[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION--VOLUME II
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
DECEMBER 7, 2011
----------
Serial No. 112-63
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION--VOLUME II
2012
COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION--VOLUME II
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
__________
Serial No. 112-63
__________
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-648 WASHINGTON : 2012
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
Joseph I. Lieberman, Connecticut, Chairman
Carl Levin, Michigan Susan M. Collins, Maine
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii Tom Coburn, Oklahoma
Thomas R. Carper, Delaware Scott P. Brown, Massachusetts
Mark L. Pryor, Arkansas John McCain, Arizona
Mary L. Landrieu, Louisiana Ron Johnson, Wisconsin
Claire McCaskill, Missouri Rob Portman, Ohio
Jon Tester, Montana Rand Paul, Kentucky
Mark Begich, Alaska Jerry Moran, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Nicolas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, a U.S. Senator From the State
of Connecticut, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Susan M. Collins, a U.S. Senator From the State of
Maine, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, Office of Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense;
Accompanied by Jim Stuteville, United States Army, Senior
Advisor, Counterintelligence Operations, and Liaison to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Lieutenant Colonel Reid L. Sawyer, Director, Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Panel II
Mr. Daris Long, Private Citizen, Father of William Andrew Long:
Oral Statement................................................. 74
Prepared Statement............................................. 76
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California--Statements Submitted From Current and
Former U.S. Military:
Letter From Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad, Military Chaplain.......... 38
Statement of Michael L. ``Mikey'' Weinstein, Founder and
President, Military Religious Freedom Foundation............. 39
Statement of Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Government and Public
Policy, The College of William and Mary...................... 44
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California--Statements Submitted From
Organizations:
Statement of Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative
Office and Devon Chaffee, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU)....................................... 45
Statement of Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy, Interfaith Alliance..... 52
Statement of The Islamic Society of North America.............. 53
Statement of S. Floyd Mori, National Executive Director,
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL)..................... 54
Statement of Shoulder-To-Shoulder: Standing with American
Muslims; Upholding American Values........................... 55
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Letter From Former Military Chaplains.......................... 84
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM:
THE THREAT TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES
----------
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security, and
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in Room
HVC-210, The Capitol, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman of the House
Committee on Homeland Security] presiding.
Present from the House Committee on Homeland Security:
Representatives King, Lungren, Rogers, Broun, Miller, Walberg,
Cravaack, Duncan, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Richardson, Clarke of Michigan, Keating, Hochul, and
Hahn.
Present from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Pryor, and
Collins.
Chairman King. Good morning. The joint hearing of the House
Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will come to order.
The committees are meeting today to hear testimony on the
threat posed by homegrown terrorists to our Nation's military
communities. Pursuant to the agreement reached by the
committees, today's hearing will be governed by the Rules of
the House of Representatives and the House Committee on
Homeland Security unless any Senator raises an objection when
any specific issue arises.
The Chairman wishes to remind our guests today that
demonstrations from the audience, including the use of signs,
placards, and T-shirts, as well as verbal outbursts, are a
violation of the Rules of the House of Representatives. The
Chairman wishes to thank our guests for their cooperation in
maintaining order and proper decorum.
I recognize myself for an opening statement. Today the
House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are holding a joint
investigative hearing on the homeland terrorist threat within
the military itself and to military communities inside the
United States. Let me start by thanking Chairman Lieberman and
Ranking Member Collins for their leadership in the Senate in
addressing the threats posed by Islamist radicalization, which
they began examining 5 years ago. I appreciate Chairman
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins working with our House
committee on today's hearing, which is the first-ever joint
House-Senate Homeland Security hearing.
I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for
appearing today to discuss this growing security issue,
including Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton and
Chief Daris Long, a retired Marine Corps veteran, and the
father of Army Private William Long, who was killed in a
terrorist attack on his recruiting station in Little Rock. I
would also acknowledge that with Mr. Long today is Melvin
Bledsoe, the father of the young man who murdered Private Long.
This is the fourth hearing in a series the House committee
has held this year on the serious threat of violent Islamist
radicalization within the United States. Our committee has
previously investigated radicalization within the Muslim-
American community generally, radicalization in U.S. prisons,
and probed the recruiting and radicalization carried out inside
the United States by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group
in Somalia.
This joint investigative hearing will seriously examine the
emerging and growing danger to our men and women serving in
uniform. I believe it is particularly appropriate that we do
this on Pearl Harbor Day, when so many troops were killed in a
surprise attack 70 years ago.
We had an obligation to react in response to alarming new
developments concerning a growing security threat from
radicalization both within the military as well as against
military personnel and their families residing in the United
States. Our troops volunteer to go into harm's way overseas to
protect all of us. They should not be in harm's way here at
home, and yet they are.
There is a dominant threat from Active-Duty military within
the Armed Forces. This threat is persistent and enduring. More
than 5 Islamist terror plots have been disrupted involving U.S.
military insiders in the past decade, and 11 cases involve
veterans or those who attempted to join law enforcement and
intelligence agencies.
The total number of radicalized troops is more than
publicly realized or acknowledged. Since the 9/11 attacks, at
least 33 public cases have been prosecuted or probed in which
homegrown terrorists living and operating in the United States,
and sometimes inside the military itself, posed a grave threat,
plotted to carry out attacks, or perpetrated violence aimed at
America's Armed Forces in the homeland or deployed to overseas
war zones. Twenty-three of these military-targeted plots, or 70
percent of the total, have unfolded since mid-2009 as part of
the broader surge of homegrown Islamist terrorism. At least 16
external terror plots by jihadis inside the United States, who
were aiming for military personnel stationed in the homeland,
have been disrupted or investigated. At lease nine other
external plots were thwarted involving U.S. persons in the
homeland who traveled or planned trips overseas to kill GIs in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
A growing number of terrorist threats are directed at
families of military personnel. Particularly of concern is the
safety of relatives whose loved ones are in units deployed on
secret counterterror operations.
I would also note that within the last 2 weeks in New York
City, we saw a man, Jose Pimentel, arrested, and among his
goals was to attack returning veterans from Afghanistan.
As recent history illustrates, the only successful attacks
on the homeland resulting in deaths since September 11 have
been against the military: At Fort Hood, where 13 were murdered
in an active-shooter attack by Army Major Nidal Hasan; and at a
Little Rock recruiting center, where Army Private William Long,
the son of Chief Long, was fatally shot point blank by a
radicalized homegrown Islamist, Carlos Bledsoe, whose father is
also with us today and testified at our first hearing back in
March.
In summary, today's hearing will address the two-fold
threat from within the military and against the military. The
Fort Hood attack was not an anomaly. It was part of al-Qaeda's
two-decade success at infiltrating the U.S. military for
terrorism, an effort that is increasing in scope and threat.
Military communities in the United States have recently become
the most sought-after targets of violent Islamist extremists
seeking to kill Americans in the homeland. We cannot stand idly
by while our heroes in uniform are struck down in the place
they should feel the safest.
The homegrown terrorist threats to military communities
inside the United States is of critical significance, and one
which we simply cannot afford to neglect. That is why these
hearings on radicalization are so vital, and why we cannot back
down to political correctness. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses on these matters.
It is now my privilege to recognize a very good friend,
but, more importantly, the Chairman of the Senate Homeland
Security Committee, the gentleman from Connecticut, Senator
Lieberman, for any statement he may have.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Honorable Peter T. King, Chairman, House Committee on
Homeland Security
December 7, 2011
Today, the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are holding a
joint investigative hearing on the homegrown terrorist threat within
the military itself and to military communities inside the United
States. Let me start by thanking Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins, and their committee for their leadership in the Senate on
addressing the threats posed by Islamist radicalization, which they
began examining 5 years ago. I appreciate Chairman Lieberman and
Ranking Member Collins working with our House committee on today's
hearing, which is the first joint House-Senate homeland security
hearing held since the establishment of our House committee in 2005.
I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing
today to discuss this growing security issue including Assistant
Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton, and Chief Daris Long, a retired
Marine Corps veteran and the father of Army Private William Long, who
was killed in a terrorist attack on his recruiting station in Little
Rock.
This is the fourth hearing in a series the House committee has held
this year on the serious threat of violent Islamist radicalization
within the United States. Our committee has investigated the problem of
radicalization within the Muslim-American community generally, sounded
the alarm over radicalization in U.S. prisons, and probed the
recruiting and radicalization carried out inside the United States by
the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab group in Somalia.
This joint investigative hearing will seriously examine the
emerging and growing danger to our men and women serving in uniform, as
reflected by the facts that are known to us.
We had an obligation to act in response to alarming new
developments concerning a growing security threat from radicalization
both internally within the military, as well as externally toward
military personnel and their families residing in the United States.
Our troops volunteer to go into harm's way overseas to protect all of
us--they should not be in harm's way here at home, and yet they are.
The dominant threat is from active duty military within the armed
forces. This threat is persistent and enduring.
More than five Islamist terror plots have been disrupted involving
U.S. military insiders in the past decade and 11 cases involved
veterans or those who attempted to join law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. The total number of radicalized troops is more
than publicly realized or acknowledged.
Since the 9/11 attacks, at least 33 public cases have been
prosecuted or probed in which homegrown terrorists living and operating
in the United States--and sometimes inside the military itself--posed a
grave threat, plotted to carry out attacks, or perpetrated violence
aimed at America's Armed Forces in the homeland or deployed to overseas
war zones. Twenty-three of these military-targeted plots, or 70% of the
total, have unfolded since mid-2009 as part of the broader surge of
homegrown Islamist terrorism:
Two successful attacks against the military were perpetrated
by radicalized soldiers assigned to U.S.-based Army units at
Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 and at Fort Hood, Texas, in
2009;
At least 16 external terror plots by jihadis inside the
United States who were aiming for military personnel stationed
in the homeland have been disrupted or investigated;
At least nine other external plots were thwarted involving
U.S. persons in the homeland who traveled or planned trips
overseas to kill G.I.s in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere;
A growing number of terrorist threats are directed at
families of military personnel. Particularly of concern is the
safety of relatives whose loved ones are in units deployed on
secret counterterror operations.
As recent history illustrates, the only successful attacks on the
homeland resulting in deaths since September 11 have been against the
military--at Fort Hood, where 13 were murdered in an active-shooter
attack allegedly by Army Major Nidal Hasan, and at a Little Rock
recruiting center, where Army Private William Long was fatally shot
point-blank by radicalized homegrown Islamist Carlos Bledsoe.
In summary, today's hearing will address the two-fold threat from
within the military and against the military.
The Fort Hood attack was not an anomaly. It was part of al-Qaeda's
two-decade success at infiltrating the U.S. military for terrorism--an
effort that is increasing in scope and threat.
Military communities in the United States have recently become the
most sought-after targets of violent Islamist extremists seeking to
kill Americans in their homeland. We cannot stand idly by while our
heroes in uniform are struck down in the place they feel safest. The
homegrown terrorist threat to military communities inside the United
States is of critical significance and one which we simply cannot
afford to neglect.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these matters.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Chairman King. Good
morning, and welcome to everyone to this really historic joint
hearing of the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees.
My thanks to my friend Chairman Peter King for proposing this
hearing, and to Ranking Members Susan Collins and Ben Thompson
for supporting this idea.
There is no subject that should unite us more across both
ends of the U.S. Capitol and across partisan and ideological
lines than the threat that Islamist extremists pose to our
homeland and to our people. This joint hearing, I think, is a
demonstration of exactly that kind of unity, and I hope it is
not the last occasion on which our two committees come together
for this purpose.
Today we focus on the threat of violent Islamist extremism
to members of the U.S. military at home. The men and women who
have sworn to defend our country, our security, our freedom
expect, should realize, a respite from wartime conditions when
they are home. But the record shows that the United States
military has become a direct target of violent Islamist
extremism here in the United States, and that means that
America's troops, and perhaps their families, are potentially
vulnerable at work and at rest, in a military setting or a
civilian one, on a base or off a base, at a recruiting station,
or even at a military hospital.
I want to now go to two facts which in part Chairman King
mentioned, but I think are probably surprising to most
Americans, and the first one is this: The only Americans who
have lost their lives in our homeland to terrorists since 9/11
and the follow-on anthrax attacks have been killed at U.S.
military facilities. Private William Long, who was killed by
Abdulhakim Muhammad at a Little Rock recruiting station on June
4, 2009, and whose father we will be honored to hear testify
today, was the first killed only because he was wearing the
uniform of the United States Army. Thirteen more Americans were
murdered on November 5, 2009, during the Fort Hood attack by
Nidal Hasan. In addition, two soldiers were killed at Camp
Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 by a fellow American service-
member, Hasan Akbar.
Here is the second fact, and this one perhaps will surprise
people, too: Since 2001, law enforcement has thwarted and
prosecuted more than 30 plots or attacks against military
targets within the United States. According to the
Congressional Research Service, that represents more than half
of the 54 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks that have
occurred between 9/11/01 and today.
The stark reality, therefore, is that American service
members and their families are increasingly in the terrorists'
scope, and not just overseas in traditional war settings, so
that the premise of this hearing, this joint hearing, is not
theoretical, it is based on fact.
Today we want to ask our Defense Department witnesses what
our country is doing to protect our military personnel and
facilities here at home, and, in a broader sense, what the
future of military homeland security should look like. Our
Government's counterterrorism capabilities are critical to
uncovering plots against military installations and personnel
so that they can be prevented, and that means that the FBI,
which has primary domestic counterterrorism responsibility, and
the Defense Department have to open their lines of
communication to each other and work more closely together than
in the normal course of events they ever would or ever have
before. Law enforcement agencies and communities across the
country, and other Government agencies also should continue to
reach out to Muslim Americans so that they can help our
Government meet this threat to our country from a small, but
deadly number of people who are radicalizing to violent
Islamist extremism.
Finally, I want to say, not for the first time, but I am
going to keep saying it, that our Government has to recognize
at some point who the enemy is and call it by its exact name.
The enemy is not a vague catch-all of violent extremism, but a
specific violent Islamist extremism, an exploitation and
corruption, I would say, of the religion of Islam. But it is
adherents to that violent Islamist extremism who attacked us on
9/11/01 and have plotted to attack or have attacked those more
than 30 American military installations here at home since 9/
11/01. I repeat, that is a fact, not a theory or rhetoric.
One of the unfortunate conclusions that I take away from
the last decade is that violent Islamist extremism,
notwithstanding the extraordinary advances that our military
intelligence and law enforcement personnel have made against
it, will continue to threaten us for years to come, both around
the world and here at home, and its targets will continue to be
both civilians and military personnel, both around the world
and here at home. We have weakened our enemies, but they are
not vanquished, and protecting Americans in general, and our
service members in particular, will require continuing
preventive, defensive, and, where necessary, offensive action
by all the assets of the United States Government. That is
particularly true for American military facilities and the
patriotic Americans who serve in and from them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Statement of Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, Senate Committee
of Homeland Security
December 7, 2011
Good morning. I too want to welcome everyone to this historic,
first-ever joint hearing between the House and Senate Homeland Security
Committees. My thanks to my friend Chairman Peter King for proposing
this hearing and to Ranking Members Susan Collins and Bennie Thompson
for supporting this idea. There is no subject that should unite us more
across both ends of the U.S. Capitol and across partisan or ideological
lines than the threat that Islamist extremists pose to our homeland and
to our people. This joint hearing is a demonstration of exactly that
kind of unity and I hope it's not the last occasion on which our two
committees come together for this purpose.
Today we focus on the threat of violent Islamist extremism to
members of the military at home. The men and women who have sworn to
defend our country, our security, our freedom expect a respite from
wartime conditions when they are home. But the record shows that that
the United States military has become a direct target of violent
Islamist extremism here in the United States, and that means America's
troops and perhaps their families are potentially vulnerable at work
and at rest, in a military setting or a civilian one, on a base or off
a base, at a recruiting station or even at a military hospital.
I want to go to two facts that are probably most surprising to most
Americans. The first one is this: The only Americans who have lost
their lives in our homeland to terrorists since 9/11 and the follow-on
anthrax attacks have been killed at U.S. military facilities.
Private William Long--who was killed at a Little Rock recruiting
station in June 2009, and whose father we will be honored to hear
testify today--was the first. He was killed only because he was wearing
the uniform of the United States military. Thirteen more Americans were
murdered on November 5, 2009 during the Fort Hood attack. In addition,
two soldiers were killed at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in 2003 by a
fellow American service member.
Here's the second fact, which will perhaps surprise people to learn
that, since 2001, law enforcement has thwarted and prosecuted more than
30 plots or attacks against military targets within the United States.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), that represents
more than half of the 54 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks that have
occurred between 9/11 and today.
The stark reality, therefore, is that American service members and
their families are increasingly in the terrorists' scope and not just
overseas in traditional war setting. The premise of this joint hearing
is not theoretical, it is based in fact. I look forward to asking our
Defense Department witnesses what our country is doing to protect our
military facilities here at home and in a broader sense what the future
of military homeland security should look like.
Our Government's counterterrorism capabilities are critical to
uncovering plots against military installations and personnel so that
they can be prevented. And this means the FBI--which has primary
responsibility for domestic extremism and terrorism--and the Defense
Department have to open their lines of communication with each other
and work more closely together than they ever would have before.
Law enforcement agencies in communities across the country have
been and must also continue to reach out to Muslim-American communities
so they can help our Government meet this threat that comes from a
small but deadly number of individuals who are radicalizing or to
violent Islamist extremism.
Finally, I want to say our Government has to recognize who the
enemy is and call it by its exact name. The enemy is not a vague catch-
all of violent extremism, but a specific violent Islamist extremism, an
exploitation and corruption of the religion of Islam. It is adherents
to that extremism who attacked us on 9/11/01 and who have tried to
attack, or have attacked, those 30 American military installations here
at home since 9/11/01. I repeat--that's a fact, not a theory or
rhetoric.
One of the unfortunate conclusions of the past decade is that
violent Islamist extremism--notwithstanding the extraordinary progress
our military, counterintelligence, and law enforcement have made
against it--will undoubtedly threaten us for years to come both at
around the world and here at home, and its targets will be both
civilians and military personnel, both around the world and here at
home. We have weakened our enemies but they are not vanquished.
Protecting Americans, in general, and our service members in
particular, will require continuing preventive, offensive, and
defensive action. That is particularly true for American military
facilities and the patriotic Americans who serve from and in them.
Chairman King. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman.
I now recognize my good friend, the Ranking Minority Member
of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the gentleman from
Mississippi, and the former Chairman, Mr. Thompson, for any
statement he may have.
Representative Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman
King, for holding this hearing. I also want to welcome our
colleagues from the Senate who have joined us here today.
This hearing will examine the steps the military has taken
to ensure the safety of its bases, installations, and
recruiting stations. In the last 2 years, two attacks on
American military installations within the United States have
been successful. One attack occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, where
13 people were killed. In the Fort Hood incident, the defendant
is still awaiting a military court martial.
A second attack occurred in a recruiting station in Little
Rock, Arkansas. One person was killed, and one person was
wounded. In the Little Rock case, the defendant pled guilty to
murder in State court.
I imagine my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want
to use these two attacks to paint a picture about the nature of
violent extremist threat facing this Nation. Once again, the
picture they draw is not likely to be accurate, nuanced, or
subtle.
In the past I have expressed my concerns about the nature
and directions of these hearings. My concerns are amplified
today. Focusing on the followers of one religion as the only
creditable threat to the Nation's security is inaccurate,
narrow, and blocks consideration of emerging threats. Our
military is open to all faiths. A Congressional hearing that
focuses on religion and the military is likely to harm unit
cohesion and undermine morale within our military. A
Congressional hearing that identifies one religion as a likely
threat within the military is not only inaccurate, but unwise.
As a matter of practicality, I am certain that on the
battlefield how a soldier prays is probably less important than
how well he or she shoots.
But practicalities aside, as we begin this hearing, I think
it is appropriate to acknowledge and remember that today is the
anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. That single event,
an unprovoked attack on an American military installation in an
American territory, propelled this country into World War II.
December 7, 1941, was a day that will live in infamy.
The veterans of World War II fought to stop the spread of
totalitarian rule, halt genocide, and restore freedom. They
risked their lives to defend this Nation. The same can be said
of today's veterans. The men and women returning from
Afghanistan and Iraq have placed their lives on the line, and
each one volunteered to go. So as we think about the
significance of this day in history and the possible meaning of
this hearing, we must begin by thinking about what these two
groups of soldiers fought for. Each of them answered the call
to arms because they believe in America. Each fought because
they believe this country is a beacon of hope and freedom in a
troubled world. They will be willing to shed their blood to
protect and defend the rights and liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.
So as we think about our debts to the veterans of past
wars, let us not forget our most basic obligation to those who
currently serve. We owe them a clear understanding of their
mission and a clear definition of the enemy. That enemy is not
a religion. Their mission is not to defeat an ideology. While
some of my colleagues appear to have difficulty grasping this,
I am glad the military people understand it.
In the days after the Fort Hood shooting, then-Defense
Secretary Gates refused to lay this tragedy at the feet of one
man or one religion. He appointed a board, and gave them the
mission of reviewing what happened, why it happened, and what
could be done to prevent the same thing from happening in the
future. The review board did not sweep this incident under the
rug. They did not seek easy explanations and simple answers.
They identified deficiencies in DOD programs and policies on
force protection, emergency response procedures, and threat
identification. Once they identified the problems, they began
to solve them.
To date, DOD has completed 43 of the review board's
recommendations. Fifteen additional recommendations should be
completed by March 2012. However, the military's ability to
move forward and complete the remaining recommendations depend
entirely on us. Since September 11, Congress has approved a
total of $1.283 trillion for military operations, base
security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and
veterans health care associated with the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Budget cuts may prevent the implementation of the
rest of these recommendations. Today I hope we can reach a
bipartisan, bicameral agreement that the military should have
the funding it needs to prevent another tragedy like Fort Hood.
If we can, then something good will have come out of this
hearing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, House
Committee on Homeland Security
December 7, 2011
I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. I also want
to welcome our colleagues from the Senate who have joined us today.
This hearing will examine the steps the military has taken to ensure
the safety of its bases, installations, and recruiting stations.
In the last 2 years, two attacks on American military installations
within the United States have been successful. One attack occurred at
Fort Hood, Texas, where 13 people were killed. In the Fort Hood
incident, the defendant is still awaiting a military court-martial.
A second attack occurred in a recruiting station in Little Rock,
Arkansas. One person was killed and one person was wounded. In the
Little Rock case, the defendant pled guilty to murder in State court.
I imagine my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want to use
these two attacks to paint a picture about the nature of the violent
extremist threat facing this Nation. Once again, the picture they draw
is not likely to be accurate, nuanced, or subtle. In the past, I have
expressed my concerns about the nature and direction of these hearings.
My concerns are amplified today. Focusing on the followers of one
religion as the only credible threat to this Nation's security is
inaccurate, narrow, and blocks consideration of emerging threats.
Our military is open to all faiths. A Congressional hearing that
focuses on religion and the military is likely to harm unit cohesion
and undermine morale within our military.
A Congressional hearing that identifies one religion as a likely
threat within the military is not only inaccurate but unwise. As a
matter of practicality, I am certain that on the battlefield, how a
soldier prays is probably less important than how well he or she
shoots.
But practicalities aside, as we begin this hearing, I think it is
appropriate to acknowledge and remember that today is the anniversary
of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. That single event--an unprovoked attack
on an American military installation in an American territory--
propelled this country into World War II.
December 7, 1941, was a day that will live in infamy. The veterans
of World War II fought to stop the spread of totalitarian rule, halt
genocide, and restore freedom. They risked their lives to defend this
Nation. The same can be said of today's veterans. The men and women
returning from Afghanistan and Iraq have placed their lives on the
line. And each one volunteered to go.
So as we think about the significance of this day in history and
the possible meaning of this hearing, we must begin by thinking about
what these two groups of soldiers fought for. Each of them answered the
call to arms because they believe in America. Each fought because they
believe this country is a beacon of hope and freedom in a troubled
world. They are willing to shed their blood to protect and defend the
rights and liberties guaranteed in the Constitution.
So, as we think about our debt to the veterans of past wars, let us
not forget our most basic obligation to those who currently serve. We
owe them a clear understanding of their mission and a clear definition
of the enemy. Their enemy is not a religion. Their mission is not to
defeat an ideology.
And while some of my colleagues appear to have difficulty grasping
this, I am glad that the military people understand it. In the days
after the Ft. Hood shootings, then-Defense Secretary Gates refused to
lay this tragedy at the feet of one man or one religion. He appointed a
board and gave them the mission of reviewing what happened, why it
happened, and what could be done to prevent the same thing from
happening in the future.
The review board did not sweep this incident under the rug. They
did not seek easy explanations and simple answers. They identified
deficiencies in DOD programs and policies on force protection,
emergency response procedures, and threat identification. And once they
identified the problems, they began to solve them. To date, DOD has
completed 43 of the review board's recommendations. Fifteen additional
recommendations should be completed by March 2012.
However, the military's ability to move forward and complete the
remaining recommendations depends entirely on us. Since September 11,
Congress has approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military
operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs,
and veterans' health care associated with the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Budget cuts may prevent the implementation of the rest of
these recommendations.
Today, I hope we can reach a bi-partisan, bi-cameral agreement that
the military should have the funding it needs to prevent another
tragedy like Fort Hood. If we can, then something good will have come
out of this hearing.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member.
I would just note for the record that in the investigative
report that the Majority is releasing today, we point out that
more than 6,000, actually 6,024, service members who declared
Islam as their faith have served honorably on overseas
deployments since 9/11, and 14 Muslim troops have been killed
in battle, and 4 are buried right nearby here in Arlington. So
there is no desire on anyone's part to denigrate the tremendous
contributions made by the Muslim-American community. We are
talking about a small, small minority, but a lethal minority.
With that, I yield to the gentlelady, the Senator from the
State of Maine, the Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland
Security Committee, my good friend Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first point out that this unusual House-Senate
hearing demonstrates our joint concern for the safety of our
military personnel and their families, who are increasingly the
targets of terrorist plots. Regardless of our analysis of the
cause or what the remedy should be, I am certain that each and
every Member of both the Senate and the House Committee is
committed to doing everything that we can do to ensure the
safety of our military personnel and their families. In that
regard, I would also like to recognize the family members here
today whose lives have been forever changed by terrorism.
Our military service members have been on the front lines
in the war against terrorism for 10 years. In Iraq,
Afghanistan, and wherever they are called upon, America's
military men and women put their lives on the line for us. We
are profoundly grateful to them, and we must work to ensure
that their lives are not in jeopardy due to insider threats.
Tragically, in recent years we have seen several attacks
from both inside and outside the gates of our military bases.
As we have seen with the attacks at Fort Hood and at the Little
Rock recruiting center, our military is, in fact, a target for
Islamist extremists in our own country. In a recent report, the
Congressional Research Service notes that 23 of the plots
targeting the military have unfolded in just the last 18
months. How do we identify and stop the next homegrown attack
on our military?
In my judgment, this effort must be addressed through a
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that carefully
differentiates between peaceful practicing Muslims and violent
Islamist extremists. As Chairman Lieberman and I highlighted in
our investigation into the Fort Hood attack, the
administration, unfortunately, has been unwilling to name
violent Islamist extremism as the ideology driving the main
homegrown terrorist threat that we face. For example, in
response to our committee's continued interest in the Fort Hood
massacre, the Department of Defense responded a few weeks ago
that it is dealing with the threat of violent Islamist
extremism in the context of the broader threat of workplace
violence. This approach, I would note, stands in stark contrast
to past DOD policies that specifically addressed White
supremacist activities after the racially-motivated murders of
two African Americans by two Army soldiers in the 1990s.
Among the recommendations in the Senate Fort Hood report,
we urged that there be training for service members, and yet a
combined House-Senate committee staff review has confirmed that
the only Department-wide instruction to date is interim
guidance distributed to commanders on potential indicators of
violent behavior. That is woefully inadequate.
I do understand that DOD is moving to develop a long-term
policy solution, and that the Army is currently implementing an
updated threat awareness reporting program with associated
training. We simply must arm our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines with the knowledge to differentiate between the vast
majority of Muslim soldiers and military members who are
peaceful, practicing members of a major esteemed religion and a
service member who is radicalizing and poses a potential
threat. Identifying factors that lead to violent
radicalization, understanding behaviors that could be
indicators of such radicalization, and engaging to stop the
radicalization process are all vital components of a
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
It is frustrating that even the Senate's repeated calls for
a single Federal official to coordinate activities against
violent Islamic extremism across the entire Government have
gone unheeded. This committee, both in the Senate and the House
Committee, have been examining the process of radicalization
for more than 5 years, as Chairman King indicated. Whether
radicalization occurs in prisons or via the internet, the
threat that such radicalization poses to our military members
must be acknowledged and addressed. Today's hearing should
serve as a call to accelerate action to protect those who have
put their lives on the line for our freedom. Our service men
and women deserve no less.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Honorable Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security
December 7, 2011
Thank you, Chairman King. Let me first point out that this unusual
House-Senate hearing demonstrates our joint concern for the safety of
our military personnel and their families, who are increasingly the
targets of terrorist plots.
I would also like to recognize the family members here today whose
lives have been forever changed by terrorism.
Our military service members have been on the front lines in the
war against terrorism for 10 years. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever
called upon, America's military men and women put their lives on the
line for us. We are profoundly grateful to them, and we must work to
ensure their lives are not in jeopardy due to insider threats.
Tragically, in recent years, we have seen several attacks from both
inside and outside the gates of our military bases. As we have seen
with the attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, and at a Little Rock, Arkansas,
recruiting center, our military is a target for Islamist extremists in
our own country. In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service
notes that 23 plots targeting the military have unfolded in just the
last 18 months.
How do we identify and stop the next homegrown attack on our
military? This effort must be addressed through a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy that carefully differentiates between
peaceful, practicing Muslims and violent Islamist extremists.
As Chairman Lieberman and I highlighted in our investigation into
the Fort Hood attack, the administration has been unwilling to name
violent Islamist extremism as the ideology driving the main homegrown
terrorist threat we face. For example, in response to this committee's
continued interest in the Fort Hood massacre, DoD responded a few weeks
ago that it is ``dealing with the threat of violent Islamist extremism
in the context of a broader threat of workplace violence.''
This approach stands in stark contrast to past DoD policies that
specifically addressed white supremacist activities after the racially
motivated murders of two African-Americans by two Army soldiers in
1995.
Among the recommendations in the Senate Fort Hood report, we urged
that service members ``receive specific training concerning the
ideology and behaviors associated with violent Islamist extremism--and
how they differ from the peaceful practice of Islam.'' And yet, a
combined House-Senate Committee staff review has confirmed that the
only Department-wide instruction to date is the ``interim guidance''
distributed to commanders on potential ``indicators of violent
behavior.''
I understand that DoD is moving to develop a long-term policy
solution, and that the Army is currently implementing an updated Threat
Awareness Reporting Program and associated training. We must arm our
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines with the knowledge to
differentiate between a peaceful, practicing member of a major esteemed
religion and a service member who is radicalizing and poses a potential
threat.
Identifying factors that lead to violent radicalization,
understanding behaviors that could be indicators of such
radicalization, and engaging to stop the radicalization process are all
vital components of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
Even our repeated call for a single Federal official to coordinate
activities against violent Islamist extremism across the entire
Government has gone unheeded.
Our committee has been examining the process of radicalization for
more than 5 years. Whether it occurs in prisons or on the internet--the
threat such radicalization poses to our military members must be
acknowledged and addressed. The Congressional Research Service's
documentation of 29 plots and three attacks targeting military
personnel and bases since September 11 requires the full attention of
the military and the administration.
Today's hearing should serve as a call to accelerate actions to
protect those who have put their lives on the line for our freedom. Our
service men and women deserve no less.
Chairman King. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Other Members of the committees are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
In correspondence with today's witnesses, they have
indicated the topic we are examining is of a sensitive nature,
and, depending on the questions asked, may endanger National
security or compromise sensitive law enforcement information. I
have consulted with Senator Lieberman, and we are in agreement
that should it become necessary, the hearing should recess
after the second panel has concluded and reconvene in a closed,
classified session. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the
hearing move to a closed session at the appropriate time should
that be determined by Chairman Lieberman and by me. Without
objection, so ordered.
I would also ask unanimous consent to insert into the
record a statement from Congressman Ellison. He has not
provided the statement to us yet, but he said he would. So I
ask that it be included in the record. Without objection, so
ordered.*
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* The information was not submitted at the time of publication.
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Chairman King. I would now like to welcome our witnesses
today. I would remind you that your full testimony will be
submitted for the record, and ask you to summarize your
statements at this time.
We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses for our
important hearing today. The first panel, we have Assistant
Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, a position he
has held since April 2009. In this role he is responsible for
the supervision of homeland defense activities, defense support
of civil authorities, and Western Hemisphere security affairs
for the Department of Defense.
From 1986 to 1989--and, Senator Lieberman, this goes along
with the interests of bipartisanship--Secretary Stockton served
as legislative assistant to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
the only politician from New York I know who has been
recommended for sainthood by Republicans and Democrats. That
was a while ago, but he certainly is a hero to all New Yorkers.
Prior to his confirmation, Secretary Stockton was a senior
research scholar at Stanford University's Center for
International Security and Cooperation.
I have had the privilege of meeting with Secretary
Stockton, and certainly look forward to his testimony today.
Secretary Stockton is accompanied by Mr. Jim Stuteville,
who is a senior advisor to the United States Army for
counterintelligence operations, and liaison to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Finally on the panel we have Lieutenant Colonel Reid
Sawyer, who is the director and one of the founders of the
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. A career intelligence
officer, Colonel Sawyer has served in a variety of Special
Operations assignments, including operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Africa, and South America. Colonel Sawyer also actively
advises a number of Federal, State, and local government
agencies, and is a member of the Fire Department of New York
Terrorism Task Force. He has edited two books on the challenges
involving international terrorism, and he has lectured widely,
and we look forward to his testimony today.
Now I am pleased to recognize Secretary Stockton for his
testimony.
Secretary Stockton.
STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICAS' SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY JIM STUTEVILLE, UNITED STATES ARMY, SENIOR
ADVISOR, C0UNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, AND LIAISON TO THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stockton. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking
Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, thank you for the
opportunity today to testify on such an important issue, and
thank you so much for your focus on these topics and your
leadership, and for your contributions to National security as
a whole.
Let me begin with my bottom-line up-front. The threat that
we are discussing today is serious, and it is enduring. The
Department of Defense has taken important steps in order to
meet this challenge, but we do not intend to rest on our
accomplishments. With your help, and with the strong support of
my Department's leadership, I pledge to continue strengthening
the preparedness of our domestic military communities against
the homegrown terrorist threat as it continues to evolve.
The past several years have seen increased numbers of
American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology,
and the Department of Defense has become their target of
choice. My statement for the record summarizes actions we have
under way to counter the threat. Our initiatives are directly
targeted to fix the shortcomings revealed by the tragic
shootings at Fort Hood. In that regard, I want to thank the
Members of both committees for the support and the work that
you have done in order to identify the shortfalls that
previously existed, and make recommendations on the
improvements that we ought to pursue in the Department of
Defense. In addition, we are looking forward to the threat
evolving in the future. We want to make sure that we anticipate
how the threat is likely to evolve so we can be prepared to
counter it for years to come.
I would like to highlight some specific actions we have
under way in three areas: First of all, information sharing;
second, identifying and reporting on possible violent
extremists; and finally, improving our incident response
capabilities.
Four months ago, Secretary Panetta and the Attorney General
implemented a groundbreaking agreement to strengthen
information sharing and cooperation between the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Defense. Chairman
Lieberman, I take very seriously the importance that you and
all of us attach to continuing to strengthen the FBI-DOD
relationship. I will also welcome the opportunity to discuss
the ways that we are working together with State and local law
enforcement in order to make sure that we are better prepared
in the future to meet the challenges that we face.
We have also launched the eGuardian system to share
suspicious-activity information between State and local law
enforcement, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the Department of
Defense, including installation commanders around the Nation.
Together with other information-sharing initiatives now under
way, we have greatly strengthened our ability to connect the
dots and prevent future attacks against our military
communities.
We have also made progress in the second role, and that is
providing commanders and other supervisory personnel with the
guidance they need to identify potential violent extremists in
our ranks and ensure that necessary follow-up and intervention
actions occur. In 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Gates
provided interim guidance on how our personnel should identify
and report on potential insider threats. We have a series of
studies under way right now to refine and build on that
guidance and anticipate future homegrown threats.
In March of next year, the Defense Science Board will issue
a study that recommends additional training tools to better
enable our military supervisors to recognize when and how they
should intervene in order to thwart potential insider threats.
Two longer-term studies that we have under way are also
looking--they are diving deep into the behavioral processes
that lead to radicalization so, again, we can refine our
programs, we can refine our training efforts to ensure that we
can successfully intervene and prevent future terrorist attacks
from occurring against our military communities.
Finally, knowing that perfect prevention will always be our
goal, but it is unattainable, we have been strengthening our
ability to respond to attacks that do occur. We have launched
an Active Shooter training program for military police and
other personnel. We have greatly improved our incident
notification systems that will enable us to warn and direct
personnel and their families, support emergency response
efforts, and make other life-saving improvements.
Chairman Lieberman, Chairman King, Ranking Member Collins,
Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of both
committees, thank you again for your leadership in advancing
the security of the United States, and for your particular
focus on securing the homeland against the threats we will be
discussing today. I look forward together to working with you
in that effort, and to your questions and your recommendations.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Stockton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul N. Stockton
December 7, 2011
Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking
Member Collins, distinguished Members of the committees: Thank you for
the opportunity to address you today on the homegrown terrorist threat
to military communities inside the United States. Let me provide you
with my bottom-line up-front. The terrorist threat to our military
communities is serious, and will remain so for years to come. The
Department of Defense (DoD) has greatly improved its ability to meet
this threat, through internal initiatives and partnerships with the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) including U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and law enforcement agencies across the
Nation. This is no time to rest on our accomplishments, however. With
your help, and with the strong support of the leadership of my
Department, I pledge to continue to strengthen the preparedness of our
domestic military communities against the enduring, evolving threats of
terrorism they confront.
When it comes to defining the enemy, this administration wishes to
avoid imprecise terminology that may cause confusion and may
unjustifiably give credence to the falsehood--despite our best
intentions--that we are waging a war on Islam. Muslim Americans are
important allies in the effort to counter violent extremism in the
United States. This is consistent with the administration's strategy
``Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States'' which affirms, ``The best defenses against violent extremist
ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities,
and local institutions.'' Muslim Americans are also important in DoD
operations. Every day, patriotic Muslim Americans serve in our
military, often providing linguistic and cultural competencies
essential to disrupting and defeating our actual enemy: Al-Qaeda and
its adherents and affiliates world-wide.
Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough noted in March
2011 that ``Al-Qaeda and its adherents are constantly trying to exploit
any vulnerability in our open society. This threat is real, and it is
serious. How do we know this? Well, al-Qaeda tells us. They make
videos, create internet forums, even publish on-line magazines, all for
the expressed purpose of trying to convince Muslim-Americans to reject
their country and attack their fellow Americans.'' The Department of
Defense faces a special challenge in this regard. Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates seek to inspire and instruct U.S. military personnel and
other radicalized U.S. citizens to conduct ``lone actor'' attacks on
U.S. military targets. These adherents are, as Deputy National Security
Advisor John Brennan has said, ``individuals, sometimes with little or
no direct physical contact with al-Qaeda, who have succumbed to [al-
Qaeda's] hateful ideology and who have engaged in, or facilitated,
terrorist activities here in the United States . . . and we have seen
the tragic results, with the murder of a military recruiter in Arkansas
two years ago and the attack on our servicemen and women at Fort
Hood.''\1\
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\1\ Brennan, John. ``Remarks on Ensuring al-Qa'ida's Demise'' as
prepared for delivery, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies. Washington, DC. June 29, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in a White House statement in August 2011: ``The past
several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or
residents inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology and involved in
terrorism.''\2\ Over the last decade, a plurality of these domestic
violent extremists chose to target the Department of Defense (DoD),
making military communities the target of choice for homegrown
terrorists. Fourteen of 17 Americans killed in the homeland by domestic
violent extremists have been DoD personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The White House. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States. Washington: August 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As President Obama said in September, ``The death of [Anwar al-
Awlaki] was a major blow to al-Qaeda's most active operational
affiliate. Al-Awlaki was the leader of external operations for al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula. In that role, he took the lead in planning
and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans.'' The fact that al-
Qaeda's adherents are openly and specifically recruiting Americans to
support or commit acts of violence--through videos, magazines, and on-
line forums--poses an on-going and real threat.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The White House. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States. Washington: August 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As acknowledged in the June 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, ``[m]ass media and the internet in particular have
emerged as enablers for terrorist planning, facilitation, and
communication . . . Global communications and connectivity place [al-
Qaeda's] calls for violence and instructions for carrying it out within
easy reach of millions.'' Given the adversary's emphasis on recruiting
U.S. military personnel to attack our communities from within, the
Department has taken numerous actions to broaden its approach to force
protection beyond its traditional focus on external threats.
After the tragic shooting at Fort Hood, then-Secretary Gates
commissioned the DoD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood to
identify gaps and deficiencies in DoD's force protection programs,
policies, and procedures. In response to the Independent Review's
recommendations, then-Secretary Gates directed that the Department make
every effort to safeguard civil rights and civil liberties while
implementing several specific actions to adapt effectively to the
challenging security environment in which we operate. These initiatives
will significantly improve the Department's ability to mitigate
internal threats, ensure force protection, enable emergency response,
and provide care for victims and families should another attack occur.
It is important to recognize that although al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and adherents currently pose the pre-eminent security threat
to the United States, history has shown that the prevalence of
particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time, and new
threats will undoubtedly arise in the future.\4\ The July 2011 tragedy
in Norway and the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing underscore this
point. The administration's August 2011 strategy, Empowering Local
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, provides a
useful definition for violent extremists: ``individuals who support or
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.''
Though the nature and significance of these threats can vary, our
obligation to protect the American people demands that we maintain a
strategy that counters all of them. Consistent with the ``Empowering
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States'' the
Department of Defense's initiatives address the range of violent
extremist threats we face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The White House. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States. Washington: August 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a matter of law and National policy, DoD is generally restricted
from collecting and storing law enforcement information on U.S.
citizens; therefore, DoD must rely on civilian agencies to play an
increasingly important role in the protection of U.S. military
communities. As part of the Fort Hood review, then-Secretary Gates
directed several actions to improve DoD collaboration with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Effective August 2011, the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense implemented a single, overarching
information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote
systemic, standardized, and controlled information sharing. This MOU
establishes a general adjudication process whereby DOD and the FBI can
resolve potential future differences of opinion to whether and when
information should be shared.
This MOU will be supplemented by a series of specific annexes,
several of which are in the final stages of negotiation before
proceeding to signature. These annexes will clarify coordination
procedures and investigative responsibilities between DoD and the FBI.
Most significantly, Annex A, ``Counterterrorism Information Sharing,''
will allow DoD to articulate its force protection information
requirements to eliminate confusion or doubt about what threat
information is considered to be of value to DoD. Threat information
with a DoD nexus is shared at the institutional level and at the local
level. As a result, DOD will be able to evaluate the threat information
from a high-level perspective to ``connect the dots'' more effectively.
At the same time, installation commanders have the information they
need to take appropriate force protection and antiterrorism measures to
protect their communities from the threat. We anticipate this annex
will be signed early next year.
We also have drafted an annex addressing Counterintelligence
Information Sharing (Annex B) that we anticipate will be signed by
January 2012. Additional annexes addressing the subjects of ``Terrorist
Screening Information'' and ``DoD Participation in FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Forces'' will enter coordination shortly. Once the ``DoD
Participation in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces'' annex is finalized,
we will publish a conforming DoD Instruction, ``DoD Support to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force Program,''
which will provide policy and guidance for each DoD component
represented in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). By fiscal
year 2015, DoD will provide approximately 123 detailees to support 60
FBI JTTFs throughout the United States. The FBI has instituted a formal
training program to ensure these DoD professionals are familiar with
all available JTTF tools, databases, and information. DoD is also
working closely with State and local law enforcement agencies to
recognize the indicators of a ``lone actor'' threat and to share
suspicious activity reports to prevent another Fort Hood-type of attack
from occurring. In September 2010, DoD began using eGuardian, an
unclassified, secure, web-based capability to report suspicious
activity that can be accessed through the Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
network. eGuardian is part of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity
Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). The eGuardian system appropriately
safeguards privacy and civil liberties, enabling information sharing
among Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners,
including State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers and the FBI JTTFs.
When fully implemented in February 2012, eGuardian will have
approximately 1,500 DoD users world-wide, and all DoD law enforcement
entities will have access. The system was designed to remedy
information-sharing gaps that the review of the Fort Hood shootings
revealed and has already resulted in at least 384 new investigations or
case enhancements. In addition, DoD is working to identify funding for
the Defense Data Exchange (D-DEx), which will allow all 13 DoD law
enforcement entities to post and query criminal investigation and other
law enforcement data in a single repository.
DoD is also acting on lessons learned. For instance, the
Independent Review related to Fort Hood (``Protecting the Force:
Lessons from Fort Hood'') found DoD force protection policies and
programs were not sufficiently focused on internal threats. To improve
intradepartmental information sharing on insider threats, as well as to
synchronize force protection and law enforcement policies and programs
across DoD, we established a permanent Force Protection Senior Steering
Group (FP SSG). My office and the Joint Staff co-chair the FP SSG,
which meets not less than semiannually and reports progress and
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary's Defense Management Action
Group (formerly known as the Defense Advisory Working Group).
The FP SSG has an ``Insider Threat Working Group'' (or ``InTWG''),
which includes representatives from the Joint Staff, the Military
Departments and Services, and most DoD components. The InTWG examines
the insider threat from three perspectives: (1) Workplace violence, (2)
terrorism, and (3) security threats (including espionage and threats to
information systems). Unique among other similar Federal Government
insider threat working groups, the InTWG addresses both kinetic and
non-kinetic insider threats. The InTWG is drafting a DoD Instruction to
provide guidance that will improve information sharing among DoD law
enforcement and intelligence entities and establish a single, DoD-wide
definition of insider threat as: ``A person with authorized access, who
uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm National security
interests or National security through unauthorized disclosure, data
modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in
personal injury or loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.''
Under this broad strategic umbrella, individual DoD components may
initiate programs tailored to address their distinctive
vulnerabilities.
In order to recognize potential threats before they materialize,
DoD must first identify and validate behavioral indicators of, or
precursors to, violent behavior. In August 2010, then-Secretary Gates
issued interim guidance on how to identify and report potential insider
threats. This guidance, developed in consultation with academic experts
and law enforcement practitioners, familiarizes leaders with a list of
behaviors that may indicate a potential propensity to commit violent
acts. Behaviors on the list vary in degrees of severity--some behaviors
are themselves illegal or violate DoD rules--others may be cause for
concern only in certain contexts. Military personnel who exhibit
indicators, such as hatred or intolerance of American society and
culture, advocacy for violence-promoting organizations, and history of
poor work performance or substance abuse problems, should elicit
concern from commanders or supervisors. In all cases, leaders are
expected to exercise proper judgment and consider the full range of
administrative and disciplinary actions when addressing personnel whose
behavior adversely affects good order, discipline, or safety of the
unit. This interim guidance is intended to protect the force in the
near term.
In April 2010, then-Secretary Gates approved the Defense Science
Board (DSB) study on violent radicalization. In addition to validating
indicators of violence, the DSB was asked to recommend training tools
to enable commanders and supervisors to recognize when and how to
intervene and thwart potential insider threats. I expect the DSB report
to be completed in March 2012. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs will conduct two scientific studies--one
retrospective and one prospective--to examine DoD populations and to
develop a scientifically-based list of behavioral indicators of
violence in the military population. As findings from these studies
become available, DoD will refine its interim guidance to incorporate
what we learn into other existing workplace violence prevention and
intervention programs and policies. DoD has already supplemented pre-
and post-deployment health care screening questionnaires to help health
care providers assess the risk of violence by DoD personnel and to
refer such personnel for further evaluation or treatment as necessary.
Although DoD's intent is to prevent insider threats from
materializing, we have also taken several measures to improve emergency
response when they do. Since March 2010, ``Active Shooter'' training
has been an important component of mandatory Antiterrorism Level 1
training. Active Shooter best practices are being included in revisions
to the minimum standards for military police (and equivalents).
Finally, DoD is implementing installation emergency management
(IEM) programs, including ``Enhanced 9-1-1,'' mass notification and
warning systems, and a ``common operating picture.'' ``Enhanced 9-1-1''
provides dispatchers with the caller's location, even during cell phone
calls, which is especially important in case the caller becomes
incapacitated. Mass notification and warning systems automate guidance
(e.g., evacuation orders) to warn and direct installation personnel,
helping emergency responders manage affected populations over the
course of an incident. The ``common operating picture'' is intended to
enable coordination among emergency responders by sharing information
in real-time during an incident. This ``common operating picture'' is
also intended to improve installations' capacity to report force
protection information to the Combatant Commands. IEM program
implementation will save lives, promote interoperability with civilian
first responders, and ensure compliance with National preparedness and
response guidelines.
Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking
Member Collins, distinguished Members of the committees: I commend you
for your leadership, continued interest, and support of DoD's efforts
on this important matter. We have an obligation to ensure that the men
and women who are prepared to sacrifice so much for our Nation anywhere
in the world are safe here at home.
Chairman King. Thank you very much, Secretary Stockton.
I now recognize Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL REID L. SAWYER, DIRECTOR,
COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT
Colonel Sawyer. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking
Member Thompson, Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished
Members of both committees, as the Director of the Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, it is my distinct honor and
pleasure to be here before you today to discuss such a
critically important topic.
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is committed
to studying the intellectual underpinnings of the terrorist
threat, and as such, my remarks are based on an exhaustive 14-
month study of the domestic jihadist threat, with specific
insights to the threat that the military faces from this
purview.
My remarks will center on two critical points. First, the
rapid rise of al-Qaeda-inspired threat in the United States
beginning in 2007 reveals a complex landscape that is only
growing more opaque each year. Second, and critical for our
discussion here today, is the emergence of the military as the
preferred target for al-Qaeda-inspired individuals within the
United States, a trend that is greater than many realize, and
thus the importance of today's hearing, and which I thank you
as well.
Let me turn to my first point. Since 9/11, the United
States is witness to the radicalization of 170 of its residents
and the targeting and supporting of violent action in multiple
locations throughout the United States. Put another way, this
amounts to an average of one attack every 3 months for a 12-
year period, with the overwhelming majority of these attacks
occurring since 2007. Concurrently, we have witnessed an
increasing number of groups overseas aligned or affiliated with
al-Qaeda, which increases the number of entry points for
individuals radicalizing in the United States, functionally
decreasing the barriers of entry for those that wish to
participate in the global jihad.
The conclusions that there are few successes within this
data misses the point that the distance between failure and
success is far shorter than realized. We need to only look to
the 2004 Madrid attacks that killed 198 individuals or the
devastating attacks in London to grasp the damage possible from
a homegrown cell. In other words, while the number of failures
is an important metric of both counterterrorism successes and
the terrorist incompetence, it may also provide a false sense
of security. In the United States context, the 2010 Najibullah
Zazi plot provides a stark reminder of what might have been.
Turning to my second point, the focus on the military.
Perhaps the most disturbing trend that has been noted by many
here today is the intense focus by the domestic jihadists on
the military targets. The military presents a qualitatively
different target when attacked at home than when engaged in
combat abroad. There is an expectation among our citizenry that
our service members are safe within their home environment, and
a cursory look at the data reveals that nearly 21 percent of
domestic radicalized plots since
9/11 within the United States target our military forces at
home. But this number does not reflect the totality of interest
in targeting the U.S. military forces by domestically inspired
al-Qaeda individuals.
A second category of homegrown terrorists are those that
radicalize here are equally committed to targeting our
military, but travel overseas to participate in the global
jihad. When these numbers are included, the percentage
increases to nearly 50 percent of all plots within the United
States that are seen as directly targeting the U.S. military.
While it is difficult to assess whether the second group, were
they unable to connect to their external networks abroad, would
have indeed focused on military targets at home, it is
undeniable that the U.S. military amongst this population is of
significant interest.
If we expand the aperture even further to include all plots
that considered military targets and changed course for
whatever reason, we find that the percentage jumps to 56
percent of those post-9/11 domestic plots that target the
military.
Increasingly, we are witnessing individuals that radicalize
in near isolation, creating cells that are self-organizing.
There is little direct contact between these cells and the
radicalizing agent. The mental and moral barriers to targeting
U.S. soldiers are less than when targeting civilians. This is a
function of both the nature and specificity of al-Qaeda's
narrative that frames the U.S. military as war criminals, and
creates an imperative for striking the military in a pre-
emptive manner.
Of those individuals that move to actual attack against the
military, it is a group that is exclusively made up of lone
wolves. Whether by strategic choice or lack of access to
extremist networks, the lack of contact with others
significantly limits the ability to identify, prevent, and
interdict these individuals.
The second category of military threats is the person who
radicalizes once inside the military. Insider threats are not
only dangerous because of their access, which is certainly
crucial to their attacks, but it is the combination of access
and knowledge of their organization that enables these plots to
potentially be significantly more dangerous than they otherwise
might have been.
The number of insider cases are statistically insignificant
when looking across the entire data set, but pose a
disproportionate impact when we think about the effects that
this has across our military and how it reifies al-Qaeda's
narrative. By design or happenstance, these attackers produce
significant psychological effects. It is all too easy to forget
that, at its fundamental level, terrorism is about the
psychology of fear.
In conclusion, while the domestic violent extremists have
only realized limited success in the United States today, the
threat is significant. The potential of physical violence from
these cells is only one dimension. Radicalization of U.S.
citizens tears at the fabric of our society in the way that
attacks from Yemen or Pakistan do not. Effective intelligence
and law enforcement efforts to detect and disrupt these cells
are critical, but not sufficient to fully address the problem.
Interdiction and prevention efforts must be coupled with
programs to counter violent extremism, to ultimately foster
inhospitable conditions for the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired
extremists in the United States, and to decrease the threat to
our military forces.
Thank you very much for holding this hearing, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Colonel Sawyer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer
INTRODUCTION
The attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a stark warning that
analysts had grossly misjudged the nature of the terrorist threat
facing the United States.\1\ While the ensuing decade of conflict has
greatly constrained al-Qaeda's ability to operate with impunity, the
threat from the organization and its affiliated movements has proved
far more resilient than anticipated. The rise of new organizations, the
alignment of existing groups and the emergence of domestic cells
inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology create a complex tapestry of actors
that continues to present a very real and persistent threat to the
United States. It is this last category of--homegrown al-Qaeda-inspired
violent extremists--that represents perhaps the most unique dimension
to this varied and dynamic landscape. Self-organizing and largely
autonomous in their operations, these cells challenge the long-held
notion that al-Qaeda is a solely exogenous threat to the United States.
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\1\ This testimony represents the personal opinion of the author
and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United States
Military Academy, Department of Defense, or any other Government
agency. This testimony is based on a 14-month-long, comprehensive
research project conducted at West Point by Reid Sawyer and Michael
McGee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet domestic terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the United
States. As Brian Jenkins notes, the 1970s witnessed a far greater
frequency of terrorist attacks in the United States than in the post-9/
11 era.\2\ However, the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired violent
extremism in this country since 2005 marks an environment that did not
exist prior to--or even immediately after 9/11.\3\ Since 2001, 170
individuals in the United States have radicalized and seeking to
conduct attacks. U.S. military members stationed inside the United
States have emerged as the most prevalent target selected by al-Qaeda-
inspired, homegrown terrorists. In 2011 alone, of the seven publicly
acknowledged plots by such groups, six targeted some aspect of the
military. The nature of this phenomenon is not well understood nor
fully appreciated and deserving of more analysis.
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\2\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist
Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, 8-9.
\3\ Throughout this testimony, the terms ``domestic terrorism,''
``homegrown terrorism'' are used interchangeably. The term ``homegrown
terrorists'' refers to terrorists who have been radicalized in their
host country as opposed to those who have been radicalized in another
location and then traveled to the West or the United States. Homegrown
terrorists range from lone-wolf actors to small, isolated groups with
little or no connection to the international jihad to groups whose
members together radicalized, trained, and connected to international
jihadist organizations. This definitional concept is drawn from
Kimberley L. Thachuk, Marion E. ``Spike'' Bowman, and Courtney
Richardson, ``Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within,'' Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University,
May 2008, 6.
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As homegrown terrorism has evolved over the past decade it is
significant to note that the vast majority of al-Qaeda-inspired cells
in the United States have, at best, limited contacts with core elements
of the organization. This is an increasingly common hallmark of an era
in which globalized communication technology has simplified the
transmission of ideas from one corner of the world to another, enabling
action without connection. However, it is not simply the ease with
which ideas are shared today that enables the global jihad, but also
the construction of a virtual, global ummah--a community of believers--
through which individuals can locate personal grievances within a
broader framework of dissent. This process ensures that individuals can
find meaning in something greater than themselves as they seek to
define their level of participation in the movement. Ten years of war
in two Muslim countries combined with the rapid proliferation and
growing presence of global Salafi extremist jihadist ideology on the
internet has created a charged environment whereby participation in the
movement is not dictated by, or restricted to, an individual's country
of residence. Today, individuals can ``belong'' to al-Qaeda with little
or no physical contact with the group itself. These dynamics have
enabled the rise of domestic, or homegrown, terrorism within the United
States.
Fortunately, numerous law enforcement and intelligence successes
against al-Qaeda and its affiliated have prevented all but a handful of
attacks since 9/11. The fact that the United States has not witnessed a
significant successful terrorist attack since 2001 is a testament to
the advances made by the counterterrorism and law enforcement
communities. As important and comforting as these metrics may be, the
conclusion that al-Qaeda-directed or -inspired cells are impotent
misses two significant and important dimensions of the present threat.
1. Despite the number of failures and the ineptitude displayed by
some cells, homegrown terrorists are capable of inflicting
significant damage. One need only to look at the March 2004
bombings in Madrid, in which 191 people were killed and more
than 1,800 were wounded after homegrown terrorists planted 13
bombs on four commuter trains, or the July 2005 attack in
London, when 56 people were killed and 700 were injured after
four suicide attackers detonated bombs on three subways and one
double-decker bus, to understand that a homegrown cell can
inflict significant damage. The distance between success and
failure in domestic terrorist attacks is not as great as many
would presume, and even one successful attack can have
devastating National effects no matter the number of failures
that preceded the attack.
2. The frequency of attempted attacks against the United States
reveals a much more robust threat than is commonly understood.
In the nearly 12 years since the first al-Qaeda-sponsored
attack on the U.S. homeland, there have been no less than 13
major plots supported by al-Qaeda or its affiliates--an average
of more than one per year for 12 years. The list includes such
plots as the Millennium Bomber in 2000, Najibullah Zazi's 2009
plan to attack New York City's subways and the Christmas day
bomber in 2009.\4\ When the aperture expands beyond externally
supported plots targeting the United States to include all
domestic plots, the data reveal that there has been an
attempted plot once every 2 months for 12 years within the
United States. Despite the overwhelming number of failed
attacks over the past 12 years, the high frequency of attacks
over such an extended period of time speaks to both the
resiliency and the appeal of al-Qaeda's narrative to animate an
increasingly diverse group of individuals within the United
States.
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\4\ The 13 plots included in this statistic include: Millennium
Bomber, 9/11 attacks, Richard Reid, 2004 Citibank Plot, 2006 airliner
plot, Najibullah Zazi New York City plots, Christmas day plots, Times
Square plot, Faris, Padilla, al-Marri, and the Cargo Aircraft plots.
These two factors--the potential risk of large-scale attacks and
the ability of a self-organizing movement to sustain its efforts with
such frequency over so long a period of time--point to a stark reality:
That while the United States and its allies have been very successful
in constraining al-Qaeda's ability to operate from Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Yemen, the risk of homegrown terrorism is a more
significant and persistent threat than many realize. This frustrating
and troublesome state of affairs is the result of two main factors: (1)
The salience of al-Qaeda's narrative ideology to a diverse audience,
even those living in the United States; and (2) the organization's
ability to maintain appeal across generations and to remain a relevant
voice across a decade of conflict and emerging world events.
This statement first explores the prevailing assumptions about the
nature of the homegrown threat and the discord that results from a lack
of a common understanding of the problem. Second, it considers the
changing radicalization dynamic and challenges posed by this self-
organizing system of violence. Third, the statement examines the nature
of this persistent threat and its focus on targeting the U.S. military
in a domestic context. This data is predicated upon a 14-month
comprehensive research project conducted by the Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point examining the homegrown jihadist threat within the
United States.
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM CONTEXTUALIZED
The domestic al-Qaeda threat is both a product of an international
system of violence as well as a contributor to that system. While this
is seemingly an obvious relationship, it is important to note that as
much as homegrown terrorists are products of the broader al-Qaeda
movement, the broader movement itself derives significant benefit from
incidents such as those at Fort Hood, the Christmas day bomber or the
attack on the Little Rock recruiting center. Attacks within the
homeland, especially against military targets, provide significant
propaganda value for al-Qaeda. The now infamous Inspire magazine
highlighted these attacks as models for others to emulate and as
inspiration for others to act.
This symbiotic relationship between its domestic and international
aspects is integral to al-Qaeda's nature. The organization has always
benefited, and at times suffered, from the activities of those inspired
by its ideology or the plots of its affiliates. The very idea of al-
Qaeda is rooted in a transnational vision of global jihad defined by
its ideology, and has been embodied in the core of the organization
that operates from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet al-Qaeda's fundamental
constitution is built upon local, homegrown organizations. From al-
Qaeda's earliest members from the Islamic Jihad to al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the myriad of organizations in al-Qaeda's
``diaspora'' are almost exclusively homegrown movements. This fact is
easy to forget when groups such as AQAP assume a transnational mantle
with attacks against the U.S. homeland or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
However, AQAP was born from the conflict in Yemen and ultimately
remains focused on its goals within Yemen; the same is true of al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb or Jemmah Islamiya in Indonesia.
Seen through this lens, the evolution of domestic actors inspired
by al-Qaeda does not seem as exceptional as it might otherwise appear.
However, the qualifying difference between the U.S. experience of
homegrown terrorism and that of other countries' is the nature of the
actors in the United States. In many ways, the U.S. manifestation of
al-Qaeda represents a devolution of the jihadist threat marked by the
emergence of self-organizing, largely autonomous cells. These cells are
rarely part of a larger organization, nor have they ever grown into a
more robust organization such as AQAP. This is due as much to the
inexperience of the cell members themselves as to the largely
inhospitable environment in which they operate.d
This experience is not entirely unique to the United States. Europe
has witnessed far greater levels of jihadist activity than the United
States has, yet important differences separate the two. First, al-Qaeda
and like-minded organizations have long-established support networks
throughout Europe that have created a much more fertile environment for
recruitment than in the United States. Prior to 9/11, Osama bin Laden
and others were openly supported by select community and religious
organizations, and in 2006, the then-head of Britain's MI-5
intelligence service noted that they were tracking 1,600 suspects in
over 200 cells.\5\ The sheer scale of jihadist activity, the diversity
of groups, and the largely permissible environment prior to 9/11 within
the European context created vastly different conditions for the
emergence of homegrown activities after 2001 than in the United
States.\6\
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\5\ Alan Cowell, ``Blair Says Terrorist Threat to Last a
Generation,'' New York Times, 10 November 2006.
\6\ This is not to suggest that the United States did not see its
own ``open'' activities. Some estimates put the number of U.S.
residents who participated in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya jihads
ranging from 1,000 to 2,000. See Congressional Research Service report
titled ``American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat,'' 7
December, 2010. Furthermore, Abdullah Azzam and Gulbuddin Hekmatyr,
founder of the HiG in Afghanistan, made repeated recruiting trips
through the United States--the latter doing so both during and after
the end of the Afghan-Soviet war--to recruit U.S. residents.
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The emergence of homegrown terrorism in the United States cannot be
examined in a vacuum. As noted above, homegrown extremist activity in
the United States is both a product of the external environment and a
driver of such activity. It is the interplay of international and
domestic plots that shapes the radicalization and mobilization of
domestic audiences through four distinct but related dimensions of the
al-Qaeda-inspired threat:
1. Threats targeting the United States that originate externally to
the United States;
2. Individual al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists in the United
States, proceed overseas to receive training or material
support and return to the United States to conduct attacks or
support al-Qaeda-inspired activity;
3. Violent extremists who radicalize within the United States but
travel and remain overseas to participate in the global jihad;
4. Individuals who radicalize and remain within the United States.
The examination of threats originating externally to the United
States may appear counterintuitive in studying domestic terrorism.
However, the communicative aspects of terrorist violence are equally
important, if not more important, than the physical results. Such
exogenous terrorist attacks demonstrate that al-Qaeda (the
organization) remains relevant, that the United States remains an
important target and that success is measured in terms beyond the
actual destruction of a target. These plots both demonstrate to others
that security measures are not impenetrable and inspire them to act.\7\
While the mobilization of recruits in the United States is not the
primary purpose of such attacks, it is an important by-product of this
system of violence. Of the 15 cells in this category since 1993, the
four most or nearly successful post-9/11 attacks centered on aviation
targets.\8\ This category included the most complex plots as measured
in the data set.\9\ Each of these attacks that originated external to
the United States involved explosives and none of the targets selected
in the post-9/11 era were military targets.
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\7\ Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly on display than in Inspire
magazine, where the authors celebrated the success of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab in penetrating airline security to inspire others to act.
\8\ For the purposes of this study, successful plots included those
that alluded interdiction but where the device failed to detonate as in
the example of the Christmas day bomber. This conclusion will be
controversial to some, yet the fact that this sub-category of plots was
successful in moving to execution phase without disruption by law
enforcement is a success.
\9\ Complexity was measured as a combination of factors including
nature of the target (hard or soft), attack modality, target selection,
group size, etc., to gauge the degree of complexity involved across the
data set.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second dimension of the framework concerns individuals who
radicalize to violence inside the United States and desire to
participate in the global jihad. These individuals vary in terms of
experience, background, and connections with overseas jihadist
networks, yet are consistent in their desire to gain an authentic
experience and in their desire to fight against U.S. and coalition
forces in Afghanistan. However, once they enter the foreign terrorist
networks the individuals in this category are convinced that their true
value rests in returning to the United States and conducting an attack
in the homeland. In total, there have been 12 cells to date in this
dimension, all occurring in the post-9/11 environment. Eight of the 12
were connected to al-Qaeda's core organization and four were connected
to al-Qaeda's affiliated organizations. The greatest density of these
plots occurred between 2008 and 2011.\10\ Six of the 12 cells attacked
a total of eight civilian targets, and only one cell targeted the U.S.
military in the homeland--a successful attack against a Little Rock
Armed Forces Recruiting Station. This strongly suggests that the
networks training these individuals value civilian targets more than
military targets and seek to inflict damage in a large-scale attack. Of
the seven plots where the particular tactics were known, five planned
to use explosives. The plots in this group range are among the most
complex within the data set, reflecting an investment by al-Qaeda in
these cells with the intention to stage spectacular attacks inside the
homeland.
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\10\ There were four individuals total in this period: Vinas,
Bledsoe, Zazi, and Shahzad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third category involves U.S. residents who travel overseas to
participate in the global jihad and do not return to the United States.
These cases range from the Somali youths from Minneapolis who joined
al-Shabaab as foot soldiers to Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, an American
from Florida, who has risen to become one of al-Qaeda's external
operations planners. These individuals provide significant value to al-
Qaeda. At the simplest level, U.S. residents who join the al-Qaeda
provide significant propaganda value for the movement and its claims
against the United States and the West. While such individuals are
limited in number, it is the others that are of greater concern--those
individuals who, produce propaganda or serve in more senior operational
roles. The ``Americanization'' of jihad that has occurred over the past
4 years has altered the threat environment and has direct implications
for domestic radicalization. Much in the same way that prospective
members of any group want to join an organization that is viable and
relevant, individuals are far more likely to join an organization if
they see people like themselves in that organization. American al-Qaeda
members provide this example, help tailor al-Qaeda's narrative to
appeal to domestic audiences and inspire others to join the jihad.
These individuals do more to make the al-Qaeda's narrative relevant to
domestic audiences than any other factor within al-Qaeda.
The final grouping concerns those individuals who radicalize and
mobilize within the United States but do not travel abroad for
training, receiving very little if any support from broader jihadist
networks. Since 9/11 there have been 46 plots in this category,
involving 85 individuals. These individuals present the greatest
challenge to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. In each
plot, the members were autonomous adherents to al-Qaeda's ideology.
That is to say, they lacked any formal connections to extremist
networks. Furthermore, 30 of the 46 plots were perpetrated by lone-wolf
actors. Perhaps not surprisingly, this category realizes the most
success of any in successfully carrying out terrorist attacks (8 of
46). The reasons for this are simple: Lone-wolf actors present a lower
profile, making detection more difficult as they do not have to pass
through customs or trigger terrorist watch lists, allowing them to hide
in plain sight. In general they represent the least complex terrorist
plots of the four categories; in addition, and six of the eight
successful plots utilized firearms greatly simplifying the nature of
attack.\11\
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\11\ The other two plots utilized vehicles as weapons--also a very
simply attack modality.
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The degree of interplay between these categories is impossible to
quantify, yet the fact that there is interaction between these four
dimensions of the homegrown terrorist threat is undeniable. Locating
the domestic threat within this system of violence, and addressing that
it is both a product of the broader dynamics as well as a contributor
to this system creates a unique opportunity to analyze new
radicalization patterns, capture the dynamic of the threat through a
different lens and examine in detail the disruption and interdiction of
these plots.
Through all of this a perplexing question remains: Why, as the core
of al-Qaeda is increasingly constrained and discredited as a viable
organization, is the domestic jihadist activity on the periphery of the
movement becoming increasingly active in the United States? From a
practical perspective, this state of affairs seems somewhat counter-
intuitive. To accept significant personal risk in joining a vibrant or
successful terrorist movement presents a fairly high barrier to entry.
However, accepting those risks for an organization that appears to be
waning and whose viability is in question seems even more difficult to
understand. Two explanations seem to offer insight to this paradox.
First, the fact that 170 people have radicalized within the United
States in the post-9/11 environment points to the relevance and appeal
of al-Qaeda's narrative even if to a select, narrow group. Second, the
data are almost certainly a lagging indicator of the accumulation of a
more sophisticated and targeted narrative, the perceptions of a
protracted conflict and the evolution of an al-Qaeda diaspora. The
emergence of homegrown terrorism and the targeting of U.S. military
forces requires a renewed examination of the nature of radicalization
and the changing nature of autonomous radicalization--a process that
today occurs largely in isolation from direct connection with external
networks, creating new challenges for law enforcement and intelligence
communities to detect, prevent, and deter homegrown terrorism.
RADICALIZATION REDEFINED
The rapid rise of homegrown terrorism in the past 3 years has
triggered discussion about the extent and nature of radicalization
within the United States. While the numbers of homegrown terrorists are
small, al-Qaeda's ability to inspire and animate residents of the
United States to join or act on behalf of al-Qaeda is unquestioned. On
its surface, the appeal of al-Qaeda's narrative to U.S. residents is
perplexing. Muslims living in the United States have a far higher
degree of socio-economic attainment than in many other countries; do
not face the same assimilation or integration dilemmas experienced in
other locations, and while they have experienced some levels of
discrimination after 9/11, have been largely accepted in this
country.\12\ This paradox is further complicated by an apparent shift
in the nature of radicalization whereby peripheral actors are joining
the movement with little contact to physical networks.
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\12\ The Muslim West Facts Project, Muslim Americans: A National
Portrait. Washington, DC: Gallup, Inc., 2009, 13.
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Despite large numbers of studies focusing on radicalization, it
remains one of the most opaque issues within the terrorism studies
field. The sheer diversity of backgrounds and motivations to join
violent extremist movements complicates any attempt to draw detailed
conclusions as to the reasons people accept such risks. Gerald Post,
one of the most noted scholars of terrorism psychology, cautions that
efforts to provide an overall ``terrorist profile" are misleading,
writing that ``There are nearly as many variants of personality who
become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are variants of
personality.''\13\ For instance, within the domestic al-Qaeda-inspired
population there are individuals who are educated and uneducated; those
who are immigrants, first generation, second generation, and native-
born participants; those who are employed and those who are unemployed
and the list goes on. Even within cells there is wide variance between
members. The Northern Virginia or ``paintball'' cell (a Lashkar-e-Taiba
cell) is a prime example. The cell included three Arabs, three South
Asians, one Korean, two African Americans, and two Caucasians. Of
those, six were born into Muslim families whereas the other five were
converts to Islam. Finally, six of the members were native-born, two
were naturalized citizens, and the remaining three were permanent legal
residents.
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\13\ Gerald Post, ``Current Understanding of Terrorist Motivation
and Psychology: Implications for a Differentiated Antiterrorist
Policy,'' Terrorism 13, no. 1 (1990), 65-71.
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The reality of this situation presents significant challenges to
the understanding of radicalization, its causes and the mobilization to
violence, leaving most models to reflect only the most general
qualities as markers of the radicalization process. Most descriptions
include elements such as an affiliative need to belong to contribute to
something larger than him or herself (or alternatively a desire for
adventure); disaffection with his or her current situation;
identification with both the victims of state oppression and the
terrorist cause (both become personal and motivate action); a belief
that violence is a moral response; and finally, that the individual has
a duty to act.\14\ The overwhelming generality of these characteristics
makes it difficult to discern or identify the triggers that lead a
person from sympathizing with a cause to activist behavior and finally
to violent action.
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\14\ These factors are adapted from John Horgan's ``From Profiles
to Pathways and Roots to Routes,'' Annals of Political and Social
Science (The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 2008) 618: 85.
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Research suggests that radicalization is a fluid process, one in
which participants may enter, exit, or re-enter at different points in
time and the commitment of an individual to a group typically occurs in
stages. It is important to note that the factors driving
radicalization--in other words--why someone joins a terrorist
organization--are distinct from those affecting retention in a
terrorist organization. Commitment to a movement does not last on its
own accord and must be maintained in some manner such that the
individual's participation in a terrorist organization remains
satisfying.\15\ Ultimately, the outcome of the radicalization process
involves the subordination of previously-held identities with the new
identity as a member of an extremist organization. Issues that were
once peripheral move to the center of an individual's world, replacing
previously-held value systems and world outlooks. For instance, an
individual no longer sees himself as an American but rather sees his
service to a greater cause.
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\15\ As one study of social movements noted: ``Leadership,
ideology, organization, rituals, and social relations which make up a
friendship network each contribute to sustaining commitment and the
most effective is, of course, a combination of all five.'' Klandermas
Bert, ``Disengaging from Movements,'' in Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper
(eds), The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 16.
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Successful mobilization to violence hinges upon an organization's
ability to communicate an ideology that is relevant and meaningful to
the target audience. The past decade of conflict and shifting world
events have challenged al-Qaeda's ability to keep its narrative
relevant to the wide variety of its audiences--internal supporters,
those it would like to attract to the movement and those the movement
opposes--all while operating in an extremely contested environment.
However, its relatively sophisticated media efforts, including ``news''
releases, direct messaging from movement leaders, the revisiting of
historical events and the creation of interactive forums, have enabled
the organization to target these various audiences in a fairly
sophisticated manner.
Radicalization is best understood as occurring along a continuum of
interaction between an organization and a recruit. At one end are cases
in which a recruit is directly connected to the movement by ideological
entrepreneurs with whom he has personal contact. At the other end are
cases in which a recruit actively seeks or encounters information and
ideas from an extremist movement but lacks direct personal contact. The
difference between the members of the Hamburg Cell who formed the core
of the 9/11 plot and Major Nidal Hasan's contact with an jihad
ideologue is reflective of this continuum--presuming, for the purposes
of this paper, that Hasan was motivated by the al-Qaeda's ideology. In
the former case, Mohammed Atta and three colleagues attended the Quds
mosque in Hamburg, Germany, in which a radical cleric routinely
discussed violent jihad.\16\ In the Fort Hood case, that role was
fulfilled by a U.S.-born Yemeni cleric whose sermons in English
extolled the virtues of the al-Qaeda narrative.\17\ The only difference
between the two radicalization types is that in a ``self-
radicalization'' event, it is necessary for the individual to initially
have a higher degree of commitment to the cause than an individual who
is engaging in direct personal contact with the group or movement. In
other words, direct contact with committed group members can make it
possible for individuals who are less committed at the onset to become
more firmly radicalized than he might become on his own.
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\16\ The 9/11 Commission Report, New York: Norton, 2003, 164.
\17\ Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 2009. 111th Cong, 1st sess.; Also
see Michael Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Remarks
at Aspen Institute's ``The Terror Threat Picture and Counterterrorism
Strategy,'' 30 June 2010.
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This phenomenon of self-organizing, autonomous radicalization
became extremely pronounced in the United States after 2001. Since 9/
11, U.S. law enforcement has severely constricted the environment in
which radicalizing and mobilizing networks can operate. By doing so,
they have essentially isolated the would-be-terrorist, forcing them to
actively seek out materials on-line to expose themselves to these
views. In other words, absent a peer network or other direct
assistance, the individual must proactively engage the ideas to commit
themselves to the radicalization pathway. Of the homegrown terrorists
that radicalize and remain in United States, as opposed to those who
radicalize and go abroad to fight, 56% (26 of 46 cells) of the cells
radicalize in near-complete isolation from al-Qaeda or its affiliated
networks--either physical or virtual. When considering all of the
homegrown cells in totality, 44% of these cells are largely
disconnected from jihadist networks and move through the radicalization
process in isolation. The explanation for the lower figure is simple.
The second number includes domestically radicalized individuals who
seek to fight abroad and, with few exceptions, it is necessary for
these cells to make contact with a network to successfully engage in
the broader global movement.
In an effort to continue to drive radicalization in the United
States (and the West in general), al-Qaeda and its affiliates have had
to specifically tailor their message to reach the ``self-radicalizing''
audience. This is especially important as the vast majority of cells
that have radicalized and remained in the United States since
9/11 are lone wolf plots (65%). Inspire magazine is one of many
examples of this type of media that has been produced over the last few
years. Created by Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki, two American
citizens, Inspire magazine served a unique function as each issue
provided both ideological instruction and tactical know-how to the
aspiring domestic jihadist.\18\ Prior to the establishment of Inspire
magazine, most of al-Qaeda's materials were ideological, motivational,
or tactical in nature. The combination of these dimensions in single
product was an evolutionary step for al-Qaeda's outreach and
recruitment efforts functionally providing a one-stop reference to
interested parties.
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\18\ These individuals prominently figure in the creation of the
publication and are listed in the publication numerous times.
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A recent plot that was fueled by Inspire magazine was the 2011 Ft.
Hood bomb plot. In an early issue of Inspire magazine, Anwar al-Awlaki
praised Nidal Hasan for the 2009 Fort Hood shooting that killed 13 and
injured 32 military personnel. This previous attack and subsequent
validation by Anwar al-Awlaki, fueled Army PFC Naser Jason Abdo to plot
a similar attack near the same post. His plan was to detonate two
improvised explosive devices inside a restaurant popular with military
personnel and to shoot those fleeing the attack. This plot was
developed by Abdo in almost complete isolation. When the FBI
interdicted the plot they discovered bomb-making materials and a copy
of Inspire magazine containing an article entitled, ``Make a Bomb in
the Kitchen of Your Mom.'' He was reported to have been using the exact
recipe found in the magazine to construct his improvised explosive
devices.\19\
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\19\ United States of America v. Naser Jason Abdo, Criminal
Complaint. Western District, TX, 2011, 1-2.
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THE MILITARY AS TARGETS
As the decade of conflict has evolved, the predominant target of
choice for homegrown terrorists in the United States has become the
U.S. military. Nearly 50 percent of all plots in the homeland since 9/
11 (41 of 87 plots) considered targeting U.S. military personnel. In
one sense, the military focus is perhaps an obvious choice by those
aspiring to participate in the global jihad. To an al-Qaeda adherent,
the U.S. military represents the manifestation of American foreign
policy more so than any other target choice as the military--in al-
Qaeda's narrative--is responsible for the oppression and humiliation of
Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, among other locations.
The targeting of U.S. military forces within the homeland presents
a unique and perhaps qualitatively different target set than
transportation infrastructure, religious, or other civilian entities.
The perception that the military is to blame for the plight of Muslims
abroad is overwhelmingly privileged in al-Qaeda's propaganda from
Inspire magazine to recruiting videos featuring improvised explosive
devices killing U.S. soldiers. This portrayal of U.S. military forces
as war criminals and the accompanying call for reprisals create a
compelling narrative for those seeking to define their participation in
the fight.
However, there is a more subtle dimension to the selection and
justification of the military as a preferred target, but one that is
equally important to consider. For many homegrown terrorists, attacking
the military may well represent a choice that is ``easier'' to overcome
in terms of the moral barriers of targeting symbols of U.S. foreign
policy rather than the shopping mall, restaurants, or public spaces in
which he or she may have frequented with his or her friends. The social
distance between a terrorist's individual experiences and the military
is in most cases far greater than that of other potential targets,
making it easier to objectify military targets. Abdul-Latif, the
perpetrator of the planned attack against the Seattle Military Entrance
Processing Station captured this sentiment best: ``The key thing to
remember here is, is we are not targeting anybody innocent--that means
old people, women out of uniform, any children. Anything. Just people
who wear the green for the kaffir Army, that's who we're going
after.''\20\
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\20\ Complaint at page 31, US v. Abdul-Latif, et ano., No. MJ11-292
(W.D. Wash., 2011).
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Finally, while any al-Qaeda-inspired attack within the United
States is a high-profile event for both the violent extremists and the
citizens of this Nation, successful attacks against the military in the
homeland represent a particularly unique event. Government agencies
including military garrisons, recruiting stations, and law enforcement
offices, have long been considered primary and important targets by
terrorist groups around the world. Not only does the targeting of these
agencies seek to interfere with the execution of Governmental affairs,
but as instruments of National power, these targets serve an expressive
purpose as well as an instrumental one. The symbolic value of targeting
military or law enforcement is significant. Such attacks demonstrate a
degree of power by the terrorist, seek to draw attention to structural
violence by the state serving an agenda-setting function and, finally,
hope to deter others from supporting the Government.
All of these factors are at play with al-Qaeda-inspired violence in
the homeland targeting military facilities, yet there is still another
dimension. Violence against service members in their barracks, offices,
or with their families shocks the National conscience in ways that
combat deaths do not. This is not to say that combat losses mean less
than a soldier killed during a homegrown terrorist attack, but rather
that the effect of these events in the press and National psyche
differ: Soldiers are supposed to be safe when at home, they are not
supposed to die from a terrorist's bomb or rifle.\21\
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\21\ For example, in a Google News search that ranges 90 days from
two incidents, the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the August 2011
Chinook crash that killed U.S. Navy SEALs in Afghanistan shortly after
the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the number of articles
referencing the Fort Hood shooting outnumbered the Chinook crash by a
factor of 7:1.
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In examining the threat to military forces in the homeland, it is
important to note that most analyses under-represent the scope and
dimensions of the threat by homegrown, al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists. A
cursory look at the data would indicate that there have ``only'' been
18 attacks that directly target U.S. military forces within the United
States; 14 of those have occurred since 2007. This is a significant
number to be sure, however, these numbers do not reflect the totality
of interest in targeting U.S. military forces amongst the domestic
jihadi population. A broader look at the issue reveals two other groups
requiring examination. The first focuses on those homegrown extremists
that sought to fight U.S. forces abroad. Ten cells actually
accomplished this and 13 others intended to do so. This group is of
primary concern. When these cells leave the United States with the
purpose of engaging in classical jihad against American military forces
they enter the ``black box'' of jihad in which they can be directed
towards a myriad of different targets. Some of the largest threats
America has faced in recent years from homegrown extremists have
occurred when individuals' interest was redirected after arriving
overseas or planned on returning to the United States to conduct an
attack. Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, arrived in Pakistan
intent on joining the Pakistani Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) in the hopes of
fighting American military forces in Afghanistan. The TTP leadership
quickly recognized that his value was far greater if he were trained
and redirected to carry out a terrorist in the United States. Although,
Shahzad's limited training prevented him from designing a successful
car bomb, his ability to avoid detection and to place the bomb in Times
Square on a busy Saturday evening was a blow to Americans' perception
of security.
The second group to evaluate is those individuals within the United
States that considered attacking military forces in the homeland but,
for whatever reason, changed course as they moved forward. This group
includes an additional eight plots. Military targets were the first
step in their vision of participating in the global jihad with the
homeland given the strong symbolism of U.S. military targets. While
these cells ultimately did not select a military target, the numbers
reflect a strong interest in doing so. Together, this expanded look at
the data reveals 49 cells over the past decade planned to, or desired
to, attack U.S. military forces. This represents more than half (56%)
of the total number of cells (87) in the data set. The more pressure
al-Qaeda's core is subjected to, the more difficult it will be for
people in the United States to connect with foreign networks overseas.
While it is impossible to know for certain if these cells would have
selected military targets had they been unable to travel to Pakistan,
the primacy of the U.S. military as a target for al-Qaeda's adherents
is likely to remain steady for some time to come.
Any examination of al-Qaeda's targeting of homeland military forces
must include a discussion of what has colloquially become known as the
insider threat.\22\ The effect of these actors on the military is
perhaps more divisive and damaging than attacks against military
targets staged by external actors. At the tactical level, insiders also
have the potential to do more harm than external threats given their
knowledge of installations, schedules, and ability to gain access to
areas that would be restricted to civilians. At the organizational
level, insider threats tear at the social fabric of an organization and
make people question the patriotism of those serving next to them. At
the strategic level, these attacks provide al-Qaeda with immense
propaganda value and, in one sense, these actors are the ultimate prize
for al-Qaeda. The rejection of the values that their uniforms stood for
and an abandonment of the oaths they swore validate al-Qaeda's
narrative in a way that no other domestic, homegrown radicalized
individual could hope to achieve. Simply put, the potential effects of
the insider threat are grossly disproportionate to the extremely small
number of these cells. The characteristics of the insiders reveal four
interesting trends.
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\22\ For the purposes of this study, the insider threat includes
active-duty service members, Government civilian employees, military
contractors, Reservists or National Guard members and former military
members. This expansive definition permits the inclusion of the threats
that have unique knowledge about military installations, patterns of
behavior, access requirements, and can use that knowledge to gain
advantages external actors would not otherwise possess.
1. The radicalization process for all individuals took place in
near-isolation and was passive in nature. The contact with
outside extremists was exceptionally sparse and often over
email. For example, Abujihaad maintained limited correspondence
with two subjects and through these individuals, disseminated
sensitive data but he lacked direct ties with these subjects.
Abdo, Akbar, and Anderson also appeared to lack any meaningful,
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direct communication with extremist networks.
2. Related to the first dynamic, the individuals that engaged in
physical attacks were exclusively lone-wolf actors. Whether the
decision to act alone resulted from lack of access to extremist
networks or resulted from a strategic choice (or social
disposition) is not known--but the lack of contact with
external networks significantly limit the opportunity for
detection and interdiction.
3. The strong degree of isolation of the actors is strongly
correlated to a low level of plot complexity. Again, it is
largely impossible to discern the actors' intent or attack
preference but given the attack profiles, it is clear they
favored the readily available rather than intricate mass-
casualty tactics. Despite the desire of two individuals to use
explosives, firearms were the preferred tactic of four of the
six in this group.
4. In the two mass casualty attacks, target selection evidenced the
value of knowledge and access of an insider. Insider threats
are not dangerous solely because of their access--which is
crucial--but it is the combination of access with knowledge of
the organization, time schedules, and vulnerable points that
enable plots to become significantly more dangerous than they
otherwise might be.
By design or happenstance, these attackers produced significant
``psychological anxiety'' (in the words of Abujihaad) within the U.S.
military. It is all too easy to forget that, at its fundamental level,
terrorism is about the psychology of fear. Targeting of the military,
either from the inside or external to the Armed Forces, presents
uniquely different outcomes than exist in other quarters. This is not
to say these attacks mean more or have a greater impact than similar
deaths among civilian communities but rather to suggest that the
prevalence of interest among homegrown extremists to target the
military is a persistent issue that must be taken seriously.
CONCLUSION
While domestic violent extremists have only realized limited
success in the United States, the initial data presented here paint a
picture of a greater threat than many realize. However, the potential
physical violence from these aspiring cells is only one dimension of
the threat. The radicalization and mobilization to violence of U.S.
citizens tears at the fabric of society in a way that attacks
originating from Yemen or Pakistan do not. Xenophobic responses to
these incidents foster mistrust of Muslim diaspora communities and risk
creating the very conditions that work against counterterrorism efforts
in which communities turn inward and cooperation with law enforcement
officials is reduced. Effective intelligence and law enforcement
efforts to detect and disrupt homegrown cells are critically necessary
but are not sufficient to fully addressing the problem of homegrown
extremism. Law enforcement efforts must be coupled with programs to
counter violent extremism to ultimately foster inhospitable conditions
for the emergence of al-Qaeda-inspired extremists within the United
States.
Chairman King. Thank you, Colonel Sawyer. Also thank you
for your prepared statement, which I read last night. It was
really a treatise on terrorism. Thank you very much.
Secretary Stockton, in your prepared testimony, and also in
an article you wrote entitled ``Ten Years After 9/11:
Challenges for the Decade to Come,'' you said, among other
things, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is actively
recruiting U.S. military personnel to conduct lone-actor
attacks on U.S. military targets. How significant do you
believe the threat is from within the military, and how
successful has al-Qaeda been at recruiting members of the
American military?
Mr. Stockton. The primary threat to security at home comes
from al-Qaeda, its affiliates like al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, and its adherents. We take very seriously the
continuing efforts by AQAP and other al-Qaeda components to
recruit members of the United States military, to inspire
others to attack U.S. military facilities and communities, and
it is an issue that we take very seriously. It is my focus in
order to build the policies, the training programs, everything
else that we need in order to defeat this threat, because those
recruitment efforts are on-going. Again, this is a persistent
threat, it is an enduring threat, it is an evolving threat that
we need to stay in front of.
Chairman King. Secretary Stockton, we are in open session,
so I am not going to ask for precise numbers, but are there
cases within the military right now involving prospective
jihadists and terrorists that you are aware of or monitoring?
Mr. Stockton. I welcome the opportunity to answer that
question in closed session.
Chairman King. Okay.
Senator Lieberman, we will go into closed session at the
end of the second panel. All right. We will reconvene in closed
session. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stuteville, as Senator Collins mentioned, during the
1990s, when there were white supremacist attacks within the
military, when there were right-wing extremist attacks carried
out within the military, the military made it clear that right-
wing extremists and white supremacists were those who carried
out the attacks, and those ideologies were identified. Yet it
appears that the ideology of violent Islamist extremism is not
identified by name, including in your most recent documents. So
I would ask why does the Army now believe that it should not
identify who the enemy is when it was particularly appropriate
to identify the enemy 16, 17 years ago?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, after the tragic attacks at Fort Hood,
the Army made the decision based upon the Department of Defense
guidance to revise our AR 3D1--Army Regulation 3D1-12, the
Threat Awareness and Reporting Program. When we rewrote that
regulation, we changed the focus from--the older version of
that regulation was a Cold War-focused, espionage-focused
regulation. When we updated this regulation, we included
updated indicators of espionage, updated indicators of
international terrorism, and updated indicators of extremist
activity, which was a first for the Army in addressing that
particular problem in this manner. These indicators, though,
are focused on behavioral activity, not on any specific
ideology, religion, or ethnic group. We have adopted that
approach because we want to make sure that we can account for
any type of threat, both those previously and those in the
future. So focusing on the behavioral activity is how we have
looked at doing this.
Chairman King. Mr. Stuteville, if we are relying on
behavioral analysis and ignoring a person's ideology, the fact
is, as Senator Lieberman said, the enemy here is extreme,
violent Islam, a small minority, a tiny minority, but the fact
is they are not rallying toward Christianity, or Judaism, or
atheism, or Buddhism, or Hinduism. The particular enemy today
comes from a very violent form of Islam. Just as in the 1990s
there were white supremacists, and there were skinheads, and
there were Klan members, and it seemed the military never
hesitated in targeting that enemy and identifying that enemy,
yet it appears that, for instance, again, in this new Threat
Awareness Reporting Program--you know, yes, I am not saying we
go back to the Cold War, but the fact is white supremacists,
that was not the Cold War; that was a particular virulent
ideology that was, I believe, rightly and correctly and
effectively attacked by the military. It appears as if today we
are being politically correct by not identifying who the target
is. I would say the same thing if we were talking about Irish
Catholics who were carrying out attacks. Identify them. Say who
they are.
I think we are sort of being too politically correct here,
and I find that very frustrating. I will give you an
opportunity to answer that.
Then also my final question, and then I will be out of
time, will be we have learned, the committee staff, that, for
instance, in barracks that Inspire magazine is available to
members of the Armed Forces. Now, was that just an aberration?
Is that policy? Because I know, for instance, people can't fly
Confederate flags or Nazi flags in a barracks, and yet Inspire
magazine is the propaganda organ of the enemy, and a number of
us, including myself, have actually been named in that magazine
by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
So I would ask you to answer the specific question
regarding Inspire, and also why this change in policy to go
from naming an ideology to ignoring the ideology.
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, I will answer your question about
Inspire magazine. Sir, regarding Inspire magazine, yes, sir,
there are soldiers--we have documented incidents where soldiers
have gone on line and gotten Inspire magazine. In our current
AR 3D1-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, which I
referred to earlier, we requested the behavioral indicators
that we have identified in our table 3.3 on extremist activity,
that is one of those behavioral indicators that we want
soldiers to report when they observe other soldiers reading
Inspire magazine either on-line----
Chairman King. If it is reported, is the person allowed to
keep it in the barracks and it is just put up as one more
indicator, or is it removed?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, if it is reported to the
counterintelligence authorities, we will investigate to
determine if there is a logical reason for the soldier to have
the magazine. If he is associated with terrorist activity or
other activity that is deemed not supportive of the Army
values, then obviously we will deal with the situation. But the
bottom line, there are sometimes intelligence analysts and
others who read Inspire magazine for logical reasons, and that
is what we would want to determine.
Mr. Stockton. Mr. Chairman, could I briefly speak to the
larger policy questions here? We know who the adversary is. The
primary threat is al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Everything that
we are doing in terms of primary focus of our efforts
concentrates on that threat. So when you look at the interim
guidance issued by former Secretary Gates, and we provide this
overall policy to each of the Armed Services, expressing
sympathy or support for a violence-promoting organization,
associating with terrorists, having a copy of Inspire magazine
under your desk, these are behavioral indicators that we apply
and focus on the primary threat. We are not at war with Islam;
we are at war with al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents.
That is how we concentrate our effort.
Chairman King. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask two questions that come off of the report
that our Senate committee did after our extensive investigation
of the killings at Fort Hood. The first builds on what Chairman
King has just been pursuing. We found, I will go into this
briefly, that Major Nidal Hasan had made statements, either
informally in the presence of fellow members of the U.S. Army
or actually in one case in a lecture he gave to other members
of the Army at Walter Reed, which were incendiary, provocative,
talking about really showing that he had radicalized to violent
Islamist extremism. Yet none of the personnel in the Army who
heard those statements reported them or attempted to do
anything to raise a question about whether this individual
really should be in the U.S. Army before he did somebody great
damage. So one of the recommendations in our report was that
the Pentagon begin to train members of the U.S. military in
signs of radicalization to Islamist extremism, both obviously
to protect the safety of members of the military from another
incident like Fort Hood, but, frankly, also to protect the
religious observance of the thousands of Muslim Americans who
serve honorably in our military so that people could be able to
tell the difference.
I mean, I think part of what we heard in our investigation
was that some of the reason why people who heard Hasan say
these outrageous, violent things weren't sure whether it was--
that was really Islam, or he had politicized Islam may have
also been that they just didn't want to create a problem, so
they turned away from it.
But I am concerned that the Pentagon has not implemented
that kind of training program, which is not only in the
interests of securing the hundreds of thousands, millions of
Active and Reserve and Guard, but also in protecting the
thousands of Muslim Americans in the military.
Secretary Stockton, you want to take a try at that?
Mr. Stockton. Chairman, I would, and then I would like to
turn it over to Mr. Stuteville to talk about how the Army is
applying overall guidance.
We agree that it is critical to continue to ensure that our
supervisory personnel in the military can recognize signs of
radicalization. The interim guidance issued by former Secretary
Gates takes us a long way in that regard. Indeed, many of the
behavioral indicators retrospectively look back at the obvious
warning signs, the red flags that should have been going off
before, prior to Fort Hood, that now we can prospectively look
forward, and again continue to refine these training tools so
that our supervisors are able to monitor and detect and then
effectively intervene when, for example, military personnel
espouse violent ideology, when they praise an extremist group
abroad, and, above all, when they attack American values.
But I would like to turn it over to Mr. Stuteville to talk
about----
Senator Lieberman. So is there a training program of that
kind going on now either for all military personnel or at least
for supervisors?
Mr. Stockton. Yes, sir. I think if I could turn it over to
Mr. Stuteville to talk about how the Army is applying it, then
I could have some additional thoughts to share on the other
services.
Senator Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, after we revised the Army Regulation
3D1-12, which I referred to earlier in talking to Mr. King, we
have since gone out and professionalized the training program
across the Army. So besides putting out the Army regulation, we
have adopted a professional training program. We train a cadre
of trainers to be able to present this training in an effective
way, to be able to tailor the briefings to their audience,
whether it be a Brigade Combat Team or a group of researchers
and scientists. We have ensured that there are a number of
professionally-done vignettes in this training that cover each
of the behavioral indicators that we put into the new
regulation.
If you look at table 3.3 in the Army Regulation 3D1-12, the
indicators of extremist activity that may pose a threat to DOD
or disrupt U.S. military operations, you would see that three
of those indicators that we list in that table, those
indicators you were talking about reference Major Hasan earlier
in your question to Secretary Stockton, would have been covered
under that table 3.3. So in today's regulation, soldiers are
trained to report these behavioral indicators, and we are
confident that we would have received reports on those had we
educated our force properly prior to Fort Hood.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate that answer. That is
encouraging.
Let me just ask you a final question, because my time is
running out. The other question was about what we found to be
the lack of coordination between the FBI and DOD in the Hasan
Fort Hood case. In that case it was particularly that personnel
at the FBI had not really taken action based on emails that
they knew were going from Hasan to al-Awlaki, the now-dead
radical cleric in Yemen.
But I want to ask a different question before my time is
up. We have more than 5,000 recruiting centers, military
recruiting centers, in the United States the last time I looked
at the numbers. The first American killed by a violent Islamist
extremist here in the homeland after 9/11, after 2011, was
Private William Long outside an Army recruiting station in
Little Rock, Arkansas. I want to ask about what the level of
cooperation is, because these recruiting centers, of course,
are on Main Streets all across America, they are in shopping
malls, they are wherever, but these are areas of jurisdiction
for local and State law enforcement, and perhaps the FBI. So
just give us a quick answer on what we are doing now to secure
those recruiting centers of the U.S. military.
Mr. Stockton. Chairman Lieberman, under the Memorandum of
Agreement between DOD and the FBI now, we have DOD personnel
embedded in over 60 FBI JTTFs around the Nation. We have
liaison relationships with State and local law enforcement in
all of the communities across the Nation where our recruiting
centers exist. This is all facilitated by the new eGuardian
system for sharing of suspicious-activity information that
local law enforcement have, that our own personnel have, so
that together they can take the anti-terrorism and force
protection measures necessary to secure facilities that are
embedded in our communities, and where local law enforcement
will always be in the lead. What we need to do is continue to
strengthen that collaborative relationship in order to secure
our military communities.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. My time is up. I thank you. I am
going to ask you some more particular questions about that for
the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stockton. I welcome that.
Chairman King. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Just so people are aware--on the order of questioners, it
is going to be those who were here when the gavel came down,
and then after that in order of seniority. We are trying to get
at it the best we can. So we will go to the Ranking Member, Mr.
Thompson.
Representative Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Stockton, you have had ample time to review Fort
Hood's shooting and look at some of the information gleaned
from that review. Have we come up with any lessons learned from
that that you think would be instructive for this committee?
Mr. Stockton. Yes, sir. The first lesson learned was that
we had an inadequate flow of information from the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Forces to the Department of Defense and then
down to the installation commanders responsible for
antiterrorism measures. The specific problems, the specific
failures that helped facilitate the breakdowns in the Fort Hood
incident, those are the ones that we have helped model in order
to fix in our new relationship.
Let me give you a few examples. First of all, we have now
had the opportunity to carefully explain to the Department of
Justice and the FBI what kind of information that we need. We
have now an institutionalized flow. So it doesn't only come
from the FBI to one or two people inside the Department of
Defense; it is spread around so there isn't a single point of
failure. So there isn't a risk that the institution as a whole
will sit on information rather than acting on it.
We have a special training program for the DOD personnel
who are now being embedded in 60 Joint Terrorism Task Forces
around the Nation so they know what to look for so they can
identify a DOD nexus, a reason why we need that information to
flow to us, and we have very careful measures in place to
protect civil liberties and to make sure that, as a matter of
law and policy, the Department of Defense is fully respecting
privacy, civil liberties, and the Constitutional guarantees
under which we all live.
Representative Thompson. So your testimony is that after
that review and the regulations and rules that have been
instituted, that similar occurrences like Fort Hood would be
minimized?
Mr. Stockton. Yes, sir.
Representative Thompson. Thank you.
Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer, one of your responsibilities I
see is to review some of the training material that is going
out in the broader community to address this issue. I think
part of it is that some of this training material has been
identified as perhaps misleading. Can you suggest to the
committee a way to address some uniformity standards within the
training for this issue?
Colonel Sawyer. Yes, sir. There are two critical parts to
this. The first is that we do not want to inhibit our ability
to educate, whether it is--our forces, whether it is in the
interagency, the intelligence community, or the military, on
these critical threats. How do we get our soldiers or our
intelligence or law enforcement officials to understand these
threats in which they can react to them in a proactive manner
and to understand them in depth to be able to focus on the
changing trajectory of our time? To achieve uniformity in this,
what we need to do is really instill that there is a competency
in the people that are producing the training material, that
they are academically rigorous, that they are based on sound
research in which they are producing, and that they are fact-
based and not--and devoid of political agenda or personal
opinion in those. If we accomplish that, I think that the
training materials become much more responsible in a general
sense across the broader enterprise. In fact, the reviews have
shown this to be the case.
Representative Thompson. Thank you.
Listen, Mr. Stuteville, one of the issues that some of us
grapple with is whether or not putting into place these
standards, whether we can do that and maintain the desired unit
cohesion necessary for the military to do its job. Are you
comfortable that those items you have worked on will on one
hand identify the issues, but will not jeopardize unit cohesion
on the other?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, yes, I am. To elaborate, one of the
issues that we push when we give this training to the soldiers
and civilians in the Army is that there are a multitude of
reporting mechanisms should they observe one of these
behavioral indicators and need to report it. They can report it
to a counterintelligence agent; they can report it to a
criminal investigator; they can report it to their commander,
to their squad leader, to their security officer. We have put
in place a link on the Army Knowledge Network that they can
report this electronically. So we have put so many mechanisms
in place to allow soldiers to report the information, the
behavioral indicators, in a manner in which they feel
comfortable, and that we have seen soldiers using all of these
venues for reporting, and that is why we believe it is very
effective.
Representative Thompson. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
The order for the next several speakers is Mr. Cravaack,
Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Turner, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Lungren, Mr.
Cuellar, Mr. Rogers, and Senator Pryor.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, is recognized.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you, Chairman King, thank
you, Chairman Lieberman, for holding these what I consider
extremely important discussions in open forum. As a retired
military officer, I, quite frankly, find it frustrating that we
are playing politics on threat assessment. We should be able to
identify the enemy, know who they are, and call them for what
they are--and it is violent radical Islamic extremism--and be
able to identify that. Our troop--we owe that to our troops to
identify the enemy and make sure that they are aware of it to
protect them. As a military commander, that is one of my most
important jobs is to protect my troops.
So with that said, Secretary Stockton, if you would, sir,
thank you for being here. I just found out today you were a
fellow Minnesotan. So good to hear.
In your testimony you refer to an administrative strategy
empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the
United States, stating the best defense against violent
extremist ideologies are well-informed and -equipped families.
Could you elaborate a little bit more what you meant by this?
Mr. Stockton. My pleasure.
The President has issued a new strategy last August 2011
empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the
United States. Families are an important part--Muslim families
are an important part of the effort in order to defeat the
recruitment and radicalization of American citizens and
residents and the efforts of al-Qaeda to turn them into
attackers against military communities and all Americans. We
view the opportunity to treat families across the Nation as
partners in this shared endeavor as an important component of
the overall strategy that the President has issued.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you, sir. I appreciate you
elaborating on that.
Mr. Stuteville, sir, according to our committee's
investigation, the Army doesn't currently share
counterterrorism information given to it by the FBI with its
own military intelligence analysts or even commanders. Could
you confirm this? If you can confirm this, why is this the
case?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, with all due respect, sir, I disagree
with that statement. In fact, we do share counterterrorism
information with our local commanders, the force protection
officers in installations, security officers in the chain of
command. Every time we receive information, whether it be from
the FBI or other Federal agencies, or within our own Department
of Defense or Army, that indicates a threat to an installation,
we go to great means to make sure that all the leaders at every
echelon have the information so that they make the appropriate
decisions to protect our force and their families.
Representative Cravaack. Excellent. That is good to know.
Thank you very much. I appreciate you expanding upon that.
Colonel Sawyer, sir, the question I have was to what extent
al-Qaeda is attempting--can you elaborate--to infiltrate its
members into the U.S. military and also to conduct
counterterrorist attacks, and if you see an increase in a trend
in this.
Colonel Sawyer. Sir, parts of that question would probably
be best addressed in a closed session. But in terms of the
recruitment and the radicalization efforts by al-Qaeda,
essentially what they have done is by creating a distributive
network in the rapid proliferation of their materials on-line,
which makes it accessible for anybody, regardless of their
country or residence or ethnicity, to participate and belong to
this movement, it really increases the number of entry points.
As I mentioned before, it really functionally decreases the
barrier of entry for these individuals to join and to be
radicalized. As they continue to paint the military in this
essence of war criminals, as it legitimates military as
targets, it certainly will induce individuals to further target
the U.S. military and will increase the risk from insider
threat.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you.
Secretary Stockton, if I can. The clear evidence I have
read so far is that I have read and heard that jihadists have
discussed and are tragically carrying out in some instances
attacks on soft military-related targets, such as recruiting
centers, military funerals, Metro stations frequented by
military personnel, et cetera. What can be done to harden these
targets? How do you see how we can protect our military troops
when they are actually most vulnerable?
Mr. Stockton. Congressman, I welcome the opportunity to
address that question in closed session. I promise in the
closed session I will also explain that there are places warmer
than Minnesota. We will keep that classified.
Representative Cravaack. Roger that. Okay. My time is
expiring, and I thank you very much for your answers. I yield
back.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize for 5 minutes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez.
Representative Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, once again for being before us.
You know, my husband Jack is a retired military officer,
and on 9/11, he was in Germany, and he headed up pretty much
all of the law--he is a lawyer--all of the law institutions
that we have and oversaw that in Germany. He recalls that the
day after 9/11, he had to go in and talk to the lawyers on the
other side for local municipalities and explain to them why we
had driven our tanks all over the towns. Obviously we had
somewhat overreacted to what was happening over here, and he
had to go and explain what the heck we were doing by driving
our tanks all over towns and shutting things down.
So I think we need to plan ahead so that we don't have
these types of reactions, and we need to plan ahead just as we
learned in that issue with Germany to plan ahead with our local
municipalities and our local law enforcement when these types
of things happen, when we have--or to plan against a terrorist
attack that might happen overseas or here in the United States.
So I think that when we soul-search to try to figure out what
do we need to do, I think that is very important. As a Member
who also sits on the Armed Services Committee for 15 years now,
we have looked at much of this to try to figure out, you know,
what do we do, and how do we do it.
So I think planning is important. I think education is very
important, education of the troops.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the
record some documents that we have here, some of the
experiences that--and in particular that we have of some of our
Muslim soldiers and airmen, et cetera, and how they feel being
in the military, wanting to be a part of what is really a great
institution of the United States, and, you know, talking about
how they are looked at differently within their units or their
corps, even though some of them have Bronze Stars, Silver
Stars, you know, Medals; that they are always looked at with
questions in the eyes of even some of their fellow unit
members.
So my question to you is, first of all----
Chairman King. Does the gentlelady wish to introduce them
into the record?
Representative Sanchez. May I introduce them into the
record, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman King. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statements Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sanchez--From Current and
Former U.S. Military
Letter From Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad, Military Chaplain
5 December, 2011.
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 340 Dirksen Senate Office, Washington, DC 20510.
Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. House of Representatives, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Senators and Representatives: My name is Abdul-Rasheed
Muhammad, on 3 December 1993, I was affirmed at the Pentagon to be our
Nation's first Islamic military chaplain. I have served as a chaplain
on active duty for the past 18 years. Currently, I am assigned as a
Behavioral Health Program Manager in the Health Promotion and Wellness
Portfolio, United States Army Public Health Command (USAPHC), Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD.
I write today as a chaplain and senior officer deeply concerned as
we approach this week's hearing titled: ``Homegrown Terrorism: The
Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.''
Why am I concerned? I'm concerned because I'm not really sure who's
being referred to during these hearings? Who needs to be under
suspicion? Who is actually considered a threat to our military
communities? Will this process simply identify individuals based upon
their first and/or last name? Perhaps their religious preference would
be enough to determine their potential threat to our military
communities? Or maybe they'll be identified or categorized as a
potential threat simply based upon their race or ethnicity? I'm certain
you would agree, if these characteristics are the sole criteria for
such categorization, of single group of people, it would not only be
ludicrous, it would guess it might be outright presumptive and even
discriminatory.
During my 18 years on active duty as a chaplain, which included: A
1-year unaccompanied tour to the Republic of South Korea, a 3-year
accompanied tour to the Federal Republic of Germany, a 12-month
deployment to Iraq during OIF II, as well as a 3-month deployment to
Afghanistan for OEF in 2008. Of the many awards I've earned for
military service, the most distinguished has been the Bronze Star for
my service during OIF II. Prior to my service as an Army chaplain, I
served as an enlisted Soldier from November 1982 to November 1985. I
was honorably discharged as an active duty enlisted Soldier on 3 NOV
1985.
Throughout my 21 years of performing and providing ministerial
services to multiple groups and hundreds of our Soldiers, Family
members, and DA civilians, I've found Muslim Soldiers to be no
different than any other group Soldiers by religious preference.
Amongst them (Muslim Soldiers) generally speaking, I found them to be
honest, loyal, trustworthy, patriotic, also at times, they've been
challenging, stubborn, unmotivated no different than many other
Soldiers that I've helped, supported, counseled, consoled, or just
simply worked with. They just happened to be of the Islamic faith.
These same Muslims in uniform have faithfully and consistently modeled
our Army's values as both Soldiers, and leaders throughout the Army.
It is because of my years of service in our Nation's military that
I feel so strongly about these hearings and its potential for
ultimately doing a disservice to all of our men and women in uniform,
particularly those who've made the ultimate sacrifice at home and
abroad. I believe it is inaccurate, unjust, as well as potentially
unethical to blame or cast dispersion upon any entire race, religion,
or ethnic group of people, for the misguided, hate-filled machinations
of a few.
It has been my experience as a chaplain and enlisted soldier, to
often see the important role diversity can play in facilitating and
increasing morale, as well as establishing good order and discipline
amongst all of our troops. To think that our trusted, elected
representatives would be willing to cast such a critical eye, by merely
singling out, or ``investigating'' a single group amongst our brave men
and women primarily based upon their faith preference, race, or
ethnicity is unconscionable as well as morally wrong.
I am no more personally responsible for the misgivings of the few
misguided Muslims who committed crimes against innocents in our
country, than any random Euro-American would be responsible today for
misgivings of slavery in the antebellum south.
Additionally, my religious endorser, the Islamic Society of North
America (ISNA) has been integral in providing the moral and spiritual
foundation from which my ministry in the Armed Services has been
allowed to flourish. ISNA, continues to provide quality religious
leadership to 30 chaplains, and Lay Leaders throughout the DOD, and
DOJ. During these troubling times, organizations like ISNA have been
out front in its portrayal of the correct image of Islam and Muslims
within our pluralistic environment. That is, Islam the last of the
three great Abrahamic faith traditions is a religion of Peace, and the
vast majority of Muslims are Peacemakers, not Peace breakers! During
the past 21 years, I've been blessed to serve both Muslims and non-
Muslims within this pluralistic environment and I am forever grateful
for this privilege.
Finally, I believe these hearings can have the potential of
continuing the divide of the American people based solely upon the
promotion of religious-based prejudice and fear, which can potentially
further the discord amongst the diverse groups within our general
society and subsequently strengthen the propaganda machine of our
enemies abroad.
I stand firm and ready to make these claims formally or informally
at any place and at anytime. If additional information is needed,
please free to contact me[.]
Respectfully submitted,
Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad,
Chaplain (LTC), USA, Behavioral Health Program Manager.
______
Statement of Michael L. ``Mikey'' Weinstein, Founder and President,
Military Religious Freedom Foundation
December 7, 2011
On behalf of the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF), a
non-profit organization with the sole mission of protecting the
Constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights of United States armed forces
personnel and veterans, I am grateful for the opportunity to submit
this statement for the record of the joint hearing on ``Homegrown
Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United
States.''
MRFF's exclusive focus is protecting its clients' religious
freedom. We currently represent the interests of approximately 26,000
United States marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen, cadets, and
midshipmen at West Point, the Air Force Academy, Annapolis and other
service academies, coast guard personnel, reservists, national guard
personnel, and veterans. This number grows by thousands each year.
Approximately 96% of our clients are self-professed Christians (about
\3/4\ are Protestants of numerous denominations and the remaining \1/4\
are mostly Roman Catholic). The remaining 4% of our clients are from
many other faith traditions including, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews,
Muslims, Sikhs, and Native American spiritualists, as well as agnostics
and atheists. It is the stories of our more than 450 Muslim-American
clients (who are nearly 10% of all such men and women in the armed
services) that are particularly heartbreaking and what I would like to
focus on today.
MRFF recognizes that military life requires individual adherence to
shared patriotic principles. But this adherence cannot mean that a
soldier, sailor, airman, or marine has a right to question another's
beliefs nor that one's Constitutionally-guaranteed religious freedom
must be compromised (except in the most limited military
circumstances). Yet, our Muslim-American clients tell us every day that
their Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom are under direct
assault.
The ways in which the religious freedom of Muslim-American members
of the armed services is harmed can best be described as systemic and
pernicious throughout the armed forces. For example, military offers
and enlisted personnel alike frequently use derogatory and racist terms
such as ``towel head,'' ``raghead,'' ``camel jockey'' or the most
universally used term of ``Haji'' to describe their Muslim-American
colleagues in uniform as well as all Muslims everywhere. One of my
clients calls what he's experienced ``unjust discrimination and
unbelievable mistrust.''
I. WHERE DOES THIS PERVASIVE ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE COME FROM?
Perhaps from lectures, training exercises, and military leaders
themselves perpetuating the harmful stereotypes that Muslims and Arabs
are somehow different from their fellow Americans, and thus suspicious,
and that all Muslims seek to harm other Americans.
For example, in June 2007, Brigitte Gabriel, who the New York Times
called a ``radical Islamophobe,'' delivered a lecture at the Joint
Forces Staff College (IFSC). Her lecture was part of the JFSC's
elective course on Islam, open to American military and National
security personnel.
During the question-and-answer period of her lecture, she said
Muslims seeking political office should be resisted:
``If a Muslim who has--who is--a practicing Muslim who believes the
word of the Koran to be the word of Allah. who abides by Islam, who
goes to mosque and prays every Friday, who prays five times a day--this
practicing Muslim, who believes in the teachings of the Koran, cannot
be a loyal citizen to the United States of America.''
Then she asserted that a Muslim's oath of office is meaningless:
``A Muslim is allowed to lie under any situation to make Islam, or for
the benefit of Islam in the long run. A Muslim sworn to office can lay
his hand on the Koran and say `I swear that I'm telling the truth and
nothing but the truth,' fully knowing that he is lying because the same
Koran that he is swearing on justifies his lying in order to advance
the cause of Islam. What is worrisome about that is when we are faced
with war and a Muslim political official in office has to make a
decision either in the interest of the United States, which is
considered infidel according to the teachings of Islam, and our
Constitution is uncompatible [sic] with Islam--not compatible--that
Muslim in office will always have his loyalty to Islam.''
She made further comments on the Islamic community in the United
States and racial profiling:
``We need to see more patriotism and less terrorism, and especially on
the part of the Islamic community in this country, who are good at
nothing but complaining about every single thing instead of standing up
and working with us in fighting the enemy in our country.''
Another example of these harmful stereotypes: In formal military
training exercises, Muslim-American service members are very often
reminded that ``the enemy'' in the War on Terror is Islam as an entire
religion, and, accordingly, that any of its adherents and followers are
seriously suspect. Non-commissioned officers have ordered Muslim-
American service members to dress up in Arab garb to play the role
``terrorist'' in training exercises.
Further, an Army general, while in uniform, went on speaking tours
of churches, declaring that the War on Terrorism was a battle between
Satan and Christians, explaining, ``We in the Army of God, in the House
of God, the Kingdom of God have been raised for such a time as this.''
And, at a West Point graduation ceremony, a top Army official said
ominously, ``Your sons and daughters are fighting to protect our
citizens . . . from zealots who would restrain, molest, burden, and
cause to suffer those who do not share their religious beliefs, deny
us, whom they call infidels, our unalienable rights.''
II. WHAT ARE THE HARMS TO OUR MILITARY COMMUNITIES?
This anti-Muslim prejudice has significant consequences and leads
to discrimination--and real harm to the Muslim-American members of our
military communities.
Muslim-American service members have been denied leave time. They
have been subjected to hurdles in accessing the military's health care
system. They have been denied rank and choice assignments. They have
been unlawfully detained and falsely accused of crimes and offenses of
moral turpitude. They have been the victims of scurrilous devastating
rumors and innuendo. They have been unjustly ordered to perform
objectionable military tasks and chores.
And this systemic discrimination doesn't just affect Muslim-
American service members. Their families suffer as well. They and their
families have been derided as exemplifying ``the enemy amongst us.''
They and their families have been assaulted and abused both stateside
and abroad. They and their families have endured harmful and
humiliating taunts and threats. They and their families have been
accused of not being ``real Americans'' and told that they are not
remotely welcome in America. They and their families have been told to
``go back to your Arab lands.''
I asked one of MRFF's Muslim-American clients--a graduate of one of
our U.S. military academies who has served multiple combat tours in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, is highly decorated, and has received the
Purple Heart and the Silver and Bronze Stars for exemplary courage in
battle--to describe what he has endured.
He tells of being indoctrinated, from his first days at the
military academy to his current position as an officer, with the belief
America's military is a Christian military and that its greatest enemy
is Islam and its followers. He tells of his repeated attempts to
protect and speak for his subordinate Muslim-American military members
and describes with tears how these many attempts are futile and
essentially trivialized by the responsible military chain of command.
He tells of the officially-endorsed Islamophobia rampant throughout the
U.S. military and of Muslim-American service members being baited with
lies, attacks on their character. He tells of the loneliness and
estrangement of being told in innumerable ways that he is not a
reliable or dependable part of either his own combat unit or of the
United States military because of he is Muslim. He tells of countless
instances of being both proselytized by military chaplains and his own
direct military chain of command.
He tells of memorizing (and advising many other fellow Muslim-
American military members and their families to as well) the names of
Muslim Americans who have been killed or wounded in combat so that he
can repeatedly tell those who doubt Muslim service members' commitment
of their honorable sacrifice. But he also tells of callous and
ambivalent responses when he shares the names of the service members
and their sacrifices.
Military life is very different from civilian life. Unless one has
served in the military it is almost impossible to appropriately convey
the formidable magnitude of the imperative to be viewed as a trusted
and respected member of the military team. Muslim-American military
members have been told repeatedly that they have no place in America's
military because of their faith. They have been told that, as Muslims,
they cannot and will not be allowed into the otherwise impenetrable
brotherhood and sisterhood of trust and loyalty of their respective
military organizations.
Most heartbreaking, though, is what this decorated service member's
family has suffered. He tells of his children being harassed on base
elementary schools--even proselytized to ``save their souls from the
evils of Islam and Allah.'' He tells of his wife being spat upon while
shopping at the base commissary and whispered about and given looks of
revulsion when she shops in the Post Exchange store and gets gas at the
base gas station. He tells of his family having to endure disrespect
and dismissiveness every day for merely being Muslims.
Finally, I want to share the story of two of my clients, who haw
suffered tremendously because of the widespread mistrust of American
Muslim service members by those with whom they serve.
Yassine Bahammou and Khalid Lyaacoubi moved to the United States
from Morocco in search of freedom and opportunity. In 2009, hoping to
settle their new country, they enlisted in the Army program for U.S.
citizens and green-card holders who are native Arabic speakers. They
would serve as linguistic and cultural experts for front-line
commanders. Thus, it was a dangerous assignment. Errol Smith, the
Army's assistant deputy for foreign language programs, said about
soldiers in the program, ``The most important thing . . . is their
ability to save lives, whether it's their fellow soldiers, their
commanders, or civilians. They bring an essential skill.''
The Army offered incentives such as higher rank and bonuses for
those who enlisted in this program. But their ultimate motivation to
serve in the Army was the same as so many others who enlist. ``The
United States is known for fighting for other people's freedoms,''
explained Bahammou. ``I like it and I wanted to help do that.'' Another
reason, particular to these men: ``We wanted to prove to Arabic
nations,'' Lyaacoubi explained, ``that we were Arabic and that we lived
with Americans and socialized with Americans and that we know that they
are good.''
Their first step was basic training at Fort Jackson, which they
successfully completed. Next they began a specialized translator's
course at the Advanced Individual Training School also at Fort Jackson.
At first, the training went well. Then their lives turned upside down.
Across the country at Fort Hood, tragedy struck: Maj. Nidal Malik
Hassan massacred 13 people. After this tragedy, over at Fort Jackson,
Bahammou and Lyaacoubi began to experience harassment at the hands of
their fellow soldiers. They were called names like ``terrorists'' and
``hajis.'' They were referred to as ``garbage.'' Their bunkrooms were
ransacked.
And within weeks, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
arrested Bahammou, Lyaacoubi, and three of their colleagues. These five
soldiers who were being trained as translators to serve on the front
line were charged with somehow conspiring to poison the food supply at
the facility.
For the next 45 agonizing days, these men were held in their
barracks under 24-hour guard--even at the mess hall and latrine. They
were prohibited from speaking Arabic either to each other or to friends
or family members who called to try to find out what was happening to
them, some of whom spoke no English. And the threats and insults
continued--this time from the guards and investigators. Their guards
said they were going to be shipped off to Guantanamo; an investigator
threatened to send one of them back to Morocco ``in a box.'' And then
someone from CID confirmed their fears. They were being treated like
terrorists because of their religion. Lyaacoubi distinctly remembers an
investigator said, ``The United States is in a war against Islam and
you are a Muslim.''
After 45 days, they were suddenly released. CID had no evidence
against them and no charges were filed. But their laptops, cell phones,
and passports were confiscated. Their absolutely unjust detention
ended, but their anguish would continue.
As part of the deal offered by the Army, they were returned to
their homes in the Washington, DC area, where they joined the National
Guard. But Bahammou and Lyaacoubi were kept segregated and not allowed
to train with their company.
The Army conducted an internal review and concluded that the
allegations against them--which were initially made by a relative of a
soldier--were unfounded, but, not surprisingly, concluded there was no
racism or harassment in its handling of the Muslim soldiers. Although
the CID might have been ``overly restrictive'' in the soldiers'
detention, the review determined that the Army had acted in accordance
with the tense situation following the Fort Hood shootings. And yet,
CID turned the case over to the FBI, perpetuating the appearance that
the men were, in fact, guilty of something, even if it was only their
Muslim faith.
The FBI seems to have kept its investigation of Bahammou and
Lyaacoubi open--which is causing far-reaching harm. Bahammou, who
always wanted to work in law enforcement, applied for a job as a
security guard, but was denied a concealed weapon permit because he was
the target of an investigation and the background check said he was
``dangerous'' and had conspired to harm fellow soldiers.
The program in which they enlisted promised a fast-track to
citizenship. (It should also be noted that anyone who has even 1 day of
honorable active duty service since 9/11--which Bahammou and Lyaacoubi
had--can apply for citizenship.) But their promised accelerated path to
U.S. citizenship has been blocked. The Army has given them all the
documents clearing their names. One's immigration officer tells him
that his file is fine. But an Army immigration specialist tells him
that there is an FBI hold on his case. And he has a copy of an email
from someone in the Army asking his immigration officer to put a
military hold on his file. He goes to interviews, provides
documentation over and over again, and deadlines for making decisions
pass. He even volunteered to take a polygraph test to clear his name,
but an FBI agent told him it wasn't necessary because the FBI doesn't
have anything on him. The other is in an endless loop of being told his
background check needs to be completed; he needs to resubmits
paperwork; he's cleared; and then that he needs another background
check. He's actually taken two polygraphs. Yet his case remains open.
For him, not getting the citizenship that he's entitled to is
devastating. He has a good job with a Government contractor. His
company wants to keep him on, but they may have to let him go because
he does not yet have citizenship. He has a family to take care of and
cannot afford to lose his job. He's told me, ``It's stressful. I'm worn
every day. I try everything and I'm just still waiting.'' He continued,
``They falsely accused me, but no one will take the responsibility to
restore my rights.''
Alarmingly, Bahammou has even been searched by local police after
being stopped for routine traffic violations. He was stopped and he
can't remember committing a violation. Saying Bahammou might have a
warrant outstanding (which he didn't), the officer called in
reinforcements. Several other police cars arrived. Then saying they
smelled marijuana (which Bahammou doesn't use), the police handcuffed
him and made him stand on the side of the road for half an hour while
they turned his car inside out, searching for things unknown. They
found nothing and eventually he was given a ticket for making an
illegal turn--at a place where there's no turn to make.
When traveling to visit their families in Morocco, each man has
encountered difficulties. While transferring planes in Paris on their
return, each man was stopped by a U.S. Government agent. They were
asked about where they'd been, why they'd traveled, and the addresses
where they'd stayed in Morocco. The agent who questioned one of the men
had his picture and walked directly up to him to begin the questioning.
The agent said he was stationed in Miami but the Government had flown
him to Paris just to question him. Each man was also stopped upon
landing in the United States. They were questioned--one for 3 hours--
about why they travelled, who they stayed with, the addresses where
they'd stayed, and how they got the money to pay for their trips to
Morocco. They were searched--agents copied everything in one's wallet
and the memory card for his phone. One had his luggage returned a day
after he landed, after someone had rifled through it. At various
points, agents expressed embarrassment and apologized for having to
subject these men, with military identification, to such scrutiny. But
because these men are trapped in the system based on false accusations,
these agents must do their jobs.
Bahammou recently said to me, ``I know that this will affect me my
whole life and it's hurting me in my heart. And it's hurting me even
more because I didn't do anything. My dream is to be in the military
and law enforcement.'' It seems very unlikely he'll be able to fulfill
his dream. He explained, ``I joined the Army to fight for other
people's freedom and I ended up losing mine.''
Lyaacoubi lived in the United States for 5 years before joining the
Army. ``I thought joining the Army would change my life for the good,
but it changed my life for the worse.'' He said, ``Wherever we go,
we're the bad guys, no matter how much good we do.'' Yet, he wants to
continue to serve his country and he's going to re-enlist in the
reserves. He said, ``I'm willing to overlook those who are prejudiced
against me; I know I'm a good person.''
Days after the Fort Hood shootings, General George Casey, chief of
staff of the Army said, ``I'm concerned that this increased speculation
could cause a backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers. And I've
asked our Army leaders to be on the lookout for that. It would be a
shame--as great a tragedy as this was, it would be a shame if our
diversity became a casualty as well.''
His fears were realized. There's been a terrible backlash against
Muslim Americans. They have been targeted for suspicion and
discrimination because of their beliefs and not because of anything
they've done.
I've shared with you just a few examples of the grave and harmful
effects of the ingrained prejudice, racism, and distrust experienced by
Muslim Americans in the military--that is only reinforced by this
series of hearings. I believe it is critical to focus on why the racism
and distrust is so pervasive in the military. This deep-seeded
prejudice is taught and disseminated. And it is pernicious. It has
real-world consequences and causes real harms--the on-going
discrimination against not just service members but their families.
This is a real threat to our military communities. Not only is it
unjust and un-American, but it undermines the cohesion of our military
and the ability to retain Muslim-American soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines who are committed to fighting to protect everyone's--theirs
and ours--freedom.
______
Statement of Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Government and Public Policy, The
College of William and Mary
December 7, 2011
I, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, submit this written statement for
the record of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland
Security, and U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs joint hearing entitled, ``Homegrown Terrorism: The
Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.''
I am a Colonel in the United States Army with 31 years of service,
having retired in 1997. I served as Special Assistant to General Colin
Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as his
Chief of Staff when he was Secretary of State. Since retirement, I have
taught National security affairs at The George Washington University,
and am currently a professor of Government and public policy at The
College of William and Mary.
I am well aware of the threats facing our country. There are those
who would seek to do us harm, both within the United States and abroad.
The effectiveness and integrity of our military, however, demand that
the steps we take to defend our Nation from these threats be consistent
with the values of our country. And how we treat members of our armed
services, young men and women who put their lives on the line for our
safety and freedom, must also be consistent with the values of our
country and our military. Today's hearing, ``Homegrown Terrorism: The
Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States,'' contrary to
its purported purpose, has the potential to undermine the values of our
military and our Nation.
Thankfully, we live in a country where all Americans, regardless of
race, ethnicity, and religion, are by law to be treated equally.
America's promise of equal treatment under law is upheld everyday in
the U.S. military, and efforts to erode this fundamental value threaten
the unity and cohesion that is essential to the effectiveness and
integrity of the U.S. military. Values of hard work, service, and
loyalty are an essential part of service in the military. So are the
values of tolerance and diversity.
Focusing on a singular threat, specifically that posed by American
Muslims serving in the military, does grave injustice to our Muslim
soldiers, some of whom have died defending our country. As Matthew
Alexander, an Air Force Intelligence officer, stated:
``I know what Muslim-American interpreters and soldiers are doing for
their country--some are now buried in Arlington National Cemetery . . .
we need to stop demonizing an entire community. This is simply not the
way to fight terrorism. And it's not who we are, as Americans.''
By its very existence, the hearing suggests that American Muslim
soldiers are prone to violence simply because of their faith. Such an
assumption questions the patriotism of these brave men and women and
their allegiance to our country, and sows fear and mistrust among
Americans. In 2008, my former boss, General Colin Powell, specifically
condemned this type of blanket suspicion and fear-mongering when he
recounted the story of a young American Muslim solider, now buried in
Arlington National Cemetery:
``Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The
answer's no, that's not America. Is there something wrong with some 7-
year-old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she could be
President? . . . I feel strongly about this particular point because of
a picture I saw in a magazine. It was a photo essay about troops who
are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one picture at the tail end of
this photo essay was of a mother in Arlington Cemetery, and she had her
head on the headstone of her son's grave. And as the picture focused
in, you could see the writing on the headstone. And it gave his
awards--Purple Heart, Bronze Star--showed that he died in Iraq, gave
his date of birth, date of death. He was 20 years old. And then, at the
very top of the headstone, it didn't have a Christian cross, it didn't
have the Star of David, it had a crescent and star of the Islamic
faith. And his name was Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan, and he was an
American. He was born in New Jersey. He was 14 years old at the time of
9/11, and he waited until he could go serve his country, and he gave
his life. ''
Powell's eloquent testimonial to the sacrifice of that Muslim
soldier demonstrates emphatically how today's hearing could be
detrimental to the morale of our troops and to unit cohesion. One of
the greatest strengths of our military is the diversity of its soldiers
who come from all ethnic and religious backgrounds and from small towns
and big cities across our country. These young men and women are
fighting together in the trenches, and the trust and bond between them
is of utmost importance to their performance as well as their safety
and security. A hearing like this--that sows fear and mistrust and
singles out one group of soldiers based on religious practice--will
only serve to divide our troops and cause soldiers to question and
regard others with suspicion. As General George Casey, the Army Chief
of Staff at the time of the Fort Hood attack in 2009, stated:
``I'm concerned that this increased speculation could cause a backlash
against some of our Muslim soldiers . . . Our diversity, not only in
our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as honorific as this
tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that's
worse.''
Finally, by focusing on one particular religious group for
investigation during today's hearing, Congress is ignoring the broader
range of extremist violence that threatens our country. This includes
threats by neo-Nazis, Christian militias, and white supremacist gangs
among others. Timothy McVeigh was not a Muslim. The Unabomber was not a
Muslim. Violent extremism within the United States and, in particular,
within our armed forces, is something that our leadership should take
very seriously and should not tolerate. But a true and honest
examination of threats within our military community should address all
violent extremists who seek to do us harm.
Like the military, Congress has the job of making our country
safer, and protecting and honoring our troops, consistent with the
values of our Nation. Today's hearing is a step in the wrong direction.
Congress does not have a stellar record in this regard. Much of the
history of the House Un-American Activities Committee, for example, is
a stain on the fabric of this Nation. Rarely did its members do
anything on behalf of America's security, What they did was bring the
cameras and publicity to the soapbox appearances of now much-derided
men such as Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner--men who today
most knowing Americans, as well as global citizens, excoriate for their
extreme prejudice, hatred, and rank opportunism. Now, surely, is not
the time to resurrect the intolerance of such men and the witch-hunts
they orchestrated.
Rather it is time to live up to the values we constantly put before
the world as representative of our country, It is time to act the way
we say we believe. It is time to put away prejudice and hatred, to
recognize the service of all our fine men and women in our armed
forces, and to treat them the way they deserve to be treated.
Protecting the Nation does not require and has never required the
sacrifice of our cherished beliefs.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my views with the
committees.
______
Statements Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sanchez--From Organizations
Statement of Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative Office
and Devon Chaffee, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU)
December 7, 2011
Chairmen Lieberman and King and Ranking Members Collins and
Thompson: The American Civil Liberties Union is a non-partisan
organization of over half a million members, countless additional
activists and supporters, and 53 affiliates Nation-wide dedicated to
the protection of individual rights and civil liberties under the U. S.
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The danger posed by modern terrorists is real and Congress must
understand the scope and nature of the threat and exercise its
authorities appropriately in overseeing the Government's response,
holding our military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies
accountable, and crafting sensible legislation that enhances security
while protecting the rights of innocent persons. But the security
threat was no less real during the first ``Red Scare,'' during the Cold
War, and during the era of protests against the Vietnam War. The
question is not whether Congress should respond, but how it should
respond. History tells us that conflating the expression of unorthodox
or even hostile beliefs with threats to security only misdirects
resources, unnecessarily violates the rights of the innocent, and
unjustly alienates communities unfairly targeted as suspicious. Today,
on the 70th anniversary of attacks against Pearl Harbor, the lesson we
should remember is that targeting entire communities on the basis of
race, religion, or ethnicity is unjustified and un-American and results
in consequences that the Nation later comes to regret, as with the
targeting of Japanese-American communities during World War II.
In announcing today's hearing, the Chairmen of both committees
singled out Islam and the Muslim-American community as the focus of
their inquiry into threats to military communities as they have in
previous hearings and committee reports.\1\ Such needless targeting of
entire communities on the basis of religious ideology alienates those
community members. This is especially so for Muslim-Americans who serve
in the military--such racial and religious profiling leads to
discrimination and tangible harm. After the shooting at Fort Hood,
four-star General George Casey, then-Army Chief of Staff, stated, ``I'm
concerned that this increased speculation could cause a backlash
against some of our Muslim soldiers . . . Our diversity, not only in
our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as horrific as this
tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that's
worse.''\2\ As Casey's statement suggests, singling out Muslims within
our military does a disservice to American service members, leads to
unwarranted discrimination against these service members, and threatens
to spread distrust amongst our troops. Instead of working to resolve
the obstacles that Muslim Americans serving in our military face,
today's hearing threatens to contribute to a predisposition to unfairly
target Muslim Americans serving our country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Press Release: King, Lieberman Announce Joint House-Senate
Hearing on Homegrown Terror Threat to Military Communities, Nov. 28,
2012, at http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-lieberman-
announce-joint-house-senate-hearing-homegrown-terror-threat-military;
see also The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community
and That Community's Response, Hearing before the House Committee on
Homeland Security, Mar. 10, 2011; U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism
Lessons from the U. S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood
Attack (Feb. 3, 2011).
\2\ Interview with Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey regarding
Fort Hood shooting, State of the Union (CNN television broadcast Nov.
8, 2009), at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/11/08/casey-im-
concerned-about-possible-backlash-against-muslim-soldiers/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many U.S. officials continue to focus their counterterrorism
analysis on Muslim-American communities even though empirical studies
show that violent threats cannot be identified by any religious,
ideological, ethnic, or racial profile. Such unjust targeting is
widespread and is often based on the unsound reasoning used in ill-
conceived and methodologically flawed reports that ignore empirical
evidence that there is no direct link between religious observance or
radical ideas and violent acts.
The Senate Committee's Fort Hood report in particular relied
heavily on a single report produced in 2007 by the New York Police
Department (NYPD), Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.
The NYPD report purported to identify a four-step ``radicalization
process'' that terrorists follow, with each step involving
Constitutionally-protected religious and associational conduct--conduct
that millions of people may engage in without ever committing an act of
violence.
In contrast, the Department of Defense's (DoD) report on force
protection after the Fort Hood shootings looked at the scientific
literature, rather than flawed theories, and determined that
``researchers have yet to develop a single model that can estimate who
is at risk for potential violence.''\3\ The DoD report concluded that
predicting who might become violent is extremely difficult. While
researchers have identified certain risk factors, ``few people in the
population who have risk factors . . . actually assault or kill
themselves or others.''\4\ The study further emphasized that religious
fundamentalism is not a risk factor, ``as most fundamentalist groups
are not violent, and religious-based violence is not confined to
members of fundamentalist groups.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Dep't of Defense, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood
D-1 (Jan. 2010), at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-
ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Id. at D-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DoD report's conclusion is further supported by independent
empirical analysis. According to reports, a recent United Kingdom
analysis based on hundreds of case studies of individuals involved in
terrorism concluded that there is no single identifiable pathway to
extremism and ``a large number of those involved in terrorism do not
practice their faith regularly.''\6\ Moreover, according to reports,
the study identified ``facing marginalization and racism'' as a key
vulnerability that could tend to make an individual receptive to
extremist ideology.\7\ The conclusion supported tolerance of diversity
and protection of civil liberties and was echoed in a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) paper published in August 2008. In
exploring why there was less violent homegrown extremism in the United
States than the United Kingdom, the authors cited the diversity of
American communities and the greater protection of civil rights as key
factors. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Alan Travis, MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in
Britain, The Guardian, (Aug. 20, 2008), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism; Alan Travis, The Making of an
Extremist, The Guardian (Aug. 20, 2008), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism.
\7\ Id.
\8\ National Counterterrorism Center Conference, Towards a Domestic
Counterradicalization Strategy (Aug. 2008). Notwithstanding the
conclusion, the paper inexplicably went on to examine how the United
States could better adopt U.K. counterterrorism strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By singling out Islam and Muslim-Americans in its reports and
hearings on the terror threat, Congress increases the likelihood that
U.S. law enforcement officials will misunderstand the scientific
evidence surrounding risk factors for violence and focus their
investigative efforts on innocent Americans because of their beliefs
rather than on true threats to the community. The ACLU has documented
how U.S. law enforcement agencies are already exhibiting anti-Muslim
bias in their trainings, operations, and intelligence products.
Recently, the ACLU, through Freedom of Information Act requests and
litigation, and investigative reporters have uncovered numerous FBI
counterterrorism training materials that falsely and inappropriately
portray Arab and Muslim communities as monolithic, alien, backward,
violent, and supporters of terrorism. These documents show that the use
of these erroneous and biased materials occurred between at least 2003
to 2011, and has been an integral part of FBI training programs,
despite recent efforts by the FBI to minimize the scope of this
problem. For example, a 2003 FBI memorandum from San Francisco shows
that the FBI sought to renew a contract with a trainer and ``expert''
advisor to FBI agents, whose draft lesson plan asserted racist and
derogatory assertions about Arabs and Islam. These lesson plans
asserted:
``the Arab mind is a Cluster Thinker, while the Western mind tends
to be a linear thinker,'' and
``although Islam was not able to change the cluster Arab mind
thinking into a linear one . . . it alleviated some of the
weakness that inflicted the Arab mind in general.''
Another FBI training included a graph that shows Islam as a
consistently violent religion over a 1,300-year span while graphing
Judaism and Christianity as inexplicitly ascending directly to non-
violence from 1400 BC to 2010 AD.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Appendix for copies of additional biased training material.
While FBI officials have attempted to characterize these biased
trainings as isolated incidents, similar problematic biases can be
found in official intelligence products, A 2006 FBI Intelligence
Assessment, ``The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad,''
identifies religious practice--including frequent attendance at a
mosque or a prayer group, growing a beard, and proselytizing--as
indicators that a person is on a path to becoming a violent extremist.
The ACLU and 27 other organizations have called on the FBI to revoke
such flawed products.\10\ The flawed theories are not just part of FBI
trainings and products, however. The same theories are incorporated in
trainings across the country conducted for local law enforcement
agencies under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Letter to Robert Mueller, Director, FBI, Oct. 4, 2011,
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
sign_on_letter_to_dir_mueller_re_radicalization_report_10.4.11.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also important to remember that Muslim and Arab groups aren't
the only ones affected by the Government's inappropriate reliance on
unsubstantiated theories of radicalization that focus on ideology
instead of violent action. Non-violent protest groups have repeatedly
been targeted for surveillance and infiltration by law enforcement over
the last several years, based on their opposition to Government
policies from both sides of the political spectrum, An assessment
published by DHS in 2009 warned that right-wing extremists might
recruit and radicalize ``disgruntled military veterans.''\11\ An
intelligence report produced for DHS by a private contractor accused
environmental organizations like the Sierra Club, the Humane Society
and the Audubon Society as ``[m]ainstream organizations with known or
possible links to ecoterrorism.''\12\ Similarly, a Missouri Fusion
Center released an intelligence report on ``the modern militia
movement'' that claimed militia members are ``usually supporters'' of
Presidential candidates Ron Paul and Bob Barr.\13\ Slandering
upstanding and respectable organizations does not just violate the
rights of these groups and those who associate with them, it wastes
security resources and undermines public confidence in the Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Assessment, Rightwing
Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in
Radicalization and Recruitment (Apr. 7, 2009), at http://wnd.com/
images/dhs-rightwing-extremism.pdf.
\12\ Helios Global, Inc. for National Preparedness Directorate,
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Universal Adversary Dynamic Threat
Assessment, Eco-terrorism: Environmental and Animal Rights Militants in
the United States (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/12251436/DHS-Eco-Terrorism-in-US-2008.
\13\ T.J. Greaney, `Fusion Center' Data Draws Fire Over Assertions,
Colombia Daily Tribune, (Mar. 14, 2009), at http://
www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/mar/14/fusion-center-data-draws-fire-
over-assertions/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The basis for bringing law enforcement and intelligence resources
to bear on a problem should rest on whether the targets are prone to
violence and/or criminal behavior. Ideological or religious beliefs,
even extreme ones, are entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The inquiry of these committees has
thus far rested on a wholly contrary assumption--that radical beliefs
alone justify suspicion and investigation. Such an assumption is wrong
under the First Amendment, wrong under traditional American principles,
and wrong in light of empirical data and should not serve as the basis
for the committees' continued targeting of Muslim-American communities.
Appendix.--FBI Training Material: Military Considerations
Power Point Presentation
By William Gawthorp (Excerpts)
Appendix.--Antiterrorism Advisory Counsel--PA
DoD HAZMAT Conference Presentation
21st Century Terrorism: History, Perspective, Development
By John Marsh, Intelligence Specialist (Excerpts)
______
Statement of Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy, Interfaith Alliance
December 7, 2011
As a Baptist minister, a patriotic American and the President of
Interfaith Alliance, a National, non-partisan organization that
celebrates religious freedom and is dedicated to protecting faith and
freedom and whose 185,600 members Nation-wide belong to 75 faith
traditions as well as those without a faith tradition, I submit this
testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for the Joint
Hearing Record on ``Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military
Communities Inside the United States.''
From its inception, citizens of this Nation have appreciated, if
not revered, both religion and the military. Our armed forces are key
to the security of the American people and often, our service members
who bravely defend our Nation are our representatives abroad. Ensuring
their safety is of the utmost importance and we should all be cognizant
of the enormous sacrifice the men and women who serve in our armed
forces make on our behalf every day.
There is no doubt that our military faces serious threats which
should be rooted out, but the continued demonization of Muslims and
questioning of the Muslim faith is not the answer. I fear that this
approach is misguided and will only result in further alienating the
American Muslim community. Homegrown terrorism and countering violent
extremism require serious investigation based on fact. I am concerned
that the line of inquiry likely to be taken up in this hearing may do a
disservice to American Muslims serving in our Armed Forces and the
memory of those who have died serving their country, and spreads
distrust amongst our troops.
By singling out one particular religious community for
investigation, these hearings, as have several others held this year by
the House Committee on Homeland Security, fly in the face of religious
freedom as it is enshrined in the First Amendment to our Constitution.
Furthermore, these hearings are not only the wrong answer to the wrong
question, but in the end, they may only perpetuate the problems the
committees seek to solve, as well as add to a disturbing climate of
anti-Muslim sentiment extant in America today.
Freedom of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment protects
the freedom of all Americans to believe in any religious faith, as they
choose, without fear of criticism, retribution, or investigation
because of it. In our Nation, all people and all faiths are equal with
none favored over any other. The fact that Muslims in this country are
taking full advantage of all clauses of the First Amendment does not
make them inherently any more radical than any other religious
community in this country. These freedoms are an integral part of
American democracy.
There exists in our country today a pervasive and unsettling trend
of anti-Muslim fear, bigotry, and rhetoric and a general lack of
understanding about Islam. Targeting one particular faith for scrutiny
when the overwhelming majority of that faith's adherents in this
country are peaceful, law-abiding citizens seems counterproductive and
just plain wrong. It is the responsibility of our elected officials to
promote reason, truth, and civility in the public forum--especially at
a time when anti-Muslim bigotry is on the rise--not to waste time and
public resources on victimizing select groups.
Interfaith Alliance's work is driven by the fundamental principle
that protecting religious freedom is most critical in times of crisis
and controversy. Even the most basic knowledge of the history of the
First Amendment includes the understanding that religious freedom
exists in part to protect the rights of the minority from what Alexis
de Tocqueville not unrealistically called the tyranny of the majority.
In fact, it would not be a stretch to say that if our Founding Fathers
had relied on polling data, the First Amendment might not exist at all.
Unfortunately, in today's political climate, it may not ensure an
``electoral win'' to defend the rights of the American Muslim
community, but there is no question that it is the right thing to do.
That today's hearing falls on the anniversary of the attack on
Pearl Harbor should give us reason to pause and reflect. With 70 years'
hindsight we are now able to see just how wrong our treatment of the
Japanese-American Community after Pearl Harbor was. We have a
responsibility to ensure that 7 decades from now, our Government and
our neighbors are not apologizing to the American Muslim community for
how they were treated. I hope we can make the right decisions today so
we do not repeat the mistakes of our past.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on this important
issue.
______
Statement of The Islamic Society of North America
December 7, 2011
The Islamic Society of North America shares the committees'
commitment to ensuring the security of our service members during
today's hearing on ``Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military
Communities Inside the United States.'' However, we are concerned that
the hearing may specifically scrutinize American Muslims, including
those serving our country in the military. The House Committee on
Homeland Security has already held three hearings this year which
unfairly singled out American Muslims of various walks of life,
threatening their civil rights and tarnishing their reputations, and we
are concerned that its Senate counterpart is joining in this
discriminatory approach.
American Muslims serve honorably in all of the Armed Forces, just
as they serve in all areas of civil society. They serve in combat
areas, fighting to protect the country they love, and some have made
the ultimate sacrifice. This hearing, which appears to question their
loyalty, does them a great disservice. It dishonors the memory of those
who died serving their country, and it severely demoralizes those who
are sacrificing so much on a daily basis. Casting suspicion on these
brave individuals simply because of their faith crushes their spirits
and spreads distrust and discord among our troops.
We urge you to take the Department of Defense's approach in the
immediate aftermath of the horrific shooting at Ft. Hood, in an effort
to prevent such violent behavior from reoccurring. The Department took
immediate action, not by scrutinizing and laying blame to the American
Muslim members of the Armed Forces, but rather by monitoring a variety
of ``indicators of potentially violent behaviors.''\1\ It is clear that
the Department of Defense understands the importance of high morale and
cohesion within our military and the very negative impact of singling
out service members based on their faith. We are concerned that this
hearing will place the retention and morale of our service members at
risk, and we urge the committees to instead focus on the various
indicators of violent behavior that may present a risk to the safety
and security of our service members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ United States Department of Defense, Protecting the Force:
Lessons from Fort Hood (Washington, DC, 2010), 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Islamic Society of North America is wholeheartedly committed to
keeping our country safe, for us, for our children, and for our
American brothers and sisters of all religions or of no religion. We
are seriously aggrieved each time the name of God is used to commit
such ungodly acts as terrorism, and we have taken strides to counter
extremist ideologies within our communities, as we would encourage
everyone to do in theirs. Rather than emphasizing our differences, our
safety as a Nation would be better enhanced if Congress chose to unite
the diverse communities of America in working together to prevent
violent extremism.
It is our hope that the committees will demonstrate great
leadership in this regard, and that they will not let this hearing be
another investigation of one single community in America. Instead, we
hope they will unite us as one American community to do whatever it
takes to keep our military safe. Thank you for the opportunity to
submit testimony for this hearing, and we hope you will take these
concerns into consideration.
______
Statement of S. Floyd Mori, National Executive Director, Japanese
American Citizens League (JACL)
December 7, 2011
Holding today's joint hearing on ``Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat
to Military Communities Inside the United States'' on the seventieth
anniversary of the attacks on Pearl Harbor is particularly poignant.
Seventy years ago today, nearly 2,500 Americans were killed in a
surprise attack by the Japanese Imperial Navy on the U.S. naval base at
Pearl Harbor. The next day Japanese-American husbands and fathers were
taken from their homes, under FBI escort, to Federal detention centers.
Then a few short months later, all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast
were sent to concentration camps for the duration of the entire war.
They were held as prisoners, but charged with no crime. The purported
reason for these unlawful and abhorrent detentions: A fear of homegrown
terrorism. In reality, it was because the U.S. Government questioned
the loyalties and beliefs of our community--of American citizens--based
on nothing more than our race and religion.
The ramifications of the internments were enormous. The community
lost their homes and businesses--lost the ability to provide for their
families. It took years, in some instances, for families to be
reunited. The result was immeasurable heartache and problems within our
families that lingered for decades.
The internment of Japanese-Americans is one of the most shameful
chapters in our country's history. Two decades ago, the Nation
apologized for the grave injustice that was based on hysteria, racism,
and poor political leadership and not justified by concerns about
security. At the National Japanese American Memorial, these words are
carved in stone: ``The lessons learned must remain as a grave reminder
of what we must not allow to happen again to any group.''
I fear we have forgotten the lessons of that time.
Today's hearing purports to look at homegrown terrorism. But in
reality, it will call the loyalties and beliefs of one community of
Americans into question--based on nothing more than race and religion.
Just like what occurred 70 years ago.
This very hearing is causing the harm it's intended to stop. By
focusing exclusively on one group--Muslims--as the source for homegrown
terrorism, we are threatening our communities. We perpetuate the
discrimination and alienation experienced by Muslims. We invite more
and more harassment and hate crimes. We provide excuses for biased law
enforcement practices. And above all, we harm the American values of
equality, diversity, and religious freedom.
The effects of this harm are already visible all around us.
Unfounded animosity and threats towards Muslims are on the rise. A
Brookings poll found that 47% of Americans view Islam as at odds with
American values. Workplace discrimination against Muslim individuals
has increased 150%, doubling over the past 10 years, and there has been
an increase in bullying against Muslim children. The FBI has used its
outreach to the Muslim community as a way to gather intelligence. This
discomfort towards Muslims is being fueled by anti-Muslim rhetoric
spread by military, religious, and political leaders and creates a
fertile climate for discrimination.
This time, we must not let hysteria, racism, and poor political
leadership take us down the same path we went down 70 years ago. We
must not act in ways that sacrifice our most basic American values. We
must not single out one community based on race or religion and deny
them their civil rights. And we must not endanger the foundations of
these communities--their families and houses of worship.
Today is the 70th anniversary of the ``date which will live in
infamy.'' The date is infamous not only for the lives that were lost,
but also for the grave injustices experienced by the Japanese-American
community that followed. That another community, based only on race and
religion, is also suffering grave injustices is disheartening.
The Japanese American Citizens League is the oldest and largest
Asian-American civil rights organization in the United States. The JACL
monitors and responds to issues that enhance or threaten the civil and
human rights of all Americans and implements strategies to effect
positive social change, particularly to the Asian Pacific-American
community.
______
Statement of Shoulder-To-Shoulder: Standing with American Muslims;
Upholding American Values
December 7, 2011
Shoulder-to-Shoulder is a coalition of 27 American faith-based and
interfaith organizations and religious denominations who have joined
together to promote tolerance and put an end to anti-Muslim sentiment.
We share a deep obligation to call upon our elected leaders to foster
an ethical commitment to bedrock American values such as pluralism and
religious freedom, mutuality, and respect--values also at the core of
our religious traditions.
We therefore submit this testimony for the record of the House
Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Government Affairs Joint Hearing entitled ``Homegrown
Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United
States.'' Several Shoulder-to-Shoulder member-organizations endorse
military chaplains and minister to active duty and retired service
personnel.
We firmly believe that keeping service members safe is paramount.
Yet, by focusing only on the American Muslim community for threats of
radicalization, this hearing does a disservice to American Muslims--
especially those serving in the United States Armed Forces--by wrongly
connecting faithful observance of Islam with suspect behavior. This
connection sows mistrust of these men and women by distorting their
military service. Some American Muslim soldiers, buried in Arlington
Cemetery, have given what President Abraham Lincoln called ``the last
full measure of devotion'' while serving their country.
As spiritual leaders and people of faith, we call on the United
States Congress not to perpetuate damaging false witness against our
neighbors. Instead, we urge the Members of these committees to honor
all those who serve in the military protecting foundational American
values of freedom of religion, of pluralism and opportunity for all. We
encourage our elected leaders to honor the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitution that have enabled the free exercise of religion across our
great land--not to turn the exercise of these freedoms into a cause for
suspicion.
All of our faith communities share a powerful prohibition against
bearing false witness, with the understanding that destroying a
person's reputation is tantamount to destroying his or her life. To
assert that American Muslim soldiers are not deeply devoted to
America's safety and the peaceful interaction of its entire citizenry
or that these soldiers are more susceptible to commit acts of violent
extremism--that is false witness. By subjecting American Muslims to
such scrutiny, we weaken our more perfect union, and we harm the
National vision of our common good that is a witness to the nations.
American Muslims serve proudly and with distinction in all branches
of the U.S. armed services, as well as in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, on police forces, and in fire departments, next to
service personnel of all faiths, many having given their lives for our
country. In these and other vocations, Muslims work hard, give back to
their communities, and worship in peace--just as do Americans of other
faiths.
The Muslim community's clergy work closely with the leaders of our
Nation's other faith groups in and out of the military. We study our
sacred texts together, pray together, and join hands to address issues
of shared concern, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
depression, trauma healing, overcoming suicidal tendencies, or coping
with disabilities which often follow from military service. These are
also burdens borne by American Muslim soldiers alongside all other
service members.
As faith leaders, we are committed to building a future in which
extremism is an artifact of the past, and where religious identity is
not the cause of hostility but of acceptance. This country's spiritual,
religious, and ethnic diversity serves to enrich our public discourse.
When our public discourse is enriched, extremism is seldom given
quarter.
We urge the Members of our Government as well as citizens of good
will to refrain from passing judgment on religious or faith groups
based on the actions of the few who pervert their spiritual traditions
through acts of violence and hostile rhetoric. We believe that
politicians, cultural figures, and members of the media are never
justified in exploiting religious differences in order to advance
ideological or political aims. Our leaders in Congress must stand up
and speak out against hearings that perpetuate misrepresentations and
harm our country rather than lead it to greater awareness and a
strengthened citizenry.
We hope to see such lines of inquiry soon cease, for they simply
perpetuate the damaging climate of anti-Muslim sentiment in America
today. As spiritual leaders we have a moral responsibility and a sacred
calling to categorically denounce derision, misinformation, or outright
bigotry directed against any religious group in this country. Silence
is not an option. Only by taking a stand together can we fulfill the
highest calling of our respective faiths, and thereby play a role in
building a safer, more secure America.
Appendix: List of Shoulder-to-Shoulder Member Organizations as of
December 5, 2011
Shoulder-to-Shoulder Campaign Members*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Reflects campaign membership as of December 5, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Baptist Churches USA
The Arab American Institute
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
Church of the Brethren
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship
The Episcopal Church
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Faith in Public Life**
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
** Indicates a member of campaign Executive Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Foundation for Ethnic Understanding**
General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church
Interfaith Alliance
Islamic Society of North America**
Jewish Council for Public Affairs
Jewish Reconstructionist Movement
The Jewish Theological Seminary
National Council of Churches**
National Religious Campaign Against Torture**
The New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good
Presbyterian Church (USA)
Progressive National Baptist Convention
Rabbis for Human Rights--North America
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism**
Sojourners
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
The United Church of Christ
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops**
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
** Indicates a member of campaign Executive Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Universal Muslim Association of America
Representative Sanchez. First of all, Secretary, what do
they bring? Should we just consider maybe not having Muslims in
our military? I mean, are they a vital part? I mean, I lived in
the Middle East. So I think it is important to know the culture
and the language of the people. But, you know, I mean,
sometimes people look and say, let us just not have these
people in our military. What would you say to something like
that?
Mr. Stockton. I would begin by referring back to the
comment that Chairman King made earlier in the hearing, and
that is recognizing the tremendous contributions of Muslim
Americans to National security in the Armed Forces in
particular. We need Muslim Americans in the United States
military. We need native Pashtun speakers, native Dari
speakers, and we need patriots of all religions joining and
maintaining the strength of our Armed Forces.
You raise an important challenge, and that is in today's
environment, how do we both deal with the reality that al-Qaeda
and its affiliates are targeting Department of Defense
facilities as a target of choice, and yet recognize that we
need and value Muslim Americans in the United States military?
The way forward is to focus on indicators of violent behavior,
indicators of radicalism, where we can watch the behavior and
train our supervisory personnel to watch the behavior of their
soldiers in order to identify early on and intervene
effectively early on when they say indicators that within our
ranks we may have potential terrorists.
Representative Sanchez. But it shouldn't just be Muslims. I
mean, because my husband prosecuted plenty of non-Muslims for
radical behavior and shoot-ups and, you know, killing their
wives and their kids and everything else in the military.
Mr. Stockton. It should be anybody who is exhibiting
behaviors that indicate a propensity to become a violent--to
become terrorists. Let me emphasize again, this is about al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents as the primary threat
to American security at home.
Representative Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman King. I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Turner, for 5 minutes.
Representative Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer. You had mentioned
the intellectual underpinnings of radical Islam and--in the
training. Now, the theology of Islam is easily understood.
There is prayer and fasting and charity, similar to all
religions, and adherence to the natural law, do unto others.
Beyond that there is an overlay of politics, and there is a
battle within Islam. The political aspects of this, of course,
are problematic.
It would serve our interests if we understood more about
what is going on within Islam, had we talked to imams and
mullahs and--to get a better understanding of the politics and
the theology; are they inextricable; can--is there a movement
afoot for the intellectual justification for--to combat this
within Islam; and are we taking advantage of it? Or is this
considered too sensitive to address?
Colonel Sawyer. Sir, thank you very much for that question.
I think that the best way to answer that is to point out that
there is a significant distinction between the politics and the
theology that are embraced within the faith, or within the
tradition and within the culture as distinct from the ideology
that is perpetrated and developed and advanced by al-Qaeda, its
adherents, and its affiliates. Once we make this distinction
between the faith and the ideology of these violent Islamist
extremists, we then can start to parse these two pieces apart.
To the second part of your question, not only has the
Department of Defense, but I would argue that the entire
intelligence community, local and State law enforcement have
had extensive outreach efforts to the Muslim-American
community, the imams, to understand this not only from the
perspective of what the faith means in consulting with
academics and true Arabists, but also to understand what it
means within the American context. Because within the diaspora,
we can see different effects there.
This really comes back to the education question that the
other two Members addressed, because if we are not educating
our local law enforcement partners as to these distinctions, it
inhibits our ability to really address the problem in a
comprehensive manner. That is one of the things that the center
at West Point has done very aggressively. In fact, over the
past 2 years, we have educated over 4,100 local, State, and
Federal law enforcement officials, over about 60,000 hours of
education, student hours of education, on these issues, right?
How is it that we can make these people smarter to understand
these very distinctions so that what we don't do is harm our
ability, harm the community, and create worse relations with
the American Muslim community, which are absolutely essential
to solving these problems?
Representative Turner. Mr. Secretary, could you----
Mr. Stockton. Very quickly. Again, it is an excellent
question. I would urge all Members and staff, if they haven't
already, to become familiar with the new White House strategy
empowering local partners, because it is focused precisely on
the challenges you discussed and highlights a new way forward,
a community-based approach, in order to meet the challenges
that we confront.
Representative Turner. Can you identify any leaders in the
Muslim community that are helping you in this regard?
Mr. Stockton. I would be happy to take that question for
the record.
Representative Turner. All right. Thank you. I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Mr. Turner yields back, and I recognize the
gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
Representative Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman and
the Ranking Member, thank you for your courtesies.
Before I left Houston, I initiated with our community and
soldiers a yellow ribbon campaign to welcome home returning
troops that will be coming home from Iraq at the end of
December. I think it is evidence not of one Member's actions,
but really that America loves her military.
So if my Chairpersons would allow me, because I have
questions, I do want to quote a comment from former Secretary
Gates that says our All-Volunteer Force reflects the strength
of our National diversity, and it is composed of patriots who
are first and foremost soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines
sworn to uphold our National values.
I would like to change the direction of the discussion and
talk about Americans, American soldiers who happen to be of
many different faiths. I indicated to my Chairman, Mr. King,
that I am here to be a problem solver. Those who lost their
lives were my neighbors and friends in Fort Hood, Texas. I went
to the memorial service, and I can tell you it is a memory that
I will never forget. Deepest sympathy and the pain that Fort
Hood and those family members and extended friends continue to
experience will never be, I believe, extinguished.
To Mr. Long and the loss of his son, and Mrs. Long, I say
to them that we are paying for the enormous tragedy, and we
should be here to solve problems.
I do want to, however, quote from you, Mr. Secretary, as I
hold up a little book that I have done before and say that we
are constant reminders of the value of this book, and our
soldiers are, in fact, defending the Constitution, which says
that we do have freedom of religion.
I think it is important to note the comment that you made
that our primary threat is al-Qaeda, not at war with Islam. In
your statement you indicated that homegrown terrorists that may
happen to be of a particular faith have limited contact with
al-Qaeda across the ocean, if you will, that they are
intensified by their own research, by the internet. So we have
within our borders and within our ability the skills and tools
that should be utilized to extinguish and to stamp out those
who would do us harm.
Let me just quickly note and pay tribute to Mohsin Naqvi,
who died in Afghanistan, a 26-year-old Muslim, who was among
five soldiers that were killed. His family acknowledged that in
the military he was picked on, but that his goal was to die
defending--or his relatives said defending against acts of
terror and a violent interpretation of Islam the vast majority
of Islams denounce. Let us put that at least on the record and
pay tribute to those who have died.
My question goes specifically to, I think, the major
failures at Fort Hood. Why didn't the military who were aware
of Captain Hasan's violence at Walter Reed pass that
information on to the brass at Fort Hood? Where was the
disconnect?
Let me quickly add two other questions so that you can
quickly answer them. I am concerned about soft targets, and I
know that you may refer to some of these, but soft targets. I
am the Ranking Member on the transportation security committee.
We see our soldiers traveling in airports, train stations, bus
stations. Some soldiers will be coming home in their uniform
and going into neighborhoods and corners around this Nation.
What have we begun to do to already address the potential of
soft targets and soldiers who are walking alone in various
places in America?
On the idea of databases, one of the recommendations of the
independent review was sharing databases.
May I yield to you to answer at least two of those
questions?
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, I would like to answer your first
question about the activities of Major Hasan and why they were
not reported to his chain of command or to Army leaders.
Prior to the Fort Hood shootings, as I have expressed in
earlier comments to Chairman King, we did not have the right
behavioral indicators to the force, and we did not educate our
force in this regard. Since that time, we have revised the
regulation, and I am confident today that the behavior
indicators we have in this regulation would allow soldiers to
report the information that--which you discussed about Major
Hasan. So I believe that is--you know, the bottom line is we
did not educate our force properly prior to that, and that
information did not get reported.
Representative Jackson Lee. We are doing more as it relates
to behavioral training, which I think overcomes the idea of
stigmatizing one religion versus another. Are we really
focusing in on the actions of an individual soldier, internet
use, overly aggressive in their faith or their actions towards
their families?
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, in the table 3.3, which I referred
to earlier, those indicators of extremist activity, those
indicators are focused on the behavioral activity that would
encompass all of those topics you just mentioned.
Representative Jackson Lee. Secretary Stockton, any
response on the soft targets that are beyond the bases where
soldiers are wearing their uniforms?
Chairman King. The gentlelady's time has expired, but
Secretary Stockton can answer the question.
Mr. Stockton. Very briefly, local law enforcement and
having our military facility commanders tightly engaged with
them so that local law enforcement can be in the lead for
security in those kinds of soft targets.
Representative Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. I think
we have much more distance to travel on these issues of
securing our military families and soldiers in the United
States.
I yield back.
Chairman King. The gentlelady yields back, and I recognize
the former attorney general of the State of California, the
Chairman of our cybersecurity subcommittee, Mr. Lungren.
Representative Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me just say unequivocally my great
support for those who are serving in the military today and for
those of you who are appearing on this panel.
Secretary Stockton, are we at war with violent Islamist
extremism?
Mr. Stockton. No, sir. We are at war with al-Qaeda, its
affiliates, and adherents.
Representative Lungren. Okay. I understand that. But my
question is, is violent Islamist extremism at war with us?
Mr. Stockton. No, sir. We are being attacked by al-Qaeda
and its allies.
Representative Lungren. Is al-Qaeda--can it be described as
being an exponent of violent Islamist extremism?
Mr. Stockton. Al-Qaeda are murderers with an ideological
agenda----
Representative Lungren. That wasn't my question. My
question was: Is al-Qaeda acting out violent Islamist
extremism?
Mr. Stockton. Al-Qaeda is a violent organization dedicated
to overthrowing the values that we intend to advance----
Representative Lungren. Is it yes or no?
Mr. Stockton. Can I hear the question again? I will make it
as clear as I can. We are not at war with Islam.
Representative Lungren. I didn't ask that. I did not ask
that, sir. I asked whether we are at war with violent Islamist
extremism. That is my question.
Mr. Stockton. No. We are at war with al-Qaeda and its
affiliates.
Representative Lungren. How does al-Qaeda define itself?
Are they dedicated to violent Islamist extremism?
Mr. Stockton. Al-Qaeda would love to convince Muslims
around the world that the United States is at war with Islam.
Representative Lungren. I didn't say that.
Mr. Stockton. That is a prime propaganda tool, and I am not
going to aid and abet that effort to advance their propaganda
goals.
Representative Lungren. My question is: Is there a
difference between Islam and violent Islamist extremism?
Mr. Stockton. Sir, with great respect, I don't believe it
is helpful to frame our adversary as Islamic with any set of
qualifiers that we might add, because we are not at war with
Islam.
Representative Lungren. I understand that. I never said we
were at war with Islam. One of the questions we are trying to
deal with is the radicalization of Islam, is the radicalization
of Islamic youth. If we can't distinguish between violent
Islamist extremism and Islam, then all this stuff about
behavioral indicators doesn't mean anything.
Let me ask you this question: Is it a behavioral indicator
to put on your card that you are a soldier of Allah?
Mr. Stockton. A behavioral indicator that you have a copy
of Inspire magazine on your desk----
Representative Lungren. That is not my question. That is
not my question. My question is: Is it a behavioral indicator
to put on your card that you are a soldier of Allah, as Major
Hasan did?
Mr. Stockton. We have behavioral indicators now that enable
our personnel, our supervisors to focus on detecting indicators
of violent extremism that reflect the lessons learned from Fort
Hood.
Representative Lungren. Okay. Is that a lesson learned,
that if you put ``soldier of Allah'' on your card, that you
ought to follow up and investigate that?
Mr. Stockton. We are training our supervisors to follow up
on appropriate indicators and exercise the leadership they need
in order to provide for effective reporting and----
Representative Lungren. Do you agree with the statement to
someone representing the Department of Defense on the weekend
after the shooting that it would be a greater tragedy to lose
our program of diversity than what had occurred?
Mr. Stockton. Let me go back to something that Chairman
King said. I was trained up by Senator Moynihan. There was
nobody less politically correct than Senator Moynihan. I follow
the truth wherever it takes me, and I strongly support the
programs of the Department of Defense that focus on al-Qaeda
and behavioral indicators.
Representative Lungren. I appreciate this.
Mr. Stockton. This is not about political correctness. This
is about defeating our adversary.
Representative Lungren. Well, sir, I would disagree with
you that it may not be about political correctness. We are here
talking about the fact that we now have to have behavioral
indicators. I agree with that. But my question is: If someone
gives inflammatory remarks, as did Major Hasan, in an open
setting, if he has on his card that he was a soldier of Allah,
it seems to me to be beyond common sense to think that those
are not behavioral indicators.
So my question is: If I am a member of the military today,
and I see those two events or those two circumstances, would it
be appropriate for me to report those as behavioral indicators?
Now, that is not a question of whether or not you are being
politically correct, sir. I am asking to answer that specific
question. If I am a soldier and asked you that question, what
do you tell me?
Mr. Stockton. Inflammatory rhetoric of the sort associated
with Major Hasan, that needs to be reported. Our officers are
trained up now to report on that behavior.
Representative Lungren. I thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Stuteville----
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired.
Representative Lungren. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman King. I recognize Senator Pryor for 5 minutes.
Senator.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for doing
this, and thank you for all of us.
I want to thank the witnesses here for being here today,
and thank you for your service, and just tell you how much we
all appreciate everything you do for the country.
Let me start, if I may, with a sore subject for me, and
that is as many of our Senators and Congressmen have mentioned
today, we had a situation in Little Rock where two of our
recruiters, servicemen, were killed and targeted by someone who
had been radicalized, and he has been very open about that. He
has told everyone who will listen that that is why he did this,
and that is why they were targeted. But under the Department of
Defense regulations, he is not--they are not entitled to
receive their Purple Hearts. So, Mr. Stockton, could you talk
to the joint committee here about why the Department of Defense
has said they are not entitled to receive their Purple Hearts?
Mr. Stockton. This has been a decision led thus far by the
Department of the Army, so I defer to Mr. Stuteville.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Please. Thank you.
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, the attacks on the Little Rock
recruiting station were tragic, and the loss of our soldiers
any time for any event is a tragic situation.
As you know, the award of the Purple Heart is governed by
Federal statutes, Executive Orders, and the Department of
Defense and Army regulations which state that the Purple Heart
is to be awarded to soldiers for wounds or injuries received as
a direct result of enemy action or international terrorist
attack on the United States. The incident at Little Rock,
Arkansas, is considered a criminal act and was not deemed an
international terrorist act, and therefore, as unfortunate as
it is, the Secretary of the Army could not award the Purple
Hearts to those two soldiers. Sir, should information surface
in the future that would change that to an international act,
then the Secretary would be allowed to relook at it. But at
this time, the decision is based on that.
Senator Pryor. The concern I have there is the perpetrator
has admitted that it was a terrorist act. I mean, he
intentionally did this, he intentionally sought out these two
recruiters, he was trying to kill Americans in uniform. He had
been to Yemen and had been radicalized, and he freely admits
this. I mean, he is not hiding it. He is bragging about it to
anyone who will listen. So I am having trouble understanding
why you don't--why the Army does not consider this a terrorist
attack.
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, the Secretary of the Army did have all
that information available to him when he made the decision;
however, it still was not deemed as sufficient enough
information to indicate this was a terrorist act. I will take
your concerns back, sir, to the Army leadership at the
conclusion of this hearing.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Thank you. I know that the U.S.
attorney in Little Rock wanted to try the case, but just for
whatever legal reasons, I am not sure why it ended up in State
court, and it was a criminal matter in State court. But
certainly the U.S. attorney tried very hard, my understanding
is, to characterize it as a terrorist act on U.S. soil and have
the prosecution done in Federal court. But nonetheless, it
ended up in State court.
So I would very much appreciate hearing back from you on
this. I know Senator Boozman and I, my colleague from Arkansas,
we have a bill to try and clarify this. But I just think we are
sending a very mixed message about the threats we have here and
the sacrifices our men and women in uniform make, and it is a
head-scratcher to me. So I would appreciate you getting back
with me after you relook at this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield? Here
I am, Senator. Here I am.
I simply want to--you are from Arkansas, but I simply want
to join with you in seeking clarification. In the line of duty
and in combat are two maybe confusing themes when your
constituents are fallen, and the actor is associated with acts
of terrorism. So I think we can do this in a bipartisan,
bicameral manner, respecting the Department of Defense. You
quoted a statute that I think was written by the Congress. So I
would ask that as you take Senator Pryor's request back, that
you would add for those of us who are from Texas who have the
same pain from any families and find a way not to ignore the
Department of Defense or disrespect the definition of a Purple
Heart, but to find a way to come to recognition of the violence
of the death of those who were at the hands of someone who was
acting in the war on terror, the alleged war on terror, as it
relates to the United States of America. I yield back to the
gentleman.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Representative Cravaack. Will the gentleman yield as well?
Chairman King. The Senator's time has expired, but we will
get to you.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
Chairman King. I would like to recognize the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, and ask him if he would yield to me
for 5 seconds.
Representative Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the Obama administration refuses----
Chairman King. Mr. Duncan, I asked you to yield to me for 5
seconds.
Representative Duncan. Okay.
Chairman King. Just one observation, Mr. Stockton. You said
al-Qaeda is the enemy. We seem to be focusing on al-Qaeda. That
would exclude, for instance, the Pakistani Taliban, which
carried out the Times Square bombing in New York. So I am just
saying that it is not just al-Qaeda. It is al-Qaeda. It is also
other Islamist extremist groups throughout the world.
Senator Lieberman. Chairman, thank you. Very briefly. I
agree with you. In other words, it includes Lashkar-e-Taiba in
Pakistan, al-Shabaab in Somalia. They are all part of this
violent Islamist extremism movement, and they will all threaten
the United States of America.
Chairman King. Without antagonizing the gentleman from
South Carolina further----
Representative Duncan. That is where I thought we were, Mr.
Chairman. I apologize.
Just to further that point, because along those same lines,
the administration refuses to understand and exploit terrorist
semantics and the enemy code words. The 9/11 Commission report
used the language identifying enemy 39 times, jihad 126 times,
al-Qaeda 36 times, Shari'a 2 times. Then the most recent,
Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, in 2010, used
these terms zero times.
I have said many times in committee hearings, Mr. Chairman,
that we have got to be able to identify the enemy if we are
ever going to defeat the enemy. I think that is important.
During the Cold War, the United States conducted its diplomacy
toward the Soviet Union on the basis of complete ignorance of
the Soviet definition of the expression ``peaceful
coexistence.'' Unlike the conventional American understanding
of it, i.e., we may dislike each other, but we will live and
let live, Soviet literature and official political lexicons
defined it rather as a form of struggle against capitalism
where all forms of struggle are permissible except all-out war.
I think we have got to identify the enemy. I think we have
to be willing to discuss the true threat to this Nation and
discuss it in terms that are realistic. So according to the
information provided the committee, the Army's new Threat
Awareness and Reporting Program refuses to identify and discuss
violent Islamist extremism.
So the question for you, Mr. Stuteville, is: Were Major
Nidal Hasan and Sergeant Hasan Akbar, who killed 15, wounded 33
of their fellow soldiers--were they motivated by Islamist
extremism?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, I would characterize it as their
motivations, particularly in terms of Major Hasan, we really
can't discuss those today because his issue is still, as you
know, awaiting prosecution. I would simply say in our new
approach to----
Representative Duncan. Let me just establish the fact that
he was in communication with al-Awlaki. I just establish that.
That has been proven. Sorry to interrupt you.
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, I still believe that our current
approach of focusing on the behavioral indicators of any
individual who does certain things and those get reported back
is the best way to prevent these type of attacks from recurring
in the future. That, to me, is the focus, and that is the
Army's approach, and we believe it is successful to prevent any
of these in the future.
Representative Duncan. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I really just
wanted to make that point. I really don't have anything further
for these gentlemen other than just to encourage you going
forward and the policies of this administration and the
military going forward is that we truly identify the enemy of
this country. Let us have the courage to discuss openly and
honestly and use the terms that are necessary to defeat this
enemy once and for all and make this country and this world a
safe place. I think we do that by being honest with ourselves
and honest with the American people.
So I yield back.
Chairman King. If the gentleman from South Carolina would
yield to the gentleman from Minnesota the balance of his time?
Representative Duncan. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Minnesota.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you for yielding.
I appreciate the comments regarding the Purple Heart. Why
these young men are not receiving the Purple Heart I do not
understand. I think that they are casualties of war, a war on
terrorism, quite frankly. I also would like to see--have a
statement back explaining to me from the Secretary of the Army
why he does not consider two of his troopers victims--not
victims, but warriors that were killed in combat.
Thank you, sir. I yield back to my gentleman.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back, and I now
recognize the gentlelady from California Ms. Richardson for 5
minutes.
Representative Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
wanted to thank you both, Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman,
Ranking Member Collins and Thompson, for bringing us forward on
this very important subject.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service. I am going to ask
you a couple of questions that will simply require a yes or no
answer.
Question No. 1: Is there a threat to military communities
limited to only Islamic extremists? Yes or no. I will start
with you, Secretary Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. Thank you for that question. It allows me to
address a couple of the other questions that came----
Representative Richardson. I am sorry, Mr. Stockton. I am
not a Ranking Member within leadership, so I have only got 5
minutes. So if you would just simply--a yes or no.
Mr. Stockton. Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherents
are a primary threat. That is the center of gravity, but we
recognize other threats confront the United States as well.
Representative Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Stuteville.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, in keeping to your yes or no answer,
I would have to say no in this particular case.
Representative Richardson. So the question was: Is there a
threat to military communities only limited to Islamic
extremists, and your answer is no, correct?
Mr. Stuteville. Correct.
Representative Richardson. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer. Ma'am, I would agree with the previous
panelists, that it is not only limited.
Representative Richardson. Second question: Is the threat
to U.S. communities limited to Islamic extremists only? Yes or
no. Secretary Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. My same answer would apply.
Representative Richardson. Mr. Stuteville.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, that would be no.
Representative Richardson. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer. Yes, ma'am, no to that as well.
Representative Richardson. Third question: What other
violent extremist groups exist?
Secretary Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. I would prefer to take that for the record
and go into some detail with you.
Representative Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Stuteville.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, I would have to follow Mr.
Stockton's lead on that, please.
Representative Richardson. Okay. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer. Ma'am, we have also seen a proliferation of
other movements that share--outside the Islamic faith as has
been characterized by other members that have been targeting
from the Christian right movement and the identity movement
within the United States, and that is the reason why my answer
is no.
Representative Richardson. Thank you, gentlemen.
My next question is: It has been said here today that there
were in the 1990s skinheads, white extremists and so on. Would
you agree that skinheads and white extremists no longer exist
and are not a threat to this country or our military bases?
Secretary Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. They are likely to still be a threat.
Representative Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Stuteville.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, my answer would be no.
Representative Richardson. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer. I don't really have knowledge on those
threats, ma'am, so I would defer that question to the record,
please.
Representative Richardson. Would you say that they exist?
Colonel Sawyer. Yes.
Representative Richardson. Mr. Stuteville, would you say
that they exist?
Mr. Stuteville. Yes, ma'am, I would.
Representative Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
I went through those questions because what we were told as
Members, the topic of this hearing was ``Homegrown Terrorism:
The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States.''
It doesn't say ``Islamic'' anywhere in here.
Let me ask a separate question that I think might be
helpful for you gentlemen, particularly you, Secretary
Stockton. The budget cut effects in this dire environment that
we are all facing, there is included in the sequestration the
possibility of cutting the military. How would you see that
these cuts would affect the work that you need to do?
Mr. Stockton. Thank you for that question. Both to sustain
the progress that we have under way, but also to accomplish new
starts that we have been able to launch due to--the current
fiscal environment, they would be put at risk. Secretary
Panetta has made it clear that National security would be at
risk by sequestration, and I fully support his position.
Representative Richardson. Mr. Stuteville.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, I second Secretary Stockton's
comments.
Representative Richardson. Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer.
Colonel Sawyer. I would completely concur, ma'am.
Representative Richardson. Okay. Last question: Assistant
Secretary Stockton, when DOD begins to implement the CVE and
the violent behavioral training throughout the services, how
important is it to make sure that our soldiers are not
targeted; that we are not going to find stereotyping going on
based upon race, religion, and ethnicity? What specific steps
are you going to do to assure that the appropriate training and
monitoring exists; so even after you do the training and you
say, no, this isn't supposed to be stereotyping and targeting,
what are you going to do to ensure that that won't occur?
Mr. Stockton. We have a White House-directed review under
way right now to address the challenges you identified. We are
in it for the long haul to not only to make sure that in a
snapshot we are doing what we need to do, but to sustain those
standards in the future.
Representative Richardson. Thank you. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5
minutes.
Representative Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to
the panel for being here. I apologize for not having a chance
to hear some of the questioning that went on.
But let me ask Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer first, to what
extent is al-Qaeda targeting military communities in the United
States? Is this trend increasing?
Colonel Sawyer. Sir, it is a difficult question to answer
in terms of whether or not there is direct targeting from
abroad. What we do know is that about 56 percent of those
direct attacks against the military for the past 10 years since
9/11 have been through passive radicalization; in other words,
individuals here within the United States that reach out and
subscribe to the ideology of al-Qaeda and its adherents and its
affiliated organizations and mobilize and radicalize on their
own. So the fact that al-Qaeda is perpetrating this ideology,
that they are proliferating it in a way and identifying the
military as a prime target and as a legitimate target, to act
in a preemptive manner is significant because it allows these
individuals within the United States to seek that out and
understand why the military is such a powerful target that
reifies their narrative.
Representative Walberg. So the trend is increasing?
Colonel Sawyer. Yes, sir. It is certainly persistent as we
have seen it, and it certainly has increased since 2007.
Representative Walberg. That would be equal or--there would
be an increasing trend as well with other radicalized Islamic
terrorist organizations, including al-Shabaab and others. Would
that be the same concern?
Colonel Sawyer. Yes, sir.
Representative Walberg. Okay. We are all--I think safely we
could say we are all delighted that Osama bin Laden is no
longer anything but room temperature, wherever that room might
be. We are glad that he is not the focus or the face of radical
terrorism at this point. But in the process of locating him,
approaching him, and dealing with him, there are some of us
that have at least some concerns or questions about how it was
carried out before and aftermath.
So let me ask you, Colonel Sawyer, was it harmful for the
Special Operations Forces involved in the May 1, 2011, killing
of Osama bin Laden to be publicly identified?
Colonel Sawyer. Sir, this is--this is a difficult question.
I would like to take it for the record and address in
classified session, if we may.
Representative Walberg. Secretary Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. I would recommend that approach as well.
Representative Walberg. I assume, Mr. Stuteville, the same
thing?
Mr. Stuteville. Yes, sir.
Representative Walberg. Did their public identification
endanger these units' members and/or their families?
Mr. Stockton.
Mr. Stockton. I would welcome to take that issue on in
classified session, please.
Representative Walberg. Let me try one other question
related to that. Should units involved in such sensitive
operations be identified in the future?
Mr. Stockton. Again, I welcome the opportunity, sir, to
discuss that in closed session.
Chairman King. If I could just say to the gentleman from
Michigan, Tim, we are going to be meeting in the closed session
after this hearing, so the Secretary will be available.
Representative Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
yield my time back.
Chairman King. I would like to recognize the newest Member
of the committee--or the newest Member on the Minority side,
one of the hardest working, Ms. Hahn from California.
Representative Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman,
both Ranking Members. Thanks for this opportunity.
It has been a very interesting hearing. There are so many
things that I am disturbed about, particularly with the Fort
Hood massacre and the failure, in my opinion, of the higher-ups
to properly take discipline action against Major Hasan. I don't
think it was about political correctness. I think there were so
many indicators, you know, and policies that I believe were
probably already in place that were just not adhered to; the
fact that the guy, you know, was an Army psychiatrist, he was
transferred, he had bizarre behavior, you know, he had a bad
performance evaluation, and yet nothing was done.
I am happy that we have got new policies in place where you
think some of these indicators are going to be more recognized,
but I still believe there was a failure with policies that were
already in place that were not adhered to, and that is really a
huge part of the tragedy that I am disturbed about.
You know, my question is going to be about--and I believe,
as has been said, that I think all threats, regardless of
religion or ideology, are what we need to be paying attention
to. If we just are focusing on a certain particular ideology,
then we are exposing ourselves to threats that will put our
country at risk.
I am concerned about the military families and the military
bases. In my district out in California, my district includes
the L.A. Air Force base, so certainly that is a big concern of
mine. But also in my community of San Pedro, we have housed
military families forever. We have the Army families there. We
have Navy family housing there. We have Air Force housing.
So my question is going to be what are we doing, and what
can you tell me that we are doing, to protect the families who
live in our communities, the kids who are going to school in
our schools? Are we paying attention to the potential risk and
danger that families of militaries have in these identified
military housing projects in communities throughout this
country?
Mr. Stockton. I would like to say a few words and then turn
it over to my colleague. I have regular meetings with Sheriff
Baca. State and local fusion centers that apply to your
district are focused on this kind of challenge. Aagain, being
tight with law enforcement, between law enforcement and our
installation commanders so that we can take care of military
families as well as personnel who are on base, behind the
perimeter and in uniform, that is part of our area of focus.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, I have referred to our Threat
Awareness and Reporting Program several times this morning. As
part of that training, we make that training available to
family members as well. The primary focus of the training is to
soldiers and civilians in the Armed Forces and in the Army.
But the other thing we have done is, we have put that
training on-line so that any dependent with a common access
card can access that training through the Training and Doctrine
Center on-line, as well as we make it available for dependents
to attend the training. Should the situation warrant, they have
a large enough facility like an auditorium at their
installation to allow that.
The other part of that is we have since put in place across
the Army the iWATCH program, which is a little bit like the
``See Something, Say Something'' program. We have disseminated
that program widely across our family communities so they all
have access to that information.
Representative Hahn. Thank you.
My colleague Congresswoman Richardson alluded to the tough
decisions that Congress is going to be making about budgets,
and it seems to me all of the recommendations that are made are
all going to really be dependent on budget. Can you tell me
what sequestration will have--what kind of an effect that will
have particularly on base security?
Mr. Stockton. I would like to take that, please, for the
record and give you a detailed response.
Representative Hahn. Thank you.
Anybody else?
Thank you. Let me just add on to the family members. Are we
also working with schools who have these kids in their schools?
Are we working with teachers, counselors to also to be able to
maybe identify some of the behavior that we are talking about
that maybe we are only targeting the adults who exhibit that
kind of behavior?
Mr. Stockton. Community engagement has a special focus now
on schools, and we are taking that part of the overall strategy
that the White House has issued this summer very, very
seriously.
Representative Hahn. Thank you very much. I yield back my
time.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
I recognize the Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Representative McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
to both Chairmen here today having this historic hearing. It is
very important.
My district--well, Fort Hood is just right outside my
district, just north of my district. I went to the funeral
services for the 13 slain soldiers with the combat boots and
the rifles and the helmets. I know you are very familiar and
aware of all of this. It was very emotional. At that time, we
didn't really know the connection between Major Hasan and al-
Awlaki, and to some extent we still don't know how much of a
connection there really was.
I do recall asking soldiers who were wounded, who I thought
were the best evidence, you know, what did he say as he shot
you? They said, ``Allahu Akbar,'' over and over. He screamed
it. At that point in time, I realized that there may be
something a little more to this case than just a murder case.
Since that time, I think Senator Lieberman came out with an
excellent report outlining a lot of this investigation.
I was--you know, I worked in the Justice Department, Joint
Terrorism Task Force. I understand how this all works. I
understand FISAs. But when it came to my attention that the
JTTF in San Diego had information that Major Hasan at a
military base just north of my district was communicating with
Anwar al-Awlaki, perhaps the greatest terrorist threat while he
was alive, over the internet, and the idea that that
information was not shared with Fort Hood, and I asked General
Cone at the ceremony, I said, wouldn't you have liked to have
known more about this guy or just a heads-up that maybe you
want to take a look at this guy, keep an eye on him? That
possibly could have stopped the death of the 13 soldiers.
What I would argue is it was the greatest attack on
American soil since the 9/11 terrorist attack.
I think in the report that Senator Lieberman issued, the
FBI of course said, ``That is our boy.'' That was their
response when they saw Major Hasan being arrested.
So my first question is, you know, why wasn't that
information shared that could have prevented this attack? What
are we doing to make sure that never happens again?
I guess probably the best person would be, I guess, Mr.--
okay, Mr. Stockton?
Mr. Stockton. I will start, and then I will invite my
colleagues to add more.
The first problem, the most severe problem, is that the
personnel in that Joint Terrorism Task Force did not understand
the duty to share this information when there is what we call a
Department of Defense nexus. Our installation commander at Fort
Hood needed to know the information that the JTTFs had, and the
JTTF needed to understand that they have a duty to share that
with us.
Second, we didn't have the kind of personnel around the
Nation from the Department of Defense in Joint Terrorism Task
Forces to make it stick, to build the habitual relationships,
to build the practices of sharing that would ensure that,
again, the base commander was getting the information needed.
Then, finally, we need to ensure that it is not happening
by onesies and twosies, that institution-to-institution we get
information from the FBI that is widely distributed on a
regular basis throughout the Department of Defense so our
installation commanders in all of the armed services are
getting what they need in a timely and effective fashion.
Representative McCaul. Well, I hope we fixed it. We can't
change what happened in the past, but I sure hope, you know,
that we have fixed that problem.
You know, the way this guy was kicked--the can kicked down
the road, no one wanted to deal with it. Chairman King always
talks about political correctness, and this was political
correctness gone just awry. You know, time after time, flags
coming up about, you know, he is defending bin Laden, he is
proselytizing, and nobody wants to deal with it.
Is the military changing its strategy in dealing with
people that they can, you know, perceive to be radicalizing
within our military, at our bases?
Mr. Stuteville. Sir, again, as I have reiterated a lot this
morning, our behavioral indicators capture all the key
indicators that we believe would indicate someone is going down
the path of radicalization.
To answer your question further about the information-
sharing between the Department, the services, and the FBI, I
would be glad to share specific examples with you in the closed
hearing about how that process now works much more effectively.
Representative McCaul. You may not be able to answer this
question. Perhaps it is more appropriate in the closed hearing,
but----
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Representative McCaul [continuing]. I would like to know
about the connection between al-Awlaki and Mr. Hasan. Because
there is one.
I yield back.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize my colleague from upstate New York, the
gentlelady, Ms. Hochul.
Representative Hochul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do appreciate this opportunity. I am sorry I missed some
of the earlier questioning, but Fort Hood is personal to me. I
was with the father of a young man who was stationed there
while he was still awaiting word on whether or not his son was
dead or alive. So we suffered through this, as did the country,
as do the families who survived. I know you want to get it
right. Let that be the last case we ever have, that act of
domestic terrorism on one of our military bases.
I currently represent a base in upstate New York, the
Niagara Falls Air Force Base. Through the hearings that we have
had since my brief 6 months on this committee, I have learned a
lot. There is a Hezbollah threat facing us right across the
border in Toronto. That is not very far from my Air Force base.
Homeland Security has reported that there are more threats to
terrorism in this country along the Northern Border than the
Southern Border. We have a large expanse of land on our border
with Canada which is virtually unprotected.
I just want to ask the question: Do you feel that there is
an additional threat to any bases along the Northern Border as
opposed to the Southern Border? Are additional safeguards being
taken to protect them?
Mr. Secretary and former colleague of Senator Moynihan's,
we are alumni, so we both understand the political-correctness
issue, as well, so----
Mr. Stockton. And why we are not going to be politically
correct.
Base commanders have the obligation not only to take the
general guidance that the Department of Defense applies, but to
take in local threats, local circumstances, as a prime factor
in building their specific anti-terrorism and force-protection
packages.
So I would say, yes, indeed, along the Northern Border, as
well as in other specific areas where there are challenges for
security, base commanders are required to take those special
circumstances into account.
Representative Hochul. Thank you.
Mr. Stuteville. Ma'am, I would like to further amplify that
by--U.S. Northern Command, as you know, NORTHCOM, has the
authority to set the force-protection conditions at bases in
CONUS. Of course, their AOR, their area of responsibility,
includes the Northern and Southern Borders. So I think they do
that very well. So that is to amplify Secretary Stockton's
comments on that.
Representative Hochul. Thank you.
Colonel Sawyer. In addition to that, I would add that there
has been a significant movement in a Northern Border initiative
between the interagency with DOJ, FBI, U.S. attorney's offices
to share information and to make that available to the variety
of forces. So a specific look at that is really helping our
understanding, and then the cooperation amongst the variety of
agencies that are needed to address this problem.
Representative Hochul. I understand that today's hearing is
focused on threat to our domestic bases. I am also very
concerned about our bases overseas. We have had attacks, we
have lost nine CIA members because of threats that became
reality. I want to make sure that our focus is not limited to
our bases here, because we have men and women serving in harm's
way elsewhere.
We protect them on the battlefield--I am also on the Armed
Services Committee--but we also have to protect them from these
threats, as well. I hope we are taking a holistic approach to
this. This is very important to me.
Also, again, my area has been affected by really the first-
known domestic terrorists after 9/11, which was the Lackawanna
Six case. We had people who lived in our backyards who had gone
over and trained with Osama bin Laden, and they knew that there
was going to be an attack on 9/11 before 9/11. So we need to be
vigilant. Those people have been prosecuted, they were sent to
jail, and they are now back, and they are actually becoming
cooperating witnesses and have been very helpful to us.
That case aside, I want to make sure that there is no place
else where people are engaging in activity that could be
harmful to our bases. This is very important. I understand that
you understand the lessons from Fort Hood, as well. I am
pleased to hear that we all agree this can never happen again
in our country. So thank you very much.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentlelady yields back.
I will note that she was too modest to point out that her
husband is one of the lead prosecutors against terrorism in
northern New York.
I would now like to ask the panel to step down, but ask
them to remain for the closed session which will follow the
testimony and questioning of our next witness.
While we are waiting for the people to leave and come in
and Mr. Long to take his seat at the panel, I don't want to
embarrass Lauren at all on my staff, but Lauren Wenger has done
a tremendous job in putting this hearing together, and her
parents are here in the committee room today. Lauren will never
speak to me again after embarrassing her like this, but I do
want to acknowledge you and thank her.
I am now pleased to welcome as our next witness, Mr. Daris
Long. Mr. Long is the father of William Andrew Long, a young
Army private who was killed outside an Arkansas military
recruiting center in 2009.
Mr. Long has a distinguished record of service to his
country that includes 17 years of enlisted service in the
United States Marine Corps and 10 years as an officer. During
his military career, Mr. Long served nearly 8 years overseas
and nearly 19 years in the operating forces of the Fleet Marine
Force.
In addition, due in part to his father's extensive overseas
service with the Federal Government, Mr. Long spent his
childhood in Afghanistan and has visited roughly 50 countries,
including Pakistan, India, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran. Between him and his wife Janice, his family has been
connected with the United States Armed Forces since 1918.
Before I recognize Mr. Long for his opening statement, I
would like to acknowledge the presence of Mr. Melvin Bledsoe,
who is seated directly behind Mr. Long. Mr. Bledsoe, as you may
recall, testified before the House committee in March of this
year. He is the father of Carlos Bledsoe, who has been
convicted of murdering Mr. Long's son. Mr. Bledsoe's presence
here, and in support of Mr. Long, is a testament to how two
fathers have channeled their considerable pain to stand
together in the fight against violent Islamist extremism.
Mr. Bledsoe, thank you for being here again today. Thank
you for your testimony back in March.
Now I am privileged to recognize Mr. Daris Long for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DARIS LONG, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FATHER OF WILLIAM
ANDREW LONG
Mr. Long. Chairman King, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Thompson, distinguished Members of Congress, since my son's
death my view of things has changed. I have lain awake through
my wife's nightmares when she relives being 50 feet away while
Andy and Quinton were shot.
I was a career Marine, both enlisted and as an officer of
Marines. My wife served in the Navy, was honorably discharged.
Our family has served in various military branches since World
War I. We have one son who served in Iraq as an Army cavalry
scout and one son who was infantry, who is buried in the
ground.
My faith in Government is diminished. It invents euphemisms
instead of accurate language, while perpetrators speak freely,
using the very words deemed offensive, to justify their
actions. Clarity is absent. Little Rock is a drive-by; Fort
Hood is just workplace violence.
Three days after Andy died, it was reported on the internet
by Major Garrett, who stated the White House had released a
statement on the Little Rock shootings but only to Arkansas
news outlets--if they asked for one. According to Garrett, the
White House didn't think there was much interest in the story
otherwise.
We believe the push from certain press outlets and talk
radio put pressure on the White House over the President's
response on a ``terrorist'' attack against an abortion doctor,
which starkly contrasted with the ``saddened'' statement on the
killing and wounding of American soldiers in America's
heartland. The White House issued a letter of condolence. We
received a personal phone call from the President. The
President's press statement is conspicuously absent from the
White House website.
Two New Jersey men, 14 Minnesota men arrested for planning
to go to Somalia and join al-Shabaab, and 2 men in Seattle
planning on attacking a recruiting center--all resulting in
Federal indictments for terrorism. The Government caught a
Somali crossing from Yemen to Somalia, then sneaked him to
arraign him in a New York Federal court. He now has all the
legal rights of an American citizen, while Andy and Quinton's
rights bled out on the pavement in Little Rock.
People within the Federal Government like to trumpet its
success in thwarting attacks. Former Homeland Security Security
Tom Ridge said we just got lucky when the Christmas day and New
York Times Square bombers failed. Luck is not an effective
counterterrorism strategy. Great law enforcement, but nothing
was thwarted.
The latest Fort Hood episode was planned by a soldier who
had previously been the subject of a mainstream-media blitz for
taking his conscientious-objector stand to get out of going to
Afghanistan. He was painted as the peaceful Muslim poster boy
with principles. It is telling that his discharge was on hold
because he was facing child pornography charges and was AWOL
from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Once again, Federal terrorism
charges.
In an attack that resulted in the first death and wounding
of American soldiers on U.S. soil since 9/11, action by the
Department of Justice is absent. Little Rock has morphed into
nothing more than a drive-by shooting. Abdulhakim Muhammad's
jihad in America has been downplayed by the Federal Government
and the mainstream media, causing irreparable change to the
families involved, as well as flat-out lying to the American
people.
I am convinced the Government's position is to deny Little
Rock as a terrorist attack. By not being open and transparent,
and despite promises to do so, to this administration's shame,
two soldiers have been abandoned on the battlefield in the
advancement of a political agenda.
November 5, 2009, an attack took place at Fort Hood. In
each instance, a clear tie to Yemen, but still no Federal
indictments. My take is that if you plan or fail in a terrorist
attack, you will be charged, but if you kill in this country
under the banner of jihad, we are told it isn't terrorism, and
Federal judicial response is neither confirmed nor denied.
We firmly believe that if the White House had shown the
same attitude concerning Little Rock as was shown in the
killing of Dr. Tiller, a clear message could have been sent.
The political correctness exhibited by our Government over
offending anyone in admitting the truth about Islamic extremism
masked alarm bells that were going off. Warnings were ignored.
Major Nidal Hasan was able to openly praise the Little Rock
shootings in front of fellow Army officers and then commit his
own jihad.
The last planned attack at Fort Hood was stopped because an
ordinary citizen recognized the signs. If our Government and
press had done their jobs in calling out and honestly reporting
on Little Rock, Fort Hood may have been avoided.
The blatant masking and disregard of the facts not only
endanger American citizens of non-Muslim faith but those of
Muslim heritage who do not adhere to the extremist beliefs
demonstrated by a militant and political form of jihad. I grew
up in Afghanistan, living there for a decade. I have traveled
in over 50 countries, many of them primarily of Muslim culture.
I will not condemn the religious rights of over 1.5 billion
people.
But rational people do not deny these terrorist events were
the result of men who adopted and practiced what we are told is
a particularly warped interpretation of their religion. The
confusion being sown by our leaders is undermining the security
and tears at the fabric of our Nation. The message being sent
to the military community denies these heinous acts as
terrorism.
Abdulhakim Muhammad, formerly Carlos Bledsoe, was
unquestionably a radicalized, violent Islamic extremist
determined to wage jihad. My family kept silent for over 2
years. We will not be silent again. We are speaking not out of
hate but because our country needs to hear the truth. This
administration needs to heed the words of 1 Corinthians 14:8.
``In fact, if the trumpet makes an unclear sound, who will
prepare for battle?''
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Long follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daris Long
7 December 2011
Since my son's death my view on things has changed. I've lain awake
through my wife's nightmares when she relives being 50 feet away while
Andy and Quinton were shot. My faith in Government is diminished. It
invents euphemisms instead of using accurate language while the
perpetrators speak freely using the very words deemed offensive to
justify their actions. Clarity is absent. Little Rock is a drive-by and
Fort Hood is just workplace violence: The truth is denied.
Three days after Andy died this was on the internet and I quote:
``FNC Special Report's on-line broadcast from last night is well worth
the watch on the topic. Major Garret comes on to discuss the White
House handling of it. The White House prepared a comment to be released
about the attack for `those who requested comment.' He goes on to
explain the White House explained this was available upon request
instead of just releasing it because the press didn't seem interested.
Garret was clearly squirming, knowing how awful what he was saying
sounded.''
We believe the push from certain press outlets and talk radio put
pressure on the White House over the President's response on the
``terrorist'' attack against an abortion doctor which starkly
contrasted with the ``saddened'' statement on the killing and wounding
of American soldiers in America's heartland. The White House issued a
letter of condolence and we received a personal phone call from the
President. The President's press statement is conspicuously absent from
the White House website.
Two New Jersey men, 14 Minnesota men, arrested for planning to go
to Somalia to join al-Shabaab and two men in Seattle, who planned on
attacking a Recruiting Center, all resulting in Federal indictments
just for planning.
The Government caught a Somali crossing from Yemen to Somalia then
sneaked him in to arraign him in a New York Federal Court. He now has
all the legal rights of an American citizen, while Andy and Quinton's
rights bled out on the pavement in Little Rock.
People within the Federal Government like to trumpet its success in
thwarting attacks. Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said we
just got lucky when the Christmas day and the New York Times Square
bombers failed. Luck is not an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
Great law enforcement effort, but nothing was thwarted.
The latest Fort Hood episode was planned by a soldier who had
previously been the subject of a mainstream media blitz for his taking
a conscientious objector stand to get out of going to Afghanistan. He
was painted as the peaceful Muslim poster boy with principals. It is
telling that his discharge was on hold because he was facing child
pornography charges and was AWOL from Fort Campbell; once again Federal
terrorism charges.
In an attack that resulted in the first death and wounding of
American soldiers on U.S. soil since 9/11 action by the Department of
Justice is absent. Little Rock has morphed into nothing more than a
``drive-by'' shooting. Abdulhakim Muhammad's jihad in America has been
downplayed by the Federal Government and the mainstream media causing
irreparable change to the families involved as well as flat-out lying
to the American people.
I am convinced the Government's position is to deny Little Rock was
a terrorist attack. By not being open and transparent, despite promises
to do so, to this administration's shame two soldiers have been
abandoned on a battlefield in the advancement of a political agenda.
November 5, 2009, an attack took place at Fort Hood. In each
instance, a clear tie to Yemen, but still no Federal indictments. My
take is that if you plan and/or fail in a terrorist attack, you will be
charged, but if you kill in this country under the banner of jihad,
we're told it isn't terrorism and Federal judicial response is neither
confirmed nor denied.
We firmly believe that if the White House had shown the same
attitude concerning Little Rock as was shown in the killing of Dr.
Tiller, a clear message could have been sent. The political correctness
exhibited by the Government over offending anyone in admitting the
truth about Islamic extremism, masked alarm bells that were going off.
Warnings were ignored, Major Nidal Hassan was able to openly praise the
Little Rock shootings in front of fellow Army officers and then commit
his own jihad.
The last planned attack on Ft. Hood was stopped because an ordinary
citizen recognized the signs. If our Government and the press had done
their jobs in calling out and honestly reporting on Little Rock, Ft.
Hood may have been avoided.
The blatant masking and disregard of the facts not only endanger
American citizens of non-Muslim faith but also those of Muslim heritage
who do not adhere to the extremist beliefs demonstrated by a militant
and political form of jihad.
Rational people do not deny that these terrorist events were the
result of men who adopted and practiced what we are told is a
particularly warped interpretation of their religion. The confusion
being sown by our leaders is undermining the security and tears at the
fabric of our Nation. The message being sent to the military community
denies these heinous acts as terrorism.
My family kept silent for over 2 years we will not be silent again.
We are speaking, not out of hate, but because our country needs to hear
the truth.
This administration needs to heed the words of 1 Corinthians 14:8
``In fact, if the trumpet makes an unclear sound, who will prepare for
battle.''
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Long. Thank you for your
testimony. Thank you for your courage in being here today.
Thanks to your wife, who is not here but, as you have told us,
is the rock of the family.
Mr. Long, one of the issues that struck us when Mr. Bledsoe
testified back in March is why the Federal Government, why the
Justice Department did not treat this as a terrorist
prosecution.
Now, if I could just say some of the things we have heard.
The fact is the FBI was aware of Mr. Bledsoe. The FBI had been
monitoring. Then, for whatever reason, it appears the
monitoring was pulled back or something was allowed to happen,
obviously unintentionally. Rather than go through an
embarrassing case, an embarrassing prosecution, it was deferred
to the State.
Because I find it very unusual in a case where you had
someone who was actually trained overseas, sent back here,
carrying out a jihadist murder, is not treated as a terrorist,
when, as you said, people getting on the plane to go to Somalia
are arrested as terrorists.
So could you tell us what you have learned in your
investigation as to why this was not prosecuted by the Federal
Government as a terrorist offense?
Mr. Long. I really cannot tell you why. Rational people
couldn't tell you why.
We looked at what happened to my son, and after querying
the Army on the Purple Heart the first time, they came back and
they said, he just doesn't rate it. The second time we come
back, they said, we don't have enough information. So I sat
down and went through the internet. Abdulhakim Muhammad has
38,300 entries on the internet alone.
This is what I submitted to the Secretary of the Army. It
was not to make the determinative thing; it was to get the Army
to go through the regulation that was mentioned in here. It
comes from Army Regulation 600-8-22, paragraph 2-8. You go down
to paragraph 8(k)(4), and it specifically says, in the case of
international terrorism, the Secretary of the Army has the
authority do that, but it has to have an investigation done and
then submitted by a major command intelligence and security
officer.
To this point, we still have no answer on whether that is
done. What we get now is, it is just a criminal act. That
denies the fact that Abdulhakim Muhammad flew to Yemen on 9/11/
2007. Out of 365 days a year, why would he pick that day?
He was arrested on November 14, 2008. In his possession, he
has bomb-making materials, he has Inspire stuff, he has al-
Alwaki tapes, he has a fake Somali passport. Why would he have
a fake Somali passport? He was going to Somalia. When I met
with the FBI in September 2009, I asked them that question, and
they said they couldn't say it, and I said, ``It is
rhetorical.'' Because I have been to Somalia. I served there
during Restore Hope. The average guy can't read, but if you
show him a piece of paper with a bunch of rubber stamps on it,
he is going to let you go through because he doesn't know if it
is his warlord or the next warlord who took care of it. He was
on his way there.
He goes into a jailhouse in there. Within just hours, from
what I have been told, an FBI agent from Nashville is
interviewing him in Yemen. On 9 February this year, the Los
Angeles Times reports that the Federal Government knew this guy
was dangerously radicalized before he ever came back to the
United States. The FBI agent goes back in and tells him, ``If
you ever get out of this God-forsaken place, I am going to
hound you until you die.'' He is deported.
I didn't know if the State Department had anything to do
with that, but it was also reported that under urging from the
Embassy, he was deported out of there, rather than have a trial
there. As of the hearings that we had in here before that Mr.
Bledsoe testified at, the State Department was involved in
getting this guy here. So now we are importing these people
back in.
He gets back here. He is interrogated again in Nashville.
He stays in Memphis for a couple, 3 months, moves to Little
Rock. Within a month of moving to Little Rock, he gains over
1,000 rounds of bullets, buying in a parking lot, an SKS rifle,
a 380 pistol, and a .22-caliber rifle. He decides to go on his
jihad. When he bought the .22-caliber rifle and no one stopped
him, he said, it's on.
This was his plan that he worked up, according to his
letters to the Commercial Appeal, while he was in the political
prison in Yemen with his fellow, brother al-Qaeda people. The
FBI, in a brief to the National Guard in Little Rock, call
Abdulhakim Muhammad an ``al-Qaeda adherent.''
The Army, last August, put out a big training syllabus on
how to deal with terrorism. Part of that thing is they identify
the Little Rock shootings as terrorism. They come back in a
letter to me saying, this is just a criminal event. They don't
get it both ways.
He was left on a battlefield. It took me 2 years to get
these back. These are my son's dog tags. He wore these when he
took four rounds of 7.62 ammo from about 3 feet. On it, there
is the warrior ethos. The last line of it is, ``I will never
leave a fallen comrade.'' Well, the Army left him.
Chairman King. The Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to you, Chief Long. Thanks for having the courage to
come before the committee, to speak out in public. Thanks for
your eloquence. Your statement was extremely powerful.
You know, it brings to mind the very important role that
family of people who were killed on 9/11 have had in
influencing and shaping our Government's reaction to 9/11.
Thankfully, this group of survivors that you are in is smaller,
but I hope you will think about being in contact with survivors
of people who were lost at Fort Hood and making yourselves
available. Because your testimony is very powerful, and it is
real, and it is what I think any of us sitting here would feel
if we were the father or the mother of the young man who was
killed, again, simply because he was wearing the uniform of the
United States Army.
So I appreciate your testimony. It is very moving that Mr.
Bledsoe is here and that you have established some kind of
relationship after this tragedy. I am sure he feels a kind of
pain that is a different kind of pain but--because of what his
son has done.
I want to say, incidentally, that before preparing for this
hearing I did not know about this problem regarding the
awarding of the Purple Heart in this case and maybe in Fort
Hood. I think, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson, just
to echo what was said, we ought to get together and--I know
there is an administrative process over there. I got worried
when I heard this described with the first panel of witnesses,
that the language as it exists now in law and Executive Order
and regulation regarding the awarding of Purple Hearts has the
folks at the Defense Department in a box that nobody in
Congress wants them to be in. Because your son should obviously
be awarded the Purple Heart posthumously.
So it is probably a little bit too quick, but I am kind of
wondering, because there is a conference committee this
afternoon on the two Department of Defense authorization bills
that have passed, and I wonder--because I am sure everybody
will support this. I am going to see if we can draft up some
language that might even be included in that conference report,
which hopefully will be passed by the end of this calendar
year. If not, we will do it separately as quickly as we can.
Incidentally, we argued a lot about how to handle
detainees, in the Senate and in the House, on this bill I am
talking about. One thing that was mentioned over and over again
is that there is now a U.S. Supreme Court holding that says
that an American citizen, such as Mr. Bledsoe, now also known
as Abdulhakim Muhammad, who is found to be an enemy combatant
can be treated that way--in other words, as having committed an
act of terrorism--perhaps, in my opinion, best being subject to
military incarceration and a military tribunal.
Coming off of what you have experienced, I just want to ask
you--and I know you have spoken from your heart, and the
disappointment and anger about some of the things that the
Government has not done. Have you received any support, and how
sufficient has that support been, from the U.S. Government and
other sources after the killing of your son?
Mr. Long. I believe that if it was left up purely to the
U.S. attorneys in Arkansas and the senior agent in charge of
the FBI, this thing would have been in Federal court.
The Army, I have to say, in dealing with the casualty
affairs officer, he happens to become a very good friend of
mine. We talk to each other on a weekly basis. He has me pulled
into the survivor outreach thing. I have talked to several
other families.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Long. Arkansas has lost around, I think at last count,
119 people that are connected with the war on terror.
There are a lot of good things that have come out of this
as a part of it, but most of it is on the local scale.
Senator Lieberman. Yeah.
Okay, my time is up. Again, I want to thank you. To the
extent that it is possible, because it is not easy, and I know
you have a life of your own that you are living, the occasions
on which you can come forward and speak out, you can change the
policy of this Government, I believe. I thank you for being
here today.
Chairman King. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman.
I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking
Member, Mr. Thompson.
Representative Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Long, thank you for your service. Thank you for coming
to this joint hearing today. Like my colleagues before me, we
are deeply saddened by your tragic loss.
I also want to say to Chairman Lieberman, I am one of the
conferees on this DOD authorization effort. If there is a
possibility that we can craft some language that would provide
the relief for this family in this situation, I would love to
do it.
Senator Lieberman. That is great. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Let's work together today.
Representative Thompson. I look forward to it. The broader
public policy issue, I think, is also in conversation, too. So
I look forward to working with you on that.
Again, let me offer my personal condolences and sympathies
to the tragic loss. I look forward to doing whatever we can as
a committee to correct any past issue that we have identified
because of this situation going forward.
I yield back.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member.
I would just point out that Chairman Lungren is a conferee
also, and he fully supports the recommendation for a Purple
Heart.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr.
Cravaack.
Representative Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Long, for being here. Mr. Bledsoe, thank you
for being here, as well. Your combined efforts here in
representing your sons are very powerful.
You know, I just don't get it. I am a military officer of
24 years. Why your son has not received a Purple Heart--I don't
understand it.
This is what it said in Wikipedia: ``After his arrest,
Muhammad acknowledged the shooting of the men. He told police
that he intended to kill as many Army personnel as possible. He
had an SKS rifle, a Mossberg International 702 rifle, two
handguns, 562 rounds of ammo, and military books in his car. He
said he had been sent by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
that the attack was justified according to Islamic laws and the
Islamic religion--jihad, to fight those who wage war on Islam
and Muslims. He recently returned after 16 months in Yemen and
was the first of two gunfight attacks in 2009. Muhammad was
charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and 10
counts of unlawful discharge of a weapon. Muhammad also
reportedly faced 15 counts of engaging in a terrorist act.''
Now, I don't understand why the Army has not gone ahead and
offered your son the Purple Heart at the very least.
Mr. Long. They are looking at a State crime.
Representative Cravaack. Correct.
Mr. Long. The portion that they are talking on the
terroristic threatening, that is gang-related. It has do that
you have to turn around--it is a State law dealing with gang
suppression, that you are targeting someone inside a house in a
drive-by-shooting-type thing.
The thing that I don't understand is that, in Muhammad's
own handwriting to the FBI, to the TBI, to the prosecutor, on
30 May, midnight, he started his jihad by shooting up a Jewish
rabbi's house in west Little Rock. He then drove to Memphis,
where he parked outside another Jewish rabbi's house, but
because the neighbors were too loud, he moved on.
He then drove up to Florence, Kentucky, which was his first
recruiting center that he was planning on hitting, but it was
closed. So, in frustration, he decided to come back to Little
Rock, and, on the way, he stopped by Nashville and threw a
Molotov cocktail that he had made in Little Rock at another
rabbi's house in the west end of Nashville. It failed to
explode. My understanding is they have that Molotov cocktail in
evidence.
When he came back to Little Rock, he drove by, saw the
target of opportunity, my son and Quinton, coming out of the
recruiting center, and drove into the parking lot, came around,
and did his attack.
At this point, I am sitting here looking at, this guy is a
20-percenter. I mean, his BDA is 20 percent. But where are the
Feds on the other 80 percent? Material support for terrorism,
in that he provided his own body on 9/11/2007 to these people
in there. In a taped interview by the FBI that was allowed in
the trial in Little Rock, he specifically tells the FBI that he
went places in Yemen. They ask him what those places were; he
says Dammaj.
If you go back to the Army doctrine published in 2007,
``Terrorism in the 21st Century,'' they specifically identify
Dammaj as a front for radical jihadists and terrorists. This
guy was in Dammaj. There is nothing there. There are vineyards,
200 mud huts, and a big madrassa run by Yahya al-Hajuri, who
was of the Red Mosque fame in Saudi Arabia in 1979. It is the
same place that John Walker Lindh went to for his training.
Now, material support for there. Attempted use of a weapon
of mass destruction. Title 18, U.S. Code, Chapter 113(b),
paragraph 2332(b). Where are these guys? Where are they in here
doing this stuff?
Representative Cravaack. Well, I can tell you, sir, I will
not leave your son behind.
Mr. Long. Thank you, sir.
Representative Cravaack. I will take this as a personal
challenge to me. I am very disappointed in the Secretary of the
Army for not recognizing your son, and I will continue forth
with that mission.
Mr. Long. Thank you, sir.
Representative Cravaack. With that, sir, I will yield back.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
for 5 minutes.
Representative Jackson Lee. Mr. Long, I mentioned earlier
of our remorse and sympathy to your family, and I want to thank
you for not remaining silent. The presence of Mr. Bledsoe
acknowledges the pain that he experiences, as well.
I think we clarified for the record, and I think you were
present in the room, that those who were representing the
United States military are certainly remorseful of this
enormity of loss of life. Combined with that, I think the
virtues of our Constitution and the First Amendment make us a
great country and make us able to answer the concerns that you
have expressed.
But I think we have a solution here. You have heard a
Senator, a House Member, another House Member, another Senator
from Arkansas, and a Member from Texas who experienced and
mourned with those in Fort Hood going in a fast pace to resolve
this. I think because our country is new--not very new--at
dealing with this issue of terrorism, our statutory laws may
not have, in essence, grappled with the change.
Anyone, as your son was and the other fallen soldier, in
uniform in the action of their duty, Andy and Quinton, clearly
are defined, as far as I am concerned, as fallen heroes.
Fort Hood has the same crisis and the same situation. I
can't ask you why our soldiers were unarmed. I won't ask that
question to you. It is a question that I raised. It is a policy
on domestic territory, on the land of the United States. Some
Americans would be wondering, why did this happen? Why weren't
they armed? They have to understand that our soldiers are
called to battle. Out of our civilian government, we are not
arming them. Maybe in consideration of what we face, we have to
look at those questions.
The one thing that I will hope, Mr. Long, is that, from
hearing from us today, that your words that indicated that your
faith in Government is diminished will be somewhat, if I might
say, tempered and you might see a glimmer of hope and also a
response to the activism of your family. I hope that that will
be something that you will come away from today.
But I do want to ask this question, because out of your
pain can come insight. You heard the open discussion of
beginning to look at a behavior of an individual. In this
instance, of the perpetrator that you were dealing with, there
were actions over and over again. The behavior as evidenced by
Captain Hasan was not passed from one person to the next
because there was no policy at that time.
What other tool do you think we need when we begin to look
at this domestic terrorism, recognizing the particular actor
and associated with a particular style, but recognizing that
this does not condemn Muslims, Muslim soldiers, Muslim
Americans? But what tool do we need, Mr. Long?
Mr. Long. First of all, Mr. Bledsoe and I both lost our
sons that day, and we are very aware of that. I am very
thankful for him being here.
The tools? I hear this discussion about behavioral tools. I
am a father. My kids come home, and they do certain things. I
know they have done something, but they are not going to tell
me what they are doing. It takes me a while to figure out what
they are doing. That is a neat kind of thing.
``Sun Tzu'' came out 2,000 years ago. In my various schools
in the Marine Corps, he said basically, in Arkansas terms, if
you know what the bad guy is doing and you know what you are
doing, you are going to win all your wars. If you don't know
what the bad guy is doing and you know what you are doing, you
are going to win half of them. But if you don't know what you
are doing and you don't know what they are doing, you are going
to lose everything.
To me, the banishment of certain terms and words, they are
set up--that is the words that Muhammad used; that is not the
words that I used. In Islamic law, carried out in ``Reliance of
the Traveller,'' you know, ``War and Peace'' in Islam, it
describes jihad as a war against non-Muslims.
If you understand those terminologies, you can get inside
their decision cycle and break that cycle. It has to be both.
But it has to be clear, and it has to be concise. You have to
say the truth, work the truth.
Representative Jackson Lee. We are doing that here. We will
not leave, as my colleague said, your soldiers, your son and
the other soldier, and the soldiers at Fort Hood, we will not
leave them behind in not being honored by the United States of
America. I think you have a chorus of support here today. I
think, by the end of this hearing, we will have a resolution to
honor all of those who fell in this type of action.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I think we have learned a lot,
and we are ready to move forward as quickly as possible.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman King. The gentlelady yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, for 5
minutes.
Representative Turner. I thank you for your testimony, Mr.
Long. You were eloquent and spot-on. I simply want to thank you
for your service and shining the light on this problem.
Jihad is not clearly understood. Even the tools of jihad
are not. Takia is a----
Mr. Long. Yes, sir, I am well aware of takia.
Representative Turner [continuing]. A term for deceiving
and fooling the enemy--a useful tool in jihad, one we should
know a little more about.
Again, I thank you for your testimony. God bless you and
your family.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson,
for 5 minutes.
Representative Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to request
unanimous consent to enter in a final statement for the record
regarding our hearing today.
Chairman King. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
December 5, 2011.
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 340 Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510.
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security Democrats, H2-117 Ford House Office
Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, Chairman King, and
Ranking Member Thompson: As retired military chaplains we write to you
out of years of experience caring for the spiritual well-being of
United States military service members. We are retired Christian and
Muslim chaplains who have served and counseled in the Army, Army
Reserves, and Navy, and we have cared for soldiers across faith lines
for the betterment of the United States armed services. We are deeply
concerned about any inquiry into threats to military members which
would only focus on the adherents of one religion. To only accuse
Muslim soldiers of extremist behavior is inaccurate and very unfair to
Muslim service members who are loyal to the United States and its
military.
We must make clear that religion is not the sole indicator of
violent behavior and that all religions have included adherents prone
to such violent behavior. Following the shooting at Ft. Hood the
Department of Defense issued a report highlighting changes necessary in
base safety to protect service members and their families from internal
threats. In that report, multiple indicators of violence are
highlighted:
`` . . . genetic and biological causes; specific mental illnesses and
personality disorders; reactions to medications or substance abuse;
religion, social, and political motivations; and environmental factors.
The causes of violence do not fall neatly into discrete categories, and
several factors may combine to trigger violent behaviors.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ United States Department of Defense, Protecting the Force:
Lessons from Fort Hood (Washington, DC, 2010), 11.
Focusing primarily on religious adherence distracts from
appropriately evaluating the other indicators of violence. Such
distraction runs the danger of spreading anti-Muslim sentiment within
the ranks of the U.S. military, weakening unit cohesion and trust.
While we applaud effective efforts to protect our service members
from all threats, internal and external, we are concerned that these
hearings do a disservice to American Muslim soldiers. Generalized
rhetoric about Islam provides a distorted understanding of the
faithfulness of these American Muslim soldiers--both in religious
practice and in service to the United States.
Threats to military personnel, like that of the Ft. Hood shooting,
should not weaken the unity of the armed services or cast suspicion on
American service members; they should rather strengthen the cohesion of
our soldiers. Indeed, since the tragedy at Ft. Hood the response of the
U.S. military has made bases and soldiers safer than by developing
strategies that effectively responded to strategies and behavior which
may lead to violence--not by targeting faithful religious observance.
Responsible prevention of such attacks requires the trust and
commitment of all American soldiers, and we cannot get there by
defining faithful American Muslim soldiers by the behavior of Maj.
Nidal Malik Hasan.
American Muslims are valued service members in the U.S. military.
Many have linguistic skills and cultural competencies relevant to Iraq
and Afghanistan which have been unique contributions to meeting U.S.
goals abroad.
As Members of Congress overseeing homeland security, it is of the
utmost importance that you take violent extremism seriously by
rejecting the assertion that there is support for terrorism among
American soldiers. American soldiers of all faiths protect this country
by taking their duty seriously and they deserve leaders back home who
do the same.
Sincerely,
Rev. Stephen B. Boyd,
Chaplain (COL), U.S. Army Reserves, Retired Minister for Government
and Professional Chaplaincies, United Church of Christ.
George M. Clifford,
Captain, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired).
CH (COL) Herman Keizer, Jr.,
U.S. Army retired.
James Yee,
Former U.S. Army Chaplain (CPT).
Representative Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Long, I would like to say that you can count on me, in
standing with my colleagues who have already spoken today, in
my efforts as I will join with them for the proper recognition
of your son and his service. I want to thank you personally for
your service and also for both of your sons'.
No. 2, I want to commit to you that I am going to forward
today your testimony, when it is available, to both the
President and his administration, with a personal note of what
I personally heard you say here today. You shouldn't have to
say it time and time again, but I appreciate your willingness
to continue to talk to us and to make sure that we are better
informed and we don't make these same mistakes in the future.
Finally, I want to thank you, Mr. King, for your
relationship with Mr. Long and for bringing him here today. It
is these experiences that we, as Members of Congress, must know
so that we can do better and this administration can all do
better.
Thank you, sir, for being here.
Representative Lungren [presiding]. Mr. Long, I am not Mr.
King, but I am sitting in his chair for just a moment. I just
happen to have my 5 minutes up at this point in time.
Mr. Long, it is interesting, we can view a certain subject
from different perspectives. When I was privileged to serve my
State as the attorney general, I tried to take the perspective
of the victims when I looked at the criminal justice system,
because I thought that was a perspective that had not been
appreciated for a long period of time. It doesn't mean it was
the only perspective, but it was an appropriate perspective.
You have a unique perspective here. In your testimony you
said that we suffer from a lack of clarity in our effort. Do
you find anything wrong with the expression used of ``radical
jihad'' or ``violent Islamic extremism,'' with the knowledge
that you have of that part of the world and of different
religions? Does it mislead us? Does it help us? Is it part of
the lack of clarity, or is it part of clarity?
Mr. Long. I believe it is part of the lack of clarity.
Let me put it this way. In the 10 years that I grew up
there, I graduated high school there, I was there during the
Cuban missile crisis in Afghanistan. My dad built the canals
that we are fighting over in Helmand Province. My brother-in-
law is the grandson of a former king of Afghanistan. My nieces
are his offspring. I have a love for those people over there. I
was glad that we decided to do something about this terror that
was going on with them.
However, Islam is many things. It is a religion, and our
First Amendment gives freedom with respect to the Government
won't interfere with that. But it is also political, it is also
social, it is also economic, and it is also military. When we
can sort out what is what, I think we can have a better
discussion on it. But if you lump it all under the protections
of religion, you will never get to that.
Now, we gave a certain portion of my son's insurance to Dr.
Michael Youssef down in Atlanta. He sends messages into North
Africa, Korea. They were moved that we didn't have this feeling
of going out, saying, ``Okay, we need to bomb them all.'' I am
absolutely opposed to that. But we need to be responsive, but
we need to be honest in what we are doing. That is the real
thing, clarity.
``Manmade disaster,'' ``kinetic military action.'' That is
a war. In Arkansas, they would laugh you out the store if you
came up with words like that.
Representative Lungren. Well, you are someone who has
served this country, in addition to your son having given the
last full measure. As someone in the military, under the
circumstances we are talking about, would you consider it
something that you should bring to the attention of your
superiors if you saw a fellow officer that put on his card that
he was a soldier of Allah?
Mr. Long. 1995, I had a troop over in Okinawa, he had a
tattoo. It is now a practice in the Marine Corps, when you
recruit people or if you get selected for an officer program,
on part of your physical they take pictures of the tattoos to
make sure they are not gang-related. If you have those, you are
not getting promoted and you are not getting into the service.
If someone is doing--it is the statutory oath that you
take, ``I do solemnly swear to support the Constitution of the
United States.'' There shouldn't be a policy that you should do
this. When you see something wrong, you need to execute that
statutory thing. You all took that oath. I still go by that
oath. My son took that oath. When it is wrong, you need do
something about it. Otherwise, you are derelict in your duties.
To formalize it in a policy, that tells me something is
broken.
Representative Lungren. Well, I thank you very much for
your testimony. I think it is wonderful that we are attempting
to learn from the lessons and that we are trying to change
things.
It is an old saying that common sense isn't so common
anymore, where you have to tell people that those signs are the
red flags. It seems to me self-evident those are red flags,
unless there is a pressure being created in your environment
where you are afraid to raise the red flags.
Mr. Long. Yes, sir.
Representative Lungren. That goes beyond defining what the
red flags are; that goes to the atmosphere that has been
created.
I don't know if you overturn the atmosphere by just saying
those are red flags. I mean, it is good that we are saying they
are red flags, but it seems to me it is the manner in which you
put those in context and bring an alert when an alert ought to
be done.
So I thank you very much.
I return my time to the Chairman.
Chairman King [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Representative Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Long, for your service. Thank you for
bringing clarity to the room today in a more complete way.
My wife and I had the opportunity to be more proud of our
son than ever before because of recruiters like your son, who
recruited my son into the Army, and a son who spent part of his
MOS training at Fort Hood, as well. So it has some relation, in
my mind, as I can picture that experience.
To have the pride of a son who served willingly, with great
desire, his country is one thing. To have the distinction of
honoring a son who served his country to the last ounce of
blood is even greater.
So thank you for being here.
Mr. Long. Yes, sir.
Representative Walberg. If I am not crossing a line here, I
would like to ask if you would be willing to elaborate on--and
I appreciate the fact that Mrs. Long is not here and chose not
to be here at this hearing. But if you would be willing to
elaborate on what she heard, what she saw, what her reaction
was, what was the last time your wife saw your son alive, I
would appreciate hearing that.
Mr. Long. About 10:15 in the morning, and she had driven my
son down to Little Rock to the recruiting station. He didn't
have a car, and, at the time, we were running with one car, so
he wasn't going to get it.
She drove him down there, and she was sitting outside in
the parking lot. He had gone in, and they hadn't been keeping
him very long. But he was kind of a shill to get others to come
in: ``Look what I did; you can do this, too.''
He stepped out of the recruiting office with--and my wife
looked out and says, maybe I ought to go over and talk to him.
She was about ready to get out of the car to go do this when
another soldier came out with him. She said, no, he has a
friend there, I will let them talk.
Well, she sat down back in the car, started reading. At
that time, she heard three separate gunfire bursts. As she was
getting out of the car, she looked over, she could see one
soldier on the ground, another one trying to get back into the
recruiting center, and a black truck driving off.
At about that time, Sergeant Kennedy came out and grabbed
ahold of her, because he knew she was in the parking lot, and
they escorted her back through past my son. Sergeant First
Class Dobbs was out there doing CPR on my son. Inside the
building, some of the other recruiters were in there trying to
take care of Quinton Ezeagwula.
I got a call at 10:19. She called me up and said, ``Andy's
been shot.'' Of course my reaction is, ``What? What are you
talking about?'' She says, ``They are doing CPR on him right
now.''
Her biggest regret is she didn't get over to him. But she
also knows there were people who were competent that could
provide the first aid. That is her biggest regret.
I had to almost pry these out of her fingers to bring them
up here to show you these today. It took us 2 years, 3 months
to get them back.
The dealings with going through this, all she could see was
my son's legs popping up as they were performing CPR on him.
The next time we saw him, he was in the emergency room, he was
declared dead. They allowed her to go in there. It was still
all messy. There wasn't the tarp over him. She saw all the
wounds. Then the next time I saw him was they had cleaned him
up. We weren't able to touch him; he was evidence.
Then it was 2 years of trying to figure out what is going
on, who shot John, are the Federal people going to step in. We
were promised by the Little Rock U.S. attorney's office that
they would go for that. We have since met with them again. It
just goes on and on.
But I can tell you our first reaction on November 5, 2009.
I was out in the garage working on a project and watching the
news, and it came up, Fort Hood. I ran into the house because I
know she watched the news. I said, ``You got to turn the TV
off. It's happened again.'' Her first thing was, ``I told you
it would happen. They are not listening.'' Then our thing was
to get ahold of my daughter so that she wouldn't see the news.
So every time this happens, it is a traumatic event. Their
loss down there is not lost on us. There are 13 more parents
that are going through this.
Representative Walberg. Mr. Long, thank you. Evidence, but
not a Purple Heart. That is clarity, that is graphic, and that
is an impetus and a reminder to us. Thank you for your
willingness to share that.
Mr. Long. Thank you, sir.
Representative Walberg. I yield back.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
Chief Long, I want to thank you on behalf of myself and all
the Members of the committee for your testimony. It was a
privilege to have you here today.
We will do all we can, really on two levels: One, do all we
can to ensure that what happened to your son happens to no one
else; and also to ensure that he gets the type of recognition
that he deserves, which will be a Purple Heart.
Representative Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from Texas.
Representative Jackson Lee. I echo your remarks. May I make
a parliamentary inquiry, an inquiry to Chairman Lieberman?
Chairman King. Yes.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman King. State your inquiry.
Representative Jackson Lee. Chairman Lieberman, you
indicated on the record that there might be a conference--and I
didn't hear whether you said a conference call or a
conference--on the DOD. But, obviously, there are--I am so
delighted that Mr. Long chose to be courageous on behalf of his
son, but he also mentioned the tragedy at Fort Hood. Is it your
intent that your language would be generic, that, ultimately,
depending on the circumstances in Fort Hood, it might cover
that situation as well?
Senator Lieberman. To my friend, the gentlelady from Texas,
it happens by coincidence that this afternoon at 3:00 the first
meeting of House and Senate conferees on the Department of
Defense authorization bill for the next fiscal year is
convening, actually here on the House side. We are asking
staffs--Mr. Thompson said he is a conferee, which I did not
know, and we will work together--and Mr. Lungren is, too--we
will work together on this.
But I think our aim would certainly be to amend the
language in a manner that would not just relate to Private Long
and the other soldier wounded there but to, certainly, the
folks at Fort Hood, but really to change the statute so it can
be clear that in circumstances of this kind there shouldn't be
any question about the awarding of a Purple Heart.
Representative Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for his
clarification. I thank all the conferees. I might want to just
engage with the Chairman on some thoughts on the language, in
light of the overall circumstances that we find ourself in. But
I thank him for that clarification. Our overall sympathy to all
who have fallen in battle.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Chairman King. The gentlelady yields back.
Again, Chief Long, I want to thank you for being here
today. Thank you for your testimony. We will do all we can, as
I said, to ensure that what happened to your son does not
happen to others. Also, as you have heard from the colloquy
between the gentlelady from Texas, also comments of the Ranking
Member Mr. Thompson, Chairman Lieberman, and Chairman Lungren,
everything will be done at the defense authorization conference
to try to bring some measure of justice to your son and to
others who have also been killed or wounded in such a tragic
way.
So, with that, again, thank you for your testimony.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I know the Members of the committee may have some
additional questions. We will ask you to respond to those in
writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Pursuant to the motion--actually, before that, Senator
Lieberman, do you have any closing remarks? I am sorry.
Senator Lieberman. No, not at all. Just to thank you,
Chairman King. I think this has been a very productive hearing.
A good, really, spirit and content of unity among the Members
of the committee. I think I, for one--I speak for myself--I
have learned a lot. I think we are carrying out our
responsibility to oversee the protection of people here at home
from terrorist attack, in this case particularly members of the
armed services and their families. It happens that this
particular action that we have the ability to carry out on the
Purple Hearts emerges from this testimony.
So I think this has been a very thoughtful and informative
and productive hearing. I look forward to working with you and
our Members to find other occasions to get together again in
exactly this way.
Chairman King. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, do you have any closing
remarks?
Representative Thompson. No, but I do look forward on the
Purple Heart matter, that, since there is unanimity of
agreement, that we can do what we need to do to try to make it
happen.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member.
Again, I want to thank Senator Lieberman especially for his
willingness to hold this joint hearing. This is a very serious
hearing, so just allow me a little bit of levity to say: I
don't know how many of you in the room realize the significance
of having prominent Senators walk over to the House side to
abide by House rules in a bicameral hearing.
But, again, to me, it shows the dedication and patriotism
of Senator Lieberman. He has been involved in this struggle for
so many years. Long before any of us were involved, Senator
Lieberman was there. I want to thank him for his work he has
done as Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee in the
Senate, for coming together today on this joint hearing. Again,
he is a great friend and a great American, and I am just so
proud to be able to work with him.
With that, I will say the hearing record will be held open
for 10 days. Pursuant to the motion we agreed on earlier today,
the hearing will stand in recess and will reconvene in 10
minutes in closed session in Room HVC-301, which is down one
floor, right below us.
With that, the committee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene at 12:50 p.m., the same day.]