
CBP satisfied this statutory requirement by freezing the number of
many maintenance of revenue function positions at the level in effect
on the date of creation of the agency in March 2003. As you know, CBP
was created by the merger of the former U.S. Customs Service, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Animal, Plant, Health
Inspection Service (APHIS). In March 2003, the number of commercial
operations employees at the former U.S. Customs Service was
significantly less than prior to 9/11 and significantly less than the
need as stated in the U.S. Customs Service Optimal Staffing Levels
Fiscal Years 2000-2002 (February 25, 2000), known as the resource
allocation model (RAM).
For example, according to the U.S. Customs RAM, in fiscal year
1998, the optimal staffing level for import specialists at the U.S.
Customs Service was 1,249, and based on workload in fiscal year 2002,
the optimal staffing level for import specialists was 1,489 (pages 2,
A-1 and M-1 through M-12).
In actuality, in March 2003 when CBP stood up, there were only 984
import specialists on-board. That is 265 import specialist positions
less than the 1998 base total, and 505 less than the fiscal year 2002
import specialists optimal staffing level. A significant reduction in
the number of revenue maintenance function positions had occurred at
the U.S. Customs Service between 9/11 and March 2003 when CBP stood up.
Section 412(b) of the HSA reflected the Congress's concern regarding
this diminishment in the number of customs revenue function positions
versus customs security function positions at the U.S. Customs Service
and fear that it would continue and be exacerbated by its merger into
CBP.
Even though CBP complied with the letter of section 401(b)(4) of
the SAFE Port Act, it appears to NTEU that CBP views the ``March fiscal
year 2003 Staff On-Board'' numbers of revenue maintenance function
positions (see appendix I), including such vital trade facilitation and
enforcement positions as entry and import specialists, as a ceiling
rather than a floor.
cbp's resource allocation/optimization model
CBP's adherence to the March 2003 import specialist employment
number as a ceiling has become evident in the most recent iteration of
the SAFE Port Act mandated RAM. Section 403 of the SAFE Port Act
required CBP to complete a RAM by June 2007, and every 2 years
thereafter, to determine optimal staffing for commercial and revenue
functions. It directed that the model must comply with the requirements
of section 412(b) of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 and
required the CBP Commissioner, not later than September 30, 2007, to
ensure that the requirements of 412(b) of the HSA were fully satisfied.
The CBP positions covered by section 412(b) include entry specialists,
import specialists, drawback specialists, national import specialists,
fines and penalty specialists, attorneys at the Office of Regulations
and Rulings, customs auditors, international trade specialists, and
financial systems specialists.
The rationale for this provision arose from a GAO report (GAO-05-
663) that stated, ``as of June 2003, CBP has not increased staffing
levels [at the POEs]'' and ``CBP does not systematically assess the
number of staff required to accomplish its mission at ports and
airports nationwide . . . '' Further, GAO observed that ``not
identifying optimal staffing levels prevents CBP from performing
workforce gap analyses, which could be used to justify budget and
staffing requests.''
The former U.S. Customs Service's last internal review of staffing
for fiscal years 2000-2002, dated February 25, 2000, shows that the
U.S. Customs Service needed more than 14,776 new hires just to fulfill
its basic mission (U.S. Customs RAM, page 2 and A-1)--and that was
before 9/11. Since then, DHS was created and the U.S. Customs Service
was merged with the Immigration and Nationalization Service and parts
of APHIS to create CBP. CBP was given an expanded mission of providing
for both the first line of defense against domestic terrorism and
making sure trade laws are enforced and trade revenue collected.
The first section 403 RAM, dated July 6, 2007, stated that ``CBP
has over 8,200 employees that are involved in commercial trade
operations. The model suggests that to carry out these commercial
operations and to adequately staff the needs for priority trade
functions, the optimal level of staff in fiscal year 2008 would be over
10,000 employees'' (page 12 of CBP Report to Congress on Trade Resource
Allocation Model.) According to the 2007 RAM, 1,100 import specialists
would be needed for optimal performance in fiscal year 2010, an
increase of 116 more than the HSA Floor (see page 16).
In 2009, CBP renamed the section 403 resource allocation model
(RAM) (the SAFE Port Act mandated Report to Congress). It is now called
the resource optimization model (ROM). The fiscal year 2009 ROM reduces
the fiscal year 2010 optimal staffing levels for some revenue
maintenance function positions, specifically the entry and import
specialist positions (see appendix II). For example, the fiscal year
2009 ROM puts the number of import specialist positions needed in
fiscal year 2010 at the HSA floor number of 984, rather than 1,100 as
stated in the fiscal year 2007 RAM.
import specialist allocation model
In 2009, CBP Office of Field Operations updated its import
specialist allocation model (ISAM), ``a decision support tool in the
allocation of resources''. The number of import specialists allocated
for staffing the ports of entry, however, was determined to be 984
prior to the compiling of the ISAM. The allocation model was done with
the staffing number outcome already pre-determined.
In the ISAM, CBP states that the Office of Field Operations
``manages a set allocation of 984 for import specialists, which is the
minimum staffing requirement set forth by the Homeland Security Act of
2002.'' Since the number of import specialist positions is frozen at
984 nationwide, CBP's ISAM proposed a net reduction of 52 import
specialist positions (from 179 to 127) at New York City area ports,
shifting those positions to other ports (see appendix III) in order to
handle current workload. CBP plans to eliminate positions at the ports
with the highest number of import specialists--primarily the New York
City region--to fill needs in other ports. NTEU is concerned that the
ISAM is a zero-sum model that does not address actual staffing needs.
Ports specialize in different areas of trade compliance and have
different needs depending on the operation--air, sea, or land ports.
Larger ports handle all areas of trade compliance whereas smaller ports
might see a large amount of one type of commodity or only deal with a
small range of trade compliance issues.
Because of these differences between the ports of entry, rather
than using a one-size-fits-all metric to determine allocation of import
specialists, the data elements and factors that CBP weighs in
determining allocation of import specialists should be different for
each port depending on what type of operation it is and what the
prevalent trade issues are at that port. Then, staffing should be
decided using a work-to-staff ratio based on a formula and weighting of
the elements for that port specifically.
``Informed compliance'' is not given any weight at all when
determining import specialist staffing needs at individual ports.
Authorized by the Customs Modernization Act (Mod act), ``informed
compliance'' plays a major role in CBP's trade enforcement and
compliance operations. Two new concepts that emerged from the Mod act
are ``informed compliance'' and ``shared responsibility,'' which are
premised on the idea that in order to maximize voluntary compliance
with trade laws and regulations, the trade community needs to be
clearly and completely informed of its legal obligations.
Accordingly, the Mod act imposes a greater obligation on CBP to
provide the public with improved information concerning the trade
community's rights and responsibilities under customs regulations and
related laws. Both the trade and CBP share responsibility for carrying
out these requirements. For example, under section 484 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1484), the importer of record is
responsible for using reasonable care to enter, classify, and determine
the value of imported merchandise and to provide any other information
necessary to enable CBP to properly assess duties, collect accurate
statistics, and determine whether other applicable legal requirements,
if any, have been met. CBP is then responsible for fixing the final
classification and value of the merchandise. An importer of record's
failure to exercise reasonable care could delay release of the
merchandise and, in some cases, could result in the imposition of
penalties.
It is the responsibility of the importers of record to make sure
that what they submit to CBP is correct and it is the job of the import
specialist, through informed compliance, to verify that what is being
submitted is correct. Therefore, when considering import specialist
staffing allocations at each port, the time the import specialist
spends meeting with and educating the importing community should be
part of the equation. NTEU believes that if done in this manner, CBP's
import specialist staffing allocations would require increased import
specialist staffing levels nationally.
tariff sharing
Last year, in response to an import specialists staffing shortage
and pursuant to the 2009 ISAM, CBP is implementing at certain ports a
tariff-sharing scheme. For example, because CBP has frozen at 984
nationwide the total number of import specialist positions, CBP is in
the process of reducing by 52 positions (from 179 to 127) the number of
import specialists at the New York City-area ports (see appendix III)
and shifting those positions to other ports. To address the loss of 52
import specialist positions at New York City area ports of entry (New
York-Newark gains 3 import specialist positions, but JFK loses 55
import specialist positions), CBP has implemented tariff sharing
between the ports of New York and Newark and JFK Airport. Until last
year, each port (Newark and JFK) processed all types of entries and all
types of commodities via the harmonized tariff schedule (HTS). In other
words, each port had full tariff coverage.
Because of this reduction in trade personnel, each port has now
been assigned only parts of the HTS, not the entire HTS, and each port
only processes only one-half the commodities entering its port. Tariff
sharing presents a number of operational problems. Because the HTS will
be split, each port will have one-half the number of commodities teams
(staffed by import specialists) than they currently have. Certain kinds
of merchandise will continue to be unloaded at the port of Newark, but
the only commodity team that is trained to process it will be at JFK.
And other merchandise will continue to be unloaded at JFK, but the only
commodity team trained to process it will be in Newark. CBP has
directed import specialists to, in these cases where there is no longer
the appropriate commodity team present at the port to do a physical
examination, take digital photos of the merchandise and email the
photos to the other port. A digital photo cannot determine lead levels
in toys or thread count in textiles. This is a short-sighted solution
to an import specialist staffing shortage that will affect taxpayers,
trade compliant importers, and the Federal Treasury.
Rather than hire additional import specialists at ports of entry
where they are needed, CBP instead is shortchanging the New York City
trade community. It is clear that the fiscal year 2009 ROM, that states
that only 984 import specialists are needed nationwide, does not
adequately reflect the optimal staffing levels for import specialists
as evidenced by the need to implement a tariff-sharing scheme at New
York City region ports of entry.
tariff sharing and antidumping orders
Tariff sharing significantly affects import specialists' timely
disposition of antidumping orders. The problems that arise from tariff-
sharing centers around the movement of entries between JFK and Newark.
When liquidation orders are published in the Federal Register, CBP has
6 months to liquidate and process those entries. There is almost always
a certain amount of lag time between when the liquidation orders are
published in the Federal Register and when the import specialists on
the commodity team associated with that merchandise are actually made
aware of the liquidation orders. In actuality, the import specialist
rarely has the full 6-month period to liquidate and process these
order.
Prior to the Federal Register posting, the entries are kept in
files with the commodity team that handles the merchandise. For
example, under tariff sharing, the entry paperwork of commodities that
are received at JFK, but are inspected by a commodity team at Newark,
is supposed to be transferred to Newark and not filed at JFK. In many
cases, however, when the liquidation order is issued, the commodity
team in Newark goes through their files of antidumping entries.
Frequently, there are JFK entries missing that were lost in
transportation. At that point, Newark import specialists contact JFK to
see if they can find the lost files. If the lost files can't be found,
the Newark import specialist makes an inquiry to the Records Department
to try and to retrieve these entries, which takes time.
Pressed for time, import specialists then call the broker to ask
the broker to reconstruct the entries and send these reconstructed
entries to the commodity team. The commodity team then reviews these
reconstructed entries to make sure that the entry type codes are the
correct type for antidumping entries and that the entries were put on
hold and not previously liquidated. If this happens, CBP could lose its
ability to liquidate at the antidumping rates that are applied via the
liquidation order and the extra duties cannot be collected. Recently in
Newark, CBP lost the extra duty on 17 entries due to this very
scenario. These liquidation orders encompass hundreds of entries.
Conversely, JFK has the same problem on their end when they have
antidumping entries to deal with. This same problem with disposition of
antidumping orders is occurring at the ports of Detroit and Port Huron
where CBP has also implemented tariff sharing.
Under tariff sharing, revenue from antidumping orders is being
lost. Again, it is clear that the fiscal year 2009 ROM, that states
that only 984 import specialists are needed nationwide, does not
adequately reflect the optimal staffing levels for import specialists
that process antidumping orders.
Finally, NTEU has just learned that because the import specialists
at the ports of New York and New Jersey are overwhelmed with work due
to the loss of the 52 trade positions (that has resulted CBP
implementing tariff sharing at these ports), CBP has begun assigning
audits to import specialists at other ports, even though the majority
of the merchandise and entries associated with the importer being
audited come into the ports of New York and New Jersey.
fiscal year 2012 cbp budget request
Several years ago, pursuant to the provisions of the SAFE Port Act,
there was a small increase in the number of CBP trade enforcement and
compliance personnel. There was no increase in funding for CBP trade
operations staffing in the fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations bill and
again, the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution has no increase in
full-time equivalents (FTEs) for CBP trade operations personnel.
In effect, there has been a CBP trade staffing freeze at March 2003
levels and, as a result, CBP's revenue function has suffered. The
fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for CBP's enforcement program
to ``prevent trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, and enforce
exclusion orders on patent-infringing and other intellectual property
rights violative goods.'' This request, however, includes no increase
in CBP trade operations staff at the POEs to implement this trade
enforcement program. NTEU urges the subcommittee to appropriate funding
to hire additional trade enforcement and compliance personnel,
including import specialists, at the POEs to enhance trade revenue
collection.
cbp career ladder pay increase
NTEU commends DHS for the recent increase in journeyman pay for CBP
officers and agriculture specialists. Unfortunately, many deserving CBP
trade and security positions were left out of this pay increase, which
has significantly damaged morale. The 23,450 armed, uniformed CBP
officers and uniformed CBP agriculture specialist will be eligible for
the increase, but the approximately 2,000 non-uniformed CBP commercials
operations employees will not.
NTEU strongly supports extending this same career ladder increase,
from GS-11 to GS-12, to additional CBP positions, including CBP entry,
import and paralegal specialists and CBP-seized property specialists.
The journeyman pay level for the CBP technicians who perform important
commercial trade and administrative duties should also be increased
from GS-7 to GS-9. These upgrades are long overdue and would show CBP
trade personnel that the Congress recognizes the high level of
expertise that these employees possess.
study of dedicated funding
In 2007, the total value of all imports into the United States was
more than $2 trillion. Processing these imports meant handling 22
million entry summaries by CBP entry specialists, import specialists,
and support staff. In addition to its security and trade missions, CBP
works with more than 40 Federal agencies to help enforce a wide range
of laws from consumer product and food safety, to environmental
protection. It is clear that additional CBP commercial operations
staffing and training funds are needed. Multiple proposals to increase
customs fees are currently being promoted to support a great variety of
proposed programs. Security needs, along with important national trade
policy goals, require additional financial resources. NTEU encourages
the subcommittee to request a study of the setting, collection, and
utilization of these customs and user fees. This study should determine
the relationship between current fees and monies allocated for CBP
services and assess the need for additional fees.
conclusion
Customs revenues are the second largest source of Federal revenues
that are collected by the U.S. Government. The Congress depends on this
revenue source to fund priority programs. The subcommittee should be
concerned as to how much CBP trade enforcement staffing shortages cost
in terms of revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury.
And most importantly, for the purposes of this hearing, CBP trade
personnel are responsible for stopping illegal transshipments, goods
with falsified country of origin, goods that are misclassified and for
collecting antidumping and countervailing duties. The ongoing freeze in
the number of CBP trade compliance and enforcement staff undermines
this mission.
In order to prevent customs fraud and duty evasion, NTEU urges the
Congress to increase the number of trade compliance and enforcement
staff responsible for enforcing antidumping and countervailing duty
orders issued under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671
et seq.) and preventing the importation of merchandise in a manner that
evades that antidumping and countervailing duty orders issued under
title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.)--a
responsibility that falls solely on the shoulders of CBP import
specialists.
NTEU urges the subcommittee to fund the hiring of additional needed
CBP trade staff to enforce the more than 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws
and regulations for which they are responsible, to end the current
practice of tariff sharing at several major ports of entry, and to
ensure full tariff coverage at all major trade ports of entries listed
on the ISAM (appendix III.)
The more than 24,000 CBP employees represented by the NTEU are
proud of their part in keeping our country free from terrorism, our
neighborhoods safe from drugs, and our economy safe from illegal trade.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony on their
behalf.
______
Prepared Statement of the U.S. Council of the International Association
of Emergency Managers
Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, I am Eddie Hicks, the director of emergency
management for Morgan County, Alabama. I serve as the president of the
U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers
(IAEM-USA) and am providing, on their behalf, this statement on
critical budget and policy issues for the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). I have been a local government emergency manager for 31
years. I also served three terms as president of the Alabama
Association of Emergency Managers. We support funding the Emergency
Management Performance Grant at $350 million, the Emergency Management
Institute at $11.9 million, and Pre-Disaster Mitigation at $84.9
million in the budget for FEMA.
IAEM is our Nation's largest association of emergency management
professionals, with 5,000 members including emergency managers at the
State and local government levels, tribal nations, the military,
colleges and universities, private business, and the nonprofit sector.
Most of our members are U.S. city and county emergency managers who
perform the crucial function of coordinating and integrating the
efforts at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of,
respond to, and recover from all types of disasters including terrorist
attacks. We deeply appreciate the support this subcommittee has
provided to the emergency management community over the past few years,
particularly your support for the Emergency Management Performance
Grant Program (EMPG) as well as strengthening FEMA.
emergency management performance grants
We respectfully urge that the subcommittee approve the President's
request of $350 million for EMPG, but reject combining it with other
accounts. EMPG is fundamentally different than the post-September 11,
2001 Homeland Security grants because of its 50-percent Federal and 50-
percent State- and local-matching requirements and established
performance measures. It also pre-dates the Homeland Security grants by
more than 50 years. We also request that language be included
continuing to make it clear the funding is for all hazards and can be
used for personnel.
The program is authorized at $950 million for fiscal year 2012 in
Public Law 110-53.
EMPG which has been called ``the backbone of the Nation's emergency
management system'' in an Appropriations Conference Report constitutes
the only source of direct Federal funding for State and local
governments to provide basic emergency coordination and planning
capabilities for all hazards including those related to homeland
security. The program supports State and local initiatives for
planning, training, exercise, mitigation, public education, as well as
response and recovery coordination during actual events. All disasters
start and end at the local level, which emphasizes the importance of
building this capacity at the local level. Funding from EMPG frequently
makes a difference as to whether or not a qualified person is present
to perform these duties in a local jurisdiction.
The legislation creating EMPG is purposefully broad to allow
jurisdictions to focus their attention on customizing their
capabilities. Therefore it is important that FEMA guidance not try to
make one size fit all, but is written so as to allow maximum
flexibility in meeting the specific capability requirements within each
local jurisdiction.
Funding from EMPG has always been important to local government
emergency management offices, and is even more vital during the current
economic downturn. The programs of many of our local emergency managers
have faced or will be facing budget reductions resulting in reduced
staffing, reduced training, reduced public outreach, and reduced
support to volunteers. Some elected officials are considering reducing
their commitment from a full-time emergency manager to a part-time
emergency manager, or moving the emergency management functions as
added duties to other departments. This has the effect of actually
reducing emergency management services--and potentially preparedness--
in many areas of the country at a time when disasters and emergencies
threaten more people and property than ever before. Simply receiving
the entire 50-percent Federal match of their contributions would make a
big difference in maintaining their programs. It should be noted that
many local emergency management programs have historically provided
significantly more than the 50-percent match that is required for their
EMPG allocations.
emergency management institute
We respectfully urge the subcommittee to increase the funding for
the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) to $11.9 million. The fiscal
year 2010 enacted amount for EMI was $9 million. It is our
understanding that the request amount for fiscal year 2012 for EMI is
$9 million although it is not specifically mentioned in the President's
request. We urge you to again specifically designate funding for EMI in
your subcommittee report and to require FEMA to include a specific
request in the budget documents.
The $2.9 million increase over fiscal year 2010 would support
speeding the development and implementation of the Foundational
Academy; continued updating and development of the field (G) and on-
campus (E) courses; and, the development of other vital programs
especially an Executive Emergency Management Program for State, local,
and tribal emergency managers.
Our disasters and emergencies are becoming more complex, and our
State, local, and tribal emergency management officials continue to
assume additional duties and responsibilities.
To meet these emerging challenges, new and updated training from
EMI is imperative. Lessons are being learned which must be incorporated
into our professional body of knowledge. We are extremely encouraged by
the renewed focus and efforts to update and enhance training programs
over the past year with the funding support of the Congress. We
continue to support the highly successful Emergency Management Higher
Education Program at EMI which has produced significant improvements in
the preparation of emergency managers at more than 232 college and
university programs.
disaster mitigation
We support the President's budget request of $84,937,000. A
congressionally mandated independent study by the Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Council, a council of the National Institute of Building
Sciences, showed that on the average, $1 spent by FEMA on hazard
mitigation (actions to reduce disaster losses) provides the Nation
about $4 in future benefits.
strengthening fema
IAEM-USA continues to strongly support the full implementation of
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), Public Law 109-
205, and we urge the subcommittee to continue insisting on its
implementation. The momentum returning FEMA to long-established
principles of emergency management--all hazards, integrated, all phases
(mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery)--must continue. The
FEMA Administrator should be clearly responsible for the coordination
of the Federal response to disasters and have the maximum amount of
access to the White House as the legislation clearly requires. We are
still reviewing Presidential Policy Directive-8, but are pleased that
it included language that the directive shall be implemented consistent
with relevant authorities, including PKEMRA and its assignment of
responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of FEMA (PPD-8, page
5).
We remain concerned that FEMA functions should not be duplicated in
other parts of DHS. For example, the DHS Office of Operations
Coordination, created shortly after the enactment of PKEMRA, appears to
be assigned functions that duplicate or compete with those of FEMA such
as coordinating activities related to incident management and response.
fema response in alabama
Morgan County, Alabama--my jurisdiction--was one of the 41 counties
impacted by the Alabama tornadoes that happened on April 27, 2011. We
were fortunate that we did not receive the same level of destruction
which occurred in many other counties however we still have sufficient
damage to have been included in the declaration. Alabama has a total of
67 counties.
We have an emergency management system in Alabama--a system of
strong local programs working with a strong State program, coupled with
a restored, more confident and nimble FEMA that is making a real
difference in the lives of our citizens. The foundation of this strong
local capability is the exercising, training, planning, and experienced
personnel provided through EMPG. One thing we would like to remark on
is the restoration of a past practice of assigning a FEMA person to
serve as a ``county liaison'' for one or more counties included in the
declaration. This person serves as a conduit to brief us on the latest
developments related to the Federal portion of the recovery. In turn,
this person can also field questions or resolve issues related to the
Federal recovery. We think this is a potential ``best practice''. Some
of our citizens who lost their homes have already been in temporary
(mobile home) housing for 1 week or more--and this is just more than 1
month after our tornado event. This is a nimble response by FEMA, and
it represents a real improvement from the past.
principal federal official
We would urge the subcommittee to include bill language prohibiting
the funding of any position designated as a principal Federal official
(PFO) for a Stafford Act event. IAEM has consistently opposed the
appointment of PFOs. It leads to confusion. Instead, our members want
the Federal coordinating officer to have unambiguous authority to
direct and manage the Federal response in the field. It is absolutely
critical for State and local officials to have one person empowered to
make decisions and coordinate the Federal response in support of the
State.
conclusion
In conclusion, we urge the subcommittee to continue to build
emergency management capacity by funding EMPG at $350 million. We urge
increasing funding for EMI to $11.9 million. We urge elimination of the
PFO for Stafford Act events.
We urge the subcommittee to continue its efforts to strengthen FEMA
and to insist on the full implementation of the provisions of PKEMRA.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony.
LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS
----------
Page
American Public Transportation Association:
Attachment, APTA Survey of United States Transit System
Security Needs............................................. 201
Prepared Statements of the................................195, 197
Coats, Senator Daniel, U.S. Senator From Indiana:
Questions Submitted by....................................... 144
Statements of...............................................3, 157
Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi:
Questions Submitted by....................................150, 190
Statement of.................................................
159........................................................
Landrieu, Senator Mary L., U.S. Senator From Louisiana:
Opening Statements of.......................................1, 155
Prepared Statement of........................................ 3
Questions Submitted by.....................................37, 186
Lautenberg, Senator Frank R., U.S. Senator From New Jersey:
Prepared Statement of........................................
158........................................................
Questions Submitted by....................................... 142
Statement of.................................................
158........................................................
Marine Conservation Biology Institute, Letter From the........... 206
Murkowski, Senator Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska, Questions
Submitted by................................................153, 192
Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington, Questions
Submitted by...................................................
189............................................................
Napolitano, Hon. Janet, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security, Prepared Statement of................................ 9
Summary Statement of......................................... 6
National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information
Systems, Prepared Statement of the............................. 207
National Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of
the............................................................ 210
National Treasury Employees Union, Prepared Statement of the..... 212
Papp, Admiral Robert J., Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
Prepared Statement of..........................................
162............................................................
Summary Statement of.........................................
160........................................................
U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency
Managers, Prepared Statement of the............................ 217
SUBJECT INDEX
----------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECUITY
Page
Acquisition Long-Lead Time Material (LLTM)....................... 151
Additional Committee Questions................................... 37
Advanced Training Center (ATC)................................... 63
Air:
And Marine..................................................58, 63
Cargo Screening.............................................. 53
Domain Awareness--C2 Gap Filler.............................. 41
Airline Fees..................................................... 17
Anticounterfeit Operations in Colombia and Peru.................. 82
Antidumping Authorities.......................................... 55
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit Costs................... 81
Automated Target Recognition (ATR)............................... 70
Aviation Security:
Capital Fund................................................. 72
Fees......................................................... 144
Research--ATR................................................ 111
Baggage Fees..................................................... 70
Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs)............................... 73
Border Patrol:
Agents....................................................... 59
Construction................................................. 63
Budget........................................................... 19
Canine Teams..................................................... 77
Categories of Expenditure for Grant Programs..................... 101
CBP--Container Security.......................................... 52
Checkpoint Security.............................................. 74
Citizenship and Immigration Services:
Data Center Consolidation.................................... 151
International Adoptions--Haiti............................... 106
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties................................. 74
Coast Guard...................................................... 150
Acquisitions................................................. 78
Administrative Savings....................................... 75
Asset Decommissionings....................................... 76
Cuts......................................................... 25
Icebreakers.................................................. 31
Maritime Coverage in Alaska.................................. 153
Shipbuilding................................................. 20
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).............................. 152
Continuing Resolution...........................................16, 18
Coordination of Federal Chemical Security Efforts................ 48
Cyber Threat..................................................... 36
Departmental:
Acquisitions................................................. 37
Management................................................... 150
Deployable Security Teams........................................ 77
Detention Reform................................................. 66
DHS:
Fee Proposals................................................ 71
Headquarters Consolidation................................... 147
Disaster Relief.................................................. 151
Fund (DRF)...................................................5, 21
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)......................... 149
Algorithm Improvement........................................ 129
Aviation Multi-Pathway Scanning Integration.................. 128
Cargo Imaging for Shielded Nuclear Threats (CISNT)........... 122
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) Development:
Annual Planning, Modeling, and Analysis.................. 116
Aviation Domain.......................................... 118
Interior Domain.......................................... 120
International Domain..................................... 117
Land Border Domain....................................... 118
Maritime Domain.......................................... 119
Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER
SM)............................................. 134
Human Portable Tripwire (HPT)................................ 121
Information Sharing, Mission Critical Messaging.............. 115
Interior Capability Development (ICD)........................ 139
International Rail Program................................... 124
Joint Analysis Center (JAC).................................. 136
Collaborative Information System (JACCIS)................ 137
Long-Range Radiation Detection (LRRD)........................ 123
Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP)................... 140
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC)--
Technology Advancement..................................... 141
Non-Helium-3 (\3\ He) Neutron Detection Alternatives Program. 127
On-Dock Rail (ODR) Program................................... 125
Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection (PRND):
Pilot Programs........................................... 135
Training and Exercises Program........................... 138
Rad/Nuc Detection Standards.................................. 114
Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Program....................... 111
Red Team and Net Assessments................................. 135
Small Vessel Stand-Off Detection (SVSD) Program.............. 126
State and Local Initiatives Rad/Nuc Challenge................ 121
Systems Engineering Program.................................. 113
Test and Evaluation (T&E):
Data Management and Algorithm Test Bed................... 132
Directed Test............................................ 133
Infrastructure........................................... 131
Operations............................................... 130
Emergency Food and Shelter Program............................... 104
Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws................. 13
Ensuring Resilience to Disasters................................. 14
E-Verify......................................................... 108
Explosives Detection Systems..................................... 72
Federal:
Air Marshals................................................. 75
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)...................... 109
Protective Service Workforce Analysis........................ 97
FEMA:
Disaster Relief.............................................. 97
Map Modernization............................................ 152
Staffing..................................................... 101
Financial Systems Consolidation.................................. 45
Fiscal Year 2012:
Budget Request............................................... 10
Planned Accomplishments/Milestones........................... 141
Flood Hazard Map Risk Analysis (FHMRA) and Modernization......... 105
Funding Cuts..................................................... 21
Government Shutdown.............................................. 33
Grants:
Effectiveness................................................ 145
To State and Local Governments for First Responders.......... 102
Gulf Coast Dumping............................................... 25
Homeland Security Information Network............................ 45
Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems....................... 111
ICE--Violence in Mexico.......................................... 64
Icebreaking Acquisitions Analysis................................ 46
Impact of:
Customs Enforcement on the Seafood Industry.................. 54
2010 Coast Guard Surge Operations............................ 76
Improved Antidumping Revenue Collections......................... 57
Improving the Entry Process for Visitors to the United States.... 59
Information Integration and Transformation Program............... 82
International Adoptions--Cambodia and Nepal...................... 107
Jones Act Enforcement............................................ 58
Marine Environmental Protection.................................. 77
Mass Transit..................................................... 143
Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise...... 15
Mexico........................................................... 35
National:
Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)........................ 23
Domestic Preparedness Consortium............................. 103
Flood Insurance Program and Flood Maps....................... 104
Security Cutter (NSC)........................................ 150
Office of the Inspector General (OIG)............................ 49
Officer:
Corruption................................................... 34
Integrity.................................................... 46
Operational Mission Support...................................... 82
Overtime Pay Reform.............................................. 63
Polar Icebreakers................................................ 76
Port Security:
Grants....................................................... 143
Training..................................................... 78
Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security...................... 11
Private Sector Coordination and Information Sharing.............. 92
Progress in Interoperability..................................... 89
Proposed Cuts to FEMA............................................ 98
Providing Essential Support to National and Economic Security.... 15
Radiation Detection:
For Air Cargo and Checked Baggage............................ 113
Straddle Carrier............................................. 112
REAL ID Act Compliance........................................... 47
Recapitalization of the Customs and Border Protection Air and
Marine Fleet................................................... 146
Removal Statistics............................................... 65
Research and Development Project Summaries....................... 113
Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID)..... 87
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace............................. 14
Science and Technology (S&T)--Laboratory Facilities.............. 110
Screening Procedures............................................. 73
Secure Communities............................................... 66
Securing and Managing Our Borders................................ 12
Small Boat:
Stand-off Detection System/On-Dock Rail (ODR) Program........ 112
Strategy..................................................... 40
State and Local:
Communities, Grants.......................................... 28
Cyber Activity............................................... 83
Grants....................................................... 144
Surface Transportation........................................... 74
Tactical Border Infrastructure................................... 146
Transportation Security Laboratory............................... 143
TSA.............................................................. 142
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)............................ 152
Internal Affairs............................................. 74
Pat-Downs.................................................... 29
Screener Cap................................................. 69
Screening Process for Persons Who Have Had Medical Procedures 31
United States Secret Service (USSS)--Presidential Campaigns...... 81
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)............................ 103
US-VISIT--Carryover Balances..................................... 97
Visa Waiver Program/Biometric Air Exit Implementation............ 145
When Will We Know the Border Is Secure?.......................... 58
Workforce Balancing.............................................. 40
Worksite Enforcement............................................. 67
U.S. Coast Guard
Additional Committee Questions................................... 186
Administrative Savings Initiatives............................... 169
Appendix I--Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request...................... 166
Aviation Safety.................................................. 180
Budget:
Cuts......................................................... 172
Planning..................................................... 188
Cape May Training Center Pier Reconstruction..................... 175
Coast Guard:
Capabilities................................................. 169
Maritime Coverage in Alaska.................................. 192
Decommissionings, Efficiencies, and Savings...................... 169
Drug Interdiction................................................ 179
Enhance Maritime Incident Prevention and Response.............166, 168
Fast Response Cutter (FRC)....................................... 188
Fiscal Year 2012 Request......................................... 163
Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA)......................................... 187
High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) Decommissioning..................... 188
Illegal Immigration.............................................. 173
Living Conditions................................................ 182
Marine Ecology................................................... 184
National Security Cutter (NSC)................................... 176
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)..................................... 185
Oil Spills....................................................... 171
Personal Locator Devices......................................... 181
Pirate Attacks................................................... 175
Rebuild the Coast Guard.......................................... 166
Response to Environmental Disasters.............................. 183
Support Military Families.....................................166, 168
Sustain Frontline Operations..................................165, 167
Terrorist Attacks................................................ 174
2010 Oil Spill--Incident-Specific Preparedness Review............ 186
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).................................... 178
Vessel Security.................................................. 188
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