- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

[Senate Hearing 112-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2011

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Cochran, Shelby, Murkowski, and
Graham.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Missile Defense Agency

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O'REILLY,
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE

Chairman Inouye. This morning we are pleased to welcome
Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), to discuss the administration's
fiscal year 2012 budget request for missile defense programs.
For fiscal year 2012, MDA is requesting $8.6 billion, an
increase of $120 million over amounts appropriated in the last
fiscal year, to support a viable homeland defense, finance
European regional defenses, continue testing the current
system, and to develop new capabilities to address emerging
threats.
Fiscal year 2012 will mark the 10-year anniversary of the
Missile Defense Agency, although its predecessor organizations
track their origins way back to 1983 when President Reagan
launched the Strategic Defense Initiative 28 years ago. Since
its inception MDA has developed and fielded highly complex
integrated missile defenses against short-range, medium-range,
and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
For the defense of our homeland, the agency has emplaced 30
ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, and for
regional defenses MDA and the Navy have delivered 23 aegis
ballistic missile defense ships capable of engaging short to
medium-range missiles. In addition, the President has tasked
MDA with carrying out the European phased adaptive approach to
provide regional missile defense for allies. Finally, MDA
continuously develops and fields upgraded capabilities to
counter evolving threats.
So, General, I congratulate you and your dedicated team at
MDA for your many, many successes. As you know, development of
these highly sophisticated systems has not always been easy,
and it carries a large price tag. For example, last year the
ground-based interceptor failed two flight tests within the
span of 11 months. From an operational perspective, this is
obvious cause for concern. From the taxpayers' standpoint,
these tests cost over $200 million apiece, so we can no longer
afford to fail.
In addition, last year the terminal high altitude area
defense (THAAD) interceptor requested some redesign work that
resulted in significant production delays. I strongly support
the THAAD program and these missiles need to be fielded.
However, it is critical that the new design works and is
producible in quantities that have been requested.
This subcommittee was also concerned last year over the
procurement strategy of the standard missile program and
redirected funding to continue buying the block 1A standard
missile since the block 1B development was delayed.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request again includes no funds
for the block 1A missile. Yet the request includes over $500
million for the procurement of 1B missiles. Although we will
not know until the test late this summer whether the redesigned
missile works, this seems like a risky strategy, especially
when the Navy requires more missiles to respond to real-world
threats than are in the inventory today.
So I look forward to hearing from you, sir, and hearing
your thoughts on how you plan to address the challenges
mentioned.
However, before we proceed I'd like to turn to the vice
chairman of the subcommittee for any remarks he may wish to
make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm very pleased
to join you in welcoming General O'Reilly to be here today to
testify before our subcommittee as we continue our review of
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 for the
Department of Defense.
Specifically, we are interested in the provisions relating
to our missile defense capabilities. We recognize the
seriousness of purpose that this office requires of General
O'Reilly and we appreciate the experience and know-how he
brings to this task. He's got a very challenging job. We look
forward to hearing the testimony and working with him and
others in the Department of Defense on making sure that we are
allocating the funds we need and that they are justified and
that they will lead to the development and deployment of an
effective missile defense system.
Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I too would join you and
Senator Cochran in welcoming General O'Reilly and we look
forward to his testimony.
Chairman Inouye. Care to make a statement?
Senator Graham. Thank you. I'm ready to listen.
Chairman Inouye. Then it's your show, sir.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O'REILLY

General O'Reilly. Thank you, Chairman Inouye, Ranking
Member Cochran, and other distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today
on the Missile Defense Agency's $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012
budget request to develop protection of our Nation, our armed
forces, allies, and friends against the growing threat of
proliferating--the proliferation of increasingly capable
ballistic missiles of all ranges.
In fiscal year 2012 we propose to complete the initial
fielding of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system
for homeland defense against first generation intercontinental
ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. We are also on track to develop,
test, and deliver the phased adaptive approach to regional
defense announced by the President in September 2009. We will
deliver initial defense of Southern Europe by December of this
year, enhance that defense against medium-range ballistic
missiles in 2015, further enhance the defense of all European
NATO countries against intermediate-range ballistic missiles by
2018, and provide an early intercept capability against
missiles of all range classes by the end of this decade.
During the past year, we achieved many accomplishments,
including the first two-stage ground-based interceptor, or GBI,
flight test, the third missile intercept by the Japanese aegis
program, the lowest altitude intercept by the terminal high
altitude area defense, or THAAD, system, the destruction of two
boosting ballistic missiles with our Airborne Laser Testbed,
the collection of the most accurate missile tracks in history
by our Space Tracking and Surveillance System satellites, and a
successful intercept by Israel's Arrow 2 missile. We also
delivered 25 SM-3 1A interceptors, began THAAD interceptor
production, emplaced the 30th GBI, and completed the upgrade of
the early warning radar in Thule, Greenland.
Last year our aggressive test program also identified an
issue with the latest version of the GBI's exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle, or EKV. It's MDA's top priority to verify the
resolution of the problem by conducting extensive ground
testing this summer, conducting a non-intercept test with an
upgraded EKV and repeating the previous failed intercept test
in 2012. We suspended EKV--the resolution of the GMD test
failure is dependent upon technical progress, not funding.
We suspended the EKV production and applied funding to
rapidly initiate activities to correct the EKV problem. Thus,
our proposed fiscal year 2012 GMD program today differs from
the one we proposed in the President's budget request that we
developed prior to the latest GMD flight test failure. We are
still requesting $1.16 billion for fiscal year 2012 to recover
from the GBI flight test failure and continue to enhance the
defense of our homeland by completing Missile Field 2 at Fort
Greely, Alaska, in 2012, beginning the procurement of five new
GBIs, upgrading the early warning radar in Clear, Alaska, and
initiating the installation of a GBI communications system on
the east coast of the United States.
Today 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against
a limited ICBM attack if current regional threats successfully
develop an ICBM capability. We continually monitor intelligence
assessments, and to address the possibility that our current
GMD capability is determined to be insufficient in the future
we are developing options to increase the number of operational
GBIs and accelerate the delivery of new sensor and interceptor
capabilities.
The Department is committed to bringing to Congress soon
our strategy to hedge against uncertainties in the threat
estimates. But, given the two GBI flight test failures, the
need for a new non-intercept flight test, and the repeat of the
last flight test, we will assess the total procurement quantity
of the additional GBIs as part of the 2013 President's budget
request.
We also are on schedule to execute our phased adaptive
approach, or PAA, for regional defense. For phase 1, our first
aegis ballistic missile ship deployment, the USS Monterey, is
on station today. The latest command and control system
upgrades are being installed in the European Command and the
AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar is on track for deployment in
southern Europe by the end of this year.
Of note, a critical European PAA phase 1 milestone was
achieved in March of this year when an intermediate range
ballistic missile target was intercepted in the Pacific using
the phase 1 aegis AN/TPY-2 radar and the European Command's
command and control system, architecture, and configuration.
For phase 2, we will conduct the first flight test of the
next generation aegis interceptor, the SM-1 1B, this summer.
Additionally, the design of the aegis Ashore system began last
summer. The test site will be installed in Hawaii in 2013 and
flight testing will begin in 2014. Furthermore, the Romanian
Government recently announced the site of the aegis Ashore
system that will be operational in 2015.
For phase 3, the SM-3 block 2A interceptor has completed 57
of its 60 preliminary design reviews and is on track to support
flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018.
Key to achieving cost-effective assured missile defense and
to enable early intercepts of ballistic missiles is the
development of the Precision Tracking Space System, or PTSS,
and AirBorne InfraRed, or ABIR, missile sensor capabilities.
PTSS will provide three to six times the simultaneous tracking
capability at a small fraction of the high operations cost of
an AN/TPY-2 or ABIR air combat patrol, and the PTSS does not
require host nation basing or overflight approvals of other
countries for deployment.
Additionally, to optimize the integration of the PTSS with
all contracted activities developing our ballistic missile
defense system, we are using federally funded research and
development centers to lead an industry-government team to
develop a non-proprietary design to enable full and open
competition for the production of PTSS satellites.
For phase 4, we competitively awarded the design concept
contracts for the SM-3 2B interceptor to three industry teams
on a time line consistent with the average development of
missile interceptors, to ensure the lowest risk delivery of an
early intercept capability. While not necessary for the defense
of the United States against limited attacks by early
generation ICBMs, the SM-3 2B will augment the GMD system to
significantly increase the cost effectiveness of homeland and
regional missile defense.
Beyond PAA phase 4, we are pursuing advanced technologies,
including very efficient, lightweight, high energy laser
systems.
Finally, MDA continues to collaborate with over 20
countries and NATO in international missile defense projects
and cooperative activities.

PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, our requested fiscal year 2012 budget funds
the development and deployment of missile defense capabilities
that are adaptable, survivable, cost-effective, and tolerant of
uncertainties in intelligence estimates of both nation-state
and extremist ballistic missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
subcommittee's questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly
Good morning, Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Cochran, other
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) $8.6
billion fiscal year 2012 budget request to develop protection for our
Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and friends against a growing
threat--the proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles of
all ranges. We continue to test and improve the reliability and
performance of our homeland and regional missile defenses to defeat a
growing variety of ballistic missiles over the next decade while
posturing our Nation to respond to the uncertainties in estimates of
future missile threats. By the end of fiscal year 2012, we will
complete the initial fielding of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) system for homeland defense against first generation
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) potentially being developed
by current regional threat actors. We will also continue our initial
fielding of regional defenses against today's short-range (1,000 km or
less), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (3,000 to 5,500 km), or SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs,
respectively.
fiscal year 2010 accomplishment highlights
During this past year, we have improved our homeland defense by
emplacing the 30th Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), upgrading two
additional GBIs, installing a training node at Fort Greely, Alaska
(FGA), and completing a significant upgrade of the Early Warning Radar
in Thule, Greenland. Additionally, we had a successful two-stage Ground
Based Interceptor (GBI) booster test and conducted a three-stage GBI
intercept test where we did not achieve our primary objective, but we
did demonstrate integrated sensors and command, control, battle
management, and communication (C\2\BMC) during the longest range flight
test to date. In fiscal year 2010, we also improved our regional
defenses by converting two Aegis BMD ships, delivering 25 SM-3 IA
interceptors, and increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 20 operationally
configured BMD ships. Aegis BMD ships carrying SM-3 IA interceptors are
currently deployed and on-station in forward operating areas, including
the USS Monterey as part of the first phase of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). We also commenced production of Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Batteries 3 and 4 and the associated
interceptors. We accelerated the refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar for
phase 1 of the EPAA and installed a C\2\BMC system and prepared a
second AN/TPY-2 for deployment to U.S. Central Command. Moreover, we
successfully flew 14 target missions, including a successful intercept
of a separating MRBM with our Japanese allies using an SM-3 IA
interceptor (thus completing the first BMD Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
case), and conducted a successful intercept of a unitary SRBM with
THAAD. For future capabilities, we demonstrated the ability of the two
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites to provide
stereo, high-fidelity tracking capabilities and transfer tracks into
C\2\BMC. Our Airborne Laser Test Bed successfully destroyed two
boosting ballistic missiles. We achieved our goal of demonstrating NATO
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense interoperability with
the U.S. C\2\BMC in Joint Project Optic Windmill. Finally, we completed
United States and Israeli Government project agreements on the Arrow 3
Upper Tier Interceptor, the David's Sling Weapon System, and an Israeli
Test Bed. Recently, we supported Israel's successful intercept mission
of a separating threat missile off the coast of California.
enhancing homeland defense
MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of the most recent
GBI flight test failure, verify the resolution of the problem, and
successfully execute the previous flight test. The Failure Review Board
(FRB) has identified the most likely cause, but more ground testing
this summer and an additional non-intercept flight test in fiscal year
2012 of an upgraded GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be
required before the next intercept in late 2012. We suspended
production of the latest version of the EKV until the required design
modifications are completed and verified, and we diverted fiscal year
2011 GMD funding to expedite these modifications. Until we can resolve
this technical issue, advancement of our GMD capability is primarily
limited by technical progress, not funding.
Initiation of activities to quickly recover from the GMD flight
test failure caused us to revise our proposed fiscal year 2012 GMD
schedule of work after we developed the current fiscal year 2012
President's budget request. By deferring lower priority fiscal year
2011 activities not associated with the flight test failure resolution,
we were able to rapidly begin our resolution of the GMD flight test
issues; however, we still need the requested $1.16 billion for fiscal
year 2012 to complete the test failure resolution and the initial
fielding of the defense of our homeland against limited ICBM attacks,
including the completion of the hardened power plant and Missile Field
2 at Fort Greely Alaska.. During the suspension of EKV production, we
will accelerate the refurbishment of the existing GBI fleet, and also
begin acquiring material needed to produce new GBIs to meet our minimum
requirement of 26 operational GBIs at FGA, 4 at Vandenberg Air Force
Base (VAFB), California, and 22 GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability
testing, and spares. Given the two flight test failures, the need for a
new non-intercept flight, and a repeat of the last flight test, we will
assess the procurement quantity of additional GBIs as part of the
fiscal year 2013 President's budget request after we have confirmation
that we have resolved the EKV issue. As a hedge against uncertainties
in ICBM threat estimates, we will place Missile Field 1 in a storage
mode for possible upgrade for operational use in the future.
Additionally, we will complete the construction of a second fire
control node at FGA to allow testing or exercises to be conducted while
simultaneously controlling the operational system. We will also begin
the planning, design and environment work for a GBI In-Flight
Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data Terminal (IDT) on the east
coast of the United States by 2015. This East Coast IDT will enable
communication with GBIs launched from FGA and VAFB on longer flights,
thus improving the defense of the eastern United States against
potential ICBM threats from the Middle East. Finally, we are requesting
$177.1 millionin RDT&E funding for the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar in
fiscal year 2012, which includes software upgrades to improve its
discrimination capability.
In addition to GMD upgrades, we are requesting $222.4 million in
fiscal year 2012 for BMDS Sensors for homeland defense, including
support of the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and AN/TPY-2
radars. Integration of the Thule, Greenland radar in fiscal year 2012
will make it a fully operational UEWR in the BMDS. We will begin
upgrade of the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska for full missile
defense capability by 2016. In addition, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-
band radar will be deployed to southern Europe to provide early
tracking for both enhanced homeland and regional defense. We will
continue to upgrade system software to address new and evolving
threats, including enhancing Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI avionics, and
increasing GBI interoperability with the Command and Control, Battle
Management and Communications (C\2\BMC) system.
After last year's successful initial flight of a two-stage GBI, we
plan to conduct an intercept flight test with a two-stage GBI as a
potential hedge to allow for a longer intercept window of time if ICBMs
were launched against the United States from Northeast Asia or the
Middle East. However, as a consequence of the need to repeat the failed
three-stage GBI flight tests, we plan to delay the first intercept test
of the two-stage GBI from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014.
Finally, we will continue development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)
IIB to complement the GMD system's protection of our homeland in the
future by adding an additional layer of ICBM defense, which will
provide an early intercept capability against first generation ICBMs
within the regions from which they were launched.
hedge for protection of the united states
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. If this
capability is determined to be insufficient for protection of the U.S.
homeland based on intelligence estimations of future threats, we have
options to increase the number of operational GBIs and accelerate the
delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities. The Department is
committed to brief Congress soon on the results of our ongoing BMD
analysis and our recommended hedge strategy.
enhancing regional defense
We are also currently deploying our initial missile defense
capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. Over the next decade, we
are enhancing this initial capability by developing increasingly
capable missile defenses that can be adapted to the unique
circumstances of each Combatant Command region. In regions where
ballistic missile threats are a concern, the United States will tailor
Missile Defense Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) (like the European
PAA, or EPAA) to plan the establishment of command and control, sensor,
fire control, and interceptor infrastructures to provide fundamental
defenses and facilitate the effective surge of transportable missile
defense assets to their regions when needed.
The EPAA focuses on addressing missile defense interoperability
with NATO and our allies and partners as the threat from the Middle
East is anticipated to increase over the next decade. In November 2010,
NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to develop an Alliance
territorial missile defense capability to ``provide full coverage and
protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces
against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missiles.'' The United States has committed to provide the EPAA as a
national contribution to this capability, built on the Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) command and control system,
and we are encouraging our allies to field and provide national
capabilities as well.
Phase 1: Initial SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM Defense in Europe--to be
completed by the end of 2011.--In this phase, our goal is to achieve an
initial missile defense capability in Europe using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
weapon system with SM-3 IA interceptors, forward-based AN/TPY-2 and
SPY-1 radars, and the C\2\BMC system at Ramstein Air Force Base,
Germany, which will improve connections to NATO command and control
structures. The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired with the
AN/TPY-2 radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe
from existing SRBM, MRBM and IRBM threats. While no decision on the
location of the radar has been made, we expect to meet our 2011
deployment timeline. Additionally, THAAD batteries will be available
for deployment in this and subsequent phases. The Army activated a
second THAAD battery in October 2009, which is scheduled to complete
training by the end of calendar year 2011. We are requesting $290.5
million in RDT&E funding to enhance communications and enable THAAD's
launch-on-sensor network capability, which will allow THAAD to
intercept threat missiles tracked by many different missile defense
sensors. We also request $833.2 million for the production of 63 THAAD
interceptors, six launchers, and one Tactical Station Group to be
delivered by fiscal year 2014, and $380.2 million for the production of
two AN/TPY-2 radars. A critical EPAA phase 1 milestone was achieved in
March 2011 when an IRBM range target was intercepted in the Pacific by
a SM-3 IA interceptor using the current Aegis fire control system and
the EPAA forward based AN/TPY-2 and Command and Control architecture.
Additionally, we will conduct two critical ground tests this year to
demonstrate the EPAA Phase 1 capability for defending European allies
and deployed forces from multiple and simultaneous SRBM and MRBM
threats.
Phase 2: Enhanced MRBM Defense in Europe by 2015.--Our goal in this
phase is to provide a robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs by
launching several different interceptors to engage each threat missile
multiple times in its flight. This architecture includes the deployment
of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 weapon fire control systems with SM-3 IB
interceptors at sea and at an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Airbase in
Romania. When compared to the current SM-3 IA, the IB will have an
improved two-color seeker for greater ability to discriminate threat
Reentry Vehicles from other objects, and it will have improvements to
enhance reliability and producibility of the SM-3 IB's divert and
attitude control system. These improvements also provide greater
capability against larger sized raids. Later this summer, we will
demonstrate Aegis BMD 4.0.1 fire control and the first flight test of
the SM-3 IB interceptor. We are requesting $565.4 million for the
production of 46 SM-3 Block IB interceptors to be delivered by fiscal
year 2014 and $960 million for Aegis BMD to fund continued development
and testing of the SM-3 IB as well as upgrades to Aegis 5.0 fire
control software to support the operation of the SM-3 IB and IIA
interceptors and associated flight tests. In fiscal year 2012, we are
requesting $306.6 million to begin acquiring Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Systems (land-based SM-3) batteries--one for testing at the
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), and one for deployment in
Romania by fiscal year 2015. We request $364.1 million for the C\2\BMC
program for continued development of software and engineering to
incorporate enhanced C\2\BMC capability into the C\2\BMC battle
management architecture and enable interoperability among the BMDS
elements, incorporate boost phase tracking, and improve system-level
correlation and tracking.
Phase 3: Enhanced IRBM Defenses in Europe by 2018.--Key to
achieving more cost-effective missile defense, expanding the engagement
range of our interceptors, improving discrimination and enabling early
intercepts of ballistic missiles is our phase 3 sensor strategy. This
strategy is based on complementing our forward based AN/TPY-2 radars
with the development and deployment of the Precision Tracking Space
System (PTSS) satellites, enhanced Airborne Infrared (ABIR) capability,
and the algorithms to rapidly fuse all our data sources to provide the
most precise tracking for the GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD fire control
systems. The PTSS is the principal capability in this sensor strategy
as, unlike AN/TPY-2 and aircraft that require host nation and over
flight permissions respectively, the PTSS will provide assured,
persistent capability to detect and track large raid sizes of hostile
ballistic missiles over their entire flight in the Northern Hemisphere
and enable earlier engagements to improve both homeland and regional
defense. In sum PTSS provides three to six times the simultaneous
tracking capability of the AN/TPY-2 radars or ABIR Combat Air Patrols
at a smaller percentage of the operations and support costs.
Furthermore, to maximize competition and integration of the PTSS into
all elements of the BMDS, we are executing an acquisition strategy in
which Government federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs) develop non-proprietary preliminary designs and government
owned intellectual property, which will be used to enable full and open
competition for the production of the satellite constellation while we
are validating the performance of prototype satellites on orbit. Recent
flight tests using the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
demonstrator satellites on orbit today have repeatedly shown the
significant improvement in our ability to acquire and track ballistic
missiles.
In concert with the Phase 3 sensor architecture, the SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor is being co-developed with the Japanese Government to
nearly double the range of our SM-3 interceptors. The SM-3 IIA project
is on schedule to be deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and
at an additional Aegis Ashore site in Poland, and at sea, in 2018. The
fiscal year 2012 request for SM-3 Block IIA co-development is $424.5
million. Additional BMDS improvements during this phase include
expanded coordination of missile defense fire control systems and
improvements to radar discrimination.
Phase 4: Early Intercept Defense in Europe by 2020.--Based on the
enhanced early tracking capability of the PTSS and ABIR systems, the
SM-3 IIB will provide an early intercept (pre-apogee) capability
against MRBMs and IRBMs and provide an additional layer for a more
enhanced homeland defense against ICBMs launched from today's regional
threats. In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $123.5 million to fund
three industry teams to continue concept analysis and development of
the SM-3 IIB design while MDA develops relevant advanced propulsion and
lightweight material technologies. Advanced discrimination technologies
also will be deployed during EPAA Phase 4 including GMD's use of fused
data from the entire network of BMDS sensors (including enhancements
from PTSS and ABIR sensor capabilities) to improve homeland defense.
proving missile defense works through enhanced testing
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting nearly $1 billion of RDT&E
funding for Testing and Targets. In collaboration with the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the Operational Test
Agencies (OTAs), MDA updated its Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP).
The updated test plan (version 11.1), consisting of 53 flight tests and
74 ground tests from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016, cost-
effectively conducts increasingly complex flight tests to achieve more
objectives and enhance the realism of each test.
We will hold a series of system-level operational flight and ground
tests to demonstrate the initial capability against SRBMs and MRBMs for
theater/regional defense as well as planning in fiscal year 2012 the
first entirely operational test of the defense of the homeland by 2015.
Each operational test will be conducted as realistically as possible
and involve multiple targets of different ranges. These tests are being
planned and will be executed in concert with the BMDS Operational Test
Agencies and under the oversight of the Department of Defense Director
for Operational Test & Evaluation. The BMD system under test will be
operated by the soldiers, sailors, and airmen assigned to their
respective missile defense equipment and placed under realistic wartime
conditions to truly document the capabilities and limitations of the
system. Finally, in fiscal year 2011, THAAD will execute a near-
simultaneous engagement of an MRBM and SRBM.
developing new capabilities
After completing all of their original on-orbit testing in 2010, we
continue to operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct
cooperative tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the
capability of STSS satellites against targets of opportunity. These
tests demonstrate the ability of space sensors to provide high
precision, real-time, tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that
enable the fire control solutions BMDS interceptors. Two recent flight
tests demonstrated that STSS dramatically improved the precision of
threat missile tracks and provided more accurate fire control quality
data to the Aegis ships several minutes earlier than less accurate data
provided by organic radars in the Aegis or THAAD systems. We are
requesting $96.4 million for the STSS system in fiscal year 2012 and
are planning for an Aegis intercept in fiscal year 2013 using the STSS
data. Lessons learned from the two STSS demonstration satellites inform
PTSS development decisions. We are requesting $160.8 million for PTSS
in fiscal year 2012. The PTSS, a new program, will use simple designs
and mature technologies to provide persistent classification and
tracking capability of enemy ballistic missiles for areas of the globe
that have ballistic missile activity. PTSS project scope includes the
delivery of ground segments and the launch of the first two PTSS
spacecraft in fiscal year 2017.
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $46.9 million for the
Airborne Infrared (ABIR) program. The ABIR program will provide a
capability to track large ballistic missile raids with an airborne
forward-based sensor, decreasing the time between the enemy's launch of
the first ballistic missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile
interceptor. Initially, we will integrate an advanced sensor from the
Multi-spectral Targeting System family of infrared sensors onto an MQ-9
Reaper Remotely Piloted Vehicle to prove that we can enable Aegis fire
control solutions with forward-based airborne assets. In fiscal year
2012, using platforms and operators supplied by the Air Force, and
working closely with the Navy, we propose to continue to demonstrate
sensor performance and the ability to provide timely and accurate
ballistic missile tracking. Our objective is to integrate the ABIR
sensor into a pod that can be attached universally to the wing of a
variety of aircraft. Additionally, in fiscal year 2012 we are enhancing
our command and control capability to handle larger threat missile raid
sizes and leverage airborne and space sensor missile tracking data
networks. We will continue our development and testing of a multi-
sensor application (ABIR and space sensors) tasking and signal
processing capability that will provide data with sufficient quality to
enable Aegis, THAAD, and GMD fire control solutions for launching
interceptors.
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $96.3 million for Directed
Energy Research ($92.6 million for Airborne Laser Test Bed). Following
the successful shoot downs of liquid-fueled and solid-fueled boosting
ballistic missile targets with an airborne laser in fiscal year 2010,
the Assistant Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering designated
the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) as a science and technology test bed
for high power laser research and development. In fiscal year 2012, we
are teaming with the Air Force's Research Laboratory to use the ALTB
for testing advanced directed energy technologies and conducting beam
propagation and lethality testing. A primary objective of our directed
energy program is to continue our partnership with Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory to develop Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser System
(DPALS) technology, which offers great potential for high efficiency,
electrically driven, compact, and lightweight high energy lasers for a
wide variety of missions of interest to MDA and the Department of
Defense.
international cooperation
As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR),
developing international missile defense capacity is a key aspect of
our strategy to counter ballistic missile proliferation. In Europe, we
remain committed to working with our NATO allies to make NATO lower
layer missile defense assets interoperable with U.S. upper-tier missile
defense assets deployed under the EPAA through NATO's territorial
missile defense capability. In East Asia, we are improving missile
defenses through bilateral relationships. And in the Middle East, we
continue to work with long-term partners and pursue strengthened
cooperation with other countries that have expressed interest in
missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in missile defense projects,
studies and analyses with over 20 countries, including Australia, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, NATO,
Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates,
and the United Kingdom.
MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM-3 IIA
interceptor (Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM-3 IIA
second and third stage rocket motors and the nosecone), studying future
architectures, and supporting that Nation's SM-3 IA flight test
program. We also continue collaboration with Israel on the development
and employment of several missile defense capabilities that are
interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. In February of this year, at a U.S.
test range off the coast of California, the Arrow Weapon System
successfully intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic
missile threats facing Israel today. We are requesting $106.1 million
for Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement
and the David's Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2012. We are
working with our partners from the United Arab Emirates on the
development of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case for the THAAD system
that would represent the first sale of this capability.
Additionally, MDA is actively engaged with the Russian Federation
through three missile defense working groups led by the State
Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. We
are optimistic from the outcomes of both the NATO Russia Council
meeting at Lisbon and the U.S. bilateral working groups that we will
make meaningful progress this year in defining how we will cooperate
with the Russian Federation on missile defense, including considering
leveraging the combined early warning and surveillance radars of both
countries.
conclusion
Our fiscal year 2012 budget funds completing the initial deployment
of SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the warfighters'
near-term missile defense development priorities. In parallel, we are
developing enabling capability to create an enhanced, international
network of integrated BMD capabilities that is flexible, survivable,
cost-effective, and tolerant of uncertainties of estimates of both
nation-state and extremist ballistic missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
committee's questions.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much, General.
I'm happy that you have responded to our concerns rather
fully. But are you personally satisfied that you've been able
to identify the causes of the failures of the GMD?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am. The first cause
was a quality control problem, because we've had two failures.
We have identified and confirmed that we had an error in the
assembly process of our new EKV. I should stress that this is a
new EKV. The ones we have deployed, most of them out there,
have been successfully tested and we've seen no problems with
them. But the newest one, the first test did have a quality
control problem, which we have corrected.
When we flew the second test last December, again that
quality control problem was found to be resolved, but we ran
into another problem very late in the flight, in the last few
seconds of flight. We have assembled a nationally renowned team
of experts that's been working extensively on this. We
completed almost all of the ground testing to confirm what the
problem was and have identified that problem. We are now in the
process of correcting the problem, confirming it on the ground.
But the nature of these types of problems make it very
difficult to confirm in ground testing. So that is why I'm
proposing to have another flight test added for the GMD system
to verify the confirmation in space, and then we will proceed
on with the intercept test that we've been trying to conduct in
the last two flights.

TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE

Chairman Inouye. Are you also satisfied with the progress
being made on the THAAD?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, I am. The THAAD, we have a very
extensive test program and the component that was giving us
problems was a safety device. So it requires absolute
confirmation over an extensive series of tests that in fact
it's working properly, and the Army is independently confirming
that that component is working properly. And all of our testing
has indicated that we have resolved that issue. We have four
THAAD missiles delivered today. There are five more in
production, and we do believe we are beyond that problem and
are reaching a steady production rate on the THAAD program.
Chairman Inouye. Have you resolved the block 1B and 1A
problem?
General O'Reilly. Sir, with the block 1A we have had--over
time have indicated that in our testing we do reveal shortfalls
or concerns. We've corrected each one of them before the
previous flight test and the last series of flight tests have
shown that we have none of those issues today.
We do have an issue that still allows an intercept to
occur, but we want to confirm that it is not a greater problem
than that, and we're working that right now. We are still on
track for testing.
When we test the 1B later this summer, we actually--most of
the 1B is a 1A booster configuration. For the 1B, we did have
an issue in--not the operation of the missile, but it was more
to do with the shelf life in the environments that a Navy
missile will be exposed to. The testing on the ground to date
has indicated we have resolved that, but we have a couple more
tests in the next 2 months to validate that we will be ready
for a flight test in August.

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Chairman Inouye. As you noted in your remarks, you're
pleased with the partnership you have developed with the
Japanese on the development of the MDA. But do you have
concerns about the recent earthquake and tsunami? Will that
slow down the development?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we are working very closely with the
Japanese Government. They have been outstanding partners to
work with, meet every commitment, and are very meticulous in
their planning, and it's made it very helpful for us to work
together in the fashion which we have.
Regarding the tsunami and earthquake, it did not interrupt
the operations of our major activity in Nagoya with MHI,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. Some of their subcontractors were
affected. They were not stopped. It slowed down some
deliveries. We do not anticipate, nor does the Japanese
Government, that this will affect the ultimate delivery of the
program.
But in that regard, we do rely outside that program on some
of the foundries in Japan that develop our focal plane arrays,
and they have been affected by their proximity to their nuclear
powerplant and we are concerned about that and we work closely
with them. But that is an ongoing concern of our reliance on
only one or two foundries around the world to produce these
focal plane arrays that have wide application beyond just
missile defense.
Chairman Inouye. General, I have a few more questions, but
I'd like to call upon the vice chairman.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

General O'Reilly, I was interested in your response to the
chairman's question, questions plural. Let me ask you about the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. There were two failures
last year. Are these of particular concern to you, and if so
what are we able to do to overcome those challenges?
General O'Reilly. Sir, they are a concern to me. These are
very expensive missiles and our tests are very expensive. The
good news is we are aggressively testing these systems, and by
``aggressively'' I mean we are operating the GBI at the very
longest ranges it could ever possibly have to operate and
protect the United States.
But from that, we have uncovered a quality control problem.
We revised, because of this, both at Raytheon and Boeing and
our Defense Contract Management Agency and MDA our inspection
processes, and we have shown that we have overcome that issue
in changing processes in the plant.
The second problem was of a nature that made it extremely
difficult to uncover on the ground because of the sensitivity
of the instruments that are on board this system. We needed to
be in space. We have uncovered the problem. I believe because
we know that we will be able to correct that problem, and so
when we need the system in combat we will absolutely have one
that we can rely on.
At that, we still have a few more tests to do and, as I
said, a couple more flight tests, which will confirm that we
have in fact fixed it. I am confident we will.

ARROW 3

Senator Cochran. Yesterday we had a very persuasive speech
made in a joint session with President Netanyahu of Israel. I
was interested in hearing what your reaction is to the fact
that Israel is developing and fielding a missile defense system
to protect its nation. I wonder if you can give us an update on
the status as you understand it of the Arrow 3 and David's
Sling programs in Israel and how that fits in with our own
missile defense interests?
General O'Reilly. Senator, the Missile Defense Agency is a
co-partner to manage both of those programs with the state of
Israel. They have demonstrated--what we have established is a
program for Arrow 3 that's based on milestones, achieving
technical milestones to confirm we have the capability that
both they want and we want them to have.
Those milestones are very aggressive, more aggressive than
a U.S. program would normally take on. But I understand the
risks to their country and why they're being so aggressive.
They have successfully achieved those milestones last year, the
ones that they were supposed to achieve. As time goes on, those
technical milestones get more difficult to achieve. I do
anticipate that they will achieve those milestones. The
schedule is the question, and they are having some delays and
repeated attempts to accomplish the technical tasks that they
have to accomplish on Arrow 3.
But they have shown that they do ultimately achieve the
technical capability that they need, and we are closely
tracking that with them. So my confidence is very high they
will be successful in developing this missile capability. The
question we have is the schedule associated with that might be
a little longer than what, tracking it the way we do, than what
they're currently projecting.
On the David's Sling program, that is an exceptional
capability for short and medium-range missiles, and the David's
Sling program--also we're working with them. They've had--in
their flight tests, they have also uncovered problems, which is
the reason we do the flight tests, and they've shown that
they're very quick to react to those problems and successfully
fly afterwards.
So the David's Sling program is experiencing the type of
developmental issues that we all experience in developing new
missiles. But again, they've shown their commitment and their
technical prowess to overcome those, and we're working closely
with them. Again, the question will be not are they going to
develop this capability; it's the time line in which they will
ultimately have an operational capability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

You've talked about some of this, General O'Reilly, but
I'll get back into the GMD. This administration has scaled back
planned production and deployments of ground-based interceptors
in favor of more research and development into futuristic SM-3
block 2B missiles. You and I both agree that it's necessary to
hedge against uncertainty as we seek to develop the block 2B.
Senior defense officials, including yourself, have stated
that we need to continue modernizing and testing GBIs in the
event that the rogue ICBM threat develops more quickly than
expected or that the block 2B development encounters
unanticipated technical hurdles. Recent test failures that
you've alluded to have called into question the status of the
GBI hedge.
I understand that MDA has developed a plan to fix problems
with GBI that would cost an additional--getting into a little
money here--$281 million in 2012. Even with full funding of the
2012 GMD budget, this plan would require MDA to delay, I
understand, critical development work and to slip an intercept
test of the two-stage GBI from 2012 to 2014.
I'm confused in a way here by a recent GAO claim that the
GMD budget for 2012 could be cut by as much as $400 million
with no significant impact to the program. Do you agree with
GAO's assessment and could you explain to us what the impact of
a significant cut in 2012 would be on the GMD program?
General O'Reilly. Senator, I do not agree with the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment. If we
received a $400 million cut as they proposed, it would delay
our recovery of the program by a minimum of a year. What I
don't believe they took into account is the additional activity
that we're doing right now that required reapplying funding
from production to fixing the problem.
Senator Shelby. I assume or I believe that the problem
resides in the EKV and not the GBI booster; is that right?
General O'Reilly. That's correct, sir.

GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR

Senator Shelby. Is there any reason to delay funding for
procurement of the GBI boosters?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the GBI has no problems with the
booster. It has no problems with it. It is a matter of storage
and our supply chain management. But I do want to clarify,
there are no problems with the GBI booster. We are at a point,
though, that we were to be applying those to the EKVs and
producing those GBIs, and so we have to manage the rate at
which those boosters are produced.
Senator Shelby. You referenced earlier some quality control
in some of the failures perhaps, whatever. In your judgment, is
the architecture sound you're dealing with?
General O'Reilly. Yes. Yes, Senator, it is. This work is
very precise. When you're hitting a missile at 20,000 miles an
hour--and we have shown over and over again we can hit it
within inches of a point on an object--it requires extreme
precision. But our aerospace industry has shown that they can
have the discipline to produce those type of production
processes.
There is over 2,000 components in a GBI, and so, as we are
seeing, it's very unforgiving if there is a problem.
Senator Shelby. Very complicated.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. But we have shown we can do
this. We've adjusted our processes so that we can reliably
produce these.
Senator Shelby. And you--I know the chairman asked you this
question, basically. You feel that you have, you and your team,
have found some of the flaws in some of your testing, and
you're in the process of correcting them; is that correct?
General O'Reilly. That is correct, Senator. We found one
flaw and we are aggressively working to resolve it and prove
it.
Senator Shelby. Okay. In your testimony today you outline a
plan to conduct previously unplanned-for flight and intercept
tests of GBI to ensure that you've solved the problem with the
EKV. Do these additional tests mean that you will eventually
need to procure more GBIs than currently planned for in the
budget? In other words, you planned--with the test thing you're
into production in a sense, are you not?
General O'Reilly. Senator, it's my personal assessment--
we're still developing the budget, but it is still my personal
assessment that when we developed a previous number of GBIs
that was 52 we had assessed the need for 4 spares. However, as
you just said, in the first year since we've done that we have
consumed two in failed flight tests. I've identified the need
and proposed for another flight test, and then we have to
repeat it.
So my personal assessment is, yes, we need to procure
additional GBIs.
Senator Shelby. You've also stated previously that the
threat to U.S. interests from short-range missiles is growing
even more rapidly than the ICBM threat at the moment. One of
the assets that we have in seeking to understand and encounter
these threats is the Missile and Space Intelligence Center
(MISIC) that you work with. Can you talk about here--I don't
know if you can--about the kind of intelligence that you get
from MISIC and how it contributes to your efforts to design
defenses against short-range ballistic missiles? I know some of
that is highly classified, but you do have a working
relationship there, do you not?
General O'Reilly. Senator Shelby, we have a very strong
working relationship. It goes beyond that. It's a dependency on
MISIC, with their great resources. You're correct, we can't
talk about a lot of it, but I would like to say the accuracy of
these short-range missiles and the ease in which they now can
be launched is quite disturbing, and MISIC has been very good
at identifying that in order to reduce the uncertainty that
we're talking about of the threat. And then we can take that
through our engineering process and develop missile systems
more effectively to counter those threats.
Senator Shelby. So you have a close working relationship
there?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator Shelby, yes.

INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM

Senator Shelby. My last question, if the chairman will
indulge me. I understand that the Army has proposed
transferring its missile defense budget and program
responsibilities to the Missile Defense Agency. Programs such
as Patriot and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System, or IBCS, I believe are critical to Army
warfighters here. I worry, am concerned at times that the
arrangement could dilute Army control over these critical
systems or even put their budgets at risk.
Could you explain for the subcommittee the status and the
details of this proposal? Will the budget for Patriot and IBCS
be protected if MDA controls some or all the funding? Has that
crossed your mind?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator, it has. The process in
which MDA develops its budget is a joint process that the Army
is a full partner in. The Army 2 years ago started asking me
questions about why does the Missile Defense Agency manage the
ballistic missile defense capability of every service except--
and THAAD--except the one aspect of the Patriot program, which
does have ballistic missile capability?
We have provided a lot of information to the Army and from
that the Army has been very positive on a potential transfer,
but not this year, in the fiscal year 2013 timeframe, for a
change. That is still being deliberated in the Department. A
final decision hasn't been made on that.
However, I would--to answer your question, we have very
closely coupled budget development processes that have been
established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense between MDA and
the services, so the Army does review and we actually build our
budgets together before we submit them to OSD, and then they're
reviewed again by the Joint Chiefs and others to ensure that
there is a prioritized budget that matches the Army's needs and
the Joint Chiefs' needs.
Senator Shelby. So you don't believe you would suffer in
the management of that if it came about?
General O'Reilly. Senator, no, I don't. And the particular
proposal we have made for the Army's case is literally to take
their leadership that does currently oversee Patriot; they
would become part of the Missile Defense Agency, but still they
are--they still have rating responsibilities to the Army, back
to the Army and me both.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MISSILE FIELD

General, welcome. Thank you for the time that you have
given me in talking through some of the issues that you have
before you.
I'd like to ask just for perhaps a more general description
of the plans as they relate to Fort Greely and the intent to
place Missile Field 1 into the storage mode, in basically
mothball status, as opposed to a decommissioning; and then
further, why the launch capabilities at these three missile
fields at Fort Greely are necessary to hedge against ICBM
threats? So if you can just speak to the mothballing versus
decommissioning and then why it's so critical that we continue
to have these in place?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator. Last year's budget,
previous budget, the plan, the proposal was to decommission the
missile field, which effectively puts it in a--returns it as
much as possible to its pre-construction condition, and it
would make it very difficult in the future if we needed to use
that missile field again to bring it back into an operational
capability.
It was a test missile field, so for example it is not
hardened, it doesn't have backup power and other attributes
that we would want in an operationally hardened system.
So we have identified in this year's budget that, instead
of decommissioning the field, we put it into a storage mode.
The cost is $4 million and then every year it's about $500,000
to maintain it in that mode. But if it's in that mode, within 2
years we can complete the upgrade of that missile field and
bring it back into operation as a potential hedge.
The reason for the hedge is the uncertainty in the
intelligence estimates on exactly what is the progress being
made for successful development of ICBMs by regional threats
today in northeast Asia, such as North Korea, or in the Middle
East. And we are closely monitoring those programs, but we need
to have capability to expand if we find that the number that we
have is insufficient.
That is also the reason why we completed Missile Field 2 in
the original design, so that we have 30 operational missiles,
but we have 8 spare silos that could be very quickly, in a
matter of weeks, made operational with the test GBIs that we
are producing for test purposes, that's effectively building a
stockpile for us.
So between the additional silos and if it was deemed
necessary the ability to bring back Missile Field 1, we do have
contingency plans to have a fully operational missile site, as
we've laid out, depending on the indications and warnings from
our intelligence community.
Senator Murkowski. So essentially the $4 million that you
indicate that it will take to put it into this storage mode
allows us a level of flexibility, the option, if you will, if
we need to, to reconfigure. We have that ability. If we
decommission, we lose that flexibility; we do not have the
nimbleness--I don't know if that's a word, but we don't have
the ability to turn back as readily and in a manner that
hopefully will be a cost savings to us?
General O'Reilly. That is correct.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask you also--I think most when
they look at the ground-based midcourse defense operations Fort
Greely, given where Fort Greely sits up in Alaska there, they
view this more as a defense for the west coast against any ICBM
threats that may be coming from North Korea. But I think we
recognize that the system is effective also against missile
threats to the east coast by actors that may be out there in
the Middle East. But sometimes the geography doesn't allow us
to perhaps look that broadly.
As you mention, it helps to look at a globe and figure it
out from there, rather than the world of flat maps. But the
decision to place an in-flight communications system data
terminal on the east coast by 2015, this extends the
communication with the ground-based interceptors that may be
launched from Greely or from Vandenberg on in-flights, longer
flights.
I understand that what this will do is allow for enhanced
communications capability to really help bolster that missile
defense of the east coast. Can you characterize, General, in
perhaps qualitative terms the system's effectiveness against
the missile, any missile threats that might be directed to the
east coast, and how Alaska's strategic location can contribute
to all of this? Just put that out, because we haven't had a lot
of discussion about how the east coast and this in-flight
communication system data terminal will coordinate or integrate
together.
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator. From a polar view, as you
say, from the global view, literally the globe, you will notice
that from the East--from the Middle East to the east coast or
all of the United States, the most likely trajectories are over
the poles or in the northern regions, far northern latitudes.
Therefore, Alaska actually is in a great position in order
to launch from there and have a side shot at a missile. Instead
of defending the missiles head-on, which is the most difficult
way to hit a missile, Alaska gives us the positioning, the
geometries, so that we can intercept a missile as it's passing
by, which is the highest probability of an intercept.
However, there are great ranges involved in these launches.
Due to the great distance of communication between the missile
and the fire control center at Alaska or the one in Colorado
Springs, we need the ability to talk to the missile late in
flight, because so much time goes by as that missile is flying.
We're learning about the threat missile while it is in flight,
and the more we learn--we want to pass that on to the kill
vehicle so that it has as much information as possible before
it begins its final maneuvers.
The east coast in-flight data terminal would allow us the
opportunity to communicate late in flight, where today we only
have those communications sites in Alaska and on the west coast
at Vandenberg. So this is a significant improvement to the
capability for intercepts that would occur over the Atlantic or
heading toward the southeastern United States especially.
Senator Murkowski. So it really does give us that full
umbrella of protection that we talk about when we discuss the
advantages of a missile defense system that truly does cover
all of the United States?
General O'Reilly. Yes. Today we do have coverage of the
United States, but this greatly enhances the probability of
intercepts in the first couple interceptors we launch, because
we have this opportunity now, or will have this capability, to
communicate late in a flight.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I appreciate that, General.
I know that you've spent considerable time in Alaska
looking at the operations there at Greely. I appreciate the
fact that you're willing to go up in January, when many others
would prefer to find warmer climes. But I look forward to the
opportunity to visit with you when you perhaps head north when
the daylight hours are longer and it's a little bit warmer.
General O'Reilly. Senator, we have a fantastic work force
up there.
Senator Murkowski. Yes, we do.
General O'Reilly. And when you're working with them at 50
below zero and you see their dedication and how professional
they are, we don't lose a step in that operation. That's where
that workforce shines the best, is during those parts of the
year, and it's my honor to be up there and observe that and
witness that in those extreme environments.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I think your visits help to
contribute to good strong morale and commitment to the work as
well. So we thank you for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much.

IRON DOME

General O'Reilly, you have assessed what you consider to be
the value of the Arrow program and the David's Sling program.
Can you tell us about the recent employment, deployment, of the
Iron Dome in combat? This was the first time they used this in
combat, and apparently they consider that to have been a great
success. What is your assessment?
General O'Reilly. Senator, I don't have today and did not
have responsibility for the development of Iron Dome. But I
have observed their testing and I have been to their plants
where they manufacture it, and my assessment is that it has
been very successful in intercepting the missiles that are--the
short-range, very short-range missiles, that are extremely
difficult to hit because of the very short time flight, time of
flight.
However, the issue we have or the Israelis face with the
Iron Dome is the great number of rockets and short-range
missiles that they face. Therefore, in our budget we have a
proposal to assist with the procurement for four more
batteries. So the system has shown to be effective in
developmental testing and in actual combat, or defending their
civilian populations. The issue is the great number, the sheer
volume of the threat they're facing.
In our budget, I would assist with the procurement of four
more batteries, and that is a good capability. But obviously
when you look at the threat numbers it shows how daunting a
task it is and the need for additional short-range type defense
systems.
The Army also faces that problem, the U.S. Army. So this is
one that's shared between our country--any of our countries
that have deployed forces very close in a combat theater to a
potential threat. And this is one which the United States
benefits from understanding and studying exactly how they've
been successful with the Iron Dome system.
Chairman Inouye. We have spent much time today discussing
failures, test failures and delays in production. Does that
concern you on the basis of your industrial base?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the challenge we have in this
business is that--and I fully support production decisions to
be supported by tests. But with the threat and the rate at
which the threat continues to evolve and emerge and, even more
importantly, the uncertainties associated with exactly what the
threat is due to the clandestine activities in which these
threat missiles are developed and proliferated, it makes it--we
do need to take risks at times to move forward with the supply
chain and the production of facilitization so that we can as
quickly as possible, once we've completed successful testing,
minimize the time between a decision to go to production to
actually starting to produce these missiles.
The need for long lead procurements is critical in this so
that we can begin purchasing the components that take 2 or 3
years to build before they go into final assembly. That is the
approach we're taking with the SM-3 1B. As you stated, Senator,
in your opening remarks, we do have technical development
issues, which are not unusual for an interceptor at this point.
I believe we have addressed all of them and we have no
indication that we will not be successful this summer. However,
instead of going to a full--or requesting a full production
decision based on one test for the SM-3 1B, we are proposing to
make a decision on the procurement of the long lead items in
order to keep the industrial base set and ready to go to
deliver components that, when we have subsequent tests over the
next year with the 1B, we'll have enough data so that the
operational test agencies can independently concur that this
system is ready to be fielded or go into production.
So we are balancing between the needs, which are urgent,
the technical achievement, and making sure that we have a
thoroughly tested system before we put it in the field, and we
have to balance that with the industrial base and the need to
keep the supply chain healthy.
So it is a challenge, sir, and, as I described with the 1B,
those are approaches which we're using in order to reduce the
risk to all three.
Chairman Inouye. Because of the nature of our
responsibilities--we're the Appropriations Committee--we seem
to be focusing and concentrating on failures and delays.
However, I want the record to show that the subcommittee is
very pleased with your leadership and with the work of your
team, because you've had a lot of successes. But in most cases
we cannot discuss these successes because of its
classification. But I just wanted the record to show that we
are pleased.
General O'Reilly. Thank you, Senator. I have a great, great
industry-government-FFRDC-academia team across the United
States that does this great work. And the Missile Defense
Agency, it's my honor to be their leader, but this truly shows
the prowess of our country and all of the agencies that are
involved that deliver this capability.
Chairman Inouye. I will be submitting further questions,
but may I call upon the vice chairman.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to
join you in commending the distinguished witness, the Director
of our Missile Defense Agency, on the excellent job that he has
done leading us in this very challenging enterprise and one
that is so essential to our national defense capability and the
safety and security of American citizens here and around the
world. We thank you for your service.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I just want to associate
myself with your remarks here. I think this has been a good
hearing. I appreciate General O'Reilly's candor with us. I
know, as you alluded to and I did earlier, there's a lot of
this program that's highly classified and we have to get into
it in another meeting. But I like the idea for the moment that
the General feels good about the architecture, which is very
important, the scheme that you lay out, and feels good about
correcting some of the problems that he's recognized, and he's
got an excellent team to deal with it.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Thank you, General, for your testimony today and for your
service to our Nation, and we look forward to working with you
in the coming months.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
pacific missile range facility (pmrf)
Question. General O'Reilly, can you provide the Committee a
schedule of THAAD tests that will be conducted at PMRF over the next 5
years?
Answer. THAAD tests planned for the next 5 years at PMRF are listed
below:

THAAD FLIGHT TEST SCHEDULE (U)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight test (fiscal year 2011-
fiscal year 2016) Description Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTT-12......................... Initial Operational Test to demonstrate soldiers' ability 4Q fiscal year 2011
to plan, deploy, emplace, and operate the THAAD System
using approved Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
Demonstrate THAAD closed-loop operations and engagement
functions. Demonstrate the capability to conduct a
multiple, simultaneous engagement of two Short-Range
Ballistic Missiles (SRBM).
FTT-13......................... THAAD endo-atmospheric engagement of a separating Medium- 3Q fiscal year 2012
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with associated objects.
FTT-11a........................ THAAD exo-atmospheric engagement of a complex, separating 3Q fiscal year 2013
SRBM with associated objects.
FTT-15......................... THAAD exo-atmospheric engagement of a complex, separating 3Q fiscal year 2014
maximum range MRBM using Launch-on Network Track.
FTT-17......................... THAAD operational engagement of a MRBM with associated 3Q fiscal year 2016
objects using Launch-on Network Track.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on IMTP v11.1 as approved on February 23, 2011.

Question. What is the current schedule for Aegis Ashore testing at
PMRF?
Answer. Aegis Ashore tests currently planned at PMRF are listed
below:

AEGIS ASHORE FLIGHT TEST SCHEDULE (U)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight test (fiscal year 2011-
fiscal year 2018) Description Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis Ashore Controlled Test Aegis Ashore first launch events (total of 2) 4Q fiscal year 2013
Vehicle 01 (AA CTV-01). demonstrating system ability to launch, capture, and
control the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block (Blk) IB
interceptor.
AAFTM-01 (Event 1)............. Aegis Ashore will detect, track, and engage an air- 3Q fiscal year 2014
launched Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with the
SM-3 Blk IB interceptor.
AAFTM-01 (Event 2)............. Aegis Ashore will detect, track, and engage an MRBM with 3Q fiscal year 2014
an SM-3 Blk IB interceptor using Integrated Fire Control
capability with AN/TPY2 (FB) (common designator for Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance Forward Based).
FTO-02......................... Demonstrate initial BMDS operational effectiveness 4Q fiscal year 2015
against full range of ballistic missile threats with SM-
3 Blk IB interceptor.
FTO-03......................... Demonstrate initial BMDS operational effectiveness 4Q fiscal year 2018
against full range of ballistic missile threats with SM-
3 Blk IIA interceptor.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Per IMTP v11.1 dated February 23, 2011.

Question. I understand that within a few seconds of an SM-3 missile
launch from the test Aegis Ashore facility on PMRF, it must be
determined that the missile is moving in the intended direction, and,
if not, the missile must be quickly destroyed. For safety
considerations, PMRF is likely to require an exceptionally fast
capability that can accurately determine missile condition and
location, during the first few seconds of launch, something that radar
alone may not be able to address. This is a critical requirement for
PMRF and for safety considerations in any European country where the
Aegis Ashore is deployed, since it will be in proximity to populated
areas. Please provide an update on how the Navy and MDA will address
this safety concern.
Answer. PMRF requires extra safety considerations during Aegis
Ashore/SM-3 testing that will not be required when proven systems are
deployed to Host Nations. When Aegis Ashore/SM-3 is tested at PMRF, the
range requires two independent data sources to provide SM-3 position
and velocity to enable the Flight Safety Officer to make a decision in
the first few seconds of flight as to whether the missile is flying a
nominal profile. To that end, MDA is funding two independent Early
Launch Tracking Radar's which will be installed at PMRF by fiscal year
2013 to support the Aegis Ashore/SM-3. MDA is also funding a Telemetry
Link Best Source Selector (BSS) upgrade which will provide fully
automated and seamless source selection between the multiple telemetry
antennas tracking the same link source from the missile during flight.
In addition, MDA is funding modifications to the SM-3 Blk IB flight
test configured missile to enable the existing destruct mechanism
during the first few seconds after launch. These measures ensure safety
at PMRF and allow safe developmental testing of the system to ensure it
will perform in a safe manner when fielded in populated areas. When the
system is fielded, the extra safety precautions required on the test
range are no longer needed as the system has been proven to be reliable
based on multiple successful flight tests.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
naval force structure support
Question. General O'Reilly, the Navy recently submitted a report
outlining some challenges it will face in providing the necessary force
structure to support ballistic missile defense. In this report, the
Navy admitted that it presently does not have the capacity to meet
geographic combatant commanders needs without breaking personnel
deployment lengths or dwell time rotations.
Do the Navy's concerns affect how you deploy future phases of the
Phased Adaptive Approach, and how is MDA working with the Navy to
mitigate these concerns?
Answer. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) concept took
the Aegis BMD program of record and anticipated availability of Aegis
BMD ships into consideration when developed. The Joint Staff and Navy
deploy Aegis BMD ships as requested by the Combatant Commanders and
adjudicated by the Global Force Management (GFM) process.
The Navy and MDA work collaboratively to combine resources and
maximize Aegis BMD capability development for the fleet. In a joint
review by the Secretary of the Navy and the Director of the MDA, a
Report to Congress was submitted entitled ``Additional Requirements for
Investment in Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense'' dated April 2010. In
conducting the analysis for the report, consideration was given to the
projected number of surface combatants required to provide Aegis BMD-
capable multi-mission ship presence as requested by the geographic
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Navy and MDA have jointly worked a plan for 38 funded surface
combatants with Aegis BMD (by fiscal year 2015) which reflects an
achievable balance of capacity and capability while sustaining the
requisite number of multi-mission Aegis cruisers and destroyers
deployed worldwide to meet concurrent surface combatant requirements.
The plan is consistent with the Quadrennial Defense Review force-sizing
guidance and the Navy's 30 year Shipbuilding Plan.
Navy and MDA are jointly responding to the Combatant Commanders'
(COCOM) need for operational Aegis BMD capability in a three phase
approach; through BMD upgrades to Aegis ships, Aegis Modernization
Program and new construction. Today, MDA and the Navy have upgraded 22
Aegis combatants to conduct ballistic missile defense operations.
Sixteen of these ships are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and six ships
assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has
designated Ballistic Missile Defense as a core Navy mission and looks
to populate the BMD capability throughout the Aegis Fleet to meet the
COCOM demand signal.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman Inouye. The Defense Subcommittee will reconvene
tomorrow, May 26, at 10:30 a.m. for a classified briefing from
U.S. Central Command and Africa Command. The subcommittee
stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 25, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]