[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ADDRESSING ETHNIC TENSION
IN KYRGYZSTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2011
__________
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE
SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland,
Chairman Co-Chairman
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama TOM UDALL, New Mexico
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
New York MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State
MICHAEL C. CAMUNEZ, Department of Commerce
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense
[ii]
ADDRESSING ETHNIC TENSION
IN KYRGYZSTAN
----------
June 22, 2011
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 10
MEMBER
Hon. Trent Franks (R-8), a Member of Congress from the State of
Arizona........................................................ 14
WITNESSES
Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Chairperson, Independent International
Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in
June 2010...................................................... 3
His Excellency Muktar Djumaliev, Ambassador of the Kyrgyz
Republic to the United States.................................. 16
Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace............ 23
Dr. Alisher Khamidov, Professorial Lecturer, Johns Hopkins
University (SAIS).............................................. 27
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith.................. 38
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 40
Biography of Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen.................................. 41
Prepared statement of Amb. Muktar Djumaliev...................... 44
Prepared statement of Dr. Martha Brill Olcott.................... 47
Prepared statement of Dr. Alisher Khamidov....................... 51
[iii]
ADDRESSING ETHNIC TENSION
IN KYRGYZSTAN
----------
June 22, 2011
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 1:30 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon.
Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Member present: Hon. Trent Franks (R-8), a Member of
Congress from the State of Arizona.
Witnesses present: Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Chairperson,
Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events
in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010; His Excellency Muktar
Djumaliev, Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United
States; Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Russia and
Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
and Dr. Alisher Khamidov, Professorial Lecturer, Johns Hopkins
University (SAIS).
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order, and I want to
welcome all of you to this hearing on addressing ethnic
tensions in Kyrgyzstan, the only country in Central Asia where
street protests have in recent years twice led to changes in
government. Kyrgyzstan is also the only State in Central Asia
which has experimented with a parliamentary form of a
government, so it stands out in those two very important ways.
But the focus of today's hearing is the terrible ethnic
violence that erupted one year ago this month, shortly after
the April revolution that toppled former President Bakiyev, and
what the Government of Kyrgyzstan should do to address it. In
June 2010, ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks clashed in the
southern region of Osh. By the time the worst was over, 470
people were dead, and over 400,000 displaced. Thousands of
homes and businesses were destroyed. The clashes drew a dark
shadow on the hopes engendered by the ouster of the corrupt
Bakiyev government.
To its credit, the Government of Kyrgyzstan requested an
international investigation into the events, and I certainly
commend President Otunbayeva for that initiative. A response to
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the
Events of Southern Kyrgyzstan in the June of 2010 was formed.
It released its report last month. And our first witness is
Kimmo Kiljunen, who chaired that commission.
And it is an excellent report. I am deeply concerned by its
conclusions. Especially alarming is the commission's judgment
that the systematic nature of some acts committed last June by
ethnic Kyrgyz against ethnic Uzbeks, including patterns of
murder, rape, and brutal ethnic persecution, could qualify as
crimes against humanity. It remains to be seen whether they
will be found so in a court of law and whether or not a
competent court might take on the case. In any case, such a
judgment by such a credible commission of investigation must be
taken seriously, and the Government of Kyrgyzstan must
investigate these crimes seriously and hold those responsible
to account.
I'm also disturbed that the security forces apparently were
complicit in the attacks, not only by failing to respond
adequately to stop the violence but, according to the
commission's report, in some cases even distributing weapons to
ethnic Kyrgyz or driving the armored personnel carriers which
penetrated the defenses of ethnic Uzbek neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, so far the Government has brought more cases
against ethnic Uzbeks, who make up the majority of the victims,
and there is credible evidence that torture was used to extract
confessions from these ethnic Uzbeks. This also must be
investigated--including the case of human rights defender
Azimzhan Askarov, who has been sentenced to life imprisonment,
despite his credible claim that he was tortured.
Just as disturbing is the ongoing serious human rights
abuses against ethnic Uzbeks, including torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, and unfairly conducted trials, which also
have been covered in detail by the report. Because the police
force is deeply involved in these abuses--it is almost entirely
made up of Kyrgyz--victims feel that they have nowhere to turn.
Ethnic Uzbek businessmen and migrant workers returning from
Russia are particular targets for extortion. Even with the
understandable reluctance of victims to report abuses, the
Office of the High Commissioner of the UNHCR has documented
some 680 cases of arbitrary arrest for ransom since June of
2010, as well as 70 cases of torture in detention. Ongoing
human rights violations must stop immediately, and those
responsible need to be brought to justice.
President Otunbayeva has said many things--many of the
right things in recent days. While laying a wreath in Osh to
commemorate the one-year anniversary of the violence, she
called for interethnic peace and urged that nationalism not be
used for political purposes. She has pledged to purge the
police forces, reform the judicial system and fight organized
crime.
She told the OSCE recently that, quote, ``In addition to
the reconstruction of destroyed facilities, we also face a far
more difficult task: to restore the lost trust between [both]
communities in the south. It is not easy to achieve trust after
such a complex conflict. The level of nationalism and
intolerance is very high. In the government's comments on the
commission's report: We openly admit,'' she went on to say,
``the existence of serious problems in the field of human
rights in the post-conflict period; we agree with many
criticisms of the commission in this field; we are ready to
change the situation and we need support in implementing the
commission's recommendations.''
I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be
made a part of the record, because we are pressed for some time
this afternoon. And I would also, without objection, include
opening statements from other Commissioners, many of whom are
on their way here.
First, we will hear today from Kimmo, who is a former
member of the Finnish Parliament and currently chairman of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events
in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June of 2010. He has been a colleague
of long standing at OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, a good friend
and a man who has spoken out on human rights everywhere in the
OSCE space for many years. And we will now turn to him for his
comments.
Kimmo.
DR. KIMMO KILJUNEN, CHAIRPERSON, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS IN SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTAN IN
JUNE 2010
Dr. Kiljunen. OK. Thank you very much. And I have to start
my short presentation with thanking--two things: First, that it
wasn't necessary for me to travel to Washington in this time,
due to the fact that we do have the coming week and starting
from tomorrow already the biggest summer festivity in Finland
and I would sacrifice my family--[chuckles]--to come there. So
thanks that we could organize this in this particular way,
although obviously I'm not seeing you physically, but we can
hear it from each other. And obviously I know you very well
already; before, we have been several times.
Second, thanks goes to the American Government and you
personally also, in the way that you have given strong support
for the International Inquiry Commission, which I have headed,
first, obviously, financially--United States of America was the
second-biggest financial supporter after the European Union for
the commission's work, as well as political support during the
process itself of inquiry--several experts and the competence
came from your country--but also very important of course
after, when we have published our report. I have been very
pleased that the U.S. Government has supported it and even
after that episode, which was a bit strange, that the
Kyrgyzstan Parliament condemned the report and put me
personally as a persona non grata and also asked the
prosecutor's office, as well as law enforcement authorities, to
put accountable those people who have helped us in terms of the
report preparation inside Kyrgyzstan. These were obviously
severe steps, and I'm very pleased that the international
community, including the United States Government, has
condemned that process. So these are the thanks.
Then about the commission itself, the work and some of our
conclusions, if you allow me first to say a few words about
characteristics of the inquiry-- because it was a bit sui
generis type of operation we made--there were several requests
by the international community to have an investigation on the
events in southern Kyrgyzstan last year. OSCE, European Union,
several governments, obviously the United Nations requested
this type of inquiry. But at the end it was done via this type
of independent inquiry commission, which obviously used the
terms of references of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. It's not typically the references for this type
of inquiry, when similar types of human rights violations have
taken place throughout the world.
So we used actually very much the U.N. type of formula in
terms of our mandate, and the members of the commission were
very high caliber. Myself, I was heading it, but we had seven
members altogether in the commission, including Ralph Zacklin,
the former assistant secretary general for the United National
for legal affairs; Philip Alston, who is a professor in Harvard
University from Australia, very famous international lawyer;
Rein Mullerson from Estonia, former acting foreign minister of
Estonia and also vice chancellor of the Tallinn University;
Valery Tishkov from Russia, who is a former minister for
national minorities in Russia and academician; as well as
Brigitte Horbette from France, who has been a member of the
Court of Appeal; and Yakin Erturk from Turkey, who has been the
former U.N. representative on gender-related violence. So we
had a very high-quality commission who worked throughout the
period when we started operation at the end of September.
We had around 50 researchers, specialists on the field. We
had public officials in Osh and Jalal-Abad, and we were two and
half months, close to three months, working in Kyrgyzstan. And
thanks very much for the Kyrgyzstan Government that they
obviously agreed with the terms, but they also fulfilled the
terms. So we had access to information, access to every place
where we wanted to go. We could meet every people we wanted
inside the country. Obviously, we also made interviews outside
the country among the refugees, particularly in Russia and some
other countries too. So we made a very extensive inquiry,
interviewing over 700 people, and we have lots of audiovisual,
other documentary materials in our hands.
We finalized the report so it was released in May, early
May this year. CMI, the Crisis Management Initiative, President
Ahtisaari's office in Helsinki provided the secretarial/
technical support for the commission. So I would say so that it
was in that way properly done.
Now some of the conclusions of our report--you already
mentioned some of the basics but obviously, our task was to
study first, why this tragedy happened; secondly, what
happened. Obviously our task was to look at the
responsibilities and finally, obviously, make recommendations.
And that is roughly the content of the report, and obviously
you have had it and I'm pleased that you have even read it and
commented [on] it.
In terms of why it happened, of course, the first question
in Kyrgyzstan: Who started it and when it exactly started.
Obviously the tragedy itself in Osh, the biggest violence
period was 10th to 13th or 14th of July last year. But we can
say that the whole process started on the 7th of April, when
there was an overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in Bishkek and a
new interim government took place and created and generated,
obviously, a power vacuum, particularly in the south in
Kyrgyzstan, which is a stronghold for Bakiyev, the previous
regime.
So obviously a power vacuum, particularly, is explaining
the political reasons for the tragedy. One must remember that
20 years ago, in 1990, there were similar type of violent
tragedy--roughly even the same time of the year, June, in
1990--in Osh, particularly Osh region and southern Kyrgyzstan.
There too it was the same situation, power vacuum, because the
Soviet Union was to collapse, and was collapsing, and that
generated a problem. That was actually 1991. So it was exactly
10 years ago. And that--20 years ago. And that obviously is--
was a major problem and reason for this--for the tragedy
itself.
There were three major political players which we obviously
looked very carefully in terms of political reasons. Obviously
there are former supporters of the Bakiyev regime, who had a
stronghold in the south in Kyrgyzstan. They generated during
May already several types of violent events, in Jalal-Abad
particularly, which created concern. Obviously the interim
government itself has a responsibility in the area they're
principally controlling.
And obviously one must remember that in southern Kyrgyzstan
40 percent of the population are from Uzbek origin, although in
terms of total population it's 14 percent. But in southern
Kyrgyzstan the Uzbek population is large and obviously Uzbek
political leaders start also to be activated. And that created
tensions step by step where, I would say, sowed political
fanaticism, used ethnicity as a tool and that obviously
generated the process.
There have been, obviously, and when we are looking,
criminal elements and other issues which are related, but
that's roughly the political context.
What happened? We have a very detailed narrative in our
report. I would say so it's the best account on--almost hour by
hour, day by day, suburb by suburb, both in Osh and Jalal-Abad,
where we are really describing the terrifying events, what
happened.
Then comes, obviously, questions of the responsibility.
Major issue for us was to qualify the crimes committed in terms
of humanitarian law. Obviously the figures--you already
mentioned that roughly 470, not more than 500, were killed. The
exact number is still lacking, but roughly on that range it is.
You mentioned, obviously, displaced people, 3(00,000), 400,000,
depending how we are calculating that one, or close to 100,000,
took refuge in Uzbekistan. Short time, they returned back.
And obviously it generated big, big problems. Lots of
property demolished. Seventy-four percent of the killed people
were Uzbeks; 24 percent were Kyrgyz. So that was roughly the
relations in terms of killings and obviously in the terms of
violence. In terms of properties, dwellings, particularly, it
was primarily Uzbek areas which were destroyed in terms of
dwellings. In terms of public properties, obviously it was
different parts of the cities, also Kyrgyz properties too.
Then, in terms of the responsibilities, first issue for us
was to qualify the intent in terms of international law. We
clearly came to the conclusion it's not war crime.
The second point, which was addressed, was genocide. We
couldn't--the evidence is not enough to say it was a genocide.
But in terms of the reasonable suspicion principle we used in
the terms of our investigation, it was crime against humanity.
It was widespread, it was systematic and against civilian
population particularly--and we addressed that one--
particularly attacks in 11th, 12th and 13th against Uzbek
mahalas, Uzbek suburbs. There we can say in Osh that this was a
crime against humanity, and obviously we need court to take an
investigation--prosecution investigation in order to really
beyond doubt come to that same conclusion.
Then we obviously looked at the responsibilities in Osh
individually. The task--mandate for the commission was very
clear: We shouldn't do a criminal investigation, and we
couldn't do, obviously. We didn't have the methodologies,
competence, and it was not our task either to have a criminal
investigation. It's up to the courts in Kyrgyzstan to do, and
obviously we asked them seriously to do that.
But we obviously looked how much we have evidence in terms
of individual responsibilities, and our evidence wasn't enough
to say this or that person particularly should be taken to the
court. We don't have--we don't have enough evidence. We know
that crimes were committed--particularly lots of crimes in
terms of human rights violations were committed and others too,
and obviously the court must take those up. And that's
important.
Unfortunately, as also you mention in your preliminary--
your first statement, there have been court cases, close to a
thousand already, this day, but unfortunately, major part--
major part of those court cases are against Uzbeks.
I already mentioned that 74 percent of the victims were
Uzbeks in terms of killed people. Eighty percent of the court
cases are against Uzbeks, and all who have been condemned to
date are Uzbeks. So it's obviously disproportionally--
[chuckles]--nonbalanced procedure. And unfortunately, all the
cases have been--the major evidence have been confession.
And you yourself mentioned and we have evidence that
torture has been used. And obviously that's absolutely,
absolutely major violation against--major human rights
violations. And that should be addressed seriously by the
prosecutor's office in Kyrgyzstan, as well as to check the
judicial system that it's really working properly in terms of
all Kyrgyzstan law and obviously also in terms of international
law. These are one of the major parts of our recommendations.
Then we looked obviously at the institutional
responsibilities, and of course every governments have a
responsibility to protect their people. And irrespective of
that fact, which we know, that there was a power vacuum in the
south in Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless the interim government have a
principal and had a principal responsibility to protect the
people, and obviously they failed.
The major issue is about the law enforcement bodies and
security forces, and there, unfortunately, we can clearly see
that there is a major question mark. Our conclusion is very
clearly so--that there were actually security forces present in
the area, but they were not used properly to protect the
people. They protected rather the administrative buildings,
rather than people, and that obviously is a major failure.
Furthermore, furthermore, clearly there's an evidence that
seizure of weapons by troops, military forces, police forces,
is a big question mark, and creates a complicity potential. And
we are very much asking, the commission is asking--one of the
recommendations is that there must be a very proper prosecution
investigation on the responsibilities of the security forces,
law enforcement bodies, particularly addressing the question of
seizure of the weapons. And that's a major, major, major
problem there.
Then obviously we recognized also the, let's say, less
transparent elements in the society, including the criminal
issues and narcotrafficking, these type of problematics, which
are playing a major role in southern Kyrgyzstan. They neither--
we don't have enough evidence to say this or that gang or this
or that group has been responsible, but obviously we can also
see the role, in terms of the violence.
In terms of the recommendations, there are concrete,
major--more than 50 recommendations, starting [with] very
concrete issues, where we are really asking particularly that a
strong public stand must be taken by the Kyrgyzstan Government
and authorities to condemn ethnic nationalism--ethnonationalism
in the country. That's not the way you conduct politics in any
country today, and ethnic polarizations should be avoided.
We are proposing different measures how to improve the
relations between ethnic groups in southern Kyrgyzstan, how to
improve the position of Uzbeks, also in public administration,
law enforcement bodies, in police forces as well as in judicial
systems; that it would be more balanced than today. We also
addressed the question of the Uzbek language. We are not asking
Uzbek to become an official language in the language in the
country, but certain type of position for Uzbek language in
southern Kyrgyzstan should be recognized more proper way than
today.
There are lots of those recommendations related to the
prosecution processes and court cases which should be seriously
taken. And we also are recommending a truth and reconciliation
commission should be established more fully, with international
support.
Obviously, the reconstruction operation should be started--
it has already been started, obviously, we know, but it should
be moving further, and obviously also international support is
needed there.
Then finally, we are also asking the international
community to take seriously both our recommendations, which
they have taken--and we are pleased on that one--but also
asking the High Commissioner for Human Rights of United
Nations, as well as the High Commissioner for Minorities of the
OSCE to establish monitoring and follow-up systems, and that
way support the Government of Kyrgyzstan in putting forth our
recommendations.
Finally, in our report, there's also an annex made by the
Kyrgyzstan Government. We are--this is typical nowadays in
these types of reporting that there is an annex of opinions of
the governments on the report. They are quite critical.
Obviously we understand. There are certain areas we can
dispute, but principally most important is that the government
agrees with our conclusions in the way that the
recommendations--they are saying that the major part of them
they are taking seriously, and the Government of Kyrgyzstan is
aiming to establish a special commission to implement and
monitor our recommendations. And I've already now understood
that the international community, European Union, United
Nations, OSCE, United States--your own country--several
governments have supported that initiative and are willing to
help Kyrgyzstan Government to implement our recommendations and
also creating a monitoring system.
Finally, I want to come back to what--where from I
started--concerns the decision by Kyrgyzstan Parliament. I see
that they took a very critical--why they took a very critical
position was somewhat related--that they wanted to take
distance from the commission's report, which is very, very,
very unfortunate, particularly if that distance-taking means
that they are not supporting the Government's effort to
implement the recommendations, because our aim clearly, clearly
was reconciliation. And that's very--pity if that's not
recognized.
The persona non grata position on myself is a big pity, but
more important is that I cannot agree at all--and this is a
major, major problem--if prosecutor's office or law enforcement
bodies start to somewhat harass and--as they put accountable
those people in Kyrgyzstan who had technically helped our
commission's work. I am, and the commission members--we are
outside from Kyrgyzstan, but there are really people living in
the country who have been helpful for our work, and it's out of
questions that they should be any way harassed.
And I'm very pleased that the president has indicated
that's not the case, it cannot go this way, and also has
actually indicated that the Government itself takes seriously
our recommendations and are aiming to implement them.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Kiljunen, thank you very much for your
report. Thank you for your willingness to come and provide
testimony to our commission. You had mentioned that you're
hoping people will take notice. Well, as you can see by this
Commission hearing, we have taken notice, and we're hoping to
help you to get to the bottom of what happened and especially
an accountability for those who committed, as you put it, these
crimes against humanity.
I would like to ask you, just in terms of definitions--you
know, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the U.N. convention, makes it very clear in
Article II that genocide means any of the following acts
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group--such as killing
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
the group--and then it goes on with other criteria.
In coming to your conclusion that it's a crime against
humanity as opposed to genocide--you know, it doesn't have to
be the whole group; it can be in whole or in part. Do you think
it does rise to the status of being a crime of genocide? And as
you recall, we had serious problems during the Balkan wars of
those who would not call, for example, what happened in
Srebrenica a crime of genocide. And I'm just wondering, you
know, in terms of definitions, as my first question, what your
thoughts are on that.
Dr. Kiljunen. Thanks very much for the question. Now I must
immediately admit I'm not a lawyer in international
humanitarian law. I'm not a specialist on that area. So in
terms of our report's conclusions, on that particular issue, I
relied with the high expertise which we had actually in our
commission itself. We had actually four major--[chuckles]--
lawyers in terms of international law who really looked very,
very carefully conceptually at that issue--genocide, war crime
and crime against humanity.
Our evidence is obviously based on reasonable suspicion,
that--this is not a court; it's not a tribunal where we are. So
it's not a court case itself, but we obviously have evidence.
The evidence what we have, I already indicated, in terms of
international law--and there I'm saying what they are, I am
repeating what they are saying; as am I saying, I'm not
specialist--they say that this is not a genocide. It's not in
terms of scale itself; in terms of its process itself, it's not
qualifying on those terms.
When they're looking at the concept of crime against
humanity, they're also very, very careful on that one. They
look at very carefully the Rome Statute and all those issues,
and they clearly, as I've indicated--[inaudible]--the three
basic issues and very specific events during that process,
during that strategy, particular, as I said to you, those
attacks against Uzbek mahalas in Osh in 11th and--between 11th
and the 13th of June, they were--the way it was done clearly
was crime against humanity in terms of the evidence what we
have.
Why do we say so? It was widespread. It was widespread; it
was systematic one. It was repeated in the same way in
different suburbs, in different mahalas, Uzbek mahalas of the
Osh, and same way of organizing the attacks there and also
robbing, burning and killing. And even there was also sexual
violence--also related, but that necessarily--it's one of
elements, but was very systematic one and also obviously
against civilian population. So those indications are obvious--
[inaudible]--where you can come to the conclusions, crime
against humanity.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you if I----
Dr. Kiljunen. But in terms of genocide, clearly those
experts, the international lawyers say that it wasn't on that
scale.
Mr. Smith. You mentioned that you're hoping that High
Commissioner for Human Rights Pillay will do something in
response to your report. One, have they done anything? Has the
Human Rights Council done anything in response to your report?
And with regards to the ICC, as we all know, one of the
criteria is that whether or not there's a competence and a
willingness on the part of the government where these alleged
crimes have occurred to prosecute, investigate, and prosecute
adequately, and then incarcerate those who have committed these
crimes. We know that places like Kenya, countries like Kenya,
are arguing that they have the capacity and the willingness and
the capability to do so and yet the ICC is still asking for
certain people who have committed very, very serious crimes
there. Do you believe that the Kyrgyz judicial system has the
ability to prosecute and to bring to justice those that have
committed the crimes?
Dr. Kiljunen. First, concerning the U.N. dimensions, High
Commissioner for Human Rights. They have contributed very
strongly from the start to our investigation. The [terms is
?]--we're really even--we got them from their sources. They
helped us to formulate the mandate for the commission. And in
terms of expertise in the commission work, we're relying very
much on the knowledge.
Very pleased we were obviously when our report was
released. Madame Pillay herself immediately--she was maybe one
of the first ones to reacte positively to our report and, in
Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva a few weeks ago, as you
know, you mentioned, it was clearly mentioned our report as one
of those key documents, and high commissioner of human rights
indicated that the follow-up work in terms of the high
commissioner's work inside Kyrgyzstan will look at our
recommendations, and that way they are very supportive.
As regards to ICC, International Criminal Court, there we
have a bit different situation now concerning Kyrgyzstan
because Kyrgyzstan is not part and parcel of the ICC. They are
not--that's not a signatory country for Rome Statute. And one--
that's one of the recommendations what we are really saying,
that Kyrgyzstan should sign the Rome Statute and, in that way,
that would be the preventive issue in terms of the future,
similar to other issues, and that we hope.
Your last question was related to the issue that--are we
trusting on the juridical system in Kyrgyzstan to put people
on--accountable? And here I can say, as I already indicated,
that principally we must trust in every country under juridical
systems. Practically, obviously we have recognized several
hiccups and problems which we already indicated in our report,
even that somewhat we are feeling that--and not only feeling,
but we are seeing-- that the juridical processes have been
unbalanced and that way that should be addressed seriously.
I'm very pleased and I noted very clearly here to you also
that President Roza Otunbaeva has several times addressed that
issue. Also government has said that there should be reform
even in terms of juridical system in Kyrgyzstan, that it would
be properly in future addressing these questions. And here
actually--it's one of the talks and one of the recommendations
also we have in our report--it's a powerful international
community to help in reforming the juridical system in
Kyrgyzstan.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Kiljunen, we're joined by a Co-Chairman of
the Commission, Ben Cardin, who's on a very tight schedule in
the Senate, and he has some questions or some comments.
HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Well, Kimmo, first of all, thank you for what
you've done. It's good to see you even though it's long
distance. It's nice to see----
Dr. Kiljunen. [Chuckles.] Nice to see you also.
Mr. Cardin. Looks like you're aging well. That's good. I'm
sure--
Dr. Kiljunen. [Chuckles.] See you in Belgrade hopefully.
Mr. Cardin. Good. I will be in Belgrade, so I'll look
forward to seeing you in Belgrade.
Dr. Kiljunen. Good.
Mr. Cardin. Kyrgyzstan is a country in which the OSCE was
relevant, that they really got involved, and certain issues
were certainly calmed down dramatically. And I think we can
take great pride that the process with OSCE had a major impact
in reducing the amount of violence and death.
Having said that, as your report points out, there are
significant challenges that we need to understand and confront.
Now I didn't hear your original point, but looking at the focus
of this hearing on the minorities, the Uzbeks, the question is
whether the Uzbeks have confidence in the centralized
government and whether they will--whether they'll return and
stay in Kyrgyzstan, whether they'll be able to economically
prosper in Kyrgyzstan, whether they'll get a fair share of the
governmental resources, since they are now going to have a very
minority status within the government. And these are issues
that are not easily resolved. But I thought that your report at
least helped us to understand that better, and I hope we can
continue to put a spotlight on this to make the type of
progress for representation of all people in Kyrgyzstan, and I
welcome what you've done, and I can tell you we will treat your
information with the greatest amount of attention.
Dr. Kiljunen. Thanks, and good questions. You are
addressing very well the long-term problems, myriad problems in
Kyrgyzstan, but as related to Uzbeks. One should remember that
the Uzbek community in southern Kyrgyzstan where it's a major
community--as I said, there are roughly 40 percent of the
population in Osh are Uzbek--they do actually control quite
well the economy. They are--by average they are richer than the
Kyrgyz population, which is primarily is from countryside
dominating in the south. Uzbeks are dominating in the cities.
They are more well-to-do, as I said; the Uzbek community.
But, very important, they are somewhat excluded from the
public administration, also from the politics of the country.
Similarly the Uzbeks are not represented practically at all in
law enforcement bodies. Similarly they are not represented in
juridical systems. So that there are imbalances which are
serious ones in terms of creating long-term harmony in the
society.
And obviously Kyrgyz population's economics, living
conditions, should be improved, but similar way, the Uzbek
population's participation in the public affairs of Kyrgyzstan
should be improved in order to really reconciliate in the
longer term, as I said.
These are typical minority problems, as you put it very
clearly, and OSCE obviously--the body where we are--have been--
is addressing those issues. As regards the role of OSCE in
southern Kyrgyzstan and in terms of our inquiry commission too,
it was a bit more complicated.
As you know, I am obviously--I was the special
representative of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in the Central
Asia. But OSCE itself didn't actually do the--this was
independent commission from OSCE, even independent commission
from OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. OSCE was very active after
the events, the tragic events, in southern Kyrgyzstan in terms
of trying to help to organize--reorganize or reform the police
forces south in Kyrgyzstan. That created quite strong
resistance in Kyrgyzstan and, at the end, compromise was found,
so this type of technical advisory police group was sent to the
southern Kyrgyzstan to help these type of reforms. So OSCE is
present there obviously trying to help also the reconciliation
process, but it's a long term and long process.
Mr. Cardin. Look forward to seeing you in Belgrade.
Dr. Kiljunen. Yes. Thanks.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Kiljunen, I'd like to ask just a couple of
very brief questions; if you would, as best you can, provide
answers. And again, I thank you for the gracious grant of your
time to be here via this satellite hookup. First----
Dr. Kiljunen. It's great pleasure for me not to travel
there. [Chuckles.]
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Dr. Kiljunen. So I can see you here in Helsinki.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Could you just tell us about the role
of the media during the violence? And we understand--I know
your report recommends that the Uzbek-language media be
reopened as soon as possible, and yet we note that the
Parliament has voted to ban Fergana.ru and limit international
media during the upcoming presidential election. Secondly, if
you could speak to retaliation: Has there been any retaliation
against any of those people with whom you had contact and your
group? It's very important if you could get that on the record
so we know if there has been such retaliation.
And what is--how would you characterize the reaction of
President Karimov to the crisis that erupted last year? And
finally, your ability to travel there obviously has been
revoked. Are you seeking--if you were able to travel, would you
again, you know, hop on a plane and go there, either by
yourself or with the other members of your commission? Is there
unfinished business that you need to accomplish by an in-
country visit?
Dr. Kiljunen. Thanks very much. Very good questions and--
[chuckles]--even with the very detailed questions.
First off, the role of media. You know in America, I know
in Finland, we know the present world today--media is a very
strong player. It creates the image of the reality in every
society; it influence very much in terms of formulating
opinions, and that way the responsibility of the media is
important. And in our report, we don't have very deep analysis
of the media; but what we have is very clearly indicating that
media was one of those instruments [that were ?] polarizing and
creating stigmas and creating animosities among the ethnic
groups. They--it should have been more, let's say,
reconciliatory. And that's very unfortunate. We are actually
asking in one of the recommendations is that they should create
a code of conduct, media, in terms of ethnic balance of the
society.
In terms of aftermath--and now I'm telling you my own
experience--and you as a politician, myself too--the press
conference I had in Kyrgyzstan, in Bishkek, on 3rd of May, was
an extraordinary press conference. I have never had so hostile
media environment anywhere as there. Some--sometimes they were
accusing, attacking very strongly the media representatives
against me, and they were applauding to those questions that
they made as if they would testify against me and not myself
for giving the report. So the media unfortunately plays in
Kyrgyzstan major role and unfortunately even today not
necessary helping the reconciliation. That's a severe problem
and a severe issue.
Then you ask about the retaliation in terms of the
Parliament decision concerning the people who had helped us,
and here I am open. Unfortunately there are evidence: At least
one person who have helped us, Uzbek origin, has actually left
Osh because of harassment related to his technical help to our
commission. He has took refuge first in Bishkek, and he's now
going to Kazakhstan.
So that is obviously major, major issue if there would be
more widespread--and even this one single case is terrifying--
that those people who have helped us are somewhat in jeopardy
inside the country. That's a major, major problem in terms of
the commission's integrity and in terms of future similar type
of investigation if done in any part of the world, if the
result is persona non grata for the heads of the commission, no
travel possibilities for the other commission members, or even
harassment against people who have worked. It's absolutely
impossible to accept.
Then President Karimov's role in Uzbekistan: Of course,
it's a very good question and complicated question. You
obviously remember Andijan, 2005. There was a violent episode
in Andijan, Uzbekistan, which never, never were investigated
properly by international community. Uzbekistan Government
didn't allow that to take place, although request was made by
different governments and different international
organizations.
In this case, in terms of the Kyrgyzstan, 2010, now
Uzbekistan Government has been very supportive for
international inquiry to take place; in international forums,
they have requested it; and they have been different ways
supportive. Even how they handle the refugee situation in south
and supported the Kyrgyzstan Government to balance the
situation has been both agreed in terms of Kyrgyzstan itself,
the Government of Kyrgyzstan, as well as by international
community. So in that way, President Karimov, the Uzbekistan
Government have been very constructive.
Then the last question concerning myself and my commission
members in terms of the future: Obviously--and I'm very open
here--I'm very, very sad and sorrowed that I don't have the
opportunity to travel to Kyrgyzstan. I met some deputies from
Kyrgyzstan Parliament here in Finland, a few week ago; I hope I
to--I will meet them in Belgrade; and I--we have open
discussion, and ask them openly, why you made this decision? I
suppose I'm one of the friends of your country--and I am friend
of your country--and I wanted to help in terms of
reconciliation process. Obviously I wanted to travel there. My
commission members want to go there and help in different ways,
even if the question is about the truth and reconciliation
commission, we might give advice and ideas, et cetera, et
cetera.
But now, because of the ban, obvious it's impossible. As I
said, the president office and the government has deplored the
situation. But obviously it has a legal effect because if
Parliament makes a decision, obviously it's a Parliament
decision. It's political primarily than legal, one that has
also legal consequences. And that means that I can only
contribute for Kyrgyzstan, as I hope to contribute, outside of
Kyrgyzstan today, not inside.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Kiljunen, we're joined today by Ambassador
Muktar Djumaliev who will be testifying in the second panel,
and I'm just wondering if you had a direct message that you'd
like to convey to him or a question, we'd appreciate it. Or if
you wanted to think about that for a moment, we are joined by
Congressman Trent Franks, who is chairman of the Judiciary's
Committee on the Constitution and an expert on the
Constitution, but he also wears another hat: He's the chairman
of the caucus--the House Caucus on Religious Freedom. So if you
had a question for the ambassador--or I could to right to
Chairman Franks.
Dr. Kiljunen. If I can say a few words, first to Muktar
Djumaliev, I can say he's my friend. We know each other very
well, and thanks for Muktar Djumaliev. He helped very much
originally when we were establishing the commission. He gave
guidances and took a very responsible way, understanding the
difficult tasks for the commissions, and I'm very grateful for
that one. So Muktar is in that way my friend, but also
obviously a responsible--a responsible civil servant.
I have always one question to him in this case. I hope that
he passes the message to Kyrgyzstan Government that what they
committed in terms of the--our report, saying that our
recommendations are, by major part, valid and important, that I
would like that he also confirms that one and particularly,
because the idea was to establish a special national commission
to look at our recommendations, how he sees the situation just
now in the country, in terms of establishing that special
commission to look the implementation of our recommendation and
monitor--I would like very much to hear his reactions to that
one.
Mr. Smith. OK. He will be in the witness stand just a few
minutes from now. I'd like to yield to Chairman Franks for any
questions he might have.
HON. TRENT FRANKS (R-8), A MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
ARIZONA
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith. And I just say
for those listening here, there is no one in the Congress of
the United States that has greater credibility when--as it
relates to religious freedom and human rights, than Chairman
Chris Smith. He is a hero to all of us, and we appreciate the
opportunity just to sit here with you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kiljunen, I also am grateful to you for joining us. I
know that there are plenty of things for a fellow like you to
do, but we're grateful that you've taken the time. So I just
have one question. I know you're dealing with a lot of economic
challenges there in Kyrgyzstan. And I wanted to ask you,
related to the lack of economic opportunities as well as some
of the continued harassment, really, of some of the ethnic
Uzbeks, many of them have essentially left the country, and,
for those who stay, I'm just wondering if they--if, as an
abused and disenfranchised minority population, could it create
a situation where those youth of that community are vulnerable
to recruitment by extremist organizations, Muslim extremism,
jihadist groups? Is that a potential, or is it something that
you've observed in any way?
Dr. Kiljunen. Thanks for the question. It's a very
important one because one of the major claims before the
inquiry started was that it's actually the whole tragedy was
result of religious extremism and international terrorism. Our
evidence anyhow is not actually going to that direction. We
couldn't say that it's clearly somewhat organized from abroad
or, let's say, religious extremist groups could--had utilized
opportunity and created this cause and tragedy itself. They
might have played a role; we cannot never say so. But it wasn't
systematic, and we couldn't get evidence on that one.
How in terms of future--that was your question--obviously,
obviously, always when there is a situation that disharmony is
in the society, polarized situation is in the society, obvious
that's a breeding ground for any type of extremist elements. So
potentially, yes, if the reconciliation process is not properly
taking place in Kyrgyzstan, southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly--
obviously there is a room for different types of extremism, and
I hope that that's not created the situation ripe for this
processes.
We know very well that in Fergana Valley and in that region
of Kyrgyzstan--it's next door almost--there's lots of room for
different types of extremist and terrorist movements, and then
that's why this is even more important to address seriously,
and that's why we are hoping, and I'm so pleased that the
Government of Kyrgyzstan is also willing in terms of their
reactions to our report to have for the reconciliation.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Dr. Kiljunen. Perhaps I'll just ask
one more question; that'd be all right? I would just ask you
finally, sir, what efforts or steps do you know that may be
being taken to--by the Kyrgyzstan Government to apply the rule
of law to the entire society, whether it be religious freedom
or just the general rule of law within the judicial system and
other security instruments of the State? What are those steps,
and can the OSCE ever be of further assistance in that--to that
end or to that goal?
Dr. Kiljunen. This is a very relevant question.
Particularly you should ask Muktar Djumaliev also to respond to
that one because obviously he's representing the government
there.
I know, as I said, that already the president herself has
several times addressed that question: hiccups and handicaps in
the juridical system. And I knows also that prosecutors-
general's office when we discussed that, they also recognized
the problems. But unfortunately it's a long process to reform
the juridical system, and you're absolutely correct saying that
maybe if it's requested by Kyrgyzstan authorities, maybe the
international community could seriously help in this area. I
know that European Union, for example, has in--helped in
Kazakhstan on giving this juridical system help, and we are
also recommending in our report that the--that the inter
community in that area help Kyrgyzstan Government. So I think
it's a major issue you're asking.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you again, sir, for joining us, and
thank you, Chairman Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairman Trent
Franks.
Dr. Kiljunen, thank you so much for, again, appearing
before our commission via satellite. Your report was
extraordinary. I first read about it when I was traveling, and
it came across as an AP dispatch and especially the way that
you were being, in my opinion, very much mistreated. So I want
to thank you for staying at this because you, like our
commission, in your work for years, has been very much focused
on human rights. So thank you so much.
Dr. Kiljunen. Thanks, Chris, and we'll see also you maybe
in Belgrade. Thanks very much, indeed.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. See you there.
I'd like to now welcome our next panel made up of the
ambassador, Ambassador Muktar Djumaliev, who arrived in
Washington last December to represent the Kyrgyz Republic. He
previously served as Kyrgyz ambassador to Switzerland, the
World Trade Organization and the U.N. office in Geneva as well
as deputy chief of staff to the President and first deputy of
minister of foreign trade and industry. A full bio of you as
well as our other very distinguished witnesses who will follow
on panel three will be made a part of the record.
So, Mr. Ambassador, please proceed as you would like.
HIS EXCELLENCY MUKTAR DJUMALIEV, AMBASSADOR OF THE KYRGYZ
REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED STATES
Amb. Djumaliev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening us
this meeting today. And this is a very important issue for
Kyrgyzstan, and this is a very sensitive issue, and I think
this is important for the future stability in Kyrgyzstan and
for the--all the reconciliation process. What we are discussing
today here--it's really very painful, and this is a very sad
story in Kyrgyzstan's history.
I was hearing all the comments done by Kimmo Kiljunen. And,
of course, it seems to me that the report itself--and we have
already commented and expressed by the government on the
comment by, first of all, accepting all the comments done by
the commission. And Mr. Chairman, it was the first time
experiencing when Kyrgyzstan made access for the international
investigations into its territory, and such a precedent never
happened in the post-Soviet countries.
The Government of Kyrgyzstan appreciates the importance and
value of work done by the International Inquiry Commission and
also expresses its thanks to the reputable members for their
efforts of contribution towards it to investigate the tragic
events that occurred in Kyrgyzstan.
The Government also agrees with number of conclusions and
criticism contained in the report, and it does not absolve the
responsibility for what happened. The provisional government
honestly and openly acknowledged its guilt and responsibility
on this address on June 16th, 2010, to the people of Kyrgyzstan
and the international community.
Kyrgyzstan's Government is taking and will continue to take
all necessary measures to eliminate or minimize the
consequences of the tragic conflicts and to prevent the
repetition of similar events in the future. Many of the
recommendations contained in the report have been implemented
by the Government from the day of the conflict and from the--
which was localized. Kyrgyzstan's Government will establish the
special commission to implement and monitor implementation of
the recommendations of the report and other reports and to
research related to the tragic events of 2010 in southern
Kyrgyzstan.
However, the Kyrgyz Government believes that the report
does not contain sufficient evidence to conclude that there
have been made certain acts that can qualify it as a crime
against humanity during the June events in the city of Osh.
Kyrgyz Government considers unacceptable the visible tendency
in the ICC report to take into account to a greater extent the
crimes committed only by the members of one acting group while
ignoring the deaths or the casualties suffered by the same
group and depicting another group as the single suffered and
defenseless party.
It is also important to take into account the fact that
during the conflict, there were no sufficient political,
financial, and law enforcement resources at the disposal of the
provisional government to counter the large-scale provocations
of the interethnic clashes. However, even under such
conditions, the people and the authorities of Kyrgyzstan
independently and without outside intervention managed to stop
violence and localize the conflict within a few days.
Kyrgyzstan's Government took a great effort to reconcile
the parties of the conflict to overcome the consequences of the
conflict and still proceed with this. However, there are still
tangible tensions and a number of unsolved social economic
problems in the conflict zone. In conditions of the start of
the presidential campaign, some of the conclusions of the
report can be used by the opponents of the democratic reforms
to destabilize the situation and strengthen the position of the
internal forces.
Kyrgyzstan's Government hopes that necessary conclusions
from the events of 2010 will be made by the international
community as well, including those organizations that push--
that aim to preventing and neutralizing the--eliminating
consequences of such conflicts. We have also started work on
developing and implementing the concept of ethnic development
and consolidation of the people of Kyrgyzstan.
We are doing everything possible to punish all those
responsible. All trials are held in conditions of unprecedented
openness, but the situation remains difficult, in particular
with concerns about the emotional nature of the trials, of the
resonant crimes. The new government declared its uncompromising
war against criminals and determined to stop the emerging
criminal gangs with their authorities. The government has taken
urgent measures to normalize the functioning of law enforcement
and security agencies. The Defense Council was established as a
coordinating and supervisory body. In order to effectively
combat drug trafficking, a drug control agency abolished by the
previous government has been restored.
We intend to do everything possible to create conditions to
strengthen the rule of law, a culture of political dialogue,
and open the equitable society. Within a short period of time,
we have achieved some qualitative improvements. Independent
media is functioning. The opposition has not only ample
opportunity to criticize the head of the State, but the ruling
parliamentary coalition--but also actually participates in
governing the country by leading three parliamentary committees
on budget and finance, law enforcement and the rule of law,
human rights and public organizations.
There are supervisory boards established in the ministries
to ensure transparency and accountability of the government to
the people. We are reforming the judicial system to make it
truly independent and introduce mechanisms to ensure quality
selections of judges through the council, whose composition is
formed with the participation of opposition representatives.
Mr. Chairman, that many people want to ask me today on the
Parliament's decision with regard to the Kimmo Kiljunen's
report. And as you know, after the report was released, the
situation in the country became more tense. The people of
Kyrgyzstan were expecting that the report will be objective,
balanced, and will contribute for the reconciliation, and we
still believe in it. In such a situation, while Parliament
agreed with the comments of the government, but it passed an
order to the responsible agency to take a decision on the
entering of Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen to the Kyrgyz Republic.
In this regard, the--only specialized agencies should
decide on this issue. At the same time, the President of Kyrgyz
Republic called Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic to reconsider
its decision at the meeting of the People's Assembly yesterday.
The President called the Parliament to pay more attention on
adoption of the recommendations. Since the government commenced
to the report--complemented document, the report of the
commission, we believe that the report----
Mr. Smith. A message, Djumaliev--you're at a very critical
point in your testimony, and I am loath to interrupt you--just
hold on for one second. I have two minutes to report to the
floor for a vote. There are three votes. I will be back within
10 to 15 minutes at the most. So the Commission will stand in
brief recess, and if you could then get right back to where you
are, because it is a very critical part of your testimony. So
we stand in recess for 15 minutes.
[Recess.]
The Commission will resume this hearing, and again, Mr.
Ambassador, I apologize for that delay. We had three votes.
Nothing I could do about it, but I would now yield to you.
Please continue with your statement.
Amb. Djumaliev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I was just
completing my statement by saying the--by informing you about
the decision of the Parliament on using ban for the Kimmo
Kiljunen's entry to the Parliament. So that was my final
remarks, which I just informed you that the President called
also for the Parliament to reconsider its decision. And it was
done yesterday. But at the same time, we also know that the
Parliament has accepted the recommendations--the comments of
the government, which actually accepts the recommendations of
the commission.
So therefore, what Kimmo Kiljunen says today, that's asking
me to respond as to whether Kyrgyz Government will establish
the commission for the implementation of the commission's
report--of course there is a will. There will be established
the special commission to bring together not only the report of
the international inquiry commission, but there is also a
number of reports which is filed for--six reports have been
produced after the violence. And then the commission should
work out of these reports and to establish the action plan for
the implementation of all this commission's recommendations.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much, and thank
you for that encouraging news. I'm sure Kimmo will be very--or
was very happy to hear that as well.
Just let me ask you a few questions. Can you tell us the
main components of your government's new national plan to
promote interethnic harmony, and how will that be implemented?
And if you could also speak to the credible allegations of
torture, rape, mistreatment in detention, especially rape and
torture--are those allegations being investigated, and by whom,
and are people being held to account? Are there any instances
where someone who has abused, in recent weeks, months, days--of
being himself arrested and held for those crimes?
Amb. Djumaliev. I think the--actually, the main priority
for the government is of course the plans for the
reconciliation process. This is the priority number one for the
government, and we see that this should be the priority also
not only for the government, but for all the society.
Just after the government started to develop the strategy
on interethnic development--and I believe that it is--we know
that the--all the interethnic--all the ethnic minorities and
civil society has participated in the development of this
strategic document, which will be, or which is already
presented to the public yesterday. I think this document should
be presented yesterday, and I think there is action plan for
the interethnic development which includes all the interests of
ethnic minorities there. And this is the actual action plan,
which we believe will be adopted in a few days, maybe these
days where the assembly of peoples of Kyrgyzstan is gathering
together to see these documents and to discuss the plans.
With regard to the cases and violations, rapes and
tortures, of course this happened, and nobody can deny about
that. And we have almost--more than 5,000 cases, and Kimmo
Kiljunen also informed about these cases, and of course it's a
huge cases: 5,000. The main purpose for this, of course, for us
it is to provide open, transparent, and fair, objective
judicial process for all these cases. And the President of the
Kyrgyz Republic and the government is doing--putting all the
efforts in order to--and we understand that only the fair,
objective consideration and fair, objective process can help
for the reconciliations. And we do all our efforts for the
reforms in the judicial system in the same time. We are also
working hard in order to reform our law enforcement system. We
are also working hard in order to see what was recommended by
Kiljunen's report, that he was saying that there was a lack of
representation of other ethnic groups in the judicial system,
in the law enforcement system. So all these gaps will be taken
into account, and we are in the process of this reform.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you, if I could: Do you believe that
the political will is there to empower sufficient numbers of
prosecutors to collect evidence? And you know, time is no
friend of any prosecution. And if time is allowed to elapse, I
would be concerned--I think we all would be concerned--that
people's memories might fade--even though this is very recent,
particularly for the people who have been tortured or raped or
both in prison. Is this something--if you could answer that--
but also, is this something that's going on current, real-time,
right now? Or can you assure us that the security apparatus,
the police service is not engaging in these kinds of abuses,
like right now, today?
Amb. Djumaliev. Thank you. Thank you for this question. So
it's--I cannot say that we still have such a situation right
now. That was happened. That was happened before, and we have
5,000 cases which happened on this--what you just mentioned.
I think it is clear that security forces and the law
enforcement bodies is taking under control of the situation in
the south. And we say that we have localized this situation
just in very few days, but of course that was--the violations
was--we see the report by the NGOs that there were some cases,
also, which is the most--the continuing--the violation in the
process. But every case is under the control of the law
enforcement representatives there. And there was also mention
that the OSCE representatives also--the consultancies there in
order to assist our law enforcement representatives to
proceed--how to deal with such a difficult situation, which we
faced first time in the south of the region.
And I would definitely say that right now, there is no such
a situation in which we are worrying about that. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. My understanding is that there are at least some
people in the political parties calling the OSCE community
security initiative, the small number of trainers who are
unarmed that have been deployed there--matter of fact, an
original call for 50 such unarmed OSCE trainers was rejected--
they're calling it an occupation force.
And I'm wondering--it would seem to me that right now
Kyrgyzstan needs more, not less, such trainers to have a
presence there, particularly when it comes to training police
on basic human rights norms. What's your thought about the
community service initiative? Do you welcome it? Does your
government welcome it? And more importantly, do you think it
should be expanded?
Amb. Djumaliev. Mr. Chairman, of course this was a very
sensitive issue even we started taking decision to get the OSCE
police contingent to Kyrgyzstan. And at the same time, it was
even very difficult to get Kimmo Kiljunen's commission to
Kyrgyzstan. But there was a political will that we should do
it, and we should decide that we need to make open, transparent
investigation process for all this situation.
And with regard to the OSCE, it was also the strong
resistance from the public society that we cannot allow to
get--to bring the internal police in Kyrgyzstan, that they will
investigate all the process. There was the misunderstanding
about the OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan, and I think the
government--after the consultations, after the government
provides more information to the public society. So finally, we
also find that such a formal--which is acceptable both for the
OSCE and for Kyrgyzstan--that we, at this stage, after the
conflict was localized, we invited the consultants, not the
police because, of course, the public was strongly opposed to
getting in the police into the territory of Kyrgyzstan.
Mr. Smith. What protections does someone have, particularly
in detention, not necessarily when they are finally
incarcerated but while they are still being interrogated, that
would prevent or inhibit torture being imposed upon them? And
has the Red Crescent or the International Committee for the Red
Cross or any other body like it, but especially either of those
two, been allowed unfettered access into the prisons and into
pretrial detention?
Amb. Djumaliev. At that time where I was actually in
Kyrgyzstan--and we also appreciate the Red Cross efforts, which
actually works strongly to provide any kind of assistance for
the detention places. And I think we should continue to
cooperate with Red Cross and Crescent in order to--in this
sector. I think-- in this issue--I think this is important, and
we do appreciate that they have good expertise and good
practices to deal with such an issue in such situations.
Mr. Smith. And as you know, they report only to you. Let me
add our Commission's voice in asking that your government
robustly get them into the scene. It does have a chilling
effect, if you will, on certain police misconduct if there is
an ever-increasing presence of those credible international
experts who really know how to--I mean, they don't care what
government they go to. And they'll do it here in the United
States, as you know, as they did in Guantanamo. It's important
that they have unfettered access. So I just want to add our
voice to that plea that you do more to get them into the
country. OK.
Let me ask you--there are number of reports in the media
that cite a steady exodus of Uzbeks and other minorities from
Kyrgyzstan as a result of the ongoing harassment, attacks and
threats of violence, and the loss of properties. What is the
government doing to prevent that exodus, and who are acquiring
those properties when they are confiscated?
Amb. Djumaliev. All these cases, Mr. Chairman, under the
investigation now----
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Amb. Djumaliev. ----under the investigation process--and
for me, from here, it's very difficult who are they are. And of
course this is our Kyrgyz citizens, first of all, who are
involved in all of these crimes. And the government is taking
all the efforts in order to make the open, fair, transparent
process of investigations and to prevent further on these
difficult issues.
You mentioned that before the court will conclude, it's
very difficult to say that the--differentiate whether it is
ethnic--which ethnic groups are involved in this process. But
this is the--first of all, the criminal cases-- we accept that
this is the criminal cases under the investigation process, and
we will do our best to punish for all those who are involved in
these crimes.
Mr. Smith. One final question--and I asked this of Kimmo,
if he knew anything about this: I'll never forget, in the
1980s, I joined Armando Valladares, who spent almost two
decades in Fidel Castro's gulags, was tortured without mercy,
and actually wrote a book called ``Against All Hope,''
chronicling his two decades of resistance inside the gulag.
He led the effort at the Human Rights Commission, and I was
with him in the late 1980s when he got the U.N. to do a fact-
finding mission to Cuba. And they were told they would have
unfettered access to people. There would be no retaliation. And
almost everyone who spoke to the U.N. investigators were
retaliated against.
Now, Kimmo has been to Kyrgyzstan. They have interviewed
people. They have spoken to large numbers of people. Other
investigators surely will be doing the same as time goes
forward, including indigenous people from your own country.
What kind of protections do people have who come forward with
information or already have, from when they are on board a
plane if they're internationals, so that the retaliation is not
imposed upon them and beatings and other misfortunes come their
way. Do you have anything in place to ensure no retaliation?
Amb. Djumaliev. Of course this is--this is very important--
--
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Amb. Djumaliev. ----that we would avoid the retaliation
after the report has been published. And the government has
taken all the efforts in order to prevent any kind of
provocation or repetition of such a situation after the reports
have been released. And we were waiting, actually, and it was
very difficult at that time. We commemorated the one-year
anniversary just recently, and I think that the--God bless us--
that we will pass through very difficult time of period for us.
And the government is doing all the efforts in order to
prevent.
With regard to the human rights, with the UNHCR
commissions, that we are also cooperating with the
international experts there. And just a few days ago, there was
a resolution taking on Kyrgyzstan for technical assistance in
Kyrgyzstan, and these issues also will be covered under the
technical assistance efforts of the international community.
Just after the situation happened--the interethnic violence
happened in Kyrgyzstan, that was the first resolution under the
U.N. High Commissioner commission to call the international
community to help Kyrgyzstan in preventing a repetition of such
a situation, and we are very grateful that the international
community expresses support for Kyrgyzstan. And we are open,
also, for cooperating with them because we also feel that we
have lack of experience in such a situation, and we also think
that international community also should ask, and this will be
also lessons for the international community that we were not
able to avoid such a situation in advance, that we faced this
after the June events.
Mr. Smith. Kimmo would like, I'm sure, to travel back to
Kyrgyzstan. He's denied access or entry. I hope that will be
revisited. And an analyst for the International Crisis Group
would also like to visit, and that person has been denied a
visa. That's something you could look into as to why--I mean,
the ICG on a number of countries has provided very useful
insights and very fine recommendations to countries that are
experiencing crisis, and yet their analyst can't even get into
the country. Do you know why they were denied that visa, that
person?
Amb. Djumaliev. Mr. Chairman, I just talked to the
representative of ICG and requesting this issue. I have to find
why the visa was not still issued, and I think there's--I don't
know, actually. This is my first time and I've heard that she
was not able to get visa from our embassy. But I will check it
out, and of course I think there's--there should be no reason.
With regard to Kimmo, I told you that the president doing steps
further in order to recall the Parliament to reconsider its
decision.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And I'll only conclude by two things.
First, thank you so much for making yourself available to come
into a congressional hearing of this kind--a Helsinki
Commission hearing--for your answers, which I believe are very
candid--and I thank you for that--and for your willingness to
work with our Commission going forward, especially on a number
of these items that could be very quickly addressed.
And above all, I would ask that those who have committed
crimes, that there be no--there is no statute of limitations on
crimes against humanity or any other serious capital crime, and
I would hope that those who have committed these crimes will
themselves face long jail sentences after going through a fair
and balanced prosecution. So please-- it's very important at
the end of this that it's not glossed over and somehow, in a
spirit of reconciliation, those who commit crimes don't do
time. So thank you.
Amb. Djumaliev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate it, Mr. Ambassador.
I'd like to now introduce our third panel, beginning with
Dr. Martha Olcott, a senior associate with the Russia and
Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment here in Washington.
Dr. Olcott specializes in the problems of transitions in
Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as the security
challenges in the Caspian region more generally. Dr. Olcott has
testified before the Commission before, so we welcome her back.
Then we'll hear from Dr. Alisher Khamidov, professor
lecturer at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies. Dr. Khamidov began his career as
director of the Osh Media Resource Center, a nonprofit
independent media association in southern Kyrgyzstan. He later
worked at Notre Dame University's Sanctions and Security
Project, the NEH Summer Institute and on Eurasian Civilizations
at Harvard, and at the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the
Brookings Institution. He was in Osh during the June 10th
violence, so we look forward to his firsthand account and any
suggestions that he might have for our Commission on how we
should proceed as well as the country of Kyrgyzstan.
DR. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, RUSSIA AND EURASIA
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Dr. Olcott. Thank you very much. It's an honor to be here
to testify before you today.
I would like to focus my comments, which I'm just going to
share the highlights of--and I've submitted a written
testimony--I'd like to focus my comments on the reaction to the
report of the independent international commission of inquiry,
the reaction that it evoked in Kyrgyzstan and what may be the
implications of this reaction for future political, social and
ethnic developments in the country.
I've not traveled to southern Kyrgyzstan since the June
violence. I've made six trips to Kyrgyzstan over the past 18
months, and I happened to be in Kyrgyzstan shortly after the
report was published and got to interview many of the people. I
got to talk with people of various levels of society and
government about it.
I think before I go further in my comments, I really want
to commend the stellar team that prepared the report. They put
in extraordinary effort in what was a tremendously difficult
endeavor and came up with a detailed account of terrible acts
that destroyed so many lives, and made many, many very useful
recommendations. The end product will serve as a lasting
indictment of what went wrong in the southern part of
Kyrgyzstan last June. And the recommendations they offer
reflect much thought and discussion and have provided the
President, the Government and Parliament with a great deal to
think about. And, as has been noted here today, many of them
are already under serious discussions.
I do think, as we go forward, the Government of Kyrgyzstan
deserves credit for creating the conditions necessary for the
inquiry to go forward. It really was the first of its kind in
the region.
I would make one criticism of the report, and this is
really what I'm going to focus some of my testimony on, the
reaction. The only criticism I would make of the report is that
its findings and recommendations were not presented in a way
that was designed to make them palatable for the Kyrgyz polity,
that--I'm not speaking of the findings themselves, but the
question of audience in the report was one--was the Western
audience that had really--and the international audience that
had really sent them.
And because of it, this very strong reaction--and the
people in Kyrgyzstan compare this report to their own homegrown
efforts to investigate what occurred--this very strong
homegrown action will--I fear will increase the difficulty of
implementing some of the very important recommendations that
the commission has offered.
The fact that there's been such a loud outcry against some
of its recommendations, especially--and I'll come back to this,
the fact that in the first paragraph of the recommendations,
they urge that the name of the country be changed--the fact
that there's been such a loud outcry, including the deplorable
statement that Kimmo Kiljunen is persona non grata, I think
speak to--is a great--demonstrates the amount of political
grandstanding going on in Kyrgyzstan today, but it also points
out the sharp division of power that we have in Kyrgyzstan.
We've heard today from a representative of the government.
Power is really divided right now between a president who,
since the June referendum, has very little power, actually--and
what she exercises, she exercises with enormous political
skill--with a government which has a great deal of power and
reports to a Parliament which has no experience in supervising
executive power. And this is the atmosphere in which the
recommendations are moving forward.
I think that a majority of Kyrgyz citizens would not take
exception to the vast majority of recommendations of the
report, especially those that deal with public safety and
security. And most would probably even support the majority of
recommendations on accountability and on the need for criminal
and disciplinary accountability, although they would probably
counsel you, with a semi-quasi-fatalistic mode, that it may
take longer to get these changes implemented than one would
like, having been experienced in Kyrgyzstan.
What I think most ordinary Kyrgyz citizens and political
figures find difficult to accept is the idea that Kyrgyzstan
may have been more morally culpable than--I'm sorry, that
ethnic Kyrgyz may have more morally culpable than ethnic Uzbeks
in the events of June. And this being pushed in their face by
this report is the thing, I think, that they find it really,
really difficult to accept, which is one of the reasons why the
kinds of confidence building and reconciliation that the
commission is talking about and that the president and
government have made supporting gestures towards is so
critical.
For most ethnic Kyrgyz, I think, it is important to them
that the violence lasted only a few days and that it didn't
turn into a civil war. In that, they try to take personal and
emotional satisfaction in, rather than focus on the questions
of responsibility that the report made so clear.
To me, the most controversial recommendations of the
commission from the point of view of Kyrgyz polity--and here, I
include ethnic minorities of Kyrgyzstan and not just ethnic
Kyrgyz, save the Uzbeks, is the idea that the country should
renamed, or that there should be a special status granted to
the Uzbek language, a constitutional status. This is very, very
controversial, and it is not something that is widely supported
outside of the Uzbek community.
I'm going to just switch the--we've been here really a long
time, and everything is in the testimony itself. I think it's
important, as we go forward, for us to remember that the
country is, as a whole, experiencing a trauma, the trauma that
brought down the Bakiyev Government and living in this state of
incomplete political resolution with an interim president, a
very new parliamentary system that's not supported, if public
opinion polls are to be believed, by the majority of the
population; and on top of it, this trauma in southern
Kyrgyzstan.
The trauma that's experienced is experienced differently by
those people who are in southern Kyrgyzstan and those people
who are living outside of southern Kyrgyzstan. But all groups
feel traumatized, and all groups feel aggrieved.
And it's in this environment that the recommendations go
forward. And it's in this environment that the recommendations
will be considered.
Let me just go to the very last conclusion of my testimony.
I think it's really critical that the government and the
Parliament--[chuckles]--and the President all be pressured to
try to move towards the kinds of efforts at reconciliation,
many of which are in the report.
But how should the Helsinki Commission itself respond?
Well, defending human rights--I believe that it's important
that the Helsinki Commission continue to be what you have been
for decades now, strongly defending the human rights of of the
entire population of a country, regardless of their ethnic
origin.
But I do not believe that the Helsinki Commission should,
as the independent investigative commission did at one point,
cross the line and become prescriptive about other aspects of
nation building.
The lives of ethnic minorities everywhere were disrupted
when the U.S.S.R. fell apart, and the situation is particularly
sad where people live in communities that their ancestors lived
in for generations and now find themselves as minorities. That
violence of June 2010 is a tragedy and the victims of violence
and their survivors should be compensated, while those
responsible should be held accountable.
But the shift away from Uzbek-language education is not a
tragedy, nor is the failure to rebuild Soviet cultural
institutions in southern Kyrgyzstan. In my opinion, it dilutes
the power of the human rights message when outsiders seek to
engage in that degree of nation building, even when they do so
with the best of intentions.
The political freedom of all citizens of Kyrgyzstan should
be defended equally; freedom of press, religion, assembly,
evenly applied. And the Government of Kyrgyzstan should
continue to be pressed to ensure that legal safeguards are put
in place to guarantee that local security and judicial
officials apply the law evenly regardless of the ethnicity of
the accused or are held accountable for their actions.
But it is my opinion that we cannot even the playing field
between ethnic Kyrgyz and the various ethnic minorities of the
country. And those international agencies and actors that seek
to do so risk losing their credibility with the Kyrgyz polity
and the Kyrgyz elite.
The Kyrgyz language is going to dominate in Kyrgyzstan, and
those who can't speak it--and actually, most ethnic Uzbeks
can--and those who can't speak it will have a harder time in
public life in the future. That is the pattern everywhere in
the Central Asian region and will be the Kyrgyzstan as well.
The ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan face a difficult set of
choices in coming years: adapt to the changing political
realities in Kyrgyzstan--and this doesn't mean that they
shouldn't be introduced--I mean, that there shouldn't
affirmative action pressures to make sure they're introduced in
sectors in society where they're under-represented--or think
about relocating.
These choices are not of their making, but I do not think
that international actors can do much more than press the
Kyrgyz Government to respect the basic human rights of all
their citizens. To take this more limited approach may make us
more effective in trying to ensure that peace prevails in
southern Kyrgyzstan, but there will be no guarantees.
And to not take this approach, to not focus on human rights
in its purest definition, is to risk that the most important
recommendations of the Kiljunen commission don't get their fair
hearing in Kyrgyzstan.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Please, Dr. Khamidov.
DR. ALISHER KHAMIDOV, PROFESSORIAL LECTURER, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY (SAIS)
Dr. Khamidov. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having
me here to address the important question of ethnic tensions in
my native country, Kyrgyzstan.
In June 2010, I was among those Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek
origin who fled to the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, trying to flee the
violence. Just like many other Kyrgyz citizens, I cherished
hopes that Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries, with which
Kyrgyzstan has partnership relations, would intervene to stop
the violence. Our hopes were dashed when Kyrgyzstan was told by
the Collective Security Treaty Organization uniting these
countries that it has to deal with the conflict on its own. And
so suddenly, a country where interests of many countries
overlapped became no one's backyard.
There are many explanations for what happened in south
Kyrgyzstan. There's historical explanations, saying that, oh,
these two communities, they hated each other for centuries.
There are economic explanations pointing to economic
disparities between the two groups. And there are other
explanations.
But really, the debate about causes of the conflict misses
an important issue. I would argue that, to understand last
year's violence, we need to have a more nuanced and holistic
view of Kyrgyzstan's past and present. The violent regime
change and the bloody interethnic clash in 2010 are actually
symptoms of a set of broader and longstanding challenges or, I
would call, chronic ailments that have afflicted Kyrgyzstan and
other Central Asian republics, including Russia, since
independence. If these ailments are not treated properly and
adequately, turmoil will continue to increase.
And let me briefly outline what are these ailments.
Twenty years ago, when Kyrgyzstan became independent, it
faced four key challenges or ailments. One was dealing with the
country's political institution: Should we preserve Soviet-era
political institutions, or should we build a really democratic
state?
The second challenge was that of the country's identity: Do
we want to build a country which will be a home for all ethnic
groups, or do we want to create a country which would be run by
one ethnic group?
The third challenge related to the country's economy:
Should we preserve the country's Soviet-era system with its
social perks, or should we create a country which will be
driven by market reforms?
And the final challenge was related to foreign policy.
Kyrgyzstan was a small country; now it was independent, and now
it had to deal with enormous issues of foreign policy. So the
real challenge was, do we want to build an independent foreign
policy course, or should we stick to Russia?
So those were the challenges. Twenty years later, after two
bloody ethnic conflicts, two bloody revolutions, Kyrgyzstan has
made full circle, and we're back at square one. We're still
dealing with the same challenges.
I'd like to basically address two questions here: why there
has been no progress; and the second, where might things end.
To understand these--to answer these questions, it's important
to look at the country's history.
Now, there are various explanations to the question of why
there has been no progress. Some emphasize the country's
history again, saying that it's the nomadic past and its Soviet
illiberal past that has made the country more vulnerable to
authoritarianism and political volatility. And then there are
those who say that, look, Kyrgyzstan is in a bad authoritarian
neighborhood; how can a democracy or system develop there? And
then, there are those who emphasize economic factors. They say
that, look, the country is lacking natural resources; unlike
its neighbors, it does not have resources, so it's hard for its
elites to create a very robust system.
I would say that the main problem of Kyrgyzstan, actually,
has not been lack of resources or other issues. I would say
that--I emphasize the role of leadership or lack of it as the
major source of Kyrgyzstan's troubles. The major flaw of the
Kyrgyz leaders was that they failed to find lasting solutions
or effective treatments for the four key ailments or challenges
outlined above.
To be more precise, Kyrgyz leaders have continuously
undermined stability by engaging in systematic alteration of
political rules and arrangements whenever such rules did not
suit their immediate political preferences. More importantly,
Kyrgyz leaders failed to realize their historic roles as the
founding fathers of the new nation and the responsibility that
flows from such a realization.
Briefly, President Askar Akayev--let me elaborate just a
little bit more--President Askar Akayev, he was Thomas
Jefferson of Central Asia. He liberalized the country; he also
ushered in economic reforms, but only to change his course in
the early 2000s, after the U.S. base was established. This
turnaround on his own policies helped to undermine his own
rule.
People revolted against President Akayev. The president who
came after him--instead of learning the lessons of his
predecessor, he continued this authoritarian course. Rather
than dealing with various political groups and community
members, and rather than really allowing--rather than dealing
with these four key challenges, he basically resorted to
creating a very authoritarian regime.
So--and actually, I would say that in March 2005, it was an
alliance of the wealthy and the poor that toppled an
authoritarian regime; in April 2010, it was a combination of
economic sanctions from Russia and protests by poor and
unemployed residents in such northern towns as Naryn and Talas.
All this shows that President Bakiyev, he failed to really
create a debate or lead the country to really resolve those
four key ailments or challenges.
People who came after him, the provisional government, were
not prepared to assume power, lacking broad legitimacy and
being driven by their survival instinct. The new authorities
engaged in chaotic and populist measures, such as a reversal of
utility tariffs imposed by the previous regime, and so forth.
But although they realized the need to address longstanding
transitional dilemmas, they lacked resources and the strategic
direction. They got their sequencing wrong in terms of dealing
with the four challenges I mentioned, despite various signals
in April that ethnic tension was really palpable. Authorities
focused on the division of political power in Bishkek. So as a
result, when the ethnic conflict erupted in Osh, they were not
prepared. They lacked control over government security service,
let alone rampaging crowds.
So where might things end? I would say that new leaders
have made attempts to resolve these longstanding dilemmas,
transition dilemmas, but these efforts have been half-hearted
and ineffective. Let me describe why.
The first challenge, the division of powers--the
parliamentary system is not supported by a lot of people.
According to recent polls, the majority of Kyrgyz citizens want
to resort back to a presidential system akin to Russia.
Decisionmakers in Russia are opposing this parliamentary
system; they have been critical of it. Some influential
politicians in the Parliament, they want to change the
constitution again.
The second challenge, forming a national identity--they're
not doing much, actually. There is this assumption in
Kyrgyzstan that, look, the Osh events have resolved this
identity crisis or challenge by establishing the pre-eminence
of the ethnic Kyrgyz and relegating ethnic minorities to a
secondary status positions. This view is supported by ethnic
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. As one ethnic Uzbek told me, look, Uzbeks
lost, the Kyrgyz won; now, we're secondary and there'll be less
conflict.
The government is not challenging this erroneous
assumption. It's basically living with the status quo. And this
is really promoting all these nationalistic and chauvinistic
forces and aggravating tensions. And rather than deal with the
conflict in a rather effective way, they are basically adopting
the Soviet-style tactic of sweeping the unpleasant events under
the rug and putting forward a mantra of friendship of peoples.
This strategy is flawed and it resembles the one adopted by
Kyrgyz authorities after the June 1990 violence.
So they're also not addressing the third challenge, which
is economy. Rather than really promote a debate which would
discuss this long-term problem, they are again engaging in
populist measures by increasing public spending, salaries, and
continuing with these expensive construction projects.
Finally, the Kyrgyz authorities are again following the
footsteps of their predecessors in terms of indeterminate
foreign policy. Their relations with their neighbors are really
bad. Uzbekistan is really pissed off or is livid about the way
Kyrgyz authorities dealt with the whole crisis. The Uzbeks are
concerned that the revolution will continue. Kazakhs are also
unhappy with the instability. Tajiks are also angry.
More importantly, Moscow is unhappy about Kyrgyzstan's
choice of policy. And attacks against Russian business are not
helping Kyrgyzstan's image in Russia. And Western partners are
also becoming suspicious of all these talks in Bishkek about
changing the system again.
Finally, Kyrgyzstan finds itself at a crossroad. And so the
Osh events, they took their toll, but they provide a window of
opportunity to finally tackle these four transition challenges.
If the Kyrgyz citizens will have this painful but important
debate about how to solve these challenges, and if this process
will include all citizens, Kyrgyzstan is--will have, I would
say, a chance to become a real model for Central Asia. If they
will fail, Kyrgyzstan is set to continue with this
revolutionary and painful ethnic conflict course.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Khamidov, thank you very much for your
testimony, and Dr. Olcott. Thank you for your patience, too,
because I know this has been a long day. But frankly, the more
we build this record, and we're able to then act upon it--and
you provide incisive insights for us to act upon. So I thank
you for your written statements, your oral statements, which
were extraordinary.
Let me just ask a couple of questions, and then we'll
conclude the hearing.
How would both of you or either of you, or whoever wants to
address this, assess U.S. policy towards Kyrgyzstan, especially
what happened June last year? Have we responded well, robustly?
Have we been asleep at the switch? And secondly, on the issue
of aid to southern Kyrgyzstan, is reconstruction aid flowing
there? How much of it's coming from the U.S.? If you could
answer those.
Dr. Khamidov. Yes, thank you, Martha.
Dr. Olcott. [Chuckles.]
Dr. Khamidov. U.S. policy towards Kyrgyzstan after the
violent events--I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, that the United
States has shown genuine interest in Kyrgyzstan, its problems.
And I think the people of Kyrgyzstan, they realize it. The
United States, among the first, condemned violence and called
for peace and took measures to stop it.
But there are also some problems with the U.S. policy. In
the perceptions of many Kyrgyzstanis, U.S. policy is not
principled. There is this U.S. base and then there are human
rights, and the U.S. policy shifts between these two issues.
More importantly, I would say that the Kyrgyzstanis have
this perception of themselves as exceptional in the region
because they were the first to democratize. And so they think
that they are the darling of the United States and other
Western countries. And this is the message that the U.S.
administration, namely, the Barack Obama administration, has
fostered by telling the Kyrgyz that, look, you are a model
again; now you will be a model for the Middle East. These kind
of reassurances are useful, but they also mislead Kyrgyz
citizens. So I would say that U.S. policy has its flaws and its
positive aspects.
In terms of reconstruction efforts, I would tell you that a
lot of donors have adopted this policy of wait and see. They're
concerned; they're not sure that the money that they will
allocate to Kyrgyzstan and its regions will be spent properly.
There are concerns of transparency, mismanagement, corruption.
But they are ready to issue money. The World Bank announced
that its ready to approve a $70 million loan in reconstruction
and various projects.
Mr. Smith. Have we had a consistent policy about torture
and rape in the prisons in pre-detention?
Dr. Khamidov. The United States has systematically
criticized failures in areas which you mention.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Olcott. In terms of U.S. policy, I know we've had a
systematic policy of criticizing rape and torture, but I think
abuse in the prison systems in Central Asia is not new. It came
to the forefront here because the argument was, it was being--I
hate to be so brutally blunt--inequitably applied--that one
group was being brutalized more than another group, that Uzbeks
were being disproportionately arrested and they were being
brutalized.
But I think that it would be a real mistake to see the
Kyrgyz system as gentle to Kyrgyz. It has been a brutal
judicial system. There have been efforts made to reform it;
there have been periods in which reform went faster than
others. I think there would be a capacity to soak up more
democracy assistance in the area of judicial reform and
security system reform than is likely to be on offer.
And I think that this is really an important focus that you
raise. There's a difference between U.S. policy and the ability
of the U.S. to deliver large amounts of aid on projects that we
all recognize as good projects. As you know better than I,
there are lots of competing demands on every tax dollar today.
And by comparison, the amount of money being spent in Central
Asia is very, very small.
And on top of the traditional difficulties of delivering
anything other than humanitarian assistance rapidly, what you
had aggravating the situation in Kyrgyzstan was the fact that
you didn't have a legitimate government for so long. So you
went months until you had the elections. And until the last set
of the October elections were completed, there wasn't really a
government that had the credentials to negotiate many of the
larger international financial loan agreements.
So there has been a slower process than people in country
would like to see. That's not necessarily a criticism of us.
The last point I would make, though, is that there is one
thing I think that the Kyrgyz desperately need as they go into
this election period, is a greater sense of awareness of what
the economic realities that the country faces are. Part of the
victory of populism is that no one is really forced to be
realistic in their political rhetoric. They promise--there's
one person who was talking about running for president who's
talked about raising the GDP to roughly $9,000 a year, like a
four-fold increase in a five-year period--it's impossible. But
people can take these propositions as serious ones.
So in addition to talking about interethnic accord, I think
if we want democracy to succeed in Kyrgyzstan, we really have
to talk about empowering an electorate and a political elite at
the lower levels--[chuckles])--of that elite with more
knowledge, with working towards increasing the level and
quality of political debate.
One last comment about U.S. policy: I don't know that we
were asleep at the switch, but the fact that we went through a
period where we changed ambassadors--you know, we had a period
in which there was an ambassador at the end of the term--it's
not my place to say--but was not viewed in the polity as being
terribly effective. And then, until we got the new person out
there, named and out there, that whole process took months and
months. I mean, the new ambassador's been out there just under
a month, you know? [Chuckles.] So I don't think we were asleep
at the switch, but I do think that there are periods where we
could've been more effective.
Finally, I think it's going to be a challenge for the U.S.,
as Kyrgyzstan moves, if they hold presidential elections as
scheduled, if they keep this timetable and don't experiment
again with changing it--this policy has been very much tied at
the public level to Roza Otunbayeva as President. It's a weak
presidency. She's using power very, very effectively, but she
doesn't have very much power.
I think that U.S. policy has to be a policy that interacts
equally with all levels of the political establishment. Where
power is, we should be interacting directly; that means with
the Prime Minister's office and the government and the
Parliament, where even if we don't like some of the things they
do and we find them politically inexperienced, we really have
to get our message across to all these different people and
find ways to interact, because we run the risk, when President
Otunbayeva's term ends and a new person replaces her, that we
will be so identified with the current president and the issues
of the base that we will not have the kinds of levers to make a
quick adjustment to be effective in the country.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. The upcoming elections--will these
likely be positive? How will the tragedies of June play in
those elections, the campaigns? And given the people that are
running, where--what happens after post-election vis-a-vis the
terrible tragedy?
Dr. Khamidov?
Dr. Khamidov. Mr. Chairman, Kyrgyzstani political actors
basically divided into two camps: There are northern
politicians, and then there are southern politicians. Most of
the southern politicians, they maintain close ties with the
regime of the former president, whereas a lot of northern
politicians were in the opposition. So really, the fight, or
the struggle, is between these two camps of politicians. There
is this acting Prime Minister, Mr. Atambayev Almazbek; he's
slated to run for presidency. And on the other side, in the
southern camp, there are also two or three candidates.
But the problem is that Mr. Kiljunen's report, as well as
the other issues, have become caught up in this struggle
between these two camps. It's not only Kimmo Kiljunen's report,
but also broad issues. The ones that I mentioned, the four
challenges, the economy--all of these are becoming problematic.
And I must tell you that many Kyrgyz citizens, they are
very much driven by this desire to have a strong leadership.
And whoever is going to project himself or herself, that person
will get votes.
There are also forces who want the current president to
stay, because they're afraid that the struggle between these
southern and northern camps may become fatal. We're talking
about inter-Kyrgyz conflict. And so there are calls for
Otunbayeva to stay for one more year.
Dr. Olcott. I agree. I wouldn't bet my pension on the fact
that there will be an election in the fall. I mean, I think--
and I'm not predicting revolution. I think the situation, even
in the south, is pretty stable right now. People want quiet, if
they can get it, which is one of the things that are pushing
the idea that people are beginning to float that maybe they
should wait a year for an election.
There's also the question of changing the form of
government. I think, in my opinion, as soon as there is
presidential elections, there will be a serious call for
constitutional reform that will leave a stronger presidency, a
weaker Parliament, but still some form of power sharing that--I
think there's enough support for some form of parliamentary
power.
But I think it's very difficult to, A, predict whether
there won't be popular elite pressure as well as popular
pressure for Roza Otunbayeva to stay--even though she's made it
clear that's not her intent, that she sees herself as a
transitional figure--to stay for another year or two years,
whatever the agreement is, and that part of that would be that
there is a discussion of constitutional reform. Again, there's
a big discussion now--do they have the money for an election?
Ms. Otunbayeva said yesterday that there will be new candidates
coming out.
I think that everybody in the elite would feel more
comfortable moving towards a presidential election if there
were some sort of consensus around a candidate, even in
advance, and the belief that the election itself wouldn't serve
to tear the country apart. And right now there's no consensus.
There are several figures that are eager to run, and they are
under enormous political pressure, like Kamchybek Tashiev,
who's been one of the southern politicians, been at risk of
losing his parliamentary immunity and the source of
demonstrations in the south.
So there's going to be this building of political tension--
[chuckling]--over the next days and months--and I think if the
elite feels the tension is at risk of overflowing, they will
try to find ways to negotiate among themselves to release it,
because I agree with Dr. Khamidov that there were key forces in
the country that were active in April and May of last year, and
the government didn't read the situation right and didn't move
quickly--the interim government, to stabilize the situation in
the south in advance of these forces being able to push beyond.
I don't think in the next year people are going to make that
mistake.
I think it was painful to people ending the stalemate of
the last 20 years in the south. Nobody is going to be
interested in ending this much more fragile current stalemate
in the south. So I think the election's become a real roll of
the dice if they move forward. And it'll be interesting to see,
as long as you don't have--as long as you're not living there
in this moment of great interest, it'll be interesting to see
what happens.
But I'm more confident that we're not going to see a
repetition of last June in the immediate future. There are
always unpredicted events that could happen that would provoke
it. If there was sudden destabilization in Uzbekistan for some
reason, that would again change--you know, if somebody suddenly
died, that would change the political balance. But in the
absence of something unforeseen, I'm personally optimistic that
we have a window in which to try to be more effective in
working towards ethnic consolidation or ethnic reconciliation.
Mr. Smith. Could I just ask you, with regards to the police
and other security personnel that have committed crimes against
humanity or allegedly have done so, are you confident that they
will be held to account individually and held--and put into
prison for committing those crimes?
Secondly, President Bakiyev, as we all know, is keeping a
relatively low profile in Belarus, his current address. What
residual influence does he have?
And we also hear that Kyrgyz officials and ordinary people
have accused the Uzbeks of seeking to create an autonomous
region in Kyrgyzstan for Uzbeks. How do you rate those
accusations? Are they credible?
Dr. Olcott. [Chuckles.] We'll swap off.
In terms of whether people will be held accountable, I
think that this government and the President will make that
attempt. If you're asking me to say whether they'll succeed,
you know, I think it is always hard to be optimistic that
people will succeed in getting an only partially reformed
judiciary to behave fully responsibly.
So I think that some people--I hope and think that a
portion of those who should be held responsible will be held
responsible and that imperfection in doing this will hopefully
serve as an inhibiting example. [Chuckling.] I say that as a
realist who's spent my whole adult life going to this region.
Bakiyev, the autonomous region--the question of Bakiyev
lying low--to me, the question--and this is another one of
those topics that they talk about in the report but they don't
talk about enough because it's really hard--it's very hard to
get people to talk about organized crime, because people are
frightened of being killed. And so when you ask these questions
or the questions about Uzbek autonomy or any of those things,
you're going into this area that people will talk about
privately, but people are not comfortable talking about on the
record or giving evidence about.
I think that more important than the question of Bakiyev's
influence is the presence of organized criminal groups in both
countries, in Uzbekistan, in Kyrgyzstan. They've been under
much better control in Uzbekistan. And under Kyrgyzstan, there
were alliances between some of these criminal groups and, if
not the Bakiyev family, people who closely supported them.
This is still there, and that's what I mean by keeping
forces under wraps. There's nobody interested in inciting it.
When you talk about an autonomous region, I don't ever
believe that that was a serious issue, that the Uzbeks of
Kyrgyzstan, who are Kyrgyz citizens, who have lived in their
lives in Kyrgyzstan, ever had the goal of creating an
autonomous region of the Ferghana Valley dominated by ethnic
Uzbeks. I think that when people talk about this, they're
talking about it not hypothetically but more elliptically; that
what they're really saying--and I can't swear I'm right on
this--is that they're frightened of organized crime groups at
some point where there's regime change in Uzbekistan, whether
there's a transfer of power or where the Uzbek regime seriously
weakens, that organized crime groups might join hands across
borders and destabilize the whole area.
So yes, politicians use the rhetoric of autonomous
Uzbekistan--an Uzbek region there, but I think that's--you
know, I don't see any evidence of it. But is there a risk that
destabilized Uzbekistan and destabilized southern Kyrgyzstan
could create a pocket of lawlessness with a lot of Uzbek crime
bosses and no shortage of Kyrgyz, Russian or Tajik crime
bosses, either--this is a very international organization--
that, I think, is real, and not something that one can ever put
their hands on, because it's just too dangerous to talk about,
to reveal the identities of people.
Dr. Khamidov. Let me answer briefly. Regarding
responsibility of security forces, central government finds
itself in a bind. If they move with prosecution of the security
forces, they will not have people who will support their
regime. They are very weak. They are still fragile. Their
control is still fragile, especially in the southern regions.
And then there's this issue of who is not clean. You know,
everybody has a fault in the Osh violence--the security
services, the provisional government. So if they really bring
to accountability some security forces, there is this question
of, what about you? You are also complicit in those things.
Regarding Bakiyev, he's toxic, meaning like--nobody wants
to [fill it ?] with him. He's finished. I mean, one of the
interesting things about Kyrgyz politics is that once people
are removed from power, they are nobodies, actually, so they
don't have much influence, except for money that they have
perhaps pocketed and that they can ship to some people there.
Regarding Uzbek autonomy or claims of autonomy, I've had
many conversations with the Uzbeks, and they tell me, like,
look, we live in this country; they played a bad trick with us.
If they--the Kyrgyz leaders--told us from the very beginning
that, look, you are living in a Kyrgyz republic, just stop
pushing for political rights, we would have gladly accepted it
or, just like in Uzbekistan, we're asking the Kyrgyz to accept
the Uzbek domination. And the Uzbeks are saying that they
didn't do that. They say that the Kyrgyz Government has allowed
a lot of freedoms, they promoted ethnic minority rights, and
that kind of encouraged to be more demanding of certain
political rights. As a result, this policy led to a collision
with various nationalistic groups.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Doctor.
Let me just ask one final question, but I would like to let
the record show that Ambassador Djumaliev has stayed throughout
this entire hearing. We've had hearings before where, as soon
as their panel, the ambassador's panel, was over, they're out
the door. So I thank you for that, for that courtesy and again
for appearing here today.
One final question with regards to the U.N. Human Rights
Council, as to whether or not they have listed this as an item
for investigation and action to hold Kyrgyzstan to account--
have they done anything, as far as you know? And if not, why
not? Any idea?
Dr. Khamidov. No.
Mr. Smith. OK. We'll pursue that and try to get an answer
from the Human Rights Council., because it seems to me, when
the council was formed to replace the largely discredited Human
Rights Commission, which only focused on Israel and more Israel
and Israel and then some more Israel, it was--we had promises
that there would be very serious scrutinizing of nations, not
just when they do periodic reviews, which all nations
ultimately have to undergo, but when crises like this erupt.
And hopefully it's never too late--[chuckles]--for them to
undertake such an investigation, which will, I think, aid the
efforts to give a full accounting and hopefully hold those who
have committed crimes to account.
Anything you would like to add before we conclude? Again, I
want to thank you for your very, very fine, incisive commentary
and analysis. It is of extraordinary value to the Commission,
and I want to thank all of you. The hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Welcome to this hearing on addressing ethnic tensions in
Kyrgyzstan, the only country in central Asia where street protests
have, in recent years, twice led to changes in government. Kyrgyzstan
is also the only state in central Asia which has experimented with a
parliamentary form of government, so it stands out in two very
important ways.
But the focus of today's hearing is the terrible ethnic violence
that erupted one year ago this month, shortly after the April
revolution that toppled former President Bakiev, and what the Kyrgyz
government should do to address it. In June 2010 ethnic Kyrgyz and
ethnic Uzbeks clashed in the southern region of Osh. By the time the
worst was over, 470 people were dead and over 400,000 displaced.
Thousands of homes and businesses were destroyed. The clashes threw a
dark shadow on the hopes engendered by the ouster of the corrupt Bakiev
government.
To its credit, the government of Kyrgyzstan requested an
international investigation into the events and I certainly commend
President Otunbaeva for that initiative. In response, the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 was formed. It released its report last month,
and our first witness will be Kimmo Kiljunen, who chaired that
commission.
It is an excellent report, and I am deeply concerned by its
conclusions. Especially alarming is the commission's judgment that the
systematic nature of some acts committed last June by ethnic Kyrgyz
against ethnic Uzbeks--including patterns of murder, rape, and brutal
ethnic persecution--could qualify as crimes against humanity. It
remains to be seen whether they will found so in a court of law--and
whether or which competent court might take the case. In any case, such
a judgment, by such a credible commission of investigation, must be
taken very seriously, and the Kyrgyz government must investigate these
crimes seriously and hold those responsible to account.
I also am disturbed that Kyrgyz security forces apparently were
complicit in the attacks, not only by failing to respond adequately to
stop the violence, but, according to the commission report, in some
cases even distributing weapons to ethnic Kyrgyz or driving the armored
personnel carriers which penetrated the defenses of ethnic Uzbek
neighborhoods. Unfortunately, so far the Kyrgyz government has brought
more cases against ethnic Uzbeks--who made up the majority of the
victims--and there is credible evidence that torture was used to
extract confessions from these ethnic Uzbeks. This also must be
investigated--including the case of human rights defender Azimzhan
Askarov, who has been sentenced to life in prison despite his credible
claim that he was tortured.
Just as disturbing is the ongoing serious human rights abuses
against ethnic Uzbeks, including torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and unfairly conducted trials--which is also covered in
detail by the report. Because the police force is deeply involved in
these abuses, and is almost entirely of Kyrgyz ethnicity, victims feel
they have nowhere to turn. Ethnic Uzbek businessmen and migrant workers
returning from Russia are particular targets for extortion. Even with
the understandable reluctance of victims to report abuses, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has
documented some 680 cases of arbitrary arrest for ransom since June
2010, as well as 70 cases of torture in detention. Ongoing human rights
violations must stop immediately, and those responsible brought to
justice.
President Otunbaeva has said many of the right things. While laying
a wreath in Osh to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the
violence, she called for inter-ethnic peace and urged that nationalism
not be used for political purposes. She has pledged to purge the police
forces, reform the judicial system, and fight organized crime. She told
the OSCE recently that, ``In addition to the reconstruction of
destroyed facilities, we also face a far more difficult task: to
restore the lost trust between Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in the
south. It is not easy to achieve trust after such a complex conflict.
The level of nationalism and intolerance is very high. In the
government's comments on the Commission's report: we openly admit the
existence of serious problems in the field of human rights in the post-
conflict period; we agree with many criticisms of the commission in
this field; we are ready to change the situation and we need support in
implementing commission's recommendations.''
I sincerely hope that President Otunbaeva will be able to carry out
this policy, and that whoever replaces her after the election this
fall--she is not eligible to run--will continue on this path. Her
actions show significant commitment to this path. In any case it is
clear that many people in Kyrgyz politics have no interest in such a
path. Nationalist rhetoric is on the rise. Even high-level government
officials now routinely refer to ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan as
the ``Uzbek Diaspora,'' as if they were immigrants from another
country, which was responsible for them. In the past several weeks, the
Kyrgyz parliament has passed several unhelpful measures, including
banning Mr. Kiljunen from entering the country. This has sent a
chilling message to other international NGOs working in the country. A
Kyrgyz parliamentary commission wrote its own report on the June 2010
violence, and in contradiction to the international report, concluded
that ethnic Uzbek leaders and followers of former President Bakiev were
responsible for the violence. Parliament also voted unanimously to ban
the independent news website Fergananews.com, because it offered
accounts different from parliament's anti-Uzbek narrative.
I look forward to learning from our witnesses their view of the
situation, and what they believe the Kyrgyz government should do to
address it.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
I welcome this hearing, one year after ethnic violence devastated
areas of southern Kyrgyzstan. Let me begin, however, by welcoming an
old friend: Kimmo Kiljunen, whom many of us know from his work in the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. I am pleased to see that Kimmo has
continued doing important work in a non-legislative capacity.
In fact, I think he has done very important work in Kyrgyzstan by
heading the international investigation into the tragic events of June
2010, which stunned the country and shocked the world. The ethnic
violence took place against a backdrop of weak government institutions,
endemic problems with the police and judiciary, and growing ethnic
nationalism. It erupted in a climate of corruption, and in a place that
the United Nations has identified as a leading drug trafficking center
in Central Asia. In the local power vacuum left following the overthrow
of former President Bakiev and his supporters, I understand that
racketeering was thriving and had taken on an ethnic component, as many
businessmen vulnerable to extortion were ethnic Uzbek. And while many
successful businesses were owned by Uzbeks, they were underrepresented
in political life.
So while the violence had an ethnic face, it also appears to have
been fed by perceived economic disparities. I believe that economic
development and fighting corruption must be a component of any
reconstruction and reconciliation program. I am concerned that the
process of compensating victims for property damage is too slow and
bureaucratic. Bribes reportedly are needed to compete the complicated
application process. As a result, many young people are leaving the
region in search of work elsewhere, particularly in Russia. Few ethnic
Uzbek businesses have reopened, or reportedly reopened under ethnic
Kyrgyz ownership, leading to concerns about ``raiding'' or pressure on
minority business owners to sell for a token price.
International assistance has in some cases become a source of
ethnic tension as well. Even with good intentions, aid has not always
reached those for whom it was intended. For example, a new high-rise
apartment building funded by international aid money was intended to
house victims of the violence. Yet, while more than three-fourths of
the victims were ethnic-Uzbeks, I don't believe any ethnic-Uzbeks
received apartments in the new building. Although I understand that
this was partly because most preferred to remain in traditional single
family houses, it is illustrative of how divisive even an aid program
can be.
And property distribution likely will be another stress point.
Riots over land disputes in 1990 during the breakup of the Soviet Union
left over 300 people dead. A long-stalled land distribution project in
Osh has been restarted, opening the door to fresh quarrels.
Obviously, this is a very complicated problem, with many angles and
competing perspectives. Kimmo Kiljunen's report is exhaustive,
comprehensive and fair. Given the passions that still surround the
violence and the possibility of its recurrence, that is a major
achievement. I very much look forward to hearing from him and our other
witnesses about the results of the international investigation and the
recommendations for addressing the current situation and promoting
ethnic reconciliation.
Biography of Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen
Date of birth: 13.06.1951, Finland
Nationality: Finnish
Marital status: four children, four grand-children
Degrees
M.A. (Social Sciences) Helsinki University 1973
M.Phil. (Development Studies) Sussex University, England
1977
D.Phil. (Development Studies) Sussex University, England
1985
Adjunct Professor (Development Studies) in Helsinki
University and Joensuu University 1986
Languages
Finnish
English
Russian
Swedish
French (modest)
Work experience in Finland
Research Assistant, Finnish Institute of International
Affairs, summer 1971
Study Programme Assistant, Institute of Development
Studies, Helsinki University, 1972-73
Liaison Officer, Finnish UN Association, 1974-75
Researcher, Labour Institute for Economic Research,
Helsinki, 1979-81
Research Fellow, Academy of Finland, 1981-85
City Counsellor, Vantaa, 1985-
Director, Institute of Development Studies, Helsinki
University, 1986-95
Member of Parliament, Finland, 1995-2011
International work experience
Research student, Scandinavian Institute of African
Studies, Uppsala, summer 1973
British Council Fellowship, Institute of Development
Studies Sussex University, Brighton 1975-78
Secretary General, Kampuchea Inquiry Commission, 1980-82
Secretary General, International Peace Bureau and
personal assistant to Nobel Laureate Sean MacBride, Geneva, 1984-85
Consultant, UNICEF, Kenya Country Office, Nairobi, 1989-
91
Transition Policy Coordinator, UNDP, New York, 1993-94
Member, UNU/WIDER's Academic Advisory Council, 1993-96
Member of EU Constitutional Convention, 2002-03
Conciliator, Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
OSCE, 2007-
Chair, Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 2010-11
Parliamentary functions
Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1996-2011
Member, Future Committee, 1995-99
Vice-chair, Grand Committee (European Affairs), 1999-2007
Member, Defence Committee, 1999-2003
Chair, WTO sub-committee, 2000-07
Member, Constitutional Law Committee, 2007-09
Chair, TUTKAS, Parliamentary Society on Academia, 2007-11
International parliamentary functions
Parliamentarians for Global Action, International Council
member, 1995-99
Nordic Council, member 1995-2001
Arctic Council, Parliamentary Standing committee member,
1999-03
Nordic Council Working Group on Civic Crisis Management,
chair, 2001
WTO Parliamentary Conference, Steering Committee member,
2001-11
Parliamentary Network on World Bank, vice-chair, 2001-07
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, chair of the Finnish
Group, 2003-05
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, member, 2004-
2007
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Finnish Group, member, 2007-11
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly activities
Vice-chair, OSCE PA Finnish Delegation, 1995-2007
Vice-chair, Political and Security Committee, 1996-99
Chair, Political and Security Committee, 1999-2000
Member, Working Group on Belarus, 1998-2003
Chair, Working Group on Moldova, 2000-06
Vice-president, OSCE PA, 2001-04 and 2007-10
Special Representative for Central Asia, 2007-11
Election observation
Special Coordinator (Head) of OSCE Election Observation
Mission in
Moldova 2001 and 2005
Belarus 2001
Macedonia 2002
Kyrgyzstan Feb. 2005, July 2005 and 2007
Tajikistan 2006
Special Envoy on Elections of OSCE CiO Finland, 2008
Special Representative on Election Observation of OSCE
CiO Greece, 2009
Special Representative on Election Observation of OSCE
CiO Kazakhstan, 2010
Special Representative on Election Observation of OSCE
CiO Lithuania, 2011
Activities on international relations
Member, Finnish UN-delegation, 34th UN General Assembly,
1979
Member, State Advisory Board on Relations with Developing
Countries, 1981-85 and 1995-99
Expert Member, 1989-92
President, Finnish UN Association, 1987-91
Member, State Committee on Environment and Development,
1987-89
Chair, Isolate South Africa Campaign in Finland, 1988-89
Member, State Preparatory Committee for UNCED, 1990-92
Vice chair, Finnish Red Cross, International Committee,
1992-93
Expert member, State Committee for Sustainable
Development 1993-95
Chair, Finland-South Africa Association, 1995-97
Chair, STETE, Finnish Committee for European Security,
1995-2003
Chair, SDP Working Group on Migration Policy, 1997-99
Chair, SDP Working Group on Nearby regions, 1999-2005
Vice chair, Carelia Foundation Administrative Board 2000-
02
Chair, Sports Development Aid, 2001-05
Chair, SDP Working Group on European Union, 2005-
Honours
President Urho Kekkonen Foundation, Literature Award 1992
Liputusyhdistys Siniristi ry, ``Vuoden liputtaja'' Award
2005
Business sector activities
Delegation Member, Heureka, Finnish Science Center, 1991-
93, 1998-2000 and Vice-chair, Governing Council, Heureka, 2009-
Member, Elanto Representative Council, 1991-2005
Vice chair of HPY Body of the Representatives, 1996-99
Vice chair of HPY Holding Ltd Supervisory Board, 1999-
2000
Member of Fortum Supervisory Board, 2007-
Member, HOK-Elanto Representative Council, 2005-
Books published abroad
Namibia-the Last Colony, (ed. with R.H.Green and M-
L.Kiljunen), Longman, London 1981
Kampuchea, Decade of the Genocide, (ed.), Z Press, London
1984
Region-to-Region Cooperation between Developed and
Developing Countries, (ed.), Avebury, Aldershot 1990
Finland and the New International Division of Labour,
Macmillan, London 1992
Statele Lumii Si Drapelele Nationale, (World States and
National Flags), Monitorul Oficial, Bucharest 2001
The European Constitution in the Making, CEPS, Brussels,
2004
Riigid ja Lipud, (States and Flags), A ja O Taskutematik,
Eesti Entsuklopeediakirjastus, Tallinna 2005
Gosudarstva i Flagi, (States and Flags), Rosspen, Moscow
2008
Books published in Finland
Rotusorron kahleissa (In the Chains of Racial
Discrimination), (ed.), Joensuu 1975
Alikehityksen maailma (The Underdeveloped World,
textbook), Tammi, Helsinki 1976
80-luvun aluepolitiikan perusteet (Premises for Regional
Policy in 1980's), TTT, Helsinki 1979
Industrialisation in Developing Countries and Trade-
Related Constraints in Finland, Labour Institute for Economic Research,
Helsinki 1985
Kolme maailmaa (Three Worlds, textbook), University
Press, Helsinki 1989
Musta-valkoinen Etela-Afrikka (Black and White South
Africa), (ed. with S.Lehtonen), Kirjayhtyma, Helsinki 1990
Sina ja maailman koyhat (You and World Poverty), WSOY
1991
Suomalaisena YK:ssa (The Finns in the UN), (ed.),
Gummerus, Helsinki 1994
Maailman maat ja liput (World States and Flags), Otava
MMM, Helsinki 1995, revised 2000
Kansanedustajana Suomessa (An MP in Finland), WSOY,
Helsinki 1998
Maapallohaaste (Global Challenge), (with S. Hassi and S.
Pietikainen), Otava 1999
Minun mielestani Tarja Halonen (My opinion Tarja
Halonen), (ed.), Helsinki 2000
Valtiot ja liput (States and Flags), Otava MMM, Helsinki
2002
EU:n perustuslaki--Suomalaisena konventissa, (The
Constitution of the EU, A Finn in the Convention) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Europe-information, Helsinki 2004, revised 2005
A Constitution for the European union, Parliament of
Finland, Helsinki 2005
Globalisaatio ja demokratian itsepuolustus (Globalisation
and Self-defence of Democracy), Helsinki 2008
Satakolmetoista viikkoa--politiikkaa silta puolelta (113
Weeks, Politics from that Side), Vantaa 2009
Prepared Statement of Amb. Muktar Djumaliev
Mr. Chairman,
I thank you very much for convening us this meeting today.
The interethnic conflicts in 1990th and repeated in 2010 in
Kyrgyzstan is most painful facts in our history.
Kyrgyzstan passed through most difficult challenges on its way for
the democratic development. We faced many obstacles, corruption,
authoritarian governance, repressions by clan regime, and still are in
a very fragile situation. Interethnic conflict provoked in the country
between two friendly countries became inhuman tool to prevent new
changes and reforms.
Authoritarian methods of government and deep corruption were
accompanied by a sharp deterioration in living conditions, and
naturally led to the April People's Revolution and the fall of the
anti-people regime.
2010 was the year for Kyrgyzstan's radical democratic change, and
at the same time a serious challenge and test of the strength of
statehood and unity of the nation.
Our own experience shows that without checks and balances of
powers, there is a risk of a return to authoritarian regime. Therefore,
for the first time in Central Asia, we have embarked on the
construction of a parliamentary republic.
In June 2010 we held a referendum on adoption of a new constitution
and election of the head of state. In October, managed to have an open
and transparent parliamentary election. In December, parliament formed
a coalition government.
And this year we are going to establish a precedent of democratic
transfer of power of the President.
These efforts faced with resistance from the revenge-seekers and
organized crime, which become a real force in society for the during
the period of the ousted regime.
It is with their filing in June 2010 that representatives of the
Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups, who lived for centuries peacefully
alongside each other, were ``dragged'' into the violent clashes.
Unfortunately, during these tragic events hundreds of our citizens
were killed.
In difficult conditions, with the joint efforts of citizens of
Kyrgyzstan and support of international organizations and governments
of several countries, Kyrgyzstan has managed to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe in the south.
Mr. Chairman, for Kyrgyzstan it was the first time experiencing to
conduct an international investigation. Such precedent never happened
in the Post soviet countries.
The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic recognises the importance and
value of the work done by the IIC and thanks its reputable members for
the efforts and contribution devoted to investigate the tragic events
that occurred in Kyrgyzstan.
The Government agrees with number of the conclusions and criticisms
contained in the IIC Report. It does not absolve the responsibility for
what happened. The Provisional Government honestly and openly
acknowledged its guilt and responsibility in its address on June 16,
2010 to the people of Kyrgyzstan and the International Community.
Kyrgyzstan's Government is taking and will continue to take all
necessary measures to eliminate or minimize the consequences of the
tragic conflict and to prevent the repetition of similar events in the
future. Many of the recommendations contained in the IIC Report have
had being implemented by the Government from the day the conflict was
localized.
Kyrgyzstan's Government will establish the Special Commission to
implement and monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the
IIC Report and other reports and researches related to the tragic
events of 2010 in the Southern Kyrgyzstan.
However, the Kyrgyz Government believes that the IIC Report does
not contain a sufficient evidence to conclude that there have been made
certain acts that can be qualified as the crime against humanity during
the June events in the city of Osh.
Kyrgyzstan's Government considers as unacceptable the visible
tendency in the IIC report to take into account to a greater extent the
crimes committed only by the members of one ethnic group while ignoring
the deaths and casualties suffered by the same group and depicting
another group as the single suffered and defenseless party.
It is also important to take into account the fact that during the
conflict there were no sufficient political, financial, and law-
enforcement resources at the disposal of the Provisional Government to
counter the large-scaled provocations of interethnic clashes. However,
even under such conditions, the People and the authorities of
Kyrgyzstan independently and without outside intervention managed to
stop the violence and localize the conflict within a few days.
Kyrgyzstan's Government took great efforts to reconcile the parties
of the conflict, to overcome the consequences of the conflict and it
still proceeds with it. However, there is still tangible tension and a
number of unresolved socio-economic problems in the conflict zone. In
the conditions of the started presidential campaign, some of the ICC
conclusions can be used by the opponents of the democratic reforms to
destabilize the situation and strengthen the position of the internal
revanchist forces.
Kyrgyzstan's Government hopes that necessary conclusions from the
events of 2010 will be made by the international community as well,
including the organizations that pursue the aim of preventing,
neutralizing and eliminating consequences of such conflicts.
We have also started work on developing and implementing the
concept of ethnic development and consolidation of the people of
Kyrgyzstan.
We are doing everything possible to punish all those responsible.
All trials are held in conditions of unprecedented openness.
But the situation remains difficult, in particular, with concerns
about the emotional nature of the trials of resonant crimes.
The new government declared its uncompromising war against
criminals and is determined to stop the merging criminal gangs with the
authorities.
The government has taken urgent measures to normalize the
functioning of law enforcement and security agencies. The Defense
Council was established as a coordinating and supervisory body.
In order to effectively combat drug trafficking, the drug control
agency abolished by the previous government has been restored.
We intend to do everything possible to create conditions to
strengthen the rule of law, a culture of political dialogue, and an
open and equitable society.
Within a short period of time we have achieved qualitative
improvements. Independent media is functioning. The opposition has not
only ample opportunity to criticize the head of state and the ruling
parliamentary coalition, but actually participates in governing the
country, by leading three key parliamentary committees--on budget and
finance, law enforcement and the rule of law, human rights and public
organizations.
There are Supervisory Boards established in the ministries to
ensure transparency and accountability of government to the people.
We are reforming the judicial system to make it truly independent
and introduced a mechanism to ensure quality selection of judges
through the Council, whose composition is formed with the participation
of opposition representatives.
Mr. Chairman, responding to the question addressed on Kyrgyzstan's
Parliament decision with regards to the Killjunen's report and PNG I
would mention, after the report was released, the situation in the
country became even more tense. The people of Kyrgyzstan were expecting
that the report will be objective, balanced and contribute for the
reconciliation and we still believe on it.
In such a situation, while Parliament agrees with the Comments of
the Government, it decided to pass an order to take a decision on Mr.
Kimmo Kiljunen entry to the Kyrgyz Republic. In this regard, the
specialised agencies will review and decide on this matter.
At the same time, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic called
Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic to reconsider it decision. The
President called the parliament to pay more attention on adopting and
implementations of the recommendation. Some of the parliamentarians
even invited Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen to the Parliament in order to organise
him a public hearings.
Today, is a most important to consolidate our efforts in order to
avoid repetition of the conflicts in the future and we count on the
support of all the friends and partners.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Muktar Djumaliev was born on June 22, 1972. Graduated
from the National University of the Kyrgyz Republic in 1994, economic
faculty; 1997 Law faculty.
2001-2002 study for the Master of International Law and Economics
degree in the World Trade Institute, Bern University.
He started his work at the State Committee on Economy of the Kyrgyz
Republic as a senior expert on External Economic Relations.
1996--Advisor of the Minister of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic.
1997--Head of the Department on External Economic Relations and
then he was transferred to the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic as
a Deputy Director on Investments and Coordination of Technical
Assistance.
1998--the First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz
Republic to the United Nations Office and other international
organisations in Geneva.
2003--Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Economic
Policy Department
2003--First Deputy of Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry of the
Kyrgyz Republic.
June 23, 2004--Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Kyrgyz
Republic to the United Nations Office and other international
organisations in Geneva.
In August 20, 2004 Mr. Muktar Djumaliev has presented the
Credentials as Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Kyrgyz
Republic to the United Nations Office and other international
organisations in Geneva, to H.E. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director General
of the United Nations Office in Geneva.
In September 23, 2004 Ambassador Muktar Djumaliev has presented the
Credentials as Permanent Representative of the Kyrgyz Republic to the
World Trade Organization.
In November 23, 2004 Ambassador Djumaliev presented his credentials
as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kyrgyz Republic
to the Swiss Confederation.
In June 2010 appointed as the First deputy chief of staff of the
Administration of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Since December 2010 appointed for a position of Ambassador of the
Kyrgyz Republic to USA and in April 2011 appointed as Ambassador of the
Kyrgyz Republic to Canada with residence in Washington.
M. Djumaliev has a diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.
Prepared Statement of Dr. Martha Brill Olcott
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I would like to focus my comments on the reaction that the report
of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry evoked in
Kyrgyzstan, and what implications this might have for future political,
social, and ethnic developments in Kyrgyzstan.
Unlike the others who are testifying here today I am not an expert
on the events of last June, nor have I spent time in southern
Kyrgyzstan since the ouster of the Bakiyev government. I have, however,
made six trips to Kyrgyzstan over the past 18 months, always in the
north, and have been travelling to Kyrgyzstan regularly for the past 21
years, and have travelled extensively throughout the country on
numerous occasions.
I happened to be in Kyrgyzstan shortly after the report was
published and had the opportunity to discuss its findings with people
at various levels of society and government. And so I would like to
spend the time allotted to me focusing on why there was so much
distress over the report in Kyrgyzstan, and especially in that
country's capital, and I will develop these points further in my
written testimony that I am submitting for the record.
The stellar team that prepared the report deserves to be commended
for applying extraordinary effort to an incredibly difficult endeavor
and for coming up with a detailed account of the terrible acts that
destroyed so many lives, left countless thousands more physically and
or emotionally scarred, and destroyed the property and dreams of tens
of thousands more. The human tragedies that the report of the
Independent Commission describes in such detail are particularly
disturbing to all of us that have deep and longstanding ties to the
peoples of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The end product will serve as a lasting indictment of what went
wrong in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan last June. It details the
provisional government in this part of the country where Bakiyev's
support base had been so strong during its first two months in power,
and provides some background on the history of tension between the
Kyrgyz Republic's two largest ethnic communities.
Its recommendations reflect much thought and discussion, and have
provided the President, the government, and the parliament a great deal
of policy recommendations to think about, a number of which are already
under serious discussion.
This was the first major international investigation led by
recognized experts from the Euro-Atlantic community ever held in the
region. The government of the Kyrgyz Republic deserves great credit for
creating the conditions necessary for the inquiry to go forward and for
considering the recommendations of the commission.
The one criticism I would make of the report is that its findings
and recommendations were not presented in a way designed to make them
palatable for the Kyrgyz polity, who compare it to home-grown efforts
to investigate what occurred. This increases the difficulty of
implementation of the most important recommendations of the Independent
International Commission in the area of accountability and the
protection of human rights. This is particularly true now, as
Kyrgyzstan is beginning a presidential campaign.
It is important for those of us in the Euro-Atlantic community
looking at developments in Kyrgyzstan with the goal of defending a
human rights agenda to try and understand why the Independent
International Commission's report created such a furor in Kyrgyzstan as
we evaluate how to be effective in advancing our agenda. For if we do
not, we risk inadvertently increasing the risk of ethnic conflict, and
could put the whole democratic experiment in Kyrgyzstan at risk as
well.
It would be a mistake to equate equal protection of all citizens
before the law, which is unquestionably a necessity for any country to
defend and a cornerstone of democracy, with the idea that all ethnic
communities living within a country, even if they have lived there for
centuries, must have the same constitutional status.
One of the sad things about last June's events is that they mark
the end of the idealistic dream that the Kyrgyz Republic could emerge
as a multi-ethnic democracy in which all of the country's citizens
believe that they have an equal stake in the nation's future regardless
of the languages that they speak. It may well be that this was always
impossible in the context of the break-up of the U.S.S.R. and the
assumptions of ethnicity and nationality which were part of the legacy
of the Soviet Union, but until last May, even before the June 2010
events, it was possible to aspire to such a goal.
But now the two decade old inter-ethnic status quo in southern
Kyrgyzstan has been disrupted, and I don't believe that it can be
reconstituted. Even if it were to be the consensus of all of those
living in southern Kyrgyzstan that it should, it is hard for me to
believe that the Kyrgyz body politic living in other parts of the
country would be supportive of this.
The ethnic Kyrgyz population, and this includes the most
``westernized'' and ``secularized'' elements in the country, want to
consolidate a Kyrgyz nation, which for the overwhelming majority
includes all the ethnic minorities who live within the territory of the
Kyrgyz Republic. But there is the expectation that all citizens of the
Kyrgyz Republic will learn and use the Kyrgyz language in official
life, and that they will know the history of the Kyrgyz people, as well
as that of the territory that the Kyrgyz have long lived on.
This belief is why there has been such a loud outcry against some
of the recommendations of the Independent Commission. While actions
such as the vote in parliament to declare Kimmo Kiljunen persona non
grata have a large element of political grandstanding about them, at
the same time they speak to a deep feeling of hurt on the part of many
ethnic Kyrgyz living in Kyrgyzstan.
This said, I think most Kyrgyz citizens would not take exception to
the vast majority of the recommendations of the report, especially
those that deal with public safety and security, and most would
probably even support the majority of recommendations on
accountability, on criminal and disciplinary accountability, and on
human rights protection and the right to a fair trial. Although, I
suspect that on these questions a lot of Kyrgyz citizens would ask with
some degree of quasi-fatalism how the international community expects
that an already flawed security structure and legal system would be
able to rapidly right itself even if it was well-intentioned.
But I also believe that most Kyrgyz ordinary citizens and political
figures alike find it very difficult to accept the idea that ethnic
Kyrgyz may have been more morally culpable than ethnic Uzbeks in the
events of June, or that the Kyrgyz dominated security services have
disproportionately applied the force of the law against ethnic Uzbeks.
In saying this I am not denying the veracity of any of the findings of
the commission, which in great detail argue that this was in fact the
case. But accepting such findings as truths is something that many
people living in Kyrgyzstan find quite difficult, and those that do
accept them try and take comfort in the fact that the violence lasted
only a few days, and didn't turn into a civil war, rather than on
focusing on the burdens of moral culpability.
This takes me to the most controversial recommendations of the
commission, from the point of view of the Kyrgyz polity, and here I am
including other ethnic minorities along with the Kyrgyz, that is the
renaming of the country, and of the granting of a special and
constitutionally guaranteed status to the Uzbek language. From my point
of view, and I say this as an international expert on the region, the
commission overstepped the bounds of its mandate, and certainly of good
judgment when it made the former recommendation in particular. By
asking the Kyrgyz to rename their country the commission made it easier
for Kyrgyz politicians to criticize the report, and made the life and
death issues at the core of the Independent Commission's findings--that
those responsible for committing ``crimes against humanity'' must be
punished for their actions, and that the government of the Kyrgyz
republic is responsible for the equal protection of the human rights of
all citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
One of the challenges for the international community in dealing
with the Kyrgyz polity, as well as the next Kyrgyz government, is that
the country is still going through a national trauma. This is true of
the country as a whole, while obviously in the south the trauma is more
immediate and potentially more deadly for the well-being of those
living in this part of Kyrgyzstan and for the security of the Central
Asian region.
But unfortunately, and certainly inadvertently, the report of the
commission and especially its recommendations made the trauma of
suffered by Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek ethnicity seem at odds with the
greater national trauma, and a threat to it. This is one reason why
there was such an emotional and negative response by some, generally
outside of the government, to the report.
Let me explain. Most Kyrgyz feel like they are political victims,
that they were victimized by the Akayev regime, at least in its later
years, and that they were even more abused by the Bakiyev regime. How
people describe the form of this abuse varies, from political, in the
case of journalists and scholars, to economic, in the case of
businessmen who felt victimized by rapacious ruling families or
insufficiently protected against criminal interests and their growing
economic tentacles. And ordinary Kyrgyz just felt economically quashed
by the economic insignificance of their country which, if not losing
ground, was not ``catching up'' and where everything-especially food
and utilities-seemed to cost more and more. This has made
``Kyrgyzness,'' the idea of national consolidation, of taking pride
that one's homeland is now a sovereign state, seem more important to
many than ever before. After so much political turmoil-effectively six
straight years since Akayev's ouster--that is one of the few things
that many people have left.
But even more importantly, in the aftermath of all the traumas of
the past fifteen months, people want to simply move on with their
lives, to live quietly and if possible to improve their lot.
This does not directly address the continuing tense situation in
the south, although I think that right now there do not seem to be any
actors interested in pushing it to the tipping point. I think that this
is true both for the population in Kyrgyzstan and those living across
the border in Uzbekistan. And I personally give no credence to rumors
that the local Uzbek population on either side of the border is
pressing for ``Uzbek autonomy'' in the Kyrgyz republic.
In this regard the very existence of the Independent Commission
report is a good thing for this is a good time to press the various
government authorities in the Kyrgyz republic to work harder to
introduce measures that are designed to increase ethnic tolerance.
But these measures are certain to fall short of those things asked
for by the commission. Kyrgyzstan is still in a period of transition
and politicians competing for office will seek political gain wherever
possible. Even in a relatively poor country like Kyrgyzstan the
political prize of the presidency is worth contesting hard for, and I
think that the international community should be prepared for the fact
that Kyrgyzstan could move back toward a stronger presidential system.
Even if it does not, the current parliament may not be able to fulfill
its full term, leading to preterm parliamentary elections. But the
international human rights community must keep the pressure on those in
authority in the Kyrgyz republic to keep national extremist goals from
coloring political debate. Fortunately, most of Kyrgyzstan's leading
political figures in and out of government share want this as well.
How should the Helsinki Commission respond to the report of the
Independent International Commission? While defending human rights of
the entire population regardless of ethnic origin, I do not believe
that the Helsinki Commission should cross the line and become
proscriptive about other aspects of nation-building, as the Independent
Commission did.
The lives of ethnic minorities everywhere were disrupted when the
U.S.S.R. fell apart, and their situation is particularly sad when
people living in communities where their ancestors have lived for
generations now find themselves as minorities. The violence of June
2010 is a tragedy, and the victims of violence or their survivors
should be compensated, while those responsible should be held
accountable. But it debases the loss of human life and the trauma of
those who lived through these days to even indirectly equate them with
providing constitutional guarantees for Uzbek language education or
talk of the need to rebuild Soviet-era cultural institutions in
southern Kyrgyzstan. This takes attention away from the real crimes
that the report of the Independent International Commission
underscored, the failure forces in the south to protect all of the
country's citizens.
It dilutes the power of the human rights message when outsiders
seek to engage in that degree of nation building, even when they do so
with the best of intensions. The political freedoms of all citizens in
Kyrgyzstan should be defended equally; freedom of press, religion, and
assembly evenly applied, and the government of Kyrgyzstan should
continue to be pressed to ensure that legal safeguards are put in place
to help guarantee that local security and judicial officials apply the
law evenly regardless of the ethnicity of the accused, or are held
accountable for their actions.
But we cannot even the political playing field between ethnic
Kyrgyz and the country's various ethnic minorities, and those
international agencies or actors that seek to do it risk losing
credibility with the Kyrgyz polity and with the Kyrgyz elite. The
Kyrgyz language is going to dominate in Kyrgyzstan, and those who can't
speak it will have a harder time in public life in the future. That is
the pattern everywhere in the region and will be the case in
Kyrgyzstan, as well. The ethnic Uzbeks who are citizens of Kyrgyzstan
face a set of difficult choices in the coming years: adapt to changing
socio-cultural realities in Kyrgyzstan or think about relocating. These
choices are not of their making. Ethnic minorities everywhere in the
region are learning ``state'' languages, i.e. the languages of the
majority population. This should not be the focus of the international
community. But all of the Kyrgyz republic's citizens should have the
same rights basic human rights, enjoy the same legal protections and
the have the right to participate in public life on equal terms. This
should be the focus of the Helsinki Commission and of the international
human rights community more generally. To take this more limited
approach might make us more effective in trying to ensure that peace
prevails in Kyrgyzstan's south. But there will be no guarantees.
Martha Brill Olcott is a senior associate with the Russia and
Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C.
Olcott specializes in the problems of transitions in Central Asia
and the Caucasus as well as the security challenges in the Caspian
region more generally. She has followed interethnic relations in Russia
and the states of the former Soviet Union for more than 25 years and
has traveled extensively in these countries and in South Asia. Her
book, Central Asia's Second Chance, examines the economic and political
development of this ethnically diverse and strategically vital region
in the context of the changing security threats post 9/11.
In addition to her work in Washington, Olcott codirects the
Carnegie Moscow Center Project on Religion, Society, and Security in
the former Soviet Union. She is professor emerita at Colgate
University, having taught political science there from 1974 to 2002.
Olcott served for five years as a director of the Central Asian
American Enterprise Fund. Prior to her work at the Carnegie Endowment,
Olcott served as a special consultant to former Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger.
Soon after 9/11, she was selected by Washingtonian magazine for its
list of ``71 People the President Should Listen To'' about the war on
terrorism.
Languages: Russian, French, Turkish
Selected Publications: Central Asia's Second Chance (Carnegie
Endowment, 2005); Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Carnegie Endowment,
2002); Preventing New Afghanistans: A Regional Strategy for
Reconstruction (Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 11, 2001) Getting It
Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States,
with Anders Aslund and Sherman Garnett (Carnegie Endowment, 1999);
Russia After Communism edited with Anders Aslund (Carnegie Endowment,
1999).Areas of ExpertiseOlcott is an expert in Central Asia, Russia and
Eurasia, the Caspian region, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, ethnicity,
terrorism, oil and gas policy, natural resources, democracy, U.S.-
Russia relations, foreign and humanitarian aid, and
Islam.EducationB.A., SUNY-Buffalo; M.A., Ph.D., University of Chicago
Prepared Statement of Dr. Alisher Khamidov
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me here to testify
about the ways to address ethnic tensions in my native country
Kyrgyzstan.
In early June 1990, when the initial ethnic clashes between the
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in Soviet Kyrgyzstan, I was a 13 year-old boy
in an Uzbek-speaking town just outside Osh. I saw crowds of furious
young men, armed with sticks, stones, and incendiary weapons, attack
each other. I also witnessed firsthand how Soviet troops rolled through
the Osh streets and brutally suppressed the riots that claimed the
lives of more than 200 people. Exactly twenty years later, when the
violence between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks broke out again, I was a scholar
conducting research on ethnic relations in Osh. As the conflict
unfolded with a lightning speed, I saw the same furious and unruly
crowds of young men; but this time they were armed with firearms,
automatic machine-guns, grenades, RPGs and even tanks. Unlike the first
clash, no Soviet, Russian or any outside troops intervened to stop the
rampaging crowds. As a result, more than 400 people died during the
conflict that lasted several days.
During those hot June days in 2010, I was among thousands of other
desperate ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz who were displaced by the conflict.
I and my relatives fled to the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border near Osh. Uzbek
border guards allowed about 100 thousand Uzbek refugees, mainly women
and children, to cross the border. I was denied entry. Hunted by my own
fellow citizens and unwanted by co-ethnics in Uzbekistan, I, like many
Kyrgyz citizens, cherished hopes that Russia, Kazakhstan and other
countries such as China would intervene to stop the violence. Such
hopes were dashed when Kyrgyzstan was told to deal with the conflict on
its own. Suddenly, a country where interests of many countries overlap,
became no one's backyard.
Now, when the dust of the conflict is settling down somewhat, we
can make sense of what has happened. Some claim that the historical
hatred between the two communities precipitated the violence. Others
say that economic disparities triggered the conflict. Still others
suggest that various extremist groups, local and foreign, had a hand in
the violence. In this testimony, I do not deny the relevance of these
views. But I would argue that understanding last year's violence in
Kyrgyzstan requires us to have a more nuanced and holistic view of
Kyrgyzstan's past and present. The violent regime change and bloody
ethnic clashes in 2010 are symptoms of a set of broader and long-
standing challenges, or ``chronic ailments,'' that have afflicted
Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors since independence. If these ailments are
not treated adequately, turmoil will continue in Kyrgyzstan.
So what are these ailments? Twenty years ago, when Kyrgyzstan
gained independence, its leaders and citizens, like their counterparts
in other former Soviet republics, grappled with four key transition
challenges that fall under the general rubrics of politics, economy,
society and foreign policy. In the political realm, Kyrgyz leaders
debated whether they should divide powers more evenly among themselves
or preserve Soviet-era institutions of rule. In the economic sphere,
leaders were divided into those who promoted liberal market reforms and
those who stood for preserving Soviet-era social benefits system. The
third challenge was related to the identity of the new state--should
Kyrgyz citizens build a multi-ethnic republic or a state ruled by the
titular ethnic group (like its neighbors such as Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan)? The final challenge was related to the country's foreign
policy--should Kyrgyzstan pursue an independent multi-vector policy or
stick even more closely to Moscow?
After two decades of wavering between these alternatives, two
revolutions and two bloody inter-ethnic conflicts--the symptoms of
unresolved transition ailments--Kyrgyz citizens are grappling with the
same challenges again. It is as if the country has come full circle to
start at square one in 2010. In this testimony, I seek to answer two
questions. Why did this happen? Why there has been no progress? And
second, where might things end?
Before proceeding to these questions, it is important to remind us
why we should care about this small mountainous country of five million
people, the size of South Dakota, located in the remote part of the
world. Kyrgyzstan is important because of several factors. The first
factor is its geographic location: the country borders China,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (the last two have borders with
Afghanistan). Kyrgyzstan is also a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and numerous
other regional inter-state structures. Second, the country is important
because of geopolitical considerations. It is the only country in the
world that hosts an American and Russian military bases. The U.S.-
operated Manas Transit Center plays a key role in the so-called
Northern Distribution Network. Third, there is an ideological
consideration. Kyrgyzstan was briefly the darling of the West, serving
as a model of democratic development for other countries in the region.
Following the establishment of a parliamentary system, President Barack
Obama's administration has given an indication that Kyrgyzstan can
serve as a model for some Middle Eastern states as they chart their
post-authoritarian courses. For Russia and other Commonwealth
republics, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and chronic
instability is a model of what not to follow.
Explaining Kyrgyzstan's tumultuous path since independence
So what explains Kyrgyzstan's tumultuous trajectory since
independence? Various answers are given. Some observers emphasize the
role of history. They claim that the country's nomadic roots and
illiberal Soviet past have made the country prone to authoritarianism
and political volatility. Other observers cite economic factors,
suggesting that a low supply of natural resources has prevented
Kyrgyzstan to turn into an economically prosperous and politically
stable country. There are also claims that Kyrgyzstan is located in a
``bad authoritarian neighborhood''--a condition that is not conducive
to developing a democracy.
All of these explanations are relevant and they may not exclude
each other. But today, I will emphasize the role of leadership or lack
of it as the major source of Kyrgyzstan's troubles. The major flaw of
the Kyrgyz leaders was that they failed to find lasting solutions or
effective treatments for the four key challenges, or chronic ailments,
outlined above. To be more precise, Kyrgyz leaders have continuously
undermined stability by engaging in systematic alteration of political
rules whenever such rules did not suit their immediate political
preferences. More importantly, Kyrgyz leaders lacked a realization of
their historic roles as the founding fathers of the nation and the
responsibility that flows from such realization.
Let me describe in detail the way in which Kyrgyz leaders failed to
respond to the key transitional challenges. I will start with
Kyrgyzstan's first president Askar Akaev who ruled the country from
1990 to 2005. Akaev's initial responses to the challenges of early
independence established him as a genuine democratic leader in the
West. He liberalized the political space, creating a system in which
power was shared more or less evenly between the President, Parliament,
and regional authorities through the single-mandate district electoral
system. Akaev also liberalized the economy, ushering in massive
privatization of state enterprises. In foreign policy, he pursued a
balanced and cautious policy toward large powers and neighbors. Eager
to quell ethnic tensions, especially after the June 1990 clash in Osh,
Akaev promoted a civic idea of Kyrgyzstan as a ``common home'' for all
ethnic groups. This policy, while widely unpopular with the ethnic
Kyrgyz majority, sought to give ethnic minority groups a sense of
ownership and the Akaev administration much needed votes during
elections.
Political and economic liberalization under Akaev had lasting
consequences on the country's future trajectory. The economic
liberalization policy offered new opportunities for Kyrgyz residents to
gain capital outside state institutions and led to the formation of new
wealthy class. Seeking to gain seats in Parliament, affluent
individuals built ties with the poor in communities across the country
by sharing their wealth and by helping community members to solve their
day-to-day problems. The political liberalization widened the room for
political contestation, allowing Parliament, mass media outlets, and
NGOs to assume prominent political roles.
Amidst a rise in opposition activity in the early 2000s, especially
after the establishment of the U.S. airbase in Manas, President Akaev
began backtracking on his initial liberalizing path, however. His
efforts to create a tamed parliament and ensure a managed transition of
political power to his hand-picked successor threatened interests of
the wealthy class and low-income communities in which the affluent
elites invested. As a result, the powerful alliance of the wealthy
class and low-income communities resulted in the Tulip Revolution in
2005 and brought to power Kyrgyzstan's second President--Kurmanbek
Bakiev--one of the leaders of the opposition movement.
Having seized power in March 2005, Bakiev promised to introduce
wide-reaching democratic changes. Nevertheless, by the end of his first
term, he undid many of Akaev's initial policies that aimed at fostering
harmonious inter-ethnic relations, ensuring balance of power among
government branches, and maintaining a cautious foreign policy course.
Bakiev relied on the security apparatus and the tamed judiciary which
were controlled by his family members to suppress ethnic minorities,
religious dissidents and political opponents. In a major change, the
October 2007 constitution replaced single district mandate electoral
system with party lists, allowing Bakiev's party Ak-Jol to win the
December 2007 parliamentary election in a landslide with the help of
the pliant government bureaucracy and weak judiciary. Having bolstered
domestic control, Bakiev began to pursue a very dangerous foreign
policy that pitted Moscow against Washington and other large powers.
Bakiev's policies had some grave consequences for his own regime.
First, with the alteration of the Akaev-era constitution and
centralization of political power in Bakiev's hands, affluent
politicians lost the incentive to share their wealth with and provide
surrogate public goods to communities across the country which were
already reeling from the gradual decline in the delivery of public
goods by the state. Second, Bakiev's neglect of inter-ethnic problems
emboldened various chauvinistic groups and deepened inter-ethnic
tension. Third, Bishkek's indeterminate foreign policy course, as
demonstrated by Bakiev's 2009 turnaround on the Manas airbase,
alienated Bakiev's allies in Moscow. In February 2009, days after
receiving a large financial package from Moscow, Bishkek decided to
close the airbase. But when the U.S. government agreed to increase rent
payment in June that year, Bishkek allowed the base to stay albeit
under a changed status. And finally, Bakiev's decision to increase
utility tariffs, a measure designed to improve cash flows to the state
coffers, deepened discontent among Kyrgyz residents, especially in the
Northern regions where winter lasts several months.
In March 2005, it was an alliance of the wealthy and the poor that
toppled an authoritarian regime. In April 2010, it was a combination of
economic sanctions from Russia and protests by poor and unemployed
residents in such northern towns as Naryn and Talas which had
culminated in a violent ouster of an authoritarian ruler. Bakiev's
political demise and the concomitant collapse of the country's security
services opened a floodgate of pent-up ethnic tension created by years
of biased government policy and prepared the ground for the inter-
ethnic clashes in June 2010.
The opposition factions that formed the interim government after
Bakiev's demise were not prepared to assume power. Lacking broad
legitimacy and being driven by the survival instinct in an almost
anarchic environment, the new authorities engaged in a number of
chaotic and populist measures such as the demonization of Bakiev and
his acolytes and reversal of punitive utility tariffs imposed by the
previous regime.
Although the new leaders recognized the strategic need to address
the long-standing transitional dilemmas, they lacked resources and a
sense of strategic direction. As a result, they got the sequencing of
actions wrong. Despite various signals that simmering ethnic conflict
was ready to explode in South Kyrgyzstan, the new Kyrgyz leaders
preoccupied themselves with the division of political powers in
Bishkek. As a result, when the ethnic conflict broke out in Osh in
early June 2010, the authorities were utterly unprepared to deal with
its consequences. Authorities in Bishkek had little if no control over
government security services, let alone rampaging crowds. When their
pleas for security assistance from the Russia-led Collective Security
Treaty Organization were rejected, officials in Bishkek seemed to let
the conflict to take its own course.
The bloody conflict ended largely because the blockade of the
conflict zones reduced the supply of food; and the rampaging crowds
turned into hordes of looters. Rather than deal with the consequences
of the conflict in a more effective way, the new leaders' attention
again shifted to the distribution of political power. The referendum
held days after the violent events, when wounds were still fresh,
endorsed the parliamentary system. The December 2010 parliamentary
elections enabled five parties, representing a variety of ideological
persuasions, to occupy seats in Parliament.
Where might things end?
Kyrgyzstan's new leaders have made attempts to resolve the long-
standing dilemmas, but such efforts have been half-hearted and
ineffective. Let's consider the first challenge--the division of
powers. The new system contains a number of ambiguities regarding the
distribution of political powers; and it is now under pressure from
various corners. According to recent polls, a majority of Kyrgyz
citizens support a strong presidential system akin to Russia. Decision-
makers in Moscow have also been openly critical of Kyrgyzstan's
transition to a parliamentary republic. Some influential politicians in
Parliament appear eager to change the constitution again.
Kyrgyz authorities' response to the second challenge--forming a new
national identity--has been largely ineffective. One widespread
assumption among citizens is that the June events firmly established
the preeminence of the ethnic Kyrgyz in the political and economic
spheres. The new authorities appear to be unwilling to challenge such
assumptions in a resolute way, thus allowing chauvinistic and anti-
Semitic groups and media outlets to disseminate freely materials
containing bigotry. Authorities have done little work in the area of
reconciliation. Rather than deal with the legacy of the violence
impartially and resolutely, according to one observer, the
``provisional government's Soviet-style instinct was to try and sweep
the unpleasant events under the rug and put forward a mantra of
`friendship of the peoples.' '' This strategy is flawed and it
resembles the one adopted by Kyrgyz authorities after the June 1990
violence.
There are serious flaws in government's responses to the third
chronic problem--ailing economy. Kyrgyz officials' are engaging in
economic populism as exemplified by the recent raises in public
salaries and reversal of utility prices even at a time when the country
is facing financial troubles (Kyrgyz debt has reached $2,5 billion,
budget deficit is nearly 10 percent of the GDP) and its donors are
hesitant to issue new loans. Leaders in Bishkek are turning a deaf ear
to warnings about looming crisis while maintaining an illusion that
foreign lenders will save the country.
Finally, the Kyrgyz authorities are again following the footsteps
of their predecessors in pursuing an indeterminate foreign policy,
which led to the ouster of their predecessor. Relations with neighbors
who are concerned about pernicious effects from instability in
Kyrgyzstan are still tense. Recent unlawful attacks against Russian
businesses in Kyrgyzstan have aggravated Bishkek's relations with
Moscow. Some decision-makers in the Kremlin also suspect Bishkek of
pursuing an exceedingly pro-Western policy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan's
Western partners are growing concerned about plans by some politicians
to change the current system and restore a super-presidential
arrangement.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan finds itself at a crossroads again. The violent events
in 2010 have taken their toll, but they also provide a new window of
opportunity to learn the mistakes of the past and settle on a
constructive path. The key lesson is that Kyrgyz leaders and citizens
must have a very painful but much needed debate about their fourfold
transition challenges before settling down on potential solutions.
These solutions must include concerns of all citizens. If Kyrgyz
leaders and citizens will succeed in finding such long-lasting
solutions and will make every effort to stick to them, their country
can become a model for stability and integration of ethnic groups for
Central Asia and CIS. If they will fail, Kyrgyzstanis will set
themselves again on the path to a violent revolution and a deadly
inter-ethnic conflict.
Dr. Alisher Khamidov is a Professorial Lecturer at the School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He
is an expert on Central Asia and Russia.
He began his career as Director of the Osh Media Resource Center
(OMRC), a non-profit, independent media association in southern
Kyrgyzstan.
He has also acted as the regional coordinator of the Central Asian
Media Support Project.
Before his Doctorate, he worked at Notre Dame University's
Sanctions and Security Project, the NEH Summer Institute on Eurasian
Civilizations at Harvard University and at the Foreign Policy Studies
Program of the Brookings Institution.
Khamidov has written a series of articles on religious and ethnic
conflict in the Ferghana Valley and political developments in
Kyrgyzstan and in Central Asia, and is a frequent contributor to
Eurasianet and Transitions Online.
He is published in a number of academic journals in Central Asia
and North America.
He received his Ph.D in Russian and Eurasian Studies from SAIS,
Johns Hopkins University, an M.A. in International Peace Studies from
the University of Notre Dame, and a B.A. from Osh State University,
Kyrgyzstan.
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