[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
XINJIANG
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
_____
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Xinjiang
Findings
Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the
Commission's 2011 reporting year. Following
demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009,
authorities maintained repressive security policies
that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy,
and independent expressions of cultural and religious
identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the
region's stability. Authorities bolstered security in
the region in summer 2011, following incidents they
described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an
expanded trade expo.
The Chinese government continued to obscure
information about people tried in connection to the
July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas
media reported on cases of people imprisoned for
peaceful speech and assembly during that time. The
number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of
endangering state security--a category of criminal
offenses that authorities in China have used to punish
citizen activism and dissent--decreased in 2010
compared to 2009 figures but remained higher than in
years before 2009.
Implementation of a series of central
government-led development initiatives, first announced
at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum,
spurred an intensification of longstanding policies--
including Mandarin-language schooling, herder
resettlement, and urban development projects--that have
undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han
groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and
livelihoods.
Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight
controls over religion, especially Islam, and
maintained restrictions on religious practice that are
harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations.
Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security
campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on
the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued
campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and
women from wearing veils, and targeted ``illegal''
religious materials in censorship campaigns.
Discriminatory job hiring practices against
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups continued in both the
government and private sectors. Authorities also
continued to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs
elsewhere in China, through programs reportedly marked,
in some cases, by coercion to participate and
exploitative working conditions. Education authorities
in the XUAR continued to require students to pick
cotton and engage in other forms of labor in work-study
programs that exceeded permitted parameters for student
labor under Chinese law and international standards for
worker rights.
National and XUAR government officials
continued to implement projects that have undermined
Uyghurs' ability to protect their cultural heritage.
Authorities continued steps to demolish and
``reconstruct'' the Old City section of Kashgar and
relocate residents, a five-year project launched in
2009 that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents
and other observers for requiring the resettlement of
residents and for undermining cultural heritage
protection. The Chinese government also continued to
politicize the protection of Uyghurs' intangible
cultural heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and
artistic gathering for increased state and
international protection, but defining this form of
intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that
contain religious elements and social activism.
Information remained limited on the status of
asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia
in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the
asylum seekers' refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese
security officials, in cooperation with authorities in
Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a Uyghur man--initially
recognized as a refugee, though the UNHCR later revoked
this status--from Kazakhstan to China. In August,
authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man to
Chinese authorities--who are presumed to have returned
him to China--while authorities in Pakistan and
Malaysia forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same
month. The forced returns are among several documented
cases of forced deportation in recent years,
highlighting the ongoing risks of ``refoulement'' and
torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and
migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the
sway of China's influence and its disregard for
international law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support legislation that expands U.S. Government
resources for raising awareness of human rights
conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for
increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human
rights.
Raise concern about human rights conditions in
the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of
security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on
the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for
advocating for their rights or for their personal
connection to rights advocates, including: Gheyret
Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for
``leaking state secrets'' after giving interviews to
foreign media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10
years in prison for allegedly ``inciting racial hatred
or discrimination'' or ``inciting separatism'' after
writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim
(adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in
2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively,
for alleged economic and ``separatist'' crimes), as
well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Call on the Chinese government to provide details
about each person detained, charged, tried, or
sentenced in connection to demonstrations and riots in
the XUAR in July 2009, including each person's name,
the charges (if any) against each person, the name and
location of the prosecuting office (i.e.,
procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the
name of each facility where a person is detained or
imprisoned. Call on the Chinese government to encourage
people who have been wrongfully detained to file for
compensation. Call on the Chinese government to ensure
people suspected of crimes in connection to events in
July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their
right to employ legal defense in accordance with
Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
and to ensure suspects can employ legal defense of
their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government to
announce the judgments in all trials connected to
events in July 2009, as required under Article 163 of
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Call on the government
to allow independent experts to conduct independent
examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to
allow them access to the trials connected to these
events.
Support non-governmental organizations that
address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them
to continue to gather information on conditions in the
region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase
their capacity to preserve their rights and protect
their culture, language, and heritage. Provide support
for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the
XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand their
capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored
information to XUAR residents. Provide support for
libraries that hold Uyghur-language collections to
increase their capacity to collect and preserve books
and journals from the XUAR. Support organizations that
can research and take steps to safeguard tangible and
intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to support
development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad
protection of XUAR residents' rights and allow the XUAR
government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy
in making development decisions. Call on central and
XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that
promotes not only economic growth but also respects the
broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and
engages these communities in participatory
decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into
account the particular needs and input of non-Han
ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges
protecting their rights in the face of top-down
development policies and who have not been full
beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on
authorities to ensure that residents have input into
resettlement initiatives and receive adequate
compensation. Call on authorities to take measures to
safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their
cultures and livelihoods.
Call on the Chinese government to ensure
government and private employers abide by legal
provisions barring discrimination based on ethnicity
and cease job recruiting practices that reserve
positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on
authorities to monitor compliance with local directives
promoting job opportunities for non-Han groups, who
continue to face discrimination in the job market.
Support organizations that can provide technical
assistance in monitoring compliance with labor laws and
in bringing suits challenging discriminatory practices,
as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employment
Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to
investigate reports of coercion and exploitative
working conditions within labor transfer programs that
send rural non-Han men and women to jobs in the
interior of China. Call on Chinese authorities to
investigate work-study programs within the XUAR and
ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for
student labor under Chinese law and international
standards for worker rights.
Call on the Chinese government to provide
information on the whereabouts and current legal status
of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned from
Cambodia in December 2009 and Uyghurs forcibly returned
to China from Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, and
Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees
and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and with
officials from international refugee agencies and from
transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees.
Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or
destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and
refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations
of other countries. Call on transit and destination
countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and
migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention against Torture on ``refoulement.''
Introduction
Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission's 2011
reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the
region in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security
policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy,
and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity,
especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region's stability.
Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011
following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in
advance of an expanded trade expo. The government continued to
obscure information about people tried in connection to the
July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas media
reported on cases of people imprisoned for peaceful speech and
assembly during that time. Implementation of a series of
central government-led development initiatives, first announced
at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred
an intensification of longstanding policies--including
Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban
development projects--that have undermined the rights of
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures,
languages, and livelihoods. Authorities enforced tight controls
over religion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on
religious practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in
national regulations. Discriminatory job hiring practices
against Uyghurs and other non-Han groups, who comprise roughly
60 percent of the XUAR population, continued in both the
government and private sectors. The Chinese government
maintained its disregard of international legal protections for
refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, and information on the
status of Uyghurs forcibly returned to China in recent years,
including multiple cases in 2011, remained limited.
Security Measures
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
continued to use security measures to bolster political and
social controls in the region. At the same time XUAR
authorities reiterated the Xinjiang Work Forum's call for
``developments by leaps and bounds'' and ``long-term
stability'' in the XUAR, high-level officials also continued to
emphasize ``placing stability above all else'' and ``striking
hard'' against the ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism,
and religious extremism.\1\ Authorities continued to apply the
term ``three forces'' to include peaceful dissent, human rights
advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious
identity, especially among Uyghurs.\2\ XUAR Communist Party
Secretary Zhang Chunxian emphasized in a December 2010 meeting
that stability was the ``prerequisite'' and ``guarantee'' for
the region's development.\3\ In addition, officials at the
meeting affirmed, as the region's guiding principle for
stability work, central authorities' ``correct assessment''
that ``ethnic separatism'' is the main threat to the region's
stability.\4\ The government and media also reported that
terrorist incidents took place in the region in the past year,
including incidents in Hoten and Kashgar districts
(prefectures) in July.\5\ As in the past, authorities provided
limited information on the events and continued to enforce
restrictions on reporting that hindered efforts to investigate
the incidents.\6\ The government reported the July incident in
Hoten municipality, Hoten district, as a premeditated terrorist
attack on a police station.\7\ Some people in Hoten
contradicted the government's account, and some sources
reported that the incident involved authorities suppressing a
protest that started at another location.\8\
In line with directives to guard against stated terrorist
threats and other stability concerns, the regional government
and lower level governments within the XUAR reported
implementing a range of security measures. The XUAR Public
Security Department launched a 100-day ``strike hard'' campaign
in December 2010 that focused on preventing ``serious violent
crimes'' and ``large-scale mass incidents'' and called on
localities to expand the scope of round-the-clock street
patrols.\9\ In February, the regional government established a
leading group on state security to ``mobilize'' society to
``wage battle against various acts that harm state security and
social and political stability.'' \10\ Authorities heightened
security following reported terrorist attacks in July and
surrounding an inaugural ``China-Eurasia Expo'' in
September.\11\ The XUAR Public Security Department launched a
two-month ``strike hard'' anti-terrorism campaign in August,
pledging an increased security presence and including among its
targets ``illegal religious activities,'' ``religious
extremism,'' and ``illegal propaganda materials.'' \12\ In the
XUAR capital of Urumqi (population approximately 2.6
million),\13\ state-controlled media reported in January 2011
that authorities had added almost 17,000 security cameras in
the previous year to existing surveillance cameras in the
city.\14\ Authorities had announced plans in early 2010 to
increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city
to 60,000 by that year's end,\15\ and the 17,000-camera
addition appeared to exceed this target.\16\ After Urumqi
authorities strengthened controls over the rental housing
market in late 2009--steps they connected to the alleged
involvement of Uyghur migrants to the city in the July 2009
demonstrations and riots \17\--authorities launched a three-
month campaign in late 2010 to strengthen controls over
migrants and housing rentals.\18\ In Shuimogou district, Urumqi
city, authorities used the campaign to ``strike hard'' against
``illegal religious activities'' and other ``three forces''
crimes.\19\ Districts throughout Urumqi reportedly have used a
range of technologies and methods to monitor migrants and
rental housing, including computerized entry cards in rental
housing keyed to data about the user, and sealed-off
neighborhoods with security checkpoints for vehicles and
pedestrians.\20\ XUAR residents reported that authorities have
maintained restrictions on passport applications from Uyghurs
and members of other non-Han groups since the July 2009
demonstrations and riots.\21\
Uyghurs from the XUAR also faced scrutiny elsewhere in
China. As part of a campaign to promote a ``peaceful Asian
Games'' launched in advance of the November 2010 event hosted
in Guangdong province, authorities in Zhongshan city,
Guangdong, called for continuing work to resolve
``contradictions'' and disputes in areas where ``Xinjiang
Uyghurs'' ``assemble, live, or are active.'' \22\ A December
2010 directive on promoting stability from the Changde city,
Hunan province, ethnic and religious affairs bureau called for
``launching investigation and research into the situation for
managing Xinjiang Uyghurs.'' \23\
Ideological Campaigns
Authorities within the XUAR continued to promote
ideological and ``ethnic unity'' campaigns throughout the
region and maintained a regional regulation on promoting ethnic
unity that entered into force in February 2010. Both the
regulation and related campaigns have promoted state-defined
notions of ethnic unity and ethnic relations and have sought to
quell or punish forms of speech deemed ``not beneficial'' to
government and Party objectives.\24\ Authorities continued a
``patriotic education'' campaign, launched in June 2010, titled
``Ardently Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious
Homeland.'' A description from the state-run Xinhua news agency
described the campaign as ``a fundamental project for promoting
Xinjiang's development by leaps and bounds and long-term
stability.'' \25\ Authorities reportedly organized 13,300 teams
made up of 57,600 staff and held 91,000 lectures for a total of
11 million listeners, thereby ``conveying the voice of the
Party and government to people at the grassroots level,''
according to the head of the Xinjiang Academy of Social
Sciences.\26\ Venues for the campaign included mosques,
schools, and individual households.\27\
Xinjiang Work Forum
In the past reporting year, central and XUAR government and
Communist Party offices continued to implement a series of
initiatives first announced at the May 2010 Xinjiang Work
Forum, convened in Beijing by top central government and Party
leaders. The inaugural forum set government and Party
objectives for the XUAR's economic and political development,
intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that prioritize
state economic and political goals over the promotion of
regional autonomy and broader protection of XUAR residents'
rights.\28\ Throughout the year, authorities emphasized the
political importance of fulfilling the work forum's aims of
``developments by leaps and bounds'' and ``long-term
stability.'' \29\ As authorities renewed ``counterpart
support'' programs that bring personnel and funding to the XUAR
from other provincial-level areas, they stressed dispatching
``politically steadfast'' cadres to serve development projects
in the XUAR.'' \30\
Implementation of the initiatives announced at the May 2010
forum and its immediate aftermath brought an intensification of
longstanding policies that have challenged the ability of
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to protect their cultures,
languages, and livelihoods. Authorities accelerated
implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual education,'' a
program that has diminished the use of Uyghur and other non-
Mandarin languages in XUAR schools. [See Language Policy and
Bilingual Education in this section for more information.] XUAR
authorities bolstered steps to resettle farmers and resettle
herders away from grasslands, as part of initiatives from the
Xinjiang Work Forum and longstanding grasslands policies that
have restricted grazing for the stated goal of combating
grasslands degradation.\31\ The grasslands policies affect
Mongols, Kazakhs, and other groups in the XUAR with cultural
ties to pastoral livelihoods. [See Section II--Ethnic Minority
Rights for more information on grasslands policies throughout
China and its impact on non-Han groups.] An August 2011 report
from official media cited animal excrement upsetting tourists
and grasslands degradation as impetuses for a grazing ban
imposed at a tourist site containing grasslands.\32\ August
media reports also detailed plans to resettle herders from
grasslands areas, including other tourist sites, and shift them
to different occupations.\33\ The XUAR government reported in
November 2010 on already resettling 669,000 farmers and herders
and described plans to resettle a total of 106,000 nomadic
herding households and 700,000 rural households by 2015.\34\
Following the Xinjiang Work Forum, authorities also
accelerated urban development, raising concerns about the
resettlement of residents, equitable distribution of resources,
and cultural preservation. Projects described as ``slum
transformations'' took place in the past year in localities
throughout the XUAR.\35\ A report from the state-run Xinhua
news agency noted ``mostly ethnic Uyghurs'' made up the 250,000
residents of Urumqi city's ``slum areas,'' which the report
said ``are considered the breeding ground for the resentment
which underpinned the deadly riots that rocked the city two
years ago.'' \36\ In the past year XUAR authorities also
detailed plans for developing part of Kashgar municipality and
Korgas Port, along with part of Yining (Ghulja) municipality,
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, as two special economic zones
reportedly ``modeled on Shenzhen'' and for developing Urumqi
into a ``core city'' of western China and an ``international
trade center,'' \37\ with reported plans to double or almost
double the populations of Urumqi and Kashgar.\38\ Authorities
expanded a longstanding trade fair in Urumqi into an inaugural
``China-Eurasia Expo'' held in September, describing it as a
``major strategic measure to achieve rapid development and the
long-term stability of Xinjiang,'' with focus on ``making
Xinjiang a bridgehead in the development of [the] western
region.'' \39\ In addition, officials announced plans to
construct a railway line between Golmud city, Qinghai province,
and Korla city within the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan on
National Economic and Social Development (2011-2015).\40\ Some
Uyghurs and outside observers have expressed concern about the
ability of Uyghur communities to maintain their culture amid
top-down development projects and questioned whether Uyghurs
would enjoy economic benefits on par with Han residents,
against a backdrop of prior development projects that have
brought disproportionate benefits to Han Chinese.\41\ The
Kashgar plans come as authorities continue a five-year project
to raze and rebuild the city's historic area. [See Preservation
of Cultural Heritage in this section for more information.]
Criminal Law and Access to Justice
Authorities in the XUAR continued to stress the role of the
justice system in ``striking hard'' against the ``three
forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In
2010, the Supreme People's Court issued an opinion on
nationwide work to assist the XUAR court system. The opinion
called for strengthening ``guidance'' for trying cases
connected to endangering state security, including cases
involving the ``three forces,'' as well as cases ``influencing
ethnic unity'' and social ``harmony and stability.'' \42\ The
opinion also called for dispatching ``politically steadfast''
judges to the XUAR.\43\ The Communist Party-controlled Xinjiang
Lawyers Association held a training session for non-Han
(``ethnic minority'') lawyers in December. In addition to
providing professional training, the session's stated aim was
strengthening ``ideological and political construction'' and
cultivating ``politically steadfast'' lawyers.\44\ Speaking at
the event, XUAR Justice Department head Abliz Hoshur noted
ethnic minority lawyers' ``special role'' in dealing with
sensitive cases, including those connected to events in July
2009.\45\ He called on the lawyers to ``fully utilize the
weapon of the law'' to battle the ``three forces.'' \46\
Following a statement in March 2010 by XUAR government
chairperson Nur Bekri that courts had tried 198 people in 97
cases in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and
riots,\47\ Chinese government and media reports appeared to
provide no additional details on trials connected to the July
events. Nur Bekri said in his March 2010 remarks, however, that
trials were ongoing.\48\ Later, in January 2011, Rozi Ismail,
head of the XUAR High People's Court, also made a brief
reference to ongoing cases connected to the events,\49\ but
authorities did not provide specific information on the trials.
Overseas media and a non-governmental organization reported on
trials that took place in April and July 2010.\50\ A lawyer in
the XUAR reported to overseas media in fall 2010 that she and
other judges and lawyers had been sent to Urumqi, the XUAR
capital, from other localities in the XUAR to handle July 2009-
related cases and that they were ordered to finish handling the
cases by the end of 2010.\51\
The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of
endangering state security (ESS)--a category of criminal
offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen
activism and dissent--decreased in 2010 compared to 2009
figures, but remained higher than in years before 2009.\52\
Courts in the XUAR completed trials in 376 ESS cases in 2010, a
decrease of 61 cases over the previous year.\53\ The 2009
figure of 437 was a sharp increase over the 268 ESS cases tried
in the region in 2008, as well as cases tried earlier in the
decade.\54\ Officials did not report the reason for the high
number of cases in 2009 and 2010, although Rozi Ismail,
President of the XUAR High People's Court, said the 2010
figures included cases connected to ``violent terrorist
crimes,'' including crimes reported to have taken place in
2008.\55\ Rozi Ismail did not link the ESS cases from 2010 to
trials connected to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots. To
date, official reports have not clearly specified how many
trials connected to the July events involved ESS cases.\56\
Unofficial sources have reported on a limited number of trials
connected to the July 2009 events that involve ESS charges,
including the cases of Gulmira Imin, Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat Azat,
Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli.\57\ [See Section III--Access to
Justice for information on legal aid initiatives in western
China.]
Controls Over Free Expression
The XUAR government continued to exert tight controls over
free expression. The government maintained regulations passed
in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that
repress free speech,\58\ while a series of reports from the
past year underscored continuing government repression of
people who exercised their right to free expression. Radio Free
Asia (RFA) reported in December 2010 that Uyghur journalist and
webmaster Memetjan Abdulla received a life sentence in April
2010 in apparent connection to translating an announcement
calling on Uyghurs to hold demonstrations in July 2009 and in
connection to interviews he gave to foreign journalists.\59\
RFA reported in March 2011 on the seven-year sentence of Uyghur
webmaster Tursunjan Hezim in July 2010, following his detention
in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.\60\
A number of other Uyghur writers, journalists, and Web site
workers continued to serve prison sentences in connection to
exercising their right to free expression about the
demonstrations and riots in July 2009 or otherwise deemed to
have a connection to the events. They include Dilshat Perhat,
Gheyret Niyaz, Gulmira Imin, Nijat Azat, and Nureli.\61\
Kajikhumar (Qazhyghumar) Shabdan, an ethnic Kazakh writer in
the XUAR, remained under home confinement until his death in
February 2011. Authorities had held him under home confinement
following a 15-year prison sentence in 1987 for ``espionage,''
in reported connection to allegations that he belonged to an
illegal group with ties to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
and after he wrote a book critical of Chinese government policy
toward Turkic groups.\62\ Outside the XUAR, Beijing authorities
held Beijing-based Uyghur professor and webmaster Ilham Tohti
and his family in custody at a resort in southern China for
almost a week in December 2010 and placed additional
restrictions on their activities and travel at other times.\63\
The XUAR government continued to enforce censorship
campaigns in the region, in line with both national campaigns
and local directives to ``strike hard'' against the ``three
forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The
XUAR Press and Publications Bureau said in July 2010 that the
bureau would deepen its implementation of censorship work
during the last half of 2010 and would focus on ``striking
hard'' against ``reactionary propaganda materials'' and
``illegal'' political and religious publications publicized and
disseminated by the ``three forces.'' \64\ At a meeting in
January 2011, an official called for strengthening inspection
and prosecution connected to these publications and cited
concerns about ``western enemy forces'' and the ``three
forces'' ``importing western values and an ideological trend in
`Xinjiang independence.' '' \65\ The official also called for
strengthening oversight of transportation of published
materials, and one locality reported finding ``suspicious
items'' at a transportation inspection point that authorities
later determined were ``illegal religious publications''
consisting of Uyghur- and Arabic-language items.\66\ Other
localities within the XUAR also reported targeting or
confiscating religious and political items.\67\ The World
Uyghur Congress reported in December 2010 and February 2011 on
people detained or charged for possessing religious materials
and ``illegal'' DVDs and CDs with ``overseas enemy
propaganda.'' \68\
Freedom of Religion
Authorities in the XUAR continued to target ``illegal
religious activities'' and ``religious extremism'' as threats
to the region's stability, and they maintained curbs over
religious activities independent of government control in the
region's security campaigns, singling out Islamic practices in
a number of cases. Authorities continued to define ``illegal
religious activities'' and ``religious extremism'' to encompass
religious practices, group affiliations, and viewpoints
protected under international human rights guarantees for
freedom of religion. A December meeting of the XUAR Party
Committee Standing Committee called for ``resolutely preventing
illegal religious activities and striking in accordance with
law against religious extremist forces'' as part of work in the
region to maintain stability.\69\ XUAR Communist Party
Secretary Zhang Chunxian reiterated the pledge to curb illegal
religious activities in August 2011, following attacks the
previous month that officials labeled as terrorist.\70\ The
region's two-month ``strike hard'' anti-terrorism campaign
launched in August included ``illegal religious activities''
and ``religious extremism'' among its targets.\71\ Regional
regulations and directives maintained restrictions on religious
practice that are absent in national regulations or harsher
than curbs articulated in national documents.\72\ Authorities
continued to enforce a document of unclear legal status that
defines ``23 kinds of illegal religious activity,'' including
``letting students pray,'' conducting certain Islamic practices
pertaining to marriage and divorce, holding private religious
instruction classes, ``distorting religious doctrine,'' and
advocating ``Pan-Islamism'' and ``Pan-Turkism.'' \73\ The
region's 2009 regulation on the protection of minors stipulates
penalties for people who ``lure or force minors to participate
in religious activities'' and appears to provide the most
extensive curbs in China on children's religious activities,
while lacking a clear basis in Chinese law.\74\
In line with regionwide directives restricting the scope of
religious activity, local authorities in the XUAR reported on
enforcing a range of controls over religion. Villages within
Hoten district and a limited number of other localities
continued to implement and expand a system of ``voluntary
pledges'' to regulate villagers' behavior and to fine villagers
for noncompliance, placing special emphasis on the pledges to
curb ``illegal religious activity.'' \75\ In January 2011,
authorities in a township in Chapchal Xibe Autonomous County,
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a
system for government religious affairs employees to set the
schedule for Friday sermons at the township's mosques and for
using ``religious information gatherers'' of ``high political
consciousness'' to provide information on the sermon delivery
and the ``ideological trends'' of mosque attendees.\76\
Authorities in a district in Urumqi described an emergence of
``illegal religious sects'' that they deemed are ``contrary''
to the teachings of the Quran and they called on religious
personnel to interpret religious doctrine in accordance with
``social advancement.'' \77\ Local governments throughout the
XUAR continued to place restrictions on the observance of the
holiday of Ramadan, barring some people from fasting, ordering
restaurants to stay open, and increasing oversight of religious
venues.\78\ In April, a court in Shihezi municipality
reportedly sentenced Muslim religious leaders Qahar Mensur and
Muhemmed Tursun to three years' imprisonment in connection to
storing and distributing ``illegal religious publications,''
which Shihezi residents reportedly described as retaliation
after Qahar Mensur refused to comply with government demands
such as bringing government documents into the mosque where he
worked.\79\
Authorities throughout the XUAR also continued campaigns
targeting Muslim men who wear beards and women who wear veils
or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations, practices
authorities connect to ``religious extremism'' and
``backwardness.'' \80\ Under the direction of the Party-
controlled women's federation in the XUAR, multiple localities
reported continuing a campaign aimed at dissuading women from
veiling their hair and faces.\81\ Management rules in force for
the ``information corps'' in a residential district in Usu
city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included requirements to
immediately report scenarios such as the presence of ``people
from outside [the district] abnormally wearing large beards or
veiling their faces'' along with ``residents holding extremist
religious thoughts.'' \82\ A township in Aqsu district included
veiling and wearing large beards or ``bizarre clothes'' among
targets of a campaign against ``illegal'' religious
activities.\83\ Authorities also continued to increase
oversight of Muslim women religious specialists known as
buwi.\84\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion for additional
information on religion in China, including cases from the
XUAR.]
Language Policy and Bilingual Education
The XUAR government accelerated implementation of
``bilingual education,'' a policy that promotes the use of
Mandarin Chinese in school instruction for non-Han students and
increasingly has curtailed the opportunity for non-Han groups
to choose to receive education in Uyghur and other languages.
The policy has conflicted with legal protections for non-Han
groups to maintain and use their own languages, as provided in
both Chinese and international law,\85\ and underscores
government failure to maintain the use of Uyghur and other
languages as lingua franca within the XUAR in line with the
promotion of regional autonomy. Following goals set after the
May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum to universalize ``bilingual
education'' in the region's schools,\86\ the XUAR government
and Party Committee issued a 10-year education reform plan in
January 2011 that provides for ``basically universalizing''
elementary and secondary school ``bilingual education'' among
non-Han students (designated as ``ethnic minorities'' by the
Chinese government) to reach a coverage rate of 75 percent of
such students by 2015 and over 90 percent by 2020.\87\ The plan
adds that all ethnic minority high school graduates shall
``basically have a skilled grasp and use'' of spoken and
written Mandarin by 2020.\88\ The plan also calls for coverage
of at least 85 percent of ethnic minority preschoolers by 2012,
a target authorities appear to have articulated since 2008.\89\
The plan describes the promotion of ``bilingual education'' of
``strategic significance'' for goals including ``building a new
model of socialist ethnic relations'' and ``promoting cohesion
and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (zhonghua
minzu).'' \90\ The plan also calls for protecting the right to
instruction using minority languages and allows for preserving
instruction using such languages in the process of implementing
``bilingual education.'' \91\ The future role of non-Mandarin
languages in XUAR schools and broader society, however, remains
uncertain as the plan and accompanying measures bolster overall
support for instruction in Mandarin. The implementation of
Mandarin-focused ``bilingual'' programs and accompanying
reduction in classes using minority languages reportedly has
provoked dissatisfaction among some students, parents, and
teachers, and a few localities reportedly reinstated some
Uyghur-language instruction in the past year.\92\
XUAR authorities also have accelerated steps to staff
``bilingual'' classes and address a shortage of ``bilingual''
teachers. In 2010, the Xinjiang Education Department announced
plans to recruit 5,109 elementary and secondary school
``bilingual'' teachers, reportedly marking the largest scope of
recruitment for ``specially appointed teachers'' as of that
date.\93\ Authorities announced plans to recruit over 11,500
teachers in 2011, of whom 9,200 would be ``bilingual''
teachers.\94\ Localities within the XUAR also reported
increasing ``bilingual'' training among ethnic minority
teachers.\95\ Authorities have dismissed or reassigned some
Uyghur teachers deemed not to have adequate Mandarin skills--
with a minimum of 1,000 elementary school teachers dismissed
since 2010, according to one report--and in some cases,
authorities detained teachers for protesting ``bilingual''
policies or dismissals from their teaching posts.\96\
Authorities also reported taking some steps to promote
ethnic minority language arts classes within Mandarin-focused
schools and to train Mandarin-speaking teachers in minority
languages. A pilot project in two prefectural-level areas
called for implementing language arts classes in minority
languages for ethnic minority students (minkaohan students) in
longstanding programs that provide schooling solely in
Mandarin.\97\ A January 2011 plan called for providing 320
class hours of instruction in basic ``ethnic minority
languages'' for teachers at ``bilingual'' preschools who are
native Mandarin speakers.\98\
Population Planning Policies
XUAR authorities continued to expand a system of rewarding
non-Han households (``ethnic minority'' households) that have
been ``certified'' as having fewer children than the maximum
allowed under the region's regulation on population and family
planning.\99\ This step builds on similar reward systems
present throughout China, while intensifying a regional focus
on ethnic minority households. The XUAR Party Committee and
government reported plans in the past year to expand the
existing reward system in 2011 to any XUAR county or city where
rural ethnic minorities comprise over 50 percent of the
population.\100\ Authorities initially implemented the reward
system for ethnic minorities in 3 southern XUAR prefectural-
level areas in 2007 \101\ and expanded the reward system in
2009 to an additional 26 ``poor and border counties.'' \102\
Local governments reported enforcing the reward system in the
past year.\103\
Pledge System To Regulate Village Behavior
Some villages within the XUAR continued to implement and
expand a system of ``voluntary pledges'' to regulate villagers'
behavior and to fine villagers for non-compliance, a practice
that has no explicit basis in Chinese law and appears to exceed
the scope of villages' authority to enforce penalties.\104\
Under the pledge system, first implemented in Hoten district in
2006 \105\ and almost wholly unique to the XUAR,\106\ village
residents and village officials enter into agreements (cungui
shouyue chengnuoshu) with villagers' committees to abide by
local village ``codes of conduct'' (cungui minyue).\107\
Villages throughout China use codes of conduct, which are
stipulated under the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers'
Committees,\108\ to implement population planning requirements,
regulate social order, and manage local production, among other
tasks.\109\ In the XUAR, authorities have used the pledge
system to bolster the efficacy of these codes of conduct,
placing special emphasis on the pledges and codes of conduct to
curb ``illegal religious activity.'' \110\ An official
described the villagers' participation in the pledge system as
voluntary,\111\ but a 2007 government and Party directive from
one district called for achieving a participation rate of over
98 percent within each village.\112\
Labor
discrimination
Hiring practices that discriminate against non-Han groups
continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in
the past year. Some job recruitment announcements from the
region continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han
Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs, in
contravention of provisions in Chinese law that forbid
discrimination.\113\ A job announcement for a hospital in
Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 for 28
positions, all of which were reserved for Han.\114\ Civil
servant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline
inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open
positions for Han, leaving 93 of the remaining positions
unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving 38 for members of non-
Han (``ethnic minority'') groups.\115\ In an apparent shift
from previous years, however, 2011 annual recruiting for the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) left almost
all positions unreserved by ethnicity--marking a change from
past practice of formally reserving a majority of positions for
Han--but the XPCC continued restrictions based on sex.\116\
A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employment
promotion issued in October 2009 called for enterprises
registered in the XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit
no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among local XUAR
residents and to ``recruit more ethnic minority workers to the
extent possible,'' \117\ including an unspecified ``fixed
proportion'' of positions for ethnic minority college
graduates.\118\ The extent to which some enterprises adhered to
the opinion's provisions on minority workers in the past year
is unclear.\119\ In January 2011, several XUAR government and
Party offices issued an opinion on sending ethnic minority
university graduates to train in areas engaged in counterpart
support relationships with the region. Citing concerns about
employment pressures on the region's stability and economic
development, the opinion outlines plans to train 22,000
unemployed college graduates from the XUAR in the next two
years,\120\ after which trainees reportedly may take up set
posts within the XUAR or remain in areas elsewhere in China to
find work.\121\ The opinion states the program's usefulness in
``transforming ideas,'' promoting ``good sentiments'' among the
ethnicities, strengthening a ``sense of identification toward
the Chinese nation'' (zhonghua minzu), and promoting ``social
stability'' and ``ethnic assimilation'' (minzu ronghe).\122\
The opinion does not address barriers to employment due to job
recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han.
labor transfers
Government programs to send rural non-Han men and women to
jobs elsewhere in China continued in the past year. As
documented by the Commission in recent years, some participants
and their family members have reported coercion to participate
in the programs, the use of underage workers, and exploitative
working conditions.\123\ XUAR authorities have described the
programs as a way for XUAR workers to gain income, build job
skills, and transform participants' ``outmoded thinking.''
\124\ A XUAR Department of Agriculture official said in
September 2010 that ``the state policy of encouraging
relatively developed areas to recruit workers from Xinjiang
will not change.'' \125\ Another official described
``Xinjiang's organizing ethnic minority youth to go [elsewhere
in China] to engage in manufacturing and construction
activities'' as an ``inevitable large trend'' in professional
resources exchange in a market economy.\126\ Official media
reported in May 2011 that there have been 800,000 instances
since 2005 of XUAR laborers going to work in other provinces
under government auspices.\127\ The ongoing work to export the
labor force comes amid a reported shortage of agricultural and
factory workers within the XUAR, for which employers have
recruited laborers from other provinces and used student
labor.\128\
work study
Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require
students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in
``work-study'' programs that have exceeded permitted parameters
for student labor under Chinese law and international standards
for worker rights.\129\ Under the programs, schools take
students out of class for periods of one to two weeks during
the academic year to engage in full-time labor; in some
reported cases, students have worked for longer periods and
under hazardous conditions.\130\ Although the XUAR Education
Department issued a circular in 2008 stating that students in
junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in the
work-study programs,\131\ reports from 2010 indicated that some
localities continued to use these younger students to meet the
shortage of cotton-pickers.\132\ Officials stressed the
importance of using students to meet labor shortages following
demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009.\133\
Preservation of Cultural Heritage
National and XUAR government officials continued to
implement projects that have undermined Uyghurs' ability to
protect their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to
demolish and ``reconstruct'' the Old City section of Kashgar
city and relocate residents. The five-year project, launched in
2009, has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other
observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for
undermining cultural heritage protection.\134\ Official media
reported in July 2011 that authorities revived the project in
August 2010 after ``nearly falling into stagnation'' following
the July 2009 demonstrations and riots and reported plans to
complete restoration of 10,566 homes during the year.\135\ A
Kashgar official reported in October 2010 that 9,378 houses had
been ``removed'' to date, while 16,557 homes had been built or
restored.\136\ The Chinese government also continued to
politicize the preservation of Uyghur intangible cultural
heritage. In November 2010, the UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accepted China's nomination to
place the meshrep, a Uyghur social and artistic gathering, on
its List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent
Safeguarding.\137\ While the designation obligates China to
take measures to promote the practice's sustainability,\138\
the Chinese government defined the meshrep narrowly to exclude
forms of the practice that have incorporated religious elements
and social activism.\139\ In the mid-1990s, authorities in
Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture,
prohibited meshrep gatherings where participants sought to
reduce alcohol and drug use and had become active in organizing
a boycott of alcohol stores.\140\
Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants
In the past year, information remained limited on the
status of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from
Cambodia in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum
seekers' refugee status.\141\ Following the forced deportation
of the 20 asylum seekers and disappearance of another 2 who
escaped forced return, the Chinese government reported in June
2010 that 3 of the 20 people returned to China were suspected
of terrorist crimes, and that all 17 who remained in custody
were members of a terrorist group \142\--charges that, even if
made at the time of extradition, would not have precluded an
assessment of the asylum cases by UN officers.\143\ The
government appeared to provide no additional information on the
cases in the past reporting year. According to a March 2011
Radio Free Asia article, the group was held in detention in
Kashgar district, and their cases had not gone to trial.\144\
One of the asylum seekers who had escaped forced return from
Cambodia and was deported from Laos to China in March 2010
reportedly was held in detention in Kashgar with the group,
where he reportedly was in poor health and was denied medical
care for an arm infection.\145\
In May 2011, Chinese security officials in cooperation with
authorities in Kazakhstan forcibly returned Ershidin Israil, a
Uyghur man from the XUAR, from Kazakhstan to China.\146\
Ershidin Israil left China in 2009 after Chinese authorities
reportedly sought him for providing information to Radio Free
Asia about the death of Shohret Tursun, a Uyghur man held in
custody after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the
XUAR.\147\ Ershidin Israil received refugee status from the
UNHCR in March 2010 and had awaited resettlement to Sweden
before authorities in Kazakhstan took him into custody and the
UNHCR revoked his refugee status.\148\ Upon his return, Chinese
authorities reportedly charged him for terrorist acts. A family
member and advocates for Ershidin Israil said that the charges
and bases for revoking his refugee status were based on false
information.\149\ In August, authorities in Thailand detained
Nur Muhammed, a Uyghur man from the XUAR, on grounds of illegal
entry. Thai authorities bypassed a court appearance as provided
by Thai law and turned him over to Chinese authorities, who are
presumed to have returned him to China.\150\ The same month,
authorities in Pakistan reportedly forcibly returned five
Uyghurs, including two children, to China.\151\ Later in
August, Malaysian authorities deported 11 Uyghur men from
Malaysia to China, following the arrests of a group of 16
Uyghurs earlier in the month.\152\
The forced returns violate the Convention Against Torture,
which provides, ``No State Party shall expel, return
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.'' \153\ [See Section II--
Criminal Justice for additional information on the use of
torture in China.] In addition, the return of Uyghur asylum
seekers violates the principle of non-refoulement as stipulated
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.\154\
The forced returns from Cambodia, Laos, Kazakhstan, Pakistan,
and Thailand are among several documented cases of forced
deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of
refoulement and torture that Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees,
and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway
of China's influence and its disregard for international
law.\155\
Endnotes
\1\ See, e.g., Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, ``Persist in the
Normalization of Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability
of Overall Society'' [Jianchi weiwen gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui
daju wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10; ``Autonomous Region
Chair Nur Bekri Issues 2011 New Year's Speech, Grab Opportunities, Try
Hard and Fight to the Fullest, Wholeheartedly Drive Ahead With
Xinjiang's Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Stability''
[Zizhiqu zhuxi nu'er baikeli fabiao 2011 nian xinnian zhici qiangzhua
jiyu fenli pinbo quanli tuijin xinjiang kuayueshi fazhan he
changzhijiu'an], Xinjiang Daily, 1 January 11; ``Government Work
Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11; Cao
Huijuan et al., ``Fu Qiang: Strengthen Sense of Responsibility,
Urgency, and Mission in Work To Safeguard Stability'' [Fu qiang:
zengqiang weiwen gongzuo zerengan jinpogan shiminggan], Xinjiang Peace
Net, 13 December 10.
\2\ See examples that follow within this section, as well as, e.g.,
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 200-13.
\3\ Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, ``Persist in the Normalization of
Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability of Overall
Society'' [Jianchi weiwen gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui daju
wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10.
\4\ Ibid.
\5\ See, e.g., Kashgar Municipal People's Government, ``Kashgar
Municipal People's Government Announcement'' [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu
gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar Municipal People's Government, ``Our
Municipality Resolutely Deals With Violent Terrorism Case'' [Wo shi
guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu anjian], 1 August 11; ``Chinese State
Councilor Vows To Crack Down on Terrorists,'' Xinhua, 4 August 11;
``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan,
Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July
11); ``3 Cases of Serious Violent Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are
Concluded'' [Kashi sanqi yanzhong baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District
People's Government, ``Resolutely Uphold the Dignity of the Law''
[Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March 11. In some cases, the incidents
appear to have been described as terrorist crimes months after they
were initially reported. See, e.g., Sui Yunyan, ``Hami Armed Murder
Case Cracked'' [Hami shi chiqiang sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily, 3
December 10 (reporting on September 29 and November 3 murder cases as
ordinary crimes); Aksu District Administration News Office,
``Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City, Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang akesu shi
fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted in Aksu District People's
Government, 19 August 10 (describing August 19 attack as ordinary
crime); ``Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of Terrorist Crime''
[Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, 23
February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of crimes in Aksu and
Hami as terrorist); ``Severely Punishing Terrorist Crimes Shows Respect
for Law'' [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian falu zunyan],
Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-controlled media
describing crimes as terrorist).
\6\ Based on CECC assessment of the reports. See, e.g., Kashgar
Municipal People's Government, ``Kashgar Municipal People's Government
Announcement'' [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar
Municipal People's Government, ``Our Municipality Resolutely Deals With
Violent Terrorism Case'' [Wo shi guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu
anjian], 1 August 11; ``Chinese State Councilor Vows To Crack Down on
Terrorists,'' Xinhua, 4 August 11; ``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in
Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20
July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 11); ``3 Cases of Serious Violent
Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are Concluded'' [Kashi sanqi yanzhong
baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District People's Government, ``Resolutely
Uphold the Dignity of the Law'' [Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March
11. In some cases, the incidents appear to have been described as
terrorist crimes months after they were initially reported. See, e.g.,
Sui Yunyan, ``Hami Armed Murder Case Cracked'' [Hami shi chiqiang
sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily 3 December 10 (reporting on September
29 and November 3 murder cases as ordinary crimes); Aksu District
Administration News Office, ``Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City,
Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang akesu shi fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted
in Aksu District People's Government, 19 August 10 (describing August
19 attack as ordinary crime); ``Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of
Terrorist Crime'' [Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian],
Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of
crimes in Aksu and Hami as terrorist); ``Severely Punishing Terrorist
Crimes Shows Respect for Law'' [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian
falu zunyan], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-
controlled media describing crimes as terrorist). For background
information on Chinese government reporting on terrorist cases, see
``Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official Statements on
Terrorism Conflict,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
May 2006, 12. For information on restrictions on free press, see
Section II--Freedom of Expression.
\7\ ``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in
Hotan, Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center,
20 July 11).
\8\ See, e.g., ``Clashes in Silk Road Town,'' Radio Free Asia, 18
July 11; World Uyghur Congress, ``World Uyghur Congress (WUC) Troubled
by Witness Accounts on Hotan Incident,'' 19 July 11.
\9\ Sui Yunyan and Zhang Min, ``Autonomous Region Public Security
Organs Launch Special 100-Day Operation for Taking Strict Precautions
Against and Striking Hard Against Serious Violent Crimes'' [Zizhiqu
gongan jiguan kaizhan bairi yanfang yanda yanzhong baoli fanzui
zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Daily, 24 December 10.
\10\ Cheng Lixin, ``Autonomous Region Leading Group on State
Security Work Is Established'' [Zizhiqu guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao
xiaozu chengli], Xinjiang Daily, 1 March 11.
\11\ See, e.g., Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation
To `Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan
``yanli daji baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal
Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11; Ji Jun, Aksu
Municipal People's Government, ``District Convenes Meeting on Upholding
Stability, Huang Sanping Makes Important Speech'' [Diqu zhaokai wei wen
gongzuo huiyi huang sanping zuo zhongyao jianghua], 25 July 11;
``Security Tightened as Urumqi Gears Up for China-Eurasia Expo,''
Xinhua, 30 August 11; ``Tensions Amid Xinjiang Clampdown,'' Radio Free
Asia, 19 August 11.
\12\ Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation To `Strike
Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan ``yanli daji
baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily,
reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.
\13\ Yang Yuanyuan and Zhang Xuemin, ``Total Population of Urumqi
Surmounts 2.6 Million, Birthrate Maintains Low Growth'' [Wulumuqi
zongrenkou tupo 260 wan chushenglu baochi di zengzhang], Tianshan Net,
2 November 10.
\14\ ``Surveilance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-
Rocked City Under Watch,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26
January 11.
\15\ ``At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach
60,000'' [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6
wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10.
\16\ The city had 46,953 cameras by November 2009 and added
``nearly 17,000'' in 2010. ``At End of This Year Video Cameras in
Urumqi Proper To Reach 60,000'' [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin
shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10;
``Surveilance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-Rocked City
Under Watch,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26 January 11.
\17\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 210.
\18\ Ge Youjun and Tan Yanbin, ``Urumqi Launches 100-Day
Rectification Campaign for Floating Population and Room Rentals'' [Wu
shi kaizhan liudong renkou he chuzu fangwu bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi],
Xinjiang Peace Net, 2 December 10. See also Yi Changchun, ``Shuimogou
District Launches 100-Day Special Rectification Work Mobilization
Meeting'' [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan
dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16 December 10; Zhao Yuhong, ``North
Jiefang Road Residential Area Organizes and Launches 100-Day Special
Rectification Work Meeting'' [Jiefang bei lu jiedao zuzhi zhaokai bairi
zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuohui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 17 December 10.
\19\ Yi Changchun, ``Shuimogou District Launches 100-Day Special
Rectification Work Mobilization Meeting'' [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi
zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16
December 10.
\20\ ``One Good Plan After the Other for Management of Urumqi
Floating Population'' [Wulumuqi shi liudong renkou guanli haozhao
lianlian], Tianshan Net, 23 May 11.
\21\ `` `No Passports' for Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 September
10; ``Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call,'' Radio Free Asia, 28
February 11.
\22\ Zhongshan City Judicial Bureau, ``Zhongshan City Judicial
Bureau Launches People's Mediation Activity for `100-Day Campaign for
Peaceful Asian Games' '' [Zhongshan shi sifaju kaizhan renmin tiaojie
``pingan yayun bairi dahuizhan'' huodong], 31 August 10.
\23\ Changde City People's Government, ``City Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Bureau: Create Satisfaction Mechanisms, Use Service To Promote
Development and Seek Stability'' [Shi minzu zongjiao shiwuju: chuang
manyi jiguan yi fuwu cu fazhan qiu wending], 22 December 10. For an
example from elsewhere in Hunan province, see Yongxing County United
Front Work Department, ``Yongxing County Uses Strengthening Functions
and Stimulating United Front Work To Magnify New Bright Spots''
[Yongxing xian yi qianghua zhineng jifa tongzhan gongzuo tuxian xin
liangdian], Chenzhou City United Front News Net, 15 December 10.
\24\ See generally Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on
Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu
tiaoli], effective 1 February 10. For detailed analysis of the
regulation and broader ``ethnic unity'' campaigns in the region, see ``
`Xinjiang Ethnic Unity' Regulation Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free
Expression,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16
March 10, 2; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 201-2.
\25\ ``Summary of Educational Activities on Theme of `Ardently
Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious Homeland' '' [Re'ai
weida zuguo jianshe meihao jiayuan zhuti jiaoyu huodong zongshu],
Xinhua, 23 March 11.
\26\ Ibid.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ For more information on the forum, see CECC, 2010 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 207-8, and ``Central Leaders Hold Forum on
Xinjiang, Stress Development and Stability as Dual Goals,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3. For
comprehensive reporting on the forum from Chinese media, see, e.g., Zou
Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central Committee and State Council
Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important
Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia
Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend
the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10).
For information on past development efforts, see, e.g., CECC, 2009
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-64.
\29\ See, e.g., ``Grasp Key Points, Grasp the Breakthrough Point,
Comprehensively Implement the Spirit of the Central Work Forum on
Xinjiang'' [Zhuazhu guanjian dian zhuahao tupokou quanmian luoshi
zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui jingshen], People's Daily, 26
September 10; Cheng Lixin, ``Go a Step Further To Emancipate the Mind
and Maintain and Expand the First Stages of a Good Situation'' [Jinyibu
jiefang sixiang baochi he kuoda chubu xingcheng de hao xingshi],
Xinjiang Daily, 10 October 10; ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu
gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11.
\30\ See, e.g., ``National Conference for Aid-Xinjiang Work Opens,
Li Keqiang and Zhou Yongkang Give Speeches'' [Quanguo duikou zhiyuan
xinjiang gongzuohui zhaokai li keqiang zhou yongkang jianghua], Xinhua,
30 March 10; Supreme People's Court Guiding Opinion Concerning Aiding
Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan
xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date
October 2010), item 3(5). For more information on counterpart support,
see ``Central Leaders Hold Forum on Xinjiang, Stress Development and
Stability as Dual Goals,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3.
\31\ See Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights in this report and
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207-8, for more information on
grasslands policy and on initiatives announced at the forums.
\32\ ``Scenic Area of Tianshan Heavenly Lake, Xinjiang, Continues
`Grazing Ban,' Will Enlarge Strength in Future'' [Xinjiang tianshan
tianchi jingqu chixu ``jinmu'' weilai jiang jiada lidu], Xinhua,
reprinted in Sohu, 2 August 11.
\33\ Ibid.; Shao Wei, ``Herders Face Five Year Ban on Grazing,''
China Daily, 1 August 2011.
\34\ ``Xinjiang Wealthy Folks Affordable Housing Project Makes
Smooth Progress, 670,000 Farmers and Herders Move Into New Homes''
[Xinjiang fumin anju gongcheng jinzhan shunli 67 wan nongmumin ruzhu
xinfang], Xinhua, 8 November 10. For information on earlier reported
plans to resettle herders, see Cui Jia, ``New Measures To Boost
Xinjiang Livelihoods,'' China Daily, 28 May 10.
\35\ See, e.g., Yang Yonghua, ``Bortala Slum Transformation
Embodies Putting People at the Center'' [Bole shi penghuqu gaizao
tixian yiren weiben], China Xinjiang, 8 November 10; Zhao Guangping,
``Fukang City Slum District Transformation Enables Residents' Dreams of
Peaceful Life'' [Fukang shi penghuqu gaizao yuanle jumin anju meng],
Tianshan Net, 13 December 10; Tao Tao, Chen Zhe, ``Entering the Slum
Districts: Urumqi Slum Transformation, Sunshine To Benefit the People''
[Zoujin penghuqu: wulumuqi shi penghu gaizao yangguang huimin],
Xinjiang News Net, 5 February 11.
\36\ ``Urumqi's Sweeping Slum Makeover Gathers Steam,'' Xinhua, 16
May 11.
\37\ For detailed information on the special economic zones (SEZs),
including background on initial planning in 2009 to create the SEZs and
their formation in mid-2010, see Wang Rengui et al., ``Xinjiang
`Special Economic Zones' Unveiled,'' Liaowang, 30 May 11-05 Jun 11
(Open Source Center, 27 July 11). See also ``Xinjiang To Set Up Two
Special Economic Zones in 2011,'' People's Daily, 14 February 11;
``China Aims To Build Xinjiang's Capital Into Int'l Trade Center,''
Xinhua, 30 March 11.
\38\ ``China Aims To Build Xinjiang's Capital Into Int'l Trade
Center,'' Xinhua, 30 March 11; ``Xinjiang To Set Up Two Special
Economic Zones in 2011,'' People's Daily, 14 February 11 (describing
plans to increase Kashgar's population to 1 million); Kashgar Municipal
People's Government, ``Brief Introduction to Kashgar Municipality''
[Kashi shi jianjie], 9 November 10 (describing current population as
600,000, including a floating population of 150,000).
\39\ ``China-Eurasia Expo,'' China-Eurasia Expo Web site, last
visited 26 August 11.
\40\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11.
\41\ See, e.g., ``Development Could Widen Ethnic Divide,'' Radio
Free Asia, 31 March 11; ``Plan To Build `Guangzhou New City' in Kashgar
Gives People Deep Grief'' [Qeshqerde ``guangju yengi shehri'' ning
qurulush pilani kishini chongqur qayghugha salidu], Radio Free Asia, 18
April 11; ``Has the Economic Development Region in Korla Only Been Open
to Han? '' [Korlidiki iqtisadiy tereqqiyat rayoni peqet xitaylarghila
echiwetilgenmu?], Radio Free Asia, 19 April 11. For additional
information on past development projects, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report,
10 October 09, 263-64.
\42\ Supreme People's Court Guiding Opinion Concerning Aiding
Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan
xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date
October 2010), item 4(8).
\43\ Ibid., item 3(5).
\44\ Xinjiang Lawyers Association, ``2010 Regionwide Ethnic
Minority Lawyers' Training Class Begins Soon, Publicity Underway During
Organization and Preparatory Work'' [2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu
lushi peixunban kaike zaiji zuzhi zhunbei gongzuo jinluo migu], 1
December 10. For more information on the training, see ``Xinjiang's
First Large-Scale Training Class for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Stresses
Meeting Political Goals,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
19 January 11.
\45\ Xinjiang Lawyers Association, ``2010 Regionwide Training Class
for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Opens in Urumqi, Justice Department Head
Abliz Hoshur Attends Opening Ceremony and Makes Important Speech''
[2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu lushi peixunban zai wu kaike sifating
tingchang abulizi wushou'er chuxi kaike yishi bing zuo zhongyao
jianghua], 5 December 10.
\46\ Ibid.
\47\ ``Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198
Sentenced for Deadly Riot,'' Xinhua, 7 March 10; ``198 People in 97
Cases Already Tried and Sentenced in Urumqi `7-5' Incident'' [Wulumuqi
``7-5'' shijian yi shenli xuanpan 97 an 198 ren], Xinhua, 7 March 10.
See analysis in ``198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials
Marked by Lack of Transparency,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.
\48\ ``Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198
Sentenced for Deadly Riot,'' Xinhua, 7 March 10.
\49\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases
of Crimes of Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie
weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16
January 11.
\50\ ``Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,'' Radio Free Asia, 21
December 10; ``Uyghur Student Sentenced to Death,'' Radio Free Asia, 30
December 10; ``Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,'' Radio Free Asia, 6
March 11; Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``A City Ruled by Fear and
Silence: Urumchi, Two Years On,'' 5 July 11, 8.
\51\ ``China Handling July 5 Cases in Urgent Manner Within Court
System'' [Xitay, sot mehkimisi saheside 5-iyul delolirini jiddiy bir
terep qilmaqta], Radio Free Asia, 22 September 10.
\52\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11.
For analysis and comparison with figures from previous years, see
information that follows within text as well as ``Number of State
Security Cases Tried in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer
Prison Sentences Increases,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 3 February 11.
\53\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11;
Cao Zhiheng and Wang Dalin, ``Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in
437 Cases of Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie
weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua, 15 January 10.
\54\ In 2008, courts completed 268 cases of endangering state
security. ``Xinjiang Courts in Total Complete Investigation of 268
Endangering State Security Cases'' [Xinjiang fayuan gong shenjie weihai
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 268 qi], Xinhua, 10 January 09. Between
2003 and 2007, the XUAR court system had accepted an average of roughly
150 ESS cases per year. The figure refers to cases accepted (shouli)
rather than trials completed (shenjie), but suggests a lower number of
completed ESS trials before 2008 and subsequent years. Tian Yu, ``Work
Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts Is Launched''
[Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua,
14 August 07. See also analysis in ``State Security Cases From Xinjiang
Appear To Surge in 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 1, 2009, 3.
\55\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11.
\56\ See further analysis in ``Number of State Security Cases Tried
in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer Prison Sentences
Increases,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 February
11.
\57\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206-7, and the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2009-00448, 2009-
00449, 2010-00106, 2010-00238, and 2010-00253, for more information on
these cases.
\58\ For information on the regulations, see CECC, 2010 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 205, citing Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Informatization Promotion Regulation [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu
xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December
09, art. 40; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic
Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu
tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10; Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of
Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili
tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, revised 29
December 09, effective 1 February 10, art. 25.
\59\ ``Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,'' Radio Free Asia, 21
December 10; ``Translator and Reporter Muhemmetjan Abdulla Known To
Have Been Sentenced to Life in Prison'' [Terjiman we muxbir muhemmetjan
abdullaning muddetsiz qamaqqa hokum qilinghanliqi melum bolmaqta],
Radio Free Asia, 20 December 10.
\60\ ``Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 March
11; World Uyghur Congress, ``World Uyghur Congress Condemns 15-Year
Sentence Handed Down to Uyghur Journalist and Web site Editor Gheyret
Niyaz,'' 24 July 10.
\61\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206-7, and the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2009-00448, 2009-
00449, 2010-00106, 2010-00238, and 2010-00253, for more information on
these cases.
\62\ ``Dissident Kazakh Writer Dies in Western China,'' Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 February 11; See also the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database, record 2011-00173, on Kajikhumar Shabdan
(citing Dui Hua Foundation information based on official Chinese
sources).
\63\ ``Travel Ban Extends to Family,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 February
11; ``Uyghur Scholar, Family Held,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 December 10.
\64\ Xinjiang Press and Publication Bureau, ``Raising `Eight Points
of Work' for Making Focused Efforts in Latter Half of Year'' [Tichu
xiabannian zhongdian zhuahao ``ba xiang gongzuo''], 5 July 10.
\65\ Shi Qiaomei et al., ``Our Region Convenes `Sweep Away
Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Work Video
Teleconference'' [Wo qu zhaokai ``saohuang dafei'' gongzuo dianshi
dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.
\66\ Yang Chen, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Transportation
Department, `` `Turfan Transportation Management Bureau' Tracks Down 87
Illegal Religious Publications'' [``Tulufan yunguanju'' chahuo 87 ben
feifa zongjiao chubanwu], 22 February 11; Shi Qiaomei et al., ``Our
Region Convenes `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications' Work Video Teleconference'' [Wo qu zhaokai ``saohuang
dafei'' gongzuo dianshi dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.
\67\ See, e.g., ``Urumqi Announces `10 Big Sweep Away Pornography,
Strike Down Illegal Publications Cases' '' [Wulumuqi gongbu 2010 nian
``saohuang dafei shida anjian''], Tianshan Net, 10 February 11;
``Directly Administered Areas in Ili Prefecture Stress Strengthening
`Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications' and Cultural
Market Supervision Work During `New Year' and `Chinese New Year'
Period'' [Yili zhouzhi zhuzhong jiaqiang ``yuandan'' ``chunjie'' qijian
``saohuang dafei'' he wenhua shichang jianguan gongzuo], Xinjiang
Culture Net, 11 February 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture
People's Government, ``Bortala Prefecture Enlarges Strength of
Inspections, Ensures `Big Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal
Publications' Work Gets Down to the Substance'' [Bo zhou jiada jiancha
lidu quebao ``saohuang dafei'' gongzuo luo dao shichu], 17 February 11;
Fuyun County People's Government, ``Turaxun Township, Fuyun County,
Vigorously Launches Activity To Investigate Illegal Religious
Publications'' [Fuyun xian tu'erhong xiang dali kaizhan qingcha feifa
zongjiao chubanwu huodong], reprinted in E'erqisi Net, 14 January 11.
See analysis of these items in ``Xinjiang Authorities Target Religious
and Political Publications in Censorship Campaigns,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.
\68\ ``Crackdown Launched in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 3
December 10; ``Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call,'' Radio Free Asia,
28 February 11.
\69\ Cheng Lixin, ``Autonomous Regional Party Committee Standing
Committee (Enlarged) Meeting Stresses Raising Recognition, Synthesizing
Measures and Policies, and Ensuring Stability'' [Zizhiqu dangwei
changwei (kuoda) huiyi qiangdiao tigao renshi zonghe shice quebao
wending], Xinjiang Daily, 8 December 10.
\70\ ``Zhang Chunxian: Use `5 Resolutes' To Propel Development and
Stability'' [Zhang chunxian: yi ``wuge jiandingbuyi'' tuijin fazhan he
wending], Tianshan Net, 7 August 11.
\71\ Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation To `Strike
Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan ``yanli daji
baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily,
reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.
\72\ See examples that follow, as well as analysis in ``Authorities
in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10,
3.
\73\ Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal
Religious Activity [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de
jieding] (undated, reprinted in, e.g., Chinggil County People's
Government, 25 February 08), Nos. 3, 4, 5, 20. For mention of the
document from the past year, see, e.g., Yengisar Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Bureau, ``Penetrate the Countryside for Grand Propaganda and
Explanations, Ethnic Unity Enters People's Hearts, Yengisar County
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Launches `Grand Propagandizing and
Explanation' Activity'' [Shenru xiangcun da xuanjiang minzu tuanjie jin
minxin, yingjisha xian minzongju kaizhan ``da xuanjiang'' huodong],
reprinted in Yengisar County People's Government, 21 March 11; Qaramay
Dushanzi District Number 1 Middle School, ``2011 Plan for Launching
`Year of Studying Law' Activity'' [2011 nian kaizhan ``xuefa nian''
huodong jihua], 11 March 11.
\74\ See Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the
Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu
tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, arts. 34, 53,
and analysis in ``New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To Expand Controls
Over Children's Religious Freedom (Includes Update),'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2 and ``Draft
Regulation in Xinjiang Could Strengthen Legal Prohibitions Over
Children's Freedom of Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 3.
\75\ See Village Pledge System in this section for more information
and ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over
Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9,
10 December 10, 3.
\76\ Qiongbola Township People's Government, ``Qiongbola Township
Blazes Trails in Model for Religious Management, Drives Ahead With New
Ideas in Social Management'' [Qiongbola xiang chuangxin zongjiao guanli
moshi, tuijin shehui guanli chuangxin], reprinted in Qapqal Xibe
Autonomous County People's Government, 7 January 11.
\77\ Toutunhe District People's Political Consultative Office,
``Inspection Report Concerning Toutunhe District's Religious
Personnel's Lifestyle Situation and Conditions for Playing a Positive
Role in Strengthening Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Stability'' [Guanyu
dui toutunhe qu zongjiao renshi zai jiaqiang minzu tuanjie, weihu
wending fangmian fahui zuoyong qingkuang ji shenghuo zhuangkuang de
shicha baogao], reprinted in Toutunhe District People's Government, 2
September 10.
\78\ See, e.g., Jiashi County People's Government, ``Jiashi County
Launches Food Hygiene and Safety Education and Training Work During the
`Two Holidays' Period'' [Jiashi xian kaizhan ``liang jie'' qijian
shipin weisheng anquan jiaoyu peixun gongzuo], 28 July 11; Bortala
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, ``Bortala
Municipality Takes Four Measures To Soundly Launch Work on Management
of Religious Affairs'' [Bole shi si cuo bingju zhashi kaizhan zongjiao
shiwu guanli gongzuo], 20 July 11; Ruoqiang County People's Government,
``Washsheri Township Convenes Forum Regarding Stability Work During
Ramadan'' [Washixia xiang zhaokai guanyu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo
zuotanhui], 29 July 11; Qiemo County People's Government, ``Tatirang
Township Adopts Forum Method To Do Good Job of Religion Work''
[Tatirang xiang caiqu zuotanhui fangshi zuohao zongjiao gongzuo], 5
August 11; ``Situation All-Around Tense in Uyghur Area During Ramadan
Period'' [Ramzan mezgilide uyghur eli weziyiti omumyulu jiddiyleshken],
Radio Free Asia, 28 July 11. For additional information on controls
over Ramadan in recent years, see, e.g., ``Authorities Continue To
Restrict Ramadan Observance in Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 3, and ``Religious Repression
in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3.
\79\ ``Father and Son Religious Personages Detained on Suspicion in
Shihezi Are Given 3-Year Sentences'' [Shixenzide guman bilen tutqun
qilinghan dada-bala diniy zatlargha 3 yilliqtin qamaq jazasi berilgen],
Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11.
\80\ For information on earlier campaigns, see ``Xinjiang
Authorities Target Beards, Veils in Campaigns To Tighten Control Over
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9
November 10, 4-5, and ``Xinjiang Authorities Tighten Controls Over
Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5,
4 June 10, 2.
\81\ See, e.g., All-China Women's Federation, ``10 Measures From
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Women's Federation Let Women of
All Ethnicities All Reap Benefits'' [Xinjiang zizhiqu fulian shi xiang
jucuo rang gezu funu pu shouhui], 7 March 11; Hoten District Women's
Federation, ``Hoten District Women's Federation 2011 Work
Arrangements'' [Hetian diqu fulian 2011 nian gongzuo anpai], reprinted
in Hoten District People's Government, 27 January 11; Luntai County
Women's Federation, ``Implementation Plan for Luntai County Women's
Federation System's Launching of `Creating Advancement, Striving for
Excellence' Activities'' [Guanyu zai luntai xian fulian xitong zhong
kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou huodong de shishi fang'an], reprinted in
Luntai County People's Government, 7 September 10; Turpan Municipality
Leading Group Office for Creating Advancement, Striving for Excellence
Activities, ``Implementation Plan for Turpan City Women's Federation
System and Women of All Ethnicities' Deeply Launching of Creating
Advancement, Striving for Excellence Activities'' [Guanyu zai tulufan
shi fulian xitong he gezu funu zhong shenru kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou
huodong de shishi fang'an], Turpan Party Construction Net, 6 January
11.
\82\ Hongqiao Residential District Office, ``Hongqiao Residential
District Work System Two'' [Hongqiao jiedao gongzuo zhidu er],
reprinted in Usu Municipal People's Government, 18 September 10.
\83\ Paixianbaibazha Township People's Government, ``Implementation
Plan for Paixianbaibazha Township's Launching of Special Rectification
Operation To Attack Illegal Religious Activities''
[Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang
zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an], reprinted in Xinhe County People's
Government, 27 November 10.
\84\ Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's Federation,
``Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the `Autonomous
Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points' '' [Guanyu
yinfa ``zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian'' de
tongzhi], 30 March 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's
Federation, ``Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the
`Autonomous Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points'
'' [Guanyu yinfa ``zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo
yaodian'' de tong zhi], 2 February 11; Paixianbaibazha Township
People's Government, ``Implementation Plan for Paixianbaibazha
Township's Launching of Special Rectification Operation To Attack
Illegal Religious Activities'' [Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa
zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an],
reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 27 November 10. For more
information on oversight in recent years, see ``Xinjiang Authorities
Train, Seek To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2, and ``Xinjiang
Authorities Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
\85\ In Chinese law, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, arts. 4, 121, and
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), issued 31 May 84, effective 1
October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. 2005 Implementing
Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority
languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting
``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council
Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
[Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa''
ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22. In
international law, see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 26,
27.
\86\ For more information on goals set following the forum, see
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 208.
\87\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; Jing Bo, ``Xinjiang Promulgates
`Outline of Education Plan' '' [Xinjiang gongbu ``jiaoyu guihua
gangyao''], Tianshan Net, 22 January 11 (noting date of issue of the
reform plan). For more information, see analysis in ``Xinjiang
Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual
Education,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
\88\ Ibid.
\89\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31
October 08, 178-79.
\90\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 8.
\91\ Ibid., item 15.
\92\ ``Uyghur-Language Classes Preserved at Middle School in
Dadamtu Township, Ghulja'' [Ghulja dadamtu yeziliq ottura mektipide
uyghur tilidiki siniplar saqlinip qaldi], Radio Free Asia, 1 December
10. For additional information on dissatisfaction over bilingual
education in recent years, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Uyghur
Language Under Attack: The Myth of `Bilingual' Education in the
People's Republic of China,'' 24 July 07.
\93\ Jing Bo, ``Xinjiang Publicly Recruits 5109 Elementary and
Secondary School Bilingual Teachers'' [Xinjiang gongkai zhaopin 5109
ming zhongxiaoxue shuangyu jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 10 October 10. For
more information, see analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate
Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
\94\ Li Min, ``Xinjiang Publicly Recruits Over 10,000 Elementary
and Secondary School Teachers'' [Xinjiang 2011 nian mianxiang shehui
zhaopin 1 wan yu ming zhongxiaoxue jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 30 May 11;
``Xinjiang To Recruit 9,200 Bilingual Teachers,'' Xinhua, 31 May 11.
\95\ See, e.g., Fan Yingli and Aynur, ``Zhejiang Aid to Xinjiang
Will Train Over 5000 Ethnic Minority `Bilingual' Teachers Within 5
Years'' [Zhejiang yuanjiang wunian nei jiang peixun 5000 yu ming
shaoshu minzu ``shuangyu'' jiaoshi], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net,
16 November 10; Xinjiang Education Department, ``The Four Provinces and
Municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Jiangsu Hold
Cooperation Meeting in Nanjing on Work for Training Backbone Ethnic
Minority Bilingual Teachers'' [Jing jin hu su si shengshi zai nanjing
zhaokai xinjiang shaoshu minzu shuangyu gugan jiaoshi peixun gongzuo
xiezuo hui], 9 December 10.
\96\ ``Laid Off Profs Reject Deal,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 September
11; ``Teachers Fired Over Mandarin Ability,'' Radio Free Asia, 23
September 11; ``Two Female Teachers in Qaghliq Spent 35 Days in Prison
for Petitioning to Higher Levels'' [Qaghiliqta ikki neper ayal
oqutquchi yuqirigha erz qilghanliqi uchun 35 kun qamaqta yatqan], Radio
Free Asia, 4 April 11. See also ``Cuts Expected for Uyghur Teachers,''
Radio Free Asia, 16 November 10; ``Uyghur Teachers in Toqsun Again
Under Harsh Pressure'' [Toqsundiki uyghur oqutquchilar yenimu qattiq
besim astida], Radio Free Asia, 9 December 10.
\97\ Xinjiang Education Department, Circular Concerning Completing
Pilot Work To Offer Ethnic Minority Language Arts Classes in Compulsory
Education-Level Schools Teaching in Mandarin [Guanyu zuohao hanyu
shouke yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuexiao kaishe minzu yuwen kecheng shidian
gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 30 August 10.
\98\ Xinjiang Education Department, Guiding Opinion on Autonomous
Region's Work To Strengthen Training in Minority Languages for Newly
Hired Preschool Teachers Who Are Native Mandarin Speakers [Zizhiqu
xinpin muyu wei hanyu de xueqian shuangyu jiaoshi min yuyan qianghua
peixun gongzuo zhidao yijian], issued 30 August 10.
\99\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 209-10, for
information on reward programs in earlier years.
\100\ ``Rural Special Award System in 3 Southern Xinjiang Districts
and Prefecture Is Again Enlarged'' [Xinjiang nanjiang san dizhou
nongcun teshu jiangli zhengce zaidu kuomian], Tianshan Net, 17 March
11.
\101\ Zepu County Population and Family Planning Committee, ``Rural
Family Planning Household Special Award System for 3 Xinjiang Districts
and Prefecture'' [Nanjiang san dizhou nongcun jihua shengyu jiating
teshu jiangli zhidu], reprinted in Zepu Net, 4 September 08.
\102\ ``National Population and Family Planning Commission Starts
Series of Operations To Support Xinjiang'' [Guojia renkou jishengwei
qidong zhiyuan xinjiang xilie xingdong], China Population News,
reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission, 3
November 09. For additional analysis, see ``Authorities Begin New
Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in Xinjiang,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2.
\103\ See, e.g., Li Yanmin, ``3.21 Million From State Goes to 2252
Ethnic Minority Households in Xinjiang's Altay'' [Guojia 321 wan huiji
xinjiang aletai 2252 hu shaoshu minzu jiating], Xinhua, 19 November 10;
Zhang Yanhong and Wang Yizhi, ``Nileke County Townships and Towns
Launch Family Planning Special Awards-Granting Ceremony'' [Nileke xian
xiangzhen fafang jihua shengyu jiating teshu jiangjin fafang yishi],
Xinjiang News Net, 1 December 10; ``Seman Towsnhip, Kashgar, Convenes
[Meeting] for Farmers and Herders To Receive Family Planning
`Certificates of Honor' '' [Kashi shi seman xiang zhaokai nongmumin
lingqu jihua shengyu ``guangrongzheng''], Kashgar Today, 8 April 11.
\104\ For a broad overview and analysis of the program, see
``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over
Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9,
10 December 10, 3.
\105\ ``Seek Realistic Results, Blaze Trails, Form Great
Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look'' [Qiushi chuangxin jie
shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi Xinjiang, 25 August 10.
\106\ See analysis in ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System
To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
\107\ For general information, see, e.g., ``Seek Realistic Results,
Blaze Trails, Form Great Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look''
[Qiushi chuangxin jie shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi
Xinjiang, 25 August 10; Du Jianxi, ``Take Implementing `Village Rules'
as the Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have `Rule of Law'
Enter the Countryside'' [Yi luoshi ``cungui minyue'' wei ``zhuashou''
tuidong ``fazhi jin xiangcun'' gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang,
6 April 08. For analysis see ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge
System To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update; No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
\108\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued and effective 4 November
98, amended 28 October 10, art. 27.
\109\ See, e.g., analysis in ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge
System To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
\110\ See Du Jianxi, ``Take Implementing `Village Rules' as the
Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have `Rule of Law' Enter
the Countryside'' [Yi luoshi ``cungui minyue'' wei ``zhuashou'' tuidong
``fazhi jin xiangcun'' gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang, 6 April
08. For analysis see ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To
Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
\111\ ``Promises To Respect the Rules in Hoten District, Xinjiang:
Villagers Manage Themselves (1)'' [Xinjiang hetian diqu shouyue
chengnuo: cunmin ziji guan ziji (1)], Legal Daily, reprinted in China
Finance Net, 8 April 08.
\112\ Hoten District Leading Group on Governing District in
Accordance to Law et al., Opinion Concerning Implementation of
Promotion of Village ``Codes of Conduct'' in Rural Areas in 2007, To
Govern Villages in Accordance With Law'' [Guanyu 2007 nian zai nongcun
tuixing ``cungui minyue'' yifa zhicun de shishi yijian], 22 January 07,
Item 1(1).
\113\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4; PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31
May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 9; PRC
Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodongfa], issued 5 July 94,
effective 1 January 95, art. 12; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo jiuye cujinfa], issued 30 August 07, effective 1
January 08, art. 28. See also legal analysis in ``Governments in
Xinjiang Continue To Sponsor, Sanction Job Recruitment That
Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 11 March 09, 3.
\114\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Occupational Disease
Hospital Recruiting Information'' [Xinjiang wewu'er zizhiqu zhiyebing
yiyuan zhaopin xinxi], reprinted in Graduate School of Lanzhou
University, 26 November 10. See also ``Job Discrimination Against
Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 31 March 11.
\115\ ``List of Civil Servant and Staff Positions for 2010 Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region Public Recruiting Through Exam for County-
Level Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs'' [2010 nian
xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu mianxiang shehui gongkai kaolu xianji jijian
jiancha jiguan gongwuyuan, gongzuo renyuan zhiweibiao], reprinted in
Xinjiang Human Resources Testing Center, 16 September 10.
\116\ Bingtuan Personnel Bureau, ``Summary of Posts for 2011
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Recruiting of
Functionaries'' [2011 xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan mianxiang
shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan zhiwei huizongbiao], reprinted in Bingtuan
Personnel Testing Authority, 6 August 11. For information on hiring in
previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 211; Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 107.
\117\ Autonomous Region Party Committee and Autonomous Region
People's Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work
[Zizhiqu dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de
yijian], issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2).
\118\ Ibid., art. 1(5).
\119\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China searches for
information did not find specific reports from the past year on
localities taking steps to adhere to the opinion and promote the hiring
of ethnic minorities.
\120\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9
January 11, items 1, 2. See analysis in ``Job Discrimination Against
Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 31 March 11.
\121\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9
January 11, item 5(2) (referring to trainees taking up set posts); He
Jun and Mao Yong, ``Xinjiang Starts `Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard
College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities
for Training' '' [Xinjiang qidong ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua''], Xinhua, 25
March 11.
\122\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9
January 11, item 1.
\123\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 179; CECC, 2009
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264-66; CECC 2010 Annual Report, 10
October 10, 211-12.
\124\ See, e.g., ``Nuer Bekri Refutes the Allegation That Women of
Uyghur Ethnic Group `Are Forced To Work in the Interior of the
Country,' '' Xinhua, 18 July 09 (Open Source Center, 20 July 09); Zhang
Jie, ``Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad'' [Zhi wu: laowu shuchu
tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10; Kashgar District
People's Government, ``Earned Income in Jiashi From 7 Years of Labor
Export Exceeds 1 Billion'' [Jiashi 7 nian laowu shuchu chuangshou chao
10 yi], 13 May 11; Mao Yong and Zhao Chunhui, ``Isolated Xinjiang
Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March Toward Openness'' [Xinjiang shaoshu
minzu nongmingong cong fengbi maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in
China Ethnicities News, 25 January 10.
\125\ Zhang Jie, ``Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad'' [Zhi
wu: laowu shuchu tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10.
\126\ Ibid.
\127\ ``Strive To Stand on One's Feet, Establish Good Image for
People From Xinjiang-Third Sidelight in Autonomous Region Party and
Government Representatives Delegation Visit to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces
and Municipalities'' [Ziqiang zili shuli xinjiangren lianghao xingxiang
zizhiqu dangzheng daibiaotuan zoufang duikou yuanjiang shengshi ceji
san], Xinjiang TV, reprinted in Xinhua, 4 May 11.
\128\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Lacks Workers, Provinces [Elsewhere in
China] With Large Labor Export Suffer Hardships'' [Xinjiang quegong
neidi laowu shuchu da sheng fannan], Yaxin, reprinted in Sina, 18
February 11; ``Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory Education
Still Pick Cotton? '' [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai shi mianhua
ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 18 September 10;
``Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment's Legal Office Strengthens
Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton'' [Nong
er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian qijian fazhi
anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10.
\129\ The International Labor Organization's Convention 138, which
China has ratified, sets the minimum age for child labor at 15, with
limited exceptions. Although the Convention excludes work done as part
of general, vocational, or technical education, such work must be an
``integral part'' of a course of study or training course. Article 15
of China's Labor Law forbids the employment of minors under 16. Within
this legal framework prohibiting child labor, Article 13 of the
Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor and Article 58 of the
Education Law together allow for ``education practice labor'' and work-
study programs for children under the age of 16, but such programs must
not harm children's health or safety or adversely affect their normal
studies. A nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary
and secondary school students outlines the general terms of such
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals, contribute to
production outputs, and improve conditions for schools. ILO Convention
(No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June
73, arts. 2, 6; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin heguo laodongfa], issued
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; Provisions on Prohibiting
the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1
October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13; PRC Education Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa], issued 18 March 95, effective 1
September 95, art. 58. Also see generally Regulation Regarding
Temporary Work on Work-Study Labor for Secondary and Elementary Schools
[Quanguo zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli], issued
and effective 20 February 83, arts. 1, 3.
\130\ See Opinion on Strengthening the Management of Secondary and
Elementary School Students' Work-Study Service Activities [Guanyu
jiaqiang zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue laowu huodong guanli de yijian],
issued 8 May 06, art. 3, and ``Xinjiang Government Continues
Controversial `Work-Study' Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, November 2006, 11.
\131\ He Ping, ``Starting This Fall, Xinjiang Students Attending
Compulsory Education Will Not Pick Cotton Again'' [Jin qiu qi xinjiang
jiu nian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng buzai shi mianhua], Tianshan Net, 19
September 08. See also analysis in ``Xinjiang Work-Study Programs
Continue; Cotton-Picking Activities Limited,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, December 2008, 4.
\132\ See, e.g., ``Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory
Education Still Pick Cotton? '' [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai
shi mianhua ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 18
September 10; and ``Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment's Legal
Office Strengthens Legal and Safety Education During Period Students
Pick Cotton'' [Nong er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi
mian qijian fazhi anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information
Portal, 4 October 10, cited in ``Underage Students Continue To Pick
Cotton in Xinjiang Work-Study Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 4.
\133\ Ibid.
\134\ For general background on the project, see ``Demolition of
Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection,
Population Resettlement,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 3, 2009, 2.
\135\ Pan Ying, ``Old City Transformation Project in Kashgar,
Xinjiang, Steadily Moves Ahead, City Culture Is Inherited'' [Xinjiang
kashi laocheng gaizao xiangmu pingwen tuijin chengshi wenhua deyi
chuancheng], Xinhua, 9 July 11.
\136\ Cai Muyuan, ``Restoring Old Kashgar for a Safer Future,''
China Daily, 26 October 10.
\137\ Ben Ochieng and Wang Yanan, ``Interview: Inscribed Chinese
Intangible Elements Have Viability: UNESCO Official,'' Xinhua, 17
November 10; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, ``Intangible Heritage Lists,'' last visited 20 June 11.
\138\ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, ``Songs, Dances and Traditional Know-How From 29
Countries Proposed for Inscription on UNESCO Lists of Intangible
Heritage,'' 11 September 10.
\139\ See information on the Chinese government description of the
meshrep in Rachel Harris, UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, ``Report on the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304
for Inscription on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of
Urgent Safeguarding in 2010,'' November 2010, and Cultural Department
of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, ``Clarification to the Report on
the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304 for Inscription on the
List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in
2010,'' last visited 20 June 11. See also analysis in ``Draft of
Intangible Cultural Heritage Law Limits Research Activities; Xinjiang
Case Study Shows Politicization of Heritage (Updated),'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 16 February 11.
\140\ Jay Dautcher, ``Public Health and Social Pathologies in
Xinjiang,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick
Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285-86.
\141\ For more information on the cases, see CECC, 2010 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 212-13.
\142\ Zhou Yingfeng and Cui Qingxin, ``Our Country Busts Major
Terrorist Group Case, Details on Public Security Bureau Announcement''
[Woguo pohuo zhongda kongbu zuzhi an gong'anbu gongbu xiangqing],
Xinhua, 24 June 10.
\143\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ``The
Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application,'' December 1996,
II(i)(10). See also Monette Zard, ``Exclusion, Terrorism and the
Refugee Convention,'' Forced Migration Review, June 2002.
\144\ ``Uyghur Prisoner Denied Medical Care,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
March 11.
\145\ Ibid.; ``Laos Deports Seven Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 15
December 10; ``Health Status of Prisoner Memtili Rozi, Returned From
Cambodia, Worries Family'' [Kambodzhadin qayturulghan tutqun memtili
rozining salametlik ehwali ailisidikilerni jiddiy endishige salmaqta],
Radio Free Asia, 13 December 10.
\146\ ``Kazakhstan Deports Uyghur Teacher,'' Radio Free Asia, 2
June 11; Uyghur American Association, ``The World Must Demand
Accountability for Deported Uyghur Refugee Ershidin Israel,'' 8 June
11.
\147\ ``Uyghur in Chinese Custody? '' Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11;
Amnesty International, ``Document-China: Forcibly Returned Asylum
Seeker at Risk,'' 16 June 11.
\148\ ``Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation,'' Radio Free Asia,
15 June 11; ``Kazakhstan Deports Uyghur Teacher,'' Radio Free Asia, 2
June 11; ``Uyghur in Chinese Custody? '' Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11.
\149\ ``Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation,'' Radio Free Asia,
15 June 11.
\150\ Human Rights Watch, ``China/Thailand: Account for Uighur Man
Turned Over to Chinese Officials,'' 10 August 11; ``Uyghur Held in
Thailand,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 August 08.
\151\ ``Pakistan Deports Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 August 11.
\152\ See, e.g., Sean Yoong, ``5 Uighur Chinese Held in Malaysia
Risk Deportation,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 22 August
11; ``Malaysia Deports Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 August 11.
\153\ UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).
\154\ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by
the UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, art.
33(1). For a UNHCR statement noting that the principle of refoulement
applies to asylum seekers as well as refugees and stating that the
return of the Uyghur asylum seekers from Cambodia violates this
principle, see ``UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of Uighur
Asylum-Seekers From Cambodia,'' UN News Centre, 21 December 09.
\155\ For more information, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31
October 08, 176-77; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 261-62;
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 212-13.