[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Access to Justice
Findings
Chinese citizens' ability to redress perceived
wrongs continued to face significant challenges during
the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Authorities
continued to promote a ``harmonious'' socialist society
with Chinese characteristics. Key policies and
regulations during the past year reflect the Party's
ongoing concern with ``maintaining social stability.''
The courts encouraged the use of mediation
over trials as means to resolve disputes in civil
cases. Critics point out that mediation could lead to
curtailed access to courts for Chinese citizens. In
addition, it remains unclear whether the new PRC
People's Mediation Law can adequately resolve disputes
without coercion, and whether it can provide for
effective enforcement of mediated agreements.
Citizen petitioners seeking to address their
grievances continued to face official reprisals,
harassment, violence, and detention, especially by
local governments due to incentive structures linked to
citizen petitioning.
Officials at various levels of government
continued to discourage, intimidate, and detain human
rights lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases,
and clients that officials deem to be ``sensitive.''
Officials employed a spectrum of measures including
stationing police to monitor the homes of rights
defenders, forcing rights defenders to travel to
unknown areas or to attend meetings to ``drink tea''
with security personnel, and imprisonment.
The Supreme People's Court announced in May
2011 that it would issue uniform guidelines for some
types of cases. The guiding cases are meant to provide
uniformity in decisionmaking for the public security
apparatus, procuratoracy, and the courts. One of the
key questions that remains unanswered is the degree to
which the guiding cases are binding on lower courts.
The Chinese government continued to promote
administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater
oversight of state agencies and government employees
and to protect citizen interests if they are faithfully
implemented and executed. The amended PRC
Administrative Supervision Law became effective in June
2011. Its key provisions provide some protection for
whistleblowers. The amended PRC State Compensation Law
became effective in December 2010. Its key provisions
expand the scope of the law by allowing negligence as a
cause of action against the government under some
circumstances. In addition, the amended law eliminates
certain procedural loopholes making it easier to
establish a valid claim.
Chinese citizens remained reluctant to bring
cases against government officials utilizing
administrative law provisions. Cases brought against
the government based on administrative law provisions
reportedly accounted on average for very low
percentages of local courts' total workloads.
The government increased funding for the legal
aid system during the 2011 reporting year.
Nevertheless, China faces a systemic shortage of
defense lawyers. In underdeveloped regions, some
criminal defendants may have no access to legal
representation.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support the U.S. State Department's International
Visitor's Leadership Program and other bilateral
exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights
lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States
for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the
non-governmental organization and academic sectors that
partner with China's human rights lawyers and nonprofit
legal organizations.
Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as
the Chinese government's preferred way to resolve
disputes. Achieve a clear understanding of the
implications on Chinese citizens' access to justice and
the Chinese government's compliance with international
standards.
Continue to monitor the anticipated issuance of
the guiding cases by the Supreme People's Court for the
public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and the
courts. Pay particular attention to their effect, if
any, on lower level courts.
Express concern to Chinese authorities over
treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders
to examine the incentive structures at the local level
that lead to abuse of petitioners who seek to express
their grievances.
Object to the continued harassment of human
rights lawyers and advocates. Call for the release of
lawyers and activists who have been subject to unlawful
home confinement, ``disappearance,'' or harassment by
officials for their activities to defend and promote
the rights of Chinese citizens.
Support exchange, education, and training in
legal aid expertise with Chinese defense lawyers and
law schools.
Introduction
Chinese citizens' ability to seek redress against
government actions that violate their legal rights has changed
significantly over the past 30 years. More than 200 laws have
been enacted,\1\ but citizens continue to face significant
obstacles to accessing justice. Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that ``[e]veryone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law.'' \2\ Article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
requires states to ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms
are violated ``have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.'' \3\
During the Commission's 2011 reporting period, key policies
and regulations relating to access to justice reflected the
Communist Party's ongoing concern with maintaining stability.
Authorities emphasized the use of mediation over trials in
civil cases and promoted mediation as the solution to social
unrest. At the same time, authorities sought to enact measures
that could curb corruption and lead to greater professionalism
within the courts. Authorities' concern with maintaining
stability extended to citizen petitioning, an area beset with
well-documented human rights violations such as arbitrary
detention. During this reporting year, Chinese media exposed a
``stability maintenance'' organization tasked by some local
governments with retrieving petitioners from Beijing, a
practice that often led to abuse of petitioners. In addition,
petitioner cases involving land disputes continued as a trend
as officials sought to develop more rural land.
Against the backdrop of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded
to China's prominent imprisoned intellectual and writer Liu
Xiaobo in October 2010, and amidst the online ``Jasmine'' call
for reform domestically, the government enforced measures that
further restricted human rights lawyers' advocacy efforts.
Officials at various levels of the government continued to take
steps to discourage, intimidate, and detain human rights
lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases, and clients
that officials deem to be ``sensitive.'' In spite of apparent
efforts to train more legal aid representatives, measurable
positive effects in citizens' access to justice remain elusive.
Mediation as a Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability
During the 2011 reporting year, government and party
officials continued to use courts as a tool in their efforts to
maintain social stability. In particular, the Supreme People's
Court encouraged the use of mediation over trials as means to
resolve disputes in civil cases.\4\ The PRC People's Mediation
Law became effective in January 2011,\5\ and stresses the need
to resolve civil disputes through mediation and to maintain
social harmony and stability.\6\ It encourages disagreeing
parties to reach a voluntary resolution through people's
mediation committees.\7\ Furthermore, the mediation services
are free of charge and legally binding on the parties.\8\ To
further strengthen enforcement efforts, in July 2010,
authorities issued a joint opinion involving multiple agencies
in an effort to improve enforcement of legally binding
decrees.\9\ The joint opinion establishes general policy
provisions for each agency and allows the courts to coordinate
among agencies.\10\ Since passage of the PRC People's Mediation
Law, authorities have actively promoted it as the ``first line
of defence [sic]'' \11\ against mass conflicts. In January
2011, the Supreme People's Court further emphasized the
importance of mediation to all basic-level people's courts by
stressing the need to uphold the principle of ``mediation
first, then integrate mediation and adjudication.'' \12\
Authorities also praised the national model judge for 2010,
who resolved more than 3,100 cases in 14 years ``all without a
single mistake, appeal, or citizen petitioning [against her
decisions].'' \13\ Judge Chen explained that one of her key
work principles is to prioritize mediation over litigation,
especially in cases involving neighborhood disputes and marital
discord.\14\
In spite of the push for mediation, the broader
implications of the law remain unclear. While mediation is an
effective tool in some types of cases, concerns about mediation
center on three main issues: Curtailed access to courts for
Chinese citizens, adequate resolution of disputes without
coercion, and effective enforcement.\15\ A particular concern
is the potential use of the PRC People's Mediation Law to
pressure and silence human rights activists. For example, in
June 2011, public security officials reportedly approached
members of the Tiananmen Mothers, a non-governmental
organization that seeks public discussion and accountability
for people killed during the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The
officials reportedly offered to pay compensation to settle
individual cases.\16\ The terms of the settlement, however, did
not include public discussions about the 1989 Tiananmen
protests, investigations, or accountability--objectives that
the Tiananmen Mothers aim to achieve.\17\ To further promote
mediating disputes over trial work, the government and the
Party reportedly have mandatory mediation quotas, offer
financial rewards and career advancements to judges who have
high rates of mediation, and punish judges who issue decisions
that result in citizen petitioning.\18\ This approach can lead
some judges to engage in unfair settlement tactics that could
``detract from the substantive fairness of the process and
undermines the legitimacy of the court system.'' \19\ Survey
data also suggests that the enforcement of mediated agreements
remains weak.\20\
Efforts To Professionalize the Courts
During this reporting year, the Supreme People's Court
sought to professionalize courts by issuing codes of conduct,
recusal regulations, and guiding cases. In December 2010, the
Supreme People's Court issued two documents concerning judges'
conduct: The Model Judicial Behavior Code \21\ and the Basic
Code of Professional Conduct for Judges.\22\ The two documents
seek to guide judges in their judicial work and conduct outside
of work,\23\ set forth five principles of loyalties for
judges,\24\ and stress allegiance and loyalty to the Party.\25\
In early 2011, the Supreme People's Court issued two
regulations intended to limit improper influence on the courts.
The Trial Implementation of the Provisions Regarding
Professional Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership
When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer \26\ (``Trial
Implementation Provisions'') requires the court officials and
some trial judges to recuse themselves in some professional
settings when a spouse or child practices as a lawyer in the
jurisdiction they oversee. The Provisions Regarding the
Prevention of Interference With Casework by Internal Court
Personnel \27\ prohibit current and retired court personnel
from conducting private meetings with parties, as well as their
relatives and legal representatives, whose cases are being
adjudicated by the court. The provisions also prohibit current
and retired court personnel from forwarding documents,
inquiring, or interceding on behalf of the parties.\28\ The
efficacy of these regulations remains unclear. For example, the
Trial Implementation Provisions do not include limitations on
the procuratorate, public security personnel, or anyone else
who shares a close relationship with the parties or the court.
Authorities also sought to limit the lower courts' ability
to request instructions from higher level courts when
adjudicating cases. This practice occurs when lower level
courts seek to avoid responsibility or are unwilling to decide
a case based on the facts and law as presented. The Opinion
Concerning the Standardization of Trial Work Between Higher
Level and Lower Level Courts,\29\ issued in December 2010, is
the latest in a series of efforts by the central government to
address this practice. Key provisions in the opinion limit the
types of cases where instructions can be sought and prohibits
``in principle'' the court of second instance from remanding a
case based on unclear facts and insufficient evidence, when the
court of first instance has fully investigated the facts.\30\
The Supreme People's Court issued the long-awaited
Regulations Regarding Guiding Cases in November 2010, which
could lead to greater uniformity in the handling of cases.\31\
The regulations announced that the Supreme People's Court will
publish uniform guidelines for some cases that have generated
broad societal interest; where the regulation is general; where
cases are representative of other cases similarly situated; or
where cases are particularly complex, difficult or novel, or
otherwise have guiding value.\32\ The Supreme People's Court
(SPC) reportedly was selecting its first series of guiding
cases in May 2011.\33\ In addition, according to the director
of the SPC research department, the guiding cases will
eventually include three series covering public security, the
procuratorate, and the courts.\34\ One of the key questions
that remains unanswered is the degree to which the guiding
cases are binding on lower courts.\35\
In September 2010, the Supreme People's Court issued
sentencing guidelines on a trial basis that could improve
transparency, uniformity, and fairness in sentencing criminal
defendants.\36\ The key provisions of the guidelines provide
baseline sentences for 15 of the most commonly encountered
crimes such as traffic offenses, battery, rape, robbery,
larceny, fraud, and drug offenses, among others, and establish
sentencing factors in aggravation and in mitigation.\37\ If
implemented at the local level, the guidelines could
potentially promote greater transparency and consistency in
sentencing by limiting individual discretion of judges.
Corruption Within the Judiciary
Corruption within the judiciary has been a longstanding
problem.\38\ The extent and scope of corruption are unclear due
to a lack of independent data. According to official sources,
from January to November 2010, the government ``investigated
119,000 graft cases, resulting in 113,000 people being
punished, of whom 4,332 were prosecuted . . . .'' \39\ In
addition, a report published by the Supreme People's Court in
February 2011 singled out 187 people within the judicial system
for improper conduct, ranging from private use of public
property to charging inflated fees in 2010.\40\ Anecdotal but
numerous incidents of corruption reported in the media involved
judges extorting money from litigants,\41\ engaging in
collusion,\42\ and accepting bribes.\43\
During this reporting year, key policies continued to
reflect the authorities' ongoing efforts to root out corruption
within the judiciary,\44\ and within the confines of the
existing political structure where the courts are subject to
the control of the Party.\45\ The current approach to combat
judicial corruption appears to particularly emphasize the role
of state supervision.\46\ In October 2010, the Supreme People's
Court announced it would gradually undertake tours of
inspection of local-level courts where one of the main purposes
is to investigate the lower level courts' ability to handle
matters diligently and free from corruption.\47\ In addition,
the authorities continued to promote the policy of ``Five
Prohibitions'' first promulgated in 2009.\48\ The ``Five
Prohibitions'' policy proscribes judges from engaging in
improper conduct such as accepting gifts, interceding on behalf
of another party, divulging work secrets, and engaging in
favoritism.\49\ The courts have also instituted an online forum
where citizens can report on corrupt judges and monitor the
progress of whistleblowing tips.\50\ The efficacy of the online
forum remains unclear.
Administrative Law
Administrative law provides channels for citizens to seek
limited remedy when they believe the government has violated
their rights. Because Chinese courts do not have the power
either to apply constitutional provisions or to strike down
laws or regulations that are inconsistent with China's
Constitution,\51\ administrative laws serve as a tool to allow
citizens to express grievances, challenge alleged official
wrongdoing, and impose constraints on official misconduct.
Overall, Chinese citizens today have more options for redress
against government violations than they did 20 years ago, when
the field of administrative law first began to develop. In
spite of these developments, the administrative law system
still faces fundamental institutional challenges. For example,
Chinese citizens cannot challenge administrative regulations
that violate constitutional or legal rights. Article 12 of the
PRC Administrative Procedure Law forbids courts from accepting
citizen challenges of administrative rules and regulations that
have ``general binding force.'' \52\ In addition, the PRC
Administrative Reconsideration Law does not allow adjudication
of State Council rules or regulations.\53\ During this
reporting period, the Chinese government continued to promote
administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater
oversight of state agencies and government employees and to
protect citizens' interests. In June 2010, the amended PRC
Administrative Supervision Law became effective.\54\ The key
amendments provide some protection for whistleblowers.\55\ For
example, Article 6 stipulates that administrative agencies
shall keep whistleblowers' information confidential, and
Articles 46 and 47 provide that individuals [should] be
punished or prosecuted for revealing information about
whistleblowers or bringing retaliatory charges against
reporting parties.\56\ In December 2010, the amended PRC State
Compensation Law became effective.\57\ The amended compensation
law expands the scope of the existing law by allowing
negligence to go forward as a cause of action against the
government under some circumstances.\58\ In addition, the
amended law eliminates certain procedural loopholes making it
easier to establish a valid claim \59\ and allows compensation
for ``psychological injury.'' \60\
The Commission notes that overall, Chinese citizens remain
reluctant to bring cases against government officials using
administrative law provisions. According to the Supreme
People's Court's work report, the courts handled 135,679
administrative cases, or approximately 1 percent of the 11.7
million cases handled by local courts at various levels.\61\
The key reasons include a lack of confidence in the judicial
system, historical context, and the belief that the xinfang
system is a more appropriate channel for citizens'
grievances.\62\
Citizen Petitioning (Xinfang)
The petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system
exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for
citizens to appeal government, court, and Communist Party
decisions and present their grievances. Due to institutional
weaknesses in the judiciary and limits on citizens' ability to
air grievances, citizens often use petitioning as a means to
seek redress for perceived wrongs. Common citizen petitioning
cases involve reports of official corruption causing perceived
injustice, alleged abuse of power, and unfair land
compensation.
China's Constitution and the 2005 PRC National Regulations
on Letters and Visits provide that Chinese citizens have the
right to petition without retribution. Xinfang bureaus are
found throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, including offices of
the Party, police, government, procuratorates, courts, and
people's congresses. Individual petitioning may take the form
of one dissatisfied citizen going to multiple xinfang bureaus
repeatedly over the course of several months or years.
Collective or mass petitioning may involve attempts to organize
demonstrations, speeches, or marches of people seeking to
present their grievances. The capital city, Beijing, where the
central government and high-level officials are located, is an
especially prominent destination for petitioners from all over
China. According to a 2007 research study conducted by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, there were ``more than
10,000 petitioners that have set up temporary residence'' in
Beijing.\63\ However, only approximately 0.2 percent of the
petitioners reportedly achieve resolution through
petitioning.\64\
Based on official information from Xinhua in March 2011,
the xinfang system ``ferreted out a total of 2,076,000 cases of
varying kinds of conflicts since April 2010, of which 1,643,000
cases,'' or 79.1 percent, have been resolved.\65\ According to
the latest Supreme People's Court's annual report, the number
of citizen-petitioning cases in 2010 declined by 22 percent at
local levels.\66\ The declining figures could mean, however,
that the local officials, whose career advancement is often
correlated with lower instances of citizen petitioning,\67\ are
becoming more skilled at preventing petitioners from reaching
higher level xinfang bureaus.
In spite of Premier Wen Jiabao's show of support for
petitioners' problems during a visit to Beijing's top
petitioning bureau,\68\ Chinese citizens continued to face
official reprisals, harassment, and violence. During this
reporting year, the central government, and its extensive
network of ``social stability preservation'' organizations
under the leadership of the Communist Party Central Committee,
continued to assess local government in part based on the
number of ``abnormal petitions.'' \69\ To cope with the
assessment, local governments continued to employ private
security companies that sometimes resorted to extralegal
measures to prevent petitioners from reaching the central
government.\70\ In October 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily
exposed a private security company, Anyuanding, under contract
by local governments to ``retrieve'' petitioners who attempted
to petition in Beijing, where the central government is
located.\71\ Anyuanding employed a variety of methods to
prevent petitioners from making their grievances heard at the
central level. The methods reportedly included coaxing,
threats, abduction, detention in ``black jails'' for extended
periods of time, and beatings.\72\ Official mistreatment of
petitioners was especially harsh during national holidays,
meetings held by the Party, and ``politically sensitive
periods.'' \73\
Maintaining social stability and containing the petitioning
system remained a priority for central and local authorities.
In May 2011, the Supreme People's Court issued a series of
documents for lower level courts on how to handle petitioning.
The documents outlined ``four musts and five systems.'' The
four ``musts'' include: Strengthening the ideology of the
masses, finding the problem at the source, building long-term
capacity, and focusing on the masses. The five systems focus on
risk assessment, notification, reception of petitioners, multi-
faceted solutions, and establishing a system of finality in
petitioning.\74\ Key elements of the documents echoed the push
for mediation and social stability observed throughout the
court system during this reporting period. [See Mediation as a
Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability in this section.]
During this reporting year, local governments continued to
misapply legal regulations to punish petitioners for the sake
of maintaining social stability. Public security officers on
occasion detained petitioners under Article 23 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law.\75\ The
provision proscribes conduct that ``disturbs social order.''
Specifically, Subsection 1 prohibits ``disturbing order of
organizations, groups, enterprises, institutions, causing
interference in their routine operations in work production,
operation, medical care, education and research, but not yet
causing serious harm.'' \76\ Subsection 2 prohibits
``disturbing order in bus stations, ports, wharfs, airports,
shopping facilities, parks, exhibition centers, and other
public places.'' \77\ The punishment for ``disturbing social
order'' under Article 23 ranges from warning to 15 days of
detention. For example, public security officers from the
Beijing Public Security Bureau's Haidian district took
petitioner Cai Fuxian into custody for 10 days under Article 23
on October 17, 2010, for distributing leaflets near the meeting
place of the fifth plenum of the Communist Party's Central
Committee. Cai was seeking redress for the alleged wrongful
death of her father, a veteran cadre of the Party, and claimed
that a current Central Committee member was involved.\78\
Authorities and rural petitioners who petitioned about
demolition of or eviction from their land and residences
continued to confront each other, often violently.\79\ Under
the rubric of land and hukou reform, there appeared to be
increasing tension between some local governments' plans to
develop rural land for urbanization and some rural residents'
desire to stay put. According to data made available by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in December 2010,
petitioning related to land makes up 73 percent of all
petitioning cases.\80\ Presently, there are approximately 50
million farmers who have lost their farmland due to urban
development, a number projected to double in 10 years'
time.\81\ Against this backdrop, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee passed the PRC Administrative Coercion Law
on June 30, 2011, to become effective on January 1, 2012.\82\
The law aims to establish a framework for regulating coercive
measures government authorities can use against citizens.\83\
Key chapters in the law define government actions that fall
within the scope the law,\84\ set out a standardized process by
which forcible measures may be imposed against citizens,\85\
and allow citizens to sue for damages under certain
circumstances.\86\
Citizen petitioning and its abuses reflect two
contradictory goals of the system: Stability preservation--
embodied by the need for conflicts to remain at the local
level--and the central government's use of citizen petitioning
as a check on local governments.\87\ Furthermore, the existing
system partially reflects the limited options available to
Chinese citizens seeking redress through the rule of law.
Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders
The Commission observed increasing efforts by Chinese
authorities to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm
human rights lawyers and defenders who took on ``sensitive''
causes.\88\ Authorities continued to employ a spectrum of harsh
measures such as stationing police personnel to monitor the
whereabouts of rights defenders,\89\ forcing rights defenders
to ``travel'' to remote or unknown locations,\90\ inviting them
to ``drink tea'' with security personnel,\91\ and imprisoning
them.\92\ In addition, the Chinese government appears to
increasingly target human rights defenders under the color of
law. For example, throughout this reporting year, the
government denied annual license renewals for human rights
lawyers,\93\ charged some human rights defenders and activists
with crimes such as ``disturbing social order,'' \94\ and
prohibited others from leaving the country, citing national
security concerns under the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit
and Entry of Citizens.\95\ [See Section II--Criminal Justice
and Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement for
additional information on human rights lawyers and defenders.]
Legal Aid
Chinese law grants criminal defendants the right to hire an
attorney but guarantees pro bono legal defense only if the
defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is
blind, deaf, or mute.\96\ In other cases in which defendants
cannot afford legal representation, courts may appoint defense
counsel or defendants may apply for legal aid, in theory, as
early as the investigative stage of their cases.\97\
During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed
numerous reports of legal aid initiatives aimed at serving
disadvantaged regions and improving access to justice for
citizens. In early February 2011, the Ministry of Justice
announced that legal aid funds nationwide increased to more
than 1 billion yuan (US$153 million) in 2010, as the central
government and provincial governments allocated more funds to
establish legal aid programs in rural localities.\98\ In
addition, the China Legal Aid Foundation--a government agency
established to raise, manage, and allocate funding for the
legal aid system--increased legal assistance funding with
allocations from the public welfare lottery.\99\ The increase
in legal aid funding comes as officials report that legal aid
organizations across China handled record numbers of cases on
behalf of disadvantaged applicants.\100\
According to a February 9, 2011, China Daily article, a
senior official with the Ministry of Justice announced that the
government would send lawyers to assist disadvantaged groups in
213 destitute counties in central and western China.\101\ On
February 14, 2011, the China Daily reported that the Beijing
Legal Aid Center announced free legal aid consultations and
services for families of trafficked children seeking to sue
child traffickers, in response to a high-profile government
crackdown on child abductions.\102\ On February 25, 2011, China
Tibet News reported that the Ministry of Finance allocated a
special legal aid fund of 700,000 yuan (US$107,200) to assist
migrant workers, minors, the elderly, women, and persons with
disabilities in the Tibet Autonomous Region.\103\ In a March 1,
2011, China Daily article, the Beijing Municipal Bureau of
Justice announced its Legal Services in the Community project
would place lawyers in all 2,600 communities and 3,900 villages
within the Beijing municipality.\104\
Despite the expansion of the legal aid system, China's
legal aid structure faces systemic challenges in meeting the
demands of its disadvantaged citizens and rural localities.
According to a February 2010 article in Zhengyi Net (a Web site
under the authority of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), a
large number of citizens are in need of legal assistance--
including 40 million poor rural residents and 82 million
persons with disabilities.\105\ The article notes that ``the
staffs of legal aid agencies in China are far from meeting
these needs.'' \106\ In February 2011, China Daily reported
that China continues to face an imbalance in legal
professionals, as only 5,000 of China's 200,000 lawyers work in
the relatively poorer central and western regions.\107\ In some
of China's underdeveloped regions, courts may have no defense
attorneys.\108\ Furthermore, even in areas with a higher
proportion of lawyers, citizens are often unable to manage the
high costs associated with legal representation. According to
one estimate, 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in China
are unable to hire a lawyer.\109\ Despite increases to legal
aid funding by the China Legal Aid Foundation, the legal aid
system needs substantially more financial support to expand
legal aid resources nationwide and to improve training for
lawyers handling the challenges of legal aid cases.\110\
Endnotes
\1\ ``By the End of 2010, Our Country Will Have Drawn Up 236 Active
Laws and Over 690 Administrative Regulations'' [Dao 2010 niandi, woguo
yi zhiding xianxing youxiao falu 236 jian, xingzheng fagui 690
duojian], Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 10 March 10.
\2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December
48, art. 8.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 2.
\4\ ``Chinese Chief Justice Stresses Priority of Mediation Over
Court,'' Xinhua, 30 May 11; ``China Issues Guidelines for Resolving
Social Conflicts,'' Xinhua, 4 May 11.
\5\ PRC People's Mediation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin
tiaojie fa], issued 28 August 10, effective 1 January 11; Supreme
People's Court, Several Provisions Regarding Judicial Affirmation
Procedures for People's Mediation Agreements [Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu renmin tiaojie xieyi sifa queren chengxude ruogan guiding],
issued 23 March 11; ``New People's Mediation Law Takes Effect,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 February 11.
\6\ PRC People's Mediation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin
tiaojie fa], issued 28 August 10, effective 1 January 11, art. 1.
\7\ Ibid., arts. 1, 7-12.
\8\ Ibid., arts. 4, 33.
\9\ Opinion on Questions Regarding Establishing and Improving
Enforcement [of Judicial Decisions) by Multiple Organizations [Guanyu
jianli he wanshan zhixing liandong jizhi ruogan wentide yijian], issued
7 July 10.
\10\ Ibid. For example, Chapter 8 calls on the Ministry of Civil
Affairs to give special consideration to those seeking enforcement who
are in dire conditions.
\11\ Zhu Zhe and Lan Tian, ``Mediation Draft Law Could Ease
Tension,'' China Daily, 23 June 10. According to the article, Minister
of Justice Wu Aiying told the National People's Congress Standing
Committee that the ``mediation should be the fire line of defence to
maintain social stability and promote harmony.''
\12\ Several Opinions Regarding Further Strengthening the Basic
People's Courts Under New Circumstances [Guanyu xinxingshi xia jinyibu
jiaqiang renmin fayuan jiceng jichu jianshede ruogan yijian], issued 28
January 11, secs. 13, 14.
\13\ Zhu Xudong, ``Basic-Level Court Judge Chen Yanping's Work
Method Is Worth Spreading Throughout the Country'' [Jiceng faguan chen
yanping gongzuofa zai quanguo huo tuiguang], News of the Communist
Party of China, 23 February 11; Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against
the Law,'' Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research
Paper, No. 11-03-01 (2011), 24.
\14\ Ma Shoumin, ``Prioritizing Mediation Promotes Societal Harmony
and Stability'' [Tiaojie youxian licu shehui hexie wending], People's
Court Daily, 15 March 11.
\15\ Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01
(2011); Stanley Lubman, ``Civil Litigation Being Quietly `Harmonized,'
'' Wall Street Journal, 31 May 11; Willy Lam, ``Beijing Tightens
Control Over Courts,'' Asia Times, 25 June 11.
\16\ ``Open Letter From the Tiananmen Mothers,'' reprinted in Human
Rights in China, 30 May 11; Willy Lam, ``Beijing Tightens Control Over
Courts,'' Asia Times, 25 June 11.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01
(2011), 31-37.
\19\ Ibid., 38-39.
\20\ Li Gang, ``Court Supervised `Mediation' Is Easy, Enforcement
Is Hard'' [Fayuan ``tiaojie'' rongyi zhixing nan], Beijing Youth Daily,
7 July 10. According to this article, based on data released by a court
in Beijing, agreements in nearly half of the disputes settled through
mediation are not honored by the parties, contributing to what the
paper characterized as the ``strange phenomenon'' of too much mediation
and too little enforcement. ``We Ought To Pay Attention to Both
Mediation and Enforcement'' [Tiaojielu yu tiaojie zidong luxinglu
yingdang bingzhong], People's Court Daily, reprinted in Legal Daily, 14
April 11; Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01
(2011), 42-43. Minzner postulates that as courts began to aggressively
pressure parties to settle, parties increasingly had second thoughts
after settlement, further eroding voluntary enforcement rates for
mediated agreements.
\21\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11.
\22\ Supreme People's Court, Basic Code of Professional Conduct for
Judges [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze],
issued 6 December 11.
\23\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11, arts. 81, 82, 83-activities
outside of work; 84-interaction with media; 85-interpersonal conflict
with others; 89-overseas travel.
\24\ Supreme People's Court, Basic Code of Professional Conduct for
Judges [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze],
issued 6 December 11. The five principles are: Guaranteeing loyalty to
the administration of justice, ensuring judicial fairness, ensuring
judicial honesty, striving to achieve justice for the people, and
defending the image of the judiciary.
\25\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11, art. 1. Specifically, Article 1
requires judges to be loyal to the Party and contains new language on
``maintaining the same line of thought and action as the Party's
Central Committee,'' and ``to not go against the core policies of the
Party and the country, in words and deeds''; Supreme People's Court,
Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Judges [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze], issued 6 December 11, arts.
4-7. Specifically, these articles contain new references requiring
``loyalty to the Party, loyalty to country, and loyalty to the people
in order to build and defend a socialist system with Chinese
characteristics,'' ``abide by political discipline, guard the country's
secrets and trial work secrets, and not engage in activities that are
detrimental to the country's interests and judicial authority, and not
speak or publish speeches that are detrimental to the country's
interests and judicial authority.''
\26\ Supreme People's Court, Trial Implementation of Provisions
Regarding Professional Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership
When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer [Guanyu dui peiou zinu
congshi lushi zhiyede fayuan lingdao ganbu he shenpan zhixing gangwei
faguan shixing renzhi huibi de guiding (shixing)], issued 10 February
11.
\27\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding the Prevention of
Interference With Casework by Internal Court Personnel [Guanyu zai
shenpan gongzuozhong fangzhi fayuan neibu renyuan ganrao banande ruogan
guiding], 15 February 11.
\28\ Ibid., arts. 1-5.
\29\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Concerning the Standardization
of Trial Work Between Higher Level and Lower Level Courts [Guanyu
guifan shangxiaji renmin fayuan shenpan yewu guanxide ruogan yijian],
issued 28 December 10. For a summary of the Opinion, also see ``Recent
Developments in Judicial Reform,'' Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 31 March 11.
\30\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Concerning the Standardization
of Trial Work Between Higher Level and Lower Level Courts [Guanyu
guifan shangxiaji renmin fayuan shenpan yewu guanxide ruogan yijian],
issued 28 December 10, art. 6.
\31\ Supreme People's Court, Regulations Regarding Guiding Cases
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu anli zhidao gongzuode guiding], issued 26
November 10.
\32\ Ibid., arts. 1, 2.
\33\ ``Supreme People's Court Steadily Pushes Forward Guiding Cases
With Chinese Characteristics'' [Zuigaofa wenbu tuijin zhongguo tese
anli zhidao zhidu], Legal Daily, 17 May 11.
\34\ An Jie, ``Hu Yunteng Explains the Regulations Regarding
Guiding Cases'' [Hu yunteng jiedu guanyu anli zhidao gongzuode
guiding], Dongfang Fayan, 11 January 11.
\35\ Ibid. In the same article, the director of the research
department of the Supreme People's Court suggests that the lower courts
should abide by the guiding cases when adjudicating cases that are
similarly situated. If the judge does not follow the guiding cases, he
should articulate a compelling reason.
\36\ Supreme People's Court, Guiding Opinion on Sentencing in
Peoples' Courts (Trial Version) [Renmin fayuan liangxing zhidao yijian
(shixing)], issued 13 September 10, effective 1 October 10.
\37\ Ibid., chap. 4.
\38\ See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule
of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 295-98.
Peerenboom discusses corruption in the context of judges' technical
competence and judicial independence. See also Ling Li, ``The
`Production of Corruption' in China's Courts,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute
Working Paper Series, 5 July 2011. Li postulates that corruption within
the judiciary is a systemic problem.
\39\ ``Corrupt Chinese Judges To Face Harsh Punishments: SPC Vice
President,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Human Rights, 29 December 10.
Details about graft cases are not known.
\40\ ``Making Fundamental Improvements, Guaranteeing a Fair and
Just Judiciary'' [Zhuazhu genben qianghua cuoshi, baozhang gongzheng
lianjie sifa], People's Court Daily, reprinted in Legal Daily, 28
February 11. The article is a summary of Supreme People's Court's anti-
corruption efforts in 2010.
\41\ Mimi Lau, ``Bribing Judges Is Almost a Sure Thing,'' South
China Morning Post, 21 May 11.
\42\ Chen Xianfeng and Wang Kailei, ``Following the Trail of a
Corrupt Court in Guangdong Province, Nine Judges Conspired With Others
for Profit'' [Guangdong zhanjiang fayuan fubai wo'an zhuizong: jiuming
faguan yuren hemou huoli], Communist Party of China News, 2 May 11.
\43\ Shao Ming, ``Foshan Intermediate People's Court Responds to
Judges Accepting Bribes, `Sentences to Three, Postpones for Four' ''
[Foshan zhongyuan huiying faguan shouhui ``pansan huansi''], Southern
Metropolis Daily, 17 June 11.
\44\ Supreme People's Court, ``Work Report of the Supreme People's
Court'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], reprinted in People's
Daily, 20 March 11, subsection 5; Supreme People's Court, ``Wang
shengjun: The Work of the People's Courts Still Has Five Problem
Areas'' [Wang shengjun: renmin fayuan gongzuozhong haicunzai wuge
fangmiande wenti he kunnan], 11 March 11.
\45\ Ling Li, ``The `Production of Corruption' in China's Courts,''
U.S.-Asia Law Institute Working Paper Series, 5 July 2011, 36. Li
argues reform efforts ``have seldom touched upon the decision-making
mechanism, through which corruption in the judiciary has become
institutionalized.''
\46\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Efforts To Combat
Corruption and Build a Clean Government,'' 29 December 10.
\47\ ``Strengthen Internal Supervision of the Courts, SPC Promotes
Judicial Inspection Tour'' [Jiaqiang fayuan neibu jiandu, zuigao fayuan
quanmian tuixing sifa xuncha zhidu], People's Court Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 21 October 10. The other goals include implementing Party
ideology, shaping ideas regarding a clean government, and resolving
conflicts.
\48\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding the ``Five
Prohibitions'' [Guanyu wuge yanjinde guiding], issued 8 January 09.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ ``Tip-Off Websites Launched To Root Out Corruption in China's
Legal System,'' Xinhua, 9 February 11.
\51\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 62, 67,128.
\52\ PRC Administrative Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng susong fa], issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90, art.
12. The law is also known as the Administrative Litigation Law.
\53\ National People's Congress, Explanation Regarding the
Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng
fuyi fa shiyi], 18 October 00.
\54\ PRC Administrative Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng jiancha fa], issued 9 May 97, amended 25 June 10.
\55\ Ibid., arts. 6, 46, 47.
\56\ Ibid.
\57\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1
December 10.
\58\ Ibid., art. 2. Article 2 states, ``If a state organization or
a member of its personnel, when exercising functions and powers in
violation of the law, infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of
a citizen., and causes damages-the aggrieved person shall have the
right to recover damages from the state in accordance with the law.''
For a further discussion about the implication of the amended State
Compensation Law, including negligence, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step
Forward: New Law Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal,
13 January 11.
\59\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1
December 10, art. 35. For a further discussion about the implication of
the amended State Compensation Law, including efforts to eliminate
procedural loopholes, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step Forward: New Law
Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 January 11.
\60\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1
December 10, arts. 9-12. For a further discussion about the implication
of the amended State Compensation Law, including the inclusion of
psychological injuries, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step Forward: New Law
Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 January 11.
\61\ ``Highlights of Work Report of Supreme People's Court,''
Xinhua, 11 March 11.
\62\ See Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal
Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law,
No. 42 (2006), 118-20.
\63\ Zhang Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27
October 10.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ ``Our Country's Petition System Is Full of Innovation and
Shows Good Results, Achieving a Positive Outcome'' [Woguo xinfang
xitong chuangxian zhengyou huodong yijing qude jieduanxing chengguo],
Xinhua, reprinted in Legal Daily, 29 March 11.
\66\ Supreme People's Court, ``Annual Work Report (2010)'' [Renmin
fayuan gongzuo niandu baogao (2010)], May 2011, 33.
\67\ Human Rights Watch, ``An Alleyway in Hell,'' November 2009, 3,
7-19; Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
\68\ Tania Branigan, ``Wen Jiabao Visits China's Central Complaints
Department,'' Guardian, 26 January 11.
\69\ Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
\70\ Ibid.; Long Zhi, ``Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing
`Black Jail' Retrievers (Part I)'' [Anyuanding: beijing jiefang ``hei
jianyu'' diaocha (shang pian)], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24
September 10; See also Zhan Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global
Times, 27 October 10; Liu Chang, ``Controversy Over `Black Jails'
Continues,'' Global Times, 4 May 11; ``Woman Detained in a Black Jail
After Coming to Beijing To Handle Affairs'' [Laijing banshi nu beiguan
heijianyu], Beijing News, 2 August 11.
\71\ Long Zhi, ``Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing `Black
Jail' Retrievers (Part I)'' [Anyuanding: beijing jiefang ``hei jianyu''
diaocha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 September 10. See also Zhan
Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27 October 10.
\72\ Zhan Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27 October
10.
\73\ Ibid.; Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining
Social Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
\74\ ``Supreme People's Court Issues the Following Documents
Regarding Petitioning Work'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan jiushe su xinfang
gongzuo xiafa xilie wenjian], People's Court Daily, 16 May 11.
\75\ PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo zhi'an guanli chufa fa], issued 5 September 86,
amended 12 May 94, 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, art. 23.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ Ibid.
\78\ ``Female Petitioner Cai Fuxian From Guizhou Is Detained for
Leafletting and Later Released'' [Guizhou lupanshui nufangmin cai
fuxian sa chuandan bei zhuahou shifang], Boxun, 29 October 10.
\79\ ``Land Disputes Worst Problem in Rural Areas,'' Agence France-
Presse, 16 December 10; Choi Chi-yu, ``2,000 Battle Police in Yunna,''
South China Morning Post, 31 March 11; ``Six Hundred Policemen in
Fuzhou Used Tear Gas To Force Expropriation of Property, Violent
Conflict Results in Many Villagers Beaten and Detained'' [Fuzhou liubai
jingshi cuileidan qiangzhengdi-bao chongtu duowei cunmin beida
beizhua], Radio Free Asia, 8 April 11; ``Petitioners Attacked and
Beaten,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11; Alice Yan, ``Demolition
Violence Stirs Fury on the Mainland,'' South China Morning Post, 6
November 10; ``Police Detain Land Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 20
October 10.
\80\ Zhang Huailei, ``The Urgency of Building a Social Benefit Net
for Farmers Who Have Lost Land'' [Wei shidi nongmin jianli shehui
baozhang tixide jinpoxing], Social Sciences in China Press, Vol. 148,
16 December 10.
\81\ Ibid.
\82\ PRC Administrative Coercion Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo
xingzheng qiangzhi fa], enacted 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12.
\83\ Ibid., especially chaps. 2-4.
\84\ Ibid., chap. 2.
\85\ Ibid., chaps. 3, 4.
\86\ Ibid., art. 8.
\87\ Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
\88\ Edward Wong, ``Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China
Intensifies Crackdown,'' New York Times, 11 March 11; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the Harshest in
Recent Years,'' 25 February 11; Human Rights in China, ``Heavy Charges
for Chinese Activists; HRIC Urges Support From International
Community,'' 25 February 11; Andrew Quinn, ``U.S. Urges China To Halt
Detention of Activists,'' Reuters, 8 March 11.
\89\ See, e.g., Minnie Chan, ``Security Even Tighter After
`Jasmine' Call,'' South China Morning Post, 2 March 11; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following
Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' 30 May 11; Human Rights in China,
``Dozens Put Under House Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify
Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize Announcement,'' 28 October 10;
Chris Buckley, ``China Dissidents Under Lockdown as Nobel Tensions
Linger,'' Reuters, 29 October 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Beijing Activists Li Fangping, Li Zhiying Placed Under Soft
Detention'' [Beijing weiquan renshi li fangping, li zhiying zao
ruanjin], 26 October 10.
\90\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human
Rights Briefing Weekly December 8-13, 2010'' 15 December 10; Gillian
Wong, ``China Cracks Down, Many Activists Missing,'' Associated Press,
21 March 11.
\91\ See, e.g., ``Mainland Student in Hong Kong Asked To `Drink
Tea' by Mainland Liaison Office After Participating in Rights Defense
Activities'' [Zai gang neidisheng weiquan zhong lianban ``qing
yincha''], Sina, 1 June 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China
Human Rights Briefing Weekly December 8-13, 2010'' 15 December 10;
``Caijing Magazine Journalist Zhang Jialong Missing After Being Asked
to `Have Tea,' May Be Related to Ai Weiwei Case'' [Caijing zazhi jizhe
zhang jialong bei ``hecha'' shizong huo yu ai weiwei an you guan],
Radio France Internationale, 2 May 11; ``The Chinese Government Charges
Three Internet Dissidents With the Crime of `Incitement To Subvert
State Authority' '' [Zhongguo zhengfu dui sanming wanluo yiyirenshi
kong yi `biandong dianfu guojia zhengquan' zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 3
April 11.
\92\ See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is
Sentenced to 10 Years,'' New York Times, 25 March 11.
\93\ ``Lawyers' Licenses Withheld,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 July 10;
``Authorities Deny Human Rights Lawyers Professional License
Renewals,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 December
10.
\94\ Jonathan Shieber, ``A Joke on Twitter, a Year in Labor Camp?
'' Wall Street Journal, 19 November 10; Stanley Lubman, ``China's War
on Dissent and Activism,'' Wall Street Journal, 24 December 10; ``China
Court Jails Tainted-Milk Activist, Amnesty Says,'' Bloomberg News, 10
November 10.
\95\ Peter Simpson, ``China Bans Rights Lawyers From Travel China
[sic],'' Voice of America, 9 November 10; Cara Anna, ``Lawyers: China
Blocked US Visit, Citing `Security,' '' Associated Press, reprinted in
Yahoo!, 30 October 10.
\96\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17
March 96, effective 1 January 97, arts. 33, 34.
\97\ Provisions on Criminal Litigation [Guanyu xinggshi susong falu
yuanzhu gongzuode guiding], issued 28 September 05, effective 1
December 05, art. 4.
\98\ ``China's Legal Aid Funds Surge in 2010,'' Xinhua, 2 February
11; Cui Qingxin, ``China Surpasses One Billion Yuan in Legal Aid
Support Last Year'' [Qunian woguo falu yuanzhu jingfei zonge chaoguo 10
yi], Xinhua, 3 February 11.
\99\ Ibid.
\100\ Cui Qingxin, ``Last Year, More Than 70 Million Legal Aid
Cases Handled; 40 Percent on Behalf of Migrant Workers'' [Qunian
gongban 70 duo wanjian falu yuanzhu anjian jin sicheng wei nongmingong
banli], Xinhua, 4 February 11.
\101\ Zhang Yan and Wang Yan, ``213 Counties Will Receive Free
Legal Aid,'' China Daily, 9 February 11.
\102\ Li Jiabao, ``Parents of Child Beggars Offered Legal Aid,''
China Daily, 14 February 11.
\103\ ``700,000 Yuan Earmarked for Tibet's Legal Aid,'' China Tibet
News, reprinted in China Daily, 25 February 11.
\104\ Liu Yujie, ``China Daily: Communities Get Free Legal Aid,''
China Daily, 1 March 11.
\105\ Cao Hongbing, ``Requirements and Ideas for Improving Legal
Aid'' [Wanshan woguo falu yuanzhu de biyaoxing he silu], People's
Daily, 12 February 10.
\106\ Ibid.
\107\ Zhang Yan and Wang Yan, ``213 Counties Will Receive Free
Legal Aid,'' China Daily, 9 February 11.
\108\ Yuan Yuan, ``Aiding in Defense,'' Beijing Review, 6 February
11.
\109\ Ibid.
\110\ Ibid.