[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
The Communist Party exercises control over
political affairs, government, and society through
networks of Party committees or branches that exist at
all levels in government, legislative, and judicial
agencies, as well as in businesses, major social groups
(including unions), the military, and most residential
communities. During the 2011 reporting year, Communist
Party leaders reiterated Party dominance and
accelerated efforts to build or revitalize Party
organizations, especially focusing on Party branches in
commercial buildings, urban neighborhoods, academic
institutions, and law firms.
China's political institutions do not comply
with the standards defined in Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an
intention to ratify. Nor do China's political
institutions comply with the standards outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While central-
level Chinese leaders continued to issue measures meant
to improve the efficiency of bureaucratic governance
and to bolster trust in the Party, news reports did not
indicate any major forthcoming political reforms.
Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the need for political
reforms; however, some of his remarks were censored in
the Chinese domestic news. Other top leaders appeared
to criticize ideological pluralism and to emphasize the
impossibility of implementing ``Western-style''
democracy with its separation of powers and competing
political parties.
During this reporting year, Chinese
authorities expanded social controls under the banner
of strengthening ``comprehensive management of public
security'' and ``safeguarding social stability.''
Officials engaged in a largely preemptive crackdown
affecting hundreds of people, apparently disregarding
their constitutional right to freedom of assembly and
preventing them from gathering peacefully in so-called
``Jasmine Revolution'' rallies, with the purpose of
advocating for democratic reforms, among other issues.
In addition, authorities continued to detain, sentence,
and demonstrate little tolerance for those individuals
involved in political parties not sanctioned by the
Communist Party. For example, authorities handed down a
harsh sentence to Liu Xianbin for his democracy
advocacy activities and arrested Li Tie for posting
writings advocating for democracy on the Internet.
Direct elections for local people's congress
representatives are held only at the county level.
Authorities appeared to discourage ``independent
candidates'' who utilized online resources to campaign
in the latest round of local people's congress
elections, and news stories reported harassment of
``independent candidates'' and their families. At least
100 ``independent candidates'' announced via microblog
their intention to run.
Chinese leaders continued to voice support for
village autonomy with the Party as the leading core.
While village committee elections have spread across
most of China, they continue to be plagued by official
interference and corruption. Major revisions to the law
governing village committee elections are likely to
alter the balance of authority in village-governing
organizations, partially because the law mandates
establishment of a new ``supervisory committee'' or
equivalent in every village. The revisions also clarify
election and recall procedures. The supervisory
committees may help to reduce village corruption, but
they may also act to ``maintain social stability'' by
stifling critical voices. Central-level officials
continued a survey of outstanding governance problems
at the grassroots level, and authorities in numerous
localities reported that they instituted a variety of
``democratic management'' projects to improve relations
between village leaders and rural residents, to reduce
corruption, to improve information disclosure, and to
promote ``democratic'' public participation. The
Commission has not observed news media reports
containing details on the implementation and
sustainability of these pilot projects.
Authorities continued to express support for
government information disclosure and expanding the
transparency of Party affairs. In addition, the State
Council released the Opinion Regarding Strengthening
Construction of a Government That Rules by Law in
November 2010, which emphasizes enhancing government
information disclosure, with a focus on budgets,
allocation of public resources, approval and
implementation of major construction projects, and
nonprofit social causes. Beijing municipality issued a
measure that reportedly will, for the first time,
include Party leaders within the ``scope of
accountability.''
The Chinese government and Communist Party
reportedly sought to improve governance accountability,
and at the same time improve ``social management.'' The
government reportedly took limited steps to combat
corruption, which remains a significant problem. In the
2011 reporting year, the Chinese government issued
China's first white paper on corruption as well as
other measures to subject officials to financial
audits, encourage reporting of corruption, and protect
whistleblowers. Chinese government authorities revised
official evaluation models that could lead to greater
accountability, relieving pressure on officials to
falsify data in order to be promoted. Authorities
issued a major economic and social development plan for
the next five years (the 12th Five-Year Plan), which
notes that authorities will ``establish a community
management and service platform,'' linking service
provision and social management.
Citizens and groups in China have little
direct access to political decisionmaking processes;
however, they are increasingly able to use various
channels to express opinions regarding proposed
policies and regulatory instruments. New measures
stipulate that ``major'' policy decisionmaking
processes should include public participation, expert
argumentation, risk assessment, legal review, and group
discussions. The measures also stipulate that
authorities should track how their decisions are being
implemented.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to
call for political reform within China--including
democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, who was sentenced to 10
years in prison in March 2011 for ``inciting subversion
of state power''; the people detained for mentioning
the protests in the Middle East and North Africa or
calls for ``Jasmine'' protests in personal
communications or in Internet postings; and other
prisoners of conscience mentioned in this report and in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support research programs for U.S. citizens to
study political and social developments at the
grassroots level in China and expand the number of U.S.
consulates throughout the country.
Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in
local people's congress and village committee
elections, including expansion of domestic election
monitoring systems, training of Chinese domestic
election monitors, and joint U.S.-Chinese election
monitoring activities.
Support continued substantive exchanges between
Members of the U.S. Congress and members of the
National People's Congress and the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, especially in
relation to Congressional oversight processes and
budgetary matters.
Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations
that seek to work with local Chinese governments in
their efforts to improve transparency and
accountability, especially efforts to expand and
improve China's government information disclosure
initiatives. Such projects might include training in
the U.S. Freedom of Information system for Chinese
officials, joint efforts to better publicize the Open
Government Information (OGI) Regulations at local
levels, and citizen and group training about how to
submit OGI requests.
Support projects that assist local governments,
academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding
transparent public hearings and other channels for
citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking
process. Such projects might include an exchange
program component, whereby Chinese local government
officials and non-governmental organization
representatives would travel together to the United
States to attend town hall or public meetings that
address significant issues. Such projects might also
include pilot projects in China in which citizens'
suggestions to authorities about draft laws,
regulations, or policies are made available to the
public.
Introduction
China's political system is dominated by the Communist
Party, and Party organizations extend into and influence every
sector of society. There is limited participation by non-Party
members in political decisions. During the Commission's 2011
reporting year, Chinese authorities intensified Party-building
efforts and efforts to strengthen controls over society in the
name of improving ``comprehensive management of public
security'' and ``safeguarding stability.'' Leaders launched a
widespread crackdown to thwart citizens' attempts to gather for
peaceful demonstrations around the country, dubbed ``Jasmine''
protests by the organizers, which included advocating for
democratic reforms. Leaders continued to have little tolerance
for outspoken democracy advocates. Authorities continued to
voice support for enhanced accountability, ``open government
affairs,'' and greater public participation, although
implementation of various measures was sporadic. The central
government encouraged pilot grassroots-level ``democratic
management'' programs, partially to reduce corruption, improve
relations between officials and citizens, promote transparency,
and encourage ``democratic'' public participation. While
village elections for ``village committees'' have spread
throughout China, their implementation remains problematic.
Corruption remained a serious problem at all levels, and the
central government issued the first ``white paper'' on
corruption and reportedly strengthened anticorruption efforts.
China's One-Party State and Political Control
During this reporting year, Communist Party leaders
accelerated efforts to reinvigorate the Party's dominance and
involvement in all sectors of society. July 1, 2011, marked the
90th anniversary of the founding of the Party, which reportedly
had nearly 80.3 million members by the end of 2010 \1\ and has
established more than 3.79 million committees and branches
throughout the country.\2\ These organizations exert influence
over every sector of society, including villages and urban
neighborhoods,\3\ as well as most enterprises,\4\ public
service organizations (including hospitals, schools, and
research institutes),\5\ government departments, and quasi-
governmental and non-governmental organizations.\6\ Chinese
leaders continued to insist upon the leading role of the Party
and the infusion of Party principles in various sectors
including ``managing talent'' (human resources), education, and
the media.\7\ This reporting year, Party officials focused
Party-building efforts on urban residents' committees,\8\ law
firms, schools,\9\ and rural residents.\10\
Increasing Social Controls in the Name of ``Safeguarding Social
Stability''
Chinese government and Party officials expanded social
controls, especially mechanisms to monitor citizens and groups,
in the name of strengthening ``comprehensive management of
public security'' \11\ and ``safeguarding social stability.''
Authorities also appeared to link social control strategies
with service provision, whereby outreach to citizens would
involve both service provision and ``management'' tasks.\12\ In
July 2011, the Information Office of the State Council noted
that officials across China had opened 2,842 government affairs
service centers at the provincial, autonomous prefectural, and
municipal levels, and 25,000 (rural) township and (urban)
street service centers.\13\ In November 2010, central
government and Party officials issued an opinion about
strengthening urban Party-affiliated resident committees that
noted the growing role for the committees in ``safeguarding
social stability.'' \14\ In addition, local and sector-specific
officials implemented measures expanding controls over society:
In Beijing, authorities appear to be
encouraging volunteers to monitor their fellow
citizens; they are expected to play a ``leading'' role
in ``comprehensive management'' by providing
information and reports related to ``stability,''
sometimes for a monetary reward.\15\
In March 2011, authorities in Shanghai
reportedly began to establish Party organizations in
some commercial buildings to monitor activities, as a
part of implementing local regulations on
``comprehensive management.'' \16\ The regulations are
also the first to incorporate directives monitoring the
Internet into the city's ``comprehensive management''
system.\17\
Zhejiang provincial \18\ and Shenzhen
municipality \19\ authorities initiated measures to
control the movements of ``critical personnel''
(zhongdian renshi). Zhejiang includes in this category
persons involved in ``rights defense'' activities,
petitioners who take their grievances to higher
administrative levels, and those suspected of
``creating instability.'' \20\
Education authorities strengthened the
``student security informant'' system, which reportedly
operates covertly on campuses to safeguard stability,
and the ``student informant system,'' \21\ which
authorities use to monitor the political expression and
behavior of students and teachers.\22\ One school
bulletin board posting reportedly disclosed that
students who celebrated Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize
award would not be eligible for scholarships.\23\
Peking University reportedly banned students from
copying sensitive materials including those critical of
the Party,\24\ and announced plans to arrange
consultations for ``troublesome students,'' including
students with ``radical thoughts'' who hold critical
views of the university's management or who complained
about policy changes.\25\
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2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities conducted a largely preventative crackdown amid calls for
nonviolent, ``Jasmine'' protests in various cities in China.
Authorities prevented some citizens from exercising their
constitutional right \26\ to freedom of assembly, association, and
speech, as well as to advocate for change including democratic reforms.
[For more information on the 2011 crackdown, see Section II--Freedom of
Expression and Section II--Criminal Justice.] Beginning in mid-February
after the protests in the Middle East and North Africa, weekly calls
for peaceful ``Jasmine'' protests in China to take place each Sunday
appeared online, urging citizens to ``stroll'' around designated areas
at designated times, in a gradually increasing number of cities.\27\
The original anonymous statement circulated in China, also sent to and
posted by an international Web site, Boxun, urged Chinese citizens to
demonstrate for democratic reforms and against alleged corruption in
China among other issues.\28\ On February 19, 2011, a few days after
the appearance of the first online call for protests, and amid
commemoration of 20 years of ``comprehensive management of social
order'' work launched in 1991,\29\ top Chinese officials held a seminar
for key provincial and ministry-level leaders. At the meeting,
President Hu Jintao outlined eight main tasks for leaders to strengthen
``social management.'' \30\ According to the South China Morning Post,
government-controlled newspapers including the Beijing Daily, the
Jiefang Daily, and the Shanghai Morning Post issued front page articles
warning against mass gatherings \31\ and emphasizing the need to
strengthen ``social management'' and ``safeguard social harmony and
stability.'' \32\
Authorities have reportedly arrested, detained, ``disappeared,'' put
under ``soft detention,'' or otherwise harassed over 200 citizens,
writers, scholars, and political reform advocates since mid-
February.\33\ Those arrested included Chen Wei,\34\ Ding Mao,\35\ and
Ran Yunfei.\36\ Relevant central or local authorities also reportedly:
Censored words and phrases related to the unrest in the
Middle East and North Africa, and related to the word ``Jasmine'';
\37\
Declared jasmine flowers to be contraband and instructed at
least one flower vendor in Beijing municipality to report on people
seeking to purchase the flowers; \38\
Urged some church followers not to join mass gatherings;
\39\
Detained two students in Chongqing municipality for posting
news of the ``Jasmine'' protest strolls online, prevented some
students from leaving certain campuses at specific times, issued
notices asking students to stay away from sensitive areas, and warned
students not to hold any collective gathering in order to avoid a
misunderstanding; \40\
Presented a strong showing of security personnel and
equipment at locations in municipalities designated as ``Jasmine''
rally sites \41\ and used water trucks to flood streets and sidewalks
at those sites; \42\
Closed some subway entrances and businesses near rally
sites; \43\
Assaulted at least 2 foreign journalists, detained more than
12 international reporters in Shanghai and Beijing, and warned
journalists in Beijing not to carry out interviews without
permission; \44\ and
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disrupted mobile phone services.\45\
Chinese authorities reportedly pressured European missions and
interfered in at least 60 activities organized by the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing between February and April leading to their cancellation,
including ``cultural forums, school programs, [and] ambassadorial
visits.'' \46\ The Ministry of Education reportedly warned Chinese
academics not to cooperate with groups that promote democracy while
they are abroad and have stepped up scrutiny of nonprofit groups,
especially those that receive funding from the United States or the
European Union.\47\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates
Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and impose
sentences on democracy advocates who exercised their right to
freedom of assembly, speech, movement, and association
guaranteed in China's Constitution and under international
human rights standards. Authorities imposed a 10-year sentence
on Liu Xianbin for ``inciting subversion of state power'' for
writing and posting overseas articles that advocated for
democratization, criticized Party rule, and supported the
development of a ``strong opposition organization.'' \48\ In
October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei province, arrested
the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of subversion.\49\ As of
September 2011, news stories have not provided information
regarding his sentence. Authorities in Qianjiang city, Hubei
province, also detained, held incommunicado, illegally confined
to his home, or denied basic utilities to former local people's
congress delegate and elections expert Yao Lifa on at least
seven occasions over the past reporting year, sometimes for a
few days and other times for months.\50\ Amid the appearance of
numerous ``independent candidates'' for local people's congress
elections, authorities took Yao into custody on June 20 without
charging him, and had not released him as of early August
2011.\51\
Intraparty Democracy and High-Level Debate Regarding Reform
China's political institutions do not comply with the
standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,\52\ which China has signed and
declared an intention to ratify.\53\ Nor do China's political
institutions comply with the standards outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\54\ These standards
provide universal rights to freely choose accountable
representatives through free and monitored elections, as well
as protection for freedom of expression, assembly, and
association. In China, however, the Communist Party continues
to dominate government and allows only limited independent
political participation. Chinese leaders maintain that
intraparty democracy should come before democracy in society
more widely.\55\ The notion of intraparty democracy has been a
part of the Communist Party's basic institutional design since
1956.\56\
During the reporting period, official documents and
statements continued to include vague support for undefined
``democratic'' processes and reforms. At the same time, in
September 2011, officials issued a white paper titled ``China's
Peaceful Development'' that states, ``China is firm in
upholding its core interests which include . . . China's
political system established by the Constitution and overall
social stability. . . .'' \57\ This is the first time officials
have designated the current political system as a ``core
interest.'' \58\ A Communist Party communique issued in October
2010 emphasized that ``[g]reat impetus should be given to
economic system reform, while vigorous yet steady efforts
should be made to promote political restructuring.'' \59\ The
PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and
Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) describes plans to
``develop democracy and promote socialist political culture
development,'' without providing specifics.\60\ Premier Wen
Jiabao continued to assert the need for undefined political
reforms including in an August 2010 statement declaring that
``[w]ithout political reform, China may lose what it has
already achieved through economic restructuring and the targets
of its modernization drive might not be reached.'' \61\ State
press reports, however, criticized calls for rapid democratic
reforms in an apparent refutation of some of Wen's remarks.\62\
Other officials appeared to criticize ideological pluralism and
emphasize the need for China to maintain a ``correct political
orientation.'' \63\ At the March 2011 National People's
Congress (NPC) annual meeting, Wu Bangguo, the Chairman of the
NPC Standing Committee, said China would not ``copy'' western-
style political systems.\64\ An October 2010 People's Daily
editorial reiterated that political development should proceed
along a ``correct political direction . . . . [P]olitical
structural reform is not to weaken, but to strengthen and
improve the Party's leadership . . . .'' \65\
Local People's Congress Elections and Criticism of ``Independent
Candidates''
Communist Party members continue to dominate local people's
congress elections, but the congresses reportedly are no longer
the ``rubber stamps'' they were in the past. Only township and
county congress delegates are elected by the public, so higher
level congresses are not elected by ordinary citizens. In May
2009, an international researcher noted that Party members make
up approximately 65 percent of township congresses and
approximately 70 percent of congresses above this level.\66\ In
October 2010, the NPC Standing Committee passed revisions to
the 1992 Deputies Law of the National People's Congress and
Various Levels of Local People's Congresses of the People's
Republic of China.\67\ According to an official news source,
the revisions will help to better protect delegates' rights to
information and more clearly define their rights and
duties.\68\
Central officials appeared to discourage and prevent
``independent candidates'' from running in local people's
congress elections. While 10 or more citizens may nominate a
candidate, sometimes resulting in a large number of ``voter-
nominated candidates,'' i.e., ``independent candidates,'' in
the early stages of election activities, by the time election
day arrives, most such candidates reportedly are winnowed
out.\69\ Several articles in Party-affiliated newspapers warned
of the dangers of including ``independent candidates'' in
elections after blogger and writer Li Chengping, from Chengdu
city, Sichuan province, gained more than 2.9 million followers
on the Internet when he declared his candidacy.\70\
Subsequently, more than 100 such candidates reportedly declared
their candidacy online.\71\ In May 2011, in Xinyu city, Jiangxi
province, security personnel from an enterprise reportedly held
local ``independent candidates'' Liu Ping, Wei Zhongping, and
Li Sihua to prevent them from campaigning or participating in a
district-level election.\72\ The three were released shortly
after the election took place.\73\ Officials also reportedly
detained Du Quanbing, who traveled to Xinyu to observe the
election proceedings.\74\ In late June, news stories reported
additional harassment of ``independent candidates'' and their
families.\75\ A May article in the Party-affiliated Global
Times noted that ``independent candidates'' could play a
positive role, but also asserted that it was not suitable to
allow candidates who held opinions different from those of the
current political system to run; and that such candidates would
bring ``even more turbulence, threatening the cohesion of the
nation.'' \76\
Village Elections and ``Democratic Management'' Projects
trends in village elections and related legislative developments
While village elections have spread to all provinces and
most villages in China, they reportedly continue to be plagued
by official interference, corruption,\77\ and, in at least one
case, violence.\78\ Corruption problems reportedly include such
things as election bribery \79\ and gift-giving in exchange for
votes.\80\ One example of official interference occurred in
July 2010 in a village in Fangshan, a suburban district in
Beijing; officials there reportedly interfered with vote
counting, allegedly upon orders of the incumbent village
leader, leading to a standoff with villagers.\81\ Fangshan
officials called in 200 police, who then detained several
villagers, some for reportedly ``obstructing traffic.'' \82\
In October 2010, the NPC Standing Committee passed
revisions to the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers'
Committees,\83\ which clarified election and recall
procedures.\84\ The revisions stipulate that every village must
establish a ``supervisory committee'' or similar
organization,\85\ which may permanently alter the distribution
of power among village-governing organizations, possibly
reining in the power of village committees. The ``supervisory
committees'' are intended to promote a more ``harmonious
society,'' prevent corruption, and deepen ``open village
affairs'' and ``democratic management.'' \86\ The deputy
minister of the Ministry of Civil Affairs noted in November
2010 that 85 percent of the country's villages had already
established supervisory committees or their equivalent.\87\
Some news articles note that villages are now governed by
``three committees'' (Party, village, and supervisory
committees).\88\ In general, it appears that the Party
committee makes decisions, the village committee implements
those decisions, and the supervisory committee oversees the
decisions.\89\ However, relative authority among the three
committees, as well as other village organizations, may vary
from village to village. The revisions also appear to provide a
stronger legal foundation for the authority of ``villager
representative assemblies.'' \90\ Provincial-level authorities
in at least three provinces (Guangdong, Hubei, and Qinghai)
revised regulations governing village committee and/or urban
resident committee elections, which for the first time
stipulate the establishment of official Party- and government-
sponsored election observer systems.\91\ It is unclear whether
officials will tolerate non-governmental monitoring activities.
Major trends in grassroots governance highlight the efforts
of the Party to strengthen control at the grassroots level and
central authorities' efforts to improve the competence of
village officials. Higher level authorities continued to
encourage the same person to serve as village Party secretary
and village committee head, reversing the trend started in the
late 1980s to separate Party and government positions.\92\
While this development may reduce perceived conflict over power
in villages,\93\ it strengthens Party control and may also
decrease competition for and oversight of authority. This
development highlights the importance of the order in which
Party and village committee elections take place. Authorities
reportedly sought to enhance village-level accountability and
improve the competence \94\ of local officials in a variety of
ways, including increasing salary levels,\95\ using college
graduates \96\ and ``extra-payroll'' officials,\97\ and
incorporating Party members ``without a post'' or ``old'' Party
members as ``senators'' into village governing processes to
promote more ``harmonious'' relations and to improve
decisionmaking processes.\98\ In some localities, by the end of
2010, a greater percentage of elected village and Party leaders
reportedly had higher educational and professional skill levels
than in the past.\99\
``difficult villages'' and ``democratic management'' projects
Likely in response to growing discontent and erosion of
Communist Party legitimacy at the grassroots level, central and
local authorities continued programs to ``transform'' so-called
``difficult villages'' and to implement ``democratic
management'' projects. Programs to rectify ``difficult
villages'' \100\ (i.e., villages where tensions between
citizens and officials are present, where people's aspirations
and demands have not been met, or where there are unresolved
economic or social problems, among other problems) \101\
reportedly are basically complete.\102\ During this reporting
year, ``democratic management'' pilot projects in some
localities focused on strengthening the role of the Party at
the grassroots level, promoting economic development, and
improving participation and transparency while ``safeguarding
stability.'' \103\ Hebei, Guangdong, Hunan, Shaanxi, and other
provinces issued ``open village affairs'' or similar
regulations to accomplish these goals.\104\ Some villages also
established ``villager financial management groups,'' \105\
``transparent account book systems,'' \106\ or ``Sunshine
Village Affairs Projects.'' \107\ The effects of most of these
pilot projects remain unclear, and one Chinese researcher
believes most to be transitory.\108\
Accountability and Transparency: Party and Government Reforms
building a ``rule by law government,'' accountability, and official
evaluation system reform
The State Council and the National People's Congress (NPC)
continued or initiated policy measures to enhance government
accountability. At the annual meetings of the NPC and the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March
2011, Wu Bangguo reportedly promised that the NPC would enhance
accountability through its work on supervision of the
government, especially in the areas of ``low-income housing,
government budgets, education reform, and strengthening
primary-level courts and procura
torates.'' \109\ In November 2010, the State Council issued the
Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government
That Rules by Law. The Opinion points out several problems that
need to be addressed, including increasing ``social
contradictions'' in some localities and fields, ``mass
incidents'' occurring with some frequency, ``corruption in some
fields,'' ``unjust law enforcement,'' and ``negligible or
arbitrary administration.'' \110\ The Opinion calls for deeper
reforms, stronger institutions, enhanced government
supervision, restriction of administrative powers, and ``a
government ruled by law.'' \111\ On June 30, the NPC Standing
Committee adopted the PRC Law on Administrative Coercion, which
will come into force on January 1, 2012, after a 12-year
drafting process. The law is meant to resolve the problems of
official infringement of citizens' legal rights and weak
enforcement of regulatory instruments by government agencies,
according to an official with the NPC Standing Committee
Legislative Affairs Commission as reported by the Beijing
Review.\112\ In July, news reports indicated that the revisions
of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law had advanced to
the legislative planning phase and that it is possible the
revisions will expand the scope of administrative
reconsideration cases to be accepted in the future.\113\ The
revised PRC State Compensation Law, which came into effect on
December 1, 2010, could, if implemented, provide citizens more
opportunities to obtain compensation when government officials
violate their rights.\114\
There have been both potentially encouraging and seemingly
unconstructive developments in official evaluation system
reforms. Authorities plan to revise official professional
evaluation standards based on a new system that takes regional
economic, geographical, and social differences into
account.\115\ The new standards could lead to greater
accountability because they could reduce incentives for
falsifying information given to higher level officials to
improve promotion chances. Official responsibility and
evaluation systems sometimes provide incentives to suppress
citizens who want to take their grievances to higher level
authorities.\116\ One Chinese editorial pointed out the dangers
of incorporating ``stability preservation'' into cadre
evaluation systems, because officials may put ``safeguarding
stability'' above everything else or seek to ``control
petitions'' and, as a result, cover up problems.\117\ One
document indicates officials in one county can be marked down
for collective petitions received at higher levels of
government and for the number of ``unsafe political incidents
that affect national security.'' \118\ In one case, authorities
said they would withhold grain subsidies if citizens made
complaints to higher level officials.\119\
Accountability and Corruption
corruption
Corruption reportedly remains high, and Premier Wen Jiabao
recently emphasized that corruption poses a significant danger
to Communist Party rule.\120\ Corruption also reportedly
continues to be one of the top concerns of Chinese
citizens.\121\ During this reporting year, official discipline
inspection and supervision entities reported receiving over 1
million accusations and complaints against officials from
citizens between January and December 2010.\122\ Authorities
reportedly opened 7,349 malfeasance and rights infringement
cases perpetrated by 10,227 government officials in 2010; 3,508
of these cases were considered major or serious.\123\
measures to curb corruption and promote accountability
Chinese authorities took regulatory steps to address
corruption,\124\ and in December 2010 the State Council issued
China's first white paper on corruption titled ``China's
Efforts To Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government.''
\125\ Prior to that, on December 8, 2010, top Party and
government authorities jointly issued the Provisions on
Economic Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the
Party and the Government and Executives of State-Owned
Enterprises, which seek to strengthen supervision and
management of cadres.\126\ In addition, on December 15, 2010,
authorities issued the Provisions Regarding Implementation of
the Responsibility System for Construction of an Honest Party
and a Clean Government.\127\ In February 2011, the NPC Standing
Committee amended the PRC Criminal Law to criminalize the
giving of items of value to an official of a foreign government
or international organization in order to obtain an improper
commercial benefit. The amendment went into effect on May 1,
2011.\128\ Authorities issued a new anti-bribery law that went
into effect in May and will apply to state-owned enterprises
and private companies.\129\ In July, top Party and government
officials issued the Provisions Regarding Rural Village
Grassroots Officials' Honest Performance of Duties (Trial
Implementation), which prohibit 41 specific types of behavior
of grassroots officials, including ``participating in,
coddling, or supporting criminal syndicates or evil forces''
and ``violating stipulations by seizing and taking citizens'
money or property, or by penalizing citizens.'' \130\
Authorities also took limited steps to encourage reporting
of corruption and to protect whistleblowers. Protections for
whistleblowers, however, are insufficient and authorities have
discouraged independent anticorruption Web sites. The Supreme
People's Court and provincial courts reportedly established
corruption reporting Web sites.\131\ Revisions to the PRC Law
on Administrative Supervision require authorities to inform a
person who files a ``real-name'' report about the results of
the corresponding inquiry. A new section stipulates that
officials must keep confidential the information they collect
about citizens who provide tips.\132\ According to the Legal
Daily, 70 percent or more of the cases of work-related offenses
filed with procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from
a citizen.\133\ According to material from the Supreme People's
Procuratorate reported by the Legal Daily, 70 percent of the
people who filed tips with procuratorate offices were subject
to some form of retribution.\134\ In July, court officials in
Tengzhou city, Shandong province, rejected an appeal by
journalist Qi Chonghuai, known for his official corruption
exposes, sending him to prison for eight years on the charge of
embezzlement.\135\ This follows the four-year sentence he had
already completed after being convicted of extortion and
blackmail following his posting of stories online about alleged
corrupt practices of municipal government officials.\136\ While
authorities have established official tip sites, some have
blocked non-governmental whistleblower Web sites.\137\ In the
summer of 2011, new sites based on ``confess-a-bribe'' Web
sites in India began to appear in China.\138\ As of mid-June
2011, there were at least eight Chinese independent platforms
for reporting bribes, reportedly receiving tens to hundreds of
thousands of hits.\139\ The sites were unregistered, leaving
them vulnerable to closure.\140\ Authorities began blocking
access to the sites and warning some of the webmasters to close
their sites by mid-June.\141\ At least two of these sites were
targets of cyber attacks.\142\
transparency and open party and government affairs
Authorities reportedly strengthened policies favoring
government information disclosure, although the State Council
has implemented transparency commitments inconsistently, and
citizens continued to face challenges in accessing information
and bringing cases to court. An April 2011 report by the US-
China Business Council noted that China has pledged to publicly
release drafts of all economic laws and regulations for 30
days.\143\ The report found, however, that over a recent 11-
month period the State Council had posted no more than half of
its rules and regulations for public comment, with only a few
being posting for the full 30 days.\144\ In contrast, the
report found that the National People's Congress had posted
drafts of most laws for the full 30 days.\145\ At the May 2011
U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, China pledged to
issue a measure in 2011 requiring that all proposed trade- and
economic-related administrative regulations and departmental
rules (with certain exceptions) be published on the State
Council Legislative Affairs Office Web site for at least 30
days.\146\
In November 2010, the State Council Opinion Regarding
Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules by Law
(the Opinion) reiterated that ``making government information
public is the principle, while a few exceptions are allowed.''
\147\ Authorities reportedly also sought to strengthen
information disclosure at the grassroots level.\148\ In
December 2010, the Supreme People's Court passed a provision
that stipulates courts shall accept five types of
administrative cases brought by citizens suing government
departments for failing to provide information that legally
should be open to the public. The provision also stipulates
that courts are not authorized to accept cases under four types
of vaguely defined conditions,\149\ leaving significant leeway
for courts not to accept cases. The 12th Five-Year Plan, issued
in March 2011, specifies that China will establish and improve
``open information'' to advance digitalization of government
affairs.\150\ In August, just after Chinese citizens flooded
the Internet with inquiries regarding the lack of transparency
about a high-speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang
province,\151\ central Party and government officials issued
the Opinion Regarding Deepening Open Government Affairs and
Strengthening Government Services, which includes an item
stating that officials should ``take great efforts to make
transparent information about major sudden incidents and issues
of concern to citizens . . . and correctly guide public
opinion.'' \152\ [For more information on media coverage of the
train incident and ``guiding public opinion,'' see Section II--
Freedom of Expression.]
Nevertheless, officials continued to deny open government
information requests for reasons that appear to contradict the
spirit of the law. One study of open government information
annual reports submitted by national, provincial, and some city
government organizations conducted by researchers in China
reportedly found that officials continue to refuse to grant
information disclosure requests because officials claimed the
``information is not available,'' the information would
``influence social stability,'' and the information ``involves
state secrets.'' \153\
Voluntary disclosure of government budgetary information
remained an area of progress, although challenges remain. The
State Council Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a
Government That Rules by Law stipulates that officials should
more actively make government information public and focus on
``financial budgets, allocation of public resources, approval
and implementation of major construction projects, and non-
profit social causes.'' \154\ In early July 2011, government
departments under the State Council began to make public
information on expenditures for overseas trips, public
relations, and vehicles, otherwise known as the ``Three
Publics.'' By late July, 86 of the 98 departments under the
State Council had made their expenditures public.\155\ Central
officials also have required central government departments
that have their budgets approved by the National People's
Congress to make their annual budgets public. As of the end of
May, 88 of the 98 departments reportedly had disclosed their
budgets to the public.\156\ In July, the State Council Standing
Committee reportedly said it was necessary to ``vigorously
advance'' budget transparency, to expand the scope of
transparency, and refine disclosed content.\157\ According to
one survey, the Ministry of Finance expanded the number of
items it made public in the national budget.\158\ Although
central-level ministries, the governments of Shaanxi province
and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and other areas have
opened their 2011 budgets to the public, many citizens
reportedly believe that the information provided is incomplete
and that the budget category of ``other expenses'' hides
information.\159\
Central Party leaders continued to make policy
announcements regarding their intent to expand the transparency
of Party affairs, and the Beijing municipal government took
policy steps to enhance Party accountability. In October 2010,
a top Party organization issued a policy document that outlined
the ``guiding thought'' and basic principles for putting into
practice ``open Party affairs'' at the lowest administrative
levels, as well as the content to be made public.\160\ The
Beijing municipal government issued the Beijing Municipal
Implementation Measure in January 2011, which for the first
time includes Party leaders in the ``scope of accountability.''
\161\ Authorities announced that 13 central Party departments,
31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, and
nearly half of China's prefectural-level cities have already
established Party press spokesperson systems.\162\
Public Input in Decisionmaking, Interest Articulation, and Public
Hearings
Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to
political decisionmaking processes; however, they are
increasingly able to utilize various channels to express
opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory
instruments. The 12th Five-Year Plan stipulates that ``it is
necessary to give full play'' to ``people's organizations,
trade associations, and mass media to express social
interests'' and that authorities will expand the ``degree of
public participation'' in decisionmaking.\163\ The Opinion
Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules
by Law (Opinion), issued in November, stipulates that ``before
major decisions are made [authorities] should widely solicit
and adequately assimilate opinions from all sides.'' \164\ It
requires that ``public opinion . . . be solicited'' with
respect to ``administrative laws and regulations . . . that
have direct influence on rights and obligations of citizens,
legal person [sic] or other organizations.'' In addition, the
Opinion stipulates that ``what opinions are adopted, and why,
should be made public in appropriate formats.'' \165\
Endnotes
\1\ ``Central Organization Department: By the End of 2010, the
Chinese Communist Party Reached 80.269 Million Members'' [Zhongzubu:
jiezhi 2010 niandi zhonggang dangyuan zongshu 80.269 wan ming], China
News, 24 June 11.
\2\ ``At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches
77,995,000 Nationally'' [Jiezhi 2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da
7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News Net, 28 June 10.
\3\ Ibid. There are 6,629 urban street Communist Party
organizations, 34,224 town organizations, 80,000 residential
committees, and 598,000 village committees.
\4\ Ibid. Over 99 percent of the various types of eligible
enterprises have Party organizations.
\5\ Ibid. Of the country's 570,000 public service organizations,
471,000 have Party organizations.
\6\ Ibid. The numbers here include eligible 13,000 ``social
organizations'' (shehui tuanti), of which 12,000 have Party
organizations, and 16,000 eligible ``nonprofit enterprises'' (minban
feiqiye), of which 15,000 have Party organizations.
\7\ National People's Congress, Outline of the Economic and Social
Development 12th Five-Year Plan of the People's Republic of China''
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge
wunian guihua gangyao], issued 14 March 11. In relation to assigning
government posts, authorities must ``uphold the principle of the Party
managing talent'' (chap. 29 (3)); in relation to the education system,
authorities will ``comprehensively implement the Party's educational
principles. . . .'' (chap. 28). ``Remarks at 11th China Journalists'
Day and Presentation of Awards and Report Meeting'' [Zai di shiyi jie
zhongguo jizhe jieji banjiang baogaohui shang de jianghua], People's
Daily, 9 November 11. With regards to the media, ``Party principles
should be taken as basic principles in news propaganda work.'' ``Liu
Binjie: Political System Reform Must Insist on the Correct
Orientation'' [Liu binjie: zhengzhi tizhi gaige bixu jianchi zhengque
fangxiang], China Press and Publications Daily, 17 November 10. In
addition, ``the Party is in charge of the media, which cannot change.''
\8\ Central Committee of the Communist Party General Office and
State Council General Office, ``Opinion Regarding Strengthening and
Improving Development of Urban Residence Committees'' [Guanyu jiaqiang
he gaijin chengshi shechu jumin weiyuanhui jianshe de yijian], issued 9
November 10.
\9\ ``China's Justice Minister Calls for Better Party Building in
Law Firms,'' Xinhua, 23 November 10.
\10\ ``CPC Seeks Closer Ties With China's Grassroots To Consolidate
Ruling Status,'' Xinhua, 6 June 11. This reporting year, Party
officials took measures to ``consolidate [the Party's] ruling status''
in a campaign aimed at rural residents. For instance, the Ganzhou
municipal government, Jiangxi province, sent 20,000 Party members to
3,751 villages at the end of 2010.
\11\ Central Committee of the Communist Party and State Council,
Decision Concerning Strengthening Comprehensive Management of Social
Order, issued 19 February 91; ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights
Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 3 May 11.
\12\ ``Social Management Innovations Take People's Livelihood as
the Main Line, 35 Pilot Project Communities Nationally Give Impetus for
Innovation'' [Shehui guanli chuangxin yi minsheng wei zhuxian quanguo
35 ge shidian diqu fali chuangxin], Legal Daily, reprinted in People's
Daily, 13 June 11. Outreach activities allow officials to monitor and
gauge if citizens are a threat to ``stability,'' while simultaneously
taking care of social welfare issues. ``Focus on Social Management's
Difficult Problems, Really Resolving Contradictions Requires Putting
People First'' [Jujiao shehui guanli nanti yiren weiben caineng
zhenzheng huajie maodun], Xinhua, 19 February 11. In an economic
development zone in Hefei city, Anhui province, 119 responsible
personnel would ``learn about the affairs of 100 households'' in the
city's 21 communities, engaging in ``face-to-face'' service provision
and coordinating social management work. In Dongcheng district,
Beijing, ``network management'' personnel work to set up a database
with information on ``people, land, property, matters, and
sentiments.''
\13\ ``Assessment Report on the National Human Rights Action Plan
of China (2009-2010)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2009-2010 nian)
pinggu baogao], Xinhua, 14 July 11, sec. 3(5).
\14\ Opinion Regarding Strengthening and Improving Development of
Urban Residence Committees [Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin chengshi shechu
jumin weiyuanhui jianshe de yijian], issued 9 November 10. The preface
of this Opinion emphasized the ``more prominent [resident committee]
function of safeguarding social stability, the increasing importance of
community residence committees to take on social management tasks, and
the more urgent service demands of community resident committees by
citizens.''
\15\ ``Beijing Addresses New Challenges in Social Management, Makes
Innovations in Comprehensive Management Work Mechanisms'' [Beijing
yingdui shehui guanli xin tiaozhan chuangxin zongzhi gongzuo xin
tizhi], Xinhua, 18 June 10.
\16\ ``Building Comprehensive Management and Internet Management
Included for First Time'' [Luoyu zongzhi wangluo guanli bei shouci
naru], Liberation Daily, 2 March 11.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ ``Zhejiang Police's Internal Document: Controlling the
Movements of Critical Persons,'' China Digital Times, 2 March 10.
\19\ ``Shenzhen Evicts More Than 80,000 `Security High-Risk
Personnel,' Including People With Mental Illnesses'' [Shenzhen qingchu
8 wanyu ``zhi'an gaowei renyuan'' baokuo jingshenbingren], Chongqing
Evening News, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 12 April 11; ``Shenzhen Plans
Comprehensive Investigation of `High-Risk Personnel' To Create a Stable
Situation'' [Shenzhen jihua quanmian paicha ``gaowei renyuan'' zhizao
wending jumian], Radio Free Asia, 20 November 10. The Shenzhen
municipal Party Committee and the municipal government passed measures,
called ``Certain Opinions Regarding Strengthening Social Management
Structures, Public Security, and Solid Prevention and Control
Systems,'' which stipulate the establishment of an ``intelligence
information network,'' a ``basic prevention network,'' a ``surveillance
and control network,'' and an ``Internet management and control
network,'' among others, in order to maintain ``stability.''
\20\ ``Zhejiang Police's Internal Document: Controlling the
Movements of Critical Persons,'' China Digital Times, 2 March 10.
\21\ ``China: Student Informant System To Expand, Limiting School
Autonomy, Free Expression,'' CIA Directorate of Intelligence (Open
Source Works), 23 November 10. The ``student informant system''
reportedly is more open, includes one student informant in each class
to monitor teachers' and students' political attitudes, and employs
denunciation techniques.
\22\ Ibid. Education officials reportedly started to strengthen the
student informant system in 2005, which then reportedly was extended to
lower-tier universities and middle and high schools in some parts of
the country. Public debate about the ``student informant centers''
reportedly focuses on the risk of propagating a ``culture of
denunciation,'' of deterring freedom of speech, and potentially harming
the development of gifted students.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Huang Shaojie, ``PKU Copy Rooms Censor Materials,'' Global
Times, 19 January 11.
\25\ He Dan, ``Peking University's Plan Stirs Questions,'' China
Daily, 26 March 11.
\26\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\27\ Gillian Wong, ``AP Exclusive: Internet-Savvy Network of 20 Is
Behind Protest Calls That Have Rattled China,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Yahoo!, 6 April 11; ``Red Armbands Go Into Battle While
Authorities Monitor Those Passing by, Communications Are Monitored as
Personnel Assemble in the Capital'' [Hongxiuzhang shangzhen jianshi lu
ren tongxun jianting renyuan ju jingcheng], Radio Free Asia, 25
February 11; ``Organizer of Chinese Jasmine Rallies Extends an Open
Letter to the Whole Nation'' [Zhongguo molihua jihui zuzhizhe zhi
quanguo renmin gongkaixin], Boxun, 21 February 11.
\28\ ``Organizer of Chinese Jasmine Rallies Extends an Open Letter
to the Whole Nation'' [Zhongguo molihua jihui zuzhizhe zhi quanguo
renmin gongkaixin], Boxun, 21 February 11. The statement appeared to
say that the organizers were willing to give the Communist Party time
to resolve problems, but that if it could not eliminate corruption and
accept citizen ``supervision,'' then it should ``retreat from the stage
of history.'' The statement said, ``We do not support violent
revolution; we persist in non-violent non-cooperation.'' Further, the
statement indicated that the organizers did not care if China had a
one-, two-, or three-party system, but that government officials must
accept citizen ``supervision,'' and that China must have judicial
independence.
\29\ ``Peaceful Road With Chinese Characteristics Out of 20 Years
of Comprehensive Management'' [Zongzhi 20 nian zouchu yitiao zhongguo
tese pingan zhilu], Legal Daily, 1 March 11. 2011 marks the 20th
anniversary of the establishment of the Central Committee on
Comprehensive Management of Social Order that was put in place in 1991,
as well as the two official decisions that were issued in 1991 that
contain the ``guiding principles'' related to ``social order,''
``maintaining social stability,'' and ensuring ``lasting stability and
durable peace.''
\30\ ``Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientification of
Social Management'' [Hu jintao: zhazha shishi tigao shehui guanli
kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.
\31\ Ren Siwen, ``Be Conscious of Upholding Social Harmony and
Stability'' [Zijue weihu shehui hexie wending], Beijing Daily, 5 March
11; Ren Siwen, ``Upholding Stability Begins With Each Individual''
[Weihu wending cong mei geren zuoqi], Beijing Daily, 6 March 11;
``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies Flowering,''
South China Morning Post, 7 March 11.
\32\ Li Liyan, ``People's Editorial: Why the Communist Party
Central Committee Attaches Great Importance To Strengthening of and
Innovation in Social Management'' [Renmin shiping: zhongyang weihe
gaodu zhongshi jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli], People's Daily, 23
February 11; Ren Siwen, ``Be Conscious of Upholding Social Harmony and
Stability'' [Zijue weihu shehui hexie wending], Beijing Daily, 5 March
11; ``Chinese Official Press Attack `Jasmine' Gatherings'' [Zhongguo
guanmei pingji ``molihua'' jihui huodong], Radio Free Asia, 5 March 11.
\33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11.
According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``The Chinese government
has criminally detained a total of 26 individuals, disappeared more
than 30, and put more than 200 under soft detention.'' For Commission
analysis, see ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers,
Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May
11.
\34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Suining City Public Security
Bureau Notice of Criminal Detention to Chen Wei'' [Suiningshi gonganju
dui chen wei de xingshi juliu tongzhishu], reprinted in Boxun, 22
February 11; Democratic China, ``Chen Wei: Me and the `92 Democracy
Movement' '' [Chen wei: wo yu jiuer minzhu yundong], 11 September 10.
\35\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the
Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.''
\36\ Human Rights in China, ``Independent Intellectual Ran Yunfei
Arrested on ``Inciting Subversion of State Power'' Charge'' [Zheming
duli zhishi fenzi ran yunfei bei yi shexian `shandongzui' daibu], 28
March 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11; ``Ran Yunfei
Detained for the Crime of Subversion, All Circles Are Shocked and Decry
[Detention]'' [Ran yunfei bei yi dianfu zuiming xingju, gejie zhenjing
qianze], Radio Free Asia, 24 February 11.
\37\ Jeremy Page, ``Beijing Blocks Protest Reports,'' Wall Street
Journal, 31 January 11; Edward Wong and David Barboza, ``Wary of Egypt
Unrest, China Censors Web,'' New York Times, 31 January 11. For
Commission analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to Information on
Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\38\ Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, ``A Revolution's Namesake
Is Contraband in China,'' New York Times, 10 May 11.
\39\ ``Chinese Church Leaders Urge Followers Not To Join Street
Gatherings,'' Xinhua, 4 March 11 (Open Source Center, 4 March 11).
\40\ ``Jasmine Open for Third Time, Beijing Subway Closed, Hong
Kong Residents Expressing Support Taken Into Custody'' [Molihua kai
sandu beijing ditie beifeng gangmin shengyuan beizhua], Epoch Times, 7
March 11; ``Universities Targeted in `Jasmine' Crackdown,'' Radio Free
Asia, 7 March 11. Chinese Government Takes Strict Precautions for
Fourth Jasmine Exercise, Plainclothes Police Outnumber Pedestrians''
[Zhongguo zhengfu yanfang disi bo molihua huodong, jingcha bianyi
chaoguo sanbuzhe renshu], Radio Free Asia, 13 March 11; ``Two Chongqing
Students Detained for Transmitting News of `Jasmine Revolution' ''
[Chongqing liang xuesheng yin shangwang zhuanfa ``molihua geming''
xinxi beiju], Radio Free Asia, 2 March 11; ``Beijing High School
Students Admonished: Do Not Organize Collective Activities'' [Beijing
gaoxiao quanjie xuesheng: jinqi wu zuzhi jiti huodong], Radio Free
Asia, 2 March 11.
\41\ ``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies
Flowering,'' South China Morning Post, 7 March 11; Ian Johnson, ``Call
for Protests in China Draws More Police Than Protesters,'' New York
Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore, ``Heavy-Handed Reaction to
China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 February 11.
\42\ Ian Johnson, ``Call for Protests in China Draws More Police
Than Protesters,'' New York Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore,
``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27
February 11.
\43\ ``Jasmine Open for Third Time, Beijing Subway Closed, Hong
Kong Residents Expressing Support Taken Into Custody'' [Molihua kai
sandu beijing ditie beifeng gangmin shengyuan beizhua], Epoch Times, 7
March 11; Malcolm Moore, ``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine'
Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 February 11.
\44\ Ian Johnson, ``Call for Protests in China Draws More Police
Than Protesters,'' New York Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore,
``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27
February 11; ``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies
Flowering,'' South China Morning Post, 7 March 11.
\45\ Frank Ching, ``Don't Look for Jasmine Revolution or Tea in
China,'' Yale Global Online, 7 March 11.
\46\ Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Beijing Blames Foreigners
For Its Fears of Unrest,'' New York Times, 8 May 11.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Xianbin Case Trial Oral
Judgment Announcement of 10 Years, Family and Lawyers Cannot Visit''
[Liu xianbin an fating koutou pan shi nian xingqi, jiaren lushi wufa
huijian], 25 March 11; Human Rights in China, ``Activist Sentenced to
Ten Years for Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence,'' 25 March
11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Xianbin Already Formally
Indicted'' [Liu xianbin yijing bei zhengshi qisu], 17 November 10;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Sichuan Activist Liu Xianbin's
Criminal Sentencing Document'' [Sichuan yiyi renshi liu xianbin xingshi
panjueshu], 17 May 11. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
for more information about Liu Xianbin's case.
\49\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wuhan Rights Defender Li Tie
Arrested on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' Crime'' [Wuhan
weiquan renshi litie bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui''
daibu], 17 November 10.
\50\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``After Being Missing for 12
Days, Elections Expert Yao Lifa Free'' [Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa
shizong 12 tianhou huode ziyou], 30 October 10. This instance was
reportedly related to authorities' perception that Yao was trying to
organize a celebration of Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize. Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Special Alert: Elections Expert Yao Lifa Once Again
Kidnapped, Taken Away'' [Tebie guanzhu: xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa zaici
bei bangjia dao waidi], reprinted in Boxun, 19 November 10. This
instance was reportedly to impede his investigation of a case in which
a petitioner was allegedly killed by an official. Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa Abused and Beaten During Soft
Detention Period'' [Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa bei ruanjin qijian shoudao
ruma ouda], 13 December 10. This instance was reportedly to stop him
from meeting Qin Yongmin, a democracy advocate. Human Rights in China,
``Rights Lawyer Missing More Than 48 Hours; Former Local People's
Congress Deputy Detained Seven Days,'' 18 February 11. This instance
was reportedly to prevent him from training independent candidates for
local elections. ``Police Question Foreigners in Seventh Jasmine Wave,
Ai Weiwei and Assistant Prevented from Leaving the Country and Summoned
by the Police'' [Di qibo molihua jingfang pancha waijiren ai weiwei ji
zhushou bei jin chujing ji chuanhuan], Radio Free Asia, 3 April 11.
This instance reportedly was related to the ``Jasmine Revolution''
rallies. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``As June 4th Approaches,
Strict Control and Suppression Intensifies (Continuation)'' [Liusi
jiangling, quanguo yankong daya shengji (xu)], 3 June 11. In February,
authorities placed Yao under 24-hour observation, which intensified as
the anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests approached in early June. ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa's
Movements Restricted After Receiving a Call From the US Embassy''
[Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa jie meiguo shiguan dianhua hou bei xianzhi
renshen ziyou], 12 June 11; ``Scholar Held Amid Election Bid,'' Radio
Free Asia, 21 June 11. Yao Lifa disappeared again after receiving calls
from the U.S. Embassy and a reporter. Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Yao Lifa Missing for Twenty Days, Home Searched Twice in One Day''
[Yao lifa shizong 20 tian shi, jiazhong yitian nei bei chachao
liangci], 7 July 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human
Rights Briefing August 3-9, 2011,'' 9 August 11.
\51\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing
August 3-9, 2011,'' 9 August 11; ``Scholar Held Amid Election Bid,''
Radio Free Asia, 21 June 11.
\52\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25; UN Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate in Public Affairs,
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.7, 7 December 96. Under General Comment 25 to the ICCPR,
this language requires that: ``Where citizens participate in the
conduct of public affairs through freely chosen representatives, it is
implicit in article 25 that those representatives do in fact exercise
governmental power and that they are accountable through the electoral
process for their exercise of that power'' (Item 7); ``The right to
vote at elections and referenda must be established by law and may be
subject only to reasonable restrictions . . . [p]arty membership should
not be a condition of eligibility to vote, nor a ground of
disqualification'' (Item 10); ``Freedom of expression, assembly and
association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of the
right to vote and must be fully protected . . .'' (Item 12); ``The
right of persons to stand for election should not be limited
unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of parties or of
specific parties . . .'' (Item 17); An ``independent electoral
authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and
to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance
with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant . . . .''
(Item 20).
\53\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76. China has signed, but has not yet
ratified, the ICCPR. In the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan
issued by the Chinese government in April 2009, officials stated that
the ICCPR was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan
was framed, and that the government ``will continue legislative,
judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked
with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.''
State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of
China (2009-2010), reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction, sec.
V(1).
\54\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 21.
``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . . The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.''
\55\ ``How To Look at New Trends in Rural Grassroots Elections''
[Ruhe kandai nongcun jiceng xuanju de xin chaoshi], Beijing Daily,
reprinted in Seeking Truth, 27 September 10; Xu Dongmei, Research on
Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang
dangnei minzhu yanjiu], (Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials
Press, 2004), 7.
\56\ Deng Xiaoping, ``Report on the Revision of the Constitution of
the Communist Party of China,'' People's Daily, 16 September 56.
According to Deng, ``The measures taken for the development of inner-
Party democracy are not meant to weaken necessary centralization in the
Party, but to supply it with a powerful and vigorous base.''
Constitution of the Communist Party of China, as amended 21 October 07.
According to the Party Constitution, ``Democratic centralism is a
combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under
centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of
the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political
activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy,
safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the
initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well
as its members.'' Xu Dongmei, Research on Chinese Communist Party
Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei minzhu yanjiu],
(Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 2004), 3.
Development of inner-Party democracy was all but abandoned during the
Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), but was revived after 1978 when the
concept of ``collective leadership'' once again became a guiding
principle of the Party.
\57\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's
Peaceful Development (English), reprinted in Xinhua (Open Source
Center, 6 September 11), issued 6 September 11, sec. III; State Council
Information Office, White Paper on China's Peaceful Development
(Chinese), reprinted in China Net, 6 September 11, sec. III. A
subsequent article in Xinhua notes Chinese authorities' resolve to
never permit ``external forces to interfere in China's internal
affairs.'' ``China Will Never Allow External Interference, Says White
Paper,'' Xinhua, 6 September 11. See also ``Editorial: Political System
Included in China's `Core Interests' '' [Shelun: zhengzhi zhidu jinru
zhongguo ``kexin liyichuan''], Global Times, 7 September 11.
\58\ ``Editorial: Political System Included in China's `Core
Interests' '' [Shelun: zhengzhi zhidu jinru zhongguo ``kexin
liyichuan''], Global Times, 7 September 11.
\59\ Full Text of Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th CPC
Central Committee, reprinted in Xinhua, 18 October 10.
\60\ National People's Congress, Outline of the Economic and Social
Development 12th Five-Year Plan of the People's Republic of China
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge
wunian guihua gangyao], issued 14 March 11, chap. 54. It states that
China will ``strengthen democratic systems, enrich democratic forms,
broaden democratic channels, implement democratic elections according
to law; promote democratic policies, democratic management, and
democratic supervision; protect people's right to know, right to
participate, and right to supervise.''
\61\ An Baijie, ``Premier Wen Calls for Major Political Reform,''
Global Times, 23 August 10. Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly made a
statement in August 2010 declaring that ``[w]ithout the political
reform, China may lose what it has already achieved through economic
restructuring and the targets of its modernization drive might not be
reached.''
\62\ Gary Huang, ``Editorial Aims To Silence Calls for Political
Reform: Western-Style Democracy Rejected,'' South China Morning Post,
28 October 10.
\63\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Beijing Slams Door on Political Reform,''
South China Morning Post, 11 March 11; `` `Zheng Qingyuan' Says
Political Reform Is To `Strengthen' Party Leadership,'' People's Daily,
26 October 10 (Open Source Center, 26 October 10).
\64\ Wang Yuting, ``Wu Bangguo: Do Not Apply Mechanically Certain
Western Legal Systems'' [Wu bangguo: bu taoyong xifang moxie guojia
falu tixi], Eastday, 10 March 11; ``China Vows No Western-Style
Political Reforms,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 9
March 11. He also stated China would not carry out formal
privatization.
\65\ `` `Zheng Qingyuan' Says Political Reform Is To `Strengthen'
Party Leadership,'' People's Daily, 26 October 10 (Open Source Center,
26 October 10).
\66\ What ``Democracy'' Means in China After Thirty Years of
Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 22 May 09, Testimony of Melanie Manion, Professor of Public
Affairs and Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
\67\ National People's Congress, ``Delegates' Law Revision (Draft)
Articles and Draft Explanation'' [Daibiaofa xiuzheng'an (cao'an)
tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 28 August 10; Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, Decisions Regarding Revising Delegates Law
of the National People's Congress and Various Levels of Local People's
Congresses of the People's Republic of China, issued 28 October 10.
\68\ Ibid.
\69\ What ``Democracy'' Means in China After Thirty Years of
Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 22 May 09, Testimony of Melanie Manion, Professor of Public
Affairs and Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
According to Manion, one development is that, despite official voter
turnout figures of 90 percent, survey evidence indicates that ``very
high proportions of ordinary Chinese know little or nothing about local
congress candidates on election day, didn't vote in the most recent
congress election, and can recall nothing their congress representative
have done in the past term.''
\70\ ``New Faces Should Go Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 31 May
11; ``Editorial: Independent Candidates Should Revert From Micro Blogs
Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 30 May 11; Zhu Shanshan, ``Grass-roots
Candidates Rally Online,'' Global Times, 30 May 11.
\71\ Peter Foster, ``Chinese Activists Harness Twitter To Campaign
in Elections,'' Telegraph, 19 June 11.
\72\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent
Candidate Liu Ping Released After Four-Day Illegal Detention'' [Jiangxi
duli houxuanren liu ping bei feifa guanya 4 tian hou houshi], 17 May
11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent Candidate Liu
Ping and Others Lose Contact With Outside World'' [Jiangxi duli
houxuanren liu ping dengren yu waijie shiqu lianxi], 12 May 11; ``The
True Story of a Local Female Independent Election Candidate in Xinyu,
China,'' China Elections Blog, 20 May 11. Police told Liu, who
reportedly had over 30,000 followers on her microblog, that she was not
qualified to run because she traveled to Beijing to petition about a
land issue and because some of her nominators were not eligible. Prior
to this, police officials reportedly interrupted Liu's public speeches,
accused her of being in league with ``hostile foreign political
forces,'' and confiscated fliers and numerous items from her home.
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent Candidate Liu
Ping Released After Four-Day Illegal Detention'' [Jiangxi duli
houxuanren liu ping bei feifa guanya 4 tian hou houshi], 17 May 1.
Officials called her in for questioning for ``disrupting public
order.''
\73\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xinyu City, Jiangxi,
Independent Candidates Wei Zhongping and Others Regain Their Freedom,''
20 May 11.
\74\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Civic Elections
Monitor Du Quanbing Kidnapped by Police'' [Zhongguo minjian xuanju
guanchayuan du quanbin bei jingfang bangjia], 30 April 11.
\75\ ``Independent Poll Candidates Harassed,'' South China Morning
Post, 23 June 11. Authorities warned Li Sihua, of Jiangxi province,
that he may face charges of ``sabotaging elections,'' accusing him of
falsifying signatures on his nomination form. Xie Runliang, of Jiangsu
province, pulled out of a local election in May one day after police
called him in for a ``chat.'' A ``mysterious department'' allegedly
pressured a company to withhold a tennis sponsorship for the son of
candidate Li Chengpeng.
\76\ ``New Faces Should Go Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 31 May
11; ``Editorial: Independent Candidates Should Revert From Micro Blogs
Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 30 May 11.
\77\ Lin Wei and Chen Anyu, ``Longhua District in Haikou
Effectively Bans Anomalies Involved in Village-Level Election
Canvassing'' [Longhuachu cunji huanjie shunli tuijin], 23 July 10; Chen
Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win Village Cadre
Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan Daily, 12
August 10. This article discusses election canvassing bribery in one
district.
\78\ ``Party Committee Twists Guangdong Village Committee
Elections, New Shandong Village Chief Stabbed 20 Times'' [Guangdong
cunwei huanjie dangwei caopan shandong cunzhang xin shangren bei kan 20
dao], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 11.
\79\ Chen Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win
Village Cadre Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan
Daily, 12 August 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil
Affairs Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the
Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiang
Li jiu shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November
10.
\80\ Chen Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win
Village Cadre Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan
Daily, 12 August 10; Zhao Lei, ``Bribery Being Bred in Grassroots
Elections,'' China Daily, 22 July 10.
\81\ Yan Faming, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Fangshan Village
Election Ballot Box Snatched 8 Villagers Detained'' [Fangshan cunmin
xuanju quan piaoxiang bei qiang 8 cunmin bei zhua], reprinted in Boxun,
17 August 10; Paul Mooney, ``Village Seethes Over `Stolen' Election,''
South China Morning Post, reprinted in Web site of Paul Mooney, 29
August 10.
\82\ Yan Faming, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Fangshan Village
Election Ballot Box Snatched 8 Villagers Detained'' [Fangshan cunmin
xuanju quan piaoxiang bei qiang 8 cunmin bei zhua], reprinted in Boxun,
17 August 10. Those detained include Qiu Lina, Zhao Yun, Ma Zhizheng,
Zhao Zhenghai, and Zhao Daqing. Paul Mooney, ``Village Seethes Over
`Stolen' Election,'' South China Morning Post, reprinted in Web site of
Paul Mooney, 29 August 10. ``Four More Detained in the Beijing Suburban
Village Raoyuefu Election Scandal, 13 Arrested Including the Election
Committee Director'' [Jingjiao raoyuefu xuanjumen zai zhua siren
xuanweihui zhuren deng shisanren beizhua], Civil Rights and Livelihood,
24 August 10. Officials later detained four other villagers including
Liu Jinfu, a former village leader and director of the village election
commission, on charges not specified in news reports.
\83\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98, amended and
effective 28 October 10.
\84\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiangli jiu shenru
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
\85\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98, amended and
effective 28 October 10, art. 32.
\86\ ``Closely Watching the `Executive Power' of 7,000,000
Government Officials'' [Dingjin 700 wan cunguan de ``xingzhengquan''],
Xinhua, 7 December 10. For example, in Henan province, supervisory-
related organizations reportedly are mechanisms to supervise the
exercise of official power, prevent corruption, and according to one
official, have ``become a buffer safeguarding social stability in rural
areas.'' Li Bo, ``Yijun County Sets Up Villager Supervisory Committees
in Every Village'' [Yijun sheli cunmin jiandu weiyuanhui cujin nongcun
hexie], Shaanxi Daily, 12 August 10. One village in Shaanxi province
reported that after the village established the supervisory committee,
petitioning cases decreased by 40 percent. ``Guo Yongping at
Guanzhongwu City First District Open Village Affairs, Democratic
Management, and Democratic Supervision Work Symposium Requires
Deepening Open Village Affairs and Democracy for Tangible Advances in
Managing `Difficult Villages' '' [Guo yongping zai guanzhongwushi yiqu
cunwu gongkai minzhu guanli minzhu jiandu gongzuo zuotanhuishang yaoqiu
shenhua cunwu gongkai he minzhu queshi tuijin ``nandiancun'' zhili],
Shaanxi Daily, 27 July 10.
\87\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiangli jiu shenru
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
\88\ ``Panlong District: `Three Types of Committees' Jointly
Oversee Management of Community Affairs'' [Panlongqu: ``sanwei''
xieshou guifan shequ shiwu guanli], Yunnan Daily, 5 July 10.
\89\ Qian Qilu, ``To Hammer Out a Base, Promote Grassroots
Democratic Political Construction in Village Pastoral Areas'' [Hanshi
jichu tuijin nongcun muqu jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jianshe], Inner
Mongolia Daily, 13 August 10. According to this news story, the
``villager party branch is to exercise the power of conducting the
decision-making process, the villager representative conference is to
exercise the power to vote to approve the decision, the villager
committee is to exercise the power to execute the decision, and the
villager supervisory committee is to exercise the power of supervising
the implementation of the decision.'' ``Promote Innovations in the
Construction of Village Grassroots Party Organization--Briefing on
Construction of Village Grassroots Organizations' `Three-Three System'
High-Level Forum'' [Tuaijin nongcun jiceng dang zuzhi jianshe tizhi
chuangxin--``nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshe `sansanzhi' gaozeng luntan''
suyao], People's Daily, 20 October 10. In another village, the Party
branch reportedly ``organizes a meeting to discuss major village
issues'' and the villager representative assembly ``makes decisions
happen,'' while the ``supervisory committee'' ``directs.''
\90\ The 2010 revision contains an entire section on the ``villager
representative assemblies,'' while the 1998 version only mentions the
body once. PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98,
amended and effective 28 October 10, sec. 4. PRC Organic Law of the
Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui
zuzhifa], issued and effective 4 November 98, art. 21.
\91\ ``Qinghai Province Establishes Village (Resident) Committee
Election Observer System'' [Wosheng jianli cun (ju) min weiyuanhui
xuanju guanchayuan zhidu], Qinghai News Net, 1 February 11. According
to this article, provincial, autonomous prefecture, and county election
leading agencies chose Party members, people's congress, and people's
political consultative conference delegates, experts, scholars, and
retired Party and government cadres, among others, with ``definite
political qualities and knowledge of village/residents committee self-
governance and law'' to observe elections. Guangdong Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Guangdong Province Village Committee
Election Measure [Guangdong sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa],
issued 1 December 10. Hubei Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Hubei Province Village Committee Election Measures [Hubei
sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 26 May 11.
\92\ Wang Zhiyong and Sun Chunyan, ``Promote the Healthy
Development of Democracy'' [Cujin minzhu zhengzhi jiankang fazhan],
Jilin Daily, 17 March 10; ``For the 306 Villages of Xiji County `Two
Committee' Elections, the Overall Quality of the Candidates Improves''
[Xiji 306 ge cun ``liangwei'' shunli huanjie dangxuanzhe zhengti suzhi
tigao], Ningxia Daily, summarized in Open Source Center, 22 December
10; Zhang Zhongbao, ``Village-Level Organization Elections Complete,
All Achieved `One Shoulder To Carry' [Responsibilities of] Secretary
and Leader, Five Village Committees in Qiongshan Held Successful `Open
Direct Nomination' [Elections]'' [Wancheng cunji zuzhi huanjie xuanju,
quanmian shixian shuji, zhuren ``yijantiao'' qiongshan 5 cunweihui
``gongkai zhixuan'' chenggong], Hainan Daily, 26 September 10; Ji
Chuanpai, ``Researching the `Two Committees' Village Elections and the
Work of Party Leaders'' [Yanjiu cun ``liangwei'' huanjie xuanju he
dangzheng lingdao ganbu wenze gongzuo], Beijing Daily, 9 December 10;
Wu Zongyi and Han Xijiang, ``Grassroots Democracy Will Become Deeper if
Citizens Have More Rights To Speak'' [Jiceng minzhu jiangxiang zongshen
tuijin minzhong you gengduo huayuquan], Dazhong Net, 6 December 10. See
the Commission's 2006 Annual Report for more information regarding the
trend of recentralizing Party and government authority, which appears
to be based on a September 2004 Party ``Decision on Strengthening the
Party's Ruling Capacity.'' CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06,
Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative
Reform, 124-31.
\93\ Zhang Zhongbao, ``Village-Level Organization Elections
Complete, All Achieved `One Shoulder To Carry' [Responsibilities of]
Secretary and Leader, Five Village Committees in Qiongshan Held
Successful `Open Direct Nomination' [Elections]'' [Wancheng cunji zuzhi
huanjie xuanju, quanmian shixian shuji, zhuren ``yijantiao'' qiongshan
5 cunweihui ``gongkai zhixuan'' chenggong], Hainan Daily, 26 September
10.
\94\ Huang Yong et al., ``Rudong County Accepts Applications From
Whole County for Positions of Village Party Branch Secretaries''
[Rudong mianxiang quanxian gongkai xuanbo cun zhishu], China Jiangsu
Net, 17 July 10. In Rudong county, Nantong municipality, Jiangsu
province, to improve the professional skill level of leaders, county
authorities allowed almost 20 percent (40 out of 235) of the county's
villages to choose their Party branch secretaries from among candidates
anywhere in the county, not just in the village where the election was
being held.
\95\ ``Dafang's Open Nomination System for Cadres Increases the
Village's Vigor'' [Dafang gongkai xuanba cunji ganbu zeng huoli],
Guizhou Daily, 28 December 10. One county in Guizhou province raised
salaries for village heads and deputy heads to attract candidates with
better qualifications.
\96\ Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May
10; Lian Xiaofang, ``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and
Democratic Supervision of Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu
gongkai he minzhu guanli deng gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10.
To reduce the reported ``dishonest ethos'' among officials in so-called
``difficult villages,'' Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region officials plan to
use ``skilled and moral university students'' as village officials and
appoint officials from outside the borders of villages.
\97\ Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May
10. One county in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region combined using
local village officials, college-graduate officials, and ``extra-
payroll'' officials in local organizations to resolve problems of
governance.
\98\ Mao Guanghui, ``Party Members First Discuss Major Issues in
the Village'' [Cunli dashi dangyuan xianyi], Zhejiang Daily, 18 March
10. Party officials described in this article developed a ``Party-
Member Preliminary Consultation System'' for Party members without a
post. Guo Limin, ``Yutai Creates Village-Level Affairs Scientific
Policy Making Platform'' [Yutai dazao cunji shiwu kexue jueci pingtai],
Dazhong Daily, 6 August 10. According to this article, authorities
reportedly established a ``senator'' affiliate system. The village
Party committees in all 392 villages reportedly appointed ``senators''
from among ``old'' Party and government cadres and businessmen or
workers who now work outside the village. These ``senators'' reportedly
not only make suggestions, help with work, and even provide financing
for a variety of projects, they also have assisted in smoothing out
interactions between Hui and Han citizens, improved ``harmonious
relations,'' and resolved hundreds of disputes.
\99\ ``For the 306 Villages of Xiji County `Two Committee'
Elections, the Overall Quality of the Candidates Improves'' [Xiji 306
ge cun ``liangwei'' shunli huanjie dangxuanzhe zhengti suzhi tigao],
Ningxia Daily, summarized in Open Source Center, 22 December 10; Zhang
Xuefei, ``In Choosing Well the ``Lead Goose'' Villagers Go Straight to
the Lead'' [Xuanhao ``lingtouya'' cunmin you bentou], Yunnan Daily, 2
September 10; Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May
10.
\100\ Yang Yueqing, ``Provincial Conference on Deepening Open
Village Affairs and Democratic Management Opens'' [Quansheng shenhu
cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli gongzuo xianchang hui zhaokai], Shaanxi
Daily, 2 November 10. Shaanxi province reportedly had 314 ``difficult
villages'' and 2,900 ``weak villages.'' One hundred and fifty-six
villages now reportedly meet ``management standards.''
\101\ The list in the text contains representative types of
``difficult villages'' as defined by authorities in a variety of
locations. The sources below provide more details regarding the types
of ``difficult villages'' found in a variety of locations. Lian
Xiaofang, ``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and Democratic
Supervision of Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu gongkai he
minzhu guanli deng gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10. In the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, ``difficult villages'' include those
villages with ``relatively backward economic development,'' where
``citizen aspirations and demands have not met with a response'' and
where ``contradictions have accumulated and citizens' complaints are
relatively large.'' Hui Ji, Zhejiang Normal University Village Research
Center, ``Research Report on Guizhou Province Open Government Affairs
and Democratic Management `Difficult Villages' Governance Work'' [Dui
guizhousheng cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ``nandiancun'' zhili
gongzuo de diaoyan baogao], 11 December 09. In Guizhou province, the
category included villages that have not had successful village
elections, had long-term problems with tensions between villagers and
leaders, had longstanding issues with citizens taking grievances to
higher authorities, or had problems with transparency of village
affairs, among others. He Linping, ``Huizhou `Four-Democracy Working
Method' To Realize `Villager Management' of Village Affairs'' [Huizhou
``si minzhu gongzuofa'' shixian cunli de shiqing ``cunmin'guan''],
People's Daily, 4 August 10. In a village in Guangdong province, the
relationship between officials and villagers became ``complicated,''
and there was a high number of citizen complaints because ``a few
village cadres had the final say over everything'' and ``villagers had
no knowledge of the things they should know about, much less have the
right to participate.'' The village was known as one where there were
lots of complaints to higher levels, one that was ``ruled by men,'' and
one that was poor and underdeveloped.
\102\ See, e.g., Jiang Qiu, ``Perfecting the Systems of Open
Village Affairs and Democratic Management To Promote Social Harmony and
Stability in Rural Areas'' [Wanshan cunwu gongkai minzhu guanli zhidu,
cujin nongcun shehui hexie wending], Guangxi Daily, 27 January 11;
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010 National Civil Affairs Work Report
(Summary of Contents) [2010 nian quanguo minzheng gongzuo baogao
(neirong tiyao)], reprinted in Hebei Province Department of Civil
Affairs, 28 December 10. Following are some news articles illustrating
the various programs to resolve problems in villages. Lian Xiaofang,
``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and Democratic Supervision of
Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli deng
gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10; Zhang Xuefei et al., ``Carry
Out Duties as Promised, Let Real Achievements Speak, Malang County
Introduces `Four Double' Commitment System to Break Bottlenecks in
Supervision of Village Cadres'' [An chengnuo luzhi yong shiji shuohua -
malongxian tuixing ``si shuang'' mubiao chengnuozhi pojie cunganbu
jianguan nan pingtou], Yunnan Daily, 22 July 10; He Linping, ``Huizhou
`Four-Democracy Working Method' To Realize `Villager Management' of
Village Affairs'' [Huizhou ``si minzhu gongzuofa'' shixian cunli de
shiqing ``cunmin guan''], People's Daily, 4 August 10.
\103\ Zhou Qianjin, ``Prevent the Minority From Calling the Shots
in Village Affairs'' [Cunli de shi fangzhi xiaoshuren shuole suan],
Sichuan Daily, 18 March 10; ``Li Yuanchao: It Is Necessary To Develop
and Perfect Party Leadership Over Mechanisms of Village-Level
Autonomy'' [Li Yuanchao: yao fazhan he wanshan dang lingdao de cunji
minzhu zizhi jizhi], Chinese Communist Party Information Net, 27 August
2009; ``Liaoning Provincial Departments Strengthen Construction of
Village Grassroots Organizations'' [Liaoning sheng bushu jiaqiang
nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshe], Dongbei News Net, 15 October 10.
\104\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang li jiu shenru
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
\105\ He Xuefeng, `` `Villagers Managing Expenditures, Financial
Affairs Are Square'' [Kaizhi cunmin dangjia caiwu yiben qingzhang],
Anhui Daily, 9 August 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil
Affairs Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the
Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang
li jiu shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November
10.
\106\ Yu Qin, ``Villagers Need To Show Respect for `Transparent
Account Books' '' [``Luozhang,'' xu cunmin maizhang], Zhejiang Daily,
25 March 10.
\107\ Xu Jian, ``Village Affairs, Under the Sunshine Moving Towards
Transparency'' [Cunwu, zai yangguangxia zouxiang touming], Anhui Daily
News, 1 September 10.
\108\ The World and China Institute, Chinese Democratization Index
2.0 [Zhongguo Minzhuhua Zhibiao Yanjiu Baogao 2009], (Beijing: The
World and China Institute, 2011), 26.
\109\ ``China's Top Legislature To Step Up Oversight Work Through
Special Inquires,'' Xinhua, 10 March 11.
\110\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu
jianshe de yijian], 8 November 10, sec. 1(1).
\111\ Ibid.
\112\ ``Reining in Coercive Power,'' Beijing Review, 4 August 11.
PRC Law on Administrative Coercion [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng
qiangzhi fa], issued 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12.
\113\ ``Six Highlights of the Draft Amendments to the
Administrative Reconsideration Law'' [Xingzheng fuyifa xiuding ni
shixian mingaoguan an liu da tupo], Legal Education Net, 20 July 11;
``State Council Legislative Affairs Office: Appropriately Expand the
Scope of Acceptance of Administrative Reconsideration Cases''
[Guowuyuan fazhiban: shidu kuoda xingzheng fuyi shouan fanwei], Legal
Education Net, 17 July 11.
\114\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia
peichangfa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1
December 10, arts. 7, 35; ``New Compensation Law Brings More
Fairness,'' Global Times, 2 December 10.
\115\ Zhang Xiangdong and Zheng Yi, ``NDRC To Revise System for
Evaluating Performance of Local Officials,'' Economic Observer, 28
March 11. The National Development and Reform Commission reportedly
plans to divide regions into four categories to take differences into
consideration: ``areas optimal for development,'' ``areas for key
development,'' ``areas where development is restricted,'' and areas
where ``development is prohibited.''
\116\ Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese
Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42
(2006), 154-55.
\117\ Pan Hongqi, ``Need To Avoid Negative Effects of Including
Stability Preservation in Officials' Performance Evaluations'' [Yi
``weiwen'' kaohe guanyuan zhengji xu bimian fumian xiaoying], Beijing
Youth Daily, 16 October 10. The author of this article argues that it
would be better to evaluate the ``process'' of stability preservation
rather than evaluating just the results of stability preservation.
\118\ Ningyuan County People's Government, Detailed Rules and
Regulations for Assessing Comprehensive Order and Stability Maintenance
Marks in Villages and Towns [Du xiangzhen zongzhi weiwen kaohe pingfen
xize], last visited 25 May 11 (estimated date 2009). For more
information about the incentives for local officials to suppress
petitioners, see Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal
Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law,
Vol. 42 (2006), 154.
\119\ ``The Most Idiotic Villager Rules Ever'': Petitioners Must
Get Permission To Take Their Complaints to Higher Levels, Offenders
Grain Rations Deducted'' [``Shishang zuiniu cunmin shouze'': shangfang
xu jing xuke weizhe kou kouliang qian], Worker's Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 9 December 10. In Xiaobanqiao village, Jiaojiang district,
Taizhou city, Zhejiang province, local officials reportedly issued
``villager behavioral guidelines'' (cunmin shouze) that included the
following rule: ``Anyone who visits an administration office at a
higher level to lodge complaints without a justifiable reason and
without the permission of his respective village Party branch and
villager committee is liable to be punished by having his grain
subsidies withheld for a period ranging from one to 10 years.''
Worker's Daily reported that the villagers said a ``grain subsidy'' is
a form of cash compensation paid to villagers on a regular basis by
officials for rent or lease payments for land used by businesses.
Worker's Daily reported that ``legal experts'' advised village cadres
that the ``guidelines'' were in violation of state laws, but did not
specify which laws.
\120\ ``Wen Jiabao: The Party's Largest Danger Is Corruption'' [Wen
jiabao: zhizheng dang de zuida weixian shi fubai], China Review News,
27 August 10.
\121\ ``Graft Remains Top Public Concern Prior to Annual
Parliamentary Session: Survey,'' Xinhua, 24 February 11.
\122\ ``2010 Discipline Inspection and Supervision Agencies Case
Investigation and Management Work Situation Press Conference''
[Zhongjiwei jianchabu zhaokai 2010 nian chaban anjian gongzuo qingkuang
xinwen tongqihui], Xinhua, 6 January 11.
\123\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report March 11, 2011,
at the 4th Plenum of the 11th National People's Congress'' [Zuigao
renmin jianchayuan gongzuo baogao, 2011 nian sanyue shiyi ri zai di
shiyi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di xici huiyishang], People's
Daily, 20 March 11.
\124\ See ``Anti-Corruption Policies and Laws,'' People's Daily, 18
August 11, for a list of recent anti-corruption regulatory instruments.
\125\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on China's
Efforts To Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government,'' reprinted
in PRC Central People's Government, 29 December 10.
\126\ Central Committee of the Communist Party of China General
Office, State Council General Office, Provisions on Economic
Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the Party and the
Government and Executives of State-Owned Enterprises [Dangzheng zhuyao
lingdao ganbu he guoyouqiye lingdaoren yuan jingji zeren shenji
guiding], issued 08 December 10.
\127\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Provisions on
Implementation of the Responsibility System for Construction of an
Honest Party and a Clean Government [Guanyu shixing dangfeng lianzheng
jianshe zerenzhi de guiding], issued 15 December 10.
\128\ National People's Congress, ``PRC Criminal Law Amendment
(8)'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzhengan (8)], 25 February
11, art. 164; ``China Amends Criminal Law To Cover Foreign Bribery,
Bribery of Non-PRC Government Officials Criminalized,'' E-Alert from
Covington & Burling LLP, 1 March 11.
\129\ ``China Is Promoting Anti-Bribery Law, but Enforcement
Details Are Sparse,'' China Trade Extra, 9 August 11.
\130\ ``Central Discipline Inspection: `41 Prohibitions'
Standardize Township, Village-Level Grassroots Cadre Behavior,''
Xinhua, 15 July 11. Provisions on Rural Village Grassroots Officials'
Honest Performance of Duties (Trial Implementation) [Nongcun jiceng
ganbu lianjie luxing zhize ruogan guiding (shixing)], issued 14 July
11, arts. 8(1), 1(5).
\131\ ``Tip-Off Websites Launched To Curb Corruption,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 9 February 11.
\132\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress Regarding the Changes to the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Administrative Supervision'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui
changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng
jianchafa'' de jueding], issued 25 June 10, arts. 3, 6.
\133\ Zhao Yang, ``Supreme People's Procuratorate: More Than 70
Percent of the Cases of Work-Related Offenses Originate From Citizen
Reports'' [Zuigaojian: qicheng yishang zhiwu fanzui anjian yuanyu
qunzhong jubao], Legal Daily, 21 June 10.
\134\ Du Meng, ``70 Percent of Whistleblowers Subject to
Retribution Trend Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish
Scope'' [70% jubaozhe zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu
jieding], Legal Daily, 17 June 10.
\135\ Human Rights in China, ``Anti-Corruption Journalist Who
Served 4 Year Sentence To Serve Eight More Years'' [Fuxing 4 nian de
fanfu jizhe bei caiding zai fuxing 8 nian], 28 July 11.
\136\ Ibid.
\137\ ``Graft-Busting Site Blocked,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 January
11.
\138\ Chris Buckley, ``China Confess-a-Kickback Web Sites Draw
Inspiration From India,'' Reuters, 13 June 11.
\139\ ``China's Illegal Anti-Corruption Websites Face Closure,''
China Times News Group, 18 June 11; ``Anonymous Websites To Report
Bribery Prove Wildly Popular in China Until the Censors Arrive,''
Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 22 June 11.
\140\ ``China's Illegal Anti-Corruption Websites Face Closure,''
China Times News Group, 18 June 11.
\141\ ``Anonymous Websites To Report Bribery Prove Wildly Popular
in China Until the Censors Arrive,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
Washington Post, 22 June 11.
\142\ ``Internet Users Set Up Site To Report Bribery,'' South China
Morning Post, 14 June 11. An administrator of the site
``woxinghuiliao'' said that hackers had attacked the Web site.
\143\ US-China Business Council, "PRC Transparency Tracking,"
updated April 2011, 1.
\144\ Ibid.
\145\ Ibid.
\146\ U.S. Department of Treasury, "Third Meeting of the U.S.-China
Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact
Sheet," 10 May 11.
\147\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 17.
\148\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General
Office, Opinion Regarding Implementation of Open Party Affairs by
Grassroots-Level Party Organizations [Guanyu dang de jiceng zuzhi
shixing dangwu gongkai de yijian], issued 8 October 10; Xu Jian,
``Village Affairs, Under the Sunshine Moving Towards Transparency''
[Cunwu, zai yangguangxia zouxiang touming], Anhui Daily News, 1
September 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs
Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law
of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang li jiu
shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
\149\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding Several Issues
in Trying Open Government Information Administrative Cases, issued 13
December 10, arts. 1-2. The provisions clarify which government
organization can be sued under certain circumstances if more than one
is involved in an open government information case (art. 4). It also
stipulates that the defendant in a case must explain why the
information request was denied (art. 5). In cases involving state
secrets, commercial secrets, or personal privacy issues, the court
shall determine if the information falls within the scope of
information that should be disclosed (art. 8). It also stipulates
situations under which the court will make a determination regarding
the reasons given by the defendant for not providing the information
requested (art. 12). Zhao Yinan, ``Chinese Gain Right To Sue Govt for
Public Records,'' China Daily, 16 August 11.
\150\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11.
\151\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Media Blackout in China After Wreck,''
New York Times, 31 July 11.
\152\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General
Office, State Council General Office, Opinion Regarding Deepening Open
Government Affairs and Strengthening Government Services [Guanyu
shenhua zhengwu gongkai jiaqiang zhengwu fuwu de yijian], issued 2
August 11, item 7. See also ``Analysis of the `Opinion Regarding
Deepening Open Government Affairs and Strengthening Government
Services' '' [Jiedu ``guanyu shenhua zhengwu gongkai jiaqiang zhengwu
fuwu de yijian''], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's
Government, 3 August 11; David Bandurski, China Media Project, ``The
CCP Pushes for Openness, Again,'' 3 August 11. In addition, the Opinion
urges officials to ``make innovations in information disclosure
methods,'' ``to move ahead with openness in administrative decision-
making,'' ``to move forward with open and transparent operation of
administrative authority,'' ``to expand openness in administrative
examination and approval processes,'' ``to deepen implementation of
Open Government Information Regulations,'' ``to make an effort to
deepen open government affairs at the grassroots level,'' and ``to
strengthen openness of administrative agency internal affairs.''
\153\ Peking University, Center for Public Participation Studies
and Support, ``Some of the Open Government Information Annual Reports
Are Just a Formality'' [Bufen zhengfu xinxi gongkai nianbao zou
xingshi], 20 May 11; Beijing University Center for Public Participation
Studies and Support, ``Summary of the 2009 Annual Report on China's
Administrative Transparency,'' translated by the China Law Center, Yale
Law School, 28 September 10. The 2009 annual report assesses the
administrative transparency of 43 agencies of the State Council, 30
provinces, and 97 administrative units based on five indicators:
information disclosure on request, disclosure on own initiative,
institution building, system building, and supervision and remedy. The
report determined that, on average, provinces received higher scores
than the prefectures or cities. Further, the south-central China region
scored the highest on average, suggesting that the level of economic
development is not ``strictly proportional'' to the level of
information disclosure.
\154\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 17. It specifically
stipulates some of the categories within a budget that should be made
transparent.
\155\ ``Reluctant Transparency,'' Economic Observer, 26 July 11.
\156\ Chen Yannan, ``Finance Ministry: 88 Central Government
Departments Have Already Published 2011 Departmental Budgets''
[Caizhengbu: yiyou 88 jia zhongyang bumen gongkai 2011 nian bumen
yusuan], Administrative Transparency Watch Net, 24 May 11.
\157\ ``News on Three Public Expenses Made Public, a Good Beginning
Needs a Good End'' [Sangong xiaofei xinxi gongkai hao de kaitou hai
xuyao yige hao jieguo], Huasheng Online, 14 June 11; The ``three public
expenses'' are expenses for cars and transportation, travel overseas,
and public relations. ``Premier Wen Jiabao Convenes State Council
Standing Committee Meeting'' [Wen jiabao zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan
changwu huiyi], Xinhua, 6 July 11. The Standing Committee especially
called for the release of more detailed information related to the
``three public expenses'' and other matters of concern to citizens.
\158\ ``Central Authorities' Budget Is Made Open to the Public for
the First Time'' [Zhongyang bumen yusuan shouci xiang shehui gongkai],
Southern Weekend, 1 March 11; Chen Yannan, ``Finance Ministry: 88
Central Government Departments Have Already Published 2011 Departmental
Budgets'' [Caizhengbu: yiyou 88 jia zhongyang bumen gongkai 2011 nian
bumen yusuan], Administrative Transparency Watch Net, 24 May 11.
\159\ ``Governmental Financial Budgets: How Far Till Open and
Transparent'' [Zhengfu caizheng yusuan: li gongkai touming haiyou
duoyuan], Zhengzhou Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua, 12 April 11.
\160\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General
Office, Opinion Regarding Implementation of Open Party Affairs by
Grassroots-Level Party Organizations [Guanyu dang de jiceng zuzhi
shixing dangwu gongkai de yijian], issued 8 October 10.
\161\ Zhou Xian, ``New Beijing Measures Hold Party Leaders
Accountable,'' Beijing Daily, 22 March 11.
\162\ ``Chinese Communist Party Comprehensively Promotes Open Party
Affairs, Welcomes the 90th Birthday of Party Establishment'' [Zhonggong
quanmian tuijin dangwu gongkai yingjie jiandang 90 huadan], China News
Service, reprinted in Democracy and Law Times, 30 December 10;
``Nationally 31 Provinces, Municipalities, Autonomous Regions, Party
Committees, Organizations, and Departments Establish New Spokesperson
Systems'' [Quanguo 31 ge sheng qu shi dangwei zuzhi bumen jianli xinwen
fayanren zhidu], Xinhua, 30 June 10.
\163\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11.
\164\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 4. Authorities plan to
improve the public hearing process for major policy decisions, to
expand the scope of hearings, and to standardize hearing procedures.
The Opinion stipulates that hearing participants should have wide-
ranging representativeness, and their opinions should be used as
important references in making decisions.
\165\ Ibid.