[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TIBET
=======================================================================
EXCERPTED
from the
2011 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JAMES RISCH, Idaho
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
MARIA OTERO, Department of State
FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Tibet
Findings
Expanding Chinese government and Communist
Party use of legal and policy measures to increase
pressure on Tibetan culture--especially on religion and
language--are resulting in consequences that Tibetans
believe threaten the viability of their culture.
Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with
increases in government-provided statistical measures
on economic development and social services, such as
education. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval
of government and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are
at increased risk of punishment as the central and
local governments expand the use of legal measures to
safeguard ``social stability'' by criminalizing such
expression.
No formal dialogue took place between the
Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese government and
Party officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting
year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the
government pressed forward with implementation of legal
measures and policies that many Tibetans--including the
Dalai Lama--believe threaten the Tibetan culture,
language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 2011,
the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a
Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is
commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-
exile. The change has the potential to alter dialogue
dynamics by eliminating the basis for the Party and
government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a
``political'' figure.
The government and Party continued the
campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious
leader and expanded government and Party control over
Tibetan Buddhism to impose what officials describe as
the ``normal order'' of the religion. As of August
2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan
autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted
regulatory measures that increase substantially state
infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries. The measures impose closer
monitoring and supervision of each monastery's
Democratic Management Committee--a monastic group
legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and
teachers obey government laws, regulations, and
policies. The measures expand significantly township-
level government authority over monasteries and
nunneries and provide a monitoring, supervisory, and
reporting role to village-level committees.
Government security and judicial officials
used China's legal system as a means to detain and
imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and
cultural advocates who turned to veiled language to
lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize
government policies toward the Tibetan people and
culture. Examples during the 2011 reporting year
included writer-publishers, a conference organizer, a
singer, and persons who downloaded ``prohibited''
songs. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans
from influencing other Tibetans by punishing peaceful
expression as a ``crime'' and using imprisonment to
remove them from society.
Events this past year highlighted the
importance Tibetans attribute to the status and
preservation of the Tibetan language and the increased
threat that some Tibetans believe will result from
``reform'' of the ``bilingual education'' system.
Tibetan students in one province led protests against
plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan
language during the period 2010 to 2020. A Party
official characterized ``unity of spoken and written
language'' as essential for ``a unified country'' and
implied that protesting students put national unity at
risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to
authorities a petition analyzing what they deemed to be
violations of China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law that result in the infringement of ethnic
minorities' rights.
Rural Tibetans protested against what they
consider to be adverse effects of government and Party
economic development policies--especially mining--that
prioritize government objectives above respecting or
protecting the Tibetan culture and environment. The
value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) mineral
resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010
subsidies the central government provided to the TAR,
based on official reports. The TAR government has
completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of
nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population.
Officials provided updates on construction of the
railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan
plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu,
which the government renamed and will make into a
``city'' with a substantial population, economy, and
well-developed infrastructure. Tibetans in Yushu
protested after authorities either sold or expropriated
their property without providing adequate compensation.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to engage in
substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture,
language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous
prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan,
and Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama's withdrawal from
exiled Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential
to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for
the government and Party to characterize him as a
``political'' figure. As tensions rise in Tibetan
areas, a Chinese government decision to engage in
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for the Chinese government and
Tibetans and improve the outlook for local and regional
security in coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese government the urgent
importance of refraining from expanding the use of
legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan
Buddhists' right to the freedom of religion. Point out
to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama campaign,
aggressive programs of ``patriotic education,'' and
recent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to
control Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs could promote
social discord, not ``social stability.'' Urge the
government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
identify and educate religious teachers in a manner
consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions.
Request that the Chinese government follow up on
a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the
Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as
an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the
government to invite a representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the
representative his wishes with respect to privacy;
photograph the international representative and Gedun
Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi
Nyima's statement and the photograph.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance
of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and
language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant
Tibetan culture by honoring China's Constitution's
reference to the freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the
security establishment, courts, and law to infringe
upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights.
Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain
the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in
teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan
language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in
teaching modern subjects.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully
into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
the government plans infrastructure, natural resource
development, and resettlement projects in the Tibetan
areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to
engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of
such projects and in advising the government on the
implementation and progress of such projects. Request
the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and
promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property
or property rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu
earthquake and the government's decision to redevelop
Yushu as a new ``city.''
Increase support for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
health, and environmental conservation conditions of
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and
that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without
encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.
Continue to convey to the Chinese government the
importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan
protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security
campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the
Chinese government to provide complete details about
Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-
related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and
correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of
Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the
peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative
examples include: Former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now
serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing
leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-
Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub
(sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets);
Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a
reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years
commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8
years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a
public festival).
Introduction
Developments during the Commission's 2011 reporting period
show that expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use
of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan
culture--especially religion and language--are resulting in
consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of
their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture
contrasts with increases in economic development and social
services such as education in government-provided statistics.
Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of Chinese
government policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of
punishment as governments expand the use of legal measures to
safeguard ``social stability'' by criminalizing such
expression.
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese government and Communist Party
officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. The
environment for dialogue deteriorated as the Chinese government
pressed forward with implementation of legal measures and
policies that many Tibetans--including the Dalai Lama--believe
threaten the Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and
environment. In his March 10 address to Tibetans,\1\ the Dalai
Lama expressed disappointment with previous rounds of the
dialogue. He noted the ``lack of any positive response'' to
proposals set out in his Middle Way Approach \2\ and suggested
that the Communist Party United Front Work Department officials
who met with the Dalai Lama's envoys may not have accurately or
completely informed higher ranking officials about the Tibetan
proposals.\3\
In March 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the
official role of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization
that is commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-
exile.\4\ The change, he said, would enable him to focus ``more
effectively'' on spiritual matters.\5\ He explained in his
March 10 address that he had reached a ``decision to devolve
[his] formal authority to the elected leader'' \6\ and the next
day outlined his decision to end the centuries old Tibetan
government structure that positioned the Dalai Lama as the
highest-ranking figure in both government and religious
affairs.\7\ The Dalai Lama's renunciation of an official role
in exiled Tibetans' governance has the potential to alter the
dialogue's dynamics by eliminating an institutional basis for
the Party and government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a
``political'' figure.\8\
In July 2011, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and
Global Affairs Maria Otero reiterated U.S. Administration
objectives to ``promote a substantive, results-oriented
dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or
his representatives'' and ``to help sustain Tibet's unique
religious, linguistic, and cultural heritages.'' \9\ She
observed that it is in the Chinese government's interests to
resolve problems and that counterproductive policies ``will
exacerbate already existing tensions that could, in turn,
undermine China's efforts to maintain its current social and
economic development.'' \10\
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists
During the past year, the Chinese government and Communist
Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a
religious leader \11\ and expanded government and Party control
over Tibetan Buddhism in order to impose what officials
describe as the ``normal order'' of the religion.\12\ In April
2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United
Front Work Department \13\ (and principal interlocutor for the
Dalai Lama's envoys) summed up Party intentions toward the
Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries during a
working group ``investigation'' he led in the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR).\14\ A Party-run newspaper described his remarks:
He expressed his hopes that religious personages and
believers will always implement the line, principle,
and policies of the Party, unswervingly carry out
struggle against the Dalai clique, expose the
reactionary essence of Dalai, establish a sound and
permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries,
and ensure that all activities of monasteries will have
rules to follow. In addition, their interpretations of
religious doctrines and rules must be [in] line with
social development and progress and ensure that Tibetan
Buddhism will actively adapt itself to socialist
society.\15\
officials press attack on dalai lama, set sights on selecting next
dalai lama
Chinese government and Communist Party officials pressed
their campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious
leader. Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, at
a March 2011 meeting of TAR delegates to the National People's
Congress, accused the Dalai Lama of being ``the boss of
splittism'' and a ``double dealer'' who, ``under the signboard
of religion,'' seeks to ``deceive religious believers' simple
feelings.'' \16\ Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the TAR People's Congress, said the
same month during a visit to the United States that Tibetans
``could have developed much better without the Dalai Lama and
his followers,'' and that if the Dalai Lama ``is indeed a
religious person'' he should ``not dabble in'' political
issues.\17\ China's official media reported in August that as
part of a ``major leadership reshuffle'' the Party Central
Committee transferred Hebei province Deputy Party Secretary
Chen Quanguo to the TAR to replace Zhang as Secretary, and
posted Zhang to Hebei as Party Secretary.\18\
During the past reporting year, senior officials continued
to assert the Chinese government's intention to supervise the
selection of the next Dalai Lama and to challenge the current
Dalai Lama's views on the matter. Jampa Phuntsog, also
Executive Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee,\19\
characterized the Dalai Lama's recent remarks as ``the biggest
obstacle to the normal continuation of Tibetan Buddhism'' and
objected to the Dalai Lama's remarks about his own
reincarnation.\20\ He observed: ``The Dalai Lama's attitude on
this question is that there is sometimes reincarnation and
sometimes no reincarnation, and the living Buddha may return as
a man, a woman or a foreigner. Recently he even talked about
stopping the reincarnation.'' \21\ The comment refers to
remarks attributed to the Dalai Lama as recently as October
2010 stating that his reincarnation would take place ``in a
free country,'' \22\ and that he may choose to identify and
train his successor before he dies, or Tibetans might elect to
discontinue the institution of the Dalai Lama.\23\ Pema Choling
(Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR People's Government and
Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, said the Dalai
Lama's views on reincarnation are ``impossible.'' \24\ In July
2011, the Dalai Lama rejected government and Party intrusion
into the matter of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation as a
``disgrace'' and stated with respect to his own reincarnation,
``[The] final authority is myself and no one else, and
obviously not China's Communists.'' \25\
prefectural regulatory measures tighten control on ``tibetan buddhist
affairs''
The central government and 9 of the 10 Tibetan autonomous
prefectural governments \26\ issued or drafted regulatory
measures as of August 2011 that increase substantially the
state's infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries. The measures increase curbs on
protection of ``freedom of religious belief'' \27\ as provided
under China's Constitution by imposing greater subordination of
``Tibetan Buddhist affairs'' to government regulations that
enforce Communist Party policy.
In Qinghai province, for example, from July 2009 to
September 2010, people's congresses in five of Qinghai's six
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) put into effect
regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs to fulfill Party
objectives.\28\ The regulations followed a provincial Party
committee determination in May 2008 that Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries in the province had ``drifted freely beyond the
government's management by law and supervision by the public.''
\29\ As a result, the Qinghai government issued an ``opinion''
\30\ proposing that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries
be required to implement a ``new system'' based on ``Party
committee leadership, government responsibility, . . . and
management in accordance with the law by religious affairs
departments and other concerned departments.'' \31\
As of April 2011, new regulatory measures on ``Tibetan
Buddhist affairs'' were in effect in a total of seven TAPs
located in three provinces: \32\ Huangnan (Malho) TAP,\33\
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP,\34\ Haibei (Tsojang) TAP,\35\ Guoluo
(Golog) TAP,\36\ and Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP in
Qinghai province; \37\ Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture (T&QAP) in Sichuan province; \38\ and Diqing
(Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.\39\ Prefectural regulations
reportedly were in the legislative process in Yushu (Yulshul)
TAP, Qinghai,\40\ and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan.\41\ As of
August 2011, the Commission had not observed information on
whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, was preparing such
a regulation. The 10 TAPs make up approximately half the area
the Chinese government designates as ``Tibetan autonomous,''
and approximately half the Tibetan population of the Tibetan
autonomous areas lives in the 10 TAPs.\42\ The central
government issued national-level regulations effective November
1, 2010,\43\ that along with the prefectural-level regulations
tighten and expand existing means of government control and
monitoring of Tibetan Buddhist institutions.\44\
common features among new tibetan buddhist affairs measures
A summary of the Commission's analysis of the points of
similarity among the national regulations \45\ and four of the
prefectural-level regulations (Huangnan TAP \46\ and Hainan TAP
\47\ in Qinghai, Aba T&QAP \48\ in Sichuan, and Diqing TAP \49\
in Yunnan) follows.\50\
Prioritizing Tibetan Buddhist obligation to support Chinese
government policies. The regulatory measures build on existing
government and Communist Party policies mandating that Tibetan
Buddhist institutions (like other state-sanctioned religious
institutions) must protect Chinese national and ethnic unity
and ``social stability,'' \51\ promote patriotism toward China
and adherence to socialism,\52\ and obey Chinese government
laws and regulations.\53\
``Buddhist Associations'' (BAs): Greater authority over
monastic institutions. BAs--institutional links between Tibetan
Buddhist institutions and the Chinese government and Party that
facilitate the exercise of government and Party authority over
Tibetan Buddhist activity \54\--must, among other duties,
approve or revoke the official status of monks and nuns as
``religious personnel'' in accordance with government
requirements; \55\ approve quotas on the number of monks or
nuns who may reside at a monastery or nunnery; \56\ and conduct
classes educating Tibetan Buddhist ``religious personnel'' on
patriotism toward China, Chinese laws and regulations
(including on religion), and adapting Tibetan Buddhism to
socialism.\57\
``Democratic Management Committees'' (DMCs): Subject to
greater scrutiny, subordination to government authority. The
regulatory measures impose closer supervision of each
monastery's Democratic Management Committee--a monastic group
legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey
government laws, regulations, and policies.\58\ The measures
empower three types of agencies to supervise or monitor DMCs:
BAs, government religious affairs bureaus (RABs), and village-
level ``peoples'' or ``masses'' committees.\59\ Provisions
require DMCs (under BA supervision and in compliance with
central government measures issued in 2007 \60\) to direct the
process of identifying, seating, and educating trulkus \61\--
teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations. For
the first time, DMCs must fulfill a central government
requirement to apply for, justify, and receive approval for a
fixed quota on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a
monastery or nunnery.\62\
``Religious personnel'': Subject to more detailed control
over religious contact, travel, study. The measures strengthen
external supervision of DMCs, Tibetan Buddhist teachers,
trulkus, monks, and nuns by requiring their submission to
administration and guidance by governments at the prefectural,
county, and township levels, and by village-level residents
committees.\63\ Most of the prefectural measures impose
requirements on ``religious personnel'' who wish to travel to
another county or prefecture to study or teach Buddhism.\64\
The national measures impose the most difficult requirements:
First, ``religious personnel'' must apply for and receive
approval from the prefectural-level BA where they live and from
the prefectural-level BA where they hope to study or teach;
then each BA granting approval must report the approval to the
corresponding prefectural-level RAB.\65\
Township-level governments: Expanded responsibility,
authority over monasteries, nunneries. The prefectural
regulatory measures expand significantly township-level
government authority to implement regulations on Tibetan
Buddhist activity at monasteries and nunneries. All five of the
regulations for Qinghai TAPs for which text was available
online as of August 2011 contained articles empowering
township-level governments to monitor and supervise monastic
activity.\66\ Regulations for four of the Qinghai TAPs state
explicitly that township governments have the responsibility to
``manage'' Tibetan Buddhist affairs within the township
area.\67\ Enabling township governments to take on greater
responsibility for regulating Tibetan Buddhist affairs is
important because there are so many township-level governments.
As of 2007, there were a total of 998 township-level
governments subordinate to 75 county-level governments in the
10 TAPs outside the TAR \68\--an average of 13 township
governments under each county government.
Village-level committees: Expanded role as grassroots
monitors, supervisors. Most of the prefectural regulatory
measures for which text was available online as of August 2011
included a greater monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role
for village-level committees than did previous measures.\69\
Measures effective in Aba T&QAP, Sichuan, for example, provide
village committees a role in reviewing applications from
persons who wish to become monks or nuns, and in supervising
monks and nuns.\70\ The national regulations provide for the
first time a legal basis for placing a village committee member
on a DMC--and by doing so, empower the village committee member
to participate directly in DMC decisionmaking.\71\
distinctions between the prefectural regulatory measures
A summary of some principal areas of distinction between
the seven prefectural-level regulatory measures for which text
was available online as of August 2011 follows.
Dedicated village-level committees monitor, supervise,
report on monastic activity. All five of the Qinghai province
TAP regulations include provisions that establish ``masses
supervision and appraisal committees'' (MSACs, qunzhong jiandu
pingyi weiyuanhui).\72\ MSACs are a new development with
respect to their specific role in government management of
Tibetan Buddhist affairs.\73\ Township governments guide
selection of MSAC members from among village residents,
herders, and monastery staff.\74\ Regulations mandate MSACs to
fulfill specific duties in supervising, monitoring, and
appraising monastic management (especially DMCs),
administration (including financial affairs), and Buddhist
teaching.\75\ MSACs must submit periodic reports to township-
and county-level governments.\76\
Extent of provisions for administrative and criminal
punishment. The regulatory measures vary in the extensiveness
and specificity of language describing activity that may result
in administrative penalties (e.g., expulsion) or criminal
punishment (e.g., imprisonment) of ``religious personnel.''
\77\ Three prefectural measures (Hainan, Guoluo, Aba) contain
more extensive descriptions of punishable activity; \78\ three
prefectural measures (Haibei, Haixi, Diqing) contain less
extensive descriptions of punishable activity; \79\ and one
prefectural measure (Huangnan) contains language that is mid-
range.\80\ Information available as of February 2011 in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database demonstrated a
positive correlation between the number of Buddhist monks,
nuns, teachers, or trulkus detained in each TAP on or after
March 10, 2008, and the extensiveness of regulatory measures'
provisions on punishment.\81\
Provision for potential redress against administrative
punishment. Four of the prefectural regulations (Huangnan,
Hainan, Guoluo, Diqing) for which text was available online as
of August 2011 contain provisions allowing a person punished
administratively under the regulations either to seek
administrative reconsideration of the punishment or to file a
lawsuit against the punishment.\82\ Three of the four
regulations (Huangnan, Haibei, Guoluo) cite the PRC
Administrative Reconsideration Law \83\ and PRC Administrative
Litigation Law \84\ as the legal instruments for undertaking
such action.\85\ The Hainan, Haixi, and Aba regulatory measures
do not mention administrative reconsideration or filing an
administrative lawsuit.
Tibetan Cultural Expression: Increasing Pressure, Punishment
Chinese government and Communist Party policies and their
implementation increased pressure on and sometimes threatened
Tibetan cultural expression during the Commission's 2011
reporting year. Political detentions in 2011 increased compared
to 2009 and 2010 but were lower than the high level of
2008.\86\ Security and judicial officials used China's legal
system to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, artists,
intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled
language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize
government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. The
government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influencing
other Tibetans and uses imprisonment to remove them from
society. Examples follow of developments this reporting year
that involved imprisonment, detention, and a police manhunt. In
two separate cases, monks committed self-immolation to protest
China's handling of Tibetan issues.
January 2011: Detention after publishing an article.\87\
Public security officials reportedly detained monk-writer
Tsering Tenzin of Palyul Monastery, located in Ganzi (Kardze)
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), in connection with an
essay he wrote that was published in 2010 in a collection of
articles on ``the situation inside Tibet.'' \88\ In February
2010, officials in Hongyuan (Marthang) county,\89\ Aba (Ngaba)
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, detained monk Tsering
Dondrub of Rongtha Monastery for assisting with
publication.\90\
Winter 2010: Detention for downloading banned songs.\91\
During a winter ``strike hard'' campaign in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR), security officials punished Tibetans
who had downloaded ``prohibited'' songs such as ``Voice of
Unity,'' ``My Lama,'' and ``I Miss the Sun, Moon, and Stars,''
with 10 to 15 days of detention and a fine. Police allegedly
beat some detainees.\92\
December 2010: Imprisonment for writing articles about the
2008 Tibetan protests.\93\ The Aba Intermediate People's Court
sentenced three contributing editors of a Tibetan-language
magazine to imprisonment for ``inciting splittism'' (PRC
Criminal Law, Article 103(2)): Buddha (a pen name) and Jangtse
Donkho, four years; and Kalsang Jinpa, three years.\94\
December 2010: Redetention for making video appeal.\95\
Public security officials in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, reportedly redetained monk-writer
Kalsang Tsultrim of Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery on December
16, 2010.\96\ Officials released him on bail the previous
October after detaining him in July 2010 for distributing a
video CD of him speaking about concern for the Tibetan culture
and religion.\97\
December 2010: Detention after publishing articles,
organizing conferences.\98\ Public security officials in Lhasa
city reportedly detained monk-writer Tenpa Lodroe on December
29, 2010, reportedly in connection with a December 20
conference on ``the situation in Tibet'' arranged in Ganzi TAP,
Sichuan province.\99\
September 2010: Arrest warrant issued for singer after CD
release.\100\ In the second half of September, public security
officials in Lhasa city reportedly issued an arrest warrant for
singer Pasang Tsering and banned his newly released CD.\101\
Officials allegedly suspected the lyrics of praising the Dalai
Lama and ``inciting ethnic sentiments.'' \102\ As of late
September 2010, relatives had lost contact with him.\103\
March 2011: Self-immolation to mark anniversary of 2008
protest.\104\ On March 16, 2011, monk Phuntsog of Kirti
Monastery, located near the Aba county seat, Aba T&QAP, set
himself on fire to protest the fatal shooting on the same date
in 2008 of at least 10 Tibetan protesters.\105\ As he burned,
Phuntsog reportedly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai
Lama's long life.\106\ Phuntsog died in a hospital the next
morning.\107\ Officials forced Kirti monks to submit to
political education starting March 21; \108\ on April 21,
People's Armed Police (PAP) removed at least 300 of the monks
and took them to other counties to undergo ``legal education.''
\109\ PAP and other police allegedly beat severely Tibetans who
attempted to block removal of the monks, resulting in serious
injuries and the deaths of two elderly Tibetans.\110\ On August
29 and 30, 2011, a county-level court in Aba T&QAP sentenced
three Kirti monks to 10-, 11-, and 13-year prison terms for
Phuntsog's ``intentional homicide,'' claiming that two monks
``plotted, instigated and assisted'' in the self-immolation and
one monk delayed medical treatment.\111\ International media
and advocacy group reports described the convicted monks'
intentions toward Phuntsog in terms of providing rescue,
protection, and shelter.\112\
August 2011: Self-immolation to protest Chinese policies.
On August 15, monk Tsewang Norbu of Nyitso Monastery, located
in the seat of Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi TAP, died after
setting himself on fire as he shouted slogans calling for
Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet.\113\
Education and Economic Development: Government Initiatives, Tibetan
Protests
Tibetan students and farmers protested government and
Communist Party policies on education, the environment, and
rural Tibetans' use of farming and grazing lands during the
Commission's 2011 reporting year. Such protests indicate that
Tibetans \114\ consider the policies a threat to the Tibetan
culture, language, and environment, and the viability of
farming and herding as a means of livelihood for rural
Tibetans--who made up approximately 87 percent of Tibetans in
China in 2000.\115\
tibetan students, teachers protest government education policy
Events this past year, detailed below, highlighted the
importance Tibetans attribute to the status of Tibetan
language, its level of use in the education system,\116\ and
the threat that government and Party policy pose to the status
and use of Tibetan language.\117\ Senior Party and government
officials issued a series of statements \118\ on plans to
reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during
the period from 2010 to 2020.\119\ Tibetan student-led
protests, principally in Qinghai province,\120\ resulted in
retired Tibetan cadres and educators submitting a petition (or
``letter'') to Communist Party and government offices asserting
that the Qinghai government was implementing reforms that
contravene provisions in China's Constitution and the Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL).\121\
The speed with which protests spread suggests that Tibetan
discontent with education policy may be widespread.\122\
Tibetan teachers' and students' views in Qinghai on the role of
Tibetan language in education are unlikely to differ
significantly from Tibetan views in other Tibetan autonomous
areas.\123\ A chronology of principal events from October 15 to
29, 2010, follows.
October 15: Teachers sign letter criticizing bilingual
education reform. As a ``Tibetan Language Course Reforms
Training'' attended by more than 300 teachers employed at
Qinghai province Tibetan-language primary and middle schools
concluded,\124\ attendees reportedly signed a petition (or
``letter'') on October 15 calling on Qinghai officials to
continue to treat Tibetan language as the ``language of
instruction'' in Tibetan schools.\125\ The teachers reportedly
were responding to the ``Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term
Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)'' \126\
(the Plan).\127\ The petition reasoned that ``choice of
language of instruction should depend entirely on those being
taught.'' \128\
October 19: Student protests begin. Students at schools in
Tongren (Rebgong), the Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP) capital,\129\ reportedly protested on October
19 in response to a report that Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang
Wei ``ordered that the language used in textbooks should be
changed to Chinese.'' \130\ Students carried banners demanding
expanded use of Tibetan language \131\ and circulated a text
message claiming the central government had decided to cancel
``Tibetan-language centered'' education.\132\ Qiang had
instructed educators in September to increase Chinese-language
teaching and ``conquer the erroneous thinking that if minority
nationality students undergo an education based on the state's
common language [Mandarin] and script it will hurt the feelings
of the minority nationality masses, or effect the development
of the minority nationality culture, or impact social
stability.'' \133\ Protests reportedly spread to Beijing and
Hainan (Tsolho), Haibei (Tsojang), and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in
Qinghai.\134\
October 22: Qinghai education head defends reform. Director
Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Department of Education acknowledged
on October 22 that students had ``expressed their
dissatisfaction'' with the ``bilingual education reform plan,''
and attributed the incidents to students' ``misunderstanding.''
\135\ He referred to an ``outline'' of the Plan issued by the
provincial government and Party on September 12, and confirmed
that among the ``main goals'' was for instructors to ``adhere
to mainly teaching with the state's standard spoken and written
language [Mandarin].'' \136\
October 24: Retired cadres and educators argue that
education reforms are illegal. A petition signed on October 24
by ``retired Tibetan cadres and veteran education workers'' in
Qinghai's capital, Xining, analyzed perceived violations of
China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
(REAL),\137\ and other laws that resulted in the infringement
of ethnic minorities' rights.\138\ The educators submitted the
letter to central-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Party,
legislative, government, and consultative bodies.\139\ The
petition ``proposed'' that the Qinghai Province Education
Department ``immediately stop the enforcement of the illegal
provision for using Chinese as the only language for teaching''
\140\ and cited the Constitution and REAL, Article 20, as the
legal basis for non-implementation.\141\
October 25: Officials describe diminished scope for
Tibetan language use. At a forum convened on October 25 to
``study and implement the spirit'' of the Plan,\142\ Gao
Yunlong, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai People's Government, told
government, academic, and other personnel that Mandarin is the
appropriate language for use in ``public places'' and ethnic
languages are suitable for ``one's home location.'' \143\ He
justified the decision to exclude ethnic languages from
teaching ``scientific'' subjects such as ``mathematics,
physics, and chemistry'' and said that exclusion ``does no harm
to carrying ethnic culture forward.'' \144\
October 27: Party Secretary ties reforms to ``national
unity,'' protests to ``plots.'' Qiang Wei on October 27 linked
support of bilingual education reform to protecting ``national
sovereignty'' and promoting ``national and ethnic unity.''
\145\ He described ``unity of spoken and written language'' as
``a fundamental and essential condition for a unified
country.'' \146\ He warned Qinghai Party members that
``domestic and foreign hostile forces will seek to exploit our
promotion of bilingual education reform as an opportunity to
plot, orchestrate, incite, and provoke disturbances, . . . and
to destroy our social situation of unity and stability.'' \147\
rural tibetans protest economic development mainstay: mining
Rural Tibetans protested during the 2011 reporting year
against what they consider to be adverse effects of Chinese
government and Communist Party economic development policies--
especially mining--that prioritize government objectives above
respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and
environment.\148\ Officials justify such policies in part by
publicizing statistical indicators such as rising GDP \149\ and
household income.\150\ At the same time, government officials
emphasized the dependency of the Tibetan Autonomous Region
(TAR) on central support: State Ethnic Affairs Commission
Minister Yang Jing asserted that the central government
provided in the form of subsidies 90 percent of the funds the
TAR government spent from 2001 to 2010.\151\ Statistics are
difficult to locate on central government revenue derived from
natural resource extraction in Tibetan autonomous areas--
China's Constitution appropriates ownership of natural
resources throughout China to the central government.\152\ The
value of such resources in the TAR may be as high as 600
billion yuan (US$93.8 billion), according to a December 2010
official media report \153\--about double the total 2001 to
2010 subsidies the central government provided to the TAR.\154\
Examples of reported incidents of Tibetan protest against
economic development initiatives follow.
November-December 2010: Protest and detentions in Rikaze
(Shigatse) prefecture, TAR. On December 18, People's Armed
Police (PAP) ended a standoff that began on November 22 when
Tibetans began to protest and petition against the start of
mining activity near Lingka Monastery in Xietongmen
(Shetongmon) county, Rikaze.\155\ PAP allegedly beat protesters
and detained 17 persons, including the Lingka abbot (Kalsang)
and four monks (Jamyang Rigsang, Jamyang Tsering, Rigzin Pema,
and Tsewang Dorje).\156\
September-October 2010: Protest and detentions in Naqu
(Nagchu) prefecture, TAR. Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county
reportedly attempted to block Chinese workers who arrived in
August 2010 to begin construction of a dam near a mountain
Tibetans regard as sacred.\157\ Villagers claimed workers
intended to establish mines in the area, asserted that they had
the right to protect the local environment, and refused to
move.\158\ On September 26, the construction team claimed to
have received a mining permit agreed to by the TAR Party
secretary.\159\ Security officials reportedly detained protest
leaders Dorje Dragtsal and Palden Choedrag and three other
Tibetans, Buphel, Tsegon, and Samten, who presented a petition
to Naqu authorities.\160\
August 2010: Protest, shooting, detentions in Ganzi
(Kardze) TAP, Sichuan. On August 18 security officials in the
seat of Baiyu (Palyul) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), opened fire on a group of about 100 Tibetans
petitioning outside county government offices against a
Shanghai-based mining company's expanded gold-mining
operations.\161\ Villagers alleged that mining had damaged
their farming and grazing lands.\162\ Gunfire reportedly killed
``at least four'' Tibetans and wounded about 30 after a
``scuffle'' broke out.\163\ China's official media reported
that police fired warning shots after Tibetans attacked them
and a ``stray bullet'' killed one Tibetan; police detained 35
Tibetans.\164\
May-July 2011: Protest and detentions in Changdu (Chamdo)
prefecture, TAR. After Tibetans learned that Chinese laborers
had been ``deployed'' in May 2011 to work at mining locations
in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu, authorities warned
residents that protests against mining activity ``would be
construed as politically motivated,'' according to a media
report's unidentified source.\165\ During June and July,
security officials allegedly detained approximately 50 Tibetans
(15 named) linked to protest activity.\166\ Detainees included
``village officials'' Arsong, Tashi Namgyal, and Jamyang
Trinle, who traveled to the TAR capital, Lhasa, to ``protest''
the mining and detentions, and alleged protest ``ringleaders''
Tenzin and Tashi.\167\
settling nomads, building railways, replacing yushu
Chinese officials continued to implement policies and
announce projects over this past year that some Tibetans
believe threaten the Tibetan culture and heritage. Pema Choling
(Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR People's Government, said
on January 10, 2011, that the government had settled or
resettled ``1.43 million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000
households'' into new housing \168\--one of the initiatives of
a program the Party refers to as ``construction of a new
socialist countryside'' \169\ and that Party General Secretary
and President of China Hu Jintao named as a top development
priority at the 2010 Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet.\170\ Based
on a reported total TAR rural population of 2.21 million,\171\
the government has completed the compulsory settlement or
resettlement of nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural
population.\172\ The Commission has not observed statistics
during the past year on compulsory settlement or resettlement
in other Tibetan autonomous areas.
The Chinese government provided updates this past year on
construction of the railway network that will crisscross the
Tibetan plateau and has the potential to impact profoundly the
Tibetan culture and environment.\173\
Lhasa-Rikaze (Shigatse) railway. In February
2011, state-run media reported that the 253-kilometer
westward link from Lhasa to Rikaze will be completed by
2015 (the end of the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year
Plan on Economic and Social Development).\174\ On
September 2, China Daily reported the railway will
begin operating in 2014 but did not cite the source of
the information.\175\ The estimated cost of building
the railway as of the September 2010 start of
construction was 13.3 billion yuan \176\ (US$2.1
billion)--approximately 20 percent greater than the 11
billion yuan (US$1.7 billion) estimate reported in
April 2009.\177\
Lhasa-Linzhi (Nyingtri) railway. Construction
of the eastward link from Lhasa to Linzhi will begin
during the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan.\178\
The Commission has not observed information about
whether the railway will be built along the north or
the south side of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Yalung Zangbo,
Brahmaputra) River.\179\
Sichuan-Tibet railway and Yunnan-Tibet
railway. The TAR will ``conduct a pre-construction
planning and study on the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-
Tibet railways'' during the TAR 12th Five-Year
Plan.\180\
Ge'ermu (Golmud, Kermo)-Ku'erle (Korla)
railway. Construction of the railway linking Golmud
city in Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai province, with Ku'erle (Korla)
city, the capital of Bayingguoleng (Bayingolin) Mongol
Autonomous Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), will begin in 2011 and be complete by
2015.\181\ The railway will reduce the journey between
Urumqi city, the XUAR capital, and Lhasa city by more
than 1,000 kilometers.\182\
Chengdu-Ge'ermu railway. Construction of the
railway linking Chengdu city, the Sichuan capital, and
Ge'ermu city may start by 2015, the end of the PRC 12th
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social
Development.\183\ The route traverses Ruo'ergai
(Dzoege) county in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, Yushu (Kyegudo) in Yushu TAP
(the site of an April 2010 earthquake \184\), and
Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai.\185\ Yushu and Guoluo are
the most ethnically Tibetan areas remaining outside the
TAR, based on official 2000 census data: Yushu TAP
(97.1 percent Tibetan), TAR (92.7 percent Tibetan), and
Guoluo TAP (91.6 percent Tibetan).\186\
Tibetans protested in April 2011 against Chinese government
plans for rebuilding Yushu (Kyegudo), the capital of Yushu
(Yushul) TAP, Qinghai, severely damaged by an April 2010
earthquake, and demanded that authorities ``fairly and
legitimately'' resolve issues involving their residences and
use of their land.\187\ Media reports between June 2010 and
March 2011 revealed government plans to rename Yushu and
transform it into an urban area traversed by a railway.\188\
Yushu's ``temporary'' name would be Sanjiangyuan \189\ (``three
rivers source''), after a nearby nature reserve.\190\ The
government will redesignate the administrative area as a
``city,'' \191\ indicating that it will become the center of a
substantial population and economy with a well-developed
infrastructure.\192\ In June 2010, the Qinghai government
announced the central government would provide most of 32
billion yuan (US$4.68 billion) budgeted to rebuild the area
\193\--a sum similar to the 33 billion yuan (then US$4.7
billion) cost of constructing the Qinghai-Tibet railway.\194\
In March 2011, the Qinghai government announced that the
Chengdu-Ge'ermu railway would pass through Yushu's
location.\195\
In January 2011, official media reports described Yushu as
``flattened,'' \196\ but a June 2010 unofficial report noted
that officials allegedly were expropriating Tibetan homes and
businesses in sound condition so the government could redevelop
the area.\197\ Tibetans have objected to government plans to
move them from spacious homes to smaller apartment- or
townhouse-style residences in other locations.\198\ On April 2,
2011, approximately 300 Tibetans staged a sit-in protest in
Yushu, claiming authorities either sold or expropriated their
property without providing ``appropriate'' compensation.\199\
People's Armed Police allegedly ``attacked'' the protesters,
detained about 40 of them, and cleared the area.\200\
Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment
post-march 10, 2008: lack of information, uncertain status
During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese
government's failure to provide details about Tibetans
detained, charged, or sentenced for peaceful, protest-related
activity during the period since March 10, 2008, has resulted
in prolonged uncertainty about the current status of hundreds
of cases. As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,134 records of Tibetan
political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008--a
figure certain to be far from complete. No information is
available, however, on the outcome of more than half (623) of
the cases. More than half (348) of the 623 unresolved cases are
presumed to have resulted in release based on the substantial
period of time since detention--three years or more in hundreds
of cases.
Among the 1,134 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions
reported since March 2008, post-detention information is
available for only 307 cases. Included in those 307 cases are
21 Tibetans whom officials ordered to serve reeducation through
labor (16 are believed released upon completing their terms),
and 197 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to periods of
imprisonment ranging from six months to life (79 are believed
released upon sentence completion). Of the 197 Tibetan
political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008,
sentencing information is available for 186 prisoners: the
average sentence length is five years and three months based on
PPD data as of September 1, 2011.\201\
current tibetan political detention and imprisonment
As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained records of 527
Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be
currently detained or imprisoned. Of those 527 records, 483 are
records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008,\202\
and 44 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10,
2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is
certain to be far from complete.
Of the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed
to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on
or after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data as of September
1, 2011:
More than half (264) are believed or presumed
to be detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the
rest are believed or presumed to be detained or
imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (160), Gansu
province (23), Qinghai province (34), the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (1), and Beijing (1).
113 are serving sentences ranging in length
from one year and six months to life imprisonment; the
average sentence length is seven years and two
months.\203\ Sixty-two (55 percent) of the 113
prisoners with known sentences are monks, nuns, or
Tibetan Buddhist teachers or trulkus.
240 (50 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks,
nuns, teachers, or trulkus.
425 (88 percent) are male, 51 (11 percent)
are female, and 7 are of unknown gender.
Sentencing information is available on 27 of the 44 Tibetan
political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and
believed to remain imprisoned. Their sentences range in length
from five years to life imprisonment; the average sentence
length is 14 years and 3 months.\204\
Endnotes
\1\ The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the
March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising every year that he has lived in exile,
beginning in 1960. The statements for the years 1961 to 2011 are
available on the Web site of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
\2\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11. For information about the Middle Way
Approach, see Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``His Holiness's
Middle Way Approach for Resolving the Issue of Tibet,'' last visited 3
June 08.
\3\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11.
\4\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Message of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan
People's Deputies,'' 11 March 11. (The U.S. Government does not
recognize the ``Central Tibetan Administration'' (Tibetan ``government-
in-exile'') as a government. See, e.g., ``Report on Tibet Negotiations,
March 2009-February 2010,'' reprinted in International Campaign for
Tibet, last visited 21 March 11. The copy posted on the ICT Web site
does not include the name of the issuing authority. The Report is
mandated by Sections 611 (Tibetan Policy Act of 2002) and 613(b) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, which direct the President
to submit such a report annually to Congress. The Department of State
customarily prepares the report. The report states, ``Since the U.S.
Government does not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United
States does not conduct official diplomatic relations with the Tibetan
`government-in-exile' in Dharamsala, India.'')
\5\ Phurbu Thinley, ``Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace
Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution,'' Phayul, 19 March
11. The Dalai Lama reportedly said, ``If [relinquishing political
power] happens, like the first, second, third and fourth Dalai Lamas I
can concentrate more effectively on [the] spiritual role.''
\6\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11.
\7\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Message of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan
People's Deputies,'' 11 March 11. The Dalai Lama stated in his prepared
remarks, ``Since the Fifth Dalai Lama's founding of the Ganden Phodrang
[Gaden Phodrang] Government of Tibet in 1642, successive Dalai Lamas
have been both the spiritual and temporal leaders of Tibet. . . . The
essence of a democratic system is, in short, the assumption of
political responsibility by elected leaders for the popular good. In
order for our process of democratization to be complete, the time has
come for me to devolve my formal authority to such an elected
leadership.'' Phurbu Thinley, ``Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace
Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution,'' Phayul, 19 March
11. According to the article, the Dalai Lama said, ``So as the 14th
Dalai Lama of Tibet, I take pride and freedom to voluntarily relinquish
the political power wielded by the institution of the Dalai Lama (Gaden
Phodrang).''
\8\ ``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama
(Text),'' China Daily, 11 February 10. According to the interview
transcript, United Front Work Department Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun said,
``[The Dalai Lama] is not a religious figure; instead he is the head of
a separatist political group, who leads a government-in-exile with an
illegal constitution, a constitution which describes that the 14th
Dalai Lama is the supreme head both politically and relationally of
this political group.''
\9\ The Dalai Lama: What He Means for Tibetans Today, Roundtable of
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 July 11, Written
Statement Submitted by Maria Otero, Under Secretary of State for
Democracy and Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Member,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ ``Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable,'' Xinhua, 7
March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11); ``Qiangba
Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the
Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs,'' China News
Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 16 March 11).
\12\ See, e.g., ``Government Work Report-Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). Chairman of the TAR
Government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) urged the TAR People's Congress
to ``speed up the establishment of a long-standing mechanism on
monastery management, to protect the normal order of religion.'' Huang
Zhiwu, ``Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an Investigation
in Our Region'' [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu diaoyan], Tibet
Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 April 11).
According to the report, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the
Communist Party's United Front Work Department, said that it is
``necessary to extensively and thoroughly conduct legal publicity and
education as well as management and safeguard the normal order of
religious activities.''
\13\ China Directory 2010, ed. Radiopress (Kawasaki: RP Printing,
2009), 17.
\14\ Huang Zhiwu, ``Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an
Investigation in Our Region'' [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu
diaoyan], Tibet Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11
April 11).
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ ``Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable,'' Xinhua, 7
March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11).
\17\ ``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should
Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly
Affairs,'' China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source
Center, 16 March 11).
\18\ Zhao Yinan, ``Govt Leadership Changes Continue,'' China Daily,
30 August 11 (includes chart titled ``Major Leadership Reshuffle:
Eleven Officials Have Changed Positions in Recent Weeks''); ``Chen
Quanguo Becomes New Party Chief of Tibet,'' Xinhua, 25 August 11,
reprinted in China Daily; ``Chen Quanguo, New Secretary of the Tibet
Autonomous Region Party Committee, Says He Will Take Root in Tibet and
Dedicate His Wisdom and Efforts,'' China News Agency, 25 August 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 28 August 11).
\19\ ``[Tibetan Autonomous] Region Party Committee Holds Special
Report Meeting on Maintaining the Advanced Nature of Party Members,
Emphasizes Insisting on Unwaveringly Grasping Development, Taking a
Clear-Cut Stand on Grasping Stability, and Working Hard To Establish a
Harmonious Tibet'' [Qu dangwei juxing baochi gongchan dang yuan
xianjinxing zhuanti baogao hui qiangdiao jianding buyi de zhua fazhan,
qizhi xianming de zhua wending, nuli jianshe hexie xizang], Tibet
Daily, 7 April 05 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 May 05);
``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo],'' China Vitae, last visited 12
April 11 (Executive Deputy Secretary of TAR Party Committee since
2003).
\20\ ``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should
Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly
Affairs,'' China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source
Center, 16 March 11).
\21\ Ibid.
\22\ Amitabh Pal, ``The Dalai Lama Interview,'' Progressive,
January 2006. The Dalai Lama said, ``If the Tibetan people want another
reincarnation, then logically while we're outside, the successor should
be someone who can carry out this task, which has not yet been
accomplished by the previous Dalai Lama. That means that he must come
in a free country.''
\23\ Evan Osnos, ``The Next Incarnation,'' New Yorker, 4 October
10. ``[The Dalai Lama] has taken to musing aloud that he might be
reincarnated as a woman, or that Tibetans might vote on whether the
institution of the Dalai Lama should continue at all. Or, he says, he
might select his own reincarnation while he is still alive . . . which
would give him the chance to train a successor . . . . Only one thing
is certain, he says: his successor will be found outside Tibet.''
\24\ Sui-Lee Wee and Ben Blanchard, ``China Says Dalai Lama Has To
Reincarnate,'' Reuters, 7 March 11.
\25\ Ravi Nessman, ``Dalai Lama Calls Chinese Insistence on Picking
His Religious Successor `a Disgrace,' '' Associated Press, 1 July 11,
reprinted in Yahoo!.
\26\ There are a total of 10 prefectural-level areas of ethnic
Tibetan autonomy located in a total of four provinces in China: Qinghai
province (Haibei [Tsojang] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Hainan
[Tsolho] TAP, Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP, Huangnan [Malho]
TAP, Guoluo [Golog] TAP, and Yushu [Yulshul] TAP); Gansu province
(Gannan [Kanlho] TAP); Sichuan province (Ganzi [Kardze] TAP and Aba
[Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP); and Yunnan province (Diqing [Dechen]
TAP). For additional information on the Tibetan autonomous prefectures,
see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 22-24.
\27\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36 (``Citizens of the
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. . . .'').
\28\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09;
Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09; Haibei Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10,
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10; Guoluo Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10,
issued and effective 30 September 10; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10.
\29\ Ma Yong, ``New Changes at Qinghai's Tibetan Buddhist
Temples,'' Outlook Weekly, 29 November 10 (translated in Open Source
Center, 11 December 10).
\30\ Ibid. In or after May 2008 (the report does not provide a
date), ``[t]he province therefore drew up and distributed `Opinions on
Guiding the Strengthening and Improving of the Social Management of
Temples in Accordance With the Law.''
\31\ Ibid.
\32\ Based on Commission monitoring, as of August 2011, the first
regulatory measures known to take effect were in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan
and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, reported and
effective on July 24, 2009; the most recent regulatory measures known
to take effect were in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, effective
September 30, 2010, and posted publicly on November 19, 2010. Aba
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Circular on Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zhou renmin zhengfu
guanyu yinfa aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli
zanxing banfa de tongzhi], Find Law Net, 24 July 09; ``Qinghai Province
`Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations' Approved'' [Qinghai sheng ``guoluo zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli'' huo pi], China Tibet News, 19 November
10.
\33\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.
\34\ Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.
\35\ Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10.
\36\ Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10.
\37\ Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and
effective 3 June 10.
\38\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09. All of the regulatory measures listed are ``regulations''
(tiaoli) except for the Aba ``measures'' (banfa).
\39\ Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management
of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09,
issued and effective 1 September 09.
\40\ ``Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee 2010
Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian lifa
jihua], 14 December 09, reprinted in Qinghai Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, 3 March 10. According to the legislation plan, the
Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli] had
been reported for approval.
\41\ Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee 2011
Legislation Plan [Sichuan sheng renda changweihui 2011 nian lifa
jihua], 21 February 11, reprinted in Sichuan Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, 31 March 11. According to the legislation plan, the
Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli] had
been reported for approval.
\42\ The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately
1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 TAPs (approximately 1.02 million
square kilometers), and 2 Tibetan autonomous counties (TACs)
(approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately
2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46
percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. According to China's 2000 census
data, the Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.43 million
persons), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.47 million persons), and the 2
TACs (approximately 0.11 million persons) totaled approximately 5.01
million Tibetans. The Tibetan population of the 10 TAPs made up
approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as
of 2000. Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, 2003), Tables 10-1, 10-4; Steven Marshall and Susette
Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation:
Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Self-
published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources.
Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region
(1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai
province: Haibei [Tsojang] TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077
square miles); Hainan [Tsolho] TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075
square miles); Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square
kilometers, or 125,786 square miles); Huangnan [Malho] TAP (17,901
square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles; Guoluo [Golog] TAP (78,444
square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles); and Yushu [Yulshul] TAP
(197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province:
Gannan [Kanlho] TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles)
and Tianzhu [Pari] TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square
miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi [Kardze] TAP (153,870 square
kilometers, or 59,409 square miles); Aba [Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP
(86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles); and Muli [Mili] TAC
(11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province:
Diqing [Dechen] TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles).
The Table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square
miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological
Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square miles. For more information
on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, Special Topic
Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 22-24.
\43\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.
\44\ For detailed information on the regulations and the articles
under which various controls are imposed, see ``Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.
\45\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.
\46\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.
\47\ Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.
\48\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09.
\49\ Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management
of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09,
issued and effective 1 September 09.
\50\ For more detailed information on provisions of the regulatory
measures, see ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 10 March 11, Table 2 titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory
Measures: Selected Areas of Requirement, Prohibition, Control.
\51\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 4,
20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4, 16(2); Aba
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 3, 8; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.
\52\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 4, 10; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
arts. 4, 20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 16(1)
(no reference to socialism); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
[Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing
banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 17; Diqing Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective
1 September 09, art. 3 (no reference to socialism).
\53\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 4, 10(1); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
arts. 4, 11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4,
11(1); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 17, 21; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.
\54\ ``Deepen the Struggle Against Separatist Activities and Make
Further Efforts To Do Our Religious Work Well,'' Tibet Daily, 15
February 96 (translated in Open Source Center, 15 February 96). The
article states, ``The Buddhist association organizations formed in
accordance with the constitution of the Buddhist Association of China
are mass religious organizations composed of patriotic religious people
which serve as a bridge and tie between the government and the broad
masses of religious believers.'' Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary
Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs [Xizangzizhiqu zongjiao
shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued 9 December 91, effective 20
December 91, art. 15. The measures state, ``The Buddhist Association is
a . . . bridge for the Party and government to unite and educate
personages from religious circles and the believing masses. Its
effectiveness shall be vigorously brought into play under the
administrative leadership of the government's religious affairs
department.''
\55\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
art. 16; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
arts. 26-27; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 26-
27; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 19-20.
\56\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
art. 16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.
\57\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art.
11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 11(1); Aba
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 16, 17 (responsibility over DMC).
\58\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 8, 10, 11; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24
September 09, arts. 10, 19-20; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July
09, arts. 12-16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary
Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and
effective 24 July 09, arts. 16-18; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09,
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 7-9.
\59\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 35-36 (implied); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24
September 09, arts. 7, 10(3), 20(7), 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and
effective 31 July 09, arts. 6-8, 10(4), 18; Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 16, 18
(no mention of village committee supervision of DMC); Diqing Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective
1 September 09, arts. 5, 7.
\60\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 13 July 07,
issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on
the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special
Focus for 2007, 196-197; ``New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented
Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 August 07.
\61\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
art. 20; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 10(4); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 7(6);
Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, art. 26; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulations on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 18.
\62\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 15-17; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary
Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and
effective 24 July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09,
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.
\63\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 9, 16-18, 21, 22, 25, 28-30, 33, 35, 40, 42; Huangnan Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09,
issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 7; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and
effective 31 July 09, arts. 3, 8; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
[Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing
banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 6; Diqing Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective
1 September 09, arts. 5-6.
\64\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 22, 28-29; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24
September 09, art. 31; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture
Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba
zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa],
issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 23; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries
[Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed
14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09,
art. 14.
\65\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts.
22, 28-29. For more information on monastic travel requirements under
previous regulatory measures, see Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing
Measures for the ``Regulations on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures)
[Xizang zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)],
issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07, arts. 41, 43; Tibet
Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious
Affairs, issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous
Region People's Government on December 9, 1991, art. 9; CECC, 2007
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 194-195.
\66\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
arts. 7(2), 22(1-3), 23(6), 37; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July
09, arts. 8(1), 9, 13, 19, 21(3), 24(1,3); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10,
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 11(1),
12, 26, 39, 43, 45(3); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September
10, arts. 6, 7, 12(3), 15, 16, 18-19, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, arts. 8,
9, 13(2), 15, 17(2), 22, 25.
\67\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 7(2); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 8(1);
Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10, art. 11(1); Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10,
issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 8.
\68\ The statement is based on information obtained on the Web site
of Harry's World Atlas in January 2011 and represented as current in
early 2007.
\69\ Five of the seven measures for which text was available online
as of August 2011 provide for a greater role for village committees
than the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulations on Religious
Affairs issued in September 2006; two prefectural measures (Diqing and
Haixi) contain language similar to the TAR measures. See, e.g., Tibet
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulations on
Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1
January 07, art. 7; State Administration for Religious Affairs,
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10,
arts. 8, 11(2-3), 36; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24
September 09, arts. 19, 22-23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July
09, arts. 19-21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and
effective 22 March 10, arts. 12, 43-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued
and effective 30 September 10, arts. 18, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 9;
Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 20, 21(2); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09,
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 5(2).
\70\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24
July 09, arts. 20, 21(2).
\71\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 8,
\72\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
arts. 22-23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 18-
21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10, arts. 11(3), 35, 42(9), 43-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued
and effective 30 September 10, arts. 7(5), 17-19; Haixi Mongol and
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed
8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art.
17.
\73\ CECC Staff Analysis.
\74\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 19; Haibei
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations
[Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10,
art. 43; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 18;
Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3
June 10, art. 17.
\75\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 20-21; Haibei
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations
[Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10,
arts. 44-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10,
arts. 17, 19 (do not list specific responsibilities); Haixi Mongol and
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed
8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17
(does not list specific responsibilities).
\76\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 23(6); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 21(3);
Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10, art. 44(5); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September
10, art. 19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and
effective 3 June 10, art. 17 (does not detail reporting requirements).
\77\ Commission Staff Analysis. For more detailed information on
provisions that provide criminal or administrative punishment in the
prefectural regulatory measures, see ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 2
titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory Measures: Selected Areas of
Requirement, Prohibition, Control. According to the table, ``DMC
members, teachers, trulkus, monks and nuns may face administrative or
criminal punishment for activity characterized as . . . .''
\78\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Hainan Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and
effective 31 July 09, arts. 39-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30
September 10, arts. 45-50; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture
Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba
zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa],
issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 34-41.
\79\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Haibei Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10,
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 46-50;
Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3
June 10, art. 27 (no chapter on ``legal liability'' (falu zeren));
Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of
Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao
siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued
and effective 1 September 09, arts. 24-26, 28 (no chapter on ``legal
liability'' (falu zeren)).
\80\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued
and effective 24 September 09, arts. 43-47.
\81\ The Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) data on
Tibetan political detention and imprisonment during the period
beginning on March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.
``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan
Autonomous Prefectures,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
10 March 11, Table 3. Based on PPD information as of February 11, 2011,
the following numbers of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers
were detained on or after March 10, 2008, in prefectures with more
extensive descriptions of punishable offenses--Hainan TAP (12), Guoluo
TAP (18), and Aba T&QAP (57); in a prefecture with mid-range
extensiveness of descriptions of punishable offenses--Huangnan TAP (3);
and in prefectures with less extensive descriptions of punishable
offenses--Haibei TAP (0), Haixi M&TAP (0), and Diqing TAP (0).
\82\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September
10, art. 51; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 27.
\83\ PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe
guo xingzheng fuyi fa], issued 29 April 99, effective 1 October 99.
\84\ PRC Administrative Litigation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo
xingzheng sufa fa], issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90.
\85\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09,
art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli],
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22
March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September
10, art. 51.
\86\ As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database (PPD) contained 576 records of political or religious
detention of Tibetans in 2008; 220 records in 2009; 113 records in
2010; and 225 records in 2011. PPD information on Tibetan political
detentions in and after March 2008 is certain to be far from complete.
The increase in 2011 is due mainly to the coerced removal of monks from
Kirti Monastery in April 2011 for de facto detention at undisclosed
sites for ``legal education.'' For additional information on the Kirti
detentions, see ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and `Education'
for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 17 August 11.
\87\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba,
Author Escapes,'' Phayul, 6 March 11.
\88\ Ibid.
\89\ Hongyuan county is also known by the Tibetan names Kakhog,
Khyungchu, and Mewa.
\90\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba,
Author Escapes,'' Phayul, 6 March 11; Cornelius Lundsgaard and Pema
Tso, ``China Arrests Four Tibetans Including Two Writers Over 2
Books,'' Tibet Post, 19 March 11.
\91\ ``Police Crack Down on Banned Songs,'' Radio Free Asia, 25
February 11.
\92\ Ibid. The RFA report did not identify the location(s) in the
TAR where the detentions took place or identify any of the Tibetans
detained.
\93\ ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,'' Radio Free Asia, 31 December
10.
\94\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three More Tibetan Writers
Sentenced to Prison,'' 21 January 11; ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,''
Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict,'' 5 November 10;
``Tibetan Writers Tried as `Splittists,' '' Radio Free Asia, 5 November
10.
\95\ ``Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped
Conditions,'' Phayul, 18 October 10 (released on October 15, 2010, on
conditions described in a manner that indicates bail following
detention on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Takmig Arrested Again,'' 4 February 11 (redetention on
December 16, 2010).
\96\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Takmig
Arrested Again,'' 4 February 11 (redetention on December 16, 2010).
\97\ ``Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped
Conditions,'' Phayul, 18 October 10 (release October 15, 2010, on
conditions described in a manner that indicate bail following detention
on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``One
More Tibetan Intellectual Arrested'' 22 August 10 (2,500 VCDs);
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Monk Makes Video Appeal for
Return of Dalai Lama and End to Repression in Tibet,'' 28 August 09
(translation of VCD statement).
\98\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in
Lhasa,'' Phayul, 11 January 11 (refers to events as ``debates''); Y.C.
Dhardhowa, ``China Detains a Tibetan Writer in Lhasa, Capital of
Tibet,'' Tibet Post, 11 January 11 (refers to events as
``conferences'').
\99\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in
Lhasa,'' Phayul, 11 January 11.
\100\ ``A Lhasa Singer's Newly Published CD Accused of Political
Problems, Arrest Warrant Issued'' [Yi lasa geshou chuban xin guangdie
beikong she zheng zao tongji], Boxun, 24 September 10. The Boxun report
cites a Voice of Tibet broadcast (likely the same date or one day
earlier) that describes the police activity, including the issue of the
arrest warrant (jubu ling) and banning of the CD as taking place ``in
recent days.''
\101\ Ibid.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Ibid.
\104\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years
Since Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul, 16 March 11.
\105\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Monk Immolates Himself;
Major Protests at Tibetan Monastery Violently Suppressed,'' 16 March
11; Kalsang Rinchen, ``Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since
Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul, 16 March 11; ``After Monk's Suicide:
Coerced Removal and `Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
\106\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese Authorities
Confirm Death of Monk After Self-Immolation; Military Crackdown at
Kirti,'' 17 March 11.
\107\ Ibid.; ``Protest Monk Dies,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11;
Kalsang Rinchen, ``Monk Who Set Ablaze Self Dead, 7 Kirti Monks
Released, Several Still Held,'' 17 March 11.
\108\ ``Monks Face New Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11
(``On [March 21] . . . a program of political reeducation called
`Patriotic Religion' was launched . . .''); Kalsang Rinchen, ``3 Youth
Among Arrested as China Goes on Arrest Drive in Ngaba County,'' Phayul,
24 March 11 (``the patriotic reeducation campaign at Ngaba Kirti
monastery that started on Monday [March 21] is underway . . .'');
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Protests, Tensions Escalate in
Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under
Lockdown,'' 11 April 11 (``a rigorous `patriotic education' campaign is
being enforced''); ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and
`Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
\109\ ``Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 April
11 (``Local Tibetans . . . heard that the detained monks were then
taken to [Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li (Tashiling) counties
in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture]''); Kalsang
Rinchen, ``2 Beaten to Death in Ngaba, 300 Kirti Monks Arrested,''
Phayul, 22 April 11; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Elderly
Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown
Deepens,'' 22 April 11; ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and
`Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
\110\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Elderly Tibetans
Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens,''
22 April 11 (``[people] had their arms and legs broken''; ``The two
people who died . . . were Dongko (male) . . . aged 60, and 65-year old
Sherkyi (female).''); ``Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,'' Radio Free
Asia, 22 April 11 (``Chinese armed police then attacked the crowd,
beating some and gagging others . . .; A 60-year-old man named Donkho .
. . and a 65-year-old woman named Sherkyi . . . were killed, and others
suffered broken arms and legs in the attack.''); International Campaign
for Tibet, ``Ngaba Students Protest Crackdown, Authorities Respond; New
Information on Deaths of Tibetans Who Tried To Protect Monks,'' 9 May
11; ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and `Education' for Monks;
Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
17 August 11.
\111\ ``1st Ld-Writethru: Tibetan Monk Jailed 11 Years For Murder
in Self-Immolation Case,'' Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China
Daily. According to the report, on August 29, 2011, the Ma'erkang
[Barkham] County People's Court sentenced Kirti monk ``Drongdru'' to 11
years' imprisonment ``because he hid the injured monk and prevented
emergency treatment.'' ``Two Tibetan Monks Sentenced in Murder Case,''
Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. According to the
report, on August 30, 2011, the Ma'erkang [Barkham] County People's
Court sentenced Kirti monks ``Tsering Tenzin'' and ``Tenchum'' to 13
years' and 10 years' imprisonment respectively. PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, art. 232: ``Whoever intentionally commits homicide shall be
sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not
less than 10 years; if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years
but not more than 10 years.''
\112\ ``Tibet Protest March Attacked,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March
11. According to an RFA source, ``Chinese police and security people
present in the area immediately came to the scene and kicked and beat
him as they extinguished the flames. Local Tibetans and Kirti monks
came to his rescue and took Phuntsog back to the monastery.'' ``Ngaba
Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul,
16 March 11. According to the report, ``As the police were trying to
take him away in a waiting police van scores of Tibetans rushed to the
scene and protected Phuntsok.'' International Campaign for Tibet,
``Protests, Tensions Escalate in Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of
Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown,'' 11 April 11. According to the
ICT report, ``At that point, Kirti monks intervened and sheltered him
at the monastery before ensuring he received medical treatment at
hospital, . . . .''
\113\ Free Tibet Campaign, ``Monk Dies After Setting Himself on
Fire in Protest in Tibet,'' 15 August 11 (``Nyitso Monastery'');
``Tibetan Monk Sets Himself Ablaze,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 August 11
(``Nyatso Monastery''); ``Monk Sets Himself on Fire in SW China,''
Xinhua, 15 August 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.
\114\ Accurate, comprehensive, and independently verified
information on the views of Tibetans living in China is not available.
\115\ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 percent of
Tibetans were classified as ``rural'' population: Table 1-2 shows the
total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 1-2a shows the
``city'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1-2b shows
the ``town'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 1-2c
shows the ``rural'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 4,721,199. Based
on information in Table 1-5, the percentage of rural Tibetans could be
even higher: Of the total 5,416,021 Tibetan population, 5,373,339
Tibetans were classified as either ``agricultural'' (4,792,676) or
``non-agricultural'' (580,663). Based on those figures, the 4,792,676
Tibetans classified as ``agricultural'' made up 88.5 percent of the
5,416,021 total Tibetan population.
\116\ For previous Commission reporting addressing the issues of
Tibetan literacy and the status of the Tibetan language, see, e.g.,
CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 202; CECC, 2005 Annual Report,
11 October 05, 108-9; Teaching and Learning Tibetan: The Role of the
Tibetan Language in Tibet's Future, Staff Roundtable of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 7 April 03, Testimony of
Nicolas Tournadre, Associate Professor of Linguistics, University of
Paris 8, Paris; Testimony of David Germano, Professor of Tibetan and
Buddhist Studies, University of Virginia; Testimony of Losang Rabgey,
Commonwealth Scholar and Ph.D. Candidate, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London.
\117\ China's Constitution and the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. See,
e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa],
issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28
February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. The State Council Provisions on
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to
use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use
of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching
staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art.
22.
\118\ ``It Is in the Fundamental Interests of the Tibetan People in
Our Province To Strengthen and Reform `Bilingual' Education,'' Qinghai
Daily, 29 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 November 10);
``NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,''
Xinhua, 23 October 10; Xue Jun, ``Provincial Party Committee Convenes
Telephone and Videoconference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang
Wei Delivers Important Speech'' [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao
ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai
Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10);
Zhi Zhenpu, ``Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make `Bi-
lingual' Education a Livelihood Project'' [Qinghai sheng wei shuji
qiang wei: ba ``shuang yu'' jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng], People's
Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.
\119\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai],
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8
November 10) (ethnic languages are for use in ``one's home location''
and in ``courses of study to carry ethnic culture forward''; Chinese
language is for use in ``public places''; non-ethnic languages (e.g.,
Chinese, English) are for ``scientific learning such as mathematics,
physics, and chemistry''); ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education
Leader Explains `Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for
Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng
jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ``qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he
fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October
10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10) (the role of
Chinese language: ``adhere to mainly teaching with the state's standard
spoken and written language [Mandarin]''; role of ethnic language is
not identified: ``learn spoken and written ethnic languages'').
\120\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19
October 10 (October 19 protest in Tongren (Rebgong), capital of
Huangnan (Malho) TAP, involved students from six secondary- and
tertiary-level schools; estimates ranged from 1,000 to 7,000 students);
``Tibet Students Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10
(October 20 protests included ``more than 2,000'' middle school
students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP, and a total of about 6,000
secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, ``Tibetan Student Protests Reach
Beijing,'' Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students
protested on October 22 at the Central University for Minorities in
Beijing); ``Language Protests Spread to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 22
October 10 (``some 400'' Tibetan students protested on October 22 at
the National Minorities University in Beijing); ``20 Tibetan Students
Detained, Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,'' Phayul, 25
October 10 (``thousands'' of students reportedly protested on Sunday,
October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the
report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in
Guide (Trika) county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai
province).
\121\ ``Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of
Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu
qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian],
Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November
10). ``The Qinghai Education Department and [Director] Wang Yubo openly
restricted the freedom of study, use, and development of ethnic
minority languages in schools, which totally violates the Constitution,
the [REAL], . . . the Education Law, and the Law for the State's
Commonly Used Language.'' See also PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
[Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84,
effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01.
\122\ CECC Staff Analysis. Official reports acknowledged the
protests but did not allege planning or organization. Participation of
large numbers of students across a wide area in the protests without
planning or organization would depend on widespread student
predisposition to join protests. Such predisposition would depend on a
significant level of dissatisfaction.
\123\ CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the relative consistency of
government and Party policy on Tibetan education as well as on the
relative consistency of the Tibetan people's wish to maintain their
language and culture, teachers' and students' views in Qinghai province
are likely to be similar to such views in the Tibet Autonomous Region
and Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.
\124\ In Qinghai province, Tibetan-language primary and middle
schools are located in five Tibetan autonomous prefectures (Haibei
(Tsojang), Hainan (Tsolho), Huangnan (Malho), Guoluo (Golog), and Yushu
(Yulshul)), and in one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture (Haixi
(Tsonub)).
\125\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Teachers Write
Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After
Detentions,'' 26 October 10. According to the article, the training
took place in Tongren (Rebgong), the capital of Huangnan (Malho)
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
\126\ See Jia Xiaoyun, ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education
Leader Explains `Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for
Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng
jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ``Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he
fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October
10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).
\127\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Teachers Write
Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After
Detentions,'' 26 October 10.
\128\ Ibid.
\129\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19
October 10 (the six schools in Tongren were the First Nationalities
Middle School, the Tongren County Yifu Nationalities Middle School, the
Tongren District Residential School, the Tongren Modern Medicine
College, the Huangnan National Teacher Training Institute, and the
Huangnan Nationalities Middle School); Free Tibet Campaign, ``Students
Protest for Language Rights,'' 22 October 10.
\130\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19
October 10.
\131\ Ibid.
\132\ Free Tibet Campaign, ``Students Protest for Language
Rights,'' 22 October 10. The article provided a translation of the
apparently Chinese-language text message: ``Yesterday, the Ministry of
Education decided that, Tibetan language centered education system
should be canceled [in] all the schools in Tibetan areas. The Tibetan
language above primary school is set as an optional subject. Tibetan
students are protesting for their mother-tongue in the Tibetan areas in
Qinghai and others. For the sake of saving the Tibetan mother-tongue,
please pass the message to each other.''
\133\ Zhi Zhenpu, ``Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei:
Make `Bi-lingual' Education a Livelihood Project'' [Qinghai sheng wei
shuji qiang wei: ba ``shuang yu'' jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng],
People's Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.
\134\ ``Tibet Student Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 20
October 10 (October 20 protests included ``more than 2,000'' middle
school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP; a total of about 6,000
secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, ``Tibetan Student Protests Reach
Beijing,'' Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students
protested at Beijing's Central University for Minorities); ``Language
Protests Spread to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (``some
400'' Tibetan students protested at the Beijing National Minorities
University); ``20 Tibetan Students Detained, Protests Over Language
Continue in Tibet,'' Phayul, 25 October 10 (``thousands'' of students
reportedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza
(Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the report also mentions student
protest in the days prior to the report in Guide (Trika) county, Hainan
TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province); ``Opinions on Mid-
and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language
in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong
changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in
Open Source Center, 7 November 10) (``demonstrations staged by the
primary and secondary schools of the four autonomous prefectures of
Huangnan, Hainan, Guoluo, and Haibei since 19 October'').
\135\ ``NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education
Reform,'' Xinhua, 22 October 10.
\136\ ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains
`Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and
Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu
``Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao
(2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open
Source Center, 6 November 10).
\137\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo
minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
and effective 28 February 01.
\138\ ``Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of
Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu
qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian],
Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November
10). The letter raised issues including: ``[Director Wang Yubo of the
Qinghai Province Department of Education] bypassed the setting up of
the Chinese language course and also altered the meaning of `the right
to receive education in their own ethnic minority language' proposed in
the Outline for National Education Plan''; ``The Qinghai Education
Department and Wang Yubo openly restricted the freedom of study, use,
and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, which totally
violates the Constitution, the [REAL], the Education Law, and the Law
for the State's Commonly Used Language''; ``[Furthermore, since the
[REAL] is still in effect in the PRC, the change in use of language in
the schools practicing regional autonomy made by an administrative
department without authorization constitutes a deliberate challenge and
infringement of the state's basic laws and a serious contempt for the
authority of state laws''; and, ``Unless the National People's Congress
[NPC] adopts any amendment to the [REAL], an administrative department,
which is actually a provincial level administrative organ, has no right
whatsoever to go beyond the principles of the basic law and make a
decision in violation of the law.''
\139\ Ibid. The letter states that the authors ``submitted'' it to
national-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Communist Party,
legislative, government, and consultative entities including the
following: Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD),
National People's Congress Religious Committee, State Ethnic Affairs
Commission, Ministry of Education, Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Ethnic Affairs Committee, Qinghai
Communist Party Standing Committee, Qinghai People's Congress, Qinghai
People's Government, Qinghai CPPCC, Qinghai UFWD, Qinghai Religious
Affairs Department, and Party committees, people's governments,
people's congresses, CPPCCs, and education departments in each of
Qinghai's six autonomous prefectures.
\140\ Ibid. The letter stated, ``Under the current situation and
conditions, a government functional department, without approval of a
higher level state organ, has gone so far as to make a decision and
reform in violation of the Constitution and law. We would like to
appeal.''
\141\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo
minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
and effective 28 February 01, art. 20: ``If a resolution, decision,
order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit
the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous
agency of the area may report for the approval of that higher level
state agency to either implement it with certain alterations or cease
implementing it altogether. That higher level state agency must give
its decision within sixty days of receiving the report.'' For
information on implementation of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,
see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09,
25-28; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for
2007, 10 October 07, 187-91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, Section III--
Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights--Special Focus for 2005:
China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law, 11 October 05, 13-23.
\142\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai],
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8
November 10). The article listed Qinghai province institutional
participants: ``Education Department, Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Commission, Civil Affairs Department, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
Department, Poverty Eradication Bureau, Cultural Federation, Academy of
Social Sciences, Science Association, Red Cross, and Qinghai University
for Nationalities.'' For information on a similar conference on October
23, 2010, see ``The Party and the Government Will Never Force Any
Student To Abandon Their Mother Tongue'' [Dang he zhengfu juebu hui
qiangpo renhe xuesheng fangqi muyu], Qinghai News Agency, 25 October 10
(translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).
\143\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai],
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8
November 10). According to Gao, ``The realm of language learning is to
be able to speak the common language of one's home location, to be able
to speak the national language in public places, and to be able to
speak an international language on international occasions.''
\144\ Ibid.
\145\ Xue Jun, ``Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and
Videoconference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers
Important Speech'' [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi
dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai Daily, 28
October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10).
\146\ Ibid.
\147\ Ibid. The videoconference was convened by the Qinghai
Communist Party Committee and included ``leading cadres throughout the
province.''
\148\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). The report
emphasizes adherence to policy as the basis for success: ``In face of
constant disruptions and sabotages by the Dalai clique, all kinds of
frequent natural disasters, retrenchment of the macroeconomic
environment, and other challenges, under the leadership of the party
Central Committee and the State Council, the people of various ethnic
groups across the autonomous region have united as strongly as a
fortress, overcome difficulties, and accumulated valuable experience in
expanding demand, promoting growth, creating welfare for the masses,
and maintaining stability.''
\149\ Hu Yongqi and Dachiog, ``Tibet's Achievements Celebrated,''
China Daily, 28 March 11. According to the report, the Tibet Autonomous
Region increased an average of 12.4 percent per year from 2005 to 2010.
\150\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). ``The farmers and
herdsmen'[s] per capita net income has remained at a two-digit increase
for eight consecutive years and topped 4,000 yuan in 2010, to stand at
4,138.7 yuan, up by 99.2 percent over 2005. The city and town
residents' per capita disposable income has reached 14,980 yuan, an
increase of 78.1 percent over 2005.''
\151\ Zhao Yinan, ``Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,''
China Daily, 18 November 10. ``From 2001 to 2010, the central
government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US$46.7 billion) to
the Tibet autonomous region, . . . . Of every 100 yuan the Tibet
regional government spends, 90 yuan comes from the central
government.''
\152\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 9. ``Mineral resources,
waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and
other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole
people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland,
unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collectives in
accordance with the law.''
\153\ ``Tibet Autonomous Region Reserves Most Chromium and Cuprum
in China,'' China Tibet Information Center, reprinted in China Tibet
Online, 6 December 10.
\154\ Ibid.; Zhao Yinan, ``Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic
Challenges,'' China Daily, 18 November 10 (``[from] 2001 to 2010, the
central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US$46.7
billion) to the Tibet autonomous region'').
\155\ Reports did not provide information about the type of mining.
``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing
Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda he
jubu], Voice of Tibet, 11 February 11, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February
11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and
detention on December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-
mining Protests in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11.
\156\ ``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for
Opposing Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda
he jubu], Voice of Tibet, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 (protests
and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on
December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests
in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.
\157\ ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free Asia, 30
September 10 (the mountain's name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba); ``Tibetan
Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10 (the mountain
is ``a traditional site of worship and offerings'').
\158\ ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free Asia, 30
September 10.
\159\ Ibid. According to the report, workers claimed ``their permit
to mine in the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary
of the TAR.'' The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR
Party official may have signified agreement.
\160\ ``Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7
October 10. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more
information on the cases.
\161\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10 (``100 Tibetans from the
village had camped outside the government headquarters waiting for a
response from the authorities to their plea.''); ``Police Fire on Mine
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10.
\162\ ``Police Fire on Mine Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26
August 10 (``gold mining operations by the Chinese-owned Kartin Company
had led to an overcrowded population, severely degraded the fertility
of their farmland, and adversely affected the local grassland
habitat'').
\163\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10 (``[three] Tibetans have been
killed and 30 others severely wounded''); Phurbu Thinley, ``China Says
Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,'' Phayul, 1
September 10 (``Subsequent reports by overseas Tibetan news services
said at least four Tibetans were killed, . . .'').
\164\ ``Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With Police,''
Xinhua, 30 August 10, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.
\165\ ``Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 5
August 11.
\166\ Ibid. The Radio Free Asia report named three persons (the
``village officials'') detained on July 2, nine persons detained on
July 6 and 7, one person detained on July 14, and two persons (the
alleged protest ``ringleaders'') detained ``around July 20.''
\167\ Ibid.
\168\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). ``Around 1.43
million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000 households whose housing
conditions were comparatively bad have moved into safe and affordable
homes.''
\169\ Laba Cier and Gama Douji, ``Secretary Zhang Qingli of the
Tibet Autonomous Regional CPC Committee Says That It Is Necessary To
Adhere to the Scientific Development Concept and Maintain a Leapfrog
Development'' [Xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang qingli: jianchi kexue
fazhan guan baochi kuayueshi fazhan], Xinhua, 6 January 11 (translated
in Open Source Center, 9 January 11).
\170\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25
January 10).
\171\ ``Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers,
Herdsmen,'' Xinhua, 10 January 11. ``[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has
a rural population of 2.21 million, of whom more than 235,000 are aged
60 or over.'' (The January 2011 report likely refers to a 2010
statistic.)
\172\ Based on official Chinese media reports, the government has
settled or resettled into new housing 1.43 million ``farmers and
herdsmen'' among the Tibet Autonomous Region's 2.21 million rural
population. Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11) (``Around 1.43
million farmers and herdsmen . . . moved into safe and affordable
homes.''); ``Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers,
Herdsmen,'' Xinhua, 10 January 11 (``[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has
a rural population of 2.21 million.''). For information on the
compulsory nature of the program, see Human Rights Watch, `` `No One
Has the Liberty To Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in
Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' 11 June 07.
\173\ For more information on the network of railways the Chinese
government plans to build on the Tibetan plateau, see CECC, Special
Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 46-53; CECC, 2009 Annual
Report, 10 October 10, 285-86. For information on the completion of the
Qinghai-Tibet railway in July 2006 and passenger traffic during the
first year of operation, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06,
166-68; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203-4.
\174\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); ``Lhasa-Xigaze
Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16 February 11.
\175\ ``Tibet's New Railway To Open in 2014,'' China Daily, 2
September 11.
\176\ ``Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16
February 11.
\177\ ``Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,'' Xinhua, 29 April
09.
\178\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); ``Lhasa-Xigaze
Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16 February 11.
\179\ CECC Staff Analysis. The decision on whether to route the
railway along the northern or southern bank of the river has economic
and security implications. Most of the forestry and mineral resources,
as well as most of the population, are on the north side of the river,
but a section of the China-India border that China disputes is on the
south side of the river.
\180\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). For more
information on the Sichuan-Tibet railway between Chengdu city and
Lhasa, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09,
49-53.
\181\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11. (China Daily reported in August
2008 that the line would be constructed. Xin Dingding, ``Qinghai-Tibet
Railway To Get Six New Lines,'' China Daily, 17 August 08.)
\182\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11.
\183\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang],
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11. According
to the report, Luo Yulin, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai government,
``hopes that work will start on the Golmud to Chengdu line during the
period of the 12th Five-Year Plan.''
\184\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese Authorities
Rename and Rebuild Quake-Struck Tibetan Area; Tibetans Excluded From
Planning,'' 25 January 11; ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County
Into Tourist City,'' Xinhua, 18 January 11.
\185\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang],
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11.
\186\ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, 2003), Table 10-4. According to the table: Of Yushu
TAP's 262,661 total population, 255,167 were Tibetan; of the TAR's
2,616,329 total population, 2,427,168 were Tibetan; of Guoluo TAP's
137,940 total population, 126,395 were Tibetan.
\187\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Reconstruction of
Earthquake-Hit Area Excludes Tibetan Participation, Ignores Local
Concerns: One Year on From Earthquake,'' 15 April 11. According to the
report, on April 1 to 3, 2011, several hundred Tibetan protesters in
the damaged city displayed banners with messages such as, ``Fairly and
legitimately resolve this issue,'' ``Our land belongs to us,'' ``Help
for the Yushu disaster area should put ordinary people's benefits
first,'' and ``Reasonably plan the land of our lives.''
\188\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,''
Xinhua, 18 January 11 (renamed and designated a ``city''); Zhou Zhou
and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network
To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng
guantong xizang xinjang zhanlue tielu wang], Xinhua, 6 March 11,
reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11 (railway ``will pass through
Jiegu [Kyegudo] town in Yushu prefecture.'').
\189\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,''
Xinhua, 18 January 11.
\190\ Emily T. Yeh, ``Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in
Western China: `Converting Pastures to Grasslands,' '' Nomadic Peoples,
Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005), 23. According to the paper: ``Officially the
largest nature reserve in China (at 31.8 million ha), it was
established in 2000 to protect the sources of the Yangtze, Yellow and
Lancangjiang (Mekong) Rivers. As such, the reserve covers most of
Golog, Yushu and Haixi prefectures, which constitute about 44 percent
of the total land area of the province.''
\191\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,''
Xinhua, 18 January 11. Luo Huining, Chairman of the Qinghai People's
Government, announced the change.
\192\ Ibid. According to the Chairman of the Qinghai People's
Government, ``We will strive to build [Kyegudo] into a commerce and
logistics center and a tourist city featuring ethnic traditional
Tibetan culture and ecological preservation.''
\193\ ``China Plans 32 Billion Yuan on Qinghai Quake
Reconstruction,'' Xinhua, 13 June 10. ``The money would mainly came
[sic] from the central budget, supplemented by funds from the Qinghai
government, donations and corporate funding, according to a circular
published on the government's website.''
\194\ Cao Deshung, ``Tibet Rail Construction Completed,'' China
Daily, 15 October 05.
\195\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang],
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11.
\196\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,''
Xinhua, 18 January 11. ``The entire town of [Kyegudo], the seat of
Yushu prefectural government, was flattened, leaving more than 100,000
residents homeless.''
\197\ ``Tibetans Protest Over Land,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 June 10.
``Some properties claimed by the authorities suffered no damage in the
April earthquake, . . . . [His] family . . . complained that the `local
government selected the best sites for the construction of government
offices, schools, and public parks.' ''
\198\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``The Kyegu Earthquake: Six
Months On,'' 18 October 10 (``main concern of Tibetans is over losing
their land and being moved into the government-built permanent housing,
which will be in apartment or townhouse-type complexes''); ``Tensions
Rise in Quake Town,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 June 10 (``the government has
allocated 80 square meters (860 square feet) of living space per
household . . . the people to be displaced are also unhappy with the
location . . . . It's definitely much farther away than the place we
were in before the earthquake struck.'').
\199\ ``Tibetans Protest Land Grab,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 April 11.
According to an RFA source, Tibetan property owners had been ``assured
of compensation, but so far they have not been compensated
appropriately.''
\200\ Ibid.
\201\ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal
length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the
actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment
is not available.
\202\ In addition to the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed
or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were
detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database recorded as of September 1, 2011, an additional 651
Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March
10, 2008, who are known or presumed to have been released, or who
reportedly escaped or died.
\203\ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal
length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the
actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment
is not available.
\204\ Ibid.