[Senate Hearing 112-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 11 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Feinstein, Mikulski, Kohl,
Murray, Cochran, Shelby, Hutchison, Alexander, Collins,
Murkowski, and Coats.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary of Defense
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE
Chairman Inouye. This morning I'd like to welcome Dr.
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Mike Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to testify on the
administration's budget request for fiscal year 2012.
Gentlemen, it's my pleasure and privilege to welcome you
back to your last testimony before this subcommittee, and to
thank you for your many years of admirable and dedicated
service to our Nation.
You entered your current positions during a tumultuous
period for this country, when we were losing ground in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, and you agreed to take on what was
arguably two of the most difficult jobs in the country. And
your leadership not only turned the tide on the ongoing wars,
but also maintained the capacity, capability and public
appreciation for the United States military. You have served
tirelessly, and you have served honorably. This subcommittee
and this country are truly thankful to both of you.
I understand that Secretary Gates has to leave by 2:30
today, so, in order to have time for testimony and questions, I
will submit my full statement for the record.
And I will now turn to the Vice Chairman, Senator Cochran,
for his opening remarks.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
Today, I would like to welcome Dr. Robert Gates, the
Secretary of Defense and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to testify on the administration's
budget request for fiscal year 2012. Gentlemen, it is my
privilege to welcome you back to your last testimony before
this subcommittee and to thank you for your many years of
admirable and dedicated service to our country.
You both entered your current positions during a tumultuous
period for this country when we were losing ground in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. You agreed to take on what are arguably two of
the most difficult jobs in the country, and your leadership not
only turned the tide of the ongoing wars, but also maintained
the capacity, capability, and public appreciation for the
United States military. You have served tirelessly, and you
have served honorably; this subcommittee and this country are
truly thankful to both of you.
But, as you know, there is no rest for the weary. Before we
say farewell, the subcommittee has more business for you both
and many issues to discuss regarding the budget.
The Department's fiscal year 2012 base budget request is
$553 billion, an increase of $40 billion over last year's
enacted base budget. The Department is also requesting $118
billion for overseas contingency operations for fiscal year
2012.
Secretary Gates, as a part of the fiscal year 2012 budget,
you insightfully set a goal for the Department to achieve
efficiency savings of $178 billion over the next 5 years. Since
that time, President Obama has challenged the Department to cut
an additional $400 billion over the next 12 years. I'd like to
get your perspective of this reduction and your assessment of
the impact this reduction will have on military personnel and
warfighting capability.
Since submitting the President's budget, many events around
the globe have changed. The U.S. military is now engaged in
operations over Libya, Osama bin Laden is dead, and
longstanding dictatorships namely in the Middle East and Africa
are being challenged or have been overthrown in favor of
democratic governments. Yet our traditional threats remain and
continue to grow while our attention has been focused
elsewhere. I'd like to hear your thoughts on future force size,
structure, and capability that will be necessary to combat
future threats.
Your leadership brought about a significant change in the
way the Department buys weapons. You boldly came into the
office and challenged the military services, the defense
industry, and the Congress to cancel programs you deemed to be
exquisite technologies built for a different war than the ones
we were fighting.
Although the enemy's tactics and tools constantly changed,
you forced the traditionally slow-moving Pentagon bureaucracy
to respond swiftly with better capabilities, such as systems to
defeat improvised explosive devices and increasing much needed
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. I look
forward to hearing from you both on other lessons that you have
learned from the last 10 years of war on how to improve the
Department's acquisition programs.
Gentlemen, we sincerely appreciate your service to our
Nation, and the dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men
and women of our armed services. We could not be more grateful
for what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country
each and every day.
Your full statements will be included in the record. I now
turn to the Vice Chairman, Senator Cochran, for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to join you
in welcoming these distinguished witnesses to our subcommittee.
They have demonstrated through their service--the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--a skill, knowledge
and dedication they have to keeping our country safe, and to
helping protect the security interests of our Nation around the
world. That's a big job. That is a huge challenge. And, in my
view, they have provided distinguished leadership, for which
our Nation is very grateful.
Chairman Inouye. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
the kind words.
One correction is--12:30.
And it's in a good cause. I'm meeting with the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the Fiscal year
2012 budget. So, wish me luck.
Mr. Chairman, members of the sucommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2012--as noted, my last budget testimony before
this, or any other congressional committee ever. And, this time
I mean it.
The budget request for the Department of Defense being
presented today includes a base budget request of $553 billion,
and an overseas contingency operations request of $117.8
billion.
My submitted statement includes many more details of this
request, but I would like to take this opportunity to address
several issues that I know have been a subject of debate and
concern in recent weeks and months: First, the planned future
reductions in the size of the ground forces; second, the
proposed reforms and savings to the TRICARE program for
working-age retirees; and, third, the budget and the strategy
choices required to meet the savings targets recently laid out
by President Obama.
Nearly 4\1/2\ years ago, one of my first acts as Defense
Secretary was to increase the permanent end strength of our
ground forces--the Army by 65,000, for a total of 547,000, and
the Marine Corps by 27,000, to 202,000.
At the time, the increase was needed to relieve the severe
stress on the force from the Iraq war as the surge was getting
underway. To support the later plus-up of troops in
Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a temporary further
increase in the Army of some 22,000--an increase always planned
to end in 2000--fiscal year 2013. The objective was to reduce
stress on the force; limit, and eventually end, the practice of
stop-loss; and to increase troops' home station dwell time.
This has worked, and I can tell you that those stop-lossed in
the Army is now over. There are no Army soldiers stop-lossed.
As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year
according to our agreement with the Iraqi Government, the
overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing
significantly. That is why we believe that, beginning in 2015,
the United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army
active duty end strength by 27,000, and in the Marine Corps by
somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000.
These projections assume that the number of troops in
Afghanistan will be significantly reduced by the end of 2014,
in accordance with the President's and NATO's strategy. If our
assumptions prove incorrect, there's plenty of time to adjust
the size and schedule of this change.
These reductions are supported by both the Army and Marine
Corps leadership. However, I believe no further reductions
should be considered without an honest and thorough assessment
of the risks involved, to include the missions we may need to
shed in the future.
Let me turn to another issue relating to the Department's
personnel costs--the proposed reforms to the TRICARE program.
As you know, sharply rising healthcare costs are consuming an
ever-larger share of this Department's budget, growing from $19
billion in 2001 to $52.5 billion in this request. Among other
reforms, this fiscal year 2012 budget includes modest increases
to TRICARE enrollment fees, later indexed to the national
health expenditures, for working-age retirees, most of whom are
employed while receiving pensions. All six members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have strongly endorsed these and other cost-
saving TRICARE reforms in a letter to the Congress.
Let me be clear. The current TRICARE arrangement--one in
which fees have not increased for 15 years--is simply
unsustainable, and if allowed to continue, the Department of
Defense risks the fate of other corporate and government
bureaucracies that were ultimately crippled by personnel costs
and, in particular, their retiree benefit packages.
The House approved most of our proposed changes in its
version of the fiscal year 2012 authorization bill, and I
strongly urge the Senate to endorse all of our proposals.
Which brings me to the third and last point--the difficult
budget choices ahead for the Department. Last spring we
launched a comprehensive effort to reduce the Department's
overhead expenditures. The goal was, and is, to sustain the
U.S. military's size and strength over the long term by
reinvesting efficiency savings in force structure and other key
combat capabilities.
The results of these efforts, frankly, were mixed. While
the services leaned forward and found nearly $100 billion in
efficiency savings, efforts to trim overhead costs of DOD
components outside the military services were not as
successful. I believe there are more savings to be found by
culling more overhead, and better accounting for--and, thus,
better managing--the funds and people we have.
But one thing is quite clear. The efficiencies efforts the
Department has undertaken will not come close to meeting the
$400 billion in savings layed out by the President. To realize
the projected savings target will require real cuts, given the
escalating costs of so many parts of the defense budget, and,
as a result, real choices.
Here I would leave you with a word of caution: We must not
repeat the mistakes of the past, where budget targets were met
mostly by taking a percentage off the top of everything--the
simplest and most politically expedient approach, both inside
the Pentagon and outside of it. That kind of salami-slicing
approach preserves overhead and maintains force structure on
paper, but results in a hollowing out of the force from a lack
of proper training, maintenance and equipment, and manpower.
And that's what happened in the 1970s--a disastrous period for
our military--and, to a lesser extent, during the late 1990s.
That is why I launched the, a comprehensive review to be
completed by the end of this summer to ensure that future
spending decisions are focused on priorities, strategy and
risks, and are not simply a math and accounting exercise. In
the end, this process must be about identifying options for the
President and for you, the Congress, to ensure that the nation
consciously acknowledges and accepts additional risk in
exchange for reduced investment in the military.
Above all, if we are to avoid a hollowing effect, this
process must address force structure, with the overarching goal
to preserve a U.S. military capable of meeting crucial national
security priorities--even if fiscal pressure requires
reductions in that force's size. I've said repeatedly I'd
rather have a smaller, superbly capable military than a larger,
hollow, less capable one. However, we need to be honest with
the President, with you, with the American people, and, indeed,
with ourselves about what the consequences are. A smaller
military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places
and be able to do fewer things.
As we embark on this debate about the future size and
composition of the American military, it would be well to
remember that we still live in a very dangerous and often
unstable world. Our military must remain strong and agile
enough to face a diverse range of threats--from non-state
actors attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass
destruction and sophisticated missiles, to the more traditional
threats of other states, both building up their conventional
forces, and developing new capabilities that target our
traditional strategies.
Today, I ask your support for a leaner, more efficient
Pentagon and continued sustainable, robust investments in our
troops and future capabilities. Our troops have done more than
their part. Now it's time for us in Washington to do ours.
In conclusion, I want to thank this subcommittee for all
you have done to support our troops as well as their families.
From my earliest days as Secretary of Defense, I have made a
point of reminding officers--from midshipmen and cadets to
admirals and generals--that Congress is a co-equal branch of
government that, under the Constitution, raises armies and
provides for navies, and now air forces. Members of both
parties serving in Congress have long been strong supporters of
our military, and are owed candid--honesty and candor from the
military, and from the Department.
I've just returned from my 12th, and last, visit to
Afghanistan as Secretary of Defense. The progress we have made
there since President Obama announced his new strategy has been
impressive. The sacrifices our troops are willing to endure to
protect this country is nothing short of amazing. And all they
ask in return is that the country support them in their efforts
through to success.
It has been the greatest privilege of my life to lead this
great military for the past 4\1/2\ years. Every day, I've
considered it my responsibility to get our troops everything
they need to be successful in their mission and to come home
safely. In my visits to the combat theaters, military
hospitals, and in bases and posts at home and around the world,
I continue to be amazed by their decency, their resilience, and
their courage. Through the support of the Congress and our
nation, these young men and women will prevail in the current
conflicts, and be prepared to confront the threats that they,
their children, and our Nation may face in the future.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Mr. Secretary, I thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
2012--my last budget testimony before this, or any other, congressional
committee.
The budget request for the Department of Defense being presented
today includes a base budget request of $553 billion and an Overseas
Contingency Operations request for $117.8 billion. These budget
decisions took place in the context of a nearly 2 year effort by this
Department to reduce overhead, cull troubled and excess programs, and
rein in personnel and contractor costs--all for the purpose of
preserving the fighting strength of America's military at a time of
fiscal stress for our country. The goal was not only to generate
savings that could be applied to new capabilities and programs, but for
our defense institutions to become more agile and effective
organizations as a result.
In all, these budget requests, if enacted by the Congress, will:
Continue our efforts to reform the way the department does business;
fund modernization programs needed to prepare for future conflicts;
reaffirm and strengthen the Nation's commitment to care for the all-
volunteer force; and ensure that our troops and commanders on the front
lines have the resources and support they need to accomplish their
mission.
reform--efficiencies
The fiscal year 2012 budget decisions took place in the context of
a nearly 2 year effort by the Department of Defense to reform the way
the Pentagon does business--to change how and what we buy, to replace a
culture of endless money with one of savings and restraint. To not only
make every defense dollar count, but also become a more agile and
effective organization in the process. This process culminated in my
announcement in January that summarized the impact of these reforms on
the fiscal year 2012 budget.
The military services conducted a thorough scrub of their
bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization programs,
civilian and military personnel levels, and associated overhead costs.
They identified potential savings that totaled approximately $100
billion over 5 years. More than $70 billion is being reinvested in high
priority needs and capabilities, while about $28 billion is going to
higher than expected operating costs--``must pay'' bills that would
otherwise be paid from investment accounts.
We then looked at reducing costs and deriving savings across the
department as a whole--with special attention to the substantial
headquarters and support bureaucracies outside the four military
services--savings that added up to $78 billion over 5 years.
Ten billion dollars of that total came from restructuring the Joint
Strike Fighter program and reducing Army and Marine Corps end strength
starting in fiscal year 2015.
The rest of the DOD-wide savings came primarily from shedding
excess overhead, improving business practices, and reducing personnel
costs. Key examples include:
--$13 billion from holding the civilian workforce at fiscal year 2010
levels for 3 years, with limited exceptions such as growth in
the acquisition workforce;
--$12 billion through the governmentwide freeze on civilian salaries;
--$8 billion by reforming military health programs to maintain high
quality care while slowing cost growth;
--$11 billion from resetting missions, priorities, functions for the
defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
--$6 billion by reducing staff augmentation and service support
contracts by 10 percent annually for 3 years;
--$2.3 billion by disestablishing Joint Forces Command and the
Business Transformation Agency;
--$1 billion by eliminating unnecessary studies and internal reports;
--$4 billion in changed economic assumptions, such as a lower than
expected inflation rate;
--$100 million by reducing more than 100 flag officer and about 200
civilian senior executive positions; and
--$11 billion in a variety of smaller initiatives across the
department.
To better track how and where taxpayer dollars are spent, the
department is also reforming its financial management systems and
practices--with the goal of having auditable financial statements by
the congressionally mandated date of 2017. We are pursuing a
streamlined approach that focuses first on the information we most use
to manage the department.
choices ahead
I believe there are more savings possible by culling more overhead
and better accounting for, and thus better managing, the funds and
people we have. But one thing is quite clear. These efficiencies
efforts will not come close to meeting the budget targets laid out by
the President, much less other, higher targets being bandied about.
Nonetheless, meeting this savings target will require real cuts--
given the escalating costs of so many parts of the defense budget--and,
as a result, real choices. That is why I launched a comprehensive
review last month to ensure that future spending decisions are focused
on priorities, strategy and risks, and are not simply a math and
accounting exercise. In the end, this process must be about identifying
options for the President and the Congress, to ensure that the Nation
consciously acknowledges and accepts additional risk in exchange for
reduced investment in its military.
As we embark on this debate about the future size and composition
of the American military, it would be well to remember that we still
live in a very dangerous and often unstable world. Our military must
remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats--from
non-state actors attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass
destruction and sophisticated missiles, to the more traditional threats
of other states both building up their conventional forces and
developing new capabilities that target our traditional strengths.
fiscal year 2012 base budget request
The President's request for the base defense budget is for $553
billion, which represents about 3.5 percent real growth over the fiscal
year 2011 defense bill enacted by Congress this year. The four major
components are: $207.1 billion for operations, maintenance, logistics,
and training; $142.8 billion for military pay and benefits; $188.3
billion for modernization; and $14.8 billion for military construction
and family housing.
modernization
In all, the fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $188.3 billion
for modernization in the form of Procurement, Research, Development,
Testing and Evaluation. Key modernization initiatives include:
--$4.8 billion to enhance ISR capabilities and buy more high demand
assets, including the MC-12 surveillance aircraft, Predator,
Reaper, and Global Hawk UAVs--with the aim of achieving 65
Predator-class Combat Air Patrols by the end of fiscal year
2013;
--More than $10 billion to modernize our heavily used rotary wing
fleet;
--$3.9 billion to upgrade the Army's combat vehicles and
communications systems;
--$4.8 billion to buy new equipment for the reserves;
--$14.9 billion to buy new fighters and ground attack aircraft;
--$24.6 billion to support a realistic, executable shipbuilding and
investment portfolio that buys 11 ships in fiscal year 2012 and
modernizes existing fleet assets;
--$10.5 billion to advance the modernization portion of the
administration's approach to ballistic missile defense--
including $8.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency; and
--$2.3 billion to improve the military's cyber capabilities.
Questions have been raised about whether we are too focused on
current conflicts and are devoting too few resources to future possible
high-end conflicts. This budget should put those questions to rest. The
fiscal year 2012 base request provides for significant investments at
the high end of the conflict spectrum, including:
--$1 billion ($4.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP)) for a tactical air modernization program that would
ensure that the F-22 will continue to be the world's preeminent
air-to-air fighter. This effort will leverage radar and
electronic protection technologies from the JSF program;
--$204 million ($1.6 billion over the FYDP) to modernize the radars
of F-15s to keep this key fighter viable well into the future;
--$30 million ($491 million over the FYDP) for a follow-on to the
AMRAAM, the medium range air-to-air weapon, that would provide
greater range, lethality, and protection against electronic
jamming;
--$200 million ($800 million over the FYDP) to invest in technologies
to disrupt an opponent's ability to attack our surface ships;
--$1.1 billion ($2.2 billion over the FYDP) to buy more EA-18
Growlers than originally planned, plus $1.6 billion over the
FYDP to develop a new jamming system, expanding our electronic
warfare capabilities;
--$2.1 billion ($14 billion over the FYDP) to fund Aegis-equipped
ships to further defend the fleet from aircraft and missile
attack and provide theater-wide tactical ballistic missile
defense; and
--To improve anti-submarine capabilities, $2.4 billion for P-8
Poseidon aircraft ($19.6 billion over the FYDP) and $4.8
billion for procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines
($27.6 billion over the FYDP).
The fiscal year 2012 budget also supports a long-range strike
family of systems, which must be a high priority for future defense
investment given the anti-access challenges our military faces. A key
component of this joint portfolio will be a new long-range, nuclear-
capable, penetrating Air Force bomber, designed and developed using
proven technologies and with an option for remote piloting. It is
important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber
can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service.
The budget request includes $10.6 billion to maintain U.S.
supremacy in space, in keeping with the recently released National
Security Space Strategy. This new strategy will help bring order to the
congested space domain, strengthen international partnerships, increase
resiliency so our troops can fight in a degraded space environment, and
improve our acquisition processes and reform export controls to
energize the space industrial base.
As the military services were digging deep for excess overhead,
they were also taking a hard look at their modernization portfolio for
weapons that were having major development problems, unsustainable cost
growth, or had grown less relevant to real world needs.
The Joint Strike Fighter program received special scrutiny given
its substantial cost and its central place in ensuring that we have a
large inventory of the most advanced fifth generation stealth fighters
to sustain U.S. air superiority well into the future. The fiscal year
2012 budget reflects the proposed restructuring of the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter program to stabilize its schedule and cost. The
department has adjusted F-35 procurement quantities based on new data
on costs, on likely orders from our foreign nation partners, and on
realigned development and test schedules.
The proposed restructuring adds over $4 billion for additional
testing through 2016. It holds F-35 procurement in fiscal year 2012 at
32 aircraft and reduces buys by 124 aircraft compared with last year's
plans. Even after these changes, procurement ramps up sharply to 108
aircraft by fiscal year 2016. This is the fastest that future
procurement can prudently be increased.
The F-35 restructuring places the Marine's STOVL variant on the
equivalent of a 2 year probation. If we cannot fix this variant during
this timeframe and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost
and schedule, then I believe it should be canceled. To compensate for
any delays in F-35 deliveries, we propose buying 41 more F/A-18s
between fiscal year 2012 to 2014.
I also want to reiterate the President's and my firm opposition to
buying an extra engine for the F-35--a position echoed by the Air
Force, Navy and Marine Corps leadership. We consider it an unnecessary
and extravagant expense, particularly during this period of fiscal
contraction.
This budget proposes cancelling the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
and reallocating funds to existing Marine ground combat requirements, a
decision based on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Ultimately, the Navy and Marine Corps leadership based their
recommendations on two main principles: affordability and balance. The
EFV, a program originally conceived in the 1980s, has already consumed
more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to
build. The EFV as designed would have cost many times more than the
system it would replace, with much higher maintenance and service
costs. If continued over the next two decades, the EFV program would
consume fully half of all Marine Corps procurement dollars while
swallowing virtually the Corps' entire ground vehicle budget--
procurement, operations, and maintenance--with all the risk to
readiness that entails.
To be sure, the EFV would, if pursued to completion without regard
to time or cost, be an enormously capable vehicle. But as with several
other high end programs completed or cancelled in recent years--the F-
22, the Army Future Combat Systems, or the Navy's DDG-1000 destroyer--
the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be
judged against other priorities and needs.
Let there be no doubt--we are committed to sustaining the Marine
Corps amphibious mission. This fiscal year 2012 request proposes that
the $2.8 billion previously budgeted to the EFV for the next 5 years
instead be reinvested towards an integrated new vehicle program for the
Marine Corps, including:
--New armor, weaponry and engines, plus a life-extension program for
the existing amphibious assault vehicles;
--The development of a new, more affordable, sustainable and
survivable amphibious vehicle;
--Accelerated procurement of new personnel carriers; and
--Enhancement of existing Marine vehicles such as the Abrams tank and
Light Armored Vehicle.
Throughout this process, we will harness the lessons learned--in
terms of engineering, design, and testing--from the development of the
EFV.
personnel
The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $142.8 billion for
military pay and benefits and continues our strong support for troops
and their families. This includes funding for wounded, ill and injured
care, enhancing the military healthcare system and supporting military
families under stress. Examples in this request include: $2.3 billion
to provide care for our Wounded Warriors and their families; and $8.3
billion for supporting families, including child care and school
programs.
While the department continues to insist on and pay for the highest
quality healthcare, we are also mindful of sharply rising health
costs--which have risen over the last decade from $19 billion in 2001
to $52.5 billion in this budget request. The department has taken a
comprehensive look at all facets of the military healthcare model--
emphasizing the need to balance the number one priority of continuing
to provide the highest care and service, while ensuring fiscally
responsible management.
One area we have identified are benefits provided to working-age
retirees under the TRICARE program. Many of these beneficiaries are
employed full time while receiving full pensions, often forgoing their
employer's health plan to remain with TRICARE. This should come as no
surprise, given that the current TRICARE enrollment fee was set in 1995
at $460 a year for the basic family plan and has not been raised since.
By comparison, the fees for a comparable health insurance program for
Federal workers total roughly $5,000 per year.
Accordingly, we propose a modest increase to TRICARE Prime
enrollment fees for working age retirees: $2.50 per month for
individuals and $5 per month for families in fiscal year 2012, and then
indexed to increases in national health expenditures in future years.
We are proposing other healthcare initiatives such as efficiencies
in pharmacy co-pays designed to provide incentives to make greater use
of generic prescriptions and those ordered by mail. We also seek to
phase out, over several years, special subsidies offered to a small
group of hospitals that treat military families and retirees.
Additionally, we are proposing providing TRICARE-for-Life to all
Medicare-eligible retirees aged 65 and over, including future enrollees
in the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan. It is important to note
that none of these changes would affect healthcare benefits for active-
duty personnel.
security assistance reform
The fiscal year 2012 request includes funding and authorization for
a key step forward in a critical policy area: helping other countries
to protect and defend themselves. The Pentagon and the State Department
have agreed to a 3-year pilot pooled fund--called the Global Security
Contingency Fund--that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent
conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. The proposed fund would
incentivize interagency collaboration through a new business model. It
would provide a more agile and cost effective way to reduce the risk of
future conflicts by allowing our Government to respond to unforeseen
needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities to help partners
secure their own territories and regions.
The request is modest, an initial $50 million State Department
appropriation, along with a request for authority to transfer an
additional $450 million into the fund from either department if needed.
The Department of Defense intends to make significant contributions
from its own resources into this pooled fund. We will be requesting in
parallel an authorization for this initiative in the fiscal year 2012
NDAA.
overseas contingency operations
Finally, this budget request includes $117.8 billion in fiscal year
2012 to support Overseas Contingency Operations, primarily in
Afghanistan, and to wind down our operations in Iraq--this is a
significant reduction from the $159 billion enacted for OCO in fiscal
year 2011. The request, which fully funds our wartime requirements,
includes:
--$86.4 billion for wartime operations and related costs;
--$425 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund;
--$475 million for the Afghan Infrastructure Fund;
--$2.6 billion to support counter-IED efforts;
--$3.2 billion for MRAP vehicles, including the MRAP All Terrain
Vehicles developed for Afghanistan;
--$11.9 billion to replace and restore worn, damaged or destroyed
equipment; and
--$12.8 billion for training and equipping of the Afghan security
forces.
office of security cooperation--iraq
I also want to mention a request in fiscal year 2012 for $524
million for the Office of Security Cooperation--Iraq (OSC-I). The OSC-
I, which will be jointly funded with the State Department, will execute
our Foreign Military Sales program in Iraq. OSC-I will help ensure the
continuation of military-to-military relationships that advise, train,
and assist Iraq's security forces.
conclusion
In conclusion, I want to thank this committee for all you have done
to support our troops as well as their families. From my earliest days
as Secretary of Defense, I have made a point of reminding officers--
from cadets to admirals and generals--that Congress is a co-equal
branch of government that under the Constitution raises armies and
provides for navies and air forces. Members of both parties serving in
Congress have long been strong supporters of our military and are owed
honesty and candor from the military and from the Department.
It has been the greatest privilege of my life to lead this great
military for the past 4\1/2\ years. Every day, I've considered it my
responsibility to get our troops everything they need to be successful
in their mission and to come home safely. In my visits to the combat
theaters, in military hospitals, and in bases and posts at home and
around the world, I continue to be amazed by their decency, resilience,
and courage.
Finally, I want to thank this committee once again for all you have
done to support our troops as well as their families. In visits to the
combat theaters, in military hospitals, and in bases and posts at home
and around the world, I continue to be amazed by their decency,
resilience, and courage. Through the support of the Congress and our
Nation, these young men and women will prevail in the current conflicts
and be prepared to confront the threats that they, their children, and
our nation may face in the future.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Chairman Inouye. And may I now call upon the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen.
DEFENSE BUDGET
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, I'm honored to
appear before you today to discuss the President's fiscal year
2012 Defense budget.
As the Secretary laid out, this budget, combined with the
efficiencies effort that he led, provides for the well-being of
our troops and families; fully funds current operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq; and helps balance the global risk,
through streamlined organizations, smarter acquisitions, and
prudent modernization.
The Army, for instance, will cancel procurement of the
surface-to-air missile and the non-line-of-sight launch system;
but it will continue production of the joint light tactical
vehicle, and spearhead the development of a whole new family of
armored vehicles.
The Navy will give up its 2d Fleet headquarters, reduce its
manpower ashore, and increase its use of multi-year procurement
for ships and aircraft, allowing it to continue development of
the next generation ballistic missile submarine, purchase 40
new F/A-18s, four littoral combat ships, and another LPD-17.
The marines will cancel the expeditionary fighting vehicle,
and, like the Army, reduce their end strength starting in 2015.
But they will reinvest these savings to sustain and modernize
the amphibious assault vehicle and the light armored vehicle,
even as they advance a new concept of operations and restore
much of their naval expeditionary skills.
And the Air Force will be able to continue development of
the next-generation tanker, a new bomber, and modernize its
aging fleet of F-15 fighters, all the while finding savings of
more than $33 billion through reorganization, consolidation and
reduced facilities requirements.
None of this balancing will come on the backs of our
deployed troops.
We are asking for more than $84 billion for readiness and
training, nearly $5 billion for increased Israel capabilities,
and more than $10 billion to recapitalize our rotary aircraft
fleet.
These funds, plus those we are requesting to help build our
partnership capacity in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Iraq and Yemen, all speak to the emphasis we are placing on
giving our troops and their partners in the field everything
they need to do the difficult jobs we've asked of them.
MILITARY HEALTHCARE PROGRAM
We must also give them and their families everything they
need to cope with the stress and the strain of almost 10 years
at war. That's why I'm so pleased with the funds devoted in
this proposal--almost three-quarters as much as the $200
billion budgeted for operations and maintenance--to personnel,
housing and healthcare issues.
As you may know, the chiefs and I penned a rare 24-star
letter to Congress expressing our unqualified support for the
military healthcare program changes included in this budget. We
sought equity across all healthcare programs, with
beneficiaries and healthcare delivery providers having the same
benefits and equivalent payment systems regardless of where
they live or work. That in turn led us to propose increases in
TRICARE enrollment fees for working-age retirees. These
increases are modest and manageable, and leave fees well below
the inflation-adjusted out-of-pocket costs set in 1995, when
the current fees were established. We sincerely hope you will
see fit to pass it. It is clearly eating us alive.
Please know that we will continue to invest in critical
care areas, to include research, diagnosis, and treatment of
mental health issues and traumatic brain injury; enhanced
access to health services; and new battlefield technologies. We
understand that changes to healthcare benefits will cause
concern among people we serve, and the communities from which
we receive care. But we also understand and hold sacred our
obligation to care completely for those who have borne the
brunt of these wars, as well as those for whom the war never
ends.
I remain convinced that we haven't begun to understand
completely the toll that war extracts from our people. Just as
the grandchildren of World War II vets still struggle to
comprehend the full scope of the horror those men conceal, so,
too, will our grandchildren have to come to grips with the
wounds unseen from these wars, unless we get it right. I
believe the investments we are making in wounded care and
family readiness will pay off in that regard. But it will take
time and patience and money--three things we rarely seem to
possess.
That brings me back to this particular budget request. With
limited resources and two wars in progress--three, if you count
our support to NATO operations in Libya--we should be prudent
in defining our priorities, in controlling our costs, and in
slaking our thirst for more and better systems. We should also
be clear about what the Joint Force can and cannot do, just as
we should be clear about what we expect from our interagency
and international partners.
Our global commitments have not shrunk. If anything, they
continue to grow. And the world is a lot less predictable now
than we could have ever imagined. You need look no further than
the events across the Middle East and North Africa to see the
truth in that. In fact, I just returned from a trip to Egypt,
and 1 week before that I was in Pakistan with Secretary Clinton
as we tried to find ways to move forward our relationship with
that nation in the wake of Osama bin Laden's killing.
The challenges in both Egypt and Pakistan are distinct, to
be sure, but at each stop--and, in fact, in just about every
country I visit--I've been struck by the degree to which
civilian and military leaders alike desire to keep our military
partnerships strong. This desire isn't rooted in the fear of
revolt or recrimination, but rather, a shared understanding of
the external threats to their security and ours, which still
plague the region. Therefore, changes to these relationships in
either aid or assistance ought to be considered only with an
abundance of caution and a thorough appreciation for the long
view, rather than the flush of public passion and the urgency
to save a dollar. The support we provide many of these
militaries has helped them become the capable professional
forces they are and, in that regard, has been of inestimable
value.
Of equal or greater value is increased appropriations for
the State Department, and our request in this budget for
something called the Global Security Contingency Fund--a 3-year
pooled fund between the Pentagon and the State Department that
will be used to build partnership capacity, prevent conflicts,
and prepare for emerging threats. The request is modest--an
initial $50 million appropriation--along with a request for
authority to reprogram an additional $450 million if needed.
But, what it will buy us is an agile and cost-effective way to
better respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of
emerging opportunities for partners to secure their own
territories and regions.
We must get more efficient--absolutely. But, we must get
more pragmatic about the world we live in. We can no longer
afford bloated programs or unnecessary organizations without
sacrificing fighting power. And we can no longer afford to put
off investments in future capabilities or relationships that
preserve that power across the spectrum of conflict.
As you know, the President announced his framework for
addressing our Nation's long-term fiscal challenges, setting a
goal of reducing Defense spending by $400 billion. This will be
hard work and will require difficult choices about matching
strategy to resources. Those choices will be painful, even
unnatural for the Services, for the Department, and for the
Congress. But they are absolutely necessary.
The President also directed that, before making specific
budget decisions, the Department of Defense will assess their
impact by conducting a fundamental review of America's military
missions, capabilities, and roles in a changing world.
Secretary Gates and I have begun this review, and will work
with the service chiefs to ensure we can meet our national
security priorities, even in the face of fiscal pressure. Our
review will be based on strategy and risks, not simply
budgetary math. And our goal will be to ensure that we do not
repeat the mistakes of the past, nor, at the end of this
endeavor, find ourselves with a hollow force--a force that
retains an organizational structure, but lacks the people, the
training, and equipment necessary to perform the tasks we
expect from it.
In my view, then, this proposed budget gives us a good
start. It builds on the balance we started to achieve last
year, and represents the best of both fiscal responsibility and
sound national security.
I would be remiss, indeed, if I did not close by praising
the incredible efforts of our troops overseas and their
families as they finish one war in Iraq, begin to turn corners
in Afghanistan, and help save innocent lives in Libya. I know
you share my pride in them and that you will keep them foremost
in mind as you consider the elements of this proposal.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I, too, would like to thank you for your longstanding
support of our military, of our families. You have set a
standard in many ways that those of us who are fortunate enough
to interact with you appreciate, and I know our troops and our
families appreciate it, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Admiral Mullen, thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen
Chairman Inouye, Senator Cochran, and distinguished members of the
Committee, it is my privilege to report on the posture of the United
States Armed Forces.
We remain a Nation at war on multiple fronts. In the face of
daunting challenges, our Armed Forces have successfully carried out
their far-ranging missions over the past year. They have improved
security in Afghanistan, continued on a path to soon end the war in
Iraq, and promoted stability in the Pacific Rim. They have supported
NATO in its U.N. mission to protect civilians in Libya and have
provided humanitarian assistance, such as in Japan in the aftermath of
the recent devastating earthquakes and tsunami. And they displayed
their characteristic bravery and precision in the May 2 operation
targeted against al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, the leader of al-
Qaeda. You can be very proud of your military. However, the cumulative
stress of 9 years of war is substantial and growing. We will need your
sustained support, even in the midst of fiscal difficulties, to reset
the Joint Force so it can continue to protect the American people.
Our country is fortunate to be served by the best Armed Forces I
have seen in over 43 years of wearing the uniform. Despite continuous
deployments and combat operations, our men and women in uniform and
their families have been resilient beyond all expectations. They are
patriots who care deeply for this country and serve under very trying
conditions. They are the most combat experienced and capable force we
have ever had, and they continue to learn and adapt in ways that are
truly remarkable. I am continuously humbled as I visit them around the
country and the world. Time and again, these men and women and their
families have proven that our All Volunteer Force is the Nation's
greatest strategic asset.
This Force cannot thrive without the support of the American
people. Everything we are and everything we do comes from them. I am
grateful for the Congress' and the American people's constant reminders
that the service, heroism, and sacrifices of our service members and
their families are valued. However, I am concerned that because our
military hails from a shrinking percentage of the population, some day
the American people may no longer know us. We cannot allow this to
happen. With your help, we will endeavor to stay connected and to
maintain a strong and open relationship.
As we look to our military's posture and budget, we recognize that
our country is still reeling from a grave and global economic downturn
and is maintaining nearly historic fiscal deficits and national debt.
Indeed, I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our national
security. If we as a country do not address our fiscal imbalances in
the near-term, our national power will erode. Our ability to respond to
crises and to maintain and sustain our influence around the world will
diminish.
Our national economic health is creating real budgetary pressures.
For too much of the past decade we have not been forced to be fully
disciplined with our choices. But for the foreseeable future, cost will
be a critical element of nearly every decision we face. We must now
carefully and deliberately balance the imperatives of a constrained
budget environment with the requirements we place on our military in
sustaining and enhancing our security. We must identify areas where we
can reduce spending while minimizing risk. This will affect our
posture, force structure, modernization efforts, and compensation and
benefits. The Defense Department must and will become more efficient
and disciplined, while simultaneously improving our effectiveness.
In April, the President announced his framework for addressing our
Nation's long-term fiscal challenges, setting a goal of reducing
defense spending by $400 billion. This will be hard work and will
require choices that will be painful to many, but it is necessary. The
President also directed that before making specific budget decisions,
the Department of Defense assess their impact by conducting a
fundamental review of America's military missions, capabilities, and
role in a changing world. Secretary Gates and I have launched this
review and will work with Service Chiefs to ensure our ability to meet
our crucial national security priorities even in the face of fiscal
pressures. Our review will be based on strategy and risks, not simply
budgetary math, and our goal will be to ensure that we do not repeat
the mistakes of the past nor at the end of this endeavor find ourselves
with a hollow force--a force that retains an organizational structure
but lacks the people, training, and equipment necessary to perform the
tasks we expect from it.
In the near-term, the President's fiscal year 2012 Department of
Defense budget of $553 billion represents a balance of military risks
and fiscal realities we face today. The return on U.S. defense spending
over the past two decades has been immense and historic: preventing
world war between great powers, securing the global commons and the
free flow of international trade and natural resources, combating
terrorism across the globe, and protecting the American people and our
allies. But our operations have come with stresses and strains as well
as costs to our readiness. If we are to continue to execute the
missions set out by our strategy, we must recognize that recovering
from war and resetting the force is costly and will require several
years of continued investment. Congressional support is required for
our forces, their families, their equipment and training, and our
military infrastructure to ensure the success of our ongoing efforts
and for us to be ready to respond to new and emerging security
challenges.
The President's National Security Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, and the President's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
describe our military approaches and ongoing operations in great
detail. This posture statement will focus on the strategic priorities
for the military and the Congressional support we need. My priorities
remain defending our vital interests in the broader Middle East and
South Central Asia, improving the Health-of-the-Force, and balancing
global strategic risk.
defending our vital national interests in the broader middle east and
south central asia
Over the past year, our Armed Forces have continued to shoulder a
heavy burden, particularly in the Middle East and South Central Asia.
The balance of this burden and our wartime focus has shifted, however,
from Iraq to Afghanistan. This was made possible by drawing down
military forces in Iraq and transitioning security responsibilities to
the Iraqis. Meanwhile, we committed additional forces and resources to
Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as participated in NATO operations in
Libya.
Removing Osama Bin Laden from al-Qaeda's leadership is a signature
achievement, and it came only after years and years of painstaking and
difficult work by intelligence and military professionals. Although the
full import will not be known for some time, his death contributes to
the larger struggle and steady progress we must make toward disrupting,
dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda. As a result of our
operations with our Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani partners, and
extensive cooperation with other partners, al-Qaeda's senior leadership
in Pakistan is weaker and under greater pressure than at any other time
since being forced out of Afghanistan in late 2001. They have suffered
the losses of numerous senior leaders and face significant challenges
to coordinating operations, maintaining safe havens, and acquiring
funding. Despite this operational progress, al-Qaeda retains the intent
and capability to attack the United States and other Western countries.
The movement's leaders continue to operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border region, planning operations and guiding the efforts of al-Qaeda
networks operating out of the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and even
Europe. We, in turn, remain committed to our deepening and broadening
partnerships in the region and to our goal of ultimately defeating al-
Qaeda and creating the conditions to prevent their return to
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
We continue to implement our national strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan with great urgency. This past November, we completed the
deployment of the 30,000 additional U.S. forces, and we are seeing
signs of improving security on the ground. These forces have allowed us
to go on the offensive with our Afghan and ISAF partners, force the
Taliban out of safe havens in its heartland of Kandahar and Helmand,
better protect the Afghan population, and reduce civilian casualties.
Our counterinsurgency operations, conducted in close partnership with
Afghan forces, have reduced the Taliban's influence, reversed the
insurgency's momentum in key areas of the country, and forced many
Taliban leaders to flee. Our forces will consolidate recent gains in
Helmand and Kandahar Provinces and further expand security in other
critical parts of the country.
This success against the Taliban and other insurgent groups is
essential to prevent the return of al-Qaeda, gain time to build the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and force insurgents to
reconcile with the Afghan government on acceptable terms. We expect the
violence in 2011 to be greater than last year. The fighting this summer
will be tough and often costly, but it is necessary to sustain and even
increase the pressure we have been placing on the insurgent groups. We
cannot allow the Taliban to reorganize and reconstitute as they did in
2004 and 2005, regain their oppressive influence over the Afghan
people, and once again provide safe haven to al-Qaeda or its
affiliates.
For the success of our military operations to be enduring, it is
critical that the ANSF be able to provide adequate security for the
Afghan people. Our greatest success story this past year has been the
growth and development of the ANSF. With the help of additional ISAF
trainers, the ANSF added 49,000 soldiers and 21,000 policemen to their
ranks--an astonishing growth of 36 percent. The ANSF also continue to
improve on the battlefield and increasingly contribute to the war
effort. They are fighting beside us and have grown in their ability to
plan and conduct complex operations. In fact, their expanding
capabilities and presence have already allowed International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) units to ``thin out'' in some parts of central
Helmand and Kabul Province. We are on track to begin the transition of
security responsibilities and drawdown of our forces in July 2011. In
the coming year, while continuing to grow the ANSF in size, we will
place greater emphasis on improving its quality, professionalism, and
self-sufficiency, to ensure that they remain on track to assume the
overall lead for security in 2014. To this end, the Afghan Security
Forces Fund remains critical to the building of the ANSF's capabilities
and to the ANSF's eventual assumption of security responsibilities.
Despite our successes, numerous other challenges remain. Achieving
sustainable security requires developing Afghan governing capacity,
countering corruption, cultivating the conditions needed for conflict
resolution, and neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. Absent
these conditions, we will not succeed. Despite a dramatic increase in
our civilian presence in Afghanistan this past year, improvements in
sub-national governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with
progress in improving security. This has impeded our ability to
``hold,'' ``build,'' and ``transfer.'' For this reason, the Commander's
Emergency Response Program remains the most responsive means for
addressing a local community's needs and is often the only tool our
commanders have to address pressing requirements in areas where
security is challenged. Along with development projects, we believe
that new transparency and anti-corruption efforts may counter the
deleterious effects of Afghanistan's criminal patronage networks,
mitigate the distortive effects of international aid and development
programs, and ultimately improve the confidence the Afghan people have
in their government and their governing officials.
To complement this ``bottom-up'' development, we will support the
Afghan government's reconciliation and reintegration efforts in order
to achieve the political solution that is an imperative to sustainable
peace. Their efforts will only succeed if the Taliban and other
insurgents believe they have more to gain by negotiating an end to the
conflict than by continuing to fight. Achieving reconciliation and
reintegration will take time, skillful diplomacy, and sustained
military pressure, but we will not achieve a favorable and durable
outcome unless we meet this challenge.
Though our operational efforts are focused on Afghanistan, our
diplomatic efforts have increasingly focused on Pakistan, a country
critical to our strategy in the region. We must continue to pursue a
partnership with Pakistan even as we are realistic about the difficulty
in overcoming years of mistrust. The alternative--drifting toward a
more contentious or fractured relationship--is far more detrimental to
U.S. interests in strategically defeating al-Qaeda and ensuring nuclear
weapons do not fall into terrorists' possession. We therefore should
remain committed to close coordination, cooperation, and friendship
with Pakistan.
It is manifestly in our interest to enable the Pakistani military's
counterterror and counterinsurgency operations. The series of offensive
operations undertaken by the Pakistani military in the tribal areas
expanded dramatically in 2009. There, the Pakistanis have fought
bravely and sacrificed much--losing thousands of soldiers in the
process. We have steadfastly supported them in a variety of ways,
primarily in the development of the counterinsurgency capabilities of
Pakistan's security forces. This development and the military's
operations have kept pressure on al-Qaeda's senior leadership and the
militant groups threatening Pakistan and Afghanistan.
However, insurgent groups such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani
network continue to operate unhindered from sanctuaries in Pakistan,
posing a significant threat to NATO and Afghan forces. Our efforts to
enable the Pakistani Military depend on several critical programs, such
as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund and the Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment
announced by Secretary Clinton last fall. It is also important that
through exchange programs, such as the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program, we establish relationships with the
generation of Pakistani officers with whom we had cut ties. In
addition, because we so heavily depend on Pakistan as a supply route
supporting our efforts in Afghanistan, Coalition Support Funds remain
critical to reimbursing the Pakistanis for their assistance in securing
those supply routes.
In terms of our broader engagement with Pakistan and the region,
reducing some of the long-standing enmity and mistrust between India
and Pakistan would greatly contribute to our efforts. As neighbors, it
is in both India and Pakistan's interests to reduce the tension between
them and strengthen their political, security, and economic ties. While
we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue
their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for
continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to
improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that
builds long-term stability across the wider region of South Asia.
Another increasingly important aspect of our engagement in South
Central Asia is the development of the Northern Distribution Network.
This line of communication has proven critical to maintaining
flexibility in our logistical support to our efforts in Afghanistan. We
will continue to work with our partners to ensure access, expand
throughput, and sustain the viability of redundant supply routes for
our forces.
We have ended our combat mission in Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and started a new chapter in our partnership, Operation New Dawn. We
successfully transferred lead for security responsibilities to the
Iraqi Security Forces on August 31, 2010. Iraq's military and political
leaders are responding to the residual, but still lethal, threat from
al-Qaeda. As a result, and despite a drawn-out government formation
process, the security situation there remains stable, and the Iraqi
people are increasingly able to focus on jobs and development. Beyond
this security transition, the State Department has taken the lead for
U.S. efforts in Iraq, and our diplomats and other civilians are
increasingly the face of our partnership with the Iraqi people and
their government. Sustained funding for our civilian efforts,
commensurate with the State Department's growing responsibilities--
particularly our development assistance and police training programs--
is needed to ensure we are able to successfully turn our military
accomplishments into lasting political ones.
However, the end of the war in Iraq will not mean the end of our
commitment to the Iraqi people or to our strategic partnership. We must
focus on the future to help Iraq defend itself against external threats
and consolidate a successful, inclusive democracy in the heart of the
Middle East. As we continue to draw down forces through December 31,
2011, in accordance with the United States-Iraqi Security Agreement, we
will transition to a more typical military-to-military relationship. We
will shift the focus of our assistance from Iraq's internal domestic
security to its external national defense, keeping in consideration the
interests and sensitivities of all Iraqis as well as Iraq's neighbors.
While Iraqi security forces have made great improvements, they will
require external assistance for years to come. The cornerstone of our
future security partnership with the Iraqis will be a robust Office of
Security Cooperation, performing both security assistance and security
cooperation functions, as part of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Key to our
assistance and not squandering our hard won gains will be continued
support to the Iraqi Security Forces fund through fiscal year 2011,
IMET and other traditional security assistance programs, as well as an
extension of Section 1234 authority to transfer equipment from
Department of Defense stocks.
Despite the energy we commit to defeating al-Qaeda and to
stabilizing the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, we
remain vigilant against other security challenges and sources of
aggression and proliferation throughout this critical region. The
Iranian regime continues to threaten regional stability. Despite
growing isolation from the international community and a fourth round
of increasingly costly U.N. sanctions, the regime has neither ceased
providing arms and other support to Hezbollah, HAMAS, and other
terrorist groups nor accepted a verifiable end to its pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Many of the long-standing potential flashpoints in the
Levant and the gulf region bear Iran's signature, and the Iranian
regime is also attempting to seize on opportunities presented by the
recent unrest in the region.
That said, strong social, economic, and political tensions pull on
the region and its people--as evidenced by the turmoil we have recently
witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain.
Volatility in regional affairs can often follow volatility in domestic
affairs. Strong military-to-military relationships can help reduce and
mitigate the risks of instability, but sometimes use of force is
necessary. The most recent example of this is our rapid response to the
crisis in Libya. Since mid-March, after Muammar Gaddafi turned his
armed forces against his own, U.S. forces have participated in the
NATO-led effort to implement and enforce U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1973. We provided rapid planning, command and control, and
electronic attack capabilities for the coalition force that has halted
the regime's assault on the city and people of Benghazi, and
subsequently transitioned the leadership responsibility of the effort
over to NATO.
We will continue to help counter terrorist threats, deter Iranian
aggression, and protect our partners from coercive influence. To do
this we will continue to build the capabilities of our partners. More
important, we will nurture the development of a regional security
architecture based on multi-lateral partnerships that address a wide
range of security issues including counterproliferation, maritime
security, counterterrorism, air and missile defense, and emergency
response. As with our other partnerships across the globe, our security
assistance programs are the cornerstone of our relationships. In
particular, our Section 1206 and 1208 programs provide a unique and
necessary flexibility and responsiveness to Combatant Commander
requirements that we cannot currently get with our Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) programs.
improving the health-of-the-force
The ``back end'' of war--the continued care of our veterans and
their families and the resetting of our force--cannot be an
afterthought, and getting it right will be expensive. Moreover, because
of the duration of these conflicts, we have begun to reset our units
even in the midst of conflict. The stress of over 9 years of constant
warfare has come at a great cost to the Force and its ability to
continue to conduct operations and respond to other emergent crises. We
must care for our people and their families and reset and reconstitute
our weapon systems to restore our readiness, capabilities, and wartime
effectiveness. This will require a sustained commitment of at least 3
to 5 years, and could continue well beyond the end of our involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Care for our People
Our foremost focus is on our servicemen and women, their families,
and their supporting communities--the bedrock of our Armed Forces. They
each play unique and growing roles in our national security fabric, but
they have been under great, often unrecognized, stress for the past 9
years. Over 2 million of our service members have deployed to fight
overseas. Some have served multiple grueling tours, a great number have
suffered significant injuries, and thousands have sacrificed their
lives. Even those serving stateside enjoy only short respites between
deployments. We have asked a great deal from our people, and we must
invest in them and their families--through appropriate pay, healthcare,
family care, education, and employment opportunities--as they are the
single greatest guarantee of a strong military. And they become our
best recruiters.
The many accomplishments of our All Volunteer Force over the past 9
years of continuous combat operations have been unprecedented. That we
remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent during this
period is simply extraordinary. All of our Services in the Active Duty,
Reserve, and National Guard components continue to have exceptional
recruiting and retention rates. Ninety-six percent of our accessions
have earned at least a high school diploma, which helps explain why
this is one of the finest forces we have ever fielded. Competitive
compensation and selective bonuses are critical to our ability to
recruit and retain talent, as are other ``people programs,'' such as
the new GI Bill, improvements in housing, access to quality schooling
for military children, mental health counseling, adequate child care,
and attractive family support centers. All of these programs make the
harsh burdens of military life easier to bear. I ask for Congress'
continued support for them in order to sustain the Force while our
overseas operations continue.
I also urge Congress to continue funding the programs that will
create a continuum of healthcare for our veterans and their families
that seamlessly spans active duty and veteran status. With a focus on
our enduring commitment, we must continue to improve our active and
veteran care services, with special emphasis on Wounded Warrior
Support. We will expand our public and private partnerships and tap
into the ``sea of goodwill'' toward our veterans found in our Nation's
communities and civic organizations. That will be important, but it is
not sufficient. Long-term fiscal support for the Department of Veterans
Affairs will serve the growing number of veterans requiring care.
One issue that demands acute national attention is the challenge of
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is
the signature weapon of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and is
directly responsible for many of these injuries. Many of our heroes
suffer from severe TBI and have had their lives dramatically changed in
ways we do not yet fully understand, and over 150,000 others have been
exposed to events that may have caused moderate TBI. As such, we need
to aggressively identify the victims of TBI, both within the serving
force and among our veterans, and the treatment and rehabilitation they
need and deserve. The effects of these efforts will pay dividends for
some time, because we can expect to face IEDs in future conflicts as
well.
In addition, suicides and the many other stresses and social health
costs that lag behind war--divorce, domestic violence, post-traumatic
stress, depression, and even homelessness--are becoming alarmingly
evident. Suicide rates remain unacceptably high, although programs such
as the Department's Suicide Prevention Task Force and our improved
leadership efforts have helped to lower the rates in 2010 in three of
our four Services. Leaders must remain focused on this issue, as we
work to improve our systematic understanding of the problem's scope,
warning signs, and at-risk populations. As a society we must work to
end the stigma that prevents our service members, veterans, and
families from seeking early help.
By more effectively leveraging public-private partnerships, we can
pursue solutions and treatment for all of these health issues
afflicting the Force with great urgency and compassion and honor the
sacred trust our Nation has with all of our combat veterans.
Reset and Reconstitute
The grueling pace of deployments has not allowed for the training
needed to keep our forces ready along the entire spectrum of military
operations and, as a result, our readiness in some mission areas has
atrophied over the past decade. There are some modest reasons for hope,
though. The Army now has fewer soldiers deployed than it has had at any
time since the invasion of Iraq. In addition, this past year we
completed the increases in the Army and Marine Corps end strengths
authorized in 2007. As a result, we are beginning to see some
stabilizing deployment rates and modestly improving dwell times. We
appreciate the Congressional support to our wartime manning needs that
has enabled this. However, our overseas contingency operations do
continue to demand significant numbers of ground and special operations
forces and low-density, high-demand specialties. For our Army combat
units, we do not expect to begin to reach our interim goal of 1:2
deploy-to-dwell ratios until the end of 2012. After reset and
reconstitution activities and as demand decreases, we expect to begin
off-ramping some of our recent temporary force level increases.
However, my concerns about the health of our force go beyond our
people and training--we must also restore the readiness of our combat
systems and capabilities, which have similarly been under extraordinary
stress. In the ``back end'' of previous conflicts, we were able to
contract our equipment inventory by shedding our oldest capital assets,
thereby reducing the average age of our systems. We cannot do this
today, because the high pace and durations of combat operations have
consumed the equipment of all our Services much faster than our
peacetime programs can recapitalize them. We must actually recapitalize
our systems to restore our readiness and avoid becoming a hollow force.
All of this will force us to be more efficient and disciplined in our
choices.
We must focus resources where they matter most, and we will reset
and reconstitute by prioritizing people, readiness, capabilities, and
essential modernization to maintain a technological edge. In the short-
term, we will continue previous efforts to reconstitute and expand our
rotary wing and tilt-rotor capacity in our Combat Aviation units and to
convert one heavy Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade. However,
over a period of years, we will modernize our battle fleet of ground
combat vehicles, including replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We
require enhancements to our manned and unmanned Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, a new bomber program,
extending the service life of a portion of our F-16 fleet, and
continuing improvements in our missile defense and electronic warfare
systems. We hope to modernize and extend the service life of our F/A-18
fleet and invest in additional P-8A aircraft and tankers. Last, we ask
for full resourcing of the Air and Missile Defense Radar, the Next-
Generation Jammer, and communications and integrated fire control
systems designed for operating in contested environments. These
investments are, without question, costly, but they are critically
demanded by our current and likely future challenges.
Just as important as the reconstitution of these combat systems are
the acquisition processes and production capacities underlying them.
Our procurement systems remain complex and in need of streamlining to
help us acquire needed capabilities faster and more affordably. Last
year we committed to adding 20,000 experts to our acquisition corps by
2015. In doing so we seek to improve stability in our programs, conduct
more comprehensive design reviews, improve cost estimates, utilize more
mature technology, and increase competition in order to make the entire
process more responsive and effective.
In addition, as I stated last year, I am concerned about the
capabilities of our defense industrial base, particularly in ship
building and space. Our ability to produce and support advanced
technology systems for future weapon systems may be degraded by
decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions.
Left unchecked, this trend will impact our future warfighting
readiness. Although we are properly focusing on near-term reset
requirements, the Department, our industry leaders, and the Congress
need to begin considering how to equip and sustain the military we
require after our contemporary wars come to an end.
balancing global strategic risk
Balancing global risk requires maintaining a ready, forward
presence with available forces that, overall, can meet the full scope
of our security commitments. To meet these requirements, we must reset,
sustain, and properly posture a force that includes both our active
force and our National Guard and Reserve Components. But we must also
make prudent investments and continuously evolve the force so as a
whole it can meet the challenges of an increasingly complex global
security environment.
For many decades, our overmatch in our general purpose forces has
underwritten our national security and our prosperity, as well as that
of our many allies and partners. This credible strength has deterred
aggression and reduced the likelihood of inter-state conflict like
those of the 19th and early 20th centuries. With these capabilities, we
have stood side by side with our allies in the face of belligerent
aggression, helped secure access and responsible use of increasingly
contested domains, and provided timely humanitarian assistance in
response to natural disasters across the globe. However, our recent
experience reminds us that we must continue to adapt some of our
systems and tactics to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies,
which may involve both the most advanced and simplest technologies.
We already know some of the contours of what our future force will
need to do. We know that, in addition to the current array of
aggressive states and transnational terrorists we face, we must adjust
to a changing global environment impacted by the rise of China and
other emerging powers as well as the growing worldwide use and
capabilities of cyber space. Such a world requires an agile, adaptive,
and expeditionary force. It must ensure access, protect freedom of
maneuver, and project power globally. It should retain decisive
overmatch with air, land, sea, and special operations forces and be
able to operate in degraded space and cyber environments. As such,
transitioning to this future force will likely involve a greater
emphasis on ISR, command and control, long range strike, area denial,
undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber capabilities. This
transition will also involve further developing flexible leaders,
operators, and technicians who are highly proficient and able to fully
integrate our efforts with our partners from other agencies and other
countries.
In addition to maintaining our regular and irregular warfare
capabilities, we will also continue to rely on secure and stable
nuclear deterrence. It is also important that we maintain the safety
and surety of our nuclear forces, even as we seek to reduce them in
accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review and implement the recently
ratified New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We need to modernize our
nuclear force and its supporting infrastructure to ensure that a
smaller force is nonetheless safe, secure, and effective. Last, our
missile defense systems should support the stability of our deterrence
architectures.
And while we work to reduce, safeguard, and provide confidence in
our nuclear force and those of treaty signatories, we acknowledge that
the proliferation of nuclear technology and other weapons of mass
destruction by state and non-state actors remains one of the most
significant and urgent worldwide threats. Effectively countering
proliferation requires strong international partnerships, new
surveillance technologies, and layered defenses. These are supported by
ongoing expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
establishment of a standing joint headquarters for weapons of mass
destruction elimination, and investments in nuclear forensics
technology and programs. These relatively small programs can have a
disproportionately large positive impact on our security.
Balancing global strategic risk also requires improving our
capabilities in cyberspace. Today we face a range of threats to our
computer systems from other states, mercenaries, and even civilian
hackers, and their ability to wreak havoc cannot be overstated. Lower
grade cyber threats conducted by organized criminals and talented
individuals do not necessarily put the Nation at serious risk. But the
effects of a well coordinated, state-sponsored cyber attack against our
financial, transportation, communications, and energy systems would be
catastrophic.
Though there has been important progress across the government,
such as the recent release of the International Strategy for Cyberspace
and the standing up U.S. Cyber Command, more work is needed. Critical
to Cyber Command's future success will be our ability to recruit,
train, and most importantly, retain the right people. We must devote
the same time and attention to cultivating this Nation's future cyber
workforce as we do to our combat specialists. We must also empower
Cyber Command and the combatant commands by working with the Executive
Office of the President and other agencies to develop appropriate cyber
authorities and by refining our cyber doctrine, tactics, and
procedures. We will need to engage with NATO allies in the area of
cyberdefense, as a contributing partner at the NATO Cooperative
Cyberdefense Center of Excellence in Estonia. Last, we need to actively
foster public discussion about international observance of cyber space
norms.
Balancing global strategic risk requires strong military-to-
military engagement programs. These collaborative efforts engender
mutual responsibility and include ongoing combined operations, multi-
lateral training exercises, individual exchanges, and security
assistance. They help demonstrate the United States' responsible
military leadership in critical regions, reassure our allies, and
strengthen the international norms that serve the interests of all
nations. They also foster connections with other governments that
reinforce our diplomatic channels and have proven critical during times
of crisis.
We currently benefit from numerous strong and well appreciated
military partnerships, such as our North American and NATO
relationships. For example, at the November NATO Summit in Lisbon, we
and our allies recommitted to our alliance, ongoing operations, and a
new Strategic Concept for the next decade. This spring, NATO released
its Alliance Maritime Strategy and agreed to streamline its Command
Structure, based in part on lessons learned from ongoing operations
related to Libya. In Asia, though still underpinned by U.S. bilateral
alliances, the region's security architecture is becoming a more
complex mixture of multi-level multilateralism and expanded bilateral
security ties among states. As the region's military capability and
capacity increases, we seek new ways to catalyze greater regional
security cooperation.
Unfortunately, the global economic downturn is placing pressure on
the resources of partner nations' security forces. We foresee no
decrease in the commitment of our partners to us or to any of our
mutual security efforts, but we must face the reality of less spending
by our partners on our combined security and stability efforts. Any
measures we take to strengthen our partnerships, such as the
Administration's Export Control Reform effort, can only improve our
collective security.
We should not engage only with like-minded allies. Military-to-
military engagement, in coordination with other diplomatic efforts, can
help foster cooperation in areas of mutual interest between nations
with varying levels of amity. We have seen the fruits of our engagement
programs in strengthening cooperation in the Middle East, countering
piracy in the Red Sea and the Straits of Malacca, and countering
proliferation across the globe. We will seek out military-to-military
relations even where they have not existed before because sound
relations can prevent miscommunication and miscalculation that could
lead to crisis or conflict. In particular, we are nurturing increased
engagement with China--recently hosting the Chief of the Chinese
General Staff for the first U.S. visit in 7 years. I intend to
reciprocate and will visit China in July. China's peaceful,
constructive rise would have a positive economic and security impact on
the world, and we encourage continued improvements in transparency to
ensure that this rise is properly understood. In addition, by
increasing our military-to-military engagement with China we hope to
increase understanding and cooperation on a multitude of issues,
including encouraging North Korea to refrain from further provocation
and ensuring access to and equitable use of the global commons.
A significant component of our engagement program is the security
sector assistance we provide to build the capabilities of our partner
nations' security forces. These cost-effective programs properly place
security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments
and reduce the tactical strain on our own forces by helping to prevent
conflicts and instability. In many places, across the range of U.S.
interests, investments in capacity building result in strong
foundations for the future. These investments are often small but, if
persistent, can yield a high return. I urge your continued support for
Theater Security Cooperation programs, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements to lend military equipment for personnel protection and
survivability (under 1202 authorities), Global Train and Equip
initiatives (under 1206 authorities), funding for special operations to
combat terrorism (under 1208 authorities), as well as the many security
assistance programs managed by the Department of State, including FMF
and IMET programs.
However, just as these programs require full funding, they also
need wholesale reform. Our security assistance structures are designed
for another era--our authorities are inflexible, and our processes are
too cumbersome to effectively address today's security challenges in a
timely manner. I urge your assistance in modifying the laws and
regulations surrounding security cooperation and assistance to create a
better coordinated, pooled-resource approach--the Global Security
Contingency Fund. This approach would create a new business model we
believe will lead to collaborative programs to respond to emergent
challenges and opportunities. We should not allow bureaucratic
resistance to trump operational effectiveness when security sector
assistance is essential to our national strategy of helping others
secure and defend themselves.
On this last point of interagency cooperation, I want to reiterate
our commitment to comprehensive approaches to our security challenges
that employ all elements of national and international power in
coordination. Our future security concerns require a whole of
government effort, not just a military one, and we serve best when we
serve hand-in-hand with all of our partners and support, rather than
lead, foreign policy. As such, we will work closely with the State
Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
support their implementation of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention
and response. The capabilities and success of our interagency partners
are inextricably linked to our own. As such, I reiterate my unequivocal
support to Secretary Clinton and her efforts to fully resource the
State Department's and USAID's activities and an expansion of its
diplomacy and development capabilities, particularly in Iraq to support
the transition from a military to a civilian-led mission. In addition,
I support interagency cooperation programs and work to expand the
number of exchanges between the Department of Defense and other
Executive Agencies to institutionalize an enduring capacity to solve
global problems using whole-of-government approaches.
conclusion
In the upcoming year, our Armed Forces will build on the past
year's achievements and continue to provide the common defense our
Constitution directs with distinct honor and effectiveness. We will
advance our ongoing efforts and maintain the credibility of our forces
while learning, adapting, and preparing for new security challenges. We
know that the military's role in national security will remain
substantial, and the demands on our servicemen and women will be high.
However, we also know that we can never let our actions move us away
from the American people, and that the quality of our work and our
personal conduct will say far more about who we are and what we stand
for than anything else we do. In all of our efforts, we will maintain a
strength of character and professionalism, at the individual and
institutional levels, that is beyond reproach and continues to be a
source of pride for our Nation.
Again, on behalf of all our men and women under arms, I thank this
Committee, and the entire Congress, for your unwavering support for our
troops in the field and their families at home during this time of war
and for our efforts to maintain a strong, agile, well-trained, and
well-equipped military that can prevail in our current conflicts and
remain poised to deter or respond to new challenges.
Chairman Inouye. I'm pleased to note the extraordinary
attendance of members of the subcommittee. However, as a
result, I will have to limit the questions and answers to 4
minutes.
Secretary Gates, you have made a couple of public
statements on how to achieve our President's $400 billion
reduction over the next 12 years. Instead of gutting the
modernization programs, I know that you would prefer to see
additional organizational reductions, in addition to changes in
military pay, retirement, and the healthcare systems.
Do you wish to elaborate more on these ideas, and any other
areas that might be reduced?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, the four areas that we're
looking at in terms of how we would come up with $400 billion
in reductions are, first, as I indicated in my remarks, looking
for additional efficiencies and changes in bureaucratic
expenditures, and the way we go about our business, and the way
we do business on a day-to-day basis. We think there is still
more money to be extracted out of overhead, but also in
negotiating contracts on acquisitions, and so on. So, the first
category is--more cuts in overhead.
The second category is looking for marginal missions and
marginal capabilities that can be eliminated. This would be in
situations where, perhaps, two services have comparable
capabilities, and we can get by having that capability in just
one service. Or, there may be missions that we can set aside.
The third category is the hardest, and it's the one that
Admiral Mullen and I both talked about in our remarks, and that
is the comprehensive review to look at what are the options
that are available in terms of making reductions in force
structure, and what is the impact of that on the capabilities
of our forces and our ability to carry out our strategies? And
how do we adjust our strategies, and how do we evaluate added
risk by reduced investment in defense?
One example of this, just to give you the flavor of what
we're talking about--for many years we have had a strategy of
being able to wage two fairly major regional conflicts
simultaneously. If you tell yourself you're willing to accept
the risk that won't happen, that two conflicts of that
magnitude would not take place at the same time, but might be
sequential, if you had to take on two others--then that has
real impact for force structure.
I would just note that in terms of assessing risk, between
2007 and 2009 we, in fact, had two major regional conflicts
going on simultaneously. So, this is not far-fetched in terms
of risk.
The fourth category, then, is, are the issues that,
frankly, are politically challenging, and that have been very
difficult for us and for the Congress to take on--working age
retiree healthcare--and I want to make clear--none of us are
talking about any impact on healthcare for the active force.
This is about working-age retirees. Compensation--and
particularly I would say in that respect, retirement, and
whether the time has come to look at retirement.
I think we have two challenges on the retirement side. One
is about 70 to 80 percent of our force does not stay in the
service long enough to retire, but they leave with nothing. So,
if you've served 5 years, or 10 years, or a dozen years, you
walk out the door with nothing. That doesn't make any sense.
The private sector is well ahead of us in that respect.
The second problem is, we get a lieutenant colonel or a
sergeant first class with 20 years of service--they are at
their peak, we are at their, they are at their prime--and we
make it financially silly for them not to retire at 20 years.
How do you incentivize them to give us another 5 years of
service? I don't pretend to have the answers to these
questions, but they are issues that I think we need to address
both in terms of what's good for the force, but also in areas
where we could save some money.
So, those four areas, Mr. Chairman, are the areas that we
are looking at in terms of how we can find this $400 billion.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much.
Senator Cochran.
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, could I just make two brief
comments?
Chairman Inouye. Please.
Admiral Mullen. First of all, not unlike the Government
itself, where the Defense Department has roughly one-half of
the discretionary spending, inside our budget, a little more
than one-half is discretionary. And so, while we look at
reductions in the future in where we would take the funds,
there are obligations that we have that we just fundamentally
have to fund as we transition to whatever this new budget
environment is going to be for us.
And then, second, if we don't come to grips with some of
the most difficult issues, it is as clear as anything to me
that the only answer is--we're going to get a lot smaller with
a chance we could go hollow. We will give us force structure to
sustain these benefits, to do all those things. And that, I
think, is very dangerous in the world that we're living in, to
meet the national, the growing national security requirements
that I see.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me ask, in view of the situation in
Libya, are we learning something about the ability of our
allies, who volunteer to try to take up the slack in situations
where we're not moving forward and trying to run a military
operation? What are we learning from their capabilities or
inadequacies that give you the most concern?
DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS AND NATO
Secretary Gates. Well, I addressed this last week in
Brussels in my usual subtle form.
The reality is that, as they cut their defense budgets, and
have been--have not been investing in their defense
capabilities for a number of years, by default, the additional
burden falls on the United States. So, I think that there is a
genuine worry that our allies have looked to us to pick up the
slack, as they cut their defense budgets. And the message that
I had for them in Europe last week was that a, because of our
financial problems--and, frankly, a growing number of Members
of Congress who, for whom the cold war and our connection to
Europe and to NATO are not in their genes, as they are for me,
are going to be unwilling to pick up 75 percent of the defense
burden of the NATO alliance.
So I think this is a serious problem. It's been a problem
for some years. But, I think our own financial difficulties,
and what we're now going to face in looking at the American
defense budget, brings this issue to center stage in a way that
it really has not been in the past.
Senator Cochran. Admiral Mullen, on the same subject, what
affect does that specifically have on our ability to project
power to other regions of the world--the Far East, for example,
areas where we have been involved in actual combat operations,
the Vietnam era, and what that brings in terms of expense of
operations and training of our forces? Can you give us an
assessment of the direct impact on the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I share the Secretary's concerns and
views with respect to the investment, or, the dramatically
decreased investment in our NATO partners, or, by our NATO
partners.
The affect, or, one of the affects that it's had is, it's
certainly, they don't have the depth, the resources in some
cases, to do what their political leadership has directed them
to do. Although, I also would say that, both in Afghanistan and
in Libya, NATO is more together than I've seen, in terms of
commitment, over the course of the last 10 to 15 years. And,
while they do get criticized, they also stood this operation up
in incredibly quick fashion. We hadn't operated an air, had an
air operation like this in a long time. And from my
perspective, they have executed that well. The resources to do
it is something we're watching very carefully. And they are, in
some ways, dependent on us.
The other thing is, for countries who recently did their
own strategic review, they found themselves getting rid of
capabilities that, now that they're in a combat environment,
they're giving second thought to that. Combat has a way of
bringing that kind of reality to them--which just argues, for
me, that we and others have to be very careful in our review,
given the world that we're living in, about what capabilities
we decide to either get rid of or trim back.
Longstanding--where we are right now--and in particular, I
mean, as you talk about the Western Pacific, Senator Cochran--
we're, we've got tremendous relationships with the Japanese,
with the Republic of Korean military, we have had with our
Australian friends, as well as growing relationships with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. And
so, I'm actually pretty comfortable with where we are right
now. We've got overseas home-ported forces--as you know, both
marines and Navy--in fairly significant numbers in that part of
the world. And that makes a long, a lot of difference in terms
of stability.
The pressure over time, though--it gets back to what I
said--is, if we get into this force structure--part of us, in
terms of the defense review--and have to reduce our force
structure, there will be pressure there, which in the long run,
I think, will start to undermine stability in a place like
that.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you for your
service.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like for my opening statement to be made
part of the record.
Chairman Inouye. Without objection.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby
I want to join the Chairmen in thanking both of you for
your years of dedicated public service. Mr. Secretary, the
title of a recent book describes the job you will soon be
vacating as ``nearly impossible.'' Yet, you managed to take the
helm of the Pentagon at one of the most difficult times in our
Nation's history and succeed beyond all expectation. You
successfully prosecuted a war in Iraq that many had assumed was
lost. You have helped to oversee a surge in Afghanistan that,
we hope, is turning the tide there, as well. Perhaps even more
importantly, you have launched a much-needed battle to control
defense spending in a responsible way that will help reduce our
national debt while preserving our national security. All of
these things you have accomplished while retaining the full
confidence of two very different Presidents and the United
States Congress. We all are duly impressed by your
accomplishments, and owe you a sincere debt of gratitude for
your service.
Admiral Mullen, you assumed the Chairmanship in 2007, also
under very difficult circumstances, and have acquitted yourself
admirably in the post. I have been most impressed by your
powerful advocacy on behalf of those who wear the uniform. You
have spoken repeatedly about the strains on the force from a
decade of persistent conflict, and about the need to care for
those who have been wounded, physically or psychologically,
defending our Nation. You have also, properly, placed our
financial stability on the table as a fundamental issue of
national security. All would do well to remember your words as
we try to get our debt under control. Many thanks to you for
everything you have done for this country.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, last year you transferred
about $6 billion of your budget authority to the Department of
Energy to pay for nuclear weapons modernization programs
because, as I understood it, you're concerned about the neglect
that had befallen the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
How concerned are you, now that the House is considering
appropriations legislation that we would cut the program by
almost 10 percent from what the President requested and what
you've already paid for out of your own very tight budget? And,
what are the implications of failing to fund the modernization
program here?
Secretary Gates. Well, I'm very concerned. And, as I
recall, the actions taken by the House cut about $1 billion
from this modernization program.
This modernization program was very carefully worked out
between ourselves and the Department of Energy. And frankly,
where we came out on that, also, I think, played a fairly
significant role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the
new START agreement.
So, the risks are to our own program, in terms of being
able to extend the life our weapons systems; to modernize
them--not in the sense of capability, but in terms of security
and reliability. And this requires new construction. We have a
lot of buildings at Los Alamos that date from the Manhattan
Project. And so, this modernization project is, in my view,
both from a security and a political standpoint, really
important.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, in my short time--missile
defense. I understand that the Defense Science Board has
compiled a report on the concept of what we call Early
Intercept for Missile Defense, and the report's unclassified
conclusion is that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to
achieve an early intercept capability as part of the phase-
adaptive approach are simply not credible. This is disturbing
to some of us, since MDA's promise to develop by 2020 an early
intercept capability for the SOME-3 Block IIB was the central
justification, as I understood it, of, to cancel the third site
in Europe and to kill the KEI boost-phase defense program.
Now it looks like the Nation may be left without an
inadequate--with an inadequate defense in Europe, and no boost-
phase intercept capability.
Is the Department re-examining the phase-adaptive approach
in light of the Defense Science Board? And should the
Department be looking at ways to use funding currently
programmed for this SOME-3 Block IIB, to improve the GMD
system, or, to evolve more rapidly?
What's your thoughts on that?
Secretary Gates. We have resources in the 2012 budget to do
both. To fund----
Senator Shelby. That's good.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. The phased-adaptive approach,
and to strengthen the ground-based interceptor (GBI) program.
The 2012 budget buys 52 GBIs, both for deployment and for test
purposes; it makes investments in upgrades to long-range radars
in Greenland and the United States and Canada.
We also have money for developmental work in terms of other
kinds of interception of ballistic missiles. But, I believe
that the balance between the ground-based interceptor system
and the money we are investing in that, plus the money that we
are investing in the phased-adaptive approach--first of all,
the latter will give us a missile defense capability several
years earlier than would have been the case with the third site
in Europe. And, let's be blunt. The third site in Europe was
not going to happen, because the Czech Government wouldn't
approve the radar.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Secretary Gates. And so, if it was going to happen at all,
it would have taken years longer. And we still hadn't
negotiated the required agreements with the Poles in terms of
the interceptors. So, I think that the balanced approach
between the GBIs, the phased-adaptive approach, and the
developmental work we have underway, plus the additional half
billion dollars we've added to the budget for fiscal year 2012,
puts us in a pretty good place on missile defense.
Senator Shelby. Admiral Mullen.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Admiral Mullen. Just very quickly--and while I am not
exceptionally close to it in this job, I've been around missile
defense for the last 15 years--and, the whole issue of boost-
phase intercept is an extraordinarily difficult technical
challenge. And, at least, if someone's broken through on that,
I haven't seen that. It doesn't mean we shouldn't seek it, but
I've seen an awful lot of efforts go after that. And I was very
supportive of the program adjustments that we made--
particularly with respect to that, because I thought, my view
was, I thought we were throwing good money after bad.
Second--and I haven't seen this report, I'll take a look at
it. And I certainly, I would not, without, push back on it. The
only thing I can say is, the path through the standard missile
is the most well-developed, robust, reliable path over time,
with respect to developing missile defense. And it's, we're
still almost a decade away. And I have confidence that we can
continue to pursue that path. It's an incredibly well-tested
system. The missile you're talking about, I know, doesn't exist
yet. But, it's a path that----
Senator Shelby. But it could exist, couldn't it?
Admiral Mullen. Huh?
Senator Shelby. It could exist.
Admiral Mullen. No, I think--yes, sir. I think we can get
there in that timeframe, based on my understanding.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join the others who have thanked you for the
extraordinary service you've both shown to this country. You
came to your roles at very challenging time.
Admiral Mullen, I appreciate our friendship, and your trip
to Vermont, you and Mrs. Mullen, when you joined Marcelle and
me up there to meet with our troops when they were deploying.
Secretary Gates, I've told you before, but I'll say it here
publicly. I've enjoyed our friendship of, it must be about 30
years now.
With that said, unfortunately there's one issue we don't
all agree on, and that's the war in Afghanistan. I think like
most Americans--certainly most Vermonters I talk with, and an
increasing number of Members of Congress--I think we have to
dramatically accelerate our withdrawal of troops from that
country.
I supported going into Afghanistan for the purpose of
getting Osama bin Laden after 9/11. And the subcommittee and
all of us here on the Appropriations Committee have been
strongly supportive of that.
I did not support the invasion of Iraq, which distracted us
from that goal. Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, and we'll be
paying for this cost for years to come. We borrowed the money
to go into that war. It's an extraordinary thing in a war--to
borrow the money. We're still borrowing the money. At the same
time, we gave a tax cut for anybody who makes as much as a
Member of Congress. So, what we said was, we'll let our
children and our grandchildren pay for these two wars.
I don't think we can continue to sacrifice so many lives
and spend billions of dollars a week in a war with no end. I
think we have to identify achievable goals in Afghanistan. I
think we have to reduce our military footprint there.
And then we look at Pakistan. Well, just this morning we
see word that our putative ally arrested five people on the
suspicion that they helped the United States to get Osama bin
Laden. After publicly saying, of course, they wanted us to get
Osama bin Laden, they arrested people who helped us get him.
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
Now, we could overlook the problems probably in Pakistan if
the Afghan Government was any better, but we have President
Karzai, who can't seem to make up his mind if he's on our side
or the Taliban. We support them with our tax dollars when at
the same time we say we've got to privatize Medicare,
eviscerate education funding, shred social safety net here in
this country, and stop all the investments that might make our
industries more competitive.
It's not a criticism of our military--I've visited them
there. They are performing extraordinarily well, under very
difficult circumstances. But, how long do we support
governments that lie to us? When do we say enough is enough?
Secretary Gates, I'll start with you.
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I would say, based on
27 years in the CIA and 4\1/2\ years in this job, most
governments lie to each other. That's the way business gets
done.
Senator Leahy. Do they arrest----
Secretary Gates. And we ought to----
Senator Leahy. Do they also arrest the people that help
us----
Secretary Gates. Sometimes.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. When they say they're our
allies?
Secretary Gates. Sometimes.
Senator Leahy. Not often.
Secretary Gates. And sometimes they send people to spy on
us. And they're our close allies. So----
Senator Leahy. And we give aid to them.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. I mean, that's the real world
that we deal with. But I would tell you this. First of all,
this is not a war without end. The Lisbon Summit has made clear
that the transfer to Afghan security responsibility and
leadership will be complete not later than the end of 2014.
Troops will be coming down during that period. The costs of
these wars is coming down dramatically. The costs of these wars
will drop between 2011--fiscal year 2011 and 2012 by $40
billion, and between 2012 and 2013 probably by several tens of
billions of dollars more.
And I asked the question--first of all, I think the
prospects of having a more stable Afghanistan, in terms of a
country that can defend itself--I'm not talking about a Vermont
democracy here, but a country that can defend itself----
Senator Leahy. Neither am I, Mr. Secretary, and you know
that.
Secretary Gates. I know. But what I'm talking about is, we
are not in the business of nation building. What we are trying
to do is build the Afghan National Security Forces to the point
where they have the ability to defend that country, and so that
the Taliban and Al Qaeda cannot reconstitute themselves in that
country. And I think we are making considerable headway in that
respect.
So I think that--I know people are frustrated. The
country's been at war for 10 years. I know people are tired.
But people also have to think in terms of stability and in
terms of the potential for reconstitution. What's the cost of
failure?
PAKISTAN
Senator Leahy. Do you want to add to that, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. What I would talk about, I think, in this,
Senator Leahy, and you know I've talked about this many times,
is Pakistan. And we are in the midst, and have been, of trying
to, in the middle of this war, with threats that they have in
their territory, trying to build a relationship that was badly
broken when we left the last time, when we terminated our
relationship with them in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And
we are back. And it's actually my belief that if we--if we were
to do that again, it may not be 5 years or 10 years, but we'll
be back in a much more difficult situation. And so seeking to
support stability in that part of the world to the degree that
these two countries can evolve is, I think, a goal that we must
continue to pursue--or the danger associated with a country
that's got a nuclear arsenal, that is an--that lives next to a
country that they view as an existential threat, it's just a
matter of time before we're back.
So I don't--I don't push back on the challenge associated
with it. Some of the criticism is more than warranted. Nobody's
worked that harder than me, very frankly, with the leadership.
And it's a--it's a conscious decision I think that we have to
make. And if we walk away from it, it's my view it'll be a much
more dangerous place a decade from now, and we'll be back.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
RUNAWAY DEBT AND DEFICIT
I can't speak for other States, but I can speak for the
people of Indiana, who are grateful for your lifetime of
service--not only commitment to public service, but execution,
brilliantly, in your jobs. You've been a model for us. And I
thank you, and I know the people of Indiana thank you.
Second, I would like to, I guess, just reaffirm that,
Secretary Gates, your statements about one of the greatest, if
not the greatest, threat to our future security is a runaway
debt and a trillion dollars deficit on an annual basis, and
that, if that is not addressed, even the difficulties and scale
back of, ability to respond to challenges around the world that
won't go away, are potentially reduced--that's nothing in
comparison to the strains and stresses that will be placed on
our ability to do that in the future if we can't get ahold of
this runaway debt and deficit. So, that ever shrinking part of
the pie that goes to discretionary and defense spending is
going to keep shrinking if we don't deal with mandatory
spending. And I appreciate you speaking out on that basis.
HEALTH RESEARCH
A question that I have goes to where possibly we can get
some savings. I note that the House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee passed out a bill which includes research on a
number of health issues: $223 million cancer research, $125
million for traumatic brain injury, $30 million for orthopedic
research, $15 million for restoration of health research.
I'm just wondering, are there savings that--that's $393
million. That's a long way from $400 billion, but it's a fairly
good chunk of money. Are there savings possible in that
category where there is duplicative research, paid for by
Government or conducted by the private industry, which
addresses the very same issues?
In the past, Defense has kind of been a go-to place for
health research that, in many cases, is duplicated elsewhere.
For instance, orthopedic research. I mean, our State is the
leader of the world in orthopedic research. Some of the, all
the leading technology and so forth comes out of the private
sector for that. I don't know exactly what the military does in
addition to that, but, I guess the question is, are there
places like that we can get some--you know, I know it's the
holy grail not to touch anything having to do with health of
service members. I'm not suggesting that. I'm simply saying
there may be some duplications there that we ought to be
looking at.
Secretary Gates. I think, you know, any of these things are
worth looking into in detail. But, and I can't speak to the
cancer piece of it, but I will say this--I think that we have
funded some of the leading research being done in the country
on traumatic brain injury, and probably also on prosthetics,
and almost certainly on post-traumatic stress. The Congress has
given us quite a bit of money in those areas in particular. And
I would argue that, in terms of the practical applications of
those things, as opposed to pure research, that those funds, I
think there would be a strong bias to keeping those in the
Defense budget, because we have a very direct interest in
making sure that there is progress in, particularly, those
three areas, because those are the areas in which our service
members are suffering the most in these wars.
NATO
Senator Coats. I'll accept that.
I've got 4 seconds left, so a quick yes or no. Is a
hollowed-out NATO worse than no NATO? The reality that NATO
just is not stepping up to its responsibilities--we're going to
have to do it all anyway?
Secretary Gates. Well, I would say that a NATO that has
reduced capabilities is still better than no NATO at all. And,
I'd just add one point to the chairman's comment--to Admiral
Mullen's comment earlier. One of the things that has happened
to our allies is that they really have stepped up in
Afghanistan. But, the result of that has been that the costs of
their participation in Afghanistan has brought further pressure
on the modernization budgets of those European countries. And
so, it's contributed to their overall narrowing of military
capability, but partly it's because of the contribution that
they've made in Afghanistan.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, again, like all of my
colleagues, thank you for your service. I think the enormous
turnout of members, and also the fact that we're actually
staying--staying longer than you--is a tribute, really, to the
high regard that we regard your service, and your service,
Admiral Mullen. So, we want to thank you for it from the
incredible job that you've done keeping America safe, your
strong support for the military, your many trips to actually
get out of Washington and listen to the troops and talk to our
allies.
And for me, one of the special things was the way--always,
always, will be the way you responded unflinchingly with the
Walter Reed scandal, in the way you took ownership, the way you
ensured accountability and responsibility and corrective
action. And I want to just thank you for that.
And I've just watched you with the troops, not only in
uniform and so on, but in things like the Army-Navy game, where
you mingled with them. And the wounded warriors had such access
to you, and the way that they felt that they could approach you
and talk to you, and the warmth and regard you have. So, I
think that's what a real inspirational leader is, which is the
difference in management.
But let me tell you, your trips, your farewell trips and
speeches you've given, have been eyebrow-raising, jaw-dropping,
and for me, a must-do list, from the Eisenhower Library speech
in which you called for major fiscal reform, to the most recent
one at NATO. You've dropped more bombs in some of these than
the Air Force.
But, let me get to my questions. I'd like to, really,
follow up on, really, the questions raised about NATO. And many
of this will have to be done with your successor. What is NATO?
What are we going to require of NATO members? What actions
should NATO undertake? When we ask for a coalition of the
willing, we're going to need a coalition of the capable. Or,
are we ever going to ask that again?
But, let me go to something very specific, because those
are big policy questions to be sorted out. I wonder what your
thoughts are on an overseas base closing. And, is this the time
where we look at the major policy and make sure we don't have a
hollowed-out NATO? Is it time to have an overseas base closing,
where we bring a lot of assets home, close assets, and so on?
What would be your thought on that? Because, I think we spend
about, the President's Commission on Deficit Reduction said we
could save about $9 billion in that area.
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, any overseas base
reductions will necessarily--first of all, just the practical
thing--overseas base reductions would require Milcon here in
the United States, so there would be--at least in the beginning
it would be more expensive to bring them home than to leave
them where they are, because they have facilities already
built. And we do get support from the Germans, the Japanese and
the South Koreans in supporting those facilities.
Senator Mikulski. I'm not advocating closing all bases----
Secretary Gates. I understand.
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. But that kind of scrub we do
here.
Secretary Gates. Well, we've just been through that in the
Department of Defense, and it's now working its way through the
interagency in terms of an assessment of our global posture and
our presence in a lot of these different places. Secretary
Clinton and I will meet with the Japanese the first of next
week in our periodic two-plus-two meetings to talk about
Okinawa and Guam, and Japan, and the force presence there.
I think that the biggest policy question that I think has
to be asked is--what kind of a signal do you want to send the
rest of the world, in terms of America's role in the world?
And, if we, at the same time, we're cutting our Defense budget,
and we cut our State Department budget, and State has fewer
assets to deploy abroad, we have fewer assets to deploy abroad,
and then we begin to close one or another foreign base, are we
basically sending the message to the rest of the world--and, I
would say, to China, to Iran, to North Korea, to a variety of
other places--the United States is closing up shop and going
home, and we're headed toward Fortress America again?
So I think this, as I leave, I think this is a huge
question for the country to consider, and for you to consider,
is, what kind of a role do you want for the United States in
the world? And frankly, I believe, for example, our presence in
Europe, if--one of the benefits it has brought, in addition to
the financial benefit of having troops be able to rotate from
Germany into Iraq and Afghanistan at, actually, less cost than
from here--but, one of the things it has brought is, if
anything, it has slowed, I think, this deterioration of the
NATO military capabilities.
Senator Mikulski. Because we're there----
Secretary Gates. Because we're there and we train----
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. They feel we're glued
together?
Secretary Gates. We train with them and we work with them.
And they have to have capabilities that match us when we're
doing that.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, may Admiral Mullen respond?
Admiral Mullen. Just very briefly--and maybe it's just
because of my roots, and I'm a Navy guy--there's just nothing
like being there. And you can be there a couple of ways. You
can live there, or you can rotate there. And what I have found
in our relationships--I just came back from Egypt, and we've
had a long relationship with Egypt--but, the mil-to-mil
relationship we have with Egypt is different than the one we
have with Japan, because we live with Japan. We interact with
their families. We know the Japanese people in ways that we
just don't know other countries. The same is true in Germany.
The same is true in the Republic of Korea. Extraordinarily
strong relationships. When we are in a crisis, we can use those
relationships, I think, to prevent a crisis, or prevent
escalation.
So, I don't know if--I certainly wouldn't say that it isn't
worth a scrub. I just think the presence piece of this is so
powerful in so many ways, and it's enduring, and it prevents
conflicts in ways that sometimes we don't think about in the
short term, when we're looking for savings in moves. It's not--
our investment is significant. I understand that. And, worth a
scrub. I just think we really need to be careful.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Mr. Kohl.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I just want to, if I could.
If I could submit questions for the record, both in terms of
military health care and, quite frankly, in the follow-up, in
the undersecretary of acquisition, technology and logistics.
That's $400 billion. The House is dragging its feet. They've
reinvented earmarks. And I'd like to have, maybe, three to five
items out of that area, where you think we should definitely
stay the course in reducing our expenditures.
And, I hope somewhere we can get a chance to ask his
opinion on the House and earmarks.
Chairman Inouye. We will discuss that.
Senator Kohl.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AFGHANISTAN
Secretary Gates and Secretary Mullen, we thank you for
being here today, and we congratulate both of you on a job well
done. Your leadership has been critical to the progress that
we've made in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the global war on
terror, most recently the death of Osama bin Laden.
In light of this progress, many Americans are hoping that
our forces can soon come home from Afghanistan after a decade
of war. I share this desire to begin withdrawing our forces
from Afghanistan, beginning with a sizable and sustained
reduction in forces this summer.
I'd like to ask both of you about the government of
Afghanistan and President Karzai. President Karzai seems
increasingly hostile to the American presence in Afghanistan,
and his government, as we know, is plagued by corruption.
My first question is whether you see President Karzai
playing a positive or a negative role in Afghanistan.
But I'd also like to hear from both of you about what comes
after Karzai. Presumably he'll not be President forever. What
kind of relationships are we building with Afghan leaders from
other political parties and ethnic groups, both in power, as
well as in the opposition?
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I have spent a lot of
time with President Karzai over the last 4\1/2\ years. Frankly,
I think that we have often not done a very good job of
listening to President Karzai. The problems that he often
raises in public are problems that he has often raised with us
1 year or 2 years before in private. And, I'll give a perfect
example--and that's private security companies. This became a
crisis in our relationship late last year. We've worked our way
through it, and he has participated in working his way through,
in our working our way through this.
But we knew from Iraq that private security companies are a
problem in these countries, and we should have begun this
transition to Afghan oversight of these companies a long time
ago. So, my point is--yes, he reacts publicly to things that
are done and said. He's very sensitive to civilian casualties.
This has been a continuing theme. It's not a surprising theme.
But, I think you would find, if you talked to our commanders,
if you talked to the people that I talk to, he is somebody who
understands the campaign plan, who understands the importance
of our role, who wants a long-term U.S. relationship with
Afghanistan after he's President. He told me he plans to step
down in 2014.
I will tell you, both our military people and our diplomats
are in touch with a very broad range of Afghan leaders--and not
just in Kabul, but all around the country.
And finally, on the governance side, I would just say, at
the NATO Defense Ministers meeting late last week, the NATO
senior civilian representative, Ambassador Gass, reported
that--he had just gotten back from Afghanistan--75 percent of
deputy district governors now in Afghanistan are chosen on the
basis of merit. And he told the defense ministers further that,
as the provincial governors change, the quality is steadily
improving.
So, I think you have the Kabul environment, and you have
the outside of Kabul environment. And, frankly, it's a lot
better outside Kabul, in terms of what's going on around the
country and in terms of governance, than is often reported.
But it's a relationship from, where we're dealing with a
President whose country has been at war, like us, for 10 years.
And, he is very sensitive to the fact the Afghans are exhausted
with war, too. And so, I find that, when I sit down with
President Karzai, we have a very productive conversation. And
it's clear that he buys into what we are trying to do, and that
we are allies, not occupiers. And he also does see a post-2014
relationship with the United States going forward.
Senator Kohl. Admiral Mullen, any comments?
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I'd add is, as the security
environment continues to improve--and I'd reemphasize what
Secretary Gates said in terms of what we're seeing on the
ground--in subdistricts and districts and provinces, it's
getting better from a governance standpoint which, between
security and governance, gets you to a point where you can
start to develop the areas, which is really what the Afghan
people care about. They're tired of war.
There is this disparity between Kabul and what we see
locally throughout the country. And we have to continue to
engage. This is the elected leader of a country we're heavily
engaged in, or, with. And, we can't do it without decent
governance. We can get the security pieces necessary, but it's
not sufficient, and we have to continue to push on better
governance, the reduction of corruption, and the development
piece of this. We're just getting to point, from my
perspective, in the south, where security has gotten to a point
where those other pieces can really start to kick in. We're not
there throughout the country. But, from an overall proof of
concept, if you will, that this approach is having the impact
we thought it would, we're there.
Secretary Gates. The other, one other point I would make
is, having talked about the rest of the country being better in
some respects than Kabul, in another respect, Kabul is a model,
because the Afghans have had the security lead in Kabul for
over a year now. And that's the transition we're trying to make
throughout the rest of the country on a district-by-district,
province-by-province basis. And at this point, about 25 percent
of the Afghan population live in areas that are now under
Afghan security lead.
Senator Kohl. Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, for extraordinary
public service.
Mr. Secretary, for the historical record, for young people
who may be planning a career in public service, what's better
preparation for Secretary of Defense--president of a big
university, or director of the CIA?
Secretary Gates. President of a big university.
As you well know.
Senator Alexander. Yeah.
Mr. Secretary, how many, about how many military men and
women do our European allies have?
Secretary Gates. About 2 million in uniform.
Senator Alexander. About how many are available to be
deployed in an exercise like Libya or Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. I would guess, Senator Alexander, it would
be in the 10 to 15 to 20 percent in terms of----
Senator Alexander. Twenty percent?
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Any single time. But that
number can be very deceptive because, for all of us, we find
out--we have 2.2 million men and women Active and Reserve, and
we have about 250,000, almost 300,000 people deployed around
the world right now. And we're going at a pretty good clip.
Senator Alexander. I thought I'd had heard somewhere that
they might only have 25,000 or 40,000 troops available for----
Secretary Gates. What you heard was in my speech last week,
where I said they'd struggled to maintain 25,000 to 40,000
troops in Afghanistan.
Senator Alexander. Mr. Secretary, in the gulf war, the
first Iraq war, if I remember correctly, other countries paid
for a large part of that. How much of that did they pay for?
Secretary Gates. Virtually all.
Senator Alexander. Yeah. In the Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Libya war, how much have other countries paid for?
Secretary Gates. Well, the other countries are essentially
paying their own way, in the sense of they're paying for their
own airplanes, and they're paying for their own munitions, and
things like that.
Senator Alexander. But, the United States is paying for
virtually all of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Is that right?
Secretary Gates. Well, not Libya. But, we certainly have
paid the bulk of the money in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Alexander. And was your testimony that, in NATO,
the United States is supposed to pay what percent of the costs?
And what percent do we actually pay?
Secretary Gates. Well, the line that I had was that, up
until about, well, until the end of the cold war, we paid about
50 percent of the military costs of the alliance. Since the
cold war, that has--since 1991, that has risen to about 75
percent of the total military expenditures in NATO.
Senator Alexander. Is there a lesson for this President and
future Presidents, this Congress, as we look back at the gulf
war and as we prepare for any future military action, that we
might keep in mind not just getting approval of other countries
for the, agreeing that we ought to take the action, or to join
with us and take the action, but to do as was done in 1991 and
1992, to actually get their commitment to help pay for it?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think you, we can look at that two
ways. One is, the answer is absolutely yes. One of the things
that I pointed out last week at the NATO Defense Ministers
meeting is that the trust fund to support the Afghan national
security forces going forward is, in terms of the dollars or
Euros that have been contributed, is a joke, because it's about
350 million Euros at a time when the United States is spending
billions of dollars to support the development of those
military forces. So, one of the things that I have talked to
all of our allies about is the fact that it's imperative for
them to contribute to that trust fund.
On the other hand, the circumstances of the gulf war were,
I think, unique, in the sense that the countries we were
dealing with that felt the most threatened were Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, the gulf states and so on. I will tell you that, sort
of looking back, the two people who led the groups, the teams
going around to talk to our allies about their contributions
were led by Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Treasury
Nick Brady. And, somehow through the luck of the draw, Baker
ended up with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the gulf states, and so on,
and Nick Brady had to go talk to the Japanese, the Germans, and
others. And, let's just say, Nick wasn't nearly as successful
as Jim was.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, since this is your last hearing, it seems
ungracious to do anything except thank you and heap praise upon
you for your service. But since you're before a group of
senators, of course, while we'll do that, we'll also ask some
questions. But, I do sincerely thank you for a lifetime of
public service that has made an extraordinary difference to our
country, and to our troops, in particular.
I'm very concerned about the $400 billion that the
President has assigned the Department of Defense for additional
cuts. You have already made a tremendous effort to squeeze out
waste and inefficiency, and to reduce unnecessary spending. I'm
concerned that we could end up with the kind of hollow force
that you've warned us against, and that was so devastating to
our troops, and our security, potentially, in the 1970s, and to
a lesser extent, two decades later.
Were you consulted by the President or OMB on the size of
the target--that $400 billion that has been assigned to the
Department of Defense?
Secretary Gates. I was informed about it the day before it
was announced.
Senator Collins. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is, I believe
that military requirements have to drive the budget, and not
the other way around. And----
Secretary Gates. I will say this, though, Senator. When I
was informed, I did get immediate agreement that this--before
any specific budget decisions were made--this comprehensive
review that the chairman and I have been talking about, would
be carried out, that we would present options to the President
and to the Congress that shows relative levels of risk of
different kinds of cuts and changes in the force structure. So,
there was agreement immediately to that review before specific
decisions were made.
Senator Collins. Thank you. It still seems backwards to me,
as far as the targets given. You're going to assess the risk of
various scenarios to meet the target, but that, to me, is the
opposite of the way we should be proceeding.
Admiral Mullen, let me switch just quickly to Libya, and
ask you a question. I personally have a lot of concerns about
our involvement in Libya and the transition from it being a
humanitarian exercise, to the goal of having Colonel Gaddafi
leave and relinquish power.
Let's assume that that does happen, that Colonel Gaddafi
does give up power. The Transitional National Council is made
up almost exclusively of the eastern Libyans, I'm told. And I
believe it's a real question, whether or not that council could
effectively govern the country, given the intense regional
rivalries and tribal nature of Libyan society. But also, I'm
concerned that we're not really certain who we're dealing with.
Do you feel confident that we have a plan for what we would
do post-Gaddafi?
Admiral Mullen. Just having come out of both Egypt and also
Europe last week, I'm actually encouraged that there are
countries and organizations, NATO being one, that are very
specifically looking at--What after Gaddafi? Because I think we
need to do that.
I'm more encouraged, more confident that the more we learn
about the TNC--and in fact, I also see them now linking to the
West more than they had in the past--that there are, you know,
civilian leaders and military leaders who recognize the
challenge that you just described.
What I don't, or, I just haven't seen yet, is the kind of
comprehensive collective view of how they would run the
country. I think they recognize that internally. Their focus on
this is improving, but I think we're sort of at the beginning
of that, and that there is an awful long way to go. So, I'm
more positive than I was a few weeks ago. There's an awful lot
that's being brought to the table in terms of international
focus on this from our government, as well as many governments.
But I still think we've got a long way to go.
Secretary Gates. One of the actions taken by the NATO
defense ministers last week was to resolve that NATO would not
be in the lead in any kind of a transition, but also that the
Secretary General would be in communication with the contact
group and the United Nations, and tell them that it's our view,
as NATO Defense Ministers, that the planning for this
transition should get underway now--not wait until Gaddafi
falls.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
And thank you both for your service.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you both for your service.
Secretary Gates, I, too, echo the high praise that we all
have for you and for your efforts.
Speaking about Afghanistan now, going back from Libya
here--as we deal with the reality of a drawdown coming ahead,
and the numbers, and all the discussion that goes on there, I'm
going to make it a little more parochial. We had several
thousand troops with the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the
25th Infantry up in Fort Wainwright just deploy. They moved out
just this past month. And the concern that I'm hearing from
some of the folks up North is, well, okay, we want to be in
that phase where we are withdrawing and coming out of
Afghanistan. But we're concerned that our loved ones, who have
just now gone in, are going to be on the back end of that
withdrawal, so you will have these forces moving out.
You've mentioned that between now and 2014, the amount of
money that we will see going into Afghanistan will be, sounded
pretty dramatically reduced. What assurances can you give to
those who are just now going into Afghanistan, and who will be
there through the end of this next year, that their situation
is not increasingly riskier?
Secretary Gates. I would make two points. First of all, the
reduction in cost in Afghanistan, beginning in fiscal year 2013
and beyond--so fall, let's say, of 2012--is, really correlates
to the level of troop drawdowns. And so, the amount of money
that is saved is associated with the number of troops that we
have in country, not by any skimping on the support----
Senator Murkowski. Okay.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Or the enablers that we have
there to support the troops we have.
Second, I have had conversations with the President about
this, and I will tell you that he and I are both committed
that, whatever decisions are made, the foremost consideration
will be to ensure that whatever steps are taken do not put the
troops that are leaving at greater risk, or the troops that are
remaining at greater risk.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. I appreciate that.
Let me ask you a question about Guam. In light of where we
are with the budget issues, you responded to a question about,
to Senator Mikulski, about the overseas bases in Europe. But,
in light of what we're seeing with the tightening budgets, can
we expect any significant changes, perhaps in the current
direction, with regards to the buildup in Guam? Are we going to
meet that 2014 completion date, that target that has been set,
given what the cost estimates are at this point in time?
Secretary Gates. Senator, in all honesty, as I mentioned
earlier, Secretary Clinton and I will be meeting with the
Japanese on Monday and Tuesday, and quite honestly, I'll have a
better answer to your question after we have that meeting.
Senator Murkowski. Okay. We look forward to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, it's been a great pleasure
to work with both of you, and I want to thank both of you for
your tremendous service to this country. It is very much
appreciated at a very challenging time.
And Secretary Gates, I look forward to you coming home to
our home State at some point, and continuing that relationship.
But, I know you must be looking forward to that.
Secretary Gates. Fifteen days.
Senator Murray. Hopefully, the weather's better when you
get there than it has been.
Secretary Gates, last Friday, I visited the National Naval
Medical Center up in Bethesda and had an opportunity to talk
with a number of our wounded warriors, and their providers and
caregivers. And as you well know, many of these service members
have sacrificed life and limb in Afghanistan, and we, as a
country, are going to be taking care of them, and their
families, not just today, not just when they return home, for
but a lifetime.
As chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, I
take this issue very seriously, and I've been trying to draw
attention to some of the all too often unseen costs of war, and
thinking about how we should consider that as part of our
decision in any long-term conflict.
I think you know the major components of this long-term war
have had real and significant impacts. Death from suicides
among veterans and service members from the war are now on par
with combat deaths; many of our warriors are facing difficult
challenges with mental healthcare, as you well know, when they
return home; and a lot of our service members have served now
not just two, three or four, but sometimes even five times, and
the costs of these are real.
So, while we all talk a lot on this subcommittee about
rebuilding projects, and Afghan aid, and military resources,
and all the costs and components of a defense system, I wanted
to ask you today what you and the Pentagon consider to be the
biggest costs of this war to our wounded warriors and their
families--particularly, those costs that we'll be paying for
for a very long term; and whether that is ever considered in,
those costs are factored in, when we are making decisions about
drawing down in Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates. I would, I mean, I think it is self-
evident that the costs are exactly as you've described them, in
lives that are shattered, in bodies that are shattered, in
minds that are shattered.
I would tell you that one of the things that we've done
over the last 2 to 3 years is to ensure that all of the funding
that we have gotten in the past in supplementals and overseas
contingency operations, dealing with family programs, and with
some of the medical research we were talking about, and care
for our wounded warriors--that all of that money has been
shifted into the base budget, knowing that we will deal with
this problem for many, many years to come. So, from our part--
in addition to Virginia--we have tried to make sure that these,
the funds for these programs have been protected, and will be
protected in the future.
But it, I cannot say that decisions in terms of drawdowns
or military strategy are made bearing in mind the cost of the
soldiers and sailors, airmen and marines, who suffer. It is on
the minds of everybody who makes those decisions. But, by the
same token, it is the nature of war, and it is, frankly, one of
the reasons why, as I told an interviewer a couple of weeks
ago, I feel like I've become more conservative, more cautious
about when we use force, because I've seen the consequences up
front.
But Admiral Mullen has devoted a huge amount of effort to
this. He probably ought to say something.
Senator Murray. Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, first of all, I just appreciate
your leadership on this because it has to, it has to have a
voice. And, I actually believe we're just beginning to
understand the costs.
Your units--very specifically, I'll use Fort Lewis. I mean,
we're now, we have more soldiers and airmen at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord than we've ever had, and they're going to be home
for a couple of years. Many of those units have had only 1 year
between deployments up to now. Now, they're going to have two.
And, I think they've been compartmentalizing challenges, and
they're going to start unpacking that. And it's going to be
pretty tough now, that we're back home, and addressing, the
leadership focusing on addressing the challenges that will come
with that.
Medically, in the PTS-TBI world in particular, the more
quickly we get at the problem, the less likely the damage, or,
the damage is reduced significantly. And yet, there's still a
great deal on the TBI side that we don't understand.
Senator Murray. And it's changing, by the way.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Murray. When soldiers are home after 3 years, and
we're finding the impacts are different 3 years later----
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Murray [continuing]. And they're coming back into
the system.
MILITARY FAMILIES
Admiral Mullen. Right. There are time bombs set up that we
know are out there. We just don't know when they're going to go
off.
The relationship that the Pentagon has with the Veterans
Administration (VA) and with communities throughout the country
has got to get stronger. And we've worked that in ways to try
to focus on that. And where you and Chairman Inouye and others
can help is, when we get into budget crunches like this, this
incredible amount of money that we put into family programs,
into medical research--it's some of the first money that budget
types like to take out, historically. We like airplanes before
we would keep our family programs intact. That's something the
Secretary of Defense and I have talked about. And, unless we
watch that very carefully, it will not be there when we need
it. And so, we have to have it in a way that it is sustained
over time. Because I think these costs are longstanding. We
don't understand them as well as we should--not just for our
members, but also, for our families. We see that time and time
again.
Our families have become as much, almost as much as part of
our readiness, as anything else. And it wasn't that way 10 or
15 years ago. Always critical. But, without them we would be
nowhere in these wars.
And so, leaders have to continue to focus on--what are
these costs? And, I thought you said it very well--It is to
repay this debt for the rest of their lives. And we need to
stay with them, so that we understand what that means.
Secretary Gates. I would just say that I've told the
service secretaries and the chiefs to fence two areas in all of
these budget exercises that we're going through. One is
training, and the other is all of our family programs, that I
don't want any money taken out of those.
Senator Murray. Well, I appreciate that very much. And I do
think we have to really seriously be considering this, because
it does impact our troops today. But, it also impacts our
ability in the future for the next big one, if we've depleted
all of our resources, and we are not taking care of our folks.
Admiral Mullen. The other thing--and I know that you know,
Senator Murray--is, we are, we did it in Vietnam, and we are
doing it again. We're generating a homeless generation; many
more homeless female vets, because they're now, I think a
quarter of a million have served in Iraq and Afghanistan
incredibly well. And if we're not careful, we'll do the same
thing we did last time--and we'll pay for them long-term, when
an up-front investment would really make a difference right
now. Everybody's got to be----
Senator Murray. Because we're about to make some of the
same mistakes we made after the Vietnam war.
Admiral Mullen. We are.
Senator Murray. And this country will be paying for it 20
years from now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I will add to what has been said already. Washington
State's gain is Texas' loss. We would take you back in a
heartbeat if you would come, because you did a great job at
Texas A&M, and the Bush Library and School.
MILCON BUDGET CUTS
I want to go back to Senator Mikulski's line of
questioning. We have had an overseas base closing commission.
And after the last American BRAC, we had the overseas BRAC that
was going in the same track, and it was decided to bring 70,000
troops back from certain foreign locations--Germany and Korea
especially, and then Guam, of course, in question. And now we
are looking, Mr. Secretary, at a Fort Bliss military
construction project that has just been completed this year,
that would take one of the BCTs that was designated to come
back from Germany--it is prepared and ready for taking that BCT
from Germany. But, the Department changed the previous decision
that was going to bring back two BCTs from Germany, to just
basically say, we're not sure yet. So, you've got the Milcon
that has been done in America--about $450 million worth--to
take one BCT back, and on the five-year plan for military
construction, there is $1 billion to be done in Germany.
Germany contributes 7 percent of the cost of our Milcon, as
compared with Japan, that contributes 40 percent.
So, I would just ask you, as you are leaving in your last 2
weeks, if you can give serious consideration to the fact that
we don't get an effort from Germany--$1 billion of military
construction for changing Army headquarters and bases--couldn't
that money be saved, rather than saving it out of either
personnel, or healthcare, or weapons systems that would
modernize for our troops in America? Can't we take $1 billion
out of Milcon that was supposed to be taken care of in a
previous administration? It just seems like there's a
disconnect from what Senator Mikulski was suggesting, and what
seems to be an opportunity here.
Secretary Gates. The President's decision on the posture in
Germany was that we would come down from four brigade combat
teams to three. Where the uncertainty is, is in the Army, in
terms of whether that fourth BCT in 2015-2016 is simply
disbanded, or whether, in fact, it comes back to the United
States. The only Milcon that I'm aware of in Germany is the
consolidation of command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence at Weisbaden. The original budget for that was
$482 million. One-half of that has already been spent. There is
no money for it, as I understand, in the fiscal year 2012
budget, but then, there is about another $150 million between
2013 and 2016.
So, we'll go back and take another look at that piece of
it. But, the decision was not made just by the Department of
Defense, but by the President--that we would, in fact, come
down by one BCT in Germany.
Senator Hutchison. The original proposal was two.
Secretary Gates. Right.
Senator Hutchison. And in the interim time, I think we all
believe, or, I'll speak for myself, and, along the lines of
what you talked about in Europe last week--the Germans have
fewer than 5,000 troops in Afghanistan. They have rules of
engagement that are very restrictive. And I would just ask you
to look at, and perhaps work with the incoming secretary, to
determine if it is in our best interest to have the places
ready at Fort Bliss for a BCT? And with the lack of German
effort, is it in our best interest to keep three BCTs there,
rather than two, which had been the previous decision?
And, I certainly support having joint efforts, and working
with our partners. But, you yourself have said our partners are
not stepping up to the plate as they should. And I agree with
you. So, I would just ask if, in your last 2 weeks, you could
look at this, and could work with Secretary Panetta, to
determine if it is in our best interests, with the lack of
effort that the Germans make in Milcon, and the lack of effort,
frankly, in our NATO alliance, and with the preparation that's
already been made--$450 million in Milcon here to take the new
troops back--I'd just ask if you would look at it one more
time.
Mr. Secretary, I still have time, if I could just, if
you're not going to answer that question, then I would just ask
if we could, if you could elaborate on your view of NATO. And,
you said that some NATO is better than no NATO. Is there
something that we could do proactively, besides encouraging our
allies to be more of a player, an equal player, that would make
the NATO alliance more effective?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think one thing where the Congress
could make a contribution is that, I know that the Congress has
a variety of parliamentary exchanges with European
legislatures. And, I think just voicing, both in those
exchanges, but also, publicly, essentially the message that I
delivered last week--that the American people are going to
become increasingly skeptical about this alliance if the United
States has to bear three quarters of the burden.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for
your candid testimony, but more importantly, for your service
to our Nation. Your astute vision, and ability to quickly
implement your vision through others, is a testament to your
leadership ability, and this Nation is truly in your debt for
turning the tide in Iraq and Afghanistan, and setting the stage
for a withdrawal. So, on behalf of the subcommittee, we wish
you the very best as you transition to the next phase.
And we will have written questions submitted, if we may.
Because of the time limitation, we're not able to go
through the questions and answers.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
pakistan
Question. In the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden and
Pakistan's claims that they had no knowledge of his whereabouts, and
the ousting of United States military trainers from Pakistan, I
question our financial relationship with Pakistan and their commitment
to our partnership.
Secretary Gates, this week you sat down with an interview with the
Associated Press and urged patience with Pakistan. You have seen
Pakistan's actions over the past few months. When should our patience
with Pakistan run out?
Answer. The United States relationship with Pakistan is far from
ideal, but we should be working to improve the relationship. Although
our respective views on how best to counter regional security
challenges are not always congruent, we do have shared interests in a
stable South Asia. A comprehensive long-term partnership with Pakistan,
however, is not just in the interest of regional security, but in the
United States national security interest as well. Therefore, the United
States needs to work with Pakistan to overcome the tensions currently
straining the relationship.
First, let me be clear that we have seen no evidence that senior
Pakistani leaders were aware of Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts or
involved in harboring him. Nevertheless, the raid in Abbottabad has
created an opportunity for Pakistan's leadership to make choices that
advance United States and Pakistani shared interests in eradicating
terrorist networks threatening both countries' interests.
Since the raid on May 2, senior members of this administration,
including Secretary Clinton and Admiral Mullen, have had very frank
discussions with Pakistani civilian and military leadership to make
clear that the United States will not tolerate safe-havens for
terrorists, and to urge decisive steps to expand existing United
States-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation. In conversations with
Pakistan's leaders, the administration has been unambiguous regarding
its expectations for clear, verifiable, and sustained action against
terrorists operating in Pakistan. Progress on this front will be
beneficial for Pakistan's security, and will also demonstrate
Pakistan's commitment to a positive and enduring relationship with the
United States.
The fact remains that Pakistan's cooperation is central to United
States and coalition efforts to defeat al Qaeda and prevent its return
to the region. Pakistan's participation will also be integral to
achieving a durable political solution in Afghanistan. More broadly,
Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world, with a
majority of its population under the age of 30. It possesses nuclear
weapons, has unresolved border issues with its neighbors, and a weak
economy. These are just some of the factors that make continued United
States engagement with Pakistan so important. So even when the United
States relationship with Pakistan is strained, I believe we should
continue to communicate clearly our commitment to a long-term
relationship that is supportive of both countries' interests, and that
the United States will not ``abandon'' Pakistan or disengage from the
region.
Question. What more can we do to improve our relationship with
Pakistan?
Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is currently being tested.
In Islamabad, and here in Washington, people are asking if both sides
can maintain an effective partnership. I believe we can. The recent
turbulence in the United States relationship with Pakistan, although
troubling, is not insurmountable.
Pakistan's Government and people harbor concerns that our
engagement in the region will not extend beyond what is required for
the success of the United States mission in Afghanistan. Pakistan's
strategic importance, however, goes beyond United States objectives in
neighboring Afghanistan. A stable, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan
is critical to long-term regional prosperity and security. Therefore
the United States must demonstrate its commitment to a sustained
partnership with Pakistan that both addresses and extends beyond
immediate security threats to both countries. Such a commitment does
not mean we are locked into a specific menu or level of assistance
funding, but does require that effective and needed assistance be
available when the two countries' interests intersect.
Question. Last week General Ashfaq Kayani said in a statement that
U.S. assistance now being spent to support the military is more
urgently needed for ``reducing the burden on the common man.'' Why
should we continue to fund military operations in Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan's strategic importance is related to both the
United States mission in Afghanistan and broader regional and
international security interests. And although the United States-
Pakistan relationship is not perfect, I do believe it is vital that the
United States continues to advance a lasting partnership with Pakistan
in order for it to increase its stability and prosperity over the long
term. Cooperation--including civilian, law enforcement, and military--
on shared security interests is a necessary component of this
partnership.
Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has been a key partner in the
fight against terrorism that threatens both countries. In partnership
with the Government of Pakistan, we have made significant progress
toward disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda. U.S.
security assistance has directly enabled Pakistan to conduct its
counterinsurgency campaign against violent extremists in Pakistan more
effectively. Our assistance has also allowed for greater Pakistani
cross-border coordination with International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and Afghan Forces, which has reduced the space in which al Qaeda
and other militants intent on attacking United States, Pakistani, and
Afghan interests can operate. Specifically, the Department of Defense
(DOD) ``train-and-equip'' efforts, supported by the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, are
central to United States efforts to build the capacity of the Pakistan
military and paramilitary forces to enable Pakistan to defeat the
insurgents within its borders. Coalition Support Fund reimbursements
also remain a critical enabler in combating terrorism and helping
Pakistan to sustain its forces in their operations to reduce safe
havens.
In short, continued United States support to Pakistan's military
operations against violent extremists is a clear national security
interest. Pakistan has made progress against militants operating in its
territory, though the gains remain tenuous, and the Pakistan military
has struggled to ``hold'' and ``build'' in the areas it has cleared. In
all, Pakistan has sacrificed more than 11,000 military personnel in
this fight, and has also lost upwards of 30,000 civilian lives to
continued insecurity. So long as Pakistan continues to advance shared
security objectives, we should continue our support.
detainees
Question. The DOD currently has hundreds of individuals detained in
Afghanistan that will, at some point, need to be transferred to Afghan
control, released, charged, or held by the United States in a different
kind of detention regime than they are at Bagram (now called Parwan).
What is the Department's plan for handling these detainees in the
long run?
Answer. Drawing on our experiences in Iraq will help to ensure that
the transition in Afghanistan is accomplished responsibly. United
States forces will remain involved until the Government of Afghanistan
has the trained personnel and infrastructure to be able to assume
detention operations. Further, as necessitated by the presence of
United States and coalition forces who are conducting operations in
concert with Afghan forces to defeat the Taliban, al Qaeda, and
associated forces, United States forces may need to maintain some
detention capacity in Afghanistan, pursuant to the law of war, as long
as military operations continue.
Question. What is your assessment of the Afghan justice system and
its ability to adjudicate these cases?
Answer. The formal Afghan justice system is still developing.
Primary issues include a shortage of adequately trained, educated, and
compensated judges and attorneys, limitations and gaps in the Afghan
legal code, and in some cases a lack of political will to try,
prosecute, and incarcerate national security threats in a transparent
and influence-free manner.
In support of its goals, the United States--under the leadership of
the Department of State--conducts a broad range of programs that aim to
increase the capacity of the Afghan justice system. DOD provides
support to these efforts through the Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force 435 (CJIATF-435) and its subordinate command, the Rule of Law
Field Force--Afghanistan (ROLFF-A).
Although CJIATF-435 is primarily responsible for United States
Government detention operations in Afghanistan, CJIATF-435 also trains
Afghan military police detention guards, and mentors Afghan national
security prosecutors in preparation for the conditions-based transition
of detention operations in Afghanistan. CJIATF-435 also has made
progress in discussions with Afghan officials about a national security
legal framework that will be necessary for a complete transition to
Afghan authority.
Question. How do you compare the status of the Afghan justice
system to the Iraqi justice system that the United States has helped
build up?
Answer. The Iraqi judicial system has historically been more
advanced than the formal Afghan judicial system, reflecting a more
centralized and urbanized state and higher literacy and education
levels in Iraq. In contrast, rural Afghans, who comprise a significant
majority of the population, often make use of their own community
justice systems that are outside the purview of the Afghan Government.
United States forces, in concert with civilian partners, have
provided support to both the Iraqi and Afghan justice systems,
including building physical capacity and training correctional
officials. The United States also has provided training to Iraqi and
Afghan investigative judges regarding the use of evidentiary files
prepared to support criminal charges brought against detainees held by
United States forces. In both countries, we have endeavored to develop
rule of law systems that are adapted to, and sustainable within, the
distinct cultural contexts of Afghanistan and Iraq.
afghanistan
Question. There has been a lot of discussion lately about the
United States presence in Afghanistan and what the drawdown of forces
there should look like. I am a supporter of a conditions based drawdown
and do not want to see a hasty withdrawal jeopardize the gains that we
have made. That being said, I think that because we are 10 years after
9/11 we need to emphasize that this is not going to be an open-ended
operation.
What progress has been made in determining the specific plan for
withdrawal and how involved has the Afghan Government been in
determining the metrics to evaluate the withdrawal plans?
Answer. As you know, during his December 2009 speech at West Point,
President Obama specified that the surge would not be open-ended, and
that he would reduce U.S. surge forces beginning in July 2011 based on
conditions on the ground. The United States strategy in Afghanistan is
working as designed, and the beginning of a drawdown of the surge
forces this July is part of that strategy. The momentum has shifted to
coalition and Afghan forces, and together these forces have degraded
the Taliban's capability, achieved significant security gains,
especially in the Taliban's heartland in the south, and set the
conditions for beginning the transition of security for provinces and
districts to Afghan lead.
The United States is working very closely with the Government of
Afghanistan on the transition process, which will ultimately put the
Afghan National Security Forces in the lead of security nationwide by
the end of 2014. The growth of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) in quality and quantity over the past 18 months, including the
additional 100,000 new personnel, is a key part of the progress to date
that enables the initiation of the transition and the drawdown of U.S.
forces. The President will take these factors into consideration when
making his decision about the size and pace of the drawdown.
Question. Are the Afghans in agreement on the metrics that should
be used?
Answer. The Afghans understand that President Obama will decide on
the size and pace of the drawdown of our surge forces, and that it will
be based on conditions on the ground. They recognize the substantial
progress achieved over the past 18 months, including the progress in
the growth and quality of their own forces and the reversal of the
Taliban momentum that makes the initiation of the drawdown and the
transition of several provinces and districts to Afghan security lead
possible.
The United States, with our allies, is in the process of building a
350,000-man ANSF. There has been some conflicting reporting on the
quality of that force, specifically the Afghan National Police. There
are increasing reports of infiltrators and Afghan servicemembers
turning their weapons on coalition forces. I am concerned that we are
focusing on quantity and not quality.
Question. How is Afghanistan going to build the security force it
needs, and will they have the resources to maintain a National Army?
Answer. The NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan, working closely
with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Afghan Ministry of the
Interior, has made substantial progress over the past 18 months in
growing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)
while also improving their quality. U.S. forces and the Afghan
Government have also helped establish the Afghan local police, which
are increasingly denying the insurgents' access to rural populations.
Although there have been instances of infiltration and Afghan
servicemembers turning their weapons on coalition forces, as well as
cases of insurgents mimicking the ANA or ANP, overall reporting from
the coalition units who partner with the ANSF reflects continued
improvement in the capability and performance of the fielded ANSF.
Efforts are underway to ensure the long-term sustainability of the
ANSF. The sustainment effort is in two areas, fiscal and human capital.
NTM-A and ISAF are scrutinizing all aspects of contracting,
infrastructure development, equipping, and sustainment to find cost
savings. Examples include an ``Afghan First'' contracting policy that
employs Afghan constructions standards, ensuring designs meet cultural
and socio-economic norms, and are sustainable by Afghan maintenance
capabilities. In order to set Afghans on the track to self-sustainment,
DOD and its United States Government partners are working with the
Afghans to increase revenue generation through activities such as
collecting taxes from border stations. We project that by 2017 the
Afghans will be spending $1.25 billion of their own funds on operations
and maintenance, up from a projected $690 million in 2013. Regarding
human capital we have been working to develop institutional
professionalism and individual Afghan capacity across a broad range of
functions within the force, including operations, leadership
development and accountability, literacy, gender integration programs,
transparency and development of an Afghan instructor corps. Our
literacy training program has just reached a milestone in that the
100,000th ANSF trooper has successfully completed a literacy course.
Developing the ANSF remains a central element of our strategy in
Afghanistan, and sustaining the ANSF will be an essential means of
securing the results that so many have sacrificed to achieve. While
Afghanistan's own resources will grow over time, it is also true that
the international community will need to help sustain the ANSF for some
time to come. To that end, I recently renewed my challenge to other
ISAF members that they contribute 1 billion Euros annually to the NATO
Afghan Nation.
Question. What is the coalition doing to ensure we are building a
quality security force that will serve the Afghan people?
Answer. Coalition forces are heavily focused on improving the
quality of the ANSF--not just its size--so that the ANSF can operate
more independently and the Coalition can successfully transition
security lead to the Afghans. Up until June, the primary focus was on
building a force to provide immediate security. In June 2011, the last
of the 97 Infantry Kandaks were fielded. This has allowed ISAF to shift
its focus to professionalizing the force and building sustainment
capability. Coalition initiatives to improve quality include partnering
with ANSF units in the field, programs geared toward increasing
literacy rates, and addressing leadership shortfalls.
As of May 31, advisors partner with or mentor 148 of 156 Afghan
National Army units and 223 of 239 Afghan National Police units.
Embedded coalition military personnel live and fight with their ANSF
partners, which enables coalition forces to provide additional on-the-
job training, prevent and address corruption, and demonstrate how a
professional military conducts its operations.
Literacy training has also improved ANSF performance and morale and
the NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan projects more than 50 percent of
the ANSF will achieve third-grade literacy by 2012. A more literate
force will increasingly allow the Afghans to develop the necessary
enablers and combat support systems to develop self-sufficiency.
Officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) leader shortfalls have
been a key impediment in the quality development of the ANSF, but
leader gaps are also closing. Officer Candidate School, the National
Military Academy, and strengthened NCO training programs, combined with
improved Afghan Ministry of Interior and Defense personnel policies
that are addressing problems of attrition and retention, are enabling a
new generation of better trained and qualified ANSF officers to ascend
in the leadership ranks.
iraq
Question. The U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement will result in the
departure of United States military forces from Iraq by the end of
2011. Both of you have testified that, if asked by the Government of
Iraq to do so, the United States should keep United States armed forces
personnel in Iraq. In the absence of that, the Department of State will
be assuming several of the missions now being conducted by the United
States military.
What is your assessment of the likelihood that the Government of
Iraq will ask United States military forces to stay? By what date would
that request need to be made?
Answer. We intend to abide by our commitments in the 2008 U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement. The United States would be willing to consider a
limited United States military presence should the Iraqi Government so
request; however, to date, no such request has been made. For planning
purposes, we would like to receive any such request from Iraq as soon
as possible.
It remains unclear whether the Iraqi Government will request a
post-2011 U.S. military presence beyond the Office of Security
Cooperation--Iraq (OSC-I). The OSC-I will operate under Chief of
Mission authority and facilitate the transition from a military-led to
a civilian-led mission by continuing to support development and
modernization of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Question. Do you both still agree that United States forces should
stay in Iraq if asked?
Answer. I believe it is in our mutual interest to have a limited
U.S. military presence to help address ISFs' needs and gaps, if
requested by the Iraqi Government.
Question. What types of forces and what mission should they have if
they do stay?
Answer. We intend to abide by our commitments in the 2008 U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement. There are a number of areas where the ISF could
benefit from additional assistance, such as intelligence fusion, air
sovereignty, combined arms training, and sustainment and logistics.
However, any post-2011 U.S. military presence would require a formal
request from the Iraqi Government, which we would be willing to
consider. To date, no such request has been made.
Question. How limited can our presence be and remain effective?
Answer. Any discussion of specific military personnel numbers and
footprint at this point would be premature, as any post-2011 U.S.
military mission would require a formal request from the Iraqi
Government. To date, no such request has been made.
Question. In your assessment, what effect will the departure of
United States military forces have on the stability of Iraq?
Answer. The ISF are currently functioning well as a counter-
insurgency force and demonstrating the capability to maintain internal
security and stability in Iraq. We believe an increase in security
incidents is possible, but within the capacity of the ISF to handle.
Question. Will a complete withdrawal jeopardize the progress we
have made in the region?
Answer. We believe an increase in security incidents is possible.
However, ISF have the capacity to counter potential increases in
security incidents.
In a recent hearing by the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the
State Department indicated that it will spend close to $3 billion on
security forces in Iraq if the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement is
enforced.
Question. Would keeping United States military forces in Iraq be
more cost effective than having the Department of State contract out to
accomplish their expanded missions and their security?
Answer. It is premature to speculate on any potential cost savings
for the Department of State from a potential post-2011 United States
military presence in Iraq. Any post-2011 U.S. military mission would
require a formal request from the Iraqi Government, which we would be
willing to consider. To date, no such request has been made.
libya
Question. This month, NATO agreed to extend the mission in Libya
for 90 days until the end of September. Press reporting indicates that
Gaddafi has no intention of peacefully stepping down from power and the
United Kingdom's most senior naval officer, Admiral Stanhope, said this
week that the campaign has been a strain on UK forces and big
compromises will have to be made if the operations are extended any
longer than 6 months.
How much money are we spending every day on this campaign?
Answer. If the current tempo of support operations continues
through September 30, 2011, the DOD estimates it will spend $1.1
billion in fiscal year 2011, or approximately $3 million a day from now
to the end of the fiscal year. The amount pays to fund military
personnel pay costs, travel and sustainment of personnel, operations
(e.g., flying hours), expended munitions, supplies, airlift, drawdown
of DOD supplies (up to $25 million), and a small amount for lift and
sustainment costs for coalition partners supporting operations in
Libya. The DOD spent more per day at the beginning of the campaign due
to a higher level of kinetic operations.
Question. If NATO terminates the campaign in September and Gaddafi
is still in power, is there a plan?
Answer. It is unlikely that NATO will terminate Operation UNIFIED
PROTECTOR (OUP) until the Gaddafi regime complies with the criteria
adopted at the April 14 NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting:
--All attacks and threats of attack against civilians and civilian-
populated areas have ended;
--The regime has verifiably withdrawn to bases all military forces,
including snipers, mercenaries and other paramilitary forces,
including from all populated areas they have forcibly entered,
occupied or besieged throughout all of Libya; and
--The regime must permit immediate, full, safe, and unhindered
humanitarian access to all the people in Libya in need of
assistance.
This resolve was reiterated on June 8, when NATO and Partner
Defense Ministers issued a statement extending operations for a further
90 days from June 27, 2011. If, for some reason, NATO does not continue
OUP into the fall, it is highly likely that a small coalition of
capable allied and partner nations would continue the mission in Libya.
Again, we find the scenario of NATO terminating operations to enforce
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 highly unlikely.
china
Question. We have all been watching as the Chinese military
continues to expand and modernize their military. We have seen
concerning developments with the ``carrier killer'' missile and the J-
20 stealth fighter. There are numerous open-source reports of the
Chinese Army conducting cyber attacks on U.S. entities. Additionally,
the Chinese continue to flaunt international norms with respect to
their assertive attempts to expand their maritime territorial claims in
the East and South China Sea.
Can you please give us your assessment on the capabilities and
intentions of the Chinese military?
Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. The
country's near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential
contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military
intervention. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area
denial capabilities. China is also devoting increased attention and
resources to prepare to conduct operations beyond Taiwan and China's
immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military missions other
than war includes humanitarian assistance, noncombat evacuation
operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening
its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities
through modernization of its nuclear forces and improving other
strategic capabilities such as space and counter-space operations and
computer network operations. Recent public revelations about its
advanced fighter program and aircraft carrier underscore the progress
it is making.
Question. Can you expand on how the Chinese military expansion has
affected regional stability?
Answer. China's economic growth has increased the country's
international profile and influence, and enabled its leaders to embark
upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of the country's
military forces. China's continued investment in programs designed to
improve extended-range power projection has the potential to make
positive contributions in the delivery of international public goods--
such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism
operations--but also increases Beijing's options for military coercion
to gain diplomatic advantage, advance its interests, or resolve
disputes in its favor. The pace and scale of China's military
modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many
questions, both within the United States and the Asia-Pacific region as
a whole, about China's future intentions.
In addition, China's recent assertive behavior in the South China
Sea has raised concerns in the region, reinforcing littoral states'
appreciation for a robust and sustained United States presence.
Multiple competing territorial claims have existed for decades, but
China is increasingly confident in asserting its claims in the
resource-rich region. Although not a claimant to any territory in the
region, the United States has interests in the South China Sea, and we
remain committed to the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia as
reflected in our extensive bilateral and multilateral engagements and
defense activities with regional allies and partners.
Question. Are our forces, particularly those forward based in the
Pacific Command area of responsibility prepared to counter these
threats?
Answer. The U.S. forward presence in the region has played a key
role in ensuring decades of stability in Asia. The United States will
continue to be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens
from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world.
Although there are many demands on our forces in the Asia-Pacific, the
fiscal year 2012 defense budget ensures that we will remain prepared to
meet challenges and fulfill our security commitments in the region.
The fiscal year 2012 budget proposal would make a number of
investments that would enhance the ability of U.S. forces to project
power into the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. Chief among these is
the commencement of a new long-range bomber program.
We have worked with--and will continue to work with--our regional
allies and partners to maintain peace and ensure stability throughout
Asia. With the fiscal year 2012 budget, we intend to enhance our
forward presence in the Pacific as the most critical region for long-
term U.S. security. We will make a number of investments to ensure the
DOD has the necessary capabilities to project power into the Asia-
Pacific region and elsewhere if necessary. Examples include:
--expanding future long-range strike capabilities;
--exploiting advantages in subsurface operations;
--increasing the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base
infrastructure;
--ensuring access to space and the use of space assets;
--enhancing the robustness of key Command, Control, Communications,
and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C\4\ISR) C\4\ISR capabilities; and
--enhancing the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
taiwan arms sales
Question. I have expressed concerns in the past about additional
United States arms sales to Taiwan. Admiral Willard testified at the
PACOM hearing before this Committee that the military balance in the
Straits of Taiwan has shifted to the mainland. In my view, we would
best advance our national interest of peace in Asia by pursuing a goal
to reduce military posture across the Taiwan Strait.
What significant action could China take to ease its military
posture in the strait in a manner that was substantive enough for the
Pentagon to consider or reconsider the future arms sales to Taiwan?
Answer. We welcome steps taken by both sides of the Taiwan Strait
to improve relations. We remain committed to our one China policy based
on the Three Joint U.S.-PRC Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act.
Our one China policy has been consistent for the past eight United
States administrations. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, we
do not support independence for Taiwan, but at the same time, the
United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. If the environment changed, the relationship between China
and Taiwan continues to improve, and over time, the security
environment for Taiwan changed, then this would potentially create the
conditions for reexamining this issue. Of course, this would be an
evolutionary and a long-term process.
It is difficult to identify specific steps or actions that could
change our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs. Actions such as
removing forces, halting the missile buildup, reducing missile
stockpiles, or establishing a policy rejecting the reunification of
China by force would be welcomed steps that could be taken by the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to improve the security environment.
However, the Department's assessment of Taiwan's defense needs is not
predicated on a single Chinese action or even the combination of
several actions. Our calculus is based on our understanding of the
totality of the security environment, which not only includes actions
taken by the PRC, but also those taken by Taiwan.
In the interim, the DOD will continue to monitor military trends in
the Taiwan Strait and work with the authorities on Taiwan as they
pursue defense reform and modernization to improve the Taiwan's ability
to defend against an attack from the mainland. Organizational reforms,
improvement in joint operations, the hardening of infrastructure and
weapons systems, and long-term acquisition management are all
significant steps that will enhance Taiwan's security.
Question. Can you identify major steps that the PRC could take,
such as removing forces, halting the missile build up, reducing the
missile stock, or establishing a policy rejecting reunification of
China by force, which could change our assessment of Taiwan's defense
needs?
Answer. It is difficult to identify specific steps or actions that
could change our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs. Actions such as
removing forces, halting the missile buildup, reducing missile
stockpiles, or establishing a policy rejecting the reunification of
China by force would be welcomed steps that could be taken by the PRC
to improve the security environment. However, the Department's
assessment of Taiwan's defense needs is not predicated on a single
Chinese action or even the combination of several actions. Our calculus
is based on our understanding of the totality of the security
environment, which not only includes actions taken by the PRC, but
those taken by Taiwan.
As documented in the Department's ``Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China'' annual reports
to Congress, we remain concerned about the pace and scope of China's
military buildup including its short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, surface combatants, advanced
fighter aircraft, integrated air defense systems, and space and cyber
capabilities. We also remain concerned about the lack of transparency
surrounding the development of these capabilities.
In the interim, the DOD will continue to monitor military trends in
the Taiwan Strait and work with the authorities on Taiwan as they
pursue defense reform and modernization to improve the Taiwan's ability
to defend against an attack from the mainland. Organizational reforms,
improvement in joint operations, the hardening of infrastructure and
weapons systems, and long-term acquisition management are all
significant steps that will enhance Taiwan's security.
acquisitions
Question. Cost over-runs and delays seem to plague the Defense
acquisitions program. The Joint Strike Fighter alone is projected to
cost 80 percent more than the initial estimates and 30 percent more
than when the baseline cost was redefined 4 years ago, and I am sure it
is not the only program in this situation. In the current fiscal
environment, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify these
extreme costs.
What concrete steps are being taken to reform the acquisitions
program and when can we expect to see results?
Answer. On September 14, 2010, with my input and support, Dr.
Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)), launched an initiative called ``Better Buying
Power'' (BBP). In it, we issued a set of 23 points that indicated how
we were going to ``get more without more.'' We are implementing BBP
aggressively and are already experiencing savings on current programs.
On November 3, 2010, Dr. Carter issued BBP guidance for the Service
Secretaries and Directors of the Defense Agencies indicating that
affordability will be treated as a requirement at all Milestones and
Decision Points for our programs, and program managers will be required
to demonstrate affordability before being granted Milestone Authority
to proceed with a program. Independent cost estimates will be used to
evaluate what a program will cost based on historical data, but program
managers have been instructed to manage based on what a program should
cost. The ``should cost'' method is already being used to drive down
future costs in all acquisition programs.
Another facet of the BBP initiative is incentivizing productivity
and innovation in industry partly through use of fixed-price incentive
(firm target) contracts, where appropriate, where the reward for saving
as well as the burden of risk is appropriately shared with the
contractor. The Department is also renewing its commitment to small
business by increasing its goals and investments and placing greater
emphasis on new technology.
In line with President Obama's March 2009 memorandum on Government
contracting, the BBP initiative promotes real competition as the most
powerful tool the Department has to drive productivity. The USD(AT&L)
requires program managers to present competitive strategies to him,
even when there is not a traditional head-to-head competition. In those
cases, we will harness competitive energy at the subcontract level
where contractors can approach program managers with value engineering
change proposals to achieve program goals in the most cost-effective
manner.
counternarcotics spending in mexico and central america
Question. While the State Department is the primary U.S. agency
providing security assistance to the Mexican and Central American
Governments, according to a July 2010 report from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), ``In Mexico and Central America, the
Department of Defense provides support to U.S. and foreign agencies
with counternarcotics responsibilities which has increased in recent
years and is separate from that provided under [the] Merida
[Initiative].''
How much Defense Department funding will support the Mexican and
Central American Governments in their counternarcotics efforts in
fiscal year 2012?
Answer. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2012
includes approximately $75.5 million in DOD counternarcotics support to
Mexico; $4 million for Belize; $9 million for Guatemala; $2.7 million
for Honduras; $2.1 million for El Salvador (excluding funds to operate
and maintain the U.S. Navy's Counternarcotics Forward Operating
Location in Comalapa, El Salvador); $2.7 million for Nicaragua; $2.6
million for Costa Rica; and $8.2 million for Panama.
Question. What will that funding be used for?
Answer. U.S. Department of Defense counternarcotics (DOD CN)
support includes training, equipment, infrastructure, and information
sharing. DOD CN programs complement State Department-led security
cooperation programs, principally the Merida Initiative with Mexico and
the Central America Regional Security Initiative.
Cooperation with Mexico concentrates on helping Mexican forces
improve their tactical and operational proficiency, as well as air
mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance
capacities. Training includes air operations and maintenance,
helicopter pilot training, rule of law, tactics for urban and night
operations, logistics/resources management, maritime operations, ship
maintenance and repair, search-and-rescue and lifesaving, and
operational planning. Training includes an emphasis on intelligence-
driven and interagency operations as well as incorporating principles
of respect for human rights. Equipment includes rigid hull inflatable
boats, communications equipment, nonintrusive inspection scanners,
aircraft avionics and sensors, and navigation equipment.
Cooperation with Central America includes building and equipping
maritime forward operating sites, maintenance facilities, land border
crossing control posts and related facilities; providing intercept
boats, night vision equipment, radar equipment, ground vehicles,
ballistic flotation vests and other equipment; providing operational
support for partner country maritime interdiction; and training, which
incorporates an emphasis on respect for human rights.
In addition to providing direct support to foreign security forces,
DOD CN operates, supports, or employs U.S. intelligence, radar,
communications, computer, air and sea lift, counterdrug detection and
monitoring, technology development, and related activities. Since these
DOD activities help reduce drug trafficking and related threats to
partner countries as well as the United States, they may in part be
considered indirect support to those countries. This includes the work
of Joint Task Force--North (JTF-N), which supports drug law enforcement
agencies in the United States with an emphasis on the United States-
Mexico border region, and Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-
S), which conducts interagency and international counterdrug detection
and monitoring operations. El Salvador also hosts a critical DOD CN
Forward Operating Location to detect and monitor suspected drug
trafficking.
Question. How do you coordinate security funding for these
countries with other U.S. agencies?
Answer. Policy and strategic coordination are conducted by the DOD
primarily through Interagency Policy Coordination (IPC) committees and
related processes chaired by the national security staff which include
the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). A variety of working groups support the IPC process.
DOD requests for Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities
appropriations are coordinated with other agencies through OMB. DOD
does not request specific levels of appropriation for CN cooperation
with foreign countries, but allocates funding from the total
appropriation provided.
DOD CN support to foreign countries is requested by U.S. Military
Groups (or equivalents) after coordination with the U.S. Embassy
country team. DOD CN support may only be considered if requested by an
appropriate official of a department or agency that has counter-drug
responsibilities, as well as by an official of the recipient country.
Proposals are forwarded to the geographic combatant command (GCC) for
validation and prioritization and then to the Joint Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for consideration. U.S. Northern
Command and U.S. Southern Command are also responsible for JTF-N and
JIATF-S respectively, while the U.S. Navy is responsible for the CN
Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Comalapa, El Salvador. While JTF-N,
JIATF-S, and FOL Comalapa do not provide capacity-building support to
foreign countries, they conduct CN detection and monitoring,
information-sharing, and related international cooperation.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and
Global Threats (DASD CN>) conducts consultations with military
commands, the Armed Services, Defense agencies, and other U.S.
Government agencies to ensure that activities are prioritized and
funded in line with policy and to make budgetary adjustments. Those
processes are supplemented by a variety of working groups, program
reviews, and similar mechanisms. The DASD CN> coordinates CN policy
within DOD and other agencies, and provides policy, program, and
budgetary guidance and oversight to the military commands, Armed
Services, and Defense agencies which execute DOD CN activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Question. Since 1997, there have been 74 Nunn-McCurdy breaches
involving 47 major defense acquisition programs. The Government
Accountability Office has identified proven management practices--many
of which have been incorporated into Department of Defense (DOD)
policy, but have yet to be fully implemented in practice--that can
serve as tools to prevent DOD cost overruns. Greater adherence to
practices at key phases of the acquisition process can help reduce
weapon system costs, contain pressures for increased funding, and
better address critical warfighter needs.
What is being done within the DOD to incorporate better acquisition
practices?
Answer. With my support and input the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) launched the
Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative to reform the way we do business,
affecting all of our acquisition programs. Treating affordability as a
requirement and applying this standard at every milestone decision will
have huge impacts to the Department's overall savings and will prevent
cost overruns. Similarly, the Department's mandatory use of
competition--even when there is not a traditional head-to-head
situation--and requiring program managers to present a competitive
strategy will have profound effects on the cost of weapon systems. The
Department has set the goal of increasing the amount of contract
obligations competitively awarded every year.
The BBP initiative includes various other significant strategies to
reduce nonproductive processes and bureaucracy, to incentivize
productivity and innovation in industry, and to improve tradecraft in
services acquisition, each with detailed focus areas and goals.
Question. How does the DOD plan to incentivize acquisition program
managers and contractors to drive down acquisition costs?
Answer. Since early last year, Dr. Carter, USD(AT&L), has been
working with the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) to craft and
implement a series of initiatives geared toward gaining greater
efficiencies and productivity. On September 14, 2010, he issued a
memorandum for acquisition professionals, ``Better Buying Power (BBP):
Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense
Spending.'' He provided additional guidance with an implementation
memorandum for the CAEs on November 3, 2010. These memoranda establish
a framework for the enterprise to institutionalize the BBP reforms.
To incentivize contractors, we are increasing our use of fixed-
price-type contracts with incentives structured to reward performance
and share risks more equitably between Government and industry. Dr.
Carter and Mr. Hale, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), have
jointly issued guidance addressing conditions when savings are
realized. The intent is to seek and eliminate low-value-added
ingredients of program cost and to reward those doing so. Program
managers' and Program Executive Officers' performance will, in part, be
evaluated on this basis. Realized savings may mean additional resources
to enhance their programs, for example, by freeing up funds to buy more
warfighting capability or quantities. For industry, it means sharing in
savings realized in the form of increased profit and enhanced corporate
recognition for delivering value.
Question. How will the Department measure success in achieving
reform of its acquisition process?
Answer. The Department is measuring success by implementation of
the BBP initiative across the Department's acquisition programs. This
implementation will result in quantifiable savings for the Department.
The BBP initiative mandates treating affordability as a
requirement. Program managers must establish an affordability target as
a Key Performance Parameter equivalent for all ACAT I Milestone
programs. The 100 percent application of this standard at all Milestone
decisions will result in savings. For example, by conducting
engineering tradeoff analysis with the commencement of the Ohio-class
replacement--for example, examining the submarine design and evaluating
what could be changed in the interests of lowering costs--the Navy has
already reduced the estimated average procurement cost by 16 percent,
with a goal of reaching a 27 percent reduction. This savings would not
have been achieved without making affordability a requirement.
As a part of the BBP initiative, the Department is increasing the
use of competition to control costs of goods and services. Again,
success in this initiative will be measured by implementation; for
instance, every ACAT program milestone acquisition strategy must
contain a competitive strategy for evaluation at each milestone review.
Another measurable competition goal of the Department is to increase
the amount of contract obligations competitively awarded by 1 percent
every year.
We expect each program to have aggressive goals. These goals will
be tracked and monitored to ensure implementation and to harvest and
share good ideas with broader applicability.
Continued aggressive application of the BBP initiative will
continue to bring measurable success in terms of real cost savings to
the Department.
Many aspects of wounded warrior care in the military healthcare
system is in need of reform. The Dole-Shalala Report on military
healthcare reform has still not been fully implemented. Many wounded
warriors still find that the Medical and Physical Evaluation Board
process takes too long, is too adversarial, and is duplicative with the
VA process. Less than 40 percent of active, reserve, or guard members
were even ``somewhat'' satisfied with the disability evaluation system
and less than 50 percent said they ``completely'' or ``mostly''
understood the system.
Question. What is the status of implementing the Dole-Shalala
Report recommendations pertinent to the reform of the military health
system?
Answer. The Dole-Shalala recommendation to reform the disability
evaluation system requires considerable legislative action to fully
implement. In the meantime, the DOD and VA have implemented new
processes to improve and coordinate what was previously two separate
disability evaluation systems, while preserving DOD's requirement for
determining fitness for military duty and the VA's requirement to
compensate for disabling conditions as a result of military service.
Both Departments are committed to use existing authorities to reform
and continuously improve existing processes.
Question. What is DOD's goal for implementing a single disability
evaluation system with the VA that will ensure when wounded warriors
are discharged, they do not have to wait months with mo income or
support to access the VA medical system?
Answer. In order to address the challenges in the prior systems
created to address disability evaluation for our wounded warriors, the
Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) (a joint DOD/VA program)
was created beginning in November 2007. The DOD goal is that IDES will
be available at all Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) by September
2011. The IDES combines two previously separate and sequential systems
(the military Disability Evaluation System and the VA Compensation &
Benefit process) into one concurrent process. This simplifies
Disability evaluation processes, eliminates duplicate disability
examinations and ratings and places VA counselors (Military Service
Coordinators (MSCs)) in MTFs to ensure a smooth transition to Veteran
status. This eliminates the benefits gap, provides a VA disability
rating, (amount of benefits they will receive from VA) before leaving
the service and provides a more simple, seamless, fast and fair
Disability Evaluation System for servicemembers.
The US Family Health Plan (USFHP) designed by the Congress in 1996
provides the full TRICARE Prime benefit for military beneficiaries in
16 States and the District of Columbia for more than 115,000
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are highly satisfied with this healthcare
option. In 2010, more than 91 percent of USFHP beneficiaries were
highly satisfied with the care they received, making it the highest-
rated healthcare plan in the military health system. The fiscal year
2012 President's budget request includes a proposed legislative
provision that future enrollees in US Family Health Plan would not
remain in the plan upon reaching age 65.
Question. Shouldn't DOD be using USFHP as a model to improve access
to care and achieve better health outcomes? How are you planning to
utilize the experience of USFHP in expanding these principles across
the military health system for all beneficiaries?
Answer. Yes, DOD is currently using USFHP as a model. US Family
Health Plans, like all TRICARE contractors, have embraced the following
goals: improved health, a positive patient experience, and responsible
management of the costs; all in support of the central aim of assured
military readiness. Their emphasis on preventive care, disease
management, and enrollment of 30,000 of their 115,000 TRICARE
beneficiaries in Patient Centered Medical Homes is significant. All
TRICARE programs now offer preventive care with no copays; disease
management programs are widely available for those diagnosed with
chronic illness; and hundreds of thousands of TRICARE patients across
the Nation are enrolled in Medical Home practices.
The President's budget initiative would limit enrollment of any new
patients older than age 65 under the current financial structure. In
planning to utilize the experience of USFHP in expanding these
principles across the military health system for all beneficiaries, we
have encouraged USFHP leaders to continue to care for these patients
under Medicare and TRICARE for Life. We expect the early investment in
prevention will result in greater wellness later in life, independent
of the payment model; that loyal patients will choose to remain with
their doctors; and the Federal Government will still accrue important
savings.
The most recent data for those older than age 65, our dual-eligible
DOD/Medicare population, shows that satisfaction with the TRICARE For
Life benefit is equal to the satisfaction of USFHP enrollees. We
anticipate that this satisfaction will remain equivalent for the long
term.
Question. DOD has proposed that, after a certain date, Medicare
eligible beneficiaries will no longer be able to enroll in USFHP. What
is DOD's plan to reach out to, and work with CMS and the USFHPs to
explore options that ensure continuity of care for those beneficiaries?
Answer. The Department's primary concern is the effect of this
proposal on the beneficiaries, and we believe that there will be no
impact on continuity of care. The following plan details how DOD will
work with CMS and the USFHP's to explore options to ensure continuity
of care.
Current enrollees will be grandfathered into the program and will
see no change in their coverage. For those who enroll in the USFHP in
the future, they would be transitioned to TRICARE For Life (TFL) upon
reaching age 65, consistent with other TRICARE Prime enrollees. Under
TFL, beneficiaries will receive comprehensive healthcare coverage with
minimal out-of-pocket expenses.
Although Medicare becomes the primary payer when beneficiaries age
out of Prime, with TFL paying the difference, USFHP providers accepting
Medicare can continue to see and treat TFL beneficiaries.
Providers can also continue to manage care and referrals for their
primary care patients as well as offer disease management and
prevention program which are hallmarks of quality patient care.
The Department remains deeply committed to the continued success of
the USFHPs. These six plans, covering approximately 115,000 of our 9.6
million beneficiaries, are a valued part of our military healthcare
system. We will continue to work with the USFHPs on behalf of all of
our patients to meet the goals of improved health, a positive patient
experience, and responsible management of the costs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
minimum essential security conditions
Question. The President has made it clear that he intends to
withdraw troops from Afghanistan in the coming months, and while I am a
supporter of this drawdown, I am concerned with the security situation
on the ground for our remaining forces.
What are the minimum essential conditions in Afghanistan that can
sustain stability with a minimum level of support from the United
States and other countries?
Answer. The ability to transition provinces and districts to Afghan
security lead while reducing the support required of the United States
will depend first and foremost on the readiness and capability of
Afghan forces to provide security to the population relative to the
threat in each area. Governance and development are also crucial as
they are ultimately the keys to providing secure communities the basic
levels of services and economic opportunity that will keep them
resistant to insurgency. Continuing progress and efforts to dismantle
and defeat al Qaeda and to degrade the insurgency are also essential to
achieving these conditions. Finally, we are negotiating a strategic
partnership with Afghanistan that will help ease uncertainty in the
region by underscoring the continued United States interest in and
commitment to Afghanistan's stability and security.
joint electronic health record
Question. However, the agreement to develop a joint electronic
health record is only one step in a very difficult multi-step process.
What steps have you taken to ensure that the progress you have made
on the joint electronic health record continues, and is ultimately
successful, once you leave the Department?
Answer. I have taken critical steps with Secretary Shinseki to
ensure forward progress on the integrated electronic health record
(iEHR).
--At the highest departmental levels, we have reaffirmed our
commitment, to jointly chair recurring oversight meetings and
are establishing a robust governance structure which is
essential to the continued success of the iEHR.
--A critical component of this governance structure is the iEHR
Advisory Board, which will include clinical proponents
appointed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs,
Service Surgeons General, and their clinical counterparts from
the VA.
--Additionally, a Program Executive and the Deputy Director will be
selected jointly by the SECDEF and the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs (VA). The Program Executive will make decisions related
to requirements, design methodologies, application priorities,
implementation schedule, and deployment sequence.
integrated disability evaluation system
Question. Just last week, I met with an amputee at Bethesda who has
been in the process of getting his Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)
completed since January. This is a young man who was severely injured
several years ago and is ready to leave the service and begin the next
phase of his life. Six months is much too long for a servicemember to
languish in this process.
Will the Department of Defense commit to looking at the overall
issue of MEB timeliness and come back with a plan to improve the
process?
Answer. Yes, DOD agrees that such delays for our transitioning
servicemembers are unacceptable. The Department is committed to not
only looking at the MEB timeliness but to improving it.
wounded warriors
Question. I am concerned about the human cost of this war. We have
invested more than $421 billion in combat operations, but this war is
fought by people. Last Friday I met with Corporal Todd Nicely, 1 of 3
quadruple amputees from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What efforts are underway to better address the injuries faced by
dismounted troops?
Answer. The Department's efforts are underway to continuously study
the injuries from the current conflict and more effective ways to treat
them. For example:
--The Armed Forces Medical Examiner reviews all fatalities to
document cause of death and assesses the performance of
personal protective equipment (PPE) to document its
effectiveness and opportunities for improvement. The Services
are continually looking for ways to improve PPE to prevent
injury.
--Combat trauma surgical teams are continually improving their
techniques for care. Stateside surgical teams are enhancing
limb salvage techniques and improving amputation care.
--The U.S. Army Surgeon General (SG) recently appointed the
``Dismounted Complex Blast Injury Task Force'' which has
studied the causation, prevention, protection, treatment, and
long-term care options of these more serious and complex battle
injury patterns. The Task Force was comprised of clinical and
operational medical experts from the Departments of Defense
(DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) and solicited input from
subject matter experts in both Federal and civilian sectors.
Efforts to act upon these recommendations of the Task Force are
ongoing.
Question. Will the DOD commit to working with Secretary Shinseki to
collaboratively improve the ability of the VA to address some of the
new prosthetics provided to servicemembers? I am concerned the VA is
receiving these amputees into their system and they do not have the
capacity to properly service their new limbs.
Answer. Yes, the DOD is committed to working with Secretary
Shinseki. There is already close coordination between the two agencies
to ensure we meet the needs of our wounded warriors. Our Center of
Excellence for Extremity Injuries and Amputations will offer
opportunities to share best practices and technical innovation in
rehabilitation. Two of the current activities between VA and DOD to
improve prosthetic care are:
--evaluation of the new highly technical prostheses and the
``legacy'' less complicated devices; and
--creating a joint network of prosthetic care to improve service
delivery for servicemembers and veterans.
Oversight of this collaborative work is conducted by the VA/DOD
Joint Executive Council, composed of leaders from both agencies and the
Services.
In addition to our collaborative work on prosthetics, VA and DOD
participate in many additional joint activities, including processes to
share healthcare resources, development of clinical practice
guidelines, joint facility planning, information sharing and electronic
health record development, integrating the disability evaluation
systems, improving transitions and coordination of care, and suicide
prevention efforts. Both agencies are committed to ongoing and
developing collaborative strategies and coordinated efforts to assist
servicemembers and veterans.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
Question. What is the Department of Defense doing to recover
missing U.S. military personnel in the Global War on Terror?
Answer. Searching for and rescuing captured servicemembers in the
Global War on Terror are top priorities for the U.S. military. U.S. and
coalition forces, along with the Intelligence Community and other
agencies, continue to make every effort to facility this recovery. Upon
their return, these servicemembers will undergo a methodical process
designed to assist those who have experienced the ordeals of capture
and captivity. In addition, we continue to assist family members during
this difficult period.
Question. Please explain the purpose behind the recently directed
project #1892/AT&L 10-402 Rand Study entitled ``A review of the
Department of Defense's Plans to Disposal of its Existing Stockpile of
Chemical Weapons.'' It was reported that $500,000 was spent on this
project. Please provide the project's justification and cost.
Answer. The purpose of the RAND Study was to conduct an independent
review of DOD plans for completing destruction of the remaining
stockpiles of chemical weapons. Specific areas of review included
identifying potential schedule and cost efficiencies, determining
whether the planned acquisition strategy is most advantageous for
meeting the Government's treaty obligations and other national
priorities, and examining the current organizational construct of the
chemical demilitarization program. The study was a key element in
identifying performance and schedule risks leading to congressional
notification of a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
Increased program cost projections justified the review, which will
ensure appropriate steps are taken to maximize efficiencies in
completing destruction of the remaining U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile.
The RAND Study cost $502,000.
Question. Please explain why the study ``A review of the Department
of Defense's Plans to Disposal of its Existing Stockpile of Chemical
Weapons'' does not mention communication with the Citizens Advisory
Commissions at either ACWA site when these Commissions were
specifically established under Public Law 102-484, subtitle G, section
172 to receive citizen concerns regarding the chemical weapons disposal
program.
Answer. The RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally
funded research and development center, was commissioned to conduct an
objective independent review of DOD plans for completing destruction of
the remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons. The specific tasks
originally assigned to RAND were:
--Task 1: Review the pending (January 2010) contract between the
Government and the Bechtel-Parsons contractor team for the next
construction phase of the Blue Grass Army Depot;
--Task 2: Conduct a detailed examination of the acquisition strategy/
business plan for the ACWA program and provide recommendations
for improvement;
--Task 3: Analyze the Government's management structure for running
the ACWA and U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA)
programs; and
--Task 4: Describe an appropriate close-out plan for CMA sites.
During the study effort, Task 4, which would have more directly
involved the Citizens Advisory Commissions, was de-scoped to allow RAND
to allocate more resources to Task 2.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Chairman Inouye. So, the subcommittee will reconvene on
Wednesday, June 22, at 10:30 a.m. for our last hearing, and
we'll close our books then.
The subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., Wednesday, June 15, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m.,
Wednesday, June 22.]