[Senate Hearing 112-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:32 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Murray, Cochran, Shelby,
Hutchison, Murkowski, Graham, and Coats.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY
opening statement of chairman daniel k. inouye
Chairman Inouye. This morning, the subcommittee convenes to
review the Department of the Army's fiscal year 2013 budget
request. And so we welcome the Honorable John M. McHugh,
Secretary of the Army. We also welcome for the first time
before this subcommittee, General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army
Chief of Staff. Thank you for being with us today.
The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2013 base budget
request is $135 billion, the same level as last year's enacted
base budget. The Army is also requesting $50 billion for
overseas contingency operations (OCO) for fiscal year 2013,
which is a decrease of $18 billion from last year's enacted
amount.
Due to the country's fiscal restraints, the Army's response
to budget reductions was based on the determination of the
right balance between three areas: personnel, modernization,
and readiness.
Over the next 5 years, the Army is planning to reduce the
size of the Active Army by 490,000 soldiers and will remove at
least eight brigade combat teams (BCTs) from its existing
structure. The subcommittee hopes to learn more from you on
these reductions and your plans to achieve them without
sacrificing the lessons we have learned after a decade of war.
As far as modernization is concerned, the fiscal year 2013
request prioritizes the Army network and infantry-fighting
vehicle that can accommodate the entire infantry squad and the
joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV).
Finally, the Army must ensure its forces are maintained,
trained, and equipped at the highest levels of readiness in
order to meet its operational demands and to fulfill its
obligation in the Middle East and the Pacific in order to meet
the new defense strategy.
PREPARED STATEMENT
The subcommittee sincerely appreciates your service to our
Nation and the dedication of the sacrifices made daily by the
men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for
what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country
each and every day. And so I look forward to working with you
to make certain that the fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill
reflects the current and future needs of the U.S. Army.
[The statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE
Today, the subcommittee convenes to review the fiscal year 2013
Department of Defense budget request. We welcome the Honorable John
McHugh, Secretary of the Army. And beside him we welcome for the first
time before the subcommittee, General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army
Chief of Staff. Gentlemen, thank you for being here with us today.
The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2013 base budget request
is $135 billion, the same level as last year's enacted base budget. The
Army is also requesting $50 billion for overseas contingency operations
for fiscal year 2013, which is a decrease of $18 billion from last
year's enacted amount.
Due to the country's fiscal restraints, the Army's response to
budget reductions was based on determining the right balance between
three areas: personnel, modernization, and readiness.
Over the next 5 years, the Army is planning to reduce the size of
the Active Army to 490,000 soldiers and will remove at least eight
brigade combat teams from its existing structure. I hope to learn more
from you on these reductions and your plans to achieve them without
sacrificing the lessons learned after a decade of war.
As far as modernization, the fiscal year 2013 request prioritizes
the Army Network, an infantry fighting vehicle that can accommodate an
entire infantry squad and the joint light tactical vehicle.
Finally, the Army must ensure its forces are maintained, trained,
and equipped at the highest levels of readiness in order to meet its
operational demands and to fulfill its obligations in the Middle East
and the Pacific to meet the new defense strategy.
We sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and the
dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men and women in our Army.
We could not be more grateful for what those who wear our Nation's
uniform do for our country each and every day. I look forward to
working with you to ensure that the fiscal year 2013 appropriations
bill reflects the current and future needs of the United States Army.
Chairman Inouye. As you gentlemen are aware, there is a
vote scheduled for 10:40 this morning. So, the Vice Chairman
and I will alternate voting to continue the hearing as planned.
And may I assure you that your full statement will be made part
of the record. And now I call upon the Vice Chairman.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
scheduling this hearing and inviting witnesses to appear and
discuss the budget request for the next fiscal year for the
United States Army, our soldiers, and others who are working to
help protect the security interests of our great country. It's
a dangerous mission these days. Men and women are deployed
around the world to help protect our security interests and
help maintain the access to the freedoms and liberties we enjoy
as Americans.
The testimony comes at an important time. We face a lot of
challenges, and we appreciate your cooperation with our
subcommittee in identifying the priorities to be sure we get it
right and that we serve the best interests of our country and
peace in the world.
Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
May I call upon Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thanks for having me.
Chairman Inouye. Well, it is now my pleasure to call upon
the Secretary, Mr. McHugh.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Vice Chairman,
Senator Cochran, and Senator Graham, I don't know as I can
equal Senator Graham's brevity. But, given the time
constraints, I will try to be somewhat brief.
Mr. Chairman, let me first of all join you in expressing my
gratitude, and frankly, as the Secretary, relief to have this
great leader on my left, the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army,
Ray Odierno. And I want to thank this subcommittee and this
Senate for acting swiftly to nominate him. As you know,
gentlemen, this is a great leader who in a relatively short
time has really made his mark as the current Chief, and also
former leader. And I feel very honored and blessed to have him
as my partner in these very challenging times.
I also want to take a brief opportunity to thank this
subcommittee for the great support that all of you have
provided our 1.1 million soldiers, our 270,000 civilians, and
our families. Collectively, as you know, they make up this
great Army, and they, too, deeply appreciate all that you do
for them.
Today, more than ever, I would argue today's demanding
fiscal environment requires that we maintain an even stronger
partnership with you and this great Congress, this great house,
to ensure that we have the sufficient resources to defeat our
enemies, support our allies, and protect our homeland
responsively, decisively, and yes, affordably.
Our budget supports these goals, we believe, by laying the
foundation for a gradual reduction of our military and civilian
end-strength, while at the same time supporting, as you noted,
Mr. Chairman, the vital modernization, training, soldier, and
family programs that are so necessary to sustain this Army and
ensure that while smaller, it remains the strongest and most
capable land force in the world.
As we implement what I think can be fairly described as a
bold new security strategy, I want to be very clear. The Army's
combat experience, adaptability, and strategic reach will be
more vital to our Nation than ever before. Over the last year,
I think that's been demonstrated. The Army has continued to be
the decisive hand of American foreign policy and the helping
hand of Americans facing the devastation of natural disasters.
With soldiers deployed on 6 of the 7 continents, and in
more than 150 nations around the world, your Army has become
the face of American concern and the fist of American military
might.
In the Pacific, we continued our long-term presence in the
region with some 75,000 military and civilian personnel
participating in more than 160 exercises, engagements, and
operations in support of our allies in that vital region.
In Korea, our soldiers provided a strong deterrent to North
Korean aggression. In Japan and the Philippines, we maintained
our decades-old security relationships, training, and
supporting with those great allies. In Europe, our soldiers
fulfilled vital training stability and peacekeeping roles in
Bosnia and Kosovo. While in Africa, your Army supported
counterterrorism operations throughout the Horn and beyond.
But foreign threats and operations were not all this Army
faced. In 2011, this Nation experienced some of the worse
natural disasters in our history. From responding to wildfires
and floods to hurricanes and tornadoes, our soldiers and
civilians from all components were there to help, protect,
rescue, or rebuild. To put it very simply, our soldiers,
civilians, and their families have once again proven why the
United States Army is the most capable, versatile, and
successful land force on Earth. And it is this ability to adapt
to a myriad of unpredictable threats, both at home and abroad,
that we will maintain as we move forward in this new security
and fiscal environment.
This year's budget, we believe, portrays an army fully
embracing change by making the hard decisions now to lay the
right foundations for the future.
First, we are implementing a sweeping new defense strategy,
which emphasizes even greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region in the development of smaller, more agile land forces.
Under this new framework, which was developed collaboratively
with top military and civilian officials in our department, the
Army clearly remains the decisive arm of U.S. combat power.
Second, we are implementing this new paradigm under the
significant cuts directed by the Budget Control Act of 2011. In
so doing, we made some very tough decisions, but we are always
guided by the following key principles. First, we'll fully
support the current fight by providing operational commanders
in Afghanistan and other theaters with the best trained and
ready land forces in the world. That is and it will remain our
top priority.
Third, we will not sacrifice readiness for force structure.
We must responsibly reduce our end-strength in a manner that
fully supports the new strategy but also provides sufficient
time to properly balance our training, equipment,
infrastructure, and soldier and family support programs with
our mission requirements.
Fourth, we will be able to build force structure and
capabilities to handle unforeseen changes to global security.
The Army must be able to hedge risk through an efficient and
effective force generation process and access to a strong
operationalized Reserve component.
Fifth, we will maintain and enhance the Army's extensive
commitments in the Pacific.
And last, we will not let the Budget Control Act be taken
on the backs of our soldiers or their families. Although, we
have, and we will continue to examine and, where appropriate,
realign our programs, we will fully fund and support those
systems that work, with special emphasis on wounded warrior,
suicide prevention, behavioral health, and sexual assault
programs.
Based on these principles, our budget minimizes end-
strength reductions in the near years to support the current
fight, emphasizes continued investments in vital modernization
programs, such as the network, the ground combat vehicle (GCV),
and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), and delays or
implements programs which, in our judgment, no longer meet
urgent needs in support of our new strategy or transforming
force, and we deferred certain military construction programs.
The Army, at its core, is not programs and systems. It's
people. And each time I have the honor of appearing before you,
I come not only as the Secretary but humbly as the
representatives of our soldiers, civilians, and their families.
As this subcommittee knows so well, these brave men and women
who have endured so much over the past decade depend upon a
variety of programs, policies, and facilities to cope with the
stress, the injuries, and family separations caused by war.
Sadly, our suicide and substance abuse rates remain
unacceptably high, and we are aggressively pursuing multiple
avenues to provide our personnel with the best medical and
behavioral support that is available. We must never forget that
our success in both Iraq and Afghanistan has come at a heavy
price for our Army family. Providing the means and resources
for whatever challenges they now face is, in my opinion, the
very least, the very most, and what we must do.
PREPARED STATEMENT
As a final note regarding our Army family, I would again be
remiss if I didn't thank you so much for the great support this
subcommittee, and ultimately, the Committee as a whole has
provided to those soldiers and families. They appreciate it. We
all are so grateful for your leadership, and we look forward to
working with you in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John M. McHugh and
General Raymond T. Odierno
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Our Nation has weathered difficult circumstances since the attacks
on 9/11, yet we have met every challenge. The mission in Iraq has ended
responsibly, continued progress in Afghanistan is enabling a transition
to Afghan security responsibility, and targeted counterterrorism
efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda and degraded its
leadership. In all these endeavors, the Army has played a leading role.
As President Barack Obama stated in introducing his new national
defense priorities, the country is at a turning point after a decade of
war and considerable increases in defense spending. Even as large-scale
military campaigns recede, the Nation will still face a growing array
of security challenges. These new priorities focus on the continuing
threat of violent extremism, the proliferation of lethal weapons and
materials, the destabilizing behavior of Iran and North Korea, the rise
of new powers across Asia, and an era of uncertainty in the Middle
East.
On top of that, our Nation confronts a serious deficit and debt
problem (in itself a national security risk) that will squeeze future
Army budgets. However, declining defense budgets do not nullify our
obligation to provide enough capacity and maintain a highly ready force
that is sufficiently modernized to provide a leaner, adaptive,
flexible, and integrated force that offers the President a significant
number of options along the spectrum of conflict.
Today, the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-
led combat-tested force in the world. Today's soldiers have achieved a
level of professionalism, combat experience, and civil and military
expertise that is an invaluable national asset. Our warriors have
accomplished every assigned task they have been given. But all we have
accomplished in building this magnificent force can be squandered if we
are not careful. We are an Army in transition, and we look to the
Congress to assist us in the difficult work to build the Army of 2020.
AMERICA'S ARMY--THE NATION'S FORCE OF DECISIVE ACTION
Every day, America's Army is making a positive difference in the
world during one of the most challenging times in our history. Although
stressed and stretched, the United States Army remains the most agile,
adaptable, and capable force in the world. Ours is an army that
reflects America's diversity and represents the time-honored values
that built our Nation:
--hard work;
--duty;
--selflessness;
--determination;
--honor; and
--compassion.
Today, less than one-half of 1 percent of Americans serve in the
Army. As members of one of our Nation's oldest and most enduring
institutions, these volunteers play an indispensable role in guarding
U.S. national interests at home and abroad. Young men and women who
want to make a difference in this world want to be part of our Army,
which is why even after a decade of conflict, we continue to fill our
ranks with the best the Nation has to offer. They have earned the
gratitude, trust, and admiration of an appreciative people for their
extraordinary accomplishments.
2011--THE ARMY IN TRANSITION
Over the past year, the Army has concluded its mission in Iraq and
commenced the drawdown of surge forces in Afghanistan while
transferring responsibility to Afghan forces. We are beginning
reductions in end-strength to face budgetary realities. We are also
undertaking efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment
decisions that will shape the Army of 2020--all during a time of war.
These transformational efforts are both significant and unprecedented.
As the President's new national defense priorities are implemented, the
Army will continue its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully
prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide.
Operation Enduring Freedom
A decade into the war in Afghanistan, the Army continues to play a
leading role in defending our national security interests in this vital
theater. At the start of the war, following the attacks on 9/11,
elements of Army Special Operations Forces led efforts on the ground to
bring al Qaeda members to justice and remove the Taliban from power,
thereby denying a safe haven to terrorists. With more than 70,000
soldiers in Afghanistan at peak strength in 2011, the Army's brigade
combat teams conducted operations ranging from stability to
counterinsurgency.
Today, more than 63,000 Army soldiers in both general purpose and
special operations units continue to conduct a wide range of missions
across Afghanistan country to help Afghan citizens lay the foundation
for lasting security. Simultaneously, the Army provided essential
logistics capabilities to sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In
fact, only America's Army could provide the necessary theater
logistics, transportation, medical, and communications infrastructure
capable of supporting joint and combined forces for an operation of
this size and complexity.
Since the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan, soldiers
have earned 5,437 valor awards, including 241 Silver Stars and 8
Distinguished Service Crosses. Four soldiers have been awarded the
Medal of Honor for their heroic actions:
--SFC Jared C. Monti;
--SSG Salvatore A. Giunta;
--SSG Robert J. Miller; and
--SSG Leroy A. Petry.
They exemplify the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of all the
men and women who have served in this conflict.
Operation New Dawn
In December 2011, the Army concluded more than 8 years of combat
and stability operations in Iraq. Initially, powerful and agile forces
liberated Iraq and then adapted to the new demand of suppressing the
postinvasion insurgencies. Indeed, when the Nation needed a sustained
effort to achieve its strategic objectives, the Army answered the call,
adjusting its deployment tours from 12 to 15 months to enable a
decisive surge in forces. Army units trained and equipped Iraq security
forces, and when the mission changed, the Army executed the extremely
difficult tasks of redeploying people and retrograding equipment to
ensure future readiness.
More than 1 million soldiers and Department of the Army civilians
served courageously in Iraq. They were essential to freeing more than
25 million Iraqi people from the tyranny of a brutal dictator, putting
Iraq's future in the hands of its people, and removing a national
security threat to the United States.
Success came at a great cost in blood and treasure. But even during
the most dire times, our soldiers never wavered. Their heroic actions
earned 8,238 awards for valor, including 408 Silver Stars and 16
Distinguished Service Crosses. Two Medals of Honor were awarded
posthumously to SFC Paul R. Smith and PFC Ross A. McGinnis.
Other Global Commitments
In addition to the Army's unprecedented contributions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we have continued to conduct operations across
the globe to prevent conflict, shape the environment, and win
decisively. Nearly 20,000 soldiers remain stationed on the Korean
peninsula, providing a credible deterrent and investing in our
partnership with the Republic of Korea army. Simultaneously, Army
special operations soldiers in the Pacific region continue to provide
advice and support to the Philippine Armed Forces, enhancing our robust
alliance. Both are examples of strategic investments in a region that
is home to 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. (In fact, in most
countries around the world, the army is the dominant defense force.)
And United States soldiers continue to serve in places such as the
Sinai, Guantanamo Bay, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Horn of Africa,
developing and maintaining relationships on 6 of the world's 7
continents.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Over the past year, the Army has continued to provide instrumental
support to civil authorities. The Army's Reserve component proved to be
one of our great strengths for these missions, giving the force depth
and flexibility. The National Guard provides a distinctive capability
for the Nation. When floods, wildfires, and tornados struck from the
Midwest to the South over the span of a few days in the spring of 2011,
more than 900 National Guard soldiers supplied a coordinated response
to address citizens' needs across the affected region. Similarly, when
Hurricane Irene knocked out power and flooded towns across the
Northeast in the summer of 2011, nearly 10,000 National Guard soldiers
and airmen across 13 States delivered critical services to sustain the
region through the crisis.
In addition to ongoing counterdrug operations, approximately 1,200
National Guard soldiers and airmen supported the Department of Homeland
Security in four States along the Southwest border by providing entry
identification and analysis to disrupt criminal networks and
activities.
Army Special Operations Forces
To conduct unified land operations, the U.S. Army fields a suite of
special operations capabilities that range from the world's finest
precision strike and special warfare forces to the world's most lethal
combined arms maneuver formations. The Army draws from across its broad
set of capabilities to provide the joint commander the blend of Army
assets required to ensure mission accomplishment. True in Afghanistan
today, Army Special Operations Forces are also providing assistance in
the Philippines, Yemen, the Arabian gulf, Lebanon, Colombia, the
African Trans-Sahel, and across the Caribbean and Central America. As
Army regular forces become available, they will increasingly integrate
with Army Special Operations Forces to promote trust and
interoperability with allies and build partner nation capacity where
mutual interests are at risk from internal or external enemies.
FISCAL ENVIRONMENT
Challenges of Reduced Budget
Today's global fiscal environment is driving defense budgets down
for our partners and allies, as well as our Nation. Historically,
defense spending has been cyclic with significant reductions following
the end of major conflicts. The Army understands it cannot be immune to
these fiscal realities and must be part of the solution. Our focus
areas for the fiscal year 2013 budget demonstrate our concerted effort
to establish clear priorities that give the Nation a ready and capable
Army while being good stewards of all our resources.
Challenges of Continuing Resolutions
Timely and predictable funding enables the Army to plan, resource,
and manage the programs that produce a trained and ready force. The
Army very much appreciates that the Congress approved the fiscal year
2012 budget earlier than had been the case in recent years when we were
forced to operate for long stretches under continuing resolutions.
Long-term continuing resolutions force the Army to slow its spending,
freeze production rates, and delay the start of new programs. Such
delays pose a risk to the Army's operational readiness and investment
strategy. We stand ready to help the Congress once again pass defense
bills in a timely manner.
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
A series of powerful global trends continue to shape the current
and future strategic environment:
--increased demand for dwindling resources;
--persistent regional conflict;
--empowered non-state actors;
--the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
--failed states.
We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular
and irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality. We also face cyber-
threats to an increasingly critical and vulnerable information
technology infrastructure and the destabilizing effect of global
economic downturns. Together, these trends create a complex and
unpredictable environment in all of the Army's operational domains:
--land;
--sea;
--air;
--space; and
--cyberspace.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA'S ARMY
Role of the Army: Prevent, Shape, Win
In the uncertain environment our country faces, the Army remains
central to our Nation's defense as part of the joint force. No major
conflict has been won without boots on the ground. Listed below are the
three essential roles the Army must play.
First, our Army must prevent conflict just as we did during the
cold war. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced
that conflict with your force would be imprudent. The Army's ability to
win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a joint
force must never be open to challenge. It must be clear that we will
fight and win, which requires a force with sufficient capacity,
readiness, and modernization. That means quality soldiers; agile,
adaptive leaders; versatile units; realistic training; and modern
equipment. Prevention is achieved through credible readiness, sometimes
requiring decisive action. Our Army must continue to be a credible
force around the globe to prevent miscalculations by those who would
test us.
Second, our Army must help shape the international environment to
enable our combatant commanders to assure our friends and contain our
enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners, fostering mutual
understanding through military-to-military contacts, and helping them
build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an
investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We
must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a
reliable, consistent, and respectful partner to others.
Finally, the Army must be ready to win decisively and dominantly.
Nothing else approaches what is achieved by winning, and the
consequences of losing at war are usually catastrophic. With so much at
stake, the American people will expect what they have always expected
of us--decisive victory. The Army must never enter into a terrible
endeavor such as war unprepared. Although we may still win, it will be
more expensive, cost more lives, and require more time.
In addition to being trained, sized, and equipped to win decisively
in the more traditional operational domains, the Army also will require
robust capability in cyberspace. As the past decade of conflict has
demonstrated, the information environment has changed the way we fight.
Military and cyberspace operations have converged, and protecting
information in cyberspace is more essential than ever to how our Army
fights. The advantage will go to those able to maintain the freedom to
operate and able to gain, protect, and exploit information in the
contested cyberspace domain. The Army must be dominant in both the land
and cyberspace domains.
Smaller But Reversible
As our new national defense priorities drive us to a smaller Army,
we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast or risk
losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder to expand
again when needed. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly
expand to meet large unexpected contingencies, and four components are
key to that ability. First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of
noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new
formations when needed. Second, we will make significant investments in
Army Special Operations Forces to increase their capabilities and
provide the President with more options. Third, it will require ready
and accessible Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve forces. The
Army's Reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations
around the world. From Kosovo, the Sinai and Horn of Africa to
Afghanistan and Iraq, homeland defense along America's Southwest
border, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad,
the ARNG and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensable parts of our
operational force and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth
and versatility to meet the complex demands of the future. The fourth
critical component of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's
industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and
development and to design, produce, and maintain our weapons systems,
components, and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet
a large demand. Reversibility is the sine qua non to ensuring that the
Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls.
THE ARMY'S FOCUS AREAS
Support to Operations in Afghanistan
Our immediate focus remains on providing the best-trained and most-
ready land forces in the world to win the current fight while
maintaining responsiveness for unforeseen contingencies. The support of
the American people is paramount to our success. We must fulfill our
responsibilities to them without draining their goodwill and treasure.
Despite continued challenges and tough conditions, our forces are
making measureable progress against an adaptive enemy. Army security
force assistance teams continue to train both Afghan National Army
Forces (now almost 180,000 strong) and Afghan national police forces
(made up of nearly 144,000 men and women in uniform). The increased
capability of Afghan security forces is allowing security of the region
to be turned back over to the Government of Afghanistan district by
district. During the coming year we must continue to provide trained
and ready forces equipped to support operations. We remain focused on
doing everything we can to ensure that we meet our national objectives
and provide what our brave men and women in the field need to succeed.
In Afghanistan, the commitment and performance of our soldiers and
civilians continues to be nothing short of extraordinary. Not only have
they taken the fight to our enemies, but they have proven equally
effective as emissaries. Our investment in leader development prepared
them to operate in this demanding environment.
In the coming year we will continue to increase the Afghan lead of
security responsibilities, target key insurgent leaders, retain and
expand secure areas, and help Afghan National Security Forces earn the
support of the people through improved security capacity and
capability. Because of its geography, distance, infrastructure, and
harsh environment, the difficulty and complexity of the drawdown in
Afghanistan will exceed that in Iraq. The United States Army is the
only organization in the world with the capability to plan and execute
a logistical operation this complex and difficult.
The Army places great emphasis on properly maintaining its
equipment to restore readiness to the force and ensure it is prepared
to meet combatant commander requirements. The Army reset program
reverses the effects of combat stress and restores equipment to a high
level of combat capability to conduct future operations. Reset is a
lengthy process, and even after the drawdown from Afghanistan is
complete, the Army will require funding for 2 to 3 years to reset our
equipment from the harsh demands of war.
RESPONSIBLE STEWARDSHIP
Institutional Army Transformation
The drive to reform the Institutional Army is about doing things
better, smarter, and faster while taking advantage of available
technology, knowledge, and experience. Our Institutional Army--the part
of the Army that trains, educates, and supports Army forces worldwide--
will become more flexible by improving our ability to quickly adapt to
changing environments, missions, and priorities. The Institutional Army
is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the
organization by the current and future operational environments. It
performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while
seeking to adapt institutional business processes.
Further, the Army is working to provide ``readiness at best value''
to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and
global economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's
institutional management processes and develop an integrated management
system has never been more urgent. To enhance organizational adaptive
capacity while shepherding our resources, the Army initiated a number
of efforts, such as the Army financial improvement plan, which will
enable the Army to achieve full auditability by fiscal year 2017.
Acquisition Reform
As a result of uncertain funding, insufficient contract oversight
and an ineffective requirement determination process, the Army has
initiated a significant reform of the way we develop and acquire our
products and weapons. As part of this initiative, we have taken steps
toward improvement through a series of capability portfolio reviews.
These platforms serve to revalidate, modify, or terminate programs
based on the Army's need and the affordability of the program. We have
also started to fix an inefficient procurement system that too often
wastes precious resources and fails to provide needed systems in a
timely manner. For example, the Army commissioned a comprehensive
review of our acquisition system that, based on the findings and
recommendations, produced a blueprint for acquisition reform. These
changes fall into four broad areas:
--realignment of acquisition requirements combined with a sharper
focus on the needed competencies of acquisition professionals;
--expansion of stakeholder (acquisition professional and soldier end-
user) participation in developing requirements, planning, and
acquisition solicitation;
--reappraisal and streamlining of acquisition strategies and the
attendant risk in such streamlining; and
--improvement in the selection, development, and accountability of
the people involved in the acquisition process.
We are implementing these recommendations as part of our broader
effort to reform the Institutional Army.
Army Energy Security
Supplying energy to our Army around the world is increasingly
challenging, expensive, and dangerous. The Army must consider energy in
all activities to reduce demand, increase efficiency, obtain
alternative sources, and create a culture of energy accountability.
Energy security is an imperative that can be described in two
categories--operational and garrison.
Operational energy is the energy and associated systems,
information and processes required to train, move, and sustain forces,
and systems for military operations. The Army is developing new
doctrine, policies, plans, and technologies that will improve the
management and use of operational energy to better support soldiers'
needs. Less energy-efficient systems in an operational environment
require more fuel, increasing the number of fuel convoys and thus
risking more lives and limiting our flexibility.
Garrison energy is the energy required to power Army bases and
conduct soldier training. Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable
electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and
mission capabilities. The impact of increasing energy prices is a
decrease in the quantity and quality of training the Army can conduct.
Initiatives such as cool roofs, solar power, stormwater management,
and water efficiency are positive steps toward addressing the
challenges of energy security in the operational and garrison
environments. Innovative and adaptive leaders, seeking ways to increase
energy efficiency and implement renewable and alternate sources of
energy, are key to saving lives and increasing the Army's flexibility
by reducing costs.
A LEANER ARMY
The Army is committed to providing combatant commanders with the
capabilities, capacity, and diversity needed to be successful across a
wide range of operations. With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and
also remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements.
We will reduce in a manner that preserves our readiness and avoids any
hollowing of the force. To satisfy this enduring requirement, we have
three rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted:
--end strength/force structure;
--readiness; and
--modernization.
We will balance these three foundational imperatives throughout the
next several years to provide combatant commanders trained and ready
forces in support of Joint Force 2020.
Force Structure and Force Design
The Army will maintain a versatile mix of tailorable and networked
organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to continue providing a
sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of
military operations. This will give combatant commanders a hedge
against unexpected contingencies and enable a sustainable tempo for our
All-Volunteer Force. Over the next 5 years, the Army will decrease its
end-strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to
490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 ARNG, and 206,000 to 205,000
Army Reserve soldiers as directed. Reducing our end-strength over a
deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the Army to
take care of soldiers, families, and civilians; to continue meeting our
commitments in Afghanistan; and to facilitate reversibility in an
uncertain strategic environment.
An unpredictable and dynamic global security environment requires
the Army, as a force in transition, to adjust and reduce its size while
remaining flexible, capable, and ready to meet the Nation's
requirements and maintaining an ability to reverse course to readily
expand if necessary. In accordance with the new defense priorities, the
Army of 2020 must have a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and
equipment that is lethal, agile, adaptable, and responsive. As the Army
transitions from the current force to a leaner force, it will do so
while remaining engaged in the current conflicts. The Army will
prioritize force structure and committed assets in the Pacific region
and the Middle East, and will shape the future force to support the
Army's requirements as part of the joint force to fulfill the Nation's
strategic and operational commitments. The Army will optimize force
structure to maintain reversibility, and achieve maximum operational
strategic flexibility. Today we plan on reducing at least eight Active
component brigade combat teams (BCT); however, we continue to assess
the design and mix of these modular formations based upon the lessons
from the last 10 years of combat. This analysis may lead to a decision
to reorganize BCTs into more capable and robust formations, requiring
further BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and
agility for tomorrow's security challenges.
As the Army's Active component reduces in size, the composition of
combat support and combat service support enablers in the Active and
Reserve components will be adjusted to give the Army the ability to
conduct sustained operations and to mitigate risk. The Army will
continue to rely on the Reserve components to provide key enablers and
operational depth. An operational Reserve comprised of a discrete set
of capabilities with an enhanced level of readiness will be essential.
This force will consist of three elements:
--select combat formations prepared to respond to crisis;
--combat support and combat service support enablers employed early
in support of operational plans; and
--forces aligned to support steady-state combatant commander
requirements.
Ensured access to the Reserve component is essential to providing
the operational depth and flexibility combatant commanders require.
During the transition, we must manage our people carefully to neither
compromise readiness nor break faith with those who have served the
Nation so well.
Readiness
Army unit readiness is measured by the level of its manning,
training, and equipping. The current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model has served us well in meeting the requirements for Iraq and
Afghanistan; however, we will adapt it to ensure we meet future
combatant commander requirements in the uncertain, complex strategic
environment. We envision a progressive readiness model for most Active
and Reserve component early deploying units which will align forces for
combatant commanders. Because of their unique capabilities, our low-
density, high-demand units do not lend themselves to a rotational pool
like ARFORGEN. These units must be sustained in a constant readiness
model.
The Strength of Our Army is Our Soldiers
Soldiers and families form the foundation of unit readiness. People
are the Army, and our enduring priority is to preserve the high-
quality, All-Volunteer Force--the essential element of our strength.
The Army has gained the trust of the American public more than at any
other time in recent history while developing a force that is very
different from what it was a few short years ago. Our Army must
maintain the public's trust while our Nation fulfills its
responsibilities toward soldiers and their families. The United States
Army is unique from other professions because our core attributes are
derived from American values, the Constitution, and law. Today's Army
is building on a successful foundation with the trust, respect, and
support of the American people. This foundation, and our enduring
commitment to strengthening our Army profession, will improve our force
as it adapts to meet the Nation's evolving needs.
The Army is the Nation's pre-eminent leadership experience. The
All-Volunteer Force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth,
versatility, and unmatched experience to the joint force. We must
continue to train, develop, and retain adaptive leaders and maintain
this combat-seasoned, All-Volunteer Force of professionals. We will
continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and
complex future environments. Our leader development model is an
adaptive, continuous, and progressive process grounded in Army values.
We grow soldiers and Army civilians into competent and confident
leaders capable of decisive action. We must give our leaders broadening
opportunities to better prepare them for the myriad challenges they
will encounter. In addition, we must reinvigorate unit training,
training management skills, and leader development to build versatile
units. By providing our leaders with the professional challenges they
expect, we will retain them and nurture their adaptive spirit.
Our challenge in the coming years is not just about attracting and
selecting the best available candidates to be Army professionals. We
must also engage and develop our quality, combat-experienced leaders so
that we keep them, and they, in turn, train the next generation of Army
professionals. During the last decade of war, we have given our young
leaders unprecedented flexibility and authority to operate effectively
on the battlefield. We will prepare for tomorrow by building on that
investment and ensuring that opportunities for creativity, leadership,
and advancement exist throughout the Army.
We must draw down wisely to avoid stifling the health of the force
or breaking faith with our soldiers, civilians, and families. Excessive
cuts would create high risk in our ability to sustain readiness. We
must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too much or too fast
and risk losing the leadership, technical skills, and combat experience
that cannot be easily reclaimed. We must identify and safeguard key
programs in education, leader development, healthcare, quality of life,
and retirement--programs critical to retaining our soldiers.
The Strength of Our Soldiers is Our Families
In order to ensure a relevant and ready All-Volunteer Force, the
Army will continue to invest heavily in our soldier and family
programs. The Army Family Covenant expresses the Army's commitment to
care for soldiers and their families by providing a strong, supportive
environment that enhances their strength and resilience and helps them
to thrive. The Covenant focuses on programs, services, and initiatives
essential to preserving an All-Volunteer Force and institutionalizes
the Army's commitment to provide soldiers and their families a quality-
of-life commensurate with their service to the Nation. Through the
Covenant, the Army is improving the delivery of soldier and family
programs and services, sustaining accessibility to quality healthcare,
and promoting education and employment opportunities for family
members. We are sustaining high-quality housing; ensuring excellence in
school support, youth services, and child care; and maintaining quality
recreation services for soldiers and family members as they serve on
the Nation's behalf around the world. We will not walk away from our
commitment to our families; however, a different fiscal reality
requires us to review our investments and eliminate redundant and poor-
performing programs while sustaining those that are high-performing and
most beneficial to our families.
Honoring Service
We must fulfill our moral obligation to the health, welfare, and
care of our soldiers, civilians, and families. The effects of more than
10 years of war and inadequate dwell-time at home has resulted in a
cumulative stress on soldiers, families, and communities that has
significant implications for the Army and our Nation. We have
implemented an unprecedented number of personnel-focused programs,
including comprehensive soldier fitness; wounded warrior program; and
health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention, to ensure the
continued care, support, and services that sustain the high quality of
our force.
Sexual harassment and sexual assault are inconsistent with the
Army's values and our profession. It is imperative that we foster a
climate where such misconduct is not tolerated and the dignity of our
soldiers, civilians, and family members is respected and protected.
Army leaders are focused on the urgency of this issue and the level of
commitment required to affect cultural change and combat this crime. We
are aggressively implementing and expanding the Army's comprehensive
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program. The
SHARP program is aimed at command prevention efforts at all levels,
educating all members of our Army family, training our first responder
professionals, and supporting victims while reducing the stigma of
reporting. One incident of this type of unwarranted and abusive
behavior is one too many. The Army is committed to ensuring leadership
at all levels is engaged in preventing sexual assault and harassment
and appropriately holding offenders accountable.
The Army continues to invest heavily in better understanding
traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress, the invisible
signature wounds of our recent wars. We have developed and implemented
new prevention and treatment protocols, and we are in the third year of
our 5-year partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health to
identify the factors that help protect a soldier's mental health and
those that put it at risk.
We have also started to reduce the length of deployments to 9
months for many of our units at the division level and below, which we
believe will alleviate significant pressure on our soldiers and their
families. We are doubling our efforts to ensure that each of our more
than 18,000 soldiers currently enrolled in the Integrated Disability
Evaluation System (IDES) is carefully examined to determine whether he
or she should return to civilian life or continue military service. A
recent initiative between the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of Veterans Affairs, the IDES integrates formerly separate
programs resulting in a streamlined, more efficient process for
servicemembers, which will reduce the backlog of soldiers awaiting
benefits.
As we draw down the Army, we must honor our veterans with the very
best support, care, and services they deserve as they make the
transition from military service to civilian life. We are committed to
our soldiers and their families, who are the strength of the Army. At
the same time, the Army is focused on wisely managing our resources in
the healthcare arena. The Army supports DOD proposals to further reduce
the rate of growth in healthcare costs--proposals that are aligned with
our priorities. TRICARE is a superb health benefit, one of the best in
the country and appropriately so. Just as in all areas of the Defense
budget, we need to make decisions that preserve a strong benefit yet
reflect the fiscal realities of the times. The proposals take care to
exempt populations who have made the greatest sacrifices--those who are
medically retired and those families who have lost their loved one
while serving on Active Duty. The changes proposed are also adjusted to
reflect lower adjustments for those retirees with lower retirement pay.
And, most importantly, the Department continues to provide resources
that improve the overall health system for our soldiers and their
families.
The Army is using the health promotion and risk reduction fiscal
year 2011 Campaign Plan to holistically promote health and reduce risk.
The Campaign Plan incorporates findings and recommendations from DOD
and Army reports regarding health promotion, risk reduction, and
suicide prevention. Health promotion and risk reduction activities are
essential to sustain the force under the current operational tempo and
reset our Army.
Modernization
The Army has global responsibilities requiring large technological
advantages to prevail decisively in combat. Just as pilots and sailors
seek supremacy in the air and on the seas, soldiers must dominate their
enemies on land. Modernizing, especially as end-strength is reduced, is
the key to ensuring that our dominance continues.
The Army is setting priorities and making prudent choices to
provide the best possible force for the Nation within the resources
available. We are developing and fielding a versatile and affordable
mix of equipment to enable us to succeed in the full range of missions
and maintain a decisive advantage over our enemies. To meet the
challenges of an evolving strategic and fiscal environment, our
strategy is based on three tenets:
--integrated capability portfolios;
--incremental modernization; and
--leveraging the ARFORGEN cycle;
--integrated capability portfolios (align stakeholders to identify
capability gaps and eliminate unnecessary redundancies);
--incremental modernization (enables us to deliver new and improved
capabilities by leveraging mature technologies, shortening
development times, planning growth potential, and acquiring
in quantities that give us the greatest advantage while
hedging against uncertainty); and
--ARFORGEN (processes synchronize the distribution of equipment to
units providing increased readiness over time and
delivering a steady and predictable supply of trained and
ready modular forces. The Army has consolidated its
materiel management process under a single command and
designated U.S. Army Materiel Command as the Army's Lead
Materiel Integrator. Additionally, we consolidated all of
our materiel data into a single authoritative repository
called the Logistics Information Warehouse).
These emerging systems and processes represent a powerful new
approach for implementing the Army's equipping priorities, policies,
and programs to the meet new security demands of the 21st century. The
equipment requested in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget strikes
a balance between current and future needs, provides the basis for an
affordable equipping strategy over time, and takes into account Army
requirements and priorities. In developing this request, the Army made
difficult decisions to shift funds previously programmed for future
capabilities to current needs. The decisions came at the expense of
promising and needed technologies with capabilities that did not fit
within resource limitations. The Army's top four modernization
priorities are the Network, ground combat vehicle (GCV), joint light
tactical vehicle (JLTV), and soldier systems.
Network
Also known as LandWarNet, the network remains the Army's top
investment priority. With expectations of tighter budgets and a still
very active threat environment, the Army will have to produce a force
that is smaller yet more capable. The Network is the core of that
smaller, capable Army.
The Army is conducting a series of semiannual field exercises known
as the Network Integration Evaluation to evaluate, integrate, and
mature the Army's tactical network. The exercises will assess network
and non-network capabilities to determine implications across doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities. The process aligns several key Army network programs
and advances the fusion of radio waveforms to form an integrated
network baseline to which industry can build.
The foundation of the modernized network is a joint, secure, and
common architecture that will provide information from the cloud to
enable leaders, units, and the Institutional Army to function more
effectively. The Army will extend this critical capability to its
installations around the world. This capability will increase force
effectiveness, facilitate transition for units, and individuals from
one phase of the ARFORGEN cycle to another and greatly improve network
security.
The major programs that form the backbone of the tactical network
are:
--the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, which provides a real-
time common operating picture down to the company level by
extending satellite and line-of-sight communications, including
telephone, data, and video;
--the Joint Tactical Radio System, an advanced software-defined
family of radios that will carry data and voice for dismounted
troops and airborne and maritime platforms;
--the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, which provides
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, as well as
access to the entire Defense Intelligence Information
Enterprise, to commanders from the company to Army service
component command level;
--the Joint Battle Command Platform, which provides situational
awareness data enhancing mission command to Army and Marine
Corps tactical operations centers and combat vehicles; and
--Nett Warrior, which gives dismounted leaders integrated situational
awareness and information sharing, helping them to avoid
fratricide and increase combat effectiveness.
The Army network must be dynamic to give soldiers, civilians, and
partners information and services when and where needed. Investment
must be steady and wisely applied, while maintaining a strong
partnership with industry.
Ground Combat Vehicle
The infantry fighting vehicle is reaching the limit of its capacity
to receive technology upgrades proven critical for soldiers in combat
operations. GCV is the Army's replacement program for the infantry
fighting vehicle and the centerpiece of the Army's overall combat
vehicle investment strategy. It will be designed to deliver a full
nine-man squad with improved survivability, mobility, and network
integration, considered crucial to our ability to conduct fire and
maneuver in close quarters fighting in complex terrain. The vehicle
will also provide the growth potential necessary to accommodate
advances in protection, networking and space, weight, power, and
cooling technologies while reducing sustainment demands. No current
vehicle can sufficiently meet all these requirements.
GCV acquisition strategy implements affordability measures designed
to ensure the long-term success of the program as the Army faces
constrained resources in the future. To develop this acquisition
strategy, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted
a comprehensive review to make sure the program is both achievable and
affordable within a 7-year timeframe. The model adopted for the GCV
program incentivizes industry to use the best of mature technologies
that are both affordable and support the 7-year timeframe. The Army has
also paid close attention to risk reduction within the program by
requiring industry to identify potential cost schedule and performance
tradeoffs; provide cost targets throughout the GCV's lifecycle; and
maximize competition to support innovation, cost containment, and
schedule requirements.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
As a Joint Service program between the Army and Marine Corps, the
JLTV will replace approximately one-third of the Army's oldest
unarmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV). The JLTV
incorporates the strengths of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected
(MRAP) vehicles that the HMMWV family of vehicles does not provide. The
HMMWV was not designed to be used as an armored combat vehicle, but it
was often employed as one during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
contrast, the JLTV will be designed for this role from the outset. It
will be capable of operating across the range of military operations
and physical environments providing improved mobility and protection
for soldiers. The JLTV balances protection, payload, performance, and
improved fuel efficiency in one affordable and sustainable vehicle. It
will also be fully integrated into the Network to enhance the
effectiveness of ground forces.
Soldier Systems
The squad is the foundation of the decisive force; it is the
cornerstone of all units. To ensure the success of combat operations in
the future, the Army will invest in systems that consider the squad as
a team rather than a collection of individuals. This approach will
guarantee that the squad will not be in a fair fight but will have
overmatch. The Army will continue to invest in soldier systems that
enable the lethality, protection, situational awareness, and mobility
of the individual soldier in his or her squad. These systems include
small arms, night vision, soldier sensors, body armor, and individual
clothing and equipment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Army has been, and will continue to be, a critical part of the
joint force because land power remains the politically decisive form of
warfare and is essential to America's national security strategy. No
major conflict has ever been won without ``boots on the ground.'' By
being tasked to seize, occupy, and defend land areas, as well as to
defeat enemy land forces, the Army is unique because it must not only
deploy and defeat an adversary but must be prepared to remain in the
region until the Nation's long-term strategic objectives are secured.
Indeed, the insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable
measure of America's commitment to defend our interests, protect our
friends, and defeat our enemies.
With global trends pointing to further instability, our Army
remains a key guardian of our national security. In the wake of the
cold war, it was said that we had reached the ``end of history,'' and
that liberal democracy had won the ideological competition. However,
events since then make it clear that potential adversaries with
competing ideologies still exist and are extremely dangerous.
As a result, we find ourselves in an increasingly uncertain world,
with threats ranging from terrorist and cyberattacks to regional
instability to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For
our Army that means we will likely have to deal with near peer
competitors in niche areas and hybrid threats that mix regular,
irregular, and criminal activity--all while still facing the
possibility of a conventional force-on-force conflict.
The danger extends from the homeland to the theater where combat
operations might occur. Conflict is the norm; a stable peace the
exception. In such a world, our adversaries will adapt to gain
advantage, especially in the land domain. And it is on land that our
challenges will be the most complex because of dynamic human
relationships and terrain variables.
While the Army's new end-strength numbers allow it to support
current defense priorities, it is imperative that the Army draw down
end-strength levels in a smart and responsible manner. We believe that
our new end-strength provides us with the flexibility to retain the
hard-won expertise it has gained over the last decade. To be sure, the
Army has faced similar challenges before. After every major conflict
since the Revolutionary War, the Army has faced pressure to decrease
its end-strength. As recently as 2001 (pre-9/11), many believed a
strategic shift was needed and that the future of modern warfare would
be about missile defense, satellites, and high-tech weaponry because no
adversary would dare challenge America's conventional forces. But
whenever we have rushed to radically diminish the position of the Army,
the result has always been the same: an excessive decline in
effectiveness at a cost of blood and treasure.
Decreases after World War I directly contributed to failures at
Kasserine Pass. Decreases after World War II led to Task Force Smith's
failure in Korea. More recently, the end of the cold war demonstrated
our Nation's need for agile, adaptable, and decisive ground forces to
conduct a wide range of operations. These numerous missions include
Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Joint Task Force Andrew in Florida,
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti,
Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operation Joint
Guardian in Kosovo. What they have in common is that they were
unforeseen, thus emphasizing our need to avoid the historical pattern
of drawing down too fast.
America's leaders face difficult choices as they chart the way
ahead for our Nation. Familiar external threats persist and complex new
challenges will emerge. Concurrently, fiscal limitations create
internal challenges for our leaders. America's Army is prepared to
fulfill its role in keeping the Nation secure. The Army will prevent
conflict by remaining a credible force with sufficient capacity to
dissuade adversaries from challenging American interests. The Army will
shape the environment, building positive relationships and capabilities
that enable nations to effectively protect and govern their citizenry.
Finally, when called, the Army will fight for the Nation and win
decisively. We understand these responsibilities and resolve not to
reduce the size of the Army in a manner that does not permit us to
reverse the process should demand for forces increase dramatically.
As we look ahead, the Army is focusing on three areas. Our first
priority remains supporting operations in Afghanistan. We will guard
against becoming distracted by the future at the risk of our men and
women who remain in harm's way.
Second, we will be the very best stewards we can because America's
resources are too precious to waste. Transforming the Institutional
Army, reforming our acquisition process and ensuring energy security
are essential for us to protect the resources provided by the Congress
and the American people.
Third, we will fight to incorporate principles and processes that
preserve readiness and capability while reducing the size of the Army.
We are adjusting our formations to build the right number of units with
the right capability to meet the needs of the Joint Force. The past 10
years have taught us that an operational reserve force is essential to
accomplish our missions and expand rapidly when required. We will
invest deliberately and wisely in our soldiers, civilians, and families
to make sure they are prepared and supported. We will treat those who
have served in our ranks with respect and honor. Our wounded soldiers
will receive the very best care the Nation can provide, and our
soldiers who return to civilian life will be well-prepared to do so.
Future threats will demand enhanced capabilities for our soldiers,
so we will modernize our equipment. The Army has identified four
programs to highlight. The Network gives sight, sound, and awareness to
our soldiers, civilians, and leaders to defeat our adversaries. The GCV
and JLTV will incorporate hard-won lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan to
provide the mobility and protection our soldiers require. Investments
in soldier systems improve our soldiers' ability to move, fight, and
survive on the battlefield.
The Army has chosen its focus areas carefully and deliberately
because they will enable us to provide what Nation needs. We owe it to
America and to the American soldier, the Nation's servant and warrior--
the strength of the Nation.
______
2012 Reserve Component Addendum to the Army Posture Statement
Sections 517 and 519 of the National Defense Authorization Act of
1994 (NDAA) require the information in this addendum. Section 517
requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot program for
Active component support of the Reserves under section 414 of the NDAA
of 1992 and 1993. Section 519 requires a detailed presentation
concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information
relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act
(ANGCRRA) of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this
addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended section 519
reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using section
519 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information
that was available September 30, 2011.
Section 517(b)(2)(A)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from
within the promotion zone who are serving as Active component advisors
to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance
with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers
considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay
grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the
Army.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active component in Army average Active component in Army average
Reserve component Percentage \1\ percentage \2\ Reserve component Percentage \1\ percentage \2\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major................................. 57 of 67............... 85.1 92.1 73 of 86............... 84.9 93.3
Lieutenant Colonel.................... 10 of 12............... 83.3 88.7 6 of 11................ 54.5 86.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Active component officers serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
\2\ Active component officers not serving in Reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.
Section 517(b)(2)(B)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below
the promotion zone who are serving as Active component advisors to
units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with
that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph
(A) (the paragraph above).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active component in Army average Active component in Army average
Reserve component Percentage \1\ percentage \2\ Reserve component Percentage \1\ percentage \2\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major................................. 6 of 123............... 4.9 5.7 3 of 57................ 5.3 8.7
Lieutenant Colonel.................... 0 of 7................. .............. 10.7 0 of 10................ .............. 3.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Below-the-zone Active component officers serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
\2\ Below-the-zone Active component officers not serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
Section 519(b)
1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of
Active Duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S. Army
Reserve Selected Reserve units.
Army National Guard Officers.--21,425 or 49.2 percent of which
1,429 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.
Army Reserve Officers.--9,888 or 33 percent of which 389 were
fiscal year 2011 accessions.
2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2
years of Active Duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S.
Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
Army National Guard Enlisted.--95,375 or 30 percent of which
7,243 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.
Army Reserve Enlisted.--35,796 or 21 percent of which 3,524 were
fiscal year 2011 accessions.
3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service
academies and were released from Active Duty before the completion of
their Active-Duty service obligation and, of those officers:
a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their Active-
Duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to
section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
In fiscal year 2011, there was one Service Academy graduate
released from Active Duty before completing their obligation to
serve in the Army Reserve.
b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for
each waiver:
In fiscal year 2011, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA the
Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to the Army National
Guard.
In fiscal year 2011, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA the
Secretary of the Army granted one waiver to the Army Reserve.
The waiver provided the soldier an opportunity to play a
professional sport and complete service obligation.
4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished
Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released
from active duty before the completion of their Active-Duty service
obligation and, of those officers:
a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their Active-
Duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to
section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
In fiscal year 2011, there were no distinguished ROTC graduates
serving the remaining period of their Active-Duty service
obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.
b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for
each waiver:
In fiscal year 2011, the Secretary of the Army granted no
waivers.
5. The number of officers who are graduates of the ROTC program and
who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in
accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of 2 years
of Active Duty and such additional period of service as is necessary to
complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard
and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their
minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was
granted during the preceding fiscal year:
In fiscal year 2011, there were no graduates released early from
an Active-Duty obligation.
6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during
the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above
First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and
percentage that were concurred in by an Active-Duty officer under
section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three
categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with
Army Reserve data also reported).
There are no longer Active and Reserve component associations
affiliated with ARNG vacancy promotion due to operational
mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component
officers no longer concur or nonconcur with unit vacancy
promotion recommendations for officers in associated units
according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion
boards have Active component representation.
In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG recommended 4,286 officers for a
position-vacancy promotion and promoted 2,318.
In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve recommended 85 officers for
a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 85.
7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under
section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary
establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned
officers and the reason for each such waiver.
In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG had a total of 44 soldiers that
received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted
based on noncompletion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due
to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) (``medical
hold'' or ``medical hold-over'' units); and noncompletion of
the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) or Senior Leader Course (SLC)
due to deployment or training schedule constraints.
In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve had a total of 257 soldiers
who received a military education waiver. Of these, 89 were
sergeants (SGTs) in need of a waiver for WLC as a result of
being deployed or assigned to WTUs (medical hold or medical
hold-over units) because of a medical condition incurred in
direct support of Contingency Operations while otherwise
eligible for promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, 155
waivers for ALC and 13 waivers for SLC were granted to soldiers
otherwise eligible for consideration but lacking the
prerequisite level of Noncommissioned Officer Education System
(NCOES) schooling as a direct result of operational deployment
conflicts or inability of the Army to schedule the course.
The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the
waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRA to the
Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command
(USARC). The National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the USARC
maintain details for each waiver.
8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of
personnel in the initial entry training and nondeployability personnel
accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for
members of the ARNG who have not completed the minimum training
required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for
deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining
to the Army Reserve.)
In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG had 49,454 soldiers considered
nondeployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 220-
1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical
issues; medical nonavailability; pending administrative or
legal discharge; separation; officer transition;
nonparticipation or restrictions on the use or possession of
weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg amendment). NGB
maintains the detailed information.
In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve had 34,180 soldiers
considered nondeployable for reasons outlined in AR 220-1, Unit
Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues;
medical nonavailability; pending administrative or legal
discharge; separation; officer transition; nonparticipation or
restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition
under the Lautenberg amendment). USARC maintains the detailed
information.
9. The number of members of the ARNG, shown for each State, that
were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section
1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required
for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard.
(Army Reserve data also reported.)
A total of 445 ARNG soldiers, with at least 24-months time in
ARNG, were losses in fiscal year 2011 due to lack of minimum
required military education. The breakdown is 265 enlisted and
180 officers.
The number of Army Reserve soldiers discharged during fiscal year
2011 for not completing the minimum training required for
deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is
24 officers and 5 enlisted soldiers. Under AR 135-175,
Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for
officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36
months after commissioning. Under AR 135-178, Separation of
Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for
soldiers who have not completed the required initial-entry
training within the first 24 months.
10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted
by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under
section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1)
of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for
each waiver.
In fiscal year 2011, there were no waivers granted Secretary of
the Army to the ARNG under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the
requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in
paragraph (9).
In fiscal year 2011, there were 210 waivers granted by the Chief,
Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to
grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum
training required for deployment within 24 months after
entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were
categorized as Hardship, Medical, or Administrative (i.e.
failed height/weight standards, failed to obtain driver
license, accepted ROTC scholarship, temporary disqualified, and
failed to complete high school).
11. The number of ARNG members, shown for each State, (and the
number of Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding
fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment and, of those members:
--the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical
profile standards for deployment; and
--the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to
section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described
in paragraph (8).
a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical
profile standards required for deployment:
In fiscal year 2011, 256,696 ARNG soldiers underwent a Periodic
Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,305 (3.9 percent of the
soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due
to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention
standards.
In fiscal year 2011, 124,785 Army Reserve soldiers underwent a
PHA. There were 14,948 (12 percent of the soldiers who
underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile
limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.
b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section
1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in
paragraph (8).
In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG transferred all 14,305 soldiers to
a medically nondeployable status who were identified for a
review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet
retention standards.
In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve transferred 15,826 soldiers
to a medically nondeployable status who were identified for a
review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet
retention standards.
On August 23, 2010, Department of the Army implemented medical
readiness categories (MRC) per AR 40-501 which replaced fully
medically ready (FMR) as the metric for measuring individual
medical readiness (IMR) in the Army. This new way of measuring
medical readiness by classifying soldiers into MRC reduced the
number of soldiers considered medically not ready in the ARNG
in fiscal year 2011. Soldiers previously listed as not ``fully
medically ready'' because they didn't have current
immunizations, medical warning tags, DNA, and a current HIV
test on file are now considered ``medically ready'' and
identified as MRC 2 (which is correctable within 72 hours). The
data is generated from MEDPROS, the medical readiness database
of record for the Army.
12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of
the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during
the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section
704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
13. The number of members and the percentage of the total
membership of the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a dental
screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117
of ANGCRRA.
Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section
704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
14. The number of members and the percentage of the total
membership of the ARNG shown for each State, older than the age of 40
who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal
year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section
704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
15. The number of units of the ARNG that are scheduled for early
deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the
number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with
section 1118 of ANGCRRA.
Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section
704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1118 of ANGCRRA.
16. The estimated postmobilization training time for each ARNG
combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in
broad categories and by State of what training would need to be
accomplished for ARNG combat units (and Army Reserve units) in a
postmobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.
The January 19, 2007 Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
``Utilization of the Total Force,'' limited Reserve component
unit mobilizations to 400-day periods, including 30-days
postmobilization leave, and 5 days out-processing. The most
significant impact of this policy change to the ARNG is the
inclusion of postmobilization training time during the 400-day
mobilization period.
Timely alert for mobilizations--at least 1 year prior--is crucial
to the ARNG's mission success. Under the ARFORGEN model, many
training tasks previously conducted during the postmobilization
phase now occur in local training areas before mobilization.
First Army (1A), in the continental United States (CONUS),
manages and directs postmobilization training for Reserve
component conventional forces. 1A, in theater, conducts the
theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness
of mobilized units waiting to deploy.
ARNG training and Army Reserve training complies with the
ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multiyear cycles
and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the
ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and
available). Training progresses through these force pools with
the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrating
to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in
multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the ready year.
All ARNG units are ``Combat Units.'' Forces Command Pre-
Deployment Training, in support of combatant commands'
guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:
--Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever,
travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating
Base (COB/FOB);
--CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel
off a COB/FOB for short durations;
--CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of
their missions off a COB/FOB; and
--CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an area of operations
(such as brigade combat teams).
The premobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A
unit's postmobilization training time depends on the number of
the premobilization tasks completed during premobilization.
Army goals for postmobilization training for Reserve component
headquarters and combat support/combat service support units
range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of
the unit (Note: This time does not include administrative and
travel days). Any premobilization tasks not completed during
the premobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization
station. ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station
with a premobilization task completion rate of 90-95 percent.
Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station
100-percent complete.
Postmobilization training conducted by First Army (1A) typically
consists of:
--theater orientation;
--rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training;
--counterinsurgency operations;
--counter-improvised-explosive-device training;
--convoy live-fire exercises; and
--completion of any theater-specified training not completed
during the premobilization period.
Postmobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50-65
days training at mobilization station. This training supports a
Combat Training Center culminating training event during
postmobilization that a CAT 4 unit is required to perform in
order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or
Joint Readiness Training Center; 30-day training exercises).
Below is an outline depicting postmobilization training day goals
for various units.
FIRST ARMY-APPROVED POSTMOBILIZATION TRAINING PLANS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Postmobilization training days
--------------------------------------
Current Goal Delta
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I/H/S Brigade Combat Team....... 63 45 +18
Combat Aviation Brigade.......... 33 60 -27
Military Police (Internment/ 27 40 -13
resettlement)...................
Engineer Battalion (Route 37 40 -3
clearance)......................
Military Police Company.......... 30 40 -10
Quartermaster Company............ 23 15 +8
Engineer Company (Construction).. 29 40 -11
Transportation Company (Heavy 37 40 -3
equipment transportation).......
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Army Reserve (AR) Command in conjunction with 1A, Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and Headquarters Department of the Army
(HQDA) are in the process of transitioning the business rules
for pre- and postmobilization training for Army Reserve
formations deploying in support of overseas contingency
operations (OCO). This is motivated in order to meet the intent
behind FRAGO 4 to HQDA EXORD 150-08 (RC Deployment
Expeditionary Force (DEF) Pre and Postmobilization Training
Strategy), the January 19, 2007 SECDEF Memorandum,
``Utilization of the Total Force'' and the August 4, 2011
Secretary of the Army Memorandum, ``Army Deployment Period
Policy.''
Both the current and projected models are listed below, but both
exclude all individual skills training, to include PME, MOSQ
and functional training. The bulk of individual skills training
will remain a premobilization requirement and would consist of
24 days of Inactive Duty Training, 15-29 days of Annual
Training for Collective Training, and, under the current model,
21 additional days of Active Duty Training individual training
(Army Warrior Tasks (AWTs), Theater Specific Required Training
(TSRT)). Under the projected model, the 21 additional days
would be eliminated. Some formations, under the current model,
used up to 74 days premobilization to obtain a T2 rating prior
to mobilization and up to 60 days postmobilization to achieve a
T1 rating. Below is an average of current pre- and
postmobilization training models which will expire September
30, 2012. To reduce the demand on soldiers in a premobilization
status, 1A will assume the training responsibility for many of
the AWTs and TSRT on October 1, 2012. AR units will mobilize at
no less than a T3 rating. The shift in training strategy is for
DEF units only and will increase current postmobilization days
by a projected 10 days.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Category \1\ Average postmobilization Average total
premobilization training postmobilization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current model:
1................................ 65 days 17 days 30 days
2................................ 60 days 22 days 34 days
3................................ 56 days 33 days 46 days
Projected model:
1................................ 39-45 27 days 40 days \2\
2................................ 39-45 32 days 44 days \2\
3................................ 39-45 43 days 56 days \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ No CAT 4 formations in the AR.
\2\ Some formations may require up to 70 days post-MOB to achieve T1 and satisfy COCOM requirements.
17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal
year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to
expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training
devices and technologies for members and units of ARNG (and the Army
Reserve).
During fiscal year 2011, the ARNG continued to synchronize the
use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive
training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS)
programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN
training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with
ARFORGEN, ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency
prior to mobilization.
To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2
Bradley equipped brigade combat teams (BCTs) the ARNG is
continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire
Trainer-Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of
Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the
geographical dispersion of units, ARNG has developed the M-
COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps.
ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-Fidelity Trainers and is
fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the
M2A2 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to
the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System
(CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the
virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.
In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations and meet unstabilized
gunnery requirements, ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy
Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of
software databases, provides commanders with a unique and
critical mission rehearsal tool. In addition, ARNG has added an
Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual and crew
drills for .50 caliber and MK19 unstabilized gunnery tasks
listed in the HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and
territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an
initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 140 IGT
systems have been fielded to ARNG units.
ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that
trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both
the unit and institutional levels.
ARNG has just completed the Army Training Support Command
directed upgrades to the Call For Fire Trainer II (CFFT II).
The CFFT II trains Artillery Soldiers and observers of indirect
fires on critical skills prior to live fire requirements.
To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, ARNG
is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST
2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training
device. ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously
procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000
fielding is completed. EST 2000 and FATS also provides static
unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't
shoot training. The Army is currently rewriting the strategy
for the EST 2000 to include ARNG initiative of the mobile EST
to accommodate the geographical troop dispersion of ARNG. These
systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense
missions.
ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the
Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS
helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills,
diagnose and correct problems, and assess basic and advanced
skills. ARNG has more than 900 systems fielded down to the
company level. LMTS is a laser-based training device that
replicates the firing of the soldier's weapon without live
ammunition.
The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES)
supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction,
classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised
Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or
nonpyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature
effects. ARNG is currently fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of
which, 194 are nonpyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are
pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG
training sites across 39 States and territories. They have
received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life-cycle
sustainment as of third-quarter fiscal year 2012. ARNG-TRS is
continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based
on the recently completed (first quarter, 2012) TADSS Mission
Essential Requirements (MER) review. The latest IEDES
innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to
support less than company size training scenarios.
ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability
through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP).
This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming
(LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile
training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training
Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp
Dodge, Iowa; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, and a regional Distributed Mission Support
Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to
train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP
synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help
units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff training. The
objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and
trained operators during premobilization training.
In order to provide the critical culminating training event for
the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG
has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability
(XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle
Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater
immersed, mission-focused training event to certify company
level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available
Force Pool defined as Certified Company Proficiency with
demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent
leaders, and trained soldiers prepared for success on the
battlefield.
The Army Reserve continues to develop its ability to integrate
live, virtual, constructive and gaming training aids, devices,
simulations, and simulators (TADSS) programs with the Army
Reserve Training Strategy in order to meet established aim
points in our ARFORGEN training model. TADSS play an essential
role in our collective training exercises on our installations
which help support our transition from a strategic to an
operational Army Reserve and meet our ARFORGEN aim point of
providing units at T2 readiness in the available year. Just as
critical, TADSS also support our individual soldier training at
home station, local training areas, and institutions. By
synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve
continues to improve unit training proficiency and ensures we
meet our requirement to provide the combatant commanders with
trained units and proficient battle staffs.
The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army
Reserve's major collective training exercises conducted on Army
Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and
constructive environments to train senior battle staffs while
lower echelon units conduct company and platoon lanes. The Army
Reserve has made sizable investments in improving the facility
infrastructure at Fort Hunter Liggett and Fort McCoy to support
the use of TADSS in these and future exercises. The 75th
Mission Command Training Division is utilizing the Entity-level
Resolution Federation to provide a high-resolution (e.g.,
individual soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit
resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training
simulation.
The Army Reserve also utilizes TADSS to assist individual
soldiers in maintaining their technical and tactical
proficiency. These TADSS assist soldiers in training on
individual pieces of equipment and in sharpening their
battlefield skills.
Low-density simulators continue to be employed to reduce
expensive ``live'' time for unique combat service support
equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on
the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge
simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire
crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive
simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge
derrick simulator for transportation terminal units.
Use of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) and
Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST 2000) remain essential
elements of the Army Reserve marksmanship training strategy.
During fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve fielded more than 529
LMTS to 396 Army Reserve facilities to support home station
basic marksmanship training for individual and crew served
weapons. The system allows the soldier to use their assigned
weapon, as well as crew served weapons, in a simulation/
training mode. In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve also
fielded the EST 2000 to 21 Army Reserve facilities. The EST
2000 provides initial and sustainment marksmanship training,
static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and
shoot/don't shoot training.
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and
for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system
as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel
readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment
information required by that section, together with:
a. Explanations of the information:
Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request.
The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.
The States do not capture this data. The information is
maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System--Army.
b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's
overall assessment of the deployability of units of ARNG (and Army
Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and
equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:
Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be
provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3,
maintains this information. The information is maintained in
the Defense Readiness Reporting System--Army.
19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the
results of inspections of units of ARNG (and Army Reserve) by
Inspectors General or other commissioned officers of the regular Army
under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with
explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including
display of:
a. The number of such inspections;
b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
c. The number of units inspected; and
d. The overall results of such inspections, including the
inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit
met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting
deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of
corrective actions.
During fiscal year 2011, Inspectors General and other
commissioned officers of the regular Army conducted 1,219
inspections of the ARNG. Regular Army officers assigned to the
respective States and territories as Inspectors General
executed the bulk of these inspections (959). Of the remaining
126 inspections, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM),
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and other external
inspection agencies conducted 104. Because the inspections
conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and
recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were
not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these
inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector
General of the Army.
The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two
assessments within the last 12 months. The first was entitled
Property Accountability within the Army Reserve (Directed by
the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)) on January 25, 2011 and final
report approved on August 11, 2011). The second assessment
entitled Special Assessment of Personnel Transition within the
Army Reserve was directed by the CAR on August 11, 2011 and is
ongoing (expected final report approval in March 2012). The
Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted both
assessments. The Army Reserve Inspection General assessed 30
units for Property Accountability. As of December 13, 2011, 33
units have been assessed as part of the Personnel Transitions
Assessment. The overall goal of both assessments was not to
evaluate the unit's deployability status. However, out of the
total 66 units assessed nothing was found that would cause a
unit to be listed as nondeployable. Results of these
inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector
General of the Army.
20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP
units) of the Active-Duty combat units (and other units) associated
with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section
1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by state, for each such ARNG unit (and for
the U.S. Army Reserve) by:
--the assessment of the commander of that associated Active-Duty unit
of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements
of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance
with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and
--the results of the validation by the commander of that associated
Active-Duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard
(or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with Active Duty Forces in
accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.
While the methods employed by the Army to manage the Active
component (AC) support to Reserve component (RC) readiness have
changed during the last 10 years of persistent conflict, we
have met the intent of the Congress as outlined in title XI of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended.
Every RC unit that deployed during fiscal year 2011 was
properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet
combatant commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment
overseas and CONUS by supporting processes associated with the
ARFORGEN process.
The Army began its transformation from large, fixed organizations
(divisions and corps) to a modular, brigade-centric
organization in 2004. At the same time, and while engaged in
persistent conflict, it began transforming the way it executes
the training and readiness of modular units--both AC and RC--to
meet CCDR requirements. As such, modular force transformation
and the implementation of the ARFORGEN process precludes a
response in the format directed by title 10, U.S.C. 10542.
The formal training relationships previously established by the
AC/RC Association Program outlined in U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) Regulation 350-4, ``Active Component/Reserve
Component Partnerships,'' were modified as the requirements of
ongoing OCO kept AC units in frequent deployments and RC units
in frequent mobilization. The deployment tempo problem was
solved within the Army's Training Support XXI program by using
designated, fully functional, AC-led multicomponent
organizations to provide the necessary contact with mobilizing
RC units. Since FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 no longer reflected
the way the AC partnered with RC units, FORSCOM discontinued
its use on July 21, 2010. The legislated roles and
responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of associated
AC units listed in appendices B and C of that regulation are
now executed by the commanders of 1A (FORSCOM's executive agent
for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and
mobilization of conventional RC units in the continental United
States); the 196th Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific's
executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional
RC units located in the Pacific Command's area of
responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) for the
training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the
European Command's area of responsibility.
In 2011, the Army published Army Regulation (AR) 525-29,
ARFORGEN, which institutes the structured progression of unit
readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive
units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR
and other Army requirements. This regulation was a
collaborative effort between FORSCOM, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, the ARNG, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command
to meet the progressive readiness demands of an Army engaged in
persistent conflict. Within ARFORGEN, all rotational Active
Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve units cycle through three ARFORGEN
force pools--Reset, Train/Ready, and Available--and are
designated either for deployment to a validated CCDR
operational requirement as a Deployment Expeditionary Force
(DEF) or for the execution of a contingency mission,
operational plan, or other validated Army requirement as a
Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF).
For the RC, this pertains to all modular division headquarters,
brigade combat teams, multifunctional and functional support
brigades (headquarters only), as well as modular units at the
battalion to detachment level that comprise the critical
enablers for operational missions. Assessments of the manpower,
equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units
and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as
required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the ARNGCRRA
of 1992) are executed and maintained by 1A, the 196th Infantry
Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC unit progresses through the
ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.
Fiscal year 2011 also found the Army at an inflection point in
which strategic conditions have signaled a future change in
demand across the range of military operations (DEF to CEF). RC
will figure prominently in the Army's response to these
changes. ARFORGEN is the process that will produce trained and
ready RC units that are organized, manned, trained, and
equipped, as integral members of the total force, compatible
with their AC counterparts, to provide predictable, recurring
and sustainable capabilities for the Nation's security
requirements. The Army does not foresee a return to the legacy
construct of associated units.
21. A specification of the Active-Duty personnel assigned to units
of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261
note), shown by State for the ARNG (and for the U.S. Army Reserve); by
rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned; and
by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title XI (fiscal year 2011) authorizations Title XI (fiscal year 2011) assigned
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Warrant Warrant
Officers Enlisted officers Total Officers Enlisted officers Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Army Reserve............................... 97 110 8 215 12 18 ........... 30
TRADOC.......................................... 50 3 ........... 53 36 3 ........... 39
FORSCOM......................................... 1,033 2,165 101 3,299 696 1,925 102 2,723
USARPAC......................................... 30 49 1 80 30 41 9 80
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... 1,210 2,327 110 3,647 774 1,987 111 2,872
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of September 30, 2011, the Army had 2,872 Active component
soldiers assigned to title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006,
the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Laws 108-
767, section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources
Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of title
XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by state--the
previous table above provides the best representation of how
title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.
Chairman Inouye. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
your very generous remarks. May I now call upon General
Odierno?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, CHIEF OF STAFF
General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman, Vice Chairman
Cochran, and the rest of the members of the subcommittee. Thank
you very much for allowing me to be here.
I want to start out by also thanking you for your steadfast
support of our soldiers and their families, especially during
these last 10 years, as we've been involved in a significant
amount of combat operation. Without your support, we would not
be able to do the things we're doing, and we would not be able
to take care of our soldiers and families. So, thank you so
much for your support.
I also appreciate the vote of confidence from Secretary
McHugh. I believe in the Army we have a great civilian-military
team, led by Secretary McHugh. His experience and wisdom has
helped me as I've come onboard as the Chief of Staff of the
Army, and I know together we will walk forward to work many of
these issues that face the Army in the future. And I am
confident that in the end, the Army will remain the best land
force in the world, and I look forward to continue to work with
him as we move forward.
It's an honor to sit here today representing our 1.1
million soldiers, our nearly 300,000 Army civilians, as well as
the 1.4 million family members. I'm extremely proud of their
commitment, their professionalism, and resiliency of our
soldiers and their sacrifice and accomplishments.
Today, we remain in more than 150 countries around the
world. We are truly a globally engaged army, with 95,000
soldiers deployed, and another 96,000 soldiers forward station,
conducting a broad range of missions around the world.
ARMY GLOBAL STRATEGY
But our Army's primary mission is steadfast and resolute to
fight and win our Nation's wars. And as the Army continues to
transition, we will ensure the President's 2012 defense
strategic priorities are implemented, by first meeting our
current commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere by ensuring a
highly trained, properly equipped, and well-manned force. Now
that operations in Iraq are complete, and we continue surge
recovery in Afghanistan, we will help shape the regional
environs in support of the combatant commanders, as well as the
strategic environment.
In the Asia-Pacific, which is home of 7 of the 10 largest
land armies in the world, we are provided an array of tools
through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, and other
innovative engagements with our allies and new partners. We
currently have some 66,000 soldiers and almost 10,000 civilians
in this region today.
During a time of great uncertainty in the Middle East, we
remain committed and prepared to ensuring security and
stability across the spectrum of conflict through our
rotational presence and all available means necessary. And in
Europe, as we inactivate two brigade combat teams (BCTs), one
in 2013 and one in 2014, we will compensate through a series of
engagement tools to build and sustain relationships with our
European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
and partners. I believe this will serve as a model how I see us
doing things in the future, a combination of forward station
and rotational forces, using a tailorable approach by
regionally aligned forces and prepositioned stocks.
ARMY FOCUS AREAS
As we move forward, we will build on the competency and
experience that has been gained during the past 10 years by our
National Guard and Army Reserves in Iraq and Afghanistan,
through the resourcing of a progressive readiness model in the
future.
As we look forward, and the Secretary already touched on
this a bit, there will be several focus areas that will help
guide us for the way ahead. Foremost, we'll remain committed to
our 67,000 war fighters currently in Afghanistan. They continue
to provide trained, equipped, and ready soldiers to win the
current fight.
Next, as the Army becomes leaner, we must continue to build
on the key characteristics of the future force: Adaptability,
innovation, flexibility, agility, versatility, and lethality.
We have to prioritize our efforts as we integrate and
synchronize our activities as part of the larger joint
interagency and multinational effort of the future.
By the end of fiscal year 2017, we will decrease our end-
strength from 570,000 to 490,000 in the Active Army, from
358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard, and from 206,000 to
205,000 in the Army Reserves. It is imperative for us to
sustain a gradual ramp during these next 5 years that allow us
to take care of our soldiers, continue to provide forces for
Afghanistan, and facilitate reversibility over the next couple
years, if necessary.
End-strength above 490,000 is funded strictly through
overseas contingency operations (OCO) during the next 5 years,
and must be sustained to help mitigate risk as we continue
current operations in Afghanistan and simultaneously reset our
Army for the future.
We will also reduce our end-strength by a minimum of eight
BCTs. We are also conducting additional assessments to look at
reorganizing our brigades to make most efficient use out of our
combat structure. And we will come back to the subcommittee
after we can finish our research and our analysis, both the
Secretary and I will come back and have further conversations
on this.
Finally, we will be responsible government stewards through
energy-cost savings and institutional and acquisition reform.
We are now taking a fundamentally different approach to how we
do business with our acquisition reform. I credit Secretary
McHugh for his diligent efforts with this. We have really made
some tremendous progress here, in my view.
For a new affordable and incremental equipping strategy, we
are making better business deals and better contracts,
emphasizing competition, and saving even more money as
government stewards. Our expansion of multiyear contracts,
firm-fixed-price contracts, and cost-plus-incentive-fee
contracts have proven substantive cost savings already.
By more closely linking the development of requirements
with the acquisition cycle, we are building the flexibility to
integrate new technologies incrementally. Additionally, we are
looking to develop more efficient testing and evaluating
strategies by eliminating redundancies. We will continue our
equipment reset program to restore unit equipment to a level of
capability that is commensurate with their future missions.
There have been more than 1.8 million pieces of equipment reset
to date, which equates to approximately 31 brigade equivalents
annually.
MODERNIZATION
Much of what the Army needs to do and much of what we hope
to be able to do will be reliant upon sustained OCO funding for
our withdrawal in Afghanistan and for 2 to 3 years afterwards.
As we continue to transform our modernization practices through
a holistic bottom-up approach, we have several priorities.
First is the Network. It is critical to our ability to
manage information and command our forces at all levels both
home and abroad, in a multinational and joint context. We made
significant progress on this critical program through the
series of network integration evaluation exercises that field
tested equipment, which are integrated in a system, using our
soldiers as the testers.
Second, the ground combat vehicle (GCV), a replacement for
our infantry fighting vehicle that can accommodate an infantry
squad, balance mobility and survivability, and provide
unmatched lethality on the battlefield against current and
future threats. We've paid close attention to risk reduction in
this development program by maximizing competition to stimulate
innovation, support cost containment, and schedule
requirements, ensuring industry identifies potential pricing
schedule versus performance tradeoffs, and requiring industry
to provide cost targets throughout the GCV's lifecycle.
Our third modernization priority is the more mobile
survivable network-integrated joint light tactical vehicle
(JLTV). With both myself and General Amos, we agree it's
necessary, given the last 10 years of fighting and what future
operations may entail. We carefully revised our acquisition
strategy, reduced the schedule for the next developmental phase
from 48 to 33 months, while reducing the projected cost of the
program by $400 million.
Next is lightening the soldier's load, with a focus on the
squad. There must be continued efforts to give our squads
superiority on the battlefield, with advanced soldier systems,
and weapons communications, and protection. There has been
tremendous progress in the advancement to help lighten the load
of our individual soldiers. So now we must turn to look at how
the squad can carry the load smarter. We will continue to look
at decreasing the weight of our body armor, while increasing
protection, but we can make more progress by studying how to
better distribute the load across the squad.
The budget request for aviation modernization will continue
to ensure our lift-and-close combat capabilities remain
effective. These aircraft provide critical support to our joint
ground forces, special operations community, and our
international partners.
Finally, I'd like to point out that in order to achieve
these priorities within our modernization strategy we'll need
the help of this subcommittee to ensure timely appropriations
to reduce production and scheduling delays. The Secretary and I
will continue to assess and make adjustments to our strategy,
while addressing any potential risk incurred, as we adjust our
future force posture.
I'd like to leave you with one last thought. Sequestration
is not in the best interest of our national security. The
Army's share of the cut could be almost $134 billion through
2017. The impact to the Army could cause up to 100,000
additional cuts to our end-strength, on top of the 86,000 we
currently plan to reduce. This would result in severe
reductions in the National Guard, our Army Reserves, in
addition to continued reductions in the Active component. It
will significantly decrease what the Army can do for the joint
force. In my estimation, sequestration will require us to
fundamentally relook how we provide national security for our
Nation.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you again
for the opportunity to speak here today. This subcommittee
enables our All-Volunteer Army to be the most decisive land
force in the world, and we could not do without the support
that you give us. It's an honor to serve this great Nation and
stand beside the dedicated professionals of our Army. The
strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our Army is
our soldiers. And the strength of our soldiers is our families,
and that's what makes this Army strong.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions,
Senator.
Chairman Inouye. All right. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Before we proceed, I'd like to announce that there's a vote
pending at this moment.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to go vote. I
know Senator Cochran's coming back, and then you'll go vote. I
do want to have a chance to ask questions, so I'm going to come
back, but I am going to leave now, so that we can vote and get
back. We'll be doing a little round-robin here.
Chairman Inouye. I can assure you that.
Last January, the Secretary of Defense announced the budget
plan and said that the Active Army will be reduced by 72,000 in
the next 5 years. Many of us have privately expressed concerns,
primarily on the risks that may be involved.
Can you share with us your thoughts on this matter?
END-STRENGTH REDUCTION RISK MITIGATION
General Odierno. I think one way to mitigate the risk is
that fact we're going to do this over a 5-year period, and I
think that helps us to mitigate some of the risks that we have.
My concerns are, first, we want to be able to take care of our
soldiers and families. Doing it over a 5-year period helps us
to reduce the risk to our soldiers and their families, first
off, because we will be able to do a majority of the reductions
through national attrition, although, there will be some
requirements above that.
Second, it will help us, if we do this over a 5-year
period, to ensure that we have the forces necessary to continue
to rotate in Afghanistan, as we continue that commitment.
And third, if we have to, if we get it wrong, and we have
to reverse, we can do that easily during the next 2 to 4 years,
as we execute this strategy.
The assumptions in the strategy are that we will no longer
be engaged in large-scale, long-term operations that would be
over a 5- to 10-year period. That's the risk to this reduction.
We increased the size of the Army in the 2000s in order to meet
the requirements of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and because of
the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) it was putting on our
soldiers and our families. Now that we are reducing the size of
the Army, as long as we are not involved in large-scale
contingencies over a long period of time, I think we can
mitigate that risk.
I do believe we have the capability to conduct two
simultaneous operations at 490,000, as long as they are not
over a long duration time period, and that's where the risk
comes in, Senator.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, may I add a few on that?
Chairman Inouye. Please do.
Mr. McHugh. As the Chief noted, the primary consideration
was that we had sufficient end-strength to meet the new
security strategy and its expected requirements. And as you
heard him say, I think we all agree we do.
But the other thing really goes back to your opening
comment. You know, the Army is people. And currently, we spend
about 48 cents of every $1 on our people. And so when we're
mandated to find, as we went through the Budget Control Act for
the department, $487 billion over 10 years, we have to find
reductions in our personnel costs. There's just no other way to
do it.
And what we wanted to ensure is that we didn't have
artificially high end-strength, that our budget was resourcing
modernization and proper equipping, and the other things that
are so important, family, medical programs, so that we didn't
take that path to becoming hollow that we've had so much
discussion about over the years, and other postconflict
periods.
So, we think we're balanced in a way that resist the
temptation to pump up end-strength at a very high cost of not
giving the soldiers what they need to complete their mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Gentlemen, I will have to leave to vote,
but in the meantime, I'll call upon the Vice Chairman to
continue the hearing. I'll be back.
Senator Cochran [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let
me ask you a question about the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft
program. There's indication in our briefing paper here that the
Air Force is suggesting that even though the C-27 was developed
to provide a unique capability to support Army needs, that that
could have been managed by the use of C-130 aircraft. I don't
know whether this is a consensus, or what your reaction to it
is, but is there a difference of opinion between the Army and
the Air Force on the C-27 and C-130? We don't need to overdo
things and buy things we don't need in this time of fiscal
constraint and pressure on the budget. So, I was just curious
to know what your reaction to that would be.
INTRA-THEATER LIFT
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. The Army has a stated
requirement for intra-theater lift, which we need in places
like Iraq, Afghanistan, and we've discussed this over time. The
Army has a C-23 Sherpa program, which, frankly, is getting old
and, frankly, will no longer be capable of doing the mission we
need it to in the future. So, we've defined this requirement.
The Air Force has come back and said we can meet all of
your intra-theater lift requirements with the C-130. So, we
have worked with them to develop concepts that will put C-130s
in direct support of Army units in order to meet these
requirements.
So, I would just answer your question by saying we've
identified the requirement for intra-theater lift. C-27 was one
solution. The Air Force has come back and said we can solve
this problem using the C-130. So, we are working with them to
come up with the procedures in order for us to solve this
problem using the C-130.
Senator Cochran. One issue that always is of interest to me
as we begin this annual review of the budget request for the
different services is how well we're doing with recruiting and
retention of the quality of person and candidate for service in
the U.S. Army. Do we need to consider going back to compulsory
military service or is the all-volunteer concept alive and well
and working to suit our national defense needs?
ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY
Mr. McHugh. Very important question, Senator. I think the
easy answer to your last point is that the last 10 years pretty
well proved that the Volunteer Army, in our case, Voluntary
Military, for this Nation, can meet just about any challenge
over any duration of time you may put them up against. Having
said that, we're always concerned about what tomorrow may look
like, and we track our recruiting, our retention numbers, and
track the caliber of our recruits as well.
On the retention side, our problem is, frankly, too many
people want to stay, and we're going to have to manage that as
we draw down our end-strength in ways that ensure that we keep
the very best of the best. And that will be a challenge,
because we will have to request, as the Chief alluded to, some
soldiers who meet our minimum standards and requirements, and
who, in many cases, I'm sure, will have served honorably, but
ask them to take on new challenges in their lives.
Our recruiting numbers are better than the nearly 20 years
I've been in this town. Our numbers of waivers are at historic
lows. We don't provide major felony waivers any more, contrary
to the times in the not-so-distant past, when they were not
normal, but they weren't unheard of. Our high school graduation
rates are more than 90 percent, higher than the average that is
maintained here amongst the civilian population. And as they
have proven time and time again, even our youngest soldiers are
up to the greatest challenges.
So, we're always concerned about what a brightening economy
will mean on our ability to compete with the private sector,
but to this point, I think things are going very, very well.
Chief.
General Odierno. If I could add, Senator, to include our
ability to recruit officers as well. The numbers at West Point
are way up. Applicants are way up. The competition is way up.
The competition at Officer Candidate School (OCS) is at its
highest level I've ever seen it. Our Reserve Officers Training
Corps (ROTC) programs are, although we are doing some
consolidation, are doing very well. So, right now we are in
good shape. But it's something that we have to constantly
manage. And as we all know, some of this could be based on some
of the economic issues and unemployment rates. We have to watch
this very carefully. There is a lot of interest in serving. So,
we feel we are doing very, very well in those areas.
In terms of retention, there will be some people who want
to stay who probably will not be allowed to stay, as the
Secretary just talked about, during the next 3 or 4 years. But
we want to set up programs that allow the best to stay. We want
to keep the best talent that we have, and we're trying to
decentralize that decisionmaking process down to the commanders
in the field, so they can make the decisions on who are the
best, most qualified to continue to stay and lead our Army into
the future as we face many of these complex challenges that
you've outlined.
Senator Cochran. That is very welcome news and good to
hear, and also, a reason to compliment the leadership of our
United States Army and other forces who are providing the
example and serving in capacities of a very important
responsibility for our country. I'm sure the soldiers are
looking up to those they are serving with, or they wouldn't be
interested in re-enlisting or staying in for a career, as many
of them are now voluntarily doing. I think it's a tribute to
our leadership of our military. So, I congratulate you on those
successes that we've had.
It was a pleasure for me to serve on the Board of Visitors
at West Point for a time, and as a matter of fact, I think it
was one of the best collateral duties I've ever had in the
Congress, serving on both the Board of Visitors at West Point
and the board out in Colorado for the Air Force, and the Naval
Academy board. I really got a great opportunity to meet and get
to know those who were in charge of our training academies, and
who were the professors and instructors getting the job done,
training, and educating the officers of tomorrow, and the
leaders of tomorrow, the next Secretary of the Army and the
Joint Chief chairman, and so we appreciate the success we've
had. And we know that it doesn't just happen by itself, but
there are a lot of dedicated men and women throughout the Army
who are helping make this a very important success story.
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT BOARD OF VISITORS
General Odierno. Senator, I would just add that last night
the Cadet Andrew Rodriguez, from West Point, was awarded the
Sullivan Award, which is given each year to the top leadership
student athlete in the country for all sports. It's only the
sixth time that a football player has received it. And 3 out of
those 6 were from West Point that have received that award over
time. And I think he's representative of the type of
individuals that we now have, that are interested in serving
our country. And we're very proud of these young men and women
who continue to want to serve. And I think that's just another
indication of the quality of individuals that we continue to
get in the Army and West Point.
Mr. McHugh. I would note, Senator Cochran, that I had the
honor of serving on that--I guess I still do, but as a Member
of Congress for 15 years. And you're right. It's a special
opportunity, and one of those things that few Members of
Congress get to experience, and it was a great opportunity for
me.
I would also note, just for the record, that the gentleman
on my left is also a West Point grad, and given the football
team, and Army, Navy, I wish he were back there wearing a
helmet, but we'll talk about that later.
Senator Cochran. Do you need time for rebuttal, General?
General Odierno. I want to be on the record, we're going to
beat Navy this year.
Senator Cochran. We're joined again by other members of the
subcommittee, and I'll yield to the distinguished Senator from
South Carolina.
Senator Graham. Thank you. When you said that, John, I
thought that you were talking about his left, and that would
have been me.
I would have been the first guy to get in West Point with
800 SAT on both parts. The Army's got enough problems without
having to go down there. Not bad. That's right.
So to both of you, thanks for being leaders in a time when
we need leaders. Ten years into this thing, I know people are
war weary and we're trying to balance a $15 trillion budget
that's out of whack, and everything's on the table. So, to my
friends out there who want to argue about what we should do
with the entitlements, that we should reform them just like
we're trying to reform the Pentagon, bottom line is, the
sequestration is just a really bad idea. Both of you already
said that. Do you agree with that?
SEQUESTRATION
Mr. McHugh. It certainly would have an incredibly
devastating effect upon our national military.
Senator Graham. It would really be silly and stupid, right?
Mr. McHugh. I agree.
Senator Graham. Yes. Go ahead, John. You can say that.
Mr. McHugh. I agree with you always, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. Good. Thank you.
So, we'll find somehow to avoid it. We're not going to put
that burden on you.
But the sum total of what we're doing, $470-billion-
something during the next 10 years is no small lift, is it,
General?
General Odierno. It is not.
Senator Graham. Okay. We're going to put 87,000 people out
of work, I guess. So, just please understand what the military
is having to do on the Army side. Eighty-seven thousand people
are going to be put out of work over the next 5 or 6 years, who
have dedicated themselves to defending the Nation, who are well
trained, and, you know, make up the 1 percent who serve. So,
when I hear other agencies and other parts of the Federal
Government saying that's too much, that's too far, the Defense
Department is more than paying its fair share, in my view, and
I'll have to look long and hard if I think 87,000 makes sense.
Where do you see the potential for future land engagements,
General, that could have 100,000 troops required? Are there any
scenarios in mind?
General Odierno. Well, obviously, we have agreements with
South Korea, in reference with potential problems with North
Korea. You know, we have issues across the Middle East, a
significant amount of instability.
Senator Graham. The Horn of Africa really went bad. You may
have to enter these troops. Maybe not 100,000.
General Odierno. Maybe not 100,000.
Senator Graham. Let's talk about a scenario where you had
to commit major land forces after we cut the $487 billion. What
percentage of a, say, 100,000-person force, in the future, 5, 6
years from now, would have to come from the Reserves?
General Odierno. It would depend on the specific situation.
Senator Graham. Let's say it's an Iraq situation.
General Odierno. Well, in the beginning phases of a war,
about 80 percent would be out of the Active, and about 20
percent out of the Reserves. But as that went on over time, the
amount of use of the Reserves would increase. So, in the second
or third year, you would see more Reserve component.
Senator Graham. So, the truth of the matter is that we
need, as a nation, to understand that if we go down by 87,000,
if there are any major land engagements sustained over a period
of time, the Guard and Reserves are going to be asked to do
more, not less.
General Odierno. That is correct.
Senator Graham. That's just the math, right?
General Odierno. That is correct, Sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Mr. Secretary, stress on the force.
One, to the soldier who is going to be charged with the murder
of 16 Afghan civilians, you're highly confident in our military
justice system.
STRESS ON THE FORCE
Mr. McHugh. I have no doubt about our ability to handle it.
Senator Graham. And that soldier will be provided whatever
resources his defense team needs, within reason, to defend him,
right?
Mr. McHugh. That is our requirement, and that is our, we
feel, duty.
Senator Graham. Now, people talk about stress on the force.
Do you agree with me that most people in Afghanistan, of any
senior rank, have had multiple deployments?
Mr. McHugh. We have in the military at large more than
50,000 folks in uniform who have had at least four deployments.
Senator Graham. And this is a severe aberration and does
not reflect who our men and women are, in terms of their
behavior under stress. Do you agree with that?
Mr. McHugh. The fact that this is receiving,
understandably, so much attention, I think, underscores that
very fact. Yes, Sir.
Senator Graham. General, do you agree with that?
General Odierno. I do agree, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. So now let's talk about where we go,
in terms of the Congress's role in helping you craft this
budget. Do you have enough flexibility to make adjustments?
Let's talk about mental health for our troops, those coming
back from the theater. If we execute this budget reduction and
you have 10 years of fighting, and you may have some latent
stress problems show up down the road, do we have the adequate
infrastructure in this budget reduction environment to take
care of issues that may arise down the road from the last 10
years of fighting?
Mr. McHugh. From what we can see, there is always, of
course, as you know, Senator, it's what you don't expect that
you have to be most troubled by. We have both the facilities,
the flexibility, and funding to provide for them. The biggest
challenge on behavioral health we've had are bringing into the
Army Force structure the behavior health specialists. We've
been chasing the requirement for a number of years now.
Senator Graham. I don't want to take too much time, but
recruiting trained mental health specialists who are subject to
being deployed is a very big challenge. So, I hope we'll look,
going within the force and cross-training people. That's one
way to get more folks. But, if you wanted to serve your country
as a civilian or a military person, if you're in the mental
health arena, there's a real demand for your services.
And the last comment I'd like to make is about stress on
the force. We've been deployed a lot. It's been a very tough
time for families. What kind of stress on the force can we
anticipate from a major reduction in personnel, limited assets?
And I would just end with this proposition. I think the world
is getting more dangerous by the day, and the potential
conflicts that we face are growing, not lessening.
General, Mr. Secretary, can you describe to me what we can
expect from a force that's going to be reduced by 87,000? The
mission possibilities are growing, not lessening. What kind of
stress does that have on the Force?
General Odierno. First off, it is, as we have learned, the
issue becomes the stress of multiple deployments. So, as you
reduce the force, if we get into a sustained land combat, it
will, once again, increase the stress on the force. And that's
a bit of a risk, as we go down, as you mentioned, 87,000. So,
we have to mitigate that. We've tried to mitigate that by going
down the 87,000 over a 5-year period, which slows it down,
which enables us to take care of those soldiers and families as
we ask them to leave the service, in some cases. And we'll
hopefully be able to do most of it by attrition, but it won't
be all by attrition. There will be some people who are, in
fact, asked to leave over time. So, we're trying to figure out
the best ways to mitigate that.
Mr. McHugh. As you know, Senator, rotations, deployments
are probably the leading cause and the leading stressor. We're
operating under the assumption, the fact we're out of Iraq and
a planned phase-down through 2014 in Afghanistan. If that
should change, obviously, we're going to have to do some re-
evaluation. And then one of the advantages of going through
this exercise of assigning budget numbers every year is that
we're provided the opportunity to second guess ourselves, if
it's required.
The Chairman has noted that this is really the first
budget, not just the only budget, of what we view as a 5-year,
and ultimately a march to 2020, to a time when we're hopefully
fully modernized as a force.
Senator Graham. Thank you for your service.
Senator Inouye [presiding]. Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you. First, I want to say to
General Odierno how much I appreciate everything that you've
done. Talk about deployments to the tough spots. You've been
there. I appreciate meeting with you in Iraq twice, and seeing
what you could do there. And I think that experience has
certainly given you the base and the background to handle so
many of these issues and problems. I just can't tell you how
much I appreciate all that you've done and your service.
Secretary McHugh, I'm glad to see you. And in about a half
hour, I'm going to go to the West Point Board of Visitors'
meeting, and I know I'll see you there, where we serve
together. And I'm so happy to still be on the board and able to
help your alma mater, General Odierno.
I'd like to ask both of you, really, but it's on the issue
of drawing down the troops, and especially from Europe. And I
know that you are planning to do some rotational deployments in
Europe to save money. We're going to bring back the two
brigades. And I just wonder if you are also looking at further
reductions in Europe. Obviously, we have to have a presence
there, when we have our hospitals there, but we know the
training is limited. We know both the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have said
it's more cost effective to maintain forces in America rather
than overseas.
I'm, of course, interested, from the military construction
standpoint and the operations on overseas bases, and have
always felt like we were doing more than our fair share in
NATO. I want to ask you where you are, either of you, or both,
on conserving our dollars by having more troops based in
America, making sure that we're not over building with our NATO
military construction beyond what is our requirement. But
sometimes we're getting into regional centers, where European
countries want equality, and that's not our responsibility.
So, can you walk me through that, and maybe something we
haven't seen in the future that would help me understand that
we are being efficient with our military construction and
operations overseas, and favoring our U.S. bases, where we have
the training capabilities and certainly the more efficient
operations?
FORCE STRUCTURE
General Odierno. I think, Senator, first is that I think as
we look to the future, our strategy is going to be that we are
going to rely more and more on rotational forces. We think
that's important.
Now, it does not mean we will completely reduce our
overseas presence. It's got to be the right balance and mix, so
we're going to constantly review what that right balance and
mix is between rotational forces and forward station forces. We
will continue to do that.
We have been consistently coming down in Europe over the
last 3 years. We're going to go down to 90 bases, 50 of those
which are really Army sole bases. The other 40 are joint.
There's some Army, Air Force, and some other places. From more
than 300 bases that were there just 3 or 4 years ago. So, we
are slowly coming down.
The Secretary and I have a team over in Europe right now
looking at the structure, the infrastructure, to continue to
conduct assessments, as we inactivate the two brigades, as we
bring down Fifth Corps headquarters, as they come out of
Afghanistan, what is the exact infrastructure that would be
needed. Are there refinements to that that we will have to
make? And we will constantly assess this, as we move forward
with our final posture.
And I think so far, actually, we've gotten great
cooperation from our partners on this. They realize this. They
understand what we're trying to do, and the fact that we'll
rotate forces to continue to train with some of our NATO
forces, I think, is actually good for us and for them, because
it will allow more units to have the experience of working with
our NATO partners over time.
So, I think we will continue to assess this. I think you'll
see us reassess it again next year and the year after, and
constantly look at this, as we try to get right our posture, as
compared to what's in the United States and what's in Europe.
Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you, on the V Corps
headquarters, I believe you said that it's not going to return
to Europe after the deployment in Afghanistan. Is that going to
be eliminated, or will it be moved to an installation in the
United States?
General Odierno. The plan is to eliminate it, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Thank you very much, both of
you. I so appreciate working with you, and if there are any
things that we need to be doing at West Point, please let me
know. Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
General, you've been welcomed, but probably not by all of us
yet. Thank you very much for your service.
General, title 10, section 2464 of the U.S. Code requires
the Defense Department to provide all the depots with a
baseline core workload, the minimum amount of man-hours
necessary to sustain a given depot's unique technical skills.
For the Anniston Army Depot, that core workload
requirement, I understand, is 3.2 million man-hours. Anniston
was fortunate enough to exceed its core for nearly 9 years, but
subsequent to the drawdown in Iraq hundreds of temporary
workers have been let go. It's my understanding earlier this
year the Army only projected 2.4 million man-hours of work for
Anniston in 2013, a level far below its legally mandated core
workload. Such an unprecedented drop-off could require Anniston
to let go some of its permanent technical workforce, which we
try to keep together, precisely those essential workers the
core requirement was meant, as I understand it, to protect.
What is the Army doing to make sure that this does not
happen, and where are we there? Could you speak to that?
DEPOTS
General Odierno. I can, Sir.
Senator Shelby. And how important is it?
General Odierno. Thank you. Well, first, our depots are
incredibly important for maintaining our capabilities. And what
we've done is we've established core competencies in each one
of our depots, in order to sustain that. So, for example, for
Anniston, it's combat vehicle, assault bridging, artillery,
small caliber weapons. And that will remain the core function
of Anniston, as we go forward.
In terms of reductions, what we're seeing is, as we
continue to reduce the amount of reset and recap that we're
doing, based on our work in Iraq and Afghanistan, we're
starting to see the workload drop. But we've established these
core capabilities in each one of our depots. We will continue
to do that.
Now, I will say, and the Secretary can add to this, is that
we're going to continue to look at each one of our depots as we
move forward to make sure that we sustain enough capability to
grow, if necessary, but also to gain efficiencies. But Anniston
has been such a key piece of everything we've done and will
continue to remain one of our depots that have some core
competencies that we need.
Senator Shelby. Anniston and the other depots, without
speaking of Anniston, they're very important for the readiness
of the Army, is that correct?
General Odierno. They are. They are very important.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. McHugh. Senator, you have struck upon something that
concerns us greatly, and not just because it says it in law,
though, obviously, we're mindful of our title 10 and statutory
requirements, but also, as you just noted, these depots are
absolutely critical to the Army's ability to go out and do
whatever missions they're assigned.
As the Chief noted, our primary response to that are the
establishment of centers of excellence, of which Anniston, of
course, is one. We're working now with the Department of
Defense to go through sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2)
analysis of our depots, of our core industrial base. And as we
come down out of war, sustaining those minimum requirements
that you cited, particularly for the high-end workers, is going
to be a challenge, but we're looking at every possible avenue,
including foreign military sales, in the case of some Bradleys
for Anniston, and others, to try to yes, meet that statutory
requirement, but more importantly, keep those facilities
viable.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
General, moving over to the area of the Army Ballistic
Missile Defense, in May 2011, the Army and the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) signed a memorandum of understanding regarding a
proposed transfer of Army ballistic missile defense assets
(BMDA). This subcommittee felt that the proposal was not backed
by sufficient analysis and the report of the fiscal year 2012
defense appropriations bill contained language opposing any
such transfer.
Does the fiscal year 2013 budget move any Army programs or
personnel to MDA or request funds to enact such transfers in
the future, or where are we?
MISSILE DEFENSE
General Odierno. I'll have to go take a look at that,
Senator, and get back with you, and I don't know if the
Secretary knows, but I believe that we are clearly still
looking at that, at transferring some of the capabilities to
MDA.
Mr. McHugh. What I would note is we still believe the
transfer makes sense, from the Army perspective. It is intended
to simply provide through MDA, or provide the Army through MDA,
greater buying power. Other service missile programs are
similarly administered through that organization. And beyond
the ground, the air-breathing threats would continue to be
under our operational command. So, it's about a 65-percent, I
believe, transfer, but most of it is in procurement and
technological development.
Senator Shelby. Will you furnish this to the subcommittee,
since we were concerned about analysis of this memorandum of
understanding?
Mr. McHugh. I haven't read the fiscal year 2012 bill
recently, but my understanding is we owe you an analysis and a
report, and I can't imagine we wouldn't supply that.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Secretary McHugh, in the area of Army aviation
modernization, prior to its release, the fiscal year 2013
budget, I understand, was described as delaying Army aviation
modernization by 3 to 5 years. Could you provide us with some
more detail, if you have any yet, of which programs are being
delayed, and why, and would the delays impact primarily
procurement, or research and development (R&D), or both?
AVIATION MODERNIZATION
Mr. McHugh. I'd have to defer to the Chief on some of the
specifics of that question. It's absolutely true. We had to
slip some of the, particularly the procurement programs to the
right. We feel it's an acceptable level of risk, given the
status of most of our rotary wing fleet, as long as we have the
sufficient reset money coming out of Afghanistan, as the Chief
noted, for 2 to 3 years. But I think he can provide you some of
the platform details.
Senator Shelby. General.
General Odierno. I can, Senator. What we've done is, we've
delayed, we've not eliminated. But let me give you, for
example, for the Apache, for example, we've gone down to the
minimum requirements, which is 48 per year. It delays the
program 3 to 5 years, to 2030.
For example, out of this Program Objective Memorandum
(POM), we've delayed the procurement of 23 new-build Apaches
and 42 remanufactured Apaches. It will still be built, but it's
been moved out of the POM.
For the CH-47, we've reduced some performance upgrades,
like the rotors. We've made that adjustment on the CH-47. We
continue to do full-rate production under the current multiyear
that ends this year. We're looking for another multiyear, from
2013 to 2017, to complete the National Guard Reserve component
modernization.
In the UH-60, we're delaying modernization of all
components by about 2 to 3 years. What I mean by components is
Active, Reserve, and National Guard. And we'll delay
procurement of 72 UH-60 Mikes to outside of the POM. But we
will continue to modernize and update the UH-60s, as we move
forward. So, as I've just said to you, it's more of a delay.
Now, we have funded the upgrade of the Kiowa, but that's
based on a decision, as we do the analysis of alternatives, as
we look at the new potential armed aerial scout helicopter.
That decision will be made later this year. And then based on
that, we'll decide whether we go with the armed aerial scout,
or do we continue to invest in improvements in the Kiowa
Warrior. That will be determined sometime later. But we have
funded the improvement program in this POM for the Kiowa
Warrior at the tune of about $740 million. And we will continue
to use Kiowas at least through fiscal year 2025.
Senator Shelby. Quickly, the advanced hypersonic weapon,
which we had a very successful test last year, this capacity,
as I understand it, for a conventional prompt global strike has
been sought for years by the military. Can you talk a little
about that, and where we are in there? What will it mean for
our combat commanders?
ADVANCED HYPERSONIC WEAPON
General Odierno. Well, I don't think that's our program,
but I would tell you that on the ground, the ability for us,
it's about precision. And whenever we can increase our ability
to provide precision munitions and capabilities, that makes a
significant difference on the ground for us. And I think that's
what we gain by this capability.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh, as you and I have discussed, Joint Base
Lewis-McChord (JBLM), in my home State of Washington, is facing
some very real questions on the way they have diagnosed post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the invisible wounds of
war. Today, unfortunately, we are seeing more information on
the extent of those problems. This is actually a copy of
today's ``Seattle Times'' and in it is an article that is based
on the most recent review of the forensic psychiatry department
at JBLM, which, as you know, is under investigation for taking
the cost of mental healthcare into account in their decisions.
And what this article shows is that since that unit was stood
up in 2007, more than 40 percent of those servicemembers who
walked in the door with the PTSD diagnosis had their diagnosis
changed to something else, or overturned altogether.
What it says is that more than 4 in 10 of our
servicemembers, many who are already being treated for PTSD,
and were due the benefits and care that came with that
diagnosis, had it taken away by that unit, and then they were
sent back into the force or into their community.
Now, in light of all the tragedies that we have seen stem
from the untreated invisible wounds of war today, I'm sure that
you would agree that this is very concerning. And not only is
it damaging for our soldiers, but it also really furthers the
stigma for others, whether they're deciding to seek help or not
today.
So, in light of all the issues, you and I have had a chance
to talk to this generally, but I wanted to ask you specifically
today why was this highly controversial unit set up originally
at JBLM, and who's decision was it to do that?
Mr. McHugh. Do you mean the forensic department?
Senator Murray. Correct.
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RE-EVALUATION
Mr. McHugh. Well, for every base where you demobilize
soldiers, it is practice to have that capacity. The concern, as
you noted, Senator, is that, at least statistically, and the
numbers are changing every moment, they've changed since that
newspaper went to print.
Senator Murray. Do you have the most recent numbers?
Mr. McHugh. I don't have them exactly.
Senator Murray. But it is more than 40 percent?
Mr. McHugh. The number of cases for re-evaluation is
somewhat more than 300 now.
Senator Murray. But it is more than 40 percent?
Mr. McHugh. I haven't done the exact math, but I think
that's a pretty accurate figure. So, the question for us is,
why in this one unit were those kinds of re-evaluations and
change in diagnosis achieved? It's not totally unheard of that
a psychiatric or a mental health condition will change. So, I
don't want to say all of those diagnoses and changes were
inappropriate, but clearly, when you have those kinds of data,
we want to make sure that everything is appropriate. And as you
and I have discussed, to the Army Surgeon General's credit,
General Patty Horoho, she has immediately stepped forward, has
asked, and has had that particular unit step down, and has
conducted a wholesale re-examination that has begun with 14
soldiers, and will methodically go through all of them to make
sure that the changes were not, in fact, inappropriate.
Senator Murray. Do you know who made the original decision
to step up that unit?
Mr. McHugh. To actually form it?
Senator Murray. Yes.
Mr. McHugh. I couldn't tell you the officer's name.
Senator Murray. And can you tell me, is this an isolated
incident, or are there other Army medical centers that are
changing the PTSD diagnosis at this rate?
Mr. McHugh. That's what we have to be sure of. The Surgeon
General has asked the Inspector General of the Army to go and
examine all of similar facilities and locations. To this point,
we don't see any evidence of this being systemic, but as,
again, you and I have discussed, we want to make sure that
where this was inappropriate, it was an isolated case, and if
it were not, to make sure we address it as holistically as
we're trying to address it at that.
Senator Murray. Have you examined similar statistics for
all the other installations?
Mr. McHugh. All re-evaluations are being looked at and
evaluated.
Senator Murray. Okay. So that is being done. Can you
provide us with that information?
Mr. McHugh. We'll certainly keep you up-to-date on that.
Yes.
Senator Murray. All right. Well, as you know, the review by
that forensic psychiatry at Madigan was a change from the
standard disability evaluation process used across the
military. The integrity of the disability evaluation system
depends on each and every servicemember being subject to the
same process. Across the Army, what will be done to improve the
oversight of the disability evaluation system to make sure that
the same process is being applied system-wide?
Mr. McHugh. Well, as I said, the Inspector General, along
with the Surgeon General, are re-examining the application of
all diagnostic procedures. You noted correctly, we have a very
standardized system. It's a system that is utilized similarly
in the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) evaluations,
similarly in civilian evaluations, and we are restating to all
of our providers that that is a diagnostic protocol that they
will follow, and equally important, that fiscal considerations
are not in any way a part of the evaluation. It's simply
unacceptable.
Senator Murray. And you're making that clear system-wide?
Mr. McHugh. We're doing everything we can to make that
clear system-wide. Yes, Senator.
Senator Murray. Okay.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just add to that one
point. For us it's about, we should be patient advocates. And
that's the mindset we're going to work on changing, to make
sure everybody understands that. We are patient advocates. We
are trying to get the best for what is right for our soldiers.
Senator Murray. General, I really appreciate that. And I
have to say, I've been here for 10 years, since the beginning
of this war, at many, many hearings, hearing that from the top,
and I agree that that is what everyone is saying, but it's
really disconcerting, after 10 years, to find now that that has
not been the case. So, that's, you know, why I think it's
really important that we really focus on this, not just at
Madigan, and what happened there, but system-wide, to make
clear that this is, you know, it isn't the cost of PTSD, or any
mental health evaluation that is of concern to the Army or to
the military at all, it is making sure that those men and women
get the care that they receive. So, you know, it is very
troubling to be here 10 years, after many, many hearings, and
many, many questions, to find out this has been occurring.
And really, one of the most troubling aspects of these
recent events at Madigan is that servicemembers were diagnosed
with PTSD and other mental health disorders during their
military service. They received treatment for those conditions,
but then when they entered the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)
process, they had that diagnosis changed. So, that is very
troubling to every one of us that has been watching this for a
very long time.
And I did want to ask you what changes you are seeking,
Army-wide, to make sure that behavioral healthcare diagnosis
are more consistent between those who are providing care and
those conducting the disability evaluations.
Mr. McHugh. Well, as I said, Senator, the basic answer to
that is the processes and the protocols of diagnosis are the
same. You're always going to have individual practitioners who
take a somewhat different view as to what they're observing in
a particular patient, but that is what training is about,
trying to eliminate to the greatest extent possible, those
vagaries, but in terms of the standards of evaluation, whether
it's an MEB or whether it is a postdeployment mental health
evaluation, those diagnostic touch points are all the same and
standardized. The Surgeon General and certainly the Inspector
General, as he does his analysis across this system, are making
that very, very clear, and we'll continue to press that as
well.
Senator Murray. Okay. Well, as I said, this is an extremely
disconcerting situation. I want to know if it's system-wide,
because these men and women, the stigma of mental healthcare is
something that's very real. The challenges of PTSD and mental
healthcare are real. And no one, no one should be denying any
servicemember care purely because of a question of cost. That
is something that the taxpayers of this country bear the burden
of providing. We will provide it. But we want to make sure that
the Army is not dismissing this in any way, shape, or form.
So, we will continue to follow this and continue to stay in
touch with you, as these different questions are answered, but
I want to make sure that we are really looking not just at
Madigan, obviously, that's clearly where the focus is right
now, but system-wide, to make sure that we are evaluating all
of these on the same system, and that there is no discretionary
concern about cost or anything else, that we get these men and
women the care that they have earned and they deserve, and this
country expects them to have.
Mr. McHugh. As I've said, Senator, we appreciate truly your
leadership on that, and we are in full agreement of your
perspective. Fiscal considerations should be nonexistent, and
we're going to do everything we can to make sure they are.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if this
question has already been asked. I'm Ranking Member on another
appropriations subcommittee this morning, and so I had to
divide my time here. But this is a question I asked the Air
Force when they were here, and the Navy and Marines, when they
were here. And that is the nearly half of $1 trillion reduction
in spending on national security assets that you are working
through now, which results in a considerable drawdown of Army
personnel, and perhaps, procurement and other central areas, is
tough enough, but the prospect of an additional nearly $1
trillion under the Budget Control Act sequester, which has not
yet been addressed for any kind of change, I just want, for a
record, to get your assessment of what the impact of that would
be.
And I go back a little ways. I remember shortly after
Desert Storm I, being with then Defense Secretary Cheney,
saying, you know, if you go back through history, at the end of
a major deployment or conflict, we've always drawn down too
far, and going back up always puts us in a very difficult
situation. And I couldn't help but write down the quote that
General John F. Amos, Marine Corps Commandant, said. He said,
``History has shown that it's impossible to predict where,
when, and how our military forces will need to be called
upon.''
And so, I'd just like, for the record, to get your take on
this particular budget-driven drawdown. And we all want
efficiencies and effectiveness in saving funds, given our debt
situation but also the potential impact of this sequester, if
it's not adjusted.
SEQUESTRATION
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Senator. If I could, I'll start, and
then turn it over to the Chief.
With respect to this budget, these were tough decisions and
tough numbers to make. We had to, I think, come down in a place
that puts us on the edge, but, nevertheless, on balance, I
think all of us feel, across both the combatant commands, as
well as the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries, that this
is a reasonable fiscal plan, and most importantly, it does
reflect the requirements under the new national military
strategy.
We're very concerned about any changes to that, because it
is a delicate balance that the chair and I had a brief
discussion about how our end-strength numbers are very finely
tuned against our other budget lines, to make sure that we have
the readiness and modernization, training, family programs that
are necessary not to keep us on the path to going hollow, as
you mentioned, that happened in other postconflict periods.
As to sequestration, I think the Chief and I both agree it
would be devastating. For the Army, I'll let the Chief talk
about the actual numbers to our current end-strengths, but it
will cost us another $134 billion, roughly. I can't count for
you the number of acquisition programs that would be placed in
a Nunn-McCurdy breach, simply because while the fiscal impact
is hard enough, we have no opportunity under the budget law to
manage it. It is simply an across-the-board cut against all
appropriation lines, requiring us to buy one-half of a mine-
resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle, if you will, or
requiring us to ban all kinds of acquisition programs that I
think would be chaotic, not just for the military but would be
chaotic for our industrial partners, who obviously have
stockholders and have employees, and would have to lay off, I
don't venture an exact figure, but I suspect thousands, if not
tens of thousands of employees. So, unlimited negative impact,
should that happen.
Senator Coats. Chief, do you want to add to that?
General Odierno. Senator, if I could, I'll just say I want
to make sure that people understand that this first $487
billion cut is not an easy cut. And, in fact, I talk about the
razor's edge, and the razor's edge is the fact that we have to
balance end-strength with our modernization program and our
readiness. It's a very, very careful balance. And my guess is
we'll have to continue to refine and adjust this as we move
forward.
If we get another additional $500 billion cut, as the
Secretary said, it, frankly, will change how the joint force
looks. And so we're going to have to re-evaluate and take a
look at what do we want our joint force to do. How do we want
to accomplish our national security objectives?
Specifically to the Army, it translates into approximately
100,000 additional end-strength cut, a combination of Active,
National Guard, and Reserves, but more importantly is it would
require us to cut more steeply in 2013 and 2014, which in my
mind puts at risk the force responding in Afghanistan, and to
the current commitments we have, and puts at risk how many of
our leaders that we would have to lose that have the experience
and capabilities that we will need in the future.
So, it's not only the size of the cut, it's the fact that
they would require it to happen more quickly. They would
require it to happen without any thought. It's an even cut
across all management decision packages (MDEPs) within our
budget. So, the risk is extremely high, in my estimation,
extremely high. It would be devastating to us.
Senator Coats. Thank you. Second question I have,
assuming--do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman?
Just help me get a little bit of understanding on where
we're going with the vehicle fleet in the future. I know that
the decision has been made to recapitalize high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to a significant extent,
and I think there's money in the budget for that, but the
decision between the modernized expanded capacity vehicle
(MECV) and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), can you
just give me your thinking behind where you are now, and some
of the thinking behind that. And I raise that partly because,
and correct me if I'm wrong, the JLTV is a much lighter, more
mobile vehicle than the MECV. Am I correct in that?
LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLES
General Odierno. The JLTV is really there to replace the
HMMWV.
Senator Coats. Yes.
General Odierno. It's a HMMWV replacement.
Senator Coats. But the MECV is being terminated, or at
least in the budget, terminated.
General Odierno. Right. Right.
Senator Coats. Now, get to the rationale behind that.
General Odierno. Well, I would say that we're looking at a
combination of our whole wheel fleet, as you just kind of
brought up. And what we've got, the JLTV, we will purchase
about one-third of the amount of HMMWVs we have now. We're
still going to depend a little bit on HMMWVs. Through our recap
and reset program, we will continue to do that.
We had to look at what we thought we needed across the
force, as we move forward. You know, we've purchased a
significant amount of MRAPs. We're trying to integrate what's
the number of MRAPs we want to keep in the force, how many new
JLTVs we need. And the reason the JLTVs is so important for us,
it gives better protection than the HMMWVs, it's lighter, and
it's network integrated. So in my mind, it's a significant
upgrade to the HMMWV.
So, I think it's a combination of all those things, a
mixture of, you know, the MECV, the MRAPs, the HMMWVs, the
JLTV, and we're trying to get the right mix. And with the
budget constraints that we have, we believe the right mix was a
combination of JLTV, HMMWVs and then using some of our MRAP
capability to feel the need in that category of our truck
fleet.
We're also doing an analysis of our truck fleet, and we're
probably going to reduce the number of trucks we have in the
total fleet, as we reduce the force structure, and as we relook
how we developed our requirements for the truck fleet. And
we're taking a look at that as well, as we move forward. And
we'll continue to refine and assess this, and provide you
updates as we move forward with this during the next couple
years.
Senator Coats. My concern dates back to, again, early in
the 1990s, when we thought the light tactical vehicle was the
cat's meow, I mean, to get around in urban situations and so
forth. This is before improvised explosive devices (IEDs) came,
such a challenge for us, and so then there was a lot of
clamoring that went on, and so forth. And you know all the
history of that, and so forth. So, I guess my concern is, is
that we end up back in a situation where we're under armored.
General Odierno. Sure.
Senator Coats. And our troops are more vulnerable. And
that's really the heart of my question.
General Odierno. Senator, it's a great question. And the
challenge that we have, whether it be in our light vehicles, or
even in our infantry fighting, any vehicles we develop now,
it's this dynamic of mobility versus survivability. And what
we're trying to do is, what I'd like to have is a system that
enables us to adjust survivability, based on the environment,
so we have a choice on how mobile we can be and how survival we
can be.
An example I always use is the Stryker vehicle. Our Stryker
vehicle was built to provide us more mobility. What's happened
is we've had to put so much weight back on the Stryker we've
lost the mobility that we first wanted on the Stryker. And so,
it's okay in an operation like Afghanistan or Iraq, because of
the counter-insurgence, you know, we use it, but in other
environments, we're going to have problems with it now, because
it's so heavy, and its ability to get off-road is a problem.
So, what we're looking for is the right balance, and that's
what we're trying to get with the JLTV, that's what we're
trying to get with the ground combat vehicle (GCV), is that
right balance of mobility and survivability. And we're working
very closely with all of our partners to try to achieve this.
Senator Coats. And then just one last question. Do we have
any problems with the industrial base, in terms of all this
remixing of priorities?
General Odierno. We watch it very carefully, and we have to
make sure that we're able to sustain the industrial base, as we
move forward. Certainly, we're very cognizant of that as we
move forward.
Senator Coats. That's a component of the decision in
process.
General Odierno. It is. It is.
Mr. McHugh. As we discussed earlier, it's a big concern
across all of our industrial base, both organic, but as well as
our private industry partners. And we're working with the
Department of Defense to try to ensure that we can do
everything we can, whether it's for military sales, public-
private partnerships, in assessing and locating our personal
buys, our individual service buys in a way that sustains that
minimum rate to the greatest extent possible.
Senator Coats. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony, for your leadership. I listened
with great interest to the exchange that you had with Senator
Murray. As important as it is, when we talk about our military
equipment and the infrastructure needs, I think we recognize
that it always come back to the individual, to the human being,
and we need to make sure that we are focusing equal attention
on the need to reset that individual, reset the mind, the body,
and ensure that there is no cost that is spared in doing so.
So, I appreciate a great deal the attention that is being
focused, not only, again, on the situation that Senator Murray
has indicated at Madigan there, in Washington but, really,
system-wide in better understanding that.
General, I missed your visit when you came to Alaska in
January. We appreciate that we don't get a lot of visitors
coming to Alaska in January, and that was noted and greatly
appreciated, particularly since you were coming from Hawaii.
So, you got to really experience the contrast there. But I
think it was important.
We recognize that we're at some pretty historic levels, in
terms of the U.S. Army Alaska forces, and the contribution that
they are currently making in Afghanistan now. Well over 10
percent of the Army forces deployed in Afghanistan are coming
from U.S. Army Alaska, and I think that that is significant.
So, I appreciate that you have gone there yourself, and would
be curious in your impression, in terms of the quality of what
we're doing in Alaska, in terms of the training.
My more specific question, though, and what I would like
you to address is, on that trip, you mentioned, in Hawaii, that
the number of soldiers that are assigned to the Pacific would
generally be about the same as it is today. Can you comment on
the role of U.S. forces that are based in Alaska to achieve
these military objectives in the Pacific? Is it fair to
conclude that the number of soldiers that are assigned to U.S.
Army Alaska will generally be the same as it is today?
U.S. ARMY IN ALASKA
General Odierno. I think as we look at the plans, I think,
as you know, U.S. Army Alaska is, in fact, part of the Pacific
Command.
Senator Murkowski. Right.
General Odierno. And we're looking at, for the most part,
it will be very close to what it is today. Now, we'll continue
to look at that, but our plan is not to do much changes to the
forces that are in the Pacific. So, I would say, in general
terms, it will be pretty close to what it is today.
Senator Murkowski. Appreciate that. I know that the folks
in Alaska recognize, again, not only the strategic advantage
that is gained there, but some of the training opportunities
that we have. I'm assuming that your impression was favorable
of what we are providing, in terms of the quality of troops
we're seeing coming out of the North.
General Odierno. Yes. First, the training facilities are
incredible. What they're able to do and how they're able to
prepare, no matter what mission they go on, it gives them a
great advantage. And I would just also point out is that the
families are taken care of very well up in Alaska. They love
living there. It's a great base for us, because of its location
and its ability to respond to the Pacific and other areas as
well, if needed. So, it's a key component of our Army of the
future.
Mr. McHugh. May I just----
Senator Murkowski. Yes. It's okay.
Mr. McHugh. Somewhat of a prejudiced view on my part, I
guess, but my 17 years in the House, I represented the Fort
Drum region, which is close to the Canadian border, and I was
very fond of saying, and it applies to Alaska as well, not
everywhere we fight has palm trees. I mean it's nice to be able
to train to sometimes less conducive climates than other places
might provide. And that's important to weather acclimate our
soldiers.
Senator Murkowski. Yes. I recall flying over parts of
Afghanistan and looking down at this very remote area, very
mountainous, very tough country, and thinking, ``It looks just
like home.'' So, it is a great place to train.
I wanted to ask, also, a couple questions about the
retirement of the C-23s, the Sherpas, here. Last fall, the
subcommittee was briefed on the plan to divest the C-23s by
fiscal year 2015. And in the briefing materials, it indicated
that there would be a possibility that the Army would
reconsider that divestment decision, if the Air Force makes the
determination to retire the C-27.
Well, now that the Air Force has proposed that retirement,
I am hopeful and would certainly encourage the Army to revisit
its decision to retire the C-23. Can you tell me whether or not
the Army does intend to relook at that?
INTRA-THEATER LIFT
General Odierno. I would just say we have not made any
permanent decision. However, I would say we have some issues
because the C-23, as you're aware, is an old aircraft.
Senator Murkowski. Right.
General Odierno. It's very expensive to sustain. It doesn't
really quite meet the requirements that we have. I said
earlier, we've identified a requirement that we need intra-
theater with, which is kind of the role the C-23 plays. And
that requirement has not changed.
Now, as we began to develop the C-27, the program was
turned over to the Air Force. The Air Force has told us that
they can provide C-130s to accomplish that mission. So, we are
in agreement. We are working with them now to use the C-130,
which would be direct support to Army units that would allow us
to do that intra-theater lift. So, that's the solution we're
headed--that's the road we're headed down right now, as that
will be our solution.
We'll continue to assess the C-23 program, as we move
forward. But, frankly, especially with the current budget
constraints, it's going to be very difficult for us, in my
opinion, to sustain the C-23 program. But I'll turn it over to
the Secretary.
Mr. McHugh. Just the budgetary fiscal realities are simply
to modernize these aircraft, which we would have to do, given
their age. But modernization and longer-term sustain, that is
between $800,000 and $1 million per aircraft. So, it really is
a tough budgetary decision that we're going to make, what we'll
have to make. But, as the Chief said, particularly as our
intra-theater lift situation has evolved with the Air Force,
you know, we're always willing to re-evaluate and change a
decision where necessary. But that program has some real
dollars attached to it.
Senator Murkowski. Well, let me ask a follow-on. This is
coming from a number of the Adjutant Generals, who think that
extending the life of the C-23s is a bargain, at about $90
million. They've asked me to inquire whether or not the
National Guard's cargo lift needs can be filled at a lower-
price point, given that the C-27s will not be available to the
Guard.
General Odierno. Well, I think this is something that has
to be decided at the Department of Defense level, as we look at
this, and whether we believe the C-130s can fill that Guard
need as well.
Senator Murkowski. But that is being factored in.
General Odierno. It needs to be. It absolutely has to be
factored into this, as we look at this, because if we divest of
the C-235, there is need in the Guard.
Senator Murkowski. Right.
General Odierno. There's no doubt about it. We recognize
that, and I think that as we divest the C-23, that has to be
picked up, and I think part of our discussion is that the C-
130s will have to help us do that, as a lift capability that
would be needed for us to support National Guard missions,
simply for the Adjustment Generals.
Mr. McHugh. And I believe, according to the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that should we divest the
23s, we have to at least offer to the States' executives the
opportunity to take those aircraft. So, that's part of the
consideration as well.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr.
Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much. I had a few questions
that I wanted to ask before I left. Every member of this
subcommittee has been concerned about the increase in suicide
rates, in alcohol abuse rates, and divorce rates. In fact, the
civilian suicide rate, if I recall, is 18 per 100,000. The Army
is 24 per 100,000. I note that you have instituted an education
program for suicide prevention. I know that it's too early to
tell, but what do you think will be the future now?
SUICIDE
Mr. McHugh. Of the many things that trouble us all, Mr.
Chairman, the areas you just spoke about, and particularly
suicide, are amongst the most troubling. I sign a letter of
condolence to every survivor, and I usually do that on the
weekends, and I'm just struck by how many letters are
associated with a soldier taking his or her life. It's
breathtakingly sad.
And as you noted as well, we tried to take a multilevel
approach. Our capstone program is the ask, care, and assist
program, the Ask, Care, Escort (ACE) program, to try to bring
suicide awareness to virtually every member of the United
States Army, to tell them what they should be looking for in a
troubled buddy, but also that it's their military
responsibility to care about that, and to act and intervene,
and assist that person to go get the help that's necessary.
We have funded this to what we believe is the necessary
requirement, but that's not enough. We're trading what we call
gatekeepers in the Applied Science Intervention Skills Training
(ASIST) program, the suicide ASIST program, so that they can
have a higher level of expertise, people like chaplains, and
others in positions of responsibility, where they come in
contact with a lot of soldiers who are specially trained to
recognize when a soldier is having challenges, and there,
again, to provide them a path by which they can get some help.
None of that will work, and it really goes back to Senator
Murray's, I think, very appropriate comments about if a soldier
is afraid to reach out, if they feel that their professional
military career will be hurt, we're trying to do everything we
can to destigmatize that, to ensure that a soldier in need will
not feel inhibited in reaching out for behavioral healthcare.
We've made some progress over the last 5 years, I believe,
the data point is. We've had 100,000 more soldiers self-refer
for behavioral health problems. But that's simply enough.
Last, we, in the Army, have engaged with the National
Institute of Mental Health in a 5-year longitudinal study that
has made virtually every member of the United States Army part
of a causal look at suicide, to try to understand where there
may exist signs and commonalities, whether it's deployment,
whether it's young soldiers, whatever it may be, so that we can
be proactive, get out in front of it, not just writing letters
of condolences but to recognize when a soldier is likely to
have problems, and to step in. But, as the statistics show, I
believe it was 134 suicides last year, the numbers continue to
frustrate us.
Chairman Inouye. General, do you have anything to add?
General Odierno. Senator, if I could, I would just say, you
know, I get notified of whenever a suicide happens, and
unfortunately, it's alarming how many times I'm notified about
a suicide. That's been one of the things that's been eye
opening for me as I have become the Chief of Staff of the Army
during the last 6 months.
Suicides have leveled off, but that's not success, because
it's still, as you mentioned, at the highest levels we've had
in a very long time. So, what we're doing, it's a combination
program, as you know, and I think we've talked about it before,
you know, where it's health promotion. It's about trying to
decrease risky behavior. And it's also about improving suicide
prevention capability. So, it's a combination of all three of
those, as we work through this program.
It's about resiliency. It's about trying to understand
resiliency. It's about having programs not only for our
soldiers, but our family members as well, as they face some of
these challenges. We are trying address this bigger than
suicides.
I don't like to use ``we were so busy'' as an excuse, and I
will never use that as an excuse. We have to get our leaders
back involved with more individual soldier activities, and
counseling, and understanding what they're doing. We have to
decrease the movement of our soldiers between commands. We have
to reduce the amount of changes they have in their leadership
within their units, because I think this all causes them not to
sometimes report when they're having problems.
When they've built a long-term relationship with a
noncommissioned officer and he leaves, and/or commander, and so
we're looking at all of those areas, as we can fix that, to
provide more stability and predictability that I think will add
to us helping to identify and solve some of these issues that
we continue to have. It's going to be something that's going to
continue to take time.
I absolutely believe that our leaders are dedicated to
doing this. We are dedicated to providing them the tools. The
funding for this program is funded at the requested level. We
have not taken any reduction in the funding of any of our
programs that has to do with behavioral health, that has to do
with suicide prevention, because it's an important program to
us. And we will continue to emphasize this, and we will
continue to work with outside agencies who can help us to
identify the risky behaviors, and the indicators that we see of
potential individuals who are risky to suicidal ideation or,
you know, the commitment of suicide, and we'll continue to work
that very hard, Senator.
Chairman Inouye. I have one final question, and I'd like to
submit the rest.
This past January, the Secretary of Defense unveiled the
new national security strategy for the Asia-Pacific area, and
it was rather obvious that the Navy and Air Force did well.
Forces were increased as well as equipment and resources. But,
in the case of the Army, with the exception of Korea, it seemed
to have come down. I find this rather strange. Do you have any
thoughts on this?
ARMY ROLE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
General Odierno. I would say, Senator, as we went through
this process, first, we were involved in the process. I was
involved in the process from the beginning. I was able to
express my opinions. I was able to talk about the risk to the
Army, and what we thought we needed for the Army of the future.
But it came down to really one issue, and that is, do we
believe we need the size of the Army that will cause us to
continue to rotate large amount of forces for long periods of
time to support long-term operations, whether it be a
counterinsurgency operation, whether it be a stability
operation. And the determination was that we can take some risk
in the fact that we will not have to conduct long-term
stability operations, and that we can mitigate that risk
through reversibility and the use of our Reserve component, if
it does occur, which would buy us time to rebuild the army.
And I think as we were faced with the budget reductions, I
think we agreed that a 490,000-man Active component Army that
is equipped properly, that has the money to sustain its
readiness, although has risk to it, will enable us to
accomplish the missions of the new strategy, and that we will
be able to support the strategy in the Asia-Pacific but also to
continue to provide support in the Middle East as well.
So, although there's some risk, as we've talked about
already, we believe that this is not a competition between the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, it's about having the right
joint force to accomplish the mission. And I believe that we
now have the right joint force to move forward.
My concerns are that in the future, if we continue to look
at reducing the Army more, then we have some real issues, and
that's when my concern will grow significantly, Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Chairman Inouye. My one concern is the question marks. We
are reducing our forces, but yet there's a big question mark
over Iran and a big question mark over Syria. There's also a
question mark over Egypt. Are the risks too great? I don't
know.
I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for your
service to our Nation. And this subcommittee looks forward to
working with you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Secretary John M. McHugh
Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEM/BLUE FORCE TRACKING
Question. The Army has two mobile tracking systems: Movement
Tracking System (MTS) and Blue Force Tracking (BFT-1) which utilizes
satellite communications to track transportation and armored vehicles.
More than 120,000 BFT and MTS systems have been fielded to date, of
which approximately 11,000 unique users are active in Afghanistan over
any given month. These systems generate nearly the entire common
operating picture of mobile ground force situational awareness in
Afghanistan and are often the only means of communication for soldiers
whose missions take them out of range of terrestrial means of
communication. What is the status of developing the follow on BFT-2 and
BFT-3 X band?
Answer. The development of the BFT-2 satellite transceiver is
complete. The final production acceptance testing for ground systems
has been completed and the Army is currently receiving deliveries.
Aviation testing is approximately 75 percent complete. The Army is
fielding the BFT-2 network to units in Korea and will begin fielding to
the United States Army Forces Command units in May. The United States
Government owns and operates the network equipment, and the software is
in place to support required test events and fielding operations. There
are currently no development efforts funded for a BFT-3 capability.
Question. Is the BFT-2 development over budget and behind schedule?
What are the projected costs associated with continuing to develop BFT-
2?
Answer. The BFT-2 development was completed in 2010. The current
BFT-2 production contract is a Firm Fixed Price contract and production
remains within the planned budget. There are no additional costs
associated with the development of the BFT-2 capability.
Question. What are the potential cost savings if the Army bypassed
BFT-2 development and focused on BFT-3 X band?
Answer. The BFT-2 development is complete; therefore, there would
be no cost savings associated with bypassing the BFT-2 development.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLES
Question. Documentation for a May 2011 reprogramming action states
that ``the Army has procured sufficient High-Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to meet the Army's Acquisition Objective
(AAO).'' While this reprogramming rescinded $182,000,000 from this
account, according to the document there is still a balance of
$422,356,000. How much of the funding in the Army HMMWV procurement
account is currently unobligated?
Answer. The amount of unobligated funds in HMMWV fiscal year 2010
new production procurement account is $19.548 million. These funds have
been committed and will be obligated by June 2012.
Question. Funding has been appropriated in prior years for both
survivability and mobility enhancements for the existing HMMWV fleet
and for the Army's HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Program. What are
the current unobligated balances in these two accounts?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2012 Project/PE was authorized $70 million.
The Army has not obligated any of these funds due to an uncertain
future for the modernized expanded capacity vehicle (MECV) effort.
Decisions by Army leadership within the last month have determined that
$20 million will be used for the survivability improvements as
requested and appropriated. We will then be asking that the Congress
allow us to use the remainder for automotive improvements to our
existing fleet and higher-priority requirements. This funding is
projected to be obligated in 4th quarter 2012 and 1st quarter 2013.
Question. The President's budget for fiscal year 2013 recommends
terminating the Army's HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Program. How
does the Army propose to spend the unobligated balance in this account?
Answer. The Army will no longer pursue the HMMWV Competitive
Recapitalization Program (also known as the MECV). The Army is
currently looking at the options available for the execution of the
funds.
TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE STRATEGY
Question. The Army 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy outlines
a plan to ``replace all M939-series trucks with FMTV FoVs no later than
FY22.'' The strategy states that, ``Divesting these vehicles will
ensure dramatically lower sustainment costs for the Army as many are
well past their EUL.''
Will the cuts in family of medium tactical vehicle (FMTV)
purchasing in fiscal year 2013 and proposed termination of FMTV
procurement after fiscal year 2014 delay the divestiture of the M939-
series trucks?
Answer. The Army is currently reviewing all of its fleet
requirements. In the aggregate, the Army's current plans for FMTV
procurements through fiscal year 2014 and fleet reductions should
divest the M939-series by fiscal year 2016, with the possible exception
of some specialty variants, provided there are no additional cuts in
funding.
Question. Compared to the original plan outlined in the Army 2010
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, how much higher will the Army's
maintenance costs be over the 10-year budget window due to increased
use of the M939-series trucks?
Answer. The Army does not anticipate an increase in use of the
M900-series vehicles over the 10-year budget window and, as a result,
these vehicles will not incur higher maintenance costs. The Army is
currently revising its medium tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition
objective and expects to meet the reduced acquisition objective at the
end of the current family of medium tactical vehicles production
contract in fiscal year 2014. This will enable the Army to divest the
remaining M900-series medium tactical vehicles without an increase in
their use.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS
Question. I want to thank you yesterday for sitting down and
discussing the issues of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)/Department
of Defense (DOD) collaboration.
As you said one of the major issues is the inability for the two
agencies to share electronic medical records.
To this end, you said you were going to start a pilot that may get
off the ground in 3 years to try and make progress.
Mr. Secretary, the Congress has been pushing you to move forward
for years on this effort, we passed legislation that you voted for as a
House member many years ago, and yet after 10 years of war you are
still talking about a pilot program and an inability to get this effort
off the ground.
What can you tell this subcommittee, and millions of soldiers who
need this effort taken seriously, and me about how you will make shared
medical records a reality so we are not sitting here 3 years from now
and hear from you about some pilot program you are intending to create
in the future?
Answer. Since 2006, DOD/VA shares data through the Bidirectional
Health Information Exchange through which DOD and VA clinicians access
each other's health data via a secure real-time interface. The
Bidirectional Health Information Exchange shares data between DOD/VA
only, whereas another initiative, the Virtual Lifetime Electronic
Record (VLER) shares information with private partners through the
Nationwide Health Information Exchange. The VLER is currently a pilot
program with DOD participating at four sites including, San Diego,
California; Tidewater areas of Virginia; Spokane, Washington; and Puget
Sound, Washington. Through the VLER, providers have the ability to
query the Nationwide Health Information Exchange to view information
other healthcare organizations made available on their patient. A
decision regarding the deployability of the VLER across the enterprise
should be made in the summer of 2012.
The Interagency Program Office (IPO) has been re-chartered as the
single point of accountability for the integrated Electronic Health
Record (iEHR). All three services are involved at various levels of the
governance process to ensure the project stays on schedule and within
budget. The IPO reports to the Health Executive Council with
representation from Health Affairs and the VA. DOD and VA are committed
to the iEHR effort. The iEHR will enable DOD and VA to align resources
and investments with business needs and programs. The iEHR will
leverage open source solution development to foster innovation and
expedite delivery of a viable and effective solution.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
Question. Are there any further legislative steps that the Congress
could take to improve the screening and delivery of care to military
personnel with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic
brain injury (TBI)?
Answer. Continued congressional support of the Army's TBI and PTSD
clinical and research efforts will ensure improved screening and
delivery of care.
REPLACEMENT OF IRELAND ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AT FORT KNOX
Question. In response to a question for the record, I submitted in
2011, the Army stated that ``The Army intends to replace Ireland Army
Community Hospital (IACH). The current Defense Health Program Future
Year Defense Program includes a phased funded replacement project for
IACH beginning in fiscal year 2013.'' However, the President's fiscal
year 2013 budget did not include a funding request for the replacement
of IACH at Fort Knox. When does the Army intend to build a replacement
and when will the Army plan on requesting funding for the project?
Answer. The Fort Knox Hospital Replacement Project is 35 percent
designed. This project is being programmed in two phases: Phase 1
Inpatient at a cost of $308.5 million and Phase 2 Outpatient at a cost
of $257.5 million. The U.S. Army MEDCOM is reviewing the project
documentation and updating the Healthcare Requirements Analysis in
preparation for resubmission to the fiscal year 2014 budget estimate
submission for phase 1. The Department of Defense position on the Fort
Knox Hospital Replacement is to revalidate the project scope in light
of ongoing military health systemwide inpatient analysis by Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD (HA)). The
Army Medical Department must scope this facility based on efficient and
effective healthcare operations, but must also incorporate current and
future installation and military treatment facilities missions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson
INACTIVATION OF THE 172ND HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
Question. Secretary McHugh, while I am encouraged to see that the
Army is eliminating two permanently based brigade combat teams from
Germany, I do have a question as to the timing for this proposed move.
As you are aware, the Army will inactivate the 170th Heavy Brigade
Combat Team (BCT) in fiscal year 2013 but is waiting until fiscal year
2014 to inactivate the 172nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team. Why is the Army
waiting until fiscal year 2014 to cut the second brigade and how much
will it cost the United States taxpayers to sustain this brigade in
Germany an additional year?
Answer. The 172nd Brigade deployed in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom and was not available to inactivate in fiscal year 2013. When
the unit returns from combat, it will conduct 6 months of soldier and
family re-integration and begin incremental battalion level draw-downs
and ultimately leave the force in early fiscal year 2014. Therefore,
savings cannot be significantly accelerated and no additional resources
can be saved.
MULTIYEAR CONTRACT FOR THE CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTER
Question. Secretary McHugh, as part of this year's budget, you have
submitted a request for approval to enter into a second multiyear
contract for the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. This multiyear contract
would last for 5 years and produce 155 aircraft, 12 of which would be
for the Texas National Guard. You've already had experience with a 5-
year multiyear contract for Chinooks; the first one expires this year.
Given this experience, what have you seen as the biggest benefits for
both the Army and the taxpayer that led you to request authority for a
second multiyear contract?
Answer. The biggest benefit to the taxpayer is the savings; $449
million on the base contract for 181 CH-47F aircraft. The current
Chinook multiyear contract is a firm fixed-price contract for fiscal
year 2008-2012. The contract has executed on cost and delivered on
schedule. In addition to the base contract savings, the program office
procured 34 option aircraft for an additional $86 million in savings.
The second requested multiyear contract is projected to yield 10-
percent savings or $373 million.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
MEDIUM EXPANDED CAPABILITY VEHICLE
Question. Last year, this subcommittee added $20 million to fund
the design competition for the medium expanded capability vehicle
(MECV). The President's budget for this year, however, seeks to cancel
this program, even though the air assault requirements for 5,700
survivable trucks capable of being transported by a Chinook helicopter
remain unchanged. I am uncomfortable with the decision to cancel the
MECV design competition because it will increase the risk to our air
assault soldiers. The tactical wheeled vehicle budget was reduced by 57
percent compared to last year's budget request, and the decision to
cancel the MECV appears to be the result of insufficient procurement
funding in the near-term budget window to move forward with both the
MECV and joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) programs. Was the decision
to cancel the MECV program based solely on the fiscal constraints the
Army faced?
Answer. The decision not to begin the MECV was due to Defense-wide
funding constraints; not just fiscal constraints faced by the Army. The
Army and Marine Corps' made the decision to proceed with JLTV to fill
the capability gaps for light tactical vehicles. MECV was deemed a
lower-priority program.
Question. The funding necessary to conduct the MECV design
competition has already been authorized and appropriated for this
purpose in last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and
Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act. Proceeding with the
MECV design competition would provide you with the necessary
performance and life-cycle cost data to make an informed decision
regarding the most survivable and cost-effective way to fulfill the
capability gap to lift a survivable tactical wheeled vehicle for our
air assault and airborne units at high, hot conditions. Does the air
assault requirement for a survivable tactical wheeled vehicle that can
be lifted by a CH-47 Chinook in high-altitude and/or high-temperature
conditions still exist?
Answer. Yes, the requirement for the air assault mission to lift a
survivable light tactical vehicle with the CH-47 Chinook in high/hot
conditions (4,000 feet/95 F) still exists. The original requirement
was addressed in the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)
Operational Requirements Document in September 2004.
SUICIDE--HIRING OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SPECIALISTS
Question. Many of us on this panel have a great deal of respect for
the former Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, who authored
the Army's Gold Book in response to concerns about suicides and the
health of the force. Before he retired, he came over to the Hill to
discuss the Army's efforts to reduce the incidence of suicide in the
force and the ongoing efforts to treat the underlying problems that
lead far too many of our Nations' best men and women to contemplate or
perform suicide. General Chiarelli identified access to behavioral
healthcare as one way to reduce the rate of suicide. There have been
several efforts by the Congress to expand access to providers,
including a provision in last year's NDAA to utilize telehealth
initiatives, and I want to applaud the Army for submitting a
legislative proposal this year to expand the number and types of
providers that may conduct evaluations during preseparation screening.
I fully intend on supporting this proposal, but the problem will not be
solved by this measure alone.
Secretary McHugh, are there any other requests you would make to
allow for rapid hiring of additional behavioral health specialists,
even if on a temporary basis, to address both the rate of suicides and
alleviate pressure on your existing behavioral health force?
Answer. The permanent extension of 10 U.S.C. 1599c, which provides
for expedited hiring authority for certain healthcare professionals,
including behavioral health specialists, would provide the long-term
critical ability to hire behavior healthcare providers more rapidly.
MEDICAL AND DISABILITY EVALUATIONS
Question. During the past year the length of time that wounded
warriors and recently discharged veterans have been waiting for
disability evaluations has continued to suffer. For Active-Duty members
the average evaluation completion time increased by 88 days from March
2010 to January 2012. It takes more than a year right now.
In addition, medical evaluation boards still take twice as long as
the 35-day target. Several senior officers, including the former Vice
Chief, have identified the Integrated Disability Evaluation System and
the dual adjudication process as impediments to rapid evaluations and
outcomes for our veterans.
What administrative actions are being taken or what legislative
proposals could be implemented to improve the time it takes to conduct
the medical and disability evaluations for our wounded soldiers?
Answer. The Army is aggressively working to improve performance of
the Disability Evaluation System (DES). We are currently implementing a
number of initiatives designed to improve the performance, including:
--adding more than 1,100 in staffing;
--publishing guidance to standardize the process across the Army;
--improving our training; and
--establishing procedures that will enhance the sharing of
information with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
The Army is looking at several different options to improve the
DES--one of which would be a process in which DOD determines a disabled
servicemember's fitness for duty, and if found unfit, provide a
lifetime annuity based on the member's rank and years of service. VA
would then establish compensation for service-connected injuries,
disease, or wounds. We believe this type of system would achieve an
average disability process outcome in less than 90 days:
--improved readiness;
--reduced complexity;
--decreased impact on limited medical resources; and
--be less adversarial.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Coats
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
Question. Regarding the funding provided by this subcommittee for
Overseas Contingency Operations, does the Army have the flexibility it
needs to transfer funds between accounts to ensure funding is used
wisely and does not expire?
Answer. Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) overseas contingency
operations (OCO) funding for operational requirements was previously
distributed in subactivity group (SAG) 135. To comply with House Report
112-331, the Conference Report that accompanied Public Law 112-74,
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, specifically pages 759-761, Army
distributed OCO funding into SAGs previously used exclusively for base
resources (114, 115, 116, 121, 122, and 131). Issuing OCO funding in
base SAGs, some with reprogramming restrictions (for example, SAG 131),
limits Army's execution in those SAGs to requirements consistent with
the SAG description. To realign resources across SAGs to meet emerging
requirements requires a reprogramming action. These reprogramming
actions are time consuming and are sometimes limited to relatively low
thresholds (for example no more than $15 million may be moved out of
SAG 131 without congressional prior approval). Army executed resources
responsibly and with greater flexibility when there were fewer OCO
SAGs. The drawdown of deployed forces may also further complicate
administering Army OCO accounts as evolving priorities and requirements
may shift faster than fiscal rules accommodate.
Question. Since its inception, has any funding provided for the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) expired?
Answer. Yes, we have had ASFF funds expire. Since fiscal year 2005,
we have had an obligation rate greater than 99.5 percent per year
resulting in a cumulative total of $46 million unobligated over 6
years, of $27.9 billion available.
Question. What mechanisms does the Army utilize to ensure funding
is not allowed to expire at the end of each fiscal year?
Answer. The Army has several mechanisms in place to ensure funding
is not allowed to expire each fiscal year. Senior leaders review Army
obligations on a weekly basis. Our operations and maintenance
appropriation spend plan is reviewed monthly to ensure we are in
accordance with the mandate of no more than 20 percent of the
appropriation shall be obligated during the last 2 months of the fiscal
year; thus putting the Army on a glide path for 100-percent execution
of its appropriation. In addition, each year the Army conducts Mid Year
Review (MYR)--a senior leader comprehensive look at command execution
through end-of-month March. Resources are realigned to optimize their
use for Army requirements. The MYR is also provided to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and any resources excess to Army needs would
be used for Department of Defense requirements.
______
Questions Submitted to General Raymond T. Odierno
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
POST-DEPLOYMENT/MOBILIZATION RESPITE ABSENCE PROGRAM
Question. Due to Government errors at demobilization sites, many
soldiers did not receive the full amount of administrative leave that
they were allowed under the Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite
Absence Program (PDMRA). How many soldiers have been credited with
extra days of PDMRA administrative leave by the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) to correct this mistake?
Answer. The ABCMR granted 466 soldiers authority to use PDMRA days
they had earned but were not afforded the opportunity to use. Their
records were corrected to show that they are authorized to use these
days of PDMRA upon the next qualifying deployment/mobilization.
Authority to use these PDMRA days will expire upon the soldier's
transfer from an authorized Reserve component status.
Question. For those soldiers credited with extra days of PDMRA
administrative leave by the ABCMR, what is the average number of
additional days each soldier has received through the ABCMR process?
Answer. The average PDMRA days granted by ABCMR was 26 days.
Question. Of the soldiers who have been credited with extra days of
PDMRA leave by the ABCMR, how many have already used the leave, are
currently on a deployment which will make them eligible to use the
leave, or are scheduled for such a deployment in the future?
Answer. The Army is unable to provide specific numbers to this
question since the Reserve components, Army National Guard (ARNG) and
the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR), were never required to
track PDMRA to this level of detail. However, ABCMR reviewed
applications from 604 soldiers who sought monetary reimbursement or
credit for PDMRA days which were earned but not used. Future deployment
numbers are unknown as this is a function of demand. Current Reserve
component soldiers on mobilization orders are approximately 46,650.
Question. Some soldiers who have been credited with extra days of
PDMRA leave by the ABCMR will never be eligible to use this leave since
they will not deploy again. How do you propose that the Government's
mistakes be remedied in the cases of these soldiers?
Answer. The Army no longer has authority under section 604 of
Public Law 111-84 (the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization
Act) to provide monetary compensation to soldiers or former soldiers
for PDMRA leave. As such, we have no remedy for former soldiers. For
current soldiers, the only available remedy to address the extra PDMRA
leave they may have been credited with is for those soldiers to
participate in subsequent deployments.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
PREPARING SOLDIERS FOR THE TRANSITION OUT OF THE MILITARY
Question. General Odierno, I recently attended a number of
veterans' roundtables back in my home State of Washington. Time and
time again, I hear similar stories of struggle. Veterans do not put
their military service on their resumes because they feel that
employers will find them less desirable. Also, employers are often
unable to understand all of the skills veterans bring to a workplace.
I am concerned as the Army begins to downsize by 80,000 soldiers
over the next 5 years, how these soldiers will transition in a
difficult economy and how that will impact the Army's bottom line with
the increasing tab for unemployment compensation.
The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) provides critical
services for our soldiers transitioning to a postmilitary career. I am
concerned that with the reduction in temporary end-strength that the
Army will not have enough counselors on hand to assist--especially as
ACAP changes and requires more intensive preparation beginning 15 to 18
months prior to separation.
Have you adequately budgeted to reflect an increase in ACAP
counselors to address this surge in separations?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the
additional counselors and staff that will be required to address the
additional throughput of soldiers. Resources are being identified to
reallocate to our transition program to ensure all transition
requirements by all soldiers are met.
ACAP delivers a world-class transition program for America's Army
that ensures all eligible transitioners have the knowledge, skills, and
self-confidence necessary to be competitive and successful in the
global workforce. ACAP helps transitioning soldiers make informed
career decisions through benefits counseling and employment assistance.
ACAP is responsible for delivering both transition assistance and
employment assistance services.
Some examples of programs available through ACAP are:
--Transition Assistance Program (TAP) Employment Workshops;
--Employment Assistance to include resume writing and ``Dress for
Success'';
--Health Benefits Transition Brief;
--Survivor Benefits Plan Brief; and
--Veterans Affairs Disability Brief.
The Army is also utilizing the Hero 2 Hired (H2H) as its interim
employment application/tool (www.H2H.jobs) to provide one primary
location where soldiers of all components, veterans, and family members
can connect with private industry employment opportunities. This
application is Web-based and able to translate military occupational
skills (MOS), provide career path exploration, upload resumes, allow
customized job searches, enable employers to also search for veterans,
and provide performance metrics. H2H will eventually be included on
eBenefits, the single portal for transition benefits selected by the
Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force (www.eBenefits.va.gov).
Question. I understand ACAP does a lot to prepare soldiers for the
transition out of the military through career and transition
counseling. But the military spends hundreds of millions of dollars on
unemployment insurance for those who were unable to find civilian
employment. As you know, my Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire
Heroes legislation makes a range of improvements designed to help get
servicemembers and veterans into good civilian jobs. Part of that
legislation dealt with helping servicemembers transition skills that
have a direct correlation to civilian licensure or certification. What
are you doing so far to implement this legislation?
Answer. Army Continuing Education System (ACES) has a program
currently in place to support in-service and transitioning soldiers in
obtaining certifications and licensure. The Credentialing Opportunities
On-Line (COOL) program (www.cool.army.mil) provides soldiers with
information on civilian licensures and certifications relevant to their
Army Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The COOL program provides
each solider an MOS crosswalk to civilian skills. Also, Certification
and Licensure for each MOS is listed in COOL along with the estimated
availability of a first-term solider to obtain a credential and the
resources (GI bill, Army e-Learning, ACE credit) to obtain each
certification.
The Army Transition Implementation Plan outlines how the Army will
operatively incorporate the transition requirements mandated by the VOW
to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, and the Presidential Veterans Employment
Initiative Task Force (VEI TF) recommendations. The Army Transition
Implementation Plan was developed at the Army Transition Plan Working
Group comprised of representatives from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of
Staff, G1, U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), U.S. Army
Human Resources Command (HRC), U.S. Army Reserves (USAR), and the Army
National Guard (ARNG). The working group focused on integrating the
requirements established by the VOW Act and VEI TF, in coordination
with the Veterans Administration (VA), Department of Labor (DOL), and
Small Business Administration (SBA). The working group will evolve the
transition landscape from that of an end of service program, to one
that provides a blended transition-training and services delivery
model, integrating transition education as part of a soldier's military
life-cycle. As transition is introduced into the military lifecycle,
soldiers, leaders, and transition service providers, will maintain
transition awareness that best prepares soldiers for life after the
Army.
The Army Transition Implementation Plan was approved in April 2012.
Concurrently, Army transition service providers and interagency
partners, are in development of revised transition curricula, for
piloting in July 2012. The Army will pilot the VOW Act and VEI TF
requirements at select Active component installations and Reserve
Component locations. The Army has identified an official employment
portal, https://H2H.JOBS, ``Hero to Hired,'' where soldiers can search
for jobs and employers can post job openings.
Army-wide implementation for VOW Act and VEI TF requirements will
take place no later than November 21, 2012. The Army Transition
Implementation plan accomplishes:
Veterans Opportunity to Work Act Requirements.--Pre-separation
Counseling, VA Benefits Briefing, DOL Employment Workshop--
implementation for all Army components no later than November
21, 2012.
Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for a Core
Curriculum.--Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) Crosswalk,
VA Applications, Financial Planning, Individual Transition Plan
(ITP) Preparation--implementation no later than November 21,
2012.
Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for a
``Goals, Plans, Success'' Curriculum.--Goals, Plans, Success
(GPS) provides the opportunity for soldiers to attend
additional training sessions on continuing higher education,
pursuing technical education/certification, or venturing
towards entrepreneurship. GPS curriculum is divided into an
Education Track, Technical Training Track, and Entrepreneurship
Track, with implementation in October 2013.
Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for an End
of Career, Transition CAPSTONE Event, To Mitigate Any Risks for
Possible Negative Transition Outcomes After Separation and
Connect Jobs to Soldiers (H2H.JOBS).--CAPSTONE will identify
soldiers confidence and preparedness for transition, with the
ability to ``re-train'' as appropriate. CAPSTONE implementation
will be October 2013.
Military Life Cycle for Transition.--Military Life Cycle for
Transition will parallel transition readiness with military
career progression, as transition education will be integrated
in a soldiers military education throughout their career.
Military Life Cycle (MLC) will be implemented October 2014.
Pre-Apprenticeship.--We have begun initial staff analysis and
planning to develop and implement a pre-apprenticeship program
authorized by subsection 225 of your HHA. This training program
is intended for transitioning Active-Duty soldiers, offered
through an industry partner and seeks to capitalize on an
opportunity to address local labor needs with soldiers by
reducing training cost to employers. It allows transitioning
servicemembers, who have been vetted through appropriate
channels, and meet prerequisites, to participate in a
preapprenticeship program that provides credit toward a program
registered under the National Apprenticeship Act. Wounded
Warriors--Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) is an
existing DOD program focused on warrior care; the goal of E2I
is to ensure consistent offerings to all recovering service
members by synchronizing, integrating and expanding the
education and employment opportunities for them and their
families. E2I will ensure the service member is engaged early
in their recovery process to identify skills and develop a
career plan that leverages those skills. Through the execution
of their career plan, servicemembers will ultimately be matched
with education and career opportunities that increase their
career readiness and better prepare them for a successful
transition from their service.
Apprenticeship.--Training and Doctrine Command has mapped Army
MOS's to assist in developing an Army program similar to the
United States Military Apprenticeship Program (USMAP), managed
by Naval Education and Training Command. A formal military
training program that provides Active-Duty Coast Guard, Marine
Corps, and Navy service members the opportunity to improve
their job skills and to complete their civilian apprenticeship
requirements while they are on active duty. Our goal is to
implement this program in concert with Military Life Cycle
implementation timelines.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
MQ-8B FIRE SCOUT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. General Odierno, I've been informed that the Army's 37th
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in Afghanistan is being supported
by an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force
led land-based deployment of MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicles.
I understand the MQ-8B is providing the 37th IBCT with full-motion
video for route clearance and tactical ISR in an austere operating
environment near Kunduz. Would you please provide the subcommittee
information on who's operating the MQ-8B's in Afghanistan and more
details on the types of missions and performance of the MQ-8B in
Afghanistan?
Answer. In May 2011, the U.S. Navy deployed three MQ-8B Aircraft to
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These aircraft are operated by
Northup Grumman which is contracted to provide 300 hours of Electro
Optical/Infrared Full Motion Video per month. While the aircraft are
owned by the Navy, the deployment of this contractor flown system was
funded by the ISR Task Force.
ARMED AERIAL SCOUT HELICOPTER
Question. General Odierno, the Congress approved fiscal year 2012
funding for the Army to conduct a flight demonstration of Armed Scout
helicopter capabilities. When do you expect to conduct this
demonstration; what do you expect to glean from it; and do you plan to
use the results of this demonstration to inform the Department's fiscal
year 2014 budgeting process and the way ahead for this needed
capability?
Answer. The Army has requested authority to release a Request for
Information (RFI) and conduct the voluntary flight demonstration. Once
authorized to release the RFI, the Army expects to receive responses
within approximately 60 days. The demonstrations will begin
approximately 120 days after RFI release.
The purpose of the RFI and voluntary flight demonstration is to
assess the current state of technology within industry. Results will be
captured according to each individual respondent's level of
participation. Our path forward with the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) will
enable us to make an informed capabilities decision and, subsequently,
a materiel solution option recommendation, to the Defense Acquisition
Executive based on the current state of technology in the market place.
The AAS RFI, industry discussions, and the voluntary flight
demonstration will inform a future materiel solution option
recommendation that represents a medium-risk program with achievable
and affordable requirements within the current and future fiscal
environment.
The results of the RFI and voluntary flight demonstration is
intended to inform the Department's fiscal year 2014 budgeting process
and the way ahead for this needed capability.
TACTICAL FUEL SYSTEMS
Question. General Odierno, I am aware the Army Combined Arms
Support Command identified an operational gap for its tactical fuel
system. I have been informed that there is a need for collapsible fuel
tank storage systems to support a much longer use life than what is
being used by the Army. The subcommittee is aware of field reports
which indicate premature degradation and outright failure within the
first year of use for current systems. Have you evaluated the 10-year
service-life capabilities of Nitrile rubber collapsible storage tanks
currently used by the United States Marine Corps? What is the life-
cycle cost differential between the Army systems and the Nitrile rubber
systems being used by the Marines?
Answer. The Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and
Engineering Center (TARDEC) has not performed a 10-year service-life
capabilities analysis for the Nitrile collapsible tank; however, they
did perform a limited performance comparison between the Nitrile tank
and the polyurethane tanks.
TARDEC purchased Nitrile and polyurethane tanks that conformed to
the TRI- Services specifications for fuel tanks. The TRI-Services group
is a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) led entity that, among other
responsibilities, sets the specifications for fuel tanks.
TARDEC provided the following information from their comparison
between the Nitrile and polyurethane tanks:
--Nitrile tanks were 11 percent more expensive to produce on a unit
cost basis. This difference can be attributed to:
--Nitrile is a more expensive raw material than polyurethane.
--The fabrication of a nitrile fuel tank is more labor intensive.
--Maintenance and repair costs are equivalent.
--Costs of technical manuals and logistics data are equivalent.
--Fielding and training costs are equivalent.
--Disposal costs are equivalent.
The TARDEC comparison did not address the difference in service
life between the two collapsible bags; however, Defense Logistics
Agency-Energy will conduct separate research and development tests on
both Nitrile and polyurethane-coated tanks. The projected completion of
those tests is estimated to be October 2013 and April 2014,
respectively.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
ELIMINATION OF ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
Question. In your testimony, you mentioned the Army's plans to
eliminate at least eight brigade combat teams (BCTs). What are the
criteria that the Army will use in deciding which BCTs will stay and
which will go?
Answer. The Army will consider a broad array of criteria for
inactivation of the eight BCTs to make strategically sound, resource
informed decisions. Criteria will be based on strategic considerations,
operational effectiveness, geographic distribution, cost and the
ability to meet statutory requirements.
Strategic Considerations.--Aligns Army Force Structure to the new
Defense Strategy and forthcoming Defense Planning Guidance with
a priority on the Pacific region.
Operational Considerations.--Seeks to maximize training
facilities, deployment infrastructure, and facilities to
support the well-being of soldiers and their families. Aligns
appropriate oversight/leadership by senior Army headquarters
for better command and control.
Geographic Distribution.--Seeks to distribute units in the United
States to preserve a broad base of support and linkage to the
American people.
Cost.--Considers the impacts of military personnel, equipment,
military construction, and transportation costs.
Statutory Requirements.--Complies with the provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as appropriate,
including an environmental and socio-economic analysis.
Question. Will the Congress be consulted ahead of time on the
proposed BCT decisions? If not, why not?
Answer. The Army is considering a number of potential options, but
no final decisions have been made as to which U.S.-based BCTs will be
drawn down. An announcement on specific force structure actions is
expected sometime before, or in conjunction with, submission of the
fiscal year 2014 President's budget in early February 2013. The Army
will develop a plan that will provide detailed information regarding
the draw down and address notification of affected Army installations
and appropriate Congressional Committees as required by section 2864 of
the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act prior to the
decision going into effect.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson
SUICIDE VEST DETECTION
Question. General Odierno, Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services have spent approximately $50 million developing and deploying
technology that automatically identifies people potentially wearing
suicide vests at stand-off ranges. However, this technology is still
not currently available to many bases in Afghanistan as well as in the
United States. What is the Army doing today in Afghanistan to screen
personnel at stand-off ranges that are seeking access to our bases
where this technology is not available?
Answer. The Army and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) have resourced more than $500 million for Entry
Control Point (ECP) solutions alone. The Army has employed several
solutions in Afghanistan to screen personnel at stand-off distances
including:
--Counter Bomber 3 (CB-3);
--Standoff Suicide Bomber Detection System (SSBDS);
--Subtle madness;
--Light guard;
--Rapid scan;
--Backscatter vans;
--walkthrough metal detectors;
--Biometrics, random anti-terrorism measures (RAM); and
--the capabilities associated with ECP solutions to counter and
mitigate Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED).
These systems allow the Army in Theatre to provide a layered,
stand-off defense at most locations.
In addition to PBIED systems, Army units deploy a layered defense
at all locations in Afghanistan by continuously screening personnel and
scanning surrounding areas of each Forward Operating Base (FOB).
Soldiers occupy guard towers and entry control points with night
vision, thermal, and long-range optics, and man entry control points.
Each FOB has a Base Defensive Operations Center that controls the Base
Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Systems-Combined (BETSS-C)
camera system, Raid and Cerberus Towers, and video feeds from
aerostats. Beyond the FOB, units routinely conduct mounted patrols
around the FOBs, Tactical Checkpoints (TCPs), and regional Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to provide additional surveillance
outside the reach of the guard towers.
United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) determines the
distribution of PBIED equipment to operating bases in theater. USFOR-A
determines the needs of installations based upon analysis of the local
threat and logistics capabilities of the operating bases. Currently
there are no requirements for additional PBIED systems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
HIGH-DEMAND SOLDIERS DWELL TIME
Question. Army leaders have repeatedly said that we owe our Active-
Duty soldiers a minimum of 2 years home for every 1 year deployed.
While we are meeting that goal for some soldiers, I'm less confident
that this budget does the same for soldiers serving in the combat arms
and low-density, high-demand units such as aviation and special forces.
These are the very category of soldiers that need the required dwell
time the most. They are also the forces that are most likely to deploy
even if we are not in large-scale engagements like Iraq and
Afghanistan.
General Odierno, in light of the proposed force reductions, did the
Army ensure that this budget provides an average dwell time for combat
arms and high-demand soldiers that equals 2 years home for every year
deployed?
Answer. The Army will accomplish force reductions in a responsible
and controlled manner, and the proposed force structure will allow the
Army to meet our Boots-on-the-Ground (BOG):Dwell goal. As always, the
Army's intent has been to improve dwell time for soldiers and families
where possible, and the goal is to achieve a 1:2 for Active units and
1:4 for Reserve units by 2015. However, end-strength reductions beyond
490,000 will challenge the Army's ability to meet timelines for current
identified requirements and to maintain necessary dwell for units and
soldiers.
In the second quarter of fiscal year 2012, with the help of the
temporary end-strength increase and the decrease in demand for deployed
forces, the Active component of the Army achieved its individual
BOG:Dwell goal with a median ratio of 1:2.01. However, several grades
and specialties are still below the 1:2 goals but have been improving.
Among these are enlisted soldiers in grades sergeant and below, and
aviation soldiers in general. Army Special Operations Forces are
programmed to grow 3,677 military manpower authorizations from fiscal
years 2013 to 2017. Growth includes adding an MH-47G helicopter company
in fiscal year 2014 (176 personnel), two extended range/multipurpose
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) companies in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal
year 2015 (330 personnel), and an increase in combat support and combat
service support in each Special Forces Group in fiscal year 2013 and
fiscal year 2014 (1,445 personnel). Additionally, 334 Military
Intelligence (MI) billets will be added in fiscal year 2014 to the
Active Special Forces Groups and the Ranger Regiment to increase MI
capability. The Army remains committed to activate a Combat Aviation
Brigade (CAB) at Fort Carson in fiscal year 2013 as planned.
COMMON REMOTELY OPERATED WEAPONS STATION
Question. One of the weapon systems in the Army's arsenal that has
been most demanded by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan is the Common
Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS). I am proud that many
components of this system are manufactured and assembled in my home
State of Maine. I was please to see that funding for the CROWS has
moved from the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget to the base
budget.
However, it is unclear to me how the Army arrived at the long-term
acquisition objective for the quantity of CROWS to be procured. From my
review of the budgetary documents and solicitations, it appears the
Army intends to procure a total of between 14,000 and 18,000 CROWS to
outfit a fleet of combat and tactical vehicles that consists of several
hundred thousand vehicles.
General Odierno, how did the Army arrive at the requirement and
total acquisition objective for the CROWS system?
Answer. The Army has produced the CROWS for the last 6 years to
respond to Operational Need Statements from the commanders in the field
and to provide CROWS to various Program Managers to mount on their
vehicles such as up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWV), mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, Route
Clearance Vehicles, and Abrams Tanks. As Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) has developed their fielding plan for the various branches,
the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) submitted and approved through the
Organization Requirements Document Approval Brief (ORDAB) on May 9,
2011, was for a total of 11,269. This quantity reflects 1,556 for Heavy
Brigade Combat Teams, 1,119 for Special Operations Forces, 4,090 for
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, 576 for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 9
for Ordnance Center and Schools, 2,143 for Sustainment Center of
Excellence, and 1,776 for Maneuver Center of Excellence. This number
may change slightly as TRADOC continues to update and analyze their
requirements.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Chairman Inouye. We stand in recess, and will reconvene on
Wednesday, March 28, at 10 a.m., to learn about Defense Health
Programs.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., Wednesday, March 21, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
March 28.]