

# XINJIANG

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## XINJIANG

### *Findings*

- Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region's stability. Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011, following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an expanded trade expo.
- The Chinese government continued to obscure information about people tried in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas media reported on cases of people imprisoned for peaceful speech and assembly during that time. The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of endangering state security—a category of criminal offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and dissent—decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 figures but remained higher than in years before 2009.
- Implementation of a series of central government-led development initiatives, first announced at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred an intensification of longstanding policies—including Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban development projects—that have undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and livelihoods.
- Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight controls over religion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on religious practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations. Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and women from wearing veils, and targeted “illegal” religious materials in censorship campaigns.
- Discriminatory job hiring practices against Uyghurs and other non-Han groups continued in both the government and private sectors. Authorities also continued to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs elsewhere in China, through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by coercion to participate and exploitative working conditions. Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in work-study programs that ex-

ceeded permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker rights.

- National and XUAR government officials continued to implement projects that have undermined Uyghurs' ability to protect their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to demolish and "reconstruct" the Old City section of Kashgar and relocate residents, a five-year project launched in 2009 that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for undermining cultural heritage protection. The Chinese government also continued to politicize the protection of Uyghurs' intangible cultural heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and artistic gathering for increased state and international protection, but defining this form of intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that contain religious elements and social activism.

- Information remained limited on the status of asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum seekers' refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese security officials, in cooperation with authorities in Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a Uyghur man—initially recognized as a refugee, though the UNHCR later revoked this status—from Kazakhstan to China. In August, authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man to Chinese authorities—who are presumed to have returned him to China—while authorities in Pakistan and Malaysia forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same month. The forced returns are among several documented cases of forced deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of "refoulement" and torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway of China's influence and its disregard for international law.

### *Recommendations*

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human rights.
- Raise concern about human rights conditions in the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for their personal connection to rights advocates, including: Gheyret Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for "leaking state secrets" after giving interviews to foreign media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison for allegedly "inciting racial hatred or discrimination" or "inciting separatism" after writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer,

sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for alleged economic and “separatist” crimes), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

- Call on the Chinese government to provide details about each person detained, charged, tried, or sentenced in connection to demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, including each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned. Call on the Chinese government to encourage people who have been wrongfully detained to file for compensation. Call on the Chinese government to ensure people suspected of crimes in connection to events in July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their right to employ legal defense in accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and to ensure suspects can employ legal defense of their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government to announce the judgments in all trials connected to events in July 2009, as required under Article 163 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Call on the government to allow independent experts to conduct independent examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to allow them access to the trials connected to these events.

- Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue to gather information on conditions in the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to preserve their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage. Provide support for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand their capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored information to XUAR residents. Provide support for libraries that hold Uyghur-language collections to increase their capacity to collect and preserve books and journals from the XUAR. Support organizations that can research and take steps to safeguard tangible and intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR.

- Call on the Chinese government to support development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad protection of XUAR residents’ rights and allow the XUAR government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy in making development decisions. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that promotes not only economic growth but also respects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and engages these communities in participatory decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into account the particular needs and input of non-Han ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges protecting their rights in the face of top-down development policies and who have not been full beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on authorities to ensure that residents have input into resettlement initiatives and receive adequate compensation. Call on authorities

to take measures to safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their cultures and livelihoods.

- Call on the Chinese government to ensure government and private employers abide by legal provisions barring discrimination based on ethnicity and cease job recruiting practices that reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on authorities to monitor compliance with local directives promoting job opportunities for non-Han groups, who continue to face discrimination in the job market. Support organizations that can provide technical assistance in monitoring compliance with labor laws and in bringing suits challenging discriminatory practices, as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employment Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to investigate reports of coercion and exploitative working conditions within labor transfer programs that send rural non-Han men and women to jobs in the interior of China. Call on Chinese authorities to investigate work-study programs within the XUAR and ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker rights.

- Call on the Chinese government to provide information on the whereabouts and current legal status of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned from Cambodia in December 2009 and Uyghurs forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, and Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and with officials from international refugee agencies and from transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations of other countries. Call on transit and destination countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention against Torture on “refoulement.”

*Introduction*

Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region's stability. Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011 following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an expanded trade expo. The government continued to obscure information about people tried in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas media reported on cases of people imprisoned for peaceful speech and assembly during that time. Implementation of a series of central government-led development initiatives, first announced at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred an intensification of longstanding policies—including Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban development projects—that have undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and livelihoods. Authorities enforced tight controls over religion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on religious practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations. Discriminatory job hiring practices against Uyghurs and other non-Han groups, who comprise roughly 60 percent of the XUAR population, continued in both the government and private sectors. The Chinese government maintained its disregard of international legal protections for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, and information on the status of Uyghurs forcibly returned to China in recent years, including multiple cases in 2011, remained limited.

*Security Measures*

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued to use security measures to bolster political and social controls in the region. At the same time XUAR authorities reiterated the Xinjiang Work Forum's call for "developments by leaps and bounds" and "long-term stability" in the XUAR, high-level officials also continued to emphasize "placing stability above all else" and "striking hard" against the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.<sup>1</sup> Authorities continued to apply the term "three forces" to include peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs.<sup>2</sup> XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian emphasized in a December 2010 meeting that stability was the "prerequisite" and "guarantee" for the region's development.<sup>3</sup> In addition, officials at the meeting affirmed, as the region's guiding principle for stability work, central authorities' "correct assessment" that "ethnic separatism" is the main threat to the region's stability.<sup>4</sup> The government and media also reported that terrorist incidents took place in the region in the past year, including incidents in Hoten and Kashgar districts (prefectures) in July.<sup>5</sup> As in the past, authorities provided limited information on the events and continued to enforce restrictions on re-

porting that hindered efforts to investigate the incidents.<sup>6</sup> The government reported the July incident in Hoten municipality, Hoten district, as a premeditated terrorist attack on a police station.<sup>7</sup> Some people in Hoten contradicted the government's account, and some sources reported that the incident involved authorities suppressing a protest that started at another location.<sup>8</sup>

In line with directives to guard against stated terrorist threats and other stability concerns, the regional government and lower level governments within the XUAR reported implementing a range of security measures. The XUAR Public Security Department launched a 100-day "strike hard" campaign in December 2010 that focused on preventing "serious violent crimes" and "large-scale mass incidents" and called on localities to expand the scope of round-the-clock street patrols.<sup>9</sup> In February, the regional government established a leading group on state security to "mobilize" society to "wage battle against various acts that harm state security and social and political stability."<sup>10</sup> Authorities heightened security following reported terrorist attacks in July and surrounding an inaugural "China-Eurasia Expo" in September.<sup>11</sup> The XUAR Public Security Department launched a two-month "strike hard" anti-terrorism campaign in August, pledging an increased security presence and including among its targets "illegal religious activities," "religious extremism," and "illegal propaganda materials."<sup>12</sup> In the XUAR capital of Urumqi (population approximately 2.6 million),<sup>13</sup> state-controlled media reported in January 2011 that authorities had added almost 17,000 security cameras in the previous year to existing surveillance cameras in the city.<sup>14</sup> Authorities had announced plans in early 2010 to increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city to 60,000 by that year's end,<sup>15</sup> and the 17,000-camera addition appeared to exceed this target.<sup>16</sup> After Urumqi authorities strengthened controls over the rental housing market in late 2009—steps they connected to the alleged involvement of Uyghur migrants to the city in the July 2009 demonstrations and riots<sup>17</sup>—authorities launched a three-month campaign in late 2010 to strengthen controls over migrants and housing rentals.<sup>18</sup> In Shuimogou district, Urumqi city, authorities used the campaign to "strike hard" against "illegal religious activities" and other "three forces" crimes.<sup>19</sup> Districts throughout Urumqi reportedly have used a range of technologies and methods to monitor migrants and rental housing, including computerized entry cards in rental housing keyed to data about the user, and sealed-off neighborhoods with security checkpoints for vehicles and pedestrians.<sup>20</sup> XUAR residents reported that authorities have maintained restrictions on passport applications from Uyghurs and members of other non-Han groups since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.<sup>21</sup>

Uyghurs from the XUAR also faced scrutiny elsewhere in China. As part of a campaign to promote a "peaceful Asian Games" launched in advance of the November 2010 event hosted in Guangdong province, authorities in Zhongshan city, Guangdong, called for continuing work to resolve "contradictions" and disputes in areas where "Xinjiang Uyghurs" "assemble, live, or are active."<sup>22</sup> A December 2010 directive on promoting stability from the Changde city, Hunan province, ethnic and religious affairs bureau

called for “launching investigation and research into the situation for managing Xinjiang Uyghurs.”<sup>23</sup>

#### *Ideological Campaigns*

Authorities within the XUAR continued to promote ideological and “ethnic unity” campaigns throughout the region and maintained a regional regulation on promoting ethnic unity that entered into force in February 2010. Both the regulation and related campaigns have promoted state-defined notions of ethnic unity and ethnic relations and have sought to quell or punish forms of speech deemed “not beneficial” to government and Party objectives.<sup>24</sup> Authorities continued a “patriotic education” campaign, launched in June 2010, titled “Ardently Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious Homeland.” A description from the state-run Xinhua news agency described the campaign as “a fundamental project for promoting Xinjiang’s development by leaps and bounds and long-term stability.”<sup>25</sup> Authorities reportedly organized 13,300 teams made up of 57,600 staff and held 91,000 lectures for a total of 11 million listeners, thereby “conveying the voice of the Party and government to people at the grassroots level,” according to the head of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.<sup>26</sup> Venues for the campaign included mosques, schools, and individual households.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Xinjiang Work Forum*

In the past reporting year, central and XUAR government and Communist Party offices continued to implement a series of initiatives first announced at the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum, convened in Beijing by top central government and Party leaders. The inaugural forum set government and Party objectives for the XUAR’s economic and political development, intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that prioritize state economic and political goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and broader protection of XUAR residents’ rights.<sup>28</sup> Throughout the year, authorities emphasized the political importance of fulfilling the work forum’s aims of “developments by leaps and bounds” and “long-term stability.”<sup>29</sup> As authorities renewed “counterpart support” programs that bring personnel and funding to the XUAR from other provincial-level areas, they stressed dispatching “politically steadfast” cadres to serve development projects in the XUAR.<sup>30</sup>

Implementation of the initiatives announced at the May 2010 forum and its immediate aftermath brought an intensification of longstanding policies that have challenged the ability of Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to protect their cultures, languages, and livelihoods. Authorities accelerated implementation of Mandarin-focused “bilingual education,” a program that has diminished the use of Uyghur and other non-Mandarin languages in XUAR schools. [See Language Policy and Bilingual Education in this section for more information.] XUAR authorities bolstered steps to resettle farmers and resettle herders away from grasslands, as part of initiatives from the Xinjiang Work Forum and longstanding grasslands policies that have restricted grazing for the stated goal of combating grasslands degradation.<sup>31</sup> The grasslands policies affect Mongols, Kazakhs, and other groups in the XUAR with cultural

ties to pastoral livelihoods. [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights for more information on grasslands policies throughout China and its impact on non-Han groups.] An August 2011 report from official media cited animal excrement upsetting tourists and grasslands degradation as impetuses for a grazing ban imposed at a tourist site containing grasslands.<sup>32</sup> August media reports also detailed plans to resettle herders from grasslands areas, including other tourist sites, and shift them to different occupations.<sup>33</sup> The XUAR government reported in November 2010 on already resettling 669,000 farmers and herders and described plans to resettle a total of 106,000 nomadic herding households and 700,000 rural households by 2015.<sup>34</sup>

Following the Xinjiang Work Forum, authorities also accelerated urban development, raising concerns about the resettlement of residents, equitable distribution of resources, and cultural preservation. Projects described as “slum transformations” took place in the past year in localities throughout the XUAR.<sup>35</sup> A report from the state-run Xinhua news agency noted “mostly ethnic Uyghurs” made up the 250,000 residents of Urumqi city’s “slum areas,” which the report said “are considered the breeding ground for the resentment which underpinned the deadly riots that rocked the city two years ago.”<sup>36</sup> In the past year XUAR authorities also detailed plans for developing part of Kashgar municipality and Korgas Port, along with part of Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, as two special economic zones reportedly “modeled on Shenzhen” and for developing Urumqi into a “core city” of western China and an “international trade center,”<sup>37</sup> with reported plans to double or almost double the populations of Urumqi and Kashgar.<sup>38</sup> Authorities expanded a longstanding trade fair in Urumqi into an inaugural “China-Eurasia Expo” held in September, describing it as a “major strategic measure to achieve rapid development and the long-term stability of Xinjiang,” with focus on “making Xinjiang a bridgehead in the development of [the] western region.”<sup>39</sup> In addition, officials announced plans to construct a railway line between Golmud city, Qinghai province, and Korla city within the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development (2011–2015).<sup>40</sup> Some Uyghurs and outside observers have expressed concern about the ability of Uyghur communities to maintain their culture amid top-down development projects and questioned whether Uyghurs would enjoy economic benefits on par with Han residents, against a backdrop of prior development projects that have brought disproportionate benefits to Han Chinese.<sup>41</sup> The Kashgar plans come as authorities continue a five-year project to raze and rebuild the city’s historic area. [See Preservation of Cultural Heritage in this section for more information.]

#### *Criminal Law and Access to Justice*

Authorities in the XUAR continued to stress the role of the justice system in “striking hard” against the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In 2010, the Supreme People’s Court issued an opinion on nationwide work to assist the XUAR court system. The opinion called for strengthening “guidance” for trying cases connected to endangering state security, including cases involving the “three forces,” as well as cases “influ-

encing ethnic unity” and social “harmony and stability.”<sup>42</sup> The opinion also called for dispatching “politically steadfast” judges to the XUAR.<sup>43</sup> The Communist Party-controlled Xinjiang Lawyers Association held a training session for non-Han (“ethnic minority”) lawyers in December. In addition to providing professional training, the session’s stated aim was strengthening “ideological and political construction” and cultivating “politically steadfast” lawyers.<sup>44</sup> Speaking at the event, XUAR Justice Department head Abliz Hoshur noted ethnic minority lawyers’ “special role” in dealing with sensitive cases, including those connected to events in July 2009.<sup>45</sup> He called on the lawyers to “fully utilize the weapon of the law” to battle the “three forces.”<sup>46</sup>

Following a statement in March 2010 by XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri that courts had tried 198 people in 97 cases in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots,<sup>47</sup> Chinese government and media reports appeared to provide no additional details on trials connected to the July events. Nur Bekri said in his March 2010 remarks, however, that trials were ongoing.<sup>48</sup> Later, in January 2011, Rozi Ismail, head of the XUAR High People’s Court, also made a brief reference to ongoing cases connected to the events,<sup>49</sup> but authorities did not provide specific information on the trials. Overseas media and a non-governmental organization reported on trials that took place in April and July 2010.<sup>50</sup> A lawyer in the XUAR reported to overseas media in fall 2010 that she and other judges and lawyers had been sent to Urumqi, the XUAR capital, from other localities in the XUAR to handle July 2009-related cases and that they were ordered to finish handling the cases by the end of 2010.<sup>51</sup>

The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of endangering state security (ESS)—a category of criminal offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and dissent—decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 figures, but remained higher than in years before 2009.<sup>52</sup> Courts in the XUAR completed trials in 376 ESS cases in 2010, a decrease of 61 cases over the previous year.<sup>53</sup> The 2009 figure of 437 was a sharp increase over the 268 ESS cases tried in the region in 2008, as well as cases tried earlier in the decade.<sup>54</sup> Officials did not report the reason for the high number of cases in 2009 and 2010, although Rozi Ismail, President of the XUAR High People’s Court, said the 2010 figures included cases connected to “violent terrorist crimes,” including crimes reported to have taken place in 2008.<sup>55</sup> Rozi Ismail did not link the ESS cases from 2010 to trials connected to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots. To date, official reports have not clearly specified how many trials connected to the July events involved ESS cases.<sup>56</sup> Unofficial sources have reported on a limited number of trials connected to the July 2009 events that involve ESS charges, including the cases of Gulmira Imin, Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli.<sup>57</sup> [See Section III—Access to Justice for information on legal aid initiatives in western China.]

#### *Controls Over Free Expression*

The XUAR government continued to exert tight controls over free expression. The government maintained regulations passed in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that repress

free speech,<sup>58</sup> while a series of reports from the past year underscored continuing government repression of people who exercised their right to free expression. Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported in December 2010 that Uyghur journalist and webmaster Memetjan Abdulla received a life sentence in April 2010 in apparent connection to translating an announcement calling on Uyghurs to hold demonstrations in July 2009 and in connection to interviews he gave to foreign journalists.<sup>59</sup> RFA reported in March 2011 on the seven-year sentence of Uyghur webmaster Tursunjan Hezim in July 2010, following his detention in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.<sup>60</sup> A number of other Uyghur writers, journalists, and Web site workers continued to serve prison sentences in connection to exercising their right to free expression about the demonstrations and riots in July 2009 or otherwise deemed to have a connection to the events. They include Dilshat Perhat, Gheyret Niyaz, Gulmira Imin, Nijat Azat, and Nureli.<sup>61</sup> Kajikhumar (Qazhyghumar) Shabdan, an ethnic Kazakh writer in the XUAR, remained under home confinement until his death in February 2011. Authorities had held him under home confinement following a 15-year prison sentence in 1987 for “espionage,” in reported connection to allegations that he belonged to an illegal group with ties to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and after he wrote a book critical of Chinese government policy toward Turkic groups.<sup>62</sup> Outside the XUAR, Beijing authorities held Beijing-based Uyghur professor and webmaster Ilham Tohti and his family in custody at a resort in southern China for almost a week in December 2010 and placed additional restrictions on their activities and travel at other times.<sup>63</sup>

The XUAR government continued to enforce censorship campaigns in the region, in line with both national campaigns and local directives to “strike hard” against the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The XUAR Press and Publications Bureau said in July 2010 that the bureau would deepen its implementation of censorship work during the last half of 2010 and would focus on “striking hard” against “reactionary propaganda materials” and “illegal” political and religious publications publicized and disseminated by the “three forces.”<sup>64</sup> At a meeting in January 2011, an official called for strengthening inspection and prosecution connected to these publications and cited concerns about “western enemy forces” and the “three forces” “importing western values and an ideological trend in ‘Xinjiang independence.’”<sup>65</sup> The official also called for strengthening oversight of transportation of published materials, and one locality reported finding “suspicious items” at a transportation inspection point that authorities later determined were “illegal religious publications” consisting of Uyghur- and Arabic-language items.<sup>66</sup> Other localities within the XUAR also reported targeting or confiscating religious and political items.<sup>67</sup> The World Uyghur Congress reported in December 2010 and February 2011 on people detained or charged for possessing religious materials and “illegal” DVDs and CDs with “overseas enemy propaganda.”<sup>68</sup>

*Freedom of Religion*

Authorities in the XUAR continued to target “illegal religious activities” and “religious extremism” as threats to the region’s stability, and they maintained curbs over religious activities independent of government control in the region’s security campaigns, singling out Islamic practices in a number of cases. Authorities continued to define “illegal religious activities” and “religious extremism” to encompass religious practices, group affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international human rights guarantees for freedom of religion. A December meeting of the XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee called for “resolutely preventing illegal religious activities and striking in accordance with law against religious extremist forces” as part of work in the region to maintain stability.<sup>69</sup> XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian reiterated the pledge to curb illegal religious activities in August 2011, following attacks the previous month that officials labeled as terrorist.<sup>70</sup> The region’s two-month “strike hard” anti-terrorism campaign launched in August included “illegal religious activities” and “religious extremism” among its targets.<sup>71</sup> Regional regulations and directives maintained restrictions on religious practice that are absent in national regulations or harsher than curbs articulated in national documents.<sup>72</sup> Authorities continued to enforce a document of unclear legal status that defines “23 kinds of illegal religious activity,” including “letting students pray,” conducting certain Islamic practices pertaining to marriage and divorce, holding private religious instruction classes, “distorting religious doctrine,” and advocating “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism.”<sup>73</sup> The region’s 2009 regulation on the protection of minors stipulates penalties for people who “lure or force minors to participate in religious activities” and appears to provide the most extensive curbs in China on children’s religious activities, while lacking a clear basis in Chinese law.<sup>74</sup>

In line with nationwide directives restricting the scope of religious activity, local authorities in the XUAR reported on enforcing a range of controls over religion. Villages within Hoten district and a limited number of other localities continued to implement and expand a system of “voluntary pledges” to regulate villagers’ behavior and to fine villagers for noncompliance, placing special emphasis on the pledges to curb “illegal religious activity.”<sup>75</sup> In January 2011, authorities in a township in Chapchal Xibe Autonomous County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a system for government religious affairs employees to set the schedule for Friday sermons at the township’s mosques and for using “religious information gatherers” of “high political consciousness” to provide information on the sermon delivery and the “ideological trends” of mosque attendees.<sup>76</sup> Authorities in a district in Urumqi described an emergence of “illegal religious sects” that they deemed are “contrary” to the teachings of the Quran and they called on religious personnel to interpret religious doctrine in accordance with “social advancement.”<sup>77</sup> Local governments throughout the XUAR continued to place restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, barring some people from fasting, ordering restaurants to stay open, and increasing oversight of religious venues.<sup>78</sup> In April, a

court in Shihezi municipality reportedly sentenced Muslim religious leaders Qahar Mensur and Muhemmed Tursun to three years' imprisonment in connection to storing and distributing "illegal religious publications," which Shihezi residents reportedly described as retaliation after Qahar Mensur refused to comply with government demands such as bringing government documents into the mosque where he worked.<sup>79</sup>

Authorities throughout the XUAR also continued campaigns targeting Muslim men who wear beards and women who wear veils or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations, practices authorities connect to "religious extremism" and "backwardness."<sup>80</sup> Under the direction of the Party-controlled women's federation in the XUAR, multiple localities reported continuing a campaign aimed at dissuading women from veiling their hair and faces.<sup>81</sup> Management rules in force for the "information corps" in a residential district in Usu city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included requirements to immediately report scenarios such as the presence of "people from outside [the district] abnormally wearing large beards or veiling their faces" along with "residents holding extremist religious thoughts."<sup>82</sup> A township in Aqsu district included veiling and wearing large beards or "bizarre clothes" among targets of a campaign against "illegal" religious activities.<sup>83</sup> Authorities also continued to increase oversight of Muslim women religious specialists known as *büwi*.<sup>84</sup> [See Section II—Freedom of Religion for additional information on religion in China, including cases from the XUAR.]

#### *Language Policy and Bilingual Education*

The XUAR government accelerated implementation of "bilingual education," a policy that promotes the use of Mandarin Chinese in school instruction for non-Han students and increasingly has curtailed the opportunity for non-Han groups to choose to receive education in Uyghur and other languages. The policy has conflicted with legal protections for non-Han groups to maintain and use their own languages, as provided in both Chinese and international law,<sup>85</sup> and underscores government failure to maintain the use of Uyghur and other languages as lingua franca within the XUAR in line with the promotion of regional autonomy. Following goals set after the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum to universalize "bilingual education" in the region's schools,<sup>86</sup> the XUAR government and Party Committee issued a 10-year education reform plan in January 2011 that provides for "basically universalizing" elementary and secondary school "bilingual education" among non-Han students (designated as "ethnic minorities" by the Chinese government) to reach a coverage rate of 75 percent of such students by 2015 and over 90 percent by 2020.<sup>87</sup> The plan adds that all ethnic minority high school graduates shall "basically have a skilled grasp and use" of spoken and written Mandarin by 2020.<sup>88</sup> The plan also calls for coverage of at least 85 percent of ethnic minority preschoolers by 2012, a target authorities appear to have articulated since 2008.<sup>89</sup> The plan describes the promotion of "bilingual education" of "strategic significance" for goals including "building a new model of socialist ethnic relations" and "promoting cohesion and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (*zhonghua*

*minzu*)." <sup>90</sup> The plan also calls for protecting the right to instruction using minority languages and allows for preserving instruction using such languages in the process of implementing "bilingual education." <sup>91</sup> The future role of non-Mandarin languages in XUAR schools and broader society, however, remains uncertain as the plan and accompanying measures bolster overall support for instruction in Mandarin. The implementation of Mandarin-focused "bilingual" programs and accompanying reduction in classes using minority languages reportedly has provoked dissatisfaction among some students, parents, and teachers, and a few localities reportedly reinstated some Uyghur-language instruction in the past year. <sup>92</sup>

XUAR authorities also have accelerated steps to staff "bilingual" classes and address a shortage of "bilingual" teachers. In 2010, the Xinjiang Education Department announced plans to recruit 5,109 elementary and secondary school "bilingual" teachers, reportedly marking the largest scope of recruitment for "specially appointed teachers" as of that date. <sup>93</sup> Authorities announced plans to recruit over 11,500 teachers in 2011, of whom 9,200 would be "bilingual" teachers. <sup>94</sup> Localities within the XUAR also reported increasing "bilingual" training among ethnic minority teachers. <sup>95</sup> Authorities have dismissed or reassigned some Uyghur teachers deemed not to have adequate Mandarin skills—with a minimum of 1,000 elementary school teachers dismissed since 2010, according to one report—and in some cases, authorities detained teachers for protesting "bilingual" policies or dismissals from their teaching posts. <sup>96</sup>

Authorities also reported taking some steps to promote ethnic minority language arts classes within Mandarin-focused schools and to train Mandarin-speaking teachers in minority languages. A pilot project in two prefectural-level areas called for implementing language arts classes in minority languages for ethnic minority students (*minkaohan* students) in longstanding programs that provide schooling solely in Mandarin. <sup>97</sup> A January 2011 plan called for providing 320 class hours of instruction in basic "ethnic minority languages" for teachers at "bilingual" preschools who are native Mandarin speakers. <sup>98</sup>

#### *Population Planning Policies*

XUAR authorities continued to expand a system of rewarding non-Han households ("ethnic minority" households) that have been "certified" as having fewer children than the maximum allowed under the region's regulation on population and family planning. <sup>99</sup> This step builds on similar reward systems present throughout China, while intensifying a regional focus on ethnic minority households. The XUAR Party Committee and government reported plans in the past year to expand the existing reward system in 2011 to any XUAR county or city where rural ethnic minorities comprise over 50 percent of the population. <sup>100</sup> Authorities initially implemented the reward system for ethnic minorities in 3 southern XUAR prefectural-level areas in 2007 <sup>101</sup> and expanded the reward system in 2009 to an additional 26 "poor and border counties." <sup>102</sup> Local governments reported enforcing the reward system in the past year. <sup>103</sup>

*Pledge System To Regulate Village Behavior*

Some villages within the XUAR continued to implement and expand a system of “voluntary pledges” to regulate villagers’ behavior and to fine villagers for non-compliance, a practice that has no explicit basis in Chinese law and appears to exceed the scope of villages’ authority to enforce penalties.<sup>104</sup> Under the pledge system, first implemented in Hoten district in 2006<sup>105</sup> and almost wholly unique to the XUAR,<sup>106</sup> village residents and village officials enter into agreements (*cungui shouyue chengnuoshu*) with villagers’ committees to abide by local village “codes of conduct” (*cungui minyue*).<sup>107</sup> Villages throughout China use codes of conduct, which are stipulated under the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees,<sup>108</sup> to implement population planning requirements, regulate social order, and manage local production, among other tasks.<sup>109</sup> In the XUAR, authorities have used the pledge system to bolster the efficacy of these codes of conduct, placing special emphasis on the pledges and codes of conduct to curb “illegal religious activity.”<sup>110</sup> An official described the villagers’ participation in the pledge system as voluntary,<sup>111</sup> but a 2007 government and Party directive from one district called for achieving a participation rate of over 98 percent within each village.<sup>112</sup>

*Labor*

DISCRIMINATION

Hiring practices that discriminate against non-Han groups continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the past year. Some job recruitment announcements from the region continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs, in contravention of provisions in Chinese law that forbid discrimination.<sup>113</sup> A job announcement for a hospital in Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 for 28 positions, all of which were reserved for Han.<sup>114</sup> Civil servant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open positions for Han, leaving 93 of the remaining positions unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving 38 for members of non-Han (“ethnic minority”) groups.<sup>115</sup> In an apparent shift from previous years, however, 2011 annual recruiting for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) left almost all positions unreserved by ethnicity—marking a change from past practice of formally reserving a majority of positions for Han—but the XPCC continued restrictions based on sex.<sup>116</sup>

A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employment promotion issued in October 2009 called for enterprises registered in the XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among local XUAR residents and to “recruit more ethnic minority workers to the extent possible,”<sup>117</sup> including an unspecified “fixed proportion” of positions for ethnic minority college graduates.<sup>118</sup> The extent to which some enterprises adhered to the opinion’s provisions on minority workers in the past year is unclear.<sup>119</sup> In January 2011, several XUAR government and Party offices issued an opinion on sending ethnic mi-

nority university graduates to train in areas engaged in counter-part support relationships with the region. Citing concerns about employment pressures on the region's stability and economic development, the opinion outlines plans to train 22,000 unemployed college graduates from the XUAR in the next two years,<sup>120</sup> after which trainees reportedly may take up set posts within the XUAR or remain in areas elsewhere in China to find work.<sup>121</sup> The opinion states the program's usefulness in "transforming ideas," promoting "good sentiments" among the ethnicities, strengthening a "sense of identification toward the Chinese nation" (*zhonghua minzu*), and promoting "social stability" and "ethnic assimilation" (*minzu ronghe*).<sup>122</sup> The opinion does not address barriers to employment due to job recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han.

#### LABOR TRANSFERS

Government programs to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs elsewhere in China continued in the past year. As documented by the Commission in recent years, some participants and their family members have reported coercion to participate in the programs, the use of underage workers, and exploitative working conditions.<sup>123</sup> XUAR authorities have described the programs as a way for XUAR workers to gain income, build job skills, and transform participants' "outmoded thinking."<sup>124</sup> A XUAR Department of Agriculture official said in September 2010 that "the state policy of encouraging relatively developed areas to recruit workers from Xinjiang will not change."<sup>125</sup> Another official described "Xinjiang's organizing ethnic minority youth to go [elsewhere in China] to engage in manufacturing and construction activities" as an "inevitable large trend" in professional resources exchange in a market economy.<sup>126</sup> Official media reported in May 2011 that there have been 800,000 instances since 2005 of XUAR laborers going to work in other provinces under government auspices.<sup>127</sup> The ongoing work to export the labor force comes amid a reported shortage of agricultural and factory workers within the XUAR, for which employers have recruited laborers from other provinces and used student labor.<sup>128</sup>

#### WORK STUDY

Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in "work-study" programs that have exceeded permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker rights.<sup>129</sup> Under the programs, schools take students out of class for periods of one to two weeks during the academic year to engage in full-time labor; in some reported cases, students have worked for longer periods and under hazardous conditions.<sup>130</sup> Although the XUAR Education Department issued a circular in 2008 stating that students in junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in the work-study programs,<sup>131</sup> reports from 2010 indicated that some localities continued to use these younger students to meet the shortage of cotton-pickers.<sup>132</sup> Officials stressed the importance of using students to meet labor shortages following demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009.<sup>133</sup>

*Preservation of Cultural Heritage*

National and XUAR government officials continued to implement projects that have undermined Uyghurs' ability to protect their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to demolish and "reconstruct" the Old City section of Kashgar city and relocate residents. The five-year project, launched in 2009, has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for undermining cultural heritage protection.<sup>134</sup> Official media reported in July 2011 that authorities revived the project in August 2010 after "nearly falling into stagnation" following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots and reported plans to complete restoration of 10,566 homes during the year.<sup>135</sup> A Kashgar official reported in October 2010 that 9,378 houses had been "removed" to date, while 16,557 homes had been built or restored.<sup>136</sup> The Chinese government also continued to politicize the preservation of Uyghur intangible cultural heritage. In November 2010, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accepted China's nomination to place the *meshrep*, a Uyghur social and artistic gathering, on its List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.<sup>137</sup> While the designation obligates China to take measures to promote the practice's sustainability,<sup>138</sup> the Chinese government defined the *meshrep* narrowly to exclude forms of the practice that have incorporated religious elements and social activism.<sup>139</sup> In the mid-1990s, authorities in Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, prohibited *meshrep* gatherings where participants sought to reduce alcohol and drug use and had become active in organizing a boycott of alcohol stores.<sup>140</sup>

*Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants*

In the past year, information remained limited on the status of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum seekers' refugee status.<sup>141</sup> Following the forced deportation of the 20 asylum seekers and disappearance of another 2 who escaped forced return, the Chinese government reported in June 2010 that 3 of the 20 people returned to China were suspected of terrorist crimes, and that all 17 who remained in custody were members of a terrorist group<sup>142</sup>—charges that, even if made at the time of extradition, would not have precluded an assessment of the asylum cases by UN officers.<sup>143</sup> The government appeared to provide no additional information on the cases in the past reporting year. According to a March 2011 Radio Free Asia article, the group was held in detention in Kashgar district, and their cases had not gone to trial.<sup>144</sup> One of the asylum seekers who had escaped forced return from Cambodia and was deported from Laos to China in March 2010 reportedly was held in detention in Kashgar with the group, where he reportedly was in poor health and was denied medical care for an arm infection.<sup>145</sup>

In May 2011, Chinese security officials in cooperation with authorities in Kazakhstan forcibly returned Ershidin Israil, a Uyghur man from the XUAR, from Kazakhstan to China.<sup>146</sup> Ershidin Israil

left China in 2009 after Chinese authorities reportedly sought him for providing information to Radio Free Asia about the death of Shohret Tursun, a Uyghur man held in custody after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the XUAR.<sup>147</sup> Ershidin Israil received refugee status from the UNHCR in March 2010 and had awaited resettlement to Sweden before authorities in Kazakhstan took him into custody and the UNHCR revoked his refugee status.<sup>148</sup> Upon his return, Chinese authorities reportedly charged him for terrorist acts. A family member and advocates for Ershidin Israil said that the charges and bases for revoking his refugee status were based on false information.<sup>149</sup> In August, authorities in Thailand detained Nur Muhammed, a Uyghur man from the XUAR, on grounds of illegal entry. Thai authorities bypassed a court appearance as provided by Thai law and turned him over to Chinese authorities, who are presumed to have returned him to China.<sup>150</sup> The same month, authorities in Pakistan reportedly forcibly returned five Uyghurs, including two children, to China.<sup>151</sup> Later in August, Malaysian authorities deported 11 Uyghur men from Malaysia to China, following the arrests of a group of 16 Uyghurs earlier in the month.<sup>152</sup>

The forced returns violate the Convention Against Torture, which provides, “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”<sup>153</sup> [See Section II—Criminal Justice for additional information on the use of torture in China.] In addition, the return of Uyghur asylum seekers violates the principle of non-refoulement as stipulated in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.<sup>154</sup> The forced returns from Cambodia, Laos, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Thailand are among several documented cases of forced deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of refoulement and torture that Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway of China’s influence and its disregard for international law.<sup>155</sup>

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, “Persist in the Normalization of Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability of Overall Society” [Jianchi weiben gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui daju wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10; “Autonomous Region Chair Nur Bekri Issues 2011 New Year’s Speech, Grab Opportunities, Try Hard and Fight to the Fullest, Wholeheartedly Drive Ahead With Xinjiang’s Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Stability” [Zizhiqu zhuxi nu’er baikeli fabiao 2011 nian xinnian zhici qiangzhua jiyu fenli pinbo quanli tuijin xinjiang kuayueshi fazhan he changzhijiu’an], Xinjiang Daily, 1 January 11; “Government Work Report” [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11; Cao Huijuan et al., “Fu Qiang: Strengthen Sense of Responsibility, Urgency, and Mission in Work To Safeguard Stability” [Fu qiang: zengqiang weiben gongzuo zerengan jinpogan shiminggan], Xinjiang Peace Net, 13 December 10.

<sup>2</sup>See examples that follow within this section, as well as, e.g., CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 200–13.

<sup>3</sup>Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, “Persist in the Normalization of Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability of Overall Society” [Jianchi weiben gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui daju wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>See, e.g., Kashgar Municipal People’s Government, “Kashgar Municipal People’s Government Announcement” [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar Municipal People’s Government, “Our Municipality Resolutely Deals With Violent Terrorism Case” [Wo shi guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu anjian], 1 August 11; “Chinese State Councilor Vows To Crack Down on Terrorists,” Xinhua, 4 August 11; “Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, Xinjiang,” China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 11); “3 Cases of Serious Violent Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are Concluded” [Kashi sanqi yanzhong baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District People’s Government, “Resolutely Uphold the Dignity of the Law” [Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March 11. In some cases, the incidents appear to have been described as terrorist crimes months after they were initially reported. See, e.g., Sui Yunyan, “Hami Armed Murder Case Cracked” [Hami shi chiqiang sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily, 3 December 10 (reporting on September 29 and November 3 murder cases as ordinary crimes); Aksu District Administration News Office, “Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City, Xinjiang” [Xinjiang akesu shi fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted in Aksu District People’s Government, 19 August 10 (describing August 19 attack as ordinary crime); “Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of Terrorist Crime” [Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of crimes in Aksu and Hami as terrorist); “Severely Punishing Terrorist Crimes Shows Respect for Law” [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian falu zunyan], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-controlled media describing crimes as terrorist).

<sup>6</sup>Based on CECC assessment of the reports. See, e.g., Kashgar Municipal People’s Government, “Kashgar Municipal People’s Government Announcement” [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar Municipal People’s Government, “Our Municipality Resolutely Deals With Violent Terrorism Case” [Wo shi guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu anjian], 1 August 11; “Chinese State Councilor Vows To Crack Down on Terrorists,” Xinhua, 4 August 11; “Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, Xinjiang,” China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 11); “3 Cases of Serious Violent Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are Concluded” [Kashi sanqi yanzhong baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District People’s Government, “Resolutely Uphold the Dignity of the Law” [Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March 11. In some cases, the incidents appear to have been described as terrorist crimes months after they were initially reported. See, e.g., Sui Yunyan, “Hami Armed Murder Case Cracked” [Hami shi chiqiang sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily 3 December 10 (reporting on September 29 and November 3 murder cases as ordinary crimes); Aksu District Administration News Office, “Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City, Xinjiang” [Xinjiang akesu shi fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted in Aksu District People’s Government, 19 August 10 (describing August 19 attack as ordinary crime); “Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of Terrorist Crime” [Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of crimes in Aksu and Hami as terrorist); “Severely Punishing Terrorist Crimes Shows Respect for Law” [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian falu zunyan], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-controlled media describing crimes as terrorist). For background information on Chinese government reporting on terrorist cases, see “Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official Statements on Terrorism Conflict,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2006, 12. For information on restrictions on free press, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.

<sup>7</sup>“Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, Xinjiang,” China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 11).

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., “Clashes in Silk Road Town,” Radio Free Asia, 18 July 11; World Uyghur Congress, “World Uyghur Congress (WUC) Troubled by Witness Accounts on Hotan Incident,” 19 July 11.

<sup>9</sup>Sui Yunyan and Zhang Min, “Autonomous Region Public Security Organs Launch Special 100-Day Operation for Taking Strict Precautions Against and Striking Hard Against Serious Violent Crimes” [Zizhiqu gongan jiguan kaizhan bairi yanfang yanda yanzhong baoli fanzui zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Daily, 24 December 10.

<sup>10</sup>Cheng Lixin, “Autonomous Region Leading Group on State Security Work Is Established” [Zizhiqu guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu chengli], Xinjiang Daily, 1 March 11.

<sup>11</sup>See, e.g., Chen Zehua, “Our Region Launches Special Operation To ‘Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes’” [Wo qu kaizhan “yanli daji baoli kongbu fanzui” zhuanxiang

xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11; Ji Jun, Aksu Municipal People's Government, "District Convenes Meeting on Upholding Stability, Huang Sanping Makes Important Speech" [Diqu zhaokai wei wen gongzuo huiyi huang sanping zuo zhongyao jianghua], 25 July 11; "Security Tightened as Urumqi Gears Up for China-Eurasia Expo," Xinhua, 30 August 11; "Tensions Amid Xinjiang Clampdown," Radio Free Asia, 19 August 11.

<sup>12</sup>Chen Zehua, "Our Region Launches Special Operation To 'Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes'" [Wo qu kaizhan "yanli daji baoli kongbu fanzui" zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.

<sup>13</sup>Yang Yuanyuan and Zhang Xuemin, "Total Population of Urumqi Surmounts 2.6 Million, Birthrate Maintains Low Growth" [Wulumuqi zongrenkou tupo 260 wan chushenglu baochi di zengzhang], Tianshan Net, 2 November 10.

<sup>14</sup>"Surveillance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-Rocked City Under Watch," Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26 January 11.

<sup>15</sup>"At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach 60,000" [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10.

<sup>16</sup>The city had 46,953 cameras by November 2009 and added "nearly 17,000" in 2010. "At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach 60,000" [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10; "Surveillance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-Rocked City Under Watch," Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26 January 11.

<sup>17</sup>CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 210.

<sup>18</sup>Ge Youjun and Tan Yanbin, "Urumqi Launches 100-Day Rectification Campaign for Floating Population and Room Rentals" [Wu shi kaizhan liudong renkou he chuzu fangwu bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi], Xinjiang Peace Net, 2 December 10. See also Yi Changchun, "Shuimogou District Launches 100-Day Special Rectification Work Mobilization Meeting" [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16 December 10; Zhao Yuhong, "North Jiefang Road Residential Area Organizes and Launches 100-Day Special Rectification Work Meeting" [Jiefang bei lu jiedao zuzhi zhaokai bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuohui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 17 December 10.

<sup>19</sup>Yi Changchun, "Shuimogou District Launches 100-Day Special Rectification Work Mobilization Meeting" [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16 December 10.

<sup>20</sup>"One Good Plan After the Other for Management of Urumqi Floating Population" [Wulumuqi shi liudong renkou guanli haozhao lianlian], Tianshan Net, 23 May 11.

<sup>21</sup>"No Passports' for Uyghurs," Radio Free Asia, 10 September 10; "Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call," Radio Free Asia, 28 February 11.

<sup>22</sup>Zhongshan City Judicial Bureau, "Zhongshan City Judicial Bureau Launches People's Mediation Activity for '100-Day Campaign for Peaceful Asian Games'" [Zhongshan shi sifaju kaizhan renmin tiaojie "pingan yayun bairi dahui" huodong], 31 August 10.

<sup>23</sup>Changde City People's Government, "City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau: Create Satisfaction Mechanisms, Use Service To Promote Development and Seek Stability" [Shi minzu zongjiao shiwuju: chuang manyi jiguan yi fuwu cu fazhan qiu wending], 22 December 10. For an example from elsewhere in Human province, see Yongxing County United Front Work Department, "Yongxing County Uses Strengthening Functions and Stimulating United Front Work To Magnify New Bright Spots" [Yongxing xian yi qianhua zhineng jifa tongzhan gongzuo tuxian xin liangdian], Chenzhou City United Front News Net, 15 December 10.

<sup>24</sup>See generally Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiq minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tiaoli], effective 1 February 10. For detailed analysis of the regulation and broader "ethnic unity" campaigns in the region, see "Xinjiang Ethnic Unity' Regulation Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free Expression," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 201-2.

<sup>25</sup>"Summary of Educational Activities on Theme of 'Ardently Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious Homeland'" [Re'ai weida zuguo jianshe meihao jiayuan zhuti jiaoyu huodong zongshu], Xinhua, 23 March 11.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>For more information on the forum, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207-8, and "Central Leaders Hold Forum on Xinjiang, Stress Development and Stability as Dual Goals," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3. For comprehensive reporting on the forum from Chinese media, see, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, "The CPC Central Committee and State Council Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference," Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10). For information on past development efforts, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-64.

<sup>29</sup>See, e.g., "Grasp Key Points, Grasp the Breakthrough Point, Comprehensively Implement the Spirit of the Central Work Forum on Xinjiang" [Zhuazhu guanjian dian zhua hao tupokou quanmian luoshi zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui jingshen], People's Daily, 26 September 10; Cheng Lixin, "Go a Step Further To Emancipate the Mind and Maintain and Expand the First Stages of a Good Situation" [Jinyibu jiefang sixiang baochi he kuoda chubu xingcheng de hao xingshi], Xinjiang Daily, 10 October 10; "Government Work Report" [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11.

<sup>30</sup>See, e.g., "National Conference for Aid-Xinjiang Work Opens, Li Keqiang and Zhou Yongkang Give Speeches" [Quanguo duikou zhiyuan xinjiang gongzuohui zhaokai li keqiang zhou yongkang jianghua], Xinhua, 30 March 10; Supreme People's Court Guiding Opinion Con-

cerning Aiding Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date October 2010), item 3(5). For more information on counterpart support, see “Central Leaders Hold Forum on Xinjiang, Stress Development and Stability as Dual Goals,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3.

<sup>31</sup> See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights in this report and CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207–8, for more information on grasslands policy and on initiatives announced at the forums.

<sup>32</sup> “Scenic Area of Tianshan Heavenly Lake, Xinjiang, Continues ‘Grazing Ban,’ Will Enlarge Strength in Future” [Xinjiang tianshan tianchi jingqu chixu “jinmu” weilai jiang jiada lidu], Xinhua, reprinted in Sohu, 2 August 11.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*; Shao Wei, “Herders Face Five Year Ban on Grazing,” China Daily, 1 August 2011.

<sup>34</sup> “Xinjiang Wealthy Folks Affordable Housing Project Makes Smooth Progress, 670,000 Farmers and Herders Move Into New Homes” [Xinjiang fumin anju gongcheng jinzhan shunli 67 wan nongmumin ruzhu xinfang], Xinhua, 8 November 10. For information on earlier reported plans to resettle herders, see Cui Jia, “New Measures To Boost Xinjiang Livelihoods,” China Daily, 28 May 10.

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., Yang Yonghua, “Bortala Slum Transformation Embodies Putting People at the Center” [Bole shi penghuqu gaizao tixian yiren weiben], China Xinjiang, 8 November 10; Zhao Guangping, “Fukang City Slum District Transformation Enables Residents’ Dreams of Peaceful Life” [Fukang shi penghuqu gaizao yuanle jumin anju meng], Tianshan Net, 13 December 10; Tao Tao, Chen Zhe, “Entering the Slum Districts: Urumqi Slum Transformation, Sunshine To Benefit the People” [Zoujin penghuqu: wulumuqi shi penghu gaizao yangguang huimin], Xinjiang News Net, 5 February 11.

<sup>36</sup> “Urumqi’s Sweeping Slum Makeover Gathers Steam,” Xinhua, 16 May 11.

<sup>37</sup> For detailed information on the special economic zones (SEZs), including background on initial planning in 2009 to create the SEZs and their formation in mid-2010, see Wang Rengui et al., “Xinjiang ‘Special Economic Zones’ Unveiled,” Liaowang, 30 May 11–05 Jun 11 (Open Source Center, 27 July 11). See also “Xinjiang To Set Up Two Special Economic Zones in 2011,” People’s Daily, 14 February 11; “China Aims To Build Xinjiang’s Capital Into Int’l Trade Center,” Xinhua, 30 March 11.

<sup>38</sup> “China Aims To Build Xinjiang’s Capital Into Int’l Trade Center,” Xinhua, 30 March 11; “Xinjiang To Set Up Two Special Economic Zones in 2011,” People’s Daily, 14 February 11 (describing plans to increase Kashgar’s population to 1 million); Kashgar Municipal People’s Government, “Brief Introduction to Kashgar Municipality” [Kashi shi jianjie], 9 November 10 (describing current population as 600,000, including a floating population of 150,000).

<sup>39</sup> “China-Eurasia Expo,” China-Eurasia Expo Web site, last visited 26 August 11.

<sup>40</sup> “New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of Tibet, Xinjiang,” Xinhua, 6 March 11.

<sup>41</sup> See, e.g., “Development Could Widen Ethnic Divide,” Radio Free Asia, 31 March 11; “Plan To Build ‘Guangzhou New City’ in Kashgar Gives People Deep Grief” [Qeshqerde “guangju yéngi shehri” ning qurulush pilani kishini chongqur qayghugha salidu], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 11; “Has the Economic Development Region in Korla Only Been Open to Han?” [Korlidiki iqtisadiy tereqqiyat rayoni peqet xitaylarghila échiwétilgenmu?], Radio Free Asia, 19 April 11. For additional information on past development projects, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263–64.

<sup>42</sup> Supreme People’s Court Guiding Opinion Concerning Aiding Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date October 2010), item 4(8).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, item 3(5).

<sup>44</sup> Xinjiang Lawyers Association, “2010 Regionwide Ethnic Minority Lawyers’ Training Class Begins Soon, Publicity Underway During Organization and Preparatory Work” [2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu lushi peixunban kaiké zaiji zuzhi zhunbei gongzuo jinluo migu], 1 December 10. For more information on the training, see “Xinjiang’s First Large-Scale Training Class for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Stresses Meeting Political Goals,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 19 January 11.

<sup>45</sup> Xinjiang Lawyers Association, “2010 Regionwide Training Class for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Opens in Urumqi, Justice Department Head Abliz Hoshur Attends Opening Ceremony and Makes Important Speech” [2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu lushi peixunban zai wu kaiké sifating tingchang abulizi wushou’er chuxi kaiké yishi bing zuo zhongyao jianghua], 5 December 10.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> “Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 Sentenced for Deadly Riot,” Xinhua, 7 March 10; “198 People in 97 Cases Already Tried and Sentenced in Urumqi ‘7–5’ Incident” [Wulumuqi “7–5” shijian yi shenli xuanpan 97 an 198 ren], Xinhua, 7 March 10. See analysis in “198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of Transparency,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.

<sup>48</sup> “Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 Sentenced for Deadly Riot,” Xinhua, 7 March 10.

<sup>49</sup> Han Xiaoyi, “Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases of Crimes of Endangering State Security” [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People’s Daily, 16 January 11.

<sup>50</sup> “Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,” Radio Free Asia, 21 December 10; “Uyghur Student Sentenced to Death,” Radio Free Asia, 30 December 10; “Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,” Radio Free Asia, 6 March 11; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “A City Ruled by Fear and Silence: Urumchi, Two Years On,” 5 July 11, 8.

<sup>51</sup>“China Handling July 5 Cases in Urgent Manner Within Court System” [Xitay, sot mehkimi saheside 5-iyul délolirini jiddiy bir terep qilmaqta], Radio Free Asia, 22 September 10.

<sup>52</sup>Han Xiaoyi, “Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases of Endangering State Security Crimes” [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People’s Daily, 16 January 11. For analysis and comparison with figures from previous years, see information that follows within text as well as “Number of State Security Cases Tried in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer Prison Sentences Increases,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 February 11.

<sup>53</sup>Han Xiaoyi, “Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases of Endangering State Security Crimes” [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People’s Daily, 16 January 11; Cao Zhiheng and Wang Dalin, “Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 437 Cases of Endangering State Security” [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua, 15 January 10.

<sup>54</sup>In 2008, courts completed 268 cases of endangering state security. “Xinjiang Courts in Total Complete Investigation of 268 Endangering State Security Cases” [Xinjiang fayuan gong shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 268 qi], Xinhua, 10 January 09. Between 2003 and 2007, the XUAR court system had accepted an average of roughly 150 ESS cases per year. The figure refers to cases accepted (shouli) rather than trials completed (shenjie), but suggests a lower number of completed ESS trials before 2008 and subsequent years. Tian Yu, “Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts Is Launched” [Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua, 14 August 07. See also analysis in “State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear To Surge in 2008,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 2009, 3.

<sup>55</sup>Han Xiaoyi, “Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases of Endangering State Security Crimes” [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People’s Daily, 16 January 11.

<sup>56</sup>See further analysis in “Number of State Security Cases Tried in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer Prison Sentences Increases,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 February 11.

<sup>57</sup>See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206–7, and the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2009–00448, 2009–00449, 2010–00106, 2010–00238, and 2010–00253, for more information on these cases.

<sup>58</sup>For information on the regulations, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 205, citing Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion Regulation [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 40; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, revised 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, art. 25.

<sup>59</sup>“Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,” Radio Free Asia, 21 December 10; “Translator and Reporter Muhemmetjan Abdulla Known To Have Been Sentenced to Life in Prison” [Terjiman we muxbir muhemmetjan abdu llaning muddetsiz qamaqqa hoküm qilinghanliqi melum bolmaqta], Radio Free Asia, 20 December 10.

<sup>60</sup>“Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,” Radio Free Asia, 6 March 11; World Uyghur Congress, “World Uyghur Congress Condemns 15-Year Sentence Handed Down to Uyghur Journalist and Web site Editor Gheyret Niyaz,” 24 July 10.

<sup>61</sup>See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206–7, and the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2009–00448, 2009–00449, 2010–00106, 2010–00238, and 2010–00253, for more information on these cases.

<sup>62</sup>“Dissident Kazakh Writer Dies in Western China,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 February 11; See also the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, record 2011–00173, on Kajikhumar Shabdan (citing Dui Hua Foundation information based on official Chinese sources).

<sup>63</sup>“Travel Ban Extends to Family,” Radio Free Asia, 10 February 11; “Uyghur Scholar, Family Held,” Radio Free Asia, 15 December 10.

<sup>64</sup>Xinjiang Press and Publication Bureau, “Raising ‘Eight Points of Work’ for Making Focused Efforts in Latter Half of Year” [Tichu xiabannian zhongdian zhuhao “ba xiang gongzuo”], 5 July 10.

<sup>65</sup>Shi Qiaomei et al., “Our Region Convenes ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work Video Teleconference” [Wo qu zhaokai “saohuang dafei” gongzuo dianshi dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.

<sup>66</sup>Yang Chen, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Transportation Department, “‘Turfan Transportation Management Bureau’ Tracks Down 87 Illegal Religious Publications” [“Tulufan yunguanju” chahuo 87 ben feifa zongjiao chubanwu], 22 February 11; Shi Qiaomei et al., “Our Region Convenes ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work Video Teleconference” [Wo qu zhaokai “saohuang dafei” gongzuo dianshi dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.

<sup>67</sup>See, e.g., “Urumqi Announces ‘10 Big Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications Cases’” [Wulumuqi gongbu 2010 nian “saohuang dafei shida anjian”], Tianshan Net, 10 February 11; “Directly Administered Areas in Ili Prefecture Stress Strengthening ‘Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications’ and Cultural Market Supervision Work During ‘New Year’ and ‘Chinese New Year’ Period” [Yili zhoushi zhuzhong jiaqiang “yuandan” “chunjie” qijian “saohuang dafei” he wenhua shichang jianguan gongzuo], Xinjiang Culture Net, 11 February 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture People’s Government, “Bortala Prefecture Enlarges Strength of Inspections, Ensures ‘Big Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work Gets Down to the Substance” [Bo zhou jiada jiancha lidu quebao “saohuang dafei” gongzuo luo dao shichu], 17 February 11; Fuyun County People’s Government, “Turaxun

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<sup>68</sup>“Crackdown Launched in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, 3 December 10; “Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call,” Radio Free Asia, 28 February 11.

<sup>69</sup>Cheng Lixin, “Autonomous Regional Party Committee Standing Committee (Enlarged) Meeting Stresses Raising Recognition, Synthesizing Measures and Policies, and Ensuring Stability” [Zizhiqiu dangwei changwei (kuoda) huiyi qiangdiao tigao renshi zonghe shice quebao wending], Xinjiang Daily, 8 December 10.

<sup>70</sup>“Zhang Chunxian: Use ‘5 Resolutes’ To Propel Development and Stability” [Zhang chunxian: yi “wuge jiangdingbuyi” tuijin fazhan he wending], Tianshan Net, 7 August 11.

<sup>71</sup>Chen Zehua, “Our Region Launches Special Operation To ‘Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes’” [Wo qu kaizhan “yanli daji baoli kongbu fanzui” zhuaxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.

<sup>72</sup>See examples that follow, as well as analysis in “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>73</sup>Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal Religious Activity [Zizhiqiu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de jieding] (undated, reprinted in, e.g., Chinggil County People’s Government, 25 February 08), Nos. 3, 4, 5, 20. For mention of the document from the past year, see, e.g., Yengisar Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, “Penetrate the Countryside for Grand Propaganda and Explanations, Ethnic Unity Enters People’s Hearts, Yengisar County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Launches ‘Grand Propagandizing and Explanation’ Activity” [Shenru xiangcun da xuanjiang minzu tuanjie jin minxin, yingjisha xian minzongju kaizhan “da xuanjiang” huodong], reprinted in Yengisar County People’s Government, 21 March 11; Qaramay Dushanzi District Number 1 Middle School, “2011 Plan for Launching ‘Year of Studying Law’ Activity” [2011 nian kaizhan “xuefa nian” huodong jihua], 11 March 11.

<sup>74</sup>See Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqiu weichengnianren baohu tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, arts. 34, 53, and analysis in “New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To Expand Controls Over Children’s Religious Freedom (Includes Update),” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2 and “Draft Regulation in Xinjiang Could Strengthen Legal Prohibitions Over Children’s Freedom of Religion,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 3.

<sup>75</sup>See Village Pledge System in this section for more information and “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>76</sup>Qiongbola Township People’s Government, “Qiongbola Township Blazes Trails in Model for Religious Management, Drives Ahead With New Ideas in Social Management” [Qiongbola xiang chuangxin zongjiao guanli moshi, tuijin shehui guanli chuaxin], reprinted in Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County People’s Government, 7 January 11.

<sup>77</sup>Toutunhe District People’s Political Consultative Office, “Inspection Report Concerning Toutunhe District’s Religious Personnel’s Lifestyle Situation and Conditions for Playing a Positive Role in Strengthening Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Stability” [Guanyu dui toutunhe qu zongjiao renshi zai jiaqiang minzu tuanjie, weihu wending fangmian fahui zuoyong qingkuang ji shenghuo zhuanguang de shicha baogao], reprinted in Toutunhe District People’s Government, 2 September 10.

<sup>78</sup>See, e.g., Jiashi County People’s Government, “Jiashi County Launches Food Hygiene and Safety Education and Training Work During the ‘Two Holidays’ Period” [Jiashi xian kaizhan “liang jie” qijian shipin weisheng anquan jiaoyu peixun gongzuo], 28 July 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture People’s Government, “Bortala Municipality Takes Four Measures To Soundly Launch Work on Management of Religious Affairs” [Bole shi si cuo bingju zhashi kaizhan zongjiao shiwu guanli gongzuo], 20 July 11; Ruoqiang County People’s Government, “Washsheri Township Convenes Forum Regarding Stability Work During Ramadan” [Washixia xiang zhaokai guanyu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo zuotanhui], 29 July 11; Qiemo County People’s Government, “Tatirang Township Adopts Forum Method To Do Good Job of Religion Work” [Tatirang xiang caiqu zuotanhui fangshi zuohao zongjiao gongzuo], 5 August 11; “Situation All-Around Tense in Uyghur Area During Ramadan Period” [Ramzan mezigilide uyghur eli weziyiti omumyulu jiddiyleshken], Radio Free Asia, 28 July 11. For additional information on controls over Ramadan in recent years, see, e.g., “Authorities Continue To Restrict Ramadan Observance in Xinjiang,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 3, and “Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3.

<sup>79</sup>“Father and Son Religious Personages Detained on Suspicion in Shihezi Are Given 3-Year Sentences” [Shixenzide guman bilen tutqun qilinghan dada-bala diniy zatlargha 3 yilliqtin qamaq jazasi berilgen], Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11.

<sup>80</sup>For information on earlier campaigns, see “Xinjiang Authorities Target Beards, Veils in Campaigns To Tighten Control Over Religion,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4–5, and “Xinjiang Authorities Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.

<sup>81</sup>See, e.g., All-China Women’s Federation, “10 Measures From the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Women’s Federation Let Women of All Ethnicities All Reap Benefits” [Xinjiang zizhiqiu fulian shi xiang jucuo rang gezu funu pu shouhui], 7 March 11; Hoten District Women’s Federation, “Hoten District Women’s Federation 2011 Work Arrangements” [Hetian diqu fulian 2011 nian gongzuo anpai], reprinted in Hoten District People’s Government, 27 January 11; Luntai County Women’s Federation, “Implementation Plan for Luntai County Women’s Federa-

tion System's Launching of 'Creating Advancement, Striving for Excellence' Activities" [Guanyu zai luntai xian fulian xitong zhong kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou huodong de shishi fang'an], reprinted in Luntai County People's Government, 7 September 10; Turpan Municipality Leading Group Office for Creating Advancement, Striving for Excellence Activities, "Implementation Plan for Turpan City Women's Federation System and Women of All Ethnicities' Deeply Launching of Creating Advancement, Striving for Excellence Activities" [Guanyu zai tulufan shi fulian xitong he gezu funu zhong shenru kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou huodong de shishi fang'an], Turpan Party Construction Net, 6 January 11.

<sup>82</sup>Hongqiao Residential District Office, "Hongqiao Residential District Work System Two" [Hongqiao jiedao gongzuo zhidu er], reprinted in Usu Municipal People's Government, 18 September 10.

<sup>83</sup>Paixianbaibazha Township People's Government, "Implementation Plan for Paixianbaibazha Township's Launching of Special Rectification Operation To Attack Illegal Religious Activities" [Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 27 November 10.

<sup>84</sup>Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's Federation, "Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the 'Autonomous Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points'" [Guanyu yinfa "zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian" de tongzhi], 30 March 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's Federation, "Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the 'Autonomous Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points'" [Guanyu yinfa "zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian" de tongzhi], 2 February 11; Paixianbaibazha Township People's Government, "Implementation Plan for Paixianbaibazha Township's Launching of Special Rectification Operation To Attack Illegal Religious Activities" [Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 27 November 10. For more information on oversight in recent years, see "Xinjiang Authorities Train, Seek To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2, and "Xinjiang Authorities Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.

<sup>85</sup>In Chinese law, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, arts. 4, 121, and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting "bilingual" education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi "zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa" ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22. In international law, see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 26, 27.

<sup>86</sup>For more information on goals set following the forum, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 208.

<sup>87</sup>"Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020)" [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiq zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020 nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; Jing Bo, "Xinjiang Promulgates 'Outline of Education Plan'" [Xinjiang gongbu "jiaoyu guihua gangyao"], Tianshan Net, 22 January 11 (noting date of issue of the reform plan). For more information, see analysis in "Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>"Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020)" [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiq zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020 nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 178–79.

<sup>90</sup>"Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020)" [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiq zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020 nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 8.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., item 15.

<sup>92</sup>"Uyghur-Language Classes Preserved at Middle School in Dadamtu Township, Ghulja" [Ghulja dadamtu yeziliq ottura mektipide uyghur tilidiki siniplar saqlinip qaldi], Radio Free Asia, 1 December 10. For additional information on dissatisfaction over bilingual education in recent years, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, "Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of 'Bilingual' Education in the People's Republic of China," 24 July 07.

<sup>93</sup>Jing Bo, "Xinjiang Publicly Recruits 5109 Elementary and Secondary School Bilingual Teachers" [Xinjiang gongkai zhaopin 5109 ming zhongxiaoxue shuangyu jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 10 October 10. For more information, see analysis in "Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.

<sup>94</sup>Li Min, "Xinjiang Publicly Recruits Over 10,000 Elementary and Secondary School Teachers" [Xinjiang 2011 nian mianxiang shehui zhaopin 1 wan yu ming zhongxiaoxue jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 30 May 11; "Xinjiang To Recruit 9,200 Bilingual Teachers," Xinhua, 31 May 11.

<sup>95</sup>See, e.g., Fan Yingli and Aynur, "Zhejiang Aid to Xinjiang Will Train Over 5000 Ethnic Minority 'Bilingual' Teachers Within 5 Years" [Zhejiang yuanjiang wunian nei jiang peixun 5000 yu ming shaoshu minzu "shuangyu" jiaoshi], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 16 November 10; Xinjiang Education Department, "The Four Provinces and Municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Jiangsu Hold Cooperation Meeting in Nanjing on Work for Training Backbone Ethnic Minority Bilingual Teachers" [Jing jin hu su si shengshi zai nanjing zhaokai xinjiang shaoshu minzu shuangyu gudan jiaoshi peixun gongzuo xiezuo hui], 9 December 10.

<sup>96</sup>"Laid Off Profs Reject Deal," Radio Free Asia, 27 September 11; "Teachers Fired Over Mandarin Ability," Radio Free Asia, 23 September 11; "Two Female Teachers in Qaghliq Spent 35

Days in Prison for Petitioning to Higher Levels” [Qaghiliqta ikki neper ayal oqutquchi yuqirigha erz qilghanliqi üçün 35 kün qamaqta yatqan], Radio Free Asia, 4 April 11. See also “Cuts Expected for Uyghur Teachers,” Radio Free Asia, 16 November 10; “Uyghur Teachers in Toqsun Again Under Harsh Pressure” [Toqsundiki uyghur oqutqichilar yenimu qattiq bésim astida], Radio Free Asia, 9 December 10.

<sup>97</sup>Xinjiang Education Department, Circular Concerning Completing Pilot Work To Offer Ethnic Minority Language Arts Classes in Compulsory Education-Level Schools Teaching in Mandarin [Guanyu zuohao hanyu shouke yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuexiao kaishe minzu yuwen kecheng shidian gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 30 August 10.

<sup>98</sup>Xinjiang Education Department, Guiding Opinion on Autonomous Region’s Work To Strengthen Training in Minority Languages for Newly Hired Preschool Teachers Who Are Native Mandarin Speakers [Zizhiq xinpın muyu wei hanyu de xueqian shuangyu jiaoshi min yuyan qianghua peixun gongzuo zhıdao yijian], issued 30 August 10.

<sup>99</sup>See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 209–10, for information on reward programs in earlier years.

<sup>100</sup>“Rural Special Award System in 3 Southern Xinjiang Districts and Prefecture Is Again Enlarged” [Xinjiang nanjiang san dizhou nongcun teshu jiangli zhengce zaidu kuomian], Tianshan Net, 17 March 11.

<sup>101</sup>Zepu County Population and Family Planning Committee, “Rural Family Planning Household Special Award System for 3 Xinjiang Districts and Prefecture” [Nanjiang san dizhou nongcun jihua shengyu jiating teshu jiangli zhıdu], reprinted in Zepu Net, 4 September 08.

<sup>102</sup>“National Population and Family Planning Commission Starts Series of Operations To Support Xinjiang” [Guojia renkou jishengwei qidong zhiyuan xinjiang xilie xingdong], China Population News, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission, 3 November 09. For additional analysis, see “Authorities Begin New Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in Xinjiang,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2.

<sup>103</sup>See, e.g., Li Yanmin, “3.21 Million From State Goes to 2252 Ethnic Minority Households in Xinjiang’s Altay” [Guojia 321 wan huiji xinjiang aletai 2252 hu shaoshu minzu jiating], Xinhua, 19 November 10; Zhang Yanhong and Wang Yizhi, “Nileke County Townships and Towns Launch Family Planning Special Awards-Granting Ceremony” [Nileke xian xiangzhen fafang jihua shengyu jiating teshu jiangjin fafang yishi], Xinjiang News Net, 1 December 10; “Seman Township, Kashgar, Convenes [Meeting] for Farmers and Herders To Receive Family Planning ‘Certificates of Honor’” [Kashi shi seman xiang zhaokai nongmumin lingqu jihua shengyu “guangrongzheng”], Kashgar Today, 8 April 11.

<sup>104</sup>For a broad overview and analysis of the program, see “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>105</sup>“Seek Realistic Results, Blaze Trails, Form Great Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look” [Qiushi chuangxin jie shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi Xinjiang, 25 August 10.

<sup>106</sup>See analysis in “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>107</sup>For general information, see, e.g., “Seek Realistic Results, Blaze Trails, Form Great Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look” [Qiushi chuangxin jie shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi Xinjiang, 25 August 10; Du Jianxi, “Take Implementing ‘Village Rules’ as the Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have ‘Rule of Law’ Enter the Countryside” [Yi luoshi “cungui minyue” wei “zhuashou” tuidong “fazhi jin xiangcun” gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang, 6 April 08. For analysis see “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update; No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>108</sup>PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued and effective 4 November 98, amended 28 October 10, art. 27.

<sup>109</sup>See, e.g., analysis in “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>110</sup>See Du Jianxi, “Take Implementing ‘Village Rules’ as the Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have ‘Rule of Law’ Enter the Countryside” [Yi luoshi “cungui minyue” wei “zhuashou” tuidong “fazhi jin xiangcun” gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang, 6 April 08. For analysis see “Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

<sup>111</sup>“Promises To Respect the Rules in Hoten District, Xinjiang: Villagers Manage Themselves (1)” [Xinjiang hetian diqu shouyue chengnuo: cunmin ziji guan ziji (1)], Legal Daily, reprinted in China Finance Net, 8 April 08.

<sup>112</sup>Hoten District Leading Group on Governing District in Accordance to Law et al., Opinion Concerning Implementation of Promotion of Village “Codes of Conduct” in Rural Areas in 2007, To Govern Villages in Accordance With Law” [Guanyu 2007 nian zai nongcun tuixing “cungui minyue” yifa zhıcun de shishi yijian], 22 January 07, Item 1(1).

<sup>113</sup>See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4; PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyü zızhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 9; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodongfa], issued 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 12; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cufanf], issued 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 28. See also legal analysis in “Governments in Xinjiang Continue To Sponsor, Sanction Job Recruitment That Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 11 March 09, 3.

<sup>114</sup>“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Occupational Disease Hospital Recruiting Information” [Xinjiang wewu’er zizhiq zhiyebing yiyuan zhaopin xinxi], reprinted in Graduate School

of Lanzhou University, 26 November 10. See also “Job Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.

<sup>115</sup>“List of Civil Servant and Staff Positions for 2010 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Public Recruiting Through Exam for County-Level Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs” [2010 nian xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqiu mianxiang shehui gongkai kaolu xianji jijian jiancha jiguan gongwuyuan, gongzuo ren yuan zhiweibiao], reprinted in Xinjiang Human Resources Testing Center, 16 September 10.

<sup>116</sup>Bingtuan Personnel Bureau, “Summary of Posts for 2011 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Recruiting of Functionaries” [2011 xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan mianxiang shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan zhiwei huizongbiao], reprinted in Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority, 6 August 11. For information on hiring in previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 211; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 107.

<sup>117</sup>Autonomous Region Party Committee and Autonomous Region People’s Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work [Zizhiqiu dangwei, zizhiqiu renmin zhengfu guanyu cunjin juyue gongzuo de yijian], issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2).

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, art. 1(5).

<sup>119</sup>Congressional-Executive Commission on China searches for information did not find specific reports from the past year on localities taking steps to adhere to the opinion and promote the hiring of ethnic minorities.

<sup>120</sup>Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing “Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities for Training” [Zizhiqiu dangwei zuzhibu deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi “shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua” de yijian], 9 January 11, items 1, 2. See analysis in “Job Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.

<sup>121</sup>Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing “Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities for Training” [Zizhiqiu dangwei zuzhibu deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi “shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua” de yijian], 9 January 11, item 5(2) (referring to trainees taking up set posts); He Jun and Mao Yong, “Xinjiang Starts ‘Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities for Training’” [Xinjiang qidong “shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua”], Xinhua, 25 March 11.

<sup>122</sup>Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing “Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities for Training” [Zizhiqiu dangwei zuzhibu deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi “shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua” de yijian], 9 January 11, item 1.

<sup>123</sup>CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 179; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264–66; CECC 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 211–12.

<sup>124</sup>See, e.g., “Nuer Bekri Refutes the Allegation That Women of Uyghur Ethnic Group ‘Are Forced To Work in the Interior of the Country,’” Xinhua, 18 July 09 (Open Source Center, 20 July 09); Zhang Jie, “Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad” [Zhi wu: laowu shuchu tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10; Kashgar District People’s Government, “Earned Income in Jiashi From 7 Years of Labor Export Exceeds 1 Billion” [Jiashi 7 nian laowu shuchu chuanshou chao 10 yi], 13 May 11; Mao Yong and Zhao Chunhui, “Isolated Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March Toward Openness” [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu nongmingong cong fengbi maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in China Ethnicities News, 25 January 10.

<sup>125</sup>Zhang Jie, “Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad” [Zhi wu: laowu shuchu tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10.

<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup>“Strive To Stand on One’s Feet, Establish Good Image for People From Xinjiang-Third Sidelight in Autonomous Region Party and Government Representatives Delegation Visit to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities” [Ziqiang zili shuli xinjiangren lianghao xingxiang zizhiqiu dangzheng daibiaotuan zoufang duikou yuanjiang shengshi ceji san], Xinjiang TV, reprinted in Xinhua, 4 May 11.

<sup>128</sup>See, e.g., “Xinjiang Lacks Workers, Provinces [Elsewhere in China] With Large Labor Export Suffer Hardships” [Xinjiang quegong neidi laowu shuchu da sheng fannan], Yaxin, reprinted in Sina, 18 February 11; “Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory Education Still Pick Cotton?” [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai shi mianhua ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People’s Government, 18 September 10; “Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment’s Legal Office Strengthens Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton” [Nong er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian qijian fazhi anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10.

<sup>129</sup>The International Labor Organization’s Convention 138, which China has ratified, sets the minimum age for child labor at 15, with limited exceptions. Although the Convention excludes work done as part of general, vocational, or technical education, such work must be an “integral part” of a course of study or training course. Article 15 of China’s Labor Law forbids the employment of minors under 16. Within this legal framework prohibiting child labor, Article 13 of the Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor and Article 58 of the Education Law together allow for “education practice labor” and work-study programs for children under the age of 16, but such programs must not harm children’s health or safety or adversely affect their normal studies. A nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and secondary school students outlines the general terms of such programs, which it says are meant to cultivate mor-

als, contribute to production outputs, and improve conditions for schools. ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73, arts. 2, 6; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin heguo laodongfa], issued 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhì shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13; PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa], issued 18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, art. 58. Also see generally Regulation Regarding Temporary Work on Work-Study Labor for Secondary and Elementary Schools [Quanguo zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue zaxing gongzuo tiaoli], issued and effective 20 February 83, arts. 1, 3.

<sup>130</sup>See Opinion on Strengthening the Management of Secondary and Elementary School Students' Work-Study Service Activities [Guanyu jiaqiang zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue laowu huodong guanli de yijian], issued 8 May 06, art. 3, and "Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial 'Work-Study' Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 11.

<sup>131</sup>He Ping, "Starting This Fall, Xinjiang Students Attending Compulsory Education Will Not Pick Cotton Again" [Jin qiu qi xinjiang jiu nian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng buzai shi mianhua], Tianshan Net, 19 September 08. See also analysis in "Xinjiang Work-Study Programs Continue; Cotton-Picking Activities Limited," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2008, 4.

<sup>132</sup>See, e.g., "Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory Education Still Pick Cotton?" [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai shi mianhua ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 18 September 10; and "Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment's Legal Office Strengthens Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton" [Nong er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian gijian fazhi anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10, cited in "Underage Students Continue To Pick Cotton in Xinjiang Work-Study Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 4.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>For general background on the project, see "Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2.

<sup>135</sup>Pan Ying, "Old City Transformation Project in Kashgar, Xinjiang, Steadily Moves Ahead, City Culture Is Inherited" [Xinjiang kashi lao Cheng gaizao xiangmu pingwen tuijin Chengshi wenhua deyi chuancheng], Xinhua, 9 July 11.

<sup>136</sup>Cai Muyuan, "Restoring Old Kashgar for a Safer Future," China Daily, 26 October 10.

<sup>137</sup>Ben Ochieng and Wang Yanan, "Interview: Inscribed Chinese Intangible Elements Have Viability: UNESCO Official," Xinhua, 17 November 10; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, "Intangible Heritage Lists," last visited 20 June 11.

<sup>138</sup>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, "Songs, Dances and Traditional Know-How From 29 Countries Proposed for Inscription on UNESCO Lists of Intangible Heritage," 11 September 10.

<sup>139</sup>See information on the Chinese government description of the meshrep in Rachel Harris, UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, "Report on the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304 for Inscription on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in 2010," November 2010, and Cultural Department of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Clarification to the Report on the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304 for Inscription on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in 2010," last visited 20 June 11. See also analysis in "Draft of Intangible Cultural Heritage Law Limits Research Activities; Xinjiang Case Study Shows Politicization of Heritage (Updated)," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 February 11.

<sup>140</sup>Jay Dautcher, "Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285–86.

<sup>141</sup>For more information on the cases, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 212–13.

<sup>142</sup>Zhou Yingfeng and Cui Qingxin, "Our Country Busts Major Terrorist Group Case, Details on Public Security Bureau Announcement" [Woguo pohuo zhongda kongbu zuzhi an gong'anbu gongbu xiangqing], Xinhua, 24 June 10.

<sup>143</sup>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application," December 1996, II(i)(10). See also Monette Zard, "Exclusion, Terrorism and the Refugee Convention," Forced Migration Review, June 2002.

<sup>144</sup>"Uyghur Prisoner Denied Medical Care," Radio Free Asia, 8 March 11.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid.; "Laos Departs Seven Uyghurs," Radio Free Asia, 15 December 10; "Health Status of Prisoner Memtili Rozi, Returned From Cambodia, Worries Family" [Kambodzhadin qayturulghan tutqun memtili rozining salamatlik ehwalı ailisidikilerni jiddiy endishige salmaqta], Radio Free Asia, 13 December 10.

<sup>146</sup>"Kazakhstan Departs Uyghur Teacher," Radio Free Asia, 2 June 11; Uyghur American Association, "The World Must Demand Accountability for Deported Uyghur Refugee Ershidin Israel," 8 June 11.

<sup>147</sup>"Uyghur in Chinese Custody?" Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11; Amnesty International, "Document-China: Forcibly Returned Asylum Seeker at Risk," 16 June 11.

<sup>148</sup>"Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation," Radio Free Asia, 15 June 11; "Kazakhstan Departs Uyghur Teacher," Radio Free Asia, 2 June 11; "Uyghur in Chinese Custody?" Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11.

<sup>149</sup>"Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation," Radio Free Asia, 15 June 11.

<sup>150</sup>Human Rights Watch, "China/Thailand: Account for Uyghur Man Turned Over to Chinese Officials," 10 August 11; "Uyghur Held in Thailand," Radio Free Asia, 8 August 08.

<sup>151</sup>"Pakistan Departs Uyghurs," Radio Free Asia, 10 August 11.

<sup>152</sup>See, e.g., Sean Yoong, “5 Uighur Chinese Held in Malaysia Risk Deportation,” Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 22 August 11; “Malaysia Deports Uyghurs,” Radio Free Asia, 23 August 11.

<sup>153</sup>UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).

<sup>154</sup>UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, art. 33(1). For a UNHCR statement noting that the principle of *refoulement* applies to asylum seekers as well as refugees and stating that the return of the Uyghur asylum seekers from Cambodia violates this principle, see “UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of Uighur Asylum-Seekers From Cambodia,” UN News Centre, 21 December 09.

<sup>155</sup>For more information, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 176–77; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 261–62; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 212–13.

