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TIBET

Findings

- Expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan culture—especially on religion and language—are resulting in consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with increases in government-provided statistical measures on economic development and social services, such as education. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of government and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of punishment as the central and local governments expand the use of legal measures to safeguard “social stability” by criminalizing such expression.
- No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese government and Party officials during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the government pressed forward with implementation of legal measures and policies that many Tibetans—including the Dalai Lama—believe threaten the Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile. The change has the potential to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for the Party and government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a “political” figure.
- The government and Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader and expanded government and Party control over Tibetan Buddhism to impose what officials describe as the “normal order” of the religion. As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries. The measures impose closer monitoring and supervision of each monastery’s Democratic Management Committee—a monastic group legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey government laws, regulations, and policies. The measures expand significantly township-level government authority over monasteries and nunneries and provide a monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role to village-level committees.
- Government security and judicial officials used China’s legal system as a means to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled

language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. Examples during the 2011 reporting year included writer-publishers, a conference organizer, a singer, and persons who downloaded “prohibited” songs. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influencing other Tibetans by punishing peaceful expression as a “crime” and using imprisonment to remove them from society.

- Events this past year highlighted the importance Tibetans attribute to the status and preservation of the Tibetan language and the increased threat that some Tibetans believe will result from “reform” of the “bilingual education” system. Tibetan students in one province led protests against plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during the period 2010 to 2020. A Party official characterized “unity of spoken and written language” as essential for “a unified country” and implied that protesting students put national unity at risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to authorities a petition analyzing what they deemed to be violations of China’s Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that result in the infringement of ethnic minorities’ rights.

- Rural Tibetans protested against what they consider to be adverse effects of government and Party economic development policies—especially mining—that prioritize government objectives above respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and environment. The value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) mineral resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010 subsidies the central government provided to the TAR, based on official reports. The TAR government has completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population. Officials provided updates on construction of the railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu, which the government renamed and will make into a “city” with a substantial population, economy, and well-developed infrastructure. Tibetans in Yushu protested after authorities either sold or expropriated their property without providing adequate compensation.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama’s withdrawal from exiled Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for the government and Party to characterize him as a “political” figure. As tensions rise in Tibetan areas, a Chinese government decision to engage in dialogue can result in a durable and mutually bene-

ficial outcome for the Chinese government and Tibetans and improve the outlook for local and regional security in coming decades.

- Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of refraining from expanding the use of legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists' right to the freedom of religion. Point out to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama campaign, aggressive programs of "patriotic education," and recent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to control Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs could promote social discord, not "social stability." Urge the government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions.
- Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an "ordinary citizen" along with his family. Urge the government to invite a representative of an international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy; photograph the international representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima's statement and the photograph.
- Convey to the Chinese government the importance of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by honoring China's Constitution's reference to the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to infringe upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights. Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in teaching modern subjects.
- Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when the government plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of such projects and in advising the government on the implementation and progress of such projects. Request the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property or property rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu earthquake and the government's decision to redevelop Yushu as a new "city."
- Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.

○ Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the Chinese government to provide complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative examples include: Former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for “inciting splittism”); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival).

Introduction

Developments during the Commission's 2011 reporting period show that expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan culture—especially religion and language—are resulting in consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with increases in economic development and social services such as education in government-provided statistics. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of Chinese government policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of punishment as governments expand the use of legal measures to safeguard “social stability” by criminalizing such expression.

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese government and Communist Party officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the Chinese government pressed forward with implementation of legal measures and policies that many Tibetans—including the Dalai Lama—believe threaten the Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and environment. In his March 10 address to Tibetans,¹ the Dalai Lama expressed disappointment with previous rounds of the dialogue. He noted the “lack of any positive response” to proposals set out in his Middle Way Approach² and suggested that the Communist Party United Front Work Department officials who met with the Dalai Lama's envoys may not have accurately or completely informed higher ranking officials about the Tibetan proposals.³

In March 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile.⁴ The change, he said, would enable him to focus “more effectively” on spiritual matters.⁵ He explained in his March 10 address that he had reached a “decision to devolve [his] formal authority to the elected leader”⁶ and the next day outlined his decision to end the centuries old Tibetan government structure that positioned the Dalai Lama as the highest-ranking figure in both government and religious affairs.⁷ The Dalai Lama's renunciation of an official role in exiled Tibetans' governance has the potential to alter the dialogue's dynamics by eliminating an institutional basis for the Party and government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a “political” figure.⁸

In July 2011, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero reiterated U.S. Administration objectives to “promote a substantive, results-oriented dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives” and “to help sustain Tibet's unique religious, linguistic, and cultural heritages.”⁹ She observed that it is in the Chinese government's interests to resolve problems and that counterproductive policies “will exacerbate already existing tensions that could, in turn, undermine China's efforts to maintain its current social and economic development.”¹⁰

Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

During the past year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader¹¹ and expanded government and Party control over Tibetan Buddhism in order to impose what officials describe as the “normal order” of the religion.¹² In April 2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department¹³ (and principal interlocutor for the Dalai Lama’s envoys) summed up Party intentions toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries during a working group “investigation” he led in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).¹⁴ A Party-run newspaper described his remarks:

He expressed his hopes that religious personages and believers will always implement the line, principle, and policies of the Party, unswervingly carry out struggle against the Dalai clique, expose the reactionary essence of Dalai, establish a sound and permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries, and ensure that all activities of monasteries will have rules to follow. In addition, their interpretations of religious doctrines and rules must be [in] line with social development and progress and ensure that Tibetan Buddhism will actively adapt itself to socialist society.¹⁵

OFFICIALS PRESS ATTACK ON DALAI LAMA, SET SIGHTS ON SELECTING
NEXT DALAI LAMA

Chinese government and Communist Party officials pressed their campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader. Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, at a March 2011 meeting of TAR delegates to the National People’s Congress, accused the Dalai Lama of being “the boss of splittism” and a “double dealer” who, “under the signboard of religion,” seeks to “deceive religious believers’ simple feelings.”¹⁶ Jampa Phuntsog (*Xiangba Pingcuo*), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the TAR People’s Congress, said the same month during a visit to the United States that Tibetans “could have developed much better without the Dalai Lama and his followers,” and that if the Dalai Lama “is indeed a religious person” he should “not dabble in” political issues.¹⁷ China’s official media reported in August that as part of a “major leadership reshuffle” the Party Central Committee transferred Hebei province Deputy Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to the TAR to replace Zhang as Secretary, and posted Zhang to Hebei as Party Secretary.¹⁸

During the past reporting year, senior officials continued to assert the Chinese government’s intention to supervise the selection of the next Dalai Lama and to challenge the current Dalai Lama’s views on the matter. Jampa Phuntsog, also Executive Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee,¹⁹ characterized the Dalai Lama’s recent remarks as “the biggest obstacle to the normal continuation of Tibetan Buddhism” and objected to the Dalai Lama’s remarks about his own reincarnation.²⁰ He observed: “The Dalai Lama’s attitude on this question is that there is sometimes reincarnation and sometimes no reincarnation, and the living Buddha may

return as a man, a woman or a foreigner. Recently he even talked about stopping the reincarnation.”²¹ The comment refers to remarks attributed to the Dalai Lama as recently as October 2010 stating that his reincarnation would take place “in a free country,”²² and that he may choose to identify and train his successor before he dies, or Tibetans might elect to discontinue the institution of the Dalai Lama.²³ Pema Choling (*Baima Chilin*), Chairman of the TAR People’s Government and Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, said the Dalai Lama’s views on reincarnation are “impossible.”²⁴ In July 2011, the Dalai Lama rejected government and Party intrusion into the matter of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation as a “disgrace” and stated with respect to his own reincarnation, “[The] final authority is myself and no one else, and obviously not China’s Communists.”²⁵

PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES TIGHTEN CONTROL ON
“TIBETAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS”

The central government and 9 of the 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments²⁶ issued or drafted regulatory measures as of August 2011 that increase substantially the state’s infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries. The measures increase curbs on protection of “freedom of religious belief”²⁷ as provided under China’s Constitution by imposing greater subordination of “Tibetan Buddhist affairs” to government regulations that enforce Communist Party policy.

In Qinghai province, for example, from July 2009 to September 2010, people’s congresses in five of Qinghai’s six Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) put into effect regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs to fulfill Party objectives.²⁸ The regulations followed a provincial Party committee determination in May 2008 that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in the province had “drifted freely beyond the government’s management by law and supervision by the public.”²⁹ As a result, the Qinghai government issued an “opinion”³⁰ proposing that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries be required to implement a “new system” based on “Party committee leadership, government responsibility, . . . and management in accordance with the law by religious affairs departments and other concerned departments.”³¹

As of April 2011, new regulatory measures on “Tibetan Buddhist affairs” were in effect in a total of seven TAPs located in three provinces:³² Huangnan (Malho) TAP,³³ Hainan (Tsolho) TAP,³⁴ Haibei (Tsojang) TAP,³⁵ Guoluo (Golog) TAP,³⁶ and Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP in Qinghai province;³⁷ Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP) in Sichuan province;³⁸ and Diqing (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.³⁹ Prefectural regulations reportedly were in the legislative process in Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai,⁴⁰ and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan.⁴¹ As of August 2011, the Commission had not observed information on whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, was preparing such a regulation. The 10 TAPs make up approximately half the area the Chinese government designates as “Tibetan autonomous,” and approximately half the Tibetan population of the Tibetan autonomous areas lives in the 10 TAPs.⁴² The central government issued national-level regulations effective Novem-

ber 1, 2010,⁴³ that along with the prefectural-level regulations tighten and expand existing means of government control and monitoring of Tibetan Buddhist institutions.⁴⁴

COMMON FEATURES AMONG NEW TIBETAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS
MEASURES

A summary of the Commission's analysis of the points of similarity among the national regulations⁴⁵ and four of the prefectural-level regulations (Huangnan TAP⁴⁶ and Hainan TAP⁴⁷ in Qinghai, Aba T&QAP⁴⁸ in Sichuan, and Diqing TAP⁴⁹ in Yunnan) follows.⁵⁰

Prioritizing Tibetan Buddhist obligation to support Chinese government policies. The regulatory measures build on existing government and Communist Party policies mandating that Tibetan Buddhist institutions (like other state-sanctioned religious institutions) must protect Chinese national and ethnic unity and “social stability,”⁵¹ promote patriotism toward China and adherence to socialism,⁵² and obey Chinese government laws and regulations.⁵³

“Buddhist Associations” (BAs): Greater authority over monastic institutions. BAs—institutional links between Tibetan Buddhist institutions and the Chinese government and Party that facilitate the exercise of government and Party authority over Tibetan Buddhist activity⁵⁴—must, among other duties, approve or revoke the official status of monks and nuns as “religious personnel” in accordance with government requirements;⁵⁵ approve quotas on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a monastery or nunnery;⁵⁶ and conduct classes educating Tibetan Buddhist “religious personnel” on patriotism toward China, Chinese laws and regulations (including on religion), and adapting Tibetan Buddhism to socialism.⁵⁷

“Democratic Management Committees” (DMCs): Subject to greater scrutiny, subordination to government authority. The regulatory measures impose closer supervision of each monastery's Democratic Management Committee—a monastic group legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey government laws, regulations, and policies.⁵⁸ The measures empower three types of agencies to supervise or monitor DMCs: BAs, government religious affairs bureaus (RABs), and village-level “peoples” or “masses” committees.⁵⁹ Provisions require DMCs (under BA supervision and in compliance with central government measures issued in 2007⁶⁰) to direct the process of identifying, seating, and educating *trulkus*⁶¹—teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations. For the first time, DMCs must fulfill a central government requirement to apply for, justify, and receive approval for a fixed quota on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a monastery or nunnery.⁶²

“Religious personnel”: Subject to more detailed control over religious contact, travel, study. The measures strengthen external supervision of DMCs, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, *trulkus*, monks, and nuns by requiring their submission to administration and guidance by governments at the prefectural, county, and township levels, and by village-level residents committees.⁶³ Most of the prefectural measures impose requirements on “religious personnel” who wish to travel to another county or prefecture to study or

teach Buddhism.⁶⁴ The national measures impose the most difficult requirements: First, “religious personnel” must apply for and receive approval from the prefectural-level BA where they live and from the prefectural-level BA where they hope to study or teach; then each BA granting approval must report the approval to the corresponding prefectural-level RAB.⁶⁵

Township-level governments: Expanded responsibility, authority over monasteries, nunneries. The prefectural regulatory measures expand significantly township-level government authority to implement regulations on Tibetan Buddhist activity at monasteries and nunneries. All five of the regulations for Qinghai TAPs for which text was available online as of August 2011 contained articles empowering township-level governments to monitor and supervise monastic activity.⁶⁶ Regulations for four of the Qinghai TAPs state explicitly that township governments have the responsibility to “manage” Tibetan Buddhist affairs within the township area.⁶⁷ Enabling township governments to take on greater responsibility for regulating Tibetan Buddhist affairs is important because there are so many township-level governments. As of 2007, there were a total of 998 township-level governments subordinate to 75 county-level governments in the 10 TAPs outside the TAR⁶⁸—an average of 13 township governments under each county government.

Village-level committees: Expanded role as grassroots monitors, supervisors. Most of the prefectural regulatory measures for which text was available online as of August 2011 included a greater monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role for village-level committees than did previous measures.⁶⁹ Measures effective in Aba T&QAP, Sichuan, for example, provide village committees a role in reviewing applications from persons who wish to become monks or nuns, and in supervising monks and nuns.⁷⁰ The national regulations provide for the first time a legal basis for placing a village committee member on a DMC—and by doing so, empower the village committee member to participate directly in DMC decision-making.⁷¹

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES

A summary of some principal areas of distinction between the seven prefectural-level regulatory measures for which text was available online as of August 2011 follows.

Dedicated village-level committees monitor, supervise, report on monastic activity. All five of the Qinghai province TAP regulations include provisions that establish “masses supervision and appraisal committees” (MSACs, *qunzhong jiandu pingyi weiyuanhui*).⁷² MSACs are a new development with respect to their specific role in government management of Tibetan Buddhist affairs.⁷³ Township governments guide selection of MSAC members from among village residents, herders, and monastery staff.⁷⁴ Regulations mandate MSACs to fulfill specific duties in supervising, monitoring, and appraising monastic management (especially DMCs), administration (including financial affairs), and Buddhist teaching.⁷⁵ MSACs must submit periodic reports to township- and county-level governments.⁷⁶

Extent of provisions for administrative and criminal punishment. The regulatory measures vary in the extensiveness and specificity of language describing activity that may result in administrative penalties (e.g., expulsion) or criminal punishment (e.g., imprisonment) of “religious personnel.”⁷⁷ Three prefectural measures (Hainan, Guoluo, Aba) contain more extensive descriptions of punishable activity;⁷⁸ three prefectural measures (Haibei, Haixi, Diqing) contain less extensive descriptions of punishable activity;⁷⁹ and one prefectural measure (Huangnan) contains language that is mid-range.⁸⁰ Information available as of February 2011 in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database demonstrated a positive correlation between the number of Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus* detained in each TAP on or after March 10, 2008, and the extensiveness of regulatory measures’ provisions on punishment.⁸¹

Provision for potential redress against administrative punishment. Four of the prefectural regulations (Huangnan, Hainan, Guoluo, Diqing) for which text was available online as of August 2011 contain provisions allowing a person punished administratively under the regulations either to seek administrative reconsideration of the punishment or to file a lawsuit against the punishment.⁸² Three of the four regulations (Huangnan, Haibei, Guoluo) cite the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law⁸³ and PRC Administrative Litigation Law⁸⁴ as the legal instruments for undertaking such action.⁸⁵ The Hainan, Haixi, and Aba regulatory measures do not mention administrative reconsideration or filing an administrative lawsuit.

Tibetan Cultural Expression: Increasing Pressure, Punishment

Chinese government and Communist Party policies and their implementation increased pressure on and sometimes threatened Tibetan cultural expression during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. Political detentions in 2011 increased compared to 2009 and 2010 but were lower than the high level of 2008.⁸⁶ Security and judicial officials used China’s legal system to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influencing other Tibetans and uses imprisonment to remove them from society. Examples follow of developments this reporting year that involved imprisonment, detention, and a police manhunt. In two separate cases, monks committed self-immolation to protest China’s handling of Tibetan issues.

January 2011: Detention after publishing an article.⁸⁷ Public security officials reportedly detained monk-writer Tsering Tenzin of Palyul Monastery, located in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), in connection with an essay he wrote that was published in 2010 in a collection of articles on “the situation inside Tibet.”⁸⁸ In February 2010, officials in Hongyuan (Marthang) county,⁸⁹ Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, detained monk Tsering Dondrub of Rongtha Monastery for assisting with publication.⁹⁰

Winter 2010: Detention for downloading banned songs.⁹¹ During a winter “strike hard” campaign in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), security officials punished Tibetans who had downloaded “prohibited” songs such as “Voice of Unity,” “My Lama,” and “I Miss the Sun, Moon, and Stars,” with 10 to 15 days of detention and a fine. Police allegedly beat some detainees.⁹²

December 2010: Imprisonment for writing articles about the 2008 Tibetan protests.⁹³ The Aba Intermediate People’s Court sentenced three contributing editors of a Tibetan-language magazine to imprisonment for “inciting splittism” (PRC Criminal Law, Article 103(2)): Buddha (a pen name) and Jangtse Donkho, four years; and Kalsang Jinpa, three years.⁹⁴

December 2010: Redetention for making video appeal.⁹⁵ Public security officials in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, reportedly redetained monk-writer Kalsang Tsultrim of Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery on December 16, 2010.⁹⁶ Officials released him on bail the previous October after detaining him in July 2010 for distributing a video CD of him speaking about concern for the Tibetan culture and religion.⁹⁷

December 2010: Detention after publishing articles, organizing conferences.⁹⁸ Public security officials in Lhasa city reportedly detained monk-writer Tenpa Lodroe on December 29, 2010, reportedly in connection with a December 20 conference on “the situation in Tibet” arranged in Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province.⁹⁹

September 2010: Arrest warrant issued for singer after CD release.¹⁰⁰ In the second half of September, public security officials in Lhasa city reportedly issued an arrest warrant for singer Pasang Tsering and banned his newly released CD.¹⁰¹ Officials allegedly suspected the lyrics of praising the Dalai Lama and “inciting ethnic sentiments.”¹⁰² As of late September 2010, relatives had lost contact with him.¹⁰³

March 2011: Self-immolation to mark anniversary of 2008 protest.¹⁰⁴ On March 16, 2011, monk Phuntsog of Kirti Monastery, located near the Aba county seat, Aba T&QAP, set himself on fire to protest the fatal shooting on the same date in 2008 of at least 10 Tibetan protesters.¹⁰⁵ As he burned, Phuntsog reportedly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama’s long life.¹⁰⁶ Phuntsog died in a hospital the next morning.¹⁰⁷ Officials forced Kirti monks to submit to political education starting March 21;¹⁰⁸ on April 21, People’s Armed Police (PAP) removed at least 300 of the monks and took them to other counties to undergo “legal education.”¹⁰⁹ PAP and other police allegedly beat severely Tibetans who attempted to block removal of the monks, resulting in serious injuries and the deaths of two elderly Tibetans.¹¹⁰ On August 29 and 30, 2011, a county-level court in Aba T&QAP sentenced three Kirti monks to 10-, 11-, and 13-year prison terms for Phuntsog’s “intentional homicide,” claiming that two monks “plotted, instigated and assisted” in the self-immolation and one monk delayed medical treatment.¹¹¹ International media and advocacy group reports described the convicted monks’ intentions toward Phuntsog in terms of providing rescue, protection, and shelter.¹¹²

August 2011: Self-immolation to protest Chinese policies. On August 15, monk Tsewang Norbu of Nyitso Monastery, located

in the seat of Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi TAP, died after setting himself on fire as he shouted slogans calling for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet.¹¹³

*Education and Economic Development: Government Initiatives,
Tibetan Protests*

Tibetan students and farmers protested government and Communist Party policies on education, the environment, and rural Tibetans' use of farming and grazing lands during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Such protests indicate that Tibetans¹¹⁴ consider the policies a threat to the Tibetan culture, language, and environment, and the viability of farming and herding as a means of livelihood for rural Tibetans—who made up approximately 87 percent of Tibetans in China in 2000.¹¹⁵

TIBETAN STUDENTS, TEACHERS PROTEST GOVERNMENT EDUCATION
POLICY

Events this past year, detailed below, highlighted the importance Tibetans attribute to the status of Tibetan language, its level of use in the education system,¹¹⁶ and the threat that government and Party policy pose to the status and use of Tibetan language.¹¹⁷ Senior Party and government officials issued a series of statements¹¹⁸ on plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during the period from 2010 to 2020.¹¹⁹ Tibetan student-led protests, principally in Qinghai province,¹²⁰ resulted in retired Tibetan cadres and educators submitting a petition (or “letter”) to Communist Party and government offices asserting that the Qinghai government was implementing reforms that contravene provisions in China's Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL).¹²¹

The speed with which protests spread suggests that Tibetan discontent with education policy may be widespread.¹²² Tibetan teachers' and students' views in Qinghai on the role of Tibetan language in education are unlikely to differ significantly from Tibetan views in other Tibetan autonomous areas.¹²³ A chronology of principal events from October 15 to 29, 2010, follows.

October 15: Teachers sign letter criticizing bilingual education reform. As a “Tibetan Language Course Reforms Training” attended by more than 300 teachers employed at Qinghai province Tibetan-language primary and middle schools concluded,¹²⁴ attendees reportedly signed a petition (or “letter”) on October 15 calling on Qinghai officials to continue to treat Tibetan language as the “language of instruction” in Tibetan schools.¹²⁵ The teachers reportedly were responding to the “Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)”¹²⁶ (the Plan).¹²⁷ The petition reasoned that “choice of language of instruction should depend entirely on those being taught.”¹²⁸

October 19: Student protests begin. Students at schools in Tongren (Rebgong), the Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) capital,¹²⁹ reportedly protested on October 19 in response to a report that Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang Wei “ordered that the language used in textbooks should be changed to

Chinese.”¹³⁰ Students carried banners demanding expanded use of Tibetan language¹³¹ and circulated a text message claiming the central government had decided to cancel “Tibetan-language centered” education.¹³² Qiang had instructed educators in September to increase Chinese-language teaching and “conquer the erroneous thinking that if minority nationality students undergo an education based on the state’s common language [Mandarin] and script it will hurt the feelings of the minority nationality masses, or effect the development of the minority nationality culture, or impact social stability.”¹³³ Protests reportedly spread to Beijing and Hainan (Tsolho), Haibei (Tsojang), and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai.¹³⁴

October 22: Qinghai education head defends reform. Director Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Department of Education acknowledged on October 22 that students had “expressed their dissatisfaction” with the “bilingual education reform plan,” and attributed the incidents to students’ “misunderstanding.”¹³⁵ He referred to an “outline” of the Plan issued by the provincial government and Party on September 12, and confirmed that among the “main goals” was for instructors to “adhere to mainly teaching with the state’s standard spoken and written language [Mandarin].”¹³⁶

October 24: Retired cadres and educators argue that education reforms are illegal. A petition signed on October 24 by “retired Tibetan cadres and veteran education workers” in Qinghai’s capital, Xining, analyzed perceived violations of China’s Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL),¹³⁷ and other laws that resulted in the infringement of ethnic minorities’ rights.¹³⁸ The educators submitted the letter to central-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Party, legislative, government, and consultative bodies.¹³⁹ The petition “proposed” that the Qinghai Province Education Department “immediately stop the enforcement of the illegal provision for using Chinese as the only language for teaching”¹⁴⁰ and cited the Constitution and REAL, Article 20, as the legal basis for non-implementation.¹⁴¹

October 25: Officials describe diminished scope for Tibetan language use. At a forum convened on October 25 to “study and implement the spirit” of the Plan,¹⁴² Gao Yunlong, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai People’s Government, told government, academic, and other personnel that Mandarin is the appropriate language for use in “public places” and ethnic languages are suitable for “one’s home location.”¹⁴³ He justified the decision to exclude ethnic languages from teaching “scientific” subjects such as “mathematics, physics, and chemistry” and said that exclusion “does no harm to carrying ethnic culture forward.”¹⁴⁴

October 27: Party Secretary ties reforms to “national unity,” protests to “plots.” Qiang Wei on October 27 linked support of bilingual education reform to protecting “national sovereignty” and promoting “national and ethnic unity.”¹⁴⁵ He described “unity of spoken and written language” as “a fundamental and essential condition for a unified country.”¹⁴⁶ He warned Qinghai Party members that “domestic and foreign hostile forces will seek to exploit our promotion of bilingual education reform as an opportunity to plot, orchestrate, incite, and provoke disturbances, . . . and to destroy our social situation of unity and stability.”¹⁴⁷

RURAL TIBETANS PROTEST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MAINSTAY:
MINING

Rural Tibetans protested during the 2011 reporting year against what they consider to be adverse effects of Chinese government and Communist Party economic development policies—especially mining—that prioritize government objectives above respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and environment.¹⁴⁸ Officials justify such policies in part by publicizing statistical indicators such as rising GDP¹⁴⁹ and household income.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, government officials emphasized the dependency of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) on central support: State Ethnic Affairs Commission Minister Yang Jing asserted that the central government provided in the form of subsidies 90 percent of the funds the TAR government spent from 2001 to 2010.¹⁵¹ Statistics are difficult to locate on central government revenue derived from natural resource extraction in Tibetan autonomous areas—China’s Constitution appropriates ownership of natural resources throughout China to the central government.¹⁵² The value of such resources in the TAR may be as high as 600 billion yuan (US\$93.8 billion), according to a December 2010 official media report¹⁵³—about double the total 2001 to 2010 subsidies the central government provided to the TAR.¹⁵⁴

Examples of reported incidents of Tibetan protest against economic development initiatives follow.

November-December 2010: Protest and detentions in Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture, TAR. On December 18, People’s Armed Police (PAP) ended a standoff that began on November 22 when Tibetans began to protest and petition against the start of mining activity near Lingka Monastery in Xietongmen (Shetongmon) county, Rikaze.¹⁵⁵ PAP allegedly beat protesters and detained 17 persons, including the Lingka abbot (Kalsang) and four monks (Jamyang Rigsang, Jamyang Tsering, Rigzin Pema, and Tsewang Dorje).¹⁵⁶

September-October 2010: Protest and detentions in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR. Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county reportedly attempted to block Chinese workers who arrived in August 2010 to begin construction of a dam near a mountain Tibetans regard as sacred.¹⁵⁷ Villagers claimed workers intended to establish mines in the area, asserted that they had the right to protect the local environment, and refused to move.¹⁵⁸ On September 26, the construction team claimed to have received a mining permit agreed to by the TAR Party secretary.¹⁵⁹ Security officials reportedly detained protest leaders Dorje Dragtsal and Palden Choedrag and three other Tibetans, Buphel, Tsegon, and Samten, who presented a petition to Naqu authorities.¹⁶⁰

August 2010: Protest, shooting, detentions in Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan. On August 18 security officials in the seat of Baiyu (Palyul) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), opened fire on a group of about 100 Tibetans petitioning outside county government offices against a Shanghai-based mining company’s expanded gold-mining operations.¹⁶¹ Villagers alleged that mining had damaged their farming and grazing lands.¹⁶² Gunfire reportedly killed “at least four” Tibetans and

wounded about 30 after a “scuffle” broke out.¹⁶³ China’s official media reported that police fired warning shots after Tibetans attacked them and a “stray bullet” killed one Tibetan; police detained 35 Tibetans.¹⁶⁴

May-July 2011: Protest and detentions in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR. After Tibetans learned that Chinese laborers had been “deployed” in May 2011 to work at mining locations in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu, authorities warned residents that protests against mining activity “would be construed as politically motivated,” according to a media report’s unidentified source.¹⁶⁵ During June and July, security officials allegedly detained approximately 50 Tibetans (15 named) linked to protest activity.¹⁶⁶ Detainees included “village officials” Arsong, Tashi Namgyal, and Jamyang Trinle, who traveled to the TAR capital, Lhasa, to “protest” the mining and detentions, and alleged protest “ringleaders” Tenzin and Tashi.¹⁶⁷

SETTLING NOMADS, BUILDING RAILWAYS, REPLACING YUSHU

Chinese officials continued to implement policies and announce projects over this past year that some Tibetans believe threaten the Tibetan culture and heritage. Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR People’s Government, said on January 10, 2011, that the government had settled or resettled “1.43 million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000 households” into new housing¹⁶⁸—one of the initiatives of a program the Party refers to as “construction of a new socialist countryside”¹⁶⁹ and that Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao named as a top development priority at the 2010 Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet.¹⁷⁰ Based on a reported total TAR rural population of 2.21 million,¹⁷¹ the government has completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population.¹⁷² The Commission has not observed statistics during the past year on compulsory settlement or resettlement in other Tibetan autonomous areas.

The Chinese government provided updates this past year on construction of the railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan plateau and has the potential to impact profoundly the Tibetan culture and environment.¹⁷³

- **Lhasa-Rikaze (Shigatse) railway.** In February 2011, state-run media reported that the 253-kilometer westward link from Lhasa to Rikaze will be completed by 2015 (the end of the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development).¹⁷⁴ On September 2, China Daily reported the railway will begin operating in 2014 but did not cite the source of the information.¹⁷⁵ The estimated cost of building the railway as of the September 2010 start of construction was 13.3 billion yuan¹⁷⁶ (US\$2.1 billion)—approximately 20 percent greater than the 11 billion yuan (US\$1.7 billion) estimate reported in April 2009.¹⁷⁷

- **Lhasa-Linzhi (Nyingtri) railway.** Construction of the eastward link from Lhasa to Linzhi will begin during the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan.¹⁷⁸ The Commission has not observed information about whether the railway will be built along the north or the south side of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Yalung Zangbo, Brahmaputra) River.¹⁷⁹

- **Sichuan-Tibet railway and Yunnan-Tibet railway.** The TAR will “conduct a pre-construction planning and study on the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-Tibet railways” during the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan.¹⁸⁰
- **Ge’ermu (Golmud, Kermo)-Ku’erle (Korla) railway.** Construction of the railway linking Golmud city in Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, with Ku’erle (Korla) city, the capital of Bayingguoleng (Bayingolin) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), will begin in 2011 and be complete by 2015.¹⁸¹ The railway will reduce the journey between Urumqi city, the XUAR capital, and Lhasa city by more than 1,000 kilometers.¹⁸²
- **Chengdu-Ge’ermu railway.** Construction of the railway linking Chengdu city, the Sichuan capital, and Ge’ermu city may start by 2015, the end of the PRC 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development.¹⁸³ The route traverses Ruo’ergai (Dzoege) county in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Yushu (Kygudo) in Yushu TAP (the site of an April 2010 earthquake¹⁸⁴), and Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai.¹⁸⁵ Yushu and Guoluo are the most ethnically Tibetan areas remaining outside the TAR, based on official 2000 census data: Yushu TAP (97.1 percent Tibetan), TAR (92.7 percent Tibetan), and Guoluo TAP (91.6 percent Tibetan).¹⁸⁶

Tibetans protested in April 2011 against Chinese government plans for rebuilding Yushu (Kygudo), the capital of Yushu (Yushul) TAP, Qinghai, severely damaged by an April 2010 earthquake, and demanded that authorities “fairly and legitimately” resolve issues involving their residences and use of their land.¹⁸⁷ Media reports between June 2010 and March 2011 revealed government plans to rename Yushu and transform it into an urban area traversed by a railway.¹⁸⁸ Yushu’s “temporary” name would be Sanjiangyuan¹⁸⁹ (“three rivers source”), after a nearby nature reserve.¹⁹⁰ The government will redesignate the administrative area as a “city,”¹⁹¹ indicating that it will become the center of a substantial population and economy with a well-developed infrastructure.¹⁹² In June 2010, the Qinghai government announced the central government would provide most of 32 billion yuan (US\$4.68 billion) budgeted to rebuild the area¹⁹³—a sum similar to the 33 billion yuan (then US\$4.7 billion) cost of constructing the Qinghai-Tibet railway.¹⁹⁴ In March 2011, the Qinghai government announced that the Chengdu-Ge’ermu railway would pass through Yushu’s location.¹⁹⁵

In January 2011, official media reports described Yushu as “flattened,”¹⁹⁶ but a June 2010 unofficial report noted that officials allegedly were expropriating Tibetan homes and businesses in sound condition so the government could redevelop the area.¹⁹⁷ Tibetans have objected to government plans to move them from spacious homes to smaller apartment- or townhouse-style residences in other locations.¹⁹⁸ On April 2, 2011, approximately 300 Tibetans staged a sit-in protest in Yushu, claiming authorities either sold or expropriated their property without providing “appropriate” compensation.¹⁹⁹ People’s Armed Police allegedly “attacked” the protesters, detained about 40 of them, and cleared the area.²⁰⁰

Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment

POST-MARCH 10, 2008: LACK OF INFORMATION, UNCERTAIN STATUS

During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government's failure to provide details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for peaceful, protest-related activity during the period since March 10, 2008, has resulted in prolonged uncertainty about the current status of hundreds of cases. As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,134 records of Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008—a figure certain to be far from complete. No information is available, however, on the outcome of more than half (623) of the cases. More than half (348) of the 623 unresolved cases are presumed to have resulted in release based on the substantial period of time since detention—three years or more in hundreds of cases.

Among the 1,134 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions reported since March 2008, post-detention information is available for only 307 cases. Included in those 307 cases are 21 Tibetans whom officials ordered to serve reeducation through labor (16 are believed released upon completing their terms), and 197 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from six months to life (79 are believed released upon sentence completion). Of the 197 Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 186 prisoners: the average sentence length is five years and three months based on PPD data as of September 1, 2011.²⁰¹

CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT


As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained records of 527 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned. Of those 527 records, 483 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008,²⁰² and 44 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.

Of the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data as of September 1, 2011:

- More than half (264) are believed or presumed to be detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are believed or presumed to be detained or imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (160), Gansu province (23), Qinghai province (34), the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1), and Beijing (1).
- 113 are serving sentences ranging in length from one year and six months to life imprisonment; the average sentence length is seven years and two months.²⁰³ Sixty-two (55 percent) of the 113 prisoners with known sentences are monks, nuns, or Tibetan Buddhist teachers or *trulkus*.
- 240 (50 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus*.

- 425 (88 percent) are male, 51 (11 percent) are female, and 7 are of unknown gender.

Sentencing information is available on 27 of the 44 Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed to remain imprisoned. Their sentences range in length from five years to life imprisonment; the average sentence length is 14 years and 3 months.²⁰⁴



Endnotes

¹The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising every year that he has lived in exile, beginning in 1960. The statements for the years 1961 to 2011 are available on the Web site of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

²Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day," 10 March 11. For information about the Middle Way Approach, see Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "His Holiness's Middle Way Approach for Resolving the Issue of Tibet," last visited 3 June 08.

³Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day," 10 March 11.

⁴Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Message of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies," 11 March 11. (The U.S. Government does not recognize the "Central Tibetan Administration" (Tibetan "government-in-exile") as a government. See, e.g., "Report on Tibet Negotiations, March 2009–February 2010," reprinted in International Campaign for Tibet, last visited 21 March 11. The copy posted on the ICT Web site does not include the name of the issuing authority. The Report is mandated by Sections 611 (Tibetan Policy Act of 2002) and 613(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, which direct the President to submit such a report annually to Congress. The Department of State customarily prepares the report. The report states, "Since the U.S. Government does not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United States does not conduct official diplomatic relations with the Tibetan 'government-in-exile' in Dharamsala, India.")

⁵Phurbu Thinley, "Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution," Phayul, 19 March 11. The Dalai Lama reportedly said, "If [relinquishing political power] happens, like the first, second, third and fourth Dalai Lamas I can concentrate more effectively on [the] spiritual role."

⁶Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day," 10 March 11.

⁷Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Message of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies," 11 March 11. The Dalai Lama stated in his prepared remarks, "Since the Fifth Dalai Lama's founding of the Ganden Phodrang [Gaden Phodrang] Government of Tibet in 1642, successive Dalai Lamas have been both the spiritual and temporal leaders of Tibet. . . . The essence of a democratic system is, in short, the assumption of political responsibility by elected leaders for the popular good. In order for our process of democratization to be complete, the time has come for me to devolve my formal authority to such an elected leadership." Phurbu Thinley, "Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution," Phayul, 19 March 11. According to the article, the Dalai Lama said, "So as the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, I take pride and freedom to voluntarily relinquish the political power wielded by the institution of the Dalai Lama (Gaden Phodrang)."

⁸"Press Conference on Central Gov't's Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text)," China Daily, 11 February 10. According to the interview transcript, United Front Work Department Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun said, "[The Dalai Lama] is not a religious figure; instead he is the head of a separatist political group, who leads a government-in-exile with an illegal constitution, a constitution which describes that the 14th Dalai Lama is the supreme head both politically and relationally of this political group."

⁹The Dalai Lama: What He Means for Tibetans Today, Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 July 11, Written Statement Submitted by Maria Otero, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Member, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable," Xinhua, 7 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11); "Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs," China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 16 March 11).

¹²See, e.g., "Government Work Report-Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011" [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhi qu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci huiyi shang zizhi qu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). Chairman of the TAR Government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) urged the TAR People's Congress to "speed up the establishment of a long-standing mechanism on monastery management, to protect the normal order of religion." Huang Zhiwu, "Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an Investigation in Our Region" [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu diaoyan], Tibet Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 April 11). According to the report, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department, said that it is "necessary to extensively and thoroughly conduct legal publicity and education as well as management and safeguard the normal order of religious activities."

¹³China Directory 2010, ed. Radiopress (Kawasaki: RP Printing, 2009), 17.

¹⁴Huang Zhiwu, "Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an Investigation in Our Region" [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu diaoyan], Tibet Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 April 11).

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable," Xinhua, 7 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11).

¹⁷“Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs,” China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 16 March 11).

¹⁸Zhao Yanan, “Govt Leadership Changes Continue,” China Daily, 30 August 11 (includes chart titled “Major Leadership Reshuffle: Eleven Officials Have Changed Positions in Recent Weeks”); “Chen Quanguo Becomes New Party Chief of Tibet,” Xinhua, 25 August 11, reprinted in China Daily; “Chen Quanguo, New Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee, Says He Will Take Root in Tibet and Dedicate His Wisdom and Efforts,” China News Agency, 25 August 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 28 August 11).

¹⁹“[Tibetan Autonomous] Region Party Committee Holds Special Report Meeting on Maintaining the Advanced Nature of Party Members, Emphasizes Insisting on Unwaveringly Grasping Development, Taking a Clear-Cut Stand on Grasping Stability, and Working Hard To Establish a Harmonious Tibet” [Qu dangwei juxing baochi gongchan dang yuan xianjinxing zhuanli baogao hui qiangdiao jiangding buyi de zhua fazhan, qizhi xianming de zhua wending, nuli jianshe hexie xizang], Tibet Daily, 7 April 05 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 May 05); “Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo],” China Vitae, last visited 12 April 11 (Executive Deputy Secretary of TAR Party Committee since 2003).

²⁰“Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs,” China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 16 March 11).

²¹Ibid.

²²Amitabh Pal, “The Dalai Lama Interview,” Progressive, January 2006. The Dalai Lama said, “If the Tibetan people want another reincarnation, then logically while we’re outside, the successor should be someone who can carry out this task, which has not yet been accomplished by the previous Dalai Lama. That means that he must come in a free country.”

²³Evan Osnos, “The Next Incarnation,” New Yorker, 4 October 10. “[The Dalai Lama] has taken to musing aloud that he might be reincarnated as a woman, or that Tibetans might vote on whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue at all. Or, he says, he might select his own reincarnation while he is still alive . . . which would give him the chance to train a successor . . . Only one thing is certain, he says: his successor will be found outside Tibet.”

²⁴Sui-Lee Wee and Ben Blanchard, “China Says Dalai Lama Has To Reincarnate,” Reuters, 7 March 11.

²⁵Ravi Nessman, “Dalai Lama Calls Chinese Insistence on Picking His Religious Successor ‘a Disgrace,’” Associated Press, 1 July 11, reprinted in Yahoo!.

²⁶There are a total of 10 prefectural-level areas of ethnic Tibetan autonomy located in a total of four provinces in China: Qinghai province (Haibei [Tsojang] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Hainan [Tsolho] TAP, Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP, Huangnan [Malho] TAP, Guoluo [Golog] TAP, and Yushu [Yulshul] TAP); Gansu province (Gannan [Kanlho] TAP); Sichuan province (Ganzi [Kardze] TAP and Aba [Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP); and Yunnan province (Diqing [Dechen] TAP). For additional information on the Tibetan autonomous prefectures, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 22–24.

²⁷PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36 (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. . .”).

²⁸Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzuo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10.

²⁹Ma Yong, “New Changes at Qinghai’s Tibetan Buddhist Temples,” Outlook Weekly, 29 November 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 December 10).

³⁰Ibid. In or after May 2008 (the report does not provide a date), “[t]he province therefore drew up and distributed ‘Opinions on Guiding the Strengthening and Improving of the Social Management of Temples in Accordance With the Law.’”

³¹Ibid.

³²Based on Commission monitoring, as of August 2011, the first regulatory measures known to take effect were in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, reported and effective on July 24, 2009; the most recent regulatory measures known to take effect were in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, effective September 30, 2010, and posted publicly on November 19, 2010. Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Circular on Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zhou renmin zhengfu guanyu yinfa aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzheng banfa de tongzhi], Find Law Net, 24 July 09; “Qinghai Province ‘Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations’ Approved” [Qinghai sheng “guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli” huo pi], China Tibet News, 19 November 10.

³³Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.

³⁴Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.

³⁵Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10.

³⁶Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10.

³⁷Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10.

³⁸Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzheng banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09. All of the regulatory measures listed are “regulations” (tiaoli) except for the Aba “measures” (banfa).

³⁹Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09.

⁴⁰“Qinghai People’s Congress Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program” [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian lifa jihua], 14 December 09, reprinted in Qinghai Province People’s Congress Standing Committee, 3 March 10. According to the legislation plan, the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli] had been reported for approval.

⁴¹Sichuan Province People’s Congress Standing Committee 2011 Legislation Plan [Sichuan sheng renda changweihui 2011 nian lifa jihua], 21 February 11, reprinted in Sichuan Province People’s Congress Standing Committee, 31 March 11. According to the legislation plan, the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli] had been reported for approval.

⁴²The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 TAPs (approximately 1.02 million square kilometers), and 2 Tibetan autonomous counties (TACs) (approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. According to China’s 2000 census data, the Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.43 million persons), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.47 million persons), and the 2 TACs (approximately 0.11 million persons) totaled approximately 5.01 million Tibetans. The Tibetan population of the 10 TAPs made up approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as of 2000. Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China* (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–4; Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, *Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: Haibei [Tsojang] TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles); Hainan [Tsolho] TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles); Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles); Huangnan [Malho] TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles); Guoluo [Golog] TAP (78,444 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles); and Yushu [Yulshu] TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: Gannan [Kanhho] TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) and Tianzhu [Pari] TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi [Kardze] TAP (153,870 square kilometers, or 59,409 square miles); Aba [Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles); and Muli [Mili] TAC (11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing [Dechen] TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The Table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square miles. For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, *Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009*, 22 October 09, 22–24.

⁴³State Administration for Religious Affairs, *Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries* [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.

⁴⁴For detailed information on the regulations and the articles under which various controls are imposed, see “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.

⁴⁵State Administration for Religious Affairs, *Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries* [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.

⁴⁶Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.

⁴⁷Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.

⁴⁸Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzheng banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09.

⁴⁹Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09.

⁵⁰For more detailed information on provisions of the regulatory measures, see “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Ex-

ecutive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 2 titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory Measures: Selected Areas of Requirement, Prohibition, Control.

⁵¹See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 4, 20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4, 16(2); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 3, 8; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.

⁵²See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 4, 10; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 4, 20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 16(1) (no reference to socialism); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 17; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3 (no reference to socialism).

⁵³See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 4, 10(1); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 4, 11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4, 11(1); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 17, 21; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.

⁵⁴“Deepen the Struggle Against Separatist Activities and Make Further Efforts To Do Our Religious Work Well.” Tibet Daily, 15 February 96 (translated in Open Source Center, 15 February 96). The article states, “The Buddhist association organizations formed in accordance with the constitution of the Buddhist Association of China are mass religious organizations composed of patriotic religious people which serve as a bridge and tie between the government and the broad masses of religious believers.” Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs [Xizangzizhiqiu zongjiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued 9 December 91, effective 20 December 91, art. 15. The measures state, “The Buddhist Association is a . . . bridge for the Party and government to unite and educate personages from religious circles and the believing masses. Its effectiveness shall be vigorously brought into play under the administrative leadership of the government’s religious affairs department.”

⁵⁵See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 16; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 26–27; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 26–27; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 19–20.

⁵⁶See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.

⁵⁷See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 11(1); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 16, 17 (responsibility over DMC).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 8, 10, 11; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 10, 19–20; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 12–16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 16–18; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 7–9.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 35–36 (implied); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 7, 10(3), 20(7), 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 6–8, 10(4), 18; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 16, 18 (no mention of village committee supervision of DMC); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 5, 7.

⁶⁰ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 13 July 07, issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 196–197; “New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 07.

⁶¹ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 20; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 10(4); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 7(6); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 26; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulations on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 18.

⁶² See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 15–17; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.

⁶³ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 9, 16–18, 21, 22, 25, 28–30, 33, 35, 40, 42; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 7; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 3, 8; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 6; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 5–6.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 22, 28–29; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 31; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanzing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 23; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 14.

⁶⁵ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 22, 28–29. For more information on monastic travel requirements under previous

regulatory measures, see Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiq shishi “zongjiao shiwu tiaoli” banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07, arts. 41, 43; Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs, issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Government on December 9, 1991, art. 9; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 194–195.

⁶⁶Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 7(2), 22(1–3), 23(6), 37; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 8(1), 9, 13, 19, 21(3), 24(1,3); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 11(1), 12, 26, 39, 43, 45(3); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 6, 7, 12(3), 15, 16, 18–19, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, arts. 8, 9, 13(2), 15, 17(2), 22, 25.

⁶⁷Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 7(2); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 8(1); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 11(1); Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 8.

⁶⁸The statement is based on information obtained on the Web site of Harry’s World Atlas in January 2011 and represented as current in early 2007.

⁶⁹Five of the seven measures for which text was available online as of August 2011 provide for a greater role for village committees than the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulations on Religious Affairs issued in September 2006; two prefectural measures (Diqing and Haixi) contain language similar to the TAR measures. See, e.g., Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiq shishi “zongjiao shiwu tiaoli” banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 7; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 8, 11(2–3), 36; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 19, 22–23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 19–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 12, 43–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 18, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 9; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zangxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 20, 21(2); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 5(2).

⁷⁰Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zangxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 20, 21(2).

⁷¹State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 8.

⁷²Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 22–23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 18–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 11(3), 35, 42(9), 43–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 7(5), 17–19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17.

⁷³CECC Staff Analysis.

⁷⁴Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and

effective 24 September 09, art. 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 19; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 43; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 18; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17.

⁷⁵ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 20–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 44–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 17, 19 (do not list specific responsibilities); Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17 (does not list specific responsibilities).

⁷⁶ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 23(6); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 21(3); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 44(5); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17 (does not detail reporting requirements).

⁷⁷ Commission Staff Analysis. For more detailed information on provisions that provide criminal or administrative punishment in the prefectural regulatory measures, see “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 2 titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory Measures: Selected Areas of Requirement, Prohibition, Control. According to the table, “DMC members, teachers, trulkus, monks and nuns may face administrative or criminal punishment for activity characterized as”

⁷⁸ Commission Staff Analysis. See Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 39–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 45–50; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zhanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 34–41.

⁷⁹ Commission Staff Analysis. See Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 46–50; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 27 (no chapter on “legal liability” (falu zeren)); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 24–26, 28 (no chapter on “legal liability” (falu zeren)).

⁸⁰ Commission Staff Analysis. See Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 43–47.

⁸¹ The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) data on Tibetan political detention and imprisonment during the period beginning on March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete. “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 3. Based on PPD information as of February 11, 2011, the following numbers of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers were detained on or after March 10, 2008, in prefectures with more extensive descriptions of punishable offenses—Hainan TAP (12), Guoluo TAP (18), and Aba T&QAP (57); in a prefecture with mid-range extensiveness of descriptions of punishable offenses—Huangnan TAP (3); and in prefectures with less extensive descriptions of punishable offenses—Haibei TAP (0), Haixi M&TAP (0), and Diqing TAP (0).

⁸² Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan

fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 51; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 27.

⁸³ PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingzheng fuyi fa], issued 29 April 99, effective 1 October 99.

⁸⁴ PRC Administrative Litigation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingzheng sufa fa], issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90.

⁸⁵ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 51.

⁸⁶ As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 576 records of political or religious detention of Tibetans in 2008; 220 records in 2009; 113 records in 2010; and 225 records in 2011. PPD information on Tibetan political detentions in and after March 2008 is certain to be far from complete. The increase in 2011 is due mainly to the coerced removal of monks from Kirti Monastery in April 2011 for de facto detention at undisclosed sites for "legal education." For additional information on the Kirti detentions, see "After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 'Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

⁸⁷ Kalsang Rinchen, "4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, Author Escapes," Phayul, 6 March 11.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Hongyuan county is also known by the Tibetan names Kakhog, Khyungchu, and Mewa.

⁹⁰ Kalsang Rinchen, "4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, Author Escapes," Phayul, 6 March 11; Cornelius Lundsgaard and Pema Tso, "China Arrests Four Tibetans Including Two Writers Over 2 Books," Tibet Post, 19 March 11.

⁹¹ "Police Crack Down on Banned Songs," Radio Free Asia, 25 February 11.

⁹² Ibid. The RFA report did not identify the location(s) in the TAR where the detentions took place or identify any of the Tibetans detained.

⁹³ "Tibetan Writers Sentenced," Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10.

⁹⁴ International Campaign for Tibet, "Three More Tibetan Writers Sentenced to Prison," 21 January 11; "Tibetan Writers Sentenced," Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet, "Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict," 5 November 10; "Tibetan Writers Tried as 'Splittists,'" Radio Free Asia, 5 November 10.

⁹⁵ "Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped Conditions," Phayul, 18 October 10 (released on October 15, 2010, on conditions described in a manner that indicates bail following detention on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Takmig Arrested Again," 4 February 11 (redetention on December 16, 2010).

⁹⁶ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Takmig Arrested Again," 4 February 11 (redetention on December 16, 2010).

⁹⁷ "Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped Conditions," Phayul, 18 October 10 (release October 15, 2010, on conditions described in a manner that indicate bail following detention on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "One More Tibetan Intellectual Arrested" 22 August 10 (2,500 VCDs); International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibetan Monk Makes Video Appeal for Return of Dalai Lama and End to Repression in Tibet," 28 August 09 (translation of VCD statement).

⁹⁸ Kalsang Rinchen, "Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in Lhasa," Phayul, 11 January 11 (refers to events as "debates"); Y.C. Dhardhowa, "China Detains a Tibetan Writer in Lhasa, Capital of Tibet," Tibet Post, 11 January 11 (refers to events as "conferences").

⁹⁹ Kalsang Rinchen, "Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in Lhasa," Phayul, 11 January 11.

¹⁰⁰ "A Lhasa Singer's Newly Published CD Accused of Political Problems, Arrest Warrant Issued" [Yi lasa geshou chuban xin guangdie beikong she zheng zao tongji], Boxun, 24 September 10. The Boxun report cites a Voice of Tibet broadcast (likely the same date or one day earlier) that describes the police activity, including the issue of the arrest warrant (jubu ling) and banning of the CD as taking place "in recent days."

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Kalsang Rinchen, "Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown," Phayul, 16 March 11.

¹⁰⁵ International Campaign for Tibet, "Monk Immolates Himself; Major Protests at Tibetan Monastery Violently Suppressed," 16 March 11; Kalsang Rinchen, "Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown," Phayul, 16 March 11; "After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 'Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

¹⁰⁶ International Campaign for Tibet, "Chinese Authorities Confirm Death of Monk After Self-Immolation; Military Crackdown at Kirti," 17 March 11.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.; "Protest Monk Dies," Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11; Kalsang Rinchen, "Monk Who Set Ablaze Self Dead, 7 Kirti Monks Released, Several Still Held," 17 March 11.

¹⁰⁸ "Monks Face New Restrictions," Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11 ("On [March 21] . . . a program of political reeducation called 'Patriotic Religion' was launched . . ."); Kalsang Rinchen, "3 Youth Among Arrested as China Goes on Arrest Drive in Ngaba County," Phayul, 24 March 11 ("the patriotic reeducation campaign at Ngaba Kirti monastery that started on Monday

[March 21] is underway . . ."); International Campaign for Tibet, "Protests, Tensions Escalate in Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown," 11 April 11 ("a rigorous 'patriotic education' campaign is being enforced"); "After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 'Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

¹⁰⁹"Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed," Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11 ("Local Tibetans . . . heard that the detained monks were then taken to [Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li (Tashiling) counties in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture]"); Kalsang Rinchen, "2 Beaten to Death in Ngaba, 300 Kirti Monks Arrested," Phayul, 22 April 11; International Campaign for Tibet, "Two Elderly Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens," 22 April 11; "After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 'Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

¹¹⁰International Campaign for Tibet, "Two Elderly Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens," 22 April 11 ("[people] had their arms and legs broken"; "The two people who died . . . were Dongko (male) . . . aged 60, and 65-year old Sherkyi (female)."); "Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed," Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11 ("Chinese armed police then attacked the crowd, beating some and gagging others . . . : A 60-year-old man named Donkho . . . and a 65-year-old woman named Sherkyi . . . were killed, and others suffered broken arms and legs in the attack."); International Campaign for Tibet, "Ngaba Students Protest Crackdown, Authorities Respond; New Information on Deaths of Tibetans Who Tried To Protect Monks," 9 May 11; "After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 'Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

¹¹¹"1st Ld-Writethru: Tibetan Monk Jailed 11 Years For Murder in Self-Immolation Case," Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. According to the report, on August 29, 2011, the Ma'erkang [Barkham] County People's Court sentenced Kirti monk "Drongdru" to 11 years' imprisonment "because he hid the injured monk and prevented emergency treatment." "Two Tibetan Monks Sentenced in Murder Case," Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. According to the report, on August 30, 2011, the Ma'erkang [Barkham] County People's Court sentenced Kirti monks "Tsering Tenzin" and "Tenchum" to 13 years' and 10 years' imprisonment respectively. PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 232: "Whoever intentionally commits homicide shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years."

¹¹²"Tibet Protest March Attacked," Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11. According to an RFA source, "Chinese police and security people present in the area immediately came to the scene and kicked and beat him as they extinguished the flames. Local Tibetans and Kirti monks came to his rescue and took Phuntsog back to the monastery." "Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown," Phayul, 16 March 11. According to the report, "As the police were trying to take him away in a waiting police van scores of Tibetans rushed to the scene and protected Phuntsok." International Campaign for Tibet, "Protests, Tensions Escalate in Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown," 11 April 11. According to the ICT report, "At that point, Kirti monks intervened and sheltered him at the monastery before ensuring he received medical treatment at hospital. . . ."

¹¹³Free Tibet Campaign, "Monk Dies After Setting Himself on Fire in Protest in Tibet," 15 August 11 ("Nyatso Monastery"); "Tibetan Monk Sets Himself Ablaze," Radio Free Asia, 15 August 11 ("Nyatso Monastery"); "Monk Sets Himself on Fire in SW China," Xinhua, 15 August 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.

¹¹⁴Accurate, comprehensive, and independently verified information on the views of Tibetans living in China is not available.

¹¹⁵Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 percent of Tibetans were classified as "rural" population: Table 1-2 shows the total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 1-2a shows the "city" population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1-2b shows the "town" population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 1-2c shows the "rural" population of Tibetans in 2000 as 4,721,199. Based on information in Table 1-5, the percentage of rural Tibetans could be even higher: Of the total 5,416,021 Tibetan population, 5,373,339 Tibetans were classified as either "agricultural" (4,792,676) or "non-agricultural" (580,663). Based on those figures, the 4,792,676 Tibetans classified as "agricultural" made up 88.5 percent of the 5,416,021 total Tibetan population.

¹¹⁶For previous Commission reporting addressing the issues of Tibetan literacy and the status of the Tibetan language, see, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 202; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 108-9; Teaching and Learning Tibetan: The Role of the Tibetan Language in Tibet's Future, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 7 April 03, Testimony of Nicolas Tournadre, Associate Professor of Linguistics, University of Paris 8, Paris; Testimony of David Germano, Professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Virginia; Testimony of Losang Rabgey, Commonwealth Scholar and Ph.D. Candidate, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

¹¹⁷China's Constitution and the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. See, e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. The State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin

by promoting “bilingual” education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi “zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa” ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22.

¹¹⁸“It Is in the Fundamental Interests of the Tibetan People in Our Province To Strengthen and Reform ‘Bilingual’ Education,” Qinghai Daily, 29 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 November 10); “NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,” Xinhua, 23 October 10; Xue Jun, “Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and Video-conference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers Important Speech” [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10); Zhi Zhenpu, “Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make ‘Bi-lingual’ Education a Livelihood Project” [Qinghai sheng wei shuji qiang wei: ba “shuang yu” jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng], People’s Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.

¹¹⁹“Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education” [Lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 November 10) (ethnic languages are for use in “one’s home location” and in “courses of study to carry ethnic culture forward”; Chinese language is for use in “public places”; non-ethnic languages (e.g., Chinese, English) are for “scientific learning such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry”); “Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’” [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu “qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020)”], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10) (the role of Chinese language: “adhere to mainly teaching with the state’s standard spoken and written language [Mandarin]”; role of ethnic language is not identified: “learn spoken and written ethnic languages”).

¹²⁰“Students Protest Language Change,” Radio Free Asia, 19 October 10 (October 19 protest in Tongren (Rebgong), capital of Huangnan (Malho) TAP, involved students from six secondary- and tertiary-level schools; estimates ranged from 1,000 to 7,000 students); “Tibet Students Protests Spread,” Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10 (October 20 protests included “more than 2,000” middle school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP, and a total of about 6,000 secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, “Tibetan Student Protests Reach Beijing,” Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students protested on October 22 at the Central University for Minorities in Beijing); “Language Protests Spread to Beijing,” Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (“some 400” Tibetan students protested on October 22 at the National Minorities University in Beijing); “20 Tibetan Students Detained, Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,” Phayul, 25 October 10 (“thousands” of students reportedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in Guide (Trika) county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province).

¹²¹“Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province” [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10). “The Qinghai Education Department and [Director] Wang Yubo openly restricted the freedom of study, use, and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, which totally violates the Constitution, the [REAL], . . . the Education Law, and the Law for the State’s Commonly Used Language.” See also PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01.

¹²²CECC Staff Analysis. Official reports acknowledged the protests but did not allege planning or organization. Participation of large numbers of students across a wide area in the protests without planning or organization would depend on widespread student predisposition to join protests. Such predisposition would depend on a significant level of dissatisfaction.

¹²³CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the relative consistency of government and Party policy on Tibetan education as well as on the relative consistency of the Tibetan people’s wish to maintain their language and culture, teachers’ and students’ views in Qinghai province are likely to be similar to such views in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.

¹²⁴In Qinghai province, Tibetan-language primary and middle schools are located in five Tibetan autonomous prefectures (Haibei (Tsojang), Hainan (Tsolho), Huangnan (Malho), Guoluo (Golog), and Yushu (Yulshul)), and in one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture (Haixi (Tsonub)).

¹²⁵International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Teachers Write Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After Detentions,” 26 October 10. According to the article, the training took place in Tongren (Rebgong), the capital of Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

¹²⁶See Jia Xiaoyun, “Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’” [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu “qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020)”], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).

¹²⁷International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Teachers Write Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After Detentions,” 26 October 10.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹“Students Protest Language Change,” Radio Free Asia, 19 October 10 (the six schools in Tongren were the First Nationalities Middle School, the Tongren County Yifu Nationalities Middle School, the Tongren District Residential School, the Tongren Modern Medicine College, the

Huangnan National Teacher Training Institute, and the Huangnan Nationalities Middle School); Free Tibet Campaign, “Students Protest for Language Rights,” 22 October 10.

¹³⁰ “Students Protest Language Change,” Radio Free Asia, 19 October 10.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Free Tibet Campaign, “Students Protest for Language Rights,” 22 October 10. The article provided a translation of the apparently Chinese-language text message: “Yesterday, the Ministry of Education decided that, Tibetan language centered education system should be canceled [in] all the schools in Tibetan areas. The Tibetan language above primary school is set as an optional subject. Tibetan students are protesting for their mother-tongue in the Tibetan areas in Qinghai and others. For the sake of saving the Tibetan mother-tongue, please pass the message to each other.”

¹³³ Zhi Zhenpu, “Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make ‘Bi-lingual’ Education a Livelihood Project” [Qinghai sheng wei shuji qiang wei: ba “shuang yu” jiaoyu zuwei minsheng gongcheng], People’s Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.

¹³⁴ “Tibet Student Protests Spread,” Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10 (October 20 protests included “more than 2,000” middle school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP; a total of about 6,000 secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, “Tibetan Student Protests Reach Beijing,” Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students protested at Beijing’s Central University for Minorities); “Language Protests Spread to Beijing,” Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (“some 400” Tibetan students protested at the Beijing National Minorities University); “20 Tibetan Students Detained, Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,” Phayul, 25 October 10 (“thousands” of students reportedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in Guide (Trika) county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province); “Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province” [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10) (“demonstrations staged by the primary and secondary schools of the four autonomous prefectures of Huangnan, Hainan, Guoluo, and Haibei since 19 October”).

¹³⁵ “NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,” Xinhua, 22 October 10.

¹³⁶ “Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’” [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu “Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010–2020)”], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).

¹³⁷ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyue zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01.

¹³⁸ “Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province” [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10). The letter raised issues including: “[Director Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Province Department of Education] bypassed the setting up of the Chinese language course and also altered the meaning of ‘the right to receive education in their own ethnic minority language’ proposed in the Outline for National Education Plan”; “The Qinghai Education Department and Wang Yubo openly restricted the freedom of study, use, and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, which totally violates the Constitution, the [REAL], the Education Law, and the Law for the State’s Commonly Used Language”; “[Furthermore, since the [REAL] is still in effect in the PRC, the change in use of language in the schools practicing regional autonomy made by an administrative department without authorization constitutes a deliberate challenge and infringement of the state’s basic laws and a serious contempt for the authority of state laws”; and, “Unless the National People’s Congress [NPC] adopts any amendment to the [REAL], an administrative department, which is actually a provincial level administrative organ, has no right whatsoever to go beyond the principles of the basic law and make a decision in violation of the law.”

¹³⁹ Ibid. The letter states that the authors “submitted” it to national-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Communist Party, legislative, government, and consultative entities including the following: Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), National People’s Congress Religious Committee, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Education, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Ethnic Affairs Committee, Qinghai Communist Party Standing Committee, Qinghai People’s Congress, Qinghai People’s Government, Qinghai CPPCC, Qinghai UFWD, Qinghai Religious Affairs Department, and Party committees, people’s governments, people’s congresses, CPPCCs, and education departments in each of Qinghai’s six autonomous prefectures.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. The letter stated, “Under the current situation and conditions, a government functional department, without approval of a higher level state organ, has gone so far as to make a decision and reform in violation of the Constitution and law. We would like to appeal.”

¹⁴¹ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyue zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01, art. 20: “If a resolution, decision, order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency of the area may report for the approval of that higher level state agency to either implement it with certain alterations or cease implementing it altogether. That higher level state agency must give its decision within sixty days of receiving the report.” For information on implementation of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 25–28; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 10 October 07, 187–91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, Section III—Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights—Spe-

cial Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 11 October 05, 13–23.

¹⁴²“Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education” [Lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 November 10). The article listed Qinghai province institutional participants: “Education Department, Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, Civil Affairs Department, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Department, Poverty Eradication Bureau, Cultural Federation, Academy of Social Sciences, Science Association, Red Cross, and Qinghai University for Nationalities.” For information on a similar conference on October 23, 2010, see “The Party and the Government Will Never Force Any Student To Abandon Their Mother Tongue” [Dang he zhengfu juebu hui qiangpo renhe xuesheng fangqi muyu], Qinghai News Agency, 25 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).

¹⁴³“Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education” [Lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 November 10). According to Gao, “The realm of language learning is to be able to speak the common language of one’s home location, to be able to speak the national language in public places, and to be able to speak an international language on international occasions.”

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵Xue Jun, “Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and Videoconference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers Important Speech” [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* The videoconference was convened by the Qinghai Communist Party Committee and included “leading cadres throughout the province.”

¹⁴⁸Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhi qu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhi qu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). The report emphasizes adherence to policy as the basis for success: “In face of constant disruptions and sabotages by the Dalai clique, all kinds of frequent natural disasters, retrenchment of the macroeconomic environment, and other challenges, under the leadership of the party Central Committee and the State Council, the people of various ethnic groups across the autonomous region have united as strongly as a fortress, overcome difficulties, and accumulated valuable experience in expanding demand, promoting growth, creating welfare for the masses, and maintaining stability.”

¹⁴⁹Hu Yongqi and Dachig, “Tibet’s Achievements Celebrated,” China Daily, 28 March 11. According to the report, the Tibet Autonomous Region increased an average of 12.4 percent per year from 2005 to 2010.

¹⁵⁰Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhi qu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhi qu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). “The farmers and herdsman[s] per capita net income has remained at a two-digit increase for eight consecutive years and topped 4,000 yuan in 2010, to stand at 4,138.7 yuan, up by 99.2 percent over 2005. The city and town residents’ per capita disposable income has reached 14,980 yuan, an increase of 78.1 percent over 2005.”

¹⁵¹Zhao Yanan, “Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,” China Daily, 18 November 10. “From 2001 to 2010, the central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US\$46.7 billion) to the Tibet autonomous region, Of every 100 yuan the Tibet regional government spends, 90 yuan comes from the central government.”

¹⁵²PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 9. “Mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collectives in accordance with the law.”

¹⁵³“Tibet Autonomous Region Reserves Most Chromium and Cuprum in China,” China Tibet Information Center, reprinted in China Tibet Online, 6 December 10.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*; Zhao Yanan, “Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,” China Daily, 18 November 10 (“[from] 2001 to 2010, the central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US\$46.7 billion) to the Tibet autonomous region”).

¹⁵⁵Reports did not provide information about the type of mining. “Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing Mine” [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong dada he jubu], Voice of Tibet, 11 February 11, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on December 18); “15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests in Shigatse,” Phayul, 14 February 11.

¹⁵⁶“Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing Mine” [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong dada he jubu], Voice of Tibet, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on December 18); “15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests in Shigatse,” Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.

¹⁵⁷“Villagers Block Work on Dam,” Radio Free Asia, 30 September 10 (the mountain’s name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba); “Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10 (the mountain is “a traditional site of worship and offerings”).

¹⁵⁸“Villagers Block Work on Dam,” Radio Free Asia, 30 September 10.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. According to the report, workers claimed “their permit to mine in the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary of the TAR.” The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR Party official may have signified agreement.

¹⁶⁰ “Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.

¹⁶¹ Kalsang Rinchen, “Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans in Palyul County,” Phayul, 24 August 10 (“100 Tibetans from the village had camped outside the government headquarters waiting for a response from the authorities to their plea.”); “Police Fire on Mine Protesters,” Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10.

¹⁶² “Police Fire on Mine Protesters,” Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10 (“gold mining operations by the Chinese-owned Kartin Company had led to an overcrowded population, severely degraded the fertility of their farmland, and adversely affected the local grassland habitat”).

¹⁶³ Kalsang Rinchen, “Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans in Palyul County,” Phayul, 24 August 10 (“[three] Tibetans have been killed and 30 others severely wounded”); Phurbu Thinley, “China Says Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,” Phayul, 1 September 10 (“Subsequent reports by overseas Tibetan news services said at least four Tibetans were killed. . . .”).

¹⁶⁴ “Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With Police,” Xinhua, 30 August 10, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.

¹⁶⁵ “Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,” Radio Free Asia, 5 August 11.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. The Radio Free Asia report named three persons (the “village officials”) detained on July 2, nine persons detained on July 6 and 7, one person detained on July 14, and two persons (the alleged protest “ringleaders”) detained “around July 20.”

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiq dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhiq zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). “Around 1.43 million farmers and herdsman of 275,000 households whose housing conditions were comparatively bad have moved into safe and affordable homes.”

¹⁶⁹ Laba Cier and Gama Douji, “Secretary Zhang Qingli of the Tibet Autonomous Regional CPC Committee Says That It Is Necessary To Adhere to the Scientific Development Concept and Maintain a Leapfrog Development” [Xizang zizhiq dangwei shuji zhang qingli: jianchi kexue fazhan guan baochi kuayueshi fazhan], Xinhua, 6 January 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 9 January 11).

¹⁷⁰ “The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,” Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 January 10).

¹⁷¹ “Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers, Herdsmen,” Xinhua, 10 January 11. “[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has a rural population of 2.21 million, of whom more than 235,000 are aged 60 or over.” (The January 2011 report likely refers to a 2010 statistic.)

¹⁷² Based on official Chinese media reports, the government has settled or resettled into new housing 1.43 million “farmers and herdsman” among the Tibet Autonomous Region’s 2.21 million rural population. Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiq dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhiq zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11) (“Around 1.43 million farmers and herdsman . . . moved into safe and affordable homes.”); “Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers, Herdsmen,” Xinhua, 10 January 11 (“[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has a rural population of 2.21 million.”). For information on the compulsory nature of the program, see Human Rights Watch, “‘No One Has the Liberty To Refuse’—Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,” 11 June 07.

¹⁷³ For more information on the network of railways the Chinese government plans to build on the Tibetan plateau, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 46–53; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 285–86. For information on the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railway in July 2006 and passenger traffic during the first year of operation, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 166–68; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203–4.

¹⁷⁴ Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiq dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhiq zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); “Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,” Xinhua, 16 February 11.

¹⁷⁵ “Tibet’s New Railway To Open in 2014,” China Daily, 2 September 11.

¹⁷⁶ “Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,” Xinhua, 16 February 11.

¹⁷⁷ “Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,” Xinhua, 29 April 09.

¹⁷⁸ Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiq dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang zizhiq zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); “Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,” Xinhua, 16 February 11.

¹⁷⁹ CECC Staff Analysis. The decision on whether to route the railway along the northern or southern bank of the river has economic and security implications. Most of the forestry and mineral resources, as well as most of the population, are on the north side of the river, but a section of the China-India border that China disputes is on the south side of the river.

¹⁸⁰Dan Zengshe, “Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 10 January 2011” [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhi qu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci huiyi shang zizhi qu zhuxi baima chilin], *Tibet Daily*, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). For more information on the Sichuan-Tibet railway between Chengdu city and Lhasa, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 49–53.

¹⁸¹“New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of Tibet, Xinjiang,” *Xinhua*, 6 March 11. (China Daily reported in August 2008 that the line would be constructed. Xin Dingding, “Qinghai-Tibet Railway To Get Six New Lines,” *China Daily*, 17 August 08.)

¹⁸²“New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of Tibet, Xinjiang,” *Xinhua*, 6 March 11.

¹⁸³Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, “During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang” [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], *Xinhua*, 6 March 11, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, 7 March 11. According to the report, Luo Yulin, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai government, “hopes that work will start on the Golmud to Chengdu line during the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan.”

¹⁸⁴International Campaign for Tibet, “Chinese Authorities Rename and Rebuild Quake-Struck Tibetan Area; Tibetans Excluded From Planning,” 25 January 11; “China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,” *Xinhua*, 18 January 11.

¹⁸⁵Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, “During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang” [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], *Xinhua*, 6 March 11, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, 7 March 11.

¹⁸⁶Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China* (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, 2003), Table 10–4. According to the table: Of Yushu TAP’s 262,661 total population, 255,167 were Tibetan; of the TAR’s 2,616,329 total population, 2,427,168 were Tibetan; of Guolu TAP’s 137,940 total population, 126,395 were Tibetan.

¹⁸⁷International Campaign for Tibet, “Reconstruction of Earthquake-Hit Area Excludes Tibetan Participation, Ignores Local Concerns: One Year on From Earthquake,” 15 April 11. According to the report, on April 1 to 3, 2011, several hundred Tibetan protesters in the damaged city displayed banners with messages such as, “Fairly and legitimately resolve this issue,” “Our land belongs to us,” “Help for the Yushu disaster area should put ordinary people’s benefits first,” and “Reasonably plan the land of our lives.”

¹⁸⁸“China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,” *Xinhua*, 18 January 11 (renamed and designated a “city”); Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, “During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang” [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], *Xinhua*, 6 March 11, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, 7 March 11 (railway “will pass through Jiegu [Kyegudo] town in Yushu prefecture.”)

¹⁸⁹“China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,” *Xinhua*, 18 January 11.

¹⁹⁰Emily T. Yeh, “Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in Western China: ‘Converting Pastures to Grasslands,’” *Nomadic Peoples*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005), 23. According to the paper: “Officially the largest nature reserve in China (at 31.8 million ha), it was established in 2000 to protect the sources of the Yangtze, Yellow and Lancangjiang (Mekong) Rivers. As such, the reserve covers most of Golog, Yushu and Haixi prefectures, which constitute about 44 percent of the total land area of the province.”

¹⁹¹“China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,” *Xinhua*, 18 January 11. Luo Huining, Chairman of the Qinghai People’s Government, announced the change.

¹⁹²*Ibid.* According to the Chairman of the Qinghai People’s Government, “We will strive to build [Kyegudo] into a commerce and logistics center and a tourist city featuring ethnic traditional Tibetan culture and ecological preservation.”

¹⁹³“China Plans 32 Billion Yuan on Qinghai Quake Reconstruction,” *Xinhua*, 13 June 10. “The money would mainly come [sic] from the central budget, supplemented by funds from the Qinghai government, donations and corporate funding, according to a circular published on the government’s website.”

¹⁹⁴Cao Deshung, “Tibet Rail Construction Completed,” *China Daily*, 15 October 05.

¹⁹⁵Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, “During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang” [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], *Xinhua*, 6 March 11, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, 7 March 11.

¹⁹⁶“China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,” *Xinhua*, 18 January 11. “The entire town of [Kyegudo], the seat of Yushu prefectural government, was flattened, leaving more than 100,000 residents homeless.”

¹⁹⁷“Tibetans Protest Over Land,” *Radio Free Asia*, 3 June 10. “Some properties claimed by the authorities suffered no damage in the April earthquake, . . . [His] family . . . complained that the local government selected the best sites for the construction of government offices, schools, and public parks.”

¹⁹⁸International Campaign for Tibet, “The Kyegu Earthquake: Six Months On,” 18 October 10 (“main concern of Tibetans is over losing their land and being moved into the government-built permanent housing, which will be in apartment or townhouse-type complexes”); “Tensions Rise in Quake Town,” *Radio Free Asia*, 17 June 10 (“the government has allocated 80 square meters (860 square feet) of living space per household . . . the people to be displaced are also unhappy with the location . . . It’s definitely much farther away than the place we were in before the earthquake struck.”)

¹⁹⁹“Tibetans Protest Land Grab,” *Radio Free Asia*, 5 April 11. According to an RFA source, Tibetan property owners had been “assured of compensation, but so far they have not been compensated appropriately.”

²⁰⁰*Ibid.*

²⁰¹ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment is not available.

²⁰² In addition to the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database recorded as of September 1, 2011, an additional 651 Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are known or presumed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped or died.

²⁰³ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment is not available.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

