[Senate Hearing 112-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
    ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 2:32 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Feinstein and Alexander.

                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                National Nuclear Security Administration

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR


             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN


    Senator Feinstein. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, 
and welcome to the Energy and Water Subcommittee's hearing on 
the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal 
year 2013 budget request.
    NNSA has requested $11.536 billion for fiscal year 2013. 
Now, that's an increase of $536 million, or 5 percent from 
fiscal year 2012 levels.
    If the budget request were enacted, NNSA would see an 
increase of $1.7 billion, or 17 percent in just 3 years. This 
increase is particularly noteworthy because the rest of the 
Department of Energy (DOE) would be down $1.5 billion, or 9 
percent, compared to fiscal year 2010, and NNSA is making up a 
larger share of total spending. It's 42 percent of total 
spending for this portfolio in 2013 compared to 36 percent in 
fiscal year 2010.
    Regarding nuclear weapons activities, I believe the fiscal 
year 2013 budget request provides more than sufficient funding 
to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile. Some of my Senate 
and House colleagues have raised concerns that the budget 
request falls short and more funding is needed. I do not agree.
    However, I would like to highlight management issues that 
raise serious concerns about NNSA's ability to contain costs 
and effectively spend taxpayer dollars at the request level, 
let alone at higher levels.
    First, NNSA's projects are over-budget. The most recent 
examples of significant cost increases and schedule slips 
include the cost of a new uranium facility at Y-12 in 
Tennessee, known as the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). This 
has grown from $600 million to $6 billion. It is 10 times more 
expensive than originally projected.
    The B61 life extension program is expected to be $1 billion 
to $2 billion more than originally projected, and 2 years 
behind schedule.
    The cost of a new plutonium facility at Los Alamos, which 
has now been delayed, grew from $660 million to $5 billion, six 
times more expensive than originally projected, and is facing a 
7-year delay.
    Finally, the cost of a new facility to downblend pit 
plutonium into commercial nuclear fuel at Savannah River in 
South Carolina grew from $1.4 billion to $5 billion, four times 
more expensive than originally projected, and 14 years behind 
schedule. And the list goes on.
    It is clear, to me at least, that NNSA does not have good 
cost-estimating practices, making it impossible to determine 
the actual cost of a project, and whether the benefit outweighs 
the costs. The solution for these cost increases cannot be 
solely providing more and more funding.
    Second, when NNSA completes a project, it reduces the scope 
of its work and delivers less than promised. For example, NNSA 
claimed when it completed life-extension activities for the 
W87, and a major component of the B61 bomb, on time and on 
budget, but only because it refurbished hundreds of weapons 
less than originally planned.
    Even more worrying is that as costs go up, NNSA is reducing 
the capabilities of new facilities, and not properly 
communicating the changes to the Congress.
    A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that will 
be issued on Monday, which I requested, found that the cost of 
building a new plutonium facility as Los Alamos would cost six 
times more than projected. However, NNSA would have eliminated 
certain critical capabilities that were part of the original 
project scope to avoid even more cost increases.
    For example, the facility would not have been able to 
accommodate other plutonium-related missions for homeland 
security and nuclear nonproliferation. The result may have been 
requests for even more funding at a later date to build more 
facilities, to house capabilities that should have been 
included in the plutonium facility.
    Third, NNSA has failed to assess alternatives before 
embarking on multi-billion dollar projects. I know this is 
harsh, but if you can prove what's being said is not correct, I 
would like to hear it.
    NNSA has just terminated or delayed two major construction 
projects after spending $1.5 billion only to conclude that it 
could use existing facilities to meet mission requirements. 
Those funds could have been better spent on other nuclear 
weapons and nonproliferation activities, and it raises 
questions about the return on the taxpayers' investment.
    At a time of fiscal constraint, NNSA must be more cost-
conscious and do a better job developing realistic and credible 
cost estimates for major projects, or else cost overruns and 
schedule delays will undermine the nuclear modernization agenda 
and nonproliferation goals.
    While the nuclear weapons program receives a significant 
budget increase, I am concerned about potential funding 
shortfalls for nonproliferation activities, which address the 
highest risk to the United States, nuclear terrorism.
    Just yesterday, NNSA announced that it removed all weapons 
useable nuclear material from Mexico, the seventh country in 
only 3 years to achieve that milestone. This is an example of 
why we need to maintain momentum in removing dangerous 
materials.
    I'm concerned about unanticipated delays in implementing 
nonproliferation activities that detect nuclear smuggling and 
secure vulnerable nuclear materials. Efforts to install 
detection equipment at strategic international borders and 
shipping ports to prevent nuclear and radiological smuggling 
have had their budgets cut by $171 million. The plan up to a 
few months ago was to accelerate efforts to deploy detection 
equipment at 650 sites in 30 countries and 100 international 
seaports by the end of 2018. NNSA has now decided to take a 
strategic pause and delay activities to deploy this equipment. 
NNSA must explain this change of implementation, especially 
when nuclear trafficking remains a serious concern.
    According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there 
were 147 incidents of nuclear smuggling in 2011. Four incidents 
involved significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, one 
of the main ingredients for a nuclear weapon. One of these 
incidents was related to an attempted sale of this material.
    I'm equally concerned about delays in converting or 
shutting down reactors around the world that use highly 
enriched uranium. Up to a few months ago, the original plan was 
to accelerate these conversions and shut down or convert 200 
research reactors by 2022. The goal has now been delayed by 3 
years to 2025.
    This delay is troubling because these research reactors are 
not well protected. The only way to reduce the risk of nuclear 
threat at these facilities to zero is to make sure there is no 
usable weapons material left there to steal. This requires 
shutting down or converting these reactors as quickly as 
possible so that we can remove the material permanently.
    Finally, I am worried that delays in implementing these 
nonproliferation programs will lead to further delays as 
budgets are more restrained. While modernizing the nuclear 
weapons stockpile is important, it cannot come at the expense 
of nonproliferation activities.
    Joining us today to explore these important national 
security issues is Tom D'Agostino, the administrator of the 
NNSA. Before calling on Mr. D'Agostino, I would like to 
recognize my wonderful friend and colleague with whom, over 
many years, it's been such a great pleasure to work, Senator 
Alexander, for any remarks he would care to make.


                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER


    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Mr. 
D'Agostino. I want to thank the Chairman. It's a joy to work 
with her. We actually work on getting results, and we work 
together, and we explore our differences of opinion. I have a 
good friend who said we had a good 35-year partnership, and he 
said it was due to the fact that we had many differences of 
opinion, but never a disagreement. So that's not a bad way to 
work.
    I want to pick up on what Senator Feinstein said about cost 
overruns in big projects. And, Mr. Administrator, you and I 
have talked about this before. When you've been a Governor or 
maybe even a mayor, you have stories. And one of mine is that 
when I was running for Governor, we were about to have a 
World's Fair in Knoxville, and the Chamber of Commerce 
president was deeply concerned that the interstate road 
construction wouldn't get done in time for the World's Fair, 
and he wanted it to be my priority, if I were elected. I said, 
``Well, how would you do it if you were me?'' And he said, 
``Well, I would find the very best person you could to put in 
charge of it, I would agree upon a plan, and then I'd meet with 
him once a month, and I'd ask him whether it was on time and on 
budget.''
    So after I was elected, I went back to the Chamber of 
Commerce head, and I invited him, and he agreed to be the head 
of the highway department. And he developed a plan, and we met 
once a month, and it got done.
    And that sounds awfully simple, but it's the kind of 
accountability that, Mr. Administrator, you're accustomed to as 
a Navy man. I mean that's why our nuclear submarines have 
really never had a death in terms of the operation of the 
reactors there since the 1950s. And I'm sure it's because 
Admiral Rickover said the captain, the commander, has the full 
responsibility for this. And everybody knows that their career 
in the Navy depends upon the safe operation of the reactor and 
the proper operation of the reactor.
    So Senator Feinstein went through several of these huge 
projects that we have, and no one doubts the complexity and 
difficulty of them, and they're very expensive, but she's 
right. I mean, we think about the uranium project at Y-12 in 
Oak Ridge, it seemed like every time I asked about it, it went 
up another $500 million in cost, literally.
    And so, Madam Chairman, I'm thinking just for myself, and 
maybe this is something that you and I would want to do 
together, or maybe not, but the UPF under the Administration's 
proposals has now been moved front and center. And there's a 
proposal to make phase one of it, which will probably cost in 
the neighborhood of $5 billion, the front-and-center project. 
And it's supposed to be done by 2019, and we're supposed to 
know by the end of the year. I think 90 percent of the design 
should be done by then, and at that point, we should be able to 
fix a cost.
    And it would seem to me that maybe one way to deal with 
this is, by the end of the year, fix the cost, if we agree with 
the phase one proposal, and if it's properly funded, and agree 
with the administrator on a timeline and a cost, and then I, 
for one, would like to meet with him, maybe once a quarter, for 
about an hour just for the purpose of asking the question, 
``Are you on time, and are you under-budget?''
    Senator Feinstein. That's a good idea.
    Senator Alexander. And just do that all the way through. 
And maybe that would be true with some of the other big 
projects, and see by focusing attention on them, we can help do 
that, because a United States Senator cannot, and I don't think 
should, try to manage anything of that complexity. But our 
responsibility in oversight is to try to protect the taxpayer 
dollars, and we have so many urgent needs within just this 
budget that if we can save money, we've got a place to put it 
or to reduce the debt, which we have in our country today.
    For example, I'm concerned, the Senator mentioned the 
funding for nuclear modernization. It is true; we're $363 
million above last year, a lot of money, based upon the 
President's recommendation. But we're $372 million below where 
we, just a couple of years ago, said we should be and where the 
Department of Defense (DOD) says we should be.
    So I want to explore that in my question time as well. I'll 
wait for my question time to go into these issues. But my major 
concerns are, number one, these big projects and making sure 
that we have an agreed-upon cost, and agreed-upon timeline, and 
an accountability for whose job it is to see to it that it's 
done.
    I want to know, if we're not going to go forward with the 
facility in New Mexico right now, who's going to do the work 
that needs to be done on plutonium, and how much is it going to 
cost?
    I want to make sure that on the uranium facility at Oak 
Ridge, that as you go through a competition for management--and 
that's your prerogative to do that; it's a part of keeping 
everybody honest and making the taxpayer secure--but I want to 
make sure that all of the effort that surrounds a competition 
of such a major effort does not interfere with whatever we 
agree upon should be the timeline and the cost of what may be 
a--I don't want to say a number, because I hope it's lower than 
this--a $5 billion or so phase one of the UPF.
    So those are important issues. I thank you for your 
service. And I look forward to your testimony and to have a 
chance to follow up with questions.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.
    Mr. D'Agostino, you're on.


               SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO


    Mr. D'Agostino. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member 
Alexander, good afternoon and thank you for having me here 
today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2013 budget 
request. Your ongoing support for the men and women of the NNSA 
and the work they do, and your bipartisan leadership on some of 
the most challenging national security issues of our time, has 
kept American people safe, helped protect our allies, and 
enhanced global security.
    Last month, President Obama released his budget for fiscal 
year 2013. Due in part to constraints established by the Budget 
Control Act, this is a time of fiscal austerity. We recognize 
that. I want to assure you that the NNSA is being thoughtful, 
pragmatic, and efficient on how we achieve the President's 
nuclear security objectives and shape the future of nuclear 
security.
    We have continuously improved the way we operate, and we 
are committed to doing our part in this constrained budget 
environment.
    In April 2009 in Prague the President shared his vision and 
the united approach for our shared nuclear security goals. The 
request for NNSA is $11.5 billion, which is an increase of $536 
million over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation.
    This request reaffirms our commitment to building a 21st 
century nuclear security enterprise through innovative 
approaches to some of our greatest security challenges with key 
investments in our infrastructure.
    We're continuing our critical work to maintain the 
stockpile and ensuring that as long as nuclear weapons exist, 
they remain safe, secure, and effective. And this budget 
request provides $7.58 billion for our weapons activities 
account to implement the President's strategy in coordination 
with our partners at the DOD.
    The President continues to support our life extension 
programs, including funding for the B61 activities. He also 
requested increased funding for out stockpile systems for the 
W78 and 88 life-extension study, which I discussed with you 
last year.
    Our request for investment in science, technology, and 
engineering that supports NNSA's mission will ensure that the 
national security laboratories continue to lead the world in 
advanced scientific capabilities. For over a decade, we've been 
building the tools and capabilities we need to take care of the 
stockpile. And in fact, not just take care of the stockpile, 
but support the whole range of nuclear security work.
    We're now entering into a time when NNSA will fully utilize 
the analytical tools and capabilities towards the mission of 
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, and 
perform the necessary life-extension work. These capabilities 
provide a critical base for our nuclear nonproliferation and 
counterterrorism work, allowing us to apply our investments to 
the full scope of our mission.
    The President's budget also reflects his commitment to 
completing key dismantlements with $51.3 million requested in 
2013 to continue to reduce the number of legacy of nuclear 
weapons retired from stockpile.
    We've previously committed to completing the dismantlement 
of all warheads retired as of fiscal year 2009 by completing 
this work by fiscal year 2022.
    Last year, NNSA completed the dismantlement of the last B53 
nuclear bomb, one of the largest ever built, ahead of schedule 
and under budget. We also eliminated the last components of the 
W70 warhead, which was originally in the U.S. Army arsenal.
    To support our stockpile and provide us with world-class 
capabilities, we need to modernize our cold war-era facilities 
and maintain the Nation's expertise in uranium processing and 
plutonium research.
    This budget includes $2.24 billion to maintain our 
infrastructure and execute our construction projects.
    As you know, our deterrent is only one part of the NNSA's 
mission. 2013 will see us continue to advance the President's 
4-year goal to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material 
around the world. And the budget request provides $2.46 billion 
we need to continue critical nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
    Our continued focus on innovative and ambitious 
nonproliferation and nuclear security is vital. The threat is 
not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state 
proliferation would be devastating.
    Detonation of a nuclear device anywhere in the world would 
lead to overwhelming economic, political, and psychological 
consequences. We must remain committed to reducing the risk of 
terrorism and state-sponsored or state-based proliferation.
    Anne Harrington and I will be leaving for Seoul, South 
Korea, very soon, where the President and more than 50 world 
leaders will renew their commitment to nuclear security at the 
2012 Nuclear Security Summit.
    We know there's no silver-bullet solution, which is why 
we'll continue to implement a multilayered strategy to 
strengthen the security of nuclear material around the world by 
removing or eliminating it where we can; consolidating and 
securing the material, if elimination is not an option; 
reducing the civilian uses of highly enriched uranium, 
particularly for research in medical isotope production where 
low-enriched uranium options exist or can be developed; and 
maintaining our commitment to detecting and deterring nuclear 
smuggling.
    NNSA has also helped American sailors reach destinations 
across the globe safely and reliably for decades through our 
Naval Reactors program. The $1.1 billion in the 2013 request 
will support the effort to complete the Ohio-class replacement 
submarine, and to modernize key elements of our infrastructure.
    Support for the President's request is key in our ability 
to support the nuclear Navy. This budget request also gives us 
the resources we need to maintain our one-of-a-kind emergency 
response capabilities, which allow us to respond to a nuclear 
or radiological event anywhere in the world and anticipate the 
future of nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation.
    I told you a lot about our plans and budgets, and I'd like 
you to know that we are committed to being responsible stewards 
of our taxpayer dollars. We've taken steps to ensure that we're 
building a capabilities-based infrastructure. We view this 
constrained budget environment as an additional incentive to 
ask ourselves how can we rethink the way we're operating, how 
can we further innovate and improve our business processes?
    We're adjusting our plutonium strategy by deferring the 
construction of the chemistry and metallurgy research 
replacement facility, the nuclear portion, and focusing instead 
on how we can meet our plutonium needs on an interim basis by 
using the capabilities and expertise found at existing 
facilities.
    Deferring this project will have an estimated cost 
avoidance of approximately $1.8 billion over the next 5 years, 
which will help offset the costs of other priorities, such as 
weapon life-extension programs and the nuclear security work 
that we have to do around the world.
    We're not resting on old ideas to solve tomorrow's 
problems. We're shaping the future in a fiscally responsible 
way. Budget uncertainty adds costs and complexity on how we 
achieve our goals. You've been very supportive of our efforts 
in the past, and I ask again for your help in providing the 
stability we need to do our jobs effectively and efficiently.
    I'm proud of the work that we do everywhere, that the men 
and women of the NNSA have done around the world. And we're 
defining ourselves, and we're continuing to push ourselves into 
an integrated and interdependent enterprise, one that's not 
based on geography, but one that's based on capabilities that 
need to be maintained.
    We're implementing new business processes by looking at 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 9001 standards, and 
looking to the future via a detailed workforce analysis to make 
sure we have the right people we need in the right jobs, 
particularly in the project management area, which is so 
important.
    And finally, we've created an acquisition and project 
management organization to help institutionalize our commitment 
to improving the way we do business, to integrate project 
management and the acquisition experts, because those two 
fields overlap with each other and have a long--and will be a 
great determiner on how successful we are in pulling our 
projects together.


                           PREPARED STATEMENT


    Finally, in my role as Under Secretary of Energy for 
Nuclear Security, I've made better coordination of the 
Department's environmental management programs in the NNSA and 
the Office of Legacy Management as one of my priorities.
    We have great opportunities in this area. And I look 
forward to any question in this particular area.
    Thank you again for having me today, and I'm happy to 
answer any questions that you may have.
    [The statement follows:]

                   Statement of Thomas P. D'Agostino

                              INTRODUCTION

    Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the 
subcommittee: good afternoon and thank you for having me here to 
discuss the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request. Your ongoing 
support for the men and women of National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) and the work they do, and your bipartisan 
leadership on some of the most challenging national security issues of 
our time, has helped keep the American people safe, helped protect our 
allies, and enhanced global security.
    Earlier this month, President Obama released his budget for fiscal 
year 2013. As you know, due in part to the constraints established by 
the Budget Control Act, this is a time of fiscal austerity. I want to 
assure you that NNSA is being thoughtful, pragmatic, and efficient in 
how we achieve the President's nuclear security objectives and shape 
the future of nuclear security. We have continuously improved the way 
we operate, and we are committed to doing our part in this constrained 
budget environment.

  ACHIEVING THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR SECURITY OBJECTIVES, SHAPING THE 
                                 FUTURE

    In April 2009 in Prague, President Obama shared his vision for a 
world without nuclear weapons, free from the threat of nuclear 
terrorism, and united in our approach toward shared nuclear security 
goals. The President's fiscal year 2013 request for NNSA is $11.5 
billion, an increase of $536 million, or 4.9 percent, more than the 
fiscal year 2012 appropriation. The request reaffirms the national 
commitment to his vision, applying world-class science that addresses 
our Nation's greatest nuclear security challenges and building NNSA's 
21st century nuclear security enterprise through key investments in our 
people and infrastructure, including the revitalization of our existing 
facilities.
    We are doing this in a number of key ways. We are continuing our 
critical work to maintain the Nation's nuclear stockpile, and ensuring 
that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the stockpile is safe, secure, 
and effective. The fiscal year 2013 budget provides $7.58 billion for 
our weapons activities account, an increase of 5 percent more than 
fiscal year 2012, to implement the President's strategy in coordination 
with our partners at the Department of Defense (DOD).
    The President continues to support our life extension programs 
(LEPs) including funding for B61-12 activities in response to the 
Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) anticipated approval and entry into 
Phase 6.3 Development Engineering. He has also requested increased 
funding for our stockpile systems to support the W78 and W88 life-
extension study, which I discussed with you last year.
    The President's budget also reflects his commitment to completing 
key dismantlements, with $51.3 million requested in fiscal year 2013 to 
continue reducing the number of legacy nuclear weapons retired from the 
stockpile. NNSA has previously committed to completing the 
dismantlement of all warheads retired as of fiscal year 2009 by fiscal 
year 2022, and we continue to be on a path to do that. In fact, in 
fiscal year 2011, NNSA completed the dismantlement of the last B53 
nuclear bomb, one of the largest ever built, ahead of schedule and 
under budget. We also eliminated the last components of the W70 warhead 
which was originally in the U.S. Army's arsenal.
    Our request for investments in the science, technology, and 
engineering that support NNSA's missions will ensure that our national 
security laboratories continue to lead the world in advanced scientific 
capabilities:
  --$150.6 million is requested for our engineering campaign, which 
        reflects the need for validation-related testing and surety 
        options required for current and future refurbishments;
  --$350.1 million is requested for our science campaign, expanding and 
        refining our experiments and capabilities, which coupled to 
        simulation, improves our confidence in and broadens the 
        national security application of our predictive capabilities; 
        and
  --$460 million is requested for our inertial confinement fusion and 
        high-yield campaign, to operate NNSA's suite of world-leading 
        high-energy density facilities--National Ignition Facility 
        (NIF), Omega, and Z--to support stockpile stewardship in a safe 
        and secure manner.
    The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Campaign's request of 
$600 million is required for the continued improvement of full-system 
calculations and metric suites that are essential to annual assessments 
and also to future stockpile changes. Our capabilities directly impact 
our stockpile by generating incredibly sophisticated models against 
which we can validate our nuclear weapons codes. Not only has 
supercomputing helped us solve some existing questions such as energy 
balance, it also allows us to plan for issues that impact the future 
health of our deterrent--aging, component lifetimes, and new models for 
abnormal and hostile environment certification. Supercomputing is 
critical for life extension programs and stockpile modernization--the 
implementation of various concepts such as reuse and enhanced 
multipoint safety are only possible with the power of ASC platforms.
    For more than a decade, NNSA has been building the science, 
technology, and engineering tools and capabilities needed to take care 
of the stockpile. We are now entering a time when we will fully utilize 
these analytical tools and capabilities towards the mission of 
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile and performing the 
necessary life-extension work. These capabilities also provide the 
critical base for nonproliferation and counterterrorism work, allowing 
us to apply our investments to the full scope of our mission.
    To support our stockpile and to continue producing the world-class 
capabilities we need to modernize our cold war-era facilities and 
maintain the Nation's expertise in uranium processing and plutonium 
research. This budget includes $2.24 billion to maintain our 
infrastructure and execute our construction projects.
    The President also requests support for infrastructure improvements 
necessary to maintain the stockpile well into the future. Major efforts 
include extending the life of enduring facilities needed for directed 
stockpile work (DSW) and science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) 
program requirements, construction of the Uranium Processing Facility 
at Y-12, and construction of the transuranic (TRU) Waste Facility at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory. Funding will also provide for the start 
of construction of the Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades project at 
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, and continued 
construction activities for various projects at Los Alamos and Sandia 
National Laboratories, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and Pantex. 
The budget request also includes the resources we need to ensure a 
comprehensive physical and cyber security posture that provides strong 
security to support NNSA missions--protecting our nuclear materials, 
facilities, and information.
    However, our nuclear deterrent is only one part of NNSA's mission. 
Our nonproliferation programs perform an equally critical function. One 
of our most important missions has been to support the administration's 
commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material across the 
globe in 4 years. Our accomplishments in securing plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium around the world have made it significantly more 
difficult to acquire and traffic the materials required to make an 
improvised nuclear device, and I am proud to say that we are on track 
to meet our goals to remove or dispose of 4,353 kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium in foreign countries and equip 
approximately 229 buildings containing weapons-usable material with 
state-of-the-art security upgrades.
    The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request provides the 
$2.46 billion to continue these and other critical nonproliferation and 
nuclear security efforts. Our continued focus on innovative and 
ambitious nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts is vital. The 
threat is not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state 
proliferation would be devastating. Detonation of a nuclear device 
anywhere in the world would lead to significant loss of life and 
overwhelming economic, political, and psychological consequences. We 
must remain committed to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and 
state-based proliferation.
    But there is no silver bullet solution, which is why we will 
continue to implement a multilayered strategy to strengthen the 
security of nuclear material around the world by removing or 
eliminating it when we can; consolidating and securing it if 
elimination is not an option; reducing the civilian use of highly 
enriched uranium particularly for research and medical isotope 
productions where low-enriched uranium options exist of can be 
developed; and maintaining our commitment to detecting and deterring 
nuclear smuggling. Many of you are familiar with the significant 
contributions NNSA's Second Line of Defense program has made to the 
worldwide effort to combat nuclear trafficking. In light of the 
constrained budget environment that we find ourselves in, NNSA has 
initiated a strategic review of the program to evaluate what 
combinations of capabilities and programs make the most effective 
contribution to national security.
    We will continue to research and develop tools and technologies to 
detect the proliferation of nuclear materials as well as nuclear 
detonations. We will provide technical support and leadership to our 
interagency colleagues during the negotiation and implementation of 
arms control treaties, as we did with New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (New START). We will expand on our ongoing efforts to strengthen 
the capabilities of our foreign partners to implement international 
nonproliferation and nuclear security norms, and support the critically 
important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We will 
continue to play a supporting role in the negotiation of Peaceful 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (123 Agreements), which are so crucial 
for achieving our nuclear nonproliferation and trade objectives.
    The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request also keeps focus on 
our commitment to eliminate U.S. excess weapons materials and supports 
the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste 
Solidification Building at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. 
The $569.5 million committed to the MOX and related 
activities this year will lead to the permanent elimination of enough 
plutonium for at least 8,500 nuclear weapons, which will be matched by 
similar commitments by the Russian Federation. We have eliminated the 
line item for a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility for the 
MOX program, opting instead for a preferred alternative 
approach to producing feedstock that is much less costly by utilizing 
existing facilities at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National 
Laboratory.
    In addition, the fiscal year 2013 budget request gives us the 
resources we need to maintain our one-of-a-kind emergency response 
capabilities, which allow us to respond to a nuclear or radiological 
incidents anywhere in the world. In fiscal year 2011, we were able to 
assist the United States military, military families, and the Japanese 
people by deploying our unique emergency response assets in the 
aftermath of devastating tsunami that affected the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant.
    In response to the President's concern regarding the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, which is also a key goal within the 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Review, we have established a new organization that is now the 
focal point for all counterterrorism and counter proliferation 
activities within NNSA. This organization, the Office of 
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, not only provides unique 
technical contributions based on NNSA's core nuclear science and 
technology expertise, but also is designed to coordinate all nuclear 
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and postdetonation nuclear 
forensics related efforts without drastic restructuring.
    In addition, NNSA's Naval Reactors program directly supports all 
aspects of the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet, which encompasses the Navy's 
submarines and aircraft carriers, more than 40 percent of the U.S. 
Navy's major combatants. Currently, the nuclear fleet is composed of 54 
attack submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 guided missile 
submarines, and 11 aircraft carriers. More than 8,300 nuclear-trained 
Navy personnel safely operate the propulsion plants on these ships all 
over the world, and their consistent forward presence protects our 
national interests. Our $1.1 billion fiscal year 2013 request will 
support the refueling overhaul for the S8G land-based prototype 
reactor, the design of the Ohio replacement reactor plant, and 
recapitalization of our naval spent nuclear fuel infrastructure.
    Each of the projects is critical to fulfillment of the Navy's 
longer term needs. The S8G land-based prototype refueling overhaul 
reactor plant has served naval reactors' needs for research, 
development, and training since 1978, and the reactor provides a cost-
effective testing platform for new technologies and components before 
they are introduced. To continue vital research capabilities, as well 
as train sufficient operators to man the Fleet, the S8G land-based 
prototype refueling overhaul must begin in 2018. The Ohio replacement 
reactor plant design continues and the fiscal year 2013 requested 
amount supports continuing this work to meet the Navy's revised 
schedule and procurement of reactor plant components in 2019 (to 
support a 2021 lead-ship procurement). We need to recapitalize its 
naval spent fuel infrastructure in a cost-effective way that does not 
impede the refueling of active ships and their return to operations. 
The existing facility is more than 50 years old and was never designed 
for its current primary mission of packaging naval spent nuclear fuel 
for permanent dry storage.
    And finally, $411 million is requested for NNSA's Office of the 
Administrator account. This funds Federal personnel and provides for 
resources necessary to plan, manage, and oversee the operation of NNSA 
missions which strengthen U.S. security.

                             DOING OUR PART

    We are committed to being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. 
We have taken steps to ensure that we are building a capabilities-based 
enterprise focused on needs and solutions. We view this constrained 
budget environment as an additional incentive to ask ourselves how we 
can re-think the way we are operating, how we can innovate, and how we 
can get better.
    For example, in close consultation with our national laboratories 
and national security sites, we are adjusting our plutonium strategy by 
deferring for at least 5 years construction of the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) project at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory and focusing instead on how we can meet 
our plutonium needs on an interim basis by using the capabilities and 
expertise found at existing facilities. Utilizing existing facilities 
will allow us to meet anticipated near-term requirements for plutonium 
operations while focusing on other key modernization projects. 
Deferring CMRR-NF will have an estimated cost avoidance from 2013 to 
2017 that totals approximately $1.8 billion, which will help offset the 
costs of other priorities such as Weapons Lifetime Extension programs 
and other infrastructure needs.
    We have also updated our strategy to stop the spread of dangerous 
nuclear material as we meet the President's 4-year lockdown goal. We 
have developed an innovative approach to scientist engagement tailored 
for an age when knowledge spreads effortlessly through Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter.
    We are not resting on old ideas to solve tomorrow's problems--we're 
shaping the future of nuclear security, and we're doing it in a 
fiscally responsible way. However, I want to stress that as we make 
adjustments and look toward the future, our plans are based on the 
fiscal year 2013 budget request, which give us the resources we need to 
carry out our mission. Budget uncertainty adds cost and complexity to 
how we achieve our goals. You have been supportive of our efforts in 
the past, I ask again for your help in providing the stability we need 
to do our jobs efficiently and effectively.

                         CONTINUOUSLY IMPROVING

    I would like to acknowledge that I have come before you in the past 
and talked at length about how NNSA has been working to change the way 
we do business. I am proud of the work the men and women of our NNSA 
have done to come together and operate as one. We are defining 
ourselves as a fully integrated enterprise that operates efficiently, 
is organized to succeed, that performs our work seamlessly, and speaks 
with one voice.
    We are improving everywhere, from our governance model to our 
network infrastructure, from our contracting processes to leadership 
and development programs. We are improving business processes by 
implementing the ISO 9001 standard, looking toward the future through a 
workforce analysis, and improving efficiency through consolidated 
contracts.
    We are continuously improving so we are able to do the work the 
American people need us to do, in a time when everyone is looking to do 
more with less. We are positioning ourselves for the next decade by 
making big decisions focused on the future.
    For example, after more than 2 years of analysis and outside 
reviews, we released a request for proposal (RFP) for the combined 
management of the Y-12 National Security Complex and Pantex Plant, with 
an option for phase-in of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah 
River Site. Combining contracts and site offices will allow us to 
improve performance, reduce the cost of work, and operate as an 
integrated enterprise. We also decided to compete the contract for 
management and operation of Sandia National Laboratories, a move 
designed to find meaningful improvement in performance and reduce cost 
for taxpayers.
    We have taken other significant steps to continue improving, from 
top-to-bottom. We created an Acquisition and Project Management 
organization to help institutionalize our commitment to improving the 
way we do business. This move will improve the quality of our work 
while keeping our projects on time and on budget.
    We awarded a Blanket Purchasing Agreement (BPA) for Enterprise 
Construction Management Services. The BPA will standardize our approach 
to project management across the enterprise and provide subject-matter 
experts to provide independent analysis and advice related to the 
design and construction of facilities.
    And, importantly, we have institutionalized a culture of safety. 
Through a unique series of Biennial Reviews, including reviews at 
headquarters, we have improved nuclear safety across our Nuclear 
Security Enterprise. We have provided objective, value-added 
information to managers that ensure our nuclear safety oversight is 
consistent and effective. Since the reviews began in 2005, we have seen 
continuous improvement at every site.
    We are also improving the way we work with our partners across the 
Department of Energy (DOE). In my role as Under Secretary of Energy for 
Nuclear Security, I have made better coordination with DOE's Office of 
Environmental Management and Office of Legacy Management key 
priorities.
    For example, by partnering with the Office of Environmental 
Management, we have been able to share investments in our current 
infrastructure at the Savannah River Site. Using H-Canyon to eliminate 
surplus weapons-grade plutonium is a cost-effective approach for 
producing plutonium oxide for the MOX Facility that utilizes 
current resources and capabilities, and saves jobs. We are also taking 
care to make good use of past investments. For example, 40 grams of 
curium worth $8.8 million that was no longer needed for stockpile 
stewardship was transferred from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to 
the Idaho and Oak Ridge National Laboratories for use in energy R&D and 
for production of new isotopes.
    We are also working with the Office of Legacy Management to 
benchmark long-term surveillance and maintenance costs. Large closed 
sites with on-going groundwater issues, such as Fernald, Rocky Flats, 
Weldon Spring, Tuba City, and Mound, may have postclosure requirements 
similar to some of the Savannah River facilities, so we are learning 
from each other by comparing scope and cost to refine our estimates.

                               CONCLUSION

    Our mission is vital, and your past support has been key in helping 
us accomplish it. The fiscal year 2013 budget reflects our commitment 
to keeping the American people safe while continuously improving and 
doing our part in a time of fiscal austerity. We are looking toward the 
future and building an organization that is aligned to succeed. I look 
forward to working with each of you to help us do that. Thank you.

  NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION--APPROPRIATION AND PROGRAM 
SUMMARY TABLES--OUTYEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY TABLES--FISCAL YEAR 2013 
                             BUDGET TABLES

                                    NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY \1, 2\
                                                                [In thousands of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                   2011         2012         2013         2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                 current      enacted      request      request      request      request      request
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator:
    Program direction........................................      398,993      410,000      411,279      418,742      426,599      434,848      444,276
    Rescission of prior year balances........................       -5,700  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Office of the Administrator.....................      393,293      410,000      411,279      418,742      426,599      434,848      444,276
                                                              ==========================================================================================
Weapons Activities Appropriation:
    Defense Programs:
        Directed stockpile work..............................    1,905,078    1,873,694    2,088,274  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Science campaign.....................................      366,167      332,958      350,104  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Engineering campaign.................................      142,010      142,636      150,571  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Inertial confinement fusion ignition and high-yield        478,105      474,812      460,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
         campaign............................................
        Advanced simulation and computing campaign...........      613,620      618,076      600,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Readiness campaign...................................       91,695      128,406      130,095  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Readiness in technical base and facilities...........    1,842,519    2,004,785    2,239,828  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Secure transportation asset..........................      251,806      242,802      219,361  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Defense Programs............................    5,691,000    5,818,169    6,238,233  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ==========================================================================================
    Nuclear counterterrorism incident response...............      232,503      220,969      247,552  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program...       93,574       96,120  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Site stewardship.........................................      104,727       78,581       90,001  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
Safeguards and security:
    Defense nuclear security.................................      717,722      695,679  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Cyber security...........................................      124,231      126,370  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Safeguards and security......................      841,953      822,049  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ==========================================================================================
    Defense nuclear security.................................  ...........  ...........      643,285  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    National Nuclear Security Administration Chief             ...........  ...........      155,022  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
     Information Officer activities..........................
    Science, technology, and engineering capability..........       19,794  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    National security applications...........................  ...........       10,000       18,248  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Legacy contractor pensions...............................  ...........      168,232      185,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Use of prior year balances...............................      -67,776  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Rescission of prior year balances........................      -50,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, weapons activities..............................    6,865,775    7,214,120    7,577,341    7,613,033    7,755,866    7,905,841    8,077,242
                                                              ==========================================================================================
Defense nuclear nonproliferation:
    Nonproliferation and verification research and                 355,407      354,150      548,186      412,622      420,344      428,417      437,719
     development.............................................
    Nonproliferation and international security..............      147,494      153,594      150,119      156,363      167,070      173,718      177,490
    International nuclear materials protection and                 578,633      569,927      311,000      282,628      288,026      293,870      300,171
     cooperation.............................................
    Fissile materials disposition............................      802,198      685,386      921,305      950,000      960,000      975,000      996,170
    Global threat reduction initiative.......................      444,689      498,000      466,021      485,775      494,866      504,371      515,322
    Legacy contractor pensions...............................  ...........       55,823       62,000       63,138       64,320       65,555       66,978
    Use of prior year balances...............................       -2,050  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Rescission of prior year balances........................      -45,000      -21,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense nuclear nonproliferation................    2,281,371    2,295,880    2,458,631    2,350,526    2,394,626    2,440,931    2,493,850
                                                              ==========================================================================================
Naval reactors:
    Naval reactors...........................................      986,526    1,080,000    1,088,635    1,108,391    1,129,186    1,151,021    1,175,975
    Rescission of prior year balances........................       -1,000  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Naval reactors..................................      985,526    1,080,000    1,088,635    1,108,391    1,129,186    1,151,021    1,175,975
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, National Nuclear Security Administration........   10,525,965   11,000,000   11,535,886   11,490,692   11,706,277   11,932,641   12,191,343
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The annual totals include an allocation to NNSA from DOD. The amounts included are $677,076 in fiscal year 2014; $712,344 in fiscal year 2015;
  $766,924 in fiscal year 2016; and $781,204 in fiscal year 2017.
\2\ Fiscal year 2012 enacted reflects a rescission of $27,300 associated with savings from the contractor pay freeze. Of the $27,300, $19,877 was
  rescinded from weapons activities and $7,423 was rescinded from Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.


               NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM \1\
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                     2013         2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                   request      request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Nuclear Security Administration:
    Office of the Administrator................      411,279      418,742      426,599      434,848      444,276
    Weapons activities.........................    7,577,341    7,613,033    7,755,866    7,905,841    8,077,242
    Defense nuclear nonproliferation...........    2,458,631    2,350,526    2,394,626    2,440,931    2,493,850
    Naval reactors.............................    1,088,635    1,108,391    1,129,186    1,151,021    1,175,975
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, National Nuclear Security            11,535,886   11,490,692   11,706,277   11,932,641   12,191,343
       Administration..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The annual totals include an allocation to NNSA from DOD. The amounts included are $677,076 in fiscal year
  2014; $712,344 in fiscal year 2015; $766,924 in fiscal year 2016; and $781,204 in fiscal year 2017.


 OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator:
  National Nuclear Security
   Administration program
   direction:
    Salaries and benefits........      282,967      301,995      304,474
    Travel.......................       16,536       15,500       15,500
    Support services.............       22,445       20,500       20,500
    Other related expenses.......       77,045       72,005       70,805
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Office of the          398,993      410,000      411,279
       Administrator.............
                                  ======================================
Rescission of prior year balances       -5,700  ...........  ...........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Office of the             393,293      410,000      411,279
       Administrator.............
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                    OUTYEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator:
  National Nuclear Security Administration program
   direction:
    Salaries and benefits...................................      311,937      319,794      328,043      337,471
    Travel..................................................       15,500       15,500       15,500       15,500
    Support services........................................       20,500       20,500       20,500       20,500
    Other related expenses..................................       70,805       70,805       70,805       70,805
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Office of the Administrator....................      418,742      426,599      434,848      444,276
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


     WEAPONS ACTIVITIES--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons activities:
    Directed stockpile work......    1,905,078    1,873,694    2,088,274
    Science campaign.............      366,167      332,958      350,104
    Engineering campaign.........      142,010      142,636      150,571
    Inertial confinement fusion        478,105      474,812      460,000
     ignition and high-yield
     campaign....................
    Advanced simulation and            613,620      618,076      600,000
     computing campaign..........
    Readiness campaign...........       91,695      128,406      130,095
    Readiness in technical base      1,842,519    2,004,785    2,239,828
     and facilities..............
    Secure transportation asset..      251,806      242,802      219,361
    Nuclear counterterrorism           232,503      220,969      247,552
     incident response...........
    Facilities and infrastructure       93,574       96,120  ...........
     recapitalization program....
    Site stewardship.............      104,727       78,581       90,001
    Defense nuclear security.....      717,722      695,679      643,285
    Cyber security...............      124,231      126,370  ...........
    National Nuclear Security      ...........  ...........      155,022
     Administration Chief
     Information Officer
     activities..................
    Science, technology, and            19,794  ...........  ...........
     engineering capability......
    National security              ...........       10,000       18,248
     applications................
    Legacy contractor pensions...  ...........      168,232      185,000
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Weapons              6,983,551    7,214,120    7,577,341
       activities................
                                  ======================================
    Use of prior year balances...      -67,776  ...........  ...........
    Rescission of prior year           -50,000  ...........  ...........
     balances....................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Weapons activities..    6,865,775    7,214,120    7,577,341
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Appropriation Summary by Program
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

   DIRECTED STOCKPILE WORK--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed stockpile work:
    Life-extension programs......      248,357      479,098      543,931
    Stockpile systems............      651,333      486,123      590,409
    Weapons dismantlement and           57,968       56,591       51,265
     disposition.................
    Stockpile services...........      947,420      851,882      902,669
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Directed stockpile      1,905,078    1,873,694    2,088,274
       work......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

      SCIENCE CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Science campaign....      366,167      332,958      350,104
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

    ENGINEERING CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Engineering campaign      142,010      142,636      150,571
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

  INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION IGNITION AND HIGH-YIELD CAMPAIGN--FUNDING
                   PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Inertial confinement      478,105      474,812      460,000
       fusion and high-yield
       campaign..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

     ADVANCED SIMULATION AND COMPUTING CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY
                         SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Advanced simulation       613,620      618,076      600,000
       and computing campaign....
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

     READINESS CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness campaign..       91,695      128,406      130,095
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

     READINESS IN TECHNICAL BASE AND FACILITIES--FUNDING PROFILE BY
                         SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness in technical base and
 facilities:
    Operations of facilities.....    1,255,307    1,281,847    1,419,403
    Program readiness............       69,736       73,962  ...........
    Material recycle and recovery       77,493       77,780  ...........
    Containers...................       27,820       28,892  ...........
    Storage......................       23,945       31,196  ...........
    Nuclear operations capability  ...........  ...........      203,346
     support.....................
    Science, technology, and       ...........  ...........      166,945
     engineering support.........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Operations and       1,454,301    1,493,677    1,789,694
       maintenance...............
                                  ======================================
Construction.....................      388,218      511,108      450,134
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness in            1,842,519    2,004,785    2,239,828
       technical base and
       facilities................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Schedule by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

 SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secure Transportation Asset
 [STA]:
    Operations and equipment.....      156,877      144,800      114,965
    Program direction............       94,929       98,002      104,396
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Secure                    251,806      242,802      219,361
       Transportation Asset......
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT--FUNDING PROFILE
                       BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and equipment:
    Mission capacity.............       83,718       84,376       56,458
    Security safety capability...       34,670       19,986       22,457
    Infrastructure and C5 systems       28,867       29,449       24,199
    Program management...........        9,622       10,989       11,851
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and            156,877      144,800      114,965
       equipment.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


   SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--PROGRAM DIRECTION--FUNDING PROFILE BY
                         SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                         [Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Direction:
    Salaries and benefits........      $79,644      $82,613      $84,878
    Travel.......................       $8,334       $7,758       $7,216
    Other Related expenses.......       $6,951       $7,631      $12,302
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Program direction...      $94,929      $98,002     $104,396
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Full-time                     637          622          639
       equivalents...............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

     NUCLEAR COUNTERTERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE--FUNDING PROFILE BY
                         SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear counterterrorism incident
 response (Homeland Security):
 \1\
    Emergency response (Homeland       135,429      136,185      150,043
     Security) \1\...............
    National technical nuclear          11,446       11,589       11,694
     forensics (Homeland
     Security) \1\...............
    Emergency management                 7,494        7,153        6,629
     (Homeland Security) \1\.....
    Operations support (Homeland         8,488        8,691        8,799
     Security) \1\...............
    International emergency              6,986        7,129        7,139
     management and cooperation..
    Nuclear counterterrorism            62,660       50,222       63,248
     (Homeland Security) \1\.....
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Nuclear                   232,503      220,969      247,552
       counterterrorism incident
       response..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Homeland Security designation.

Outyear Target Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

 FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM--FUNDING PROFILE
                       BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities and infrastructure
 recapitalization program:
  Operations and maintenance
   [O&M]:
    Recapitalization.............       77,160       81,720  ...........
    Infrastructure planning......        6,494        9,400  ...........
    Facility disposition.........        9,920        5,000  ...........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and             93,574       96,120  ...........
       maintenance--facilities
       and infrastructure
       recapitalization program..
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

      SITE STEWARDSHIP--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site Stewardship:
  Operations and maintenance:
    Environmental projects and          41,970       45,191       46,978
     operations..................
    Energy modernization and             6,618  ...........       10,262
     investment program..........
    Nuclear materials integration       41,169       33,390       18,963
    Corporate project management.  ...........  ...........       13,798
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and             89,757       78,581       90,001
       maintenance...............
                                  ======================================
    Construction.................       14,970  ...........  ...........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Site stewardship....      104,727       78,581       90,001
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

  DEFENSE NUCLEAR SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense nuclear security:
  Operations and maintenance
   (Homeland Security):
    Protective forces............      414,166      418,758      341,676
    Physical security systems....       73,794       82,783       98,267
    Information security.........       25,943       30,117       34,237
    Personnel security...........       30,913       37,285       37,781
    Materials control and               35,602       34,592       34,484
     accountability..............
    Program management...........       78,183       75,595       96,840
    Technology deployment,               7,225        4,797  ...........
     physical security...........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and            665,826      683,927      643,285
       maintenance (Homeland
       Security).................
                                  ======================================
  Construction (Homeland                51,896       11,752  ...........
   Security).....................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Defense nuclear           717,722      695,679      643,285
       security..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

       CYBER SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber security (Homeland
 Security):
    Infrastructure program.......       97,735      107,374  ...........
    Enterprise secure computing..       21,500       14,000  ...........
    Technology application               4,996        4,996  ...........
     development.................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Cyber security......      124,231      126,370  ...........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

   NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
         ACTIVITIES--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Nuclear Security
 Administration Chief Information
 Officer activities:
  Cyber security (Homeland
   Security):
    Infrastructure program.......  ...........  ...........      111,022
    Technology application         ...........  ...........  ...........
     development \1\.............
  Enterprise secure computing      ...........  ...........       14,000
   (Homeland Security)...........
  Federal unclassified             ...........  ...........       30,000
   information technology........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, National Nuclear      ...........  ...........      155,022
       Security Administration
       Chief Information Officer
       activities................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 Technology Application
  Development is reflected in the Cyber Security program. In fiscal year
  2013 funds supporting Technology Application Development were
  realigned to infrastructure for higher priority requirements.
  Technology Application initiatives are to be supported in the
  outyears.

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

    NATIONAL SECURITY APPLICATIONS--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND
                                ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, National security     ...........       10,000       18,248
       applications..............
                                  ======================================
      Total, Science, Technology,       19,794  ...........  ...........
       and Engineering Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Outyear Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity
    The outyear numbers for weapons activities do not reflect 
programmatic requirements. Rather, they are an extrapolation of the 
fiscal year 2013 request based on rates of inflation in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011. The administration will develop outyear funding 
levels based on actual programmatic requirements at a later date.

  DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY
                                 PROGRAM
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current    enacted \1\    request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense nuclear nonproliferation:
    Nonproliferation and               355,407      354,150      548,186
     verification research and
     development.................
    Small Business Innovation          [5,579]      [6,245]     [11,727]
     Research/Small Business
     Technology Transfer [Non-
     Add]........................
    Nonproliferation and               147,494      153,594      150,119
     international security......
    International nuclear              578,633      569,927      311,000
     materials protection and
     cooperation \2\.............
    Fissile materials disposition      802,198      685,386      921,305
    Global threat reduction            444,689      498,000      466,021
     initiative \2\..............
    Legacy contractor pensions...  ...........       55,823       62,000
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Defense nuclear      2,328,421    2,316,880    2,458,631
       nonproliferation..........
                                  ======================================
    Use of prior year balances...       -2,050  ...........  ...........
    Rescission of prior year           -45,000      -21,000  ...........
     balances....................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Defense nuclear         2,281,371    2,295,880    2,458,631
       nonproliferation..........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2012 enacted reflects rescission of $7.4 million
  associated with savings from the contractor pay freeze.
\2\ Fiscal year 2011 total includes international contributions for
  INMP&C of $300,000 from South Korea; $117,000 from the United Kingdom
  of Great Britain; $512,076 from Norway; $540,602 from New Zealand; and
  $5,169,026 from Canada. International contributions for GTRI include
  $8,207,791 from Canada, and $499,970 from the Netherlands.


                                    OUTYEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense nuclear nonproliferation:
    Nonproliferation and verification research and                412,622      420,344      428,417      437,719
     development............................................
    Nonproliferation and international security.............      156,363      167,070      173,718      177,490
    International nuclear materials protection and                282,628      288,026      293,870      300,171
     cooperation \1\........................................
Fissile materials disposition...............................      950,000      960,000      975,000      996,170
Global threat reduction initiative \1\......................      485,775      494,866      504,371      515,322
Legacy contractor pensions..................................       63,138       64,320       65,555       66,978
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense nuclear nonproliferation...............    2,350,526    2,394,626    2,440,931    2,493,850
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


   NONPROLIFERATION AND VERIFICATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT--FUNDING
                   PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and verification
 research and development:
    Proliferation detection [PD].      229,427      222,150      240,536
    Homeland security-related         [50,000]     [50,000]     [50,000]
     proliferation detection [Non-
     Add]........................
    Nuclear detonation detection       125,980      132,000      157,650
     [NDD].......................
    Domestic uranium enrichment    ...........  ...........      150,000
     research, development, and
     demonstration...............
    Small Business Innovation      ...........      [6,245]     [11,727]
     Research/Small Business
     Technology Transfer \1\ [Non-
     Add]........................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and      355,407      354,150      548,186
       verification research and
       development...............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2011 current appropriation reflects the $5,579,000
  transferred out of the DNN appropriation for SBIR/STTR.


                               OUTYEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and verification research and development:
    Proliferation detection [PD]............................      248,312      252,955      257,790      263,369
    Homeland security-related proliferation detection [Non-      [50,000]     [50,000]     [50,000]     [50,000]
     Add]...................................................
    Nuclear detonation detection [NDD]......................      164,310      167,389      170,627      174,350
    Domestic uranium enrichment RD&D........................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    SBIR/STTR [Non-Add].....................................      [8,446]      [8,941]      [9,598]     [10,461]
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and verification R&D..........      412,622      420,344      428,417      437,719
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


     NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY
                       SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY \1\
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and
 international security:
    Dismantlement and                   49,207  ...........  ...........
     transparency................
    Global security engagement          47,289  ...........  ...........
     and cooperation.............
    International regimes and           39,824  ...........  ...........
     agreements..................
    Treaties and agreements......       11,174  ...........  ...........
    Nuclear safeguards and         ...........       54,897       54,723
     security....................
    Nuclear controls.............  ...........       47,444       45,420
    Nuclear verification.........  ...........       39,969       40,566
    Nonproliferation policy......  ...........       11,284        9,410
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and      147,494      153,594      150,119
       international security....
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Nonproliferation and International Security Program implemented
  a budget structure change starting in fiscal year 2012. The structure
  change created a more efficient and clearer program organization with
  activities aligned along functional lines that reflect U.S.
  nonproliferation priorities and initiatives. The new structure depicts
  more clearly the alignment of people, technology, and resources to
  meet and implement nuclear nonproliferation objectives.


                               OUTYEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and international security:
    Dismantlement and transparency..........................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Global security engagement and cooperation..............  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    International regimes and agreements....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Treaties and agreements.................................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Nuclear safeguards and security.........................       56,999       60,902       63,326       64,701
    Nuclear controls........................................       47,309       50,549       52,560       53,701
    Nuclear verification....................................       42,253       45,147       46,943       47,962
    Nonproliferation policy.................................        9,802       10,472       10,889       11,126
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and international security....      156,363      167,070      173,718      177,490
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


   INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION AND COOPERATION--FUNDING
                   PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International nuclear materials
 protection and cooperation:
    Navy complex.................       34,332       33,664       39,860
    Strategic rocket forces/12th        51,359       59,105        8,300
     main directorate............
    Weapons material protection         93,318       80,735       46,975
     \1\.........................
    Civilian nuclear sites.......       53,027       59,117       60,092
    Material consolidation and          13,867       14,306       17,000
     conversion..................
    National infrastructure and         60,928       60,928       46,199
     sustainability program \2\..
    Second line of defense.......      265,163      262,072       92,574
    International contributions          6,639  ...........  ...........
     \3\.........................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, International             578,633      569,927      311,000
       nuclear materials
       protection and cooperation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Weapons Material Protection was formerly known as Rosatom Weapons
  Complex.
\2\ National Infrastructure and Sustainability was formerly known as
  National Programs and Sustainability.
\3\ Fiscal year 2011 total includes international contributions of
  $300,000 from South Korea, $117,000 from the United Kingdom of Great
  Britain, $512,076 from Norway, $540,602 from New Zealand, and
  $5,169,026 from Canada.


                               OUTYEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International nuclear materials protection and cooperation:
    Navy complex............................................       39,742       39,767       39,843       39,823
    Strategic rocket forces/12th main directorate...........       14,300       14,300       14,300       14,300
    Weapons material protection \1\.........................       54,857       54,882       54,958       54,938
    Civilian nuclear sites..................................       59,972       59,997       60,074       60,053
    Material consolidation and conversion...................       20,000       20,000       20,000       20,000
    National infrastructure and sustainability program \2\..       46,081       46,106       46,182       46,162
    Second line of defense..................................       47,676       52,974       58,513       64,895
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, International nuclear materials protection and       282,628      288,026      293,870      300,171
       cooperation..........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Weapons Material Protection was formerly known as Rosatom Weapons Complex.
\2\ National Infrastructure and Sustainability was formerly known as National Programs and Sustainability.


    FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND
                                ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile Materials Disposition:
    U.S. surplus fissile
     materials disposition:
        Operations and
         maintenance [O&M]:
            U.S. plutonium             200,400      205,632      498,979
             disposition.........
            U.S. uranium                25,985       26,000       29,736
             disposition.........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Operations and         226,385      231,632      528,715
       maintenance...............

            Construction.........      575,788      452,754      388,802
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, U.S. surplus fissile      802,173      684,386      917,517
       materials disposition.....
                                  ======================================
    Russian surplus fissile                 25        1,000        3,788
     materials disposition:
     Russian materials
     disposition.................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Fissile materials         802,198      685,386      921,305
       disposition...............
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                               OUTYEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile materials disposition:
    U.S. surplus fissile materials disposition:
        Operations and maintenance [O&M]:
            U.S. plutonium disposition......................      793,506      908,906      930,967      957,881
            U.S. uranium disposition........................       30,058       33,546       33,453       30,514
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
              Subtotal, Operations and maintenance..........      823,564      942,452      964,420      988,395

            Construction....................................      118,661        9,773        2,805  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
              Total, U.S. surplus fissile materials               942,225      952,225      967,225      988,395
               disposition..................................
                                                             ===================================================
    Russian surplus fissile materials disposition: Russian          7,775        7,775        7,775        7,775
     materials disposition..................................
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Fissile materials disposition..................      950,000      960,000      975,000      996,170
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


  GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND
                                ACTIVITY
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current      enacted      request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global threat reduction
 initiative:
  Highly enriched uranium [HEU]        100,968      148,269      161,000
   reactor conversion............
  Nuclear and radiological
   material removal:
    Russian-origin nuclear             159,031      147,000      102,000
     material removal............
    U.S.-origin nuclear material         4,420        9,000        5,000
     removal.....................
    Gap nuclear material removal.        9,289       45,731       61,000
    Emerging threats nuclear             8,768        5,000        5,000
     material removal............
    International radiological          20,660       20,000        8,000
     material removal............
    Domestic radiological               19,128       20,000       19,000
     material removal (Homeland
     Security) \1\...............
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and            221,296      246,731      200,000
       radiological material
       removal...................
                                  ======================================
  Nuclear and radiological
   material protection:
    BN-350 nuclear material              1,840        2,000  ...........
     protection..................
    International material              46,573       50,000       50,000
     protection..................
    Domestic material protection        65,304       51,000       55,021
     (Homeland Security) \1\.....
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and            113,717      103,000      105,021
       radiological material
       protection................
                                  ======================================
    International contributions          8,708  ...........  ...........
     \2\.........................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Global threat             444,689      498,000      466,021
       reduction initiative......
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Homeland Security designation.
\2\ International contributions for GTRI include $8,207,791 from Canada,
  and $499,970 from the Netherlands.


                               OUTYEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM AND ACTIVITY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                                  2014         2015         2016         2017
                                                                request      request      request      request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global threat reduction initiative:
  Highly enriched uranium [HEU] reactor conversion..........      177,000      183,000      185,000      195,000
  Nuclear and radiological material removal:
    Russian-origin nuclear material removal.................      100,000      100,000      100,000       95,000
    U.S.-origin nuclear material removal....................        5,000        5,000        6,000        8,000
    Gap nuclear material removal............................       45,000       30,000       20,000       15,000
    Emerging threats nuclear material removal...............        5,000        5,000        5,000        5,000
    International radiological material removal.............       20,000       20,000       20,000       20,000
    Domestic radiological material removal (Homeland               20,000       20,000       20,000       20,000
     Security) \1\..........................................
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and radiological material removal...      195,000      180,000      171,000      163,000
                                                             ===================================================
  Nuclear and radiological material protection:
    BN-350 nuclear material protection......................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
    International material protection.......................       52,000       60,000       68,000       73,000
    Domestic material protection (Homeland Security) \1\....       61,775       71,866       80,371       84,322
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and radiological material protec-         113,775      131,866      148,371      157,322
       tion.................................................
                                                             ===================================================
      Total, Global threat reduction initiative.............      485,775      494,866      504,371      515,322
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


       NAVAL REACTORS--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                        [In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                       2011         2012         2013
                                     current    enacted \1\  request \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval reactors:
    Naval reactors operations and      914,071  ...........  ...........
     maintenance [O&M]...........
    Naval reactors operations and  ...........      358,300      366,961
     infrastructure..............
    Naval reactors development...  ...........      421,000      418,072
    S8G protype refueling........  ...........       99,500      121,100
    Ohio replacement reactor       ...........      121,300       89,700
     systems development.........
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Naval reactors            914,071    1,000,100      995,833
       operations and maintenance
                                  ======================================
    Program direction............       39,920       40,000       43,212
    Construction.................       32,535       39,900       49,590
                                  --------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Naval reactors...      986,526    1,080,000    1,088,635
                                  ======================================
    Rescission of prior year            -1,000  ...........  ...........
     balances....................
                                  --------------------------------------
      Total, Naval reactors......      985,526    1,080,000    1,088,635
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Conference Report of H.R. 2055 Military Construction and
  Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012
  establishing new funding controls for Naval Reactors: Naval Reactors
  Operations and Infrastructure, Naval Reactors Development, S8G
  Prototype Refueling, and Ohio Replacement Reactor Systems Development.
\2\ Fiscal year 2013, fiscal year 2014, and fiscal year 2015 include an
  allocation to Naval Reactors from the Department of Defense's (DOD)
  Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account
  entitled ``NNSA PROGRAM SUPPORT''. The amounts included for naval
  reactors from this DOD account are fiscal year 2013 $5.8 million;
  fiscal year 2014, $2 million; and fiscal year 2015, $0.9 million.


                                    OUTYEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Fiscal year     Fiscal year   Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                                             2014            2015           2016         2017
                                                        projection \1\  projection \1\   projection   projection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval reactors:
    Naval reactors operations and infrastructure......        384,365         377,814       383,719      396,283
    Naval reactors development........................        434,306         426,245       432,449      446,609
    S8G prototype refueling \2\.......................        123,327         125,522       127,760      130,054
    Ohio replacement reactor systems development \2\..         91,350          92,975        94,634       96,333
    Program direction.................................         49,670          52,400        54,159       56,096
    Construction......................................         25,373          54,230        58,300       50,600
                                                       ---------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Naval reactors...........................      1,108,391       1,129,186     1,151,021    1,175,975
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2013, fiscal year 2014, and fiscal year 2015 include an allocation to Naval Reactors from the
  Department of Defense's (DOD) Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account entitled ``NNSA
  PROGRAM SUPPORT''. The amounts included for naval reactors from this DOD account are fiscal year 2013 $5.8
  million; fiscal year 2014, $2 million; and fiscal year 2015, $0.9 million.
\2\ Due to the Budget Control Act of 2011 the outyear funding for S8G Prototype Refueling and Ohio Replacement
  Reactor Systems Development is under review and will be updated at a later date.


    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Agostino.
    Senator, if it's agreeable with you, I'd like to proceed in 
5-minute increments, and we'll just go back and forth. I have a 
large number of questions.
    Senator Alexander. You can just go through for a while if 
you want to, if you don't want me to interrupt that. That's 
fine with me. I'll listen.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, let's see. I want you to have 
plenty of opportunities.

                       NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

    On March 19, a letter was sent to Member Frelinghuysen and 
Member Visclosky signed by a substantial number of House 
Members on the National Ignition Facility (NIF). There have 
been claims made that the NIF is short $140 million, and 
proposed budget cuts, which I understand are $20 million, will 
result in the shutdown of the facility, and the layoff of 400 
scientists and technicians.
    Are these claims true?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Madam Chairman, the NIF, the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) budget, the overall 
laboratory budget, did go down. The budget did not go down by 
$140 million. The decrease at LLNL is on the order of $81 
million.
    The majority of that decrease is due to the completion of a 
procurement of a computer called the Sequoia computer, it's a 
supercomputer, as well as some reductions in our security 
budget, because we are in the process of reaching our 
commitment that we made a number of years ago to reduce the 
quantities of category one and two security for plutonium in 
the Livermore Valley. We're 96 percent of the way on that, and 
that's why we have a little bit of a decrease in security.
    The reductions in the specific line, the budget line for 
the NIF, or Inertial Confinement Fusion Program, is about $20 
million. The challenges, what we're working through right now 
with the laboratory, is factoring in how the laboratory and the 
DOE can blend what's known as an overhead rate. And this is a 
problem that we've known for 2 years, and we're working 
together to make sure that the overhead rates, the rates that 
the laboratory charges its internal programs, is even and 
consistent and meets accounting standards. And there's some 
challenges that we're working on with the laboratory to do 
that.
    So I don't believe that we are talking--I'm committed that 
the NIF project is very important. It's important to stockpile 
stewardship. We are not reducing the budget by $140 million in 
the NIF project, and we are committed to working with the 
laboratory to ensure that we can get through this adjustment of 
their overhead rate in a way that allows the project to move 
forward to address its mission.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay, let's go into that for a minute. A 
decrease of $81 million because of the completion of the 
Sequoia program and a reduction in security. The fusion 
element, which I want to ask some questions about, you said is 
$20 million. Is that a $20 million cut?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, it's a $20 million reduction in the 
NIF line. The project is essentially complete. The construction 
project is complete. And an element of the construction project 
is installing what's known as cryogenic and diagnostic tools to 
keep the target itself cold, the cryogenic piece, and to be 
able to have the tools to measure the output, the experiments.
    This is the whole reason for NIF, of course, is to get this 
very important data. And so you need to have the diagnostics 
there.
    The reduction is due to the fact that the procurement of 
those tools is done, and they're installed, and now we're just 
into the operation of that. And this is documented in the NIF 
plan itself.
    So that $20 million is not because we wanted to just take 
money out of the laboratory, because we're trying to balance 
the budget. It's because that work, that specific work, is done 
on the project.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. Now, NIF is supposed to achieve 
ignition by September. My question is, will it? There are some 
that believe it will not.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Achieving ignition is going to be very 
challenging. I'll be very upfront with this. Ignition is very 
important to stockpile stewardship, but achieving ignition by 
the end of this year will be very challenging. We've learned a 
lot, particularly in the last year, on how good our codes are, 
our simulation codes, in actually predicting the experimental 
data.
    And we've realized, and this is actually a very good news 
in a way, that there are some gaps. And so we're going to focus 
our effort to try to understand why did our codes predict one 
thing and the experiments gave us some different data. It's 
very important that we solve that particular piece of the 
problem.
    We will be doing credible shots on the NIF, credible 
meaning--our codes predicted that we should achieve ignition. 
Whether we do or not will have to stand the test of time. We'll 
know soon enough whether we can do it or not.
    Senator Feinstein. And if you can't achieve ignition, that 
becomes a very big deal in terms of testing of weapons.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Should I comment on that?
    Senator Feinstein. That's a question. Yes.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Achieving ignition is absolutely very 
important for stockpile stewardship. It's a critical element 
for us to be able to have confidence in our codes, in our 
validation codes, and it's important for us to be able to get 
that kind of experimental data in the very high temperature and 
pressure areas that only ignition can give us.
    Does it mean that we fail in being able to take care of our 
stockpile the day after, the week after, the year after we fail 
to achieve ignition? Absolutely not.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, how much longer can the stockpile 
be considered safe without ignition?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I would put it in terms of many years. I 
would like to provide you a detailed answer for the record, if 
I could.
    Senator Feinstein. If you would, and we will follow up.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you.
    Senator Feinstein. Is it possible that NIF will not achieve 
ignition?
    Mr. D'Agostino. It's always----
    Senator Feinstein. Is it only a question of time? Because 
you're just now pushing the September date until the end of the 
year.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein. So here we go.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, you know, I would say achieving 
ignition is a very important factor for it. It's always 
possible that we can achieve it, I think. But the key is, for 
us, is to make every concerted effort to reach ignition by 
making sure we have the right power and energy level on the 
target inside the hohlraum in order to squeeze that particular 
target, and getting the diagnostic tools, these measuring 
devices, so that when we actually do it, we actually know we 
actually did it. It wouldn't be right for us to try to do this 
too early and then not be able to actually measure the fact 
that we achieved it.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, if the original estimate was 
September, and it's now March, that's a substantial period of 
time. But what I hear you saying is, and correct me if I'm 
wrong, please, that the likelihood of so doing is remote, even 
by the end of the year.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I would not call it remote.
    Senator Feinstein. Then what is it, on a scale of 1 to 10?
    Mr. D'Agostino. You know, it's hard for me to put a 
specific number to it. I would say there is a likelihood that 
we will achieve ignition. I would say it's very difficult for 
us to predict. There are new phenomenon in squeezing the 
capsule itself that we hadn't predicted would come out of the 
experiments that we've already done.
    And so we're approaching this in a stepwise fashion, 
because we don't want to rush all the way to full speed ahead 
without approaching it in a stepwise fashion.
    So my sense is that we have a likelihood of achieving 
ignition, I would respectfully ask that I not put a number on 
it, because, actually, I don't want to pretend I know the 
actual number, is what I'm saying. We have the report--I'm 
sorry?
    Senator Feinstein. In the Senate, there was a considerable 
debate about whether to go ahead with this facility or not. 
Senator Domenici was really not a big fan of this facility. 
Everything we heard was, you know, this thing would achieve 
ignition and they would go on and do all this stuff, and fusion 
was a possibility.
    Now, all that appears to have been changed. So what I'm 
saying is, the climate for funding, for finishing this 
facility, and this facility is major. I mean, it is a very 
impressive facility, just in terms of hardware alone.
    I would just hate to see all the money put in not able to 
achieve the goal. What you have said today doesn't give me a 
lot of belief that it's just a question of time. What you've 
said is some new problem has arisen, and you need a solution to 
it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I want to be clear that I am not saying 
that it's remote. I'm saying that there is a likelihood that we 
will achieve ignition this year. That is the goal that we have 
set out of the laboratory to do. We have pressed very hard.
    Senator Feinstein. You are saying there is a likelihood we 
will achieve ignition by the end of the year?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. Yes, absolutely. And I want to be 
clear on that.
    I also want to let you know, Madam Chairman, that we have 
submitted recently--Dr. Cook had sent a report to the Congress, 
a quarterly report, documenting the technical challenges, the 
successes, and the technical challenges.
    A success, for example, a very significant milestone that 
LLNL achieved, is reaching the 1.8 megajoule target, which is 
all 196 beams, 1.8 megajoules into the very tiny target 
chamber.
    And that's a very significant milestone, just the timing of 
196 beams to arrive at the precise moment in time, and the 
pulses needed to squeeze that. The laboratory has made 
progress.
    We've also done hundreds of experiments and shots on the 
facility itself, getting a tremendous amount of data that has 
already--the Nation is already taking advantage of it. Some of 
this data, because of the radiation that comes out of it, lets 
us test electronics, if you will, that the DOD needs to make 
sure can survive in different types of radiation environments.
    So we are getting a significant amount of work out of the 
NIF as it exists today.
    This ignition goal of this year, which I said we have a 
likelihood of achieving, will be, frankly, something that 
mankind has never done before. Man has never been able to 
harness and achieve this capability in a controlled laboratory 
fashion.
    So there are some things that are hard to projectize in a 
way of just saying that it's a matter of money and time. This 
is a hard one to projectize, because it's never been done 
before.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. Well, the letter that the House 
Members have written to the chairman and ranking member of the 
Appropriations subcommittee essentially says the reduction will 
result in the termination of approximately 100 highly trained 
staff, and will jeopardize LLNL's ability to support the 
stewardship of the Nation's nuclear weapons.
    Can you comment on how many layoffs are necessitated by 
these cuts?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I think, if done correctly, there will not 
be any layoffs as a result of a fairly small change in the NIF 
budget, and a fairly small change in the laboratory's overall 
budget. It's a matter of management and getting the right type 
of blend of the overhead rate that was charged to the project.
    If I may, I could add a little bit to that, depending on 
how much time you'd like on this.
    Senator Feinstein. Please, why don't you? This is a big 
issue and obviously is going to be in the House, too.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly.
    When the NIF project was in its construction phase, the 
United States Government committed a significant amount of 
money, as you've indicated, every year to the laboratory to 
construct and build and assemble this NIF.
    In order to do that, we, United States Government, decided 
that the laboratory would be allowed to charge a lower overhead 
rate to the project, because, in essence, why would they charge 
the normal overhead rate, because this is a one-time 
construction project, and when construction is done, it goes 
back down to normal.
    This change is called a self-constructed asset pool. It's a 
set-aside on overhead, and it's a significantly reduced 
overheard because we in the United States Government want the 
dollars to flow into the construction project, not into the 
overhead of the laboratory.
    Once the project was completed, and it was completed a few 
years ago, and the national ignition campaign is completed, 
which will be done in September this year, we had an 
understanding a few years back that we would work together to 
have a lower--to get the laboratory off of this special 
overhead rate.
    And this is the area, this is where you hear this number 
$140 million, it comes through. This is the area where we are 
going to work together with the laboratory to change their 
overhead rates across the laboratory, allow the movement of 
people into the NIF project appropriately, because the reality 
is the bottom line is the laboratory's overall budget is not 
going down all that much.
    And so the logic of saying we have to layoff these very 
important scientists--Parney Albright, who is the laboratory 
director, and I and Don Cook, we don't want that, and so we're 
working together. In fact, we had a very long conference call, 
video conference call, last week Thursday on this, to address 
this very specific issue, because we recognize it was getting a 
lot of attention. And we can come back to that, Madam Chairman.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I've taken a lot of 
time on this.
    Senator, why don't you go ahead?
    Senator Alexander. Okay. It's very interesting.

                       OAK RIDGE URANIUM PROJECT

    I'd like to talk about the two big projects, the uranium 
project at Oak Ridge and the New Mexico project on plutonium. 
And I'll start off with the uranium project at Oak Ridge.
    As I understand the Administration's proposal, you plan now 
to accelerate construction somewhat, and to do a phase one by 
the year 2019. Is that right? Or roughly?
    Mr. D'Agostino. That's right. That's the proposal. Dr. Cook 
has asked for a 30-day study, which will be completed at the 
end of this month, in another week or so. And the leading 
approach on delivering on this project is the phased approach 
you just described.
    Senator Alexander. When will we know what our cost 
objective is for phase one?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Our plan right now is to complete critical 
decision--I shouldn't use this terminology, I apologize. Our 
plan is, after we reach 90 percent design, which is going to be 
about this fall timeframe, because there's still a fair amount 
of work to reach that objective, then the department will 
undergo a very detailed review, it takes about 4 months or so, 
of the proposal put forward by our contractor down in Tennessee 
on this.
    Then this will be independent reviews by outside experts to 
make sure that, because as you said earlier, Sir, once we make 
a commitment on how much something is going to cost, we want to 
make sure we can honor that commitment and honor that 
commitment for this 8-year period.
    So my expectation is, by the end of this year, or early 
into next year, Sir.
    Senator Alexander. You have a number now, if I'm correct, 
of about $6.5 billion for the entire project before you lop off 
phase one. Is that about right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The cost range right now is--that's the 
upper end of the Government's cost range. At this stage in the 
game, because we don't have the design completed, we talk about 
ranges, a low-end and a high-end of the range. And that $6.5 
billion is there.
    Senator Alexander. So you might have design 90 percent 
complete by the fall, then it will take you another 3 or 4 
months to satisfy yourself that you got the right figure. And I 
assume the right schedule for project completion; is that 
right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. That's absolutely right. The cost, the 
schedule, and the scope. What we're actually going to 
accomplish will be a key part of that as well.
    Senator Alexander. So that might be early next year that 
you could say to Senator Feinstein and me and what the schedule 
is and what the cost objective is?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, but we would be happy to update you in 
the interim before then to give you an idea of how things look 
as we approach that time. Of course, with the President's 
official budget submittal in January of next year, my 
expectation is to make sure that that's formally documented in 
that particular timeframe.
    Senator Alexander. Well, that means you'll have to know in 
October and November.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, ideally, we'll have a pretty good 
sense in October and November, because we will have----
    Senator Alexander. So you'll be able to tell us about the 
same time you tell the Office of Management and Budget, which 
will probably be October, November, what you think it's going 
to be. And then you're going to confirm it within the next 2, 
3, or 4 months.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Sir. We want to do a validation 
process. It's not simply a matter of just taking what we get 
and just throwing it in there. We want to get external experts.
    And this is a key point that that was discussed earlier on 
project management, of establishing a very solid baseline of 
project management principles, which one of them is the 90 
percent design that we've talked about; having the right people 
in the job to get the job done.
    You brought this point up and, in fact, John Eschenberg in 
the audience here, who's a certified project manager at the 
highest levels, he's got a great reputation, he does fantastic 
work. We have him assigned particularly this project, establish 
the baseline, get it independently checked. And that's what we 
want. We want the independent validation.
    And then once we do that, kind of line up the funding, the 
project scope itself, and the right people, and then hold them 
accountable. And that'll be the key piece at the very end of 
this.
    Senator Alexander. Well, there's a competition going on for 
management of the Y12 project. And it's possible, it seems to 
me, that that competition could divert energy that ought to be 
directed toward keeping the project under cost and on budget. 
What's your plan to make sure that doesn't happen?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The plan to make sure that doesn't happen 
is the way we've structured the competition, by asking the 
people that propose, that would like to ultimately run our 
facility, two proposals, one is in which where we can sever out 
or cut out the UPF project from the project, if we needed to. 
So this will give the Government a number of options on how we 
can move forward.
    We also have a wonderful team that is there; Babcock & 
Wilcox and Bechtel that are working together. They both 
committed that this is--from their standpoint, their commitment 
is to make sure that taxpayers get the best value and that they 
have committed, no matter how the competition goes, to make 
sure that there if there is a transition, that the transition 
happens appropriately.
    Senator Alexander. The contractor was arguing that the 
longer we delayed UPF, the more money we wasted because of the 
inefficiency of the cost of security and operations. And anyone 
who visits there, as I have, could easily believe that. The 
numbers that I used to hear when we were talking about the 
whole project I believe were in the neighborhood of a couple of 
$100 million a year in extra costs to taxpayers for every year 
we delayed it.
    Now, if we're going to speed it up, we should be saving 
money, shouldn't we? If we get it done a year earlier, 
shouldn't we be saving as much as if we delayed it a year 
later?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We should expect to save money on two 
fronts. One is the fact that it's one less year of operating 
kind of in this less efficient way. And two is projects 
typically become more efficient if you compress the amount of 
time to actually do the project.
    In addition, the phasing that you had talked about earlier, 
Senator Alexander, will address a portion--it's not the 
complete collapse of the security footprint, because we are 
phasing it, because we want the most important part of the 
project, the 9212 capabilities piece, done early instead of--
we're going to move that up a few years, like 2\1/2\-years, 
3\1/2\-years timeframe.
    So we will save from an operational efficiency standpoint. 
We'll save some money from the security standpoint. We hope to 
do that in the near future by driving this H road right down 
the site and splitting it into two pieces.
    And we should be able to save some resources, particularly 
once the facility gets operational. Those savings typically, 
though, particularly on the latter, the security savings and 
the operational savings, won't happen until that phase is 
completed.
    Senator Alexander. Well, my last question on the UPF, and 
then in my next opportunity I want to talk about the plutonium 
facility and how you're going to deal with that.
    And this is the Chairman's prerogative to how she would 
like to do this, but I'd like to ask your advice about the 
example I used of when I was trying to get that highway built 
on time.
    You've got a number of people who are accountable to you, 
but it seems to me that, using good Navy procedure, that there 
ought to be a single person accountable to Senator Feinstein 
and to me for an on-time, on-budget project and that ought to 
be you.
    And that would mean, it seems to me, that it would be wise 
for us to have some session with you in 2 or 3 months just on 
this one project. And we may want to do it on others but just 
on this one. And say, find out how you're doing in preparing 
for it. And then about the time of the budget, it sounds like 
October or something, we need another one.
    And then once you come to us, and it sounds like it'll 
finally be at the end of the year, early next year, and say, 
``Okay, this is an X-cost project. This is our plan between now 
and 2019'', or whatever the number is, that we ought to meet on 
a regular, systematic basis, not to waste time, not too much, 
maybe a quarter, every quarter is enough, but for the sole 
purpose of a report about whether you're on time and whether 
you're on budget.
    And I don't think it's up to us then to get inside and 
figure out why you are and why you aren't. I mean, we could do 
that if we want, but we're not the managers of the project; in 
effect, you are.
    And that would be the discipline that I would think would 
be most likely for us to do our jobs in making sure we're 
saving taxpayers' money.
    What's your thought and your recommendation about how that 
process could be most useful?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I like that idea. I like the idea that you 
as ranking and Madam Chairman are interested in wanting to 
deliver this project. It helps me actually do that as well, 
knowing that it's time on your calendars.
    And I'm happy to do that. I would look forward to doing it.
    I think once we get this baseline, particularly, we should 
establish the kind of information that is important for both of 
you to hear and see and gain confidence in. And in fact, I 
would also even suggest at some point, time permitting, that at 
the right moment, we schedule a short visit down to the site 
itself. I think it would be very illuminating. And I don't 
think it has to happen every year, but I think maybe when we 
establish that point in the sand where we say, ``Okay, this is 
it,'' both your presence there would reinforce to our team, our 
colleagues, that this is serious business, that the Government 
is making a commitment, that we need a commitment, not just a 
contractual commitment, but a commitment to get this job done.
    Senator Alexander. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
    It is serious business. I mean, we're talking about 
billions of dollars here, and we just don't have billions of 
dollars. We've got a debt that has to be reduced, and we've got 
other urgent needs just within our own budget.
    Senator Feinstein. Right. Thank you very much. It's a good 
idea, Senator. And I'd be very pleased to participate.

                       NATIONAL LABORATORY COSTS

    Let me ask you, as long as we're on the subject of lab 
costs, it's my understanding that indirect costs at the 
national labs average 45 percent. I assume that this is 
overhead and administration.
    This seems to me to be inordinately high. Why would an 
average of indirect costs be 45 percent?
    Mr. D'Agostino. There are a couple of reasons. One is, the 
cost accounting standards, each laboratory approaches cost 
accounting, we ask them to manage and operate, so we will not 
dictate on the Federal side that you have to, you know, do 
things everywhere across the laboratories in the exact same 
way.
    However, each laboratory will then decide how it wants to 
attribute its costs for just the basic operation of the 
facility, whether it's turning on the lights, keeping the 
buildings painted, putting a roof on the facility, taking care 
of the grounds, the chief financial officer organization, the 
human capital office organization, these are high costs. We 
think they're very too high.
    And one way we are approaching to address this particular 
problem, because we realize it's a real problem, because 
ultimately the taxpayers are paying this particular cost, is 
we're looking at consolidation of contracts to see if like-
minded what we would call business functions, like human 
capital, procurement, general counsel, and the like, can be 
done in a more efficient way.
    And by integrating contracts and by asking our contractors 
to buy their equipment from a central procurement source, we 
can save money.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, I've asked GAO to take a look at 
this.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
    Senator Feinstein. So I'd like to ask that you work closely 
with them and that we get figures that the Senator and I can 
share and see what is really at the heart of this, because it's 
an inordinately high figure.

                        PLUTONIUM PIT PRODUCTION

    Let's talk a little bit about pit production. In 2007, the 
JASONs found that the plutonium in pits can last up to 100 
years without affecting nuclear weapons' performance. Recent 
assessments, I'm led to believe, may indicate that pit 
lifetimes may even approached 200 years.
    Has NNSA conducted pit-aging studies in the last 5 years?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Madam Chairman, we're continuing----
    Senator Feinstein. Yes or no?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay.
    Mr. D'Agostino. And I'm not familiar with the 200-year 
estimate that you've provided. But the original 100 years 
calculation that we did, and that JASON did validate it, as you 
suggest.
    Senator Feinstein. Could we please see the results of your 
pit-aging studies?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. In the last 5 years?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. It's continuous. Yes, of course.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. I'd like to see it.
    NNSA says that the current capacity of 10 to 20 pits per 
year is not enough. However, is there an identifiable need in 
the next 10 years to manufacture new pits? Given shrinking 
stockpiles, do we really need the capacity to produce 50 to 80 
new pits per year?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We believe our current capacity, which is 
roughly at about the 10 to 20 pit per year capacity, is enough 
to take care of the stockpile needs over the next decade. We'll 
work closely with the Defense Department.
    Senator Feinstein. Good. Okay, that's good to hear.
    Mr. D'Agostino. There will always be a question--the term 
you used, the 50 to 80 pits per year term, is an element of 
what we call a responsive infrastructure, which once there is 
confidence that we have a nuclear security infrastructure in 
place that can take care of the Nation's need, the number of 
reserve warheads that we would need to maintain could actually 
go down even further.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay, but for my purposes, what you're 
telling us is that for the next 20 years, the 10 to 20 percent 
figure is enough, 10 to 20 pits is enough.
    Mr. D'Agostino. No, Ma'am. I would say in the next 10 
years, we're confident that we take care of the--is enough, and 
that, in all likelihood, that can be stretched to 15 years, 
because we have a pretty good sense of the kind of work that we 
need to do.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. That's what I want to know. We'll 
write it down and hold you to it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right. What I'd like to just add, if I 
could, because, unfortunately, some of these, you'd like to 
make these black and white. Some of them aren't so black and 
white.
    We're in the process of conducting a study called the W78 
and W88 life-extension study, you recall. And an element of 
that study will be to examine what is needed from a plutonium 
need for the country. That study is not done, so I don't want 
to make a presumption or force our laboratories into saying you 
can only come up with solutions that do the following.
    The laboratories need to be free to examine all options 
then bring options before the Government to decide which is the 
right approach. So we'll have an opportunity on this.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay, good.

                        LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

    The W76 makes up the largest share of our nuclear deterrent 
on the survivable leg of the triad--nuclear submarines. Yet, 
the fiscal year 2013 budget request cuts the W76 life extension 
program by $81 million, and it delays completion by 3 years. My 
understanding is that this funding was shifted to support the 
B61 life extension program. Why did you make that decision?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We recognize that it's important to take 
care of the W76 and the B61. Particularly, the B61 is entering 
into a phase of work where the workload will increase if we are 
going to meet our milestone data 2019.
    When we looked at the impacts of the fiscal year 2012 
appropriation and the Budget Control Act from last summer, we 
recognize that we need to balance across all our programs.
    Senator Feinstein. But what effect will this have on the 
W76 in the Navy?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, the Navy's warhead, we're going to do 
the production requirements to meet the Navy's operational 
needs, which will take care of the Navy's needs by, I believe, 
it's the 2018 timeframe.
    And what we will have done is then shifted so that the 
warheads that need to be on the submarines for sure are going 
to be taken care of. We're going to meet the production 
requirements with that.
    Senator Feinstein. So the Navy's needs are met.
    Mr. D'Agostino. The Navy's operational needs are met, but 
we need to also finish the refurbishment on the systems that 
are not actually going to be deployed out on--and we're going 
to do that. That's going to take a few more years.
    But the key is to make sure the Navy's operational needs 
are met.
    Senator Feinstein. And the Navy is accepting of this 
transfer?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The Nuclear Weapons Council, which has 
elements of the Defense Department, the senior officials from 
the Defense Department who are responsible for this area, have 
agreed that this is an approach. I will add that that doesn't 
mean that everybody in the Navy thinks this is the right thing 
to do.
    But the reality is when we've examined all of the options, 
when we took a look at our desire to make sure that the Navy's 
operational needs are met, that the proposal that we put 
forward is one that makes sense.
    I will also add, though, that we're working very closely 
with the Defense Department this summer because--in fact, not 
right now, but we're working right now through the summer to 
make sure that we fully understand and agree on the fiscal year 
2014 to fiscal year 2022 timeframe, make sure that that plan is 
all laid out.
    Senator Feinstein. And this will not increase the cost of 
the W76?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, there will be, most likely probably a 
slight cost increase, because we've had to stretch the 
production out over a few more years, because we're completing 
the warheads a little bit later than we had wanted to. So we 
have to maintain a little bit of that infrastructure in place.
    But I don't think it's that significant. We can give you 
our best analysis on that, probably in a question for the 
record, to give you a sense of that.
    Senator Feinstein. Yes, would you please do that?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Ma'am.

           LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY PLUTONIUM FACILITY

    Senator Feinstein. I want to speak about the termination or 
delay of two projects after spending a $1.5 billion on them. 
And you can, of course, guess what they are. One is Savannah 
River, and the other is the new plutonium facility at Los 
Alamos that's now been delayed by at least 5 years.
    Why did you delay the construction? These are multi-billion 
dollar facilities. So you spend money and then stop. I don't 
understand it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, there's a couple of things. We 
learned a lot in the last year, and some things have changed. 
And I'll describe the changes from last year to this year that 
led us to conclude, led me to conclude, because it's my 
decision in submitting this to the Secretary and ultimately 
then to the White House.
    The things that changed, and I apologize in advance for 
maybe getting down the level of detail. We built part of the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility already. 
It's called the radiation building. It's the radiological 
building that is done. It's built, and it's in place.
    Senator Feinstein. Are you talking about Savannah River?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Oh, no, I'll just start off with the--I can 
start with Savannah River.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, whichever.
    Mr. D'Agostino. We're starting off with the Los Alamos, New 
Mexico, plutonium facility.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay.
    Mr. D'Agostino. That particular facility, the radiation 
building, which already exists, which you appropriated 
resources for and we built, was originally only going to handle 
extremely small quantities of plutonium. And it will still 
handle small quantities of plutonium.
    But the analysis that was done, the safety analysis that 
was done for that particular facility was done at a time--did 
not use what we would call modern, up-to-date internationally 
accepted dose conversion factors.
    Now, this term dose conversion factor, this is somewhat of 
a technical term, but translated it means how would you convert 
material in the building to an actual dose that a human being 
might receive if they were exposed to this material.
    In modern dose conversion factors, in the past year, we've 
shifted our approach to doing the safety analysis to use the 
most up-to-date, modern, internationally accepted dose 
conversation factors. That one simple change alone allowed us 
to shift the amount of plutonium we can have in this radiation 
building, which already exists, from small gram quantities, 
like 4 to 6 grams, up to higher gram quantities, like 34 to 39 
grams of plutonium.
    It doesn't sound like a lot of plutonium, and it's not a 
lot of plutonium. But that one change alone will allow us to do 
the analysis in the radiation building that we didn't think we 
could do there.
    And in essence, it's a very significant increase in the 
amount of work we can do in this radiation building. That takes 
a tremendous amount of pressure off the desire to have the 
nuclear facility built and up and operating quickly, which was 
a big item.
    The second change from last----
    Senator Feinstein. I'm not understanding.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
    Senator Feinstein. So you're saying that based on this new 
acceptable dose conversion factor----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. That you can now process 
more plutonium. Therefore, the new facility is not necessary. 
Is that what you're saying?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The new facility, the need for the new 
facility to take care of those items by the year--early 2020s, 
the pressure is off to get that done. We can actually use the 
facility that we have built already.
    Before this, we didn't have this modern dose conversion 
factor piece in there. At some point in the future, and this is 
why we've deferred it; we haven't canceled Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research (CMR). The Nation will need a facility that 
can consolidate all of these functions.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. We've got $1.5 billion worth of 
facilities here, right? These two facilities? Over the last 10 
years, $800 million has been spent on design of the new 
facility.
    My understanding is that now you find you don't need it, 
and that the other facility is going to be used. Is that right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We are going to use--we believe we can 
delay, defer the decision on building the actual facility, 
because we have flexibility as a result of this analysis, as 
you've correctly described.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. And you're $800 million into it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. We are----
    Senator Feinstein. Over 10 years, over the past 10 years.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Over the past 10-year period, we spent a 
significant amount of money in doing the analysis, because we 
didn't have the modern dose conversion factors.
    In fact, we had earlier on, 10 years ago, the production 
rates were higher, because the size of the stockpile was 
different and was more. There was a time many years ago that 
there was a discussion of a thing called the modern pit 
facility, which was going to make plutonium pits. That is off 
the table.
    And in fact, because of----
    Senator Feinstein. Yes, the plutonium pits----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Because we've been illuminated by longer 
pit aging, because we've now been illuminated by the fact that 
we have a very significant and different financial environment, 
because we know that we have a lot of material out of the 
plutonium vault in the existing plutonium facility that the 
laboratory has cleaned up, the pressure to start today on two 
large, very expensive facilities, that pressure has been 
reduced.
    And so we've decided to focus our attention on the most 
critical, that thing that limits us most operationally, which 
is the uranium capability.
    That's on the Savannah River side. I think your second part 
of your question dealt with--asked the question on the Savannah 
River side.
    Also, from the standpoint, we benefited in some respects, 
and the Secretary made a decision last year to integrate--not 
integrate but to have both the environmental management 
organization and the NNSA report to one position, this Under 
Secretary for Nuclear Security.
    Working with the Environmental Management (EM) 
organization, the NNSA looked at fully utilizing the H Canyon 
facility in order to provide some plutonium feedstock, as well 
as fully utilizing the Los Alamos facility for the feedstock 
itself.
    This is probably the other $700 million that you described 
on the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF).
    Senator Feinstein. $700 million over 13 years.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right. So what we wanted to do is take 
advantage of the fact that we've gotten--the NNSA received 4 
metric tons of material of feed from the EM organization. We're 
going to use the H Canyon to make a certain amount of material. 
And we're going to take advantage of the Los Alamos capability.
    That takes the pressure off having this large PDCF. They 
don't make sense----
    Senator Feinstein. I just want you to understand that if 
it's been $700 million over 13 years to design a facility that 
you terminate, and then $800 million over 10 years. That's $1.5 
billion essentially wasted.
    I mean, that's the way I see it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Ma'am. I make the decisions----
    Senator Feinstein. Based on what you----
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. Based on what I know.

                  UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION

    Senator Feinstein. I understand that. We haven't even 
gotten to USEC yet. You want to do that on top of this?
    Let's do USEC for a minute.
    Given the uncertainty about the future of operations, my 
understanding is that there's a one-time cost of $150 million 
in fiscal year 2013, and that is it. Is that correct?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Ma'am. I've talked to Secretary Chu 
about this, most recently even yesterday. We have a request for 
the transfer authority in fiscal year 2012 coupled with the 
fiscal year 2013 request that is in the nonproliferation budget 
for $150 million to do the demonstration project.
    Senator Feinstein. Have things improved?
    Mr. D'Agostino. With the ability----
    Senator Feinstein. Has management improved?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The management, in this environment, we 
would only agree to move forward in this area is if a 
consortium of companies came together with USEC in order to----
    Senator Feinstein. We're aware of that, because we had a 
big discussion, and I know the Senator is well aware, and I am, 
too.
    But the question is, has it made a difference?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, because we don't have the consortium 
in place, and we haven't started the----
    Senator Feinstein. It isn't in place?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, not to my knowledge. Until we have 
the----
    Senator Feinstein. Can you refresh my memory? Because we 
went over this----
    Senator Alexander. Well, it seems to me, Madam Chairman, 
isn't the idea that the research and development (R&D) project 
is ready to be demonstrated for 2 years. And we're going to run 
it for 2 years and see if it can operate at a level of 
efficiency the DOE regards as adequate, both in terms of its 
successes in operation and its ability to acquire materials?
    Senator Feinstein. We're funding it for 1 year.
    Senator Alexander. The transfer authority did 1 year and 
then we fund it for another. And that's the two $150 million 
that we were all caught up in with the late requests that we 
got last year.
    But somebody has got to be in charge of the facility today.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, absolutely. USEC is in charge of the 
facility today.
    Senator Alexander. And who's going to be in charge of the 
2-year test? Is that what's not put together yet?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, we have to, with great respect, we're 
waiting for the transfer authority. I mean, obviously, this is 
complicated. The Congress and the Administration have to do 
this together.
    Senator Alexander. Yes.
    Mr. D'Agostino. We don't have the transfer authority in 
place unless something happened recently that I'm not aware of. 
And so, therefore, moving forward on the exact mechanism is 
going to take a little bit of time.
    Senator Alexander. So you're saying first we have to 
provide the money and then you have to put together the team to 
figure out whether the project works?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, there are things happening in 
parallel. We won't do this first and then second and then 
third, because we don't have the time for that kind of an 
approach.
    Senator Feinstein. We didn't fund it with all those 
discussions?
    Senator Alexander. No, we didn't. And they're asking----
    Senator Feinstein. We made an offer to the House. The House 
turned it down.
    Mr. D'Agostino. That's correct.
    Senator Feinstein. So we didn't fund it.
    Senator Alexander. Right.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Alexander. They've asked for transfer authority to 
go with some other money to take care of what would have been 
year 1, and they put in the 2013 budget another $150 million 
for year 2.
    And at the end of that, we're supposed to know if it works 
or it doesn't. And if it does, then it's up to the Department 
to recommend where we go from there.
    Mr. D'Agostino. That's right. But I would also propose for 
something like this, we would want, not just at the end but 
throughout the process, we, you know, on a periodic basis, 
frankly, whether it's quarterly or maybe even more frequently 
than that, we communicate officially back to the committee in 
this particular area, once we get started.
    The planning work has started.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, have you stockpiled low-enriched 
uranium for tritium?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We are set. We have commitments for a 
number of years into the future, 5 years into the future. We're 
fine for tritium production for the next 5 years in the future.
    We can do obligation exchanges to take care--what's known 
as flag swapping, taking material and making sure that it's 
domestically produced material that we can use it for national 
security purposes, that will take care for about another 5 more 
years.
    But it's not just the tritium production piece that's 
important, an element of this. But from a tritium production 
standpoint over the next number of--a decade or so, as I've 
described, there are ways through this, but----
    Senator Feinstein. Without USEC, is that what you're 
saying?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I don't want to call it a particular 
company. I'm talking without an indigenous U.S. capability, 
which of course USEC right now is the only indigenous U.S. 
capability. It doesn't mean another company can't step in to do 
this.
    Senator Feinstein. So what is your prognosis? As you know, 
this keeps going back and forth and back and forth. Candidly, I 
don't know whether this facility can produce or not. And yet, 
you've requested $150 million.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I mean, the American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) 
project is one that the Department and the USEC organization 
have been working on. There's been some successes, and some 
areas where improvements are needed.
    The key is, the concern that we have, of course, is making 
sure, since it is the only technology----
    Senator Feinstein. What are the successes?
    Mr. D'Agostino. What are the successes?
    Senator Feinstein. Yes.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I would say the success is the fact that 
we've operated and trained a number of centrifuges for periods 
of time. I don't have the exact lengths of time off the top of 
my head, but we can get that for you, for periods of time and 
successfully spun the centrifuges. And there have been some 
very significant challenges.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, the Iranians are doing that, too.

                           NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

    I mean, in any event, let me go to an easier topic, nuclear 
smuggling.
    NNSA plans to cut $171 million from efforts to install 
detection equipment at strategic international borders and 
shipping ports.
    What's the reason for the cut and the reason for the 
``strategic pause''?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, there's multiple reasons, one of 
which I mentioned of having to do with challenges. When we look 
at the overall scope of work that has to happen in the 
nonproliferation arena, the most important part of the 
nonproliferation scope, the absolutely most important part, is 
securing the material at its location or removing the material 
from its location.
    And, of course, we just can't do this ourselves. We have to 
get agreement by our partner countries in order to make this 
particular thing happen. And so the emphasis is placed on the 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative program, because we're 
absolutely deeply committed to achieving the President's charge 
to us.
    With your support, we've been very successful to finish the 
first slice of dealing with the most vulnerable material.
    The second line of defense program helps significantly in 
the transfer, illicit transferring of material around the 
world. And we've done a significant amount, and we will have, 
with this budget, more than 500 sites around the world complete 
a significant amount of this work.
    The pause allows us to, in essence, evaluate whether or not 
just combinations of capabilities and programs from across the 
agency can be done in a different way.
    We've been doing second line of defense in this manner now 
for, I would say, close to a decade in this approach. And it's 
normal when you're doing something in a consistent way for a 
long period of time and had successes in installation, and, 
frankly, we had some successes in finding material to evaluate. 
Do we keep doing things the same way out well out into the 
future or not?
    We're going to focus on increasing our mobile detection 
efforts, because we recognize that when we established fixed-
site radiation detectors, the obvious question is, is, well, 
you've just told the smugglers that this is a place where 
you've got radiation detectors, they're just not going to go 
there. They're going to go somewhere else or they're going to 
go around.
    So an element of the pause is to put in place mobile 
detection capability to ensure that the whole border areas are 
covered.
    And so it's a confluence of budget and the like----
    Senator Feinstein. You talked about buildings. You had a 
goal of securing 8,500 buildings by 2025, and that slipped by 
10 years to 2035. Is that for the same reason or that you just 
can't do it?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, it's somewhat of the same reason, but 
it's also the fact that to make sure that the resource, the 
limited resources, we have are applied on the highest risk 
activities, which is not just securing some of the building.
    The numbers you mentioned, Ma'am, are dealing with 
radiological materials in many cases, which are different than 
nuclear materials. The nuclear material is fissionable 
materials that can turn into a mushroom cloud. The radiological 
materials are hazardous, but in a radiological dirty device. So 
they can cause some contamination spread, which would be 
expensive to clean up, but it's different than the mushroom 
cloud problem.
    So given a limited, finite set of dollars, the 
preponderance of our resources should be focused on dealing 
with the improvised nuclear device or nuclear materials, not 
just radiological materials.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, Mr. D'Agostino, you certainly have 
a difficult portfolio.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Ma'am, I'd agree.
    Senator Feinstein. I don't know why any nation would want 
to go nuclear.
    Senator.
    Senator Alexander. Yes, Ma'am. I've got three questions, if 
I may.

                     NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION

    One is the United States DOD and the President have said in 
their so-called 1251 figure that we need $372 billion more for 
nuclear weapons modernization than your budget recommends, even 
though your budget recommends $363 billion more than we spent 
in the current year--than we're spending in the current year.
    What can you say to the DOD and to the group of defense 
experts who said we need $372 billion more? Were they wrong? 
Have they changed their mind? Or do you have some other way to 
meet what they say is important for the Nation's defense?
    And I'm assuming most of the questions about it would come 
from your decision to delay the additional facilities for 
plutonium in New Mexico, because that's where about $300 of the 
$373 billion comes from. In other words, how are you going to 
do the work in plutonium that they say needs to be done to 
adequately secure the Nation's defense?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay, if I could start off with saying the 
DOD and the Nuclear Weapons Council support the President's 
budget, support this program.
    All of our organizations are larger organizations, so there 
may be folks that aren't happy with the fact that we have 
stepped off of----
    Senator Alexander. So they've adjusted their view, they 
have amended the 1251 number, those people you just mentioned? 
The DOD, the----
    Mr. D'Agostino. I don't know about the whole Department. I 
know about the Under Secretaries and the four-star officers on 
the Nuclear Weapons Council. Those are----
    Senator Alexander. Well, who provided us with the 1251 
number? That was part of a review?
    Mr. D'Agostino. That was both the DOE and the DOD that 
provided that.
    Senator Alexander. Now have the Departments amended that 
number?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We will be. And this is the study we're 
doing with the DOD to make sure that our out-year budgets, the 
fiscal year 2014 through 2022, 2023 budgets, because we do owe 
the Congress a plan.
    Senator Alexander. So the answer is yes, you're going to 
amend the 1251 budget, 1251 number. Then how are you going to 
do what needs to be done with plutonium with at the lower 
estimate level and with the deferral of the facility?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Sure. One element of how we're going to do 
this is by doing more work inside the radiological building 
that's already built.
    Senator Alexander. Which you described.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Which I described earlier. And that is an 
element of the resources that Madam Chairman was asking 
earlier, you know, was this a waste.
    Senator Alexander. So you do more work in an existing 
building. Are you going to produce, are you going to refurbish 
fewer pits or manufacture fewer pits?
    Mr. D'Agostino. We're going to take care and we're going to 
do the surveillance as we always do on the plutonium pits that 
we have. We have a PF facility called PF4 that exists, and 
we're going to take advantage of that.
    That was always the case. What we've done in the last year, 
the piece I hadn't described adequately, was--the big thing 
that changed in the last year as well, aside from this decision 
to be able to do more work in the existing radiologic facility, 
is we've reduced the amount of material that Los Alamos was 
keeping in its plutonium vault.
    In essence, the laboratory did a fantastic job in cleaning 
out, if you will--I use that term ``cleaning out''; it's not a 
technical term--but making sure that they only have material in 
the vault that they need in order to do their job. And the 
material that they don't need is appropriately dispositioned, 
whether it goes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
facility also in New Mexico or is put in a different area that 
the vault space is--the pressure on having a large vault, which 
CMR was going to give us, the nuclear facility was going to 
give us, the pressure on having a large vault right away has 
been taken--the notch has been taken down.
    But because we can use the device assembly facility for 
staging in Nevada, and because we plan on using the Superblock 
Facility at Lawrence Livermore for very small amounts of 
experimental work in the Superblock facility.
    So it's what I described earlier, which is this idea of 
operating in an integrated and interdependent----
    Senator Alexander. Well, just to boil it down, are you 
going to be processing fewer pits than you otherwise would 
have, otherwise were planning?
    Mr. D'Agostino. No, we will process the same amount of 
pits, which processing means doing surveillance on them, taking 
them apart, looking at them, making sure that they're okay.
    Senator Alexander. What about manufacturing?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Manufacturing pits, we have the capability 
to manufacture about 10 pits per year now. With a few small 
upgrades, we can move that number up to 20 pits per year.
    I believe that depending on the outcome of the W78 study, 
and if we maintain kind of this 10- to 20-pit per year capacity 
and working with the Defense Department on the overall size of 
the stockpile that that will take care of the need, the 
operational need to stockpile.
    Senator Alexander. So manufacturing 10 or 20 and then 
otherwise processing an additional number of pits.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Processing for surveillance, to do the 
surveillance work.

                  UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION

    Senator Alexander. Right. Let me shift quickly to my other 
two.
    Just to summarize the chairman's questions about USEC, I 
mean, basically, this centrifuge project is completed to the 
point where we need to know whether it works or not. Isn't that 
the argument?
    And the request is for a $150 million in the current year 
and next year to do an R&D deployment and assess whether it's 
ready to go. Isn't that basically right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. It's basically right, but it includes the, 
essentially, I'll call it the purchase--this R&D program to buy 
and train a set, a small production grouping of these 
centrifuges, and make sure that they work together.
    Senator Alexander. Yes, enough of them to make a judgment 
about whether it's been successful or not, this project.
    Mr. D'Agostino. And then to ensure that the taxpayer is 
protected in this area, that that intellectual property comes 
back to the department because----
    Senator Alexander. Yes, we understand that.
    But the point is to find out, at the end of 2 years, you 
should be able to say, unfortunately, this project on which we 
have spent billions of dollars doesn't work well enough to go 
forward with it, or, fortunately, it does and this is what we 
propose to do with it at this point.
    Is that----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Alexander. Is that basically right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. That's about right, Sir.
    Senator Alexander. And then, now, if I've got this right, 
you don't have the budget for cleanup, environmental cleanup, 
but you've got the management responsibility. Is that right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, the Environmental Management 
organization works for me. I'm keeping the Environmental 
Management and the NNSA budgets separate. There's two separate 
accounts, because it's very important--we have a significant 
amount of environmental management work.
    So, yes, the Environmental Management budget is part of my 
portfolio.

                          RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP

    Senator Alexander. It comes to you.
    Well, that's very important and another part, Madam 
Chairman, of making good use of the taxpayer dollars. Shrewd 
decisions and careful priorities in cleanup could make a huge 
difference not just in the safety of Americans, but in how 
wisely we spend the money, for example, in the case of the Y-12 
facility.
    I know that you're making some decisions to get certain 
buildings out of the security compound to reduce security costs 
and to permit us to clean them up more rapidly. You're 
finishing up, I know at least in the Oakridge area, a huge 
amount of radiological cleanup. And we've talked about the 
importance of beginning to move ahead with a plan to deal with 
the mercury problem in the Oakridge area, which is a very large 
problem.
    So I would like to receive assurances from you that you 
will continue to focus on finishing the radiological cleanup 
and be flexible in terms of spending the dollars to move as 
rapidly ahead so we can, A, develop a plan, and, B, get started 
on the long-term mercury cleanup.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, I'd be glad to do that. The U-233 
project I think is the radiological project that you talked 
about.
    Senator Alexander. Yes.
    Mr. D'Agostino. And that's a real demonstration of how two 
organizations can and, frankly, should work together. It was as 
the result of pushing--or Bill Brinkman and I--Bill Brinkman 
runs the Office of Science--and I have the other piece of 
working together and saying we have to finish this job. 
Fortunately, I have a colleague like Bill in this area, and we 
were able to do it with his help.
    Senator Alexander. Madam Chairman, I have no other 
questions.

                       AMERICAN CENTRIFUGE PLANT

    Senator Feinstein. Okay. I'm afraid I do.
    Let's go back to last June at USEC. What blew up?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Last June at USEC. I don't know, Madam 
Chairman. I will have to check. I wasn't given responsibility 
at that particular point.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, didn't the centrifuges blow up?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I don't know if I would use the term ``blow 
up''. We had, I think, as I understand it, there were some 
issues with the centrifuges spinning in a way that was not 
conducive to their operation at all.
    Senator Feinstein. Sorry.
    Welcome to the United States Government.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, if when you have somebody that has 
my job called the Nuclear Security Administration, I don't 
usually use the words ``blow up'' too often. So I'm aware that 
sometimes I can be--that term could get--if I use the term 
``blow up''----
    Senator Feinstein. Let me put it in another way.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
    Senator Feinstein. Were they all incapacitated?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Were they all incapacitated?
    Senator Feinstein. The centrifuges.
    Mr. D'Agostino. We'll have to take that for the record. I 
don't know.
    Senator Feinstein. Because it seems to me, before we fund 
something, we ought to know where things are.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. I'd glad to come up, once I get 
the data, with my colleagues from the nuclear energy 
organization to explain where things are with the ACP, 
absolutely.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay. I would appreciate that very much, 
because, you know, we went through this. All the vibrations 
that I get from the commentary is we're right where we were. 
And yet, has the plant been operating?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, the plant has--I mean, pieces of the 
plant had been operating. I couldn't tell you which pieces are. 
USEC continues to do work on the ACP project to tackle the 
problem.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, I'd like to know what's working 
and what isn't working.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Sure. Absolutely.
    Senator Feinstein. Before we fund it. I'm really serious.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. I think that's a fair question.
    Senator Alexander. Madam Chairman, if I could add, I mean, 
isn't the question, is the project ready to receive funding for 
a 2-year demonstration about whether it works or not. I mean, 
isn't that what we're talking about? That was the whole project 
purpose of the 2-year project, was to see whether all this 
research and effort over the last several years----
    Senator Feinstein. Candidly, I thought it began. Now what 
I'm finding out is that it may not have. I don't know whether 
the plant went totally down, whether the centrifuges went 
totally down last June, but there certainly was a big 
interruption.
    I mean, if it can't operate, why fund it? If it doesn't 
operate well, why fund it when, as I understand it, there are 
other methods of handling the problem?
    Senator Alexander. Well, it could be, Madam Chairman, 
that--I mean, that's certainly a logical--we got a late request 
for 2 years of $150 million that surprised us, correct?
    Senator Feinstein. Correct.
    Senator Alexander. And we weren't--it came late in the 
process, and we tried to help but could not. Because we 
couldn't fund it, I suppose that produced--you couldn't move 
ahead, would be my guess. And I guess the question I'd like to 
know the answer to, too, is if are you ready for us to fund it? 
And if so, can you show us why?
    Mr. D'Agostino. And the answer would be, we believe that 
moving forward that we will be ready to show you why we can 
move forward with this deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) 
project. I don't have the data here to tell you exactly how 
many centrifuges are spinning, do we have all of the problems 
solved.
    But the key for us is, USEC has been working on this 
project for a number of years, as we've discussed, that it is 
the best technology available, we believe the best approach to 
move forward on maintaining an indigenous U.S. capability. 
That's absolutely critical for not just the tritium reason, 
recognizing that's not a problem that we have to make tritium, 
make low-enriched uranium for tritium today. But it takes time 
in order to take us from a D&D project, a 2-year effort, to 
ultimately turning into a capability that the Nation can rely 
upon to take care of its needs out into the future.
    And that's why we believe it's important to move forward 
with this D&D project, but if at some point in working with the 
Congress, it isn't something that the Congress is willing to 
do, we will have to explore other paths and take back the 
technology and use a different approach.
    Senator Feinstein. How many people are working there now 
and how is it funded?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I'll have to take that one for the record. 
I don't know the number of people that are working there now 
and the details of funding.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Feinstein. All right. At this point, this is a 
serious concern. We had to grapple with it, and we tried to 
solve what was an immediate problem. We made the offer to the 
House; nothing happened.
    I don't know how they're functioning. I don't know how 
they're paying for functioning. I don't know whether they are 
functioning and producing.
    Mr. D'Agostino. As I understand it----
    Senator Feinstein. I don't know how many people they 
employ. I heard it was a couple of thousand people. So it's 
kind of like a shadow, and I think we need to flesh it out.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]

            Questions Submitted by Chairman Dianne Feinstein

                       NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) is 
supposed to achieve ignition in September 2012. Some experts believe 
that NIF will not achieve ignition by September.
    What are the prospects for ignition at NIF?
    Answer. The timeframe for achieving ignition is impossible to 
predict with our current scientific understanding. Demonstrating fusion 
ignition has always been recognized to be a grand scientific challenge. 
The National Ignition Campaign (NIC), a multilaboratory, multiyear 
effort devoted to this pursuit, although producing many significant 
advances, has yet to accomplish three key milestones on the pathway to 
ignition. The milestone to create significant self-heating (``lighting 
the match'') and the ignition milestone itself were recently delayed by 
3 months each, and the milestone to exceed 5 million joules of fusion 
yield has been dropped from the campaign. The campaign is scheduled to 
end at the close of fiscal year 2012. It is imperative that the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program understands the physics underlying 
National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) inability to achieve 
indirect-drive ignition thus far, and in doing so, assess the important 
fundamental issues relevant to ignition. Through the current campaign, 
the NIC team has gained insights into the challenges of developing the 
scientific, technological, and engineering basis for indirect-drive 
ignition and has regularly communicated the technical progress to the 
broader scientific communities through a number of reviews and refereed 
papers. An in-depth scientific understanding of the ignition target 
performance and its deviations from computer model predictions is 
critically important and will inform our subsequent decisions relative 
to the stockpile and further ignition attempts. Gaining that 
understanding while continuing to conduct important stockpile 
stewardship experiments that do not rely on an igniting capsule will be 
the priority for the next few years.
    Question. Has NNSA developed a plan B to maximize the use of this 
$3.5 billion facility?
    Answer. The experimental and simulation work required to resolve 
the issues remaining after fiscal year 2012 will be based on 
information derived from an evaluation of experimental results from the 
NIC. A process is well underway to stand up a Federal advisory 
committee to provide independent advice to NNSA regarding Stockpile 
Stewardship including the future conduct of the Inertial Confinement 
Fusion (ICF) program and ignition activities. Once established, NNSA 
will charge the Federal advisory committee or a subcommittee thereof 
with evaluating the progress on the NIF and providing advice on the 
evaluation, selection, and pursuit of alternative approaches to 
ignition. In the intervening time, the NNSA is continuing with plans to 
conduct the next NIC review in May using a combination of Federal staff 
members and outside scientists who served on the panel under former 
Under Secretary Koonin. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
has also planned and invited national and international participants 
for a workshop on ignition science in May to be co-chaired by Dr. 
William Goldstein and Dr. Robert Rosner. NNSA will observe and will use 
the output of this workshop as one input for the report to the Congress 
due in November 2012 on impediments to ignition and the path forward. 
NNSA is soliciting ideas for alternative approaches to ignition, and 
for one of these, polar direct drive, has Q2 and Q4 fiscal year 2012 
milestones to develop a proposed scientific plan.
    Question. How much longer can NIF support stockpile stewardship 
work without ignition?
    Answer. NNSA has invested in a balanced stewardship program that 
includes:
  --underground nuclear test re-analysis;
  --Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC); and
  --hydrodynamic, nuclear, and non-ignition high-energy-density physics 
        experimental capabilities that when combined provide necessary 
        tools to assess and certify the stockpile in the near term.
    In the longer term, it is imperative that the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program understands the physics underlying the challenges encountered 
during the campaign to achieve indirect-drive ignition, and in doing 
so, assesses the fundamental issues relevant to ignition and whether 
they might impact our understanding of simulating high energy density 
plasmas. Ignition provides a critical capability needed to explore 
physical regimes of matter previously only achievable in a nuclear 
weapon. This capability will inform decisions that will be required for 
the future stockpile in the latter half of this decade. Achieving 
ignition on NIF would potentially open a larger range of design choices 
for increased safety and security, but more constrained design options 
do not negate stewardship. Emphasizing this point, in its April 2010 
report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee 
on Appropriations, U.S. Senate entitled ``Nuclear Weapons--Actions 
Needed to Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and Management 
Weaknesses at the National Ignition Facility,'' the GAO concluded 
``failure to achieve ignition in fiscal year 2012 would not immediately 
impact NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, but further delays could 
limit NNSA's options for maintaining the stockpile''.
    Question. Is it possible that NIF will never achieve ignition?
    Answer. The timeframe for achieving ignition is impossible to 
predict with our current scientific understanding, and therefore, yes 
it is possible that in its current design, ignition may never be 
achieved. ICF Program participants, who have the principal purpose of 
providing experimental capabilities to validate NNSA's nuclear weapons 
codes in unprecedented regimes, are engaged in reconciling NIC 
experimental data with predictions; they also have begun planning for 
alternate approaches to ignition and preparing for enhanced utilization 
of ICF facilities for a wide array of SSP-relevant experimental 
activities. The Office of Defense Science through its Science Campaigns 
is developing programmatic plans for fiscal year 2013 and beyond under 
both ignition and non-ignition scenarios. Ignition, or understanding 
the obstacles to it, will remain a significant goal for NNSA. It 
supports multiple aims within the Predictive Capability Framework of 
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.

                         CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, NNSA has just terminated or delayed 2 
major construction projects--a plutonium facility at Los Alamos and a 
pit disassembly and conversion facility at Savannah River--after 
spending $1.5 billion only to conclude that it could use existing 
facilities to meet mission requirements. (NA-20 needs to provide PDCF 
info).
    If these existing facilities were available, why did NNSA pursue 
the construction of these multibillion dollar facilities?
    Answer. The use of existing facilities to meet mission requirements 
is a choice precipitated by the realities of the current fiscal 
environment. NNSA is fully committed to being responsible stewards of 
taxpayer dollars and doing our part in a time of fiscal austerity.
    The decisions related to the deferral of the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) are designed 
to ensure that NNSA is building a capabilities-based enterprise focused 
on needs and solutions while achieving President Obama's nuclear 
security objectives with the funding that is available. The decision to 
defer the construction of the CMRR-NF for at least 5 years was not an 
easy one, but it was assessed that, given budget constraints, other 
programs were a higher priority. Moreover, every effort has been made 
to mitigate the risks inherent in this decision, to include the use of 
existing infrastructure to provide for some of the capabilities 
originally planned for the CMRR-NF. Deferring a major construction 
project and opting to use current infrastructure carries an inherent 
programmatic risk that NNSA accepts in a time of constrained budgets. 
Use of existing infrastructure to provide analytical chemistry, 
materials characterization, and storage capabilities is not a final, 
nor preferred, solution but requires additional efforts to optimize 
equipment sets in both the newly constructed Radiological Laboratory/
Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) and Plutonium Facility-4 (PF-4). While 
NNSA accepts the programmatic risk associated with deferral of the 
CMRR-NF, it will continue to mitigate the current operational risks 
associated with the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility by 
continuing orderly phase out of program activities targeted for 
completion in 2019.
    Question. What is the return on the taxpayer investment after 
spending $1.5 billion on these projects?
    Answer. Through fiscal year 2011 the CMRR project received 
approximately $640 million and in fiscal year 2012 another $200 million 
with the stipulation that no construction for the NF begin in fiscal 
year 2012. Of the funds appropriated through fiscal year 2012, 
approximately $363 million provided for the first two phases of the 
CMRR project, the construction of the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/
Office Building and RLUOB Equipment Installation (REI). Through March 
2012 approximately $362 million was spent on design of the third phase 
of the CMRR project, the CMRR-NF. A portion of the remaining fiscal 
year 2012 project funds provides for the close out of CMRR-NF design 
activities. Responsible close out of CMRR-NF design activities in 
fiscal year 2012 provides:
  --Enhanced insight into the seismology at Los Alamos and its impacts 
        to design of nuclear facilities.
  --A design product that incorporates lessons learned during CMRR-NF 
        design and the design, construction, and equipment installation 
        of the RLUOB.
  --Analysis of the programmatic and support equipment needed for 
        enduring capabilities in analytical chemistry and materials 
        characterization.
  --Improved understanding of the safety equipment requirements of a 
        Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility for any future Hazard 
        Category 2 facilities.
    Question. What has NNSA done to avoid these issues in the future?
    Answer. NNSA plans and programs for new construction projects 
through its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
activities, and relies on program-specific prioritization efforts like 
the Construction Working Group in Defense Programs. Large scale, unique 
nuclear projects like the plutonium facility at Los Alamos and the pit 
disassembly and conversion facility at Savannah River have inherent 
risks to scope, schedule, and cost. In the future, NNSA will continue 
to sharpen its risk analysis in order to inform sound resource 
decisions that support national program priorities. While NNSA works 
with the Congress, the Department of Defense, the Office of Management 
and Budget, and other stakeholders to align priorities with anticipated 
out-year funding profiles, unforeseen events may require NNSA to make 
difficult budget decisions.
    Question. Domestic uranium enrichment technology is needed to 
produce tritium for nuclear weapons.
    Given the uncertainty about the future of operations of domestic 
facilities and technologies, has NNSA stockpiled low-enriched uranium 
for tritium production?
    Answer. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has the United States 
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) under contract to provide unobligated 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) to support tritium production through fiscal 
year 2015. TVA has confidence that these requirements can be met from 
USEC inventories, if the Paducah enrichment capability goes away. NNSA 
has identified approximately 140 metric tons uranium (MTU) of 
unobligated LEU that can be used for obligation exchanges to support 
tritium production through fiscal year 2020. This unobligated LEU is 
maintained by the MOX program as backup to provide potential 
MOX customers with assurance of delivery. In addition, DOE 
has approximately 5,000 MTU of unobligated uranium hexafluoride feed 
material (normal uranium) which could be enriched to LEU. The initial 
investment for such an approach would include enrichment costs of 
approximately $45 million per reload for each TVA 18-month fuel cycle, 
plus the costs of carrying that fuel in inventory until it is needed 
beginning in fiscal year 2021. NNSA has no other stockpiles of 
unobligated LEU that could support tritium production.
    Question. Does NNSA have a contingency plan for tritium production 
if Paducah is shut down and the new gas centrifuge technology is not 
viable?
    Answer. Plans for providing unobligated LEU for tritium production 
between now and fiscal year 2020 are described in the response to the 
previous question. Beyond fiscal year 2020, there are a number of 
options under evaluation. However, the contingency plan is to down 
blend highly enriched uranium (HEU) from future weapons dismantlements. 
High assay HEU is also needed to meet naval reactor program 
requirements and is essentially irreplaceable until a domestic HEU 
capability is built. There may also be intermediate assay HEU that 
could be accelerated for dismantlement to meet the fuel requirement for 
producing tritium in the timeline necessary.
    Question. Have you determined whether there are cheaper 
alternatives to the American Centrifuge Project for low enriched 
uranium supplies?
    Answer. Other than down blending HEU or stockpiling LEU from a 
special enrichment campaign at Paducah, we know of no alternative to 
ACP for providing unobligated enrichment services in the future, absent 
a new United States Government enrichment facility.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray

             MAJOR SHIFT IN SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE PROGRAM

    Question. I understand the NNSA is undertaking a strategic review 
of the program. Which agencies are participating in the review? What is 
the schedule for the review?
    Answer. The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program is in the process 
of a strategic review. The program has held multiple meetings with 
important stakeholders and partners with which it collaborates on a 
regular basis. SLD coordinates its prioritization and deployment 
activities through the State Department and its Embassies; carries out 
multiple joint initiatives involving partner countries, including 
regional exercises with Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); and is responsible for a large component of 
the foreign transit and foreign departure element of the Interagency 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. SLD also participates in the 
National Security Council (NSC)-led and Department of State (DOS) 
coordinated effort to establish Counter Nuclear Counter-Smuggling 
Teams. SLD similarly collaborates with international partners such as 
the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on related efforts, and is 
taking into account their capabilities as part of its review of how to 
most effectively deploy SLD programs, including mobile detection, to 
meet the threat of nuclear trafficking.
    The schedule for the review is closely linked to the fiscal year 
2014 budget development cycle to provide an overall strategic plan for 
consideration in light of the current fiscal environment. Throughout 
this deliberative process, SLD is engaging interagency partners with 
which it has traditionally collaborated. This includes the Departments 
of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, as well as interagency 
coordinating groups such as the Interagency Working Group at the 
Department of State and the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Initiatives led 
by the National Security Council.
    Question. What concerns me is what happens in the meantime?
    Answer. It's not clear to me how you maintain existing 
capabilities, retain existing expert personnel, sustain currently 
deployed detection systems, and meet our international commitments to 
priority ``source'' nations by cutting funding for this program by 65 
percent while you undertake a strategic review.
    Question. What can you do with the $93 million you've requested for 
the SLD program? Are you going to deploy any new detection systems in 
priority ``source'' countries?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2013, the SLD program will focus on a 
strategic review intended to identify and prioritize those elements of 
SLD that should continue. While this strategic review is underway, SLD 
will focus on the highest priority deployments. This will still allow 
for a number of new starts at locations in the highest priority Core 
countries, including some fixed radiation portal monitor deployments, 
the next segment of the national communications system in Russia, and 
the provision of mobile detection equipment to countries such as 
Belarus, Czech Republic, Jordan, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. 
The remaining funding will be used to ensure adequate sustainability 
support is available to assist those partner countries in process of 
assuming the maintenance, training, and management responsibilities 
associated with the radiation detection systems.
    Question. How will you meet our existing international commitments 
to these and other nations?
    Answer. The SLD program will not be able to meet all prior 
commitments for new installations in fiscal year 2013 as a result of 
the reduced budget and the associated strategic pause. SLD is currently 
conducting outreach to international partner countries to inform them 
of the implications of the strategic pause. A major element of the 
outreach is to express SLD's continued support for the project and our 
commitment to sustainability activities. We are also actively 
encouraging partners whose SLD work scope in fiscal year 2013 is 
reduced or terminated to continue operating previously deployed 
systems. As the strategic review is refined, we will reach out to 
partner countries to inform them of the results of the review.
    Question. How will you be able to maintain the hundreds of millions 
of dollars in detection systems that have already been deployed around 
the world?
    Answer. SLD is committed to a robust sustainability program with 
partner countries and will strive to maintain that standard under the 
new funding profile. SLD has a multi-faceted 3-year support and long-
term engagement strategy that we believe is a solid formula for 
building partner country capabilities to sustain SLD systems and for 
ensuring the long-term operation of such systems.
    SLD seeks to provide at least 3 years of maintenance and training 
support to each partner country following the acceptance of a new 
Megaport or Core site. We also seek continued technical engagement 
thereafter to ensure that the value of SLD's investment is properly 
sustained. SLD conducts quarterly assessments of local maintenance 
provider performance to ensure that local maintenance providers are 
properly maintaining SLD systems. In addition, SLD conducts quarterly 
assessments of the partner countries' capabilities to sustain the 
systems in the areas of operations and management, training, and 
maintenance. SLD will fund the highest-priority sustainability 
activities, and will continue to engage with partner countries and will 
identify opportunities for improvement through continued analysis of 
daily operational reports from deployed monitors, worldwide reporting 
to the SLD technical support Help Desk, and regular review of local 
maintenance provider reporting, refresher training, and assurance 
visits. This information, in combination with our consistent engagement 
with partner countries, will ensure the sustainability of installed SLD 
systems and will offer the opportunity to address any gaps. As a result 
of the prioritization of sustainability activities, other activities 
such as exercises, refresher training, and regulations development 
might not receive full funding.
    Question. And how do you intend to implement the recommendations 
coming from the strategic review?
    Answer. You've got capabilities and teams of experts at labs like 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and elsewhere who have been 
working hard to deploy and maintain systems to keep nuclear material 
from ever reaching our shores.
    Question. After reducing the budget by 65 percent, are you sure 
those people and those assets are still going to be available once your 
strategic review is complete?
    Answer. The current and future success of the SLD Program is 
largely dependent on the contributions of the technical experts at the 
National Laboratories, including those at the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL). Accordingly, SLD intends to maintain a core 
capability of these technical experts. However, it is well understood 
that the reduction in funding and resulting reduction in workscope will 
necessitate a decrease in the present number of technical staff 
supporting this program effort. It is possible that this loss will 
impact the program's ability to resume a high level of workscope 
implementation immediately should the results of the review call for 
that. The strategic planning process and outyear budget development 
will take this into account. In the meantime, SLD is working with its 
national laboratory colleagues to retain key expertise throughout the 
strategic pause.
    environmental management--technology development and deployment
    Question. Under Secretary D'Agostino, as you may know, the Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory has historically provided scientific and 
technical support to the Hanford Site in areas such as tank waste 
processing and soil and groundwater monitoring. Over the past few 
years, the funding for Technology Development and Demonstration and 
within each site that supports these tasks has been on a downward 
trend.
    If adequate funding is not provided to maintain the institutional 
scientific and technical knowledge, subsequent staff reductions will 
result in these capabilities being lost forever--even as we enter a 
period in which addressing technical challenges underlying cleanup is 
key to ensuring successful outcomes.
    What is the Department of Energy's (DOE) Environmental Management 
(EM) office doing to address this issue and to ensure that EM has the 
technical and scientific capabilities it will need to address cleanup 
challenges moving forward?
    Answer. In the 2012 budget, EM requested $32 million for the 
Technology Development and Deployment program. The Congress provided 
$10 million. The 2013 budget requests $20 million for the program. EM's 
focus is to maintain a strategic applied research and technology 
development program that supports the effective, efficient, safe, and 
compliant completion of cleanup at the DOE sites. To accomplish this, 
EM identifies its highest priority technical challenges involving, 
among other things, soil and groundwater remediation, tank waste 
processing, nuclear materials disposition, and facility deactivation 
and decommissioning. Then the EM program interacts with the national 
laboratories and various universities to address those challenges. We 
look forward to working with the laboratories to address EM's technical 
challenges.
      national nuclear security administration workforce planning
    Question. Have you done a comprehensive assessment of the 
appropriate staffing levels and skills needed to oversee the nuclear 
security enterprise?
    Answer. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is 
currently conducting a Federal Workforce Analysis to enhance NNSA's 
human capital model by identifying future staffing levels and 
organizational core competencies, and implementing a competency model, 
and integrating legacy human capital information with project 
information. This will assist NNSA in organizing and staffing 
optimally, including the proper skill mix, to meet future mission 
requirements.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lamar Alexander

                             PIT PRODUCTION

    Question. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has 
decided it will defer for at least 5 years construction of the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR).
    NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan issued in April 
2011 stated ``. . . the U.S. must maintain a basic set of production, 
scientific and engineering capabilities. This minimum capability-based 
physical infrastructure will have to be responsive to changing world 
demands and have the inherent capacity to produce up to 80 of the most 
work-intensive weapons per year while sustaining the remaining 
stockpile''.
    Has the requirement for a capacity of producing up to 80 pits per 
year changed?
    Answer. There were a number of factors the Department of Defense 
and NNSA considered that informed the decision to seek a pit production 
capability of up to 80 newly manufactured pits per year. First, at an 
unclassified level, the best estimate for minimum pit lifetimes in the 
U.S. stockpile is 85-100 years, and most pits are nearing half that 
age. There are many uncertainties with regard to the pit lifetime 
estimates and performance of aged pits (the details of which are 
classified) which all support the prudent maintenance of a capability 
to manufacture pits to ensure against technological surprise. 
Furthermore, adding modern safety and surety capabilities to the 
majority of the enduring stockpile will require capabilities to 
remanufacture and rework pits and pit components. These factors have 
not changed, and therefore, a pit production rate of up to 80 pits per 
year is currently assessed to be a prudent, long-term capability to 
achieve. However, NNSA is reviewing combinations of reuse of existing 
pits in addition to the remanufacture of existing pit designs to 
support planned life extension programs and determine the most 
efficient use of resources and production capabilities and capacities.
    Question. NNSA says it can develop the capability to produce 20-30 
pits per year without CMRR. How much will this cost over the next 5 
years? Please delineate which facilities will do the work in the 
absence of CMRR, and the associated costs.
    Answer. The CMRR project involved three phases:
  --the construction of the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office 
        Building for small sample analytical chemistry,
  --the RLUOB Equipment Installation, and
  --the CMRR-NF for larger sample analytical chemistry, material 
        characterization, and vault space.
    Construction of the radiological facility is complete and the 
nuclear facility construction is deferred. As a result, in the interim, 
options are being evaluated to increase the analytical chemistry work 
in the radiological facility; additional material characterization to 
include sample preparation in PF-4; performing some material 
characterization at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and 
reducing the amount of unused material in the existing PF-4 vault. 
These actions are targeted at supporting a production rate of 30 pits 
per year. The feasibility of these actions are currently being 
evaluated, including cost estimates.
    Question. NNSA plans to reuse or refurbish existing plutonium pits, 
which would lessen the need for manufacturing. Are you confident this 
will be feasible?
    Answer. Plans to reuse or refurbish existing plutonium pits would 
reduce the short-term need for manufacturing, but do not address the 
long-term need. The best estimate for minimum pit lifetimes in the U.S. 
stockpile is 85-100 years, and most pits are nearing half that age. 
There are also many uncertainties with regard to the pit lifetime 
estimates and performance of aged pits (the details of which are 
classified) which all support the prudent maintenance of a capability 
to manufacture pits to ensure against technological surprise. 
Furthermore, adding modern safety and surety capabilities to the 
majority of the enduring stockpile will require capabilities to 
remanufacture and rework pits and pit components.
    NNSA has a strong record of reusing and refurbishing pits as part 
of major nuclear explosive package operations and life extension 
programs (LEP) over the last two decades. Examples include the W87 
Alteration (Alt) 342, the B61 Alt 357, and most recently the ongoing 
W76 LEP. In addition, the baseline for the B61 LEP, scheduled for a 
first production unit in fiscal year 2019, is relying on a pit reuse 
strategy. NNSA is also pursuing the ability to certify the use of 
insensitive high explosives with pits designed for conventional high 
explosives, which would increase the re-usable pit inventory. Science, 
Technology, and Engineering tools and capabilities investments are 
being made to enable this certification.
    Our interim capability of 20-30 pits per year will support our 
expectation during this interim time period to rely on reuse and 
refurbishment of existing pits. We are confident that this is feasible. 
Therefore, an expanded capability to produce 80 pits per year is 
associated with the remanufacture of existing stockpile designs or the 
replacement option, which produces new pits based on previously tested 
designs. With the CMRR deferment choice made following the adoption of 
the Budget Control Act of 2011, an inability to expand to 80 pits 
annually over the short term does represent an acceptable risk.
    Question. Which planned life extension programs are expected to 
require new pit production?
    Answer. NNSA has existing life extension programs for the W76 and 
the B61. The W76-1 and B61-12 do not require new pit production. The 
W78 and W88 are undergoing a conceptual study for life extension 
options. Options for both reuse of existing pits and remanufacture of 
existing pit designs are being evaluated. No decisions have been made.

                        LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

    Question. The life extension program (LEP) for the W76 nuclear 
warhead is well underway. This summer, the B61 LEP is expected to begin 
and may delay completion of the W76 LEP.
    Please describe, in broad terms, the relative importance of the B61 
and W76 to our strategic deterrent.
    Answer. The B61 and W76 support separate but very important 
elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent Triad. B61 bomb variants are 
actively deployed in the United States and abroad. The B61 strategic 
variants are an integral part of the air delivered deterrent supporting 
the bomber leg of the Triad. The non-strategic variants, along with the 
U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dual capable 
aircraft, are the cornerstone of the U.S. commitment to extended 
deterrence. The W76 warheads are deployed on the submarine launched 
ballistic missiles as part of the sea-based strategic nuclear 
deterrent, which is the most survivable leg of the Triad. Additionally, 
with the reductions in warheads and launchers under the New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the W76 will comprise a majority of 
the Nation's nuclear strategic force. Both the B61 and W76 provide the 
U.S. with unique capabilities. The two LEPs will enable the U.S. to 
continue to rely on these capabilities. The NNSA is working closely 
with the Department of Defense to balance resources on both programs to 
ensure requirements are met.
    Question. Currently, what is the projected unit cost for a 
refurbished B61 and how does this compare to the unit cost of the W76?
    Answer. The B61 LEP is finalizing and validating costs as part of 
the Nuclear Weapons Council Phase 6.3 authorization. These costs are 
not available today but will be reported to the Congress in July 2012 
as part of the report on the Phase 6.2A design definition and cost 
study required by Public Law 112-74. Upon submittal of the report, a 
comparison to the W76 LEP unit cost can be provided.
    Question. What percentage of the B61 LEP costs will our NATO allies 
pay?
    Answer. All design, qualification, and production costs associated 
with the B61 LEP nuclear bomb components, with the exception of the 
USAF procured tail kit assembly, are funded by NNSA in accordance with 
Atomic Energy Act and applicable joint USAF and NNSA memorandum of 
agreements. The USAF and NATO allies are responsible for aircraft 
integration costs. Additional questions on NATO responsibilities 
associated with the U.S. extended deterrent should be referred to the 
Office of Secretary of Defense.
    Question. A stated goal for LEPs is to increase the safety, 
security, and use control (surety) of U.S. nuclear weapons. Please 
describe in broad terms the surety improvements in the W76 and B61 
LEPs.
    Answer. The W76 and B61 LEPs have and will, respectively, 
incorporate design features to increase the safety, security, and use 
control of the nuclear explosive package. A major goal for the W76 LEP 
was to improve the surety and safety of the Ultimate User Package 
delivered by NNSA to the Department of Defense. This goal was 
accomplished by incorporating a modern safety and surety architecture 
known as Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety (ENDS) into the W76 LEP 
hardware including new electrical stronglinks, thermal weaklinks and 
improved exclusion region barriers which greatly enhance safety in 
abnormal electrical and thermal environments. The existing B61 bomb 
variants already have some of the most advanced safety, security, and 
use control features in the stockpile including a modern ENDS and an 
insensitive high explosives design. However, these features are old and 
are reaching the end of their service life. The B61 life extension 
program will replace these capabilities and incorporate improvements 
including enhancements to the stronglinks and exclusion region barriers 
in the safety theme without significant impact to cost or schedule.

                     FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION

    Question. The budget includes $569 million for continued 
construction and initial testing and evaluation of the Mixed Oxide Fuel 
(MOX) Fabrication Facility. NNSA estimates the 
MOX facility will cost nearly $500 million a year to 
operate, compared to earlier estimates of $185-356 million. Why is the 
estimated annual cost to operate so much higher than earlier estimates?
    Answer. As the project advances, we are now in a better position to 
identify and project which elements need to be reflected in a 
comprehensive estimate of operating costs for the MOX 
facility. Therefore, the current total life cycle costs include capital 
equipment procurements, a larger facility staff, and increased Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission costs, which were not included in any of the 
previous estimates. In addition, the previous total life cycle cost 
estimate did not include government furnished services such as 
electricity, waste disposal services, and SRS emergency services, which 
are now included in the estimate.
    Furthermore, the current estimate is expressed in 2011 dollars, 
while the previous estimate was expressed in 2005 dollars. These 
estimates will continue to be preliminary until the negotiations for 
the contract, option for operating the MOX facility, have 
been completed. In the meantime, we will continue to update and refine 
these estimates.
    Question. NNSA has cancelled plans for a new Pit Disassembly & 
Conversion Facility (PDCF) that would have produced the plutonium 
feedstock for the MOX facility, and will instead produce the 
feedstock from existing facilities. Are you confident you have the 
facilities you need to generate plutonium feedstock for MOX 
Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) without the PDCF facility? Please 
explain which facilities will be used, the extent to which 
refurbishment will be required, and the costs.
    Answer. NNSA examined a number of alternatives for the pit 
disassembly and conversion capability. The examination considered 
resources across the Savannah River Site (SRS), including K-Reactor, H-
Canyon, the MFFF, as well as possible additional work at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL). In January 2012, the Department issued an 
Amended Notice of Intent that identified a preferred alternative, which 
will consider a combination of facilities at TA-55 at LANL, H-Canyon/HB 
Line, and MFFF at SRS.
    The Department is confident that the preferred alternative for the 
pit disassembly and conversion capability would meet the long term, 
steady-state plutonium disposition feedstock requirements by utilizing 
LANL to provide the majority of plutonium metal, H-Canyon to process 
certain categories of plutonium pits, and the MOX facility 
to convert the plutonium metal to oxide. A more detailed plan is being 
prepared by the Department, and will be made available to the committee 
upon completion.
    In addition, the Department has already identified nearly 10 MT of 
early feedstock for the MOX facility, including:
  --2 MT from ARIES at LANL;
  --3.7 MT to be processed at H-Canyon at SRS; and
  --4.1 MT of plutonium currently stored at SRS.
    Question. Concerns have been raised about whether you will have 
customers for the MOX fuel that will eventually be produced 
by the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. How many firm 
MOX fuel customers have been identified? Is NNSA confident 
there will be sufficient customers for MOX fuel?
    Answer. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is currently exploring 
technical and regulatory requirements associated with irradiation of 
MOX fuel in five reactors, pursuant to an interagency 
agreement that was signed in 2010. The current schedule with TVA is to 
execute a fuel supply agreement for MOX fuel in early 2013, 
after NNSA completes a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, in 
which TVA is a cooperating agency.
    In addition, NNSA is consulting with various fuel vendors regarding 
the possibility of them marketing MOX fuel to their utility 
customers. NNSA also continues to develop strategies to attract other 
utility customers.
    Question. The contractor building the MOX facility has 
difficulty retaining nuclear workers. What measures, if any, has NNSA 
and its contractors put in place to retain the skilled workforce needed 
for constructing and operating the MOX fuel facility?
    Answer. The Department is working with MOX Services to 
mitigate high employee turnover and is currently developing a retention 
plan to ensure that its investment in the trained staff is fully 
capitalized. In addition to the retention plan, MOX Services 
provides employees with quality-of-life benefits, such as ensuring a 
safe workplace with 8.5 million work hours without a lost time 
accident, and career development incentives, such as an MBA program 
with on-site classes through the University of South Carolina.

             MAJOR SHIFT IN SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE PROGRAM

    Question. What does this ``strategic pause'' mean, how will NNSA 
assess the path forward for this program, what changes are being 
considered, and have the specific goals of the program changed?
    Answer. After an administration review of DNN priorities, funding 
was shifted in fiscal year 2013 to focus the Second Line of Defense 
(SLD) on a strategic review intended to identify and prioritize those 
elements of SLD that should continue. While this strategic review is 
underway, SLD will focus on the highest priority deployments. This will 
still allow for a number of new starts at locations in the highest 
priority Core countries, including some fixed radiation portal monitor 
deployments, the next segment of the national communications system in 
Russia, and the provision of mobile detection equipment to countries 
such as Belarus, Czech Republic, Jordan, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and 
Ukraine. In fiscal year 2013, the SLD Core Program plans to complete 
installation of radiation detection equipment at an additional 35 high-
priority foreign sites. The program has no Megaports implementation 
work planned in fiscal year 2013.
    The strategic review of the program will achieve four primary 
objectives. First, the review is intended to assess the effectiveness 
of the program's deployments relative to their cost and other 
interdiction methods. Second, it is intended to produce program and 
country specific strategies that capitalize on SLD lessons learned and 
available detection technologies and applications. Third, the review 
will also update our performance metrics that are closely linked to 
performance data collected by maintenance providers, help desk 
requests, and other sources of information to continually improve our 
understanding of system performance. Finally, the review will also 
consider the impacts of a new Eurasian Customs Union, currently 
composed of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and soon Kyrgyzstan. The 
Customs Union resulted in a loss of customs presence on the affected 
borders, such as the border between Russia and Kazakhstan, which means 
there are reduced opportunities to scan people and cargo in those 
countries. This review is part of a broader assessment strategy.

                        NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

    Question. U.S. suppliers of nuclear commodities and services have 
voiced frustration that the U.S. nuclear export control system imposes 
major competitive disadvantages on U.S. suppliers competing with State-
owned international rivals. DOE has jurisdiction over nuclear 
technology exports under 10 CFR 810, which legal experts have found is 
more restrictive, complex and time-consuming than that of foreign 
nuclear supplier nations. Delays in the licensing of exports can amount 
to a significant commercial disadvantage for suppliers that have slower 
regulators. NNSA often takes more than 1 year to process specific 
authorizations for commercial nuclear transfers under 10 CFR 810.
    How will NNSA improve the efficiency of the 10 CFR 810 process so 
that U.S. exporters are on a level playing field with their foreign 
competitors whose governments process similar export licenses in a few 
months, rather than more than a year?
    Answer. We know that we need to improve the efficiency of the 10 
CFR part 810 process and we are addressing this in a couple of key 
ways. First, we are in the process of updating the current 10 CFR 810 
regulations to address industry's concerns. Second, we intend to 
examine our internal review and approval process to ensure maximum 
efficiency. In carrying out the review process, we have to balance U.S. 
nonproliferation principles and obligations with commercial interests.

                        NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

    Question. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has 
recently proposed a significant revision to 10 CFR 810. Rather than 
ending restricted treatment of countries that have concluded a nuclear 
trade agreement with the United States, the proposed rule would double 
the number of countries requiring a specific authorization. Rather than 
focus the regulation on sensitive technologies, consistent with the 
Administration's Export Control Reform Initiative, the proposed rule 
would extend its reach to new technologies that pose little or no 
proliferation risk. The proposed changes would dramatically increase 
the number of Part 810 applications and the delays in processing them. 
However, the Administration's budget request shows no evidence that 
resources have been requested to process the significant number of new 
authorizations that will be required or to make the process of issuing 
authorizations more efficient.
    How will NNSA ensure that any changes to the 10 CFR 810 regulation 
do not result in additional delays that negatively impact U.S. 
industry?
    Answer. We have received helpful comments and suggestions from 
industry and other stakeholders on the revision of the 10 CFR 810 
regulation through the public comment period and Federal register 
process. We are aware of concerns articulated by some industry groups 
that the revised regulation would increase the number of countries for 
which U.S. nuclear industry would need specific authorization from the 
Secretary of Energy to engage. We are also aware of concerns 
articulated by these same groups that the proposed rule expands the 
scope of technologies that would require specific authorizations for 
non-sensitive technologies. We are reviewing all comments received, and 
we plan to re-release the revised regulation for public comment through 
the Federal register process. This will allow U.S. industry to voice 
any specific concerns it may have. In addition to updating the 810 
regulation, we are exploring ways to automate certain aspects of the 
process to allow applicants to more easily track the progress of their 
requests.
    Question. Has NNSA considered the additional resources required to 
administer the proposed 10 CFR 810 revision? If so, how long should a 
U.S. exporter expect to wait for a specific authorization under the 
proposed rule?
    Answer. As with all updates to regulations, there will be an 
adjustment period during which the Department will need to work more 
closely with U.S. industry to help clarify the implementation and 
application of the revised rule. Once we are through that period, we 
believe that the U.S. exports will see more efficient service from the 
Department. We do not at this time anticipate that additional staff 
will be needed to support the revised process.

                          ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

    Question. NNSA's budget includes $411.3 million for its Federal 
workforce. In 2005, NNSA had 1,634 total Federal employees overseeing 
the NNSA. Today the number is 1,928--an increase of 15 percent.
    Last year, NNSA decided to consolidate the contracts at Y-12 and 
Pantex. What other efforts are you considering to consolidate 
operations and achieve administrative efficiencies?
    Answer. NNSA continues to evaluate options for increased 
efficiencies throughout the complex, both in its contracting strategies 
and oversight. NNSA has three management and operating (M&O) contracts 
expiring over the next 5 years, Sandia National Laboratories, the 
Kansas City Plant, and the Nevada National Security Site. As the 
expiration dates draw near, NNSA will evaluate whether there are 
opportunities for efficiencies within an existing site or through 
consolidation, and develop an acquisition strategy that is in the best 
interest of the government for each individual procurement. 
Additionally, NNSA is conducting two studies that evaluate staffing 
requirements throughout the Enterprise, the ``NNSA Baseline Staffing 
Requirements,'' which informs the NNSA's Federal Workforce Study to be 
completed by December 2012.

                           WORKFORCE PLANNING

    Question. What have you done to review your administrative and 
overhead costs to ensure you are adequately overseeing work while not 
spending excessive amounts on unnecessary layers of administration?
    Answer. NNSA ensures the Office of the Administrator (OA) account 
provides the appropriate level of Federal personnel and resources 
necessary to plan, manage, and oversee the operation of NNSA by 
participating in the planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation 
(PPBE) processes.
    During the planning, programming, and budgeting processes, the 
budget is formulated by working with the headquarters NNSA programs and 
field sites to develop a funding request that will accomplish the NNSA 
mission under fiscally constrained budgets. They are required to 
justify any requirement that is over the established baselines. In 
addition, over the past several years, our budget has reflected the 
efficiencies required in support of the President's Executive Order 
``Promoting Efficient Spending''. This has forced us to reduce our 
travel and support service budgets by more than 25 percent and 20 
percent, respectively, from our fiscal year 2010 funding levels. Also, 
in the fiscal year 2013 President's request, we proposed the internal 
transfer of Federal Unclassified Information Technology from the Office 
of the Administrator to Weapons Activities, NNSA CIO Activities, to 
achieve efficiencies by consolidating all information management 
activities under one program.
    During the evaluation process, we ensure that the OA budget is 
executed effectively and efficiently. We have developed tracking 
systems, provide monthly execution reviews, review uncosted and 
unobligated balances on a quarterly basis, and in fiscal year 2012, did 
an extensive clean up of support service contracts and old uncosted 
balances.
    In addition, in keeping with OMB and DOE expectations that 
administrative costs be minimized, one of the NNSA performance measures 
is to maintain the Office of the Administrator Federal administrative 
costs as a percentage of total Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation program costs at less than 6 percent.

                          SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

    Senator Feinstein. Okay. Well, thank you very much. I 
appreciate it.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you.
    Senator Feinstein. The hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., Wednesday, March 21, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of 
the Chair.]
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