

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:32 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Murray, Cochran, Shelby, Hutchison, Murkowski, Graham, and Coats.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

Chairman INOUE. This morning, the subcommittee convenes to review the Department of the Army's fiscal year 2013 budget request. And so we welcome the Honorable John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army. We also welcome for the first time before this subcommittee, General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff. Thank you for being with us today.

The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2013 base budget request is \$135 billion, the same level as last year's enacted base budget. The Army is also requesting \$50 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO) for fiscal year 2013, which is a decrease of \$18 billion from last year's enacted amount.

Due to the country's fiscal restraints, the Army's response to budget reductions was based on the determination of the right balance between three areas: personnel, modernization, and readiness.

Over the next 5 years, the Army is planning to reduce the size of the Active Army by 490,000 soldiers and will remove at least eight brigade combat teams (BCTs) from its existing structure. The subcommittee hopes to learn more from you on these reductions and your plans to achieve them without sacrificing the lessons we have learned after a decade of war. As far as modernization is concerned, the fiscal year 2013 request prioritizes the Army network and infantry-fighting vehicle that can accommodate the entire infantry squad and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV).

Finally, the Army must ensure its forces are maintained, trained, and equipped at the highest levels of readiness in order to meet its operational demands and to fulfill its obligation in the Middle East and the Pacific in order to meet the new defense strategy.

PREPARED STATEMENT

The subcommittee sincerely appreciates your service to our Nation and the dedication of the sacrifices made daily by the men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country each and every day. And so I look forward to working with you to make certain that the fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill reflects the current and future needs of the U.S. Army.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

Today, the subcommittee convenes to review the fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense budget request. We welcome the Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army. And beside him we welcome for the first time before the subcommittee, General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff. Gentlemen, thank you for being here with us today.

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We sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and the dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country each and every day. I look forward to working with you to ensure that the fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill reflects the current and future needs of the United States Army.

Chairman INOUE. As you gentlemen are aware, there is a vote scheduled for 10:40 this morning. So, the Vice Chairman and I will alternate voting to continue the hearing as planned. And may I assure you that your full statement will be made part of the record. And now I call upon the Vice Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for scheduling this hearing and inviting witnesses to appear and discuss the budget request for the next fiscal year for the United States Army, our soldiers, and others who are working to help protect the security interests of our great country. It's a dangerous mission these days. Men and women are deployed around the world to help protect our security interests and help maintain the access to the freedoms and liberties we enjoy as Americans.

The testimony comes at an important time. We face a lot of challenges, and we appreciate your cooperation with our subcommittee in identifying the priorities to be sure we get it right and that we serve the best interests of our country and peace in the world.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. May I call upon Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thanks for having me.

Chairman INOUE. Well, it is now my pleasure to call upon the Secretary, Mr. McHugh.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Cochran, and Senator Graham, I don't know as I can equal Senator Graham's brevity. But, given the time constraints, I will try to be somewhat brief.

Mr. Chairman, let me first of all join you in expressing my gratitude, and frankly, as the Secretary, relief to have this great leader on my left, the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army, Ray Odierno. And I want to thank this subcommittee and this Senate for acting swiftly to nominate him. As you know, gentlemen, this is a great leader who in a relatively short time has really made his mark as the current Chief, and also former leader. And I feel very honored and blessed to have him as my partner in these very challenging times.

I also want to take a brief opportunity to thank this subcommittee for the great support that all of you have provided our 1.1 million soldiers, our 270,000 civilians, and our families. Collectively, as you know, they make up this great Army, and they, too, deeply appreciate all that you do for them.

Today, more than ever, I would argue today's demanding fiscal environment requires that we maintain an even stronger partnership with you and this great Congress, this great house, to ensure that we have the sufficient resources to defeat our enemies, support our allies, and protect our homeland responsively, decisively, and yes, affordably.

Our budget supports these goals, we believe, by laying the foundation for a gradual reduction of our military and civilian end-strength, while at the same time supporting, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the vital modernization, training, soldier, and family programs that are so necessary to sustain this Army and ensure that while smaller, it remains the strongest and most capable land force in the world.

As we implement what I think can be fairly described as a bold new security strategy, I want to be very clear. The Army's combat experience, adaptability, and strategic reach will be more vital to our Nation than ever before. Over the last year, I think that's been demonstrated. The Army has continued to be the decisive hand of American foreign policy and the helping hand of Americans facing the devastation of natural disasters.

With soldiers deployed on 6 of the 7 continents, and in more than 150 nations around the world, your Army has become the face of American concern and the fist of American military might.

In the Pacific, we continued our long-term presence in the region with some 75,000 military and civilian personnel participating in

more than 160 exercises, engagements, and operations in support of our allies in that vital region.

In Korea, our soldiers provided a strong deterrent to North Korean aggression. In Japan and the Philippines, we maintained our decades-old security relationships, training, and supporting with those great allies. In Europe, our soldiers fulfilled vital training stability and peacekeeping roles in Bosnia and Kosovo. While in Africa, your Army supported counterterrorism operations throughout the Horn and beyond.

But foreign threats and operations were not all this Army faced. In 2011, this Nation experienced some of the worse natural disasters in our history. From responding to wildfires and floods to hurricanes and tornadoes, our soldiers and civilians from all components were there to help, protect, rescue, or rebuild. To put it very simply, our soldiers, civilians, and their families have once again proven why the United States Army is the most capable, versatile, and successful land force on Earth. And it is this ability to adapt to a myriad of unpredictable threats, both at home and abroad, that we will maintain as we move forward in this new security and fiscal environment.

This year's budget, we believe, portrays an army fully embracing change by making the hard decisions now to lay the right foundations for the future.

First, we are implementing a sweeping new defense strategy, which emphasizes even greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific region in the development of smaller, more agile land forces. Under this new framework, which was developed collaboratively with top military and civilian officials in our department, the Army clearly remains the decisive arm of U.S. combat power.

Second, we are implementing this new paradigm under the significant cuts directed by the Budget Control Act of 2011. In so doing, we made some very tough decisions, but we are always guided by the following key principles. First, we'll fully support the current fight by providing operational commanders in Afghanistan and other theaters with the best trained and ready land forces in the world. That is and it will remain our top priority.

Third, we will not sacrifice readiness for force structure. We must responsibly reduce our end-strength in a manner that fully supports the new strategy but also provides sufficient time to properly balance our training, equipment, infrastructure, and soldier and family support programs with our mission requirements.

Fourth, we will be able to build force structure and capabilities to handle unforeseen changes to global security. The Army must be able to hedge risk through an efficient and effective force generation process and access to a strong operationalized Reserve component.

Fifth, we will maintain and enhance the Army's extensive commitments in the Pacific.

And last, we will not let the Budget Control Act be taken on the backs of our soldiers or their families. Although, we have, and we will continue to examine and, where appropriate, realign our programs, we will fully fund and support those systems that work, with special emphasis on wounded warrior, suicide prevention, behavioral health, and sexual assault programs.

Based on these principles, our budget minimizes end-strength reductions in the near years to support the current fight, emphasizes continued investments in vital modernization programs, such as the network, the ground combat vehicle (GCV), and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), and delays or implements programs which, in our judgment, no longer meet urgent needs in support of our new strategy or transforming force, and we deferred certain military construction programs.

The Army, at its core, is not programs and systems. It's people. And each time I have the honor of appearing before you, I come not only as the Secretary but humbly as the representatives of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. As this subcommittee knows so well, these brave men and women who have endured so much over the past decade depend upon a variety of programs, policies, and facilities to cope with the stress, the injuries, and family separations caused by war.

Sadly, our suicide and substance abuse rates remain unacceptably high, and we are aggressively pursuing multiple avenues to provide our personnel with the best medical and behavioral support that is available. We must never forget that our success in both Iraq and Afghanistan has come at a heavy price for our Army family. Providing the means and resources for whatever challenges they now face is, in my opinion, the very least, the very most, and what we must do.

PREPARED STATEMENT

As a final note regarding our Army family, I would again be remiss if I didn't thank you so much for the great support this subcommittee, and ultimately, the Committee as a whole has provided to those soldiers and families. They appreciate it. We all are so grateful for your leadership, and we look forward to working with you in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH AND
GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Our Nation has weathered difficult circumstances since the attacks on 9/11, yet we have met every challenge. The mission in Iraq has ended responsibly, continued progress in Afghanistan is enabling a transition to Afghan security responsibility, and targeted counterterrorism efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda and degraded its leadership. In all these endeavors, the Army has played a leading role.

As President Barack Obama stated in introducing his new national defense priorities, the country is at a turning point after a decade of war and considerable increases in defense spending. Even as large-scale military campaigns recede, the Nation will still face a growing array of security challenges. These new priorities focus on the continuing threat of violent extremism, the proliferation of lethal weapons and materials, the destabilizing behavior of Iran and North Korea, the rise of new powers across Asia, and an era of uncertainty in the Middle East.

On top of that, our Nation confronts a serious deficit and debt problem (in itself a national security risk) that will squeeze future Army budgets. However, declining defense budgets do not nullify our obligation to provide enough capacity and maintain a highly ready force that is sufficiently modernized to provide a leaner, adaptive, flexible, and integrated force that offers the President a significant number of options along the spectrum of conflict.

Today, the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led combat-tested force in the world. Today's soldiers have achieved a level of professionalism, com-

bat experience, and civil and military expertise that is an invaluable national asset. Our warriors have accomplished every assigned task they have been given. But all we have accomplished in building this magnificent force can be squandered if we are not careful. We are an Army in transition, and we look to the Congress to assist us in the difficult work to build the Army of 2020.

AMERICA'S ARMY—THE NATION'S FORCE OF DECISIVE ACTION

Every day, America's Army is making a positive difference in the world during one of the most challenging times in our history. Although stressed and stretched, the United States Army remains the most agile, adaptable, and capable force in the world. Ours is an army that reflects America's diversity and represents the time-honored values that built our Nation:

- hard work;
- duty;
- selflessness;
- determination;
- honor; and
- compassion.

Today, less than one-half of 1 percent of Americans serve in the Army. As members of one of our Nation's oldest and most enduring institutions, these volunteers play an indispensable role in guarding U.S. national interests at home and abroad. Young men and women who want to make a difference in this world want to be part of our Army, which is why even after a decade of conflict, we continue to fill our ranks with the best the Nation has to offer. They have earned the gratitude, trust, and admiration of an appreciative people for their extraordinary accomplishments.

2011—THE ARMY IN TRANSITION

Over the past year, the Army has concluded its mission in Iraq and commenced the drawdown of surge forces in Afghanistan while transferring responsibility to Afghan forces. We are beginning reductions in end-strength to face budgetary realities. We are also undertaking efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment decisions that will shape the Army of 2020—all during a time of war. These transformational efforts are both significant and unprecedented. As the President's new national defense priorities are implemented, the Army will continue its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide.

Operation Enduring Freedom

A decade into the war in Afghanistan, the Army continues to play a leading role in defending our national security interests in this vital theater. At the start of the war, following the attacks on 9/11, elements of Army Special Operations Forces led efforts on the ground to bring al Qaeda members to justice and remove the Taliban from power, thereby denying a safe haven to terrorists. With more than 70,000 soldiers in Afghanistan at peak strength in 2011, the Army's brigade combat teams conducted operations ranging from stability to counterinsurgency.

Today, more than 63,000 Army soldiers in both general purpose and special operations units continue to conduct a wide range of missions across Afghanistan country to help Afghan citizens lay the foundation for lasting security. Simultaneously, the Army provided essential logistics capabilities to sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In fact, only America's Army could provide the necessary theater logistics, transportation, medical, and communications infrastructure capable of supporting joint and combined forces for an operation of this size and complexity.

Since the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan, soldiers have earned 5,437 valor awards, including 241 Silver Stars and 8 Distinguished Service Crosses. Four soldiers have been awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroic actions:

- SFC Jared C. Monti;
- SSG Salvatore A. Giunta;
- SSG Robert J. Miller; and
- SSG Leroy A. Petry.

They exemplify the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of all the men and women who have served in this conflict.

Operation New Dawn

In December 2011, the Army concluded more than 8 years of combat and stability operations in Iraq. Initially, powerful and agile forces liberated Iraq and then adapted to the new demand of suppressing the postinvasion insurgencies. Indeed, when the Nation needed a sustained effort to achieve its strategic objectives, the Army answered the call, adjusting its deployment tours from 12 to 15 months to enable

a decisive surge in forces. Army units trained and equipped Iraq security forces, and when the mission changed, the Army executed the extremely difficult tasks of redeploying people and retrograding equipment to ensure future readiness.

More than 1 million soldiers and Department of the Army civilians served courageously in Iraq. They were essential to freeing more than 25 million Iraqi people from the tyranny of a brutal dictator, putting Iraq's future in the hands of its people, and removing a national security threat to the United States.

Success came at a great cost in blood and treasure. But even during the most dire times, our soldiers never wavered. Their heroic actions earned 8,238 awards for valor, including 408 Silver Stars and 16 Distinguished Service Crosses. Two Medals of Honor were awarded posthumously to SFC Paul R. Smith and PFC Ross A. McGinnis.

Other Global Commitments

In addition to the Army's unprecedented contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have continued to conduct operations across the globe to prevent conflict, shape the environment, and win decisively. Nearly 20,000 soldiers remain stationed on the Korean peninsula, providing a credible deterrent and investing in our partnership with the Republic of Korea army. Simultaneously, Army special operations soldiers in the Pacific region continue to provide advice and support to the Philippine Armed Forces, enhancing our robust alliance. Both are examples of strategic investments in a region that is home to 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. (In fact, in most countries around the world, the army is the dominant defense force.) And United States soldiers continue to serve in places such as the Sinai, Guantánamo Bay, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Horn of Africa, developing and maintaining relationships on 6 of the world's 7 continents.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Over the past year, the Army has continued to provide instrumental support to civil authorities. The Army's Reserve component proved to be one of our great strengths for these missions, giving the force depth and flexibility. The National Guard provides a distinctive capability for the Nation. When floods, wildfires, and tornados struck from the Midwest to the South over the span of a few days in the spring of 2011, more than 900 National Guard soldiers supplied a coordinated response to address citizens' needs across the affected region. Similarly, when Hurricane Irene knocked out power and flooded towns across the Northeast in the summer of 2011, nearly 10,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen across 13 States delivered critical services to sustain the region through the crisis.

In addition to ongoing counterdrug operations, approximately 1,200 National Guard soldiers and airmen supported the Department of Homeland Security in four States along the Southwest border by providing entry identification and analysis to disrupt criminal networks and activities.

Army Special Operations Forces

To conduct unified land operations, the U.S. Army fields a suite of special operations capabilities that range from the world's finest precision strike and special warfare forces to the world's most lethal combined arms maneuver formations. The Army draws from across its broad set of capabilities to provide the joint commander the blend of Army assets required to ensure mission accomplishment. True in Afghanistan today, Army Special Operations Forces are also providing assistance in the Philippines, Yemen, the Arabian gulf, Lebanon, Colombia, the African Trans-Sahel, and across the Caribbean and Central America. As Army regular forces become available, they will increasingly integrate with Army Special Operations Forces to promote trust and interoperability with allies and build partner nation capacity where mutual interests are at risk from internal or external enemies.

FISCAL ENVIRONMENT

Challenges of Reduced Budget

Today's global fiscal environment is driving defense budgets down for our partners and allies, as well as our Nation. Historically, defense spending has been cyclic with significant reductions following the end of major conflicts. The Army understands it cannot be immune to these fiscal realities and must be part of the solution. Our focus areas for the fiscal year 2013 budget demonstrate our concerted effort to establish clear priorities that give the Nation a ready and capable Army while being good stewards of all our resources.

Challenges of Continuing Resolutions

Timely and predictable funding enables the Army to plan, resource, and manage the programs that produce a trained and ready force. The Army very much appreciates that the Congress approved the fiscal year 2012 budget earlier than had been the case in recent years when we were forced to operate for long stretches under continuing resolutions. Long-term continuing resolutions force the Army to slow its spending, freeze production rates, and delay the start of new programs. Such delays pose a risk to the Army's operational readiness and investment strategy. We stand ready to help the Congress once again pass defense bills in a timely manner.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A series of powerful global trends continue to shape the current and future strategic environment:

- increased demand for dwindling resources;
- persistent regional conflict;
- empowered non-state actors;
- the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
- failed states.

We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular and irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality. We also face cyber-threats to an increasingly critical and vulnerable information technology infrastructure and the destabilizing effect of global economic downturns. Together, these trends create a complex and unpredictable environment in all of the Army's operational domains:

- land;
- sea;
- air;
- space; and
- cyberspace.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA'S ARMY

Role of the Army: Prevent, Shape, Win

In the uncertain environment our country faces, the Army remains central to our Nation's defense as part of the joint force. No major conflict has been won without boots on the ground. Listed below are the three essential roles the Army must play.

First, our Army must prevent conflict just as we did during the cold war. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced that conflict with your force would be imprudent. The Army's ability to win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a joint force must never be open to challenge. It must be clear that we will fight and win, which requires a force with sufficient capacity, readiness, and modernization. That means quality soldiers; agile, adaptive leaders; versatile units; realistic training; and modern equipment. Prevention is achieved through credible readiness, sometimes requiring decisive action. Our Army must continue to be a credible force around the globe to prevent miscalculations by those who would test us.

Second, our Army must help shape the international environment to enable our combatant commanders to assure our friends and contain our enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners, fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts, and helping them build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a reliable, consistent, and respectful partner to others.

Finally, the Army must be ready to win decisively and dominantly. Nothing else approaches what is achieved by winning, and the consequences of losing at war are usually catastrophic. With so much at stake, the American people will expect what they have always expected of us—decisive victory. The Army must never enter into a terrible endeavor such as war unprepared. Although we may still win, it will be more expensive, cost more lives, and require more time.

In addition to being trained, sized, and equipped to win decisively in the more traditional operational domains, the Army also will require robust capability in cyberspace. As the past decade of conflict has demonstrated, the information environment has changed the way we fight. Military and cyberspace operations have converged, and protecting information in cyberspace is more essential than ever to how our Army fights. The advantage will go to those able to maintain the freedom to operate and able to gain, protect, and exploit information in the contested cyberspace domain. The Army must be dominant in both the land and cyberspace domains.

Smaller But Reversible

As our new national defense priorities drive us to a smaller Army, we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast or risk losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder to expand again when needed. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly expand to meet large unexpected contingencies, and four components are key to that ability. First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new formations when needed. Second, we will make significant investments in Army Special Operations Forces to increase their capabilities and provide the President with more options. Third, it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve forces. The Army's Reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around the world. From Kosovo, the Sinai and Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and Iraq, homeland defense along America's Southwest border, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad, the ARNG and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensable parts of our operational force and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth and versatility to meet the complex demands of the future. The fourth critical component of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and development and to design, produce, and maintain our weapons systems, components, and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a large demand. Reversibility is the sine qua non to ensuring that the Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls.

THE ARMY'S FOCUS AREAS

Support to Operations in Afghanistan

Our immediate focus remains on providing the best-trained and most-ready land forces in the world to win the current fight while maintaining responsiveness for unforeseen contingencies. The support of the American people is paramount to our success. We must fulfill our responsibilities to them without draining their goodwill and treasure.

Despite continued challenges and tough conditions, our forces are making measureable progress against an adaptive enemy. Army security force assistance teams continue to train both Afghan National Army Forces (now almost 180,000 strong) and Afghan national police forces (made up of nearly 144,000 men and women in uniform). The increased capability of Afghan security forces is allowing security of the region to be turned back over to the Government of Afghanistan district by district. During the coming year we must continue to provide trained and ready forces equipped to support operations. We remain focused on doing everything we can to ensure that we meet our national objectives and provide what our brave men and women in the field need to succeed.

In Afghanistan, the commitment and performance of our soldiers and civilians continues to be nothing short of extraordinary. Not only have they taken the fight to our enemies, but they have proven equally effective as emissaries. Our investment in leader development prepared them to operate in this demanding environment.

In the coming year we will continue to increase the Afghan lead of security responsibilities, target key insurgent leaders, retain and expand secure areas, and help Afghan National Security Forces earn the support of the people through improved security capacity and capability. Because of its geography, distance, infrastructure, and harsh environment, the difficulty and complexity of the drawdown in Afghanistan will exceed that in Iraq. The United States Army is the only organization in the world with the capability to plan and execute a logistical operation this complex and difficult.

The Army places great emphasis on properly maintaining its equipment to restore readiness to the force and ensure it is prepared to meet combatant commander requirements. The Army reset program reverses the effects of combat stress and restores equipment to a high level of combat capability to conduct future operations. Reset is a lengthy process, and even after the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, the Army will require funding for 2 to 3 years to reset our equipment from the harsh demands of war.

RESPONSIBLE STEWARDSHIP

Institutional Army Transformation

The drive to reform the Institutional Army is about doing things better, smarter, and faster while taking advantage of available technology, knowledge, and experience. Our Institutional Army—the part of the Army that trains, educates, and sup-

ports Army forces worldwide—will become more flexible by improving our ability to quickly adapt to changing environments, missions, and priorities. The Institutional Army is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by the current and future operational environments. It performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while seeking to adapt institutional business processes.

Further, the Army is working to provide “readiness at best value” to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and global economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army’s institutional management processes and develop an integrated management system has never been more urgent. To enhance organizational adaptive capacity while shepherding our resources, the Army initiated a number of efforts, such as the Army financial improvement plan, which will enable the Army to achieve full auditability by fiscal year 2017.

Acquisition Reform

As a result of uncertain funding, insufficient contract oversight and an ineffective requirement determination process, the Army has initiated a significant reform of the way we develop and acquire our products and weapons. As part of this initiative, we have taken steps toward improvement through a series of capability portfolio reviews. These platforms serve to revalidate, modify, or terminate programs based on the Army’s need and the affordability of the program. We have also started to fix an inefficient procurement system that too often wastes precious resources and fails to provide needed systems in a timely manner. For example, the Army commissioned a comprehensive review of our acquisition system that, based on the findings and recommendations, produced a blueprint for acquisition reform. These changes fall into four broad areas:

- realignment of acquisition requirements combined with a sharper focus on the needed competencies of acquisition professionals;
- expansion of stakeholder (acquisition professional and soldier end-user) participation in developing requirements, planning, and acquisition solicitation;
- reappraisal and streamlining of acquisition strategies and the attendant risk in such streamlining; and
- improvement in the selection, development, and accountability of the people involved in the acquisition process.

We are implementing these recommendations as part of our broader effort to reform the Institutional Army.

Army Energy Security

Supplying energy to our Army around the world is increasingly challenging, expensive, and dangerous. The Army must consider energy in all activities to reduce demand, increase efficiency, obtain alternative sources, and create a culture of energy accountability. Energy security is an imperative that can be described in two categories—operational and garrison.

Operational energy is the energy and associated systems, information and processes required to train, move, and sustain forces, and systems for military operations. The Army is developing new doctrine, policies, plans, and technologies that will improve the management and use of operational energy to better support soldiers’ needs. Less energy-efficient systems in an operational environment require more fuel, increasing the number of fuel convoys and thus risking more lives and limiting our flexibility.

Garrison energy is the energy required to power Army bases and conduct soldier training. Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and mission capabilities. The impact of increasing energy prices is a decrease in the quantity and quality of training the Army can conduct.

Initiatives such as cool roofs, solar power, stormwater management, and water efficiency are positive steps toward addressing the challenges of energy security in the operational and garrison environments. Innovative and adaptive leaders, seeking ways to increase energy efficiency and implement renewable and alternate sources of energy, are key to saving lives and increasing the Army’s flexibility by reducing costs.

A LEANER ARMY

The Army is committed to providing combatant commanders with the capabilities, capacity, and diversity needed to be successful across a wide range of operations. With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and also remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements. We will reduce in a manner that preserves our

readiness and avoids any hollowing of the force. To satisfy this enduring requirement, we have three rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted:

- end strength/force structure;
- readiness; and
- modernization.

We will balance these three foundational imperatives throughout the next several years to provide combatant commanders trained and ready forces in support of Joint Force 2020.

Force Structure and Force Design

The Army will maintain a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to continue providing a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of military operations. This will give combatant commanders a hedge against unexpected contingencies and enable a sustainable tempo for our All-Volunteer Force. Over the next 5 years, the Army will decrease its end-strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 ARNG, and 206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers as directed. Reducing our end-strength over a deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the Army to take care of soldiers, families, and civilians; to continue meeting our commitments in Afghanistan; and to facilitate reversibility in an uncertain strategic environment.

An unpredictable and dynamic global security environment requires the Army, as a force in transition, to adjust and reduce its size while remaining flexible, capable, and ready to meet the Nation's requirements and maintaining an ability to reverse course to readily expand if necessary. In accordance with the new defense priorities, the Army of 2020 must have a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment that is lethal, agile, adaptable, and responsive. As the Army transitions from the current force to a leaner force, it will do so while remaining engaged in the current conflicts. The Army will prioritize force structure and committed assets in the Pacific region and the Middle East, and will shape the future force to support the Army's requirements as part of the joint force to fulfill the Nation's strategic and operational commitments. The Army will optimize force structure to maintain reversibility, and achieve maximum operational strategic flexibility. Today we plan on reducing at least eight Active component brigade combat teams (BCT); however, we continue to assess the design and mix of these modular formations based upon the lessons from the last 10 years of combat. This analysis may lead to a decision to reorganize BCTs into more capable and robust formations, requiring further BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and agility for tomorrow's security challenges.

As the Army's Active component reduces in size, the composition of combat support and combat service support enablers in the Active and Reserve components will be adjusted to give the Army the ability to conduct sustained operations and to mitigate risk. The Army will continue to rely on the Reserve components to provide key enablers and operational depth. An operational Reserve comprised of a discrete set of capabilities with an enhanced level of readiness will be essential. This force will consist of three elements:

- select combat formations prepared to respond to crisis;
- combat support and combat service support enablers employed early in support of operational plans; and
- forces aligned to support steady-state combatant commander requirements.

Ensured access to the Reserve component is essential to providing the operational depth and flexibility combatant commanders require. During the transition, we must manage our people carefully to neither compromise readiness nor break faith with those who have served the Nation so well.

Readiness

Army unit readiness is measured by the level of its manning, training, and equipping. The current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model has served us well in meeting the requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan; however, we will adapt it to ensure we meet future combatant commander requirements in the uncertain, complex strategic environment. We envision a progressive readiness model for most Active and Reserve component early deploying units which will align forces for combatant commanders. Because of their unique capabilities, our low-density, high-demand units do not lend themselves to a rotational pool like ARFORGEN. These units must be sustained in a constant readiness model.

The Strength of Our Army is Our Soldiers

Soldiers and families form the foundation of unit readiness. People are the Army, and our enduring priority is to preserve the high-quality, All-Volunteer Force—the

essential element of our strength. The Army has gained the trust of the American public more than at any other time in recent history while developing a force that is very different from what it was a few short years ago. Our Army must maintain the public's trust while our Nation fulfills its responsibilities toward soldiers and their families. The United States Army is unique from other professions because our core attributes are derived from American values, the Constitution, and law. Today's Army is building on a successful foundation with the trust, respect, and support of the American people. This foundation, and our enduring commitment to strengthening our Army profession, will improve our force as it adapts to meet the Nation's evolving needs.

The Army is the Nation's pre-eminent leadership experience. The All-Volunteer Force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth, versatility, and unmatched experience to the joint force. We must continue to train, develop, and retain adaptive leaders and maintain this combat-seasoned, All-Volunteer Force of professionals. We will continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and complex future environments. Our leader development model is an adaptive, continuous, and progressive process grounded in Army values. We grow soldiers and Army civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. We must give our leaders broadening opportunities to better prepare them for the myriad challenges they will encounter. In addition, we must reinvigorate unit training, training management skills, and leader development to build versatile units. By providing our leaders with the professional challenges they expect, we will retain them and nurture their adaptive spirit.

Our challenge in the coming years is not just about attracting and selecting the best available candidates to be Army professionals. We must also engage and develop our quality, combat-experienced leaders so that we keep them, and they, in turn, train the next generation of Army professionals. During the last decade of war, we have given our young leaders unprecedented flexibility and authority to operate effectively on the battlefield. We will prepare for tomorrow by building on that investment and ensuring that opportunities for creativity, leadership, and advancement exist throughout the Army.

We must draw down wisely to avoid stifling the health of the force or breaking faith with our soldiers, civilians, and families. Excessive cuts would create high risk in our ability to sustain readiness. We must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too much or too fast and risk losing the leadership, technical skills, and combat experience that cannot be easily reclaimed. We must identify and safeguard key programs in education, leader development, healthcare, quality of life, and retirement—programs critical to retaining our soldiers.

The Strength of Our Soldiers is Our Families

In order to ensure a relevant and ready All-Volunteer Force, the Army will continue to invest heavily in our soldier and family programs. The Army Family Covenant expresses the Army's commitment to care for soldiers and their families by providing a strong, supportive environment that enhances their strength and resilience and helps them to thrive. The Covenant focuses on programs, services, and initiatives essential to preserving an All-Volunteer Force and institutionalizes the Army's commitment to provide soldiers and their families a quality-of-life commensurate with their service to the Nation. Through the Covenant, the Army is improving the delivery of soldier and family programs and services, sustaining accessibility to quality healthcare, and promoting education and employment opportunities for family members. We are sustaining high-quality housing; ensuring excellence in school support, youth services, and child care; and maintaining quality recreation services for soldiers and family members as they serve on the Nation's behalf around the world. We will not walk away from our commitment to our families; however, a different fiscal reality requires us to review our investments and eliminate redundant and poor-performing programs while sustaining those that are high-performing and most beneficial to our families.

Honoring Service

We must fulfill our moral obligation to the health, welfare, and care of our soldiers, civilians, and families. The effects of more than 10 years of war and inadequate dwell-time at home has resulted in a cumulative stress on soldiers, families, and communities that has significant implications for the Army and our Nation. We have implemented an unprecedented number of personnel-focused programs, including comprehensive soldier fitness; wounded warrior program; and health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention, to ensure the continued care, support, and services that sustain the high quality of our force.

Sexual harassment and sexual assault are inconsistent with the Army's values and our profession. It is imperative that we foster a climate where such misconduct is not tolerated and the dignity of our soldiers, civilians, and family members is respected and protected. Army leaders are focused on the urgency of this issue and the level of commitment required to affect cultural change and combat this crime. We are aggressively implementing and expanding the Army's comprehensive Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program. The SHARP program is aimed at command prevention efforts at all levels, educating all members of our Army family, training our first responder professionals, and supporting victims while reducing the stigma of reporting. One incident of this type of unwarranted and abusive behavior is one too many. The Army is committed to ensuring leadership at all levels is engaged in preventing sexual assault and harassment and appropriately holding offenders accountable.

The Army continues to invest heavily in better understanding traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress, the invisible signature wounds of our recent wars. We have developed and implemented new prevention and treatment protocols, and we are in the third year of our 5-year partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health to identify the factors that help protect a soldier's mental health and those that put it at risk.

We have also started to reduce the length of deployments to 9 months for many of our units at the division level and below, which we believe will alleviate significant pressure on our soldiers and their families. We are doubling our efforts to ensure that each of our more than 18,000 soldiers currently enrolled in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) is carefully examined to determine whether he or she should return to civilian life or continue military service. A recent initiative between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs, the IDES integrates formerly separate programs resulting in a streamlined, more efficient process for servicemembers, which will reduce the backlog of soldiers awaiting benefits.

As we draw down the Army, we must honor our veterans with the very best support, care, and services they deserve as they make the transition from military service to civilian life. We are committed to our soldiers and their families, who are the strength of the Army. At the same time, the Army is focused on wisely managing our resources in the healthcare arena. The Army supports DOD proposals to further reduce the rate of growth in healthcare costs—proposals that are aligned with our priorities. TRICARE is a superb health benefit, one of the best in the country and appropriately so. Just as in all areas of the Defense budget, we need to make decisions that preserve a strong benefit yet reflect the fiscal realities of the times. The proposals take care to exempt populations who have made the greatest sacrifices—those who are medically retired and those families who have lost their loved one while serving on Active Duty. The changes proposed are also adjusted to reflect lower adjustments for those retirees with lower retirement pay. And, most importantly, the Department continues to provide resources that improve the overall health system for our soldiers and their families.

The Army is using the health promotion and risk reduction fiscal year 2011 Campaign Plan to holistically promote health and reduce risk. The Campaign Plan incorporates findings and recommendations from DOD and Army reports regarding health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention. Health promotion and risk reduction activities are essential to sustain the force under the current operational tempo and reset our Army.

Modernization

The Army has global responsibilities requiring large technological advantages to prevail decisively in combat. Just as pilots and sailors seek supremacy in the air and on the seas, soldiers must dominate their enemies on land. Modernizing, especially as end-strength is reduced, is the key to ensuring that our dominance continues.

The Army is setting priorities and making prudent choices to provide the best possible force for the Nation within the resources available. We are developing and fielding a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to enable us to succeed in the full range of missions and maintain a decisive advantage over our enemies. To meet the challenges of an evolving strategic and fiscal environment, our strategy is based on three tenets:

- integrated capability portfolios;
- incremental modernization; and
- leveraging the ARFORGEN cycle;
- integrated capability portfolios (align stakeholders to identify capability gaps and eliminate unnecessary redundancies);

- incremental modernization (enables us to deliver new and improved capabilities by leveraging mature technologies, shortening development times, planning growth potential, and acquiring in quantities that give us the greatest advantage while hedging against uncertainty); and
- ARFORGEN (processes synchronize the distribution of equipment to units providing increased readiness over time and delivering a steady and predictable supply of trained and ready modular forces. The Army has consolidated its materiel management process under a single command and designated U.S. Army Materiel Command as the Army's Lead Materiel Integrator. Additionally, we consolidated all of our materiel data into a single authoritative repository called the Logistics Information Warehouse).

These emerging systems and processes represent a powerful new approach for implementing the Army's equipping priorities, policies, and programs to the meet new security demands of the 21st century. The equipment requested in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget strikes a balance between current and future needs, provides the basis for an affordable equipping strategy over time, and takes into account Army requirements and priorities. In developing this request, the Army made difficult decisions to shift funds previously programmed for future capabilities to current needs. The decisions came at the expense of promising and needed technologies with capabilities that did not fit within resource limitations. The Army's top four modernization priorities are the Network, ground combat vehicle (GCV), joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), and soldier systems.

Network

Also known as LandWarNet, the network remains the Army's top investment priority. With expectations of tighter budgets and a still very active threat environment, the Army will have to produce a force that is smaller yet more capable. The Network is the core of that smaller, capable Army.

The Army is conducting a series of semiannual field exercises known as the Network Integration Evaluation to evaluate, integrate, and mature the Army's tactical network. The exercises will assess network and non-network capabilities to determine implications across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. The process aligns several key Army network programs and advances the fusion of radio waveforms to form an integrated network baseline to which industry can build.

The foundation of the modernized network is a joint, secure, and common architecture that will provide information from the cloud to enable leaders, units, and the Institutional Army to function more effectively. The Army will extend this critical capability to its installations around the world. This capability will increase force effectiveness, facilitate transition for units, and individuals from one phase of the ARFORGEN cycle to another and greatly improve network security.

The major programs that form the backbone of the tactical network are:

- the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, which provides a real-time common operating picture down to the company level by extending satellite and line-of-sight communications, including telephone, data, and video;
- the Joint Tactical Radio System, an advanced software-defined family of radios that will carry data and voice for dismounted troops and airborne and maritime platforms;
- the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, which provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, as well as access to the entire Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise, to commanders from the company to Army service component command level;
- the Joint Battle Command Platform, which provides situational awareness data enhancing mission command to Army and Marine Corps tactical operations centers and combat vehicles; and
- Nett Warrior, which gives dismounted leaders integrated situational awareness and information sharing, helping them to avoid fratricide and increase combat effectiveness.

The Army network must be dynamic to give soldiers, civilians, and partners information and services when and where needed. Investment must be steady and wisely applied, while maintaining a strong partnership with industry.

Ground Combat Vehicle

The infantry fighting vehicle is reaching the limit of its capacity to receive technology upgrades proven critical for soldiers in combat operations. GCV is the Army's replacement program for the infantry fighting vehicle and the centerpiece of the Army's overall combat vehicle investment strategy. It will be designed to deliver a full nine-man squad with improved survivability, mobility, and network integration,

considered crucial to our ability to conduct fire and maneuver in close quarters fighting in complex terrain. The vehicle will also provide the growth potential necessary to accommodate advances in protection, networking and space, weight, power, and cooling technologies while reducing sustainment demands. No current vehicle can sufficiently meet all these requirements.

GCV acquisition strategy implements affordability measures designed to ensure the long-term success of the program as the Army faces constrained resources in the future. To develop this acquisition strategy, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a comprehensive review to make sure the program is both achievable and affordable within a 7-year timeframe. The model adopted for the GCV program incentivizes industry to use the best of mature technologies that are both affordable and support the 7-year timeframe. The Army has also paid close attention to risk reduction within the program by requiring industry to identify potential cost schedule and performance tradeoffs; provide cost targets throughout the GCV's lifecycle; and maximize competition to support innovation, cost containment, and schedule requirements.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

As a Joint Service program between the Army and Marine Corps, the JLTV will replace approximately one-third of the Army's oldest unarmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV). The JLTV incorporates the strengths of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that the HMMWV family of vehicles does not provide. The HMMWV was not designed to be used as an armored combat vehicle, but it was often employed as one during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In contrast, the JLTV will be designed for this role from the outset. It will be capable of operating across the range of military operations and physical environments providing improved mobility and protection for soldiers. The JLTV balances protection, payload, performance, and improved fuel efficiency in one affordable and sustainable vehicle. It will also be fully integrated into the Network to enhance the effectiveness of ground forces.

Soldier Systems

The squad is the foundation of the decisive force; it is the cornerstone of all units. To ensure the success of combat operations in the future, the Army will invest in systems that consider the squad as a team rather than a collection of individuals. This approach will guarantee that the squad will not be in a fair fight but will have overmatch. The Army will continue to invest in soldier systems that enable the lethality, protection, situational awareness, and mobility of the individual soldier in his or her squad. These systems include small arms, night vision, soldier sensors, body armor, and individual clothing and equipment.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Army has been, and will continue to be, a critical part of the joint force because land power remains the politically decisive form of warfare and is essential to America's national security strategy. No major conflict has ever been won without "boots on the ground." By being tasked to seize, occupy, and defend land areas, as well as to defeat enemy land forces, the Army is unique because it must not only deploy and defeat an adversary but must be prepared to remain in the region until the Nation's long-term strategic objectives are secured. Indeed, the insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable measure of America's commitment to defend our interests, protect our friends, and defeat our enemies.

With global trends pointing to further instability, our Army remains a key guardian of our national security. In the wake of the cold war, it was said that we had reached the "end of history," and that liberal democracy had won the ideological competition. However, events since then make it clear that potential adversaries with competing ideologies still exist and are extremely dangerous.

As a result, we find ourselves in an increasingly uncertain world, with threats ranging from terrorist and cyberattacks to regional instability to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For our Army that means we will likely have to deal with near peer competitors in niche areas and hybrid threats that mix regular, irregular, and criminal activity—all while still facing the possibility of a conventional force-on-force conflict.

The danger extends from the homeland to the theater where combat operations might occur. Conflict is the norm; a stable peace the exception. In such a world, our adversaries will adapt to gain advantage, especially in the land domain. And it is on land that our challenges will be the most complex because of dynamic human relationships and terrain variables.

While the Army's new end-strength numbers allow it to support current defense priorities, it is imperative that the Army draw down end-strength levels in a smart and responsible manner. We believe that our new end-strength provides us with the flexibility to retain the hard-won expertise it has gained over the last decade. To be sure, the Army has faced similar challenges before. After every major conflict since the Revolutionary War, the Army has faced pressure to decrease its end-strength. As recently as 2001 (pre-9/11), many believed a strategic shift was needed and that the future of modern warfare would be about missile defense, satellites, and high-tech weaponry because no adversary would dare challenge America's conventional forces. But whenever we have rushed to radically diminish the position of the Army, the result has always been the same: an excessive decline in effectiveness at a cost of blood and treasure.

Decreases after World War I directly contributed to failures at Kasserine Pass. Decreases after World War II led to Task Force Smith's failure in Korea. More recently, the end of the cold war demonstrated our Nation's need for agile, adaptable, and decisive ground forces to conduct a wide range of operations. These numerous missions include Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Joint Task Force Andrew in Florida, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. What they have in common is that they were unforeseen, thus emphasizing our need to avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast.

America's leaders face difficult choices as they chart the way ahead for our Nation. Familiar external threats persist and complex new challenges will emerge. Concurrently, fiscal limitations create internal challenges for our leaders. America's Army is prepared to fulfill its role in keeping the Nation secure. The Army will prevent conflict by remaining a credible force with sufficient capacity to dissuade adversaries from challenging American interests. The Army will shape the environment, building positive relationships and capabilities that enable nations to effectively protect and govern their citizenry. Finally, when called, the Army will fight for the Nation and win decisively. We understand these responsibilities and resolve not to reduce the size of the Army in a manner that does not permit us to reverse the process should demand for forces increase dramatically.

As we look ahead, the Army is focusing on three areas. Our first priority remains supporting operations in Afghanistan. We will guard against becoming distracted by the future at the risk of our men and women who remain in harm's way.

Second, we will be the very best stewards we can because America's resources are too precious to waste. Transforming the Institutional Army, reforming our acquisition process and ensuring energy security are essential for us to protect the resources provided by the Congress and the American people.

Third, we will fight to incorporate principles and processes that preserve readiness and capability while reducing the size of the Army. We are adjusting our formations to build the right number of units with the right capability to meet the needs of the Joint Force. The past 10 years have taught us that an operational reserve force is essential to accomplish our missions and expand rapidly when required. We will invest deliberately and wisely in our soldiers, civilians, and families to make sure they are prepared and supported. We will treat those who have served in our ranks with respect and honor. Our wounded soldiers will receive the very best care the Nation can provide, and our soldiers who return to civilian life will be well-prepared to do so.

Future threats will demand enhanced capabilities for our soldiers, so we will modernize our equipment. The Army has identified four programs to highlight. The Network gives sight, sound, and awareness to our soldiers, civilians, and leaders to defeat our adversaries. The GCV and JLTV will incorporate hard-won lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide the mobility and protection our soldiers require. Investments in soldier systems improve our soldiers' ability to move, fight, and survive on the battlefield.

The Army has chosen its focus areas carefully and deliberately because they will enable us to provide what Nation needs. We owe it to America and to the American soldier, the Nation's servant and warrior—the strength of the Nation.

2012 RESERVE COMPONENT ADDENDUM TO THE ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

Sections 517 and 519 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (NDAA) require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot program for Active component support of the Reserves under section 414 of the NDAA of 1992 and 1993. Section 519 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information

relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRRA) of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended section 519 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using section 519 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information that was available September 30, 2011.

Section 517(b)(2)(A)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as Active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	Fiscal year 2010			Fiscal year 2011		
	Active component in Reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²	Active component in Reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²
Major	57 of 67	85.1	92.1	73 of 86	84.9	93.3
Lieutenant Colonel	10 of 12	83.3	88.7	6 of 11	54.5	86.8

¹ Active component officers serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Active component officers not serving in Reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as Active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	Fiscal year 2010			Fiscal year 2011		
	Active component in Reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²	Active component in Reserve component	Percentage ¹	Army average percentage ²
Major	6 of 123	4.9	5.7	3 of 57	5.3	8.7
Lieutenant Colonel	0 of 7		10.7	0 of 10		3.5

¹ Below-the-zone Active component officers serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Below-the-zone Active component officers not serving in Reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 519(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of Active Duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

Army National Guard Officers.—21,425 or 49.2 percent of which 1,429 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.

Army Reserve Officers.—9,888 or 33 percent of which 389 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2 years of Active Duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

Army National Guard Enlisted.—95,375 or 30 percent of which 7,243 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.

Army Reserve Enlisted.—35,796 or 21 percent of which 3,524 were fiscal year 2011 accessions.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from Active Duty before the completion of their Active-Duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their Active-Duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In fiscal year 2011, there was one Service Academy graduate released from Active Duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2011, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to the Army National Guard.

In fiscal year 2011, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA the Secretary of the Army granted one waiver to the Army Reserve. The waiver provided the soldier an opportunity to play a professional sport and complete service obligation.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their Active-Duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their Active-Duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In fiscal year 2011, there were no distinguished ROTC graduates serving the remaining period of their Active-Duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2011, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the ROTC program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRRA by a combination of 2 years of Active Duty and such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In fiscal year 2011, there were no graduates released early from an Active-Duty obligation.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an Active-Duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

There are no longer Active and Reserve component associations affiliated with ARNG vacancy promotion due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or nonconcur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have Active component representation.

In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG recommended 4,286 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 2,318.

In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve recommended 85 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 85.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG had a total of 44 soldiers that received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted based on noncompletion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) ("medical hold" or "medical hold-over" units); and noncompletion of the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) or Senior Leader Course (SLC) due to deployment or training schedule constraints.

In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve had a total of 257 soldiers who received a military education waiver. Of these, 89 were sergeants (SGTs) in need of a waiver for WLC as a result of being deployed or assigned to WTUs (medical hold or medical hold-over units) because of a medical condition incurred in direct support of Contingency Operations while otherwise eligible for promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, 155 waivers for ALC and 13 waivers for SLC were granted to soldiers otherwise eligible for consideration but lacking the prerequisite level of Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) schooling as a direct result of operational deployment conflicts or inability of the Army to schedule the course.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). The National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the USARC maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and nondeployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the ARNG who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not

available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG had 49,454 soldiers considered nondeployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical nonavailability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; nonparticipation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg amendment). NGB maintains the detailed information.

In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve had 34,180 soldiers considered nondeployable for reasons outlined in AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical nonavailability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; nonparticipation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg amendment). USARC maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the ARNG, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

A total of 445 ARNG soldiers, with at least 24-months time in ARNG, were losses in fiscal year 2011 due to lack of minimum required military education. The breakdown is 265 enlisted and 180 officers.

The number of Army Reserve soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2011 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 24 officers and 5 enlisted soldiers. Under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning. Under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for soldiers who have not completed the required initial-entry training within the first 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In fiscal year 2011, there were no waivers granted Secretary of the Army to the ARNG under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9).

In fiscal year 2011, there were 210 waivers granted by the Chief, Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were categorized as Hardship, Medical, or Administrative (i.e. failed height/weight standards, failed to obtain driver license, accepted ROTC scholarship, temporary disqualified, and failed to complete high school).

11. The number of ARNG members, shown for each State, (and the number of Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members:

—the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and

—the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In fiscal year 2011, 256,696 ARNG soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,305 (3.9 percent of the soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In fiscal year 2011, 124,785 Army Reserve soldiers underwent a PHA. There were 14,948 (12 percent of the soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In fiscal year 2011, the ARNG transferred all 14,305 soldiers to a medically nondeployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve transferred 15,826 soldiers to a medically nondeployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

On August 23, 2010, Department of the Army implemented medical readiness categories (MRC) per AR 40-501 which replaced fully medically ready (FMR) as the metric for measuring individual medical readiness (IMR) in the Army. This new way of measuring medical readiness by classifying soldiers into MRC reduced the number of soldiers considered medically not ready in the ARNG in fiscal year 2011. Soldiers previously listed as not “fully medically ready” because they didn’t have current immunizations, medical warning tags, DNA, and a current HIV test on file are now considered “medically ready” and identified as MRC 2 (which is correctable within 72 hours). The data is generated from MEDPROS, the medical readiness database of record for the Army.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the ARNG shown for each State, older than the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

15. The number of units of the ARNG that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), division A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated postmobilization training time for each ARNG combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for ARNG combat units (and Army Reserve units) in a postmobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

The January 19, 2007 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,” limited Reserve component unit mobilizations to 400-day periods, including 30-days postmobilization leave, and 5 days out-processing. The most significant impact of this policy change to the ARNG is the inclusion of postmobilization training time during the 400-day mobilization period.

Timely alert for mobilizations—at least 1 year prior—is crucial to the ARNG’s mission success. Under the ARFORGEN model, many training tasks previously conducted during the postmobilization phase now occur in local training areas before mobilization. First Army (1A), in the continental United States (CONUS), manages and directs postmobilization training for Reserve component conventional forces. 1A, in theater, conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units waiting to deploy.

ARNG training and Army Reserve training complies with the ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multiyear cycles and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and available). Training progresses through these force pools with the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrating to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the ready year.

All ARNG units are “Combat Units.” Forces Command Pre-Deployment Training, in support of combatant commands’ guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:

—Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB);

—CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel off a COB/FOB for short durations;

—CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB; and

—CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an area of operations (such as brigade combat teams).

The premobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A unit's postmobilization training time depends on the number of the premobilization tasks completed during premobilization. Army goals for postmobilization training for Reserve component headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of the unit (NOTE: This time does not include administrative and travel days). Any premobilization tasks not completed during the premobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization station. ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station with a premobilization task completion rate of 90–95 percent. Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station 100-percent complete.

Postmobilization training conducted by First Army (1A) typically consists of:

- theater orientation;
- rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training;
- counterinsurgency operations;
- counter-improvised-explosive-device training;
- convoy live-fire exercises; and
- completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the premobilization period.

Postmobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50–65 days training at mobilization station. This training supports a Combat Training Center culminating training event during postmobilization that a CAT 4 unit is required to perform in order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center; 30-day training exercises).

Below is an outline depicting postmobilization training day goals for various units.

FIRST ARMY-APPROVED POSTMOBILIZATION TRAINING PLANS

	Postmobilization training days		
	Current	Goal	Delta
V/H/S Brigade Combat Team	63	45	+ 18
Combat Aviation Brigade	33	60	– 27
Military Police (Internment/resettlement)	27	40	– 13
Engineer Battalion (Route clearance)	37	40	– 3
Military Police Company	30	40	– 10
Quartermaster Company	23	15	+ 8
Engineer Company (Construction)	29	40	– 11
Transportation Company (Heavy equipment transportation)	37	40	– 3

The Army Reserve (AR) Command in conjunction with 1A, Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) are in the process of transitioning the business rules for pre- and postmobilization training for Army Reserve formations deploying in support of overseas contingency operations (OCO). This is motivated in order to meet the intent behind FRAGO 4 to HQDA EXORD 150–08 (RC Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) Pre and Postmobilization Training Strategy), the January 19, 2007 SECDEF Memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force” and the August 4, 2011 Secretary of the Army Memorandum, “Army Deployment Period Policy.”

Both the current and projected models are listed below, but both exclude all individual skills training, to include PME, MOSQ and functional training. The bulk of individual skills training will remain a premobilization requirement and would consist of 24 days of Inactive Duty Training, 15–29 days of Annual Training for Collective Training, and, under the current model, 21 additional days of Active Duty Training individual training (Army Warrior Tasks (AWTs), Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT)). Under the projected model, the 21 additional days would be eliminated. Some formations, under the current model, used up to 74 days premobilization to obtain a T2 rating prior to mobilization and up to 60 days postmobilization to achieve a T1 rating. Below is an average of current pre- and postmobilization training models which will expire September 30, 2012. To reduce the demand on soldiers in a premobilization status, 1A will assume the training responsibility for many of the AWTs and TSRT on October 1, 2012. AR units will mobilize at no less than a T3 rating. The shift

in training strategy is for DEF units only and will increase current postmobilization days by a projected 10 days.

Category ¹	Average premobilization	Average postmobilization training	Average total postmobilization
Current model:			
1	65 days	17 days	30 days
2	60 days	22 days	34 days
3	56 days	33 days	46 days
Projected model:			
1	39-45	27 days	40 days ²
2	39-45	32 days	44 days ²
3	39-45	43 days	56 days ²

¹No CAT 4 formations in the AR.

²Some formations may require up to 70 days post-MOB to achieve T1 and satisfy COCOM requirements.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of ARNG (and the Army Reserve).

During fiscal year 2011, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped brigade combat teams (BCTs) the ARNG is continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire Trainer-Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the geographical dispersion of units, ARNG has developed the M-COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps. ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-Fidelity Trainers and is fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the M2A2 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations and meet unstabilized gunnery requirements, ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of software databases, provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. In addition, ARNG has added an Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual and crew drills for .50 caliber and MK19 unstabilized gunnery tasks listed in the HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 140 IGT systems have been fielded to ARNG units.

ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both the unit and institutional levels.

ARNG has just completed the Army Training Support Command directed upgrades to the Call For Fire Trainer II (CFFT II). The CFFT II trains Artillery Soldiers and observers of indirect fires on critical skills prior to live fire requirements.

To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training device. ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is completed. EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. The Army is currently rewriting the strategy for the EST 2000 to include ARNG initiative of the mobile EST to accommodate the geographical troop dispersion of ARNG. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assess basic and advanced skills. ARNG has more than 900 systems fielded down to the company level. LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the soldier's weapon without live ammunition.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or nonpyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature effects. ARNG is currently fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of which, 194 are nonpyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG training sites across 39 States and territories. They have received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life-cycle sustainment as of third-quarter fiscal year 2012. ARNG-TRS is continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based on the recently completed (first quarter, 2012) TADSS Mission Essential Requirements (MER) review. The latest IEDES innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to support less than company size training scenarios.

ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp Dodge, Iowa; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a regional Distributed Mission Support Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during premobilization training.

In order to provide the critical culminating training event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission-focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool defined as Certified Company Proficiency with demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

The Army Reserve continues to develop its ability to integrate live, virtual, constructive and gaming training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS) programs with the Army Reserve Training Strategy in order to meet established aim points in our ARFORGEN training model. TADSS play an essential role in our collective training exercises on our installations which help support our transition from a strategic to an operational Army Reserve and meet our ARFORGEN aim point of providing units at T2 readiness in the available year. Just as critical, TADSS also support our individual soldier training at home station, local training areas, and institutions. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve continues to improve unit training proficiency and ensures we meet our requirement to provide the combatant commanders with trained units and proficient battle staffs.

The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army Reserve's major collective training exercises conducted on Army Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and constructive environments to train senior battle staffs while lower echelon units conduct company and platoon lanes. The Army Reserve has made sizable investments in improving the facility infrastructure at Fort Hunter Liggett and Fort McCoy to support the use of TADSS in these and future exercises. The 75th Mission Command Training Division is utilizing the Entity-level Resolution Federation to provide a high-resolution (e.g., individual soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training simulation.

The Army Reserve also utilizes TADSS to assist individual soldiers in maintaining their technical and tactical proficiency. These TADSS assist soldiers in training on individual pieces of equipment and in sharpening their battlefield skills.

Low-density simulators continue to be employed to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for transportation terminal units.

Use of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) and Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST 2000) remain essential elements of the Army Reserve marksmanship training strategy. During fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve fielded more than 529 LMTS to 396 Army Reserve facilities to support home station basic marksmanship training for individual and crew served weapons. The system allows the soldier to use their assigned weapon, as well as crew served weapons, in a simulation/training mode. In fiscal year 2011, the Army Reserve also fielded the EST 2000 to 21 Army Reserve facilities. The EST 2000 provides initial and sustainment marksmanship training, static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The States do not capture this data. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Army.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Army.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of ARNG (and Army Reserve) by Inspectors General or other commissioned officers of the regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During fiscal year 2011, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the regular Army conducted 1,219 inspections of the ARNG. Regular Army officers assigned to the respective States and territories as Inspectors General executed the bulk of these inspections (959). Of the remaining 126 inspections, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and other external inspection agencies conducted 104. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two assessments within the last 12 months. The first was entitled Property Accountability within the Army Reserve (Directed by the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)) on January 25, 2011 and final report approved on August 11, 2011). The second assessment entitled Special Assessment of Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve was directed by the CAR on August 11, 2011 and is ongoing (expected final report approval in March 2012). The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted both assessments. The Army Reserve Inspection General assessed 30 units for Property Accountability. As of December 13, 2011, 33 units have been assessed as part of the Personnel Transitions Assessment. The overall goal of both assessments was not to evaluate the unit's deployability status. However, out of the total 66 units assessed nothing was found that would cause a unit to be listed as nondeployable. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the Active-Duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by state, for each such ARNG unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by:

- the assessment of the commander of that associated Active-Duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and
- the results of the validation by the commander of that associated Active-Duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with Active Duty Forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

While the methods employed by the Army to manage the Active component (AC) support to Reserve component (RC) readiness have changed during the last 10 years of persistent conflict, we have met the intent of the Congress as outlined in title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended. Every RC unit that deployed during fiscal year 2011 was properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet combatant commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment overseas and CONUS by supporting processes associated with the ARFORGEN process.

The Army began its transformation from large, fixed organizations (divisions and corps) to a modular, brigade-centric organization in 2004. At the same time, and while engaged in persistent conflict, it began transforming the way it executes the training and readiness of modular units—both AC and RC—to meet CCDR requirements. As such, modular force transformation and the implementation of the ARFORGEN process precludes a response in the format directed by title 10, U.S.C. 10542.

The formal training relationships previously established by the AC/RC Association Program outlined in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-4, “Active Component/Reserve Component Partnerships,” were modified as the requirements of ongoing OCO kept AC units in frequent deployments and RC units in frequent mobilization. The deployment tempo problem was solved within the Army’s Training Support XXI program by using designated, fully functional, AC-led multicomponent organizations to provide the necessary contact with mobilizing RC units. Since FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 no longer reflected the way the AC partnered with RC units, FORSCOM discontinued its use on July 21, 2010. The legislated roles and responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of associated AC units listed in appendices B and C of that regulation are now executed by the commanders of 1A (FORSCOM’s executive agent for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and mobilization of conventional RC units in the continental United States); the 196th Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific’s executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the Pacific Command’s area of responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the European Command’s area of responsibility.

In 2011, the Army published Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, ARFORGEN, which institutes the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR and other Army requirements. This regulation was a collaborative effort between FORSCOM, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the ARNG, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command to meet the progressive readiness demands of an Army engaged in persistent conflict. Within ARFORGEN, all rotational Active Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve units cycle through three ARFORGEN force pools—Reset, Train/Ready, and Available—and are designated either for deployment to a validated CCDR operational requirement as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or for the execution of a contingency mission, operational plan, or other validated Army requirement as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF).

For the RC, this pertains to all modular division headquarters, brigade combat teams, multifunctional and functional support brigades (headquarters only), as well as modular units at the battalion to detachment level that comprise the critical enablers for operational missions. Assessments of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the ANGCRRRA of 1992) are executed and maintained by 1A, the 196th Infantry Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC unit progresses through the ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.

Fiscal year 2011 also found the Army at an inflection point in which strategic conditions have signaled a future change in demand across the range of military operations (DEF to CEF). RC will figure prominently in the Army’s response to these changes. ARFORGEN is the process that will produce trained and ready RC units that are organized, manned, trained, and equipped, as integral members of the total force, compatible with their AC counterparts, to provide pre-

dictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities for the Nation's security requirements. The Army does not foresee a return to the legacy construct of associated units.

21. A specification of the Active-Duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown by State for the ARNG (and for the U.S. Army Reserve); by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned; and by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

	Title XI (fiscal year 2011) authorizations				Title XI (fiscal year 2011) assigned			
	Officers	Enlisted	Warrant officers	Total	Officers	Enlisted	Warrant officers	Total
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215	12	18		30
TRADOC	50	3		53	36	3		39
FORSCOM	1,033	2,165	101	3,299	696	1,925	102	2,723
USARPAC	30	49	1	80	30	41	9	80
Total	1,210	2,327	110	3,647	774	1,987	111	2,872

As of September 30, 2011, the Army had 2,872 Active component soldiers assigned to title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of title XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by state—the previous table above provides the best representation of how title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your very generous remarks. May I now call upon General Odierno?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, CHIEF OF STAFF

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Chairman, Vice Chairman Cochran, and the rest of the members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for allowing me to be here.

I want to start out by also thanking you for your steadfast support of our soldiers and their families, especially during these last 10 years, as we've been involved in a significant amount of combat operation. Without your support, we would not be able to do the things we're doing, and we would not be able to take care of our soldiers and families. So, thank you so much for your support.

I also appreciate the vote of confidence from Secretary McHugh. I believe in the Army we have a great civilian-military team, led by Secretary McHugh. His experience and wisdom has helped me as I've come onboard as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I know together we will walk forward to work many of these issues that face the Army in the future. And I am confident that in the end, the Army will remain the best land force in the world, and I look forward to continue to work with him as we move forward.

It's an honor to sit here today representing our 1.1 million soldiers, our nearly 300,000 Army civilians, as well as the 1.4 million family members. I'm extremely proud of their commitment, their professionalism, and resiliency of our soldiers and their sacrifice and accomplishments.

Today, we remain in more than 150 countries around the world. We are truly a globally engaged army, with 95,000 soldiers deployed, and another 96,000 soldiers forward station, conducting a broad range of missions around the world.

ARMY GLOBAL STRATEGY

But our Army's primary mission is steadfast and resolute to fight and win our Nation's wars. And as the Army continues to transition, we will ensure the President's 2012 defense strategic priorities are implemented, by first meeting our current commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere by ensuring a highly trained, properly equipped, and well-manned force. Now that operations in Iraq are complete, and we continue surge recovery in Afghanistan, we will help shape the regional environs in support of the combatant commanders, as well as the strategic environment.

In the Asia-Pacific, which is home of 7 of the 10 largest land armies in the world, we are provided an array of tools through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, and other innovative engagements with our allies and new partners. We currently have some 66,000 soldiers and almost 10,000 civilians in this region today.

During a time of great uncertainty in the Middle East, we remain committed and prepared to ensuring security and stability across the spectrum of conflict through our rotational presence and all available means necessary. And in Europe, as we inactivate two brigade combat teams (BCTs), one in 2013 and one in 2014, we will compensate through a series of engagement tools to build and sustain relationships with our European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners. I believe this will serve as a model how I see us doing things in the future, a combination of forward station and rotational forces, using a tailorable approach by regionally aligned forces and prepositioned stocks.

ARMY FOCUS AREAS

As we move forward, we will build on the competency and experience that has been gained during the past 10 years by our National Guard and Army Reserves in Iraq and Afghanistan, through the resourcing of a progressive readiness model in the future.

As we look forward, and the Secretary already touched on this a bit, there will be several focus areas that will help guide us for the way ahead. Foremost, we'll remain committed to our 67,000 war fighters currently in Afghanistan. They continue to provide trained, equipped, and ready soldiers to win the current fight.

Next, as the Army becomes leaner, we must continue to build on the key characteristics of the future force: Adaptability, innovation, flexibility, agility, versatility, and lethality. We have to prioritize our efforts as we integrate and synchronize our activities as part of the larger joint interagency and multinational effort of the future.

By the end of fiscal year 2017, we will decrease our end-strength from 570,000 to 490,000 in the Active Army, from 358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard, and from 206,000 to 205,000 in the Army Reserves. It is imperative for us to sustain a gradual ramp during these next 5 years that allow us to take care of our soldiers, continue to provide forces for Afghanistan, and facilitate reversibility over the next couple years, if necessary.

End-strength above 490,000 is funded strictly through overseas contingency operations (OCO) during the next 5 years, and must be sustained to help mitigate risk as we continue current operations in Afghanistan and simultaneously reset our Army for the future.

We will also reduce our end-strength by a minimum of eight BCTs. We are also conducting additional assessments to look at reorganizing our brigades to make most efficient use out of our combat structure. And we will come back to the subcommittee after we can finish our research and our analysis, both the Secretary and I will come back and have further conversations on this.

Finally, we will be responsible government stewards through energy-cost savings and institutional and acquisition reform. We are now taking a fundamentally different approach to how we do business with our acquisition reform. I credit Secretary McHugh for his diligent efforts with this. We have really made some tremendous progress here, in my view.

For a new affordable and incremental equipping strategy, we are making better business deals and better contracts, emphasizing competition, and saving even more money as government stewards.

Our expansion of multiyear contracts, firm-fixed-price contracts, and cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts have proven substantive cost savings already.

By more closely linking the development of requirements with the acquisition cycle, we are building the flexibility to integrate new technologies incrementally. Additionally, we are looking to develop more efficient testing and evaluating strategies by eliminating redundancies. We will continue our equipment reset program to restore unit equipment to a level of capability that is commensurate with their future missions. There have been more than 1.8 million pieces of equipment reset to date, which equates to approximately 31 brigade equivalents annually.

MODERNIZATION

Much of what the Army needs to do and much of what we hope to be able to do will be reliant upon sustained OCO funding for our withdrawal in Afghanistan and for 2 to 3 years afterwards. As we continue to transform our modernization practices through a holistic bottom-up approach, we have several priorities.

First is the Network. It is critical to our ability to manage information and command our forces at all levels both home and abroad, in a multinational and joint context. We made significant progress on this critical program through the series of network integration evaluation exercises that field tested equipment, which are integrated in a system, using our soldiers as the testers.

Second, the ground combat vehicle (GCV), a replacement for our infantry fighting vehicle that can accommodate an infantry squad, balance mobility and survivability, and provide unmatched lethality on the battlefield against current and future threats. We've paid close attention to risk reduction in this development program by maximizing competition to stimulate innovation, support cost containment, and schedule requirements, ensuring industry identifies potential pricing schedule versus performance trade-offs, and requiring industry to provide cost targets throughout the GCV's lifecycle.

Our third modernization priority is the more mobile survivable network-integrated joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV). With both myself and General Amos, we agree it's necessary, given the last 10 years of fighting and what future operations may entail. We carefully revised our acquisition strategy, reduced the schedule for the next developmental phase from 48 to 33 months, while reducing the projected cost of the program by \$400 million.

Next is lightening the soldier's load, with a focus on the squad. There must be continued efforts to give our squads superiority on the battlefield, with advanced soldier systems, and weapons communications, and protection. There has been tremendous progress in the advancement to help lighten the load of our individual soldiers. So now we must turn to look at how the squad can carry the load smarter. We will continue to look at decreasing the weight of our body armor, while increasing protection, but we can make more progress by studying how to better distribute the load across the squad.

The budget request for aviation modernization will continue to ensure our lift-and-close combat capabilities remain effective. These

aircraft provide critical support to our joint ground forces, special operations community, and our international partners.

Finally, I'd like to point out that in order to achieve these priorities within our modernization strategy we'll need the help of this subcommittee to ensure timely appropriations to reduce production and scheduling delays. The Secretary and I will continue to assess and make adjustments to our strategy, while addressing any potential risk incurred, as we adjust our future force posture.

I'd like to leave you with one last thought. Sequestration is not in the best interest of our national security. The Army's share of the cut could be almost \$134 billion through 2017. The impact to the Army could cause up to 100,000 additional cuts to our end-strength, on top of the 86,000 we currently plan to reduce. This would result in severe reductions in the National Guard, our Army Reserves, in addition to continued reductions in the Active component. It will significantly decrease what the Army can do for the joint force. In my estimation, sequestration will require us to fundamentally relook how we provide national security for our Nation.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today. This subcommittee enables our All-Volunteer Army to be the most decisive land force in the world, and we could not do without the support that you give us. It's an honor to serve this great Nation and stand beside the dedicated professionals of our Army. The strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our Army is our soldiers. And the strength of our soldiers is our families, and that's what makes this Army strong.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions, Senator.

Chairman INOUE. All right. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Before we proceed, I'd like to announce that there's a vote pending at this moment.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to go vote. I know Senator Cochran's coming back, and then you'll go vote. I do want to have a chance to ask questions, so I'm going to come back, but I am going to leave now, so that we can vote and get back. We'll be doing a little round-robin here.

Chairman INOUE. I can assure you that.

Last January, the Secretary of Defense announced the budget plan and said that the Active Army will be reduced by 72,000 in the next 5 years. Many of us have privately expressed concerns, primarily on the risks that may be involved.

Can you share with us your thoughts on this matter?

END-STRENGTH REDUCTION RISK MITIGATION

General ODIERNO. I think one way to mitigate the risk is that fact we're going to do this over a 5-year period, and I think that helps us to mitigate some of the risks that we have. My concerns are, first, we want to be able to take care of our soldiers and families. Doing it over a 5-year period helps us to reduce the risk to our soldiers and their families, first off, because we will be able to do a majority of the reductions through national attrition, although, there will be some requirements above that.

Second, it will help us, if we do this over a 5-year period, to ensure that we have the forces necessary to continue to rotate in Afghanistan, as we continue that commitment.

And third, if we have to, if we get it wrong, and we have to reverse, we can do that easily during the next 2 to 4 years, as we execute this strategy.

The assumptions in the strategy are that we will no longer be engaged in large-scale, long-term operations that would be over a 5- to 10-year period. That's the risk to this reduction. We increased the size of the Army in the 2000s in order to meet the requirements of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and because of the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) it was putting on our soldiers and our families. Now that we are reducing the size of the Army, as long as we are not involved in large-scale contingencies over a long period of time, I think we can mitigate that risk.

I do believe we have the capability to conduct two simultaneous operations at 490,000, as long as they are not over a long duration time period, and that's where the risk comes in, Senator.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, may I add a few on that?

Chairman INOUE. Please do.

Mr. MCHUGH. As the Chief noted, the primary consideration was that we had sufficient end-strength to meet the new security strategy and its expected requirements. And as you heard him say, I think we all agree we do.

But the other thing really goes back to your opening comment. You know, the Army is people. And currently, we spend about 48 cents of every \$1 on our people. And so when we're mandated to find, as we went through the Budget Control Act for the department, \$487 billion over 10 years, we have to find reductions in our personnel costs. There's just no other way to do it.

And what we wanted to ensure is that we didn't have artificially high end-strength, that our budget was resourcing modernization and proper equipping, and the other things that are so important, family, medical programs, so that we didn't take that path to becoming hollow that we've had so much discussion about over the years, and other postconflict periods.

So, we think we're balanced in a way that resist the temptation to pump up end-strength at a very high cost of not giving the soldiers what they need to complete their mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Gentlemen, I will have to leave to vote, but in the meantime, I'll call upon the Vice Chairman to continue the hearing. I'll be back.

Senator COCHRAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask you a question about the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft program. There's indication in our briefing paper here that the Air Force is suggesting that even though the C-27 was developed to provide a unique capability to support Army needs, that that could have been managed by the use of C-130 aircraft. I don't know whether this is a consensus, or what your reaction to it is, but is there a difference of opinion between the Army and the Air Force on the C-27 and C-130? We don't need to overdo things and buy things we don't need in this time of fiscal constraint and pressure on the

budget. So, I was just curious to know what your reaction to that would be.

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. The Army has a stated requirement for intra-theater lift, which we need in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and we've discussed this over time. The Army has a C-23 Sherpa program, which, frankly, is getting old and, frankly, will no longer be capable of doing the mission we need it to in the future. So, we've defined this requirement.

The Air Force has come back and said we can meet all of your intra-theater lift requirements with the C-130. So, we have worked with them to develop concepts that will put C-130s in direct support of Army units in order to meet these requirements.

So, I would just answer your question by saying we've identified the requirement for intra-theater lift. C-27 was one solution. The Air Force has come back and said we can solve this problem using the C-130. So, we are working with them to come up with the procedures in order for us to solve this problem using the C-130.

Senator COCHRAN. One issue that always is of interest to me as we begin this annual review of the budget request for the different services is how well we're doing with recruiting and retention of the quality of person and candidate for service in the U.S. Army. Do we need to consider going back to compulsory military service or is the all-volunteer concept alive and well and working to suit our national defense needs?

ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

Mr. MCHUGH. Very important question, Senator. I think the easy answer to your last point is that the last 10 years pretty well proved that the Volunteer Army, in our case, Voluntary Military, for this Nation, can meet just about any challenge over any duration of time you may put them up against. Having said that, we're always concerned about what tomorrow may look like, and we track our recruiting, our retention numbers, and track the caliber of our recruits as well.

On the retention side, our problem is, frankly, too many people want to stay, and we're going to have to manage that as we draw down our end-strength in ways that ensure that we keep the very best of the best. And that will be a challenge, because we will have to request, as the Chief alluded to, some soldiers who meet our minimum standards and requirements, and who, in many cases, I'm sure, will have served honorably, but ask them to take on new challenges in their lives.

Our recruiting numbers are better than the nearly 20 years I've been in this town. Our numbers of waivers are at historic lows. We don't provide major felony waivers any more, contrary to the times in the not-so-distant past, when they were not normal, but they weren't unheard of. Our high school graduation rates are more than 90 percent, higher than the average that is maintained here amongst the civilian population. And as they have proven time and time again, even our youngest soldiers are up to the greatest challenges.

So, we're always concerned about what a brightening economy will mean on our ability to compete with the private sector, but to this point, I think things are going very, very well.

Chief.

General ODIERNO. If I could add, Senator, to include our ability to recruit officers as well. The numbers at West Point are way up. Applicants are way up. The competition is way up. The competition at Officer Candidate School (OCS) is at its highest level I've ever seen it. Our Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs are, although we are doing some consolidation, are doing very well. So, right now we are in good shape. But it's something that we have to constantly manage. And as we all know, some of this could be based on some of the economic issues and unemployment rates. We have to watch this very carefully. There is a lot of interest in serving. So, we feel we are doing very, very well in those areas.

In terms of retention, there will be some people who want to stay who probably will not be allowed to stay, as the Secretary just talked about, during the next 3 or 4 years. But we want to set up programs that allow the best to stay. We want to keep the best talent that we have, and we're trying to decentralize that decision-making process down to the commanders in the field, so they can make the decisions on who are the best, most qualified to continue to stay and lead our Army into the future as we face many of these complex challenges that you've outlined.

Senator COCHRAN. That is very welcome news and good to hear, and also, a reason to compliment the leadership of our United States Army and other forces who are providing the example and serving in capacities of a very important responsibility for our country. I'm sure the soldiers are looking up to those they are serving with, or they wouldn't be interested in re-enlisting or staying in for a career, as many of them are now voluntarily doing. I think it's a tribute to our leadership of our military. So, I congratulate you on those successes that we've had.

It was a pleasure for me to serve on the Board of Visitors at West Point for a time, and as a matter of fact, I think it was one of the best collateral duties I've ever had in the Congress, serving on both the Board of Visitors at West Point and the board out in Colorado for the Air Force, and the Naval Academy board. I really got a great opportunity to meet and get to know those who were in charge of our training academies, and who were the professors and instructors getting the job done, training, and educating the officers of tomorrow, and the leaders of tomorrow, the next Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chief chairman, and so we appreciate the success we've had. And we know that it doesn't just happen by itself, but there are a lot of dedicated men and women throughout the Army who are helping make this a very important success story.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT BOARD OF VISITORS

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would just add that last night the Cadet Andrew Rodriguez, from West Point, was awarded the Sullivan Award, which is given each year to the top leadership student athlete in the country for all sports. It's only the sixth time that

a football player has received it. And 3 out of those 6 were from West Point that have received that award over time. And I think he's representative of the type of individuals that we now have, that are interested in serving our country. And we're very proud of these young men and women who continue to want to serve. And I think that's just another indication of the quality of individuals that we continue to get in the Army and West Point.

Mr. MCHUGH. I would note, Senator Cochran, that I had the honor of serving on that—I guess I still do, but as a Member of Congress for 15 years. And you're right. It's a special opportunity, and one of those things that few Members of Congress get to experience, and it was a great opportunity for me.

I would also note, just for the record, that the gentleman on my left is also a West Point grad, and given the football team, and Army, Navy, I wish he were back there wearing a helmet, but we'll talk about that later.

Senator COCHRAN. Do you need time for rebuttal, General?

General ODIERNO. I want to be on the record, we're going to beat Navy this year.

Senator COCHRAN. We're joined again by other members of the subcommittee, and I'll yield to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. When you said that, John, I thought that you were talking about his left, and that would have been me.

I would have been the first guy to get in West Point with 800 SAT on both parts. The Army's got enough problems without having to go down there. Not bad. That's right.

So to both of you, thanks for being leaders in a time when we need leaders. Ten years into this thing, I know people are war weary and we're trying to balance a \$15 trillion budget that's out of whack, and everything's on the table. So, to my friends out there who want to argue about what we should do with the entitlements, that we should reform them just like we're trying to reform the Pentagon, bottom line is, the sequestration is just a really bad idea. Both of you already said that. Do you agree with that?

SEQUESTRATION

Mr. MCHUGH. It certainly would have an incredibly devastating effect upon our national military.

Senator GRAHAM. It would really be silly and stupid, right?

Mr. MCHUGH. I agree.

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. Go ahead, John. You can say that.

Mr. MCHUGH. I agree with you always, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Good. Thank you.

So, we'll find somehow to avoid it. We're not going to put that burden on you.

But the sum total of what we're doing, \$470-billion-something during the next 10 years is no small lift, is it, General?

General ODIERNO. It is not.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We're going to put 87,000 people out of work, I guess. So, just please understand what the military is having to do on the Army side. Eighty-seven thousand people are going to be put out of work over the next 5 or 6 years, who have dedi-

cated themselves to defending the Nation, who are well trained, and, you know, make up the 1 percent who serve. So, when I hear other agencies and other parts of the Federal Government saying that's too much, that's too far, the Defense Department is more than paying its fair share, in my view, and I'll have to look long and hard if I think 87,000 makes sense.

Where do you see the potential for future land engagements, General, that could have 100,000 troops required? Are there any scenarios in mind?

General ODIERNO. Well, obviously, we have agreements with South Korea, in reference with potential problems with North Korea. You know, we have issues across the Middle East, a significant amount of instability.

Senator GRAHAM. The Horn of Africa really went bad. You may have to enter these troops. Maybe not 100,000.

General ODIERNO. Maybe not 100,000.

Senator GRAHAM. Let's talk about a scenario where you had to commit major land forces after we cut the \$487 billion. What percentage of a, say, 100,000-person force, in the future, 5, 6 years from now, would have to come from the Reserves?

General ODIERNO. It would depend on the specific situation.

Senator GRAHAM. Let's say it's an Iraq situation.

General ODIERNO. Well, in the beginning phases of a war, about 80 percent would be out of the Active, and about 20 percent out of the Reserves. But as that went on over time, the amount of use of the Reserves would increase. So, in the second or third year, you would see more Reserve component.

Senator GRAHAM. So, the truth of the matter is that we need, as a nation, to understand that if we go down by 87,000, if there are any major land engagements sustained over a period of time, the Guard and Reserves are going to be asked to do more, not less.

General ODIERNO. That is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. That's just the math, right?

General ODIERNO. That is correct, Sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Mr. Secretary, stress on the force. One, to the soldier who is going to be charged with the murder of 16 Afghan civilians, you're highly confident in our military justice system.

STRESS ON THE FORCE

Mr. MCHUGH. I have no doubt about our ability to handle it.

Senator GRAHAM. And that soldier will be provided whatever resources his defense team needs, within reason, to defend him, right?

Mr. MCHUGH. That is our requirement, and that is our, we feel, duty.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, people talk about stress on the force. Do you agree with me that most people in Afghanistan, of any senior rank, have had multiple deployments?

Mr. MCHUGH. We have in the military at large more than 50,000 folks in uniform who have had at least four deployments.

Senator GRAHAM. And this is a severe aberration and does not reflect who our men and women are, in terms of their behavior under stress. Do you agree with that?

Mr. MCHUGH. The fact that this is receiving, understandably, so much attention, I think, underscores that very fact. Yes, Sir.

Senator GRAHAM. General, do you agree with that?

General ODIERNO. I do agree, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So now let's talk about where we go, in terms of the Congress's role in helping you craft this budget. Do you have enough flexibility to make adjustments? Let's talk about mental health for our troops, those coming back from the theater. If we execute this budget reduction and you have 10 years of fighting, and you may have some latent stress problems show up down the road, do we have the adequate infrastructure in this budget reduction environment to take care of issues that may arise down the road from the last 10 years of fighting?

Mr. MCHUGH. From what we can see, there is always, of course, as you know, Senator, it's what you don't expect that you have to be most troubled by. We have both the facilities, the flexibility, and funding to provide for them. The biggest challenge on behavioral health we've had are bringing into the Army Force structure the behavior health specialists. We've been chasing the requirement for a number of years now.

Senator GRAHAM. I don't want to take too much time, but recruiting trained mental health specialists who are subject to being deployed is a very big challenge. So, I hope we'll look, going within the force and cross-training people. That's one way to get more folks. But, if you wanted to serve your country as a civilian or a military person, if you're in the mental health arena, there's a real demand for your services.

And the last comment I'd like to make is about stress on the force. We've been deployed a lot. It's been a very tough time for families. What kind of stress on the force can we anticipate from a major reduction in personnel, limited assets? And I would just end with this proposition. I think the world is getting more dangerous by the day, and the potential conflicts that we face are growing, not lessening.

General, Mr. Secretary, can you describe to me what we can expect from a force that's going to be reduced by 87,000? The mission possibilities are growing, not lessening. What kind of stress does that have on the Force?

General ODIERNO. First off, it is, as we have learned, the issue becomes the stress of multiple deployments. So, as you reduce the force, if we get into a sustained land combat, it will, once again, increase the stress on the force. And that's a bit of a risk, as we go down, as you mentioned, 87,000. So, we have to mitigate that. We've tried to mitigate that by going down the 87,000 over a 5-year period, which slows it down, which enables us to take care of those soldiers and families as we ask them to leave the service, in some cases. And we'll hopefully be able to do most of it by attrition, but it won't be all by attrition. There will be some people who are, in fact, asked to leave over time. So, we're trying to figure out the best ways to mitigate that.

Mr. MCHUGH. As you know, Senator, rotations, deployments are probably the leading cause and the leading stressor. We're operating under the assumption, the fact we're out of Iraq and a planned phase-down through 2014 in Afghanistan. If that should

change, obviously, we're going to have to do some re-evaluation. And then one of the advantages of going through this exercise of assigning budget numbers every year is that we're provided the opportunity to second guess ourselves, if it's required.

The Chairman has noted that this is really the first budget, not just the only budget, of what we view as a 5-year, and ultimately a march to 2020, to a time when we're hopefully fully modernized as a force.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you for your service.

Senator INOUE [presiding]. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you. First, I want to say to General Odierno how much I appreciate everything that you've done. Talk about deployments to the tough spots. You've been there. I appreciate meeting with you in Iraq twice, and seeing what you could do there. And I think that experience has certainly given you the base and the background to handle so many of these issues and problems. I just can't tell you how much I appreciate all that you've done and your service.

Secretary McHugh, I'm glad to see you. And in about a half hour, I'm going to go to the West Point Board of Visitors' meeting, and I know I'll see you there, where we serve together. And I'm so happy to still be on the board and able to help your alma mater, General Odierno.

I'd like to ask both of you, really, but it's on the issue of drawing down the troops, and especially from Europe. And I know that you are planning to do some rotational deployments in Europe to save money. We're going to bring back the two brigades. And I just wonder if you are also looking at further reductions in Europe. Obviously, we have to have a presence there, when we have our hospitals there, but we know the training is limited. We know both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have said it's more cost effective to maintain forces in America rather than overseas.

I'm, of course, interested, from the military construction standpoint and the operations on overseas bases, and have always felt like we were doing more than our fair share in NATO. I want to ask you where you are, either of you, or both, on conserving our dollars by having more troops based in America, making sure that we're not over building with our NATO military construction beyond what is our requirement. But sometimes we're getting into regional centers, where European countries want equality, and that's not our responsibility.

So, can you walk me through that, and maybe something we haven't seen in the future that would help me understand that we are being efficient with our military construction and operations overseas, and favoring our U.S. bases, where we have the training capabilities and certainly the more efficient operations?

FORCE STRUCTURE

General ODIERNO. I think, Senator, first is that I think as we look to the future, our strategy is going to be that we are going to rely more and more on rotational forces. We think that's important.

Now, it does not mean we will completely reduce our overseas presence. It's got to be the right balance and mix, so we're going

to constantly review what that right balance and mix is between rotational forces and forward station forces. We will continue to do that.

We have been consistently coming down in Europe over the last 3 years. We're going to go down to 90 bases, 50 of those which are really Army sole bases. The other 40 are joint. There's some Army, Air Force, and some other places. From more than 300 bases that were there just 3 or 4 years ago. So, we are slowly coming down.

The Secretary and I have a team over in Europe right now looking at the structure, the infrastructure, to continue to conduct assessments, as we inactivate the two brigades, as we bring down Fifth Corps headquarters, as they come out of Afghanistan, what is the exact infrastructure that would be needed. Are there refinements to that that we will have to make? And we will constantly assess this, as we move forward with our final posture.

And I think so far, actually, we've gotten great cooperation from our partners on this. They realize this. They understand what we're trying to do, and the fact that we'll rotate forces to continue to train with some of our NATO forces, I think, is actually good for us and for them, because it will allow more units to have the experience of working with our NATO partners over time.

So, I think we will continue to assess this. I think you'll see us reassess it again next year and the year after, and constantly look at this, as we try to get right our posture, as compared to what's in the United States and what's in Europe.

Senator HUTCHISON. Let me ask you, on the V Corps headquarters, I believe you said that it's not going to return to Europe after the deployment in Afghanistan. Is that going to be eliminated, or will it be moved to an installation in the United States?

General ODIERNO. The plan is to eliminate it, Senator.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. Thank you very much, both of you. I so appreciate working with you, and if there are any things that we need to be doing at West Point, please let me know. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General, you've been welcomed, but probably not by all of us yet. Thank you very much for your service.

General, title 10, section 2464 of the U.S. Code requires the Defense Department to provide all the depots with a baseline core workload, the minimum amount of man-hours necessary to sustain a given depot's unique technical skills.

For the Anniston Army Depot, that core workload requirement, I understand, is 3.2 million man-hours. Anniston was fortunate enough to exceed its core for nearly 9 years, but subsequent to the drawdown in Iraq hundreds of temporary workers have been let go. It's my understanding earlier this year the Army only projected 2.4 million man-hours of work for Anniston in 2013, a level far below its legally mandated core workload. Such an unprecedented drop-off could require Anniston to let go some of its permanent technical workforce, which we try to keep together, precisely those essential workers the core requirement was meant, as I understand it, to protect.

What is the Army doing to make sure that this does not happen, and where are we there? Could you speak to that?

DEPOTS

General ODIERNO. I can, Sir.

Senator SHELBY. And how important is it?

General ODIERNO. Thank you. Well, first, our depots are incredibly important for maintaining our capabilities. And what we've done is we've established core competencies in each one of our depots, in order to sustain that. So, for example, for Anniston, it's combat vehicle, assault bridging, artillery, small caliber weapons. And that will remain the core function of Anniston, as we go forward.

In terms of reductions, what we're seeing is, as we continue to reduce the amount of reset and recap that we're doing, based on our work in Iraq and Afghanistan, we're starting to see the workload drop. But we've established these core capabilities in each one of our depots. We will continue to do that.

Now, I will say, and the Secretary can add to this, is that we're going to continue to look at each one of our depots as we move forward to make sure that we sustain enough capability to grow, if necessary, but also to gain efficiencies. But Anniston has been such a key piece of everything we've done and will continue to remain one of our depots that have some core competencies that we need.

Senator SHELBY. Anniston and the other depots, without speaking of Anniston, they're very important for the readiness of the Army, is that correct?

General ODIERNO. They are. They are very important.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MCHUGH. Senator, you have struck upon something that concerns us greatly, and not just because it says it in law, though, obviously, we're mindful of our title 10 and statutory requirements, but also, as you just noted, these depots are absolutely critical to the Army's ability to go out and do whatever missions they're assigned.

As the Chief noted, our primary response to that are the establishment of centers of excellence, of which Anniston, of course, is one. We're working now with the Department of Defense to go through sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) analysis of our depots, of our core industrial base. And as we come down out of war, sustaining those minimum requirements that you cited, particularly for the high-end workers, is going to be a challenge, but we're looking at every possible avenue, including foreign military sales, in the case of some Bradleys for Anniston, and others, to try to yes, meet that statutory requirement, but more importantly, keep those facilities viable.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

General, moving over to the area of the Army Ballistic Missile Defense, in May 2011, the Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) signed a memorandum of understanding regarding a proposed transfer of Army ballistic missile defense assets (BMDA). This subcommittee felt that the proposal was not backed by sufficient analysis and the report of the fiscal year 2012 defense appropriations bill contained language opposing any such transfer.

Does the fiscal year 2013 budget move any Army programs or personnel to MDA or request funds to enact such transfers in the future, or where are we?

MISSILE DEFENSE

General ODIERNO. I'll have to go take a look at that, Senator, and get back with you, and I don't know if the Secretary knows, but I believe that we are clearly still looking at that, at transferring some of the capabilities to MDA.

Mr. MCHUGH. What I would note is we still believe the transfer makes sense, from the Army perspective. It is intended to simply provide through MDA, or provide the Army through MDA, greater buying power. Other service missile programs are similarly administered through that organization. And beyond the ground, the air-breathing threats would continue to be under our operational command. So, it's about a 65-percent, I believe, transfer, but most of it is in procurement and technological development.

Senator SHELBY. Will you furnish this to the subcommittee, since we were concerned about analysis of this memorandum of understanding?

Mr. MCHUGH. I haven't read the fiscal year 2012 bill recently, but my understanding is we owe you an analysis and a report, and I can't imagine we wouldn't supply that.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

Secretary McHugh, in the area of Army aviation modernization, prior to its release, the fiscal year 2013 budget, I understand, was described as delaying Army aviation modernization by 3 to 5 years. Could you provide us with some more detail, if you have any yet, of which programs are being delayed, and why, and would the delays impact primarily procurement, or research and development (R&D), or both?

AVIATION MODERNIZATION

Mr. MCHUGH. I'd have to defer to the Chief on some of the specifics of that question. It's absolutely true. We had to slip some of the, particularly the procurement programs to the right. We feel it's an acceptable level of risk, given the status of most of our rotary wing fleet, as long as we have the sufficient reset money coming out of Afghanistan, as the Chief noted, for 2 to 3 years. But I think he can provide you some of the platform details.

Senator SHELBY. General.

General ODIERNO. I can, Senator. What we've done is, we've delayed, we've not eliminated. But let me give you, for example, for the Apache, for example, we've gone down to the minimum requirements, which is 48 per year. It delays the program 3 to 5 years, to 2030.

For example, out of this Program Objective Memorandum (POM), we've delayed the procurement of 23 new-build Apaches and 42 remanufactured Apaches. It will still be built, but it's been moved out of the POM.

For the CH-47, we've reduced some performance upgrades, like the rotors. We've made that adjustment on the CH-47. We continue to do full-rate production under the current multiyear that ends this year. We're looking for another multiyear, from 2013 to

2017, to complete the National Guard Reserve component modernization.

In the UH-60, we're delaying modernization of all components by about 2 to 3 years. What I mean by components is Active, Reserve, and National Guard. And we'll delay procurement of 72 UH-60 Mikes to outside of the POM. But we will continue to modernize and update the UH-60s, as we move forward. So, as I've just said to you, it's more of a delay.

Now, we have funded the upgrade of the Kiowa, but that's based on a decision, as we do the analysis of alternatives, as we look at the new potential armed aerial scout helicopter. That decision will be made later this year. And then based on that, we'll decide whether we go with the armed aerial scout, or do we continue to invest in improvements in the Kiowa Warrior. That will be determined sometime later. But we have funded the improvement program in this POM for the Kiowa Warrior at the tune of about \$740 million. And we will continue to use Kiowas at least through fiscal year 2025.

Senator SHELBY. Quickly, the advanced hypersonic weapon, which we had a very successful test last year, this capacity, as I understand it, for a conventional prompt global strike has been sought for years by the military. Can you talk a little about that, and where we are in there? What will it mean for our combat commanders?

ADVANCED HYPERSONIC WEAPON

General ODIERNO. Well, I don't think that's our program, but I would tell you that on the ground, the ability for us, it's about precision. And whenever we can increase our ability to provide precision munitions and capabilities, that makes a significant difference on the ground for us. And I think that's what we gain by this capability.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary McHugh, as you and I have discussed, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), in my home State of Washington, is facing some very real questions on the way they have diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the invisible wounds of war. Today, unfortunately, we are seeing more information on the extent of those problems. This is actually a copy of today's "Seattle Times" and in it is an article that is based on the most recent review of the forensic psychiatry department at JBLM, which, as you know, is under investigation for taking the cost of mental healthcare into account in their decisions. And what this article shows is that since that unit was stood up in 2007, more than 40 percent of those servicemembers who walked in the door with the PTSD diagnosis had their diagnosis changed to something else, or overturned altogether.

What it says is that more than 4 in 10 of our servicemembers, many who are already being treated for PTSD, and were due the benefits and care that came with that diagnosis, had it taken away

by that unit, and then they were sent back into the force or into their community.

Now, in light of all the tragedies that we have seen stem from the untreated invisible wounds of war today, I'm sure that you would agree that this is very concerning. And not only is it damaging for our soldiers, but it also really furthers the stigma for others, whether they're deciding to seek help or not today.

So, in light of all the issues, you and I have had a chance to talk to this generally, but I wanted to ask you specifically today why was this highly controversial unit set up originally at JBLM, and who's decision was it to do that?

Mr. MCHUGH. Do you mean the forensic department?

Senator MURRAY. Correct.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RE-EVALUATION

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, for every base where you demobilize soldiers, it is practice to have that capacity. The concern, as you noted, Senator, is that, at least statistically, and the numbers are changing every moment, they've changed since that newspaper went to print.

Senator MURRAY. Do you have the most recent numbers?

Mr. MCHUGH. I don't have them exactly.

Senator MURRAY. But it is more than 40 percent?

Mr. MCHUGH. The number of cases for re-evaluation is somewhat more than 300 now.

Senator MURRAY. But it is more than 40 percent?

Mr. MCHUGH. I haven't done the exact math, but I think that's a pretty accurate figure. So, the question for us is, why in this one unit were those kinds of re-evaluations and change in diagnosis achieved? It's not totally unheard of that a psychiatric or a mental health condition will change. So, I don't want to say all of those diagnoses and changes were inappropriate, but clearly, when you have those kinds of data, we want to make sure that everything is appropriate. And as you and I have discussed, to the Army Surgeon General's credit, General Patty Horoho, she has immediately stepped forward, has asked, and has had that particular unit step down, and has conducted a wholesale re-examination that has begun with 14 soldiers, and will methodically go through all of them to make sure that the changes were not, in fact, inappropriate.

Senator MURRAY. Do you know who made the original decision to step up that unit?

Mr. MCHUGH. To actually form it?

Senator MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. MCHUGH. I couldn't tell you the officer's name.

Senator MURRAY. And can you tell me, is this an isolated incident, or are there other Army medical centers that are changing the PTSD diagnosis at this rate?

Mr. MCHUGH. That's what we have to be sure of. The Surgeon General has asked the Inspector General of the Army to go and examine all of similar facilities and locations. To this point, we don't see any evidence of this being systemic, but as, again, you and I have discussed, we want to make sure that where this was inappropriate, it was an isolated case, and if it were not, to make sure we address it as holistically as we're trying to address it at that.

Senator MURRAY. Have you examined similar statistics for all the other installations?

Mr. MCHUGH. All re-evaluations are being looked at and evaluated.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. So that is being done. Can you provide us with that information?

Mr. MCHUGH. We'll certainly keep you up-to-date on that. Yes.

Senator MURRAY. All right. Well, as you know, the review by that forensic psychiatry at Madigan was a change from the standard disability evaluation process used across the military. The integrity of the disability evaluation system depends on each and every servicemember being subject to the same process. Across the Army, what will be done to improve the oversight of the disability evaluation system to make sure that the same process is being applied system-wide?

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, as I said, the Inspector General, along with the Surgeon General, are re-examining the application of all diagnostic procedures. You noted correctly, we have a very standardized system. It's a system that is utilized similarly in the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) evaluations, similarly in civilian evaluations, and we are restating to all of our providers that that is a diagnostic protocol that they will follow, and equally important, that fiscal considerations are not in any way a part of the evaluation. It's simply unacceptable.

Senator MURRAY. And you're making that clear system-wide?

Mr. MCHUGH. We're doing everything we can to make that clear system-wide. Yes, Senator.

Senator MURRAY. Okay.

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could just add to that one point. For us it's about, we should be patient advocates. And that's the mindset we're going to work on changing, to make sure everybody understands that. We are patient advocates. We are trying to get the best for what is right for our soldiers.

Senator MURRAY. General, I really appreciate that. And I have to say, I've been here for 10 years, since the beginning of this war, at many, many hearings, hearing that from the top, and I agree that that is what everyone is saying, but it's really disconcerting, after 10 years, to find now that that has not been the case. So, that's, you know, why I think it's really important that we really focus on this, not just at Madigan, and what happened there, but system-wide, to make clear that this is, you know, it isn't the cost of PTSD, or any mental health evaluation that is of concern to the Army or to the military at all, it is making sure that those men and women get the care that they receive. So, you know, it is very troubling to be here 10 years, after many, many hearings, and many, many questions, to find out this has been occurring.

And really, one of the most troubling aspects of these recent events at Madigan is that servicemembers were diagnosed with PTSD and other mental health disorders during their military service. They received treatment for those conditions, but then when they entered the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) process, they had that diagnosis changed. So, that is very troubling to every one of us that has been watching this for a very long time.

And I did want to ask you what changes you are seeking, Army-wide, to make sure that behavioral healthcare diagnosis are more consistent between those who are providing care and those conducting the disability evaluations.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, as I said, Senator, the basic answer to that is the processes and the protocols of diagnosis are the same. You're always going to have individual practitioners who take a somewhat different view as to what they're observing in a particular patient, but that is what training is about, trying to eliminate to the greatest extent possible, those vagaries, but in terms of the standards of evaluation, whether it's an MEB or whether it is a postdeployment mental health evaluation, those diagnostic touch points are all the same and standardized. The Surgeon General and certainly the Inspector General, as he does his analysis across this system, are making that very, very clear, and we'll continue to press that as well.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. Well, as I said, this is an extremely disconcerting situation. I want to know if it's system-wide, because these men and women, the stigma of mental healthcare is something that's very real. The challenges of PTSD and mental healthcare are real. And no one, no one should be denying any servicemember care purely because of a question of cost. That is something that the taxpayers of this country bear the burden of providing. We will provide it. But we want to make sure that the Army is not dismissing this in any way, shape, or form.

So, we will continue to follow this and continue to stay in touch with you, as these different questions are answered, but I want to make sure that we are really looking not just at Madigan, obviously, that's clearly where the focus is right now, but system-wide, to make sure that we are evaluating all of these on the same system, and that there is no discretionary concern about cost or anything else, that we get these men and women the care that they have earned and they deserve, and this country expects them to have.

Mr. MCHUGH. As I've said, Senator, we appreciate truly your leadership on that, and we are in full agreement of your perspective. Fiscal considerations should be nonexistent, and we're going to do everything we can to make sure they are.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if this question has already been asked. I'm Ranking Member on another appropriations subcommittee this morning, and so I had to divide my time here. But this is a question I asked the Air Force when they were here, and the Navy and Marines, when they were here. And that is the nearly half of \$1 trillion reduction in spending on national security assets that you are working through now, which results in a considerable drawdown of Army personnel, and perhaps, procurement and other central areas, is tough enough, but the prospect of an additional nearly \$1 trillion under the Budget Control Act sequester, which has not yet been addressed for any

kind of change, I just want, for a record, to get your assessment of what the impact of that would be.

And I go back a little ways. I remember shortly after Desert Storm I, being with then Defense Secretary Cheney, saying, you know, if you go back through history, at the end of a major deployment or conflict, we've always drawn down too far, and going back up always puts us in a very difficult situation. And I couldn't help but write down the quote that General John F. Amos, Marine Corps Commandant, said. He said, "History has shown that it's impossible to predict where, when, and how our military forces will need to be called upon."

And so, I'd just like, for the record, to get your take on this particular budget-driven drawdown. And we all want efficiencies and effectiveness in saving funds, given our debt situation but also the potential impact of this sequester, if it's not adjusted.

SEQUESTRATION

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Senator. If I could, I'll start, and then turn it over to the Chief.

With respect to this budget, these were tough decisions and tough numbers to make. We had to, I think, come down in a place that puts us on the edge, but, nevertheless, on balance, I think all of us feel, across both the combatant commands, as well as the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries, that this is a reasonable fiscal plan, and most importantly, it does reflect the requirements under the new national military strategy.

We're very concerned about any changes to that, because it is a delicate balance that the chair and I had a brief discussion about how our end-strength numbers are very finely tuned against our other budget lines, to make sure that we have the readiness and modernization, training, family programs that are necessary not to keep us on the path to going hollow, as you mentioned, that happened in other postconflict periods.

As to sequestration, I think the Chief and I both agree it would be devastating. For the Army, I'll let the Chief talk about the actual numbers to our current end-strengths, but it will cost us another \$134 billion, roughly. I can't count for you the number of acquisition programs that would be placed in a Nunn-McCurdy breach, simply because while the fiscal impact is hard enough, we have no opportunity under the budget law to manage it. It is simply an across-the-board cut against all appropriation lines, requiring us to buy one-half of a mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle, if you will, or requiring us to ban all kinds of acquisition programs that I think would be chaotic, not just for the military but would be chaotic for our industrial partners, who obviously have stockholders and have employees, and would have to lay off, I don't venture an exact figure, but I suspect thousands, if not tens of thousands of employees. So, unlimited negative impact, should that happen.

Senator COATS. Chief, do you want to add to that?

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could, I'll just say I want to make sure that people understand that this first \$487 billion cut is not an easy cut. And, in fact, I talk about the razor's edge, and the razor's edge is the fact that we have to balance end-strength with our

modernization program and our readiness. It's a very, very careful balance. And my guess is we'll have to continue to refine and adjust this as we move forward.

If we get another additional \$500 billion cut, as the Secretary said, it, frankly, will change how the joint force looks. And so we're going to have to re-evaluate and take a look at what do we want our joint force to do. How do we want to accomplish our national security objectives?

Specifically to the Army, it translates into approximately 100,000 additional end-strength cut, a combination of Active, National Guard, and Reserves, but more importantly is it would require us to cut more steeply in 2013 and 2014, which in my mind puts at risk the force responding in Afghanistan, and to the current commitments we have, and puts at risk how many of our leaders that we would have to lose that have the experience and capabilities that we will need in the future.

So, it's not only the size of the cut, it's the fact that they would require it to happen more quickly. They would require it to happen without any thought. It's an even cut across all management decision packages (MDEPs) within our budget. So, the risk is extremely high, in my estimation, extremely high. It would be devastating to us.

Senator COATS. Thank you. Second question I have, assuming—do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman?

Just help me get a little bit of understanding on where we're going with the vehicle fleet in the future. I know that the decision has been made to recapitalize high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to a significant extent, and I think there's money in the budget for that, but the decision between the modernized expanded capacity vehicle (MECV) and the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), can you just give me your thinking behind where you are now, and some of the thinking behind that. And I raise that partly because, and correct me if I'm wrong, the JLTV is a much lighter, more mobile vehicle than the MECV. Am I correct in that?

LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLES

General ODIERNO. The JLTV is really there to replace the HMMWV.

Senator COATS. Yes.

General ODIERNO. It's a HMMWV replacement.

Senator COATS. But the MECV is being terminated, or at least in the budget, terminated.

General ODIERNO. Right. Right.

Senator COATS. Now, get to the rationale behind that.

General ODIERNO. Well, I would say that we're looking at a combination of our whole wheel fleet, as you just kind of brought up. And what we've got, the JLTV, we will purchase about one-third of the amount of HMMWVs we have now. We're still going to depend a little bit on HMMWVs. Through our recap and reset program, we will continue to do that.

We had to look at what we thought we needed across the force, as we move forward. You know, we've purchased a significant amount of MRAPs. We're trying to integrate what's the number of

MRAPs we want to keep in the force, how many new JLTVs we need. And the reason the JLTVs is so important for us, it gives better protection than the HMMWVs, it's lighter, and it's network integrated. So in my mind, it's a significant upgrade to the HMMWV.

So, I think it's a combination of all those things, a mixture of, you know, the MECV, the MRAPs, the HMMWVs, the JLTV, and we're trying to get the right mix. And with the budget constraints that we have, we believe the right mix was a combination of JLTV, HMMWVs and then using some of our MRAP capability to feel the need in that category of our truck fleet.

We're also doing an analysis of our truck fleet, and we're probably going to reduce the number of trucks we have in the total fleet, as we reduce the force structure, and as we relook how we developed our requirements for the truck fleet. And we're taking a look at that as well, as we move forward. And we'll continue to refine and assess this, and provide you updates as we move forward with this during the next couple years.

Senator COATS. My concern dates back to, again, early in the 1990s, when we thought the light tactical vehicle was the cat's meow, I mean, to get around in urban situations and so forth. This is before improvised explosive devices (IEDs) came, such a challenge for us, and so then there was a lot of clamoring that went on, and so forth. And you know all the history of that, and so forth. So, I guess my concern is, is that we end up back in a situation where we're under armored.

General ODIERNO. Sure.

Senator COATS. And our troops are more vulnerable. And that's really the heart of my question.

General ODIERNO. Senator, it's a great question. And the challenge that we have, whether it be in our light vehicles, or even in our infantry fighting, any vehicles we develop now, it's this dynamic of mobility versus survivability. And what we're trying to do is, what I'd like to have is a system that enables us to adjust survivability, based on the environment, so we have a choice on how mobile we can be and how survival we can be.

An example I always use is the Stryker vehicle. Our Stryker vehicle was built to provide us more mobility. What's happened is we've had to put so much weight back on the Stryker we've lost the mobility that we first wanted on the Stryker. And so, it's okay in an operation like Afghanistan or Iraq, because of the counter-insurgency, you know, we use it, but in other environments, we're going to have problems with it now, because it's so heavy, and its ability to get off-road is a problem.

So, what we're looking for is the right balance, and that's what we're trying to get with the JLTV, that's what we're trying to get with the ground combat vehicle (GCV), is that right balance of mobility and survivability. And we're working very closely with all of our partners to try to achieve this.

Senator COATS. And then just one last question. Do we have any problems with the industrial base, in terms of all this remixing of priorities?

General ODIERNO. We watch it very carefully, and we have to make sure that we're able to sustain the industrial base, as we

move forward. Certainly, we're very cognizant of that as we move forward.

Senator COATS. That's a component of the decision in process.

General ODIERNO. It is. It is.

Mr. MCHUGH. As we discussed earlier, it's a big concern across all of our industrial base, both organic, but as well as our private industry partners. And we're working with the Department of Defense to try to ensure that we can do everything we can, whether it's for military sales, public-private partnerships, in assessing and locating our personal buys, our individual service buys in a way that sustains that minimum rate to the greatest extent possible.

Senator COATS. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you for your testimony, for your leadership. I listened with great interest to the exchange that you had with Senator Murray. As important as it is, when we talk about our military equipment and the infrastructure needs, I think we recognize that it always come back to the individual, to the human being, and we need to make sure that we are focusing equal attention on the need to reset that individual, reset the mind, the body, and ensure that there is no cost that is spared in doing so. So, I appreciate a great deal the attention that is being focused, not only, again, on the situation that Senator Murray has indicated at Madigan there, in Washington but, really, system-wide in better understanding that.

General, I missed your visit when you came to Alaska in January. We appreciate that we don't get a lot of visitors coming to Alaska in January, and that was noted and greatly appreciated, particularly since you were coming from Hawaii. So, you got to really experience the contrast there. But I think it was important.

We recognize that we're at some pretty historic levels, in terms of the U.S. Army Alaska forces, and the contribution that they are currently making in Afghanistan now. Well over 10 percent of the Army forces deployed in Afghanistan are coming from U.S. Army Alaska, and I think that that is significant. So, I appreciate that you have gone there yourself, and would be curious in your impression, in terms of the quality of what we're doing in Alaska, in terms of the training.

My more specific question, though, and what I would like you to address is, on that trip, you mentioned, in Hawaii, that the number of soldiers that are assigned to the Pacific would generally be about the same as it is today. Can you comment on the role of U.S. forces that are based in Alaska to achieve these military objectives in the Pacific? Is it fair to conclude that the number of soldiers that are assigned to U.S. Army Alaska will generally be the same as it is today?

U.S. ARMY IN ALASKA

General ODIERNO. I think as we look at the plans, I think, as you know, U.S. Army Alaska is, in fact, part of the Pacific Command.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Right.

General ODIERNO. And we're looking at, for the most part, it will be very close to what it is today. Now, we'll continue to look at

that, but our plan is not to do much changes to the forces that are in the Pacific. So, I would say, in general terms, it will be pretty close to what it is today.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Appreciate that. I know that the folks in Alaska recognize, again, not only the strategic advantage that is gained there, but some of the training opportunities that we have. I'm assuming that your impression was favorable of what we are providing, in terms of the quality of troops we're seeing coming out of the North.

General ODIERNO. Yes. First, the training facilities are incredible. What they're able to do and how they're able to prepare, no matter what mission they go on, it gives them a great advantage. And I would just also point out is that the families are taken care of very well up in Alaska. They love living there. It's a great base for us, because of its location and its ability to respond to the Pacific and other areas as well, if needed. So, it's a key component of our Army of the future.

Mr. MCHUGH. May I just—

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. It's okay.

Mr. MCHUGH. Somewhat of a prejudiced view on my part, I guess, but my 17 years in the House, I represented the Fort Drum region, which is close to the Canadian border, and I was very fond of saying, and it applies to Alaska as well, not everywhere we fight has palm trees. I mean it's nice to be able to train to sometimes less conducive climates than other places might provide. And that's important to weather acclimate our soldiers.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. I recall flying over parts of Afghanistan and looking down at this very remote area, very mountainous, very tough country, and thinking, "It looks just like home." So, it is a great place to train.

I wanted to ask, also, a couple questions about the retirement of the C-23s, the Sherpas, here. Last fall, the subcommittee was briefed on the plan to divest the C-23s by fiscal year 2015. And in the briefing materials, it indicated that there would be a possibility that the Army would reconsider that divestment decision, if the Air Force makes the determination to retire the C-27.

Well, now that the Air Force has proposed that retirement, I am hopeful and would certainly encourage the Army to revisit its decision to retire the C-23. Can you tell me whether or not the Army does intend to relook at that?

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

General ODIERNO. I would just say we have not made any permanent decision. However, I would say we have some issues because the C-23, as you're aware, is an old aircraft.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Right.

General ODIERNO. It's very expensive to sustain. It doesn't really quite meet the requirements that we have. I said earlier, we've identified a requirement that we need intra-theater with, which is kind of the role the C-23 plays. And that requirement has not changed.

Now, as we began to develop the C-27, the program was turned over to the Air Force. The Air Force has told us that they can provide C-130s to accomplish that mission. So, we are in agreement.

We are working with them now to use the C-130, which would be direct support to Army units that would allow us to do that intra-theater lift. So, that's the solution we're headed—that's the road we're headed down right now, as that will be our solution.

We'll continue to assess the C-23 program, as we move forward. But, frankly, especially with the current budget constraints, it's going to be very difficult for us, in my opinion, to sustain the C-23 program. But I'll turn it over to the Secretary.

Mr. McHUGH. Just the budgetary fiscal realities are simply to modernize these aircraft, which we would have to do, given their age. But modernization and longer-term sustain, that is between \$800,000 and \$1 million per aircraft. So, it really is a tough budgetary decision that we're going to make, what we'll have to make. But, as the Chief said, particularly as our intra-theater lift situation has evolved with the Air Force, you know, we're always willing to re-evaluate and change a decision where necessary. But that program has some real dollars attached to it.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, let me ask a follow-on. This is coming from a number of the Adjutant Generals, who think that extending the life of the C-23s is a bargain, at about \$90 million. They've asked me to inquire whether or not the National Guard's cargo lift needs can be filled at a lower-price point, given that the C-27s will not be available to the Guard.

General ODIERNO. Well, I think this is something that has to be decided at the Department of Defense level, as we look at this, and whether we believe the C-130s can fill that Guard need as well.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But that is being factored in.

General ODIERNO. It needs to be. It absolutely has to be factored into this, as we look at this, because if we divest of the C-235, there is need in the Guard.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Right.

General ODIERNO. There's no doubt about it. We recognize that, and I think that as we divest the C-23, that has to be picked up, and I think part of our discussion is that the C-130s will have to help us do that, as a lift capability that would be needed for us to support National Guard missions, simply for the Adjutant Generals.

Mr. McHUGH. And I believe, according to the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that should we divest the 23s, we have to at least offer to the States' executives the opportunity to take those aircraft. So, that's part of the consideration as well.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much. I had a few questions that I wanted to ask before I left. Every member of this subcommittee has been concerned about the increase in suicide rates, in alcohol abuse rates, and divorce rates. In fact, the civilian suicide rate, if I recall, is 18 per 100,000. The Army is 24 per 100,000. I note that you have instituted an education program for suicide prevention. I know that it's too early to tell, but what do you think will be the future now?

SUICIDE

Mr. MCHUGH. Of the many things that trouble us all, Mr. Chairman, the areas you just spoke about, and particularly suicide, are amongst the most troubling. I sign a letter of condolence to every survivor, and I usually do that on the weekends, and I'm just struck by how many letters are associated with a soldier taking his or her life. It's breathtakingly sad.

And as you noted as well, we tried to take a multilevel approach. Our capstone program is the ask, care, and assist program, the Ask, Care, Escort (ACE) program, to try to bring suicide awareness to virtually every member of the United States Army, to tell them what they should be looking for in a troubled buddy, but also that it's their military responsibility to care about that, and to act and intervene, and assist that person to go get the help that's necessary.

We have funded this to what we believe is the necessary requirement, but that's not enough. We're trading what we call gatekeepers in the Applied Science Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) program, the suicide ASIST program, so that they can have a higher level of expertise, people like chaplains, and others in positions of responsibility, where they come in contact with a lot of soldiers who are specially trained to recognize when a soldier is having challenges, and there, again, to provide them a path by which they can get some help.

None of that will work, and it really goes back to Senator Murray's, I think, very appropriate comments about if a soldier is afraid to reach out, if they feel that their professional military career will be hurt, we're trying to do everything we can to destigmatize that, to ensure that a soldier in need will not feel inhibited in reaching out for behavioral healthcare.

We've made some progress over the last 5 years, I believe, the data point is. We've had 100,000 more soldiers self-refer for behavioral health problems. But that's simply enough.

Last, we, in the Army, have engaged with the National Institute of Mental Health in a 5-year longitudinal study that has made virtually every member of the United States Army part of a causal look at suicide, to try to understand where there may exist signs and commonalities, whether it's deployment, whether it's young soldiers, whatever it may be, so that we can be proactive, get out in front of it, not just writing letters of condolences but to recognize when a soldier is likely to have problems, and to step in. But, as the statistics show, I believe it was 134 suicides last year, the numbers continue to frustrate us.

Chairman INOUE. General, do you have anything to add?

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could, I would just say, you know, I get notified of whenever a suicide happens, and unfortunately, it's alarming how many times I'm notified about a suicide. That's been one of the things that's been eye opening for me as I have become the Chief of Staff of the Army during the last 6 months.

Suicides have leveled off, but that's not success, because it's still, as you mentioned, at the highest levels we've had in a very long time. So, what we're doing, it's a combination program, as you know, and I think we've talked about it before, you know, where

it's health promotion. It's about trying to decrease risky behavior. And it's also about improving suicide prevention capability. So, it's a combination of all three of those, as we work through this program.

It's about resiliency. It's about trying to understand resiliency. It's about having programs not only for our soldiers, but our family members as well, as they face some of these challenges. We are trying address this bigger than suicides.

I don't like to use "we were so busy" as an excuse, and I will never use that as an excuse. We have to get our leaders back involved with more individual soldier activities, and counseling, and understanding what they're doing. We have to decrease the movement of our soldiers between commands. We have to reduce the amount of changes they have in their leadership within their units, because I think this all causes them not to sometimes report when they're having problems.

When they've built a long-term relationship with a noncommissioned officer and he leaves, and/or commander, and so we're looking at all of those areas, as we can fix that, to provide more stability and predictability that I think will add to us helping to identify and solve some of these issues that we continue to have. It's going to be something that's going to continue to take time.

I absolutely believe that our leaders are dedicated to doing this. We are dedicated to providing them the tools. The funding for this program is funded at the requested level. We have not taken any reduction in the funding of any of our programs that has to do with behavioral health, that has to do with suicide prevention, because it's an important program to us. And we will continue to emphasize this, and we will continue to work with outside agencies who can help us to identify the risky behaviors, and the indicators that we see of potential individuals who are risky to suicidal ideation or, you know, the commitment of suicide, and we'll continue to work that very hard, Senator.

Chairman INOUE. I have one final question, and I'd like to submit the rest.

This past January, the Secretary of Defense unveiled the new national security strategy for the Asia-Pacific area, and it was rather obvious that the Navy and Air Force did well. Forces were increased as well as equipment and resources. But, in the case of the Army, with the exception of Korea, it seemed to have come down. I find this rather strange. Do you have any thoughts on this?

ARMY ROLE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

General ODIERNO. I would say, Senator, as we went through this process, first, we were involved in the process. I was involved in the process from the beginning. I was able to express my opinions. I was able to talk about the risk to the Army, and what we thought we needed for the Army of the future.

But it came down to really one issue, and that is, do we believe we need the size of the Army that will cause us to continue to rotate large amount of forces for long periods of time to support long-term operations, whether it be a counterinsurgency operation, whether it be a stability operation. And the determination was that we can take some risk in the fact that we will not have to conduct

long-term stability operations, and that we can mitigate that risk through reversibility and the use of our Reserve component, if it does occur, which would buy us time to rebuild the army.

And I think as we were faced with the budget reductions, I think we agreed that a 490,000-man Active component Army that is equipped properly, that has the money to sustain its readiness, although has risk to it, will enable us to accomplish the missions of the new strategy, and that we will be able to support the strategy in the Asia-Pacific but also to continue to provide support in the Middle East as well.

So, although there's some risk, as we've talked about already, we believe that this is not a competition between the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, it's about having the right joint force to accomplish the mission. And I believe that we now have the right joint force to move forward.

My concerns are that in the future, if we continue to look at reducing the Army more, then we have some real issues, and that's when my concern will grow significantly, Senator.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Chairman INOUE. My one concern is the question marks. We are reducing our forces, but yet there's a big question mark over Iran and a big question mark over Syria. There's also a question mark over Egypt. Are the risks too great? I don't know.

I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for your service to our Nation. And this subcommittee looks forward to working with you.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY JOHN M. MCHUGH

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEM/BLUE FORCE TRACKING

Question. The Army has two mobile tracking systems: Movement Tracking System (MTS) and Blue Force Tracking (BFT-1) which utilizes satellite communications to track transportation and armored vehicles. More than 120,000 BFT and MTS systems have been fielded to date, of which approximately 11,000 unique users are active in Afghanistan over any given month. These systems generate nearly the entire common operating picture of mobile ground force situational awareness in Afghanistan and are often the only means of communication for soldiers whose missions take them out of range of terrestrial means of communication. What is the status of developing the follow on BFT-2 and BFT-3 X band?

Answer. The development of the BFT-2 satellite transceiver is complete. The final production acceptance testing for ground systems has been completed and the Army is currently receiving deliveries. Aviation testing is approximately 75 percent complete. The Army is fielding the BFT-2 network to units in Korea and will begin fielding to the United States Army Forces Command units in May. The United States Government owns and operates the network equipment, and the software is in place to support required test events and fielding operations. There are currently no development efforts funded for a BFT-3 capability.

Question. Is the BFT-2 development over budget and behind schedule? What are the projected costs associated with continuing to develop BFT-2?

Answer. The BFT-2 development was completed in 2010. The current BFT-2 production contract is a Firm Fixed Price contract and production remains within the planned budget. There are no additional costs associated with the development of the BFT-2 capability.

Question. What are the potential cost savings if the Army bypassed BFT-2 development and focused on BFT-3 X band?

Answer. The BFT-2 development is complete; therefore, there would be no cost savings associated with bypassing the BFT-2 development.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

HIGH-MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLES

Question. Documentation for a May 2011 reprogramming action states that “the Army has procured sufficient High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to meet the Army’s Acquisition Objective (AAO).” While this reprogramming rescinded \$182,000,000 from this account, according to the document there is still a balance of \$422,356,000. How much of the funding in the Army HMMWV procurement account is currently unobligated?

Answer. The amount of unobligated funds in HMMWV fiscal year 2010 new production procurement account is \$19.548 million. These funds have been committed and will be obligated by June 2012.

Question. Funding has been appropriated in prior years for both survivability and mobility enhancements for the existing HMMWV fleet and for the Army’s HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Program. What are the current unobligated balances in these two accounts?

Answer. The Fiscal Year 2012 Project/PE was authorized \$70 million. The Army has not obligated any of these funds due to an uncertain future for the modernized expanded capacity vehicle (MECV) effort. Decisions by Army leadership within the last month have determined that \$20 million will be used for the survivability improvements as requested and appropriated. We will then be asking that the Congress allow us to use the remainder for automotive improvements to our existing fleet and higher-priority requirements. This funding is projected to be obligated in 4th quarter 2012 and 1st quarter 2013.

Question. The President’s budget for fiscal year 2013 recommends terminating the Army’s HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Program. How does the Army propose to spend the unobligated balance in this account?

Answer. The Army will no longer pursue the HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Program (also known as the MECV). The Army is currently looking at the options available for the execution of the funds.

TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE STRATEGY

Question. The Army 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy outlines a plan to “replace all M939-series trucks with FMTV FoVs no later than FY22.” The strategy states that, “Divesting these vehicles will ensure dramatically lower sustainment costs for the Army as many are well past their EUL.”

Will the cuts in family of medium tactical vehicle (FMTV) purchasing in fiscal year 2013 and proposed termination of FMTV procurement after fiscal year 2014 delay the divestiture of the M939-series trucks?

Answer. The Army is currently reviewing all of its fleet requirements. In the aggregate, the Army’s current plans for FMTV procurements through fiscal year 2014 and fleet reductions should divest the M939-series by fiscal year 2016, with the possible exception of some specialty variants, provided there are no additional cuts in funding.

Question. Compared to the original plan outlined in the Army 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, how much higher will the Army’s maintenance costs be over the 10-year budget window due to increased use of the M939-series trucks?

Answer. The Army does not anticipate an increase in use of the M900-series vehicles over the 10-year budget window and, as a result, these vehicles will not incur higher maintenance costs. The Army is currently revising its medium tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition objective and expects to meet the reduced acquisition objective at the end of the current family of medium tactical vehicles production contract in fiscal year 2014. This will enable the Army to divest the remaining M900-series medium tactical vehicles without an increase in their use.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS

Question. I want to thank you yesterday for sitting down and discussing the issues of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)/Department of Defense (DOD) collaboration.

As you said one of the major issues is the inability for the two agencies to share electronic medical records.

To this end, you said you were going to start a pilot that may get off the ground in 3 years to try and make progress.

Mr. Secretary, the Congress has been pushing you to move forward for years on this effort, we passed legislation that you voted for as a House member many years ago, and yet after 10 years of war you are still talking about a pilot program and an inability to get this effort off the ground.

What can you tell this subcommittee, and millions of soldiers who need this effort taken seriously, and me about how you will make shared medical records a reality so we are not sitting here 3 years from now and hear from you about some pilot program you are intending to create in the future?

Answer. Since 2006, DOD/VA shares data through the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange through which DOD and VA clinicians access each other's health data via a secure real-time interface. The Bidirectional Health Information Exchange shares data between DOD/VA only, whereas another initiative, the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) shares information with private partners through the Nationwide Health Information Exchange. The VLER is currently a pilot program with DOD participating at four sites including, San Diego, California; Tidewater areas of Virginia; Spokane, Washington; and Puget Sound, Washington. Through the VLER, providers have the ability to query the Nationwide Health Information Exchange to view information other healthcare organizations made available on their patient. A decision regarding the deployability of the VLER across the enterprise should be made in the summer of 2012.

The Interagency Program Office (IPO) has been re-chartered as the single point of accountability for the integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR). All three services are involved at various levels of the governance process to ensure the project stays on schedule and within budget. The IPO reports to the Health Executive Council with representation from Health Affairs and the VA. DOD and VA are committed to the iEHR effort. The iEHR will enable DOD and VA to align resources and investments with business needs and programs. The iEHR will leverage open source solution development to foster innovation and expedite delivery of a viable and effective solution.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Question. Are there any further legislative steps that the Congress could take to improve the screening and delivery of care to military personnel with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI)?

Answer. Continued congressional support of the Army's TBI and PTSD clinical and research efforts will ensure improved screening and delivery of care.

REPLACEMENT OF IRELAND ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AT FORT KNOX

Question. In response to a question for the record, I submitted in 2011, the Army stated that "The Army intends to replace Ireland Army Community Hospital (IACH). The current Defense Health Program Future Year Defense Program includes a phased funded replacement project for IACH beginning in fiscal year 2013." However, the President's fiscal year 2013 budget did not include a funding request for the replacement of IACH at Fort Knox. When does the Army intend to build a replacement and when will the Army plan on requesting funding for the project?

Answer. The Fort Knox Hospital Replacement Project is 35 percent designed. This project is being programmed in two phases: Phase 1 Inpatient at a cost of \$308.5 million and Phase 2 Outpatient at a cost of \$257.5 million. The U.S. Army MEDCOM is reviewing the project documentation and updating the Healthcare Requirements Analysis in preparation for resubmission to the fiscal year 2014 budget estimate submission for phase 1. The Department of Defense position on the Fort Knox Hospital Replacement is to revalidate the project scope in light of ongoing military health systemwide inpatient analysis by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD (HA)). The Army Medical Department must

scope this facility based on efficient and effective healthcare operations, but must also incorporate current and future installation and military treatment facilities missions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHINSON

INACTIVATION OF THE 172ND HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Question. Secretary McHugh, while I am encouraged to see that the Army is eliminating two permanently based brigade combat teams from Germany, I do have a question as to the timing for this proposed move. As you are aware, the Army will inactivate the 170th Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in fiscal year 2013 but is waiting until fiscal year 2014 to inactivate the 172nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team. Why is the Army waiting until fiscal year 2014 to cut the second brigade and how much will it cost the United States taxpayers to sustain this brigade in Germany an additional year?

Answer. The 172nd Brigade deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and was not available to inactivate in fiscal year 2013. When the unit returns from combat, it will conduct 6 months of soldier and family re-integration and begin incremental battalion level draw-downs and ultimately leave the force in early fiscal year 2014. Therefore, savings cannot be significantly accelerated and no additional resources can be saved.

MULTIYEAR CONTRACT FOR THE CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTER

Question. Secretary McHugh, as part of this year's budget, you have submitted a request for approval to enter into a second multiyear contract for the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. This multiyear contract would last for 5 years and produce 155 aircraft, 12 of which would be for the Texas National Guard. You've already had experience with a 5-year multiyear contract for Chinooks; the first one expires this year. Given this experience, what have you seen as the biggest benefits for both the Army and the taxpayer that led you to request authority for a second multiyear contract?

Answer. The biggest benefit to the taxpayer is the savings; \$449 million on the base contract for 181 CH-47F aircraft. The current Chinook multiyear contract is a firm fixed-price contract for fiscal year 2008–2012. The contract has executed on cost and delivered on schedule. In addition to the base contract savings, the program office procured 34 option aircraft for an additional \$86 million in savings. The second requested multiyear contract is projected to yield 10-percent savings or \$373 million.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

MEDIUM EXPANDED CAPABILITY VEHICLE

Question. Last year, this subcommittee added \$20 million to fund the design competition for the medium expanded capability vehicle (MECV). The President's budget for this year, however, seeks to cancel this program, even though the air assault requirements for 5,700 survivable trucks capable of being transported by a Chinook helicopter remain unchanged. I am uncomfortable with the decision to cancel the MECV design competition because it will increase the risk to our air assault soldiers. The tactical wheeled vehicle budget was reduced by 57 percent compared to last year's budget request, and the decision to cancel the MECV appears to be the result of insufficient procurement funding in the near-term budget window to move forward with both the MECV and joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) programs. Was the decision to cancel the MECV program based solely on the fiscal constraints the Army faced?

Answer. The decision not to begin the MECV was due to Defense-wide funding constraints; not just fiscal constraints faced by the Army. The Army and Marine Corps' made the decision to proceed with JLTV to fill the capability gaps for light tactical vehicles. MECV was deemed a lower-priority program.

Question. The funding necessary to conduct the MECV design competition has already been authorized and appropriated for this purpose in last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act. Proceeding with the MECV design competition would provide you with the necessary performance and life-cycle cost data to make an informed decision regarding the most survivable and cost-effective way to fulfill the capability gap to lift a survivable tactical wheeled vehicle for our air assault and airborne units at high, hot conditions. Does the air assault requirement for a survivable tactical wheeled vehi-

cle that can be lifted by a CH-47 Chinook in high-altitude and/or high-temperature conditions still exist?

Answer. Yes, the requirement for the air assault mission to lift a survivable light tactical vehicle with the CH-47 Chinook in high/hot conditions (4,000 feet/95 °F) still exists. The original requirement was addressed in the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) Operational Requirements Document in September 2004.

SUICIDE—HIRING OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SPECIALISTS

Question. Many of us on this panel have a great deal of respect for the former Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, who authored the Army's Gold Book in response to concerns about suicides and the health of the force. Before he retired, he came over to the Hill to discuss the Army's efforts to reduce the incidence of suicide in the force and the ongoing efforts to treat the underlying problems that lead far too many of our Nations' best men and women to contemplate or perform suicide. General Chiarelli identified access to behavioral healthcare as one way to reduce the rate of suicide. There have been several efforts by the Congress to expand access to providers, including a provision in last year's NDAA to utilize telehealth initiatives, and I want to applaud the Army for submitting a legislative proposal this year to expand the number and types of providers that may conduct evaluations during preseparation screening. I fully intend on supporting this proposal, but the problem will not be solved by this measure alone.

Secretary McHugh, are there any other requests you would make to allow for rapid hiring of additional behavioral health specialists, even if on a temporary basis, to address both the rate of suicides and alleviate pressure on your existing behavioral health force?

Answer. The permanent extension of 10 U.S.C. 1599c, which provides for expedited hiring authority for certain healthcare professionals, including behavioral health specialists, would provide the long-term critical ability to hire behavior healthcare providers more rapidly.

MEDICAL AND DISABILITY EVALUATIONS

Question. During the past year the length of time that wounded warriors and recently discharged veterans have been waiting for disability evaluations has continued to suffer. For Active-Duty members the average evaluation completion time increased by 88 days from March 2010 to January 2012. It takes more than a year right now.

In addition, medical evaluation boards still take twice as long as the 35-day target. Several senior officers, including the former Vice Chief, have identified the Integrated Disability Evaluation System and the dual adjudication process as impediments to rapid evaluations and outcomes for our veterans.

What administrative actions are being taken or what legislative proposals could be implemented to improve the time it takes to conduct the medical and disability evaluations for our wounded soldiers?

Answer. The Army is aggressively working to improve performance of the Disability Evaluation System (DES). We are currently implementing a number of initiatives designed to improve the performance, including:

- adding more than 1,100 in staffing;
- publishing guidance to standardize the process across the Army;
- improving our training; and
- establishing procedures that will enhance the sharing of information with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

The Army is looking at several different options to improve the DES—one of which would be a process in which DOD determines a disabled servicemember's fitness for duty, and if found unfit, provide a lifetime annuity based on the member's rank and years of service. VA would then establish compensation for service-connected injuries, disease, or wounds. We believe this type of system would achieve an average disability process outcome in less than 90 days:

- improved readiness;
- reduced complexity;
- decreased impact on limited medical resources; and
- be less adversarial.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL COATS

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Question. Regarding the funding provided by this subcommittee for Overseas Contingency Operations, does the Army have the flexibility it needs to transfer funds between accounts to ensure funding is used wisely and does not expire?

Answer. Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding for operational requirements was previously distributed in subactivity group (SAG) 135. To comply with House Report 112–331, the Conference Report that accompanied Public Law 112–74, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, specifically pages 759–761, Army distributed OCO funding into SAGs previously used exclusively for base resources (114, 115, 116, 121, 122, and 131). Issuing OCO funding in base SAGs, some with reprogramming restrictions (for example, SAG 131), limits Army's execution in those SAGs to requirements consistent with the SAG description. To realign resources across SAGs to meet emerging requirements requires a reprogramming action. These reprogramming actions are time consuming and are sometimes limited to relatively low thresholds (for example no more than \$15 million may be moved out of SAG 131 without congressional prior approval). Army executed resources responsibly and with greater flexibility when there were fewer OCO SAGs. The drawdown of deployed forces may also further complicate administering Army OCO accounts as evolving priorities and requirements may shift faster than fiscal rules accommodate.

Question. Since its inception, has any funding provided for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) expired?

Answer. Yes, we have had ASFF funds expire. Since fiscal year 2005, we have had an obligation rate greater than 99.5 percent per year resulting in a cumulative total of \$46 million unobligated over 6 years, of \$27.9 billion available.

Question. What mechanisms does the Army utilize to ensure funding is not allowed to expire at the end of each fiscal year?

Answer. The Army has several mechanisms in place to ensure funding is not allowed to expire each fiscal year. Senior leaders review Army obligations on a weekly basis. Our operations and maintenance appropriation spend plan is reviewed monthly to ensure we are in accordance with the mandate of no more than 20 percent of the appropriation shall be obligated during the last 2 months of the fiscal year; thus putting the Army on a glide path for 100-percent execution of its appropriation. In addition, each year the Army conducts Mid Year Review (MYR)—a senior leader comprehensive look at command execution through end-of-month March. Resources are realigned to optimize their use for Army requirements. The MYR is also provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and any resources excess to Army needs would be used for Department of Defense requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

POST-DEPLOYMENT/MOBILIZATION RESPITE ABSENCE PROGRAM

Question. Due to Government errors at demobilization sites, many soldiers did not receive the full amount of administrative leave that they were allowed under the Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence Program (PDMRA). How many soldiers have been credited with extra days of PDMRA administrative leave by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) to correct this mistake?

Answer. The ABCMR granted 466 soldiers authority to use PDMRA days they had earned but were not afforded the opportunity to use. Their records were corrected to show that they are authorized to use these days of PDMRA upon the next qualifying deployment/mobilization. Authority to use these PDMRA days will expire upon the soldier's transfer from an authorized Reserve component status.

Question. For those soldiers credited with extra days of PDMRA administrative leave by the ABCMR, what is the average number of additional days each soldier has received through the ABCMR process?

Answer. The average PDMRA days granted by ABCMR was 26 days.

Question. Of the soldiers who have been credited with extra days of PDMRA leave by the ABCMR, how many have already used the leave, are currently on a deployment which will make them eligible to use the leave, or are scheduled for such a deployment in the future?

Answer. The Army is unable to provide specific numbers to this question since the Reserve components, Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Office of the Chief

of Army Reserve (OCAR), were never required to track PDMRA to this level of detail. However, ABCMR reviewed applications from 604 soldiers who sought monetary reimbursement or credit for PDMRA days which were earned but not used. Future deployment numbers are unknown as this is a function of demand. Current Reserve component soldiers on mobilization orders are approximately 46,650.

Question. Some soldiers who have been credited with extra days of PDMRA leave by the ABCMR will never be eligible to use this leave since they will not deploy again. How do you propose that the Government's mistakes be remedied in the cases of these soldiers?

Answer. The Army no longer has authority under section 604 of Public Law 111-84 (the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act) to provide monetary compensation to soldiers or former soldiers for PDMRA leave. As such, we have no remedy for former soldiers. For current soldiers, the only available remedy to address the extra PDMRA leave they may have been credited with is for those soldiers to participate in subsequent deployments.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

PREPARING SOLDIERS FOR THE TRANSITION OUT OF THE MILITARY

Question. General Odierno, I recently attended a number of veterans' roundtables back in my home State of Washington. Time and time again, I hear similar stories of struggle. Veterans do not put their military service on their résumés because they feel that employers will find them less desirable. Also, employers are often unable to understand all of the skills veterans bring to a workplace.

I am concerned as the Army begins to downsize by 80,000 soldiers over the next 5 years, how these soldiers will transition in a difficult economy and how that will impact the Army's bottom line with the increasing tab for unemployment compensation.

The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) provides critical services for our soldiers transitioning to a postmilitary career. I am concerned that with the reduction in temporary end-strength that the Army will not have enough counselors on hand to assist—especially as ACAP changes and requires more intensive preparation beginning 15 to 18 months prior to separation.

Have you adequately budgeted to reflect an increase in ACAP counselors to address this surge in separations?

Answer. The Army is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the additional counselors and staff that will be required to address the additional throughput of soldiers. Resources are being identified to reallocate to our transition program to ensure all transition requirements by all soldiers are met.

ACAP delivers a world-class transition program for America's Army that ensures all eligible transitioners have the knowledge, skills, and self-confidence necessary to be competitive and successful in the global workforce. ACAP helps transitioning soldiers make informed career decisions through benefits counseling and employment assistance. ACAP is responsible for delivering both transition assistance and employment assistance services.

Some examples of programs available through ACAP are:

- Transition Assistance Program (TAP) Employment Workshops;
- Employment Assistance to include résumé writing and "Dress for Success";
- Health Benefits Transition Brief;
- Survivor Benefits Plan Brief; and
- Veterans Affairs Disability Brief.

The Army is also utilizing the Hero 2 Hired (H2H) as its interim employment application/tool (www.H2H.jobs) to provide one primary location where soldiers of all components, veterans, and family members can connect with private industry employment opportunities. This application is Web-based and able to translate military occupational skills (MOS), provide career path exploration, upload résumés, allow customized job searches, enable employers to also search for veterans, and provide performance metrics. H2H will eventually be included on eBenefits, the single portal for transition benefits selected by the Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force (www.eBenefits.va.gov).

Question. I understand ACAP does a lot to prepare soldiers for the transition out of the military through career and transition counseling. But the military spends hundreds of millions of dollars on unemployment insurance for those who were unable to find civilian employment. As you know, my Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire Heroes legislation makes a range of improvements designed to help

get servicemembers and veterans into good civilian jobs. Part of that legislation dealt with helping servicemembers transition skills that have a direct correlation to civilian licensure or certification. What are you doing so far to implement this legislation?

Answer. Army Continuing Education System (ACES) has a program currently in place to support in-service and transitioning soldiers in obtaining certifications and licensure. The Credentialing Opportunities On-Line (COOL) program (www.cool.army.mil) provides soldiers with information on civilian licensures and certifications relevant to their Army Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The COOL program provides each soldier an MOS crosswalk to civilian skills. Also, Certification and Licensure for each MOS is listed in COOL along with the estimated availability of a first-term soldier to obtain a credential and the resources (GI bill, Army e-Learning, ACE credit) to obtain each certification.

The Army Transition Implementation Plan outlines how the Army will operatively incorporate the transition requirements mandated by the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, and the Presidential Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force (VEI TF) recommendations. The Army Transition Implementation Plan was developed at the Army Transition Plan Working Group comprised of representatives from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), U.S. Army Reserves (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG). The working group focused on integrating the requirements established by the VOW Act and VEI TF, in coordination with the Veterans Administration (VA), Department of Labor (DOL), and Small Business Administration (SBA). The working group will evolve the transition landscape from that of an end of service program, to one that provides a blended transition-training and services delivery model, integrating transition education as part of a soldier's military life-cycle. As transition is introduced into the military lifecycle, soldiers, leaders, and transition service providers, will maintain transition awareness that best prepares soldiers for life after the Army.

The Army Transition Implementation Plan was approved in April 2012. Concurrently, Army transition service providers and interagency partners, are in development of revised transition curricula, for piloting in July 2012. The Army will pilot the VOW Act and VEI TF requirements at select Active component installations and Reserve Component locations. The Army has identified an official employment portal, <https://H2H.JOBS>, "Hero to Hired," where soldiers can search for jobs and employers can post job openings.

Army-wide implementation for VOW Act and VEI TF requirements will take place no later than November 21, 2012. The Army Transition Implementation plan accomplishes:

Veterans Opportunity to Work Act Requirements.—Pre-separation Counseling, VA Benefits Briefing, DOL Employment Workshop—implementation for all Army components no later than November 21, 2012.

Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for a Core Curriculum.—Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) Crosswalk, VA Applications, Financial Planning, Individual Transition Plan (ITP) Preparation—implementation no later than November 21, 2012.

Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for a "Goals, Plans, Success" Curriculum.—Goals, Plans, Success (GPS) provides the opportunity for soldiers to attend additional training sessions on continuing higher education, pursuing technical education/certification, or venturing towards entrepreneurship. GPS curriculum is divided into an Education Track, Technical Training Track, and Entrepreneurship Track, with implementation in October 2013.

Veterans Employment Initiative Task Force Requirements for an End of Career, Transition CAPSTONE Event, To Mitigate Any Risks for Possible Negative Transition Outcomes After Separation and Connect Jobs to Soldiers (H2H.JOBS).—CAPSTONE will identify soldiers confidence and preparedness for transition, with the ability to "re-train" as appropriate. CAPSTONE implementation will be October 2013.

Military Life Cycle for Transition.—Military Life Cycle for Transition will parallel transition readiness with military career progression, as transition education will be integrated in a soldiers military education throughout their career. Military Life Cycle (MLC) will be implemented October 2014.

Pre-Apprenticeship.—We have begun initial staff analysis and planning to develop and implement a pre-apprenticeship program authorized by subsection 225 of your HHA. This training program is intended for transitioning Active-Duty soldiers, offered through an industry partner and seeks to capitalize on an opportunity to address local labor needs with soldiers by reducing training cost to employers. It allows transitioning servicemembers, who have been vetted

through appropriate channels, and meet prerequisites, to participate in a preapprenticeship program that provides credit toward a program registered under the National Apprenticeship Act. Wounded Warriors—Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) is an existing DOD program focused on warrior care; the goal of E2I is to ensure consistent offerings to all recovering service members by synchronizing, integrating and expanding the education and employment opportunities for them and their families. E2I will ensure the service member is engaged early in their recovery process to identify skills and develop a career plan that leverages those skills. Through the execution of their career plan, servicemembers will ultimately be matched with education and career opportunities that increase their career readiness and better prepare them for a successful transition from their service.

Apprenticeship.—Training and Doctrine Command has mapped Army MOS's to assist in developing an Army program similar to the United States Military Apprenticeship Program (USMAP), managed by Naval Education and Training Command. A formal military training program that provides Active-Duty Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy service members the opportunity to improve their job skills and to complete their civilian apprenticeship requirements while they are on active duty. Our goal is to implement this program in concert with Military Life Cycle implementation timelines.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

MQ-8B FIRE SCOUT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. General Odierno, I've been informed that the Army's 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in Afghanistan is being supported by an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force led land-based deployment of MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicles. I understand the MQ-8B is providing the 37th IBCT with full-motion video for route clearance and tactical ISR in an austere operating environment near Kunduz. Would you please provide the subcommittee information on who's operating the MQ-8B's in Afghanistan and more details on the types of missions and performance of the MQ-8B in Afghanistan?

Answer. In May 2011, the U.S. Navy deployed three MQ-8B Aircraft to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These aircraft are operated by Northrop Grumman which is contracted to provide 300 hours of Electro Optical/Infrared Full Motion Video per month. While the aircraft are owned by the Navy, the deployment of this contractor flown system was funded by the ISR Task Force.

ARMED AERIAL SCOUT HELICOPTER

Question. General Odierno, the Congress approved fiscal year 2012 funding for the Army to conduct a flight demonstration of Armed Scout helicopter capabilities. When do you expect to conduct this demonstration; what do you expect to glean from it; and do you plan to use the results of this demonstration to inform the Department's fiscal year 2014 budgeting process and the way ahead for this needed capability?

Answer. The Army has requested authority to release a Request for Information (RFI) and conduct the voluntary flight demonstration. Once authorized to release the RFI, the Army expects to receive responses within approximately 60 days. The demonstrations will begin approximately 120 days after RFI release.

The purpose of the RFI and voluntary flight demonstration is to assess the current state of technology within industry. Results will be captured according to each individual respondent's level of participation. Our path forward with the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) will enable us to make an informed capabilities decision and, subsequently, a materiel solution option recommendation, to the Defense Acquisition Executive based on the current state of technology in the market place. The AAS RFI, industry discussions, and the voluntary flight demonstration will inform a future materiel solution option recommendation that represents a medium-risk program with achievable and affordable requirements within the current and future fiscal environment.

The results of the RFI and voluntary flight demonstration is intended to inform the Department's fiscal year 2014 budgeting process and the way ahead for this needed capability.

TACTICAL FUEL SYSTEMS

Question. General Odierno, I am aware the Army Combined Arms Support Command identified an operational gap for its tactical fuel system. I have been informed

that there is a need for collapsible fuel tank storage systems to support a much longer use life than what is being used by the Army. The subcommittee is aware of field reports which indicate premature degradation and outright failure within the first year of use for current systems. Have you evaluated the 10-year service-life capabilities of Nitrile rubber collapsible storage tanks currently used by the United States Marine Corps? What is the life-cycle cost differential between the Army systems and the Nitrile rubber systems being used by the Marines?

Answer. The Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) has not performed a 10-year service-life capabilities analysis for the Nitrile collapsible tank; however, they did perform a limited performance comparison between the Nitrile tank and the polyurethane tanks.

TARDEC purchased Nitrile and polyurethane tanks that conformed to the TRI-Services specifications for fuel tanks. The TRI-Services group is a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) led entity that, among other responsibilities, sets the specifications for fuel tanks.

TARDEC provided the following information from their comparison between the Nitrile and polyurethane tanks:

- Nitrile tanks were 11 percent more expensive to produce on a unit cost basis. This difference can be attributed to:
 - Nitrile is a more expensive raw material than polyurethane.
 - The fabrication of a nitrile fuel tank is more labor intensive.
- Maintenance and repair costs are equivalent.
- Costs of technical manuals and logistics data are equivalent.
- Fielding and training costs are equivalent.
- Disposal costs are equivalent.

The TARDEC comparison did not address the difference in service life between the two collapsible bags; however, Defense Logistics Agency-Energy will conduct separate research and development tests on both Nitrile and polyurethane-coated tanks. The projected completion of those tests is estimated to be October 2013 and April 2014, respectively.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

ELIMINATION OF ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

Question. In your testimony, you mentioned the Army's plans to eliminate at least eight brigade combat teams (BCTs). What are the criteria that the Army will use in deciding which BCTs will stay and which will go?

Answer. The Army will consider a broad array of criteria for inactivation of the eight BCTs to make strategically sound, resource informed decisions. Criteria will be based on strategic considerations, operational effectiveness, geographic distribution, cost and the ability to meet statutory requirements.

Strategic Considerations.—Aligns Army Force Structure to the new Defense Strategy and forthcoming Defense Planning Guidance with a priority on the Pacific region.

Operational Considerations.—Seeks to maximize training facilities, deployment infrastructure, and facilities to support the well-being of soldiers and their families. Aligns appropriate oversight/leadership by senior Army headquarters for better command and control.

Geographic Distribution.—Seeks to distribute units in the United States to preserve a broad base of support and linkage to the American people.

Cost.—Considers the impacts of military personnel, equipment, military construction, and transportation costs.

Statutory Requirements.—Complies with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as appropriate, including an environmental and socio-economic analysis.

Question. Will the Congress be consulted ahead of time on the proposed BCT decisions? If not, why not?

Answer. The Army is considering a number of potential options, but no final decisions have been made as to which U.S.-based BCTs will be drawn down. An announcement on specific force structure actions is expected sometime before, or in conjunction with, submission of the fiscal year 2014 President's budget in early February 2013. The Army will develop a plan that will provide detailed information regarding the draw down and address notification of affected Army installations and appropriate Congressional Committees as required by section 2864 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act prior to the decision going into effect.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHINSON

SUICIDE VEST DETECTION

Question. General Odierno, Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have spent approximately \$50 million developing and deploying technology that automatically identifies people potentially wearing suicide vests at stand-off ranges. However, this technology is still not currently available to many bases in Afghanistan as well as in the United States. What is the Army doing today in Afghanistan to screen personnel at stand-off ranges that are seeking access to our bases where this technology is not available?

Answer. The Army and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) have resourced more than \$500 million for Entry Control Point (ECP) solutions alone. The Army has employed several solutions in Afghanistan to screen personnel at stand-off distances including:

- Counter Bomber 3 (CB-3);
- Standoff Suicide Bomber Detection System (SSBDS);
- Subtle madness;
- Light guard;
- Rapid scan;
- Backscatter vans;
- walkthrough metal detectors;
- Biometrics, random anti-terrorism measures (RAM); and
- the capabilities associated with ECP solutions to counter and mitigate Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED).

These systems allow the Army in Theatre to provide a layered, stand-off defense at most locations.

In addition to PBIED systems, Army units deploy a layered defense at all locations in Afghanistan by continuously screening personnel and scanning surrounding areas of each Forward Operating Base (FOB). Soldiers occupy guard towers and entry control points with night vision, thermal, and long-range optics, and man entry control points. Each FOB has a Base Defensive Operations Center that controls the Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Systems-Combined (BETSS-C) camera system, Raid and Cerberus Towers, and video feeds from aerostats. Beyond the FOB, units routinely conduct mounted patrols around the FOBs, Tactical Checkpoints (TCPs), and regional Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to provide additional surveillance outside the reach of the guard towers.

United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) determines the distribution of PBIED equipment to operating bases in theater. USFOR-A determines the needs of installations based upon analysis of the local threat and logistics capabilities of the operating bases. Currently there are no requirements for additional PBIED systems.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

HIGH-DEMAND SOLDIERS DWELL TIME

Question. Army leaders have repeatedly said that we owe our Active-Duty soldiers a minimum of 2 years home for every 1 year deployed. While we are meeting that goal for some soldiers, I'm less confident that this budget does the same for soldiers serving in the combat arms and low-density, high-demand units such as aviation and special forces. These are the very category of soldiers that need the required dwell time the most. They are also the forces that are most likely to deploy even if we are not in large-scale engagements like Iraq and Afghanistan.

General Odierno, in light of the proposed force reductions, did the Army ensure that this budget provides an average dwell time for combat arms and high-demand soldiers that equals 2 years home for every year deployed?

Answer. The Army will accomplish force reductions in a responsible and controlled manner, and the proposed force structure will allow the Army to meet our Boots-on-the-Ground (BOG):Dwell goal. As always, the Army's intent has been to improve dwell time for soldiers and families where possible, and the goal is to achieve a 1:2 for Active units and 1:4 for Reserve units by 2015. However, end-strength reductions beyond 490,000 will challenge the Army's ability to meet timelines for current identified requirements and to maintain necessary dwell for units and soldiers.

In the second quarter of fiscal year 2012, with the help of the temporary end-strength increase and the decrease in demand for deployed forces, the Active component of the Army achieved its individual BOG:Dwell goal with a median ratio of

1:2.01. However, several grades and specialties are still below the 1:2 goals but have been improving. Among these are enlisted soldiers in grades sergeant and below, and aviation soldiers in general. Army Special Operations Forces are programmed to grow 3,677 military manpower authorizations from fiscal years 2013 to 2017. Growth includes adding an MH-47G helicopter company in fiscal year 2014 (176 personnel), two extended range/multipurpose Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) companies in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 (330 personnel), and an increase in combat support and combat service support in each Special Forces Group in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 (1,445 personnel). Additionally, 334 Military Intelligence (MI) billets will be added in fiscal year 2014 to the Active Special Forces Groups and the Ranger Regiment to increase MI capability. The Army remains committed to activate a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) at Fort Carson in fiscal year 2013 as planned.

COMMON REMOTELY OPERATED WEAPONS STATION

Question. One of the weapon systems in the Army's arsenal that has been most demanded by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan is the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS). I am proud that many components of this system are manufactured and assembled in my home State of Maine. I was please to see that funding for the CROWS has moved from the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget to the base budget.

However, it is unclear to me how the Army arrived at the long-term acquisition objective for the quantity of CROWS to be procured. From my review of the budgetary documents and solicitations, it appears the Army intends to procure a total of between 14,000 and 18,000 CROWS to outfit a fleet of combat and tactical vehicles that consists of several hundred thousand vehicles.

General Odierno, how did the Army arrive at the requirement and total acquisition objective for the CROWS system?

Answer. The Army has produced the CROWS for the last 6 years to respond to Operational Need Statements from the commanders in the field and to provide CROWS to various Program Managers to mount on their vehicles such as up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, Route Clearance Vehicles, and Abrams Tanks. As Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has developed their fielding plan for the various branches, the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) submitted and approved through the Organization Requirements Document Approval Brief (ORDAB) on May 9, 2011, was for a total of 11,269. This quantity reflects 1,556 for Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, 1,119 for Special Operations Forces, 4,090 for Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, 576 for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 9 for Ordnance Center and Schools, 2,143 for Sustainment Center of Excellence, and 1,776 for Maneuver Center of Excellence. This number may change slightly as TRADOC continues to update and analyze their requirements.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman INOUE. We stand in recess, and will reconvene on Wednesday, March 28, at 10 a.m., to learn about Defense Health Programs.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., Wednesday, March 21, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, March 28.]