[Senate Hearing 112-957]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-957
REVIEW OF THE NRC'S NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING
REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAR AIR
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 2, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
Bettina Poirier, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Ruth Van Mark, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BENARD SANDERS, Vermont LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex
officio) officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
AUGUST 2, 2011
OPENING STATEMENTS
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 1
Inhofe, Hon. James, U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma...... 3
Carper, Hon. Thomas, U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware..... 10
Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming...... 12
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.... 14
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 15
Udall, Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico....... 16
Johanns, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska...... 17
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey. 18
Hon. John Boozman, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas....... 19
Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama....... 20
WITNESSES
Jaczko, Hon. Gregory B., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 33
Senator Caper............................................ 47
Responses to additional questions from Senator Cardin........ 52
Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........ 53
Svinicki, Hon. Kristine L., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 65
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 66
Senator Carper........................................... 67
Senator Inhofe........................................... 69
Apostolakis, Hon. George, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission n................................................... 71
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 72
Senator Carper........................................... 73
Senator Inhofe........................................... 75
Magwood, Hon. William D., Iv, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 76
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 77
Senator Carper........................................... 79
Senator Inhofe........................................... 81
Ostendorff, Hon. William C., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 82
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 83
Senator Carper........................................... 86
Senator Inhofe........................................... 89
REVIEW OF THE NRC'S NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING
REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
----------
TUESDAY, AUGUST 2, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air
and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer
(chairman of the full committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Boxer, Inhofe, Sessions, Carper,
Lautenberg, Alexander, Sanders, Barrasso, Udall, Johanns and
Boozman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Good morning.
Senator Carper is the Chair of the Subcommittee. I am
delighted that he is here, and, of course, we have a good
turnout considering at noon we have a crucial vote. So we are
going to move forward.
Today is the fourth time the Members of this Committee have
gathered in this room to discuss nuclear safety following the
disaster in Japan. Since our first briefing on March 16th, I
have asked the NRC to heed the wake-up call and reevaluate our
current safety and security measures that are at our nuclear
power plants. I especially wanted them to look at our power
plants that are located in areas that face the possibility of
natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding.
California's two nuclear power plants at Diablo and San
Onofre are located in seismically active areas, and I want to
repeat that any task force recommendations be implemented as
soon as possible since millions of people live close to those
plants, millions and millions of people.
The NRC has begun to act. First, NRC ordered inspections on
the 104 operating nuclear reactors and issued reports on their
readiness to address power losses and damage following extreme
events. More recently, NRC issued the results of its near-term
90-day task force review. I understand that the six-person task
force that conducted the review was made up of senior NRC staff
with more than 135 years of combined expertise, but they did
not rely on their experience alone.
The task force also had full access to all NRC staff and to
all experts as they prepared their report. The task force found
``continued operation and continued licensing activities do not
pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.'` That means
that the task force found that no plants needed to be
immediately shut down, but problems were identified.
The task force has highlighted some issues that should be
addressed right now as we speak, while further study and
analysis is needed before other recommendations can be
implemented. Last month, I sent a letter to Chairman Jaczko in
which I urged the commission to act promptly on the near-term
task force recommendations. Their near-term recommendations,
they need to be implemented now in the near term.
I support the Chairman's road map for action within 90 days
and I will ask the commission to move forward expeditiously. It
took 90 days for the task force to make their recommendations.
It should not longer than 90 days for the NRC to accept or
reject them and move toward implementation. Any stalling will
not be viewed favorably by the American people I can assure
you. Their confidence in nuclear power is waning.
The task force concluded that the NRC ``The NRC's safety
approach is incomplete without a strong program for dealing the
unexpected, including severe accidents. Continued reliance on
industry initiatives for a fundamental level of defense in
depth similarly would leave gaps in the NRC regulatory
approach.'`
These findings are important. Although the task force
stated that an accident like what happened in Japan is unlikely
in the U.S., they did conclude changes should be made to our
regulatory system to improve safety. They further concluded we
cannot count on voluntary industry initiatives to provide the
necessary level of safety.
The Japanese were not prepared for the disaster that hit
them on March 11 th. That is the lesson learned from Fukushima.
We can't afford to make the same mistake. We should make
improvements that will enhance safety and preparedness for
unforeseen disasters.
To that end, the NRC's 90-day review includes important
recommendations. They should move quickly to implement the
safety recommendations contained in the report or we are
wasting taxpayer dollars and money. In addition, I believe more
work should be done as part of the longer-term review to
address moving spent fuel to dry cask storage and other issues
that were not fully addressed.
Today, I call on the commission to announce a plan for
adopting the task force recommendations, and I am not alone in
my call for action. A July 23d New York Times editorial stated,
``If nuclear power is to have a future in this Country,
Americans have to have confidence that regulators and the
industry are learning the lessons of Fukushima and taking all
steps necessary to ensure safety. They went on to say, ``This
month, NRC's near-term task force issued thoughtful and common
sense recommendations. The five commissioners should quickly
adopt them.'`
A July 17th editorial in The Washington Post stated, ``The
NRC should use this review not merely to respond to a single
event, but to ensure that it is actively assessing low
probability but high consequence risks.'`
On July 19th, 15 nongovernmental organizations, including
the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources
Defense Council, sent a letter to the NRC urging them to act to
implement the recommendations. And more recently, on July 28th,
my colleague, Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois was reported as
saying, ``The bottom line is we cannot let the lessons learned
from Fukushima become a forgotten story by dragging our feet on
some of these critical short-and long-term improvements that
can be made now.'` I couldn't agree with him more.
For both the safety and confidence of the American public,
the NRC must act without delay. It is not acceptable now that
we have the results of the task force review to merely call for
more study and further delay. And I look forward to hearing
each of you make a commitment that you are ready to move on
their recommendations. You must act now that you know what some
of the problems are. It is your moral and your legal
responsibility, and I consider it mine as well.
I now call on Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First, I would like to put into the record the letter from
Marvin Fertel, the President of the Nuclear Energy Institute,
NEI. I will just read one sentence, the second paragraph. It
says, ``The task force report lacks the rigorous analysis of
issues that traditionally accompanies regulatory requirements
proposed by the NRC.'` I would like to put it into the record.
Senator Boxer. Absolutely, in the record.
[The referenced document follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. And I think on this report of the full
commission, actually we have this as a joint Committee. It is
the full Committee and the Nuclear Subcommittee, which I used
to Chair a few years ago.
Chairman Jaczko relayed in our June hearing how as a part
of the review, and I am going to quote him at this time, he
said, ``We always ask ourselves the question: Are the plants
still safe? Is there anything we need to do today to address
that? And the answer continues to be no, that we want to get
good information. We have time to do that.'`
And I agree. It might be a while until we have an adequate
assessment of the event, but we have time. And frankly, we need
to take time to ensure that we learn the right lessons; that
any regulatory changes have the maximum benefit to safety.
In that spirit, the task force describes how following the
Three Mile Island event, the NRC took a number of actions which
were not subjected to structured review and which were
``subsequently not found to be of substantial safety benefit
and removed.'`
I am pleased to see that a majority of the Commissioners
are committed to ensuring that the task force recommendations
proceed through a structured review process that incorporates
the views of a wide range of agency staff, the NRC's Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, industry and other
stakeholders. Meanwhile, a full commission can take action at
any time should new safety information warrant.
There are many facts that we still don't know about the
accident, not just about the technical aspects, but also
emergency preparedness and the impact of external influences on
decisionmaking. It is important to remember that the Japanese
regulatory system is very different from our own. I believe it
is crucial for the NRC to understand those differences in order
to assess whether proposed regulatory changes will accurately
and adequately address the actual problems highlighted by the
Fukushima accident.
Accordingly, I have sent a letter to each of you and look
forward to receiving your responses. I was pleased to see
Commissioner Svinicki endorse that concept. I was also
disappointed to hear from the Chairman that he considers it too
``difficult and time-consuming.'`
I don't believe that an accident in a country with
different regulatory systems and practices means that ours are
broken. I think the NRC must take time to learn not just the
technical lesson from Fukushima, but also the regulatory and
policy lessons, and I hope the NRC will focus on solving
specific safety weaknesses highlighted by the Fukushima event,
rather than allowing itself to become distracted by redesigning
a regulatory framework that has served our Country very well.
The NRC's efficiency principle and good regulatory practice
states, ``regulatory action should be consistent with the
degree of risk reduction they achieve.'` A structured process
akin to the comments of Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki and
Ostendorff goes a long way toward doing that.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator
from the state of Oklahoma
Thank you for holding this hearing today with the full
Commission to review the Near-Term Task Force's report--this is
a good first step toward understanding the implications of the
Fukushima nuclear accident. The Commission directed the Task
Force to identify near-term or immediate operational and
regulatory issues, and their report concludes that the
Fukushima scenario is unlikely to happen here and that
continued nuclear power plant operation and licensing
activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public.
Chairman Jaczko relayed in our June hearing how, as part of
the review, ``we've always asked ourselves the question: Are
the plants still safe? Is there anything we need to do today to
address that? And the answer continues to be no. That we want
to get good information, we have time to do that.'' I agree. It
may be a while until we have an adequate assessment of the
event but we have the time, and frankly need to take the time,
to ensure we learn the right lessons and that any regulatory
changes have the maximum benefit to safety.
In that spirit, the Task Force describes how, following the
Three Mile Island event, the NRC took a number of actions which
were not subjected to a structured review, and which ``were
subsequently not found to be of substantial safety benefit and
were removed.'' I am pleased to see that a majority of the
commissioners are committed to ensuring that the Task Force's
recommendations proceed through a structured review process
that incorporates the views of a wide range of agency staff,
the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, industry,
and other stakeholders. Meanwhile, the full Commission can take
actions at any time should new safety information warrant.
There are many facts that we still don't know about the
accident, not just about the technical aspects but also
emergency preparedness and the impact of external influences on
decisionmaking. It is important to remember that the Japanese
regulatory system is very different from our own. I believe it
is crucial for the NRC to understand those differences in order
to assess whether proposed regulatory changes will accurately
and adequately address actual problems highlighted by the
Fukushima accident. Accordingly, I have sent a letter to each
of you and look forward to receiving your responses. I was
pleased to see Commissioner Svinicki endorse that concept. I
was also disappointed to hear from the Chairman that he
considers it too ``difficult and time-consuming''.
I don't believe that an accident in a country with
different regulatory systems and practices means that ours are
broken. I think the NRC must take the time to learn, not just
the technical lessons from Fukushima, but also the regulatory
and policy lessons. I hope the NRC will focus on solving
specific safety weaknesses highlighted by the Fukushima event
rather than allowing itself to become distracted by redesigning
a regulatory framework that has served this country well. As
the NRC's Efficiency Principle of Good Regulation States:
``Regulatory actions should be consistent with the degree of
risk reduction they achieve.'' A structured process akin to the
comments of Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki, and Ostendorff
goes a long way toward ensuring that.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
I am going to call on the Subcommittee Chair and then the
Ranking Member, and then the rest of our colleagues.
Senator Carper, Subcommittee Chair.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Commissioners, welcome. Nice to see all of you today. This
is a day that the economy could have melted down, and it looks
we are going to be able to avoid that. And we want to make sure
that the recommendations that these smart people at work at the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that we can somehow seize the
opportunity, seize the day and ensure that we don't have a
meltdown in any our 104 nuclear power plants. But I am happy
that you are here and look forward to this testimony.
These are challenging times for the NRC. They have been,
frankly, challenging times for my colleagues and me as well.
And we are going to get through this day and hopefully we will
get through to your recommendations and you will pick some that
are the winners and the ones that we ought to implement sooner,
rather than later, and we can get this show on the road.
As many of you know, my interest in nuclear energy comes
from a clean air and energy security perspective. It also comes
from a perspective of 23 years as a Naval Flight Officer
chasing nuclear submarines. And a lot of my buddies in the Navy
lived on nuclear power plants on submarines and aircraft
carriers and ships. So I have a lot of interest from that
perspective as well.
But nuclear power has helped this Nation curb our reliance
on dirty fossil fuel. Nuclear power has also helped to reduce
air pollution that damages our health and causes global
warming. However, as we saw the crisis unfold at Fukushima
facility, one wrong step at a nuclear power plant can have big
and bad consequences. This crisis is a strong reminder that
with nuclear energy, we never be complacent. Safety must always
be our top priority.
Today, I look forward to hearing an update from our
Commissioners regarding their reviews of our Nation's nuclear
power fleet in light of the crisis at Fukushima. I especially
look forward to hearing more about the recent task force
recommendations and hope to learn today how the Commissioners
expect to move forward on them.
I was relieved that the task force concluded that an
accident like Fukushima is unlikely to happen in the United
States and the nuclear fleet posed no imminent risk to public
safety, which is due in part to the due diligence of the NRC to
protect public safety.
But as our colleagues have heard me say once or twice, I
believe it is not perfect and we need to make it better. And I
believe the task force took this thing to heart that we can do
better. And I believe we can all agree some of the task force
recommendations are common sense and should be implemented
soon, maybe sooner than others.
I would liken these recommendations to patching up a hole
in a boat that is slowly leaking. There are easy no-brainers
and it can be done with relative ease. Some of the
recommendations are going to need more time, maybe much more
time, and a fair amount of vetting. These recommendations are
more like taking the boat apart and putting it back together.
Definitely, more time is needed and more thought is needed on
some of those and how we ought to go about doing them.
I sincerely hope the commission will take time to talk to
stakeholders and get public reaction from all sides of this
issue before moving forward with these recommendations.
However, I will be disappointed if we are 6 months or a year
from now down the road and have not seen any action from the
NRC on any of these recommendations. That would not sit well
with me and I would urge you to keep that in mind.
We need to all work together. I would like to say we are
all in this together and we need to make sure that we
incorporate the right lessons learned to keep our nuclear fleet
safe into the future because, in the end, we are all in the
same boat when it comes to nuclear safety.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and again welcome.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
Statement of Hon. Thomas Carper, U.S. Senator
from the state of Delaware
``Let me begin by welcoming back the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) Commissioners to our Committee. I know these
are trying times for the NRC, and I appreciate you taking the
time to be before us today.
``As many of you know, my interest in nuclear energy comes
from a clean air and energy security perspective. Nuclear power
has helped this nation curb our reliance on dirty fossil fuels.
Nuclear power has also helped reduce our air pollution that
damages our health and causes global warming.
``However, as we saw the crisis unfold at the Fukushima
Daiichi facility, one wrong step at a nuclear power plant could
have big consequences. This crisis is a strong reminder that
with nuclear energy, we can never be complacent. Safety must
always be our top priority.
``Today, I look forward hearing an update from the NRC
Commissioners regarding their review of our nation's nuclear
power fleet in light of the crisis at Fukushima. I especially
look forward to hearing more about the recent Task Force
recommendations. I hope to learn today how the Commissioners
expect to move forward on those recommendations.
``I was relieved that the task force concluded that an
accident like Fukushima is unlikely to happen in the United
States and that our nuclear fleet poses no imminent risk to
public safety. This is due in part to the due diligence of the
NRC to public safety. But as my colleagues have heard me say
over and over, I believe if it is not perfect, make it better.
And I believe the task force took this saying to heart. We can
do better.
``I believe we can all agree that some of the task force
recommendations are common sense and should be implemented
soon. I liken these recommendations to patching up a hole in a
boat that is slowly leaking--these are no brainers and can be
done easily. And some of the recommendations are going to need
much more time and vetting. These recommendations are more like
taking the boat apart and building it back together. We
definitely need more time and more thought on this issue.
``I sincerely hope the Commission will take time to talk to
stakeholders and get public reaction--from all sides of this
issue--before moving forward with any of the recommendations.
However, I will be very disappointed if we are 6 months or a
year down the road and have not seen any action from the NRC on
any of the recommendations.
``We all need to work together to make sure we incorporate
the right lessons learned to keep our nuclear fleet safe into
the future, because in the end, we are all in the same boat
when it comes to nuclear safety.''
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
It is my pleasure to introduce John Barrasso, the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
appreciate that. I thank you. I thank Chairman Carper as well
for holding the hearing today on the near-term task force
report entitled Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in
the 21st Century.
In reviewing the report, there are a couple of points that
I believe need to be stated that come from the report itself.
And first, our regulatory framework to protect our nuclear
plants is working. It is working. As the task force concludes,
although complex, the current regulatory approach has served
the commission and the public well, and allows the task force
to conclude that a sequence of events like those occurring in
the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United
States and could be mitigated, reducing the likelihood of core
damage and radiological releases.
As Commissioner Ostendorff, who is before us today, stated
on July 19th, ``I do not believe that our existing regulatory
framework is broken.'` I agree. I do not believe that our
existing regulatory framework is broken.
Second, our regulatory system is quite different than
Japan's. I agree with Commissioner Ostendorff's opinion with
regard to the conclusions in the task force report that the
Fukushima tragedy occurred in another country whose regulatory
structure is quite different from that found in the United
States and that ``there is still a great deal that we do not
know about Fukushima concerning the sequence of events, the
failure of modes of equipment, functionality and execution
procedures.'`
Because of the reasons that I have just mentioned, with so
much uncertainty still remaining, I find the report to be light
on suggested recommendations directly tied to the events at
Fukushima. Instead, this report appears to be loaded with
recommendations to overhaul our entire system of oversight and
safety.
I agree with Commissioner Svinicki, who commented in her
recent vote that the task force report recommendations are
surprisingly specific and detailed for what was to be an
initial 90-day review. In fact, the document is 82 pages long.
I am not surprised, however, if you put six career
regulators in a room for 90 days, that you are going to get a
lot of suggestions for more Washington red tape,
recommendations that appear to be based on old agendas. This is
what I believe we have here before us today. Some of these
recommendations may be good and worth pursuing. Some may not
be.
But as Commissioner Svinicki stated about the
recommendations in the report, ``Lacking the NRC technical and
programmatic staff's evaluation, beyond that of the six NRC
staff members who produced the task force report, I do not have
a sufficient basis to accept or reject the recommendations of
the near-term task force. There is no immediate threat that
needs to be addressed, according to the task force, so we do
have time.'`
There is no need to rush to regulate. Before we move
forward with more red tape for America's nuclear industry,
perhaps we need to look at these suggestions more closely. I am
not advocating for a few NRC public meetings to simply check a
box. I am talking about real NRC staff and stakeholder input
through an open and transparent process where recommendations
can be reviewed, prioritized and eventually either approved or
rejected, which is essentially what Commissioner Magwood has
said in his letter of July 29th to Congressman Markey.
This is the type of review that I believe four of the NRC
Commissioners before us today are advocating.
So I thank you, Madam Chairman, and look forward to the
testimony.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sanders.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Sanders. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for
holding this important hearing, and thank you to the members of
the NRC for being here.
The first and I think most important point that I want to
make is the function of the NRC is not to represent the nuclear
power industry. That is not your job. Whether we have more
nuclear power plants or fewer is not your job. Your job
foremost is to make sure that the nuclear power plants that we
have in this Country are as safe as humanly possible.
My friend from Wyoming, Senator Barrasso, mentioned, he
quoted the report and the report said it is unlikely that we
are going to have a Fukushima disaster in this Country. Well,
you know what? For the people of Vermont, and I think most
people in this Country, unlikely is really not quite good
enough. We want to make sure that everything humanly possible
that can be done is done to make sure that nuclear power and
the nuclear power plants in this Country are as safe as
possible.
Madam Chair, to the Commissioners here today, it seems to
me we should take note of the Associated Press, this very
disturbing report that recently found that the NRC and the
nuclear industry have worked ``in tandem to weaken safety
standards to keep aging reactors within the rules.'` In that
regard, I have joined with the Chair of our Committee, Senator
Boxer, to call for a GAO investigation of these allegations.
Americans are concerned about nuclear safety not just
because of the AP investigations, but because of what happened
in Japan. We have 23 reactors in this Country that are Mark I
models, the same as the Fukushima plant. The President asked
the NRC for a safety review after Japan and the NRC's task
force of senior staff did a 90-day review and laid our
recommendations to improve safety. They did what they were
asked to do.
A New York Times editorial summarized, ``The group's most
important finding is that our Nation's oversight of nuclear
power plants is a less than rigorous patchwork of mandatory and
voluntary provisions.'` The task force recommendations include
no-brainer measures to test earthquake and flood resiliency and
to install hardened vents to reduce the risk of hydrogen
explosion.
We are here today to find out what the NRC is going to do
about these 12 common sense recommendations. Some people may
think that this is ``government red tape.'` Some of us believe
that in fact we have got to do everything we can to make sure
that the impossible does not happen and that a major nuclear
accident occurs in the United States.
The answer, from what I am hearing up to this point, from a
majority of the members of the NRC is that nothing is going to
happen with regard to these recommendations. The Chairman has
asked the NRC to begin to move forward on all 12
recommendations within 3 months in order to fully implement new
post-Fukushima regulations by 2016, and I applaud him for doing
that. This does not sound very ambitious to me, yet the media
reports that this timeframe is apparently too ambitious for
three of our Commissioners, and I hope they dispel what I read
in the media, and that is Commissioners Svinicki, Magwood and
Ostendorff apparently, as I understand it, they want more study
and review and delay.
And I happen to know, have been here long enough to know
what happens in this town when we ``delay,'` when we want to
postpone a study. It means that the issue is going to be swept
under the rug, that nothing is going to happen. And to me, that
is unacceptable.
We need a commission focused on safety and acting on the
task force recommendations in a swift and transparent manner. I
believe we should all demand that the NRC commissioners today
commit to start action on the safety recommendations within 3
months. Delay is not an acceptable option, and I look forward
to hearing from the Commissioners.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Alexander.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
for this hearing.
Thanks to the Commissioners for their service.
I think it is always useful since safety is our concern to
begin with the safety records: no deaths at any commercial
nuclear reactor; no deaths on any Navy reactor; and no one was
even hurt at our most celebrated nuclear accident, Three Mile
Island. That is an enviable record which we should always try
to improve.
And I would like to approach it a little differently today.
I would like to ask this question: What if we didn't have
nuclear power? What if we didn't have it at all in the United
States? It is 20 percent of all of our electricity; 70 percent
of all our clean electricity. We use about a quarter of all the
electricity in the world to power this County. What if we
didn't have nuclear power?
Well, we can look at Japan, which is the third-largest
economy, and get an idea of that. There were a couple of
articles last week, one in The Wall Street Journal, one in
Bloomberg, which gave us a picture of it. The Wall Street
Journal article did say the Japanese are very patient people,
so they have turned their air conditioners up to 82 degrees.
The reason all this is true is because since the earthquake,
most of their reactors are out. They have closed them down for
maintenance and to check them.
And so they have lost about 20 percent of all their
electricity in Japan, about the same amount that nuclear power
provides to us. So their air conditioners are at 82 degrees.
The car-makers are operating on weekends to avoid sucking up
electricity during the week. The Emperor and the Empress are
wandering around the Imperial Palace at night with flashlights
and candles. Emergency responders have brought 22,000 people to
the hospitals with heat stroke. It is about the same weather
over there as here.
They are expecting electric bills to go up because as they
use more renewable power, that is higher cost. Bloomberg was
even more graphic. It quotes the Chairman of Sharp, a company
that has a plant in Tennessee making solar panels, that the
issue of the power supply could be the end of manufacturing in
Japan, an exodus of Japanese manufacturers, he sees. ``If we
don't keep these reactors operating,'` he said, ``Japan's
economy will wither. Our young people will move abroad leaving
the country with only grandpas and grandmas.'`
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce, estimates that Japan's
gross domestic product will fall by 3.6 percent, lose 200,000
jobs if all of the reactors close by next spring as scheduled
maintenance takes them offline.
So there is a little snapshot of what would happen if you
lose 20 percent of your electricity, which is what nuclear
power provides us. Why do I raise that? Because, as was said,
we have an aging nuclear fleet. We haven't built a new reactor
in 30 years; 25 or 30 years from now, this commission will have
to decide whether to extend the life of a lot of the older
reactors. I have advocated building 100 new nuclear reactors
over the next 20 years, and even if we did that, we would still
barely replace the reactors that we have and the need for
electricity in this Country because the EIA, the Energy
Information Administration, estimates that the increase in the
need for electricity will be up by 31 percent.
So we are going to need a lot of clean, reliable
electricity in this Country. And we can't afford, if we want to
have a high standard of living and good jobs, to lose 20
percent or 10 percent of our electricity. And if we don't have
nuclear power, we will have to rely on coal that is dirtier; on
gas that is dirtier; and who knows what the price of gas will
be. And the idea of relying on windmills to power the United
States of America is the energy equivalent of going to war in
sailboats.
So we are going to need lots of nuclear power. And as long
as we are having eloquent testimony about delays here, which I
just heard, I would like to recommend we have no delay in one
of the other recommendations of the Committee, which is to
complete without delay the design for the AP 1000 and the
economically simplified boiling water reactor design.
In other words, complete without delay this commission's
approval of those two designs so that we can move ahead
building a sufficient number of nuclear reactors to give us the
kind of clean, reliable electricity that will permit us to have
the low-cost energy to have good jobs in the United States and
not experience the kind of exodus of manufacturing overseas
that the Japanese are afraid might happen to them if they are
not able to bring their reactors back online.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Senator Udall.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
calling this hearing.
I think many others have said it already that I think
safety is the key here and I am going to want to hear from each
of you as to how you believe we should move forward on the
safety issue. I think it is unacceptable if we have the kind of
thing happen in the United States that happened in Japan, and I
hope that you are on a wavelength, that you are going to move
in the direction of taking seriously what this task force said.
I mean, my understanding is that this is a task force with
a 139 years of experience in this area. They are substantial.
They are people that really know what they are talking about.
We talk about recommendations that fall into five categories.
These categories seem very common sense to me, clarifying the
regulatory framework. You have to take a hard look every now
and then at regulatory frameworks and how they work.
Ensuring protection, the task force recommends under that
category as part of a longer-term review, the NRC evaluate
potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate
seismically induced fires and floods. We have seen in New
Mexico those kinds of fires and floods. I know they are seeing
them across the Midwest. We need you to take a hard look at
that.
The third category, enhancing mitigation, the task force
recommends the NRC strengthen station blackout mitigation
capability at all operating and new reactors for design basis
and beyond design basis external events. I hope that we will
have time to discuss that with you. I intend to ask a question
about that.
Strengthening emergency preparedness, the fourth category,
seems very common sense to me and something we could move
forward with on this front. And the fifth, improving the
efficiency of NRC programs, I mean, we always want to be doing
things like that.
So I am not going to use all my time. I want to get to the
questions, Madam Chair, and I yield back at this point.
Senator Boxer. Next is Senator Johanns.
Thank you so much for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Madam Chair.
To the Commissioners, let me just start out and tell you we
appreciate your being here with us today. So many things were
said by Senator Alexander that I concur with that it would
almost be sufficient to say that I adopt his statement, but let
me offer a thought or two, if I might.
I am very anxious to hear about the safety concerns. We
have nuclear power, as you know, in the State of Nebraska. It
has been a good neighbor in our State. We feel it runs
sufficiently smartly. We feel that the folks who are operating
the facilities in our State are responsive to the community. I
would be remiss if I didn't mention the quality jobs that go
with the facilities. All of that has worked very well for us.
The second thing I would say about that is, as you know,
for many months now we have been in the throes of a historic
flooding event with the Missouri River in Nebraska, and that
has implicated our nuclear facilities. We have found you folks
to be responsive, the staff to be responsive, and it has been
an experience that although difficult and trying, because so
much land has been under water for so long, we feel in terms of
the nuclear facility that people have responded and not
overreacted, but worked with us.
Therefore, I am very anxious to hear about the safety
recommendations. I don't think there is any doubt, wherever you
sit on this dais, we want to make sure that our facilities are
safe.
But I would also offer a thought that there is a reason why
we are not building nuclear power plants these days in any kind
of numbers. When I talk to folks in this industry, they say it
is complicated. It is very difficult to get through the
process. It is enormously expensive and there is no guarantee
that you are going to get anything at the other end for that
massive, massive investment.
There seems to me a better way of doing this. Now, this is
not an area of expertise for me. I have no nuclear background
whatsoever in my life. But having said that, what I am anxious
to hear about today is the economic of what you are
recommending just because I want a full picture. Sometimes you
have to make hard decisions, do the things that you need to do
from a safety standpoint, even though you know that the cost is
there, but there is just no other choice.
But for me, I always like to weigh the decisions made
against the cost that is incurred and try to get an
understanding of whether we have benefited the situation in any
significant way for the investment. This industry, I worry, is
literally at a point where it could shut down over time if we
can't somehow free up the ability to approve plants and approve
construction and deal with the safety issues in a cost-marked
sort of way.
So those are the kinds of things I am interested in. But I
don't say those things to criticize you. Like I said, our
experience in working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has been a good experience. People have worked with us and the
staff has worked with us. I am just interested in how do we do
this in a way that is safe, but economically viable.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
And thank you, members of the NRC. I think you do a very
good job, I will start off with that, and then I will get more
critical, but we do thank you.
Since Japan's nuclear crisis began unfolding 5 months ago,
Americans have wondered, could it happen here? The NRC's task
force studied the situation closely and determined our nuclear
facilities pose no imminent threat to the American people.
While this is reassuring news, our work is just beginning.
The NRC task force issued 12 recommendations to strengthen
nuclear safety and ensure reactors remain safe, including long-
term steps to improve emergency preparedness and protect
facilities when earthquakes or other natural disasters occur.
Now, it is critically important for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to act on these recommendations quickly. The five
Commissioners will hear today are from among our Country's most
important guardians, and we are relying on you to keep our
Country's nuclear facilities safe and secure.
Prompt action on the recommendations to the NRC is
particularly important to the people of my State of New Jersey,
where four nuclear power reactors provide our State with half
of its electricity. Just last month, the NRC renewed the
license to operate the reactor at Hope Creek which shares the
same design as the damaged reactors in Japan.
Now, in its renewal, the NRC included conditions intended
to make Hope Creek safer and we have to continue to take every
precaution to make sure this facility and others like it are as
safe as we can make them. The fact is, nuclear power plays a
great role, a critical role in our Country and it is an
emissions-free energy source that provides one-fifth of our
Nation's electricity.
So nuclear power can continue to be a part of our energy
future, but the disaster in Japan has taught us nothing can be
taken for granted where nuclear power is concerned. Japan is a
world leader in technology and its leaders believed that
Fukushima, the plant, was very strong, strong enough to
withstand a worst-case scenario. But as we now know, it wasn't.
Likewise, the Chernobyl tragedy 25 years ago taught us that
the effects of a single nuclear accident can linger for
generations and we have to pay attention to these questions and
learn from others' mistakes. This means continually revisiting
the laws intended to keep nuclear plants safe, strengthening
the NRC's regulations, and ensuring plants are in compliance at
all times.
The NRC has got to ask the hard questions and make sure the
American people get the answers that they deserve, and I urge
you Commissioners to act quickly, to take the next steps to
make sure that nuclear facilities are prepared and that the
public is fully protected.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Boozman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Inhofe for having this really important hearing on the task
force review.
The task force has produced a report that is a good first
step to help make sure our nuclear industry continues to be the
safest in the world. Nuclear energy provides an affordable,
reliable, emissions-free supply of energy to power our economy
and create jobs, especially industrial and manufacturing jobs
that are power-intensive.
We need to learn and implement both short-term and long-
term lessons from the event in Japan. Safety must remain our
highest priority, and I think that all of us agree with that.
American nuclear energy is produced with oversight from a
strong, independent regulatory agency within a robust culture
of safety. Our industry is truly the gold standard and we need
to keep it that way.
The task force review confirmed that appropriate mitigation
measures have already been put in place and that continued
operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk
to public health and safety. I would very much like to
encourage the commission that as they move forward that they do
so with speed, but more importantly, or as importantly that
they do this very, very thoughtfully. We need a process that
allows the commission, the NRC staff, the industry and other
stakeholders to be fully engaged.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
Now, Senator Sessions, you are our last, but certainly not
least.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
We spend a good deal of time on this Committee and other
Committees in rightly considering the events at Fukushima. The
report of the near-term task force provides a good starting
point to thinking about potential improvements that can be made
on our nuclear fleet.
But I do think it is important to keep in mind, as Senator
Alexander noted, that we have not had one single event at an
American nuclear power generating plant where an individual has
lost their life or sustained a serious injury as a result of
nuclear effects.
So I think that is a significant thing that we need to
remember since over 20 percent of our electricity is coming
from nuclear power. It is a big part of our economy and it has
been very safe. I really think we need to remember that. How
many lives have been lost in the process of creating coal
plants and providing the fuel? And how many problems have we
had with natural gas and difficulties and lives have been lost?
And most provide CO2 and other pollutants into the atmosphere.
I am interested, as Senator Inhofe is, in looking at the
Japanese system to see if theirs was less effective than ours.
NEI, Nuclear Energy Institute, says that we have the gold
standard for nuclear regulation and I hope that is true, and we
would like it to be true. And we need to know if perhaps our
regulations would have prevented this.
Certainly, nuclear plants already must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of you, the NRC, that the plants can continue to
operate safely even during a blackout scenario. And I do
believe, as Senator Alexander noted, the AP 1000, for example,
would have gravity-fed fuel or water processes that would shut
down a plant even if there was complete loss of power and the
backup failed.
So those would be even safer plants, it seems to me, and
those ought not to be unnecessarily delayed. Delays are costs.
And you delay and create uncertainty, and pretty soon people
are afraid to invest what would need to be invested for us to
create a cleaner, more productive form of energy that is safer,
in bottom line, than other forms of energy for the United
States.
My goal has always been that we should have cleaner energy.
We want American energy, not imported, wherever possible. We
want safe energy. We want cost-efficient energy, energy that
does not place an unnecessary burden on our people and our
economy.
Nuclear power fits all of those, it seems to me. It may not
be the total solution, but it fits all of those policies and I
hope and pray and urge that you do your job to make sure we are
safe, make sure it is operating safely, but do not be a burden
on our ability to meet the need for increased electricity in
the future by blocking a reasonable development of new sources
of nuclear power.
I notice in Alabama we had a shutdown of power. We had
power failures to our nuclear plant at Brown's Ferry, the TVA
plant. The backup systems responded just as expected, just as
required, just as you have monitored and required, and there
was no dangerous scenario that occurred.
I also appreciate the fact that your committee has found
that there is no reason to doubt the safety of our nuclear
power facilities. Your task force report concludes that a
sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to
occur in the United States. Continued operation and continued
licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public
health and safety.
So Madam Chairman, thank you for having the hearing. I
think it is something that we need to move forward with.
Hopefully, we can be able to effectively allow a new generation
of even more efficient, more safe nuclear power plants to come
online, plants that produce tremendous amounts of baseload
electricity without pollution of our atmosphere and that
provide safety to all concerned.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Senator.
So under the agreement that we have reached, the Chairman
will have 5 minutes and each of his colleagues will have three.
Is that your understanding? OK, excellent.
Chairman, go right ahead.
I am going to ask everyone to stick with their time because
we are so close to a vote and we want to conclude before then.
So go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman
Carper, and Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the
Committee, on behalf of the commission I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the NRC's near-term
task force recommendations and their potential implementation.
In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, the commission
established the task force to spearhead our systematic and
methodical review of the NRC's Nuclear Reactor Safety Program.
Its members include some of the agency's most experienced and
expert staff, collectively having more than 135 years of
regulatory experience.
In conducting their review, the task force's efforts were
independent, but by no means isolated or solitary. In
developing their report and recommendations, the task force had
access to the entire NRC staff with more than 100 hours of
briefings.
They also spent thousands of hours reviewing agency
products and information and consulted with the NRC site team
in Japan. In its report, the task force outlined a
comprehensive set of 12 recommendations, many with short-and
long-term elements that touch on a broad range of important
issues, including the loss of electrical power, earthquakes,
flooding, spent fuel pools, venting and emergency preparedness.
I provided a detailed overview of the recommendations in
the written testimony I submitted on behalf of the commission.
As their report makes clear, the task force has done an
outstanding job of helping us better understand what nuclear
safety requires in a post-Fukushima Dai-ichi world.
Now that the task force has completed its review, it is up
to the commission to decide how to move forward. A wide range
of stakeholders have called upon the commission to act
promptly. At this point, the commission has not yet reached a
decision on how to proceed.
And although my colleagues may hold differing viewpoints, I
believe our goal remains for the commission to come to an
agreement on an open and transparent way for us to make a
merit-based decision on the 12 recommendations in a finite
period of time.
In considering the task force recommendations, the
commission must move forward with the urgency called for by
these real safety issues. Although the task force did not find
imminent risk to public health and safety, they identified
significant concerns with specific issues and they recommended
improving the agency's regulatory framework.
Fukushima clearly demonstrated that extraordinary
circumstances can challenge plants in unexpected ways and we
must commit to a strong and timely response. I believe that the
American people expect no less.
So to all the Members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you and I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:]
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Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Commissioner Svinicki.
STATEMENT OF HON. KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Ms. Svinicki. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman
Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper and Ranking
Member Barrasso and other Members of the Committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
The members of NRC's near-term task force covered
tremendous ground in the conduct of their 90-day review. After
a more extensive examination than earlier NRC efforts were able
to undertake, the task force concluded that a sequence of
events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the
United States and that continued operation and continued
licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public
health and safety.
In providing this safety reassurance to the commission and
the public, the task force's work, conducted with some urgency
given their mission of finding any near-term deficiencies or
confirming the safety of continued operations, now allows the
NRC the opportunity to proceed with the systematic and
methodical review of lessons learned that the commission
established early on.
I believe that wise regulatory decisions depend on public
participation and on careful analysis of the likely
consequences of regulation. The NRC is now in a position to
conduct activities that the task force's short timeframe did
not allow them to undertake, namely a more extensive public
stakeholder engagement on these issues and others that will
likely emerge, and opportunities to consider a comprehensive
set of facts regarding the events in Japan, and to receive the
expert views of the commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards.
In that vein, I view the near-term task force report as an
important first step in the process of learning from the events
at Fukushima. The conclusions drawn by the six individual
members of the near-term task force must now be open to
challenge by our many public stakeholders and tested by the
scrutiny of a wider body of experts, including the NRC's
technical staff who would be responsible for carrying out the
changes the commission might adopt prior to final commission
decisionmaking on those changes.
I support acting with the appropriate dispatch and urgency,
but without short-changing the thoroughness, inclusiveness and
deliberation of our response.
Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Svinicki follows:]
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Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Honorable George Apostolakis.
How did I do on that one? We met in California so I had a
chance to practice that.
Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Apostolakis. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe,
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the
Committee, good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today. My views regarding the way forward with the
near-term task force recommendations are summarized as follows.
First, it is important to bear in mind the significant task
force conclusion that the current regulatory system has served
the commission and the public well, and that a sequence of
events like those that occurred in Fukushima is unlikely to
occur in the United States.
Second, many people have referred to the events at
Fukushima as unthinkable or unforeseen and imply that we should
focus on protecting nuclear plants from unimaginable events.
However, there is growing evidence that the historical record
of tsunamis had not been used properly to determine the design
basis of Fukushima Dai-ichi and consequently the protection of
the plant was not sufficient.
In addition, the location of safety significant equipment
was less than optimal with respect to protection against
flooding. The accident was not of extremely low probability.
That is, it was not unthinkable or unforeseen. These
observations suggest that we should be mindful of striking a
proper balance between confirming the correctness of the design
basis and expanding the design basis of U.S. plants.
Third, the timely disposition by the commission of the
near-term task force recommendations is important. It is also
important to do this in an open and transparent manner. Three
months should be sufficient time to achieve these objectives.
Fourth, our process for reaching decisions should be
methodical and systematic. The Three Mile Island experience is
relevant here. As the task force states, ``Some of the actions
taken by the NRC after TMI were not subjected to a structured
review. Subsequently, some of the resulting requirements were
found not to be of substantial safety benefit and were
removed.'`
Fifth, with these recommendations in mind, I believe that
the commission's deliberations would benefit from an evaluation
of the task force recommendations by NRC management, the views
of external stakeholders, and an independent evaluation by the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. These reviews may in
fact result in additional or different recommendations.
I will be working with my fellow Commissioners to reach a
timely resolution of the lessons learned from Fukushima.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Apostolakis follows:]
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Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
And now we look to Commission member William Magwood.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Magwood. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking
Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
Soon after the seriousness of the events at Fukushima
became evident, the commission created a task force to study
this and apply any lessons learned. After nearly 4 months of
work, this task force has provided us with the recommendations
we have discussed this morning.
I congratulate the six-person team for its impressive work
and I also want to just sort of point out that Dr. Charles
Miller, who chaired the task force, is with us in the audience
today somewhere back there, and I wanted to just make mention
of the fact that I think tomorrow is his retirement date. So
this is his opportunity to observe his work.
Senator Carper. Can we ask him to raise his hand?
Thanks for your service.
Mr. Magwood. Thank you, Charlie.
Nevertheless, while the task force found that U.S. plants
are safe and they say that quite clearly. Their conclusion that
the U.S. plants are safe is not a license for complacency.
There are very clearly some important lessons learned from
Fukushima that can be used to further improve our regulatory
framework, and the task force has made the 12 recommendations
we have spoken of this morning.
Obviously, the task force was limited in its time and scope
and its ability to reach out to stakeholders and the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Fortunately, since the task
force found no imminent risk to public health or safety, we
have the opportunity to apply our resources and processes to
best effect and deal with issues such as the potassium iodide
and other issues which were not covered by the task force in
open and transparent manner.
We must work quickly and effectively to engage our
stakeholders in consideration of the task force's
recommendations, as well as consideration of approaches which
the task force did not have time or resources to analyze.
I also believe that while there are many who believe that
we should move very quickly on every recommendations, I think
what Senator Carper said this morning is actually quite
apropos. There are some recommendations which I believe can be
implemented almost right away, and I think the votes of the
commission so far have indicated that that is possible.
There are others that may take some more time, and I think
we should take that time to do this the right way and not
repeat the mistakes of the post-Three Mile Island era.
So with that, I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Magwood follows:]
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Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Ostendorff, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Ostendorff. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe,
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, Members of the
Committee, thank you for the chance to be before you today.
I highly commend the NRC's near-term task force for its
dedication, thoughtfulness and professionalism in conducting
its review. Given a very short period of time, the task force
has provided a very significant product that will serve us
well.
Before forming my position on the task force report, I
carefully studied the report. I met with the task force in a
public meeting. I sought input from NRC staff. And I listened
to the views of my colleagues at this table. I cast my vote on
the task force report last Wednesday and made that vote
publicly available.
Serving, in my view, as the anchor for this report are
findings related to the safety of commercial reactors in the
United States. The task force noted that the current regulatory
approach has served the commission and the public well, and the
continued operation and continued licensing activities do not
pose imminent risk to public health and safety.
As I stated at the commission's July 19th public meeting on
the task force report, while I support thoughtful consideration
of potential safety enhancements in a systematic and holistic
manner, at the same time I do not believe that our existing
regulatory framework is broken.
My vote is centered on three key principles. First, the
need to ensure that we have an integrated, prioritized approach
based on recommendations by the NRC's Executive Director for
Operations. The failure to have such an approach was a key
lesson learned from NRC's response to the events at Three Mile
Island and was stated by the EDO, Bill Borchardt, who is here
today as a concern that he had going forward with Fukushima
when we had our public meeting March 21st.
Not all the 12 task force recommendations that have 35
subparts are equal, neither in safety enhancement or urgency
perspective.
Second, some actions should be taken sooner than others. My
vote cast last week supports the EDO coming back within 30 days
with a list of recommendations warranting short-term actions. I
specifically called out in my vote from last week six discrete
actions that I think should happen now. There are perhaps
others. I look forward to hearing from the EDO as to what those
recommendations might be from an integrated prioritization
standpoint.
Third and finally, I join with my colleagues at the table
in supporting the full engagement by our stakeholders. That is
absolutely critical.
I appreciate the Committee's oversight and interest in this
area and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ostendorff follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Each of us will have 5 minutes.
We are not dealing here with safety issues that are
relatively straightforward like seatbelts. We know it is
essential people buckle up. We know they save lives. What we
are dealing with here is potentially fatal doses of radiation
if you don't do your job right and we don't do our jobs right.
And today, the New York Times had a story here, Fatal
Radiation Level Found At Japanese Plant. They said the operator
at Tokyo Electric Power said that workers on Monday afternoon
found an area near reactors numbers one and two where radiation
levels exceeded their measuring device's maximum reading of 10
sieverts per hour, a fatal dose for humans.
So when I hear colleagues call, and this is my
interpretation of what they said, not far off, recommendations
for safety, more Washington red tape, I believe that is what
the Ranking Member said, more Washington red tape. I can tell
the people in Japan would have got down on their knees and
prayed God that they had more safety measures in place.
So I want to ask some questions here. The task force
recommends requiring hardened vent designed in Mark I and Mark
II reactors. Now, the reason is that what happened in Japan is
the fuel in the reactors of units one, two and three became
partially uncovered which led to a buildup of hydrogen gas.
Japanese tried to vent the gas, but because the vents were not
working, explosions occurred in all three units. Those units
were Mark I reactors, and we know some of the Mark II reactors
have made some safety improvements.
But the task force recommends requiring hardened vent
designs in Mark I and Mark II reactors. It is important to note
only three reactors in America have installed hardened vents.
There are five remaining reactors who have. Now, why do we have
to wait before we implement that recommendation?
So I am going to ask each of you: Do you think we ought to
move on that recommendation to harden, to move forward with
this recommendation of the hardened vent designs?
I just want a yes or know or don't know.
Mr. Jaczko. Yes, I think that is a fine recommendation.
Senator Boxer. OK, I don't want any editorial comment, yes
or no or don't know.
Ms. Svinicki. I don't know at this time.
Senator Boxer. OK. Next?
Mr. Apostolakis. Sounds reasonable.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. I can't answer at this point.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Ostendorff. I support assessing our venting capability
and accessibility. The task force report noted that they did
not have a clear understanding of whether the operators were
able to actually operate the vents. So there is more
information to be gleaned here.
Senator Boxer. I take it as a no.
It is not good news from this commission. Can I ask each of
you, what is your purpose that when you became a commission,
what was your highest duty, in a word?
Mr. Jaczko. Public health and safety protection.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Ms. Svinicki. The safety and security of nuclear material.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Apostolakis. Public health and safety.
Mr. Magwood. Protect health and safety.
Mr. Ostendorff. Public health and safety.
Senator Boxer. Good. Well, then I would like you to
consider looking at what happened in Japan and looking at the
similarities that we see in some of our plants and move on it.
And let me tell you why I am concerned. After 9/11, the NRC
took seemingly decisive action, I want you to listen to this. I
hope the public is listening to this. You ordered U.S. nuclear
power plants to take a series of improved security measures
because we worried about a terrorist attack. And in my home
State, they were handing out iodine pills. That is how worried
they were about it because we had millions of people that live
within 50 miles of power plants.
The NRC later codified those orders in regulations. You
know when? With compliance required by March 31st, 2010, from
2001 to 2010.
Now, I want assurances from each of you that you will not
allow that to happen. And I want to hear from you as to whether
or not you believe we can move on these recommendations and put
them in place within a year.
Mr. Jaczko. Yes, I believe we can move on them within 90
days and have full implementation with potentially long-term
recommendations in 5 years.
Senator Boxer. OK. So let's ask 90 days if we can move on
these, most of these recommendations and put them in place in
90 days. There is a yes from the Chairman.
Yes.
Ms. Svinicki. I don't believe that all can be acted on in
90 days.
Senator Boxer. How many? How many do you think could?
Ms. Svinicki. I am not certain. I have proposed that we
receive an evaluation.
Senator Boxer. So you don't know.
Next.
I am sorry. My time is over. Go ahead.
Mr. Apostolakis. I agree with the Chairman that we should
disposition all of them within 90 days.
Senator Boxer. Excellent.
Sir.
Mr. Magwood. I certainly think some of them could be
dispositioned within 90 days. It is hard to say that all of
them could, but some of them certainly could.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. I agree with Commissioner Magwood.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
OK. My time is up.
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
You might recall when we had our June meeting, I had an
Armed Services commitment that kept me from being here, so I
asked Senator Barrasso if he would ask Chairman Jaczko to
provide a full account of the actions he took while exercising
his emergency authority as provided in Section 3 of the NRC's
reorganization plan of 1980. To date, I have not received such
a report.
Section 3 states, ``Following the conclusion of the
emergency, the Chairman shall render a complete and timely
report to the commission on the actions taken during that
emergency.'` Let me start by asking each one of you, except for
Chairman Jaczko, the question: Has Chairman Jaczko provided
such a report?
Let's start with you.
Ms. Svinicki. I have not received a report.
Senator Inhofe. You have not.
Mr. Apostolakis. I have not.
Mr. Magwood. I have never seen a report.
Mr. Ostendorff. I have not.
Senator Inhofe. The second thing I would ask you is: Has he
informed you that he has ceased using his emergency authority?
Ms. Svinicki. He has not informed me of that.
Mr. Apostolakis. He has not.
Mr. Magwood. He has not.
Mr. Ostendorff. He has not.
Senator Inhofe. OK. Then I would have to assume that he is
still using the emergency. You know, this is kind of very
confusing.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator Inhofe, would you like a response?
Senator Inhofe. Not yet.
Well, if you want to extend my time, that is fine. Go
ahead.
Senator Boxer. Sure, I will extend your time.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Jaczko. My colleagues have all been informed.
Senator Inhofe. It might be better if I finish then he can.
Senator Boxer. Fair enough.
Senator Inhofe. All right. So I have to assume that he is
still using, I mean since they haven't received, and I do want
to do this because I think it needs to be in the record. None
of us were around at that time, but in 1980 when this emergency
provision was passed by law, and it was Toby Moffett. He was a
Democratic Congressman from Connecticut.
And I am going to read this because I think it is important
to have this in the record. This is from over 30 years ago:
``There will be two situations in the future, those where the
Chairman is in basic agreement with the majority and those
where he or she is not. In those cases where the Chairman has a
majority of Commissioners with him or her, it is obvious that
the Chairman will not need the extraordinary powers tucked away
in this plan to work his or her will. The Chairman and the
commission can move in unison toward their chosen regulatory
policy.'`
``But what about the other situation, where the Chairman is
in the minority, regardless of party affiliation, within the
commission, when the majority of the commissioners oppose the
Chairman? Isn't it equally obvious that if will be at that
moment that these special powers will be most appealing to the
Chairman? Isn't it clear that if these powers are ever to be
needed and utilized at all, it is precisely by the Chairman
bent on going against a majority of the commissioners. And if
that be the case, is this plan not clearly constructed to gut
the commission form of regulation and would it not be subject
to the basest sort of partisan political manipulation?'`
That was over 30 years ago. And I would just have to say,
before you make your comments, Chairman Jaczko, I would like to
get a commitment from you that you will respect the will of the
commission majority on this report and all other issues and
that you will not attempt to act unilaterally to implement any
of these task force recommendations.
Do you feel comfortable making that commitment here in this
hearing?
Mr. Jaczko. Of course, everything I do I do consistent with
that.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Jaczko. With regard to the emergency powers, the
commissioners personally have been briefed by me on ths status
of our situation. We no longer have our emergency operation
center activated, which is a clear signal that there would be
no emergency powers.
Senator Inhofe. But Chairman Jaczko, that is not what they
said. They said they have not been notified by you.
Mr. Jaczko. Which is a true statement. But for one to infer
that they are not aware of the status of the agency and whether
or not, as I believe you indicated, you were therefore assuming
that I am continuing to use emergency powers, I don't believe
that that is a fair assumption. The commission is fully aware.
Their staff is briefed on a weekly basis on our response
activities related to Japan. They were provided situation
reports throughout the entire activity of everything that was
going on.
Moreover, they have received a report that you have all
received, the task force report which summarizes and looks at
the actions that were taken following the Fukushima incident.
So to somehow infer that the commission is being kept in
the dark about what is going on at the agency is simply not
true. They have been receiving multiple briefings, many
briefings, including public commission meetings.
Senator Inhofe. So all four of them were not telling the
truth when they answered the question, have they received a
report.
Mr. Jaczko. I simply can't speak for them, but they
certainly have received many reports about what we have done
following Fukushima, including the report that you see in front
of you. If that is not a report summarizing actions and
recommendations going forward, I don't know what would be. And
that is one of the clear requirements of the report in the
statute. So their response I cannot explain.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I think I can.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
OK. How about a smile from everybody here. Can you do that?
Not quite.
Senator.
Senator Carper. We don't always smile either up here.
Senator Boxer. We try to. The Chairman and I do.
Senator Inhofe. We do.
Senator Boxer. We do.
Senator Carper. I am sitting here listening to this and I
am reminded of something my mother used to say with respect to
moving along expeditiously on these recommendations or not. My
mother used to say, haste makes waste. My father, on the other
hand, would say that work expands to fill the amount of time we
allocate to a job. And so I had like one parent pushing on the
accelerator and one parent tapping on the brakes, which is not
a bad combination.
It sounds to me like that is a little bit like what we want
to do here, or what the commission thinks we ought to do here.
In some cases, some of the recommendations we can push on the
accelerator, and with some others we can tap on the brakes.
I think one of the things I like to do around here is try
to encourage consensus across the aisle, and I am going to try
and see if we can get some consensus here with respect to some
of these recommendations.
Mr. Magwood, you mentioned that you thought there were some
of these recommendations that could be implemented pretty much
right away, and there are others that would take some time.
Would you mention a couple of the ones that fall into the
implement right away category for us please?
Mr. Magwood. Well, I have generally tried not to point out
specific recommendations because I would like to let the
process work its way. But just to anticipate, a clear example I
think are what we call the walk down inspections to confirm
that the plants are prepared to deal with a flood and seismic
events. I think that is an obvious one that can be done very
quickly.
Commissioner Ostendorff in his vote highlighted I think
about a half dozen. I am in general agreement with what he
recommended. There are others. I think ultimate action on
events, for example, are ones we have to study and understand
very carefully before those are implemented, but that doesn't
mean it has to take years to do it. It simply may not be
possible in a few weeks.
So I think many of these could be implemented very quickly.
And let me just share just personally because I have talked
with other members of the commission. I have absolutely no
sense that there is anyone on the commission that wants to
delay this unnecessarily. I think everyone is looking at this
very seriously and wants to move forward as quickly as
practical, but we want to make sure the process is done
correctly.
Senator Carper. OK. Good. Well, that is encouraging.
Mr. Ostendorff, did I hear Commissioner Magwood say the
Ostendorff half dozen? Is that what he said?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. Ostendorff. Real quick, I will just summarize some of
those. There are six things that I think could be done very
quickly here and decided on in a matter of weeks. I put those
in my vote from last week.
The first is reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at
all sites against current NRC requirements; second, perform, as
Commissioner Magwood mentioned, seismic and flood protection
walk-downs to look at any plant-specific vulnerabilities;
third, issue an advance notice of rulemaking to address long
loss of A.C. power, this is the station blackout rule we
discussed at the last hearing.
Fourth, review what is called B(5)(b), our fire and
flooding protection equipment to ensure that they can withstand
a seismic event or flooding, and also we have additional
equipment in the event of a multi-unit accident; fifth, review
the venting capability and accessibility of vents on Mark I and
Mark II boiling water reactors; and sixth, maintain and train
on severe accident management guidelines.
Those are examples of things I think can be done right
away.
Senator Carper. What was the sixth one?
Mr. Ostendorff. We have severe accident management
guidelines that guide our licensees as to how to deal with a
catastrophic event. Making sure that those are in good order
and the people are fully trained in those is a high priority.
Senator Carper. OK. All right.
Let me just go right down the line here. We will start with
you, Mr. Chairman, if you will.
Would you want to kind of react to the Ostendorff half
dozen please?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I certainly don't have any disagreement.
I would note that I think beyond that, there really aren't that
many recommendations that the task force recommended for near-
term action. So I think some of this discussion is really about
semantics. But four of the 12 recommendations themselves were
long-term recommendations. Two of them were specifically
targeted toward NRC action in and of itself. So there are
actually only six recommendations that are actually directed
toward licensees in the short term.
Senator Carper. And were those six the ones that
Commissioner Ostendorff mentioned?
Mr. Jaczko. They were a subset of that. They are smaller.
The ones that appear to be missing were recommendations related
to spent fuel pools and the need to have reliable monitoring
and capability to deal with spent fuel pools, which I think is
one that most people would agree is an action that we would
want to address in the near term.
I don't think there are that many left once we take those
particular issues that we can't get all this work done in 90
days.
Senator Carper. OK. My time is expired.
Just really quickly, Commissioner Svinicki and Commissioner
Apostolakis, would you like to just give me some indication of
whether you are pretty much in agreement that Commission
Ostendorff's list of half dozen is easily on the money there or
has he overstated the case?
Ms. Svinicki. I would just add quickly that I did not have
any negative reaction to the task force's recommendations. I
agree that they are of varying complexity. And I think that my
proposal was to hear from those NRC staff who would be
responsible for carrying out such actions, and I think the
recommendations when shaped through the NRC programmatic
offices may come back to us slightly different. I would like to
do it maybe once and do it right, as opposed to continually
iterating. I think prolonged uncertainty about these
recommendation is very undesirable.
Senator Carper. OK.
Dr. Apostolakis.
Mr. Apostolakis. Well, all I am saying in my vote is that I
would like to have the opinion and judgment of the senior
management before we go ahead. That doesn't mean it is going to
take forever to get that, but this sounds like a reasonable
list, but I would like to have this additional input before we
make a decision.
Plus, senior management may come up with additional
recommendations that can be implemented immediately. I don't
think we should limit ourselves to what the task force said.
Senator Carper. OK.
Thanks very much.
Senator Boxer. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Jaczko, how involved were you in the selection of
the six members of the six members of this near-term task
force?
Mr. Jaczko. I was not involved.
Senator Barrasso. Not involved?
Mr. Jaczko. I mean, I believe the EDO may have told me the
list of people that would be on it and I think I OKed it.
Senator Barrasso. Were you involved in any way or shape or
form in the deliberations of the task force?
Mr. Jaczko. No, not at all. I spoke to them before they
began their work and told them they had a tremendous
responsibility to do and they should do it the best they could.
Senator Barrasso. The task force report talked about a
patchwork of requirements flowing from the current regulatory
program. Do you agree with the implication that our current
regulatory program of nuclear safety in the United States is
defective or not working?
Mr. Jaczko. I don't believe that is what the task force
said. The task force said we have a patchwork. I think the
inference that it is defective therefore is not true. It is
true that we have a patchwork of regulations. That is what the
task force indicated. We have some things that, for instance if
you just look at emergency procedures. We have emergency
procedures that fall into three classes, the standard emergency
procedures that we call emergency operating procedures. We then
have procedures for severe accidents. And then we have
procedures dealing with what we call essentially the September
11th actions.
Each one of those has a different regulatory treatment, but
all three of them are likely comparable in their importance and
should be integrated into a whole process of procedures. So
that was the patchwork that existed. Each of those came out of
a particular incident. The severe accidents came out of the
1980's and when we recognized that there was a need to have a
better preparation for severe accidents. The last, the
extensive damage mitigation guidelines came out of September
11th.
So there was never an effort to look at those in a holistic
way as part of a unified set of procedures. That is simply what
the task force is recommending. And in some cases, some would
get greater regulatory treatment than they get right now, in
particular the severe accident management guidelines.
Senator Barrasso. Commissioner Ostendorff, you stated in
your notation vote response sheet that the NRC is an agency
that ``prides itself on openness and transparency.'` You also
referenced that the NRC has principles of good regulation that
you use in your decisionmaking.
If the NRC simply has a couple of public meetings on these
task force recommendations, would that suffice to meet the
goals of openness and transparency and meet the standard of the
NRC principles that you referenced?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think public meetings are a very key component of that effort.
We had a public meeting just last Thursday at the NRC which I
think is a very good start. I think all the Commissioners here
support the Chairman's call for open and public meetings as
being a very key component.
There is also the discussions that will happen outside of
public meetings that will help inform the prioritization that
these individual recommendations should receive.
Senator Barrasso. OK. And you said that you didn't believe
that the existing regulatory framework is broken. Is this 82-
page report larger in scope than maybe you expected, given that
statement?
Mr. Ostendorff. If I can, Senator, address that comment. I
agree with all of what the Chairman said just a few minutes ago
on his characterization of the patchwork comment. I think there
has been a dynamic evolving buildup of regulations in response
to events. And so I don't think that the patchwork is a fair
characterization itself, but I think the Chairman's explanation
is correct here.
I think it is something that we ought to look at, but I
don't think it is something that is an immediate concern that
would suggest our existing regulations are not safe and proper.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much.
And then Commissioner Svinicki, if I could, you said in
your vote ``lacking the NRC technical and programmatic staff's
evaluation'` beyond that of the six NRC staff members. You said
``I do not have a sufficient basis to accept or reject the
recommendations of the near-term task force.'`
In your opinion, how can we achieve a sufficient basis of
knowledge to then make that decision about accepting or
rejecting these recommendations?
Ms. Svinicki. I had made a proposal to my colleagues which
is not yet decided upon, but it would be that the NRC
programmatic staff would take these recommendations and within
45 days come back to the commission with a prioritization and a
plan for how the agency might move forward to get that more
complete evaluation. They could also at that time identify the
more straightforward recommendations and how they would propose
to move forward on those more quickly.
So I did not think it needed to take an excessive amount of
time.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sanders.
Senator Sanders. I will just start again by telling you how
I begin my thinking. I am going back to the AP article, June
20th, 2011. Federal regulators have been working closely with
the nuclear power industry to keep the Nation's aging reactors
operating within safety standards by repeatedly weakening those
standards or simply failing to enforce them, an investigation
by the AP has found.
Now, throughout this discussion, I probably a half dozen
times Members of the Committee have quoted the statement in the
task force which says that the task force which says that the
task force concludes that a sequence of events like the
Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States.
We have heard that a half dozen times, but we haven't heard
the paragraph before that. And the paragraph before that says,
this regulatory approach established and supplemented piece by
piece over the decades, has addressed many safety returns and
issues using the best information and techniques available at
the time. The result is a patchwork of regulatory requirements
and other safety initiatives, all important, but not all given
equivalent consideration and treatment by licensees or during
NRC technical review and inspection. Consistent with the NRC's
organizational value of excellence, the task force believes
that improving the NRC's regulatory framework is an
appropriate, realistic and achievable goal.
Chairman Jaczko, what is the problem? I think again my
friend from Wyoming talked about somebody saying that they were
defective. I didn't hear the word defective, that the
regulatory system is defective. What I hear here is they want
to improve it. Do we have a problem of improving the regulatory
framework?
Second of all, let's be clear what we are talking about.
You have highly knowledgeable people who have made 12
recommendations. They want you to go forward. No one is saying
that you have to accept all 12 recommendations tomorrow. What
they are saying is look at them, analyze them, tell us what you
like. I think Mr. Ostendorff has said he likes some of them. He
is ready to go on some of them. Some of them he has concerns
about. Fine.
What is the problem, Mr. Chairman, in your judgment, about
taking these recommendations and starting an immediate
discussion to see what we like or don't like?
Mr. Jaczko. I think that is something that we can do. And
as I said, I think it is something we should be able to get
done in 90 days.
Senator Sanders. Ms. Svinicki, what is the problem with
starting this discussion?
Ms. Svinicki. I voted within days of receiving the task
force report to respectfully, I believe, begin that discussion.
So I don't see that my proposal is to take an inordinate amount
of time to evaluate them.
Senator Sanders. So you are ready to get going, then, on
taking a hard look at these 12 recommendations?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, I am.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, the process has started, Senator.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, I think I was actually the first one to
vote.
Senator Sanders. So you are ready now to begin immediately
to start a discussion on these 12 recommendations?
Mr. Magwood. Absolutely.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Ostendorff.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator Sanders, I think we are all ready.
Senator Sanders. I am glad to hear that.
Chairman Jaczko, is the process now ready to go? Where has
the confusion been? What am I missing here?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think there is a bit of, or we are kind
of stuck I think in developing the process, rather than just
moving forward to actually begin the discussion and the dialog
on the recommendations. Right now, what we are talking about is
the process to have that discussion. And unfortunately,
certainly with the exception of Commissioner Ostendorff, most
of my colleagues have weighed in about the process, not about
specific recommendations.
Senator Sanders. And what are the differences of opinion
with regard to process?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think they are not severe. They are
minor, but I think a big difference is setting an expectation
for when we can get completed. I have suggested that we work to
get completed our decisions about all 12 recommendations in 90
days. I think that is a reasonable timeframe. I think that is
perhaps what I hear is the biggest point.
Senator Sanders. Ms. Svinicki, do you think we could do it
in 90 days?
Ms. Svinicki. I agree with the Chairman's characterization.
Senator Sanders. Do you think we can? Well, do you agree
with him that we can get these recommendations done in 90 days?
Ms. Svinicki. No, I believe that some of them are complex
enough that it would not be possible to make a final decision
on all 12 in 90 days.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Apostolakis.
Mr. Apostolakis. I believe we can do it in 90 days. I think
the major difference, Senator, process-wise is that the
Chairman's original road map would go directly to public
meetings of the commission. Some of the members feel that we
should get senior management evaluation first of the
recommendations.
Senator Sanders. OK.
Mr. Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. As I see the votes being cast so far, I see a
great deal of commonality. So I think there is actually a
consensus coming here quite quickly on the commission to move
forward with this. And as I stated earlier, I do think some of
these recommendations can very likely be implemented very
quickly.
Senator Sanders. Do you agree with the Chairman that we can
get moving on this?
Mr. Magwood. I think we can launch some of them sooner than
90 days. Others may take longer.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Ostendorff.
Mr. Ostendorff. I believe that we can act on most of these
recommendations within 90 days, perhaps not all. I think
unfortunately in the press there has been a perception created
there is great dissension among the commissioners on this
topic, which I quite frankly don't think is there. I think
there is a lot more consensus. Everybody is ready to move
forward. I think there is a lot of agreement on the need for us
to place this at the highest priority. And I think it clearly
is.
Senator Sanders. OK.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Let's see, Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Jaczko, a traffic policeman's job would be to keep the
traffic safe, and all five of you said public health and safety
was your job. But if the traffic cop just stopped all the cars
from going anywhere, his supervisor might come down and say,
hey, wait a minute, that is not very creative of you.
Is there anything within the charge of the commission to
make it possible for a power plant to create an environment in
which a nuclear power plant can actually operate and in which a
new one could actually be built?
Mr. Jaczko. I don't think there is a charge specifically
for that motivation for what we do.
Senator Alexander. That is not a part of your charge, to
create an environment in which a power plant--if you only
charge is public health and safety, you would shut them all
down.
Mr. Jaczko. No, I think our charge is reasonable assurance
of public health and safety. So the charge is that we are
providing an level of assurance that is reasonable.
Senator Alexander. So there is no economic responsibility?
No responsibility you have to make sure that a power plant can
also be operated economically at the same time?
Mr. Jaczko. No. Our requirements really fall into two
categories, those things which are kind of the basic tenets of
safety based on court decisions. The commission is required to
make those safety decisions irrespective of the economic
considerations of that decision.
Certainly, when it goes to the implementation of
requirements, we can consider the economic impact and look to
see which is the most cost-beneficial.
Senator Alexander. You can consider that?
Mr. Jaczko. At that stage, but not at the basis of
determining whether something is a fundamental safety
requirement. At that point, we are bound by a court decision
from considering economic matters.
Senator Alexander. Well, is it your objective to create an
environment in which nuclear power plants could be built?
Mr. Jaczko. No, my goal is to continue to ensure that we
have an environment in which nuclear power plants are safe, and
if new plants are to be built that they will be as safe as our
requirement dictate.
Senator Alexander. So you don't have any--what about the
recommendation of the commission that recommended that you
complete without delay the design certification of the AP 1000
and the economically simplified boiling water reactor design?
Mr. Jaczko. I think that was a recommendation not to
encourage the commission to take action, but it was a
recommendation indicating that there was no reason to
specifically delay action as a result of these recommendations.
Senator Alexander. Well, that sounds like action to me. Are
you planning to do it without delay? Does that mean within 90
days?
Mr. Jaczko. We are continuing to move forward.
Senator Alexander. Can you do it within 90 days?
Mr. Jaczko. We will be fairly close to receiving a final
rule on the AP 1000 in October, which again is part of the
reason for us to look at these recommendations in 90 days
because when we go into the decision of looking at a final
design for, for instance, the AP 1000, I think it is important
that we have dispositioned the recommendation so we know what,
if any, changes would impact those new reactors.
Senator Alexander. Will considering all of the
recommendations, all 12, delay your consideration of the design
certification for the AP 1000 and the new boiling water reactor
design?
Mr. Jaczko. Not in my opinion. However, I believe if we
don't consider the recommendations in a timely way, it could
have the potential impact of delaying the action on the new
reactor licensing.
Senator Alexander. But there is a lot of talk here about
delay. This report said you should do this without delay. I
mean, why did they say that?
Mr. Jaczko. I don't know. That is probably something better
to task the task force. But again, I think the information that
is relevant there is that it was useful information for the
commission to know that there were no immediate issues with the
design certification.
Senator Alexander. But let me press you a little further.
You said you think everything could be done in 90 days. Does
that include these two designs?
Mr. Jaczko. What I said is that it is important for the
commission to disposition the 12 recommendations. I would note
that the statements related to new reactors are not any of the
12 recommendations of the task force.
Senator Alexander. But they are in the report.
Mr. Jaczko. That is correct.
Senator Alexander. Yes. And they say without delay, right?
Mr. Jaczko. That is correct, and we are currently not
delaying any of the new reactor work. However, as I said, if we
don't promptly act on these recommendations, it will create
uncertainty for what actions would be applicable to those new
reactors, which in my opinion could actually lead to a
potential delay in that work if we don't disposition these
recommendations promptly.
Senator Alexander. Well, as you can tell, my hope is that
you if you are going to take the Committee's advice to do the
task force recommendations within 90 days, that you will take
the task force's advice to complete these design certifications
without delay.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator, I would just call your attention to the mission of
the NRC, which is clearly stated. The U.S. NRC is an
independent agency created by Congress. The mission of the NRC
is to license and regulate the Nation's civilian use of
byproduct source and special nuclear materials in order to
protect public health and safety, promote the common defense
and security, and protect the environment.
Senator Alexander. Well, Madam Chair, I would think that it
is still a legitimate question whether a traffic stop should
stop all the traffic. That is one way to have safety. His
supervisor still might ask him if he couldn't be a little more
creative and at least people drive in a safe way.
Senator Boxer. I don't think that is the right analogy,
because there is really no analogy when you are dealing with
nuclear energy.
Senator Alexander. We have had a lot more death in traffic.
We tolerate 38,000 traffic deaths every year. We have never had
one with a nuclear reactor in the United States.
Senator Boxer. That says a lot for the fact that we have an
independent agency protecting the health and safety. They said
the same thing in Japan until recently.
But in any event, let's move on.
Obviously, we have differences here just like you have
differences there. But I want to make the point, and I really
do want to make this point because I have made it to you
before. As many differences as we have here, we are friends.
And we differ. We argue. We debate. I am sensing with you that
maybe there needs to be a little bit more friendship. Just a
point spoken as a human being, not as a Senator.
I think it is important that these differences not become
personal. If Inhofe and I can do it, we are really good
friends, then anybody could do it.
Anyway, here we go. We are moving on and we are going now
to Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
This is beginning to look like a glee club here, everybody
happy faces. What you see isn't really what you get.
Mr. Jaczko, the NRC recently renewed the operating license
for Hope Creek nuclear plant in New Jersey through 2046. Now,
what did we learn from the incidents in Japan that you would
take into account when deciding to grant the extension? And
which conditions would that influence you to place on it?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, for any reactor, whether it is a reactor
that has been operating for 35 years or 45 years, if we adopt
any of these recommendations, they would likely apply to every
reactor in the Country, with the exception of some of the
recommendations like the hardened vent, which would only apply
to boiling water reactor design.
So the license renewal process is really about ensuring
that they have a program in place to deal with the aging of
components and systems. And nothing that came out of the task
force specifically touched on those issues, but called, for
instance, for a number of recommendations dealing with
earthquakes and those kinds of things that we would expect that
any plant, Hope Creek being one of them, would be required then
to implement along with the others.
Senator Lautenberg. So not too much specific information
came from the Fukushima failure that influenced your granting
of the extension of the license?
Mr. Jaczko. Right. Not at this point, nothing that affected
the extension, but ultimately if these recommendations are
adopted, some of them would apply to Hope Creek as an operating
plant, just like any other plant in the Country.
Senator Lautenberg. The Mark I containment system that was
used at Fukushima is also used at U.S. plants including two
reactors in New Jersey. And you said in June that we didn't
know what went wrong with the containment system at Fukushima.
Now, what did this uncertainty factor bring into the recent NRC
task force recommendations? When do you think we will know all
we can about what went wrong at the Japanese plant?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, that could take possibly years. What will
need to happen is that they will have to decontaminate the
facility, decontaminate the reactor itself to be able to get in
and actually analyze and really look at the equipment and try
and, almost like a criminologist, to try and recover and
reconstruct what happened in the accident.
But as the task force laid out, there are some things we
can do in the short term, in particular with the hardened
vents. This is an area where the task force recommended an NRC
requirement. The Mark I containment system, which is similar to
what they had in Japan, are containment designs that do have
hardened vents, but they have never been done as a formal
regulatory requirement. So the task force recommended that we
do that.
The advantage of that is that it brings it under our
inspections and our oversight and all those kinds of things so
we can monitor it and make sure it is being used effectively.
So that is something specifically for the Mark I's that has
been recommended that we take action on.
Senator Lautenberg. But it would take years, you say, to
fully understand what took place there?
Mr. Jaczko. It may.
Senator Lautenberg. It is hard to imagine because there
were specific events. We are not talking about the influence on
the people who were in the area, that kind of thing, but the
specific trigger for this collapse is pretty much obvious.
Mr. Jaczko. And that is certainly why you see a number of
recommendations from the task force. They acknowledge that
there were some things we don't yet know, and those things will
need additional study. But clearly, there were at least six
recommendations they believe we had sufficient information to
take action on right now.
Senator Lautenberg. Looking ahead a little bit, you said in
a 2008 speech that ``I believe that the NRC should develop new
regulations which require spent fuel to be moved to dry cask
storage after it has been allowed to cool for 5 years.'` The
task force recommended enhancements to spent fuel pools, but
did not advocate requiring dry cask storage.
Now, given that it falls short of your 2008 proposal, how
can we be sure that the task force approach here will ensure
the safest form of storage for spent fuel?
Mr. Jaczko. I think the task force recommendation is really
a short-term recommendation, which is precisely to ensure that
if an event like Fukushima were to happen, the challenges we
saw there, namely knowing how much water is in the pool and
making sure that there is sufficient capability to put water
into the pool to keep it cool, that those things would be
addressed. That is what they have asked for in the short term.
And then over the longer term, we can analyze this issue
more importantly of whether we should have more fuel in pools
versus in dry cask storage. But they really went at that short-
term issue of making sure that the fuel that is in pools is
going to be in an enhanced configuration and safer that way.
Senator Lautenberg. I am being ruled out, so thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. I answered a little long, I think.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko, there have been some complaints about your
leadership at the commission, as you are aware, in the media. I
do believe it is important that you reflect the proper role of
the Chairman, which has I am sure some administrative
responsibilities. But we have a commission and the commission
was established to decide as a commission important issues.
With regard to this emergency power, did you file an
official document assuming emergency powers of any kind?
Mr. Jaczko. No, Senator.
Senator Sessions. How did you announce that you were
assuming emergency power?
Mr. Jaczko. It is not something which we have procedures in
which that is formally done. About three or 4 days into the
incident, I was made aware that my colleagues on the commission
had inquired about that. I spoke with the General Counsel. I
actually asked members of the staff should I make a formal
declaration of use of emergency powers. And in all honesty, I
got one or two people who said no, that would just distract you
from the work that we are doing. And frankly, I got distracted
by dealing with the emergency response and didn't turn back to
it until several weeks later.
Senator Sessions. Well, did you seek a formal opinion from
counsel as to whether an event on the other side of the world
would give the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
commission chairman, the power to assume emergency powers that
would in some ways diminish, obviously, the influence of the
other members of the commission?
Mr. Jaczko. I did seek that and the general counsel advised
me that it was perfectly appropriate.
Senator Sessions. Do you have a written opinion to that
effect?
Mr. Jaczko. I do have a written opinion. I believe that has
been provided to the Committee.
Senator Sessions. With regard to this Committee, well, are
you still assuming those powers?
Mr. Jaczko. No, I ceased that weeks or ago or perhaps
months.
Senator Sessions. Have you issued a report of what you did
during the course of that time?
Mr. Jaczko. As I indicated, we provided situation reports
to the commission at the beginning of the incident. Those
situation reports were issued multiple times a day.
Senator Sessions. No, the Reorganization Act, the statute
of 1980 said following the conclusion of the emergency, the
Chairman or member of the commission delegated emergency
functions under the subsection shall render a complete and
timely report to the commission on the actions taken during the
emergency.
Have you done that?
Mr. Jaczko. I believe that I have.
Senator Sessions. Is that available to us?
Mr. Jaczko. We can provide you with the boxes of situation
reports which detail the----
Senator Sessions. Well, no, that is not what the statute
requires, would you not agree, Mr. Jaczko? Why would you
hesitate to do a complete and timely report of the actions
taken during the emergency?
Mr. Jaczko. I have conferred with the General Counsel and I
believe that I have more than satisfied the requirements of
that particular provision. Tremendous information was provided
to the commission about actions that were taken during the
response.
Senator Sessions. Well, I am not arguing about that.
Mr. Jaczko. In the form of reports.
Senator Sessions. You have given a lot of information. I
believe the statute under which you serve requires that the
Chairman or the emergency official render a complete and timely
report, not a series of situation reports in a box somewhere.
Wouldn't you agree that that is what it seems to say plainly?
Mr. Jaczko. As I read the statute, it is clear that they
envision one piece of information.
Senator Sessions. Well, why wouldn't you do that?
Mr. Jaczko. Because I think we provided much of that
information already to the commission and I have heard nothing
from my colleagues on the commission that they have any
interest in that particular report.
Senator Sessions. Well, I have an interest in it. The
people of the United States have an interest in the Chairman of
the NRC following the plain statutory requirement. So I will
ask you, what hesitation do you have to put a formal report
together that says what you did while you assumed emergency
powers?
Mr. Jaczko. I will be happy to put that together, and I
believe I have more provided information to the American people
through testimony, through a variety of different reports that
have provided significant information about the actions that
were taken during this event. But I would be more than happy to
summarize those in a single report.
Senator Sessions. I think you should comply with the
statute.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, I would just like to comment that I
have conferred with the General Counsel and we believe that I
have more than complied with the statute in that particular
provision and we can provide you with analysis of that as well.
Senator Sessions. I believe it requires a single report
after the conclusion and it is pretty obvious you have not done
that.
With regard to this committee, the six members that were
appointed, you said you didn't select them, but EDO did. Who is
EDO?
Mr. Jaczko. The Executive Director for Operations.
Senator Sessions. And who does that person work for?
Mr. Jaczko. Nominally to the Chairman.
Senator Sessions. And so did you know who was being
selected and were those members discussed with you before they
were selected?
Mr. Jaczko. I believe he gave the names to me and I said
that they were appropriate and I thought they were good
selections.
Senator Sessions. Did you make any suggestions to him about
names that might be on that list?
Mr. Jaczko. I don't recall whether I did or I didn't.
Senator Sessions. You don't recall?
Mr. Jaczko. It was not something that was formally
presented to me. It was presented to me verbally and I believe
I signed off on it verbally. I believe that they were a good
selection, the people that he selected were excellent people.
And I don't recall if there was at a time a smaller group or a
larger group. I could check my records, but it was not for me a
significant decision for me and I trusted the EDO to appoint
the appropriate people to that task force.
Senator Sessions. My time is up.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will submit a written question
concerning how it was that the mission plan that stakeholders
would be invited to submit suggestions was eliminated from the
staff effort.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Senator.
The last hearing we had here, we did ask the Chairman about
this in depth about his taking over emergency powers.
Do not start the clock yet because I have another thing to
do.
Senator Cardin, I am just going to put this out here. And
he would like this in writing, this answer. If the commission
delays action on task force recommendations on the grounds you
don't have enough information yet about what happened at
Fukushima to move forward, does that suggest the NRC also
doesn't have enough information to move forward with
relicensing existing reactors or licensing new reactors?
So that is a question he wants answered.
We are going to have a second round here. I think Senator
Carper is coming back and we will have a second round.
Senator Sanders. I just have one brief question.
Senator Boxer. I go first.
Senator Sanders. I am sorry.
Senator Boxer. And you go after.
Senator Sanders. You are the Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you for noticing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. OK. Here is where we are. I want all of you
to know we are going to have you back every 90 days until I
know what you are doing. And we will take all the answers you
gave, how much you are going to work to make this happen, a
half dozen, a dozen, a baker's dozen, whatever it is, and we
are going to stay on this.
I will tell you why. After 9/11, we had all these great
ideas. Everybody thought great, the NRC took decisive action.
And 9 years later, some of these things went into effect. That
is not going to happen. Of it is happens, the American people
are going to know.
And here is the point. Whether you love nuclear energy,
don't like it or you are agnostic, it ain't going anywhere if
it isn't safe. And it is not going anywhere if the public
doesn't have faith in you. If the public thinks that you are
somehow not independent, not doing their business, let me tell
you they won't be happy.
So I have a question for you Commissioner Svinicki, in your
July 19th vote on the task force report, you stated, ``The NRC
finds itself at the appropriate point now to move away from
small group taskings, including the commission itself
attempting to labor in isolation.'`
This is very disturbing to me, very disturbing, the
commission itself attempting to labor in isolation. You are an
independent entity. What are you talking about? Isolated from
who?
Ms. Svinicki. I meant that term to reinforce the importance
of having public meetings and stakeholder outreach, meaning
that the commission ought to have the benefit of----
Senator Boxer. But you don't think that it is up to
stakeholders to decide what we should approve? You are an
independent commissioner, are you not?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, I meant that the process should be
informed by those public----
Senator Boxer. OK. And Chairman Jaczko has laid out a plan.
He proposes a process to move forward over the next 90 days to
receive broad input from NRC staff and external stakeholders
and to have votes by October 7th, 2011. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Svinicki. As I indicated in response to your earlier
question----
Senator Boxer. I am not asking you an earlier question. I
am asking you this question. Chairman Jaczko has proposed a
process to move forward over the next 90 days to address your
concerns, to receive broad input from NRC staff and external
stakeholders and to have votes on specific recommendations by
October 7th, 2011. Do you agree? It seems to match what you
called for. Now he has put it out there. It echoes what you
want. Do you agree?
Ms. Svinicki. I support commission meetings. As I have
indicated, I am not sure that all the task force
recommendations could be decided in 90 days.
Senator Boxer. How many do you think could be decided on in
90 days? Commissioner Ostendorff has pointed out six. Do you
agree with him? Can they be decided in 90 days?
Ms. Svinicki. I had proposed in my July 19th----
Senator Boxer. Yes or no? Yes or no? Do you agree with him,
that six of these could be decided in 90 days?
Ms. Svinicki. I don't have a specific count.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well let me just say your responses
disturb me. When you say that the commission isolated. Your
role by statute is to be independent. Chairman Jaczko has laid
this out. I want you to know I have 7 million people who live
within 50 miles of San Onofre. I went there with the wonderful
friend sitting next to you, Commissioner Apostolakis.
And you know what they told me? I said, what is your plan
if there is an emergency. They said, we have to go out on the
highway. That is all we can do is escape that way.
Do you ever go to those freeways? You probably may not
have. You can't even move an inch on some of those freeways.
And I have 7 million people there. And you are sitting here and
basically saying you can't move forward.
And I want to compliment the members of this special task
force. It is not red tape at all. It is 12 recommendations.
They make sense. And I am stunned to hear that you--is there
one that you could say we can move forward before you hear from
the industry? Anybody? Any one of these you can recommend?
Ms. Svinicki. I agree that the task force identified the
correct areas, but I would like the NRC staff that would be
responsible for carrying out the recommendations, I would like
to have, respectfully, their input prior to deciding on the
final form.
Senator Boxer. That is right. And Chairman Jaczko has laid
out a path to do just that, but you say you won't be ready in
October. What is the date you will be ready? What date do you
think is good to be ready to vote on perhaps a half dozen
simple ones that everyone else seems to think we could move on?
What is the date? Give me a date?
Ms. Svinicki. My objective would be, if some are less
complex, to move on them before 90 days.
Senator Boxer. Excellent. Which ones do you think those
would be? What is less complex? I looked at all of these. Most
of them don't seem too complex, especially the ones that deal
with making sure that the plants undertake more safety
precautions, emergency preparedness and all the rest.
Which ones do you think are less complex than the others?
Give me a couple out of the 12.
Ms. Svinicki. I think that the re-looking at the flooding
and seismic requirements to make sure that we are using state-
of-the-art knowledge there is a very straightforward
recommendation.
Senator Boxer. So you like the recommendation that every 10
years, the operators of these plants have to come up with new
assessments as to the safety. That is the recommendation.
Ms. Svinicki. I was referring to the recommendation that
tasked the staff to re-look at our basis on seismic.
Senator Boxer. Well, how about that one? The one I just
said. It is very clear. They say every 10 years, the operator
of a plant that is located near flooding and seismic has to do
a re-look at the problems. Because with science moving forward,
Commissioner, we have new information all the time as to
whether the seismic was worse, less harsh. Right now, we are
very concerned because science shows us that it is moving in
the wrong direction, more tsunamis, more earthquakes. Harder,
deeper. What do you think about that? Every 10 years the
operators there ought to look at that. That is one of the
recommendations.
Do you think that is complex? Is that complex?
Ms. Svinicki. I think that we as a agency constantly look
at our State of knowledge in those areas, as you suggest.
Senator Boxer. Do you think it is complex to ask the
operator who is operating a plant on or near an earthquake
fault or near a possible tsunami zone to ask them every 10
years to reassess the safety of their plant? Is that a complex
recommendation?
Ms. Svinicki. I would assess that we actually require them
to be looking at that constantly if there is any new
information that comes forward as is the case in California
with faultlines off the coast. We require it even in advance of
a 10-year period we require it.
Senator Boxer. Good. So you would support, then, a every
time there is new science an overall new look at the safety of
these plants. Is that correct?
Ms. Svinicki. Yes, I believe we require that now.
Senator Boxer. Excellent. Well, are you ready to vote on
that in the next 90 days? What you say you support, are you
ready to go for that in the next 90 days?
Ms. Svinicki. Respectfully, my proposal asks that the NRC
staff come back and provide us with the implementation on these
recommendations. And I wanted, before I made a final decision,
to be informed by that input from the NRC.
Senator Boxer. Well, all I can say is if I am the people of
California and I am watching this, right now I am not so sure
about whether I want that plant to operate, because it is very
simple. And we have our plants there coming in to get
relicensed. And I urge them not to do that, not even to issue,
not to move forward until they have studied it.
You seem to be on my side, but then you have to hear from
everybody else. I would submit to you it is common sense. There
are certain things, you should have more belief in what you say
because it is common sense.
And I am just saying we have oversight over the work you
do. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment you. And I want to say
to the commissioners who are ready and willing and able to act
in a timeframe of 90 days, thank you. Because if we don't do
that, we are not going to see people supporting nuclear power.
I mean, I take an opposite view of my friends on the other
side today. The more you convince the people that you are doing
your job, the more they are going to be comfortable with
nuclear power. If you give me answers like I have to wait and I
can't tell, and then you have a situation where it took 9 years
to put into place the last safety measures, that is ridiculous.
So as long as I am sitting over here, and I have a voice, I
am going to continue to call you before us. I mean, I really
could get used to this because I think you need to know how
important the work you do is to the safety of the people, first
and foremost, and to the future of nuclear energy, second.
Senator Sanders.
Senator Sanders. Just a few questions.
Chairman Jaczko, some of my Republican colleagues have kind
of suggested that you have initiated a Bolshevik coup on the
NRC. You are running a dictatorship to undermine American
democratic values. So I just wanted to ask you once again, to
be clear. Do you believe and does the nonpartisan General
Counsel of the NRC believe that you have fulfilled the statute
in terms of your utilization of the emergency powers?
And in terms of emergency powers, as I understand it, quite
appropriately after Fukushima, you wanted to make sure that,
was it 13 plants that we have in this Country that are similar
design to the Fukushima plants? You quite appropriately wanted
to make sure that something similar to what happened in Japan
does not happen in the United States. Is that correct?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, it certainly was a piece of it. The
primary focus was really on American citizens in Japan and
ensuring that we were doing everything we could to protect them
as they were there. And that was in many ways the prime focus.
Most of the issues related to how we dealt with U.S. plants
were really dealt with by the commission when it established
this task force. So that was how we decided to go forward in
that way. So I didn't really exercise any authorities with
regard to domestic facilities.
Senator Sanders. So it was just to protect the interests of
American citizens in Japan?
Mr. Jaczko. Correct.
Senator Sanders. And does the nonpartisan General Counsel
believe that you acted appropriately within the statute?
Mr. Jaczko. I believe that is the case and he is somewhere
he, so he can probably----
Senator Sanders. Madam Chair, can we ask the gentleman?
Senator Boxer. I am sorry. I was distracted by my staff.
Say again?
Senator Sanders. May ask the General Counsel, did he act
within the law?
Senator Boxer. Yes, you can.
Please, sir. Please join us.
Mr. Burns. Senator, my name is Stephen Burns. I am General
Counsel of the NRC, a career Federal employee.
The simple answer to your question is I believe the
Chairman's actions were consistent with the powers that he has
under the statute. I received an inquiry from his office fairly
early on in the event. And based on my view and actually an
assessment of my predecessor's view of actions taken in
response to 9/11, when there also was not a specific event at a
U.S. facility, although a threat environment obviously to U.S.
facilities, my view was that given the intentions of President
Carter and congressional essentially endorsement under the
reorganization plan, that his actions were consistent with
those responsibilities.
Senator Sanders. And you are, as I understand it, a
nonpartisan official.
Mr. Burns. Yes, I am a career official. I am appointed by
the commission.
Senator Sanders. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
And I appreciate you coming up here. I would hope that puts
an end to this consistent attack against the Chairman.
Let me ask Mr. Ostendorff, if I could, a question.
Mr. Ostendorff, my understanding is that you are prepared
to move pretty quickly on a number of the recommendations of
the task force. Let me ask you about their first
recommendation, and that is that the task force recommends
establishing a logical, systematic regulatory framework for
adequate protection that appropriately balances defense in
depth and risk considerations.
That is an important recommendation. Are you prepared to
move rapidly on that one?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, thank you for the question. I
addressed that specific recommendation in my vote in some
detail. I think it needs to be looked at. I have some concerns
that trying to embark upon that right now will distract us from
taking other actions that can and should be taken in the short
term. But I do support us taking a look at trying to improve
the framework we currently have.
Senator Sanders. I just don't quite get that answer. You
see his as an important recommendation. No one is suggesting
that you have to swallow hook, line and sinker what people
recommend. What is the problem with beginning that discussion
right now?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I have been around nuclear
propulsion in the Navy for many, many years and I have seen a
lot of different efforts taken in the Naval Sea Systems Command
to improve reactor safety on our nuclear-powered submarines and
carriers. I have seen how corrective actions are implemented.
I think this is one that is going to take a few years to
go, recommendation one. I support moving forward as a separate
effort to look at recommendation one. But I don't think that
should hold us up in trying to take shorter-term actions.
Senator Sanders. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield the floor then.
Senator Carper.
[Presiding] All right. We are going to close it out and
have a couple of questions to ask of our commissioners, and
then I think we are going to vote here pretty soon.
This is a question for Commissioner Magwood and
Commissioner Ostendorff, if I could. It is my understanding
that the majority of you have asked senior staff to take a
second look at these recommendations. And you have asked the
senior staff folks to provide suggestions to the commissions on
how to proceed with these recommendations.
Here is my question. And we have talked around this
already, but I am going to ask you just directly. Since senior
NRC staff made these recommendations in the first place and now
you are asking other senior staff to come in and to provide
suggestions, why is this next step needed? And just explain
that to me. Why is it needed?
Mr. Magwood. I will start. First, I think that, well, I
will speak for myself here, certainly. My perspective is that
it isn't simply another assessment by NRC staff, although I do
look forward to seeing what the senior staff thinks about the
recommendations. For me, the most important thing is to have
the staff interact with stakeholders in a direct and
comprehensive fashion to understand what stakeholders'
responses are to the various recommendations and then see what
their suggestions are. And then think about that and feed that
information to the commission.
So I don't look at it as simply the NRC staff looking at
what the NRC staff has already said. I think of it as NRC staff
using the mechanisms we have in place, public meetings, across-
the-table discussions in public venue, of course, to hear
details about the reaction to the recommendations, and then get
that back to the commission. That is really the normal in large
respect what we do every day.
Senator Carper. Mr. Ostendorff?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator Carper, thank you.
I would agree with Senator Magwood's comment. I will just
make two points here in addition. One is when I asked our
Executive Director for Operations, Bill Borchardt, how he
thought we should proceed, he supported having his office,
EDO's office and those that work for him, come back and give us
an integrated prioritized list.
As I said in my opening statement, that was a key lesson
learned from Three Mile Island when the agency did not do that.
I think we will get more bang for the buck implementing those
safety enhancements that will make a real difference sooner by
having this prioritized list. We have called for that within 30
days.
The second piece is that not all these recommendations are
equal. And there are some that should be done right now and
there are some that require a little bit more information.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Jaczko, a question in orders versus regulatory
process. Some of the regulatory tools at the commission's
disposal are the rulemaking process and apparently the issuance
of orders. Could you just describe or compare both processes
for us? And for each, what kind of opportunities are there for
public comment and for input from stakeholders?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, generally, the orders have more limited
opportunity for public involvement. They are usually activities
that either we believe need to be taken in a very prompt period
of time for safety reasons, or are responses to violations of
our regulations.
So they are not a preferred tool because they don't provide
for the more in-depth public engagement that a regulation
would. One of the activities that I have challenged the staff
with since I have been Chairman is to better streamline our
rulemaking process so that we can use that as a more viable
tool and get things done in a more timely way, but still have
that stakeholder input.
So generally, the orders have less involvement, but it is
usually a situation in which we feel there is a clear safety
need that requires prompt action. In most cases when it is
relating to a specific issue, we usually initiate a rulemaking
process as well, so that eventually that same content of the
order gets captured in a regulation.
Senator Carper. All right. Let me just followup with that,
if I could. Stakeholders in industry and the environmental
community have shared and discussed concerns with my own staff
about moving these recommendations through your order process.
And what has been the NRC's experience with expedited
rulemaking and might it have a role to play with some of the
recommendations adopted by the commission?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think everyone that comes in as
Chairman of the NRC, and probably every commissioner that comes
to the NRC, wants the rulemaking process to go forward faster.
We have mixed success with that, and a lot of it, I think,
comes down the usual challenges of resources and focus and
prioritization.
But we did recently complete a regulation from start to
finish in about 4 months, having to do with an issue related to
how we deal with fatigue and workers who may get tired at a
nuclear power plant.
So I think there are ways to do it. It would cause us to
change how we do our regulations, but I think it is doable. In
my mind, that would be the most preferable way for some of
these things is to do them in expedited rulemaking that can be
done in four or 5 months, or something like that, rather than
the two to 3 years that it typically takes.
Senator Carper. OK. Well, the vote hasn't started yet and
so we have it looks like another hour or two.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. All right. Not that long.
But what I would like to do is just do something--it is my
mother calling in to say haste makes waste. Not really.
What I want to do is, sometimes I like to at the close of a
hearing ask, you know, we always ask for an opening statement.
We ask you to respond to our questions. Sometimes, I find it is
helpful to have a closing statement. I am not going ask for a
lengthy closing statement, but just maybe something like given
the conversation we have today or questions that have been
asked and responses that have been given, this may be a closing
thought as we prepare to go vote to save the Republic.
Captain Ostendorff, Chairman Ostendorff, or Commissioner
Ostendorff, why don't you go first?
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you, Senator.
I would say that we talk all the time. We meet each week
when we are in town.
Senator Carper. How often are you all in town?
Mr. Ostendorff. I would say we probably are all together to
meet at least 3 weeks out of four.
Senator Carper. OK.
Mr. Ostendorff. In individual periods, consistent with the
Government in the Sunshine Act.
Senator Carper. OK.
Mr. Ostendorff. And I would say that it is clearly my
perception based on discussion with all my colleagues here that
we all want to move forward quickly; that we all want to do the
right thing. And I don't think we are as far apart as maybe
some of the questioning might have suggested. I really think we
want to do those things, but not all of these are longer-term
actions. Some are short term. Some are intermediate. And some
of those will require more information.
I used the one example on the hardened vents that was asked
about. I asked the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations on
July 15th, a senior executive there, do you have sufficient
information on the hardened vents in order right now to support
the order recommended by the task force to install those. And
he said no.
The task force report itself said that we do not understand
whether or not the operators at Fukushima actually operated
these vents.
I am using that just as a discrete example we can all
understand. I think we need to explore this area. It could be a
month from now we have sufficient information to make a
disposition of that one in a smart manner. But that is just one
example. There are some things that do require more
information, more granularity.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks.
Commissioner Magwood, a closing thought or two, please.
Mr. Magwood. I think Commissioner Ostendorff actually
covered it. I think he said it quite well.
The only thing I would add is I believe that we will move
forward quickly. There is a lot of willingness on the
commission to get this done. We are taking this very seriously.
I think we all were talking to each other during the event. I
think almost immediately, we began to think about what lessons
were being learned as were watching it unfold on television.
So I see this as just the conclusion of what started back
in March. And I feel very positive that we will get this done
quickly and do the right thing.
Senator Carper. All right. Good.
Dr. Apostolakis.
Mr. Apostolakis. I agree with my colleagues. I think the
commission will act in a timely manner. It is just the details
that we have to work out. So I don't see any problem at all.
Senator Carper. All right.
Commissioner Svinicki?
Ms. Svinicki. I agree with what my colleagues have said
thus far. In summary remarks, I think that there is a lot of
overlap and commonality in the approach here. And I think that
want to and can, I believe it is possible to strike the
appropriate balance between urgency and moving forward, and
also being thoughtful and getting it right.
Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
The last word, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I would say I appreciate all the comments
of my colleagues and I think there are far more areas of
agreement than disagreement. But I do believe strongly that it
is important for us to disposition these recommendations in 90
days. And I think that is something that is doable and from
what I have heard from my colleagues, I think there is perhaps
more agreement than there is disagreement about that.
Senator Carper. Good.
In closing, one of my favorite people to work here with
here in the Senate is a Republican from Wyoming. His name is
Mike Enzi. A lot of people in other places don't know him. I
knew him when I was Governor. We worked on a couple of things
together then.
Mike Enzi is the Senior Republican on the Health,
Education, Labor, Pension Committee. And the Senior Democrat
for many years was a guy named Kennedy, Ted Kennedy. And they
were remarkably effective. The Committee was remarkably
productive. And I would say to Mike Enzi, how does one of the
most conservative Republicans around here work so productively
with one of the most liberal Democrats? And you guys just get
so much done, regardless of who is the Chairman, whether it is
Kennedy or whether it is Enzi.
And he said, Ted Kennedy and I subscribe to the 80/20 rule.
I said: What is that? And he said, the 80/20 rule says we agree
on about 80 percent of the stuff. We disagree on maybe 20
percent of the stuff. And what we have decided to do is focus
on the 80 percent that we agree on. And as a result, we get a
lot done.
More times than I can count I call on my colleagues on this
said of the dais in the Senate to subscribe to the 80/20 rule,
and if we did that on a consistent basis, I think it would be
not just a better place to work, but actually probably a better
Country.
And I would just urge as it seems like we have about, I
don't know if it is 80 percent agreement on this stuff, but
pretty broad agreement on what needs to be acted on more
quickly, more promptly, and that which needs a little more
scrubbing.
And so in deference to my mother, haste does make waste,
but remembering the words of my father, work does expand to
fill the amount of time we allocate to a job. So I would ask
that we move forward on the stuff that we can move forward on,
and do it as a team. And the stuff that needs a little more
time, let's take a little more time, but not more time than we
really need.
All right. With that having been said, I think we are going
to wrap this up and you guys go have lunch maybe, and I am
going to go vote. You all take care.
This hearing is adjourned. Thank you all for coming.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committees were adjourned.]