[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS
GOVERNMENT CLAIMS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 25, 2012
__________
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE
SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland,
Chairman Co-Chairman
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama TOM UDALL, New Mexico
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
New York MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State
MICHAEL C. CAMUNEZ, Department of Commerce
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense
[ii]
KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS
GOVERNMENT CLAIMS?
----------
January 25, 2012
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 3
WITNESSES
Ambassador William Courtney (Retired), Former U.S. Ambassador to
Kazakhstan and Georgia......................................... 11
Susan Corke, Director for Eurasia Programs, Freedom House........ 33
Dr. Sean R. Roberts, Associate Professor and Director of the
International Development Studies Program, GWU's Elliott School
for International Affairs...................................... 4
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith.................. 28
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 30
Prepared statement of Amb. William Courtney...................... 31
Prepared statement of Susan Corke................................ 33
Prepared statement of Dr. Sean R. Roberts........................ 38
Prepared statement of Ambassador Erlan Idrissov.................. 40
Prepared statement of the Central Council of People's Front...... 45
[iii]
KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS
GOVERNMENT CLAIMS?
----------
January 25, 2012
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 2 p.m. in room 200, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith,
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon.
Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Ambassador William Courtney (Retired),
Former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia; Susan Corke,
Director for Eurasia Programs, Freedom House; and Dr. Sean R.
Roberts, Associate Professor and Director of the International
Development Studies Program, GWU's Elliott School for
International Affairs.
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order. And I want to
thank you all for being here this afternoon, and especially to
our very distinguished panel.
Today we will discuss the state of human rights and
democracy in Kazakhstan.
The Government of Kazakhstan, controlled by the
authoritarian President-for-Life Nazarbayev, has long sought to
obscure its serious human rights and democracy deficiencies by
claiming that at least it is a haven of stability in Central
Asia. Stability has in fact become the basis of the Government
of Kazakhstan's claim to legitimacy. Of course, stability can
never be an excuse for dictatorship or widespread torture and
similar abuses. We simply can never accept the hidden premise
of the Kazakhstan Government's talk of stability, that human
dignity can be bargained away in some exchange for stability.
Likewise, we cannot accept at face value the claim that
Kazakhstan is in fact as stable as its Government claims. This
claim must be carefully examined. That is what this hearing is
about today. Too often, in Washington and within the OSCE, the
Government of Kazakhstan's claim to stability is tacitly
accepted. And that allows the Government to set itself up as a
model for other Asian and European countries.
After last year's events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Syria, we have to look carefully at authoritarian claims to
stability--all the more since last month, when there were riots
in Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan, which the authorities put
down with deadly force. At least 16 people were killed, and
some estimates go as high as 70. Many of us have seen terrible
videos circulating on YouTube that clearly show government
forces firing on fleeing protesters and beating those who fell
to the ground. I doubt many Kazakhs will soon forget these
images.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty reported the harrowing
testimony of a 21-year-old girl who was detained while out
looking for her father the night of the riots. She described
witnessing the torture, the abuse and humiliation of dozens of
people who had been rounded up and taken to the basement of
police headquarters, including girls who were stripped naked
and dragged into an adjoining room. She herself was beaten. She
reported what she saw to authorities, who returned with her a
week later. The basement had been scrubbed clean, and the
police claimed that nothing had happened. The woman's father
returned home after two days. He said he had been badly beaten
by police, and he died of his injuries on December 24th.
There are many such stories. AP reports a journalist's main
police department heard screams coming from what appeared to be
interrogation rooms, while men with bloodied faces were lined
up in the corridors with their faces against the wall. Sadly,
reports of police abuse and torture in Kazakhstan are not new.
In December of 2009, in his report the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Torture concluded that, quote, ``evidence obtained through
torture or ill treatment is commonly used as a basis for
conviction.''
Since the violence in December, the Government of
Kazakhstan has said it is open to an international
investigation, and has said many other things that we would
expect a responsible democratic government to say. It has also
established a governmental investigative commission. I
certainly hope the internal investigation will be transparent
and serious, and that there will be an international
investigation soon--but best of all, by the OSCE--and that many
good things the Government has said since the violence are the
harbinger of a new openness to reform.
At the same time, we have reason to be skeptical. Just
yesterday, the chief editor of an opposition paper was jailed
as part of an investigation. So far, charges against police
have only been for stealing cellphones and cash from
protesters. And the focus of the investigation has been focused
instead on the political opposition. Access to the town itself
and to potential witnesses have been severely restricted. While
some journalists were giving access on December 18th and 19th,
they reported that they were under close supervision and not
permitted to speak freely with detainees or residents.
Prison Reform International, which the Kazakhstani
Government claims met with detainees and found no evidence of
torture, told my staff that they only assisted in getting
access for local human rights monitors to a very limited number
of detainees, far below the official number of those who had
been arrested. Contrary to the Government's statement that no
evidence of torture was found, in fact the monitors cited four
suspected cases.
There are reports that those who have tried to come forward
may have been threatened. Surprise, surprise. At least one of
the local monitors who visited detainees will no longer discuss
it. The young woman I mentioned earlier will no longer speak
about her ordeal. The persons who filmed the YouTube video from
their window reportedly were sought by the authorities and have
gone into hiding out of fear for their safety. Many people
reportedly are still missing, but their families are afraid to
come forward.
Of course, we will also want to talk about the January 15th
parliamentary elections, which the OSCE concluded, quote, ``did
not meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.'' The
OSCE details significant problems, including the exclusion of
opposition parties and candidates, electoral commissions
controlled by the ruling party, media bias, restrictions on
freedom of assembly and problems during the counting process.
I have spoken to participants in the election observation
mission who personally observed outright fraud, including
falsification of the final protocol in favor of the ruling Nur
Otan party. Other American observers reported falsification of
protocols to the party's advantage, as well as ballot stuffing
and people being paid to vote.
I'd like to now introduce our very distinguished panel to
the Commission. And again, I thank you for being here, because
your information not only is received by Members of this
Commission, but we disseminate it very widely among the
leadership of the House, Senate, Democrat and Republican. And
then there's an even wider distribution, obviously, to the
executive branch and to others in the diplomatic circles. So
your testimonies will make a difference.
Beginning with Ambassador William Courtney, who was a
career foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State
from 1972 through 1999. In his past post--last post, I should
say--he served as senior adviser to this Commission--so we
welcome him back--and co-chair of the U.S. delegation to the
review conference of the OSCE, which prepared for its 1999
summit in Istanbul. He was an adviser in the 1999 re-
organization of foreign affairs agencies; special assistant to
the President of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia; and ambassador to
Kazakhstan and Georgia.
Earlier he headed the U.S. delegation to the implementation
commission of the U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty and was
deputy U.S. negotiator for defense and space in Geneva. He's a
member of the Council of Foreign Relations, on the boards of
directors of the American Academy of Diplomacy and World
Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. He graduated from West
Virginia University with a B.A. and Brown University with a
Ph.D. in economics.
We will then hear from Susan Corke, who's director of the
Eurasian programs at Freedom House. Ms. Corke is a skilled
practitioner in supporting human rights and democratic reforms
in Europe and Eurasia. Before joining Freedom House, she spent
seven years at the State Department, first two as Presidential
Management Fellow, and most recently as a deputy director for
European affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, where she worked to promote human rights and democratic
reform in some of the most repressive countries in the region,
such as Belarus and Russia.
She oversaw the editing for the State Department human
rights country reports for Europe and had supervisory oversight
of DRL's 25-plus civil society meeting and human rights
programs in Europe. She also did stints at the U.S. embassy in
Moscow, U.S. embassy Prague, in the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs.
Prior to the State Department, Ms. Corke helped found and
manage the U.S. foreign policy institute at the Elliott School
of International Affairs at George Washington University. She
also worked at the German Marshall Fund, and as a media
strategist at several advertising agencies in New York. Ms.
Corke has a master's degree in international affairs from
George Washington University--its Elliot School of
International Affairs--and a bachelor's degree from the College
of William and Mary.
And finally, we'll hear from Dr. Sean R. Roberts, who is
the Director of the International Development Studies Program
and Associate Professor of Practice [of International Affairs]
at George Washington University's Elliott School for
International Affairs. He has spent substantial time over the
last 18 years living in Kazakhstan, both doing academic
research and working for the United States Agency for
International Development.
While at USAID, Dr. Roberts managed projects in civil
society development, political party assistance, independent
media development, and elections assistance. During this time,
he also served as a short-term elections monitor for the OSCE
missions to the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, as well
as the 2005 presidential elections in the country. He has a
forthcoming article coming out in the summer issue of Slavic
Review entitled ``Doing the Democracy Dance in Kazakhstan:
Democracy Development as Cultural Encounter.''
So we have three outstanding witnesses, and we look
forward--beginning with you, Mr. Ambassador--to your
testimonies.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM COURTNEY (RETIRED), FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO KAZAKHSTAN AND GEORGIA
Amb. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
appear before you today.
Kazakhstan has a population of over 16 million. Ethnic
Kazakhs comprise three-fifths; ethnic Slavs one-quarter; and
Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tatars and others the remainder. Given this
diversity, the term ``Kazakhstanis'' best refers to all the
people of the country, and Kazakhs to the ethnic group.
In many ways, Kazakhstan is blessed. It is larger than
Western Europe and endowed with a minerals bounty. People tend
to pragmatism. Ethnic differences are muted--regrettably in
part because political expression is limited. Rulers encourage
inter-ethnic harmony--although some Kazakh advantages, such as
political dominance, raise concerns. Selection to chair the
OSCE last year was a mark of the country's international
respect and weight.
Kazakhstan has achieved notable economic gains. Modernizing
reforms, private property, talented people, and booming exports
of energy and minerals make the country far wealthier than in
Soviet times. In 2010, according to the World Bank, per capita
GDP in current U.S. dollars stood at 9,136 [dollars] in
Kazakhstan: slightly lower than Russia's 10,440 [dollars], but
three times higher than Ukraine's $3,007.
These data, however, do not tell the full story. Much
wealth disappears into corruption. Construction of the
extravagant new capital in Astana diminishes state funding for
the rest of the economy. The economy is unbalanced: for
example, the World Bank reports that labor productivity in
agriculture is just 1 percent of that in America.
Political development in Kazakhstan is stunted by 20 years
of authoritarian rule. The tragedy last month, to which you
referred, Mr. Chairman, highlights the risks. On December 16,
security forces in Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan fired on
unarmed demonstrators, including striking oil workers, killing
and wounding scores. A chilling video on YouTube shows security
forces firing on and beating fleeing people, as you pointed
out.
Rather than apologizing, offering amends and opening a
credible investigation, the authorities did the opposite. They
blamed hooligans, shut off communications to the city and
imposed martial law. The hardline response may not have calmed
tensions; martial law was extended. A former interior minister
became the new regional governor--a hint of unease about the
loyalty of security forces.
Today, on the date of this hearing, Kazakhstan's chief
prosecutor announced that criminal charges are being brought
against several regional police executive and state oil company
officials. It will be important that due process be followed
and that judicial proceedings be transparent. Otherwise, many
Kazakhstanis will wonder whether these officials are culpable
for the Zhanaozen calamity, or whether they are lambs being
sacrificed to exculpate the guilt of those higher up or better
connected.
The violence was an aberration in the country's generally
peaceful life. The callous response, however, is symptomatic of
a wide gap between rulers and ruled, between reality and
expectations, and between those who live honestly and those who
do not.
In history, Kazakhs do not meekly submit to arbitrary
power. In the 19th century, Russian colonization was slowed by
uprisings and wars. In World War I, many Kazakhs resisted the
czar's conscription, and then the communist takeover. A decade
later, Kazakhs opposed brutal Soviet collectivization of
agriculture, such as by killing their own livestock rather than
turning it over to the State. Over a million Kazakhs perished.
In World War II, Stalin exiled ethnic Germans, Crimean
Tatars and North Caucasian Muslims to Kazakhstan. A million
Poles were banished there. Many of these peoples, starving or
ill, were taken in by Kazakhs and survived. Vast numbers lost
their lives to Soviet cruelty. Nikita Khrushchev hurled huge
numbers of ethnic Slavs into northern Kazakhstan for the
wasteful Virgin Lands Campaign, aimed at turning pasture into a
grain belt. Other Slavs built and operated raw materials and
military facilities. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn labored in
Kazakhstan in a prison camp.
The Soviets used much of Kazakhstan for military purposes.
They tested nuclear weapons at Semipalatinsk, operated the
world's largest anthrax factory at Stepnogorsk, tested
biological weapons in the open air on an island in the Aral
Sea, tested anti-ballistic missiles and lasers at Sary Shagan,
assembled torpedoes in Almaty, deployed giant SS-18
intercontinental missiles in two locations, and conducted
ballistic missile tests and space launches from Baikonur. Amid
the military activity, most of the country was closed.
Kazakhstanis had few contacts with the outside world. A vital
lifeline was shortwave broadcasting by Radio Liberty, VOA, BBC,
Deutsche Welle and others.
After the Soviet collapse, Kazakhstan returned nuclear
weapons to Russia and became a model partner in the Nunn-Lugar
program to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their
infrastructure. Kazakhstan welcomes substantial U.S. and other
investment in Caspian Energy. It is a critical partner in the
Northern Distribution Network, which provides logistical
support to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Close cooperation on core interests has yielded a
productive U.S.-Kazakhstani strategic relationship--one of
America's most valued. Yet as Egypt shows, rulers must retain
the consent of the governed in order to sustain foreign
support. The lesson is salient for Kazakhstan.
First, the legitimacy of personalized rule is in decline,
and Zhanaozen is accelerating it. Transitions beyond President
Nazarbayev, now 71, are uncertain. No evident successor has
broad stature or appeal. Few, if any, independent groups
combine the experience and acceptance required for effective
political intermediation. None is so strong or enduring, for
example, as the liberal Yabloko party in Russia or the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt.
On January 15 Kazakhstan held elections for a new
parliament, but no genuine opposition parties were allowed to
participate. OSCE election monitors found that the elections,
quote, ``did not meet fundamental principles of democratic
elections,'' end quote. In another anti-democratic step,
earlier this week security forces raided the office of the
opposition party Alga and the home of its leader. The
courageous suffer. Journalist Ramazan Esergepov, labor union
lawyer Natalia Sokolova, and human rights activists Aidos
Sadykov and Yevgeny Zhovtis have languished in prison.
Multiple factors, some unforeseen today, could shape
Kazakhstan's political evolution. One might be the
demonstration effect of the Arab Awakening. Other factors may
include elites empowered by economic liberalization; educated
and connected young people; restive citizens in western
Kazakhstan; Islamic interests; disadvantaged groups; and
Russia's policy toward neighbors. Kazakhstan's burden of
autocracy could render its politics less resilient against
extremist pressures.
Second, the accumulation of wealth by President Mubarak and
his family, and popular resentment of it, have a disturbing
parallel in Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev is rightly
credited for improving the economy, but personal aggrandizement
arouses concern and cynicism. Moreover, several in his family
are multibillionaires. Third, Zhanaozen may propel more unrest.
One risk is western Kazakhstan, which does not benefit
commensurate with its contribution to the economy. Another risk
is ethnicity. Zhanaozen was largely Kazakh-on-Kazakh violence.
If large-scale lethal force were ever turned on unarmed ethnic
Russians, consequences could be far reaching. The Kremlin is
vocal about protecting the interests of Russians abroad.
Kazakhstan's regions with higher proportions of ethnic Russians
lie along the border with Russia--a key reason why the capital
was moved northward.
In conclusion, political risks in Kazakhstan are rising
even as the economy expands. The arrogant, official response to
Zhanaozen suggests dulled leadership awareness of human
conditions. Repeated promises of democratic reforms go
unfulfilled. Popular expectations may be climbing faster than
the brittle political system can accommodate. Limits on
independent political life weaken safety valves for peaceful
change.
America and Europe are widely respected in Kazakhstan. They
should bite the bullet and do more to promote political and
human freedoms. While some may resist, this will be a prudent
investment in an important country and a friendly people with
good long-term prospects. I will be pleased to answer any
questions you might have and hear your further perspectives.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so very much for your
testimony and your insights. Ms. Corke.
SUSAN CORKE, DIRECTOR FOR EURASIA PROGRAMS, FREEDOM HOUSE
Ms. Corke. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you and
Helsinki Commission staff today to discuss whether Kazakhstan
is as stable as its Government claims at a pivotal moment in
its history. I'm also pleased to appear in distinguished
company with Ambassador Courtney and Dr. Sean Roberts.
While working in the State Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, I worked in common cause
both with Helsinki Commission staff and Freedom House, before,
during and after Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE to press
together for human rights improvements.
Just over one year ago, Kazakhstan's foreign minister said
at the OSCE summit in Astana that that was a sign of the
objective recognition by the international community of
Kazakhstan's successes in its socioeconomic and democratic
development. It continued to say that they endeavored to fully
live up to their motto--trust, tradition, transparency and
tolerance--and be worthy of the confidence placed in them by
the OSCE.
Unfortunately, as we gather today to consider Kazakhstan's
stability and human rights record, it seems that the nation is
not deserving of that confidence. While those who supported
Kazakhstan's chairmanship argued that it could galvanize human
rights reform, it has failed to do so. In our recently released
Annual Freedom in the World report, Kazakhstan continued to
earn its ``not free'' ranking.
This week, as we take stock of the situation, it's been a
pretty bad week. Additional repressive measures have been
launched in Kazakhstan, including raids of the opposition Alga
Party offices and detentions of opposition activists and
journalists. All of civil society feels under serious pressure
and is nervous about what will happen next. Our Freedom House
office in Almaty, led by Mr. Vyacheslav Abramov, and his small
but dedicated staff, continuously working on human rights and
reporting on developments. They are fearful now, and say that
the common belief amongst NGOs is that NGOs will be the next
place raided.
I'll focus primarily today on the current human rights
situation as gathered from their reporting, which demonstrates
that Kazakhstan is heading down a path of increasing
instability. The recent riots and violence are not simply a
random outburst. A leading Kazakh NGO, The Bureau, documented
the growth of civic engagement this past year--interestingly,
the emergence of ordinary citizens as leading organizers of
public assemblies, and 78 percent of these were on
socioeconomic problems.
As the Government severely restricts freedom of assembly,
however, the fact that more people are willing to challenge the
government to have their voices heard is a sign of societal
discontent. And if theGovernment continues on its repressive
path, more peaceful protests will turn to violent ones.
Nazarbayev has ruled Kazakhstan with an iron fist since
1991, and remains fixed on retaining power. When stability,
however, is defined as keeping the lid on, it is only a matter
of time before the pot starts to boil over. We've already
talked about Zhanaozen. And the international community
watched, taken aback, as violence erupted there the day of
Kazakhstan's 20-year celebration of independence from the
Soviet Union. For those who had been paying attention, the pot
had been simmering there for a while, and as already discussed,
there were some underlying elements of social unrest. The oil
strike had been going on since last April, when a large group
of oil workers in western Kazakhstan began to demand higher
wages and better working conditions. While Kazakhstan has
several billionaires, these strikes signaled that uneven
distribution of the country's resources was sparking a
backlash.
Starting in May, many workers began camping in the city
square in an indefinite protest--a challenge to a government
that had tried and succeeded in squelching dissent. On December
16, the situation took a deadly turn. We've already talked
about the videos that showed police firing with lethal force at
citizen's backs. Our reporting on the ground had 18 deaths,
which is higher than some of the other reports. And we were
horrified, too, to hear of the abuse in police headquarters.
Soon after, President Nazarbayev took decisive steps to try
to regain stability, as already discussed, imposing emergency
rule. Surprisingly he dismissed his son-in-law, the head of the
state oil holding company. He demanded a public inquiry and
vowed to severely punish perpetrators. At the moment the city
remains closed to public defenders and journalists, who may
enter the city only if official permission is granted.
The presidential administration, while it was swift in
trying to usher in stability, shows no real signs of
understanding the root causes. Nazarbaev's political adviser
called the disorder a provocation against the president and
then continued to say that criminals were responsible. He said:
The president dealt with it, and the situation is back to
normal. If only that were the case.
We've already gone into--Ambassador Courtney went into
detail on the elections, so I'll just note that Kazakhstan
continued its 20-year tradition of failing to observe
democratic norms. The election was a sham effort to meet its
stated goals of increasing the number of parties in Parliament.
Interestingly, two days after the election, Nazarbayev
issued a fast rebuttal, revealing what he really thinks about
political modernization, saying that Kazakhstan would no longer
invite international experts who criticize its elections. The
Government of Kazakhstan seems to only want the OSCE's input
when it is good news.
In looking to place blame for the growing instability, the
obvious target was the opposition for the Government. In
December the leaders of the unregistered Alga party in Astana
and in the Mangistau region were both arrested. After the
election, Vladmir Kozlov, the leader of Alga in Almaty,
predicted Kazakh authorities would continue to try to blame the
opposition. This has been the case.
On Monday, police and the Committee on National Security
organized a search in at the central office of the Alga party
and at the homes of Kozlov and others. Several were detained,
including Kozlov, who was then accused of inciting social
discord. The Government said the raids were part of the
investigation into Zhanaozen. By tightening the screws rather
than allowing for political competition or dissent, Nazarbayev
and his administration are on some level admitting their own
weakness and vulnerability. A confident leader would not need
to resort to such tactics.
Throughout the past year, the country has been shaken by
several attacks, mostly in western Kazakhstan, that were blamed
on religious extremists, and the Government responded by
cracking down and passing new legislation broadly tightening
religious freedoms and public expression. When I visited
Kazakhstan last August, there was a palpable sense of fear
about what this uptick in religious extremism would mean for
Kazakhstan. Human rights activists I spoke with warned that
speaking publicly about the rise in extremism would cross a
government red line.
The restrictive law on religion soon followed, and was
rushed through Parliament in only three weeks, in spite of
protests from the OSCE and NGOs. It gives the Government
unprecedented authority to regulate the activities and
structures of religious communities and forbids prayer or
religious expression in government institutions. The specifics
of the law are poorly defined and leave much room for
interpretation to local authorities.
Shortly on the heels of that, the new National Security Act
was signed by the President this month. It not only provides
for the empowerment of special services, especially for
combatting terrorism, but it allows for blocking of the
Internet and other communication. In addition, the law imposes
a vague restriction that those who harm the image of Kazakhstan
in the international arena can be considered destructive. This
law could be directed against those who criticize the country
at international fora, such as this one.
The Government is trying to keep the lid on freedom of
expression in other ways too. The new Broadcasting Act was
signed by the president in January after a year of disregarding
recommendations made by the OSCE and NGOs. It contains a number
of troubling regulations that give the state additional control
over TV and radio channels. For example, 50 percent of the
broadcasts of foreign channels must contain domestic content by
2018. This new restrictive measure occurs in a media
environment that is already under siege.
Kazakhstan has preferred to view democracy and freedom as
public relations slogans to boost prestige. It spared no
expense in promoting itself with advertisement campaigns and
high-level consultancies, such as Tony Blair. Admittedly, this
has paid some policy dividends for Kazakhstan.
However, in spite of trying to tout its harmony and peace
of the country, an essential truth has been revealed with the
latest violence. When citizens have legitimate grievances
without an outlet, when freedoms are denied in the name of
stability, instability and extremism are likely to increase.
It is time to address the political stagnancy and lack of
an apparent heir after Nazarbayev, officially deemed the leader
for life. It is time for pro-democratic forces within
Kazakhstan and the international community to start thinking
about how to catalyze a more democratic, stable future for the
country. Given its strategic importance, how Kazakhstan
approaches the immediate future should be a cause for concern
for policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic.
I will conclude now with five specific recommendations,
which were developed in consultation with civil society in
Kazakhstan.
One, it is important to publicly, at high levels, continue
to hold the Kazakh authorities to their international
obligations. Kazakhstan must earn positive attention, not buy
it.
Two, it is important to express support for civil society
in Kazakhstan in cases of direct repression against NGOs and
their activists.
Three, the time is now to increase material support for
civil society in Kazakhstan through funding and participation
in various programs. They need our help more than ever.
Four, it is important to put pressure on the Kazakh
authorities, demanding that the domestic and international
investigation of the events in Zhanaozen are allowed to occur
openly and transparently.
And finally, it is important to press the Government of
Kazakhstan to put words into action and allow political
pluralism and not paint the opposition as the enemy. The
opposition will hold a protest rally January 28th in Almaty and
will try to contest the election results in courts. This is a
test for the Government. The West should pay attention. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Corke, thank you very much for your
testimony and your very specific recommendations. Dr. Roberts,
please proceed.
DR. SEAN R. ROBERTS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAM, GWU'S ELLIOTT SCHOOL
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Dr. Roberts. Chairman Smith and members of the Commission,
I'd like to thank you for inviting me here today to speak on
this very important and timely topic: Whether Kazakhstan is as
stable as its Government claims.
As I recently wrote in a briefing paper commissioned by the
Atlantic Council on 20 years of U.S.-Kazakhstani relationship,
the Republic of Kazakhstan is something of an oasis of
stability in the desert of uncertainty that represents Central
Asia.
Indeed, this stability is also largely the result of
intelligent policies adopted by the Government of Kazakhstan
over the last 20 years. In the 1990s the Government of
Kazakhstan, with cooperation from the United States, divested
itself of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet
Union. Also in the 1990s, Kazakhstan's Government was careful
to adopt inclusionary policies for its Russian minority
citizens and to establish close relations with the Russian
Federation, which helped to substantially reduce ethnic tension
in the heavily Russian-populated north of the country.
During the later 1990s and into the 2000s, Kazakhstan also
adopted substantial liberal economic reforms that helped the
country use its natural resource wealth to stimulate growth and
create a vibrant middle class. All of these steps have played a
role in making Kazakhstan the strongest and most stable country
in Central Asia, both politically and economically. And the
Government of Kazakhstan frequently, and justifiably, takes
credit for them.
Unfortunately, stability is not something a state can
merely establish once in its history. It is an ongoing duty of
governments around the world to meet the challenges that they
face in keeping their citizens secure. This duty requires
adapting to changing circumstances and understanding the
changing needs of citizens. Given the several outbreaks of
violence that have occurred in the country over the last year,
one can justifiably ask whether the Government of Kazakhstan
today is adapting to the new realities the country faces and
whether the state is as stable as itsGovernment suggests.
After all, the Kazakhstan of 2012 is quite different from
that of 1992, or even from that of 2002. But during the past 20
years the same President, who continues to be advised by many
of the same men, has led its Government. This is not a recipe
for an adaptive government and long-term stability.
In the interest of time, I want to focus on three critical
and relatively recent changes in Kazakhstan's socioeconomic
environment that, in my opinion, have contributed to the
growing violence and tension we have seen in the country over
the last year. I will also note that the country's present
government has yet to sufficiently address these changes and
may be ill-equipped to properly engage them, bringing into
question whether the violence we have seen this year is the
beginning of a much less stable Kazakhstan into the future.
The first change is the rapid growth of the popularity of
Islam in the country. In the last several years, the re-
engagement of Islam by the people of Kazakhstan, which has been
ongoing since the early 1990s, has suddenly become apparent in
public spaces throughout the country. As somebody who has been
visiting the country frequently over the last 20 years, for
example, I was struck last summer by the number of Kazakh women
dressed according to Islamic custom in the city of Almaty,
which is the most cosmopolitan city in the country.
This rapid growth of public religiosity is not suggestive
of a terrorist threat or even of an immediate move towards
political Islam, but it does point to a changing public culture
that is poorly understood by both the Government and the
secular middle class of the cities. As such, it is also
suggestive of a growing population for whom the Soviet past,
from which Kazakhstan's current leadership emerged, holds
little authority.
We know very little about this growing Islamic religiosity
in Kazakhstan, but it is likely quite diverse and represents a
variety of different understandings of Islam. While we know
even less about the alleged Muslim extremists who clashed with
authorities in western Kazakhstan earlier this year, one must
assume that these people were representative of at least one
part of this population that is expressing its belief in Islam
more publicly.
Again, I will stress that I do not consider that these
people or these events represent a serious terrorist threat to
Kazakhstan. Rather, I believe they are emblematic of the
inability of the present government in Kazakhstan to speak to
the needs, perspectives, and values of an increasingly
religious population.
A second related development in the country is the growth
of ethnic Kazakh nationalism. Like the growth of religiosity,
this is a phenomenon that has been ongoing since the early
1990s, but has taken on new characteristics in recent years. In
particular, the large number of ethnic Kazakh Oralman who have
come back to the country since the early 90s from exile in
China, Mongolia, Iran and elsewhere, are now becoming much more
integrated into society. They generally have a poor knowledge
of Russian language, are religious and believe that they should
have an advantage over non-Kazakhs regarding economic
opportunity.
This situation is increasing ethnic tension in the country,
as well as creating fear among Russian-speaking Kazakhs in
urban areas, who see these developments as also promoting the
status of Kazakh language. While the country's leadership has
tried to balance the promotion of Kazakh patriotism with
policies of multiculturalism since independence, the growth of
Kazakh language use and Kazakh nationalism are developments
they are not well-placed to engage, given their political
education in a Soviet system that shunned nationalist politics.
Furthermore, while the ethnic tension created by these
developments has not yet exploded into mass violence, it has
already manifested itself in numerous violent clashes between
Kazakhs and Uyghurs in the area of Kazakhstan between Almaty
and the Chinese border.
Finally, and perhaps most ominous for the present
government, Kazakhstan is beginning to face a crisis of rising
economic expectations that are unmet. While Kazakhstan is
certainly the most economically viable country in Central Asia,
the country's middle class and skilled laborers have come to
expect their standard of living to improve on a regular basis
after a decade of rapid economic growth. A combination of the
global financial crisis, a leveling off of the Kazakhstan's
post-transition growth and the burst of a substantial housing
market bubble have stunted these improvements for many citizens
in the country over the last several years.
Given the awareness of the income gulf in the country,
these unmet expectations for improved standards of living have
resulted in increased dissatisfaction with the current economic
situation in the country among the middle class and skilled
laborers. This situation undoubtedly contributes to the labor
strikes we saw in the west of the country. And the Government's
violent reaction to these strikes show just how unprepared the
present Government of Kazakhstan is to deal with such
dissatisfaction.
It should be noted that these changes in Kazakhstan's
socioeconomic environment are not extreme and are unlikely to
immediately cause widespread unrest in the country. In fact, in
a democratic society such discord and socioeconomic dynamism is
expected, and politicians in different political parties
compete to provide the best solutions for them. In Kazakhstan,
however, the stagnant political system has no mechanism to
adapt to such dynamic changes. Furthermore, at a time when many
authoritarian states have sought to implement at least gradual
liberalization of their political systems in response to the
Arab Spring, Kazakhstan has shown no such desire, instead
holding controlled elections this past year that differed
little from those held in the country over the last 20 years.
In my opinion, the growing dynamism of Kazakhstan's society
coupled with its stagnant political system could create a
dangerous scenario when the country finally decides or is
forced to decide on a strategy for presidential succession.
With a diversification of powerful interests in the country,
significant natural resource wealth at stake, and no experience
with competitive politics, such a succession could become a
flash point for substantial conflict and sustained instability.
In conclusion, I will note that I believe that Kazakhstan
has the capacity to adapt to these changes, given the country's
rich human resources and relatively broad economic prosperity.
To do so, however, the country must begin taking measures
towards a liberalization of its political system now. The
gradual development of a competitive and transparent multiparty
political system now can prepare the country to deal with
presidential succession. But if Kazakhstan waits until a
succession crisis ensues to implement such reforms, I fear it
may be too late.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony. You
know, within the last couple weeks, as you know, President
Nazarbayev put into effect a couple of new laws--one, putting
further controls on broadcast media, but the other that would
make it a crime to damage the image of Kazakhstan. It occurs to
me that, as the three of you have been simply telling the truth
and giving your best insights, all three of you--and I have to
put myself in that category as well--broke the law. I wonder if
you might speak to that law. It's obviously too soon to tell, I
think, if anybody has been rounded up under its provisions. But
what will it do? You know, how much time might one get if you
hurt the image of Kazakhstan?
Ms. Corke?
Ms. Corke. Now, as you mentioned, it provides for the
empowerment of special services, especially for combatting
terrorism. It also allows for the blocking of Internet and
fixed and mobile communications. As you noted, it imposes a
vague restriction that those who harm the image of Kazakhstan
in the international arena can be considered destructive. So
you're right. This sort of fora is the--exactly the sort of
thing that may cause our passports to not get visas. But it's
interpreted as closing off further dissent, closing themselves
off to the West, which is--you know, contravenes their
chairmanship of the OSCE and all of their declarations of being
committed to political liberalization and modernization. These
things seem to be mutually exclusive with this law.
Mr. Smith. It occurs to me that it is so parallel to what
the Chinese Government does, with disharmonious activity on the
part of dissidents. It's often used as one big vague way to
round up people and put them into the laogai for long periods
of time. So I think it's a very ominous escalation or further
sinking into the abyss of dictatorship.
Let me ask you, if you would--you know, the Kazakhstani's
Government and the embassy right here in Washington has put
forward what many must think is a very slick campaign, a PR
campaign, portraying the riots in Zhanaozen as instigated by
hooligans and the recent parliamentary elections as democratic,
free and fair. And I mean, honestly, do they think governments
and do they think people, especially a country like the U.S.
that does have a free press, are so foolish to buy into what is
so transparently a propaganda--in the worst sense of that
word--effort? Or do they think they might get away with it?
Amb. Courtney. Earlier last year, President Nazarbayev had
an op-ed in the Washington Post, which could have been written
by the propaganda department of the Kazakhstani Government. So
yes, one would have to assume that Kazakhstani officials
believe that, in some cases, some official statements can be
given currency beyond what dispassionate analysis of the facts
and conditions would suggest.
Mr. Smith. And Dr. Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. I'll just add that--I mean, it's an
interesting phenomenon because so few people in the United
States know much about Kazakhstan. And I think sometimes, you
know, if you look at some of these things that come out as
communications in the U.S. that are obviously public relations
attempts, if you know something about Kazakhstan, they seem
quite silly. But I would believe that people who don't know
anything about Kazakhstan may take them very seriously. And of
course, it's also well known that U.S. consulting firms assist
them in these endeavors.
Mr. Smith. Do you know who's assisting them right now?
Dr. Roberts. Actually, I don't know because I think their
former company was removed, if I remember correctly. So I'm not
sure exactly right now, but maybe some of the other panelists
do.
Mr. Smith. You know, it is tragic and I would say beyond
tragic that very often that is the case. I know that Frank Wolf
and I have been raising the alarm on another country, Sudan,
which just got the OK from the Obama administration to allow a
representative group to present talking points that would
appear to put a gloss over, you know, Bashir's terrible and
despicable crimes against humanity. He ought to be at The
Hague, as we all know, being held to account for those crimes,
and yet he now is being represented in a way that puts a good
finish on his terrible crimes.
Let me ask you, if I could, about the new religion law,
which they, in Kazakhstan, defend as aimed at preventing
Islamic radicalism. Your sense of that law--how bad is it? How
will it affect the various religious groups and individuals?
And as you know, Kazakhstan is not--you know, has been reviewed
and has not been designated a country of particular concern
under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Does
this new law and recent events make a case that the department
ought to do that? You know, the--[off mic]--your thoughts on
that, whether or not they should get CPC designation?
Ms. Corke.
Ms. Corke. As far as whether it should receive CPC
designation, I'd say it's too soon to tell.
Mr. Smith. OK.
Ms. Corke. You know, authorities are making the argument
that the new law on religion will help combat extremism.
Critics warn that the restrictions under the new law could
backfire and fuel extremism rather than combat it. So at this
point and one of the urgent things that our office is working
on, prior to the swift passage of it, they were trying to
mitigate and advocate with the Government against some of the
worst provisions of the law. But it was passed so quickly, with
such determination from Nazarbayev and his Parliament, that
there was no time for us to have our voices heard on that.
But what we're focused on now is monitoring the
implementation and raising awareness in the international
community when there's any problematic implementation of it. I
will note that they were in such a rush that before the law was
even enacted, authorities started using it as grounds to harass
and detain members of the New Life Church and Jehovah's
Witnesses and raid these groups' properties. So they were in
such a rush, they didn't even wait for the legislation to go
through. But international, domestic civil society and
religious organizations, including Kazakhstan's top Muslim
cleric, took issue with several provisions in the law and think
that it will drastically curtail Kazakh citizen rights to
freedom of religious belief. So time will tell.
Mr. Smith. I would hope that all of you and--would be
looking at that and whether or not--I know the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom is watching it very
carefully as well, because it seems to me that we have been far
too slow to designate country CPC and far too quick to lift it
when there's even the slightest hint of a thaw, when it comes
to religious persecutions.
And I say that--yesterday in this hearing room, I chaired a
hearing. It's about the eighth one I've had on human rights
abuses in Vietnam. Obviously, it's a whole different country
but some of the dynamics on how we respond to human rights
abuse apply. And the situation has so deteriorated in Vietnam
against Catholics, Christians, the Montagnards, Protestants,
the Buddhist Unified Church of--Buddhists, that the fact that
they're not CPC is outrageous. And yet, again, this slow
response--it was lifted in order to get the bilateral agreement
and, particularly, most favored nation status effectuated for
Vietnam. They made no change. They got worse, and, again, no
CPC.
And I know we have concerns about Kazakhstan. We have
interests relative to our troops. But if the price is to
tolerate significant human rights abuse, I would think that
that's too high of a price. And I would appreciate your
thoughts on how well or poorly you think the Obama
administration and the State Department, the U.S. Congress is
dealing with Kazakhstan. Are we speaking forcefully and
accurately about what is going on there, with perhaps some
penalties if they don't change?
Mr. Ambassador?
Amb. Courtney. One of the remarkable things about U.S.
policy toward the former Soviet Union for the last 20 years has
been how remarkably bipartisan it has been. There was a very
smooth continuity from the President George H.W. Bush
administration to the Clinton administration in terms of the
emphasis on supporting territorial integrity, sovereignty, and
independence of the new independent republics; building
democracy in the region; providing assistance through USAID and
other mechanisms--National Endowment for Democracy, programs
carried out by the International Republican Institute, National
Democratic Institute, International Foundation for Electoral
Systems. Those programs have had strong bipartisan support all
the way.
I would argue that, by and large, our policy has continued
to be generally bipartisan for most of those countries. And in
Kazakhstan, in particular, we have to consider the enormous
interest that the United States has--one I discussed at some
length, the military activities in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has
dismantled an enormous amount of infrastructure for weapons of
mass destruction. And that came because Kazakhstan saw that
America was a strategic partner.
The second consideration is Caspian Energy. At the
beginning after the Soviet collapse, a lot of oil companies saw
that Russia had the largest reserves, but it was Kazakhstan,
being more moderate, which negotiated the first arrangement for
a super--the Tengiz Arrangement, initially negotiated by
Chevron.
The third consideration now is that with the situation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and with the proposed withdrawal or
drawdown of American troops--which has a fair amount of
bipartisan support in the United States--if transportation
through Pakistan is going to be limited, the retrograde--the
withdrawal of U.S. forces and equipment via surface
transportation--is going to depend very heavily on cooperation
with Kazakhstan, with Russia, other Central Asian countries. So
we have quite a few interests at stake, and no single interest
can be pursued to the exclusion of the others.
But that said, I would say that the statements by the State
Department and our U.S. ambassador to OSCE about the elections
have been fairly honest and straightforward statements. And the
work that this Commission does to hold the executive branch to
a high standard has been particularly important and helped.
Dr. Roberts. I would just add, I think that Kazakhstan is
the type of country that the U.S. should be engaging on these
issues. I don't think that necessarily sanctions and just pure
criticism is going to really get much accomplished with the
Kazak Government. And Kazakhstan--and one of the, I think, very
positive things about Kazakhstan is that it does have a fairly
broad base of elites. And I think there are people who are
close to power in Kazakhstan who have very different ideas
about what should be done, than kind of the old guard that's
been in power for 20 years.
So I would advocate for engagement. I think it's important,
at the same time, that the U.S.--one of the things the U.S. has
done in the past and, I think to a certain degree, continues to
do is speak out of both sides of its mouth about issues of
democracy and human rights in a country like Kazakhstan, where
we have an interest in oil reserves and we have security issues
that we're interested in. I think it's important to be very
straightforward about how important issues of democracy and
human rights are to the United States' interest in the country
and not short sell them. But on the other hand, I think that we
really need a policy of engaging Kazakhstan, because I think
that that's going to bear much more fruit than just beating
them up.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Corke.
Ms. Corke. If I may add, so while I was at the State
Department in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
and while at Freedom House, my role has been advocating the
human rights and democracy part of the policy equation. So
while in full recognition that it's a complex policy
environment and our bilateral relationship, there's a range of
interests--oil and gas, the Northern Distribution network, a
restive neighborhood, economic interests--at the same time.
And I was in the State Department in the lead up to
deciding whether or not Kazakhstan would be chosen as the
chairman-in-office, and making sure that it lived up to its
commitments in all three dimensions, and it was found to be
sorely lacking in the human dimension area; and leading up to
that, pressing them to live up to those commitments. And even
during its chairmanship, it didn't.
So I would say that continuing to make sure that human
rights and democracy, particularly at this juncture, remains
high as far as the policy balance is really important. I've
seen internal battles on kind of the relative weight of the
various policy interests, and it's important to have
consistency of support for human rights and democracy concerns,
because if we lose the limited space that still exists, it will
be hard to regain in the future.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. You know, you mentioned the
chair-in-office and the considerable debate, although there
should have been more, about whether or not that was a wise
decision. I strongly oppose that, on the record, believing that
we needed deeds first, and followed by a modest but a very real
reward as being chair-in-office.
And I wonder sometimes that when we put the cart before the
horse, you know, history has told us in country after country--
and I believe it's accurate, I would like to know if there's an
example that shows it otherwise--that usually the day they get
it or the day they get whatever the benefit, is the pivotal day
when they start turning the other way. And I'll give you two
examples. When we delinked most favored nation status from
China on May 26, 1994, China went into a slide on human rights
abuse. It was already bad--became much worse.
Even more telling--and, again, subject of yesterday's
hearing, in part, on Vietnam right here in this room--when the
bilateral agreement was agreed to with Vietnam, they were taken
off CPC by John Hanford, the ambassador-at-large, with a hope--
he called them ``deliverables''--that they promised him and the
department they would come through on--forced renunciations,
all those things that were happening. And there was an
abatement of repression up until bilateral agreement and MFN
conference, and that was the end of it. It went into Block
8407, patterned after Vaclav Havel's Charter 77, a beautiful
manifesto on human rights and democracy. All these signers came
forward and signed it, and that became the hit list for the
secret police in Vietnam, soon as they got the bilateral
agreement through an MFN from the United States. The chair-in-
office of--you know, wasn't as big, certainly. But I think in
retrospect, we've got to get a lessons learned--I would say to
all of us, that--get some concrete actions on the ground, not
even vague promises before.
And I met with the Kazakh parliamentary assembly members--
some of whom go to these parliamentary assemblies that we have
frequently. And I can say ``deeds, just do deeds; all we care
about is your people.'' You know, this isn't bashing Kazakhstan
because it's some kind of sport. This is all about standing in
solidarity with your oppressed people, who you could be next if
you fall outside the parameters that have been circumscribed or
established by the leadership and by the police.
So, you know, I sometimes wonder if the OSCE was changing.
Mr. Ambassador, you might want to talk to this. The same thing
happened with Belarus. When we invited the Belarusians into the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and I kept saying, let's see deeds
first before--they were already in the OSCE--the president of
the PA from the U.K. lamented a year later how disruptive and
how--what a mistake it was, because there was no movement on
the ground; if anything, they got worse. So you might want to
speak to that.
And sometimes I think they try to change, then, what the
human dimension provisions are all about, as well as election
observations. All of a sudden they're siding with those who
want a less robust effort, because chair-in-office certainly
conveys considerable power. So, Mr. Ambassador.
Amb. Courtney. Mr. Chairman, let me offer two perspectives
on that issue.
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
Amb. Courtney. One, sir, that you and the Commission and
the U.S. Government are going to be facing is with Ukraine's
impending chairmanship of the OSCE.
President Nazarbayev used the chairmanship of the OSCE
internally and externally as a very important legitimizing tool
for his reign. So how do you think Kazakhstanis now interpret
President Nazarbayev's recent statement that he will not invite
election observers who criticize Kazakhstan?
Mr. Smith. Do they get to hear that?
Mr. Smith. [Inaudible]--press, yeah.
Amb. Courtney. So what's happened is that President
Nazarbayev raised expectations in Kazakhstan about its role and
the way it might evolve. And now that's actually made it more
difficult for him to be hard-line in a convincing way in his
country. And I think that's putting more pressure on him.
The second consideration----
Mr. Smith. If I could----
Amb. Courtney. Oh yes.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, is that true even in spite of
the crackdown on the media and the most recent laws--the
Internet and all the other--the broadcast new law? I know it's
not soundproof--remember, ``the Iron Curtain isn't
soundproof,'' that famous Radio Free Europe expression? But if
you control the media, you still control what a lot of people
get to hear and say--and think.
Amb. Courtney. Yes, that's quite true.
Mr. Smith. OK.
Amb. Courtney. But still, publicly in Kazakhstan, President
Nazarbayev raised a lot of expectations with OSCE. And then now
each one of these new laws that you just cited makes it more
complex for him internally to justify doing that, based on the
raised expectations. And as Professor Roberts pointed out in
his presentation, this clash of reality and expectations is
going to be one of the major political dynamics that affects
his legitimacy and the transition beyond President Nazarbayev.
Second consideration, sir, is Central Asian security in the
wake of U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The one area
in which Russia has made clear that it might be open to
cooperation with the United States and Central Asia is
counternarcotics. It has said this over and over. Yet effective
cooperation is going to be difficult if Russia keeps the United
States out of Central Asia, as many in Russia seek to do. There
seems to be a schizophrenic approach in Russia about how it
should deal with America's role in Central Asia, although the
clear predominant view is to remove U.S. participation in the
Manas air base and to have the U.S. take a lesser role.
The Russian Government, though--as we've seen in the North
Caucasus, does not have a good strategy for how to deal with
Islamic extremism. And security threats from Afghanistan as
U.S. and NATO forces withdraw could increase. Now I'm not
saying that they will, but they could increase. And it
certainly would be prudent on the part of Russia, the United
States, Kazakhstan and other countries in Central Asia to take
advantage of the intermediation of the OSCE, which has
legitimacy, and the OSCE has field presence in those
countries--to start thinking harder about security arrangements
and security cooperative mechanisms with that impending change.
So I think the shift in the center of gravity of the focus
of OSCE toward Central Asia, caused by Kazakhstan's
chairmanship, has not been a bad thing. Frankly, I believe too
many OSCE resources have been lingering too long in countries
that are hoping to get into the European Union, and not enough
out where some of the danger zones are.
So there was that benefit as well, but that benefit will be
vitiated if political openness in Kazakhstan does not improve,
and especially if it gets worse. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Just to be clear in terms of my position, it
wasn't that Kazakhstan could never be chair-in-office----
Amb. Courtney. Right.
Mr. Smith.--it was only when certain benchmarks were
achieved. Would any of our other witnesses like to----
Dr. Roberts. I think one other thing that I do perceive as
kind of a chronic problem in the United States' approach to
Kazakhstan is, there's a general belief that Kazakhstan doesn't
need the United States. There's a sense that they have these
other partners. They have Russia; increasingly China is a major
trading partner and a major ally.
But I think it's important to realize that Kazakhstan's
always been very interested in having a very good relationship
with the United States, because precisely their other partners
are countries they don't necessarily trust exclusively. I think
there's a lot of suspicion of China's interest in Kazakhstan
among Kazakhstanis, including within the Government. And there
always has been a certain reticence to be dependent on Russia.
So I think it's important that the U.S. recognizes where it
does have leverage, that there is an interest. It is important
to Kazakhstan that they have a strong relationship with the
U.S. And we have to at least express what that relationship
means to us beyond just the oil and gas and security issues.
Mr. Smith. One final question, and I'd like to yield to
Janice Helwig for a question or two, our expert on the
Commission. And back to Zhanaozen very briefly: The Government
has suggested that they would allow an international
investigation. Do we take that at face value? And in your view,
how quickly must that be done so that evidence, information,
victims' testimonies, can be appropriately received without
retaliation to those who might come forward? I mean, the fear
has always been, you get somebody's equivalent of a deposition,
the next thing you know, they're in prison. Can it be done?
Should the OSCE do it? U.N.? Some other, you know, cobbled-
together investigative team? How do you think it should be
done, and can it be done?
Amb. Courtney. That offer was suggested at the very
beginning.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Amb. Courtney. We've had a month of experience now and seen
no sign that the Kazakhstani suggestion of an international
investigation was a serious offer. There have been
circumstances in a variety of countries in which incidents that
are murky in nature have raised questions, and the United
States has offered the support of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation investigators to help look into circumstances.
I'm not in government, but I'm not aware that Kazakhstan
immediately invited that kind of participation, or that FBI or
international law enforcement or investigatory authorities have
been involved in any of the arrangements.
Now as I mentioned in my statement today, the prosecutor
general in Kazakhstan announced that a number--a small number--
of regional police executive authorities and a mayor and a
former mayor and some officials of the state oil company
there--are going to be held criminally liable. But that came
out of the blue with no transparency, although sometimes that
happens.
But from the point at which you announce that people may be
held criminally liable, that they're being charged, there
should be transparency in the proceedings, in the trials and
other things, to build confidence among Kazakhstanis that
indeed these people are culpable. And so right now is the most
important time, I think, to hold Kazakhstan to account for
having a judicial process that is worthy of an independent
judiciary.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Corke. I agree that it's vitally important that there
be a full international and domestic investigation. The state
of emergency is on until January 31st, so up until now there's
been--it's been virtually a closed environment for information,
which is dangerous. And they have not shown--while saying that
they intended to fully investigate and find the perpetrators--
they haven't shown a real interest in doing so. Their only
interest, I think, is in portraying that as criminal elements
as opposed to really wanting the answers to that.
So yes, I think it's important that the U.N. be allowed in
to do an expert investigation. And I think if the OSCE could
field a team to go in as well--which would also remind
Kazakhstan of its commitments within the OSCE--so I would
encourage the OSCE to continue----
Mr. Smith. Are there U.N. agencies--any treaty bodies,
panel of experts, investigative teams, actively looking to go
in--Arbitrary Detention, for example, the working group?
Ms. Corke. They have announced that they--I think it was
the prosecutor general that announced that a U.N. expert
working group would be allowed into the country. But to my
knowledge, it has not----
Mr. Smith. OK.
Ms. Corke.----been given a mandate yet to go in.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Roberts. I would just add that, if there was any
interest from the Kazakh side of the FBI going in, I think that
would be a very bad idea, because there is experience with
that--I think it was in 2005, there was a suspicious killing of
a prominent opposition figure, Altynbek Sarsenbayev. And when
that happened, the U.S. Government did bring in some FBI
assistance.
And the problem was that they probably did good work, but
none of the information ever got out to the public, what their
findings actually were. And subsequently there were trials that
were--did not have due process and so on. And so it just became
that the FBI investigation was somehow linked to a bad process
overall, and it was a--I think a mistake.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Ms. Helwig.
Ms. Helwig. Thank you. I would like to just add a couple of
questions. First I'd like to talk a little bit more about the
recent parliamentary elections. As we've talked about, the
Kazakhstani Government has worked hard to create an alternate
narrative about the parliamentary elections and their conduct--
and has even gotten Western experts, parliamentarians, other
organizations like the CIS to provide public positive
assessments of the elections. You can find a list on the
embassy's website if you go to that here.
At the same time, we've also talked about the authority's
moves against the Alga party in the wake of Zhanaozen, and also
that Alga's never been allowed to register and wasn't allowed
to participate in the elections. And what I wondered is, why do
you all think that the Government has felt it so necessary to
control the electoral process so much by preventing the
opposition parties and the candidates from running; controlling
almost all of the levels of the electoral commissions; and
manipulating the count, certainly in some polling stations,
including the one where I observed? And why do you think they
find Alga in particular such a threat? Or do they find it a
really serious threat?
Amb. Courtney. If I may, you know, in Russian history and
the Bolshavik period, the word ``spark'' played an unusual
role. And when you asked the question, I was thinking you were
going to ask about Yabloko in Russia. But in fact we're seeing
a very similar circumstance there.
My sense is that leaders in former Soviet countries that
have authoritarian regimes--which in some cases have been
popular, whether it's Vladimir Putin or Nursultan Nazarbayev--
and in which there are no credible people of national stature
who've had an opportunity to express their views politically,
or had access to free media--these figures can be for awhile
sort of generally popular, or ``acquiesced in'' may be a better
word in some circumstances, but leaders may still be scared.
They are scared even of a small party, of Grigory Yavlinsky
in Russia or the Alga party in Kazakhstan. There could be a
leader who could start off with maybe not much knowledge by the
electorate, but after voicing opinions in an open political
debate, could catalyze greater support. So I think it's the
fear of a potential spark, even from a small source.
Dr. Roberts. I think--I mean, the short answer is, why they
control the process is because they can, and it's worked so
far, so why change it? I think that that, you know, may really
be the perspective of the powers that be.
In terms of--I mean, I've found that Kazakh--one of the
interesting things about Kazakhstan is the politics are much
more complex than they look like--than they look on the
surface. And there's a history behind every relationship.
I would think that one of the reasons that they're
concerned about Alga is they feel that there are certain former
government officials who are injecting money into it and
support it, and that these kind of personal vendettas, in my
experience, are extremely important in Kazakh politics. So I
think that that's part of the reason.
Ms. Corke. To add to that, the Russia comparison is an apt
one. I remember some media reporting saying that the problem
with Russia having the huge demonstrations after the election
was that it allowed a little bit of openness. And Kazakhstan
was not going to make the same mistake, it was making sure to
clamp down.
I was in Russia after the elections and attended the
protests of 100,000 people. And I couldn't believe I was seeing
this in Russia that, you know, we've seen even a protest of 200
people be cracked down on so harshly. And I think Kazakhstan is
very much afraid of that same thing.
I'll just mention one other thing, that in addition to
being scared that the Alga party could gain some popular
support, they're also scared of, if they had access to the
media, what sort of information they might reveal, such as
corruption, murders, other abuses. So keeping them sidelined
and portraying them as enemy number one of the Government and,
you know, now trying to blame the Zhanaozen events on them is
trying to find somebody to blame for what's going on in the
country other than the Government.
Ms. Helwig. Thank you. And just to follow up on that, a bit
more on media and Internet issues. We've talked about the new
broadcast media law and also the Internet law, which went into
effect a few years ago. The Government seems to know exactly
how to use all these new media; they certainly were using
Facebook and Twitter and Internet updates after Zhanaozen. They
brought a team of bloggers into Zhanaozen right after the
events and actually posted their blogs on the, I believe, prime
minister's website, if I'm not mistaken.
At the same time, independent bloggers seem to have been
gone after after Zhanaozen. One even reported having a gun held
to his head while his film was taken--his video was taken.
We've seen an editor of a major newspaper arrested, Stan TV and
other broadcasters gone after after Zhanaozen.
I wondered if you could talk a little bit about how you
think the new broadcast law might restrict TV, what the state
of Internet control is, and in particular the role of social
media in Kazakhstan, particularly among the younger generation.
I know when I visited there it seems to be that even though
there are controls on it, everybody's seen the video of
Zhanaozen, even though it's certainly not been shown on
national television.
So if you could just discuss a little bit about that.
Ms. Corke. To start out with the social media question,
it--there was a big discussion in social media after Zhanaozen
on the reason and the role of the Government and the opposition
in those events. One thing to mention, that most of the
citizens of Kazakh are using Russian social media, which is
more apolitical. So there isn't the same full openness of views
exchanged. Only about 350,000 people are on Facebook and less
than 100,000 are using Twitter. So those tools have not been
fully realized in the country.
So young people are using social media. What our office is
reporting, though, is that it's more for entertainment than
searching for information purposes, and that the Zhanaozen
events were sort of a--them following that so closely was a
relatively new development.
Amb. Courtney. Let me talk about our media. We made a
mistake in ending the Kazakh service on the Voice of America.
That mistake needs to be corrected. Kazakhstan is too important
a country to have been excluded.
Secondly, Russian is still the language throughout Central
Asia. VOA should establish a Central Asian Russian service run
by Central Asian broadcasters to expand information.
And again, if we're in a circumstance of withdrawal or
drawdown in Afghanistan, which is going to lead to greater
insecurity in Central Asia, it's time now to start making these
kinds of prudent, very cost-effective investments. The Kazakh
service that Radio Liberty has had has been very important.
But, even Radio Liberty broadcasts in Kazakh and Russian,
oriented toward Kazakhstan and Central Asia, should be
strengthened.
Dr. Roberts. I'll just add that I think that the Kazakhstan
Government has always seen the control of the media as probably
its most important mechanism for preventing political dissent.
And they've been very, I would say, smart about how they've
gone about it. They have not done the type of things you see in
Uzbekistan, where you completely cannot access opposition
media. They just limit it so--they understand that there's a
certain number of people who are going to be with the
opposition. And if they can limit access to that information,
allow those people to share it amongst themselves, then they
feel that they're fine--that's it's safe.
So it's always been to limit the ability of the
opposition--the opposition has no access to television. You
know, they've really only had the print media to date, and
they've always tried to limit the ability to get those
newspapers out.
Now, that said, the Internet is an interesting dilemma for
Kazakhstan, I think, because it's much less predictable. And I
haven't really looked at this new law, but my guess is that
that would be a major part of it, is trying to decide how
they're going to be able to limit access to the Internet.
Ms. Corke. Just to add to that, the new law will
essentially allow them to intensify a trend that we saw already
in the past year, that the Government, under the guise of
extremism and countering terrorism, expanded their attempts to
identify websites that had supposedly, quote, ``destructive
content,'' blocking the blogging sites LiveJournal and
LiveInternet.ru and 20 other sites. So I think they're adding--
they already have a lot of tools to crack down on media freedom
and the Internet, but they're just stacking their arsenal, I
think, with the new law.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask one final question on sex trafficking
and trafficking in general. As you might know, Kazakhstan was
designated a tier two country in the last round, and obviously
the data calls are out or are going out and we'll know soon
whether or not progress continued. And perhaps based on what
you've heard, is that trend continuing? Kazakhstan is a
destination and, to a lesser extent, source and transit country
for women and girls subjected to sex trafficking and for men,
women and children subjected to conditions of forced labor.
Our TIP Report for the most recent report--and that would
be for the year 2010--said that while Kazakhstan does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking, it is making, however, significant efforts to do
so, and noted in pertinent point that there was a significant
decrease in the use of forced child labor in the cotton
harvest, increased law enforcement efforts against human
trafficking, and they passed a law that hiked penalties. And
I'm wondering if any of you have any knowledge or information
or insight as to whether or not that trend continued into 2011.
That would have been for 2010 calendar year.
Ms. Corke. That's something I can get back to you with more
information.
Mr. Smith. OK, thank you.
Ms. Corke. My understanding of the situation has not been
that there's been a huge change in the situation, but I can
talk to our staff in Almaty and see if they could get us some
more updated information. But I haven't witnessed a huge
change.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I want to thank our very
distinguished witnesses for your testimony. If there's anything
you'd like to say before we close? Mr. Ambassador?
Amb. Courtney. Sir, you made reference to the Arab
awakening earlier. In the former Soviet Union, many people
believe that Western Europe is more politically mature, as well
as more prosperous. Many people believe that those are the
kinds of conditions to which people should aspire in the former
Soviet Union, even as many disagree about what should be the
tradeoffs today between democratic change and economic
advancement in Russia or Kazakhstan or other countries.
The Arab awakening has had an interesting impact on the
former Soviet Union. Without overgeneralizing, many people in
the former Soviet Union have tended to believe that political
culture in the Arab world has been less advanced than in the
former Soviet space. For people in the former Soviet Union to
see young people have the courage go out into the streets in
Tunisia, Egypt, and now especially in Syria, where young people
are going out in the streets every day risking death, fighting
for some measure of greater political equity or more
competitive, more open political arrangements--and those goals
may vary widely in Syria, in part because of the ethnic makeup
of the country--but for people in the former Soviet Union to
see these young people going out and risking injury and death
every day for some more responsive political system, that, I
think to some extent, is embarrassing for many people in the
former Soviet Union, because we haven't seen people in the
former Soviet Union go out and take those same risks day after
day. So I think this has, if you will, concentrated the mind a
bit in the former Soviet Union, among a number of people whom
we today can't predict how they will react. And the impact may
be very different in Ukraine or Russia or Kazakhstan or other
places.
But I think what's happening in the Arab Awakening is
concentrating the mind, and probably is going to have a helpful
effect in the former Soviet Union and cause people to think
harder about the choices they should be making for greater
political openness and greater political and human freedoms.
Mr. Smith. Yes, Dr. Roberts.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Dr. Roberts. To add on that, I think one of the
interesting--going back to a media issue, the people of
Kazakhstan consume Russian media on a steady diet.
And so I think that the changes that happened in Ukraine in
2005 and in Georgia--that didn't really have much influence on
people in Kazakhstan. But if we do see that these protests in
Russia continue and we see that there's even any kind of--any
kind of change coming out of the next presidential election in
Russia, that would have massive impact, I think, in Kazakhstan,
because I think most people in Kazakhstan kind of see Russia as
their reference point. And that's partially just because that's
what they watch on TV every day. And you know, I think if they
saw changes in Russia, that would very quickly translate to
changes in Kazakhstan.
Ms. Corke. I'd just like to say thank you for holding this
panel today. It's very important. And I'd like to end just on a
final note. Civil society--and our office as well has noted
this--that they've noticed a waning interest from the
international community in civil society, following
Kazakhstan's chairmanship. And right now, they need the
attention of Europe and the U.S. more than ever. So I would
urge the U.S. to give support vocally and materially to civil
society and urge European counterparts to do the same. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith. Excellent point. And this Commission will
certainly try to do that as well. And I thank you for all of
your very valuable insights, your--this is of extraordinary
benefit to the commission and, I hope, to the rest of the
Congress by extension. Without any further ado, the hearing is
adjourned, and I thank you again.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith
Good afternoon and welcome to our witnesses and everyone joining
us. Today we will discuss the state of human rights and democracy in
Kazakhstan.
The Government of Kazakhstan, controlled by the authoritarian
``president for life'' Nursultan Nazarbayev, has long sought to obscure
its serious human rights and democracy deficiencies by claiming that at
least it is a haven of ``stability'' in central Asia. ``Stability'' has
in fact become the basis of the government of Kazakhstan's claim to
legitimacy.
Of course ``stability'' can never be an excuse for dictatorship or
widespread torture and similar abuses. We simply can never accept the
hidden premise of the Kazakhstan government's talk of ``stability''--
that human dignity can be bargained away in some exchange for
``stability.''
Likewise we cannot accept at face value the claim that Kazakhstan
is in fact as stable as its government claims--this claim must be
examined carefully.
That is what this hearing is about. Too often in Washington, and
within the OSCE, the Government of Kazakhstan's claim to stability is
tacitly accepted. And that allows the Government to set itself up as a
model for other Asian and European countries.
After last year's events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, we
have to look carefully at authoritarian claims to ``stability.''
All the more so since last month there were riots in Zhanaozen in
western Kazakhstan, which the authorities put down with deadly force--
at least 16 people were killed, some estimates go as high as 70. Many
of us have seen the terrible videos circulating on YouTube that clearly
show government forces firing on fleeing protesters, and beating those
who fell to the ground. I doubt many Kazakhs will soon forget these
images.
RFE/RL reported the harrowing testimony of a 21-year old girl who
was detained while out looking for her father the night of the riots.
She described witnessing the torture, abuse, and humiliation of dozens
of people who had been rounded up and taken to the basement of police
headquarters, including girls who were stripped naked and dragged into
an adjoining room. She herself was beaten. She reported what she saw to
authorities, who returned with her a week later. The basement had been
scrubbed clean, and the police claimed that nothing had happened. The
woman's father returned home after two days. He said he had been badly
beaten by police; he died of his injuries on December 24.
There are many such stories. Associated Press reported that
journalists at Zhanaozen's Main Police Department heard screams coming
from what appeared to be interrogation rooms, while men with bloodied
faces were lined up in the corridors with their faces against the wall.
Sadly, reports of police abuse and torture in Kazakhstan are not new.
In a December 2009 report, the UN special rapporteur on torture
concluded that ``evidence obtained through torture or ill-treatment is
commonly used as a basis for conviction.''
Since the violence in December, the Government of Kazakhstan has
said it is open to an international investigation, and has said many
other things that we would expect a responsible democratic government
to say. It has also established a governmental investigative
commission.
I certainly hope the internal investigation will be transparent and
serious, and that there will be an international investigation soon--
best of all by the OSCE--and that the many good things the Government
has said since the violence are a harbinger of a new openness to
reform.
At the same time we have reason to be skeptical. Just yesterday the
chief editor of an opposition paper was jailed as part of the
investigation. So far charges against police have only been for
stealing cell phones and cash from protesters, and the focus of the
investigation has been focused instead on the political opposition.
Access to Zhanaozen itself and to potential witnesses has been severely
restricted. While some journalists were given access to Zhanaozen on
December 18 and 19, they reported that they were under close
supervision and not permitted to speak freely with detainees or
residents. Prison Reform International, which the Kazakhstani
Government claims met with detainees and found no evidence of torture,
told my staff that they only assisted in getting access for local human
rights monitors to a very limited number of detainees, far below the
official number of those arrested. Contrary to the government statement
that no evidence of torture was found, in fact the monitors cited four
suspected cases.
There are reports that those who have tried to come forward may
have been threatened. At least one of the local monitors who visited
the detainees will no longer discuss it. The young woman I mentioned
earlier also will no longer speak about her ordeal. The persons who
filmed the YouTube video from their window reportedly were sought by
the authorities and have gone into hiding out of fear for their safety.
Many people reportedly are still missing, but their families are afraid
to come forward.
Of course we will also want to talk about the January 15
parliamentary elections, which the OSCE concluded ``did not meet
fundamental principles of democratic elections.'' The OSCE detailed
significant problems, including the exclusion of opposition parties and
candidates, electoral commissions controlled by the ruling party, media
bias, restrictions on freedom of assembly, and problems during the
counting process.
I have spoken to participants in the Election Observation Mission
who personally observed outright fraud, including falsification of the
final protocol in favor of the ruling Nur Otan party. Other American
observers reported falsification of protocols in Nur Otan's advantage,
as well as ballot stuffing and people being paid to vote for Nur Otan.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin
Mr. Chairman, I welcome this hearing on Kazakhstan. The Helsinki
Commission has closely examined that country's record on
democratization and human rights, especially in connection with
Astana's ultimately successful bid to chair the OSCE. Today, for the
first time since Kazakhstan's chairmanship ended, we will consider the
implications for the country's stability of very interesting events
that have been unfolding the last few months.
Until recently, Zhanaozen, in western Kazakhstan, had gotten few
headlines. But a strike by oil workers led to violence in December,
triggering a crackdown and the imposition of martial law. According to
official reports, at least 16 people have been killed; unofficial
videos have surfaced of police firing at fleeing demonstrators.
The willingness expressed by Kazakhstan's Government to participate
in an international investigation was welcome. I hope the OSCE, which
Kazakhstan chaired in 2010, will have a leading role in efforts to
uncover what really happened. In any case, it is clear that
Kazakhstan's Government will have to seriously address social concerns
in order to prevent any more outbreaks of discontent.
The other major news story is Kazakhstan's January 15 parliamentary
election, which has been touted as the beginning of multi-party
democracy in Central Asia's economic powerhouse. Surely, it is a
positive development that all the seats in Parliament are no longer
occupied by the ruling party, Nur Otan, as two other parties will now
be represented.
But I would have been more pleased if genuinely opposition
political parties that sought to participate had been able to do so. As
many observers have pointed out, the two parties which won seats are
reputedly ``safe'' from the Government's point of view. And, I would
have been delighted if the OSCE had been able to certify the election
as having met OSCE standards. Unfortunately, the OSCE said the election
did not meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.
In that connection, I would like to note Kazakhstan's efforts to
create an alternate narrative of the election. A stream of positive,
even glowing, reviews of the election has come out of Astana. We are
accustomed to such assessments from CIS observers but it is frankly
surprising that Western analysts have come to conclusions so at
variance with those of the OSCE.
Mr. Chairman, I very much look forward to the day when the most
positive views of an election in Kazakhstan legitimately accord with
the OSCE's judgment. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Prepared Statement of Ambassador William Courtney
Chairman Smith, it is an honor to appear before you. I am William
Courtney, a retired career diplomat. I served as the first U.S.
Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 1992 to 1995. Later I was Ambassador to
Georgia, special assistant to the President for Russia, Ukraine, and
Eurasia, and senior advisor to this distinguished Commission.
Kazakhstan has a population of over 16 million. Ethnic Kazakhs
comprise three-fifths, ethnic Slavs one-quarter, and Uzbeks, Uyghurs,
Tatars, and others the remainder. Given this diversity, the term
``Kazakhstanis'' best refers to all the people of the country, and
``Kazakhs'' to the ethnic group.
In many ways Kazakhstan is blessed. It is larger than Western
Europe and endowed with a minerals bounty. People tend to pragmatism.
Ethnic differences are muted, regrettably in part because political
expression is limited. Rulers encourage inter-ethnic harmony, although
some Kazakh advantages, such as political dominance, raise concerns.
Selection to chair the OSCE last year was a mark of the country's
international respect and weight.
Kazakhstan has achieved notable economic gains. Modernizing
reforms, private property, talented people, and booming exports of
energy and minerals make the country far wealthier than in Soviet
times. In 2010 according to the World Bank, per capita gross domestic
product in current U.S. dollars stood at $9,136, slightly lower than
Russia's $10,440 but three times higher than Ukraine's $3,007.
These data, however, do not tell the full story. Much wealth
disappears into corruption. Construction of the extravagant new capital
in Astana diminishes state funding for the rest of the country. The
economy is unbalanced. For example, the World Bank reports that labor
productivity in agriculture is just one percent of that in America.
Political development in Kazakhstan is stunted by twenty years of
authoritarian rule. A tragedy last month highlights the risks.
On December 16, security forces in Zhanaozen, in western
Kazakhstan, fired on unarmed demonstrators, including striking oil
workers, killing and wounding scores. A chilling video on YouTube shows
security forces firing on and beating fleeing people.
Rather than apologizing, offering amends, and opening a credible
investigation, the authorities did the opposite. They blamed
``hooligans,'' shut off communications to the city, and imposed martial
law. The hard-line response may not have calmed tensions; martial law
was extended. A former interior minister became the new regional
governor, a hint of unease about the loyalty of security forces.
Today--on the date of this hearing--Kazakhstan's chief prosecutor
announced that criminal charges are being brought against several
regional police, executive, and state oil company officials. It will be
important that due process be followed and that judicial proceedings be
transparent. Otherwise, many Kazakhstanis will wonder whether these
officials are culpable for the Zhanaozen calamity, or whether they are
lambs being sacrificed to exculpate the guilt of those higher up or
better connected.
The violence was an aberration in the country's generally peaceful
life. The callous response, however, is symptomatic of a wide gap
between rulers and ruled, between reality and expectations, and between
those who live honestly and those who do not.
In history, Kazakhs do not meekly submit to arbitrary power. In the
19th century, Russian colonization was slowed by uprisings and wars. In
World War I many Kazakhs resisted the Tsar's conscription, and then the
communist takeover. A decade later Kazakhs opposed brutal Soviet
collectivization of agriculture, such as by killing their own livestock
rather than turning it over to the state. Over a million Kazakhs
perished.
In World War II, Stalin exiled ethnic Germans, Crimean Tatars, and
North Caucasian Muslims to Kazakhstan. A million Poles were banished
there. Many of these peoples, starving or ill, were taken in by Kazakhs
and survived. Vast numbers lost their lives to Soviet cruelty.
Nikita Khrushchev hurled huge numbers of ethnic Slavs into northern
Kazakhstan for the wasteful Virgin Lands campaign, aimed at turning
pasture into a grain belt. Other Slavs built and operated raw materials
and military facilities. Alexander Solzhenitsyn labored there in a
prison camp.
The Soviets used much of Kazakhstan for military purposes. They
tested nuclear weapons at Semipalatinsk; operated the world's largest
anthrax factory at Stepnogorsk; tested biological weapons in the open
air on an island in the Aral Sea; tested anti-ballistic missiles and
lasers at Sary Shagan; assembled torpedoes in Alma Ata; deployed giant
SS-18 intercontinental missiles in two locations; and conducted
ballistic missile tests and space launches from Baykonur.
Amid the military activity, most of the country was closed.
Kazakhstanis had few contacts with the outside world. A vital lifeline
was short-wave broadcasting by Radio Liberty, VOA, BBC, Deutsche Velle,
and others. VOA broadcasts in Kazakh language ought to be resumed. VOA
should also create a Russian language service focused on Central Asia.
Radio Liberty ought to strengthen its valuable Kazakh broadcasts, and
increase its Russian language broadcasting oriented toward Central
Asia. Kazakhstan is an important a country and its people need better
access to trustworthy information.
After the Soviet collapse Kazakhstan returned nuclear weapons to
Russia and became a model partner in the Nunn-Lugar program to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their infrastructure.
Kazakhstan welcomes substantial U.S. and other investment in Caspian
energy. It is a critical partner in the northern distribution network,
which provides logistical support to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Close cooperation on core interests has yielded a productive U.S.-
Kazakhstani strategic relationship, one of America's most valued. Yet,
as Egypt shows, rulers must retain the consent of the governed in order
to sustain foreign support. The lesson is salient for Kazakhstan.
First, the legitimacy of personalized rule is in decline and
Zhanaozen is accelerating it. Transitions beyond President Nazarbayev,
now 71, are uncertain. No evident successor has broad stature and
appeal. Few if any independent groups combine the experience and
acceptance required for effective political intermediation. None is so
strong or enduring as, for example, the liberal Yabloko party in
Russia, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
On January 15 Kazakhstan held elections for a new parliament, but
no genuine opposition parties were allowed to participate. OSCE
election monitors found that the elections ``did not meet fundamental
principles of democratic elections.'' In another anti-democratic step,
earlier this week security forces raided the office of the opposition
party, Algha, and the home of its leader. The courageous suffer. Labor
union lawyer Nataliya Sokolova, and human rights activists Aidos
Sadykov and Yevgenniy Zhovtis languish in prison. Fortunately
journalist Ramazan Yesergepov has been released.
Multiple factors, some unforeseen today, could shape Kazakhstan's
political evolution. One might be the demonstration effect of the Arab
awakening. Other factors may include: elites empowered by economic
liberalization, educated and connected young people, restive citizens
in western Kazakhstan, Islamic interests, disadvantaged groups, and
Russia's policies toward neighbors. Kazakhstan's burden of autocracy
could render its politics less resilient against extremist pressures.
Second, the accumulation of wealth by President Mubarak and his
family, and popular resentment of it, have a disturbing parallel in
Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev is rightly credited for improving the
economy, but personal aggrandizement arouses concern and cynicism.
Moreover, several in his family are multi-
billionaires.
Third, Zhanaozen may propel more unrest. One risk is western
Kazakhstan, which does not benefit commensurate with its contribution
to the economy. Another risk is ethnicity. Zhanaozen was largely
Kazakh-on-Kazakh violence. If large-scale lethal force were ever turned
on unarmed ethnic Russians, consequences could be far-reaching. The
Kremlin is vocal about protecting the interests of Russians abroad.
Kazakhstan's regions with higher proportions of ethnic Russians lie
along the border with Russia, a key reason why the capital was moved
northward.
In conclusion, political risks in Kazakhstan are rising even as the
economy expands. The arrogant official response to Zhanaozen suggests
dulled leadership awareness of human conditions. Repeated promises of
democratic reforms go unfulfilled. Popular expectations may be climbing
faster than the brittle political system can accommodate. Limits on
independent political life weaken safety valves for peaceful change.
America and Europe are widely respected in Kazakhstan. They should
bite the bullet and do more to promote political and human freedoms.
While some may resist, this will be a prudent investment in an
important country and a friendly people with good long-term prospects.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have and hear
your further perspectives. Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Susan Corke
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, it is an honor to appear
before you today to discuss whether Kazakhstan is ``As Stable as Its
Government Claims?'' at a pivotal moment in that nation's history. I am
also pleased to appear today in distinguished company with Ambassador
William Courtney and Dr. Sean Roberts.
During my years in the State Department's Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, I worked in common cause with Helsinki
Commission staff and Freedom House before, during, and after Kazakhstan
assumed the Chairmanship of the Organization for Security Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE). In particular, we worked together to press for human
rights improvements before Kazakhstan assumed the Chairmanship and
continued to hold the spotlight up throughout the year highlighting
where the government continued to fall short of its human dimension
commitments. On the civil society side, Freedom House helped establish
a coalition of leading Kazakhstani NGOs, the OSCE 2010 coalition that
produced numerous reports on Kazakhstan's flawed human rights
peformance as chairman.
Just over one year ago, Kazakhstan, in concluding its OSCE
Chairmanship, hosted an OSCE summit in Astana, where Foreign Minister
Kanat Saudabayev proclaimed that ``this is a sign of the objective
recognition by the international community of Kazakhstan's impressive
successes in its socio-economic and democratic development during the
years of independence and convincing evidence of the leadership of
Nursulatan Nazarbayev and his contribution to ensuring regional and
global security. We have endeavoured to fully live up to our motto--
trust, tradition, transparency and tolerance (4 T's)--and be worthy of
the confidence placed in us by the participating States and meet the
expectations of the OSCE community.''
Unfortunately, as we gather today to consider the questions of
Kazakhstan's stability and its adhesion to human rights commitments and
its own 4Ts' motto, it seems that the nation is not deserving of the
OSCE community's confidence. While those who supported Kazakhstan's
chairmanship argued that it could galvanize human rights reform, more
than a year after its chairmanship, it has failed to do so. In our
recently released annual Freedom in the World report Kazakhstan
continued to earn its ``Not Free'' ranking.
This week, as we take stock of the situation, additional harsh and
repressive measures have been launched in Kazakhstan, including raids
of the opposition Alga party offices and detentions of opposition
activists and journalists. This follows the OSCE's critical assessment
the recent parliamentary elections lacked plurality, transparency,
safeguards against fraud, and respect for electoral procedures.
Our Freedom House office in Almaty, led by Mr. Vyacheslav Abramov,
is a small but dedicated staff continuously reporting on and working to
improve respect for human rights. I will focus today primarily on the
current human rights situation as gathered from their reports and
recent events. From what we have heard from our office and our
partners, Kazakhstan is heading down a path of increasing instability.
But the recent riots and violence are not simply a random outburst. The
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, a
leading NGO, documented the growth of civic engagement in Kazakhstan in
2011, and the emergence of ordinary citizens as the leading organizers
of public assemblies; 78 percent of these were demonstrations on socio-
economic problems of citizens, many of whom had avoided political
activity in the past. The government severely restricts freedom of
assembly; 91 percent of assemblies were not authorized by the
government. This signals that there is growing societal discontent and
that more people are willing to challenge the government to have their
voices heard. And if the government continues on its repressive path,
more peaceful protests will turn to violent ones.
When a government is dedicated to systematically thwarting
democratic reforms and failing to observe citizens' fundamental rights,
it is sowing the seeds for instability. President Nazarbayev has ruled
Kazakhstan with an iron fist since independence in 1991, and as
demonstrated again in the recent parliamentary elections, his
administration remains fixed on retaining power and on withholding it
from other parties, even as Nazarbayev reaches the ripe age of 72. When
stability is defined as keeping the lid on, and silencing its citizens,
it is only a matter of time before the pot starts to boil over. By
denying moderate voices, the regime is opening the door to extremism
and violence.
Zhanaozen: Social Unrest
The international community watched, taken aback, as violence
erupted December 16 in the city of Zhanaozen (Zhe-na-oh-ZEN), the day
of Kazakhstan's 20th year of independence from the Soviet Union. For
those who have been paying attention to Zhanaozen, however, the pot had
been simmering for a while, and there had been long-standing underlying
elements of social unrest. An oil strike has been going on since April
2011, when a large group of oil workers in the western Mangistau region
of Kazakhstan began to demand higher wages and better working
conditions. While Kazakhstan has several billionaires, there is not
much of a middle class, and these strikes signaled that uneven
distribution of the country's resources was sparking a backlash.
Starting in May, many workers began camping in the city square in an
indefinite protest, a challenge to a government that had tried and
succeeded in squelching dissent. A court found the workers' strike
illegal, and hundreds were subsequently fired from their posts. In
August, Natalia Sokolova, a labor lawyer and activist, was accused of
inciting social discord and sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment for
doing nothing more than providing counsel to several of the striking
workers. Freedom House issued a statement and expressed concern that
Kazakhstan was using the judiciary as a means to silence oppositional
voices. Despite the strikers' increased coverage in the international
media, as organizations like Freedom House and celebrities like Sting
condemned the government's actions, officials began to harass
journalists trying to cover the strike, and in October, two journalists
were brutally attacked by unknown assailants.
On December 16, the situation in Zhanaozen took a deadly turn.
While local officials claimed police fired at the ground to disperse
troublemakers interfering with Independence Day celebrations, videos on
the Internet showed police firing with lethal force at fleeing crowds.
18 people were reportedly killed. It is not clear where the riots began
or who initiated them, but a correspondent from Russia's Novaya Gazeta
newspaper reported that 3,000 oil workers, families, and onlookers were
in the square when authorities brought additional residents there for
the celebration. Then, from noon until late into the night, over a
thousand people reportedly attacked the square and burned down the city
hall, the offices of oil companies, and shops. On December 17 similar
events spread to the village of Shetpe, where police also opened fire
and killed one person.
The next day, President Nazarbayev took decisive steps to try to
regain ``stability.'' In Zhanaozen he imposed emergency rule, which he
extended until January 31 (and essentially cut off communications to
the outside world). The government promised to find jobs for the oil
workers. Nazarbayev also dismissed his son-in-law, the head of the
holding company to which state-owned oil company KazMunaiGaz belongs.
He demanded a public inquiry into the events in Zhanaozen, and vowed to
severely punish the perpetrators. The Prosecutor General later said
that Kazakhstan is ready to allow a United Nations expert group to
investigate, but at the moment the city remains closed to public
defenders and journalists, who may enter the city only if official
permission is granted. Human rights organizations have only now been
able to begin fully monitoring events and conducting a public
investigation of law enforcement's firing onto crowds.
The presidential administration, while it was swift in trying to
usher in stability, shows no real signs of understanding or addressing
the root causes of the instability. Nazarbaev's political advisor
called the disorder in Zhanaozen a provocation against the president
and then continued to say that criminals caused the trouble December
16. ``The president dealt with it, and the situation is back to
normal,'' he said. ``There will be a detailed criminal investigation.''
These labor strikes originated in social and economic grievances, but
as they gathered steam became a political challenge. If Nazarbayev
wants to prevent a repeat of this violence, he would be wise to pay
heed to the calls of his people.
January 15th Elections and the Aftermath
Besides failing to address the root issues of instability in
Zhanaozen, following a 20 year tradition of holding elections that
Western observers have continually deemed unfair, Kazakhstan failed
again to observe democratic norms in the January 15 parliamentary
elections. The OSCE's election observation mission issued a statement
that the ``early parliamentary vote did not meet fundamental principles
of democratic elections'' and expressed disappointment that the
election was a sham effort to meet stated goals of increasing the
number of parties in parliament. In the style of authoritarian
elections, there was a high voter turnout (75%), and observers reported
standard abuses such as ballot stuffing and misuse of absentee ballots.
Two days after the election, Nazarbayev issued a fast rebuttal,
revealing what he really thinks about political modernization and
dialogue with the West, saying that Kazakhstan would no longer invite
international experts who criticize its elections. This was interpreted
as unambiguous criticism of the OSCE. The government of Kazakhstan's
rhetoric touting transparency and fulfillment of OSCE commitments thus
seem to be only applicable when there is good news to share and not on
the day-to-day level.
In looking to place blame for the growing instability, the
opposition was the obvious target for the government. In December the
leaders of the unregistered Alga party in Astana and in the Mangistau
region were both arrested. After the election, Vladmir Kozlov, the
leader of Alga in Almaty, predicted that Kazakh authorities would
continue to try to blame the opposition for the Zhanaozen events. The
website ``Republika'' posted an anonymous message stating that the
authorities have chosen the path of repression, that many opposition
politicians and civil society activists will be arrested.
On Monday, police and the Committee on National Security (KNB)
organized a search in at the central office of the Alga party and at
the homes of Kozlov, his deputy, several party activists, and a youth
leader. Several were detained, including Kozlov, who was then accused
of inciting social discord. The National Security Committee said the
raids against the Alga party were part of an investigation into last
month's fatal clashes between police and striking oil workers in the
town of Zhanaozen. But this latest clampdown on the opposition figures
contravenes the government's promises of political reform and
liberalization.
By tightening the screws rather than allowing for political
competition or dissent, Nazarbayev and his administration on some level
are admitting their own weakness and vulnerability. A confident leader
would not need to resort to such tactics.
Religious Extremism and the Government Response
Throughout 2011, the country was shaken by several attacks, mostly
in Western Kazakhstan, that were blamed on religious extremists, and
the government responded by abruptly passing new legislation broadly
tightening religious freedoms and public expression.
When I visited Kazakhstan last August, there was a palpable sense
of unease and fear about what this uptick in religious extremism would
mean for Kazakhstan. Citizens and the government had been proud of its
stability and peace in a restive neighborhood and had often touted the
nation as a model for religious harmony. Human rights activists I spoke
with warned that speaking publicly about the rise in extremism would
cross a redline that they feared would provoke the government. There
was already a sense that the government planned to clamp down tightly
on religious freedom in response to the attacks and that restrictive
legislation was underway. The resultant legislation, rushed through
parliament in only 3 weeks in spite of protests from the OSCE and human
rights organizations, gives the government unprecedented authority to
regulate the activities and structures of religious communities and
forbids prayer or religious expression in government institutions. Some
additional provisions of the law on religion include:
Religious literature, as well as groups' registration
documents, now have to be examined in a specially created Agency for
Religious Affairs;
religious associations must agree on the appointment of
leaders of organizations with a state agency; and
all religious groups should be re-registered within one
year of the law's adoption.
Similar to analogous legislation in neighboring countries, the
specifics of the laws are poorly defined, leave much room for
interpretation to local authorities, and empower special ``anti-
terror'' task forces to police mainstream religious groups. Authorities
say the new law on religion will help combat extremism, but critics
warn that restrictions under the new law could backfire and fuel
extremism rather than combat it. How the law is implemented needs to be
carefully monitored. Authorities express confidence that the new law
does not violate the rights of believers and religious groups and is
directed against the Muslim extremist groups.
Law on national security
Shortly on the heels of the new religion law, with little fanfare
or room for analysis, the new National Security Act was signed by the
president this month. The law not only provides for the empowerment of
special services, especially for operations to combat terrorism, but it
allows for blocking of the Internet, as well as disabling fixed and
mobile communications. In addition, the law imposes a vague restriction
on allowing people ``recognized to be destructive'' to enter
Kazakhstan; according to a clause, those who ``harm the image of
Kazakhstan in the international arena'' can be considered
``destructive.'' There is an obvious concern that this law will thus be
directed against the human rights organizations and politicians who
criticize the country at international fora.
Trying to Keep the Lid on Freedom of Expression
Unlike the government's previously-mentioned hasty steps to crack
down on dissent and unrest, the new Broadcasting Act was signed by the
president in January after a year of disregarding recommendations made
by the OSCE and Kazakhstani civil society organizations.
While human rights groups were urging the president to veto the
law, the new law was eventually passed, at least officially, in
connection with the transition of television and radio broadcasting to
digital format, but it contains a number of troubling regulations that
give the state additional control over television and radio channels,
thereby violating citizens' rights to freely receive and impart
information. All foreign television and radio stations will be required
to be registered with an official Kazakh entity, and 50 percent of the
broadcasts of foreign channels must contain domestic content by 2018.
One of the more bizarre restrictions is that the government will now
license all satellite devices, and local authorities may prohibit
placement of satellite dishes on rooftops if they are not attractive to
the eye. Human rights groups believe that the law is directed primarily
against the opposition K+ TV channel, which is broadcast via satellite
in Kazakhstan, funded by Mukhtar Ablyazov and extremely popular in the
regions.
The new restrictive measure occurs in a media environment that is
already under siege. The government has repeatedly harassed or shut
down independent media outlets. Libel is a criminal offense, the
criminal code prohibits insulting the president, and self-censorship is
widespread. Most media outlets, including publishing houses, are
controlled or influenced by members of the president's family and other
powerful groups. In 2011, the government expanded attempts to identify
websites with supposedly ``destructive'' content, blocking the popular
blogging sites livejournal.com and liveinternet.ru along with some 20
other sites in August on charges that they contribute to ``terrorism.''
The human rights situation in Kazakhstan has eroded in many areas
over the past year, but following the parliamentary election, the
situation has become more urgent. Our office in Almaty said that the
common belief is that NGOs will be raided next by the government. Civil
society in Kazakhstan had already operated under tightly controlled and
repressive conditions, with government harassment, including police
visits and surveillance, of NGO offices and personnel. Real civil
society efforts have been squeezed out by the GONGOs, which the
government mobilized to create the impression of a thriving Kazakhstani
civil society in the West. Kazakhstan's most-prominent human rights
defender, Evgeniy Zhovtis, remains in prison. The expectation now is
that things are only going to get worse.
While in 2010 Kazakhstan's human rights record was under the
spotlight during its OSCE chairmanship, in 2012 the international
community moved its focus elsewhere, which has proved to be a dangerous
miscalculation and which has let the situation unravel all the more.
Kazakhstan has preferred to view democracy and freedom as public
relations slogans to boost prestige. It spared no expense in promoting
itself with advertisement campaigns and high-level consultancies with
Tony Blair and lobbyists. Admittedly, this has paid some dividends for
Kazakhstan on policy fronts. The international community hoped that
giving Kazakhstan the carrot of a prestigious OSCE leadership role as
well as the accompanying glare of the international spotlight, would
lead to significant improvements in the country's human rights
implementation. This has not been the case.
Despite trying to tout a multi-ethnic population which lives in
relative harmony (especially in comparison with its neighbors in the
Ferghana Valley), an essential truth was revealed in yet another
authoritarian government: governments that cannot meet the political
and material aspirations of their citizens lose legitimacy. When
citizens have legitimate grievances without an outlet, when freedoms
are denied in the name of stability, instability and extremism are
likely to increase.
Kazakhstan's ``stability'' was based on the precarious assumptions
that dissent could be stifled and there was no need to enable a
peaceful rotation of power among alternative political forces. The
lesson of the past year is that stability will not be enhanced through
further repression. It is time to address the political stagnancy and
lack of an apparent heir after Nazarbayev, officially deemed ``Leader
for Life.'' It is time for pro-democratic forces within Kazakhstan and
the international community to start thinking about how to catalyze a
more democratic and more stable future for the country. Given its
strategic importance, how Kazakhstan approaches the immediate future
should be a cause for concern for American, Russian, Central Asian, and
European policy-makers.
I would now like to offer five specific recommendations, which have
been developed in consultation with civil society in Kazakhstan:
It is important to publicly, at high levels, continue to
hold the Kazakh authorities to their international obligations--
particularly the fundamental freedoms of expressions and assembly--and
to require their implementation. Kazakhstan must earn positive
attention not buy it.
It is important to express support for civil society in
Kazakhstan in cases of direct repression against NGOs and their
activists.
The time is now to increase material support for civil
society in Kazakhstan--through funding and participation in various
programs. Freedom House's office in coalition with other domestic and
international NGOs has worked hard to try to build space in a
repressive environment. They need our help more than ever.
It is important to put pressure on the Kazakh
authorities, demanding an investigation of the events Zhanaozen openly
and transparently, including any searches, detentions and arrests.
It is important to press the government of Kazakhstan to
put words into action and allow political pluralism and not paint the
opposition as the enemy. The opposition has announced on January 28 it
will hold a massive protest rally in Almaty and will try to contest the
election results in courts. The West should pay attention.
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sean R. Roberts
Chairman Smith and members of the Commission, I would like to thank
you for inviting me here today to speak on this very important and
timely topic. As I recently wrote in a briefing paper commissioned by
the Atlantic Council on twenty years of U.S.-Kazkahstani relations, the
Republic of Kazakhstan is something of an oasis of stability in the
desert of uncertainty that represents Central Asia. Indeed, this
stability is also largely the result of smart policies adopted by the
Government of Kazakhstan over the last twenty years.
In the early 1990s, the Government of Kazakhstan, with cooperation
from the United States, divested itself of the nuclear weapons it
inherited from the Soviet Union. Also in the 1990s, Kazakhstan's
government was careful to adopt inclusionary policies for its Russian
minority citizens and to establish close relations with the Russian
federation, which helped to substantially reduce ethnic tension in the
heavily Russian-populated north of the country. During the later 1990s
and into the 2000s, Kazakhstan also adopted substantial liberal
economic reforms that helped the country use its natural resource
wealth to stimulate growth and create a vibrant middle-class. All of
these steps have played a role in making Kazakhstan the strongest and
most stable country in Central Asia both politically and economically,
and the Government of Kazakhstan frequently and justifiably takes the
credit for them.
Unfortunately, stability is not something a state can merely
establish once; it is an ongoing duty of governments around the world
to meet the challenges that they face in keeping their citizens secure.
This duty requires adapting to changing circumstances and understanding
the changing needs of citizens. Given the several outbreaks of violence
that have occurred in the country over the last year, one can
justifiably ask whether the Government of Kazakhstan today is adapting
to the new realities the country faces and whether the state is as
stable as its government suggests. After all, the Kazakhstan of 2012 is
quite different from that of 1992 or even from that of 2002, but during
the past twenty years the same President, who continues to be advised
by many of the same men, has led its government. This is not a recipe
for an adaptive government and long-term stability.
In the interest of time, I want to focus on three critical and
relatively recent changes in Kazakhstan's socio-economic environment
that, in my opinion, have contributed to the growing violence and
tension we have seen in the country over the last year. I will also
note that the country's present government has yet to sufficiently
address these changes and may be ill-equipped to properly engage them,
bringing into question whether the violence we have seen this year is
the beginning of a much less stable Kazakhstan into the future.
The first change is the rapid growth in the popularity of Islam in
the country. In the last several years, the re-engagement of Islam by
the people of Kazakhstan, which has been ongoing since the early 1990s,
has suddenly become apparent in public spaces throughout the country.
As somebody who has been visiting the country frequently over the last
twenty years, for example, I was struck last summer by the number of
Kazakh women dressed according to Islamic custom in the city of Almaty,
the most cosmopolitan city in the country. This rapid growth of public
religiosity is not suggestive of a terrorist threat or even of an
immediate move towards political Islam, but it does point to a changing
public culture that is poorly understood by both the government and the
secular middle-class of the cities. As such, it is also suggestive of a
growing population for whom the Soviet past, from which Kazakhstan's
current leadership emerged, holds little authority.
We know very little about this growing Islamic religiosity in
Kazakhstan, but it is likely quite diverse and represents a variety of
different understandings of Islam. While we know even less about the
alleged Muslim extremists who clashed with authorities in western
Kazakhstan earlier this year, one must assume that these people were
representative of at least one part of the population that is
expressing its belief in Islam more publicly. Again, I will stress that
I do not consider that these people, and others like them, represent a
serious terrorist threat to Kazakhstan. Rather, I believe they are
emblematic of the inability of the present government in Kazakhstan to
speak to the needs, perspectives, and values of an increasingly
religious population.
A second related development in the country is the growth of ethnic
Kazakh nationalism. Like the growth of religiosity, this is a
phenomenon that has been on-going since the early 1990s, but it has
taken on new characteristics in recent years. In particular, the large
number of ethnic Kazakh Oralman who have come back to the country since
the early 1990s from exile in China, Mongolia, Iran, and elsewhere are
now becoming much more integrated into society. They generally have a
poor knowledge of Russian, are religious, and believe that they should
have an advantage over non-Kazakhs regarding economic opportunity. This
situation is increasing ethnic tension in the country as well as
creating fear amongst Russian-speaking Kazakhs in urban areas who see
these developments as also promoting the status of Kazakh language.
While the country's leadership has tried to balance the promotion
of Kazakh patriotism with policies of multiculturalism since
independence, the growth of Kazakh language use and Kazakh nationalism
are developments they are not well placed to engage given their
political education in a Soviet system that shunned nationalist
politics. Furthermore, while the ethnic tension created by these
developments has not yet exploded into mass violence, it has already
manifested itself in violent clashes between Kazakhs and Uyghurs in the
area of Kazakhstan between Almaty and the Chinese border.
Finally, and perhaps most ominous for the present government,
Kazakhstan is beginning to face a crisis of rising economic
expectations that are unmet. While Kazakhstan is certainly the most
economically viable country in Central Asia, the country's middle-class
and skilled laborers have come to expect their standard of living to
improve on a regular basis after a decade of rapid economic growth. A
combination of the global financial crisis, a leveling off of
Kazakhstan's post-transition growth, and the bust of a substantial
housing market bubble have stunted these improvements for many citizens
in the country over the last several years. Given the awareness of the
income gulf in the country, these unmet expectations for improved
standards of living have resulted in increased dissatisfaction with the
current economic situation in the country among the middle-class and
skilled laborers. This situation undoubtedly contributed to the labor
strikes we saw in the west of the country this year, and the
government's violent reaction to these strikes shows just how
unprepared the present Government of Kazakhstan is to deal with such
dissatisfaction.
It should be noted that these changes in Kazakhstan's socio-
economic environment are not extreme and are unlikely to immediately
cause widespread unrest in the country. In fact, in a democratic
society, such discord and socio-economic dynamism is expected, and
politicians and different political parties compete to provide the best
solutions to them. In Kazakhstan, however, the stagnant political
system has no mechanism to adapt to such dynamic changes. Furthermore,
at a time when many authoritarian states have sought to implement at
least gradual liberalization of their political systems in response to
the ``Arab Spring,'' Kazakhstan has shown no such desire, instead
holding controlled elections this past year that differed little from
those held in the country over the last twenty years.
In my opinion, the growing dynamism of Kazakhstan's society coupled
with its stagnant political system could create a dangerous scenario
when the country finally decides, or is forced to decide, on a strategy
for presidential succession. With a diversification of powerful
interests in the country, significant natural resource wealth at stake,
and no experience with competitive politics, such a succession could
become a flashpoint for substantial conflict and sustained instability.
In conclusion, I will note that I believe that Kazakhstan has the
capacity to adapt to these changes given the country's rich human
resources and relatively broad economic prosperity. To do so, however,
the country must begin taking measures towards a liberalization of its
political system now. The gradual development of a competitive and
transparent multi-party political system now can prepare the country to
deal with presidential succession, but if Kazakhstan waits until a
succession crisis ensues to implement such reforms, I fear it may be
too late.
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Erlan Idrissov
Thank you Chairman Smith, Senator Cardin and other Members of the
Helsinki Commission, for holding this important hearing on the state of
Human Rights in Kazakhstan. We appreciate that our close friend and
ally, the United States, is concerned about the recent events in
Zhanaozen and the overall stability of Kazakhstan. On behalf of my
government, I want to address those concerns and outline for you the
steps Kazakhstan is taking to ensure continued stability in our country
and the events that took place on December 16.
The support of the United States for our young democracy over the
past twenty years has been essential to our development. We look
forward to another 20 years of close engagement and partnership on
these issues as Kazakhstan grows in its independence.
As you are well aware, the United States was the first country to
recognize Kazakhstan's sovereign independence from the Soviet Union on
December 25, 1991. As Kazakhstan has just celebrated its 20th
anniversary of independence, we look back with pride over the progress
we have made over such a short period of time. Democracy is about more
than laws and institutions; it is fundamentally about custom, habit,
and culture, supported by property rights, and backed by the rule of
law. When given the opportunity 20 years ago to choose how we wanted to
govern ourselves, we chose democracy because we believe it is the best
way to run our society, ensure the prosperity of our people and
guarantee the long-term security and success of our state. While
Kazakhstan's record in all of these areas is not perfect, we are proud
of the progress we have made.
Kazakhstan's ties with the United States are close, multi-faceted
and enduring. We have shared objectives of enhanced political,
economic, infrastructure, and security linkages and cooperation that
can mutually benefit our nations. We have achieved much towards
building institutional capacity and making our continued progress in
areas such as education, civil society, media freedom and local
governance.
Kazakhstan is committed to being a responsible member of the
international community. After suffering through almost 500 Soviet
nuclear tests that destroyed the lives of 1.5 million people,
Kazakhstan made the unprecedented move, upon independence, to
voluntarily shut down its nuclear test site and renounce the world's
fourth largest nuclear arsenal. At this time, our nuclear arsenal was
larger than the nuclear weapons stockpiles of Great Britain, France,
and China combined. President Nazarbayev stood up to intense pressure
from outside forces pushing for Kazakhstan to keep our nuclear weapons
and become the first Muslim nation with nuclear capabilities. He made
this decision because he knew that responsible engagement in the
international community was far more important than having a large
nuclear stockpile.
Today, Kazakhstan is actively collaborating with the United States
in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. When operations at the
U.S. Air Force Base at Manas were threatened by the political
instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the Kazakh government offered our
airspace for expedited U.S. military flights to Afghanistan.
We are an essential part of and proud partners in the Northern
Distribution Networks, which provides supply lines to coalition troops
in northern Afghanistan.
The Eurasian region has seen instability over the past year. In
Kyrgyzstan political unrest in April 2010 led to the ouster of
President Bakiyev. The Kazakh government worked with the United States,
Russia, the European Union and the United Nations to address the
turmoil as it was taking place. Working with the transition government
we encouraged them to work together to return normalcy to the country
by restoring political institutions and basic economic activity. We
were pleased with the outcome of the Presidential elections last year
and are committed to working with President Atambayev to promote
stability in the region.
As we have shown our commitment to promoting stability throughout
the region we are equally committed to promoting stability within our
borders. For this reason, my government was deeply concerned about the
events in Western Kazakhstan last December. The government is still
conducting its investigation, but as far as we can tell a small group
of people violently interrupted a national celebration. While hundreds
of other citizens happily commemorated Kazakhstan's 20th year of
independence from the Soviet Union, agitators burned police cars and
government buildings for reasons that remain unclear. This disturbance,
which I am sad to say resulted in at least 16 deaths and many injuries,
is an example of the growing pains that our young nation is going
through. Oil workers in Zhanaozen have been pressing for higher wages
and better conditions and the government has been working to address
their concerns. Nevertheless, the rioters, possibly instigated by
outsiders, chose destruction rather than negotiation.
We deeply regret that this incident resulted in the loss of life.
In response to this violence, President Nazarbayev called for a full
investigation into the matter within 24 hours. Establishing government
commission, headed by First Vice-Prime Minister Shukeyev, and
collaborating with the investigation group led by Interior Minister
Kasimov, the Kazakh government is looking forward to receiving a full
report of what exactly took place. These groups are not only
investigating the rioters' actions, but are also conducting a thorough
investigation into the police forces actions throughout this event.
Moreover, international experts have been invited by us to participate
in the investigation process, including from FBI and UN.
The Kazakh government is committed to accountability. Those found
responsible for this violence will be brought to trial and must be held
accountable for their actions. We will pursue the full weight of the
law against anyone found guilty, including those in the security forces
and government.
In order to address the unrest and ongoing disputes with oil
workers, the unemployed oil workers in the region have been offered new
jobs. In addition, the Government and company officials who had failed
to address these grievances have been removed from their positions and
replaced. The newly appointed Minister of Economic Development and
Trade, Bakhytzhan Sagintayev, is overseeing a seven-point action plan
to rehabilitate the region. This plan is working to address problems of
rebuilding damaged property, improving food security, and improving
residents living conditions.
These actions taken to restore stability have already seen some
results. The region had regained sufficient stability to participate
fully in Parliamentary elections held last week, and citizens of the
region were given the opportunity to participate fully in those
elections.
Zhanaozen violence came out of the blue and shocked the entire
nation. But observers noted that despite this the Government displayed
quite a mature behavior and reaction to the events, making special
emphasis that the crisis is addressed and reported in the most
transparent, open and fair manner.
I have personally held press briefings here in Washington to
discuss these events and the government's response to them. To ensure
transparency, beginning on the day after the riots, I have published on
the Embassy website (www.kazakhembus.com) a timeline of events on that
day, and updates regarding the investigation, as they are available.
The Parliamentary elections that took place January 15 are further
proof that Kazakhstan is making incremental progress in developing its
democracy. For the first time in history Kazakhstan has elected a
multi-party Parliament. This shows great movement in the right
direction for Kazakhstan, in terms of building political pluralism,
strengthening the rule of law and developing democratic institutions.
Over 75 percent of the eligible population voted in the election, and
more than half of the Kazakh population living abroad participated by
voting at polling stations in diplomatic and consular representation
offices. In addition, the people of Western Kazakhstan turned out in
large numbers to vote. Various international observers commented on the
high organizational level of the elections and generally praised them.
The elections were monitored by 819 international observers. Those
include 309 representatives of the OSCE/ODIHR, 262 from the CIS
Observer Mission, 46 from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 15 from the
PACE, eleven from the SCO Observer Mission, nine from the Cooperation
Council of Turkic Speaking States, seven from the OIC, ten from the
TURKPA, and 150 others from 29 countries. In addition, 156 foreign
media representatives covered the elections. These figures show that
the elections were open and transparent. All international
organizations have made independent assessments and conclusions based
on their own observation of the electoral process.
OSCE issued a critical Statement on Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions. But even OSCE's assessment could not ignore improvements.
In particular, OSCE said: ``The elections were well administered at the
technical level and the observers noted legal changes aimed at ensuring
representation of at least a second party in parliament, but the
authorities did not provide the necessary conditions for the conduct of
genuinely pluralistic elections.'' Despite these assessments from OSCE
ODIHR, the outcome is clear: Kazakhstan has made a major step forward
to strengthen its multiparty and more robust democracy.
Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned in a region of the world that is
fraught with instability and poor governance. Amidst the uncertainty
however, Kazakhstan is establishing a stable democracy. We are not
perfect, but we are a mature government. It takes a long time to
develop the institutions and cultural habits that make up democracy as
westerners know it. We make progress towards that goal every year.
Kazakhstan has benefited from significant progress in a short period of
time in part because we have focused on strengthening our economy. A
strong economy is the necessary first step toward democracy. We started
out, twenty years ago, with hyperinflation, poverty and high
unemployment. Today we are the fastest growing and most reliable
economy in our region.
Developing a fully functioning democracy is not easy work, and it
will not happen overnight. However, Kazakhstan is committed to pursuing
the ideals of freedom, rule of law, and economic growth. Our government
will take full responsibility and demand accountability when it is
found to have been wrong. However, we are also committed to protecting
our citizens from overzealous activists who choose violence over
dialogue. We are thankful for the support and partnership of the United
States and hope to strengthen our bilateral relationship as we work to
address challenges together.
I appreciate the opportunity to share the perspective of my
Government with you.
In addition, in our continuing effort to be open and transparent
about the violence last December in western Kazakhstan, below please
find the complete report by the Prosecutor General. It [is] noteworthy
reading because of its balance and fairness.
25 January 2012
Statement by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Kazakhstan on
the events that took place in the town of Zhanaozen on Dec. 16, 2011
On the 16th of December 2011 in the town of Zhanaozen in Mangystau
province during the celebration of the Independence Day of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, a group of former workers of the ``OzenMunaiGaz'' oil
producing enterprise--with the support of youngsters--started to loot
and set fires in the Central Square.
As a result, 125 facilities were set on fire, damaged or looted,
including offices of the mayors of Zhanaozen and Tenge. Also damaged
were a Pension distribution center, police stations, an office of
``OzenMunaiGaz,'' the ``Aruana'' hotel, the ``Sulpak,'' ``Atlant'' and
``Sholpan'' shopping centers, five bank offices, nine ATM machines, 21
vehicles, apartment buildings and numerous facilities that belong to
small and medium sized businesses.
The damage caused to the state, companies and individuals ran in
the billions of tenges.
In order to end mass disorder and to protect civilians, the command
of the Department of Internal Affairs of the province sent a police
squad that was attacked by the crowd with firearms and knives, stones,
sticks and Molotov cocktails.
The police, after several warning shots, used weapons against the
rioters.
As a result of the clashes, 64 persons received gunshot wounds, 14
persons died. The death of two persons mentioned in media reporters was
not related to the disturbances.
35 police officers received various injuries.
* * *
By the instruction of the Head of the State, in order to
investigate the facts of the disturbances as well as the reasons and
conditions of their development, an inter-agency investigation team
under the special prosecutor was established and is operating now.
Six organizers of the disturbances have been identified--
Saktaganov, Dzharylgasinov, Irmuhanov, Dosmagambetov, Utkilov and
Tuletaeva--and all have been charged with Part 1 Chapter 241 of the
Criminal code and all are under arrest.
Twenty three active participants of the disturbances and 11
individuals who set fires and looted have also been identified and
arrested. Most of them confirmed the fact that they helped organize and
participated in the disturbances.
They said that they were preparing for the insurgencies in advance
and worked with a group of young people who prepared bottles of Molotov
cocktails and armed themselves with improvised weapons.
In the course of the investigation--and following an appeal--softer
treatment was given to 11 individuals, short of arrest. The work to
identify other organizers and participants of the disturbances
continues.
* * *
Simultaneously, by the order of the Head of the State, the
legitimacy of the actions of the police officers who took part in
restoring public order is being examined.
Special attention is being given to the use of weapons.
The investigation has shown that in most cases police officers
acted in accordance with law under a real threat to the lives and
health both of civilians and the police officers themselves.
Nevertheless, in some cases, use of weapons and special devices by
the police was of disproportional character, reaction to the acts of
the attackers was unequal to the threat thus leading to death and
injures of citizens.
For the improper performance of his duties, the deputy head of the
Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) of Mangystau province Utegaliev,
who was in charge of the police squad, is being brought to criminal
account.
For the use of a weapon with excess of authority that lead to the
death of people, the following are being brought to criminal account:
head of the anti-extremist division of the DIA of
Mangystau province Bagdabaev;
first deputy head of the Office of the Internal Affairs
of the town of Zhanaozen Bakytkaliuly;
police inspector of DIA of Mangystau province Zholdybaev.
The death of Kenzhebaev Bazarbai, who according to the statement of
his relatives died because of the bodily injures that he suffered in
the Temporary Detention Facility of the Office of the Internal Affairs
of the town of Zhanaozen, was evaluated.
As a result, the Head of the Temporary Detention Facility of the
Office of the Internal Affairs of the town of Zhanaozen Temirov, who
allowed illegal detention of Kenzhebaev and did not arrange timely
hospitalization for the latter, is being brought to criminal account.
Also, measures are being taken to identify those who beat the
deceased.
* * *
Illegal actions of the local executive officials and the heads of
oil enterprises contributed to the tension that resulted in the
disturbances.
Financial police discovered that the abovementioned officials,
contrary to the interests of the people of the town, for several years
had been stealing money allocated for social and economic support of
the local population and workers of the oil industry.
The investigation reveals that both the former and the current
mayors of the town of Zhanaozen Babahanov and Sarbopeev had been
stealing money through the ``Zhanashyr'' and ``Zharylkau'' public
endowments.
The mentioned officials and heads of endowments are being brought
to criminal account.
A criminal case on clause ``b'' of part 3 of chapter 176 of the
Criminal code has been started against heads of JSC ``EP''Kazmunaigaz''
and ``Kompaniya Munai Ecologiya'' LTD Mirishnikov and Baimuhambetov on
the evidence of the theft of 335 million tenges that belongs to JSC
``EP"Kazmunaigaz''.
A criminal case on clause ``b'' of part 3 of chapter 176 of the
Criminal code is under investigation against former director of
``OzenMunaiGaz'' Eshmanov, his deputy Markabaev, who are accused of
stealing 127 million tenges that belongs to JSC ``EP''Kazmunaigaz''--in
collusion with director of ``Burgylau'' LTD Seitmagambetov.
* * *
One of the reasons of the disturbances was active efforts of some
individuals who persuaded fired workers to continue protests and to
violently oppose the authorities.
A Committee of national security has started to investigate a
criminal case in accordance with part 3 of chapter 164 of the Criminal
Code.
During the investigation a number of leaders and active members of
the unregistered public unions ``Alga'' and ``Halyk Maidany'' Kozlov,
Amirova and Sapargali, who are suspected in inciting social hatred,
have been detained.
* * *
Events that took place in the village of Shetpe need a separate
comment.
On the 17th of December 2011 a group of people blocked a railroad
connection, disassembled the railroad sections and damaged facilities
of transport infrastructure at a railroad station of Shetpe in
Mangystau province.
These actions infringed the normal operation of the transport for
several hours.
When police tried to prevent the illegal actions, they were
attacked by individuals who used weapons, Molotov cocktails and stones;
5 police officers received various injures and burns.
After several warning shots police were forced to use weapons. 11
of the attackers were wounded, 1 died.
The investigation had come to the decision that in this case the
use of weapons was legal.
Three individuals--Bakytzhan, Sabirbaev and Zhilkishiev--are being
brought to criminal account for organizing disturbances and for the use
of violence against authorities.
Another 12 individuals were charged with participation in mass
disorder, use of violence against the representatives of authority and
damaging means of transportation and railroads.
* * *
Investigations on all the mentioned cases continue. The results of
the investigations will be reported regularly.
Statement From the Central Council of People's Front
January 24, 2012
Statement regarding arrests of Alga People's Party and People's Front
activists
On January 23, 2012, the Committee of National Security (KNB)
raided the office of Alga People's party and homes of Vladimir Kozlov,
Mikhail Sizov, Gulzhan Lepisova, Askar Tokmurzin, as well as People's
Front activists Igor Vinyavskiy and Zhanbolat Mamay.
After that Vladimir Kozlov and Igor Vinyavskiy were arrested on
charges of inciting social unrest and calling for the violent overthrow
and change of the constitutional order by force and violation of the
unity in the Republic of Kazakhstan. We view these actions as political
provocations by KNB to intimidate our activists, to undermine activity
of the Alga People's Party and People's Front and to stop supporting
people who participated in peaceful social protest in Zhanaozen and who
were shot by the police on December 16, 2011.
With these actions, KNB confirms a fact that Nazarbayev and his law
enforcement agencies were not planning and will not conduct an
objective investigation of the Mangistau tragedy. But on the other hand
they try to shift a responsibility for what happened out there on
strikers themselves and those who helped them effectively protect their
political and human rights.
This means that our fellow party members will face a politically-
motivated and legalized tyranny because the investigation is managed by
those who gave the order to open gunfire on December 16-18 and it
conducted by those who detained, tortured and beaten our fellow
citizens, beating testimonies out of them forcibly required by the
Akorda.
To save our party members from the Nazarbayev's repression, as well
as to rescue victims of the December 16-18 tragedy from police reprisal
is possible by breaking out the informational blockade and make public
all facts about what happened in in Zhanaozen and Shetpe,and solidarity
support by the Kazakhstani and international societies.
Therefore we call upon all citizens of Kazakhstan, NGOs and
political forces:
To support our party members.
To disseminate information about the outbreak of police
brutality and Nazarbayev's lawlessness.
To send us and independent media outlets information
about events in Zhanaozen and Shetpe, eye-witness and documented
evidences that the death toll there is higher than official one, and
that the Akorda is trying to hide it to weaken and undermine the
resentment of the bloody action as well as facts that prove the
innocence of our fellow party members to the bloody events.
To support victims of the Mangistau tragedy to help them
break the information blockade, ease the pressure on them from the
police state apparatus, to help them survive the incident and find the
strength to live.
We also call upon the diplomatic offices of democratic countries:
To inform their countries' political leadership on
transformation of Kazakhstan's ``managed democracy"'' into a
totalitarian state.
To protest against recurrent violation of citizens' human
and political rights by the Kazakhstani authorities.
We urge the European Parliament and European Commission:
To form an International Commission to investigate the
December 16-18, 2011 events in Zhanaozen and Shetpe, and in case of
refusal by Nazarbayev to allow conduct a full and fair investigation in
Kazakhstan they should initiate a case at the International Criminal
Court in the Hague.
To adopt a resolution in support of the Mangistau tragedy
victims and in defense of the democratic forces of Kazakhstan,
defending the right to freedom of speech, assembly, procession and
other fundamental human rights.
We also urge the OSCE and international human rights organizations:
To express their negative position to a recent outbreak
of police lawlessness in Kazakhstan.
To dispatch their representatives to the Mangistau region
after the state of emergency is lifted to study the situation there and
to participate in the trials of activists of the democratic forces whom
Nazarbayev and his law enforcement agencies are trying to make
responsible for what happened there on December 16-18, 2011.
We ask foreign non-governmental organizations and media outlets:
To pay attention to the transformation of Kazakhstan into
a police state, and Nazarbayev to a dictator of the Arab type, who
stays in power only because of police brutality and widespreading the
fear.
To provide information and moral support to the
democratic forces of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstani civil society in their
efforts to turn the country to democracy path, rule of law, justice and
harmony.
The Central Council of People's Front
[all]
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