[Senate Hearing 112-950]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-950
OVERSIGHT HEARING: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S PRELIMINARY
RESULTS OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE
EMERGENCY AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI POWER PLANT IN JAPAN
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
Bettina Poirier, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Ruth Van Mark, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex
officio) officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
JUNE 16, 2011
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 1
Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming...... 3
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 4
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 6
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.... 7
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 8
Merkley, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon........ 14
Lautenberg, Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey.. 14
Sessions, Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey,
prepared statement............................................. 116
WITNESSES
Jaczko, Gregory, B., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission..... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 27
Senator Baucus........................................... 37
Senator Inhofe........................................... 44
Senator Vitter........................................... 62
Senator Sessions......................................... 116
Accompanied By:..................................................
Svinicki, Hon. Kristine L., Commissioner
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 118
Apostolakis, Hon. George, Commissioner
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 121
Magwood, Hon. William D., IV, Commissioner
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 124
Ostendorff, Hon. William C., Commissioner
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 127
OVERSIGHT HEARING: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S PRELIMINARY
RESULTS OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE
EMERGENCY AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI POWER PLANT IN JAPAN
----------
THURSDAY, June 16, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The full committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer
(chairman of the full committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Boxer, Inhofe, Carper, Lautenberg,
Sanders, Merkley, Barrasso, Alexander, Boozman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Good morning, everybody. The Committee will
come to order.
Just to go over the way we are going to operate this
morning, each of us Senators has 5 minutes to make an opening
statement. And then we will go to the panel, and the Chairman
will have 5 minutes and every other member three. So try to
stick to it. There will be lots of questions. We will go back
and forth from one side to the other. So your heads will be
bobbing like a tennis match. But hopefully it will be as
enjoyable as that and not too contentious.
So let me begin. It has been over 3 months since Japan was
hit by a devastating earthquake and tsunami. It is expected to
take additional time before cold shutdown of all reactors at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power will be achieved. The
emergency in Japan serves as an important wake-up call for the
United States and the rest of the world. We cannot afford to
ignore it.
If there is one lesson to be learned, and this is the
lesson I think is the most important, we must plan for the
unexpected. Because as the Japanese told us, they planned for
the expected, not for the unexpected.
I am pleased to see that the NRC is taking initial steps to
reevaluate current assumptions about the safety and the
security of nuclear power plants in the U.S. in light of what
has happened in Japan. And these are the things that I am
pleased about. The NRC's inspectors have inspected and issued
reports on the 105 operating nuclear reactors and their
readiness to address power losses or damage following extreme
events. And the NRC is in the middle of a 90-day task force
review of its processes and regulations in light of the events
in Japan.
I want to talk a bit about the two nuclear plants in
California, which I visited recently. The most recent
inspections of California's two nuclear power plants turned up
numerous problems that need to be corrected. Among other
things, NRC's inspections at Diablo Canyon power plant found
that State highways and access roads needed to reach diesel
fuel and an alternative seawater source for cooling may be
inaccessible after an earthquake. And hoses needed to get
cooling water from the reservoir to the plant were blocked by a
security fence.
Now, I want to correct myself. The Diablo, I haven't
visited in a while. But San Onofre, I recently visited. And as
a matter of fact, I met one of the commissioners there, who was
extremely helpful.
NRC's inspections at San Onofre Generating Station, and
this is a plant that is surrounded by millions of people within
50 miles, what did we say, 7 million? About 7.4 million within
50 miles. This is what you found. A lack of a written agreement
for a fuel oil supply to support emergency diesel generators
for more than 7 days. And you found that some firefighting
equipment was stored in locations that could be impacted by an
earthquake.
Now, firefighting equipment that is stored in a place that
can't be located, if there is an earthquake, doesn't do us any
good.
I have additional concerns about seismic issues at both
California plants. Diablo Canyon has submitted its application
to the NRC for license review. The 3D seismic studies need to
be considered as part of the license renewal at Diablo. It is
very important, I find it very strange that they would try to
get a license before they have the latest information. And the
latest information will be part of the 3D seismic study.
And also, 3D studies should be part of NRC's review of San
Onofre's license renewal application, once it is submitted.
They haven't submitted it yet, as you know. And I lauded them
for that, because I think there is more work that needs to be
done.
I expect the NRC to closely examine the results of these
inspections in California and other States across the Country,
as well as reexamine the current regulations, such as what is
considered in the NRC's review of license renewal applications.
And I expect the Commission to implement the task force
recommendations. It doesn't help us to have these
recommendations if you don't implement them. The health and
safety of all Americans hangs in the balance.
I applaud the Commission for making the results of its
inspections of the nuclear power fleet available to the public
immediately after compilation by NRC staff in May and June. I
believe it is critical for public confidence in the safety of
our nuclear facilities that the results of the 90-day task
force report be available to the public as soon as it is
compiled by NRC staff in July.
To me, complete openness, transparency and prompt
disclosure are vital to maintaining the Federal Government's
credibility and the confidence of the American people. I want
to thank all five members of the Commission for being here
today to provide us with preliminary results of the nuclear
review that is underway. As Chairman of this Committee, I will
continue to provide vigorous oversight to make sure that we
learn all we can from the Fukushima emergency. The safety of
the American people, above all, is our No. 1 priority. I look
forward to working with each of you to make sure that the
United States of American has taken every appropriate
precaution to ensure our nuclear power plants are managed in
the safest possible manner.
Senator Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
appreciated especially your comments about the safety of the
American people being a No. 1 priority. Madam Chairman, the
storage of nuclear waste should be a top priority for Congress
and the Administration in the wake of Japan's nuclear disaster.
As you know, spent fuel rods stored at Fukushima
overheated, causing explosions, fires and radiation leaks. This
occurred when the power was knocked out and backup generators
failed at the plant. The American people who watched the
coverage of the nuclear crisis in Japan are looking to Congress
and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to prevent similar
instances form happening here.
Congress took action years ago to begin addressing the
problem of buildup of nuclear waste stored at nuclear plants
throughout the United States. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
passed by Congress designated Yucca Mountain as the only
candidate site for a national repository of nuclear waste.
Congress has voted a number of times to retain Yucca Mountain
as the national repository.
Fifteen billion dollars, $15 billion has been spent on the
project. But this Administration has seen fit to walk away from
the project.
As the Washington Post points out in an article entitled,
At Yucca Mountain, ``At Yucca Mountain, money down a hole.''
This was in yesterday's paper, Wednesday, June 15th, 2011. At
Yucca Mountain, money down a hole. This is what they said:
``When Barack Obama ran for President and sought the five
electoral votes of the swing State of Nevada, he vowed to kill
Yucca. In early 2009,'' the article says, ``Steven Chu, Obama's
energy secretary, announced that his department did not feel
that Yucca was a workable option.'' The article continues:
``The Department of Energy terminated the jobs of several
thousand Federal workers and contractors, while hastily
abandoning offices in Las Vegas and transferring dozens of
truckloads of furniture, computers and other equipment to local
schools.''
The article states: ``The project dates back three
decades.'' It goes on, ``It has not solved the problem of
nuclear waste, but has succeeded in keeping fully employed
large numbers of litigators. Is that the Administration's idea
of job creation?''
The end result of this saga is a five-mile long, 25-foot
wide hole in the Nevada desert. It was meant to store America's
nuclear waste. But instead, because of politics, it stands as a
monument to bureaucratic waste of taxpayer dollars.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is before us
today, has not officially resolved this issue. During his
opening remarks at the meeting of the NRC's Japan Task Force,
the chairman, who is here today, stated ``I believe it is
important that our safety review proceeds systematically and
methodically, but with the appropriate sense of urgency given
the important safety issues being examined.''
I do not believe that the actions of this Administration or
the Chairman have demonstrated the sense of urgency with regard
to the issue of storing spent nuclear fuel. Thank you, Madam
Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
We are going to call on Senator Carper, because he chairs
the subcommittee that oversees the NRC. And Senator Sanders was
very kind to yield to him.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thank you very, very much. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
I just want to come back to something that our colleague
from Wyoming has said. You have heard me say, everything I do I
know I can do better. I think that is true of all of us. I was
not a member of the Congress in 1982, when the Congress voted
basically to say we are going to have a repository, we are
going to put it in one State. I was a Member of Congress later
on when the vote was taken to designate Yucca Mountain in the
State of Nevada.
I think originally the county, and even still the county in
which Yucca Mountain was located was a willing host for the
repository. Since that time, the State has turned against the
idea, and for the most pat, the elected officials, Governors
and congressional delegation, as you know have opposed it. The
delegation here in the Senate led for a number of years by
Senator Reid and Senator Ennison, Democrat and Republican, have
on a bipartisan basis strongly opposed the establishment of the
repository.
When I say everything I know I do I know I can do better,
if we had to do this all over again, if we had to do this all
over again, we should be smart enough to do actually what they
have done in France. What they have done in France is to
incentivize communities in that country to be repositories and
to provide really terrific economic opportunities, job
opportunities for the communities, and for some of the people
who work there.
If in this Country, we could actually have States standing
in line to be prisons, sites for prisons, to take prisoners
from Delaware or Tennessee or any other States, if we can do
that and get communities to be willing to be host for inmates
from all over this Country, we should be able to find or
provide an incentive system so that States would willingly,
unlike Nevada, would willing say, please, put your nuclear
spent fuel here in our State.
Meanwhile, we have, as you may recall, a blue ribbon
Commission that has a lot of smart people, some of them the
commissioners know, they have been working, they have been over
to France to see what the French are doing in terms of
reprocessing and recycling spent fuel. They are going to come
back to us and say, this is what we think we should do for a
path going forward in this Country.
In the meantime, if you take all the spent fuel rods at 104
nuclear power plants, my recollection, and I am going to ask
Senator Alexander to correct me on this if I am wrong, but if
we took all the spent fuel rods in 104 nuclear power plants
across the Country, I think if we put them on a football field,
they would fit on a football field maybe about 20 feet high. Is
that about right?
That is about right. So 104 plants is not a small amount of
spent fuel. But for now, what the experts are telling us is we
can safely store for 30, 40, 50, 60 years onsite the spent
fuel. Does that mean we never need a repository, a place to
recycle and reprocess this fuel? No. And when we are smart, I
hope we are a lot smarter in siting those places than we were
in siting the repository at Yucca Mountain. So there.
Now, having said that, let me find my place here. Let me
just say to all of you here today, thanks a lot for coming.
Thank you for your service. We are very anxious to hear what
you have to share with us.
We have a great opportunity, you all have heard me say
before, quoting Albert Einstein, in adversity lies opportunity.
Heck of a lot of adversity in Japan, in Miyagi Prefecture with
the terrible tragedy that they faced, also a great opportunity.
And the great opportunity is for us and for the rest of the
world to learn what they did wrong, so that we won't make that
mistake in this instance.
And we have worked, as a bunch of you know, on this
Committee, and George Voinovich and I worked for a whole lot of
years before that to try to establish within those 104 nuclear
power plants what we call a culture of safety. And
commissioners have heard me say a million times, we want to not
only establish that culture of safety, we have established it,
we want to strengthen it and we want to make sure that if it
isn't perfect in terms of adhering to safety, if it isn't
perfect, we make it better.
And despite all the protections we have in place for
nuclear reactors, the tragedy in Japan should serve as a clear
warning that we can't be complacent when it comes to nuclear
safety, and that a disaster like that could happen any time
here as well.
Anyway, we have asked for a comprehensive review, Senator
Boxer and I have, and we are pleased that we are getting that.
We are going to make sure that every precaution is being taken
to safeguard our people from a similar nuclear incident,
similar to that of Japan. Today I am anxious to hear the first
readouts from the Commission on this review. We look forward to
working with you to incorporate the right lessons across our
nuclear fleet in this Country.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and Senator Sanders, thank you so
much for yielding to me.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Subcommittee Chairman
Carper.
And now it is Senator Alexander.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Madam Chairman. First, let me
thank, welcome the Commissioners and thank the Chairman and
Senator Carper for having this hearing. I have said before, I
think the more oversight hearings we have with the
Commissioners, the better. The more Americans know about
nuclear power, the better. Both from a safety point of view and
how important it is to our future.
The subject in America today is jobs. We want jobs. We have
to have large amounts of reliable, low-cost electricity. And we
now have to add clean to that. So it is important to have a
hearing so that Americans know that 20 percent of all our
electricity comes from 104 nuclear plants. It is important that
we have hearings so that Americans know that 70 percent of our
carbon-free, sulfur-free, nitrogen-free, mercury-free
electricity comes from nuclear plants.
It is important to have these hearings because it is
important for Americans to know that there has never been a
death at a civilian reactor in the United States, that there
has never been a death in connection with a reactor in one of
our 104 Navy reactors. It is important for Americans to know
that even though Three Mile Island was our worst Nuclear
accident in the United States at a civilian reactor, no one was
hurt at Three Mile Island.
It is important for Americans to know this is complex,
these big operations, these nuclear plants. And it is important
for them to know that we taking very seriously, especially
those of us who can't imagine a future for the United States
without many more nuclear reactors than we have today, that we
are taking very seriously the importance of continuing to make
their operation safer and safer.
We have learned a lot from Three Mile Island, for example,
even though no one was hurt there. The safety record is even
better, as a result of those lessons. It will take months and
years to learn from what happened in Fukushima. But we ought to
do our best to do that.
Senator Carper's comments on the repository are important.
We both are former Governors. I had the problem of locating
prisons, we were stuck on prisons in Tennessee when I came in.
Nobody would take one, until I announced I only had one and
there would be a competition for it. Then we had a line of
people who wanted it.
We are going to need repositories. We need to recycle used
nuclear fuel. That means there will be even less of it. And
then we will need to find, either reopen Yucca Mountain or find
some other ones. We shouldn't keep collecting billions of
dollars from ratepayers and not using it for its intended
purpose.
I hope we learn from this hearing more about spent fuel
storage. We have heard from Secretary Chu, a Nobel physicist,
who is our Energy Secretary, and we have heard from the
Chairman, who is here today, that spent fuel can be stored
safely onsite for up to 100 years. It is important for
Americans to know that and to hear that from the top two
officials in our Country who know about such things.
But we need to bring to a close the discussion about
whether spent fuel pools or dry cask storage or long-term
repository is the right way to deal with the fuel that we have.
And we need to take advantage of this distinguished panel the
President has appointed to recycle used nuclear fuel in an even
better way.
We need to explore and learn from our Commissioners how the
next generation of reactors can improve safety capabilities,
for example, with passive technologies. We need to learn how
the small nuclear reactors, the ones that might be 125
megawatts and 150 instead of 1,140, how they might be a way for
the United States to get back in the business of leading the
world in developing a technology we invented, the peaceful use
of atomic weapons, peaceful use of the nuclear process.
Then I would like to know more about how the Commission
itself functions, the Chairman's use of emergency power, the
gathering of information about reactors. So it is very useful,
Madam Chairman, to have all of the Commissioners here. I would
suggest that maybe every quarter is to often, but every so
often, either the Subcommittee or the full Committee ought to
hear from the Commissioners, the American people ought to
listen and be assured not just of the safety of our 104
civilian reactors, but that we are on a track to begin to build
more and to provide the low-cost, clean, reliable electricity
that nuclear power does for this Country.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sanders.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Madam Chair. Welcome,
Commissioners. Thanks for being here.
Madam Chair, I want to spend a moment discussing an issue
of great concern to the people of the State of Vermont, and
that is the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, which is
located in the very southern part of our State.
Madam Chair, Vermont Yankee is one of 23 plants in our
Country with the same design, General Electric Mark 1, as the
Fukushima plants that experienced partial or full meltdowns in
Japan. As my colleagues may or may not know, the State of
Vermont has a unique position in this Country with regard to
nuclear power. As a result of an agreement signed between the
State and Energy, the owner of the nuclear power plant in
Vermont, this agreement was signed when Entergy purchased
Vermont Yankee in 2002. Our State legislature and Public
Utility Commission have a legal say of whether the Vermont
Yankee plant is relicensed for operation beyond 2012, when its
license expires. That is unique in the Country.
The plant is nearing 40 years of age. It is my firm view
that 40 years is enough. But that is not just my view. Far more
importantly, the Vermont State Senate, representing the people
of the State of Vermont, voted on a bipartisan basis 26 to 4
not to grant an extension to Vermont Yankee. And in my view,
that vote in fact represented the wishes of a vast majority of
the people in our State.
We know that Vermont Yankee has had serious problems in the
last number of years, including a collapse of its cooling
towers in 2007 and radioactive tritium leaks in 2005 and 2010.
The tritium leaks came from pipes plant officials claimed,
under oath, did not exist. Which did not, by the way, further
the confidence of the people of the State of Vermont in
Entergy.
In support of the Vermont legislature, the Vermont
congressional delegation has been clear that Entergy should
respect Vermont's laws. We understand that Entergy's well-paid
corporate lobbyists and lawyers have been pushing for the
Federal Government to get involved in the lawsuit Entergy filed
against Vermont. We have seen the class letter from Entergy's
CEO, Wayne Leonard, who is among the best-compensated electric
energy CEOs at $18 million a year, saying that if Vermont
successfully defends its rights to decide whether Vermont
Yankee is relicensed that we will see States opting out of,
among other things, the Voting Rights Act.
He could not be more wrong or out of touch. That is why the
Vermont congressional delegation was heartened to learn that
Chairman Jaczko, who I believe is a fair-minded and diligent
public servant, even if we occasionally disagree, told
Vermonters publicly that the NRC should not intervene in any
legislation between Entergy and Vermont. I believe his position
is the right one. The NRC regulates safety. That is what your
job is. It is a difficult job. It is an important job. And in
fact, many people in the State of Vermont think you are not
doing that job very well.
But the NRC is not an arbiter of political or legal
disputes between a huge energy company like Entergy and the
people of the State of Vermont. Frankly, that is not your
business. You have enough on your plate to deal with the very
complicated and important issue of maintaining safety.
There was a story in the New York Times today of great
concern, raising issues that maybe we are not doing a good job
in this Country in protecting people in the event of a shutdown
of all electric power. Pay attention to that. Do not get
involved in telling the people of the State of Vermont what
they should be doing or should not be doing.
In that regard, I was extremely disappointed to learn that
the NRC voted yesterday on whether to recommend to the Justice
Department that the NRC take Entergy's side in this litigation
and that the result of that vote was not public. I want to know
today that you will make the result of that vote public. If you
voted to have the DOJ, the Department of Justice involved, then
at least you should tell the people of the State of Vermont how
you voted and what that vote was. We would like the relevant
materials associated with that vote.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
And now my Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. I am going to apologize in advance to this
Committee, this is a very significant hearing we are having
right now. But it is also the markup in the Senate Armed
Services Committee, and I am the second ranking there. So I
apologize for being late.
Let me start by thanking you and honoring your commitment
to act on the renomination of Commissioner Ostendorff for a
full 5-year term. Our Country is best served when we have a
complete commission, and I am hoping this will happen soon.
I just want to thank you for having this hearing. It has
been over 3 months since the earthquakes and the tsunami that
devastated Japan and resulted in the world's second largest
nuclear accident in history. I am pleased that we will finally
hear from all five Commissioners on the agency's actions to
ensure the safety of our nuclear plants, based on lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident.
But first, I want to take a moment to acknowledge a report
by the NRC Inspector General into the NRC Chairman Jaczko's
conduct with regard to the Yucca Mountain license application.
I was concerned about this very situation in 2005, when he
appeared before this Committee for the first time, that his
prior work in opposition to Yucca Mountain would impair his
ability to act fairly as a Commissioner. So I asked him to
recuse himself. His conduct has clearly damaged the credibility
of the agency and warrants oversight hearings by this
Committee.
However, what I find most disconcerting in the IG's report
is an image of a Chairman who withholds information from his
colleagues, acts unilaterally and rules by intimidation. While
the IG may have focused on the chairman's involvement with
Yucca Mountain, I believe misconduct extends beyond that. This
first became apparent to me while preparing for our last
hearing on April 12th, when I heard that the majority was
breaking with the Committee precedent of having a full
Commission testify. I was surprised to learn that we would only
hear from Chairman Jaczko because he was exercising his
emergency powers under Section 3 of the Organization Plan of
1980.
Even more unbelievable was that he had not only failed to
inform me of this decision on the last two occasions, but he
had also failed to inform his colleagues. Furthermore, in
exercising this emergency authority, he acted unilaterally
without a firm legal basis, failed to keep his colleagues fully
informed and prohibited them from entering the operations
center where much of the agency's post-Fukushima work was
conducted.
These actions are strikingly similar to some of the IG's
conclusions regarding the Chairman's conduct on Yucca Mountain.
More importantly, he chose not to utilize the expertise of his
fellow commissioners when confronted with the world's second
largest nuclear accident. A true leader, when facing such
extraordinary challenges, would marshal all resources at his
disposal and seek out the best expertise that he can.
That would be my expectation of any chairman responsible
for ensuring nuclear safety. Instead, we have a chairman who,
under statute, ``shall be governed by general policies of the
Commission,'' and yet selectively ignores Commission
procedures, discounting them as merely guidelines when
questioned by the IG.
In the nuclear industry, procedures exist to ensure nuclear
safety. The Chairman should show the same respect for
procedures governing his actions that he would expect from
licensees. The public deserves nothing less.
I thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator
from the State of Oklahoma
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Full Committee and Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear
Safety joint hearing entitled, ``Oversight Hearing: the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Preliminary Results of the Nuclear
Safety Review in the United States following the Emergency at
the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant in Japan.''
Thursday, June 16, 2011 10 o'clock am Chairman Boxer, I'd
like to begin by thanking you for honoring your commitment to
act on the re-nomination of Commissioner Ostendorff for a full,
5-year term. Our country is best served by a complete
Commission with each member contributing their diverse views
and acting as a collegial body. Commissioner Ostendorff's
expertise is invaluable and given the unanimous vote in this
Committee, I hope he will be confirmed immediately.
I also want to thank you for having this hearing. It has
been over 3 months since the earthquake and tsunami devastated
Japan and resulted in the world's second largest nuclear
accident in history. I am pleased that we will finally hear
from all five commissioners on the agency's actions to ensure
the safety of our nuclear plants based on lessons learned from
the Fukushima accident.
But first, I want to take a moment to acknowledge a report
by the NRC Inspector General (IG) into NRC Chairman Jaczko's
conduct with regard to the Yucca Mountain license application.
I was concerned about this very situation in 2005 when he
appeared before this Committee for the first time: that his
prior work in opposition to Yucca Mountain would impair his
ability to act fairly as a commissioner and so I asked him to
recuse himself. His conduct has clearly damaged the credibility
of the agency and warrants oversight hearings by this
Committee.
However, what I find most disconcerting in the IG's report
is the image of a Chairman who withholds information from his
colleagues, acts unilaterally, and rules by intimidation. While
the IG may have focused on the Chairman's involvement with
Yucca Mountain, I believe misconduct extends beyond that. This
first became apparent to me while preparing for our last
hearing, on April 12th, when I heard that the Majority was
breaking with the Committee precedent of having the full
commission testify. I was surprised to learn that we would only
hear from Chairman Jaczko because he was exercising his
emergency powers under Section 3 of the Reorganization Plan of
1980. Even more unbelievable was that he had not only failed to
inform me of his decision on at least two occasions, but he had
also failed to inform his colleagues.
Furthermore, in exercising this emergency authority, he
acted unilaterally without a firm legal basis, failed to keep
his colleagues fully informed, and prohibited them from
entering the Operations Center where much of the agency's post-
Fukushima work was conducted. These actions are strikingly
similar to some of the IG's conclusions regarding the
Chairman's conduct on Yucca Mountain. More importantly, he
chose not to utilize the expertise of his fellow commissioners
when confronted with the world's second largest nuclear
accident.
A true leader when facing such extraordinary challenges
would marshal all resources at his disposal and seek out the
best expertise he can. That would be my expectation of any
Chairman responsible for ensuring nuclear safety. Instead, we
have a chairman who, under statute, ``SHALL BE GOVERNED BY
GENERAL POLICIES OF THE COMMISSION'' and yet selectively
ignores Commission procedures, discounting them as merely
``guidelines'' when questioned by the IG. In the nuclear
industry, procedures exist to ensure nuclear safety. The
Chairman should show the same respect for procedures governing
his actions that he would expect from licensees. The public
deserves nothing less.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. If I could just say, I am going
to put into the record the statement made by the Chairman on
the report. I just, there is a disagreement between the Ranking
Member and myself and the characterization that he has put
forward. Because my understanding clearly that the IG found
that the actions that the Chairman took were consistent with
the law, guidance and his authority.
So there is just a difference here on that.
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Boxer. And I think that is, I have to put that in
the record.
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Senator Inhofe. And that is the first time we have ever had
a difference.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I know. And it won't be the last.
But I just feel it is important, because it was just such
an attack. I was a little taken aback by it.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to
yield my time to Senator Sanders to complete his comments.
Senator Boxer. OK. Senator Sanders has an additional 5
minutes.
Senator Sanders. I am not going to take the whole 5
minutes, and I thank my friend from Oregon very much for
yielding.
Madam Chair, the point I am going to stay on this morning
is an enormously important issue for my State. In the State of
Vermont, people have been extremely dissatisfied with the role
that Entergy has been playing. They do not have confidence in
that nuclear power plant, for a whole lot of very valid
reasons.
When Entergy purchased Vermont Yankee, an agreement was
reached with the State that the State could be involved, and
would be involved, as to whether or not a 40-year old plant
would be relicensed. That was the agreement, Madam Chair. That
is unique in America.
And then the State legislature recently voted by a 26 to 4
vote to say no, we do not think it is in the best interest of
the people of Vermont to extend that contract. We want Vermont
Yankee shut down. And in doing that, I believe they were
reflecting the wishes of the people of our State. Vermont wants
to move in a new way in terms of energy. We are No. 1 in the
Country in terms of energy efficiency. We are moving
aggressively in sustainable energy.
Now, you may disagree with us, but that is the direction
the State of Vermont wants to go.
Now, the issue is, what is the role of the NRC in that
discussion ? Is it appropriate for the NRC to get involved with
one of the largest utility companies in the United States of
America, Entergy, a $14 billion company, pays its CEO $18
million a year, to get involved in a legal case between the
State of Vermont and Entergy? Entergy wants to stay open. They
want to make more money. I understand that. People of Vermont
want to shut it down. I believe in that. I agree with the
people of my own State. Why should you be involved in that?
What disturbs me very much, and I want to pursue this
later, is my understanding is that yesterday, by a three to two
vote, this Commission decided to urge the Department of Justice
to get involved in that fight. Now, I don't care what your view
is on what Vermont Yankee should or should not be doing. In my
very strong opinion, it is not your business to get involved in
that fight. You have to worry about the safety issues of
nuclear power. It is not your business to tell the people of
Vermont that they have to keep open a nuclear power plant that
they don't want. That is not your business.
So I am going to pursue, during my questioning period, and
I am going to ask each of you how you voted on that issue, I
want to thank Chairman Jaczko, he has been public in the past
in saying, and he is a strong advocate of nuclear power, he
does not believe it is the NRC's business to be involved in
that debate.
So Madam Chair, this is an issue that is very disturbing to
the people of the State of Vermont. We have enough on our hands
taking on one of the large powerful utilities in America. We do
not need the NRC to get involved in this debate.
So I want to thank my colleague from Oregon, and I yield
back to him.
Senator Boxer. The remaining 2 minutes? You are welcome.
Three minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would just briefly note that I would like, if anyone has
any comments about why the hydrogen, when it was vented, why it
exploded. Obviously the venting process is intended to avoid a
situation where the plant is damaged. Obviously that didn't
happen in Japan with at least three hydrogen explosions.
I also wanted to note that I think it is very important
that a lot of research be done on different models of nuclear
reactors, and in particular, modular systems, systems that
employ passive measures, the types of passive measures that
would have made it irrelevant whether power had been knocked
out to a plant or irrelevant whether it was flooded with a
tidal wave.
I have a lot of doubts about nuclear power, being able to
be competitive, by the time you take in costs, by the time you
take into account addressing potential terror threats, natural
disaster and human error. But I also think it is very important
to look at all options as we wrestle with ways to generate non-
carbon power. So any comments in that vein would be helpful.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg, we haven't heard from you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. I am
pleased that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is here to
present the preliminary results of its safety review.
Since Japan's nuclear disaster began unfolding in March,
Americans have asked with a good deal of trepidation, could it
happen here. This ongoing safety review is intended to give
them the answer, and that is why we have to make sure that the
final product is complete, comprehensive and thorough. The
NRC's top priority has to make sure that our Country's nuclear
facilities are safe and secure, and that means leaving no stone
unturned during the review.
And that is especially important to the people in my home
State. New Jersey's four nuclear power reactors provide our
State with half of its electricity. And one of those reactors,
located in Oyster Creek, is the Country's oldest, and shares
the same design as the damaged reactors in Japan.
So we need the NRC to let us know what risks, if any, are
present in American communities with the older nuclear
reactors, and what we have to do to reduce these risks and
protect the public. We also need the NRC to do a better job of
making sure that Americans know what to do in the case of a
nuclear emergency.
Now, I was deeply troubled in March when our Country was
told that American citizens in Japan should stay at least 50
miles away from the site of the meltdown. We have had this
discussion before. Here in the United States, the NRC's
emergency guidelines only require plants to evacuate people to
an area 10 miles from a plant. And it is confusing and we ought
to not be sending mixed signals to the public. Stakes are too
high.
At the same time, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that
nuclear power has the qualities that we like to see, emissions-
free energy source, providing one-fifth of our Country's
electricity. And we have a pretty good nuclear safety record.
There have been few nuclear accidents and few injuries here in
the United States. The bottom line is that nuclear power can be
part of an energy future.
But as the tragedies in other countries have taught us,
nothing can be taken for granted where nuclear power is
concerned. Japan, a world leader in technology, and it believed
that the Fukushima plant was strong enough to withstand a worst
case scenario. And now we know it wasn't. Likewise, Chernobyl
demonstrated the effects of a single nuclear accident that can
linger for generations.
We have to pay attention to these lessons, learn from
others' mistakes, and each one of you, as members of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has a responsibility to ask the
hard questions, but to make sure that the American public gets
the answers that we deserve. I have to say that I think on
balance, a great job has been done.
But I think as we find these new circumstances that come up
as a surprise, when in Japan, the accident happened as it did.
Regardless of the elements that created it, the fact of the
matter is, we shouldn't permit it to happen.
So Madam Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Senator.
Now we go to our distinguished panel. We are going to start
with the Chairman, 5 minutes, then each of you has three. Go
right ahead, Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY: THE HONORABLE KRISTINE
L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER; THE HONORABLE GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS,
COMMISSIONER; THE HONORABLE WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV,
COMMISSIONER; AND THE HONORABLE WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF,
COMMISSIONER
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member
Inhofe, Chairman Carper and Ranking Member Barrasso and members
of the Committee.
On behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you to provide an update on the response of
the NRC to the nuclear emergency in Japan.
At the current time, the Japanese utility and the Japanese
government are still in an active accident mitigation phase at
the Fukushima Daiichi site. Plant conditions are slowly
stabilizing. At this time, the reactors and spent fuel pools do
not appear to be changing in a way that creates additional
concerns.
Some structural conditions have recently been identified
that are receiving increased attention, such as the structural
integrity of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, which is being shored
up to strengthen its resistance to earthquakes. There are
radioactive release paths that are continuing at various
degrees in the three reactors that were operating at the time
of the event.
The Japanese utility is working to install reliable closed
loop cooling system for the reactors and spent fuel pools,
improving environmental conditions inside the plant and
installing a treatment system to clean up the contaminated
water that currently exists at the site.
Many challenges in the recovery activities include the high
radiation fields and humidity levels inside the reactor
buildings, which make it challenging for the workers to
operate, large amounts of radioactive water in the turbine
building basements and a considerable amount of contaminated
debris across the site.
The rainy season is underway in Japan, and the immense
cleanup challenges resulting from the tsunami itself add to the
difficulties of dealing with the radioactive contamination
area. But overall, the Japanese are certainly making
significant progress in moving forward in what is a very
difficult and challenging situation. On behalf of the
Commission, we continue to express our sympathies for the
people of Japan who are dealing with a very significant crisis.
As you know, the decision to recommend a 50-mile radius
evacuation of U.S. citizens near the Daiichi site has been a
topic of much discussion. The concerns about the spent fuel
pool in Unit 4, which have received attention recently, were
only one element of the dynamic situation in which information
was scarce, sketchy and uncertain.
The more reassuring recent assessments of the situation in
the Unit 4 spent fuel pool is countered by the confirmation of
significant core damage to Units 1, 2 and 3, and ultimately
does not invalidate our earlier decision. This decision was
based on limited information and the best assessment of
conditions as we understood them at the time. We are, however,
continuing to reevaluate and review the 50-mile recommendation.
Now, turning to the actions here in the United States,
since the events of Fukushima Daiichi began to unfold in early
March, the NRC has been relaying information to our Country's
nuclear power plants. We issued instructions to our inspectors
calling for immediate independent assessments of each plant's
level of preparedness. The instructions covered extensive
damage mitigation guidelines, station blackout and seismic and
flooding issues, as well as severe accident management
guidelines.
We also issued a bulletin which was a communication to our
licensees to provide information on a broad range of issues.
Once receiving this information, the agency will determine
whether additional actions are necessary.
We have also convened a senior level task force made up of
a number of the agency's experienced and expert staff. Their
review is proceeding on a short-term and a longer-term
timeframe. This task force is examining issues including
seismic events, flooding and other natural hazards, how to
maintain power during these types of extreme events, how to
mitigate the potential losses of power and emergency
preparedness.
The time constraints of the short-term review have limited
stakeholder involvement. But during the longer-term review we
will engage the public, licensees and other key stakeholders to
a greater extent. The final report will be reviewed by the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
In terms of accident prevention, we are evaluating the
requirements and safety margins for seismic and flooding events
and other external events that might inflict widespread damage
to a plant and lead to an extended station blackout. In
addition to prevention, we are re-examining effective
mitigation strategies for severe accidents. We are also
examining cross-cutting considerations related to a plant's
ability to mitigate a long-term station blackout event.
As part of our review, the NRC is also examining
implications for emergency preparedness, especially in possible
situations involving widespread infrastructure damage.
[Interruption to proceedings.]
Senator Boxer. I am sorry to interrupt you. I am sorry, we
understand that you care about nuclear safety, but we really
ask you to put down your signs. You could either put them down
and stay or you can leave with the signs. It is up to you.
Whatever you wish to do is fine with us. Oh, you are leaving.
OK. We are sorry to lose you.
Mr. Chairman, you have 30 seconds more.
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you. As part of our review, as I said,
the NRC is also examining the implications for emergency
preparedness, especially in possible situations involving
widespread infrastructure damage, multi-unit events at a single
site, and long-term station blackouts. The NRC is committed to
proceeding as openly and as transparently as possible. It is
holding a series of three public meetings at the 30-day, 60-day
and 90-day marks. We just had the 60-day meeting yesterday to
discuss the progress of the near-term review.
The third public meeting is scheduled for July 19th, when
the 90-day report will be presented. This report will provide
important recommendations and outline the strong vision for the
longer-term review. It will also begin that longer-term
component of our safety review, which we expect to be completed
within an additional 6 months.
Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper,
Ranking Member Barrasso, and members of the Committee, this
concludes my formal testimony. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you, and we would be pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:]
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Senator Inhofe. Madam Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Yes?
Senator Inhofe. Could I make a request? To accommodate my
problem with the Armed Services Committee, Senator Barrasso has
been kind enough to agree to take my 5 minutes in addition to
his 5 minutes, and I have given him my questions. If we could
do that, I would appreciate it.
Senator Boxer. Sure, of course.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you so much.
Senator Boxer. Absolutely. We will miss you very much.
OK. We are going to move along now, to each of you, for 3
minutes each. Our next commissioner is Hon. Kristine Svinicki.
Ms. Svinicki. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Chairman Carper
and Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the Committee, for
the opportunity to appear before you today. Chairman Jaczko has
addressed the breadth of the NRC's ongoing activities in the
written statement he has submitted on behalf of the Commission.
The events at Fukushima in Japan are a sober reminder that
nuclear technology is unique and its use requires an unwavering
commitment to nuclear safety. We must learn the lessons that
these tragic events preset.
The NRC has initiated a systematic review of the events in
Japan, while maintaining its focus on the safety and security
of nuclear materials and facilities here in the U.S. The NRC
staff also continues its work on the many routine licensing,
rulemaking and inspection activities before the agency. The NRC
has been entrusted with the important missions of nuclear
safety and security. During my service as a Commissioner, I
have found the NRC to be an organization of dedicated safety
professionals who are mindful of their important obligations to
the Nation. I strive, as a member of the Commission, to enable
them in advancing this cause.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, and we move to the
Commissioner that I was happy to meet in California, he was
visiting the San Onofre plant when I was there. I think that
was a very good visit. So it is an honor to welcome you back
here, Mr. Apostolakis.
Mr. Apostolakis. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe and
members of the Committee, good morning. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today.
I will summarize my impressions of the Fukushima events to
date as follows. First, the performance of the NRC staff. I
have been a commissioner a little over a year now. During that
time, as well as during my 15 years as a member of the NRC's
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, I had plenty of
opportunities to interact with the NRC staff at all levels.
I have always been impressed by their technical excellence
and dedication to our mission of protecting public health and
safety. Our team in Japan confirmed what I already knew. I am
told that both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese
government have great respect for our team and its advice on
technical matters. I am proud of the NRC staff and honored to
be an NRC commissioner.
Second, the value of conservative decisionmaking. The
plants at Fukushima were subjected to incredibly destructive
natural forces exceeding the plant's design limits without
reported acute health effects resulting from radiation
exposure. In my view, this reflects at least in part the
conservatism built into nuclear reactor designs in terms of
safety margins. This is a valuable lesson for me as I consider
the application of conservatism in our regulatory family.
Third, the importance of decisionmaking during emergencies.
The terrorist events of September 11th, 2001, and the aftermath
of the Katrina Hurricane, had already brought the issues
related to emergency preparedness to the forefront in this
Country. The Fukushima accident demonstrated once again the
need for a clearly defined decisionmaking process during
emergencies.
Fourth, a lesson in humility. There have been numerous
safety studies of light water reactors worldwide. I believe
that, as a community of safety analysts, we were pretty
confident that there would be no new surprises. Fukushima has
challenged that belief. We must retain a questioning attitude
and ensure that confidence does not translate into complacency.
Thank you, Chairman Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you for those remarks.
We welcome Commissioner Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. Thank you, Chairman Boxer. Thank you, Senator
Carper and Senator Barrasso. It is a pleasure to be here this
morning to speak to you about these important issues.
The vital importance of understanding and responding
appropriately to the lessons of Fukushima weighs heavily on the
minds of all who serve on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Also, may I add that we continue to send our best wishes to the
people of Japan, as they continue the hard work of recovering
from the March 11th earthquake.
NRC is a learning organization. We have and will continue
to learn from Fukushima. That said, I recognize it will take
months and possibly years before all the technical facts
associated with the events of Fukushima are fully assessed.
While we will learn much from a complete understanding of what
happened to the plant and its systems after it was battered by
the earthquake and tsunami, we know enough today to review the
nuclear regulatory framework of the United States with a
critical, post-Fukushima eye. From what we know now, I believe
that we will need to make some changes in a variety of areas.
It is our responsibility to take new knowledge and new
perspectives and review our regulatory framework. I also
believe that the regulated community takes safety seriously and
is stepping up to its responsibility to preemptively identify
safety issues in the aftermath of Fukushima.
While, as the staff reported to us yesterday, we remain
quite confident in the safety of all U.S. nuclear power plants
and also in our overall approach to assure safety into the
future, there may be opportunities to improve defense in depth.
If those opportunities exist and enhance safety, we should
seize them.
As our efforts proceed over the coming months, I believe a
strong role for experts and stakeholders outside of the NRC
will be essential. Many observers have raised important and
challenging questions, and I believe we should engage them
directly to assure that our review benefits from their
insights. This includes the full engagement of the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
As smart and talented as the NRC staff is, even they may
not have all the answers. We will, as we have always done,
benefit from the open process. Once again, thank you for
holding today's hearing. I look forward to working with this
Committee as we go forward, and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. And now, Commissioner Ostendorff.
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I also thank
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, for the chance to be
here today.
I am fully supportive of the Task Force the Commission
chartered back in March, and I am committed to a systematic,
methodical review of the events of Fukushima. I know that if we
need to make changes, and I am sure there are some changes we
will need to make, the Commission will.
The full Commission received a public briefing yesterday in
Rockville on what the Task Force has learned so far in the
near-term review. The Task Force informed the Commission of its
results to date, including the results of our inspections at
all 104 reactors, and several key themes in the application of
our defense in depth safety philosophy. Those key themes
include assessment of protection of equipment from external
hazards, mitigation strategies to prevent core damage or spent
fuel damage, emergency preparedness and last, how to apply our
regulations in a consistent and coherent manner.
Concurrent with our near-term review efforts, the NRC's
highly qualified resident inspectors have also inspected
licensee implementation of severe accident management
guidelines around the Country to ensure that our licensees are
able to deal with the loss of power or big damage event to
their particular reactor sites. The findings from these
inspections will help to guide our decisions going forward with
respect to any warranted regulatory changes.
For the longer term, our review efforts will focus on other
key areas related to the Fukushima incident. These areas
include, among others, station blackout, acts of mitigation,
spent fuel pool safety and emergency preparedness. I will echo
Commissioner Magwood's comments of the importance of the
Advisory Committee on reactor safeguards for an independent
technical review.
I am looking forward to evaluating the NRC staff's
recommendations in areas where improvements can be made to our
regulatory framework. Congress and the public can be assured
that our findings will be brought to light in an open and
transparent fashion. I appreciate the Committee's oversight
role. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Before I start my questions, I want to respond on Yucca.
Because it was important to note that we found out that through
a GAO report that Republicans asked for that they terminated,
the DOE terminated the project, because it was not a workable
option, and that there were benefits associated with this. Now,
that is a report that was requested by the Republicans in the
House.
And some of the past problems we had with Yucca, the risk
that water will seep into the repository and cause the casks
holding high level radioactive waste to rust and break, leaking
the contents, earthquake faults in the vicinity, and Lord
knows, I know too much about earthquake faults and dangerous
radiation.
And of particular concern to me, groundwater from Yucca
Mountain flows into my State. And the fact that there were
tests that showed that water was leaking from the site.
So to me, it is a closed matter. But since it was raised by
the Ranking Member on the Subcommittee, Senator Barrasso, I
felt it was important to bring everybody up to date that a GAO
investigation asked for by House Republicans basically said
this was an appropriate decision.
I have some questions here, I am going to focus, starting
on the Fukushima and then move to California, try to cover all
those bases. Chairman Jaczko, 34,000 children in Japan have
been issued personal radiation monitors. Those children live
within, they live 40 miles from the plant itself, well outside
the 12-mile exclusion zone. Why do you think 34,000 kids were
given radiation monitors?
Mr. Jaczko. It is my understanding there has been a lot of
discussion about the protective actions for children in Japan,
as well as in general with all of the people living in Japan.
The Japanese government continues to evaluate the actions that
they have taken with regard to protecting all of their
population. This is a very complicated situation and I think as
the international community begins to look more and more at
what happened in Japan, there is a lot of interest and effort
in attempting to come up with a more common set of guideline
for what types of protective actions are appropriate.
Senator Boxer. OK, well, wait a minute, this isn't about
protective. This is about exposure. So I would just say, since
we want to learn from this, if your answer was because the
Japanese government has been bombarded by parents, I would say
that is a better answer. Because that is my understanding. And
let's just note, we can't have an accident like this, is my
point. Because you can't, kids are going to school there. They
live 40 miles, and the parents don't feel good.
Now one of the things, I am going to ask Commissioner
Ostendorff on this, because I don't want to give you all the
hard questions. Because this is a hard one. Help me with this.
The Japanese government has raised the legal limit for
exposure since the plant was devastated, since the plant was
devastated by the March 11th earthquake and tsunami. Prior to
the accident, the annual permissible dose was 1 millisievert
per year, and now it's 20 millisieverts.
Now, that sounds to me very suspicious. Why would you all
of a sudden find out, oh, we can be exposed to more radiation?
Were there any studies that were done that said that level is
safe and that's why they raised it? Or did they raise it
because the people were exposed to more than one?
Mr. Ostendorff. Madam Chair, I am personally not aware of
there being any studies that informed that decision. But I do
not have the detailed knowledge of what the Japanese government
may have considered in that area. I do agree that is a
significant change to radiation exposure levels.
Senator Boxer. OK, well, can I just ask the Chairman to
work with the commissioners and try to see if you can do a
little more investigation on this? Because I don't want to see
that happen where, after an accident, we say, oh, it is OK, you
are exposed to what we thought was the limit, but we are
changing the limit. It doesn't make it OK.
I wanted to ask you about, Chairman Jaczko, I will get back
to you. On April 11th, PG&E asked the NRC to delay final
processing of the Diablo Canyon license renewal application
until they complete their 3D seismic studies. I think that was
a smart thing they did, and the right thing. According to press
accounts, the NRC is moving forward with safety and other
reviews of Diablo in preparation for a ruling on this request.
So I guess what I want to ask you, is it usual, if they have
asked for a delay, do you normally grant the delay, or is that
something that is not going to be automatic unless you take a
vote? How does that work?
Mr. Jaczko. What PG&E asked for specifically was that we
delay a final decision. They did not actually ask us to delay
the review. But what we have done is we have moved forward with
the safety component of the review, but held open a piece of
that review pending the analysis of the seismic studies.
In addition, we have held off and won't finalize the final
environmental impact statement until the final 3D assessment is
done. So we are effectively waiting for that 3D assessment to
be completed before we complete our actions on the review.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, let me just say, from a very
concerned Senator, and I speak for my fellow Senator and for
the people in my State, if you were looking at a new proposal
and it came to you on an earthquake site, where we have had
studies that show the faults are getting worse, not better, and
the tsunamis are going to get worse, not better, I would assume
you would say, take your plant somewhere else. What I am hoping
that you do is understand. Both of these plants have had
enormous increase in population since they were approved,
especially San Onofre, which has now 7.4 million people living
within 50 miles. They are on earthquake faults, they are right
along the coast. You have identified issues and problems.
I think it is very important that when you look at this in
a humble way, as the commissioner pointed out, and I appreciate
so much the tone of his remarks, I think we are all humbled by
what happened, that you look at this with the eyes of the
people living there who are in a situation where, when I went
to San Onofre, one of the women, she was actually a PR person,
pulled me aside, and she said, you asked what the evacuation
plan is there. They don't really have any. She said, here is
our evacuation plan. Rush hour on the freeway.
Now, anyone who has been to Southern California in rush
hour on the freeway, that is not acceptable. So I am urging
you, do not rush these.
We also in California, I don't know whether Vermont is No.
1 in energy efficiency or California, we may be No. 1. But the
bottom line is, in our State, we have a lot of sun, we have a
lot of wind. We have a lot of geothermal. And yes, there may be
places for nuclear power that are not on earthquake faults or
near tsunami zones. So please put on those safety hats. We will
be working very closely with you. I don't want to see a rush to
relicense these plants. It would not be fair to the people.
Senator Barrasso, you have 10 minutes.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I am
glad to see the full Commission here with us today. I am
particularly pleased to see Commissioner Ostendorff, thank you
very much for being here. I congratulate you on your recent
nomination by the President to serve again on the Commission.
Your background is extensive. Prior to being sworn in as
commissioner, you worked as an engineer, legal counsel, policy
advisor, naval advisor. Among your many jobs, you were
Principal Deputy Administrator at the National Nuclear Security
Administration, a member of the staff of the House Armed
Services Committee, serving as staff director of the Strategic
Force Subcommittee, and a captain in the Navy, commanding an
attack submarine squadron. I could go on and on.
I would like to ask the Chairman, having served with Mr.
Ostendorff on the Commission, do you believe that the Senate
should confirm Commissioner Ostendorff as quickly as possible
before his term expires?
Mr. Jaczko. I would leave it up to the Senate to decide
that, but I certainly have had a good and productive working
relationship with him and I think he is a valuable member of
the Commission.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you. It is interesting, because I
agree with Senator Boxer, in our efforts on safety and our
concerns about safety, I know that you had spoken at a
symposium in Virginia, Mr. Chairman, were you said employees,
both of the NRC and industry, must feel empowered to ask the
difficult questions. Ensuring this happens is at the core of
safety culture. And when we look at industry, we want safety
for workers, for others, for communities. And you have to be
able to ask questions. Do you agree with that statement? I see
you nodded your head yes.
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely.
Senator Barrasso. And I know you are aware that the Office
of Inspector General issued a report on June 6th that has been
widely referenced in the press, your statement on June 8th
stated that you appreciated the thoroughness with which the
Inspector General and his staff conducted this comprehensive
review. Do you still agree with that issue about the
thoroughness?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, nodding your head yes. Well,
according to the report, and I have read it, and the New York
Times has done an extensive reporting on it on June 11th, it
says ``Mr. Jaczko created a hostile workplace atmosphere with
frequent outbursts of temper, favoritism in travel assignments
and selective release of information to other members of the
Commission.'' And Madam Chairman, I ask that the entire
Inspector General's report be made a part of the record.
Senator Boxer. Without objection, so ordered.
[The referenced information was not received at time of
print.]
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could just comment, those were
not findings of the Inspector General. They were comments in
the report of individuals that they interviewed. There is a
distinction between those as far as the review goes.
Senator Barrasso. Well, continuing, I would say that with
safety and a sense of a feeling of someone being able to speak
out and feel intimidated or feel pressured to not speak out,
where there is a finding in a report or a statement of someone
who has felt that way, they may be less likely to speak out.
Because the Inspector General's report goes on, it says, ``Over
the course of the investigation, a number of interviewees,'' as
you say, ``a number of interviewees conveyed their perception
that the Chairman controls and restricts the information
available to his fellow commissioners, and noted concerns about
his interpersonal style.'' It goes on, ``Several current and
former Commission staff members said the Chairman's behavior
caused an intimidating work environment.''
A former chairman told the Office of the Inspector General
that the Chairman often yelled at people and his tactics had a
negative effect on people. He described this behavior as ruling
by intimidation. The former chairman said he----
Senator Sanders. Madam Chair, if I could, I am not clear.
Who is making these statements?
Senator Barrasso. This is in the report----
Senator Sanders. I know it is in the IG, but this is not
the IG that is making this----
Senator Boxer. An unnamed staffer.
Senator Sanders. An unnamed staffer?
Senator Barrasso. People that are members of the staff and
a former chairman said----
Senator Sanders. A former chairman?
Senator Barrasso [continuing]. described the behavior as
ruling by intimidation. The former chairman said he verbally
counseled the chairman----
Senator Sanders. Is the former chairman still active in the
NRC?
Senator Barrasso. The former chairman counseled this
Chairman on his behavior on two occasions before leaving the
agency. It is page 43 of the report. And I don't want to use my
time as part of the questioning.
Senator Sanders. I am sorry, yes.
Senator Barrasso. But I am happy to share this report. And
my question is, I am focusing on a culture of safety. So I want
to make sure that we are getting that culture of safety. And if
people feel intimidated and they work there, I worry about
that. I worry about that in coal mines, I worry about that in
industrial sites, I worry about that on the railroads, I worry
about that throughout the State of Wyoming and I worry about
that also from a nuclear power issue.
Yes, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. I worry about the same things. And since I have
become Chairman, I have worked very hard to ensure that we have
an open debate and dialog at the Commission. It is no, I am a
very passionate and intense person. I have, hold people
accountable for their actions at the agency. And that is what I
have done since I became Chairman.
But I would note that all of those statements that you read
were not findings of the IG, which means that they were
statements that some people made and they couldn't corroborate
them, they couldn't substantiate them to the point that they
became an official finding.
As I said, as Senator Carper has said, we can always work
to make everything we do better. And every day I come to the
NRC, I work to do my job better. And there are going to be
difficult issues and difficult discussions that we will
sometimes have at the agency. I feel very strongly that the
staff, I have not experienced staff being shy around me and
being unwilling to tell me they think. So while sometimes I
express my thoughts about what I think to them, I have been
very comfortable that we have an open and----
Senator Barrasso. Do you agree with the Washington Post
that Yucca Mountain is a $15 billion hole to nowhere?
Mr. Jaczko. It is not really something that is in my role
and responsibility to comment on.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you. You mentioned my colleague
from Delaware and his comments about the State of Nevada
perhaps making a decision to change their mind on Yucca
Mountain. But it seems to me that Nye County, the home county,
the folks there still did want Yucca Mountain to proceed and
still did want those jobs and did want that opportunity.
To get to Senator Inhofe's questions, and Madam Chairman,
if I run out of time I would like to just submit the others for
the record.
Senator Boxer. Of course.
Senator Barrasso. The Energy Reorganization Act that the
Chairman is exercising his executive administrative functions,
it says, ``shall be governed by general policies of the
Commission. The Commission, through its internal Commission
procedures sets forth procedures for the Chairman to follow in
exercising the emergency authority under Section 3 of the
reorganization plan.'' I have that section here.
There have been some concerns, because you have used your
emergency authority. I read it, it says you shall have it for a
limited period of time, any chairman, should have it for a
limited period of time, and it requires additional reporting to
the other members.
So I would ask the other members who are sitting here if
you can tell me, when did the Chairman inform you that he
ceased using his emergency powers under Section 3? Has that
happened?
Ms. Svinicki. I received no such notification.
Mr. Apostolakis. I did not, either.
Mr. Magwood. Never received notification.
Mr. Ostendorff. I have not received any notification.
Senator Barrasso. OK. Because the Chairman is required,
both in statute and Commission procedures, to provide a
complete and timely report to the Commission on actions taken
while exercising the authority. So you have not yet received a
report, it sounds like, if you haven't gotten notification.
Mr. Chairman, when you testified before this Committee back
in April, and these are Senator Inhofe's questions, when you
testified back in April you stated that ``most of the
activities'' that you had engaged in as part of this response
``have been in my normal supervisory authorities over the staff
at the agency and my communication responsibilities.'' Senator
Inhofe asked for a full account of the actions that you took
outside of your normal authority, because you had said ``most
of the activities.'' So will you commit to provide a report to
this Committee detailing the actions during your exercise of
emergency authority?
Mr. Jaczko. Of course.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, also, in your testimony before the House
Energy and Commerce Committee in May, you stated that you were
not ``required'' to make a formal declaration of your decision
to use emergency authority under Section 3(a) of the
reorganization plan and go on to, I can read the whole plan,
but in the interest of time, why did you choose to keep secret
the fact that you were transferring to yourself functions
vested in the Commission?
Mr. Jaczko. The Commission was fully aware that I was
exercising my emergency authorities. I did not keep that
secret. I did not make a formal declaration, because that is
not part of the process.
The Commission was briefed three times a day by the staff,
or rather, staff was briefed three times a day during the
accident about all the actions that were being taken. They were
provided with situation reports that were, at the outset of the
incident, produced at least three times a day. I spoke with
them at least once a day. Generally, as much as time allowed in
the initial part of the incident.
So there was a tremendous amount of communication to my
colleagues. They were fully aware of all the decisions that
were being taken by the agency and then ultimately by me in my
role as Chairman.
Senator Barrasso. So I would like to ask each of the four
other commissioners, when did you first learn that the Chairman
had taken on emergency powers?
Ms. Svinicki. I did not receive any declaration as the
Chairman has stated. He made no declaration.
Senator Boxer. The question was when did you learn about
it, not whether you received notification.
Ms. Svinicki. My understanding is that NRC's Office of
congressional Affairs informed this Committee of the exercise
of emergency powers. And I believe I learned of it then.
Senator Barrasso. Have you been specifically informed by
the Commissioner that he was taking over?
Mr. Apostolakis. No, I was not.
Senator Barrasso. Commissioner Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, just echoing Commissioner Svinicki, I
first heard about it when we heard that the Office of
congressional Affairs had notified this Committee. That was the
first time I heard it.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I did have a discussion with the
Chairman on March 31st, in which I understood at that point in
time that it appeared to me he was exercising emergency powers,
though there had not been a formal statement to that effect.
Senator Barrasso. Mr. Chairman, final question from Senator
Inhofe, he sent you a letter outlining his concerns regarding
your exercise of emergency authority, asked you to provide any
legal analysis that supports your transfer of Commission
functions to yourself. He said you have not provided one yet.
Are we to conclude that you chose to exercise the authorities
without seeking any legal counsel? And perhaps you want to seek
legal counsel and respond to Senator Inhofe on that.
Mr. Jaczko. No, that is incorrect. I sought legal counsel.
There is no question my authority in this case, and I have
plenty of documentation from the general counsel to support
that.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
I am going to place in the record a document backing up
what Chairman Jaczko has stated. There is no requirement for an
emergency declaration at all. And we will put the actual
language into the record. Because this kind of questioning is
to me extraordinary, asking if you did something that you don't
have to do. And having every commissioner say no, he didn't do
it. Yes, you didn't have to. It is mind-boggling around here.
OK, we are going to turn to the Subcommittee Chairman now,
Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. I want to go back to what I thought this
hearing was to focus on, and that is, what have we learned.
Before I do that, I just want to encourage all of you in the
roles that you are playing on the commission, whether it is as
a commissioner or as the chairman of the commission, one of the
best leadership rules I ever learned in the Navy and then a lot
of other places, including my own home, was to follow the
Golden Rule, treat other people we want to be treated.
I would just remind all of you, that is the way I try to
live my life. Sometimes fail miserably. I try every day. I
implore you to do the same, whether you are the Chair or a
member of this Commission. Treat other people the way you want
to be treated.
The Chaplain here, Barry Black, with whom some of us will
be meeting in a couple of hours, those of us who need special
help, special guidance from the Chaplain, meet with him on
Thursdays for half an hour or so. But he always reminds us that
the Golden Rule is the Cliff Notes of the New Testament. And as
it turns out, it is the Cliff Notes of just about any scripture
of the major religions of the world.
Having said that, let's talk about lessons that we have
learned, lessons that we have learned so far since the
tragedies at Fukushima. I just want to ask, I will start with
you, Commissioner Ostendorff, just give us one example of a
lesson that we have learned that we have or have not begun to
act on, to implement some followup in this Country because of
that.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, thank you for your question. I
would say one area that has come up by the Task Force at two
meetings we have had so far has been the need to evaluate the
adequacy of our existing station blackout rules, which deal
with the loss of A/C power onsite offsite. I think that the
Commission will probably receive from the Task Force perhaps
some recommendations in this area. That is a concrete example
that I provide to you.
Senator Carper. All right, thank you.
Mr. Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. I would agree with Commissioner Ostendorff on
station blackout. I would also add----
Senator Carper. That is good, and for anybody, if you want
to repeat something that somebody else has said, just for
reinforcement, that is a good thing. I appreciate that. But
then you still have to give me another example.
Mr. Magwood. One other example, one that I think leaps out
at many of us, after 9/11 we put in place certain procedures
and equipment to allow plants to respond to events that require
emergency cooling from auxiliary diesel generators to drive
pumps to provide water to core reactors and spent fuel pools.
We require those units be just a very short distance away from
reactor buildings. Clearly, if we had those procedures in place
and had experienced a Fukushima type event, that equipment
would have been wiped out along with a lot of the other site
equipment. That was a significant revelation for me and
something I think we have to address.
Senator Carper. All right, thank you.
Dr. Apostolakis, how are you doing?
Mr. Apostolakis. I am doing fine, thank you.
Senator Carper. Nice to see you.
Mr. Apostolakis. One thing that maybe I have learned is
that we, that I think at least we should go back and look again
at the distinction between design basis events and beyond
design basis events. That is a legal distinction. The agency
has many, many requirements and inspection requirements and so
on for design basis events. For beyond design basis events, we
don't really get involved too much.
And of course, nature doesn't work that way. Nature does
not distinguish between design basis and beyond design basis
events. So I think we ought to go back and look at what we are
doing now with respect to beyond design basis events and maybe
get some ideas from the staff as to how we can strengthen our
involvement. This is of course a personal view.
Senator Carper. Good. Ms. Svinicki, one lesson?
Ms. Svinicki. I certainly agree that we should look at
station blackout and loss of offsite power. I also agree that
we need to re-look at the measures put in place after September
11th to deal with catastrophic events.
I would add an area that is fruitful for lessons learned
would be looking at our coordination between Federal agencies
and State and local governments, should an event occur. It is
always very difficult to have communications in a crisis
situation. I think that is an area that we can always be
exercising and improving. Thank you.
Senator Carper. All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. Certainly I think they are good comments by my
colleagues. The only thing I would add that hasn't been touched
on is the significance of spent fuel pools. I think we have had
a singular focus, perhaps, on reactor safety in the event of
accidents, and have not put enough attention to considering the
impact of spent fuel pools. Not necessarily for the pools
themselves, but for how they could possibly impact the ability
to carry out response at the site.
The other piece of that I think is just a recognition that
our traditional approach has always been to assume a single
incident at a single reactor. Clearly, Fukushima Daiichi has
shown us that we have to consider the possibility of multiple
units at a single site, perhaps multiple spent fuel pools being
affected at the same time.
Senator Carper. Thank you all. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Madam Chair. And again, thanks
for the hearing.
I guess I would say that our Country is well served when
you as a Commission function collectively and collegially. When
you do, you can pool your expertise and more effectively
harness the knowledge at your disposal.
I have concerns that the Commission may not be fully
utilizing the expertise on their Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, the ACRS. The Advisory Committee is mandated by law
and structured to provide a forum where experts representing
many technical perspectives can provide independent advice that
is factored into the Commission's decisionmaking process. The
Advisory Committee again represents a wealth of knowledge in
reactor safety and severe accident occurrences. I am concerned
that they have been so far limited to merely reviewing the
NRC's staff's conclusions at the end of their long-term review
of the Fukushima accident.
My question is, the NRC's direction for the Fukushima Task
Force lists no role for the ACRS, other than reviewing the
staff's final report and the end of the longer-term review. Mr.
Chairman, considering the ACRS's wealth of expertise in nuclear
and reactor safety and severe accidents, wouldn't the NRC's
Task Force benefit from the insights throughout the Fukushima
review?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, the staff has briefed the ACRS once
already. Very early on in the incident they held a meeting and
they briefed them. The senior staff members will also be
briefing the ACRS, I believe next week. So there has been
dialog and interaction between the ACRS. But the Commission did
provide a role for ACRS in the longer-term review. But given
the significant task in front of us and the very short period
of time in which we asked the Task Force to work, we really
wanted them to focus on their best thinking and utilize and
reach out to the people that they thought would be most
helpful.
In my discussions with the ACRS, I have encouraged them to
make their members available to the Task Force if the Task
Force had questions and wanted to reach out to them. The ACRS
was not comfortable with that. They preferred for them to meet
singly as a body. I think that is unfortunate, because as you
said, I think they have tremendous expertise that could be made
available to the Task Force. But their interest is not to do
that in a way that would be most convenient for the Task Force.
Senator Boozman. Would the rest of you like to comment in
that regard? Do you feel like increased use of the ACRS would
be beneficial?
Ms. Svinicki. Senator, as the Chairman noted, the
Commission did explicitly instruct that one tasking for the
ACRS to review the final report. But in general, the ACRS
Chairman can also initiate inquiries and look into matters. I
am fully supportive of the ACRS doing some self-directed looks
at Fukushima as well.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, I am a former chairman of the ACRS.
And I can assure you that there is no doubt in my mind that we
will hear from them and they will give us their frank opinion.
There is nothing to stop them from writing letters any time
they want.
Senator Boozman. And you agree that is helpful?
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, Senator, I am fully supportive of a full
participation by the ACRS, particularly in the longer-term
review.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I agree with my colleagues. I also
agree with the Chairman's comment that the ACRS role in the
longer-term review is perhaps, as far as our Task Force
tasking, is appropriate. But as Commissioner Apostolakis says,
to the extent that they have other ideas as to what might be
helpful, I welcome those.
Senator Boozman. Very good. I believe that Chairman Issa
sent a letter regarding this, are you familiar with that, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes, I am.
Senator Boozman. Good. I think he asked for a response by
June 9th. Have you sent a response yet?
Mr. Jaczko. I don't believe I have yet.
Senator Boozman. OK. Do you have any idea when that will be
done?
Mr. Jaczko. I assume in the next couple weeks.
Senator Boozman. Would you, again, I am interested also,
would you share the response with the Committee when that is
done?
Mr. Jaczko. I would be happy to.
Senator Boozman. Good. Thank you, and I appreciate you all
being here. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Sanders.
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I believe that it was Commissioner Magwood who, in his
remarks, said something to the effect that the NRC can benefit
from an open process. And I happen to agree very much with what
the Commissioner said. In that light, let me ask Chairman
Jaczko just a few questions. Mr. Chairman, your position, as I
understand it, has been that the NRC should not be involved in
preemption issues, the legal fight that is currently going on
between the State of Vermont and the Entergy Corporation. Is
that still your position?
Mr. Jaczko. I certainly, as I have looked at the issues, I
don't see an immediate issue here where there is a concern for
preemption. I don't want to get into the specifics, though, of
kind of the legal question that was in front of the Commission
to protect that, those frank legal discussion from our staff.
But as I have said publicly, the States have a role here.
The Federal Government has a role. And I think we have taken
our action with our license extension, and the State has
permanent action, those things are necessary in order for
license.
Senator Sanders. So just to say it again, at this moment,
you do not believe that the State, that the NRC should get
involved in the legal dispute between the Entergy Corporation
and the State of Vermont? Am I hearing you say that NRC should
not be involved?
Mr. Jaczko. Again, Senator, I don't want to comment
specifically on the matter in front of the Commission, because
that is a privileged discussion. But certainly I have seen
nothing that would tell me that there is a preemption issue
here.
Senator Sanders. OK. Again, getting back to Commissioner
Magwood's very apt statement, which I strongly agree with, that
the NRC benefits, and we all benefit, from an open process, my
understanding is that there was a vote yesterday at the NRC on
the issue in fact of whether or not the NRC should be involved
in this case. Can you tell me what the vote was, Mr.
Commissioner?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, again, the matter in front of the
Commission was in our, one of our legal discussions. And we
generally like to keep those closed matters. Because it
preserves the opportunity for our legal counsel to give us
frank legal recommendations.
Senator Sanders. Well, you may not like it, but I am going
to pick up Commissioner Magwood's point again about our open
process. Your job is to represent the best interests of the
people of the United States of America on very difficult
issues. My understanding is that there was a vote yesterday on
whether or not the NRC should recommend to the Department of
Justice as to whether or not they should intervene on behalf of
Entergy. Can you tell me if I am right and what the vote was on
that?
Mr. Jaczko. As I said, at this point the Commission has not
released those documents. I certainly would be in favor of
providing them to you, with the understanding until we were to
agree to release them publicly that you not release them.
Senator Sanders. Well, I don't want them if they can't be
released publicly. I would like them released publicly and I
would like a member of the Commission now, Commissioner
Magwood, you believe in an open process. Will you tell us how
you voted yesterday?
Mr. Magwood. I can really only echo what the Chairman just
said. It is a privileged discussion and it is also a discussion
that the agency has had with the Department of Justice. It is
not something, in fact, we were specifically asked not to
comment on it by the Department of Justice.
Senator Sanders. Well, I am asking you to comment on it.
Mr. Magwood. I am afraid I can't do that, Senator.
Senator Sanders. And one of the reasons, well, let me ask
Commissioner Svinicki, will you tell me how you voted
yesterday?
Ms. Svinicki. Senator Based on inquiries from your office
regarding this legal, this ongoing litigation, I asked my
counsel to inquire and receive advice and confer with the
Justice Department. The Justice Department asked that I
emphasize two things in my response. First of all, that the
Justice Department has the litigating authority and is the sole
decisionmaker on any Federal Government involvement in this
matter and they also----
Senator Sanders. But you can and apparently did make a
recommendation to the DOJ, is that correct?
Ms. Svinicki. There are interagency, the litigation posture
of the United States is under active deliberation by the
Justice Department. And they have asked that in our testimony
today we not comment any further.
Senator Sanders. All right. Madam Chair, I won't waste a
whole lot of time asking all the commissioners. I suspect I
will get the same answer, and I find that a disturbing answer.
Let me ask Chairman Jaczko if he could tell me, what did
the non-partisan general counsel's office recommend to the
Commission about this matter?
Mr. Jaczko. Again, in order to preserve the integrity of
their advice, I would rather not comment. I would just say
personally, I do think historically it has been very rare for
the agency to get involved in preemption issues. It is a very
high threshold for us to get involved. And I think it should be
a very high threshold for us to get involved.
Senator Sanders. My last question, I am running out of time
now, let me ask the chairman, has Entergy or its
representatives or the nuclear industry as a whole come in to
meet or requested to meet with the Commission or the NRC staff
about this litigation?
Mr. Jaczko. There were meetings between Entergy officials
and staff at the agency. They requested meetings with
commissioners under guidance from the Department of Justice. I
can only speak for myself in that regard, I did not take the
meeting.
Senator Sanders. You did not meet with them, but staff did?
Mr. Jaczko. I believe that they had a meeting with some of
our staff, correct.
Senator Sanders. Have representatives from the State of
Vermont met with your staff? Have they been invited to meet
with your staff?
Mr. Jaczko. I am not aware of that.
Senator Sanders. OK. Madam Chair, I may want to get back
later, but my time has expired.
Senator Boxer. We will have another round.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
I want to turn to some of the issues that were raised by
Fukushima. One of those is regarding vent systems. And here in
the United States, there is a point in time in which we
recommended that vent systems be hardened and if someone could
choose to just kind of quickly describe what was done in that
hardening and whether that was fully implemented across the
nuclear power plants across America.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, Senator, I believe all of our boiling
water reactors, as ultimately really kind of a voluntary
initiative, did harden the vents, which ensures that they are
able to withstand the pressures in more of a design basis
accident scenario. The event in, it is still unclear exactly
what the source of hydrogen was and the challenges with the
venting at Fukushima, whether it was a failure of the vents
themselves or whether there was some other leak in one of the
systems that would have allowed the hydrogen to accumulate
where it did.
So at this point, it is not clear exactly what role they
played. But that again is something that our Task Force will be
looking at very closely. I expect some very significant
recommendations on future changes to our requirements for the
hardened vents and other means to monitor and control hydrogen
accumulation.
Senator Merkley. So one of the other issues that has been
discussed in the past has been automatic depressurization
systems. And there has been debate over whether a design should
be implemented that allows pressure to be automatically
decreased or whether there should be a human in the link, if
you will. And I have received some conflicting understandings
of what was decided and what has been done on nuclear power
plants in America in that regard. Can you comment a little to
that?
Mr. Jaczko. On that particular issue, I am not as familiar
with it. But we can get back to you with some detailed
information.
Senator Merkley. Is there anyone who is familiar with it?
So the general understanding at the press level has been that
the hydrogen gas that occurred in 1 and 3 came from fuel rods
in those active reactors that were partially uncovered. Mr.
Chairman, you are proposing that is perhaps not the reason?
What are the other potential sources?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, again, the hydrogen would come from some
type of interaction with exposed fuel in the water and air.
That is essentially how you generate the hydrogen. So Unit 4 in
particular, there is still some uncertainty about where the
hydrogen came from there, whether it was from the spent fuel
pool or whether it came, what I think is kind of the dominant
theory right now is that the vent lines themselves, and the
actual exhaust stack that goes from Unit 3 potentially had a,
did not have a valve that prevented the hydrogen from flowing
into the Unit 3 vent into the Unit 4, and therefore it kind of
went back through the pipes essentially.
Senator Merkley. So I want to stick to 1 and 3, we will
leave the mystery of Unit 4 apart right now. The whole point of
venting is so that the explosion occurs outside rather than
inside a vessel. And clearly, something went wrong. What do we
think went wrong?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, certainly the fuel was uncovered. When
the fuel is uncovered, it is likely going to produce hydrogen.
Now, the plants are designed so that hydrogen will pool in
essentially what is called the wet well. And then there is a
vent, this so-called hardened vent, that takes that hydrogen
from the wet well and releases it out into the atmosphere.
Somewhere in that system, there was a failure and that
hydrogen was allowed to accumulate in an area where it
shouldn't have accumulated, and therefore there was ultimately
an explosion. But at this point, the details are still not yet
clearly defined as to what the exact path of that hydrogen was
from the accumulation from the fuel.
Senator Merkley. So my understanding is the explosions
occurred after the venting began but there is no insight yet as
to what went wrong in terms of whether the explosion began on
the outside, ignited the hydrogen inside, so on and so forth?
There is just a--well, this is a pretty important issue for us
to understand. Because it is key to a lot of the complexities
that have come about in the effort to rescue the reactors.
Commissioner Magwood, you noted that the Fukushima shows
insights about specific safety improvements. What are the top
five?
Mr. Magwood. What are the top five improvements?
Senator Merkley. Yes, you said that Fukushima gives us
insights on the needs we have for specific safety improvements.
What are the top five for American power plants?
Mr. Magwood. I am not sure I can give you a top five. I
think that is really what we are expecting this Task Force to
do for is. But just an overall----
Senator Merkley. What are a couple that you would highlight
for us?
Mr. Magwood. Well, an observation I would make is that if
there is, I think Senator Barrasso asked earlier what it was,
or maybe Senator Carper, what a lesson was. If there is an
overall lesson to be learned from this, I think it is that you
can't, as I think Senator Boxer said earlier, you can't predict
everything that will happen in the future, you can't predict
every earthquake, every tsunami.
But I think the biggest lesson I take form all this is that
you have to be able to recover from whatever happens. So for
me, the biggest safety message is to position equipment, have
training, to have the capability to recover from whatever
incident transpires and to be able to do so in an effective
manner.
Senator Merkley. Well in order to do that--I am over my
time now. I would just leave you with this thought. In order to
do that, one has to have an understanding kind of what are the
highest risk areas, so that the training can be appropriate,
the countermeasures can be appropriate, the preventive measures
are fully pursued. I would think at this point, we would have a
list of the top five concerns, be they not having backup power
that is susceptible to being flooded by tsunami, might be one
example.
Thanks.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman. In view of
some of the assertions that we heard that were made, how many
employees are on the staff of the NRC?
Mr. Jaczko. Approximately 4,000.
Senator Lautenberg. Four thousand. OK. I think it is
important to note that is a pretty large size organization.
Mr. Magwood, the GE Mark 1 design that was used at
Fukushima is also used at U.S. plants, including two reactors
in my State of New Jersey. Some have said that modifications to
the design in the United States ensures the safety of the
reactor. But it now appears that the Japanese plant also
previously made the modifications like the ones that were made
at plants in the U.S., and if those modifications could prevent
what finally happened in the Japanese accident, can we believe
that our plants are not similarly vulnerable?
Mr. Magwood. I think that is a very important question that
we are all asking ourselves today. By the way, I did visit
Oyster Creek some months ago and learned a lot about the Mark
1s during that visit. I think that what we are finding today is
that there are still facts dribbling in from Fukushima, there
are still some very basic things that we are still trying to
understand about what exactly were the modifications that the
Japanese performed at the Mark 1s in Japan. We really don't
have all those details yet.
We don't know, and I think the Chairman was indicating
this, we don't really know what happened to the vents during
the earthquake and the following tsunami. There are so many
factors yet that we still have to sort out, that it would be
premature to make a judgment at this point. But right now,
today, the staff has indicated that they believe the plants are
safe. Unless we learn something dramatically different from
what we know today, we will continue to believe that.
Senator Lautenberg. I am not sure that is reassuring to the
public. But Mr. Chairman, do you have anything to say about
that?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think the review we are doing is to
make sure we get this right. And what we want to make sure that
we do is we don't follow something that is an incorrect path,
that we don't take early information that turns out to be
inaccurate and pursue it and make changes that ultimately don't
impact safety.
So as Commissioner Magwood indicated, the venting process
is still a little bit uncertain. Because there is still too
much radiation for people to really get into the buildings to
begin to remove debris, to try and figure out exactly what
happened in the units. So right now, we have done, as part of
the reviews and the Task Force review, we have always asked
ourselves the question, are the plants still safe, is there
anything we need to do today to address that.
And the answer continues to be, no. We want to get good
information. We have time to do that. The likelihood of
something like this happening in the United States is still
very, very, very small. Because these are really very, very
unlikely types of events.
So it is very important, 90 days may seem like a very long
time to do this review.
Senator Lautenberg. It does.
Mr. Jaczko. To the people doing the review, it is going by
in a millisecond, because they have done so many interviews,
there is so much information for them to process. But it is
important that we get it right. I think that so far, they are
looking at all the right things. I think they are going to come
out with very good----
Senator Lautenberg. My concern included the length of time
that it is taking to do this. But you have already dealt with
that.
The spent fuel, and I address this to any and all of you,
the spent fuel can be stored in pools, as it was at Fukushima,
the plant in Japan, or dry casks. Now, we have heard from you
that spent fuel and dry casks are both, each one is a safe
method of storage. But is one more reliable than the other,
safer than the other?
Mr. Jaczko. Each of them I would say has different
strengths and weaknesses.
Senator Lautenberg. That is not--I think we should get past
that and really, can we clearly say yes, one has a safety edge
that the other doesn't have?
Mr. Jaczko. With all the information we have right now, I
would say no. They both provide a very robust way to maintain
spent fuel cooling and to maintain the spent fuel. Now, we may
find with all this new information from Japan that spent fuel
pools may provide additional vulnerabilities that make them
less of an optimal approach for storing fuel in the long term.
But right now, with the information we have, what we know
is that they are both very, very safe ways to store fuel. And
there doesn't really seem to be an obvious difference between
one approach versus another. But again, we are really looking
closely at what happened in Japan, and we may get some
information from that tells us that there really is a
difference, and if there is, then we will do whatever we need
to do to our regulations to do that.
Senator Lautenberg. That universal, each of you, have each
of you looked at this fairly in depth and come up with the
conclusion that we have just heard?
Ms. Svinicki. I agree with Chairman Jaczko.
Mr. Apostolakis. I do also.
Mr. Magwood. I agree with the Chairman. I would add one
other fact. I think that while I believe, I agree with the
Chairman, there are different aspects of wet and dry storage,
and they both have their attributes. But probably the less safe
thing to do with spent fuel is move it around a lot. So before
you make a decision about whether to relocate spent fuel, you
also have to take into consideration the risks involved in
simply transporting this spent fuel around from wet storage to
dry storage or whatever you want to do, because that's where
the risks are the highest.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I would agree with the Chairman's
comment and Commissioner Magwood's comment. I would also add
that our Office of Research is looking right now at a
differential risk calculation between leaving the spent fuel in
a pool as opposed to putting it in a dry cask at different
periods of time. So that will be informing the Task Force
recommendations.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank each of you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. We are going to continue,
going to do another round.
Chairman Jaczko, it is my understanding that the NRC staff
will report their recommendations from this initial phase of
the review to the commissioners on July 12th, and the
commissioners will hold a meeting concerning those
recommendations on July 19th. A lot of us are really anxious to
see those recommendations.
Will you assure me that the report containing the
recommendations is delivered to my office and Senator Inhofe's
office on the day it is delivered to the commissioners?
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. I mean, again, I would say that is
a decision probably for the commission, but certainly I would.
Senator Boxer. Well, I will ask each commissioner. Can you
assure me that you will release that report to me and to
Senator Inhofe?
Ms. Svinicki. I support that action.
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
Mr. Magwood. Yes.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Excellent. OK.
Ms. Svinicki, you testified at your confirmation hearing,
when I asked you a series of questions about Yucca, and I sent
it up and said, so you didn't work directly on Yucca, and you
said, I did not, no. N-O. And I said, OK, very good, thank you.
Now there is a report out in the media that says as a DOE
employee you co-authored a technical report entitled Acceptance
of Waste for Disposal and the Potential United States
Repository at Yucca. And this report was used in the site
characterization of Yucca Mountain, which eventually led to
Secretary Abraham and President Bush approving it. And also,
according to these documents, while at DOE you were tasked by
the former Yucca Mountain project director to conduct technical
work related to radioactive waste materials that could be
stored in Yucca. And there is other, you were a member of DOE's
repository task team, tasked with resolving technical issues
related to Yucca.
So it is kind of important to me, since I said to you, so
you didn't work directly on Yucca, and you said, I did not, no,
and now years later this comes out. Could you explain this to
me?
Ms. Svinicki. I am aware of the document that you are
referencing, Chairman Boxer, and it has caused me to go back
and look at my testimony to you and the exchange that we had at
my confirmation hearing. You asked me to characterize my work
at DOE, and my answer indicated that I had worked obviously in
the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, which was
well-known and was on my resume.
And I indicated to you that I did not work on the Yucca
Mountain license application. I worked on DOE waste inventories
and transportation of materials in that program. And I drew
that distinction in my testimony. I do not agree that the
document that I believe you are referring to is accurate about
stating that the reports I worked on were underlying the Yucca
Mountain licensing application. I don't agree that is accurate.
Senator Boxer. OK, that is fair. I would just like to say,
when I summed up and said, so you didn't work directly on
Yucca, I didn't mean you were in the mountain taking tests on
it. I meant, were you working in the whole subject. And you
were.
So I would just say to you, this is troubling to me, I will
leave it. I will leave it at that. I will leave it at that.
I believe that the focus should be on ensuring the safe
operation of the 104 nuclear reactors in communities across our
Nation, not on old, already-resolved issues. But to ensure that
everyone is clear that no laws were broken, I am going to ask
you, Chairman Jaczko, two questions about the leaked Inspector
General report. One, did the IG find that the NRC's general
counsel supported your decision to direct staff to follow the
Fiscal Year 2011 budget guidance on closing out Yucca, and that
your direction was consistent with NRC's statute, OMB guidance
and the Administration's decision to terminate Yucca?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Did the IG find that your decision was a
budgetary matter within your purview as chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Chairman, I want to ask you a question off the political
side of it. According to an article in the New York Times this
morning, the Chairman of the NRC Task Force review said
yesterday that past studies by safety experts in the U.S. have
analyzed the risk of losing electricity from the grid or from
onsite emergency generators, but not both at the same time. I
understand this scenario, the loss of offsite electricity and
onsite emergency generators, which happened in Japan, is that
correct?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
Senator Boxer. That is referred to as a station blackout?
Mr. Jaczko. Correct.
Senator Boxer. So in light of what happened in Japan, will
the NRC consider new regulations that will prepare nuclear
power plants to better handle a station blackout?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, ultimately that will be, I think, a
decision for the Commission. But my personal view, I think this
is an area where I suspect we are going to have to make some
changes in the area of the regulations for station blackout.
And I suspect that the Task Force will have some
recommendations for us in this area.
Senator Boxer. Is there agreement on the panel on that
statement by the Chairman, yes or no?
S. I will study carefully the Task Force's recommendations.
Senator Boxer. OK, so you don't see a station blackout as a
problem that needs to be fixed at this time?
S. There are currently requirements to address station
blackout. I look forward to the Task Force's analysis of the
adequacy of the current requirements.
Senator Boxer. OK. My understanding is there aren't, that
what they deal with in the past are just losing electricity
from the grid or from onsite, but not both at the same time.
Mr. Apostolakis. No.
Senator Boxer. That is incorrect?
Mr. Apostolakis. That is incorrect, Senator.
Senator Boxer. OK. Please correct the record for me, sir.
Mr. Apostolakis. Station blackout means that you lose all
A/C power, including onsite and offsite, and that there is a
rule that the Commission has promulgated. So it was an issue
that was addressed. But there are other questions that are
coming up as a result of Fukushima. For example, in most power
plants in the United States right now, the batteries which are
supposed to provide the extra power when you lose both are
expected to work somewhere between four and 8 hours. And the
Japanese incident shows that you may have days or even weeks.
So these are some of the things that we will have to think
about how to address in the future. But----
Senator Boxer. So you don't agree with the New York Times
article where Charlie Miller, the chairman of the Task Force,
said that studies by safety experts in the United States had
analyzed the risks of losing electricity from the grid or from
onsite emergency generators, but not both at the same time? You
are saying you have had studies on this?
Mr. Apostolakis. This is not a true statement, yes.
Senator Boxer. OK, well, that is important. And we will let
the New York Times know. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jaczko. Madam Chairman, I would say, I think the
intention of that statement by the team was that when you are
looking at the coping time, which is the important factor in
the station blackout event, you have to make assumptions about
how quickly you can restore that electrical power. So that
historically has been done, they have looked at events in which
you had the loss of the electric power from a minor disturbance
in the electrical grid, and that would take a certain amount of
time to restore that. That gets you to essentially that four to
8 hours of coping time.
But that idea of the simultaneity in some of the guidance
gets really to the recovery and how long it would take to
recover. We would make assumptions that you wouldn't
necessarily both have catastrophically lost the use of the
generators as well as catastrophically lost the offsite power.
Senator Boxer. I see.
Mr. Jaczko. So if you lost offsite power and the diesels
didn't work, you would be able to get the diesels back in a
normal time or the normal expected time for recovery of
diesels. Or if it was the other way and the diesels weren't
working, then you would have a normal way to recover the
offsite power.
Senator Boxer. So if I can get to what both of you have
said, that you have looked at station blackout, but not for
such a long duration?
Mr. Jaczko. Correct.
Senator Boxer. And I am assuming that Commissioners, you
will look at, the last two, if you will look at this
recommendation carefully, if there is one?
Mr. Magwood. I agree. I just want to add one small thing. I
think the Chairman characterized it correctly. But I think the
Task Force is also interested in the fact that you could have
what we would call a common cause failure, both offsite power
and the onsite diesel generators. That is something that I
think was a new thought for many people. I agree with others
who said that is something we have to look at.
Senator Boxer. Do you agree?
Mr. Ostendorff. Madam Chair, I agree this is an area we
need to look at.
Senator Boxer. OK, very good.
All right, Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you very much.
Again, I appreciate the hearing. I think it has been very
helpful. I really do understand, I think the Country
understands how important this agency is and I know you have
your differences. But we do appreciate your working hard
together to keep us safe.
We have a nuclear plant in Arkansas run by Entergy, and
they do a tremendous job. They are a great citizen and we are
very proud to have the plant there, again, realizing that
everyone working in harmony to make sure that these things
function in such a manner that they not only produce cheap
electricity and help us in that way but also again, we don't
have to worry that we are not doing the very best that we can
for the population.
The only thing else I would add, I think that probably on
the Yucca project, there were probably thousands of people that
worked in a minor way. I think the idea that you, Ms. Svinicki,
as a junior engineer, being there, working in whatever manner,
the idea that somehow that laid the foundation for the Bush
administration's decision 6 years later I think is a real
reach. So we do appreciate you all. Certainly anything I can do
to help, I will. I know the Committee feels the same way. And
like I said, we appreciate your efforts. And I yield back.
Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Carper and then Senator Sanders.
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chair.
I would like to come back to the issue raised by our
Chairman about the batteries, the power batteries. It is my
understanding that in Fukushima things were not that bad as
long as the power batteries were working. And once, I think
they had an 8-hour life, as I recall. But whether it was 8
hours or four, the life of those batteries was used up. That is
when something hit the fan, if I could. I am told that many,
maybe most of our facilities, nuclear facilities in this
Country, have the backup batteries of I think a 4-hour battery
life. I don't know if they are all four, or if there are some
that are eight. The thought occurs to me, we had a little
discussion here already, but shouldn't we be looking at the
requirements for the operating life of these batteries and
extending that? Is there a place called A123, right there in
Cambridge, Dr. Apostolakis, but A123, the battery folks, the
batteries that are going to be in the Chevrolet Volt or are in
the Chevrolet Volt. But our battery technology is getting a lot
better as we go forward, particularly with electric powered
vehicles. But shouldn't we be able to do a whole lot better
than a 4-hour or 8-hour life battery in the future?
Let me just ask that of the--I will just say Dr.
Apostolakis, why don't you take a shot at that. And Mr.
Magwood, would you take a shot at that question too, please?
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, you are absolutely right, Senator.
This is something that we have to look into and take some sort
of action. I don't know what that action would be. But clearly,
a message from Fukushima is that 4 hours or sometimes eight is
not sufficient.
Interestingly enough, when the requirement of four or
longer hour was put in place, it was actually a conservative
estimate. They looked at the time it took to recover A/C power,
the average was about 2 hours. So to be conservative, they
doubled it. And now we have this accident that shows that it is
very inadequate. So that is certainly something we have to look
into.
Senator Carper. Thank you, sir. Mr. Magwood?
Mr. Magwood. Not long after Fukushima, when I was talking
with experts on the staff about this, I was listening to the
history of how the 4-hour coping time was decided. As
Commissioner Apostolakis pointed out, the time was deemed to be
conservative.
I remember pointing out to the staff at the time that, I
live in Montgomery County in Maryland. If I lost power for only
4 hours, I would be thrilled. Because often, when I lose power,
it is gone for 2 days. So I wondered, how in the world can you
justify 4 hours.
There is certainly a technical background for the 4-hours.
But it is clearly something we have to look at.
Senator Carper. All right. And the other side of this, not
just the life of the batteries but also our ability to get
additional batteries onsite where they are needed, fully
charged. Is that something that we are considering?
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could say, I don't want to focus
too much on the batteries. The focus really is to have the
ability to have systems move water, or perform whatever safety
functions. The way the current station blackout rule is
written, the batteries, they don't, because of the way pumps
are designed, they don't activate pumps. What the batteries are
there for is instrumentation and sometimes valves or other
control systems.
So the most important issue is the restoration of
electrical alternating current power. That is really the most
important factor. So the batteries provide a way to cope. But
that also requires some other system to do the pumping. So that
is done with turbines that are driven by steam from the
reactors.
So there is lots of ways to look at this problem. It may
not necessarily be a problem of coping and dealing with the
batteries. But it may be, the better, more effective approach
may be to have additional ways to provide alternating current
power. That may in fact be more effective.
So at this point, it is not clear exactly what the right
way will be. But the real issue is to get the electrical power
back, the alternating current power back. As long as you are on
the batteries, you are in a coping mode and you are not in an
ideal situation.
Senator Carper. Well, we will look forward to you report
back to us later this year to see how this all sorts out.
One other thing. I spent, along with Captain Ostendorff, we
both spent some time in the Navy, he was on submarines, nuclear
submarines, I was on Navy P3 airplanes trying to find
submarines. It was very easy to find those Russians, a lot hard
to find our guys, which was actually reassuring. But we were in
aircraft, and I know it is true in some ways you are given
actually very realistic scenarios to follow. Training
exercises, going after, in our case Russian submarines.
We do, in nuclear power plants, in order to prepare for
challenges with respect to plant security from hostile forces,
or actually these force on force exercises in plants across the
Country where we use good guys, our guys, to sort of take the
role of bad guys and try to actually do force on force
exercises. Pretty realistic. Nobody is shooting real bullets,
but they are pretty realistic, I am told.
Do you think we ought to maybe consider something similar
for inspections and for regular emergency preparedness
exercises, where plant employees are faced with different
scenarios that are more realistic than maybe what we do today?
And let me say, Mr. Ostendorff, Commissioner Ostendorff,
Captain Ostendorff, will you take a shot at that? And Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ostendorff. Sure. I think the training and
qualification and the demonstrated ability to carry out
response actions is a piece of this. It is one thing to do a
tabletop exercise, it is another thing to actually fight a fire
in conditions of flooding where you are up to your knees in
water where you maybe have very poor lighting, very poor
ventilation. I think the training, qualification, command and
control, direction on an individual reactor plant site are
areas we should look at.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. I would just say, actually, the Commission has
kind of maybe anticipated your question. We actually just
finalized an update to our emergency preparedness regulations.
And one of the cornerstones of that was to incorporate in our
emergency planning exercises one, more realistic exercises. I
would often comment that everybody knew when to order lunch,
because we always knew there was going to be a lull in the
exercise at around noon. So the exercises are in many ways kind
of pro forma and everybody knows how they are going to play
out. So one thing we have done is made them more, we are going
to be making them more realistic.
The other thing we have done is we have added what we call
hostile action-based drills. So we are now going to incorporate
in the exercise cycle precisely what you talked about, which is
dealing with an emergency response when you have a security
component as well. And the additional confusion and drains on
communication and command and control, that can be
accomplished. So it is actually something the Commission just
finalized, and I think it is a very strong effort over the last
really decade since September 11th.
Senator Carper. Thanks.
Madam Chair, I would just say, they are used to, in these
exercises, having a lull and during the lull they have lunch. I
am just wondering, when will they eat lunch now? I am sure they
will find the time.
Mr. Jaczko. We will find a way.
Senator Boxer. OK. Senator Sanders.
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Chairman, you indicated during my last round of
questioning that representatives of a major multi-national
corporation, a $14 billion corporation, Entergy, which is now
involved in a major and extremely important legal contest with
the State of Vermont, met with staff at the NRC.
Mr. Jaczko. That is my understanding.
Senator Sanders. Do you think it is proper, in the midst of
a major legal dispute, for proponents of Entergy to be meeting
with the staff of the NRC?
Mr. Jaczko. I would say, I think in the end, the best way
to determine that is to see how the staff handle it. Our staff,
I think, are very diligent and dedicated and focused on their
responsibilities to safety. I think we have an effort to be
open and to listen to concerns.
Senator Sanders. But the issue in this lawsuit is not about
safety. It is about the right of the State of Vermont, under
the law, to not relicense a nuclear power plant. I am just kind
of curious, if I can ask Ms. Svinicki and other members, have
you been contacted by Entergy or the nuclear power industry in
anyway, written, verbally, phone, personal meetings, about the
Vermont Yankee case? Ms. Svinicki?
Ms. Svinicki. I have not communicated with Entergy or any
broad industry group regarding this particular litigation.
Senator Sanders. Have they communicated with you?
Ms. Svinicki. They have not. As the Chairman mentioned,
there was a request to meet with commissioners. But that
request was withdrawn based on, my understanding is the Justice
Department had concerns, and so Entergy withdrew that request.
Senator Sanders. What about representatives of the nuclear
power industry?
Ms. Svinicki. I have not had any meetings with
representatives of the nuclear power industry on this
litigation.
Mr. Apostolakis. I have not either.
Mr. Magwood. I have had no conversations.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I also was aware of a request to
meet with commissioners. And that request, as Commissioner
Svinicki mentioned, was withdrawn. I have not met with Entergy
nor with members of the nuclear industry to discuss this
matter.
Senator Sanders. Nor any communications with them about
this matter?
Mr. Ostendorff. There was a communication that came through
for a request to meet. We did not meet.
Senator Sanders. Right. Thank you.
What I want to do now is go to a very important Supreme
Court decision dealing with the role of States in terms of
nuclear power. Very important decision. I want to read it to
you. It will take me a moment.
Senator Boxer.
[Remarks off microphone.]
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It has to do
actually with the State of California. This is what the Supreme
Court said in ruling for a State, in this case the State of
California, in 1983.
My question, after I read this paragraph is, if you could
comment on your feelings on this important decision. This is
what the Supreme Court said in 1983. It said that ``The
promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished at all
costs. The elaborate licensing and safety provisions, and the
continued preservation of State regulation in traditional areas
belie that. Moreover, Congress has allowed the States to
determine as a matter of economics,'' let me repeat that, ``as
a matter of economics,'' not safety, my words, ``as a matter of
economics, whether a nuclear plant vis-a-vis a fossil fuel
plant should be built. The decision of California to exercise
that authority does not in itself constitute a basis for
preemption. The legal reality remains that Congress has left
sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of
nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic
reasons.''
In other words, to my understanding, what the Supreme Court
said in 1983 is, look, forget the safety issue. If a State,
California or any other State, feels that there is another way
to go forward that is better for the people of that State in
terms of energy, maybe they want to buy power from Canada,
hydroelectric power. Maybe they want to go sustainable energy.
Maybe they want to invest in energy efficiency.
From an economic point of view, the Supreme Court has said,
they of course have that right. You can't push a nuclear power
plant on people. It is not a safety issue. Let me go very
briefly and ask members of the Commission if they would give us
their view on that Supreme Court decision. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Jaczko. As I said, I think it should be very rare that
the Commission is involved in preemption cases. There are
clearly, and I think I have said this publicly, there are
clearly areas that, where the States have authority and we
should respect those authorities as we expect them to respect
our authorities.
Senator Sanders. Thank you. Ms. Svinicki.
Ms. Svinicki. Senator Sanders, although I have not read the
decision you were quoting from, I would agree in general with
Chairman Jaczko that there areas reserved to the States. And I
would note I began my career working for the State of Wisconsin
at a utility commission. So I am aware of the States' role in
economics.
Senator Sanders. Just out of curiosity, Madam Commissioner,
were you familiar with this Supreme Court decision?
Ms. Svinicki. I have not read that decision. I believe I
may know the one you are quoting from, but I have not read it.
Senator Sanders. Well, it concerns me very much that you
may not be knowledgeable about this decision. Because as I
understand it, this Commission just voted yesterday on an issue
very relevant to what the Supreme Court had to say.
Mr. Commissioner, are you familiar with it? How do you feel
about that?
Mr. Apostolakis. I was not familiar with it, but what you
just read makes perfect sense.
Senator Sanders. Makes perfect sense. Do you think the
State should have the right, from an economic point of view, to
say no, we don't want a nuclear power plant?
Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, I do agree.
Senator Sanders. Commissioner Magwood.
Mr. Magwood. Yes, I also am not familiar with that
particular ruling, although I will read it when I get back to
the office, I make that commitment. I agree generally, I think
that there is clearly a reason we have a Federal Government.
The States have a strong role in issues such as economics. And
as you have described it, it seems perfectly reasonable to me.
Senator Sanders. Commissioner Ostendorff.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator Sanders, I agree with the
Chairman's statement. I would also comment that I am generally
familiar with that case in the context of discussions I have
had with our solicitor, with respect to this, the matter of
Vermont Yankee. Our authority is not based on economics, but
rather on nuclear safety.
Senator Sanders. Right.
Mr. Ostendorff. So preemption, however, where there may be,
as, in a rare case, as Chairman Jaczko has mentioned, where
there is an issue of potential nuclear safety issues being
raised, then that is a situation that might warrant NRC
engagement.
I would like to, Senator, if I can also comment on a
comment you made during the first round of questions on this
topic, and the Chairman has appropriately characterized the
Department of Justice's role in this matter as the litigating
authority for the United States executive branch. I would just
like to add that the comments to us, or discussions between the
Department of Justice and NRC are not whether to intervene on
the side of Entergy. It is a matter of whether or not the NRC
has an interest in this case dealing with preemption issues.
So I just wanted to maybe provide a different perspective
on that.
Senator Sanders. I am not so sure. I mean, the reality, the
political reality is that the Department of Justice is going to
have to make a decision. And I think it is quite understandable
that they would go to you guys and say, NRC, what do you think?
What do you think?
But I want to get back to your first point, Commissioner
Ostendorff, because, correct me if I am wrong, but I am hearing
you say that if the issue is not safety, which certainly is an
NRC issue, but the issue about whether or not a plant should be
relicensed and kept open then in fact you do not see that as an
issue that the NRC should be preempting the State on, is that
what you are saying?
Mr. Ostendorff. I want to be very careful here with my
words, but I will answer the question, Senator, it is a very
fair question to ask. This case is very complex. And I have had
a chance to read briefings filed by both parties, and to be
briefed on the status of the case.
Senator Sanders. Who briefed you on the status of the case?
Mr. Ostendorff. I talked to our solicitor, the solicitor
for the NRC. He is our representative with the rest of the
Federal Government, our interface with the Department of
Justice. And as Chairman Jaczko mentioned, there are things we
cannot discuss here today in this session. So each individual
case has its own nuances, its specific details, its specific
issues, contentions. As a safety regulator, our job is to
ensure that nuclear power plants are operated safely.
Senator Sanders. Right.
Mr. Ostendorff. Whether or not there is a safety issue in a
particular case depends on a lot of fact, a lot of details, a
lot of arguments made by both parties to the case. And so I
think it is hard to say in a particular abstract manner whether
a particular case has a safety nuance or not.
Senator Sanders. Let me try. If the people of the State of
Vermont want to shut down a 40-year old plant that has had
numerous problems, want to shut it down, not relicense it, not
see it continue for years to come, why do you see that as a
safety issue rather than an economic issue, perhaps, of the
State to do that?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I appreciate the question. And for
me to respond in that would be counter to what I have been
advised by our solicitor.
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me more
time than I was originally scheduled to have. Let me just say
this. First of all, I do appreciate, I think as I hear it, and
somebody jump up and tell me if I am wrong, all of the
Commissioners' understanding that States certainly under the
Supreme Court decision do have the right for economic reasons
to determine whether or not they want a nuclear power plant.
Not a safety issue, an economic issue.
Is there anyone who disagrees with that?
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. I am going to followup just with a couple of
quick questions. Commissioner Ostendorff, you just said in
answer to Senator Sanders, I hope I heard you right, I want you
to clarify if I didn't, that when there is a safety problem you
have to listen to both sides. That is what you said, is that
right?
Mr. Ostendorff. I am not sure exactly what both sides--we
are talking----
Senator Boxer. Commissioner, can you read that back
perhaps, what he said?
OK.
Mr. Ostendorff. I believe what I may have said, at least
what I believe I said, Madam Chair, is that whether or not
there is a nuclear safety issue, in the case Senator Sanders is
referring to, requires hearing the perspectives of both parties
to a case.
Senator Boxer. Right. That is right. I want to talk----
Mr. Ostendorff. I did say that, yes.
Senator Boxer. I want to talk to you about that. Why is
that the issue? Isn't the issue whether you find it is safe or
not? I don't get that. I didn't get that. If that is your job,
why do you listen to both sides? You need to have your staff
ascertain whether it is safe or not, taking into consideration
what both sides are saying. But I hope that is what you meant.
Mr. Ostendorff. Well, certainly that is our job as a
regulatory, Madam Chair. I don't dispute that at all. What I am
trying to say in the context of Senator Sanders' question as to
whether or not there is a safety issue that might warrant
preemption issues being raised by the NRC, I think it is
important for us to hear both sides of the question----
Senator Boxer. It is.
Mr. Ostendorff [continuing]. from all parties.
Senator Boxer. But please tell me, don't you have the
ability, I will ask the Chairman, to decide for yourself if a
plant is safe or not safe?
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. That is our responsibility and it
is ultimately our decision. We strive as an agency to make sure
that we listen to stakeholders so that we have informed
decisionmaking. But ultimately it is our decision.
Senator Boxer. But you are independent. You are
independent. So when I hear you say, when there is a safety
issue raised, we are going to hear both sides, that troubles
me.
Mr. Ostendorff. Madam Chair, I----
Senator Boxer. I think hearing both sides is fine. But at
the end of the day, you have to perform your own inspections.
Am I correct on that? And that is what you do with your people,
right? You send them out and say, look, one side says it is
safe, the other side said they are scared. Can you come back
and give us a review of what is going on? Isn't that what you
would demand, Mr. Ostendorff, other than just listening to
either side?
Mr. Ostendorff. I would like to clarify this, Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Please.
Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you for the opportunity.
Senator Boxer. Sure.
Mr. Ostendorff. It is clearly our responsibility as
regulators under the Atomic Energy Act to make the final
determinations on whether a plant is safe or not.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Ostendorff. The question I was responding to with
respect to Senator Sanders dealt with whether there is an issue
being raised in this lawsuit of nuclear safety, or is it purely
economics. The case that Senator Sanders was citing from the
Supreme Court in California was dealing with an economic-based
aspect. What I am saying is that on the decision that I can't
discuss the details----
Senator Boxer. Right, right, right.
Mr. Ostendorff [continuing]. the Department of Justice, it
is important for us as commissioners to hear and listen to the
different briefs and our perspectives on how to vote, being
informed by understanding both sides of the argument as to
whether or not there is a preemption issue.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, I mean, I just have to say, and I
want to commend all of you, first of all, for giving us your
total focus and attention. There have been some tough moments
here today. I think each of you has conducted yourself just
very well and very sincerely.
I want to compliment my colleague. I so identify with his
fighting for his State. And I share his concerns about
transparency and openness and intervening in a State's rights
situation. I think that if a commissioner votes one way to say,
we are going in, and I assume spending taxpayer dollars, would
it not be? Taxpayer dollars to intervene in a suit, it ought to
be a matter of the public's right to know. And I am sure each
of you could eloquently defend your reasoning.
So I would question all of you ducking this question, I
think it is wrong. I think you ought to rethink it. All of you
should meet and think about it. Think about it. It is too
important. You need to be as transparent as you can be.
I want to just close by saying, I looked through this
really good book, The Information Digest, that you put out. I
am sure all of you are very, there are very nice pictures of
you in here. And it really lays out what you do. And I am
struck by page 2, where you or your writers, and I am sure you
have agreed with them, have highlighted the major function of
this Commission in a very clear way. You took all of the law
and you just synthesized it.
This is what you said: Strategic goals, there are two,
safety is first. Insure adequate protection of public health
and safety and the environment.
What a wonderful job you have. It is the way I look at my
job. That is sacred trust you have. Sacred trust to the people
of this great Country, so that we never get into a situation
where because somebody might have done the wrong thing, we are
dealing with a Japanese disaster. We just, we just can't do
that. I keep thinking back to my two plants and all the people
there who really, some of them don't realize how much their
very well-being depends on you being vigorous on their behalf.
I am going to be vigorous on their behalf. Senator Feinstein
is. And others who, I am sure the Governor and all of us.
But you have the power. You are independent. I can't tell
you what to do, I can just urge you to do the right thing.
Second, security. That is your second strategic goal.
Insure adequate protection in the secure use and management of
radioactive materials. So important. And that is why Yucca
keeps being brought up, and I remember reading those reports of
leakage and all kinds of problems there. And I have a county
that just is right next door, which would get anything that
leaked into the river. We would get it on our side.
So I just want to close by saying thank you. This Committee
cares a lot and we have different views. You saw them all
today, and that is the beauty of America and democracy. I often
say anyone watching us, every point of view is represented. And
that is really what democracy is. Of course, some of us think
our point of view is the right one. Each of us thinks that our
ideas are the right one.
But we will keep on overseeing the work you do. We wish you
well. We hope that you as a Commission will be kind to one
another, good to one another. Yes, there will be debates, there
will be arguments. But life is too short to make them personal.
That is just coming from me as a friend, as a Senator, as a
mother, as a grandmother.
So we need you to work together. Disagreements may abound.
But at the end of the day, you have to work it out. Because you
are in charge of safety and security for the American people in
a very important way with these 104 plants. A hundred and four,
is that right? Yes. Two of which are in my State, and I worry
about.
So worry about those a little bit, too.
Thank you very much. We hope to see you again. We stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows.]
Statement of Hon. Jeff Sessions, Senator
from the State of Alabama
Thank you, Commissioners of the NRC, for appearing before
our committee today.
We have spent a lot of time in this committee and in other
committees in Congress reviewing the earthquakes and tsunamis
in Japan in March of this year and the implications for nuclear
power in the United States. In fact, we have spent so much time
on the nuclear aspects of this natural disaster that the public
may overlook that at least 15,000 individuals were killed and
nearly 8,000 were reported missing as a result of the
earthquakes and tsunamis. Yet I am not aware of a single death
or injury arising from the overheating of spent fuel stored at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Certainly, there are
lessons to be learned from the unusual events at the Japanese
plants but it does not seem at this point that there are
substantial reasons to call into question the overall safety or
reliability of nuclear power in the United States. I look
forward to hearing today about the preliminary results of the
Commission's review of this incident.
According to the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, the United States will need to add 135,000
megawatts (MW) of new generation by 2017 in order to meet our
economy's energy needs, but the amount of new generation
currently planned to come on-line by that date is significant
less than what will be required.1 America needs a comprehensive
energy plan that increases domestic American energy production
from a variety of sources--nuclear, oil, natural gas,
hydroelectric, biofuels, and other sources of reliable energy
that America can put to good use. Conservation has a very
important role as well. America needs an energy policy that
strengthens our national security by using more domestic
energy, fosters economic growth by providing plentiful low cost
energy, and protects the environment in an effective and cost-
effective manner.
I read yesterday that Chairman Jaczko believes, as a result
of the Japanese situation, the NRC should issue tougher new
regulations. After a thorough review, some new safety
requirements may be justified. But policymakers in Washington
D.C. should not get ahead of themselves. An earthquake of
historic intensity was centered very near a 40-year old nuclear
facility that is located directly on Japan's Pacific coast.
This caused Daiichi reactors 1 through 4 to experience a
``station blackout''--that is, the facility lost all offsite
power and the emergency diesel generators were flooded and
inoperable as a result of the tsunami. As a result, the cooling
systems did not function as designed. In the United States,
nuclear plants already must demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the NRC that the plant can continue to operate safely during a
blackout scenario. Existing U.S. regulations also require
multiple layers of redundancy to ensure safe operation.
In Alabama, we saw a potential blackout event first-hand in
April of this year when severe tornados occurred throughout our
state, knocking out the power lines that fed offsite power to
the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant--the second largest
nuclear power station in the U.S. The backup power systems at
Browns Ferry responded as designed and there was no blackout or
meltdown scenario. While there will certainly be lessons to
learn from the Japanese experience at Fukushima, I believe that
we need to remain firmly committed to expanding America's
nuclear power fleet today. The new nuclear units currently in
the licensing process contain safety features, such as gravity-
fed cooling systems, that would have been another safety
redundancy that would have prevented the kinds of problems seen
at Fukushima.
That is the case with the Westinghouse AP1000 design. These
new designs reduce reliance upon mechanical and electrical
systems for cooling. As the NRC does its work in this regard,
it will be critically important that the Commission has a full
panel of commissioners, and I would continue to urge that
Commissioner Ostendorrf, whose term expires at the end of this
month, receives a confirmation vote on the floor of the Senate
immediately.
In my view, the Japanese situation should not lead us to
push the pause button, especially for licensing new facilities
in areas of the country not susceptible to the kinds of events
that led to the Japanese disaster. Rather, I believe we need
these newer, safer nuclear units to come on line as soon as
possible. Nuclear power is a clean source of domestic energy
that the American people support. It has an important role to
play in reducing our dependence on foreign oil and reducing air
pollutants. Nuclear power plants provide long term economic
benefits, and the construction of new nuclear facilities
creates new, high paying jobs.
Finally, I am very concerned, Chairman Jaczko, about
reports concerning your apparent decision to withhold important
and relevant information about the Yucca Mountain matter from
the other members of the Commission. I am also concerned about
the way in which you exercised ``emergency powers'' in the wake
of the Japanese incident. Both are troubling situations that
merit a full review.
Thank you. I look forward to our hearing today.
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