[Senate Hearing 112-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:32 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Cochran, Shelby, and Alexander.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O'REILLY,
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE
Chairman Inouye. Good morning. Today, we are pleased to
welcome Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to discuss the administration's
fiscal year 2013 budget request.
While we scheduled this year's hearing several months ago,
it could not be more timely given the events that transpired
last week. The attempted North Korean rocket launch serves as a
stark reminder of potential threats to our homeland. I know the
operational demands the Nation places on you.
In fiscal year 2013, MDA is requesting $7.75 billion, a
reduction of more than $650 million from amounts appropriated
in the last fiscal year. This request supports a viable
homeland defense, enhances European regional defenses,
continues testing the current system, and develops new
capabilities to address new threats.
Like all of our defense and other Federal Government
agencies, we're asking you to continue to perform your vital
mission in a fiscally constrained environment. Your agency has
several significant programs underway that I'm certain you will
address this morning.
In particular, I look forward to hearing an update on
progress you have made after two successive test failures of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. As you well
know, the threat to our Nation is not static, and this
subcommittee will continue to fully support your efforts to
return to flight successfully.
In addition to the regional defense of our deployed troops
and allies, MDA has begun implementation of a phased adaptive
approach (PAA) by placing a forward-based radar in Turkey and
deploying an Aegis ballistic missile defense ship in the
Mediterranean.
You have also made progress in the next phases of the PAA
by negotiating important postnation agreements and by
continuing to upgrade our Aegis ships.
Therefore, we are concerned to hear about the Navy's
proposed plans to prematurely retire some of its ships that
were slated to be upgraded to a ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capability. This will result in six fewer BMD capable ships
than what you had projected just 1 year ago. I believe this is
alarming given the evolving threat, and we would like to hear
your thoughts on that proposal.
The year 2012 marks the 10-year anniversary of MDA, and
over this time, you have made technical progress to secure our
homeland and our allies. As we look forward to future
challenges coupled with limited resources, our Nation will
continue to rely on your foresight and technical expertise.
Before I proceed, I would like to recognize the Vice
Chairman, Senator Cochran, for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you,
General O'Reilly, for being here with us today to review the
President's budget request with respect to the next fiscal year
for the Department of Defense (DOD).
We, of course, are interested in trying to do our part to
hold back on wasteful Government spending. That's kind of the
word of the day, and constrains us, as we review the request
being submitted to the Congress this year for DOD.
But we know we have no more important undertaking than to
safeguard the security of the citizens of the United States and
to help protect our interests around the world.
We do need to practice fiscal discipline, but our
adversaries continue to develop medium- and long-range
ballistic missiles that threaten our security, as well as the
security of our deployed forces around the world. And our
friends and allies are threatened as well.
So we hope to explore with our witnesses before the
subcommittee at our hearing the technological and fiscal
challenges we face and undertake to do what is thoughtful and
necessary to help continue to provide a multi-tiered, missile
defense system to help protect these security interests.
Thank you for being here today, and we look forward to our
discussion about the MDA and what we can do to help support
your best efforts.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my opening
statement be made part of the record. I look forward to hearing
from General O'Reilly. We had a nice meeting yesterday. Thank
you for calling this hearing.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Alexander.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I'm here to hear
the General, and I have no opening statement.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you, Sir.
General.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O'REILLY
General O'Reilly. Good morning.
Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran, and other
distinguished members of this subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the MDA's $7.75 billion fiscal
year 2013 President's budget request to further develop our
missile defenses against the increasing ballistic missile
threat to our homeland, armed forces, allies, and international
partners.
This request balances our policies as documented in the
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, U.S. Strategic Command's
Integrated Air and Missile Defense priorities, the MDA's
technical feasibility assessments, affordability constraints
and current intelligence community estimates of the ballistic
missile threat.
I describe our past year's accomplishments and detailed
justification of this year's budget request in my written
statement submitted to this subcommittee. However, I would like
to highlight now that last year our homeland defense
improvements included activating a new missile field and an
additional fire control node at Fort Greely, Alaska, activating
a newly upgraded early warning radar in Thule, Greenland, and
upgrading the reliability of three ground-based interceptors
(GBIs).
This year, we continue to aggressively pursue the agency's
highest priority, to conduct a missile intercept with the
newest version of the GBI's exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)
after two previous flight test failures.
We conducted a failure review board comprised of Government
and industry experts, redesigned critical GBI EKV components,
and established more stringent manufacturing and component
requirements.
These requirements had previously not been encountered
anywhere in the aerospace industry. As a result of these
stringent manufacturing requirements, we have encountered
delays in preparing for our next flight test.
MDA is fully committed to test the GMD system as soon and
as often as possible. But we will not approve the execution of
a flight test until our engineers and independent experts are
convinced that we have resolved all issues discovered in
previous testing.
We will fly a nonintercept test by the end of this year to
verify we have resolved all issues, and then we will conduct
our next intercept flight test early next year to reactivate
the GMD production line.
We will also activate our hardened power plant at Fort
Greely, Alaska, this year, and we will increase the firepower
of the fielded GBI's by continuing to test and upgrade the
reliability of GBI components.
Finally, we will continue to increase the capability of the
Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX). But we have cost effectively
limited its operation to flight testing and operational
contingency support under the control of the U.S. Navy Pacific
Fleet.
Our regional defense highlights over the past year include
the on-time deployment of the first phase of the European
phased adaptive approach (EPAA) consisting of a command and
control node in Germany, a forward-based radar in Turkey, and
an Aegis missile defense ship on station in the Mediterranean
Sea.
During the past year, we demonstrated the first Aegis
intercept of a 3,700 kilometer target using a remote forward-
based radar and we demonstrated the simultaneous intercept of
two missiles by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system.
This year, the first two THAAD batteries will be available
for deployment, increasing the number of Aegis capable ships to
29 and conduct of three Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1B
flight tests to demonstrate the resolution of last year's
flight test failure.
And we will conduct the largest missile defense test in
history involving the first simultaneous intercepts of multiple
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles
by Patriot Advanced Capability 3, THAAD and Aegis BMD systems
integrated with a forward-based radar.
Finally, we continue to work with more than 20 countries
including our Cooperative Development Programs with Israel and
Japan, and our first foreign military sale of THAAD to the
United Arab Emirates. And we continue to support technical
discussions with the Russians on missile defense.
While Phases 2 and 3 of the EPAA to missile defense are on
track to meet the 2015 and 2018 deployment dates, the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) has criticized concurrent
production of prefabricated buildings to house the Aegis Ashore
System for Romania prior to the completion of flight testing
with the Aegis Ashore at the Pacific Missile Range in Hawaii.
While I concur with the GAO that programs of high
concurrency between testing, production and fielding such as
the initial fielding of the GMD system have associated risks, I
deem the risk of proceeding with the production of
prefabricated buildings for the Aegis Ashore System, while
flight testing, is a low risk, since all the functions of the
Aegis Ashore System are identical to the functions of the Aegis
System that have been thoroughly tested at sea.
However, the cost of suspending Aegis Ashore production
until all flight testing is completed will greatly increase the
production costs, needlessly delay the deployment of the second
phase of the EPAA production protection of Europe, and
negatively impact the industrial base supporting the Aegis
program.
Finally, I'm concerned about delivering the critically
needed and cost-effective missile defense sensor capability of
the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) and the need to
develop a second independent layer of homeland defense with the
SM-3 IIB Interceptor due to past congressional funding
reductions to both programs.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I request your support for these programs so that our
homeland benefits from the same layered missile defense
approach that we successfully employ in our regional defenses.
Three industry teams are developing the SM-3 IIB
Interceptor concepts that expand the forward edge of our
homeland defense battle space and provide our war fighters a
highly effective Shoot-Assess-Shoot anti-intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) capability as endorsed by the recent
Defense Science Board Study.
Thank you, and I look forward to the subcommittee's
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly
Good morning, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran, other
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) $7.75
billion fiscal year 2013 budget request to develop protection for our
Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and partners against the
proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The
Department developed the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request in
accordance with the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review,
which balanced war fighter needs as expressed in the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Prioritized Capability List (PCL) with technical feasibility and
affordability constraints and intelligence community updates. We
continue to demonstrate and improve the integration of sensor, fire
control, battle management, and interceptor systems that transforms
individual missile defense projects into a Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) capable of defeating large raids of a growing variety of
ballistic missiles over the next decade. For homeland defense, last
year we completed the construction of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) infrastructure for protection of the U.S. homeland
against future limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
threats from current regional threats including the activation of our
newest hardened missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska (FGA). This year,
we will continue to aggressively pursue the MDA's highest priority--
successful return to flight and intercept tests of the Capability
Enhancement II (CE II) version of the ground-based interceptor (GBI).
We will prepare for the next GMD nonintercept flight test by the end of
this year and our next intercept early in the following year, activate
the hardened power plant at FGA, prepare to restart the GBI production
line, and aggressively conduct component testing and refurbish
currently deployed missiles to test and improve their reliability. For
regional defenses, last year we deployed phase 1 of the European phased
adaptive approach (EPAA) consisting of a command and control, battle
management system in Germany, forward-based radar in Turkey, and an
Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ship in the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea. This year, we will have two operational Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, convert 5 Aegis ships and upgrade 1 for
a total of 29 ships with BMD capability installed, and increase the
number of associated Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors. In our
test program, we will conduct three flight tests of the SM-3 Block IB
to demonstrate resolution of last year's flight test failure and its
ability to intercept complex short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (up
to 1,000 km) targets. Finally, this year we will demonstrate the
maturity of our layered regional defense with the first simultaneous
intercepts of three short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and two
cruise missiles by an integrated architecture of PATRIOT Advanced
Capability 3 (PAC-3), THAAD, and Aegis BMD systems assisted by a remote
Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance 2 (AN/TPY-2) forward-based
radar--the largest, most complex, live fire missile defense test in
history.
ENHANCING HOMELAND DEFENSE
MDA's highest priority is the successful GMD intercept flight test
of the newest GBI exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)--the CE II EKV.
Last year, we concluded the Failure Review Board (FRB) evaluation for
the December 2010 FTG-06a flight test by identifying the most probable
cause of the failure and revising the CE II EKV design to correct the
problem. As a result of that FRB, we have redesigned critical GBI EKV
components and established more stringent manufacturing and component
test standards--standards previously not used anywhere in the U.S.
aerospace industry. As a result of these stringent manufacturing
standards, we have encountered several delays in preparing for our next
nonintercept and intercept flight tests. MDA is fully committed to test
the GMD system as soon and often as possible, but we will not approve
executing a flight test until our engineers, and independent government
and industry experts, have been convinced that we have resolved all
issues discovered in previous testing and will be successful in our
next test. Flight testing as often as possible is our goal, but we risk
further failure if we conduct GMD testing prior to verification that we
resolved problems discovered in previous flight tests. Also, conducting
flight tests at a pace greater than once a year prohibits thorough
analysis of premission and postmission flight test data and causes
greater risk of further failure and setbacks to developing our homeland
defense capability as rapidly as possible. If our CE II nonintercept
(controlled test vehicle (CTV) flight) is not successful later this
year, we will be prepared to conduct the next test of the previous
version of the EKV (the CE I EKV) GBI test while we continue to resolve
any CE II issues in order to continue to test other improvements in our
homeland defense. Other improvements to homeland defense include:
--the upgrades and integration of the Thule Early Warning Radar into
the BMDS to view and track threats originating in the Middle
East;
--upgrade of three emplaced FGA GBIs as part of our on-going GMD
fleet refurbishment and reliability enhancement program;
--fielding improved GMD fire control software to allow testing or
exercises to be conducted while simultaneously controlling the
operational system; and
--upgrading the FGA communications system.
We activated Missile Field 2 earlier this year, thus increasing the
number of total GBI operational silos to 38 (34 at FGA and 4 at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) in California). This past December, we
awarded the GMD Development and Sustainment contract, one of MDA's
largest and most complex competitive acquisitions, with a price of
almost $1 billion less than the independent government cost estimate.
For the next 7 years, this $3.5 billion contract will provide for
sustainment and operations as well as improvements and enhancements of
the current capability, provide for a robust and vigorous testing
program, and deliver new and upgraded interceptors. A key part of the
scope of this new contract is comprehensive verification and
reliability testing, and upgrades as needed, of every component of our
GBIs. These component reliability improvements and tests will require 3
years to complete and will provide the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
commander convincing GBI reliability data resulting in a greater number
of ICBMs that can be engaged with a higher probability of protection of
our homeland.
We are requesting $903.2 million in fiscal year 2013 in research,
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the GMD
program. We plan to continue to upgrade our fleet of 30 operational
GBIs and acquire 5 additional GBIs for enhanced testing, stockpile
reliability, and spares, for a total of 57 GBIs. We will continue GBI
component vendor requalifications for the future GBI avionics upgrade
and obsolescence program.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. If, at
some point in the future, this capability is determined to be
insufficient against a growing ICBM threat, it is possible that we can
increase the operational GBIs' fire power by utilizing all 38
operational silos, refurbishing our 6-silo prototype missile field, and
accelerating the delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities.
Additionally, our GBI reliability improvement program will enable more
successful intercepts with fewer GBIs with the same probability of
successful intercept. In fiscal year 2013, we will begin construction
of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal
(IDT) at Fort Drum, New York, with a completion date by 2015. The East
Coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs launched from FGA and
VAFB over longer distances, thus improving the defense of the Eastern
United States. We will also continue to develop and assess the 2-stage
GBI to preserve future deployment options, including an intercept
flight test in fiscal year 2014.
Because the defense of our homeland is our highest priority, we are
pursuing a layered defense concept--similar to that in regional missile
defense--to achieve high-protection effectiveness by deploying more
than one independently developed missile defense interceptor system;
therefore, we will continue development of the SM-3 Block IIB to
protect our homeland in the future by creating a new first layer of
intercept opportunities, expanding the forward edge of our homeland
defense battle space, and providing our war fighters highly feasible
``Shoot-Assess-Shoot'' firing doctrine. The recent Defense Science
Board (DSB) agreed with our assessment that the SM-3 IIB will be
challenged to destroy ICBMs before their earliest possible deployment
of countermeasures. The DSB also supports MDA's development of the SM-3
IIB to significantly expand the forward edge of our ICBM battle space
and enable SAS to obtain very high levels of ICBM protection of our
homeland. The fiscal year 2012 congressional reduction of the SM-3 IIB
funding has increased the challenge of fielding this improvement in
homeland defense against ICBMs in the 2020 timeframe. My additional
concern is the impact of reducing funding for the SM-3 IIB will
eliminate the only new interceptor design and development opportunity
for our Nation's missile defense industrial base for the foreseeable
future. The three SM-3 IIB industry teams lead by Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, and Raytheon have shown rapid progress in developing very
effective and feasible SM-3 IIB interceptor design concepts. To
terminate, or slow down, the SM-3 IIB development effort will have a
significant negative impact on missile defense aerospace industrial
base at this time and risk our ability to cost-effectively respond to
emerging regional ICBM threats to our homeland for decades in the
future.
This year, we will begin upgrading the clear early warning radar in
Alaska for full missile defense capability by 2016. We will also
continue operations of the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar and development
of algorithms to improve its discrimination capability. We are
requesting $347 million in fiscal year 2013 for BMDS Sensors
development for homeland defense, including support of the Cobra Dane
radar, the upgraded early warning radars at Beale AFB (California),
Fylingdales (United Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland). We are requesting
$192.1 million to operate and sustain these radars and $227.4 million
to procure additional radars and radar spares. In fiscal year 2013, we
will also place the SBX in a limited test operations status for
affordability reasons, but we will be prepared to activate the SBX if
indications and warnings of an advanced threat from Northeast Asia
become evident. We will also continue to upgrade the GMD system
software to address new and evolving threats, including enhancing EKV
discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI avionics, and
increasing GBI interoperability with the command and control, battle
management and communications (C\2\BMC) system.
ENHANCING REGIONAL DEFENSE
This year, we will demonstrate integrated, layered regional missile
defense in the largest, most complex missile defense test ever
attempted. We will simultaneously engage up to five air and ballistic
missile targets with an Aegis, THAAD, PATRIOT and Forward Based Mode
AN/TPY-2 radar integrated C\2\BMC system operated by soldiers, sailors,
and airmen from multiple Combatant Commands. This live-fire test will
allow our war fighters to refine operational doctrine and tactics while
providing confidence in the execution of their integrated air and
missile defense plans.
Last year, in addition to deploying EPAA phase 1, we successfully
supported negotiations for host nation agreements to deploy Aegis
Ashore batteries to Romania (Phase 2) and Poland (Phase 3); we
successfully tested the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Interim
Capability with European Command (EUCOM) C\2\BMC to enhance NATO
situational awareness and planning; we installed the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
weapon system on three Aegis ships and upgraded one Aegis BMD ship to
Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 22 operationally
configured BMD ships); and we delivered 19 SM-3 Block IA interceptors
and the first SM-3 Block IB interceptor. We continued SM-3 Block IIA
system and component Preliminary Design Reviews. We delivered 11
interceptors for THAAD Batteries 1 and 2 and flight test, and started
production of Batteries 3 and 4. We also delivered the latest C\2\BMC
upgrades to NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, Pacific Command, and Central Command.
These software builds will improve situational awareness, sensor
management, and planner functions.
We also demonstrated critical BMDS regional capabilities in key
tests over the past year. In April 2011, we conducted an Aegis BMD
flight test (FTM-15) using the SM-3 Block IA interceptor launched using
track data from the AN/TPY-2 radar passed through the C\2\BMC system to
intercept an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target (3,000
km to 5,500 km) to demonstrate the EPAA phase 1 capability. This
mission also was the first Launch-on-Remote Aegis engagement and
intercept of an IRBM with the SM-3 Block IA. In October 2011, the BMDS
Operational Test Agency, with the oversight of the Director,
Operational Test & Evaluation, conducted a successful Initial
Operational Test & Evaluation test (FTT-12) of THAAD's ability to
detect, track, and engage SRBM and middle-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) targets simultaneously.
Enhanced Middle-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe by 2015
(European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 2).--Our goal in this phase is
to provide a robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs by deploying
several interceptors to engage each threat missile multiple times in
its flight. The architecture includes the deployment of the Aegis BMD
5.0 weapon systems with SM-3 Block IB interceptors at sea and at an
Aegis Ashore site in Romania. When compared to the current SM-3 Block
IA, the IB will be more producible, have an improved two-color seeker
for greater on-board discrimination, and have improvements to enhance
reliability of the SM-3 Block IB's divert and attitude control system.
These improvements also provide an enhanced capability to
simultaneously engage larger sized raids of threat missiles.
We are requesting $992.4 million in fiscal year 2013 for sea-based
Aegis BMD to continue development and testing of the SM-3 Block IB,
continue outfitting of ships with the BMD 4.0.1 system as well as
spiral upgrades to Aegis 5.0 to support the operation of the SM-3 Block
IB and IIA interceptors and associated flight tests. We are requesting
$389.6 million in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement of 29 SM-3 Block
IB interceptors and $12.2 million to operate and maintain already
deployed SM-3 Block IA interceptors. In fiscal year 2013, we are also
requesting $276.3 million to develop and build the Aegis Ashore Test
Facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and $157.9
million to construct the first Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System
battery in Romania by fiscal year 2015. We request $366.5 million in
fiscal year 2013 to operate and sustain C\2\BMC at fielded sites and
continue C\2\BMC program spiral development of software and engineering
to incorporate enhanced C\2\BMC capability into the battle management
architecture and promote further interoperability among the BMDS
elements, incorporate boost phase tracking, and improve system-level
correlation and tracking. We will also continue communications support
for the AN/TPY-2 radars and PAA-related C\2\BMC upgrades.
In September 2011, we conducted FTM-16 to demonstrate Aegis BMD
4.0.1 fire control and the first flight test of the SM-3 Block IB
interceptor. While we did not achieve the intercept of the SRBM
separating payload, we demonstrated critical system functions,
including the exceptional performance of the kinetic warhead divert
system, which allowed the Navy's partial certification of the Aegis BMD
4.0.1 computer program. In the third quarter of fiscal year 2012, we
will conduct FTM-16 (Event 2a) to demonstrate the resolution of the
previous flight test issue and the SM-3 Block IB's Kill Warhead's
capability. We will also demonstrate the ability of the SM-3 Block IB
to intercept more complex SRBM targets in FTM-18 and FTM-19 later this
summer. In the third quarter fiscal year 2013, we will conduct the
first operational flight test led by the BMDS Operational Test Agency
team involving a coordinated and simultaneous engagement involving
Aegis BMD, THAAD and PAC-3 systems against three targets and two cruise
missiles. Our fiscal year 2013 testing program continues to demonstrate
the SM-3 Block IB and Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (FTM-21 and FTM-22), including a
salvo engagement involving two interceptors against an SRBM.
Enhanced Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe by
2018 (European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3).--The SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor, being co-developed with the Japanese Government, is on
schedule for deployment at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland,
and at sea, in 2018 to provide enhanced protection for European NATO
countries from all ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. This
year we completed the SM-3 Block IIA preliminary design review, and
continue shock and vibration testing of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor
canister, and development of Aegis BMD 5.1 fire control system. We also
reduced the execution risk of the SM-3 Block IIA program by increasing
the time between flight tests while maintaining the original initial
capability date of 2018. The fiscal year 2013 request for SM-3 Block
IIA co-development is $420.6 million.
Expanded Interceptor Battle Space by 2020 (European Phased Adaptive
Approach Phase 4).--The SM-3 Block IIB will provide a pre-apogee
intercept capability against IRBMs and an additional layer for a more
enhanced homeland defense against potential nonadvanced ICBMs launched
from today's regional threats. This program is in the technology
development phase, and its 7-year development timeline is consistent
with typical interceptor development timelines according to Government
Accountability Office data. Last year we awarded risk reduction
contracts for missile subsystem components, including advanced
propulsion, seeker, and lightweight material technologies. We also
awarded concept design contracts for the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor to
three aerospace industry teams. In fiscal year 2013, we are requesting
$224.1 million to develop the Request For Proposal and begin source
selection for the SM-3 Block IIB Product Development Phase, which we
propose to begin in early 2014. The SM-3 Block IIB is leveraging
advanced tracking and discrimination technologies planned for
deployment during EPAA phase 4, as well as the entire sensor network,
with PTSS and C\2\BMC upgrades to maximize homeland defense.
ADDITIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
This year, we are procuring 42 THAAD interceptors for Batteries 1
and 2, six launchers, and two THAAD Tactical Station Groups. We are
requesting $316.9 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2013 to
enhance communications and debris mitigation, which will allow THAAD to
be more interoperable with PAC-3 and Aegis BMD and connected to the
BMDS, and $55.7 million for THAAD operations and maintenance. We also
request $460.7 million to procure 36 THAAD interceptors. THAAD will
complete delivery of the first 50 interceptors in June 2012,
demonstrating the capacity of the contractor supply chain and the main
assembly factory in Troy, Alabama to deliver interceptors. The next
production lots are under contract, with delivery beginning this
summer. We will maintain a production rate of four THAAD missiles per
month through June 2012 due to components on hand and enhance the
supply chain's production capacity to sustain a three missile per month
production rate beginning in spring 2013. In late fiscal year 2012, we
will demonstrate THAAD's ability to intercept an MRBM as part of an
integrated operational test with PAC-3 and Aegis BMD.
Additional BMDS improvements include expanded coordination of
missile defense fire control systems and improvements in radar
discrimination. We are requesting $51.3 million for the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS) in fiscal year 2013. We continue to
operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct cooperative
tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the capability of STSS
satellites against targets of opportunity. These tests demonstrate the
ability of a space sensor to provide high precision, real-time tracking
of missiles and midcourse objects that enable closing the fire control
loops with BMDS interceptors. In fiscal year 2013, we plan the first
live intercept of a threat missile by the Aegis BMD system using only
STSS data to form the fire control solution for the SM-3 IB
interceptor. Additionally, lessons learned from the two STSS
demonstration satellites inform Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
design development decisions.
DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES
We are requesting $80 million in fiscal year 2013 to continue
development of fiscally sustainable advanced BMD technologies that can
be integrated into the BMDS to adapt as threats change. Intercepts
early in the battle space will provide additional opportunities to kill
threat missiles, enlarge protection areas, and improve the overall
performance of the BMDS.
Last year, we accelerated our test campaign with the Airborne Laser
Test Bed (ALTB) to collect data on tracking and atmospheric
compensation, system jitter, and boundary layer effects on propagation
for future directed energy applications. This year, in accordance with
the funding reduction enacted by the Congress, we grounded the ALTB
aircraft and are examining the technical feasibility of high-
efficiency-directed energy technology for the next decade. In fiscal
year 2013, we are requesting $46.9 million to pursue Diode Pumped
Alkaline-gas Laser System and coherent fiber combining laser
technologies, which promise to provide high-efficiency, electrically
driven, compact, and lightweight high-energy lasers for a wide variety
of missions of interest to MDA and the Department of Defense (DOD) and
support concept development for the next generation of airborne missile
defense directed energy systems.
We request $58.7 million in fiscal year 2013 to continue support
for research and development of advanced remote sensing technologies,
demonstrate acquisition, tracking and discrimination of multi-color
infrared sensors, and investigate techniques to improve the system's
data fusion capability to further strengthen the Nation's missile
defense sensor network. We have integrated our international and
domestic university research programs into the same structure, allowing
MDA to capitalize on the creativity and innovation within our small
business and academic communities to enhance our science and technology
programs.
The greatest future enhancement for both homeland and regional
defense in the next 10 years is the development of the Precision
Tracking Space System (PTSS) satellites, which will provide fire
control quality track data of raids of hostile ballistic missiles over
their entire flight trajectories and greatly expand the forward edge of
the our interceptors' battle space for persistent coverage of more than
70 percent of the Earth's landmass. The need for persistent, full
trajectory, tracking of ballistic missiles is one of the war fighter's
highest development priorities as stated in the 2012 STRATCOM PCL. PTSS
will enhance the performance of all missile defense interceptors at an
operational cost significantly less (and with much greater ability to
track large raid sizes of threat missiles) than forward based AN/TPY-2
radars, based on MDA's experience with STSS program costs. The emerging
concept design of the PTSS spacecraft is much simpler than STSS because
it relies on the mature Air Force Space Based Infra-Red (SBIR)
satellite system to acquire threat ballistic missiles, leverages PTSS's
ability to provide precision tracks of the remainder of threat
missiles' trajectories, and uses only satellite components with high
technology readiness levels. Due to the intrinsic simplicity and
component maturity of the PTSS design, the integration of concurrent
developments is considered to be a low acquisition risk. Key to our
acquisition strategy is MDA partnering Air Force Space Command and the
Naval Research Laboratory with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL), with participation of six aerospace corporations, to
develop a fully Government-owned preliminary design and technical data
package to enable full competitions by our aerospace industry for the
production for the first and subsequent PTSS satellite constellations.
MDA is requesting $297.4 million for PTSS in fiscal year 2013 to
continue development of preliminary design requirements to create these
multi-mission satellites (e.g., missile defense, space situation
awareness, DOD and intelligence community support). APL has a
noteworthy track record, dating back to 1979, for meeting planned
development cost and schedule projections involving 17 significant
spacecraft missions. We will complete final design and engineering
models for the PTSS bus, optical payload, and communications payload in
fiscal year 2013. PTSS project scope includes delivery of PTSS ground
segments and launch of the first two PTSS spacecraft in fiscal year
2017. We are fully cooperating in an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) of
the development and 20-year life-cycle cost of the PTSS constellation
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense of Capability Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) to achieve a high confidence cost estimate of
the development and 20-year life of the PTSS constellation. Of note,
this ICE will provide great insight into the validity of the recent
National Academy of Science (NAS) Boost Phase Intercept study cost
estimate for the PTSS constellation that we believe is considerably
higher than our estimates. Although the NAS study was critical of
PTSS's ability to discriminate a re-entry vehicle (RV) from other
objects accompanying a missile, the NAS did not benefit from an
understanding of our sensor discrimination architecture concept nor our
classified programs developing PTSS's future RV discrimination
capability. However, the NAS study did benefit from understanding our
disciplined systems engineering process that scrutinizes capability
trades to achieve urgent, cost-effective, satisfaction of the war
fighters BMD needs as documented in STRATCOM's PCL.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, developing
international missile defense capacity is a key aspect of our strategy
to counter ballistic missile proliferation. A significant
accomplishment of international cooperation in 2011 was the signing of
the first Foreign Military Sale case for the THAAD system to the United
Arab Emirates, valued at nearly $3.5 billion. In Europe, we
successfully completed interoperability testing of our C\2\BMC system
with the ALTBMD Interim Capability, demonstrating U.S. and NATO's
ability to share situational awareness of missile defense execution and
status and planning data. NATO plans to invest more than 600 million
Euros for the ALTBMD capability. Moreover, we are working with our NATO
allies on developing requirements for territorial NATO missile defense.
We continue to pursue potential missile defense contributions of NATO
countries such as the Netherlands' announcement that they are upgrading
their maritime radars with missile defense surveillance and tracking
capability. In East Asia, we are supporting the BMDR-based objective in
leading expanded international efforts for missile defense through
bilateral projects and efforts with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Australia. And in the Middle East, we continue to work with long-term
partners, such as Israel, and are pursuing strengthened cooperation
with various Gulf Cooperation Council countries that have expressed
interest in missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in missile
defense projects, studies and analyses with more than 20 countries,
including Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Israel, Japan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates,
the United Kingdom, and NATO.
MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM-3 IIA
interceptor (Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM-3 Block
IIA second- and third-stage rocket motors and the nosecone), studying
future missile defense architectures for defense of Japan, and
supporting that nation's SM-3 Block IA flight test program, to include
the successful intercept flight test in October 2010 involving a
Japanese SM-3 Block IA. This test completed the first foreign military
sale of Aegis BMD to a key maritime partner. Japan now has four Aegis
destroyers equipped with Aegis BMD systems and a complement of SM-3
Block IA interceptors.
We also continue collaboration with Israel on the development and
employment of several missile defense capabilities that are
interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. Last year, at a U.S. test range off
the coast of California, the Arrow Weapon System successfully
intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic missile
threats facing Israel today. This year, we plan to conduct several
first time demonstrations of significant David's Sling, Arrow-2 block
4, and Arrow-3 system capabilities. We are requesting $99.8 million for
Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement and
the David's Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2013 to continue our
cooperative development of Israeli and United States missile defense
technology and capability. MDA will conduct a David's Sling flight test
to demonstrate end game and midcourse algorithms and initiate David's
Sling and Arrow-3 Low Rate Initial Production.
CONCLUSION
Our fiscal year 2013 budget funds the continued development and
deployment of SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the war
fighters' near-term and future missile defense development priorities.
We are dedicated to returning to successful GMD flight testing as soon
as possible as well as developing an additional layer of homeland
defense with the SM-3 IIB to ensure we have a robust and responsive
ICBM defense for our Nation, during this decade and for many decades in
the future. Additionally, we are committed to develop a persistent,
space based, PTSS constellation to ensure always available, early
tracking of large size raids of missiles to enable cost-effective
homeland and regional missile defense. We are also dedicated to
creating an international and enhanced network of integrated BMD
capabilities that is flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of
uncertainties of estimates of both nation-state and extremist ballistic
missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
subcommittee's questions.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much, General.
As I indicated in my opening remarks, we have been advised
that including the ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability
on Aegis ships is a critical element of the phased adoptive
approach (PAA).
Now, the Navy has, as I indicated, the possibility of
decommissioning six of the cruisers. What impact would it have
on the PAA?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we support the Navy's technical
assessments. They make the final decision, of course. I know of
some factors that played into that consideration. Some of it
was the stationing of ships in Rota, Spain, which has been
agreed to, to reduce the transit time and increase the multi-
mission ship presence in the Mediterranean.
That was part of their considerations. Additionally, we
continue to work with the Navy to perform functions in other
ways than just using a ship for BMD. For example, for sensors.
Can we deploy some of our sensors in locations and relieve
the need for Aegis ships to be doing the surveillance mission
which some of those ships are doing today.
So, Sir, I defer the final answer to your question because
that is a Navy decision, but we work very closely to ensure our
technical programs are synchronized with their programs, and at
the same time, they benefit from our technical analysis.
Chairman Inouye. So the decommissioning is not finalized?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I'm not in a position to answer that
question. That's one where we have been supporting the Navy.
Chairman Inouye. Can you tell us about Aegis Ashore?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the Aegis Ashore System is a very
cost-effective approach to take the proven capability we've
seen at sea and move it effectively to the land. It is then a
focused mission on missile defense. Instead of the more than
270 sailors, for example, needed on a Navy ship, an Aegis
Ashore System can operate the system with less than 35 sailors,
and that includes multiple shifts.
So it's a very cost-effective way of having Aegis BMD
capability. Aegis BMD capability has the longest range of our
regional systems. So it adds a layer of missile defense to the
land that otherwise would be solely relying on THAAD.
And, so, with Aegis Ashore and THAAD and Patriot and other
international systems, we are able to achieve that multilayered
effect with the dedicated and persistent presence of the Aegis
Ashore system.
Chairman Inouye. We've been told that these systems will be
in Poland and Romania. When will this happen?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we have selected the sites with
their countries and the European Command, both locations, in
Romania and in Poland. We have signed agreements with their
countries for that.
Romania will be fully operational in 2015, and Poland will
be fully operational in 2018.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. General O'Reilly, the request before us
proposes a reduction in the number of Aegis ships that are
planned to be equipped with ballistic missile capability. The
ships are going to be reduced under this budget request from 43
to 36.
How do these changes affect our missile defense mission,
and are we putting at risk any important U.S. military assets
by adopting this plan?
General O'Reilly. Sir, that decision is made ultimately by
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Chiefs. As I said
before, I provide technical support and things we can do to
increase the capability of missile defense capable ships out
there.
An example of the type of capability I'm referring to is
even though it still looks like the same Aegis ship of a year
ago, several of our ships have now been upgraded with the
capability to launch three times as many interceptors at once.
We can use off board sensors. As I said last year, our
system was designed to intercept missiles of about 1,000
kilometers, and with the assistance of off board sensors (like
AN/TPY-2 radar) we intercepted a missile of more than 3,000
kilometers.
So there are enhancements which MDA is developing for the
Navy so that each ship can handle many more missiles at once,
and also at much greater ranges.
And that is the extent, that is the technical support I'm
providing the Navy to make their final judgment on what's the
right size of the fleet and how it's deployed.
Senator Cochran. How would you describe the success of our
testing program up to this point in our effort to deploy a GMD
system? Could you explain what contingency plans we may be
developing to provide homeland defense if there are test
failures?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the problems we've had in flight
testing, and we've had two failures, were with the latest
version of the front-end of the missile, the EKV.
The older EKV is deployed today. It's been successful in
five tests (three intercept tests and two other flight tests).
We have never seen any indication of a problem on the ground
with the older EKV. And we have a lot of confidence in that
system today to protect the United States as they're fielded at
Vandenberg Air Force Base and in Fort Greely, Alaska.
However, we had obsolescence problems with continuing the
older EKV design. We upgraded the design 4 years ago, and we've
had two subsequent test failures. We have worked closely, and I
firmly believe, with the best experts in the country, both
government and industry, identifying where the problems were.
We've addressed the problems. The first one was a quality
control issue in the production plant. It has been validated
that we have addressed that issue with the second test.
And then the second problem, we literally found in space.
We couldn't have identified it on the ground, and working with
the best experts, including National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and others, we believe we've addressed and
resolved that issue. And we're out to prove it this year in our
next flight test.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned that you're going to
increase the number of operational interceptors and accelerate
the delivery of interceptor capabilities.
Could you describe for us how this is going to be done, or
what the timetable will be for accelerating the delivery of new
sensors?
General O'Reilly. Sir, from a point of view for the GMD
system, we currently have production on hold until we prove
we've resolved the production issues.
But what I've done is use the work force and the supply
chain to prepare for that production go ahead. So once we have
a successful test, we can immediately go into refurbishing the
missiles at Fort Greely and at Vandenberg, the ones that need
it. Not all of them do.
We have also enhanced the manufacturing capability at the
site, the ability to upgrade missiles, so we can accelerate
their upgrade without shipping them away from the missile
fields.
From the point of view of the delivery of our sensor
systems, we have several of them that are ready today for
operational deployment, and combatant commanders, we're in
coordination with them. And we stand ready to support them and
those in the Army and the Air Force who are associated with
those deployments and the decisions made by the Joint Chiefs.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have a number of questions. We appreciate your
service to the country and what you are doing as Director of
the MDA.
General O'Reilly, the State Department official, Ellen
Tauscher, recently told a Russian newspaper that the
administration was ``prepared to provide the Russian Government
with written political guarantees regarding the U.S. and NATO
Missile Defense Systems in Europe.''
Have you been consulted regarding the form and substance of
these guarantees, and, if so, what can you tell us about them?
If not, do you think it would be advisable for the
administration to consult with you and the Congress about any
potential restrictions on the systems you're responsible for
developing?
Are you aware of this statement?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we have been providing technical
consultation to Secretary Tauscher and to the State Department.
I am unaware of specific proposals.
I will tell you that the nature of our work has typically
been to address the Russian Government claims that we are
building capability to upset the strategic balance.
We've been able to analyze that and provide them data that
show we are not, and the errors in their estimates, such as
interceptor missiles flying faster than anyone's ever built,
and so forth.
So I am unaware, first of all, of what those specific
proposals are, but also, I have never been given any
instructions to consider limiting the development of our
system.
Senator Shelby. In other words, written guarantees that
would limit our system?
General O'Reilly. No, Sir. I'm not aware of any nor have I
ever been given guidance to consider any ways of limiting our
system.
Senator Shelby. Do they have, to your knowledge, any--any
is a big word I guess here--any technical capabilities that if
shared through a cooperative arrangement could help you defend
our homeland or our allies, or is that off the table?
General O'Reilly. Sir, there are capabilities that we could
benefit from. Primarily their sensors, their large sensors,
that they have for their homeland defense or their protection
in Russia.
The location of Russia itself, looking through from Europe,
all the way across through Asia, including Northeast Asia,
would give us the opportunity to view threats very early in
their flight.
And, their ability to observe flight testing done by other
countries would in fact provide us beneficial information.
Senator Shelby. But you don't know of any information or
promises that have been made to Russia that would compromise
our ability to defend our interests in any way, do you?
General O'Reilly. No, none whatsoever.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
In the GMD area, I know you face some challenges there.
Does the MDA fiscal year 2013 budget request provide adequate
funding to restore your confidence in all of the elements of
the GMD system?
In other words, under this budget, will the GMD industrial
base remain robust enough to respond to unanticipated
developments in the ICBM programs of our adversaries or
potential adversaries?
General O'Reilly. Sir, in our budget, we've requested the
procurement of five additional GBIs, and one of the reasons is
to ensure that our industrial base stays viable, and to leave
open those options in the future if necessary.
Also, our newest missile field has eight additional spare
silos in it, so we are postured in a way, if we're supported in
our budget request, to maintain our capability, our industrial
base, and continue testing in order to validate our missile
defense capability with GBIs.
Senator Shelby. In the area of what we call the kill
vehicle development, you referenced in your testimony some of
the problems that we've experienced with this kill vehicle, EKV
on the GMD system.
I understand that you're working out some of those
challenges, the problems most recently identified, and I hope
that will be successful.
But I'm sure this won't be the last problem, because this
is something that's being developed. It's my understanding that
EKV was never meant to be the permanent kill vehicle for the
GMD, and that the current system is heavier, less capable, and
less reliable than I think it can or should be.
But with the cancellation in 2009 of the Multiple Kill
Vehicle Program, we're locked into the current system for the
foreseeable future; do you agree with that, or disagree?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I do believe we can continue to
improve the GMD EKV and make it a very viable, reliable system
that we can rely on for decades.
On the other hand, I also believe, as technologies have
moved on, we haven't taken advantage of those technologies. I
can----
Senator Shelby. Could you talk more about the SM-3 IIB
Program?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Sir. The SM-3 IIB Program gives us
the opportunity to continue supporting our aerospace industry
to apply our latest technologies which, Sir, equates to smaller
KVs and more capable KVs.
Senator Shelby. It could possibly give you more than a
single interceptor there, could it not?
General O'Reilly. Sir, depending on the size of the
booster, yes, it could, if you had a large booster and these
small interceptors.
Senator Shelby. In the area of THAAD--I know I'm touching
on a number of subjects, but they're all in your domain----
General O'Reilly. Yes, Sir.
Senator Shelby. The administration's fiscal year 2013
request included funding for production of 36 THAAD missiles
annually. That rate is considerably below what the MDA had
proposed in fiscal year 2012.
Does that production rate, General, allow MDA to outfit
THAAD batteries as they become available, or, on the other
hand, will there be a lag time between when batteries are
completed, and when the missiles to outfit them come off the
assembly line?
Will there be a gap there, or you're working to make sure
there's not?
General O'Reilly. Sir, at this time, we have realigned when
the batteries will be available as well as the production of
missiles for those batteries. And, no, there will not be a gap
at this point in time.
We have also increased the number of missiles in each THAAD
battery. So, even with those higher numbers of missiles in each
unit, we'll be able to make our delivery needs, and our foreign
military sale also increases production capacity of THAAD.
Senator Shelby. Can I get into the ship modifications of
the Navy a little bit.
Now, you believe that fielding the SM-3 IIB, it's a
mouthful, SM-3 IIB, will require modifying the vertical launch
system onboard the Aegis cruisers and destroyers?
And, if so, is there currently a funded plan, since we're
here in the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, is there a
funding plan in place to make the necessary conversions, you
know, if we have to do that?
And will those preparations be complete for the arrival of
the production of missiles? Same thing. Will there be a gap
there? Will you have the money, and what do you need?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for the SM-3 IIB is in concept
development. The amount of progress that's been made by
industry in the last year on that program indicates that they
have a lot of engineering capability that they have now bring
to bear.
And we've seen many different proposals. There are
proposals that would require a modification, but there are
also, as with every contractor, proposals that do not require a
modification to a ship's vertical launch system.
So, they're at the point where they have not finalized what
they're going to propose to us, but we've seen both options.
Senator Shelby. How big an improvement is this new system,
the SM-3 IIB?
General O'Reilly. Sir, it would fly at a tremendously
higher velocity than the current SM-3.
Senator Shelby. That's a quantum breakthrough, isn't it?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Sir, and the fact that it's mobile,
that, as a long-range threat missile is launched, it's like
playing hockey. You can get into the position where you can
intercept with a smaller missile and still have the same
effect.
Senator Shelby. But, basically, does it make us--you're in
charge of it--make us more agile?
General O'Reilly. Tremendously more agile, and we can surge
a lot of missiles into a region like we do our other military
capabilities if the need arise.
Senator Shelby. What's your thought regarding Korea? You
know, they've been in the news lately, about they had a failed
launch. Of course, at some time, they might work those problems
out.
They'll have to do it themselves. We'll all watch that with
interest. I know the Chairman, coming from the State of Hawaii,
had to be more than watchful of that, but we all are interested
in that, as they build a more robust missile with longer legs,
and a danger to Hawaii, Alaska, and perhaps others.
General O'Reilly. Yes, Sir. At the point I can say here in
this hearing----
Senator Shelby. Yes.
General O'Reilly [continuing]. They obviously failed early
to demonstrate their capability in their flight, once again.
Our experience has been you need a lot of ground testing and
flight testing in order to validate and have reliance in a
capability.
They do not. And it's been evident every time they test.
And their progress has not been made apparent in this latest
flight test.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, General, and thank
you for your service to the country.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
I have one more question. And, if I may, I would like to
submit the rest for your careful consideration.
Recently, there were rocket attacks from Gaza on Israel.
And the Iron Dome performed remarkably well. In fact, we've
been advised that the success rate exceeded 90 percent.
My question, number one is, what is the current status of
Iron Dome? And, second, in light of this recent attack, are we
prepared to provide more Iron Domes?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I do not develop them. I am not part
of the development of the Iron Dome system like I am
responsible for the development, co-development, with other
Israeli programs.
But I do oversee our funding of the manufacturing of the
Iron Dome system for the Israelis. Our assessment is, it's a
very effective system, and they are also adding improvements to
it in the near term to make it even more effective.
I know the Department is considering right now several
options on how to enhance our support to the availability of
Iron Dome to the Israeli Government.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I have another question.
I would like to know, General O'Reilly, what your
assessment is of the testing of the Arrow 3 Interceptor? I know
there are plans to have additional tests. I wonder if you could
give the subcommittee some idea of what the status of this
effort is and what capability this system will provide?
General O'Reilly. The Arrow 3 Program will provide a
significant increase over the current Arrow Program. In other
words, it will be able to fly farther, faster, intercept
earlier in the flight of a threat missile, and effectively add
another layer of defense to Israel.
We work very closely with the Israelis to set up this
program so that we have very identifiable milestones to show
their progress.
While we felt their original schedule was optimistic, and
although it is turning out to be optimistic--they're not on the
original track that they set up--they have made significant
progress. They are achieving those milestones.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
This year, we look forward to their first flight of their
missile system. And so, we're very pleased with the progress
they're making, and it's more along the lines of what we expect
with our own programs.
Senator Cochran. Good. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Agency for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY
Question. General O'Reilly, can you provide the subcommittee a
schedule of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) tests that will
be conducted at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) over the next
5 years?
Answer. Now that THAAD is in production, the operation and
development of test communities agree (as documented in Integrated
Master Test Plan [IMTP] 12.1) that flight testing is limited to
development capability increments (which there are two in the next 5
years) and operational testing integrated with Aegis and PATRIOT. Thus,
the developmental flight tests over the next 5 years are FTT-11a in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014 (4QFY14) and FTT-15 in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2017 (2QFY17) at PMRF.
THAAD will also be extensively tested using models and simulations
(hardware in the loop and distributed testing using actual THAAD
batteries), which have been accredited based on the THAAD's highly
successful flight test program.
Question. What is the current schedule for Aegis Ashore testing at
PMRF, and how has it changed from last year?
Answer. The previous (IMTP 11.1) and current (IMTP 12.1) Aegis
Ashore Flight Test Schedules are contained in the below table. The only
change from last year is the acceleration of AAFTM-02 by two quarters
(from the second quarter of fiscal year 2015 (2QFY15) to 4QFY14).
AEGIS ASHORE FLIGHT TEST SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date (IMTP Date (IMTP
Flight Test Description 11.1) Approved 12.1) Approved
(FY12-17) 5/31/11 3/1/12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AACTV-01 E1 Aegis Ashore will 2QFY14 2QFY14
engage a simulated
Dynamic Test Target
and launch an SM-3
Controlled Test
Vehicle (CTV) to
check out the
installation of the
land-based Aegis
Weapon System and VLS
Launcher.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AAFTM-01 Aegis BMD Ashore will 4QFY14 4QFY14
detect, track and
engage an air-
launched MRBM target
with an SM-3 Blk IB
missile and track
data provided by an
up-range Aegis BMD
ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AAFTM-02 Aegis BMD Ashore will 2QFY15 4QFY14
detect, track and
engage an air-
launched MRBM target
with an SM-3 Blk IB
missile and track
data provided by an
up-range Aegis BMD
ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTO-02 This operational 4QFY15 4QFY15
flight test event
will be executed
across two test
ranges in two
multiple simultaneous
engagements against
an SRBM and three
MRBMs. Aegis Ashore
will detect, track
and engage an MRBM
target with a SM-3
Blk IB missile. Aegis
BMD 5.0 ship will
detect, track and
engage an MRBM with a
SM-3 Blk IB missile.
THAAD will engage an
MRBM. Patriot will
engage the SRBM.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP)
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. I understand that within a few seconds of an SM-3 missile
launch from the test Aegis Ashore facility on PMRF, it must be
determined that the missile is moving in the intended direction, and,
if not, the missile must be quickly destroyed. For safety
considerations, PMRF is likely to require an exceptionally fast
capability that can accurately determine missile condition and location
during the first few seconds of launch, something that radar alone may
not be able to address. This is a critical requirement for PMRF and for
safety considerations in any European country where the Aegis Ashore is
deployed, since it will be in proximity to populated areas. Please
provide an update on how the Navy and MDA will address this safety
concern.
Answer. The Pacific Fleet Command has agreed to allow test firings
from the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at PMRF only upon
successful development, integration, and certification of the range
flight safety upgrades. These upgrades provide PMRF with the
independent capability to take a flight termination action as early as
2.5 seconds after launch (confining hazards well within PMRF's launch
hazard area).
The flight safety upgrades include:
--Modification to the SM-3 Block IB missile's flight termination
system that allows a termination command to be received
within one second after launch;
--Procurement, integration and certification of two Early Launch
Tracking Radars (ELTRs) that will provide missile position
and velocity no later than one second after launch; and
--Development, integration, and certification of a Safety
Augmentation System that will use missile position data
from the ELTRs and predetermined safety boundary conditions
based on test mission scenarios to make a decision on
missile heading and send a flight termination command if
the missile is headed outside the predetermined safety
boundaries.
Status.--Acquisition contracts are in place, development plans are
defined, designs have been approved, and certification test plans are
in development for all flight safety upgrades. The ELTRs will be
developed and delivered to White Sands Missile Range for initial
testing and integration with targets of opportunity commencing in the
second quarter of fiscal year 2013 (2QFY13). The radars will then be
transported to PMRF for final range certification during 4QFY13, in
time to support the first Aegis Ashore flight test (AA-CTV-01) in
2QFY14.
Fiscal year 2012 funds initiated the development of these safety
upgrades. Fiscal year 2013 funding, necessary to complete these safety
upgrades, was requested in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Chairman Inouye. All right. Thank you very much.
On behalf of the subcommittee, I thank you for your
testimony and for your exemplary service. We will be looking at
your request very carefully, and we look forward to working
with you, Sir.
The Defense Subcommittee will reconvene at 10:30 a.m. on
April 25 for a classified hearing on the national and military
intelligence programs. We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:08 a.m., Wednesday, April 18, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]