    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    112th Congress }                            Printed for the use of the

     1st Session   }     Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

    ======================================================================
    	         PROSPECTS FOR UNFREEZING
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    	             IN TRANSNISTRIA

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                         JUNE 14, 2011

                        Briefing of the
              Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Washington: 2018

              Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europ
                      234 Ford House Office Building
                          Washington, DC 20515
                              202-225-1901
                          csce@mail.house.gov
                          http://www.csce.gov
                           @HelsinkiComm

                     Legislative Branch Commissioners

                  HOUSE				SENATE
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 	BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
     Chairman				 Co-Chairman
    Joseph R. PITTS, Pennsylvania	        SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
    ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama             TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    PHIL GINGREY, Georgia			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas		RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    ALAN GRAYSON, Florida			SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 	        KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
     NEW YORK
    MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee

                   Executive Branch Commissioners

                        MICHAEL H. POSNER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                       MICHAEL C. CAMUNEZ,DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                      ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                                     [II]

    ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security
    and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
    Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33
    European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,
    1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security
    and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has
    expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the
    Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
        The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings
    of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
    addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various
    locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,
    Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
        Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the
    fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,
    and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is
    primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and
    resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The
    Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in
    Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The
    website of the OSCE is: .

    ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
    the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
    monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
    OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
        The Commission consists of nine members from the United States
    Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member
    each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions
    of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two
    years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
    Commissioners in their work.
        In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
    relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening
    hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the
    Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities
    of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.
        The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
    U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff
    participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the
    Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government
    officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
    private individuals from participating States. The website of the
    Commission is: .

                                     [III]

                            PROSPECTS FOR UNFREEZING

                            MOLDOVA'S FROZEN CONFLICT

                                 IN TRANSNISTRIA

                                  June 4, 2011

                                                                      Page

                                  COMMISSIONER

        Hon. Phil Gingrey, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe                                                  5

                                  PARTICIPANTS

        Mark Milosch, Chief of Staff, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe                                                   1

        Winsome Packer, Policy Advisor on Political-Military Issues,
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe                        2

        Kyle Parker, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation
    in Europe                                                               20

                                   WITNESSES

        Igor Munteanu, Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Moldova  2
        Vlad Spanu, President, Moldova Foundation                            5
        Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation                  8
        Lyndon K. Allin, 2008-2009 IREX Policy Specialist, U.S. Embassy in
         Chisinau                                                           11

                                   APPENDICES

        Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith                     27
        Prepared statement of Hon. Phil Gingrey                             29
        Prepared statement of Amb. Igor Munteanu                            30
        Prepared statement of Vlad Spanu                                    34
        Prepared statement of Lyndon K. Allin                               39

                            MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

        Prepared statement of Matthew Rojansky, Deputy Director, Russia and
    Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace             49

                                        [IV]

                              PROSPECTS FOR UNFREEZING
                              MOLDOVA'S FROZEN CONFLICT
                                   IN TRANSNISTRIA

                                       ----------

                                      JUNE 4, 2011

        The briefing was held at 10 a.m. in room 2203, Rayburn House Office
    Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Phil Gingrey, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe, moderating.
        Commission staff present: Mark Milosch, Chief of Staff, Commission
    on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Winsome Packer, Policy
    Advisor on Political-Military Issues, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe.
        Panelists present: Igor Munteanu, Ambassador to the United States,
    Republic of Moldova; Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown
    Foundation; Vlad Spanu, President, Moldova Foundation; and Lyndon K.
    Allin, 2008-2009 IREX Policy Specialist, U.S. Embassy in Chisinau.
        Mr. Milosch. Good morning. My name is Mark Milosch. I'm the staff
    director at the Helsinki Commission. And on behalf of Chairman Smith,
    I'd like to welcome Ambassador Munteanu, our other panelists and
    everyone joining us today, including those joining us on video.
        This morning, we will examine the human cost of Moldova's frozen
    conflict with its breakaway region of Transnistria and the prospects
    for resolving this 20-year-old conflict. We say it's a frozen conflict
    because it was settled not by a peace agreement, but simply by agreeing
    to freeze each side's positions.
        In Moldova, this happened immediately after the dissolution of the
    Soviet Union, in 1992, when armed conflict between Moldova and Russian-
    backed separatist forces was frozen by mutual consent. The Moldovan
    Government had no reasonable alternative. Yet, it can hardly give away
    its territory. In the ensuing 18 years, almost nothing has been
    resolved.
        The Moldovan Government has not managed to reassert control over
    Transnistria, nor has Transnistria won recognition, even from Russia,
    as an independent state. As is generally the case in frozen conflicts,
    we're also dealing with grave human rights and humanitarian concerns.
    Let me quote briefly from the 2010 country reports on human rights
    practices for Moldova.
        Quote: ``In Transnistria, authorities restricted the ability of
    residents to freely change their government and interfered with the
    ability of Moldovan citizens living in Transnistria to vote in Moldovan
    elections. Torture, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions were
    regularly reported. Transnistrian authorities continued to harass
    independent media and opposition lawmakers, restrict freedom of
    association, movement and religion, and to discriminate against
    Romanian speakers.''
        Today, we'll examine two general questions. First, given the
    frozenness of the situation, how can we address the human rights and
    humanitarian concerns in Transnistria? Second, and more optimistically,
    can the conflict be unfrozen? What should our policy be to promote the
    reintegration of Transnistria into Moldovan Government? We are
    fortunate to have an impressive panel of experts, and I will now turn
    the microphone over to Winsome Packer, staff advisor at the commission.
        Ms. Packer. Thank you, Mark. I also would like to welcome our
    panelists and I'd like to also acknowledge my colleague, Kyle Parker,
    who has worked with me to put this briefing together. The panelists'
    full bios are available outside the hearing so I won't read them. We
    will hear first from Ambassador Munteanu, Moldova's representative to
    the United States, who also has a distinguished academic and think tank
    career.
        Ambassador Munteanu will be followed by Mr. Vladimir Socor, a
    senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and former analyst with Radio
    Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Next, we will hear from Mr. Vlad Spanu,
    president of the Moldova Foundation and former senior diplomat of
    Moldova. And then we will hear from Mr. Lyndon Allin, a corporate
    lawyer and policy expert who has done extensive work on Transnistria.
        We also have a written statement from Matthew Rojansky, deputy
    director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment
    for International Peace, which will be included in the briefing record.
    Following the presentation of the panelists, we'll accommodate
    questions from the audience at the microphone at the far right of the
    podium. Thanks. Ambassador?
        Amb. Munteanu. Yes, good morning, everyone. It's a privilege for me
    to be here and speak in front of such a distinguished audience. Allow
    me to state from the outset that the origins of this conflict--
    Transnistrian conflict, which is called frozen--were not ethnic, not
    racial, nor religious.
        With its mixed population of religion, the region is not a state or
    a nation, being artificially separated from the Moldova proper
    following the military conflict in 1992. The trigger for secession was
    opposition, by 1991, 1992, of the Soviets to understand and acknowledge
    the independent statehood of Moldova. And that was the major objective
    pursued by the largest share of the population of Moldova.
        Military hostilities started in March, 1992, and lasted until July
    21, 1992, when a ceasefire agreement was signed by the presidents of
    Russia and the Republic of Moldova introducing peacekeepers in the
    region with the aim to stop military hostilities and disengage hostile
    sites.
        An OSCE mission has been established in Moldova after 1993 but it
    has been obstructed to perform its main tasks under constant
    objections, including from the separatist regime, as regards their
    requests to do military inspections, alleged arms production or
    accumulation of military illegal forces in the so-called
    demilitarization zone.
        Unconstrained by international law, the separatist regime in
    Transnistria turned into a safe haven for criminal activities,
    smuggling and constant violations of the human rights, which, performed
    systematically, imposed a totalitarian control over the population of
    the region, business and mass media. Movement of the population is
    hindered by multiple checkpoints.
        People are put in jails and tortured physically or morally if they
    show dissent towards the official propaganda endorsed by the so-called
    Tiraspol authorities. Of special target are people which oppose the
    regime, like the villages of the left bank, which remained loyal to the
    Moldovan statehood and Moldovan jurisdiction after the conflict--the
    military conflict--ended.
        And the second were the Moldovan schools, whose teachers are
    harassed, whose parents are intimidated and whose licensing is
    suspended by the regime. Just to mention that in spite of the OSCE
    mission actions, situation of the Moldovan schools remains unclear
    until today, and that was the main reason why the European Union
    introduced a visa ban for the leaders of the separatist regimes after
    2004, after the shutdown of some of these schools.
        Of special concern for us in Moldova is the situation of the
    political prisoners arrested by the local KGB, which is an instrument
    of power for the administration in Tiraspol. In 2002, the European
    human rights court found Russia guilty of actions or inactions that led
    to the arrest of Ilascu group and imposed penalties to be paid, calling
    Tiraspol to release people that were jailed for 12 years.
        In 2010, Ernest Vardanyan, a journalist from Moldova, was arrested
    under accusation of espionage for Moldova. He was jailed for more than
    one year. Other cases of illegal arrests used by the authorities of
    this region to claim, afterwards, payments for the liberations have
    been reported almost weekly by the watchdogs of the region.
        In that same year of 2010, another Moldovan citizen, Ilya Kazak,
    was arrested by the region's KGB and sentenced for 15 years of prison
    under accusation, again, of spying for Moldova. In April, 2011,
    Vardanyan was released, but several other people still remain in jail
    for alleged accusations, which, in some cases, seem to be an ordinary
    attempt to extort money from their families. And this is documented by
    Amnesty International, by Helsinki Group, by Promolex, local watchdogs.
        We want this situation to be changed, and by creating all necessary
    conditions to reintegrate the region of Transnistria into the Moldovan
    State within its internationally recognized borders as of January 1st,
    1990. We call the settlement of the Transnistrian completely
    exclusively by peaceful means through a transparent negotiations
    process in the framework of the existing five-plus-two format.
        Today, we have a favorable international situation defined by an
    increased attention to a viable settlement from Moldova's major
    partners: European Union, United States, Russia, Ukraine. As well,
    we've noticed a gradual intensification of political consultations in
    OSCE. In 2010, there were five unofficial meetings in the five-plus-two
    format; in 2011, there have been two meetings--first in February and
    second in April--testing the ground for official launch of talks,
    although the visions remain quite far distant.
        We hope that the meeting scheduled for June 21st in Moscow will
    mark the resumption of the official five-plus-two format of
    negotiations with all five actors aiming to restore trust and respect
    international law. Once the official negotiations are relaunched, we
    will be able to see a clearer perspective in the settlement process and
    move towards identification of the status of the Transnistrian region.
        Moldova's position is well-known. Transnistria should be an
    integral part of the Moldovan Republic or the Republic of Moldova.
    Within its sovereign constitutional space, it is supposed to enjoy a
    large degree of administrative, financial and political autonomy.
    Respect of democratic norms, values and practices should prevail, while
    national legislation should be applied in full throughout the territory
    of the country.
        Resumption of negotiations shall not be done for the sake of
    resumption but on clear ideas related to the full and comprehensive
    settlement of this conflict, appropriate to consolidate a viable,
    democratic, independent and sovereign state of Moldova. We see this as
    a matter of exclusive internal power-sharing mechanisms and the
    emergence of territorial autonomy in Transnistria, similar to the
    Gagauz autonomy, which has been established in 1994, in December, in
    Moldova.
        It is by default that a special statehood will provide fundamental
    civil and political rights to the population without any discrimination
    and the basis of the international and the European conventions. In
    fact, National Parliament of Moldova has adopted already, in 2005, a
    law on the principles of the conflict settlement in line with the
    international and European rules protecting the rights of local and
    regional governments.
        And we want this sovereign law to be respected in full and
    acknowledged by the mediating parties. It is my pleasure to commend, in
    the same regard, the findings and conclusions of the Senate Committee
    on Foreign Relations report distributed on February 8th, 2011, under
    the name ``Will Russia End Eastern Europe's Last Frozen Conflict?''
        Wrapping up my references to the basic principles of the
    Transnistrian conflict settlement, I would like to quote Vice President
    Joe Biden, who put them in a very eloquent way during his March visit
    to Chisinau. He said, ``the only solution that can be accepted is the
    solution which would ensure the respect of sovereignty and territorial
    integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its borders recognized by
    the international community. The future of Transnistria is within the
    Republic of Moldova.''
        Dear colleagues, today, Moldova is a democratic state, which is
    proudly advancing towards an (accession?) agreement with the European
    Union. It has ratified and is effectively implementing the European
    Convention on Human Rights. It is signatory of the most important
    international and the European human rights conventions. As a member of
    the Council of Europe, it is regularly monitored by specialized
    committees, which constantly assess the progress towards the rule of
    law.
        Following the installation EUBAM in 2006--the border-monitoring
    mission of the European Union--over 620 Transnistrian firms were
    registered by Moldovan law, which allowed them, now, to use their
    access to the European common market with no taxes paid for their
    exports. Population of the region receives all social benefits from the
    national social budget. Hundreds of fellowships are provided free of
    charge to the region's youth annually.
        Over 350,000 of its half-a-million population holds Moldovan
    citizenship, and many of them are actively using their rights and
    freedoms protected by the Moldovan constitution and support the
    reintegration process of the region against the obstructions made by
    the separatist regime. Nevertheless, conservation of the Russian troops
    and ammunitions and the territory of the Republic of Moldova is a
    flagrant violation of our constitution, a violation of international
    obligations and a challenge to the legitimated authorities of the
    national government.
        The political solution to the conflict should be consistent with
    the strategic vector of the European Union integration for Moldova. A
    responsible though more active participation of the United States and
    the European Union in the conflict settlement is, of course, crucial,
    as it brings the impetus and the resources necessary in reaching the
    positive result of this process.
        Why should the Western community be interested in solving the
    problem, and how this conflict can affect the West? The region is
    simply 60 miles away from the border of NATO and the European Union.
    Therefore, this conflict is directly affecting the European Union
    security areas. And we are talking here about 60 miles--something
    comparable to the distance from here, where we are now, to
    Fredericksburg, Virginia--one-hour drive.
        So the danger generated by the existence of a region of instability
    at the immediate proximity of the Euro-Atlantic community is obvious
    and it is also obvious that the price of solving the conflict is far
    lower than the price of instability and the risks of escalation. A
    civilian mission under international mandate would be of great value to
    the viable conflict settlement by taking stock of the ammunitions and
    troops concentrated in the security zone between the two banks of the
    Nistru River.
        Today, there is not enough information about the heavy deployment
    of military equipment and arsenals. At the same time, efforts to change
    the existing so-called peacekeeping forces with the international
    mission under the mandate of international organizations should be
    intensified. Constant violations of the human rights must be stopped
    and innocent people ought to be released from the jails of the regime.
        Moldovan authorities call international organizations to intensify
    their watching and monitoring activities on the region's situation and
    intensify collective efforts to stop the existing abuses, ensuring
    basic rights to be protected in a region that is not covered by
    international law today.
        We call towards all states and actors that are involved in the
    five-plus-two format of negotiations to abstain from any sort of
    actions that directly or indirectly obstruct restoration of the
    Moldovan sovereignty over the region, focus attention to the 3D
    commandments that are indispensable for a fair settlement:
    democratization, demilitarization and decriminalization of the region.
    I think I will stop here to pass the floor to the next speakers and to
    leave more room for discussion during the session of questions and
    answers. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Gingrey. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony.
    We'll now hear from Vlad Spanu, president of the Moldova Foundation, a
    former senior diplomat of Moldova. And I'll turn it over to Mr. Spanu.
        Mr. Spanu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to express
    gratitude to the U.S. Helsinki Commission members and staff for
    including in its agenda this important topic today. And a special
    thanks to Winsome Packer, Kyle Parker and Mark Milosch, who made this
    briefing today and other briefings and hearings for Moldova, in the
    past, possible.
        I express this gratitude on behalf of those who suffer the most
    because of this externally imposed conflict--that is, the residents of
    the towns and villages east of the Nistru River in Moldova. Although
    they constitute the majority, those people are not represented at the
    negotiation tables.
        Their voice is not heard, not only in Moscow, Brussels, Vienna or
    Washington, but even in their own capital, Chisinau. They are not on
    the front pages. They are not interviewed by public or private TV
    stations in the Republic of Moldova, or elsewhere to say their painful
    story of living in ghetto-type settings where residents have no rights.
        What is happening today in the eastern part of Moldova is nothing
    else than a continuation of the Soviet Union geopolitical policies now,
    after 1991, embraced by the Russian Federation. To understand better
    the conflict, one should look back in history. There are several events
    that have to be remembered when tackling the Transnistrian conflict.
        First, the 1792 Treaty of Jassy, signed between the Ottoman Empire
    and the Russian Empire, after which Russia, for the first time, reached
    the Nistru border and became the neighbor of the principality of
    Moldova.
        Second is the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest between the same two
    actors--resulted in the partition of the principality of Moldova, the
    eastern half of which was incorporated into Russia as Bessarabia until
    1917 Bolshevik revolution.
        Third, the creation, in 1924, within the Soviet Ukraine, of the
    Moldovan autonomous Soviet republic on the eastern bank of Nistru,
    where the majority of population constituted ethnic Romanians, as
    bridge- head to once again successfully occupy Bessarabia in 1940 by
    the Red Army as an outcome of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939.
        Finally, in 1990 and 1991, the same territory east of Nistru, with
    its main city, Tiraspol, was once again used by the Kremlin's
    masterminds as an outpost to keep the Republic of Moldova--back then
    Soviet Moldavia--from getting away from the USSR control, and today,
    from Russia's control.
        Today, Russia's minimum objective in Moldova is to create a second
    Kaliningrad in the south to keep the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in
    check. Its maximum objective is to get full control of the Republic of
    Moldova through federalization schemes imposed on Moldova where
    Transnistria is to play the main role of holding veto power on the
    future of Moldova, its internal and external policies.
        As a bonus, by reaching these objectives, Russia will be able to
    encircle Ukraine, closing its only large window to the West, thus
    keeping Ukraine into its orbit. Focusing entirely on fruitless official
    negotiations to solve the conflict between Russia and Moldova is a big
    mistake. During 19 years of bilateral negotiation and multilateral
    negotiations, no result was achieved in ending the conflict.
        Russian troops are still stationed in Moldova and Russia's support
    for separatist movement continues while local residents of this region
    suffer. These residents, who are nothing less than geopolitical
    hostages, are not allowed to have access to basic freedoms, including
    freedom of expression, of education in their native language and of
    assembly, among others.
        Education in the Romanian language is viewed by those in charge of
    this separatist regime as their main threat. This is why, as soon as
    the legislative body in Chisinau, still within the Soviet Union back in
    1989 adopted the language law that established the return of the Roman
    script to the republic's official language, the Soviet authorities in
    Moscow triggered the separatist movement in Transnistria. The alphabet
    issue became central to the secessionist movement and it developed into
    a school war against educational institutions that opted for Latin
    characters.
        As a result of discrimination policies in the field of education,
    the majority of the population in Transnistria, Romanian ethnics, has
    only 88 schools that are authorized to teach in the native language,
    but only eight are permitted to use the Latin alphabet. The several
    Romanian language schools made headlines in international media when,
    in July, 2004, the Tiraspol militia seized the orphanage school in
    Tighina, and schools in Tiraspol, Ribnita and Corjova were closed.
        The closing down for good of these schools was prevented only
    thanks to the international pressure. These days, the situation in the
    eight schools is worsening. Last week, on June 9th, in an open letter
    to the Moldovan Parliament and to Prime Minister Vlad Filat, Eleonora
    Cercavschi, chairwoman of the Lumina Association that represents
    teachers from Transnistria, asked for help.
        She accuses Moldovan authorities of designing discriminatory policy
    against
    Romanian-language schools that use the Latin alphabet. Cercavschi
    argues that these students are put in tougher competition when applying
    to Moldovan universities than those schools controlled by Tiraspol.
    Those, along with the Tiraspol regime's persecution and discrimination
    against pupils, their parents and teachers, are the major cause why
    these five high schools and three middle schools lose students.
        An example: If, in 1989, the total number of students in five high
    schools was about 6,000, in 2011, this number was only about 2,000,
    three times less. The other 80
    Romanian-language schools in the breakaway region continue to use the
    Russian, Slavonic alphabet in teaching of their language, dubbed
    ``Moldovan,'' as it was imposed by the Soviet regime on all schools in
    Bessarabia in 1940.
        More than that, today, these schools continue to use an outdated
    curriculum and use textbooks from the Soviet period. If the
    Russification of the Republic of Moldova largely stopped in 1991, when
    Moldova gained independence, it still flourishes in the Transnistrian
    region. Suffer mostly the Romanian-speaking population, but the
    Russification policy also affects other minorities, such as Ukrainians,
    Bulgarians, Jews and Gagauz.
        This 21st-century soft genocide, called by the OSCE ``linguistic
    cleansing,'' mainly against the Romanian ethnic population, resulted in
    sharp reduction of Romanian Moldovans, from 40 percent in 1989 to 31.9
    percent in 2004, while Russian ethnics increased their presence in
    Transnistria from 24 percent in 1989 to 30.4 percent in 2004.
        Schools are not the only target of the regime in Tiraspol. Free
    media cannot penetrate on the east bank of Nistru because of radio and
    TV jamming and prohibition of printed media. Local journalists are
    arrested and intimidated. The arrest, in 2010, of Ernest Vardanyan, an
    Armenian-born journalist, citizen of Moldova and a resident of
    Tiraspol, is the most notorious example of the KGB-style intimidation
    of free press.
        He was accused by intelligence services of Transnistria, which are,
    in fact, the local office of the Russian FSB, of spying for Moldova.
    That is, he was accused for spying for his own country in his own
    country. In March, 2010, the Transnistrian intelligence services
    kidnapped Ilya Kazak, an employee of the Moldovan fiscal inspectorate
    in Tighina. He was kidnapped in the town of Varnita, controlled by the
    Chisinau central authorities.
        Kazak was accused, also, of espionage. His parents have been on
    hunger strikes numerous times for weeks, protesting outside the Russian
    embassy in Chisinau, hoping, through their actions, to secure the
    release of their son, but in vain. Last Sunday, June 12th, Kazak's
    mother approached U.S. Senator John McCain, who was visiting Moldova,
    and pleaded for help. What else a mother can do for her son?
        The private property is another target of the separatist regime.
    From time to time, local farmers are prevented to cultivate their land
    or bring home crops from their own fields. Small business owners can
    also see their property confiscated through different schemes,
    including intimidation, arrest or worse, killing.
        Why are these violations of basic freedoms allowed to continue to
    happen in the 21st century? Who is responsible for it? The right and
    obvious answer is the masterminds behind the separatist movement
    strategy in Moldova's eastern region. Somehow, identical elements of
    this strategy can also be seen in another ex-Soviet republic, Georgia,
    with two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that launched
    a war against the central government in Tbilisi in 1991-1992, the same
    time when the war against the central government of Moldova happened.
        In all these cases, Russia played the major factor in triggering
    the conflict and then supporting the separatist puppet governments. As
    in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Moldova's Transnistria,
    leaders of the separatist regime are Russian citizens and reportedly on
    payroll of the Russian intelligence services and military. Blaming only
    Russia for the existence of Transnistria is just part of the story.
    There are other actors who benefit from the status quo, mainly in Kiev
    and in Chisinau.
        Smuggling of arms and good, human trafficking and others are also
    associated with Transnistria, dubbed the ``black hole of Europe.'' But
    the main responsibility has to be put on shoulders of the political
    leadership in Chisinau. After all, most residents of Transnistria are
    Moldovan citizens, although Moscow and Kiev rush in giving passports in
    expedite mode to everyone who asks, in order to later claim the need
    for protection of their citizens and, eventually, claiming the
    territory east of the Nistru River. Russia's actions in Moldova are as
    many and as reckless, as allowed by both the Moldovan government and by
    international community.
        Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Spanu, if you don't mind trying to finish up in
    the next 15 seconds or so, we have other panelists, but continue.
        Mr. Spanu. OK. Moldova's Western partners--United States and the
    European Union, as well as other mediators like OSCE--should put more
    pressure on Moldova, but also offer support when it comes to provide
    basic services for residents in Transnistria.
        When a Moldovan citizen from Transnistria comes to law enforcement
    in Chisinau to ask for help, they usually are told that Transnistria
    has no--that they don't have jurisdiction over Transnistria, which is
    wrong because the person who orders arrests, beatings and torture is
    the president of the self-named Transnistrian region but those who
    execute are those in prosecution office and militia and so forth. And
    in all of the cases or most of the cases they are a citizen of Moldova,
    they need to be prosecuted and asked to respond for their unlawful
    actions.
        Mr. Gingrey. We'll go ahead and stop there with your oral
    presentation, and your written remarks will be part of the permanent
    record. And now we'll hear from our next panelist, Vladimir Socor.
    Vladimir is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and a former
    analyst with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Mr. Socor?
        Mr. Socor. Thank you. I have been asked to review the background of
    the Transnistria conflict and to provide an accounting of the current
    state of play. It is frequently observed that the conflict in
    Transnistria is comparatively easier to resolve than the conflicts over
    territories of Georgia or Azerbaijan because this particular conflict
    has neither an ethnic, nor a religious component. Therefore, the
    solution seems to be more reachable.
        Why, then, has the solution not been reached during the past 20
    years? It is, of course, because of the role of Russia. The conflict in
    Transnistria has been entered into the international diplomatic lexicon
    as a conflict between two parts of Moldova. This is the greatest
    success of Russian diplomacy in the last 20 years, in terms of
    approaching this conflict.
        We are in the presence of an interstate conflict between Russia and
    Moldova. There is no inner conflict between two parts of Moldova. The
    conflict originated in the overt Russian military intervention of 1991-
    1992, when units of the Russian 14th army stationed in Transnistria
    occupied, in a piecemeal fashion, one-by-one in a low-level conflict
    operation, the seats of Moldovan authorities on the left bank of the
    Nistru River.
        And in March, 1992, elements of the Russian 14th army crossed over
    onto the right bank of the Nistru River and established a large
    beachhead in the city of Bendery and around it. It was a clear case of
    foreign military intervention. It culminated with the shelling of the
    right bank of the Nistru River by the 14th army in 1992, resulting in a
    ceasefire agreement signed by the Russian Federation and the Republic
    of Moldova.
        This was a ceasefire agreement between the Russian Federation and
    the Republic of Moldova, not between two parts of Moldova. The
    agreement was signed and ratified by then-President Boris Yeltsin and
    Mircea Snegur of Moldova. Transnistria was not a party to the conflict.
    Russian diplomacy subsequently introduced the fiction that Transnistria
    is a party to the conflict while Russia is a mediator, and this fiction
    is being accepted to the present day.
        It will be very difficult to remove this approach from the five-
    plus-two negotiations, which are about to restart in Moscow on June 21.
    This frame of reference is officially accepted by international
    diplomacy. It will be very difficult to change it, and it is the main
    reason why the conflict remains unresolved--because it's misinterpreted
    as a civil conflict, which it is not.
        Since 1992, Russian troops are stationed in the Transnistria region
    of Moldova in the role of peacekeepers. This peacekeeping operation
    lacks any international legitimacy. It is a purely bilateral
    arrangement imposed by Russia on a weak and incompetent Moldova back in
    1992, which has never changed. This arrangement is part of Russia's
    wider policy of obtaining international acceptance of Russia's role as
    a peacekeeper in the so-called former Soviet space.
        Moldova, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, at one time Tajikistan, possibly
    at the present time Kyrgyzstan are examples of Russia's attempts to
    establish a peacekeeping monopoly on the former Soviet-ruled
    territories. The international community has never granted acceptance
    to Russia for this role but it has tolerated it in practice without any
    official acceptance.
        A peacekeeping monopoly is one ingredient to rebuilding a sphere of
    influence, and this is what is happening, also, in Transnistria.
    Transnistria, as I mentioned earlier--and this is generally
    acknowledged--is not an ethnic conflict or an inter-ethnic conflict;
    however, it does have an unmistakable Russian dimension. Transnistria
    is a Russian-ruled territory.
        Most of its officialdom are people born in Russia, part of the
    Russian hierarchy or chain of command, who are assigned to jobs or to
    administrative positions in Transnistria. It is an operation, so to
    speak, of holding the fort for Russia, pending a more active resurgence
    of Russia in Europe. Most of Transnistria's leaders are born in Russia
    and seconded to Russia on this mission.
        Transnistria state security ministry is a branch of Russia's
    intelligence services. Its leader, from 1992 to the present day,
    General Vladimir Antyufeyev, used to be a commander of the Russian
    special police in Riga, Latvia, and moved from there--he is from
    Russia--he moved from Riga, Latvia, to Transnistria in 1992 under a
    covert identity, which he soon thereafter revealed.
        Negotiations to resolve the Transnistria conflict began almost as
    soon after the ceasefire agreement of 1992. The negotiations went
    through a lot of stages, and there is a lot of negotiating acquis and a
    lot of negotiating of documents that was generated by this negotiating
    process. And I'm going to skip most of these stages, but I want to
    explain the background to the current negotiations, which are about to
    resume in Moscow on June 21, after a five-year breakdown.
        Negotiations were strictly a Russia-Moldova bilateral matter from
    1992 until 1997. In 1997, Russia lent a semblance of internationalizing
    the negotiating format by co-opting the OSCE and Ukraine. The OSCE is
    the only international organization in charge of handling this
    conflict. The OSCE mission in Moldova, active since 1993, has, as the
    main part of its mandate since 1993, resolution of the Transnistria
    conflict.
        The OSCE is very poorly equipped for this job because Russia has an
    internal veto power in the OSCE. Putting the OSCE in charge, either of
    negotiations or of a possible replacement peacekeeping operation, would
    be the worst solution. It would provide a semblance of
    internationalization without the reality of internationalization due to
    Russia's veto power within the OSCE. The OSCE cannot speak, much less
    act, without prior consent by Russia in the internal deliberations of
    this organization.
        In 2005, when Russian influence was at a low ebb in Europe and in
    Eastern Europe and U.S. influence at an all-time high--in 2005--it was
    possible to internationalize in a genuine way the negotiating format.
    That was the origin of the five-plus-two format, which was joined in
    2005 by the United States and the European Union in the capacity of
    observers. So the format consists of Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, United
    States, European Union, Chisinau and Tiraspol. This is the five-plus-
    two format established in 2005.
        This format has had a life of five months, from October, 2005,
    until March, 2006. At that point, Russia and Tiraspol dropped out of
    the negotiations in response to a decision by the European Union to
    establish a border control mission on the eastern border of Moldova,
    EUBAM--the European Union Border Assistance Mission. In response to
    that, Russia and Tiraspol dropped out of the negotiations and blocked
    the negotiations until now--the official negotiations. Informal
    contacts were continued.
        So this is the process that is about to restart in Moscow on June
    21. What has led to the initiative to restore the negotiations--the
    official negotiations? Primarily, a German initiative--the initiative
    agreed at the top level by Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian
    President Dmitry Medvedev in June, 2009, in a document known as the
    Meseberg Memorandum, signed in the Meseberg Castle near Berlin.
        It is an ideological tenet of German foreign policy to include
    Russia, in one way or another, in the decisionmaking processes of the
    European Union, and potentially down the road, in the decisionmaking
    processes of NATO, as well. The German chancellor's office has thought
    of a possible way of achieving this goal, and that would be for Russia
    to prove to the European Union that it can be a constructing partner in
    settling one European Security issue--Transnistria--because this is
    regarded, of the reasons already mentioned, as easier to solve,
    compared to other conflicts.
        So Russia is asked, by Berlin, to be constructive in resolving the
    Transnistria issue, in return for which, under the Meseberg Memorandum,
    which is published, Russia and the European Union would establish a
    joint committee on European security affairs for joint decisionmaking
    on European security issues--a way for Russia to gain access to EU
    decisionmaking processes. Russia's entrance ticket to this mechanism
    would be a constructive attitude on settling the Transnistria issue--a
    low price to pay, in my view, but these are the terms under which
    negotiations are resuming. There are a number of pitfalls----
        Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Socor, if I could ask you to conclude within the
    next minute, your remarks, thank you.
        Mr. Socor. OK, thank you. There are a couple of potential pitfalls
    in the negotiations that are about to resume on June 21 in Moscow. The
    first would be a starting document that would establish the principles
    of the new negotiating process that would contain ambiguities regarding
    the Transnistrian status in a reintegrated Republic of Moldova.
        That might open the way for Transnistria to exercise decisionmaking
    powers in Chisinau's internal governance, not just local autonomy for
    Transnistria but a role for Transnistria in the decisionmaking
    processes of the central Moldovan government. This is in the form of
    some sort of federalization.
        This is one pitfall and the other pitfall would be pressure on
    Moldova to give up its law of 2005 about the basic principles of
    settlement of the Transnistria conflict. Those principles include
    democratization in Transnistria as part of the process of conflict
    settlement, going hand in hand with the process of conflict settlement
    and the political resolutions that would follow the withdrawal of
    Russian troops from Transnistria--following the withdrawal of Russian
    troops--and the internationalization of that peacekeeping operation.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Gingrey. Thank you very much. And our final panelist, and I
    would ask him, respectfully, to keep it between five and seven minutes
    with your oral presentation, Lyndon Allin, a corporate attorney and
    policy expert, has done extensive work on Transnistria. Mr. Allin?
        Mr. Allin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
    Commission for convening this meeting and for inviting me to talk today
    about economic interactions within and around Transnistria. I'm really
    happy that we're gathered and convened under such an optimistic idea of
    looking for a breakthrough in the conflict-resolution process.
        I want to emphasize, first, that my remarks are offered in a
    personal capacity and I'm not going to try to provide a detailed legal
    or economic analysis of any of the issues that I discuss. What I'm
    going to try to do is highlight the economic circumstances that are
    going to have to be addressed if we hope to move towards settling the
    Transnistrian conflict.
        Those issues are, principally, Russian economic assistance and
    Transnistrian and foreign business interests in the region. I'm also
    going to talk a little bit about the potential upside if the conflict
    can be, ultimately, resolved, resulting from reintegration of a number
    of regional networks, which are currently fractured by the conflict. So
    I'm not going to talk about other issues. Those have been quite well-
    handled by my colleagues. I'm not going to use the F-word--
    federalization. I'm going to just stick to economic issues.
        So first, economic assistance from Russia. Russia subsidizes
    Transnistria's budgetary operations in two ways. First, Russia provides
    publicly declared subsidies of $25 million a year, roughly, to assist
    the Transnistrian Government in supplementing local pension payments.
    This assistance fosters a sense, among the Transnistrian public, of
    being part of Russia.
        In fact, it undermines Russia's official position on Moldova's
    territorial integrity, which is that Transnistria is a part of Moldova,
    and it means that residents of Transnistria are going to be concerned
    about who might provide them with such aid in the event of a conflict
    settlement. One of my interlocutors in Transnistria once said to me
    that the conflict boils down to the question of who pays for us.
        So to a certain extent, there are going to be some welfare issues
    that have to be taken care of down the road. Russia also allows
    Transnistrian authorities to cover budgetary shortfalls using money
    that they collect locally for gas payments. Gazprom does not demand
    payment from Transnistria directly. And I'll deal with that a little
    bit later, also.
        Transnistria's economy, according to some local experts, would be
    sustainable only for two to three months if these forms of Russian
    assistance were cut off. So who are Transnistrian economic actors? I
    will focus on the most important one of those, which is Sheriff, which
    monopolizes trade in the region, including food, gasoline, wholesale
    and retail.
        They have some production assets. They also run the local
    television network and the only local Internet and fixed-line and
    mobile telephone service. So they're a monopoly provider of a number of
    services to Transnistrian residents. Sheriff's business model depends
    on relationships with Transnistrian officials and on market distortions
    created by the conflict.
        For example, their supermarkets can get away with selling expired
    and counterfeit goods because consumers don't have a lot of options.
    Some of the assets owned by Sheriff and other economic actors in the
    region were acquired in the Transnistrian privatization program. This
    was another way that the government filled its economic shortfalls in
    recent years.
        Those privatizations are not valid under Moldovan or international
    law; nevertheless, in the past, the Moldovan Government in Chisinau has
    acknowledged the need to reach an agreement on property rights of
    existing owners in the event of a final settlement. So that's going to
    be a very important issue down the road.
        This is also going to be an issue for the foreign property owners,
    principally Russian and Ukrainian, in the region. The two most valuable
    industrial assets in the region are foreign-owned. The first of those
    is MMZ, a modern and competitive steel mill that's located in Ribnita.
    It's the largest enterprise anywhere in Moldova and, in the past, has
    been the country's largest exporter.
        Interestingly, the interests of local elites in Transnistria and
    foreign investors are not always aligned and MMZ's Russian and Ukraine
    owners have had some disputes with the Transnistrian authorities in the
    past, and that may come to the fore again in the future. The factory
    purchases scrap metal from right-bank Moldova, which is an example of
    how interaction with Transnistria can be profitable to Moldovan elites.
        The second large industrial asset that's owned by Russian interests
    is the power station at Kuchurgan, which was designed to supply
    Moldova, as well as large parts of Ukraine and the Balkans, with
    electricity. It's owned by an affiliate of Russian electricity provider
    RAO UES. Both of these industrial plants run exclusively on Russian
    natural gas and their ability to pay discounted rates on this gas is
    important to their profitability. Nevertheless, they would likely be
    profitable under market conditions, as well.
        The region also has other viable production assets and
    Transnistrian exporters are able to take advantage of Moldova's trade
    preferences with the European Union. Overall, it's estimated that 35
    percent of Transnistrian exports go to the European Union. So the
    upside potential from resolution of this conflict would be the ability
    to knit back together some of these networks that have been broken up
    by Transnistria. It's a shame we don't have a map.
        Transnistria runs along most of Moldova's eastern border and,
    basically, it breaks up a lot of transit routes that run eastward
    toward Ukraine and Russia supply and infrastructure networks within and
    around Moldova were designed to operate in the context of regional
    integration.
        Instead, they're fractured and operate inefficiently as a result of
    this conflict. Enterprising and corrupt actors have created workarounds
    to evade or cooperate with the multiple sets of officials and borders
    in the region and, over time, these workarounds have hardened into
    self-perpetuating economic ties, which are going to be very hard to
    dislodge.
        Among the systems that are fractured are the telephone system--it's
    not integrated between the two banks of the Nistru, which results in
    higher costs for callers on both sides; power generation and
    distribution, which suffers from non-transparent and politically
    motivated pricing and corrupt transfer pricing schemes; transit routes
    and railways, which are periodically blocked off and held hostage to
    the political situation; natural gas, which is a special case.
        Gazprom has a single contract with Moldova, which has enabled the
    Transnistrian portion of Moldova to run up debts of over $2 billion
    over the last 20 years and to argue that the internationally recognized
    Moldovan authorities must pay them. Also, Transnistria has its own
    currency system and central bank, which will be a big challenge for
    reintegration.
        So because of all these fractured networks, I would say that the
    region's full economic potential is also held hostage to this conflict.
    So what conclusions can we draw? There are going to be a lot of
    economic challenges to reaching and implementing a stable, durable
    settlement. First among those is going to be treatment of the gas debt.
        Additional ones will be guarantees or some kind of arrangement for
    current holders of Transnistrian assets, dealing with Transnistrian
    public concern about the loss of Russian-funded social assistance.
    Here, we have an unfortunate example of the triumph of fear over hope
    among the Transnistrian population. They know what they have and they
    are afraid of change.
        We are going to have to deal with corrupt regional elites who want
    to maintain personally profitable arrangements. There are a lot of
    potential benefits, I would argue, to people on all side and parties on
    all side. First, Russia could benefit if it no longer has to serve as
    Transnistria's economic lifeline. Russia's Gazprom could benefit from
    greater payment discipline.
        Ukraine could benefit from better transit routes westward and less
    corruption on its western border. And the benefits to the entire
    population of Moldova, including Transnistria--more efficient markets,
    better work opportunities, et cetera--I think are obvious. Because of
    the setting of this briefing, I'd like to make some recommendations
    about what U.S. policymakers can do.
        First, the U.S. needs to give Moldovan products permanent normal
    trade relations treatment and terminate the applicability of the
    Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Moldova. Moldova should also be considered
    for a visa-waiver program. This would help make right-bank Moldova
    economically more attractive to Transnistrians.
        Second, the U.S. should promote regional cooperation on
    anticorruption enforcement, to include Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian
    authorities, particularly as this issue has been a signature for
    Russian President Medvedev. This could be perhaps a part of an OSCE-
    administered resource center on economic development, which is proposed
    in my colleague, Matt Rojansky's, written remarks, which I encourage
    you to check out.
        Hopefully, these remarks have made clear that the involvement of
    and difficult decisions from all sides will be required to resolve this
    conflict. Therefore, my final recommendation to the U.S. is that we
    should encourage our partners in Europe, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova to
    devote the necessary political will to pursuing a durable,
    comprehensive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Thank you.
        Mr. Gingrey. I want to thank all of our panelists for an excellent
    briefing on the situation and prospects for unfreezing Moldova's frozen
    conflict in Transnistria. Let me start off by asking a couple of
    questions and then I'll refer to the other staff members on the dais,
    including our staff director, who will follow me. And then we'll open
    it up for questions from any of you, and the mic here to your left and
    my right is where you'll come to present your questions.
        And this really is for any of the panelists: What measures may be
    taken to effectively hold the Tiraspol regime accountable for its human
    rights violations? Were the recent trials by the Transnistrian
    authorities of Kazak--am I saying that correctly--and Ernest Vardanyan
    conducted fairly? What do you think motivated the Transnistrian
    leadership to try these men and sentence them to such long periods of
    imprisonment? Mr. Ambassador?
        Amb. Munteanu. Well, at this point, I don't see how the
    Transnistrian leaders can be motivated, personally, to respond to the
    claims from the human rights organizations or from the political
    institutions because they are not responsible to the population inside
    and they are not responsible to the international law. It is not
    applied in this region.
        I think, however, that through OSCE and through the members of the
    negotiation format five-plus-two, to conduct a very comprehensive
    report on the situation of human rights and to have a common view on
    how to prevent violations of human rights in the region would be seen
    as an improvement in the situation of so many people which are still
    detained in Transnistria.
        The second: Of course, in order to advance on this complicated
    issue of protecting human rights, there are some elements of
    democratization that need to be implemented in the region. And
    democratization means guarantees for free press, free movement of
    people, a kind of oversight of the security forces, which impede this
    process of the democratization and liberalization of the legal space.
    These kind of steps would generate a positive response from the
    population of the region, which is, unfortunately, hostage to this
    current situation.
        Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Anyone else want to comment
    on that? Yes, go ahead, Mr. Spanu.
        Mr. Spanu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In those 15 seconds, I couldn't
    answer because that was exactly what I was going to cover. I was trying
    to jump from one place to another. But in responding to that question,
    I think, besides what the ambassador mentioned--the international
    pressure--it's necessary to hold accountable those people who commit
    these unlawful arrests of Mr. Vardanyan and Kazak, their detention, and
    who set the system that is not based on the law.
        There are two main people--and the speakers here talked, today,
    about them: Smirnov, who is the President of Transnistria, put by
    Russia in since 1991, and Antyufeyev, who runs the intelligence
    services. Those lawyers and the human rights groups who examine all
    these cases, including Vardanyan's and Kazak's and many, many others--
    they see a pattern. They see orders from this Smirnov and Antyufeyev
    and there are executors down the line who do these concrete actions.
        And as I tried to mention, those executors--some of them are
    Moldovan citizens. So they need to be filed cases against them by the
    Moldovan law enforcement and prosecutorial offices because these people
    freely travel to Chisinau--to Moldova--or Ukraine or to other places.
    They commit these crimes but they are not held accountable. So if they
    will know that they will stay, one day, in court for their actions,
    they will think twice about executing orders from Smirnov or
    Antyufeyev.
        Mr. Gingrey. Thank you very much. I want to ask one last question
    and then we'll quickly go to others for their questions. And I'll
    direct this question to Mr. Socor, who I went out of turn just a minute
    ago--but do you think that the current status quo is satisfactory to
    Moscow? And if so, what needs to change for Russia to be willing to
    negotiate seriously on Transnistria's status? What are the prospects
    for it to recognize Transnistria as an independent state?
        Mr. Socor. Russia has never pursued the goal of effecting
    Transnistria's final separation from Moldova. To the contrary, Russia
    wants Transnistria to remain, on paper, a part of Moldova in order to
    share political power with the central government in Chisinau and to
    act as an insurmountable obstacle to Moldova's Euro-Atlantic
    integration. This has been Russia's goal since 1992 and remains
    Russia's goal.
        Russia has a minimal and a maximal objective in Moldova. The
    minimal objective has been named by my colleague, Vlad Spanu:
    consolidating a Kaliningrad-type exclave on the border of the threshold
    to the Balkan Peninsula and on the southwestern border of Ukraine,
    forming a strategic chain of Russian military outposts, together with
    the Crimea. This is the minimal goal.
        The maximal goal is to integrate Transnistria's political
    leadership with that in Chisinau by awarding Transnistria de facto veto
    or blocking power on the political decisions of the central government
    in Chisinau. And that was the main goal of the so-called federalization
    project of 2002-2004, which Russia and Berlin now seem on the verge of
    reviving.
        Mr. Gingrey. Well, thank you very much. And now, we'll turn to the
    staff director, Mark Milosch, for any questions that he might have.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you very much, Congressman Gingrey. Thus far,
    we've been talking mostly about politics and security issues, which is
    entirely natural. I'd like to switch gears if we could for a moment and
    ask a question about human rights.
        And I'm wondering specifically, is there any prospect for putting
    human rights on the agenda at the five-plus-two talks? I can see
    naturally that Mr. Smirnoff or the Russians would presumably not be
    very eager for this. But it seems to me there are ways that this could
    be done by the OSCE or the EU and the U.S. that might be difficult to
    resist. I'm thinking particularly of trafficking.
        When trafficking is out there on the table, it's something that the
    governments have a hard time walking away from. The Russian government
    has many people in it who've actually been quite helpful on the issue
    and if Russia wants it on the table, I think it will be on the table.
        And that could be an issue perhaps in which Transnistria and
    Chisinau could work well, build bridges. There might be something
    there. So I'd like your thoughts on that.
        Secondly, in the Trafficking in Persons Report on Moldova, we have
    very little reporting on Transnistria probably because we don't have a
    lot of diplomatic coverage there. But if any of you have heard anything
    about the trafficking situation or have any perhaps man or woman in the
    street report on that, I would really appreciate hearing it.
        Thanks. I guess we'll start with Ambassador Munteanu.
        Amb. Munteanu. To my knowledge, the issue of the human rights
    situation was never put on the agenda of talks in the five-plus-two
    format, with the exceptional cases when some people were arrested and
    the people were citizens of Moldova, of course the Moldovan side
    attempted to use the negotiation format in order to create a getaway
    for those who were in jail.
        It is not a pressing issue probably for Russians which want to see
    the negotiation of the special status for Transnistria if they would
    not get more. And of course we want to relaunch negotiations in this
    five-plus-two in order to settle some existential problems for the
    populations of this region--movement checkpoints which prohibit free
    movement of the population, even the organization of elections in this
    region.
        I just wanted to mention the fact that holding local elections in
    this region, and we have eight villages on the left bank of the
    Dniester under Moldovan jurisdiction--effective jurisdiction--and we
    have--constantly we are blocked, constantly by militia of Transnistria
    which tried to steal the ballots from the electoral precincts. They
    tried to threaten the people that participate in elections. They tried
    to impose blocking posts for those who want to cross the lines.
        And generally speaking about the human rights situation, population
    of the region feel not only--how to say--constant pressures. They feel
    hard security threats because the demarcation lines which have to be by
    definition free of military equipment and military forces they are full
    with Transnistrian armory and munitions and hardware equipment
    particularly because of the Russian peacekeepers do not fulfill their
    mandatory role. And this is one important issue.
        Speaking about the trafficking situation, we know there are several
    networks of trafficking which have been recently annihilated by the
    Moldovan prosecution and specialized forces. They have their roots and
    origins in the region. But how we can intervene into this situation,
    how the prosecution can act into this region because it is over-
    militarized, it is protected by the Russian peacekeepers and our
    prosecution forces cannot act there.
        And on a different note, if there will be in Chisinau in order to
    investigate some cases, the Transnistrians will say that, look,
    Moldovans they are staging a new war. So this situation is much more
    complex and more complicated than it could be seen from outside. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Socor. May I contribute an answer to that question? Introducing
    the issue of democracy and human rights into the negotiations would be
    a great innovation and as in all diplomatic processes it would take a
    long time to implement because it would almost revolutionize the
    existing routine five-plus-two negotiating process. So formally
    introducing this issue would be very difficult.
        However, on the one hand, Moldova's law of 2005 on the principles
    of settling the Transnistria conflict stipulates that a settlement can
    only go hand-in-hand with democratization in Transnistria because
    otherwise a settlement negotiated with the incumbent leadership in
    Transnistria would consolidate the role of this Russian-installed
    dictatorship.
        So a settlement cannot be concluded with this type of leadership.
    That's on the one hand. On the other hand, Moscow is aware of
    objections to the current leadership in Transnistria on democratic
    grounds.
        Therefore, Russia is about to change the regime in Transnistria and
    so, so to speak, we won't have Smirnov and Antyufeyev to kick around
    anymore pretty soon because the Kremlin administration chief Sergey
    Naryshkin and the Russian security council secretary Nikolai Patrushev
    recently in May summoned Smirnov to Moscow and asked him to depart from
    office.
        One month later, Konstantin Kosachyov, chairman of the Duma's
    international affairs committee, attended a meeting of the Supreme
    Soviet in Tiraspol, making clear that Smirnov and Antyufeyev have to
    go. So we will have a new leadership also installed by Russia in
    Transnistria but with less of a monstrous face than Smirnov's face.
        Russia's candidate to succeed Smirnov--Russia's declared candidate
    to be the new leader of Transnistria in Tiraspol is a character named
    Anatoly Kaminski, who is an ethnic Ukrainian, a native of Bashkiria,
    who was assigned in Soviet times to a job in Moldova in right bank
    Moldova, not in left bank Moldova.
        This is another example of these sort of individuals with no ties
    whatsoever to Moldova or to Transnistria who are being assigned to hold
    the fort for Russia in Transnistria. We'll have to be prepared for a
    regime change in Transnistria orchestrated directly from Moscow and
    changing the person of the leaders--Smirnov to Kaminski--and changing
    the name of Transnistria Supreme Soviet into Transnistrian Parliament.
    And this will pass for some kind of political reform.
        Mr. Gingrey. I think Mr. Spanu wanted to comment as well.
        Mr. Spanu. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think including in the
    five-plus-two form of human rights is not only good but it's a must for
    the settlement to be reached. And first of all, Moldovan Government
    needs to push this forward as well as OSCE, European Union and the
    United States. Ukraine must be interested because Ukrainian citizens
    are deprived of their rights. So it is--Russia would not be willing
    to--and Transnistria of course not--but at the negotiation tables
    everyone comes with its item on the agenda. So it must be pushed by all
    the parties.
         Regarding trafficking in persons, we forget one simple thing. This
    person travel outside of the country through the airports and airports
    are in Chisinau and in Kiev and in Odessa. So you need to have land
    borders controlled as well as airport border control and to prevent
    this trafficking and then go and persecute these people.
        Till now, most of the human rights cases like arrest of the mayor
    of Corjova which is under the--within the unification control
    commission which is set by Russia Ukraine Moldova jurisdiction, but
    these people are not efficient in terms of solving a concrete problem,
    that arrest of mayor of Corjova. Therefore other mechanisms need to be
    put in place, as I said, internally in Moldova as well, as it was
    suggested, in the five-plus-two format to raise the importance of the
    human rights violations. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you.
        Mr. Gingrey. Any other questions from staff? Yes?
        Ms. Packer. My first question is to Mr. Socor. The five-plus-two
    talks are supposed to resume on June 21st in Moscow, and can you
    elaborate on what you think the German non-paper recently circulated,
    how that might impact the outcome of these negotiations?
        The second question is to Mr. Allin. While your recommendations for
    addressing the conflict are commendable, and extending PNTR and
    retraction of Jackson-Vanik and addressing corruption are all
    commendable, I think that speaking of allowing Moldova in to the visa
    waiver program is premature.
        As you all acknowledged, a central government does not effectively
    administer its borders or extend its control over its territory, which
    are prerequisites for any country entering this program. So what I
    wanted to ask you is whether you think that extending economic
    sanctions or travel restrictions might affect the players in the
    monopolies in Transnistria and the parties outside of Moldova.
        Mr. Socor. Thank you for the question. The situation with the
    German non-paper is a very strange one. The European Union is a
    participant in the five-plus-two talks. It should have a position--a
    starting position in these talks. It does not. Instead, one member
    country of the European Union-- Germany--has published its own position
    which does not have the endorsement of the European Union, but neither
    has the European Union rejected the German paper.
        And this very situation reflects the fact that the European Union
    plays a weak hand in its foreign security policies, and on the other
    hand the bilateral German-Russian relationship is emerging to undercut
    any foreign policy that might be commonly agreed by the European Union.
        The German non-paper pursues the goal of facilitating a
    Transnistria settlement, not necessarily on terms consistent with
    Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity but primarily on terms
    consistent with Russian interests so as to facilitate Russia's entry
    into the European Union bilateral mechanisms which I mentioned earlier,
    creating the appearance that Russia is being cooperative on the
    Transnistria settlement.
        So therefore the German non-paper--the starting position in this
    negotiation-- with remember, Germany not being a participant in the
    negotiation, being only a member of the European Union--the starting
    position does not mention withdrawal of Russian troops, opens the way
    for a role by the Transnistrian authorities in the central government
    of Moldova and is being accompanied by the [inaudible] of responsible
    German diplomats trying to persuade their Moldovan counterparts to
    accept, A, some kind of federalization formula and, B, to give up the
    Moldovan law of 2005 on the principles of a Transnistria settlement.
        So we have a convergence of German and Russian views which if
    allowed to prevail on this issue might constitute the basis for a wider
    German-Russian partnership on settling European security affairs,
    circumventing the European Union, circumventing NATO and indirectly
    sidelining a role for the United States. And here I would like to
    complete my answer.
        I'd like in just one sentence to add a recommendation for U.S.
    policy. Since 2007-2008, approximately 2007, more or less--the United
    States has taken a back seat to the European Union in Transnistria-
    Moldova issues, allowing the EU to define the Western negotiating
    position with the United States supporting whatever the EU decides.
    Given the weakness of the EU role, it is time for the United States to
    advance from the back seat and to regain the front seat it once had in
    these negotiations.
        Mr. Gingrey. Did you have another question?
        Mr. Allin. Sure. Thanks for the question. I don't think that
    economic sanctions from the U.S. would have any great impact on any of
    the players in the conflict. You know, the U.S. has from time to time
    been cited as a market for some of the Transnistrian exporters.
        But I don't think it's significant enough to have a real impact,
    not to mention the fact that those companies have an ability to
    reorient their exports eastward if markets in the West are cutoff. I
    think actually that what such sanctions would do is just kind of feed
    the siege mentality that allows the current Transnistrian authorities
    to maintain some legitimacy in the eyes of their population.
        And so I actually don't think that--I think they would probably do
    more harm than good. I would draw your attention to one of the items
    that I cited in my written remarks, which is the FinCEN alert about a
    number of Transnistrian banks that was put out earlier this year. I
    think that's the kind of measure that the U.S. can take that's useful.
    I would also note that while I don't think it's related, what I mean to
    say is I don't--FinCEN was piggybacking on Russian complaints.
        There were Russian complaints last year about--last summer about a
    Gazprom bank which strangely is not affiliated with Gazprom,
    apparently, but which is owned by a member of Smirnov's family and
    which was alleged by some in Moscow to be performing machinations with
    some of the humanitarian aid funds that Russia sent.
        So again, I would emphasize I think I understand that it seems like
    a very bland recommendation to collaborate on anticorruption. But I
    think that if that's done, that can be done with real teeth; it's
    something the Russian Government has certainly shown a lot of
    rhetorical interest in within its own country.
        Certainly I would think they'd like to protect their taxpayer
    money, you know, during the time that it is still going to
    Transnistria, and that's an area in which I think there may be room for
    some collaboration.
        Mr. Milosch. Yes, thank you, Lyndon. Now, we'll hear from
    Ambassador Munteanu.
        Amb. Munteanu. Thank you very much. I just wanted to add my comment
    to the second part of your question related to the visa waiver. Well,
    you know, it is a matter of truth that Moldova cannot at this point
    control its borders because of what we have discussed so far.
        But nevertheless, this is not an impediment for the European Union
    to work hard with the Moldovan authorities in visa liberalization
    regime. And we are advancing quite with speed towards the visa
    liberalization for Moldovan citizens. And this is really heavy
    incentive for the institutional framework in Moldova and also for the
    citizens of Moldova.
        I think that it should be seen also as an incentive for the
    security sector reform in Moldova, which encompass minister of interior
    reform, border monitoring reform, biometrical passports which are
    introduced since January 1st, 2010.
        And I think you have also if the United States wants to be an
    active promoter of the settlement--conflict settlement--and will be not
    in the back seat but in the front seat of this car, I think visa waiver
    should be seen as incentive that citizens of both banks of the Dniester
    will see a real accomplishment that can be achieved. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you, Ambassador. Before we move to question from
    the audience, I'll invite Kyle Parker to ask the witnesses.
        Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mark. And I have a few questions kind of
    scattered, so pardon me. We're at a briefing and hopefully it's an
    interesting exchange of ideas. It's interesting to me to ask if the
    proximity of a few eastern chairmanships of the OSCE is any reason for
    hope?
        You know, we recently had the Kazakh chairmanship and the
    Lithuanians are quite engaged. We'll skip a year with Ireland and then
    go back to Ukraine. Does this give us any reason for hope? Sort of
    developing that, how relevant is any success on this conflict to the
    other conflicts, the more acute conflicts? They are different
    situations to be sure.
        But I know in terms of trying to get people interested here in
    Washington, one of the issues is the prospect for success, and also
    along those lines, what is an appropriate yardstick of success? I think
    when you're looking towards total solution and resolution it seems,
    right now at least, that there's not a whole lot of reason to think
    that's happening any time soon.
        At the same time, in these conflicts, you do have the dogs that
    don't' bark. And the notion that it simply--I mean, the status quo
    remains is--I hate to call that a success but in a sense it's also not
    a failure given what we've seen in some of the other conflicts.
        Another question I'm wondering you know, Moldova has sort of the
    unfortunate--it has a number of sort of unfortunate distinctions,
    including the poorest country in Europe, more recently the World Health
    Organization largest consumption of alcohol in the world, high rates of
    multiple-drug-resistant TB, and other things.
        And as we look towards the human face, the human cost,
    comprehensive security, how much of these types of indicators can be
    attributed to sort of a wound in the country, or the conflict, or the
    sore? Certainly that is obviously going to have an effect of deterring
    investment and certain things that could perhaps improve standards of
    living.
        And on WTO, I'll just note that Moldova is a very interesting case
    of being an early WTO member, sort of a poster child for a lot of
    interesting reforms, including land reform in the early 1990s and still
    subject to Title IV of the Trade Act--a very interesting paradigm that
    has some relevance as we move towards looking at the possibility of
    terminating Title IV to other countries.
        And last, if you would pardon two last points, one is just a
    question. Recently the Holocaust Memorial Museum was able to work
    something out--and this was thankfully agreed to--Vice President
    Biden's visit on access to Holocaust-era archives in Moldova. This is a
    matter that's been of great interest to this Commission over many
    years.
        And we know that some of the worst atrocities of the Holocaust were
    committed on Moldovan soil, and particularly on the area that is now
    called Transnistrian soil--but that part of the country. I would
    imagine a lot of those sites are un-memorialized and unmarked.
        And I'm wondering is there perhaps an interesting opportunity for
    sort of a new type of confidence- and security -building measure in
    terms of collaboration on both sides on memorializing this important
    history? I say that that's something that would certainly have, I
    think, the interest of some in Washington.
        It comes with interesting political, ideological baggage
    potentially but at the same time it's telling the truth, and I would
    think that that should be something that all sides can get together on
    and look into. It would be interesting to know if that idea might have
    any legs.
        And lastly, Lyndon, to your point on corruption and collaboration
    with Russia, I would just have to say while you do mention sort of
    rhetorical support, certainly by way of actions and the reality on the
    ground in Russia, it certainly doesn't match the rhetoric we've heard
    from some in the senior Russian leadership.
        And in terms of being concerned about taxpayer money as it's going
    to Transnistria, I'm a little skeptical particularly when we have not
    seen a whole lot of concern, to put it charitably, about Russian
    taxpayer money to the tune of almost a half a billion dollars that was
    stolen by Russian tax authorities in the frauds uncovered by Sergey
    Magnitsky that have lately featured prominently in the news, including
    on Russian television.
        NTV just did a 20-minute spot a weekend back on national TV. So I'm
    I guess skeptical, to put it mildly, on where we can go with that in
    terms of moving beyond sort of simple rhetoric on anticorruption and
    also, Vlad, your idea of putting some teeth into this.
        I'm wondering if anyone might comment on the wisdom or the ability
    of using tools like the Interpol red notice to sting some people.
    Moldova does have the ability to do that. It is an Interpol member.
    It's an easy enough thing to do and that is an awful thing to have in
    terms of cramping your style and ability to travel and vacation around
    the world. Sorry for the million questions and----
        Mr. Milosch. Well, as usual, Kyle pitches them high and hard. I
    guess we'll start off with the ambassador.
        Amb. Munteanu. Thank you very much for your questions. It is always
    very good to have a long list of questions because you can pick up what
    exactly you prefer to respond. I will start with the last question
    which is very important--the Holocaust Museum. We have a great respect
    for the efforts put by the Holocaust Museum and restoring the memory.
        And we all know that the Jewish population of Moldova before the
    Second World War was very important, a considerable part of the urban
    population and the restoration of the leagues with their memories,
    their personal attributes, it is very important. We have a constructive
    cooperation with the Holocaust Museum.
        Their leaders have to pay a visit by the end of June to Chisinau.
    We have adopted a delegation to the low which protect the personal data
    and this will allow the Holocaust Museum and their executive staffers
    to work in the archives which have been closed so far. And we
    understand very well that this is not an overnight effort. It will
    require a lot of institutional steps in order to reach the truth, I
    would say.
        But I think that in what concerns and worries Transnistria in this
    equation--Transnistria is a space where hate speech is on the agenda of
    the day, I would say. It is anti-Semitic discourse. It is anti-Moldova
    discourse. It is anti-Western discourse. So when we try to understand
    how the Holocaust Museum will accomplish its mission, of course it is
    open and it can do its work in Chisinau and other cities which are in
    effective jurisdiction of Moldova, not today in Transnistria. They are
    not sensitive to the human rights violations. They are not sensitive to
    the issues that are part of our common memory. And of course as soon as
    we will come closer to a final settlement, we will have a solution
    favorable to the Holocaust Museum.
        But of course, if the United States is interested, it should also
    put the leg in the door and also advance the idea of having an
    important dimension of the human rights and the five-plus-two format of
    negotiations and also the Holocaust Museum. You know, Moldova cannot be
    responsible for the crimes and atrocities committed in the Second World
    War--the Republic of Moldova. It was too young a state. But we
    understand very well how important it is to cooperate with the
    institutions.
        The status of the poorest country in Europe--just to put it
    bluntly, we have been deprived in 1991, 1992 by 40 percent of our
    economic potential which are located in Transnistria. This explains the
    level of deprivations of the population.
        And the consecutive steps that were made in the last two decades to
    transform the ownership of the industry to create the basis for the
    economic growth--it mutated into a strength of the economy. By 1989,
    for instance, Moldova had reached only 45 percent of its 1989 GDP. And
    we try to re-accommodate ourselves in these new international realties.
        Now, we have 55 percent of our goods being exported to the European
    market, which is a significant change in the structure of the economy.
    We are benefiting from the automatic state preferences provided by the
    European Union. And I've mentioned before that a large number of
    Transnistrian enterprises, they can export without paying border
    excises to the European markets--their goods.
        They do not pay taxes to the state budget, which is not totally
    positive, not totally good. But this is an important incentive for the
    business community to develop own agenda in advancing and performing. I
    think that if Moldova will receive the normal trade regime with United
    States, this will also influence positively the way how the business
    community plans their life and their business.
        This will create incentive for change in the minds of the
    Transnistrian population as well. And I think that coming closer to the
    association agreement with the European Union--and we are doing
    everything necessary in order to advance in this way--we will see
    different results and a different Moldova for those who want to be part
    of European--a larger Europe--for those who want to remain loyal
    citizens of Moldovan state and for those who believe that our place in
    the Western community of democracies. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you. I guess we'll move next to Mr. Socor.
        Mr. Socor. I'd like to take up the question about the role of the
    OSCE chairmanships. Although the OSCE as an organization has been a
    complete failure in Moldova and in South Ossetia due to Russia's veto
    power within the organization, nevertheless the chairmanships are
    immune from Russian veto power. They have a far greater leeway for
    action.
        What can we expect from the current Lithuanian chairmanship or from
    the Ukrainian chairmanship in 2013? Lithuania has changed its approach
    to policies towards Eastern Europe in the last two years due to the
    unfavorable trends geopolitically and economically in Europe.
        Lithuania has renounced its former role of a vanguard player in
    terms of extending NATO and EU influence eastwards. For the last two
    years, Lithuania has played a far more cautious role than it used to
    be. And this is reflected in the way in which Lithuania is exercising
    its chairmanship of the OSCE. The official approach of Lithuania is
    that even a millimeter of change would be a great positive success.
        This is the Lithuanian approach. This official statement,
    constantly repeated, of Lithuania's officials, even a millimeter's
    worth of progress will be a great achievement, therefore nothing really
    to expect much. In 2013, Ukraine will be the OSCE chairman. Ukraine has
    never been able to clarify its policy towards a Transnistrian conflict,
    neither under the Kuchma nor under Yushchenko nor under the Yanukovych
    presidency.
        Ukraine does not want to add another contentious issue in its
    bilateral relationship with Russia. At the same time, Ukraine does not
    want to be encircled from the southwest. Ukraine was never able to
    resolve this dilemma. In the interest of the eastern Ukraine oligarchs
    in the bilateral relationship with Russia, usually trump the strategic
    interest of the country itself.
        Let us, however, not underestimate the 2012 Irish chairmanship of
    the OSCE. And I know this firsthand from conversation with people from
    Dublin. Ireland is eager to share its own experience of conflict
    resolution in Northern Ireland. There is a proliferation of outfits in
    Ireland trying to share this experience on the international level and
    even trying to make a consultancy type of business out of this.
        And so therefore for the Irish minister of foreign affairs
    approaching proactively the frozen conflicts in former Soviet
    territories will be a mark of the Irish chairmanship. This chairmanship
    will operate much less free from a Russian veto compared to the
    Kazakhstani chairmanship of one year ago or compared to the Ukrainian
    chairmanship of 2013.
        So I think it will be possible to work with the Irish chairmanship
    of the OSCE constructively and proactively. Again, however, what the
    chairmanship can achieve is not to resolve anything but to put the
    issue on the table and keep it on the table, at least so that the issue
    is not relegated to oblivion. And to answer very briefly one of your
    other questions, what can be a measurable progress in the year ahead or
    in the months ahead or in this calendar year, what could be measurable
    progress.
        Measurable progress would be to pressure Russia to comply with its
    commitments under conventional treaty forces in Europe to withdraw the
    troops from Moldova. The review conference of the CFE treaty is due to
    take place shortly.
        The United States and NATO collectively would be remiss if they
    would not publicly raise the issue of Russia's unfulfilled commitments
    under the CFE treaty, including the withdrawal of troops from Moldova,
    from the occupied territories of Georgia, and also in the CFE treaty,
    much neglected, the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied
    territories of Azerbaijan. So these three issues need to be raised, not
    in the hope of affecting an immediate resolution this year, but to keep
    these in the public--this debate in the public eye.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you, Mr. Socor. I'm going to have to ask the
    next two witnesses to--in order that we will have time for audience
    questions--to be very concise. Thank you.
        Mr. Spanu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would add a few words in
    addition to what Vlad said about OSCE chairmanship and I will focus on
    Ukraine. I think Ukraine's role in its chairmanship role in 2013 has a
    great potential but has a small probability that it will play a great
    role, because among all these players who deal with the Transnistrian
    conflict, Ukraine has a good set of keys to solve the conflict because
    it's on its border, because it's control many, many elements of the
    conflict.
        And if Ukraine fully cooperates and is fully committed for this
    resolution of the conflict, I think we have a chance to move forward.
    But looking back, what happened during the last two or three years
    comparative to what happened in 2004-2005, I think the probability is
    not so large.
        Regarding all your other good ideas, it underlines that all these
    ideas should be put in a strategy or a roadmap, and this strategy and
    roadmap should be initiated first of all by the Moldovans, by the
    Moldovan Government. For the time being, Moldovan Government for 19, 20
    years didn't have any strategy how to deal with the Transnistrian
    conflict.
        And to incorporate into all these ideas from the West, from the
    Moldovan experts in 2004 among the speakers, three of us participated
    in co-authoring the treaty strategy that was mentioned. During the
    Communist Party leadership in Moldova, we were able to convince the
    opposition to the Communists in the West to be engaged in a new
    strategy.
        Today there is none. Why? These are big questions for the current
    Moldovan government. And the second, why in the budget of Moldova of
    this year, of next year, of last year, there is no--put enough money to
    implement programs on confidence building measures, maybe because it's
    not a strategy. Maybe it's their things involved. These two things that
    Moldovans need to do if they are serious about resolution of the
    Transnistrian conflict. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you. Lyndon?
        Mr. Allin. Thanks. The question about corruption, of course I
    understand your skepticism. I just--the point that I would make is that
    there are bilateral gov-gov contacts on these issues. Regulators do
    talk to regulators.
        There's no reason for it not to be raised. Perhaps it's another
    suitable topic for the five-plus-two, you know, as another format where
    it might be raised. I would also mention that there has been Russian
    public outcry, at least in the press and on the Internet, about the
    much larger sums of aid money but really funds probably pre-designated
    for embezzlement that were sent to South Ossetia in the past couple of
    years.
        So there is the potential. I'm just proposing that there's a
    potential to get Russian civil society and, you know, you get somebody
    like [inaudible] to take up this issue and all of a sudden people will
    say, hey yeah why are we sending all this money to that place. And then
    it becomes something that's a little bit harder for the Russian
    government to sweep under the rug. So that's my only point about that.
        Regarding your question about Moldova's unfortunate status as the
    poorest country and apparently hardest drinking country in Europe, I
    think a large part of my written testimony was intended to address
    specifically that question.
        I do believe that the conflict has had a large impact on the
    economic well-being of the country and of its citizens. I would note
    however that it's a poor country where one sees a lot of very nice
    automobiles in the capital city. I saw a Bentley the last time I was in
    Chisinau.
        So the elites, both in Chisinau and Tiraspol, seem to be doing OK,
    which of course is part of the problem with getting some progress on
    conflict resolution.
        Regarding the WHO alcohol consumption study, I confess that my
    first thought when I saw it was to wonder whether the methodology
    somehow involved imports or something that could have--where the
    anomaly could have resulted from somebody gaming customs stickers
    simply because that behavior is so common really on both sides of the
    Dniester. Thanks.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you, Lyndon. Kyle mentioned in his question dogs
    that don't bark. I think he was referring to the famous Sherlock Holmes
    line about the strange thing the dog did in the night. Watson, the dog
    did nothing in the nighttime. That was the strange thing.
        We have a lot of un-barked dogs here I think. In about 12 minutes--
    I don't think we've really mentioned Romania very much, which is a
    striking thing. So I throw that out to you to take up, or maybe you
    have some other dogs that you'd like to pursue here. We have a
    microphone on the right and anybody in the audience who'd like to ask a
    question is welcome to come to the microphone. I guess turn it on right
    now. I see the light. Introduce yourself and ask a question of our
    panelists. Please?
        Questioner. Hi. I'm Richard Sola from Radio Free Europe. My
    question is directed to Ambassador Munteanu primarily. We've spoken
    about Russia quite extensively during this hearing. But I wanted to
    hear from you if you feel that--or you get the sense that the United
    States is raising the issue of Transnistria at a high enough level in
    the so-called reset that the Obama administration has made such a high
    goal of its foreign policy.
         And even just kind of some basic information, how much contact do
    you have between kind of the architects of the reset and your own
    office on this issue--you know, how much is it being discussed with you
    and with the Russians as far as you know, and how do you feel about the
    level?
        Amb. Munteanu. Thank you very much for your excellent question. Of
    course, we feel the arm of support from the United States in many
    areas, in particular to the negotiation format.
        Just not to leave a wrong impression that Moldovan Government is
    doing nothing, I would point out the fact that we have presented by the
    end of April a non-paper on the principles of the conflict settlement,
    and this concept has been circulated towards all the interested
    parties--of course to the United States as well, which commended the
    value and clarity of scope and principles which were proposed by the
    Moldovan Government.
        In addition to that, of course we have made great efforts to
    combine forces and to have a chain of friends behind us in setting up
    the target for this conflict settlement. And I think that this is quite
    an important advantage if we compare with five years ago, when we were
    still under the consequences of the failed Kazakh memorandum.
        Today, our friends in Europe do not question the legitimacy and the
    main principles which we see as major for the conflict settlement--
    indivisibility of the country, sovereignty and unitary state. We feel
    that this hand of support may do more work and the policy of reset
    create special gateways and windows for discussing strategic issues
    with the Russian Federation.
        We mentioned several times the Russian Federation because it did
    not fulfill its commitments from 1999 and from Istanbul Summit
    declaration, and it also failed to commit itself with the reduction of
    arms. And I think that there are many doors to be opened in this
    strategic dialogue with Russians.
        But I truly share the concerns that the human rights violations
    create frustration among the population of the region, which feels
    itself alienated from the political process in Moldova and from the
    benefits that our proximity with the European Union extends to the
    whole society of the Republic of Moldova.
        I remain positive and my colleagues in the Moldovan Government
    remain positive that more things have to be achieved this year in 2011
    irrespective of the name of the chairman of the OSCE and irrespective
    to the bumps in the road which we know there are many. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you, Ambassador. Do we have any more questions?
    Mr. Spenu?
        Mr. Spenu. Yes, I want to add on the reset issue--I hope that the
    reset setting is a good frame for the opportunity to solve the
    Transnistrian conflict at the level of the Russia-U.S. relationship and
    it's not an impediment, not a distraction from this. Thank you.
        Mr. Milosch. Thank you. Any more questions? OK, well I think it
    will be extremely difficult for me to summarize what was said today.
        I did see two themes that the optimism that we've heard recently
    about the push on the part of the EU and the U.S. Government for
    settlement in Transnistria has been challenged today, and yet we've
    heard a lot of comments about the necessity of pushing forward with
    this.
        I would like to thank Winsome Packer for organizing this briefing,
    Josh Shapiro for administratively organizing it. And thanks to all of
    you for coming today. With that, we're adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the briefing was adjourned.]

    A P P E N D I C E S

        Let me first welcome everyone to this morning's briefing to examine
    the human cost of the unresolved conflict in Transnistria, and the
    prospects for a lasting resolution of the longstanding conflict.
    Exactly ten years ago I chaired a Commission hearing--the first of its
    kind specifically focused on Moldova--``Moldova: Are the Russian Troops
    Really Leaving?'' A decade later, a residual contingent of Russian
    troops continues to be deployed in this divided country notwithstanding
    specific commitments Moscow made in 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE Summit.
        For almost twenty years, a corrupt and despotic regime has governed
    Transnistria, with the aid and support of the Russian Government.
    Russia has maintained troops and armaments in Transnistria since 1992,
    against the wishes of the Moldovan Government, and in violation of its
    Helsinki Final Act and other international commitments, regarding the
    stationing of foreign forces on the territory of another state without
    the consent of the host government, and respect for the sovereignty and
    territorial integrity of other states. As a consequence, Moldova's
    central government is unable to extend its administration to
    Transnistria, and there is an absence of democracy, human rights, and
    the rule of law in the region.
        The governing regime in Tiraspol, Transnistria's self-proclaimed
    capital, has overseen a sustained campaign to stifle civil society,
    free media, and any political opposition. Governance in Transnistria is
    characterized by the arbitrary arrest of citizens who differ with the
    ruling regime, and journalists, including Ernest Vardanean, who was
    sentenced to fifteen years in prison-but recently released, under
    pressure from the international community. Tax officer, Ilie Cazac, who
    was arrested with Mr. Vardanean on charges of espionage, remains
    imprisoned. The State Department's 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
    Practices cites numerous instances of such arbitrary arrests, pressure
    on judges, and corruption in the judicial system, where bribes often
    determine the sentences during trials. The courts which issue these
    judgments have no legal standing and are politically-motivated.
        Farmers living on the other side of the Nistru River face
    difficulties in farming their lands on the eastern (Transnistrian)
    side. Transnistrian authorities have expropriated the properties of
    thousands of citizens, without compensation. Moldovans who travel to
    Transnistria face harassment from the authorities. Elections are
    routinely rigged. Romanian language schools in Transnistria are
    regularly harassed by Transnistrian ``authorities'' and Moldovan
    citizens of face serious obstacles in receiving education in their
    national language.
        Outside the authority of the government in Chisinau, an illegal
    smuggling industry thrives in Transnistria, benefitting the ruling
    cadre, their Russian partners, and some Ukrainians. While improved
    since the European Union instituted customs monitors at a section of
    the Ukrainian and Transnistria boundary, customs fraud remains a
    problem. The absence of effective control by the central government
    over the territory of Transnistria contributes to illegal arms
    smuggling with Russia and other illicit transport. While notable
    progress has been made, trafficking in persons remains a significant
    challenge for the government of Moldova against this backdrop.
        The OSCE, the European Union, and the U.S. have worked to effect a
    peaceful resolution of the Transnistria conflict. Moscow, while going
    through the motions when it comes to talks, appears content with the
    status quo effectively contributing prolonged instability and
    insecurity in the affected areas. But renewed interest by the U.S., as
    evidenced by Vice President Biden's March visit this year, and
    intensified efforts by the European Union, have raised the prospect of
    an ultimate resolution of the Transnistria conflict.
        We are fortunate to have an impressive panel of experts, who have
    been engaged with Moldova and the Transnistria frozen conflict for
    decades. We look forward to hearing their views on these critical
    concerns and any recommendations they may offer regarding the
    resolution of the conflict. The panelists' bios are available outside
    the hearing room, so I will not read them. We will hear first, from
    Ambassador Igor Munteanu, Moldova's Representative to the United
    States. Ambassador Munteanu will be followed by Mr. Vladimir Socor, a
    senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, Mr. Vlad Spanu, President of
    the Moldova Foundation, and Mr. Lyndon Allin, a corporate attorney and
    policy expert who has done extensive work focusing on Transnistria. We
    also have a written statement from Mr. Matthew Rojansky, Deputy
    Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment
    for International Peace, which will be included in the briefing record.

        Mr. Speaker, almost twenty years after they started from
    secessionist movements, the protracted conflicts in Moldova, as well as
    those in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia continue to
    be a source of instability and insecurity in the OSCE region. They have
    been of longstanding concern to the Helsinki Commission, where we have
    addressed developments and the prospects for resolutions of these
    conflicts through Commission initiatives as well as at meetings of the
    Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
    in Europe.
        Within a week, the formal five plus two talks among the parties to
    the negotiations on resolving the frozen conflict in Transnistria,
    Moldova--the OSCE, U.S., EU, Russia, Ukraine, plus Moldova and
    Transnistria--will resume in Moscow. The fact that the formal
    negotiations are resuming, five years after they were halted by the
    withdrawal from the talks of the Russian and Transnistrian sides, have
    given rise to optimism in some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic.
        Mr. Speaker, any ultimate resolution to the Transnistria conflict
    must ensure that Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity are
    fully upheld. A final resolution cannot be merely another ``paper''
    agreement, where Russia commits on paper to certain obligations, only
    to promptly disregard them, in view of its geo-strategic interests.
    This issue is of grave concern because Russia has repeatedly broken
    signed agreements regarding the stationing of its troops and weapons on
    the territories of Moldova and Georgia, without the consent of those
    Governments. Russia should not be permitted to continue to violate the
    sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors out of some
    artificial perception of its entitled ``sphere of influence.''
        In this respect, Mr. Speaker, intensified efforts and political
    will on the parts of the Moldovan Government and the international
    community will be necessary to ensure that Russia finally fulfills its
    commitment to withdraw its remaining troops and weapons from
    Transnistria. Only then will Moldova's re-unification, democratization
    and potential for economic prosperity be fully realized.

    Dear Chairman, Honorable Members of the Commission, Colleagues,

    It is a privilege for me to be here and speak in front of such a
    distinguished audience.
        1.  Allow me to state from the outset that the origins of the
    Transnistrian conflict were not ethnic, nor racial or religious. With
    its mixed population the region is not a state or a nation, being an
    artificially separated territory following the military conflict in
    1992. The trigger for secession was opposition of the Soviets to the
    independent statehood pursued in Moldova by the largest majority of the
    population.Military hostilities started in March 1992 and lasted till
    July 21, when a cease-fire agreement was signed by Presidents of
    Russia/Moldova, introducing Peace-keepers with the aim to stop military
    operations and disengage hostile sides.

        2.  An OSCE Mission has been established in Moldova after 1993, but
    it has been obstructed to perform its main tasks, under constant
    objections including from the separatist regime, as regards the
    requested military inspections, alleged arms production, or
    accumulation of military illegal forces in the so-called `demilitarized
    zones'.

        3.  Unconstrained by international law, the separatist regime
    turned into a `safe heaven' for criminal activities, smuggling and
    constant violations of the human rights, which performed systematically
    imposed a totalitarian control over population, business and mass
    media.

        4.  Movement of people is hindered by multiple checkpoints. People
    are put in jails and tortured physically or morally, if they show a
    dissent towards the official propaganda endorsed by the so-called
    `Tiraspol authorities'. Of special target are people which oppose the
    regime, like the settlement of the left bank which remained under
    Moldova's jurisdiction, and Moldovan schools, whose teachers are
    harassed, whose parents are intimidated, and whose licensing is
    suspended by the regime. Just to mention that in spite of the OSCE
    Mission actions, situation of the Moldovan schools remain unclear, and
    that was the main reason why the EU introduced a visa ban for the
    leaders of the separatist regime in 2004, after their shutdown.

        5.  Of special concerns is the situation of political prisoners,
    arrested by the local KGB. In 2004, EHCR found Russia `guilty of
    actions or inactions that led to the arrest of Ilascu Group', and
    imposed fines to be paid, calling Tiraspol to release people that were
    jailed for 12 years.

        6.  In 2010, Ernest Vardanyan, a journalist from Moldova was
    arrested under accusation of espionage for Moldova, he was jailed for
    more than one year. Other cases of illegal arrests, used by the
    authorities to claim afterwards payments for their liberation have been
    reported, almost weekly. In the same year, another Moldovan citizen,
    Ilia Cazac, was arrested by region's KGB and sentenced for 15 years of
    prison under accusation of spying for Moldova. In April 2011, Vardanyan
    was released, but several other people remain still in jail for alleged
    accusations which in some cases seem to be an ordinary attempt to
    extort money from their families, as this is documented by Amnesty
    International, Helsinki Group, other watchdogs.

    We want this situation to be changed by creating all necessary
    conditions to reintegrate the region into the Moldovan state within its
    internationally recognized borders as of January 1, 1990.

        7.  We call for settlement of the Transnistrian conflict
    exclusively by peaceful means, through a transparent negotiation
    process, in the framework of the existing 5+2 format. Today we have a
    favorable international situation, defined by an increased attention to
    a viable settlement from Moldova's major partners: EU, US, Russia and
    Ukraine. As well, we notice a gradual intensification of the political
    consultations. In 2010 there were 5 unofficial meetings in the 5+2
    format. In 2011 there have been two meetings, first in February and
    second in April, testing the ground for official re-launch of talks,
    although visions are still far too distant.

        8.  We hope that the meeting scheduled for June 21 in Moscow will
    mark the resumption of the 5+2 official format, with all 5 actors
    aiming to restore trust and respect international law. Once the
    official negotiations are re-launched, we will be able to see a clearer
    perspective in the settlement process and move towards identification
    of the status of the Transnistrian region.

        9.  Moldova's position is well-known: Transnistria shall be an
    integral part of Moldova within its sovereign constitutional space; it
    is supposed to enjoy a large degree of administrative, financial and
    political autonomy. Respect of democratic norms, values and practices
    shall prevail, while national legislation shall be applied in full
    throughout the territory.

        10.  Resumption of negotiations shall not be done for the sake of
    resumption, but on clear ideas related to the full and comprehensive
    settlement of this conflict, appropriate to consolidate a viable,
    democratic, independent and sovereign state of Moldova. We see this as
    a matter of exclusive internal power-sharing mechanisms, and emergence
    of a territorial autonomy in Transnistria, similar to the Gagauz
    Autonomy, as it is defined by 1994 Special Law.

        11.  It is by default, that a special statute will provide
    fundamental civil and political rights to the population without any
    discrimination, on the basis of international and European conventions.
    In fact, National Parliament of Moldova has adopted already in 2005 a
    Law on the principles of the conflict settlement, in line with
    international and European rules, protecting the rights of the local
    and regional governments and, we want this sovereign law to be
    respected in full and acknowledged by the mediating parts.

        12.  It is my pleasure to commend in the same regard the findings
    and conclusions of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' report
    distributed in February 8, 2011, under the name ``Will Russia End
    Eastern Europe's Last Frozen Conflict.''

        13.  Wrapping up my references to the basic principles of the
    Transnistrian conflict settlement, I would like to quote VP Biden, who
    put them in a very eloquent way during his March visit to Chisinau--he
    said ``the only solution that can be accepted is the solution which
    would ensure the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
    of RM within its borders recognized by the international community. The
    future of Transnistria is within the RM.''

    Dear colleagues:

        14.  Today, Moldova is a democratic state, which is proudly
    advancing towards an AA with EU. It has ratified and is effectively
    implementing European Convention on Human Rights; it is signatory of
    the most important international and European HR conventions.

        15.  As a Member of the Council of Europe, it is regularly
    monitored by specialized committees, which constantly assess the
    progresses towards the rule of law. Following installation of the EUBAM
    in 2006, over 620 Transnistrian firms were registered by Moldovan law,
    which allow them to use the access to the European common market, with
    no taxes paid for their exports.

        16.  Population of the region receives all social benefits from the
    national social budget. Hundreds of fellowships are provided free of
    charge to the region's youth annually. Over 350.000 of its half a
    million population holds Moldovan citizenship, and many of them are
    actively using their rights and freedoms, protected by the Moldovan
    Constitution, and support the reintegration process of the region,
    against the obstructions made by the separatist regime.

        17.  Nevertheless, conservation of the Russian troops and
    ammunitions on the territory of RM is a flagrant violation of the
    Constitution, a violation of international obligations and a challenge
    of to the legitimated authorities of the national government.

        18.  The political solution to the conflict should be consistent
    with the strategic vector of EU integration. A responsible though more
    active participation of the US and EU in the conflict settlement is
    crucial as it brings the impetus and resources necessary in reaching
    the positive result of the process. Why should the Western community be
    interested in solving this problem and how this conflict can affect the
    West? The region is only 60 miles away from the border of NATO and EU,
    therefore this conflict is directly affecting the EU security areas.

        19.  And we are talking here about 60 miles, something comparable
    to the distance from here where we are now to Fredericksburg, VA--1
    hour drive. So, the danger generated by the existence of a region of
    instability at the immediate proximity of the Euro-Atlantic community
    is obvious and it is also obvious that the price of solving the
    conflict is far lower than the price of instability and risks of
    escalation.

        20.  A civilian mission under international mandate would be of
    great value to the viable conflict settlement by taking stock of the
    ammunition and troops concentrated in the Security Zone between two
    banks of Nistru river. Today, there is not enough information about the
    heavy deployments of military equipment and arsenals. At the same time,
    efforts to change the existing so-called peacekeeping forces with an
    international mission under the mandate of an international
    organization should be intensified.

        21.  Constant violations of the human rights must be stopped and
    innocent people are to be released form jails of the regime. Moldovan
    authorities call international organizations to intensify their
    watching and monitoring activities on the region's situation, and
    intensify collective efforts to stop the existing abuses, ensuring
    basic rights to be protected.

        22.  We call towards all states and actors that are involved in the
    5+2 format of negotiations to abstain from any sort of actions that
    directly or indirectly obstruct restoration of the Moldovan sovereignty
    over the region, focus attention to the 3D commandments that are
    indispensable for a fair settlement: democratization, demilitarization
    and decriminalization of the region.

    I think I will stop here to pass the floor to the next speakers and to
    leave more room for discussions during the Q&A session.

    Igor Munteanu was born on August 10, 1965, in Costuleni, Ungheni. He
    holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communications and Journalism (1989,
    Moldova State University), a Masters degree in political analysis and
    administration (1992, Romania's National School of Political and
    Administrative Studies) and a Doctoral degree in Law (2002, Free
    International University of Moldova.)

    He has expertise in the field of local public administration and public
    sector reform, having as an educational background political sciences
    and administrative law. Since 1993, Igor Munteanu has established
    together with a group of young intellectuals of Moldova one of the
    first think tanks, known as ``Viitorul Foundation.'' The foundation has
    emerged into a specialized public research institute, IDIS Viitorul.
    Since 1996, Igor Munteanu has acted as Executive Director of IDIS
    Viitorul.

    Igor Munteanu has written and edited several publications published
    abroad, as well as in the Republic of Moldova, being actively engaged
    as freelance author in the international and national press as
    political commentator to the Radio Free Europe (1997-2005). Often, he
    is involved in national political debates. He is a member of the
    Institutional Committee of the Congress of Local and Regional
    Authorities of the Council of Europe.

    In August 2010, Igor Munteanu was appointed ambassador to the United
    States.

        I would like to express gratitude to the U.S. Helsinki Commission's
    members and staff for including this important topic--the conflict in
    the Republic of Moldova's eastern region--in its agenda. Special thanks
    to Winsome Packer and Kyle Parker who made this briefing today and
    other briefings and hearings on Moldova in the past possible. I express
    this gratitude on behalf of those who suffer the most because of this
    externally imposed conflict--that is, the residents of towns and
    villages on the Eastern Bank of the Nistru. Although they constitute
    the majority, those people are not represented at the negotiation
    table, including in the ``5+2'' format. Their voice is not heard not
    only in Moscow, Brussels, Vienna or Washington but even in their own
    capital, in Chisinau. They are not on the front pages, they are not
    interviewed by public or private TV stations in the Republic of Moldova
    to say their painful story of living in ghetto-type setting where
    residents have no rights.
        What is happening today in the Eastern region of Moldova,
    controlled by the puppet separatist regime installed in Tiraspol in
    1990-1991, is nothing else than a continuation of the Soviet Union's
    geopolitical policies, now, after 1991, embraced by the Russian
    Federation. To understand better this conflict, one should look back
    into history. There are several events that have to be remembered when
    tackling the Transnistrian conflict.
        First, the 1792 Treaty of Iasi, signed between the Ottoman Empire
    and the Russian Empire, after which Russia, for the first time,
    reaching the Nistru border and became the neighbor of the Principality
    of Moldova.Second, the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest, resulted in the
    partition of the Principality of Moldova, the Eastern half of which was
    incorporated into Russia as Bessarabia until the 1917 Bolshevik
    Revolution.
        Third, the 1924 creation, within the Soviet Ukraine, of the
    Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Republic on the Eastern Bank of Nistru
    where the majority constituted ethnic Romanian population, as bridge-
    head to once again successfully occupy Bessarabia in 1940 by the Red
    Army, as an outcome of the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939.
        Finally, in 1990-1991, the same territory East of Nistru, with its
    main city in Tiraspol, was once again used by the Kremlin master-minds
    as an outpost to keep the Soviet Moldova from getting away from USSR's,
    then, Russia's control.
        Today, Russia's minimum objective in Moldova is to create a second
    Kaliningrad in the South to keep the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in
    check. Her maximum objective is to get full control of the Republic of
    Moldova, through federalization schemes imposed on Moldova, where
    Transnistria and possible Gagauzia (another enclave inhabited by
    Christian Turks in the South), are to play the main role of holding
    veto power on the future of Moldova, its internal and external
    policies. As a bonus, by reaching these objectives, Russia will be able
    to encircle Ukraine, closing its only large window to the West, thus,
    keeping Ukraine into its orbit.
        Focusing entirely on fruitless official negotiations to solve this
    conflict between Russia and Moldova is a big mistake. During 19 years
    of bilateral (Russian-Moldovan) and multilateral (in current ``5+2''
    format and previous formats) negotiations, no resolution was achieved
    in ending the conflict. Russian troops are still stationed in Moldova,
    and Russia's support for separatism movement continue, while local
    residents of this region suffer.
        These residents, who are nothing less than geopolitical hostages,
    are not allowed to have access to basic freedoms, including freedom of
    expression, of education in their native language, and of assembly,
    among others.
        Education in the Romanian language is viewed by those in charge of
    this separatist regime as their main threat. This is why, as soon as
    the legislative body in Chisinau, still within the Soviet Union,
    adopted the language law in 1989 that established the return of the
    Roman script to the republic's official language, the Soviet
    authorities in Moscow triggered the separatist movement in the trans-
    Nistru district. The alphabet issue became central to the secessionist
    movement and it developed into a ``school war'' against educational
    institutions that opted for Latin characters. As result of
    discrimination policies in the field of education, the majority of the
    population in Transnistria--Romanian ethnics--has only 88 schools. They
    are authorized to teach in the native language, but only eight are
    permitted to use the Latin alphabet.
        The several Romanian language schools made headlines in
    international media when, in July 2004, the Tiraspol militia seized the
    orphanage school in Tighina/Bender and schools in Tiraspol, Rybnitsa
    and Corjova were closed. The closing down of these schools was
    prevented only thanks to international pressure. These days, the
    situation in the eight schools is worsening. This is due to the
    Tiraspol regime's persecution and discrimination against pupils, their
    parents and teachers, but also because of the indifference and ill-
    thought policies of the Moldovan authorities.
        Last week, on June 9, 2011, in an open letter to the Moldovan
    Parliament and to Prime Minister Vlad Filat, Eleonora Cercavschi,
    chairwomen of the Lumina Association that represents teachers from
    Transnistria, asked for help. Cercavschi is also principal of the
    Stefan cel Mare high school in Grigoriopol, but it was forced to
    evacuate to another school in Dorotcaia some 20 km away, thus, every
    day, students and teachers have to travel this distance by bus. She
    accuses Moldovan authorities of designing discriminatory policies
    against Romanian language schools that use the Latin alphabet.
    Cercavschi argues that these students are put in tougher competition
    when applying to Moldovan universities than those from schools
    controlled by the Tiraspol regime. These, along with persecution by
    separatists are the major cause why five high schools and three middle
    schools lose students. If in 1989 the total number of students in five
    high schools was 5878, in 2011 this number was only 1837, 3.2 times
    less.
        The other 80 Romanian language schools in the breakaway region
    continue to use the Russian-Slavonic alphabet in teaching of the
    language, dubbed ``Moldovan,'' as it was imposed by the Soviet regime
    on all schools in Bessarabia in 1940. More than that, today, these
    schools continue to use an out-dated curriculum and use textbooks from
    the Soviet period. If the Russification of the Republic of Moldova was
    largely stopped when the country gain independence in 1991, it still
    flourishes in its Transnistrian region. Suffer mostly the Romanian
    speaking population, but Russification policies also affect other
    minorities such as Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Jews or Gagauz.
        This 21st century soft-genocide, called by the OSCE linguistic
    cleansing , mainly against the Romanian ethnic population, resulted in
    sharp reduction of Romanians/Moldovans from 40 percent in 1989 to 31.9
    percent in 2004, while Russian ethnics increased their presence in
    Transnistria from 24 percent in 1989 to 30.4 percent in 2004 (the
    number of Ukrainian ethnics, the second largest after Moldovans,
    remains constant), based on census results.
        Schools are not the only target of the regime in Tiraspol. Free
    media can not penetrate on the Eastern Bank of Nistru because of radio
    and TV jamming and prohibition of printed media; local journalist are
    arrested and intimidated. The arrest in 2010 of Ernest Vardanian, an
    Armenia-born journalist, citizen of Moldova and a resident of Tiraspol,
    is the most notorious example of the KGB-style intimidation of free
    press. He was accused by intelligence services of Transnistria--which
    are, in fact, local office of the Russian FSB--of spying for Moldova,
    that is, he was accused of spying for his country in his own country.
        In March 2010, the Transnistrian intelligence services kidnapped
    Ilie Cazac, an employee of the Moldovan Fiscal Inspectorate in Tighina
    (Bender), in Varnita, a town controlled by the Chisinau central
    authorities. Cazac was also accused of espionage. His parents have been
    on hunger strikes numerous times for weeks, protesting outside the
    Russian Embassy in Chisinau, hoping through their actions to secure the
    release of their son, but in vain. Last Sunday, June 12, Cazac's mother
    approached U.S. Senator John McCain who was visiting Moldova and
    pleaded for help. What else a mother can do for her son?
        The private property is another target of the separatist regime.
    From time to time, local farmers are prevented to cultivate their land
    or bring home crops from their own fields. Let me cite U.S. diplomat
    David Kostelancik, who told the OSCE council on April 21, 2005 the
    following about an incident involving farmers: ``The United States is
    troubled by the ongoing, systematic harassment of Moldovan farmers from
    the village of Dorotscaia by Transnistrian authorities. These villagers
    farm land that is located in an area under the de-facto control of the
    Transnistrian authorities, who last year installed a ``customs'' post
    in the zone. The effect of this move has been to deny the villagers
    access to their farmland, and thus their livelihood. Last year the
    entire harvest for this village was lost due to Transnistrian
    restrictions on the farmers harvesting the fields. This year, the
    harassment has continued, with reports that Transnistrian authorities
    have impounded tractors and detained farmers who are trying to plow and
    sow their fields.''
        Why are these violations of basic human rights allowed to continue
    to happen in the 21st century? Who is responsible for it? The right and
    obvious answer is the master minds behind the separatist movement
    strategy in Moldova's Eastern territory. Somehow identical elements of
    this strategy can also be seen in other ex-Soviet republic, Georgia,
    with two separatist regions--Abkhazia and South Ossetia--that launched
    a war against central government in Tbilisi in 1991-1992. In all these
    cases, Russia played the major factor in triggering the conflict and,
    then, supported the separatist puppet governments. In 2004, in the
    legal case ``Ilascu and others versus Russia and Moldova'' examined by
    the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the judges concluded
    that the ``Russian 14th Army and other elements of the Russian
    government had contributed to the creation and continued existence of
    the Moldavian Transnistrian Republic (MTR).'' In 2006, lawyers of the
    New York City Bar Association in their study of the Transnistrian
    conflict demonstrated that Russia's activities in Moldova violate
    international law by supporting the Transnistrian regime and having
    military presence on the Moldovan soil without the agreement of the
    Moldovan government.
        As in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Moldova's
    Transnistria leaders of the separatist regime are Russian citizens and,
    reportedly, on payroll of the Russian intelligence services and
    military.
        Blaming only Russia for the existence of Transnistria is just part
    of the story. There are other actors who benefit from the status-quo,
    mainly in Kiev and in Chisinau. Smuggling of arms and goods, human
    trafficking are often associated with Transnistria, dubbed the ``black
    hole of Europe.'' But the main responsibility has to be put on the
    shoulders of the political leadership in Chisinau. After all, most
    residents of Transnistria are Moldovan citizens, although Moscow and
    Kiev rush in giving passports in expedite mode to everyone who asks, in
    order to later claim the need for protection of their citizens and,
    eventually, claiming this territory, east of the Nistru River.
        Russia's actions in Moldova are as many and as reckless, as allowed
    by both the Moldovan government and by international community.
    Recently, I have asked a ranking member of the Moldovan parliament in
    charge with budgeting how much was allocated in the state budget for
    programs aimed at reunification of the Transnistrian region, like
    education, healthcare, infrastructure. The answer was ``none.''
    Residents of Transnistria are fed up by empty promises of politicians
    during elections or statements at international forums and they are
    looking for concrete deeds.
        Another simple question to the current Moldovan government is why
    is there no strategy or an action plan on the reintegration of the East
    Bank of Nistru. Even the Communist-led Moldovan government, which was
    in the reaction mode to Russian proposals that ultimately led to the
    infamous Kozak memorandum designed by the Kremlin to federalize
    Moldova, made a few steps towards working with a plan. In 2004, civil
    society experts from Moldova and abroad put together such a strategy
    called 3-D (Demilitarization, Democratization and Democratization of
    the Transnistrian region). Three experts who co-authored or contributed
    to the 3-D strategy promotion in Moldova, in Washington, Brussels and
    Kiev are among witnesses at this briefing. As it turned out, the
    principles laid down in the 3-D strategy were used by the Moldovan
    parliament in three resolutions related to the trans-Nistrian conflict
    adopted in June 2005 and also in the Moldovan Law on the basic
    provisions of the special legal status of the localities from the left
    bank of Nistru River, passed in July 2005. Another element of that
    strategy was the international involvement in searching for settlement
    solutions. In December 2005, the EU Border Assistance Mission for the
    Ukraine-Moldova border was launched, aiming at suppressing the traffic
    in arms, drugs, and human beings, as well as the regular commercial
    contraband of which MTR is consider to be both a source and a transit
    route. Starting October 2005, the European Union and the United States
    joined Moldova, MTR, Russia, Ukraine, and OSCE in the new ``5+2
    format'' of the trans-Nistrian settlement process . But, as previously
    stated, these negotiations did not bring any results in terms of
    resolution, therefore, today, a new approach is needed that should be
    incorporated into a new strategy or plan. The focus should be put on
    confidence building measures, meeting the needs of residents on the
    east bank. The Moldovan government has no excuse why such a strategy
    has not been designed yet, if it claims to be serious in regard to
    Transnistria. Thus, the Moldovan government should not wait for the
    international community to come and solve its problems. Instead, the
    Moldovan politicians should take the lead and do whatever they can for
    their citizens residing in Transnistria, who feel abandoned and
    betrayed by their own government.
        Moldova's Western partners--U.S. and EU--as well as other mediators
    like OSCE should put more pressure on Molodva when it comes to
    providing basic services for residents in Transnistria. When a Moldovan
    citizen from Transnistria comes to Moldovan law-enforcement and
    prosecuting officers for help because their rights were violated, he
    usually hears that his government is impotent in protecting his rights
    or, worse, Transnistria is not part of their jurisdiction. The Moldovan
    government bodies have not only the legal authority, but they have
    obligation to start investigation, file cases against those who
    committed human rights violations, especially when those violators are
    citizens of Moldova, but on the payroll of Tiraspol. Unlawful arrests,
    torture, illegal detention, kidnapping and killing, are ordered, but
    not committed by Igor Smirnov, self-proclaimed president of
    Transnistria since 1991, or by Vladimir Antyufeyev, head of security
    apparatus (indicted for crimes against both Latvian and Moldovan
    states). These Russian citizens are assisted by concrete militia
    officers, prosecutors, judges who blindly follow these orders, for
    which they should be investigated by the Moldovan law-enforcement
    bodies. These people will think twice before they take orders from
    people like Antyufeyev, if they knew that for their unlawful deeds they
    have to answer in a court of justice. Many of these middle and law
    levels executors are citizens of Moldova; they travel freely to
    Chisinau or foreign countries, conducting their private business. This
    practice must simply stop.
        For Moldovan officials it is easier to blame everything on
    geopolitics, on international community that has no stomach to deal
    with Russia and solve this conflict, than to get their sleeves rolled
    and address real problems of very concrete individuals who come to
    Chisinau for help that today are met often with indifference.

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    M A T E R I A L    F O R    T H E    R E C O R D

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Victor
    Dragutan for help editing and fact-checking this paper. This paper is
    based in part on remarks delivered on June 1, 2011 at the Finnish
    Institute of International Affairs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Moldova is a small country, with fewer than 4 million citizens, but
    in recent years it has gained symbolic significance on the world stage
    far out of proportion to its size. As US-Russia relations have been
    ``reset'' and cooperation has likewise grown between Brussels and
    Moscow on a range of issues, Moldova has been one of the main
    beneficiaries of the improved atmosphere.
        European Union officials now routinely refer to Moldova's
    ``encouraging progress'' on reform projects, often as a favorable
    comparison to other post-Soviet states.\2\ In March 2011, Vice
    President Joe Biden, the highest ranking US government official ever to
    have visited Moldova, spoke to a cheering crowd of tens of thousands in
    Chisinau's main square. He described the country's ``journey toward
    democracy'' as sending a message to millions beyond Moldova's borders,
    and described Moldovans' achievements in glowing terms.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\  ``A new response to a changing Neighbourhood,'' Joint
    Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
    Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
    European Commission, High Representative of the European Union For
    Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, May 25, 2011. http://
    ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf, accessed on June 10,
    2011.
    \3\ Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden in Chisinau, Moldova, March 11,
    2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/remarks-
    vice-president-joe-biden-chisinau-moldova, accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        But, as Biden acknowledged, it is too early to declare a successful
    conclusion to Moldova's delicate and still evolving post-Soviet drama,
    of which several essential chapters are still unwritten. Alongside the
    ongoing evolution of Moldova's domestic institutions and system of
    government, the most significant clear challenge ahead is resolution of
    the protracted conflict with Transnistria. The purpose of this paper is
    to evaluate the causes, context, and consequences of this conflict and
    to propose some productive next steps for each of the stakeholders to
    the current conflict resolution process, and for the international
    community as a whole.

    What is the Transnistria conflict about?

        Much of the Western discourse on Moldova in the past two years has
    praised the country's largely non-violent political transition in 2009,
    when the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), a coalition of four
    parties, displaced the Communists who had held power since 2001. The
    new leadership refers to the 2009 transition as Moldova's ``European
    choice,'' which has been underscored by growing percentages in favor of
    the AEI and its explicitly pro-Europe agenda in two subsequent national
    elections.\4\ Officials are particularly proud of their relatively
    rapid progress in negotiations aimed at reaching an association
    agreement with the EU, billed in Moldova as a key step toward eventual
    EU membership.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\  ``Pro-Europe Alliance Leads Moldova Vote,'' RFE/RL, November 29,
    2011 http://www.rferl.org/content/modova_elections/2232737.html,
    accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        But amidst the enthusiasm surrounding Moldova's deepening ties with
    Europe, it is impossible to ignore the most significant potential
    obstacle to the country's future prosperity and successful European
    integration: the conflict over Transnistria, a 400 km long, narrow
    strip of land on the ``left bank'' of the River Dniester/Nistru between
    Moldova and Ukraine. Though internationally recognized as part of
    Moldova, Transnistria declared its independence from Chisinau during
    the breakup of the Soviet Union. Popular sentiment for independence was
    driven by fears on the part of the region's residents that Russian-
    speakers would lose positions of economic privilege and perhaps even
    basic language rights within an independent Moldova, or that the
    country might be united with Romania. The brief war that ensued in 1992
    ended with a ceasefire mediated by Russia and enforced by Russian
    military forces. Russian troops remain in Transnistria as part of a
    trilateral peace-keeping operation under the terms of the July 21, 1992
    Moscow Agreement, and to guard the remnants of a massive Soviet-era
    arsenal at Kobasna. \5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/
    transdniester.htm, accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since 1997, the OSCE has managed a conflict resolution process
    which now engages 7 parties in the ``5+2'' format: Moldova and
    Transnistria, with Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as intermediaries, and
    the US and the EU as observers. The OSCE-brokered talks have helped to
    defuse occasional crises and to keep the sides in dialogue, but no
    framework agreement has yet been accepted by all sides. The closest
    they came was in 2003, when the Russian-brokered ``Kozak plan'' was
    rejected at the last minute by Chisinau. The parties have met both
    officially and unofficially at various times, with the talks currently
    in an unofficial phase which may change to official following a June 21
    meeting of the parties in Moscow.
        In the intervening time, OSCE inspectors have had some access to
    the former Soviet weapons stockpiles at Kobasna, however Transnistria
    authorities have not permitted the type of unfettered access or
    verified removal necessary to ensure that none of the stored weapons or
    materials are leaving the territory and ending up in criminal hands.
    Indeed, due to poorly regulated borders, it is widely believed that
    Transnistria is a major node in European and global arms, drugs, and
    human trafficking networks. And, although the conflict has been
    ``cold'' since 1992, there is still a real risk of resumption of
    hostilities between two heavily-armed military forces if negative
    changes in the political environment were to occur. This would
    undoubtedly draw intervention from Russia and perhaps Romania, Ukraine
    and other states in the region.

    History and Culture

        To some degree, the reasons for the outbreak of armed conflict in
    1992 still underlie tensions between right-bank Moldova and the de
    facto Transnistrian Moldovan Republic on the left bank. Although
    Transnistria is ethnically diverse, with a roughly even mix of ethnic
    Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, the dominant official language and
    the language of everyday life on the left bank is Russian. However, on
    both sides of the river, there are schools in which both Russian and
    Moldovan are used, and each language group fears discrimination by
    authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol--these fears have been justified
    by occasional provocative school closures and curriculum changes, for
    example in Transnistria in 2004.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\  ``Moldova Schools Resist Threats,'' BBC, September 7, 2004, http:/
    /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3631436.stm, accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Anecdotal evidence indicates that Russian speakers in Transnistria
    still generally think of Romania as the villain and Russia as the hero
    in a historical narrative dating back to World War II, when Bucharest
    was allied with Nazi Germany. Russian speakers therefore associate
    modern Romanian nationalism with revanchist fascism, a narrative
    heavily informed by the persistence of a World War II memory shaped by
    Soviet ideologists throughout the Slavic core of the post-Soviet space,
    and in overt conflict with a neo-nationalist historical narrative among
    many of the post-Soviet and post-Communist states in Eastern Europe,
    including Romania. Deep fears about possible Moldovan-Romanian union in
    the early 1990's drove Transnistria's secession movement, and they
    continue to cause hostility on the left bank and in Moscow toward
    Moldova's warm relations with Romania.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\  ``Romania and Moldova `to merge' with Transdniester clinging to
    Russia,'' Russia Today, December 1, 2010, http://rt.com/politics/
    russia-moldova-romania-eu/, accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, there is a generational crisis brewing, since Moldovan and
    Transnistrian youth who have grown up since 1992 have no memory of
    living together with their neighbors in a single state. The persistence
    of low level conflict and provocation, even though there has been no
    overt fighting, have become a ``normal'' state of being for young
    people on both sides, who can no longer easily imagine a future in
    which the two live together. Some Western-funded programs like the
    youth-oriented ``Transnistrian Dialogues'' \8\ have helped bridge this
    psychological divide, but the longer the sides live in physical
    separation the less urgency each feels to change the situation.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\  Transcript of British Ambassador to Moldova Keith Shannon's
    interview for Radio Moldova, June 17, 2009, http://
    ukinmoldova.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=News&id=20644522, accessed on June
    10, 2011.
    \9\  Alyona Getmanchuk et al., ``Scenarios for the Development of the
    Transnistria Conflict: Challenges to European Security,'' Institute of
    World Politics: Kyiv, 2011. P. 77.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Geopolitics

        Consistent with an approach to conflict resolution that has
    included far flung parties such as Russia and the United States, broad
    geopolitical factors are often perceived as the main obstacles in the
    conflict. While these factors are important, they should be understood
    as one of several layers of obstacles, the removal of which is
    necessary but not sufficient for conflict resolution. A case in point
    is the ongoing dispute over ``host nation consent'' to basing of
    military forces in the area. Russia has expressed an interest in
    maintaining its current force of some 1,500 troops (around 400 of which
    serve as peacekeepers) \10\ in the region, but questions whether it
    could do so in a reunited Moldova. Moscow's interest in keeping a
    military presence in Transnistria has a number of possible
    explanations, but is most likely largely symbolic. The contingent on
    the left bank gives Russia a ``foothold'' in this part of Europe, an
    image of strategic depth against possible threats from the West, and
    perhaps also some psychological leverage in relations with Ukraine,
    which is partially encircled by Russian military outposts.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-
    moldova.htm
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moldova, on the other hand, has gravitated increasingly toward the
    West and away from Moscow since the 2009 transition--not only through
    promising negotiations aimed at an association agreement with the
    European Union, but on security and political questions as well.
    Although neutrality is enshrined in the Moldovan constitution,
    influential figures on both sides have hinted that military cooperation
    with NATO and even outright NATO membership is on the AEI's agenda.\11\
    That prospect is of deep concern to the Moldovan Communists, who still
    have nearly half the votes in Parliament, and it would undoubtedly be
    perceived as a provocation by Russia, which would be more reluctant to
    support Moldova's reunification.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\  ``Moldovan Defense Minister: NATO Membership Key For Joining
    EU,'' RFE/RL, February 24, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/
    moldovan_defense_minister_nato_membership_key_for_joining_eu/
    2320020.html, accessed on June 10, 2011.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Powerful Private Interests

        When analyzing the causes of protracted conflict, it is often
    revealing to ask, ``who benefits?'' In the case of Transnistria, the
    biggest beneficiaries are arguably not states but powerful private
    interests, many of whom exert influence over state policies. There is
    much to covet in the region as it was, during Soviet times, a
    privileged economic zone within the Moldovan SSR, containing at least
    40% of Moldova's industrial capacity, and the only large power plant in
    the region. \12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\  The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, ``Thawing a
    Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova,''
    2006. P. 14.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The major Soviet-era industrial assets in Transnistria are the MMZ
    steel plant and Rybnitsa Cement plant in the north, and the Cuciurgan
    power plant in the south. All of these are at least partially
    controlled by Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, who profited from
    Tiraspol's privatization of these assets during the last decade. These
    powerful individuals gained not only from the sale of assets legally
    belonging to all Moldovans, but continue to benefit from an arrangement
    whereby Russia's Gazprom ``sells'' gas to enterprises in Transnistria,
    which pay reduced fees for the gas to Tiraspol, which in turn simply
    allocates that money to the ``state'' budget. The resulting Gazprom
    debt, now worth over $2 billion, is sent to Chisinau, consistent with
    Russia's official position that Transnistria is part of Moldova. Simply
    put, the unresolved status of Transnistria allows oligarchs to profit
    from industrial assets that belong to average Moldovans and gas that
    belongs to the Russian people. \13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\  Ibid, p. 87-88; Rebecca Chamberlain-Creanga and Lyndon Allin,
    ``Acquiring Assets, Debts and Citizens:Russia and the Micro-Foundations
    of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict,'' Demokratizatsiya, Spring 2009.
    P. 334-335.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, powerful Transnistrian businessmen, all closely linked
    to the ruling circle of President Igor Smirnov, profit from the favored
    status of the ``Sheriff'' holding company, which dominates all aspects
    of the local economy, from food and liquor retailing to book
    publishing. Sheriff receives protection from the Transnistrian customs
    authorities, who also facilitate smuggling and counterfeiting for the
    benefit of Russian and Ukrainian businesses moving goods in and out of
    the region through the Black Sea. For instance, goods marked for
    Transnistria can enter Ukraine free of customs duties, but, with
    cooperation from the Transnistrian authorities, they often end up in
    Ukrainian markets. Although the de facto authorities control a handful
    of local banks, international transactions with the region are enabled
    primarily by Russian banks, which use their own access to western
    financial markets to help conceal the ownership of companies concerned.
    The De Facto Authorities

        One simple explanation for the persistence of tension and low level
    conflict between Moldova and Transnistria is that the de facto
    authorities in Tiraspol are not interested in giving up their hold on
    power. If they negotiate a reintegration agreement, they might keep
    some influence in a unified Moldova, but would not have absolute power
    as they do now. The Transnistrian Moldovan Republic is basically a
    Soviet style government, with a Presidency, a nominal Supreme Soviet,
    and courts that are all loyal to the handful of allies of President
    Smirnov. These Soviet style nomenklatura travel in luxury cars
    distinguished by special 1 or 2 digit license plate numbers with a
    large Transnistrian coat of arms. The authorities keep tight control
    over any political dissent, and find it easiest to simply deport any
    troublesome figures to Moldova, as they did with Moldovan nationalist
    Ilie Ilascu and his supporters following a long prison term. \14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\  See, e.g. Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia, European Court
    of Human Rights, Application no. 48787/99. (2004)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Soviet style system of government, the inherited Soviet
    industrial base, and subsidies (in effect) from Russia enable the de
    facto authorities to maintain a high level of economic stability, and a
    standard of living that while low, is slightly higher than in
    neighboring Moldova.\15\ In practice, these benefits come at the cost
    of complete dependence on Moscow, especially since Transnistria's
    independence is not even nominally recognized by Russia. However, as
    one walk past Suvorov Square and the Presidential Administration will
    reveal, the local authorities have converted this dependence into a
    source of pride with larger than life posters of Smirnov, Putin and
    Medvedev, and the slogan: ``Our strength is our unity with Russia!''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\  Chamberlin-Creanga and Allin, 337.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Individuals' Pragmatic Interests

        Thanks to subsidies from Russia and the ``offshore'' gray market
    opportunities of the Transnistrian economy described above, the region
    manages to eke out a standard of living slightly better than that of
    neighboring Moldova. However, individual citizens still seek the kind
    of greater economic opportunity that neither Moldovan nor Transnistrian
    citizenship offers, and so some 100-140 thousand have accepted Russian
    citizenship, a process facilitated by consular offices located in the
    breakaway territory, and consular officials who make a special effort
    to support local Russian affinity groups.\16\ It is believed that there
    are up to 100 thousand Ukrainian and 250 thousand Moldovan passport
    holders in the region as well, however many people have more than one
    document, since this enables them to travel to both East and West.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\  Chamberlin-Creanga and Allin, 332.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia's extension of citizenship to residents of Transnistria on
    such a large scale carries an ominous connotation in light of Moscow's
    past declarations that it has the right and duty to protect the
    interests of its citizens abroad, by force if necessary.\17\ Moreover,
    Russian citizens may receive supplemental pension benefits, and enjoy
    the possibility of studying, working or ultimately settling in Russia
    itself. By contrast, Moldovan citizenship is viewed as far less useful,
    since the country is economically depressed, and up to a third of the
    adult population of Moldova is working abroad, primarily in Russia and
    Western Europe. The unique benefits of Russian citizenship would likely
    be lost to residents of Transnistria if it rejoined Moldova.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\  ``The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation'' approved by
    Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010,
    www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf,
    accessed on June 10, 2011.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    International Context

        Nearly twenty years after the end of fighting, and almost ten years
    since the parties' last concerted effort at resolution of the conflict,
    Transnistria has come into renewed focus thanks to factors outside the
    immediate region. First, the Arab Spring has captured popular
    imaginations worldwide, and on both sides of the Dniester this air of
    change has provoked tough questions about the status quo. If political
    systems that once seemed deeply entrenched can be toppled in the Middle
    East and North Africa, many wonder, why not in the heart of Europe as
    well? Following so soon after Moldova's own popular transition, the
    revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia could underscore challenges to the
    legitimacy of the Smirnov regime, which has held power in Transnistria
    since 1992.
        From the perspective of Transnistrian separatists, recent history
    offers a different set of precedents, namely the recognition by Moscow
    of Georgia's breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and by
    the West of newly independent Kosovo and South Sudan. These precedents
    provoke the obvious comparisons, and the question, why not us? Those
    Transnistrians who would prefer union with Russia or formal recognition
    as a Russian protectorate draw inspiration from the apparent
    restoration of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, including
    the victory over Georgia in 2008, the extension of Russia's military
    presence in Crimea through 2042, and the entry into force of the
    Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus customs union.
        The fast-moving events in North Africa and the Middle East have
    also been a distraction for the key outside participants in the 5+2
    process, particularly as European policymakers and publics have shifted
    attention and resources from the EU's ``eastern neighborhood'' to its
    ``southern neighborhood.'' Meanwhile there is far less attention for
    seemingly faraway problems like the Transnistria conflict, since Europe
    is still struggling to save its own debt-ridden member states from
    default and thus preserve confidence in the Euro, while the United
    States faces a budget crisis of its own against the backdrop of an
    impending Presidential election. Finally, perhaps in response to these
    financial woes, varied strains of populist nationalism have been on the
    rise throughout the West. In Moldova's immediate neighborhood,
    chauvinistic statements by political leaders, particularly in Romania,
    have worsened the climate for compromise necessary to finally resolve
    the separatist conflict.

    Why pursue conflict resolution now?

        Despite the deep-rooted historical, geopolitical, economic and
    other drivers of conflict in Transnistria, there is some evidence that
    a window of opportunity is now opening for conflict resolution. While
    it is no guarantee that the conflict will remain cold, the fact that
    fighting has not resumed and no one has been killed on either side of
    the Dniester since 1992 is encouraging. At a time when violence in
    Nagorno-Karabakh claims dozens of lives a year, and with memories of
    the 2008 war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia still fresh, the relative
    calm around Transnistria appears to offer the best environment for
    productive engagement among conflicting parties in the post-Soviet
    space.
        Although the relative calm, stability and quiet for nearly two
    decades are reasons why the Transnistrian conflict could be solvable,
    these very factors reflect a growing risk which itself calls for urgent
    action. With each passing year, the demographic scales tip more toward
    the new generation of Moldovans and Transnistrians who have grown up
    entirely after the end of the Soviet Union and the de facto separation
    of Moldova. That is not to say that they are immune to the trauma of
    the original conflict. Indeed, some of these young people have
    childhood memories of the violence in 1992, and nearly all know friends
    and relatives who suffered personally. Yet none of them has any
    personal experience living as part of a united society with their
    neighbors on the other side of the river, and therefore little
    intuition for how such a future might look. The danger is simply that
    with passing years, most people in the region will no longer feel a
    strong motivation-or possess the vision needed-to change the status
    quo.
        At this moment, however, the populations on both sides of the
    Dniester and all stakeholders to the conflict resolution process still
    have the capability of resolving the conflict if they choose to do so.
    Thus, the key question is one of political will. Fortunately, there are
    a number of recent positive signals from all sides.
        Russia has long been the de facto guarantor of Transnistria's
    autonomy, through the presence of Russian troops, direct humanitarian
    aid, and economic engagement. However, Russia has consistently
    expressed a desire to resolve the conflict without a formal declaration
    of independence by Transnistria, which is a red line for Moldova. After
    the failure of Russia's 2003 peace initiative (the Kozak plan) the
    Russian leadership pursued these two seemingly contradictory policies
    in parallel.
        Last summer, following a Russian-German summit at Meseberg Castle
    in Germany and a subsequent meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russian President
    Dmitry Medvedev and German Chancellor Angela Merkel issued statements
    suggesting Russia would be prepared to support resolution of the
    longstanding Transnistria conflict in the context of a high-level
    Russia-Europe security dialogue. The joint declaration following the
    October 2010 Deauville summit of France, Germany, and Russia also
    singled out Transnistria as a main focus of potential EU-Russia-US
    security cooperation. Some commentators even described resolving the
    conflict as a ``test case'' for a new Euro-Atlantic security
    partnership.\18\ Most recently, Russia has offered to host a meeting of
    the 5+2 parties in Moscow on June 21, 2011, and conducted separate
    discussions with Ukraine and Transnistria officials, the aim of which
    seems to be to find ways to resume the ``official'' negotiations in the
    5+2 format, stalled since 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\  Dumitru Minzarari, ``Moldova: the Ties that Don't Bind,''
    Transitions Online, July 28, 2010, http://www.tol.org/client/article/
    21666-moldova-the-ties-that-dont-bind.htm, accessed on June 10, 2011;
    Stefan Wolff, ``The conflict in Transnistria: where things are, why,
    and where they might be going,'' http://www.stefanwolff.com/media/the-
    conflict-in-transnistria , accessed on June 10, 2011
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich issued a statement following
    his own meeting with Medvedev in Kyiv in May 2010 identifying
    Transnistria conflict resolution as a top shared priority for the
    region's two large eastern neighbors.\19\ In a February 2011 speech at
    the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn
    Gryshchenko underlined this point, warning that this frozen conflict
    could heat up once more without urgent action from all sides.\20\ Thus
    far, Ukraine's commitment has amounted mostly to rhetoric. However, as
    the largest state in the region, a major trading partner of Moldova,
    and sharing a 400 kilometer border with Transnistria, Ukraine is in a
    position to apply meaningful pressure to both sides to move toward a
    resolution to the conflict.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\  http://www.ng.ru/cis/2010-05-13/1--pridnestr.html
    \20\  http://www.carnegie.ru/events/?fa=3167
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Romania's role in the conflict is complex and sometimes
    inconsistent. Despite the country's ethnic, cultural and historic links
    to Moldova, it does not participate directly in the 5+2 process, but is
    instead represented through the EU observer delegation (which,
    understandably, has never included Romanians in top positions).
    However, Romanian influence on the conflict is inescapable, and is
    often cited by stakeholders and analysts as a decisive factor.
        On the positive side, Bucharest has formally elevated Transnistrian
    conflict resolution to a top national security priority, and describes
    itself as a staunch supporter of European diplomacy and of Moldova's
    European integration prospects.\21\ Less helpfully, Romania's historic
    close ties with Moldova are often treated as fodder for the political
    campaigns of pan-Romanian nationalists, especially when courting votes
    from the tens of thousands of Moldovans who carry Romanian passports.
    Yet suggestions that Romania and Moldova are more than close neighbors,
    or interpreting Moldova's EU integration as a pathway to reunification
    with Romania, simply stoke the darkest suspicions of Transnistrians and
    their Russian allies that Transnistrian conflict resolution is a mere
    fig leaf for Romanian nationalism.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\  Statement by H.E. Mr. Traian Basescu, President of Romania, OSCE
    Summit, Astana, 1-2 December, 2010, www.osce.org/mc/74998, accessed on
    June 10, 2011; http://www.bucharestherald.ro/politics/34-politics/
    16841-basescu-welcomes-medvedevs-stance-on-transnistria-issue, accessed
    on June 10, 2011.
    \22\  See, e.g. ``Moldova may reunite with Romania in next 25 years -
    Basescu,'' RIANovosti, November 30, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/world/
    20101130/161565516.html, accessed on June 10, 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On the Moldovan side, the major political development of the past
    two years is, of course, the rise of the Alliance for European
    Integration (AEI). Following improved results in two national elections
    in 2009 and 2010, the AEI now leads a coalition government with an
    absolute majority in the parliament of 59 seats, to the Communists' 42
    seats, a sufficient margin of control to pass legislation but not to
    elect a president (that would require a supermajority of 61 votes).\23\
    Under AEI leadership, Moldova has made European integration its top
    priority, and emphasizes its commitment to implement the reforms
    necessary to conclude an association agreement, including enhanced
    trade and visa-free travel. The AEI links its position on European
    integration to Transnistria conflict resolution by arguing that a clear
    European perspective will help make right-bank Moldova more attractive
    to the separatists.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\  ``General Information on the 2010 Early Parliamentary
    Elections,'' e-Democracy.md, http://www.e-democracy.md/en/elections/
    parliamentary/2010/info/ ; See also OSCE-ODIHR report at http://
    www.osce.org/odihr/elections/73833.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The new Moldovan government has not abandoned any of Moldova's past
    insistence on preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity,
    but it is clearly prepared to make possible some of the conditions that
    would be necessary for conflict resolution, including a special
    autonomous status for the Transnistria region, preservation of left-
    bank residents' property rights and social welfare benefits, and other
    political and constitutional guarantees. On the other hand, there is a
    risk that if more than two years of openness to reconciliation by
    Chisinau does not soon result in the commencement of formal 5+2
    negotiations and agreement on a reunification process, the goal of
    conflict resolution will fall by the wayside. In this respect, the EU
    has a critical role to play, both in pushing forward the conflict
    resolution process, and ensuring that right-bank Moldova's progress in
    association talks does not leave the left bank behind.
        In Transnistria itself, conditions have evolved only glacially
    since 1992. However, there have been some positive signs, and
    significant political change could occur in the near future. In May,
    Tiraspol released Moldovan journalist Ernest Vardanean, who had been
    imprisoned for espionage, a conviction challenged by Westerners as
    false and politically motivated.\24\ The leadership has also indicated
    a willingness to resume formal negotiations following meetings with
    OSCE and Russian officials, although subsequent statements from
    Tiraspol often backtrack and suggest negotiations would depend on
    obviously unacceptable preconditions such as recognition of
    Transnistrian independence. The current leader, Igor Smirnov, is
    approaching 70, and despite Russian urging has not successfully
    anointed a successor who could take his place in the presidential
    election scheduled for December 2011.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\  ``Transdniestrian Leader Pardons Moldovan Journalist,'' RFE/RL,
    May 5, 2011 http://www.rferl.org/content/
    transdniester_leader_pardons_moldovan_journalist/24092543.html
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While no new leader is likely to fully abandon Transnistria's
    ambitions of independence, pressure from Russia and Ukraine could
    create an opening for an agreement in the context of a security
    dialogue with Europe and the United States that served all sides'
    broader interests. In this respect, Russia holds most of the crucial
    cards, as illustrated by Transnistrian furor in late 2010 over the
    threatened suspension of Russian aid payments, which, together with
    Russian gas, are the lifeline for the Tiraspol authorities' budget. As
    long as Russia remains prepared to accept relations with Transnistria
    that run through Chisinau rather than Tiraspol, it should be possible
    to adjust the composition of, and incentives for, the Transnistrian
    leadership to facilitate productive talks. After all, greater
    prosperity for the region through enhanced ties with Europe will
    undoubtedly benefit people and businesses on both sides of the river.

    What can be done by the international community?

        Well-intended official statements on the Transnistrian conflict
    usually involve repetition of the mantra that the OSCE 5+2 process is
    the essential format for conflict resolution, and that it should be
    supported and strengthened by all parties. This statement is of course
    true: the 5+2 process engages each of the critical stakeholders to the
    conflict and without it there is little hope of conflict resolution.
    However, by itself this reasoning offers little in the way of content
    that can shape negotiations and move the parties toward eventual
    resolution of the conflict. To that end, let us consider what the
    international community and each of the relevant stakeholders could
    contribute to improving the atmosphere while building a foundation for
    conflict resolution.
        As has been discussed previously, the Transnistrian conflict cannot
    be understood independently from the broader context of relations among
    states in the Euro-Atlantic region, since it is a consequence of past
    and present tensions in these relations. Thus, an essential first step
    in the conflict resolution process is to recognize the existence of a
    Euro-Atlantic security space, in which states and other actors are
    subject to one another's decisions and actions-in other words, to
    recognize that security is unavoidably a mutual good in the greater
    world region of which Transnistria is a part. With that understanding,
    it is possible to acknowledge the legitimate security concerns of each
    of the states in the region, including the parties to the Transnistria
    conflict. By recognizing, for instance, Russia's legitimate security
    interests in the former Soviet space, and in the region around Moldova
    in particular, we can help to create an atmosphere of trust and
    transparency in which Russia is likely to be more prepared to engage
    seriously in the conflict resolution process.
        It would undoubtedly further improve the atmosphere for conflict
    resolution to go one step beyond recognizing the existence of a Euro-
    Atlantic security space, by seeking states' acknowledgement and active
    support of an inclusive security community in this region. Far short of
    calling for a new organization or alliance, recognition of a security
    community is simply the effort to manage issues of shared security
    concern within the Euro-Atlantic space that do not easily fit into the
    exclusive ambit of individual states or supranational groups.
        The agenda for such a security community would entail, first,
    defining the traditional and novel threats to the security of states in
    the community, whether internally or externally generated. Second,
    states would identify compatible--though not necessarily shared--values
    on which to base cooperation in responding to those threats. Finally,
    states should cooperate through appropriate channels to manage tension
    and conflict, such as by establishing an effective community-wide
    energy security dialogue, or by defining acceptable standards for
    states pursuing association with supra-national groupings like the EU,
    the CSTO, or NATO, that do not fundamentally threaten other states'
    security interests.
        One obvious platform to enable community-wide approaches to
    conflict management and resolution is the OSCE, in which all 56 states
    in the Euro-Atlantic region participate, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
    Under the framework of the OSCE's ``second dimension,'' participating
    states have identified economic development as a common security
    interest, yet this dimension has been only minimally exploited by
    participating states in the context of addressing protracted conflicts
    like Transnistria. In light of the importance of asset ownership and
    revenue flows to stakeholders in the Transnistria conflict, it could be
    helpful to engage the OSCE's second dimension authority to create a
    neutral, international resource center on economic development and
    conflict resolution. Such a center could conduct audits of asset
    ownership and monitor trade and financial flows related to conflict
    regions, and make the resulting data publicly available on the
    internet, helping at least to clarify what and whose interests are at
    stake in a given conflict and thus enabling solutions which take those
    interests into account.
        A second novel contribution by the OSCE could be to help address
    the linked issues of protracted conflicts and historic reconciliation,
    which fit comfortably within the purview of the OSCE's ``first
    dimension,'' on politico-military security. As described above, new
    generations of Moldovans and Transnistrians may lack personal memories
    of the 1992 conflict, but their perceptions of one another and of the
    states and societies around them derive from deeply rooted cultural and
    historical narratives. Even if the modern geopolitical and economic
    dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict could be solved, there would
    still be the potential for conflict between people on opposite sides of
    the Dniester, as long as they perceive one another as heirs to a
    tradition of conflict between rival empires going back a century or
    more, and punctuated by wars, ethnic cleansing and occupation.
        Rather than seeking merely to move on and forget about these
    traumas, it will be far more conducive to enduring conflict resolution
    for the parties to engage in bilateral or multilateral reconciliation,
    perhaps on the model of the recent Russian-Polish Group for Difficult
    Matters. The OSCE could facilitate such efforts by establishing an
    electronic archive of documents on historic conflicts and related
    issues, open to contributions from all parties, and with a standing
    group of international experts available at the request of states to
    advise on reconciliation methodologies. In order for parties like those
    in Transnistria to overcome the deep historical dimensions of their
    conflict, they must achieve not only truth, but satisfying mutual
    understanding, and some measure of real justice where it is not too
    late to be done. On that basis, the parties can agree to move forward
    on a new agenda that will define their shared future.

    What can be done by the 5+2 parties?

        At this point, Russia holds a great many of the critical cards in
    Transnistria. Moscow has significant influence on the authorities in
    Tiraspol, through aid payments, energy supplies, and the presence of
    Russian troops. The Russian government maintains an official policy in
    favor of Moldovan reunification with respect for Transnistrian rights,
    and has been prepared to sponsor conflict resolution in the 5+2
    framework. Now it is time for Russia to overcome its internal obstacles
    to conflict resolution by reconciling the interests of the state, which
    are largely productive, with those of powerful individuals who benefit
    financially from the continuation of the status quo. For Russia, this
    is fundamentally a choice between a model of development based on
    growing the pie and ensuring free and fair competition versus a future
    defined exclusively by those who hold power today. It is therefore not
    unlike the choice Russians face about their own future development, and
    may depend greatly on the outcome of Russia's 2012 presidential
    transition.
        In the meantime, Russia and Ukraine can play a helpful role by
    continuing to press Transnistria to participate in dialogue in the 5+2
    format, so that the parties can maintain channels for resolving minor
    technical issues and developing confidence building measures. It is
    also important for both Moscow and Kyiv to maintain accurate records on
    residents of Transnistria who have acquired Russian or Ukrainian
    citizenship, and to refrain from further undermining Moldovan
    sovereignty in the region by granting passports to new applicants who
    intend to remain in Transnistria. Lastly, both states should use their
    considerable trade and economic relations with both Moldova and
    Transnistria as leverage to oppose provocations and promote dialogue,
    and to support economic development that will benefit the region as a
    whole.
        The EU, although formally an observer to the 5+2 process, is
    potentially the party most able to transform the situation by
    dramatically enhancing the appeal of Moldovan citizenship for residents
    on both sides of the Dniester. Association with the EU, including free
    trade and travel, would be an enormous carrot for Moldovans, but must
    be leveraged to promote both the appropriate domestic reforms and to
    require engagement of Transnistrians in the process, so that the left
    bank is not left behind. The worst case scenario might actually be if
    Moldova achieves its European integration goals without making real
    progress in the conflict resolution process, as this would sap Chisinau
    of important incentives to make necessary but difficult compromises.
        The EU must also carefully balance between its collective position
    on the conflict and its relations with Russia. Romania, which has a
    more direct interest in the conflict than any other EU state, must be
    encouraged to police its own rhetoric to ensure that it does not
    undermine the credibility of the EU as a whole. At the same time, it is
    appropriate and understandable for Brussels to resist Russian efforts
    to exploit differences of opinion and approach among EU member states.
    The EU can neither ignore Russia's interests in the region nor strike a
    deal with Moscow that neglects the interests of Chisinau or Bucharest.
        Above all, the EU has unique comparative advantages which enable it
    to foster institutional reform, capacity building and civil society
    engagement on both sides of the Dniester. To Moldova, the EU should
    offer a clear path to European association under the rubric of its
    ``more for more'' policy, including clear and neutral metrics for
    success, together with tough love, demanding real action and hard
    evidence of reform, not just promises. For both Moldova and
    Transnistria, the EU should expand its current investment in civil
    society programs, including both those intended to strengthen civil
    society groups and those promoting relationship- and trust-building
    dialogue among the parties. Finally, the EU can contribute personnel
    with skills and expertise to help and train local officials, as it has
    done already for the EUBAM border-monitoring program, but which might
    be expanded to include justice sector capacity building and efforts to
    combat corruption in state contracting.
        The United States is also an observer to the 5+2 process with the
    potential to make a more significant contribution to conflict
    resolution. First and foremost, the US should take steps to help
    improve the appeal of Moldovan citizenship, by finally repealing
    Jackson-Vanik for Moldova, signing a bilateral trade and investment
    agreement with Chisinau, and making Moldova a candidate for the visa
    waiver program. Together with even modest investments in educational
    and cultural exchanges with Moldova, these steps would build on the
    positive image the US already has there while making a concrete
    contribution to Moldova's growth and integration with the global
    economy.
        US engagement should not leave Transnistria behind, either. Even
    though Washington does not and should not recognize the authorities in
    Tiraspol, US investments in the region's small and medium sized
    enterprises could help support growth, enhance ordinary Transnistrians'
    ties with the West, and foster more transparent business practices in
    the region. Like the EU, the US should be prepared to lend experienced
    personnel to assist with border management and law enforcement,
    especially in the acute struggle against human trafficking from and
    through this region. In its democracy promotion activities throughout
    the post-Soviet space, the US should not neglect Transnistria, where
    enhanced citizen participation in local government would actually
    facilitate reintegration with Moldova, which has markedly improved its
    own democratic practices in recent years.
        Last but hardly least, Moldovans and Transnistrians themselves must
    be prepared not only to demand help from outside powers, but to commit
    to policies and rhetoric that improve the atmosphere for conflict
    resolution rather than undermining it. Above all, this means that both
    sides must stop delivering contradictory messages to outsiders and to
    their own populations. It is incumbent upon Moldova's leadership to
    prepare Moldovan citizens for a future in which Transnistria enjoys
    unique rights and privileges within a mutually agreed power-sharing
    arrangement. Moldovans cannot unilaterally write laws dictating the
    terms of Transnistria's reintegration and demand that these constitute
    the framework for negotiations within the 5+2 process.
        The reality is that Transnistria has a special status, and Moldova
    is in no position to impose terms on the left bank. But at the same
    time, the Transnistria authorities cannot expect any serious
    concessions from Moldova if they insist on recognition of their formal
    independence and equal status with Moldova as a precondition for
    negotiations. Both parties' international partners should remind them
    that the cost of pursuing unrealistic, maximalist positions and failing
    to lay the foundation for compromise in their domestic political
    discourse is likely to be reduced potential for populations on both
    sides to achieve their long term goals.
    Conclusion

        Although the causes of the Transnistria conflict are complex, and
    linked to broader international issues that cannot easily be resolved
    in the short term, there is good reason to believe that we now face a
    new window of opportunity to bring conflict resolution back into focus
    for each of the relevant parties and the international community as a
    whole. Russia and Ukraine have expressed a renewed serious interest in
    solving the conflict, while Europe and the United States have the
    ability to help Moldova grow and develop in ways that will make it a
    more appealing partner for Transnistrians. Recent but sustained
    political change in Moldova and the possibility of an imminent change
    of leadership in Transnistria could also combine to enable a renewed
    drive to resolve the conflict within the OSCE 5+2 framework.
        Moldova is certainly a positive example in a region with more than
    its share of hard cases. The new government has made a concerted effort
    to deepen ties with Europe, while maintaining historically close and
    cordial relations with Moscow. Moreover, Moldovans are still among the
    most moderate and flexible people in the region in their attitudes
    toward the complex interplay among language, religion, and nationality.
    Moldovans living on both banks of the Dniester river deserve a chance
    to put these values into practice in a reunited society and state which
    will open new opportunities, end painful separation, and deliver far
    greater prosperity for the region as a whole.

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