[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ENVIRONMENT
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
The Environment
Findings
China's environmental problems remain serious.
This year's report highlights heavy metal and growing
rural pollution problems. Citizens continued to express
their environmental grievances and sometimes protested
in the streets, including at a protest against a
chemical plant in Dalian city, Liaoning province,
involving over 10,000 citizens who ``took a walk'' in
front of government and Communist Party buildings. In
some cases, officials suppressed demands for a cleaner
environment. Local authorities detained, harassed, or
threatened people including parents of children
affected by lead poisoning in several provinces who
raised grievances or sought redress; citizens
demonstrating or complaining about landfill operations
in Fujian province; citizens protesting operations of a
waste incinerator in Jiangsu province; and citizens
protesting expanded mining operations in the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous
areas.
Corruption, noncompliance with and uneven
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations, and the lack of legal recourse, remain
significant challenges for China in managing its
environmental problems. Sometimes environmental
protection authorities do not take enforcement actions
as required by law, and at times courts refuse to
accept lawsuits because of concerns over ``social
stability.'' Environmental protection was among the
areas to have the highest levels of bribery and
corruption in the first six months of 2010.
Central and some local Chinese environmental
protection officials have taken steps to improve
information disclosure. Yet, efforts to implement
disclosure measures remain underdeveloped. Some
citizens have been proactive in requesting information;
however, several challenges to accessing information
remain, including administrative provisions that limit
the scope of information that environmental authorities
can disclose. The most difficult type of information to
obtain in some cases is that related to polluting
enterprises, which has potential implications for
citizen health. Chinese citizens and experts have
expressed concern over the speed and lack of
transparency of developing hydroelectric and nuclear
power projects. The nuclear power plant disaster in
Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese
citizens and experts to speak out about safety
concerns, and prompted Chinese officials to conduct a
safety review and consider new legislation that could
improve the transparency of China's nuclear industry.
Environmental protection remains a sector in
which public participation is somewhat encouraged, yet
officials also continue to seek to ``guide'' or manage
participation. A new national-level official guiding
opinion requires environmental groups to report on
their international cooperative projects with foreign
non-governmental entities for ``examination and
approval.'' The opinion also calls for the further
strengthening of relations and cooperation between the
government and social organizations, as well as greater
political indoctrination of environmental groups by
relevant authorities.
Top Chinese authorities reportedly consider
China to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change
and have taken steps to mitigate and adapt to climate
change. Chinese leaders plan to voluntarily reduce
carbon dioxide intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of
GDP) by 17 percent by 2015. While non-governmental
organizations continue some activities to address
climate change, public participation in climate change
policy processes is minimal. Chinese leaders stated
they would improve data reliability and transparency in
relation to energy and climate change; however, Chinese
leaders face significant challenges in these areas.
Official Chinese measures to address climate change, as
well as their implementation, could place the rights of
citizens at risk without sufficient procedural and
safety protections.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call upon the Chinese government to cease
punishing citizens for their grassroots environmental
activism or for utilizing official and
institutionalized channels to voice their environmental
grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts
by Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand
awareness of citizens' environmental rights and to
promote the protection of those rights. Projects might
include supporting U.S.-China discussions about
complaint resolution mechanisms and strengthening U.S.-
China cooperation regarding researching and addressing
environmental health problems. Include environmental
law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal
expert dialogues.
Support multilateral exchanges regarding
environmental enforcement and compliance tools,
including environmental insurance, market mechanisms,
criminal prosecution of serious environmental
infringements, and public interest litigation
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen
environmental impact assessment processes and citizen
participation in those processes. Engage Chinese
officials and others who seek to devise a realistic and
fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution
in China that could aid enforcement efforts.
Support continued expansion of environmental
information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government
experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program
and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more
environmental transparency. Support programs that
educate Chinese citizens about China's system of open
government information. Encourage Chinese officials to
make government and expert research reports regarding
climate change and its impacts in China public and
easily accessible. In addition, continue U.S.
Government engagement with relevant ministries,
academic institutions, experts, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in developing China's capacity to
measure, report, publicize, and verify emissions
reduction strategies and techniques reliably.
Encourage the development of environmental NGOs
in China, including incorporating joint non-
governmental participation in bilateral projects.
Support efforts to raise the technical and operational
capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs.
Engage local Chinese leaders in their efforts to
reconcile development and environmental protection
goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city
relationships in China to incorporate environmental
rights awareness, environmental protection, and climate
change components into their sister-city programs. When
making arrangements for travel to China, request
meetings with officials from central and local levels
of the Chinese government to discuss environmental
governance and best practices. Invite Chinese local-
level leaders, including those from counties,
townships, and villages, to the United States to
observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to
environmental problem-solving.
Introduction
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to strengthen regulatory efforts to
address China's serious environmental problems. Inadequate
access to information, unreliable access to legal remedies, an
underdeveloped compensation system for individuals and groups
harmed by pollution, uneven enforcement and lax compliance,
corruption, and other issues, however, have contributed to the
continuation of these serious environmental problems and to the
potential for the infringement of citizens' rights. Chinese
authorities have taken some steps to improve collection of
environmental data and to expand ``open environmental
information,'' but significant challenges remain, especially in
relation to obtaining information on industrial pollution
sources. Access to legal remedies also remains a challenge, and
channels available to citizens to express environmental
grievances are not always open, contributing to the rise of
citizen anti-pollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities
continued to selectively stifle environmental activism and
environmental grievances or suppress people who were involved
in or organized collective action to halt perceived
environmental harms. During this reporting year, citizen
grievances regarding hydroelectric dam construction, lead
pollution, chemical plants, and waste incinerator and landfill
operations were prominently covered in Chinese and foreign
media.
Serious Environmental Challenges: Focus on Rural and Heavy Metal
Pollution
China's environmental problems reportedly remain severe,
despite some regulatory advances and isolated reductions in a
limited number of pollutants.\1\ Examples highlight the
seriousness of these problems and the legal challenges they
pose. In October 2010, a Chinese research institute completed a
``Green GDP'' report on the economic impacts of environmental
pollution in China, which asserts that the economic costs of
environmental pollution and ecological damage have risen 74.8
percent over a five-year period from 2004 to 2008, equaling
about 3 percent of GDP.\2\ In February 2011, a Chinese
scholarly report revealed that 10 percent of the rice in
markets in many cities contained cadmium levels above standard;
soil pollution is seen as the culprit.\3\ In August, it came to
light that the Luliang Chemicals Company dumped over 140
truckloads, totaling over 5,200 tons, of hexavalent chromium
slag in Yunnan province, where it could wash into the Pearl
River via its tributaries.\4\ The chromium reportedly killed
fish and livestock and threatens drinking water sources.\5\ The
dumping case underscores the lack of official transparency and
reportedly may have involved official complicity, highlighting
governance problems.\6\ An employee of the plant reportedly
admitted that the company had dumped or buried over 288
thousand tons of chromium dregs between 1989 and 2003.\7\
Across 12 provinces, there reportedly may be 1 to 1.3 million
tons of chromium waste (from a variety of sources) not disposed
of properly, with some dumped in water sources and densely
populated areas.\8\
During this reporting year, authorities continued to
develop regulatory instruments to manage these pollution
problems. Chinese officials currently have reduction targets
for only two pollutants but have announced plans to expand this
to four in the next five-year period (2011-2015).\9\
Environmental officials reportedly discussed revisions to the
Environmental Protection Law, circulated a draft for comment of
a technical guideline for public participation in environmental
impact assessment processes, issued the Opinions Regarding
Initiation of Environmental Pollution Damage Assessment Work,
which outlines the initial steps toward an environmental
compensation system, and issued several other relevant laws,
policies, and measures on environmental issues.\10\
Over the past year, officials focused on growing rural
pollution problems, which highlight ongoing challenges in
applying the laws evenly and in protecting citizens' health,
especially the health of children and the rural poor.
Authorities reportedly acknowledged environmental conditions in
many villages are still severe, partially due to the increasing
movement of polluting enterprises from urban to village
areas.\11\ In June 2011, a top environmental official stated
that environmental protection efforts in rural areas lag far
behind those in urban areas, the foundation for rural
environmental management is weak, regulatory standards are
incomplete, and the ability to monitor problems is
insufficient.\12\ These problems put the health of rural
populations at risk. In January 2011, central government
officials announced long-term plans to address rural pollution
challenges, primarily relying on the policy of ``using rewards
to promote control.'' \13\ In June 2011, Chinese news reports
further described the steps officials said they would take
during the next five-year period.\14\ The Minister of
Environmental Protection stated that China would ``work hard''
to make initial improvements in rural village environmental
quality by 2015 and to control prominent environmental problems
in key villages and townships across the country by 2020.\15\
Environmental protection officials also prioritized heavy
metal pollution problems, including lead pollution that is
linked to cases of lead poisoning involving thousands of
children in several provinces in 2009 and 2010.\16\ Some of
these cases involve the violation of citizens' rights.\17\ [See
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a
Cleaner Environment in this section for more information on
these cases.] In response to the series of lead poisoning
cases, authorities reportedly released a circular in May 2011
that outlined steps to address heavy metal pollution, including
better management and disposal of pollutants, punishment of
violators, and enhanced transparency.\18\ However, the circular
does not have the power of a legally binding regulation.\19\ In
June 2011, environmental authorities launched a special
campaign to try to reduce heavy metal pollution and asserted
that they would use their authority to suspend approval of new
projects in areas where heavy metal pollution cases have
occurred.\20\ In August, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection reportedly suspended production at 1,015 lead
battery manufacturing, assembly, and recycling plants and made
public the names of these plants. Authorities shut down 583 of
the plants, but the news agency reporting the story did not
indicate how many of the plants moved production facilities to
other locations.\21\
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner
Environment
Environmental problems, including heavy metal pollution,
continued to trigger citizen grievances and demands for better
environmental quality. In June 2011, nearly 1,000 citizens
blocked a road protesting pollution from a battery plant in
Heyan city, Guangdong province; one citizen reported that 10
people were injured in the ensuing conflict between citizens
and police and that police killed one person.\22\ In August,
more than 10,000 citizens peacefully protested a chemical plant
that manufactures paraxylene (PX) in Dalian city, Liaoning
province, by ``taking a stroll,'' after a typhoon damaged an
ocean wall protecting the plant, triggering citizen concerns
about a chemical leak.\23\ Prior to the storm, factory workers,
reportedly ordered by plant bosses, stopped and beat reporters
who wanted to investigate possible impacts of a storm on
chemical storage tanks.\24\ The story of this event reportedly
was pulled from TV coverage.\25\ Local Communist Party and
government leaders quickly responded to the protest and
reportedly put the ``relocation of the plant on the government
work agenda.'' \26\ One international press report noted that
the government was considering closing down the plant prior to
the protests. It also noted that the plant had been approved
during the term of a previous Party Secretary, speculating that
the current cohort of authorities may have had political
motives for allowing such a large demonstration.\27\
Nevertheless, the Global Times, which operates under the
official People's Daily, stated that citizens taking to the
streets to express their views ``should not be advocated in
China'' and that ``Chinese society objected'' to the street
protests as evidenced by the fact that ``[r]eports on this
incident have not gained much ground in China's mainstream
media . . . .'' \28\
Access to legal remedies remains unreliable, contributing
to citizen protests, despite a growing number of specialized
environmental courts. In 2010, regular Chinese courts completed
12,018 environmental pollution compensation cases, an increase
of 2.83 percent over the previous year.\29\ However, notably, a
study by a Peking University professor reportedly found that
courts often refuse to take cases in the name of ``social
stability.'' \30\ One expert with an international
environmental organization noted that Chinese lawyers said they
believe it is more difficult to have an environmental damages
case accepted by the courts now than in the past.\31\ The same
expert noted that public supervision via the courts has been
constrained in recent years, emphasizing that while litigation
in some cases has driven legal reform or compelled a local
government to act, it has not been as effective in stopping
pollution problems or for compelling pollution cleanup.\32\ In
some cases, the expert noted, litigation has led to
compensation for citizens, but he pointed out that compensation
is sometimes difficult to obtain due to evidentiary burdens and
problems in proving causality.\33\ In some cases, it can be
difficult to obtain compensation even when a party has been
ordered to pay it.\34\ One former environmental protection
official told a reporter that ``[w]ith limited fines and low
compensation, breaking the law is often cheaper than following
it . . . .'' \35\ Specialized environmental courts may still
benefit environmental litigation, although critics reportedly
believe they have not resolved the challenges of local
protectionism or judicial independence.\36\ Some of these
courts, which are growing in number, set local rules providing
for public interest litigation cases brought by procuratorates,
environmental agencies, non-government organizations, and
individuals.\37\ In January 2011, the Kunming Intermediate
People's Court in Yunnan province awarded approximately 4
million yuan (US$626,300) compensation for citizens whose
drinking water had been contaminated in a public interest case
brought by the Kunming City Environmental Protection Bureau and
supported by the city procuratorate.\38\ The Commission's 2010
Annual Report noted a couple of these courts have accepted a
few cases brought by the All-China Environment Federation
(ACEF), an environmental group that is overseen by the Ministry
of Environmental Protection; \39\ the ACEF demonstration cases
appear to have been the only quasi-NGO or NGO public interest
cases accepted by the courts.
In some cases, officials suppressed citizen demands for a
cleaner environment. The study by the Peking University
professor reportedly found that criminal liability for
pollution is rarely enforced and that in many cases, citizens
exposed to environmental harms have little access to legal
remedies and may resort to violence to pressure the polluter to
act.\40\ Further, the study pointed out that those who use
violence to protest pollution are often prosecuted.\41\ Some
recent incidents of official suppression of largely peaceful
citizen demands for a cleaner environment include the
following:
According to a June 2011 Human Rights Watch
Report, local officials in four provinces--Henan,
Hunan, Shaanxi, and Yunnan--in recent years ``imposed
arbitrary limits on access to blood lead testing;
refused appropriate treatment to children and adults
with critically high lead levels; withheld and failed
to explain test results showing unaccountable
improvements in lead levels; and denied the scope and
severity of lead poisoning.'' \42\ Other sources
provide additional information on cases in Hunan and
Shaanxi.\43\ Parents reportedly stated that local
police threatened some people who tried to obtain
information and detained or arrested individuals
protesting against polluting factories or seeking help
for their sick children.\44\ In addition, journalists,
including one foreign reporter, indicated they had been
harassed when they tried to report on some of the lead
poisoning cases.\45\
In October 2010, over 1,000 citizens in
Pingnan county, Ningde city, Fujian province, signed a
collective petition complaining about pollution from a
local landfill facility \46\ following a protest that
resulted in the detention of four citizens.\47\ After
receiving no response from local government officials,
five village representatives took the collective
petition to the provincial government office of letters
and visits.\48\ County officials intercepted and
detained the representatives on suspicion of
``disrupting social order.'' \49\ Their detention
triggered a protest by village residents.\50\ News
reports do not provide additional information on those
detained.
In late 2010, authorities allegedly beat and
detained 17 persons who participated in protests or who
petitioned against proposed mining operations in Rikaze
(Shigatse) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR).\51\ Also in late 2010, authorities detained over
20 Tibetans, some briefly, for their protest or
petitioning activities against a construction team said
to have a mining permit.\52\ In August 2010, officials
reportedly fired upon a group of 100 Tibetans and
possibly killed one to four citizens. They were
protesting gold-mining operations in Ganzi (Kardze)
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province,
because of the harmful environmental effects.
Authorities also reportedly detained 35 Tibetans in
this case.\53\ In July 2011, authorities in Zuogong
(Dzogang) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR,
reportedly detained about 50 Tibetans because they
protested mining activities.\54\ Authorities reportedly
warned citizens that protest activities would be
considered ``politically motivated.'' Officials
detained the ``village officials'' who traveled to
Lhasa, the TAR capital, to ``protest'' the mining and
the other detentions, as well as the alleged protest
``ringleaders.'' \55\ [See Section V--Tibet for more
information on these incidents.]
In May 2011, citizens and police clashed in a
large-scale conflict involving as many as 10,000 \56\
residents in a village in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province,
after residents gathered to protest the operation of a
waste incinerator that they have opposed since 2007
because they claim to have been tricked into accepting
it.\57\ Authorities reportedly injured several citizens
and took a few residents into custody,\58\ although
reports do not provide further information on those
detained.
In June 2011, Mongol herders in Bayannuur
city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, shut down the
water pump to a lead mine, which had expanded into
grazing land, after ``repeatedly petitioning the
government.'' \59\ Some protesters set up traditional
tents outside of government offices for nearly two
weeks.\60\ The herders believed the mine was polluting
the environment and endangering their health.\61\ The
local government sent more than 50 riot police to the
scene, and they reportedly beat and detained many of
the protesters.\62\ A group of 600 herders reportedly
sought compensation for pollution linked to the
mine.\63\ The mine reportedly agreed to compensate the
group with 1.2 million yuan (US$188,000), and the
herders ended their protest.\64\ News stories do not
provide further details regarding the herders detained
by police. The demonstration followed herder protests
in May linked to the death of a herder at the hands of
a mine worker.\65\ [See Section II--Ethnic Minority
Rights for more information on the May protests.]
Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and Safety
Controversies
Increasing reliance on renewable energy and reducing
China's carbon dioxide and other air pollutant emissions are
among the reasons Chinese authorities cite for escalating the
construction of hydroelectric dams.\66\ Some of these projects
reportedly continue to raise safety concerns and include
forcible relocation practices. To date, China has constructed
25,800 large dams, and the associated land requisition projects
reportedly have led to the relocation of more than 10 million
people.\67\ Central-level authorities announced in early 2011
that development of hydropower, including the controversial
series of dams along the Nu River (Salween River), is a
``must.'' \68\ Local officials rapidly built many smaller
hydroelectric projects along the Nu River that did not need
State Council approval over the past two years, some of which
are in areas of relative geological instability, leading to
heightened concerns among experts and citizens.\69\ In May
2011, Xinhua reported that the State Council had recognized
``urgent'' problems associated with the Three Gorges Dam.\70\
During the same month, the State Council Standing Committee
passed a plan to address these issues.\71\ Estimates of the
number of people resettled because of the Three Gorges Dam so
far range from 1.4 million to 4 million.\72\ There have been
numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations
affected by the Three Gorges Dam, including an attack on
activist Fu Xiancai that left him paralyzed.\73\ Additional
areas with reports of forced resettlement practices include
Fujian, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces.\74\ In some cases, these
resettlement practices triggered citizen protests. For example,
in March 2011, as many as 2,000 to 3,000 citizens reportedly
blocked roads to protest compensation levels for their homes
and farmland in Suijiang county, Zhaotong prefecture, Yunnan
province, to make way for the Xiangjiaba Dam along the Yangtze
River.\75\ Authorities reportedly administratively detained
several men for two weeks in what appeared to be punishment for
participating in the demonstrations.\76\ Central authorities
acknowledged problems with compensation schemes, and the PRC
Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and
Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) notes intended reforms
to the land requisition system, including shrinking ``the scope
of requisitioned land, and increas[ing] the compensation
standard for requisitioned land.'' \77\
The relocation of some of the 330,000 people relocated in
Hubei and Henan provinces to make way for the central route of
the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, which is slated for
completion in 2014 and will divert water from China's southern
regions to dryer northern regions,\78\ so far reportedly has
involved less forcible practices. The relocation projects,
however, have already triggered a protest and citizen
grievances. According to an international non-governmental
organization report released in August 2010, authorities
utilized persuasion rather than physical force in some citizen
relocation projects in Danjiangkou city, Hubei province, which
the report described as an improvement from the practices
employed in Three Gorges Dam relocations. The government
employees who were responsible for persuading people to
relocate, however, reportedly were required to live among the
villagers and were not permitted to return home until the
villagers all agreed to relocate.\79\ News reports indicate the
project has already triggered a multi-day villager protest in
Qianjiang city, Hubei province; \80\ led to complaints by
relocated farmers about inadequate compensation,\81\ poor job
prospects, and unprofitable land; \82\ and triggered at least
one instance in which officials threatened citizens who took
their grievances to higher levels.\83\ In addition, the central
route of the relocation project reportedly generated claims of
dishonest officials and corruption, as well as additional
citizen hardships.\84\
Environmental Transparency and Public Participation
Central and some local Chinese environmental protection
officials have taken steps to improve environmental
transparency, but regular disclosure of information remains a
problem. Central authorities took a positive step when they
reportedly acknowledged the link between pollution in the Huai
River basin and the high number of cancerous tumors found in
residents along the river.\85\ According to its 2010 annual
work report, the Ministry of Environmental Protection received
226 requests for information in 2010, an increase of 205
percent.\86\ The report does not indicate how many requests
were granted or denied, only that the ministry responded to
every request, except one which was still in process.\87\ The
ministry received 25 requests for administrative
reconsideration.\88\ A joint Chinese-international study
released in December 2010 found that there had been some
improvement in awareness of the need for transparency on the
part of government officials but that more efforts are
necessary to translate this awareness into regular disclosure
of information.\89\ The study also found that the types of
information hardest for researchers to obtain included
``list(s) of polluting enterprises whose pollutant discharge
exceeds national or local standards, list(s) of enterprises
with major or serious environmental pollution accidents or
incidents, and list(s) of enterprises refusing to carry out
effective environmental administrative penalties.'' \90\ The
results of a second joint study by Chinese and international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on open environmental
information in 113 cities released in December 2010 noted
overall improvement in information disclosure from 2009 to 2010
but also noted that some cities' disclosure performance
declined.\91\ Eleven cities (9.73 percent) earned ``passing''
scores of 60 or above in 2009-2010, an increase from four
cities (3.54 percent) in 2008.\92\ The study noted that ``many
facilities in violation of emissions and clean production
standards failed to publicly disclose emissions data as
required by law.'' \93\
During this reporting period, environmental groups have
utilized environmental open government information procedures
to obtain information, although barriers to transparency
continue. A December 2010 article by a Chinese author noted
that at least 35 organizations joined an ongoing campaign
promoting green consumption and that these NGOs had requested
information on polluting factories.\94\ Over 300 enterprises
reportedly responded to the requests by explaining the reasons
for the pollution problems, and 50 of those companies consented
to ``third-party audits'' by NGOs.\95\ Administrative
provisions, however, remain a major obstacle to transparency as
environmental protection authorities use them as the basis for
restricting information disclosure.\96\ Authorities refused to
grant information in two recent environmental information
disclosure cases discussed in the Chinese media. In the first
case, the Ministry of Agriculture refused a 2011 request for
information about the downsizing of a national nature reserve
along the Yangtze River because it involved ``procedural
information.'' \97\ In the second case, local environmental
officials in Hai'an county, Nantong prefecture, Jiangsu
province, denied a 2011 request regarding a waste incinerator,
reportedly responding that they had ``already approved an
environmental impact assessment'' for the project. The lawyer
who submitted the request on behalf of an environmental group
reportedly noted that ``this answer was unrelated to the
information requested.'' \98\ In May, the lawyer filed an
administrative reconsideration request to the environmental
protection bureau at the next highest level.\99\
Chinese citizens and experts have expressed concern over
the perceived lack of transparency and the potential risks
associated with the rapid development of nuclear power
projects. The nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 appeared
to embolden Chinese citizens and experts to speak out about
safety concerns.\100\ For example, a noted Chinese scientist
stated that China is ``seriously unprepared, especially on the
safety front,'' for speedy development of nuclear plants.\101\
The disaster also prompted Chinese officials to conduct a
safety review of currently operating and planned nuclear power
plants.\102\ In June, a Ministry of Environmental Protection
vice minister announced that officials had found all of China's
13 operating nuclear reactors were safe.\103\ The Chinese
government reportedly will adhere to its current medium- and
long-term plans for nuclear power development.\104\ Chinese
authorities are reportedly considering a new nuclear energy law
\105\ that one researcher notes could spur transparency in
China's nuclear power industry.\106\
public participation and environmental outcomes
Environmental protection remains a sector in which central
authorities state a need for greater public participation but
within the confines of state control. In December 2010, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection passed a guiding opinion,
which states that China needs to further expand efforts to
cultivate and guide environmental social organizations, as well
as further strengthen relations and cooperation between the
government and social organizations.\107\ The opinion requires
environmental social organizations that want to engage in
cooperative projects with foreign non-governmental entities to
report to foreign affairs departments for ``examination and
approval.'' \108\ In addition, the opinion also stipulates that
various levels of environmental departments must ``strengthen
political thought construction'' (sixiang zhengzhi jianshe) of
environmental social organizations.\109\
This past year, authorities' responsiveness to citizen
environmental grievances varied across the country. One case
that highlights the influence of environmental groups involves
the shuttering and relocation of a polluting chemical plant in
Qiugang village, Bengbu municipality, Anhui province.\110\
Residents unsuccessfully utilized the court system over a
period of years to find relief from pollution associated with
nearby chemical plants but then worked with an environmental
group to utilize alternative ways to bring pressure on
officials to act.\111\ Local officials relocated one of the
main polluting plants, although the site still requires a large
cleanup effort.\112\ Another case involves a waste incineration
plant in Beijing municipality. A Chinese newspaper reported in
February 2011 that authorities in Haidian district, Beijing,
cancelled construction of the incinerator reportedly because of
its environmental impacts, citizen protests, and its close
proximity to ``high-end residential complexes.'' \113\ In
addition, authorities in Dalian municipality, Liaoning
province, responded quickly to the more than 10,000 people who
protested a paraxylene (PX) plant in the city.\114\ In
contrast, in May, in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality,
Guangdong province, 5,000 citizens signed a petition to voice
opposition to five incinerators. Authorities, however, counted
the petition only as ``one opposition vote'' because the
citizens did not provide their addresses and phone numbers on
the petition.\115\ [See Access to Justice and Suppression of
Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment in this section for
more examples of less responsive authorities in pollution
cases.]
Challenges of Enforcement, Compliance, and Official Corruption
Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations, along with non-compliance and corruption,
remain significant challenges for the development of rule of
law in the environmental sector, including in relation to
environmental impact assessments. In September 2010, a study
done by a Peking University professor reportedly noted that
officials face difficulties in enforcing legal sanctions, that
environmental criminal law remains weak, and that often a law's
overall objectives contradict the articles within the law.\116\
In addition, news reports indicated high levels of bribery and
corruption among officials in ecological and environmental
protection during the first six months of 2010.\117\ A 2010
international study found that enforcement of pollution
standards varied across time and location in China for a
variety of reasons, including the level of support from central
authorities, public pressure, the level of commitment of local
government officials, enforcement capacity, the characteristics
of businesses, and the economic context.\118\ In August 2011,
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) announced at
least two special programs to ``supervise'' seven sewage plants
across China because they turned off their systems ``without
good reason'' and eight power plants across China for
fabricating emissions monitoring data.\119\ In June, five non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) sent a letter to the MEP
noting that the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences
(CAMS) had given a ``grade A environmental impact assessment''
to a waste incineration plant and reportedly had ``falsified
public feedback.'' The letter urged officials to reject the
environmental impact assessment (EIA), investigate and fine
CAMS, and reform the EIA system.\120\ The Hebei Provincial
Environmental Protection Bureau had previously revoked a
different CAMS EIA in May for ``fabricated public feedback.''
\121\ One report suggests that of the 68 hydropower projects
approved by local authorities in Zhouqu (Drugchu) county,
Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province,
67 had not undergone an EIA or geological assessment.\122\ In
August, one Chinese newspaper article outlined several alleged
problems with the current EIA system, including low penalties
for construction companies that break the law, EIA
organizations' lack of integrity, difficulties in getting
public information on EIAs, and the symbolic nature of public
participation.\123\ One Chinese expert notes that ``it is more
common in China for the public wish to participate in
environmental impact assessments to be thwarted.'' \124\ An
international NGO noted that a Chinese scholar reported that
there are times when local government officials will protect
polluting businesses.\125\ A December 2010 joint Chinese and
international report noted that from 2009 to 2010, ``[l]ocal
environmental protection bureaus often failed to impose any
fines or take other actions in response as required by law.''
\126\ For example, in Shaanxi province, local environmental
protection bureau personnel on several occasions reportedly
agreed to an electric power company's requests for a delay in
execution of penalties for commencing regular operations
without first gaining environmental approvals.\127\
Climate Change: Rule of Law and Public Participation
China's efforts to address climate change relate to the
development of the rule of law in China, the incorporation of
public participation in policy processes, and cases of rights
infringement. China surpassed the United States to become the
world's top emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007 \128\ and
reportedly may become responsible for one-third to one-half of
the world's carbon dioxide emissions by 2030.\129\ Top
officials reportedly consider China to be vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change \130\ and during this reporting year
undertook a variety of actions \131\ and laid out plans \132\
to address the issue, including engaging in cooperative
programs with the United States.\133\ Chinese leaders signed
the UN Cancun Agreements in December 2010,\134\ but as a
developing country, China is not bound to reduce greenhouse
gases under relevant international climate change
agreements.\135\ Nevertheless, domestically, Chinese leaders
included a carbon dioxide intensity reduction target of 17
percent in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on
National Economic and Social Development.\136\ In addition, the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reportedly
established a working group to draft a climate change law,\137\
for which officials sought public comments between March and
September 2011.\138\ Despite the call for public input, the
lack of transparency hinders public participation in climate
change policy processes.\139\ While in general, participation
in policy processes is minimal,\140\ citizens do engage in some
activities addressing climate change. For example, 60 NGOs
reportedly organized 20 events surrounding the NGO side event
at the UN Climate Change Conference in Tianjin municipality and
published a position paper on Chinese NGOs' response to climate
change, among other projects.\141\ In recent years, citizen
protests reportedly took place in Shanxi and Liaoning
provinces, as well as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
because of the lack of public input and the land requisition
practices associated with experimental carbon capture projects
to help mitigate carbon dioxide emissions in industrial
processes.\142\ [For additional cases of policies to promote
use of renewable energy sources to address climate change that
can be linked to cases of rights infringement, see
Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and
Safety Controversies in this section.]
Data Reliability and Transparency: Climate Change
Chinese leaders have pledged to improve data reliability
and transparency related to energy and climate change.
Nevertheless, they reportedly face significant challenges, such
as obtaining from provinces comprehensive statistics on coal,
transportation energy, coal-bed methane, biomass, and clean
energy sectors.\143\ China is reportedly still developing the
institutions and capacity to evaluate energy figures provided
by provincial governments, some of which may have incentives to
provide false information.\144\ Authorities specified in the
PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and
Social Development the intention to establish a greenhouse gas
emissions statistical accounting system,\145\ which could
improve data collection if implemented. In October 2010, a
high-level NDRC official stated that China would begin
greenhouse gas inventory pilot projects in provinces and cities
and develop a publicly available greenhouse gas inventory
database.\146\ Chinese leaders have indicated they would
continue to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and
verification of China's greenhouse gas emissions and reduction
data in relation to projects using domestic financing and
technology.\147\ They reportedly stated their willingness to
share this information with the international community \148\
and to do their utmost to improve transparency.\149\
Endnotes
\1\ Wu Jingjing, ``Vigorously Explore New Paths for Environmental
Protection in China--Interview With Ministry of Environmental
Protection Minister Zhou Shengxian'' [Jiji tansuo zhongguo huanjing
baohu xin daolu-huanjing baohubu buzhang zhou shengxian fangtan],
Xinhua, 25 December 10. Zhou describes regulatory and institutional
improvements and notes that carbon oxygen demand dropped 9.66 percent
and sulfur dioxide emissions dropped 13.4 percent between 2006 and
2009. He also notes that pollution problems remain severe. Ian Johnson,
``China Faces `Very Grave' Environmental Situation, Officials Say,''
New York Times, 3 June 11.
\2\ Guangdong Municipal Environmental Protection Science Research
Institute, ``Five Years of Economic Development in China Gives Rise to
Environmental Pollution Costs Nearing One Trillion Yuan'' [Woguo 5 nian
jingji fazhan zaocheng de huanjing wuran chengben jin wanyi], reprinted
in Greenlaw, 14 January 11. The original report title is: ``Zhongguo
Huanjing Jingji Hesuan Yanjiu Baogao'' and it asserts that economic
losses due to pollution and ecological damage total nearly a trillion
yuan (US$157 million) for the five-year period.
\3\ Gong Jing, ``Cadmium Rice Killing Machine'' [Gemi shaji], New
Century, reprinted in Caixin Net, 14 February 11.
\4\ Yu Dawei, ``Yunnan Circulates Notice Chromium Dregs Reason for
Pearl River Pollution, for the Moment, Water Quality Has Not Appeared
Abnormal'' [Yunnan tongbao gezha wuran yuanyin zhujiang shuizhi zhan
weijian yichang], Caixin Net, 15 August 11; Meng Si, Chinadialogue,
``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30 August 11.
\5\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30
August 11; ``Experts To Probe Toxic Dumping,'' South China Morning
Post, 15 August 11.
\6\ Zhang Yanling, ``Scholar Urges Third Party Institution
Investigate Yunnan Chromium Pollution'' [Xuezhe huyu disanfang jigou
diaocha yunnan gezha wuran], Caixin, 16 August 11; An Baijie,
``Watchdog Suspected Over Toxic Waste,'' China Daily, 25 August 11;
Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30 August 11.
Yunnan officials reportedly did not inform downstream provinces of the
problem in a timely manner.
\7\ Fiona Tam, ``Yunnan Plant Dumped Toxins for 20 Years,'' South
China Morning Post, 17 August 11.
\8\ Zhou Wenting, ``Huge Stockpile of Toxic Waste in 12
Provinces,'' China Daily, 31 August 11.
\9\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 3(5).
Authorities plan to reduce carbon oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur
dioxide by 8 percent by 2015, as well as reduce by 10 percent the
amounts of two new pollutants, ammonia nitrogen and nitrogen oxide.
\10\ ``Scholar Calls the Content of the Environmental Protection
Law Out of Touch With Reality'' [Xuezhe cheng ``huanjing baohu fa''
neirong yu xianshi tuojie], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 10; Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ``Circular Letter Regarding Soliciting
Comments on Environmental Protection Standard (Environmental Impact
Assessment Technical Guidelines Public Participation) (Draft for
Comment)'' [Guanyu zhengqiu guojia huanjing baohu biaozhun ``huanjing
yingxiang pingjia jishu daoze gongzhong canyu'' (zhengqiu yijiangao)
yijian de han], 30 January 11; State Council Standing Committee,
Hazardous Chemicals Safety Management Regulations, issued 26 January
02, amended 16 February 11; Yang Zhanghuai, ``Hubei Dazhi Formally
Establishes `Environmental Police' '' [Hubei dazhi zujian ``huanbao
jingcha''], Southern Metropolis Weekend, 13 May 11; ``Legal Aid in
Environmental Pollution Cases Just in Time'' [Falu yuanzhu huanjing
wuran an zhengdang qishi], Beijing News, 8 October 10. According to the
above Beijing News article, Beijing included air pollution cases among
the cases eligible for legal aid in the city. ``China Will Write
Legislation Regarding Genetically Modified Organisms Safety, Ministry
of Environmental Protection To Draft Bill'' [Zhongguo jiang dui zhuan
jiyin shengwu anquan lifa huanbaobu qicao fa'an], People's Daily, 7
January 11; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Water
and Soil Conservation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shuitu baochifa],
issued 29 June 91, amended 25 December 10; ``Our Suggestions for Air
Pollution Law Revision'' [Wo wei daqifa xiuding jianyan], China
Environment News, 9 December 10; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Seeking
Damages,'' 21 July 11.
\11\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu:
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China
Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily
article, environmental protection Vice Minister Li Ganjie stated that
environmental pollution in rural areas is serious. Liu Yu, Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian Chairs Opening of the
Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing Committee Meeting'' [Zhou
shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu changwu huiyi], 31 December
10; Ian Johnson, ``China Faces `Very Grave' Environmental Situation,
Officials Say,'' New York Times, 03 June 11.
\12\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu:
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China
Youth Daily, 3 June 11.
\13\ Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian
Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing
Committee Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu
changwu huiyi], 31 December 10. In conjunction with the basic policy
approach, authorities plan to strengthen planning leadership, expand
financial investment, strengthen the evaluation of targets, spread
technology, and promote ``coordinated action.''
\14\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu:
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China
Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily
article, at a press conference, environmental protection Vice Minister
Li Ganjie noted the steps in the strategy to tackle rural pollution.
The first step is to design environmental protection plans; the second
step is to pass livestock and poultry waste and soil pollution
prevention legislation; the third step is to organize environmental
monitoring, enforcement, and education activities in villages and
establish environmental teams to extend supervision coverage to
villages; the fourth step includes using ``rewards to promote control''
demonstration projects and official environmental comprehensive control
target responsibility system assessments; the fifth step concentrates
on making advances in drinking water safety, trash management, and soil
protection, as well as preventing and controlling livestock, poultry,
and farm pollution. National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian
guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11. The plan also
notes efforts will be made to protect drinking water, control
fertilizer and pesticide pollution, speed up the handling of solid
waste management, and strictly prohibit urban and industrial pollution
from spreading to rural areas, among other goals.
\15\ Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian
Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing
Committee Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu
changwu huiyi], 31 December 10.
\16\ Elaine Kurtenbach, ``Arrests and Closures in Lead Poison
Crackdown,'' Shanghai Daily, 31 May 11; ``Ministry Allocates Fund To
Inspect Environmental Emergencies,'' Xinhua, 13 June 11. In 2010, 14
major pollution cases involving heavy metals occurred and there had
already been 7 cases in 2011 as of the end of May.
\17\ ``Ministry Allocates Fund To Inspect Environmental
Emergencies,'' Xinhua, 13 June 11.
\18\ ``China Intensifies Regulation on Battery Industries After
Lead Poisoning Case,'' Xinhua, 19 May 11.
\19\ Mimi Lau, ``Crackdown on Cities With Major Lead Pollution,''
South China Morning Post, 20 May 11.
\20\ ``Chinese Environment Minister Warns of Project Approval
Suspension Amid Crackdown on Heavy Metal Pollution,'' Xinhua, 1 June
11.
\21\ ``China Shuts Down 583 Plants in Lead Battery Plant
Overhaul,'' Xinhua, 2 August 11.
\22\ ``Heyuan Conflict Erupts, Villager Says Police Beat Someone to
Death'' [Heyuan bao chongtu, cunmin cheng jingcha dasi ren], Bingbao,
reprinted in Sina, 20 June 11.
\23\ ``Dalian PX Project Triggers Concerns, Thousands of Citizens
Gather in Protest'' [Dalian PX xiangmu yinqi danyou shuwan minzong shi
zhizheng jihui kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 14 August 11.
\24\ Christina Larson, ``The New Epicenter of China's Discontent,''
Foreign Policy, 23 August 11.
\25\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``PX Factory in Typhoon,'' 11 August
11.
\26\ ``Dalian PX Project Stopped and Will Be Moved'' [Dalian PX
xiangmu tingchan daiban], Southern Metropolis Daily, 15 August 11.
\27\ ``Dalian's People--and Power,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 August
11.
\28\ ``Dalian Incident Shows More Adaptable Government,'' Global
Times, 15 August 11.
\29\ ``Highlights of Work Report of Supreme People's Court,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 11 March 11.
\30\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,''
23 September 10. A survey of 12,000 judicial employees revealed that 50
percent of them believed environmental lawsuits were regularly being
refused by courts.
\31\ Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,''
18 July 11.
\32\ Ibid.
\33\ Ibid.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Seeking Damages,'' 21 July 11.
\36\ Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,''
18 July 11.
\37\ Ibid. The author counts 39 environmental courts, which is an
increase from a handful of courts noted in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 191, 195. CECC staff
interviews found that other estimates of the number of environmental
courts run from 50 to 100.
\38\ ``Kunming's First Environmental Public Interest Case Announces
Judgment, 4 Million in Compensation'' [Kunming shouli huanjing gongyi
susong anjian xuanpan peichang 400 wan], Jinghua News, reprinted in
NetEase, 30 January 11.
\39\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 156. Also see Alex
Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,'' 18 July 11.
\40\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,''
23 September 10.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Human Rights Watch, `` `My Children Have Been Poisoned': A
Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces,'' 15 June 11, 25-31.
\43\ For more information about one of the cases in Hunan (Wugang
city), see Michael Wines, ``Lead Sickens 1,300 Children in China,'' New
York Times, 20 August 09; ``Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan
Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental
Accountability,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No.
1, 8 January 10, 2. For more information about the Shaanxi (Fengxiang
county) lead poisoning case, see Tu Chonghang, ``Shaanxi Lead Poisoning
Incident From Start to Finish'' [Shaanxi fengxiang qian zhongdu
shijianshiwei], Beijing News, reprinted in China Law Information Net,
21 August 09; ``Lead Poisoning Incident in Shaanxi Leads to Protests,
Rights Infringements Reported,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 8.
\44\ Human Rights Watch, `` `My Children Have Been Poisoned': A
Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces,'' 15 June 11. Police in
Shaanxi detained citizens demonstrating in front of a lead-processing
facility and police in Hunan reportedly arrested seven people seeking
assistance with their sick children.
\45\ Ibid. Authorities in Shaanxi forced a journalist who tried to
report on the lead poisoning cases to leave the area.
\46\ ``Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for
Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian
Province,'' [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin
shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.
\47\ ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel
in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan jin
bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.
\48\ ``Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for
Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian
Province'' [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin
shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.
\49\ Ibid.; ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers
Kneel in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan
jin bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May
10.
\50\ ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel
in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan jin
bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.
\51\ Voice of Tibet, ``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Detained by
Authorities for Opposing Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang
zao zhonggong duda he jubu], reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11
(protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention
on December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining
Protests in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.
\52\ ``Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7
October 10. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more
information on the cases. ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free
Asia, 30 September 10 (the mountain's name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba).
According to the news report, workers claimed ``their permit to mine in
the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary of the
TAR.'' The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR Party
official may have signified agreement.
\53\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10; ``Police Fire on Mine
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10; Phurbu Thinley, ``China
Says Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,'' Phayul, 1
September 10; ``Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With
Police,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 30
August 10.
\54\ ``Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 5
August 11.
\55\ Ibid.
\56\ ``Wuxi Huangtutang Trash Incinerator Mass Incident, More Than
10,000 Gather'' [Wuxi huangtutang laji ranxiao qunti shijian yiwan duo
ren juji], Boxun, 9 April 11.
\57\ ``Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation
of Incinerator'' [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan],
Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11; Feng Yongfeng, ``Jiangsu, Wuxi
`Grandfather Gallery' Morphs Into `Waste Incinerator' '' [Jiangsu, wuxi
``huangtutang'' bianshen ``laji fenshaochang''], Wohua Media Net,
reprinted in QQ News, 31 May 11. The village secretary reportedly
convinced 77 percent of the villagers in the area to sign over their
land to build a ``Grandfather Gallery,'' but then proceeded to build an
incinerator instead.
\58\ ``Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation
of Incinerator'' [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan],
Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11.
\59\ ``Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights
Group,'' Reuters, 30 June 11; ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia
Protest Over Lead Mine in Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,''
Washington Post, 30 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``New Round of Herders' Protest Erupts in Southern
(Inner) Mongolia,'' 29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Fresh Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens
Hospitalized,'' 23 July 11.
\60\ ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in
Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,'' Washington Post, 30 June 11.
\61\ ``Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights
Group,'' Reuters, 30 June 11.
\62\ Ibid.; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``New Round of Herders' Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia,''
29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Fresh
Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized,'' 23 July 11.
\63\ ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in
Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,'' Washington Post, 30 June 11.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Protests Spread in Southern Mongolia, Thousands More Take to the
Streets,'' 26 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, ``Anger Over Protesters' Deaths
Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians,'' New York Times, 30
May 11.
\66\ Wenran Jiang and Zining Liu, Jamestown Foundation, ``Energy
Security in China's 12th Five-Year Plan,'' China Brief, Vol. 11, No.
11, 17 June 11; National Human Rights Action Plan and China National
Development and Reform Commission, ``Medium and Long-Term Development
Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version),'' China Net,
September 2007, secs. 3.2, 4, 4.1. See the following articles for
examples of reasons given by Chinese officials as to why dams are
built, which include increasing reliance on renewable energy, flood
control, transportation, establishing a reliable reservoir of water for
irrigation or drinking, stimulating economic development, and
generating local government revenues. ``Massive Chinese Hydro Project
Moves Ahead,'' Breakbulk Online, 27 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng,
``Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower,'' Global Times, 24
November 11; ``China Daily: China Pledges Water Will Still Flow,''
China Daily, 19 November 11; S. Anuradha, International Rivers Network,
``China's Sinohydro Says Hydropower Growth Likely To Fall in Asia on
Growing Resistance,'' 11 November 10; Christina Larson, ``Where the
River Ends,'' Foreign Policy, 2 June 11; ``Lessons To Be Learned,''
China Daily, 8 August 11.
\67\ Xu Donghuan, ``Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom,'' Global Times,
10 February 11.
\68\ ``Is Hydropower Exploitation of the Nu River in China a Must?
'' Guardian blog, 10 February 11; Jonathan Watts, ``China's Big Hydro
Wins Permission for 21.3GW Dam in World Heritage Site,'' Guardian, 1
February 11; ``National Energy Bureau Responsible Person Declares for
First Time: Nujiang Will Be Developed'' [Guojia nengyuanju fuzeren
shouci biaotai: nujiang yiding hui kaifa], China National Radio,
reprinted in People's Daily, 31 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng,
``Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower,'' Global Times, 24
November 10.
\69\ Xu Donghuan, ``Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom,'' Global Times,
10 February 11. According to the Global Times report, a Beijing-based
river expert stated that ``[t]hese sub-standard small hydroelectric
stations can trigger landslides and are a great threat to the local
ecological system.'' Authorities have dammed 60 tributaries to the Nu
River, with 42 projects completed and 88 slated to be completed. A top
official noted that a number of national studies show the Nu River
valley in Yunnan province is subject to geological and seismological
disasters, and she prepared a proposal calling on the central
government to ``pay attention to the special and complex geological and
seismological conditions in the Nu River valley and take caution in
making decisions about hydraulic power development there.'' Li Xing and
Wang Huazhong, ``Earthquake Casts Doubt on Hydropower,'' China Daily,
12 March 11; ``Lessons To Be Learned,'' China Daily, 8 August 11.
\70\ ``Wen Jiabao Opens State Council Meeting, Discusses and Passes
`Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan' '' [Wen jiabao kai guowuyuan hui
taolun tongguo ``sanxia houxu gongzuo guihua'' deng], Xinhua, 18 May
11. These problems include the ``stability'' and livelihood of
resettled populations and the prevention of geological disasters.
Leaders also acknowledged that the dam had affected the
``transportation in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River,
irrigation, and the supply of water,'' among other problems.
\71\ Ibid. The plans include the ``Three Gorges Follow-Up Work
Plan'' and the ``Yangtze Middle and Lower Reaches Watershed Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Plan.'' According to Xinhua, the Three
Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan's objectives include bringing the standard
of living of those relocated because of the dam up to a level equal to
that of residents in Hubei province and Chongqing municipality.
\72\ Dai Qing, Probe International, ``On the Completion of the
Three Gorges Project,'' 22 January 11. Some estimates are higher
because they include people who the government said were resettled for
``urbanization'' or ``employment'' programs. Dai Qing reports the
official number of people relocated to make way for the Three Gorges
dam to be 1.4 million. Probe International estimates that 3.7 million
people have been relocated and Dai Qing estimates the number is higher
at 4 million.
\73\ These reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard
compensation, suppression of advocates, and government corruption
during resettlement processes, as well as documented the threat of
severe hardships that may be faced by relocated citizens, including
homelessness, unemployment, conflicts between resettled citizens and
existing populations, and poverty among resettled migrants. See, e.g.,
Peter H. Gleick, ``Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China,'' in
Water Brief 3, The World's Water 2008-2009 (Oakland, CA: Pacific
Institute, 2009), 145-46; Jim Yardley, ``Chinese Dam Projects
Criticized for Their Human Costs, Choking on Growth, Part IV,'' New
York Times, 19 November 07. For information on activist Xie Fulin, see
CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 103; ``Three Gorges
Resettlement Activist Paralyzed After Assault,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 10-11; Stacy Mosher, Human
Rights in China, ``The Case of Fu Xiancai,'' China Rights Forum, No. 3,
2006, 48-51. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more
information on Fu Xiancai.
\74\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August
10.
\75\ Choi Chi-yu, ``2,000 Battle Police in Yunnan,'' South China
Morning Post, 31 March 11.
\76\ Rachel Beitarie, ``Burst of New Dams in Southwest China
Produces Power and Public Ire,'' Circle of Blue, 22 March 11.
\77\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 8(2).
\78\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August
10, 1; ``More Resettled for S-N Water Diversion Project,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 20 September 10.
\79\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August
10, 8.
\80\ ``Migrants Hold Large Protest at Median Line of South-to-North
Water Diversion Project, Vice Governor Assumes Command, Moves Armed
Police To Disperse With Force'' [Nanshui beidiao zhongxian yimin da
kangyi fushengzhang zuozhen tiao wujing qiang qusan], Radio Free Asia,
26 November 10; Carla Freeman, China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, ``Quenching the Dragon's Thirst, the
South-North Water Transfer Project--Old Plumbing for New China? '' last
visited 9 February 11, 6.
\81\ Jamil Anderlini, ``China: A Blast From the Past,'' Financial
Times, 14 December 09.
\82\ Chris Buckley, ``China To Move Tens of Thousands for Huge
Water Scheme,'' Reuters, 29 June 10. According to Reuters, some farmers
relocated for the Danjiangkou Dam have complained they are being
relocated to less arable land and have sparse job prospects. The dam's
reservoir will provide water for the diversion project. Carla Freeman,
China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, ``Quenching the Dragon's Thirst, the South-North Water
Transfer Project--Old Plumbing for New China? '' last visited 9
February 11, 6. In 2009, villagers near the Danjiangkou Dam
construction site ``verbally attacked village officials and threatened
resistance over plans to resettle them elsewhere in central China.''
Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work Department, and
Nanyang City Petition Bureau, ``Several Points To Ponder in Addressing
South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route Project Danjiangkou
Reservoir Migrant Petitions'' [Dui nanshui beidiao zhongxian gongcheng
danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13 October 10; Michael
Bristow, ``China Villagers Moved To Quench the Urban Thirst,'' BBC, 3
March 10. The above report provides some information about the nature
of citizen complaints related to the Danjiangkou Dam relocation
project.
\83\ ``Officials Lure Villagers, Force Them To Accept Place To
Settle, Threaten Petitioners'' [Ganbu youdao cunmin qiangzhi jieshou
anzhidian konghe shangfang zhe], China Journalist Survey Net, reprinted
in Bangkaow.com, 3 September 10.
\84\ Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work
Department, and Nanyang City Petition Bureau, ``Several Points To
Ponder in Addressing South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route
Project Danjiangkou Reservoir Migrant Petitions'' [Dui nanshui beidiao
zhongxian gongcheng danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13
October 10; Michael Bristow, ``China Villagers Moved To Quench the
Urban Thirst,'' BBC, 3 March 10.
\85\ Xu Chao, ``The Relationship Between Huai River Basin Pollution
and Cancer Basically Established'' [Huaihe liuyu wuran yu aizheng
guanxi jiben zhengshi], Caijing, 27 December 10.
\86\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Ministry of
Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2010 Annual
Report'' [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 2010 niandu
baogao], 14 March 11.
\87\ Ibid.
\88\ Ibid.
\89\ Article 19 and Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution
Victims, ``Access to Environmental Information in China: Evaluation of
Local Compliance,'' December 2010.
\90\ Ibid.
\91\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public &
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 3. According to the study's
results, out of 100 possible points, the average score of the cities
examined increased from 31 points in 2008 to 36 points in 2009-2010 (p.
3).
\92\ Ibid.
\93\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public &
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 4.
\94\ Ma Jun, Chinadialogue, ``Advancing Energy Conservation and
Reducing Pollution With Environmental Open Information'' [Yi huanjing
xinxi gongkai cujin jieneng jianpai], 13 December 10.
\95\ Ibid.
\96\ For example, one online response to an open environmental
information request on the Anhui Government Open Government Information
Net Web site listed a provision and its appendix as the basis for not
releasing some of the information requested. Anhui Province People's
Government Open Government Information Net, ``Description of Needed
Information Contents, Yangtze River, Anchuang Section, Wuwei Section
and Chaohu Lake Region Related Water Quality Raw Data from 2007-2010''
[Suo xu xinxi de neirong miaoshu, changjiang anqing duan, wuwei duan he
chaohu huqu zi 2007-2010 de xiangguan shuizhi yuanshi shuju], 20
October 10. According to the response posted on the Anhui Province
government Web site, the response to the environmental information
request cites provisions that environmental protection authorities
apparently issued in 2004, i.e., ``Provisions on the Scope of State
Secrets in Environmental Protection Work'' (Provisions). Based on the
response to the open environmental information request cited above, the
Provisions appear to have an appendix that stipulates environmental
protection work secrets, i.e., the ``Environmental Protection Work
State Secrets Catalog'' [Huanjing baohu gongzuo guoji mimi mulu]. Based
on a review of the Catalog of National Environmental Departmental
Normative Documents Remaining in Force cited below, the Provisions were
in force as of September 2010, but Commission staff could not locate a
copy of them on the Internet. Hubei Environmental Protection Portal,
``Appendix: Catalog of National Environmental Departmental Normative
Documents Remaining in Force'' [Fujian: jixu youxiao de guojia huanbao
bumen guifanxing wenjian mulu], 30 September 10.
\97\ Xi Jianrong, ``Environmental Protection Organization Seeks
Investigation Into Legality of `Procedural Information' '' [Huanbao
zuzhi tiqing ``guochengxing xinxi'' hefaxing shencha], Legal Daily, 25
March 11; Zhang Ke, ``Environmental NGO Petitions State Council To
Question Whether Fish Reserve Restructuring Serves Power Station''
[Huanbao zuzhi shangshu guowuyuan zhiyi yulei baohuqu wei dianzhan
tiaozheng], Number One Caijing Daily, reprinted in China Transparency,
8 June 11. For more complete information about the case, see Xi
Jianrong, ``NGO Requests Publication of Information on Nature Reserve
Restructuring'' [Minjian zuzhi jiu ziran baohuqu tiaozheng shenqing
xinxi gongkai], Legal Daily, 20 January 11; Ministry of Environmental
Protection, ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Announcement on
Applications for Promotion and Restructuring of National Level Nature
Reserves'' [Huanjing baohubu gonggao: dui shenqing jinsheng he
tiaozheng de guojia ji ziranbaohuqu jinxing gong shi], 4 January 11; Xi
Jianrong, ``Scholars Request Hearing on National Level Nature Reserve
Restructuring'' [Xuezhe qingqiu jiu changjiang shangyou guojia ji
ziranbaohuqu tiaozheng tingzheng], Legal Daily, 1 March 11; Beijing
Impact Law Firm, ``Upper Yangtze National Level Rare Fish Nature
Reserve To Be Downsized'' [Changjiang shangyou zhenxi teyou yulei
guojia ji ziranbaohuqu mianji bei suojian], 24 March 11.
\98\ Han Lewu, ``Application for Publication of Environmental
Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental NGO
Seeks Administrative Review'' [Shenqing gongkai laji fenshaochang
huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi], Legal Daily, 8
June 11. According to the Legal Daily article, the Darwin Nature
Knowledge Society submitted open government information requests to the
Hai'an County Environmental Protection Bureau among other environmental
departments asking for the environmental impact assessment reports for
a waste incineration power plant and related waste management projects,
as well as requesting information about the power plant's emissions
data. Xi Jianrong, ``Environmental Organization Requests Environmental
Impact Assessment of Beijing Sujiatuo Incineration Plant'' [Huanbao
zuzhi shenqing gongkai beijing sujiatuo fenshaochang huanping xinxi],
Legal Daily, reprinted in China Transparency, 16 June 11.
\99\ Han Lewu, ``Application for Publication of Environmental
Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental
Protection NGO Seeks Administrative Review'' [Shenqing gongkai laji
fenshaochang huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi],
Legal Daily, 8 June 11.
\100\ Malcolm Moore, ``Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear
Programme `Rash and Unsafe,' '' Telegraph, 1 June 11; ``Minister
Recommends China Have Independent Nuclear Safety Regulator in Wake of
Japan Crisis,'' Associated Press, 3 June 11. Other Chinese experts and
top international nuclear authorities also expressed the need to
increase oversight of nuclear power plants. Keith Bradsher, ``Nuclear
Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns,'' New York Times, 15 December
09. An International Atomic Energy Agency official noted there was some
concern that China might not have enough nuclear inspectors with
sufficient training to manage the rapid growth of nuclear power. Choi
Chi-yuk, ``Nuclear Threat From Mountain of Spent Fuel,'' South China
Morning Post, 1 April 11. One Chinese nuclear engineer was quoted as
saying ``. . . previously produced waste has yet to be properly dealt
with, . . .'' ``It will pose a tremendous safety threat to the public
as a result of the piling up of more and more nuclear fuel, year after
year.''
\101\ Malcolm Moore, ``Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear
Programme `Rash and Unsafe,' '' Telegraph, 1 June 11.
\102\ Liu Yiyu, ``New Nuclear Power Plants `Set To Be Approved,' ''
China Daily, 22 April 11. Chinese authorities reportedly suspended
approvals for new nuclear power projects and inspected plants in
operation and under construction.
\103\ Brian Spegele, ``Beijing Says Its Reactors Are Safe,'' Wall
Street Journal, 16 June 11.
\104\ Liu Yiyu, ``New Nuclear Power Plants `Set To Be Approved,' ''
China Daily, 22 April 11; ``China Says Its Nuclear Reactors Passed
Inspections,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 15 June
11. China reportedly plans to have more than 100 plants in operation by
2020.
\105\ Wang Huazhong, ``Japan Nuclear Crisis Prompts `Urgent'
Drafting of New Law,'' China Daily, 26 April 11. China currently does
not have an overarching nuclear energy law and two previous attempts to
pass one in 1984 and 2008 were not successful. The law would reportedly
include stipulations related to uranium mining, nuclear material
management, nuclear power plant operation, nuclear waste, emergency
management, and compensation.
\106\ Ibid.
\107\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, Guiding Opinion on
Cultivating and Guiding Orderly Development of Environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations [Peiyu yindao huanbao shehui zuzhi youxu
fazhan de zhidao yijian], issued 10 December 10, arts. 2, 10.
\108\ Ibid., art. 10.
\109\ Ibid. This may indicate efforts to strengthen Party control
over environmental groups.
\110\ Alex Wang, ``The Warriors of Qiugang--A New Documentary on
the Struggle To Save China's Environment,'' Natural Resources Defense
Council Switchboard Blog, 11 January 11 (has a link to the video).
\111\ Ibid.
\112\ Ibid.
\113\ Wang Qingchu, ``Pollution Fear Cancels Beijing Power Plant
Plan,'' Shanghai Daily, 10 February 11.
\114\ ``Dalian PX Project Stopped and Will Be Moved'' [Dalian PX
xiangmu tingchan daiban], Xinhua, reprinted in Southern Metropolis
Daily, 15 August 11; ``Dalian PX Project Triggers Concerns, Thousands
of Citizens Gather in Protest'' [Dalian PX xiangmu yinqi danyou shuwan
minzong shi zhizheng jihui kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 14 August 11.
\115\ Tao Dapin, ``5,000 People Press Thumbprints To Oppose Panyu
Waste Incinerator, Only Counted as One Opposition Vote? '' [5 qian ren
an shouyin fandui panyu laji fenshaochang zhi suan yizhang
fanduipiao?], Asia News, 24 May 11.
\116\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,''
23 September 10. For example, the government of Guzhen county, Anhui
province, removed six local environmental protection officials,
including the head of the local environmental protection bureau (EPB),
because local government officials claimed the EPB's strict enforcement
actions hurt efforts to attract business investment. Anhui province
requires environmental authorities to obtain governmental approval
prior to conducting a check.
\117\ Zhao Yang, ``Ecology, Environmental Protection, Land
Requisition, and Demolition, High Levels of Corruption'' [Shengtai
huanbao zhengdi chaiqian fubai gaofa], Legal Daily, 12 August 10.
\118\ Benjamin Van Rooij and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, ``Fragile
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's
Industrial Pollution Law,'' Law & Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), 16-17.
\119\ ``China Launches Special Supervision in 15 Companies for
Pollution Control Violations,'' Xinhua, 29 August 11.
\120\ Chinadialogue, ``NGOs Challenge Environment Authorities,'' 21
June 11.
\121\ Ibid.
\122\ ``Lessons To Be Learned,'' China Daily, 8 August 11.
\123\ ``The Fabricated Environmental Impact Assessment System''
[Bei jiakong de huanping zhidu], China Reform Net, reprinted in Caixin,
1 August 11. For one review of the role of public participation in
environmental EIA processes and beyond since 2004, see Zhang Jingjing,
Chinadialogue, ``The Plight of the Public (1),'' 19 July 11.
\124\ Zhang Jingjing, Chinadialogue, ``The Plight of the Public
(2),'' 19 July 11. Zhang notes that while the 2006 measure ``Temporary
Method for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessments''
provides for public participation, there is no legal recourse for
infringement of that right.
\125\ Wang Jin, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,'' China Dialogue,
23 September 10. For example, the government of Guzhen county, Anhui
province, removed six local environmental protection officials,
including the head of the local environmental protection bureau (EPB),
because local government officials claimed the EPB's strict enforcement
actions hurt efforts to attract business investment. Anhui province
requires environmental authorities to obtain governmental approval
prior to conducting a check.
\126\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public &
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 4.
\127\ Qie Jianrong, ``Delay in Administering Penalty for
Illegalities Raises Doubts Among Experts'' [Weifa chufa huanqi zhixing
yin zhuanjia zhiyi], Legal Daily, 13 December 10. The power plant
authorities claimed that stopping power generation and paying a fine
would adversely affect regional power supply.
\128\ John Vidal and David Adam, ``China Overtakes U.S. as World's
Largest CO2 Emitter,'' Guardian, 19 June 07; Jane A. Leggett, Jeffrey
Logan, and Anna Mackey, Congressional Research Service, ``China's
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies,'' 10 September 08;
Todd White and Jeremy Van Loon, ``China Exports Made It World's Largest
Greenhouse-Gas Factory,'' Bloomberg News, 25 February 09.
\129\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 6-8.
\130\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper: China's
Policies and Actions on Climate Change,'' 29 October 08. According to
the white paper, authorities state they take ``economic development as
the core objective''; and they have also stated that they place
emphasis on energy conservation policies, strive to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions, and prioritize policies to adapt to climate change.
Renmin University, ``China Human Development Report 2009/10, China and
a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and Society,''
commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, April 2010;
Joint Global Change Research Institute and Battelle Memorial Institute,
Pacific Northwest Division, ``China: Impact of Climate Change to 2030--
A Commissioned Research Report,'' prepared for the National
Intelligence Council, April 2009. The above paper lists several
specific impacts, states China has lower resilience (adaptive capacity)
to climate change than some other counties, and argues climate change
will exacerbate existing social and resource stresses. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, ``Climate Change: Impacts,
Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries,'' 2007;
Germanwatch, ``Global Climate Risk Index 2011, Who Suffers Most From
Extreme Weather Events/Weather-Related Loss Events in 2009 and 1990 to
2009,'' 16 December 10. This research ranked China 35th compared with
other countries for the occurrence of extreme weather events in 2009.
\131\ Barbara Finamore, ``Taking Action To Meet Its Climate
Pledge--China Enacts National Energy Efficiency DSM Regulations To
Dramatically Scale Up Investment in Energy Efficiency,'' Natural
Resources Defense Council Switchboard Blog, 29 November 10; ``China To
Set Up Funds for Development of Green Energy Counties,'' Xinhua, 28
April 11; ``National Development and Reform Commission Issues `China's
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change--2010 Annual Report'
'' [Fagaiwei gongbu ``zhongguo yingdui qihou bianhua zhengce yu
xingdong--2010 niandu baogao''], China Government Net, reprinted in
Xinhua, 23 November 10.
\132\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 21. Chinese
leaders plan to speed up research and development of low carbon
technologies, to develop a greenhouse gas statistical accounting
system, to gradually establish an emission trading market, and to
promote ``low carbon demonstration projects,'' among other plans.
\133\ Joanna Lewis, ``The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate
Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,'' China
Environment Series, No. 11, 2010/2011, 7-39 (especially pp. 26-34).
\134\ ``Cancun Climate Conference Passes Resolution on Response to
Climate Change'' [Kankun qihou dahui tongguo yingdui qihou bianhua
jueyi], Caixin Net, 11 December 10.
\135\ Because China signed and ratified the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol as a
``developing'' country and is not on the list of Annex B countries with
binding emission reduction targets, China currently has no formal
obligation under the Protocol to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.
For China's ratification information, see United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, ``Kyoto Protocol Status of
Ratification,'' 10 July 06. For listings of countries on Annexes A and
B of the Kyoto Protocol, see United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, Annexes A and B. See also
Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate Change,
National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo de
Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat [Letter Regarding
Autonomous Domestic Mitigation Actions], reprinted in ChinaFAQs, 28
January 10. Internationally, top officials emphasize the voluntary
nature of the country's efforts to lower carbon dioxide emissions per
unit of GDP (carbon intensity) by 40-45 percent by 2020 compared to
2005 levels. The Chinese government has not agreed to carbon emission
caps, only voluntary carbon intensity reductions.
\136\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 3. According to
the 12th Five-Year Plan, China also pledged to increase the forest
coverage rate to 21.66 percent and its forest stock volume by 600
million cubic meters. Chapter 10(1) of the 12th Five-Year Plan
indicates that officials also included ``energy conservation and
environment'' and ``new energy'' among a list of at least seven
priority ``strategic new and developing industries.'' Xie Zhenhua,
``China's Challenges Limit Control of Emissions (Authority Forum)''
[Zhongguo tiaozhan kongzhi paifang jixian (quanwei luntan)], People's
Daily, 6 January 10.
\137\ ``China Drafting Special Law on Climate Change,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 27 April 11. ``China Will Consider Climate
Change Legislation at an Appropriate Time'' [Zhongguo jiang zai shidang
shiji kaolu qihou bianhua lifa], Caixin Net, 9 December 10.
\138\ Wang Qian, ``People Invited To Share Their Climate Change
Ideas,'' China Daily, 22 March 11.
\139\ Renmin University, ``China Human Development Report 2009/10,
China and a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and
Society,'' Commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme,
April 2010, 86. ``Where public participation does exist, it is often on
inequitable terms or does not provide adequate opportunity for public
inputs. Little information on procedures and timing for public
participation is available.''
\140\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 6-8.
\141\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Turning Point in Tianjin,'' 25
October 10.
\142\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 14.
\143\ Barbara Finamore, ``Transparency of Climate Change Actions:
Sitting Down With Minister Xie,'' National Resources Defense Council
Switchboard Blog, 20 October 10. Finamore paraphrases remarks by Teng
Fei of Tsinghua University, who outlined some of the difficulties in
obtaining statistics relevant to evaluating energy usage and carbon
dioxide emissions.
\144\ Ibid.
\145\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 21(1).
\146\ Barbara Finamore, ``China's Domestic Climate Commitments
Reach a Global Audience in Tianjin,'' Natural Resources Defense Council
Switchboard Blog, 7 October 10.
\147\ ``China Does Not Oppose MRV, Should Find a Good Reason for
Transferring Responsibility'' [Zhongguo bu fandui MRV, zhuanyi zeren
yao zhaohao liyou], China Net, 12 October 10.
\148\ Ibid. Su Wei, Director-General, Office of National Leading
Group on Climate Change, stated the Chinese government was ``not
opposed to monitoring, reporting, and verification'' in projects using
international financing and technology and that China would make the
results of its domestic MRV known to the international community and
``can accept international discussions, consultations, dialogue, and
clarifications.''
\149\ Barbara Finamore, ``China's Domestic Climate Commitments
Reach a Global Audience in Tianjin,'' Natural Resources Defense Council
Switchboard Blog, 7 October 10. Vice Chair of the National Development
and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua reportedly said that China would do
its utmost to ``increase the transparency of its actions in terms of
tackling climate change and integrating our measure into global
efforts.''