[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Freedom of Expression
Findings
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year,
Chinese officials continued to maintain a broad range
of restrictions on free expression that do not comply
with international human rights standards, including
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such
standards permit states in limited circumstances to
restrict expression to protect interests such as
national security and public order, Chinese
restrictions covered a much broader range of activity,
including expression critical of the Communist Party
and peaceful dissent. Despite this, Chinese officials
continue to point to Internet development in China as
proof of freedom of expression and to argue that
Chinese restrictions comply with international law,
including in the case of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize
winner Liu Xiaobo.
This past year was marked by a major crackdown
on Internet and press freedom that exemplified the
range of tools officials can use to restrict the free
flow of information. The crackdown began in mid-
February following protests in the Middle East and
North Africa and the appearance of online calls for
``Jasmine'' protests in China.
While international and domestic observers
continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell
phone use in China, government and Party officials
showed little sign of loosening political control. Top
leaders, including President Hu Jintao, called for
``strengthening'' the Party's guidance of online public
opinion, as well as the Party's leadership over the
Internet. Officials established a central-level agency
to tighten supervision of the Internet and issued
regulations to increase monitoring of Internet use in
public places. Censors continued to block the sharing
of online information that officials deemed to be
politically sensitive, including news of the Nobel
Peace Prize award to imprisoned intellectual and reform
advocate Liu Xiaobo, the calls for ``Jasmine''
protests, and words such as ``human rights'' and
``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's
microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following the
Wenzhou high-speed train accident in July 2011.
Officials insisted that any reform of the
media industry would result in ``no change in the
Party's control over the media.'' Officials continued
to issue broad guidance, such as telling the media it
was their ``common responsibility'' to promote the 90th
anniversary of the Party's founding. Officials also
continued to issue specific directives, such as how to
cover the protests in the Middle East and North Africa
and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.
Harassment of foreign journalists reached a new height
this past year, including beatings and threats of
expulsion of journalists who attempted to report on the
``Jasmine'' protest strolls.
Officials continued to arbitrarily restrict
expression by abusing vague criminal law provisions and
abusing broad regulations and registration requirements
applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and
the Internet. Citizens who criticized the government
were charged with national security crimes such as
``subversion.'' Official campaigns to train and
supervise journalists conducted in the name of
combating corruption continued to be heavily imbued
with political indoctrination. Officials continued to
use campaigns they described as intended to enforce the
law to instead target ``illegal'' political and
religious publications. Such publications included ones
that ``defame the Party and state leaders'' or
``contain political rumors that create ideological
confusion.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise concerns over and draw enhanced
international attention to the Chinese government's
continued insistence that its restrictions on freedom
of expression are consistent with international
standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures
are taken to protect national security or public order
when available information indicates that many measures
are aimed at silencing opposition to the Party or
blocking the free flow of information on politically
sensitive topics. Emphasize that the Chinese
government's position undermines international human
rights standards for free expression, particularly
those contained in Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19
and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and
government censorship of the Internet and the press can
lead to instability by eroding public faith in the
media and government.
Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese
officials on the issue of how governments can best
ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are
not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to
protect national security, minors, and public order.
Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such
as public participation in formulation of restrictions
on free expression, transparency regarding
implementation of such restrictions, and independent
review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese
officials' own calls for greater transparency and
public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may
be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S.
and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the
protection of common interests on the Internet,
including protecting minors, computer security, and
privacy.
Acknowledge the Chinese government's efforts to
expand access to the Internet and cell phones,
especially in rural areas, while continuing to press
officials to comply with international standards.
Support the research and development of technologies
that enable Chinese citizens to access and share
political and religious content that they are entitled
to access and share under international human rights
standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools
and training materials that enable Chinese citizens to
access and share content in a way that ensures their
security and privacy. Support the dissemination of
online Chinese-language information on the Internet,
especially popular Chinese social media sites, that
discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese
citizens are entitled under international standards.
Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials'
instrumental use of the law, including vague national
security charges, as a tool to suppress citizens'
rights to freedom of expression, and question whether
such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the
``rule of law.''
Elevate concern over the increased harassment of
foreign journalists, who this past year have been
beaten and threatened with expulsion for attempting to
report on events of public concern. Emphasize that such
treatment is not in keeping with regulations issued for
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games in which Chinese
officials promised greater freedoms for foreign
journalists, and is not in keeping with the treatment
Chinese journalists are afforded when reporting on
events in the United States.
Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other
political prisoners imprisoned for allegedly committing
crimes of endangering state security and other crimes
but whose only offense was to peacefully express
support for political reform or criticism of government
policies, including Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February
2010 to five years in prison after using the Internet
to organize an independent investigation into school
collapses in an earthquake).
Introduction
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, Chinese
officials maintained a broad range of restrictions on free
expression that do not comply with international human rights
standards. While such standards permit states in limited
circumstances to restrict expression to protect interests such
as national security and public order, Chinese restrictions
covered a much broader range of activity, including peaceful
expression critical of the Communist Party. Chinese officials
showed little sign of loosening political control over the
Internet and cell phones. They called for strengthening the
Party's guidance of online opinion and censored politically
sensitive information, including searches for ``human rights''
or ``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's
popular microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following a
high-speed train accident in July. A top official said there
would be ``no change in the Party's control over the media,''
amidst censorship of events such as the Nobel Peace Prize award
to imprisoned Chinese intellectual and reform advocate Liu
Xiaobo and intensified harassment of foreign journalists.
Officials continued to abuse vague criminal charges, including
subversion, to target peaceful speech critical of the Party.
Officials maintained broad regulations and registration
requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news media,
and the Internet.
International Standards for Free Expression
Many Chinese restrictions on free expression do not comply
with international human rights standards. Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is
(1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of
others or protecting national security, public order, public
health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law;
and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve
the purported aim.\1\ Regarding the purpose requirement, the UN
Human Rights Council has said restrictions on ``discussion of
government policies and political debate,'' ``peaceful
demonstrations or political activities, including for peace and
democracy,'' and ``expression of dissent,'' are inconsistent
with Article 19 of the ICCPR.\2\ As outlined in this section,
Chinese officials continued to restrict expression on the
Internet and in the media for impermissible purposes, such as
to stifle peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. As to
restrictions clearly set forth in law, Chinese officials this
past year abused vaguely worded criminal law provisions and
resorted to extralegal measures to arbitrarily restrict free
expression. As to the narrowness requirement, as documented in
this section, Chinese restrictions continued to be overly broad
and disproportionate to protecting the stated interest. In May
2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted that
restrictions on expression should be applied by an independent
body and include the possibility of remedy against abuse.\3\ As
noted in this section, in China there remained no independent
checks on government abuse.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official Response to Overseas Protests and Calls for Domestic
``Jasmine'' Protests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year was marked by a crackdown on free expression in China
in early 2011 that followed protests in the Middle East and North
Africa and the appearance of online calls for ``Jasmine'' protests
domestically. Protests in the Middle East began in Tunisia in December
2010 and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the
region. In February 2011, the ``Jasmine'' calls began circulating
online in China.\4\ They called for weekly non-violent protest strolls
in select cities to demand an end to corruption and to promote issues
such as judicial independence, free expression, and political
reform.\5\
MEDIA AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP
Officials reportedly censored Chinese media coverage of the Middle
East and North Africa protests. According to leaked censorship
instructions, officials allegedly ordered Chinese media to use only
stories issued by the central government news agency, Xinhua, and
banned reporting on demands for democracy in the Middle East or drawing
comparisons to China's political system.\6\ Western media observed
Chinese media relying heavily on Xinhua stories and observed one-sided
coverage emphasizing the dangers of democracy for countries not ready
for it.\7\ At the time, online censors reportedly blocked searches of
the words ``Egypt,'' ``Libya,'' ``Jasmine,'' and ``democracy.'' \8\ The
duration and effectiveness of the censorship was unclear. Foreign media
attempting to report on the ``Jasmine'' protests encountered intense
harassment. [See Foreign Journalists below for more information.]
HARASSMENT, DETENTIONS OF CHINESE CITIZENS
Starting in mid-February 2011, Chinese authorities also targeted large
numbers of writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform
advocates. Many were outspoken critics of the government; some tried to
share information about the ``Jasmine'' protest calls, while the
connection of others, if any, to the calls was unclear.\9\ Officials
detained numerous citizens on national security and public disturbance
charges.\10\ [For information on these and other individual cases in
the crackdown, see Internet and Other Electronic Media, and Abuse of
Criminal Laws To Punish Free Expression in this section.] The UN
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other
international groups noted reports of numerous Chinese citizens having
gone missing or disappearing into official custody with little or no
information about their charges or whereabouts.\11\ [For more
information on the apparent disregard of criminal procedural
protections in connection with the disappearances, see Enforced
Disappearances in Section II--Criminal Justice.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet and Other Electronic Media
BLOCKING AND FILTERING POLITICAL CONTENT
In China, officials are not transparent about the content
that is blocked or why it is blocked,\12\ and they continue to
arbitrarily block content for purposes impermissible under
international standards. Chinese authorities expressed anger
over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned
prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo in
October 2010, for example, and blocked online searches for
``Nobel Peace Prize'' or ``Liu Xiaobo'' and text messages
containing Liu's name.\13\ In January 2011, authorities
reportedly banned hundreds of words, including ``democracy''
and ``human rights'' from cell phone text messages.\14\
Politically sensitive Web sites continued to be blocked,
including a popular Tibetan culture site, an anticorruption
site, and a public health advocacy Web site.\15\ Officials also
continued to block information in a disproportionate manner
that did not appear necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. For
example, access to overseas sites such as Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube remained completely blocked.\16\ In late May 2011,
officials reportedly imposed broad blocks on Internet and cell
phone access in the northern part of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region following a series of mostly peaceful
protests sparked by the death of a herder.\17\
Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens
who sought to share politically sensitive content online. In
each case, the activity appeared to pose little threat to
national security or public order, or the punishment appeared
disproportionate to the alleged offense. For example, rights
defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) sent a
satirical Twitter message urging anti-Japanese protesters to
converge on the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World
Expo.\18\ The Xinxiang City Reeducation Through Labor (RTL)
Committee in Henan province ordered her to serve one year of
RTL in November 2010.\19\ In April 2011, authorities in
Chongqing municipality ordered a citizen to serve RTL for
posting scatological humor in a critique of the policies of
Chongqing's Party Secretary Bo Xilai.\20\ In November 2010,
Shanghai police interrogated the writer Xia Shang after he
offered to buy flowers for victims of a Shanghai fire in an
Internet post.\21\ Officials treated citizens who sought to
share information about the calls for domestic ``Jasmine''
protests, which appeared to be a non-violent call for political
reform, as threats to the state. The detained included Hua
Chunhui, an insurance company manager and activist who
reportedly sent Twitter messages about the ``Jasmine'' protest
calls and was charged with endangering state security.\22\ In
April 2011, officials in Jiangsu province ordered Hua to serve
18 months of RTL.\23\ In February, police in Harbin city,
Heilongjiang province, detained Internet blogger Liang Haiyi on
suspicion of the crime of ``subversion of state power.'' Police
accused her of posting information about the ``Jasmine''
protests on the popular QQ microblogging site.\24\
The types of content prohibited online in China are not
clearly defined in law, and thus conflict with international
standards. Chinese Internet regulations contain vague and broad
prohibitions on content that, for example, ``harms the honor or
interests of the nation,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts
national policies on religion.'' \25\ Chinese law does not
define these concepts.\26\ In China, the government places the
burden on Internet service and content providers to monitor and
remove content based on these vague standards and to maintain
records of such activity and report it to the government.\27\
In February 2011, a manager at Renren, a major social media
company similar to Facebook, said that the company censored
sensitive content using a staff of 500 and a keyword filtering
system, and that the ``CEO would have to have a coffee with the
government'' for any misstep.\28\ The Party's influence over
the technology sector was evident in June, when more than 60
representatives from top Chinese Internet companies, including
Sina and Baidu, gathered in Shanghai to commemorate the Party's
90th anniversary.\29\ Also in June, Sina announced plans to
launch an English microblog site in the United States, which
could have the effect of exporting Chinese censorship to
overseas markets.\30\ The U.S.-based company Google, which has
operations in China and which in early 2010 challenged Chinese
censorship requirements, reportedly continued to face problems
in China. In March 2011, Google reported that the Chinese
government appeared to be interfering with its email service in
China and making it look like a technical problem.\31\ The
government denied the charge.\32\ In June, Google reported that
an attack on hundreds of personal Gmail accounts, including
those of Chinese political activists, senior U.S. officials,
and journalists, had originated from China.\33\ The Party's
official newspaper rejected the allegation.\34\
PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON THE INTERNET
In addition to blocking certain types of content, officials
in China control the Internet by determining who gains access
to the medium through numerous licensing requirements (i.e.,
prior restraints). All Web sites hosted in China are required
either to be licensed by or registered with the government, and
sites providing news content or audio and video services
require an additional license or registration.\35\ In a 2011
report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Free Expression said that
licensing requirements ``cannot be justified in the case of the
Internet, as it can accommodate an unlimited number of points
of entry and an essentially unlimited number of users.'' \36\
In October 2010, Chinese media reported that as of the end of
September 2010 Chinese Internet companies had inspected nearly
1.8 million Web sites and shut down 3,000 for failing to
register.\37\ In July 2011, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) reported a 41 percent decrease in the number of
Web sites in China in 2010 to 1.91 million sites.\38\ The
report's editor cited government campaigns targeting
``obscene'' sites and the economic downturn as reasons for the
decrease, and said in recent years few sites had been closed
``purely to control speech.'' \39\ Other observers in China,
however, attributed the decrease to the chilling effect of
expanding government control.\40\ The CASS study also claimed
that the United States was using new media, including the Voice
of America, to threaten China's ``ideological safety.'' \41\
EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, WHILE MAINTAINING CONTROL
The government has pledged to expand access to the Internet
and cell phones.\42\ Official statistics indicate that by the
end of 2010, there were 457 million Internet users in China,
including a growing number in rural areas, and by April 2011,
900 million mobile phone accounts.\43\ Officials have sought to
expand the Internet to promote economic development and
government propaganda.\44\ Still, international observers and
Western media continue to note the difficulties officials have
in controlling this emerging and vibrant space for expression,
including expression of criticism of the government and
discussion of some politically sensitive topics.\45\ In July
2011, for example, users on China's two most popular Twitter-
type microblogs posted some 26 million messages after a high-
speed train crash near Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province.\46\
Officials reportedly censored some messages, but a large number
of messages either were allowed through or appeared too quickly
for censors to react.\47\
Official statements and actions continue to emphasize
control rather than freedom on the Internet. The importance of
maintaining official control was reinforced in May 2011, when
officials established a State Internet Information Office to
``supervise and urge relevant departments to strengthen their
supervision of online content, and to be responsible for
approvals for online news services and other related services
as well as day-to-day oversight.'' \48\ In China, the Communist
Party exercises tight control over government agencies that
manage the media and Internet.\49\ This relationship gives the
Party discretion to use government restrictions not just for
the purpose of regulating pornography, intellectual property
violations, and protecting minors--permissible purposes under
international standards--but also to serve the Party's
interests. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao called for
``strengthening the mechanisms for guiding online public
opinion.'' \50\ The practice of authorities paying Chinese
citizens to post comments favorable to the government and Party
on the Internet reportedly continued.\51\ In February,
Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou
Yongkang said authorities should ``coalesce a comprehensive''
structure for managing the Internet ``under the Party
committee's unified leadership.'' \52\ In Beijing, authorities
reportedly issued regulations requiring bars, hotels, and other
public places to purchase and install costly software to
monitor the identities of people using wireless services at
those locations.\53\
Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression
Officials continued to use the criminal charges of
``subversion'' and ``inciting subversion'' (Article 105 of the
PRC Criminal Law) this past year, in part in connection with
the crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and
North Africa and the calls for ``Jasmine'' protests
domestically.\54\ According to the non-governmental
organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders, out of a
total of 48 individuals detained since mid-February 2011,
officials had charged at least 17 with ``subversion'' or
``inciting subversion.'' \55\ Ran Yunfei, a prolific writer,
blogger, and activist, was arrested in March for ``inciting
subversion.'' \56\ Authorities released him in August but
placed him under ``residential restriction'' for six months,
restricting his movements and ability to write and speak.\57\
In March, police in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, detained
prominent blogger Guo Weidong on suspicion of ``inciting
subversion of state power'' after alleging he had forwarded
information online about the protests.\58\
Officials also charged numerous persons with ``creating
disturbances,'' a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal
Law.\59\ Officials detained the human rights activist Wei Qiang
on the charge of ``creating a disturbance'' in March 2011,
before releasing him on bail to await trial in April.\60\ In
February, Wei was at the site of one of the ``Jasmine'' protest
strolls in Beijing and reported on the scene using his Twitter
account. Amid the broader crackdown, authorities in March 2011
also detained the Beijing-based rights advocate Wang Lihong on
the charge of creating a disturbance, but in connection with
activities stemming from almost a year earlier.\61\ They
alleged that Wang had used the Internet to organize protests
outside a court in support of three bloggers accused of
defamation for helping a woman call on officials to
reinvestigate her daughter's death.\62\ In September, after a
trial reportedly marked by procedural irregularities,\63\ a
Beijing court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for
creating a disturbance.\64\
In the case of the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, officials
charged him with economic crimes, alleging that his company had
evaded ``a huge amount of tax.'' \65\ Ai had become an
outspoken critic of government policies and had been keeping
track of the lawyers, bloggers, and activists swept up in the
crackdown, when officials detained him in April.\66\
Authorities had refused to notify his family of the charges
against him or his whereabouts and kept him at a secret
location, purportedly under ``residential surveillance.'' \67\
During his 81 days in custody, Ai was reportedly kept in a cell
without windows and was accompanied by two guards.\68\
Authorities released Ai on bail in June on the condition that
he not give interviews or use Twitter.\69\ In August, Ai
resumed his Twitter messages and told a Western newspaper, ``I
can't be alive and not express my feelings.'' \70\
The actual threat these citizens posed to state security
and public order or whether the underlying crime was the actual
motivation for official action is unclear, as details regarding
many of these cases remain limited. Available information
suggests that officials targeted the citizens to stifle
political expression and dissent. Many of the citizens targeted
had track records of criticizing the government and Communist
Party and advocating for democracy and human rights.\71\ As the
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Chinese Human
Rights Defenders have noted in recent years, the vagueness of
Chinese crimes of endangering state security, including
subversion, lends itself to official abuse of freedom of
speech, and Chinese courts make little assessment of whether
the speech in question poses a threat to state security.\72\
There were other cases of alleged subversion or splittism this
past year. In October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei
province, arrested the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of
subversion; Li had written numerous essays in support of
democracy.\73\ In November, Beijing authorities detained
activist Bai Dongping on inciting subversion charges after he
posted online a photo of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\74\ In
December, three Tibetan writers, Kalsang Jinpa, Jangtse Donkho,
and Buddha were sentenced to prison terms of three to four
years for inciting splittism after articles they had written
about the 2008 Tibetan protests appeared in a magazine.\75\ In
March 2011, authorities in Suining city, Sichuan province,
sentenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin to 10 years in prison
for seeking to incite subversion by writing essays advocating
for, among other things, democracy, and posting them on Web
sites outside of China.\76\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Defend Liu Xiaobo Case on Grounds of International Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
After imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, Chinese authorities
sought to defend their handling of his case as consistent with
international law. After the award was announced, China's central
government news agency, Xinhua, issued an analysis of the case based on
the findings of a Chinese criminal law scholar, Gao Mingxuan.\77\ The
analysis noted that international treaties and nearly every country's
laws criminalize some speech, and that Liu's speech had sought to
incite the overthrow of the Chinese government.\78\ Xinhua failed to
note that the essays and activities cited as evidence against Liu, who
was sentenced to 11 years in prison, did not advocate violence and
instead called for nonviolence and gradual political reform.\79\ A May
2011 opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded
that Chinese authorities' handling of Liu's case violated both his
right to fair trial and his right to political free speech as provided
under international law.\80\ Chinese officials responded to the Nobel
announcement by detaining citizens who distributed leaflets and posted
online messages in support of Liu.\81\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extralegal Harassment
Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict
the travel of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to
punish and stifle expression. Under illegal home confinement
after his release, self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng
and his wife Yuan Weijing recorded video of themselves
describing the round-the-clock surveillance and harassment they
faced.\82\ After the video was smuggled out and posted online
in February 2011, security officials reportedly beat Chen and
Yuan on two occasions.\83\ After the Nobel announcement in
October 2010, authorities confined Liu Xia, the wife of Liu
Xiaobo, to her home in Beijing and cut off her communications
to the outside world.\84\ A May 2011 opinion of the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Liu Xia's house
arrest violates international standards.\85\ After his release
from prison in December, China Democracy Party co-founder Qin
Yongmin was harassed by police in Wuhan city, Hubei province,
who accused him of speaking to reporters.\86\ Officials refused
to allow the noted writer Liao Yiwu to attend the March 2011
PEN World Writers Festival in New York and a literary festival
in Australia in May.\87\ In July, Liao escaped China at the
Vietnam border. He fled to Berlin in anticipation of the
publication of a memoir on the four years he spent in a Chinese
prison for writing a poem on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\88\
The Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng reportedly has been beaten,
harassed, and prevented from participating in a Buddhist
celebration by authorities in Guangdong province following his
release from prison in February 2010.\89\ Wu previously served
11 years for alleged economic crimes, although reports connect
that imprisonment to his issuance of letters to China's
leadership calling for reforms and an end to corruption.\90\
Freedom of the Press
Chinese government and Communist Party control over the
press continued to violate international standards.
International experts identify media serving ``as government
mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the
public interest'' as a major challenge to free expression.\91\
In China, officials expect the media to serve as the Party and
government's mouthpiece. In a November 2010 speech on political
reform, Liu Binjie, director of the government agency
responsible for regulating the press, the General
Administration on Press and Publication, said any reform must
be ``beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party's
leadership over press and publishing work. . . . From beginning
to end we must insist on . . . no change to the nature of press
and publishing serving as mouthpiece of the Party and the
people, no change in the Party's control over the media.'' \92\
In January 2011, a spokesperson for the State Administration
for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said officials had
ruled out any moves to commercialize radio and television
stations. ``Radio and television stations are the Party's
important news media and battleground for propagandizing
ideology and culture . . . and propaganda must remain its
focus,'' he said.\93\ In November 2010, the Party's official
journal, Seeking Truth, cited the experience of the former
Soviet Union to argue against any liberalization of China's
press.\94\
Authorities have allowed reporters some room to exercise
``public supervision'' duties over local officials and local
matters, but in recent years have sought to rein in this space.
In the summer of 2010, for example, the Central Propaganda
Department reportedly barred more commercially oriented
``metropolitan'' (dushi) newspapers from publishing
``negative'' stories about incidents in other geographic areas
within China or carrying stories published by newspapers based
in other areas, a practice known as ``outside area
supervision.'' \95\ Rhetorically, officials continue to claim
that the rights of legally recognized journalists should be
protected, although the content of such rights remains
unclear.\96\ Emboldened by official claims that journalists
deserve protection, Chinese journalists protested a series of
incidents during the summer of 2010 in which local officials
and commercial interests had targeted a number of journalists,
including threatening them with charges of criminal
defamation.\97\ Despite such protests, a deputy editor at
Caijing, a Chinese financial magazine known for its
investigative reporting, noted the ``core problem: our police
and judiciary are not independent and there is widespread
collusion between officials and enterprises.'' \98\ In July,
the Party issued an order censoring news coverage of a high-
speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province,
forcing newspapers to discard pages containing coverage of the
incident.\99\ The order came after Chinese citizens flooded the
Internet with messages questioning officials' response and
openness following the crash.\100\ A number of Chinese
journalists expressed outrage at the propaganda order on their
blogs, and at least one news weekly appeared to ignore the
order.\101\
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH PARTY DIRECTIVES
This past year, officials continued to publicly issue broad
directives on what China's domestic media should report,
reminding journalists of their duty to ``correctly'' (zhengque)
guide public opinion. On Journalists' Day in China in November
2010, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, said
that ``a correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party
and the people.'' \102\ He called on the news media to
``propagandize the Party's positions.'' \103\ To prepare for
the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party in July 2011, Central Propaganda Department director Liu
Yunshan said in April that covering the anniversary was the
``common responsibility of media organizations at various
levels.'' \104\ He called on evening and metropolitan
newspapers to ``use vivid stories and inspiring topics to
illustrate the glorious history of our Party's struggle'' and
urged online media to ``help the large numbers of netizens
understand the Party's great historical course by publishing
special postings, background links, and online interviews.''
\105\ In May 2011, an official at SARFT confirmed that
television stations had been verbally ordered not to air
detective and time travel shows during the anniversary
period.\106\
The Party, through its Central Propaganda Department, lower
level propaganda departments, and other government agencies,
also issues more specific directives to the media on what they
can and cannot report on. These directives are considered state
secrets, but their contents continue to be leaked to the public
and reported on by foreign and Hong Kong media and non-
governmental organizations. In an April 2011 Washington Post
story, unnamed Chinese editors and journalists confirmed the
substance of a series of directives issued in March that
appeared to reflect official nervousness over the North Africa
and Middle East protests.\107\ In January 2011, the
International Federation of Journalists released a report
documenting more than 80 censorship orders in 2010.\108\ The
orders reportedly blocked information on ``public health,
disasters, corruption and civil unrest.'' \109\ A virtual news
blackout, including the blacking out of Western stations
broadcast in China, followed the Nobel Peace Prize announcement
in October 2010.\110\ The only news stories were from state-run
media outlets such as Xinhua and Global Times, which reported
on Chinese displeasure with the award.\111\ In January 2011,
the Central Propaganda Department reportedly ordered media not
to use the phrase ``civil society'' in their reports.\112\
PUNISHMENT OF JOURNALISTS
Journalists and news media who issued news reports that
authorities did not approve of continued to face punishment. In
December 2010, a reporter at Southern Weekend said that the
paper had been ordered to cease publication of an annual media
award.\113\ In January 2011, the outspoken journalist Chang
Ping, who worked for the Southern Daily Group, reported that he
had been dismissed from his job under pressure from
authorities.\114\ That same month, Time Weekly placed one of
its editors, Peng Xiaoyun, on what appeared to be involuntary
leave after the paper ran a story mentioning prominent
activists and several signers of Charter 08.\115\ Titled the
``100 Most Influential People of Our Time'' and published in
mid-December, the list included Zhao Lianhai, the advocate for
victims of tainted milk.\116\ After the story's publication,
copies reportedly were recalled and Peng and another editor
were required to write self-criticisms.\117\ In March 2011,
Peng reported that she had been dismissed.\118\ The publishers
of another Guangzhou-based publication, South Wind Window,
reportedly demoted its president and suspended another
journalist after officials criticized a story they deemed
``anti-government and anti-Communist Party.'' \119\ Following
the Wenzhou train crash, China's central television network
suspended Wang Qinglei after the host of a program he produced
questioned the Railway Ministry's response to the incident, and
removed another program after it criticized the ministry's
spokesman.\120\
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS AND
JOURNALISTS
All news media are subject to an extensive licensing system
and continual government oversight. In order to legally report
the news, domestic newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as
well as individual journalists, must obtain a license or
accreditation from the government.\121\ Radio and television
broadcast journalists must pass a government-sponsored exam
that tests them on basic knowledge of Marxist views of news and
Communist Party principles.\122\ In the 2010 Annual Report, the
Commission reported that government officials were planning to
require all journalists to pass a similar exam, but it is
unclear whether this exam has been implemented.\123\ Ongoing
training initiatives for journalists continued to be heavily
imbued with political indoctrination. In November,
teleconferences with journalists across China were held in
connection with a new campaign to ``Stop False Reporting,
Strengthen Social Responsibility, and Strengthen Construction
of News Profession Ethics.'' \124\ The campaign sought to
``guide editors and journalists to grasp the basics of Marxist
views of news . . . in order to strengthen the feeling of glory
and mission in doing the Party's news work well.'' \125\
According to an April 2011 article on the China Journalists
Association Web site on 14 newspaper units that carried out
``self-education,'' journalists at one Beijing newspaper were
reminded that ``news media are the mouthpiece of the Party and
people . . . and not simply a commercial activity.'' \126\
International experts have criticized a general licensing
requirement for journalists.\127\ In a 2010 joint declaration
on challenges to free expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression and his international
counterparts identified as challenges ``registration
requirements for print media'' and government rules against
``publishing false news.'' \128\ Chinese officials continue to
exercise their discretion to shut down unlicensed media. In
March 2011, China's main press regulator, the General
Administration on Press and Publication, announced a 100-day
campaign to, among other objectives, shut down ``illegal''
reporting offices.\129\
FOREIGN JOURNALISTS
This past year the Commission observed a spike in the
intensity and level of harassment against foreign journalists
as they attempted to report on events considered sensitive by
Chinese officials. In February 2011, foreign journalists who
traveled to Linyi city, Shandong province, to report on the
home confinement of self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng
encountered violent groups of men who roughed them up,
threatened them with bricks, and destroyed equipment.\130\ The
journalists contacted local police but received no
assistance.\131\ In late February and early March 2011, Chinese
authorities harassed foreign journalists attempting to cover
the ``Jasmine'' protest strolls at sites in Beijing and other
parts of China.\132\ On February 27, reporters covering the
Wangfujing site in Beijing met rough treatment from officials,
and one journalist was reportedly beaten and later sought
treatment at a hospital.\133\ Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi denied that any foreign journalists had been beaten, and
foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said the journalists had
disrupted ``normal order'' and violated unspecified rules.\134\
Harassment continued in the days that followed, with officials
asking a journalist to sign a pledge promising never to report
on the ``Jasmine'' protests and officials threatening to expel
journalists or revoke their press credentials.\135\ In April,
plainclothes police detained, and in at least one case roughed
up, foreign reporters attempting to cover an outdoor Christian
religious gathering.\136\ In May 2011, the professional
association of international journalists in China, the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China, said 94 percent of survey
respondents believed reporting conditions in China had
deteriorated, with 70 percent saying they faced interference,
violence, or other harassment during the past year, and 40
percent saying their sources had encountered official
harassment.\137\
RESTRICTIONS ON ``ILLEGAL'' PUBLISHING AND POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS
PUBLICATIONS
The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to
root out unlicensed publications and publications containing
what officials deemed to be ``illegal'' political and religious
content. In China, no one may publish, print, copy, or
distribute a publication without government approval, and
publishers must submit to ongoing government supervision.\138\
To obtain government approval, a publisher must meet minimum
capital requirements, obtain a government-approved sponsor, and
accord with the state's own plans for the publishing
industry.\139\ Once approved, publishers must submit written
reports of their publishing activities to the government and
seek advance approval to publish on matters that involve
``state security'' or ``social stability.'' \140\ In March
2011, the State Council amended the Regulations of the
Administration of Publications, leaving these general
requirements intact and adding new provisions requiring those
who distribute publications over the Internet or information
networks to obtain a license and requiring specialized
personnel to take a state exam to show compliance with state-
imposed qualifications.\141\
Those who ``illegally'' engage in business activities,
including publishing without a license, remain subject to
criminal penalties under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law,
and officials continue to use this charge to target political
speech.\142\ In August 2010, authorities in Shaanxi province
detained author and journalist Xie Chaoping on this charge
after he published a book on the relocation of citizens
affected by a hydroelectric dam.\143\ Prosecutors refused to
approve Xie's arrest for insufficient evidence.\144\ In
December 2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into
custody in apparent connection to a new book he authored that
reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from China,
saying the writer had engaged in ``illegal publishing.'' \145\
The Chinese government reported in September 2010 that Mongol
rights advocate Sodmongol was being tried in connection to
``counterfeiting book registration numbers and illegally
publishing and selling books.'' \146\ In April 2010 authorities
detained Sodmongol while he was en route to attend the UN
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.\147\
Government agencies police content based on vague and
sweeping prohibitions on content deemed by officials to
``destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and
habits,'' ``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harm
the honor or interests of the nation.'' \148\ Provincial and
local authorities continued to target ``illegal'' political and
religious publications. In March 2011, a Chinese news report
said authorities in Heilongjiang province would ``strictly
confiscate political illegal publications and publications that
defame the Party and state leaders, along with illegal
publications that incite ethnic division.'' \149\ It also said
authorities would emphasize blocking and confiscating ``illegal
political publications'' that ``hostile foreign forces cook
up,'' or that ``domestic lawless persons illegally print or
copy to disseminate political rumors,'' or that ``create
ideological confusion.'' \150\ In April, authorities in Jiangxi
province seized some 632 publications that constituted
``illegal religious propaganda.'' \151\ Also in April,
authorities in Guang'an city, Sichuan province, reportedly
destroyed some 30 items that were ``illegal political
publications, [related to the] Falun Gong cult organization,
and illegal religious propaganda,'' as well as 1,141 ``illegal
newspapers and journals.'' \152\
Endnotes
\1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A
(III) of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the
standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under
Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Council, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/
17/27, para. 24.
\2\ UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection
of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights
Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para.
5(p)(i).
\3\ In its May 2011 report, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression stated
that ``any legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression
must be applied by a body which is independent of any political,
commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against
abuse, including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its
abusive application.'' UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.
\4\ Wu Yu, `` `Jasmine Revolution' Circulates Online, Chinese
Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts'' [Wangchuan ``molihua
geming,'' zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle, 19 February
11.&
\5\ ``China's `Jasmine Revolution,' Assembly Sites in Each Major
City'' [Zhongguo ``molihua geming'' geda chengshi jihui didian], Boxun,
19 February 11; Wu Yu, `` `Jasmine Revolution' Circulates Online,
Chinese Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts'' [Wangchuan
``molihua geming,'' zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle,
19 February 11; Human Rights in China, ``Jasmine Organizers Call for
Rallies Every Sunday,'' 22 February 11.
\6\ ``Latest Directives From the Ministry of Truth, January 2-28,
2011,'' China Digital Times, 8 February 11; ``Latest Directives From
the Ministry of Truth, February 17-24, 2011,'' China Digital Times, 23
February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to
Information on Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\7\ Jeremy Page, ``Beijing Blocks Protest Reports,'' Wall Street
Journal, 31 January 11; Edward Wong and David Barboza, ``Wary of Egypt
Unrest, China Censors Web,'' New York Times, 31 January 11. See, e.g.,
``Color Revolutions Will Not Bring About Real Democracy,'' Global
Times, 30 January 11.
\8\ Michael Kan, ``China Microblogs Block Chinese Word for `Egypt,'
'' IDG News, reprinted in PCWorld, 29 January 11; Jeremy Page, ``China
Co-Opts Social Media To Head Off Unrest,'' Wall Street Journal, 22
February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to
Information on Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\9\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11. For
CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders,
Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 3 May 11.
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China:
UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced
Disappearances,'' 8 April 11; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Arrests,
Disappearances Require International Response,'' 31 March 11; Amnesty
International, ``China: New Generation of Internet Activists
Targeted,'' 23 March 11.
\12\ Barbara Demick, ``China Has Many `Dirty Words,' '' Los Angeles
Times, 21 April 10; Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, ``China's Censors
Thrive in Obscurity,'' Wall Street Journal, 31 March 10. Zhang Lei,
``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times, 25 February 10.
\13\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China, Angered by Peace Prize, Blocks
Celebration,'' New York Times, 9 October 10; ``PRC Blocks Web, Text
Message Reports of Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo,'' Agence France-Presse,
8 October 10; Pascale Trouillaud, ``China Wages Propaganda War After
Nobel,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.
\14\ ``New Controls on Text Messages,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 January
11.
\15\ ``China, Tibet: The End of TibetCul.com? '' Global Voices, 19
March 11; ``Graft-Busting Site Blocked,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 January
11; ``China Closes AIDS Website,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11.
\16\ Sky Canaves, ``What Are You Allowed To Say on China's Social
Networks? '' IEEE Spectrum, June 2011.
\17\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Internet Is Collateral Victim of
Crackdown on Inner Mongolia Protests,'' 31 May 11. For CECC analysis,
see ``Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands
Use, Mining Operations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
1 July 11.
\18\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``News Flash: Rights Defender
Wang Yi About To Be Sent to Reeducation Through Labor'' [Kuai xun:
weiquan renshi wang yi zheng yao bei song qu laojiao], reprinted in
Boxun, 15 November 10; Amnesty International, ``Chinese Woman Sentenced
to a Year in Labour Camp Over Tweet,'' 17 November 10. For CECC
analysis, see ``Henan Authorities Order One-Year Reeducation Through
Labor Sentence for Activist's Satirical Tweet,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ ``Netizen `Re-educated' for Online Rant,'' Radio Free Asia, 6
June 11.
\21\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Caught in an `Authoritarian Moment,' ''
New York Times, 25 November 10.
\22\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.
\23\ ``Guangzhou Lawyer Liu Zhengqing Arrested and House Searched,
Zheng Chuangtian Seeks Defense and Hua Chunhui Receives Reeducation
Through Labor'' [Guangzhou lushi liu zhengqing beibu chaojia, zheng
chuangtian qubao hua chunhui chuan laojiao], Radio Free Asia, 1 April
11.
\24\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.
\25\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00,
effective 25 September 00, art. 15.
\26\ See, e.g., a November 2010 China Daily article that notes the
concerns of one Chinese professor, who said there is a need for
specific laws to determine when citizens have ``spread rumors.'' Li
Xinzhu, ``Latest Batch of Rogue Netizens Exposed,'' China Daily, 3
November 10.
\27\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00,
effective 25 September 00, arts. 15-16; Provisions on the
Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25
September 05, arts. 19-21.
\28\ Lana Lam, ``Social Media Finding Ways Around Censors,'' South
China Morning Post, 13 February 11.
\29\ Zhang Duo, et al., ``Online Media Visit `First Congress'
Meeting Site in Nanhu, Li Yanhong Speaks on Behalf of Members''
[Wangluo meiti tanfang ``yi da'' huizhi nanhu li yanhong daibiao
chengyuan fayan], Xinhua, 8 June 11.
\30\ Melanie Lee, ``Sina To Launch English Microblog by Year-End,''
Reuters, 7 June 11.
\31\ Loretta Chao, ``Google Objects to China's Acts,'' Wall Street
Journal, 22 March 11.
\32\ Chris Buckley, ``Ministry Spokeswoman Says Accusations
`Unacceptable,' '' Reuters, 22 March 11.
\33\ ``Ensuring Your Information Is Safe Online,'' The Official
Google Blog, 1 June 11.
\34\ Michael Wines, ``China Rejects Google's Hacking Charge,'' New
York Times, 6 June 11.
\35\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00,
effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures
for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing
hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05,
effective 20 March 05, art. 5; Provisions on the Administration of
Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli
guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 5,
11, 12; Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio
Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding],
issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January 08, art. 7.
\36\ The Special Rapporteur also noted that such licensing schemes
should be distinguished from ``registration with a domain name
authority for purely technical reasons or rules of general application
which apply without distinction to any kind of commercial operation.''
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 28. In China,
because the registration system gives the government discretion to
reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site
operator intends to post ``news,'' and if so, whether it is authorized
to do so), it is qualitatively different from registration which all
Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and
constitutes a de facto licensing scheme. Measures for the
Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu
guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art.
4; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet
Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an
guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 5.
\37\ ``Nationwide 3000 Web Sites Closed for Failing To Register,
636,000 Domain Names No Longer Resolving'' [Quanguo guanbi 3000 ge wei
bei'an wangzhan, tingzhi jiexi 63.6 wan yuming], Sina, 28 October 10.
\38\ Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, ``The Indigenization and
Socialization of China's New Media--Characteristics, Dissemination
Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in
China in 2010'' [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua--2010 nian
zhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi],
taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo
xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.
\39\ Priscilla Jiao, ``41pc of Mainland Websites Close in Just One
Year,'' South China Morning Post, 13 July 11.
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, ``The Indigenization and
Socialization of China's New Media--Characteristics, Dissemination
Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in
China in 2010'' [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua--2010 nian
zhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi],
taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo
xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.
\42\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on the State
of the Internet in China'' [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang bai pi
shu], 8 June 10, sec. I.
\43\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``27th Statistical
Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 27 ci zhongguo
hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha tongji baogao], 19 January 11,
12, 21; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ``Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology Announces April 2011
Telecommunications Industry Operating Situation'' [Gongye he xinxihua
bu fabu 2011 nian 4 yue tongxinye yunxing zhuangkuang], 24 May 11.
\44\ ``Wang Chen: Chinese Government Attaches Great Importance to
and Actively Promotes the Development and Utilization of the Internet''
[Wang chen: zhongguo zhengfu gaodu zhongshi bing jiji cujin hulianwang
fazhan yu yunyong], China.com, 30 December 10; ``Hu Jintao: Firmly
Raise the Standard for Scientization of Social Management'' [Hu jintao:
zhazhashishi tigao shehui guanli kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19
February 11.
\45\ Guobin Yang, ``China's Gradual Revolution,'' New York Times,
13 March 11; Keith B. Richburg, ``In China, Microblogging Sites Become
Free-Speech Platform,'' Washington Post, 27 March 11; Michael Wines,
``China's Censors Misfire in Abuse-of-Power Case,'' New York Times, 17
November 10. One U.S.-based Chinese Internet expert tallied 60 major
cases of online activism in 2009 and 2010, but noted that the protests
were primarily local and directed at corrupt officials and specific
instances of injustice and that government controls had prevented more
``broad-based coalitions.'' Guobin Yang, ``China's Gradual
Revolution,'' New York Times, 13 March 11.
\46\ Michael Wines and Sharon LaFraniere, ``In Baring Facts of
Train Crash, Blogs Erode China Censorship,'' New York Times, 28 July
11.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ ``State Internet Information Office Established'' [Guojia
hulianwang xinxi bangongshi sheli], Xinhua, reprinted in State Council
Information Office, 4 May 11.
\49\ In an April 2011 Chinese news article, an official with the
Beijing City Internet Propaganda Supervision Office noted that the
``basic principle of the Communist Party managing the media'' had been
legally enshrined in major Internet regulations and that the government
body in charge of managing the media, the State Council Information
Office, and the Central Party External Propaganda Office were simply
``the same office under different names.'' Chen Hua, ``Looking Back on
Ten Years of Internet News Publishing Work and the Avenues of
Management by Law'' [Hulianwang zhan dengzai xinwen yewu shinian huigu
yu fazhi guanli lujing], Qianlong Net, 29 April 11.
\50\ ``Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientization of
Social Management'' [Hu jintao: zhazhashishi tigao shehui guanli
kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.
\51\ Pascale Trouillaud, ``China's Web Spin Doctors Spread
Beijing's Message,'' Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 11.
\52\ ``Zhou Yongkang: Adapt to New Economic and Social Development
Conditions, Strengthen and Create Innovations in Social Management''
[Zhou yongkang: shiying jingji shehui fazhan xin xingshi, jiaqiang he
chuangxin shehui guanli], Xinhua, 20 February 11.
\53\ Andrew Jacobs, ``As China Steps Up Web Monitoring, Many Wi-Fi
Users Stay Away,'' New York Times, 25 July 11; Xu Tianran, ``Is Wi-Fi
Software Illegal? '' Global Times, 29 July 11.
\54\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Official Data Show State Security
Arrests, Prosecutions Remained at Historic Levels in 2010,'' 15 March
11. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for
attempts to subvert state power or up to 15 years for inciting such
subversion. PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97,
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, art. 105.
\55\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May
11.
\56\ Ibid.
\57\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Releases Dissident Blogger, With
Conditions,'' New York Times, 10 August 11.
\58\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11.
\59\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97,
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, art. 293.
\60\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May
11.
\61\ ``Chinese Activist on Trial Amid Crackdowns,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Time, 11 August 11.
\62\ Tania Branigan, ``Chinese Internet Activist Wang Lihong Goes
on Trial,'' Guardian, 12 August 11.
\63\ Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Report Procedural
Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang Lihong,'' 13 August 11.
\64\ Human Rights in China, ``Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced
to Nine Months,'' 9 September 11.
\65\ ``Ai Weiwei's Company Evades `Huge Amount' of Tax: Police,''
Xinhua, 20 May 11.
\66\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Takes Dissident Artist Into Custody,''
New York Times, 3 April 11.
\67\ ``Wife of Detained Chinese Artist Finds Him Tense During
Visit; No Word on Why He Was Seized,'' Associated Press, 15 May 11.
\68\ Jeremy Page, ``Ai Weiwei Resumes His Defiance of Beijing,''
Wall Street Journal, 12 August 11.
\69\ Ibid.
\70\ Ibid.
\71\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May
11.
\72\ Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention noted that the vague definition of crimes of
endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state
power, and supplying state secrets ``leaves their application open to
abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and
assembly.'' It recommended that political crimes ``that leave large
discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as
`endangering national security,' `subverting State power,' `undermining
the unity of the country,' `supplying of State secrets to individuals
abroad,' etc. should be abolished.'' Manfred Nowak, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, paras. 34,
82(s). In a January 2008 report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders studied
41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which officials used the ``inciting
subversion'' provision of the PRC Criminal Law (Article 105(2)) to
punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of
expression. It found that in such cases ``[t]he `evidence' often
consists of no more than the writings of an individual or simply shows
that he/she circulated certain articles containing dissenting views,
without any effort to show that the expression had any potential or
real subversive effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is
interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion. . . .'' Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal
Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China,'' 8 January 08. See, e.g., a
Beijing court's December 2009 decision in the Liu Xiaobo case in which
the court provided no evidence that Liu advocated violence in his
works. Human Rights in China, ``Case Update: International Community
Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict,'' 30 December 09. For CECC analysis,
see ``Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From
Outset,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5
February 10, 2.
\73\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wuhan Rights Defender Li Tie
Arrested on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' Crime'' [Wuhan
weiquan renshi litie bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui''
daibu], 17 November 10.
\74\ ``Chinese Activist Held Over Tiananmen Picture,'' Associated
Press, reprinted in Guardian, 30 November 10.
\75\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three More Tibetan Writers
Sentenced to Prison,'' 21 January 11; ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,''
Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict,'' 5 November 10;
``Tibetan Writers Tried as `Splittists,' '' Radio Free Asia, 5 November
10.
\76\ Human Rights in China, ``Activist Sentenced to Ten Years for
Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence,'' 25 March 11.
\77\ ``So-Called `Punishment Because of Speech' Is a Misreading of
the Judgment in the Liu Xiaobo Case'' [Suowei ``yinyan huozui'' shi dui
liu xiaobo an panjue de wudu], Xinhua, 25 October 10. For CECC
analysis, see ``Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets
International Standards,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 1-2.
\78\ Ibid.
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011
(People's Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1
August 11. For CECC analysis, see ``UN Group Calls for Immediate
Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 12 August 11.
\81\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Debate on Internet Censorship
Censored,'' 30 November 10; ``Guizhou Poet `Still Missing,' '' Radio
Free Asia, 16 December 10.
\82\ ChinaAid, ``Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese
Citizens Appeal to America,'' 10 February 11; China Human Rights
Lawyers Concern Group, ``Vehemently Condemn Beating and Taking Into
Custody Rights Defense Lawyer'' [Qianglie qianze ouda ji jujin weiquan
lushi], 21 February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Chen Guangcheng, Wife
Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.
\83\ Ibid.
\84\ PEN American Center, ``PEN Sounds Alarm Over Treatment of
Jailed Nobel Laureate's Wife in China,'' 22 February 11.
\85\ UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011
(People's Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1
August 11. For CECC analysis, see ``UN Group Calls for Immediate
Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 12 August 11.
\86\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Qin Yongmin, Recently
Released From Prison, Suffers High Blood Pressure After Being Abused by
Police During Visit'' [Gang chuyu de qin yongmin yin jingcha shangmen
manma, zhi xueya dou sheng chuxian yanzhong bushi], 1 December 10.
\87\ Philip Gourevitch, ``Liao Yiwu: Grounded in China,'' New
Yorker, 30 March 11; ``China Bans Writer From Traveling Abroad,''
Associated Press, 9 May 11. Earlier, officials had allowed Liao to
attend a literary festival in Germany in September 2010.
\88\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Artists Drawn to Berlin, a
Haven That Reveres History,'' New York Times, 10 August 11.
\89\ Human Rights in China, ``Three Documents Related to the Case
of Buddhist Leader Wu Zeheng,'' 22 September 11.
\90\ Ibid.
\91\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Tenth Anniversary Joint
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next
Decade,'' Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, art. 1(a).
\92\ ``Liu Binjie: Political System Reform Must Insist on the
Correct Orientation'' [Liu binjie: zhengzhi tizhi gaige bixu jianchi
zhengque fangxiang], China Press and Publications Daily, 17 November
10.
\93\ ``SARFT Spokesperson: Radio and Televisions Not Allowed To
Entirely Go on Market'' [Guangdian zongju xinwen fayan ren: diantai
dianshitai buxu zhengti shangshi], China News Net, 14 January 11.
\94\ Zhao Qiang, ``Loss of Control Over Public Opinion: Catalyst
for Disintegration of Soviet Union'' [Yulun shikong: sulian jieti de
cuihuaji], Seeking Truth, 1 November 10.
\95\ ``Local Newspapers Prohibited From Swapping Reports, Freedom
of Speech in the Mainland Again Put Under Pressure'' [Difang baozhang
jin huhuan gaojian neidi yanlunziyou zai yu ya], Ming Pao, 15 July 10;
Reporters Without Borders, ``New Regulations Pose Threat to Liberal
Press,'' 21 July 10. For CECC analysis, see ``Communist Party Seeks To
Restrict Already Limited Critical Media Reports,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.
\96\ ``Does China's General Administration on Press and Publication
Safeguard or Restrict Freedom of the Press? '' [Zhongguo xinwen chuban
shu weihu hai shi xianzhi xinwen ziyou?], Radio Free Asia, 6 November
10.
\97\ Katherine Hille, ``Anger Over Attacks on Journalists in
China,'' Financial Times, 8 August 10.
\98\ Ibid.
\99\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Media Blackout in China After Wreck,''
New York Times, 31 July 11.
\100\ Ibid.
\101\ Ibid.
\102\ ``Remarks at 11th China Journalists' Day and Presentation of
Awards and Report Meeting'' [Zai di shiyi jie zhongguo jizhe jie ji
banjiang baogao hui shang de jianghua], People's Daily, 8 November 10.
\103\ Ibid.
\104\ ``Liu Yunshan Presides Over Convening of Meeting on Topic of
Starting Propaganda Reporting Work for 90th Anniversary of the Party's
Founding'' [Liu yunshan zhuchi zhaokai jiandang 90 zhounian xuanchuan
baodao gongzuo zhuanti huiyi], Xinhua, 22 April 11. For CECC analysis,
see ``Top Official Directs Media To Promote July Anniversary of Party's
Founding,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.
\105\ Ibid.
\106\ Damian Grammaticas, ``Chinese Regulators Suspend TV Crime and
Spy Dramas,'' BBC, 6 May 11.
\107\ Keith Richburg, ``Chinese Editors, and a Web Site, Detail
Censors' Hidden Hand,'' Washington Post, 1 April 11.
\108\ International Federation of Journalists, ``New IFJ Report
Outlines Restrictions on Journalists in China in 2010,'' 30 January 11.
\109\ Ibid.
\110\ Pascale Trouillaud, ``China Wages Propaganda War After
Nobel,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.
\111\ Ibid.
\112\ Wu Yu, ``Chinese Authorities Issue Media Restriction, Banning
`Civil Society' '' [Zhongguo danggju xiada meiti jinling, pingbi
``gongmin shehui''], Deutsche Welle, 6 January 11.
\113\ Priscilla Jiao, ``Officials Put an End to Reporting Awards,''
South China Morning Post, 28 December 10.
\114\ David Barboza, ``Chinese Journalist Who Defied the Censors
and Wrote About Corruption Is Fired,'' New York Times, 27 January 11.
\115\ `` `Time Weekly' Selection Crisis, Commentary Department Head
`Forced To Resign' '' [``Shidai zhoubao'' pingxuan fengbo, pinglunbu
zhuren ``bei cizhi''], Radio Free Asia, 10 January 11.
\116\ Ibid.
\117\ Ibid.
\118\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Mainstream Journalists
Also Targeted in China Crackdown,'' 30 March 11.
\119\ Priscilla Jiao, ``High Price for Airing Sun Yat-sen
Criticism,'' South China Morning Post, 19 August 11.
\120\ International Federation of Journalists, ``IFJ Demands
Reinstatement of Journalist Suspended Over China Disaster Reports,'' 2
August 11.
\121\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25
September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8, 11; Regulations on
the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25
December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15; Measures for
Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli
banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16.
\122\ Zhejiang Province Radio, Film and Television Bureau, ``2010
Nationwide Radio and Television Editors and Reporters, Broadcasters,
and Hosts Qualification Exam'' [2010 nian quanguo guangbo dianshi
bianji jizhe, boyin yuan zhuchi ren zige kaoshi dagang], 30 July 10,
chap. 2, art. 6.
\123\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 68.
\124\ ``Stop False Reporting, Strengthen Social Responsibility,
Strengthen Construction of News Professional Ethics'' [Dujue xujia
baodao, zengqiang shehui zeren, jiaqiang xinwen zhiye daode jianshe],
Xinhua, 24 November 10.
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ ``14 News Units Conscientiously Launch Self-Education and
Self-Examination, Self-Rectification'' [Shisi jia xinwen danwei renzhen
kaizhan ziwo jiaoyu he zicha zijiu], Xinhua, 13 April 11.
\127\ ``Individual journalists should not be required to be
licensed or to register. There should be no legal restrictions on who
may practice journalism.'' UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of
American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression,
``International Experts Condemn Curbs on Freedom of Expression and
Control Over Media and Journalists,'' UN Press Release, 18 December 03.
\128\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Tenth Anniversary Joint
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next
Decade,'' Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, arts. 1(b), 1(g).
\129\ ``GAPP's Special Campaign Against Newspaper and Magazine
Journalist Stations'' [Xinwen chuban zongshu jiang dui baokan jizhe
zhan kaizhan zhuanxiang zhili], Xinhua, 24 March 11.
\130\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Warning: Reporting
on Chen Guangcheng,'' 17 February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Chen
Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing
Official Abuse,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March
11.
\131\ Ibid.
\132\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``New Details on
Wangfujing Interference,'' 28 February 11. For CECC analysis, see
``Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists
Covering `Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 22 March 11.
\133\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``New Details on
Wangfujing Interference,'' 28 February 11; ``Bloomberg Journalist
Assaulted as China Heightens Security,'' Bloomberg, 27 February 11. For
CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten
Foreign Journalists Covering `Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\134\ ``Foreign Minister to Foreign Press: Don't Believe Your Lying
Eyes,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 March 11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on
March 3, 2011,'' 5 March 11. The Commission and others reported on the
existence of local regulations issued in late 2010 and early 2011 that
require official approval to report in the Wangfujing area and near the
designated Shanghai protest site. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities
Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering
`Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
22 March 11. But national regulations put in place for the 2008 Beijing
Olympics provide that foreign journalists may interview any individual
or organization so long as they obtain their consent. At the time,
officials touted the regulations as providing foreign journalists
freedom to report on every aspect of Chinese society, from political
matters to social issues. Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News
Agencies and Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo
changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17
October 08, art. 17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry
News Department Head Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press
Conference on State Council's Promulgation of the `Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent
Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists' '' [Waijiaobu
xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao jiu guowuyuan banbu shishi ``zhonghua
renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang
tiaoli'' juxing zhongwai jizhe hui], 17 October 08.
\135\ Sharon LaFraniere and Edward Wong, ``Even With Protests
Averted, China Turns to Intimidation of Foreign Journalists,'' New York
Times, 6 March 11; Alexa Olesen, ``China Warns Foreign Media Not To
Cover Protests,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 3
March 11.
\136\ Louisa Lim, ``China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor
Service,'' National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Bill Schiller, ``Star
Reporter Detained, Interrogated by Chinese Police for Taking Photo,''
Toronto Star, 11 April 11.
\137\ Ben Blanchard and Chris Buckley, ``Foreign Media in China
Face Worsening Conditions--Survey,'' Reuters, 19 May 11.
\138\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended
19 March 11, arts. 6, 7, 61; Provisions on the Administration of
Newspaper Publishing [Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], issued 30
September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 4; Provisions on the
Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding],
issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 5.
\139\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended
19 March 11, art. 11.
\140\ Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing
[Qikan chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1
December 05, art. 45 (written reports); Regulations on the
Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December
01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, art. 20 (advance
approval for special topics).
\141\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended
19 March 11, arts. 36, 53.
\142\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97,
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, art. 225.
\143\ ``Procuratorate Decides Not To Arrest Author Xie Chaoping in
Sanmenxia Dam Relocation Program `Book Case,' '' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 10 December 10.
\144\ Ibid.
\145\ ``Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for
Publishing New Book'' [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi
daibu], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; ``Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly
Arrested in Inner Mongolia'' [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki
mongghulda mexpiy tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern Mongolian
Dissident Writer, Author of `Forefront of Independence' Arrested and
Detained,'' 23 January 11.
\146\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Cases Examined by the Special
Rapporteur (June 2009-July 2010),'' Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous People, James Anaya, 15 September 10, A/HRC/
15/37/Add.1.
\147\ Ibid.
\148\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended
19 March 11, art. 25.
\149\ ``Strongly Rectify and Standardize Culture Market Order''
[Zhongquan zhengdun guifan wenhua shichang zhixu], Heilongjiang
Information Net, 11 March 11.
\150\ Ibid.
\151\ ``Jiangxi Province `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down
Illegal Publications' Publications Market Program Clean-Up Has
Remarkable Results'' [Jiangxi sheng ``saohuang dafei'' chubanwu
shichang zhuanxiang zhengzhi chengxiao xianzhu], People's Daily, 21
April 11.
\152\ Liu Xilin, ``Our City Has Destroyed More Than 60,000 Items of
Rights--Violating, Pirated, and All Types of Illegal Publication'' [Wo
shi jizhong xiaohui 6 wan yu jian qinquan daoban ji gelei feifa
chubanwu], Guang'an City Radio and Television Station, 22 April 11.