    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2013
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                    BEFORE A

                               SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                    ________

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

                       C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman

     JERRY LEWIS, California                  NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
     RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey      PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
     JACK KINGSTON, Georgia                   JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
     KAY GRANGER, Texas                       MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
     ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida                  STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
     KEN CALVERT, California                  MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
     JO BONNER, Alabama
     TOM COLE, Oklahoma

     NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full
    Committee, and Mr. Dicks, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
    Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

            Tom McLemore, Jennifer Miller, Paul Terry, Walter Hearne,
                Ann Reese, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, B G Wright,
          Adrienne Ramsay, and Megan Milam Rosenbusch, Staff Assistants
                      Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
                                    ________

                                     PART 2
                                                                       Page
     Fiscal Year 2013 Army Budget Overview............................    1
     Defense Health Program...........................................  137
     Fiscal Year 2013 National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Budget
    Overview..........................................................  333
     U.S. Pacific Command / U.S. Forces Korea.........................  451
     Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization............  497
     Outside Witness Statements.......................................  545
                                    ________

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

     79-874                     WASHINGTON : 2013

                           COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                        HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman

     C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida \1\        NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
     JERRY LEWIS, California \1\          MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
     FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia              PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
     JACK KINGSTON, Georgia               NITA M. LOWEY, New York
     RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey  JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
     TOM LATHAM, Iowa                     ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
     ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama          JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
     JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri             JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
     KAY GRANGER, Texas                   ED PASTOR, Arizona
     MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho            DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
     JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas          MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
     ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida              LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
     DENNY REHBERG, Montana               SAM FARR, California
     JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
     RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana          CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
     KEN CALVERT, California              STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
     JO BONNER, Alabama                   SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
     STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           BARBARA LEE, California
     TOM COLE, Oklahoma                   ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
     JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
     MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida           BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
     CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
     STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
     CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming
     TOM GRAVES, Georgia
     KEVIN YODER, Kansas
     STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
     ALAN NUNNELEE, Mississippi

     ----------
     1}}Chairman Emeritus

                   William B. Inglee, Clerk and Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2013

                                  ----------

                                              Wednesday, March 7, 2012.

                          FY2013 ARMY BUDGET OVERVIEW

                                   WITNESSES

    HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
    GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

                      Opening Statement of Chairman Young

        Mr. Young. Good morning. The Committee will be in order.
    This morning the Committee is holding a hearing on the budget
    for the United States Army for fiscal year 2013. We will be
    discussing personnel matters, current operations and readiness,
    research and development and procurement, along with any other
    subject that our witnesses prefer to raise or that the members
    prefer to ask about.
        And we are very happy to welcome our distinguished
    witnesses, the Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army,
    and General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army. And
    of course John McHugh has been one of our colleagues for many,
    many years, former chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
    and a colleague that we are very proud of, Mr. Secretary. And
    General, we are very, very happy to have you here. Your
    biography will be placed in the record, which is an extremely,
    extremely impressive biography. It will be placed in our
    record.
        Mr. Secretary, you have appeared several times before this
    subcommittee as Secretary of the Army. We welcome you back, as
    you are a veteran of the budget process and you bring to these
    proceedings a wealth of experience based on your service in the
    House of Representatives and your ongoing service as Secretary
    of the Army. Representing the people of New York's 23rd and
    24th Districts, you served as ranking member on the House Armed
    Services Committee and you served on the Oversight and
    Government Reform Committee and the House Permanent Select
    Committee on Intelligence, and that is quite a background. You
    are highly respected in the area of military affairs, and we
    are pleased that you are here today to discuss the Army budget
    request for fiscal year 2013.
        General, 38th Chief of Staff of the United States Army,
    welcome to you, sir. We note that you are a New Jersey native,
    as is one of our ranking members, who will be here shortly,
    that you are a West Point graduate and you are one of a very
    small company of officers who have commanded at division, corps
    and Army levels in the same conflict. Quite a history and quite
    a record. And while serving in positions other than command,
    you were an assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and military advisor to Secretary of State Rice. You
    bring with you experience gained in three tours in Iraq,
    initially as commanding general 4th Infantry Division and
    culminating as Commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq and
    senior U.S. Military commander in Iraq. Impressive. At present
    you are guiding the Army through a ramping down of actions in
    Afghanistan and a shifting focus to the Asia-Pacific. Your
    assessment of the status of personnel, equipment and training
    readiness will be of great assistance to this committee as we
    consider how to best allocate resources so that the Army might
    accomplish its mission in defense of our Nation.

                       OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

        Mr. Secretary and General, salute you and the men and
    women, officers and enlisted soldiers, family members and
    civilian employees that you represent. For the past decade the
    Army has carried a heavy load in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite
    multiple extended combat tours many soldiers and their families
    have continued to serve in the Army. They are proud of what
    they have done, as they should be, and what they continue to do
    for the Nation.

                          ARMY END STRENGTH REDUCTION

        Although operations are ramping down in Afghanistan, we
    hope that they will be successful. Deployments do continue.
    Meanwhile the Secretary of Defense has announced that while the
    United States will continue an active approach to countering
    the threat posed by violent extremists, the focus of national
    defense will be balanced toward the Asia-Pacific region. A
    significant reduction in Army end strength is planned, yet the
    Army is expected to maintain the capability to regenerate
    ground forces as necessary.

                                 ARMY READINESS

        Mr. Secretary, General, reversibility sounds great, but
    this committee will want to hear how you ensure the Army when
    called to action can provide the needed units fully manned,
    equipped and trained. The 32nd Chief of Staff of the Army,
    General Gordon Sullivan, frequently noted that hope is not a
    method. This Committee will continue to support an Army that is
    properly equipped, properly supplied, and fully trained. The
    Committee will guard against a hollow Army, and we would like
    to hear your assessment of where you propose to accept risk in
    soldier end strength, training, equipment, readiness and
    modernization.

                    SUICIDE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT PREVENTION

        We will be interested in your plan to downsize the Army and
    programs to prevent, important programs to prevent suicide and
    sexual harassment. Fiscal management and the frequency and
    magnitude of reprogramming requests are likely topics of
    discussion, as they were considerably last year. And we will be
    interested in your updates on key acquisition programs,
    including Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle,
    Armed Aerial Scout, Abrams tank and Paladin self-propelled
    Howitzer. We are interested as well in the performance of the
    Stryker vehicles that have the double V hull.

                     NETWORK INTEGRATION EVALUATIONS (NIE)

        Finally, the Army has initiated a series of network
    integration evaluations at Fort Bliss in Texas. We will be
    interested to hear how that process is working and how the
    findings and recommendations are used to inform acquisition
    programs.
        Mr. Secretary and General, we have an ambitious agenda this
    morning. We want to get started. But before we proceed I am
    going to complete my remarks. I should have just put them in
    the record, because what I said about all of you, you already
    know. Anyway, before we proceed I want to recognize Mr. Dicks,
    the former chairman of the subcommittee and ranking member on
    the Full Committee. Chairman Dicks.

                              Remarks of Mr. Dicks

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In welcoming both
    Secretary McHugh and General Odierno before the Committee, we
    extend our sincere thanks to you both for your many years of
    service and dedication to our Nation. You are testifying before
    the Committee at a difficult time that places many often
    competing demands on the Army. We recognize that the Defense
    Department will begin to implement significant changes in its
    strategy to address both emerging global security realities and
    the obvious financial challenges.

                     FUNDING FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Regarding DOD funding, we understand that the Budget
    Control Act requires Department-wide savings of $487 billion
    over the coming decade. A significant portion of this will
    ultimately come from the Army budget. It is often said that
    soldiers are the strength of the Army. With this in mind, we
    realize that the Army faces many challenges managing its
    personnel. The Army bears a significant burden as our soldiers
    continue to engage in combat operations in Afghanistan over the
    next several years.

                   ARMY END STRENGTH REDUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

        Your written statement indicates that as of today over
    63,000 soldiers are deployed to Afghanistan performing a
    variety of missions. As the Army continues to support
    deployments, we note that the largest share of the personnel
    drawdown will come from the Army. OSD figures show that the
    Army will draw down 72,000 active duty troops out of a total
    personnel reduction DOD wide of 124,000 over the FYDP. We also
    understand that the Army will reduce its force structure by
    eight brigades from the current 63 and will remove two brigades
    based in Europe. In addition, we understand the Army must tend
    to the needs of military families, post support to troops as
    they return from deployments and provide transition assistance
    as soldiers return to civilian life. And as the chairman
    mentioned, you are developing several new programs, the Ground
    Combat Vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Soldier
    Systems, including improved night vision, body armor, sensors
    and other individual equipment for soldiers, and the land
    warfare network, which includes WindTM and the joint
    tactical radio system. And I know reset is very important to
    you, as we discussed earlier.

                            REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION

        The Committee stands ready to help the Army field these
    programs. However, we need to hear what measures you have in
    place to ensure that requirements are clearly defined and
    technically achievable, that cost estimates to develop and
    field these programs are realistic and that these programs
    receive proper management and oversight. We look forward to
    working with you to meet the needs of our soldiers and their
    families to maintain the readiness of our forces and to field
    the next generation of combat equipment.
        We look forward to your testimony. And Mr. Young and I have
    been here long enough that we remember when Shy Meyer was the
    Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1980s. And during that time
    we fielded the Bradley fighting vehicle, the M1 tank and the
    Apache helicopter. Now we know that General Odierno is as good
    as Shy Meyer was, and so we are expecting him to get these
    systems--he is going to crack the whip, have great oversight
    and get these things out and turn around the rather dismal
    record of the Army on procurement. And we are counting on you,
    General. Just like you did the surge over in Iraq, we are
    counting on you to turn around the Army acquisition and get
    them moving in the right direction.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Well, thank you, Mr. Dicks. And I have mentioned
    in earlier hearings how much we regret Mr. Dicks has announced
    his retirement. And I should also say that Mr. Lewis, who
    Chaired this Committee for 6 years and chaired the Full
    Committee for 2 years, had also announced his retirement. And
    he leaves behind a real legacy of effective representation for
    the United States military and for our readiness and basically
    made the military accept some weapons that they did not want to
    accept and that are so widely used today.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, we are going to place your entire
    statement totally in our record, as well as the General's, and
    so summarize it any way that you like, sir. I am happy to hear
    from you.

                     Summary Statement of Secretary McHugh

        Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will do
    that. I will try to abbreviate my comments so we can have more
    opportunity for discussion. First of all, on behalf of the 1.1
    million soldiers, 270,000 civilians that make up this great
    Army, it is an honor for me to be here today to add my voice of
    admiration to what is without question the greatest land force
    the world has ever seen, the United States Army. And Mr.
    Chairman, Ranking Member Dicks and distinguished members of the
    committee, I truly appreciate both your kind comments, Mr.
    Chairman, but more importantly the incredible support year in
    and year out that this great subcommittee and ultimately the
    committee in Congress provide to our Army and to our great
    military at large.
        I do not know if the Chief will--I do know the Chief will
    be every bit as effective as Mr. Dicks has challenged. And
    certainly he is bigger than Shy Meyer, I know that, by sitting
    next to him. So I am honored and feel very blessed to have as
    our 38th Chief of Staff someone on the caliber of Ray Odierno,
    who as you noted Mr. Dicks, has a career record throughout his
    military career, but I think for many of us who had the
    opportunity to visit him in Iraq, particularly in that very,
    very difficult theater of being someone who can come in and
    take a tough job and get it done. And we have got a few tough
    jobs ahead of us, and like you, Mr. Dicks, I look forward to
    working with him. I feel very fortunate, as I said.

                                ARMY DEPLOYMENTS

        Mr. Chairman, I most of all want to assure you that the
    strategy that this administration, the Department of Defense,
    all the military services went through, the development of it
    and ultimately the adoption of the supporting budget, was one
    that took a great deal of analysis, a great deal of thought and
    I think fairly represents a reasonable way for all of us to go
    forward in these very, very difficult times. For your Army
    these challenges over the last 10 years in many ways continue,
    as I know you understand. But we are busier than that. We have
    soldiers on six of the seven continents of the world, some 150
    nations across this great planet. And whether in the Pacific
    from Japan to Korea to the Philippines or through EUCOM and the
    Middle East and on and on and on, this Army remains fully
    engaged. And this budget that we are here to discuss today I
    think helps us to be prepared for today and, as was noted, to
    be postured for tomorrow.
        This budget really does I think underpin an Army that is
    fully embracing the hard decisions, as I said, we have to make
    at this moment, and at the same time laying the right
    foundation for a new and better future. Under the new framework
    that we will talk about, which was developed collaboratively,
    as I said, I would argue the Army clearly remains adecisive arm
    of the combat power. And at the end we will have a balanced and
    transformed force that will continue to be the most capable and
    effective land force in the world. That is our standard, that
    is what the strategy requires, and that is what this budget
    supports.

                              KEY ARMY PRINCIPLES

        I would also note that we are implementing a new paradigm
    under, as was mentioned, the significant cuts directed by the
    Budget Control Act. And we did have to make tough decisions.
    But I want you to know that we were guided by a number of key
    principles. First, we intend to fully support the ongoing fight
    and make sure the operational commanders in Afghanistan and
    other theaters have the best trained and ready land forces in
    the world. That is our top priority, and it was not in any way
    compromised through this budget.
        Secondly, we intend not to sacrifice readiness for force
    structure. We must responsibly reduce our end strength in a
    manner that fully supports the new strategy, but also provides
    sufficient time to properly balance our training, equipment,
    infrastructure and soldier and family support programs with our
    mission requirements.
        Third, we will be able to build force structure and
    capabilities to handle unforeseen changes to global security.
    The Army must be able to hedge risk through an efficient and
    effective force generation process and access to a strong
    operationalized reserve component.
        Fourth, we will maintain and enhance the Army's extensive
    commitments as they exist today even further in the future as
    they exist in the Pacific.

                          IMPACT OF BUDGET CONTROL ACT

        And lastly, we will not let the Budget Control Act cuts be
    taken on the backs of our soldiers or their families. Although
    we have and we will continue to, where appropriate, examine all
    of our programs we will fully fund those support systems that
    work with special emphasis on wounded warrior, suicide
    prevention, behavioral health and sexual assault programs. And
    based on these principles our budget, as you noted, Mr.
    Chairman, reduces end strength beginning in 2013 and 2014 to
    support the current fight, emphasizes continuing investments in
    vital modernization programs such as a network GCV and JLTV,
    and delays or eliminates programs which no longer meet urgent
    needs in support of our new strategy in transforming the force,
    and defers certain military construction programs.
        At its core the Army is not programs, it is not systems,
    and it is people. And every time I have had the honor to appear
    before you, including this moment, I come not as just Secretary
    but as representative in a small way of those soldiers,
    civilians and their families. And no one on this great
    subcommittee needs to have me sing the praises of these
    incredible men and women who have endured so much over the past
    decade and who depend upon all of us to provide them with the
    tools that they need, the support they deserve, and the funding
    that is required to support them and our families.
        We have remaining challenges. Suicide and substance abuse
    rates are unacceptably high. We are pursuing multiple avenues
    to provide our personnel with the best medical and behavioral
    health support available. We never, never must forget our
    success in Iraq and Afghanistan came at a heavy price to our
    Army families, and we are going to do everything we can to
    continue to provide for them.
        Let me just finally close, Mr. Chairman, if I may, adding
    my words of great admiration to two great Americans who served
    in this Congress and with whom I had the great chance to serve
    with Ranking Member Dicks and my dear long friend Jerry Lewis.
    One of the sad things I have learned since leaving this
    building and looking across sometimes longingly at the Capitol
    from the fun side of the Potomac and the Pentagon is so often
    incredible work is not widely recognized. I think all of us
    understand that when we come here to serve, and in these areas
    it is probably not that important. But the good that these two
    gentlemen have done, the programs that they have initiated,
    sometimes over the objections of some, the support that they
    have provided to these brave men and women in the military and
    their families far extends the reputations, and their
    reputations are extensive. So to my good friends, thank you
    both personally and as the Army secretary of what you have
    done. I wish you both every best in the future.
        I will yield back, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our
    discussion.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. And you have
    given us a lot of thought for some thoughtful questions already
    in your very well thought out statement.
        General Odierno, we are very happy to hear from you now,
    sir.

                      Summary Statement of General Odierno

        General Odierno. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Young,
    Ranking Member Dicks, and the rest of the distinguished members
    of the Committee. Thank you so much for allowing us to be here
    today. I want to first thank you for the continued support that
    you have given our soldiers, especially over the last 10 years,
    as we have been involved in two conflicts in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and other places around the world. Without your
    oversight and without your help we could not have accomplished
    what we have done, and your work has saved many, many, many
    lives as we have worked in these conflicts, so I thank you all
    for that.
        I also appreciate your vote of confidence, I appreciate the
    confidence that Secretary McHugh has shown in me. I think we
    have an incredible civilian military team in the Army today. We
    are focused on continuing to have the best Army in the world,
    one that can satisfy the security requirements of this Nation,
    and there is no better person to do that than Secretary McHugh,
    and he is a great boss, and I appreciate the opportunity to
    work with him.
        It is an honor for me to be representing the 1.1 million
    soldiers in our Army today, our 278,000 Army civilians and our
    1.4 million family members who have contributed so much over
    the last 10 years to our Nation's security. And we owe them a
    debt of gratitude, but more importantly we owe them to provide
    an Army that is capable of moving forward and also capable of
    taking care of our families.

                                ARMY DEPLOYMENTS

        As the Secretary said, we continue to be a truly globally
    engaged Army. We have 95,000 soldiers deployed today in a
    variety of places around the world and another 96,000 forward
    stationed today conducting a broad range of missions.
        But the one thing I would like to point out is our Army's
    primary purpose is steadfast and resolute, and that is to fight
    and win our Nation's wars. As the Army continues its transition
    we will ensure the President's 2012 strategic defense
    priorities are implemented, first meeting our current
    commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere by ensuring a highly
    trained, properly equipped, and well manned force.
        Now that operations in Iraq are complete and we continue
    surge recovery in Afghanistan, we will begin to shape the
    regional environs in some of the other combatant commanders'
    areas of responsibilities in order to develop the strategic
    environment that allows us to sustain our own security. In the
    Asia-Pacific, which is home to seven out of the 10 largest
    armies in the world, we will provide an array of tools through
    rotational forces, multi-lateral exercises and other innovative
    engagements with our allies and new partners. We currently have
    some 66,000 soldiers and almost 10,000 civilians in this
    region.
        During a time of great uncertainty in the Middle East we
    remain committed and prepared to ensuring security and
    stability across the spectrum of conflict through our
    rotational presence and other available means. And in Europe as
    we inactivate two brigade combat teams, one in 2013 and one in
    2014, we will compensate through a series of engagement tools
    to build and sustain relationships with our European and NATO
    allies and partners. And I believe in the long term this will
    serve as a model of how I see us doing business in the future,
    a combination of forward station and rotational forces using a
    tailored approach by regionally aligned forces and
    prepositioned stocks.

                                ARMY FOCUS AREAS

        As we move forward we will build on the competency and
    experience that has been gained over the past 10 years by our
    National Guard, our Army Reserves, and our Active component in
    Iraq and Afghanistan through the resourcing of a progressive
    training model that will continue to sustain this expertise,
    specifically in our National Guard and Army Reserves.
        As we look forward, the Secretary already touched on this a
    bit, there are several focus areas which will help us guide us
    in the future. Foremost, remain committed to our 67,000
    warfighters in Afghanistan and continue to provide trained,
    equipped and ready soldiers to be successful in that current
    fight.

                             END STRENGTH REDUCTION

        Next, as the Army becomes leaner we must continue to build
    on the key characteristics of our future force, adaptability,
    innovation, flexibility, agility, versatility and lethality. We
    have to prioritize our efforts as we integrate and synchronize
    our activities as part of a larger joint interagency and multi-
    national effort.
        By the end of fiscal year 2017 we will decrease our end
    strength in the Active component from 570,000 to 490,000, from
    358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard, and from 206,000 to
    205,000 in the Army Reserves. It is imperative for us to
    sustain a gradual ramp over the next 6 years that will allow us
    to take care of our soldiers, continue to provide forces for
    Afghanistan, and facilitate reversibility over the next several
    years, if necessary.

                     REDUCE NUMBER OF BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

        Currently end strength of 490,000 is funded strictly
    through OCO and must be sustained to help mitigate risk as we
    continue current operations in Afghanistan and simultaneously
    reset for the future. We also reduce our end strength by a
    minimum of eight brigade combat teams. And I say minimum
    because we are looking at potential reorganization initiatives
    that will expand the capabilities of a brigade which could
    cause us to reduce some of the brigades while increasing the
    number of combat battalions available. And we can discuss that
    later if you would like.

                               ACQUISITION REFORM

        Finally, we will be responsible government stewards through
    energy cost savings and institutional and acquisition reform.
    We are now taking a fundamentally different approach to how we
    do business with our acquisition reform, and I credit Secretary
    McHugh for his diligent efforts with this. We have really made
    some tremendous progress, and I will take the challenge that
    Congressman Dicks has given me as the Chief to continue to move
    forward with this.
        Through a new affordable and incremental equipping
    strategy, we are making better business deals and better
    contracts, emphasizing competition and saving even more money
    as governmental stewards. Our expansion of multi-year
    contracts, firm fixed price contracts, and cost-plus incentive
    fee contracts have proven substantive cost savings already. By
    more closely linking the development of requirements with the
    acquisition cycle, we are building the flexibility to integrate
    new technologies incrementally. Additionally, we are looking to
    develop more efficient testing and evaluation strategies by
    eliminating redundancies. We will continue our equipment reset
    program to restore unit equipment to a level of capability that
    is commensurate with our future missions. There have been over
    1.8 million pieces of equipment reset to date, which equates to
    approximately 31 brigade equivalents. Much of what the Army
    needs to do and much of what we hope to be able to do will be
    relying upon sustained OCO funding through our withdrawal in
    Afghanistan and for 2 to 3 years afterwards.

                            MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES

        As we continue to transform our modernization practices to
    a holistic bottom up approach we have several priorities. First
    is a network, which is critical to our ability to manage
    information and command our forces at all levels, both home and
    abroad. We have made significant progress on this critical
    program due to the series of network integration evaluation
    exercises that field tested equipment and integrated the system
    using our soldiers.
        Second, the Ground Combat Vehicle, a replacement for our
    Infantry Fighting Vehicle, that can accommodate an infantry
    squad, balance mobility and survivability and provide unmatched
    lethality. We have paid close attention to risk reduction in
    this development program by maximizing competition to stimulate
    innovation, support cost containment and schedule requirements,
    ensuring industry identifies potential pricing schedule versus
    performance tradeoffs and requiring industry to provide cost
    targets throughout the life cycle of this program.
        Our third priority is the more mobile and survivable
    network integrated Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which both
    myself and General Amos agree is necessary given the last 10
    years of fighting and what future operations may entail. We
    carefully revised our acquisition strategy to reduce the
    schedule for the next developmental phase from 48 to 33 months
    while reducing the projected cost of the program by $400
    million.
        Next is lightening a soldier's load with a focus on the
    squad. This must be continued efforts to give our squad
    superiority on the battlefield with advanced soldier systems
    and weapons, communications and protection. There has been
    tremendous progress in the advancements to help lighten the
    load of our individual soldiers, so now we must turn to look at
    how the squad can carry the load smarter. We will continue to
    look at decreasing the weight of our body armor while
    increasing protection. But we can make more progress by
    studying how to better distribute the load across the squad.
        The budget request for aviation modernization will continue
    to ensure our lift and close combat attack capabilities remain
    effective. These aircraft provide critical support to our joint
    ground forces, our special operations community, and also our
    international partners.
        Finally, I would like to point out that in order to achieve
    these priorities within our modernization strategy we will need
    the help of this Committee to ensure timely appropriations to
    reduce production and scheduling delays.
        In conclusion, the Secretary and I will continue to assess
    and make adjustments to our strategy while addressing any
    potential risk incurred as we adjust our force posture.

                             SEQUESTRATION CONCERNS

        I would like to leave you with one last thought.
    Sequestration is not in the best interest of our national
    security. The Army share of the cut could be almost $134
    billion through 2017. The impact to the Army could cause up to
    100,000 in cuts to end strength, in addition to the 86,000 we
    were already programmed to take. This would result in severe
    reductions in the National Guard, the Army Reserves and also
    continued reductions in the Active component and will
    significantly decrease what the Army can do for the joint
    force. In my estimation, sequestration would require us to
    fundamentally relook at how we provide national security.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for
    the opportunity to speak here today. It is an honor to be here
    representing the Army, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Secretary McHugh and General Odierno
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Young. Well, General, thank you very much. And Mr.
    Secretary, thank you very much.
        I was not going to start with sequestration, but I have to
    tell you that all of the members that I know in this House of
    Representatives and many in the Senate are looking long and
    hard to find a solution to avoid sequestration. We understand
    sequestration would be a disaster for our national defense, for
    our military, and in fact for those who serve in the military.
    So believe me, we share that concern, and we are working ways
    to try to make sure that sequestration just does not happen. We
    cannot let it happen.

                             END STRENGTH REDUCTION

        Now, let me ask about the end strength, because you
    mentioned great obligations that the United States Army has.
    You also mentioned that in the Pacific area you will be dealing
    with seven other armies. I believe you said it was seven. But
    we know, this Committee knows, that while our Army is by far
    the best Army of any of those we are not the biggest. We do not
    have the manpower that a lot of these other armies have. And
    then we are going to be reducing, and if I did the math
    properly, we are going to be reducing end strength by about
    80,000, is that correct?
        General Odierno. That is correct.
        Mr. Young. Over what time frame? What will be the time
    frame before you reach that 80,000 drawdown?
        General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, the end of fiscal year 2017
    is when we will meet that requirement. So it has begun in
    fiscal year 2012, so it is over a 6-year period from 2012
    through 2017 that will impact that. And that is important
    because that ramp allows us to make sure we are taking care of
    our soldiers and families, it allows us to ensure we continue
    to meet our commitments in Afghanistan and other deployable
    places, and it also provides a hedge for a few years against
    uncertainty that can allow us to reverse if necessary.
        Mr. McHugh. If I may, Mr. Chairman, there were some
    realities afoot. As you noted, armies are people. About 48
    cents of every dollar currently we spend is on personnel cost.
    So to take the mandated reductions under the Budget Control
    Act, but also to look at the realities coming out of two
    theaters of war as planned by the end of 2014, we felt that
    that end strength reduction was first prudent, but also
    required so that we remained, as you noted, Mr. Chairman,
    balanced, that we did not hollow out. We spent a great deal of
    time ensuring through the process of constructing this budget
    that we had the sufficient resources behind that end strength
    to do the right things by them in family programs,
    modernization, all kinds of readiness, training availabilities,
    et cetera, et cetera. So when you look at this as a whole piece
    I think it represents a very prudent reaction to the realities
    of today, the likelihoods of tomorrow, and as I have said, the
    Budget Control Act that was passed by this Congress.

                           FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

        Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, we understand the difficulties in
    reaching the goals set by the President.
        General, you mentioned when you talked about the size of
    the Army, I think you said 178,000 civilians also work for the
    Army. Was that the right number?
        General Odierno. 278,000.
        Mr. Young. Will there be a reduction in that civilian force
    as well?
        General Odierno. I think that we will see reductions in the
    civilian force. We are required to take some throughout this
    period. There will also be required reductions in the end
    force.
        Mr. McHugh. That kind of falls over my side of the ledger.
    We had R&D by the Secretary that required us to reduce the end
    strength of civilian by 8,700. We are in the process of doing
    that. That will be completed by the end of this year. And
    thereafter we are right now trying to right size this civilian
    workforce. We are very mindful that all of the cuts cannot come
    just on the military side. We will in fact be announcing some
    steps forward in the very near future as to exactly how and
    where those civilian cuts will come. Some of your staff have
    already been briefed on the preliminary aspects of those
    drawdowns. But in short, civilian end strength will be coming
    down as well.
        General Odierno. We grew about 30,000 civilians over the
    last 8 or 9 years as we increased the size of the Army during
    the mid-2000s. And in addition, because of some of the
    requirements, because of us being engaged in two theaters, we
    were using operational funds, hired overhires in order to
    provide support to deployed families and other things. So all
    of those things will be relooked as we come out of Iraq, as we
    begin to come out of Afghanistan, and those will all be things
    that we have to look at over the next several years as we right
    size the Army.

                          CONTRACT CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

        Mr. Young. As you downsize, will it be necessary for you to
    hire contractors to fill in the void or will you just accept
    the void?
        Mr. McHugh. We will always have a requirement for
    contractors. They provide specialized skills that it is just
    not cost beneficial for any military service to keep those
    internally. However, having said that, we are involved in just
    the opposite initiative at the moment, and that is trying to
    shed ourselves of the buildup of contractors that has happened
    principally because of the two theaters of war and begin to
    internalize those where they are absolutely essential and use
    military personnel wherever practicable.
        Mr. Young. I have a lot of other questions but we have a
    very good attendance today and so hopefully I will get a second
    chance to visit with you. But at this point I would like to
    yield to Mr. Dicks.

                           STRYKER RESET AND UPGRADE

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Stryker program was
    initiated in 1999. The Stryker family of vehicles has 10
    variants ranging from infantry carrier to reconnaissance
    vehicle to medical evacuation. The Stryker family was intended
    to serve as a bridge to the future fielding of the Future
    Combat System. FCS, as we know, was canceled in 2009, but the
    Stryker vehicles have performed well.
        Now, let me ask you this. We are going have to go through
    reset on a number of these things. And what I am trying to
    figure out is, and we have had some discussion, General, about
    this, if there is a lack of mobility off the road why would not
    we consider increasing, putting a bigger engine in the
    Strykers, and at the same time going to the double V hull,
    which as I understand it has been very successful, and try to
    reset as many of those in that way in order to meet the
    requirement?
        General Odierno. Congressman----
        Mr. Dicks. Tell us what you think about the Stryker.
        General Odierno. First, the Stryker has performed
    incredibly well both in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are very
    proud of the legacy of the Stryker and the Stryker brigades and
    what they have been able to accomplish. What we have to do is
    one of the things we are doing with this downsizing, is we are
    reassessing the force mix. And a part of this force mix is how
    much light, medium, heavy airborne will we continue to have in
    the force. And once we make those decisions we will have to go
    back and relook at what systems do we want to have in these
    elements. I will tell you that right now the Stryker brigades
    are really not under consideration because they are found to be
    a very flexible capability that we want to sustain, at least
    into the future. Right now we are planning on purchasing two
    brigades with a double V hull Strykers. And I think in the
    future as we develop this force mix we will then make a
    decision do we have to purchase more of those or not. But
    before we make any decisions like that we have to ensure that
    we understand what our final force mix will be. And I suspect
    we will come to that answer in the next year or so as we
    continue to do our evaluations of what the final force will
    look like.
        I would also add----
        Mr. Dicks. Are you talking there about reset? I mean, about
    taking some of these that we are going to bring back and
    resetting them? I mean, I was intrigued by the idea of going to
    a slightly bigger engine. I think, what is it, 350 horsepower.
    You could go to 450 and maybe this would solve this off road
    issue that you raise.
        General Odierno. What we are going to do is as we go
    through the Ground Combat Vehicle, which is an infantry
    fighting vehicle, as we go through that process, when we get to
    Milestone B one of things we are going to look at is
    alternatives, and one of the alternatives is the Stryker. And
    one would be improvements to the Stryker and would that be a
    better way to go once we see what the two competitors come up
    with in the Ground Combat Vehicle. So I think that is when we
    will take a look at that and decide is that a better way to go
    or not.

                               M1 TANK PRODUCTION

        Mr. Dicks. You know, last year our committee felt very
    strongly on an almost unanimous basis that we ought to keep the
    tank line open, and so we added I think $255 million or
    whatever in order to do that.
        Can you tell us kind of how the Army sees this now? And I
    understand that there is a possibility of foreign military
    sales that could help us keep the tank line open.
        Mr. McHugh. Let me just start and then the Chief can, I am
    sure, fill in the substantial blanks I leave. I just approved
    the execution of the $225 million that you spoke about, Mr.
    Dicks. That will procedure between 42 and 44 tanks. In order to
    sustain the Abrams line at Lima you have to produce at least 70
    tanks a year. So the money that we provided, while substantial,
    will not fill the production gaps. And in fact we would have to
    spend about $600 million to $800 million to close and later
    reopen the line versus nearly $3 billion to close it, and the
    cost analysis is that the closure costs far outweigh keeping an
    open, nearly $3 billion to keep it open.
        The other thing I would tell you, the reality is----
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Secretary, does that include an analysis of
    industrial base? It just seems to me if you are going to reopen
    this thing in a couple of years the idea of shutting it down
    when we only have one tank for the country I think is something
    that is hard to accept up here.
        Mr. McHugh. Well, you raise a good point. And we are very
    concerned about those high end jobs that are attendant not just
    at the Abrams line, but virtually any of our production lines.
    And we do have, as you noted, a strategy that is working its
    way that we think in concert with GDLS, General Dynamics Land
    Systems, we can fill in substantial gaps in that production gap
    to frankly hold the very high end, high technical jobs that are
    so critical and make reopening or a clean shutdown and a
    reopening so very, very difficult. So we are trying to fill
    those.
        The other thing I would tell you is that the Department of
    Defense is conducting what they call a S2T2, a sector-by-
    sector, tier-by-tier analysis that the Army is participating
    in, to try to develop further strategies to protect this
    industrial base through these drawdown times. We simply do not
    feel, going back to the Abrams line, that this is one--we do
    know it is one of the most modernized platforms in our Army.
    The average Abrams tank is about 2\1/2\ years old. So we are
    trying to find the right way forward, we are sensitive to the
    industrial base, we think we have some means by which we can
    sustain those high end jobs but these are going to be tough
    challenges.
        Chief.

                              TANK FLEET READINESS

        General Odierno. And Congressman, the conundrum we have is
    that we do not need tanks. Our tank fleet is 2\1/2\ years old
    average now. It has been recapped, it has been reset, we are in
    good shape. And these are additional tanks that we do not need.
    So that is the other problem we have in keeping this line open.
    When we are done in 2014 we now have all the tanks we need, and
    we did not think we would have to start to reset or
    recapitalizing again until after 2017. So it is about a 3-year
    gap that we have. And in order to sustain it you got to
    purchase 70 tanks a year. That would be another 280 tanks that
    we simply do not need. And so that is part of the problem here
    as we assess this. So what we have done is we have--we believe
    there is, as I mentioned to you yesterday, there are several
    countries who are looking that they believe they have to do
    some work on their tank fleet. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and there is
    a few others. And we think that this could be a solution to us
    keeping the line open if we are successful. But again, it is
    not a done deal yet, and so there is still a lot of work that
    we have to do in the foreign military sales area.
        Mr. Dicks. What about the Guard and Reserve, do they have
    all the tanks they need?
        General Odierno. Yes.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Odierno. And the other piece, finally, is part of
    this force mix we also might, as we go through this force
    structure review, we actually might reduce the requirement for
    heavy capability. And that is the other thing we have to make
    sure we take into account as well.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        Mr. Lewis.
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    McHugh, General Odierno, a pleasure to be with you. Thank you
    very much for your service. I cannot help but reflect upon the
    chairman's mentioning that I had the privilege of chairing this
    Committee for a while. Emblazoned in my mind is a picture of a
    session I went to a couple of weeks after becoming chairman
    when they were swearing in a new Chief to the Army. I never had
    been exposed to this person before, but amazingly to me here
    was a guy who when he first became eligible for the Army was a
    foreign alien, born in Hawaii, World War II. And here some
    years later is this fellow Eric Shinseki being sworn in as the
    Chief of the U.S. Army, and amazing to me and amazing statement
    about this country.

                               SEXUAL HARASSMENT

        I am a little uncomfortable beginning my questioning along
    these lines, but it is an important set of questions. Men and
    women who make up the U.S. Army, we do face a serious challenge
    oft time on the front line with a thing called sexual
    harassment within the force.
        Could you please discuss for the committee those programs
    and policies in place that are designed to deal with this
    challenge and give us an idea of where you see us going
    regarding this challenge?
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Lewis. That is a
    critically important issue, not just for the Army but for all
    of the services. And certainly from our perspective one of the
    most disturbing things about it other than the personal tragedy
    that it creates is that there are few things that are more
    contrary to the Army values. And it sadly tragically is not
    just on the front lines, it is through everywhere that we have
    men and women serving together, which is throughout all aspects
    of our United States Army.
        What we have done is to try to take the most holistic
    approach we possibly can. And in fact we have supported what is
    called the SHAR program, sexual harassment and assaults
    response program, where we have literally increased the funding
    over the last 5 years by 500 percent to ensure that we bring on
    line better training programs so that today virtually every
    training level has it, not just as an hour or two, but
    something that is imbued through every aspect of our training
    modules. We have tried to enrich the personnel, to put out
    mobile training teams so that they can go out through all our
    camps, posts and stations training CID officers in the unique
    aspects of both investigating and forensically mining a crime
    scene. We have hired special prosecutors who are particularly
    adept at these kinds of cases to ensure that we are bringing
    the perpetrators to trial. We have hired new lab analysts to
    ensure that the forensic material that is collected is handled
    appropriately and that we are not falling behind the curve.
        So from literally the first day that someone comes into the
    Army to the last day we are either providing the resources
    necessary or the training that is absolutely required. At the
    end of the day it is a commander's program. We have to rely
    upon leadership. And I will defer to the Chief to speak about
    that, but if we do not have our Army command and our NCO
    officers every day instilling this in our young soldiers, then
    I do not think we have really reached the place we need to be.
        We see signs of it being better. The Army reporting rate
    for these incidents is about 33 percent, in the civilian sector
    is about 19 percent. We want crime victims to report. We want
    them to be assured that the Army will do right by them, that
    they will not be victimized again. So those increasing report
    rates I think are encouraging, and our conviction rates are
    going up as well. But as long as there is one case of this that
    still exists in our ranks that is one case too many, and we are
    working it each and every day.
        General Odierno. Congressman, I would just say what I talk
    about all the time is that sexual harassment and sexual assault
    is inconsistent with our Army values. It is inconsistent with
    what we want our Army to be. We want to foster a climate of
    trust and respect. It is essential for us to have that. As we
    ask our soldiers to go into combat and do very many difficult
    missions, it is absolutely inherent that we have trust and
    respect for each other. And if we have sexual harassment and
    sexual assault going on within our force, we do not have that
    trust and respect of protecting each other to making sure we
    are taking care of each other no matter who you are.
        And so there is a two-prong strategy, and actually the
    Secretary covered most of it. But one is institutional. And we
    have now embedded this from the time you come into basic
    training to the basic course in our military academies and ROTC
    programs all the way through our institutional training program
    to when you go through being a general officer. We have also
    now embedded it into all our command programs. We have programs
    that train battalion and brigade and company commanders. This
    is an integral part of this. And then we have our operational
    strategy, which the Secretary talked about, where we now go
    into operational units and continue to train them in there. It
    is about changing our culture. It is about changing the
    culture, and I call it the bystander culture, where you will
    not tolerate if you see something happen; you will not allow
    this to happen to a fellow soldier. And that is what our
    strategy is based on.
        And we will continue to work this. As the Secretary said,
    we have increased our funding in this program. For me it is
    fundamental that we correct this problem. And I want you to
    know that we are totally dedicated and all in on this to ensure
    that we continue, because we still have problems and we will
    continue to go after this, Congressman.

                            NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

        Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much for that, General and
    Secretary. General Odierno, we have a, you may or may not be
    aware of it, but the National Training Center for the Army,
    NTC, happens to be in San Bernardino County, which is in my
    district. No more fabulous training place in the world for the
    kinds of challenges we present to our soldiers. And what they
    do out there, the equipment we might place there, the testing
    of better, faster, stronger couldn't be done better than I see.
    I wish our entire Committee could go out and spend some time at
    the NTC to view the training aspects of this tremendous Army.

                       NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER EXPANSION

        One piece of this that concerns me that I have not been
    able to successfully get a response to is the fact that beyond
    the NTC in this territory is also the 29 Palms training of the
    Marine Corps. There is space between these two great forces,
    and very, very important to our long-term success. There are
    some who are suggesting that it might be okay to let much of
    the remaining open space between the 29 Palms facility and the
    NTC to be taken up as an addition to our kind of park frontier.
    I am very, very concerned about what that might do to our
    future training capabilities by force, both in the air, but
    also on the ground.
        Could you respond to that?
        General Odierno. Well, first I will tell you I have spent
    many, many rotations, months, days out at the National Training
    Center, so I know it quite well. And it is in my opinion
    probably the finest combined arms training center in the world
    today. And as we have continued to increase its capabilities I
    think there is no other place where we can replicate the future
    environment as well. And I am very excited that this year we
    will conduct several rotations that really take us into the
    future and the threat that we might be challenged to see and we
    will start training our units to this threat as they return
    from Iraq and Afghanistan.
        As I am sure you are aware, Congressman, the Marine Corps
    and the Army has in some cases different training requirements
    that we have to go through. And they do some at 29 Palms, we do
    ours at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness
    Training Center. But as we become more joint it is important
    that we are able to bring some of these things together.
        I will specifically look at the question you have asked. I
    do not have an answer for you on the area between 29 Palms and
    the National Training Center, but I will certainly look into
    that. And I just want you to know though that there is nothing
    more important to us, especially now that we are moving in
    reestablishing some of our basic capabilities that we have to
    reinstill in the Army and the importance of these training
    centers.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, thank you very much. And you have
    noticed the presence of our Full Committee chairman.
        Mr. Lewis. I noted his arrival. And I certainly want to
    defer to our chairman. But if I could just say in closing
    regarding that, the NTC and the 29 Palms facility is so
    critical to our future, our ability to cross train. We have
    enough space out there to put four eastern States. We do not
    have to put the whole world into a big park. But indeed the
    future of our ability to extend our force, to exercise our
    force lies right there. And I would hope you give it very high
    priority, Mr. Secretary, as well as the General.
        Mr. McHugh. I promise you we will take a look at that. And
    having been to NTC any number of times and been awed at places
    like Medina Wasl out there. It is an incredible resource and we
    cannot afford to lose it, I would fully agree. So we will get
    back to you on that.
        Mr. Young. I would like to yield now to Chairman Rogers.

                            PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding the time.
        Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Back to your old stomping grounds
    here on the Hill. And General, welcome as well.
        Last year, I discussed with you a problem that is a
    national problem but which also impacts our military, and that
    is prescription drug abuse. We had a good conversation about it
    last year, and I was happy to learn of efforts that you have
    undertaken and, over the last year, have enhanced. I don't need
    to repeat to you the problem that we have. In my home State,
    Kentucky, on the diversion of prescription drug medicine, we
    have more people dying of overdoses from prescription drug
    medicine than who die in car wrecks. The medicine cabinet is a
    bigger weapon than a car, and it is infecting the military as
    well. You are not immune from the problem.
        According to a recent Army Times article, 21 percent of
    soldiers involved in illegal drug use in fiscal 2011 were
    abusing prescription drugs. In addition, between 2009 and 2011,
    142 of the 197 drug-related undetermined or accidental deaths
    involved prescription drugs. Because of the mobility of
    soldiers and the different locales that they serve in during
    their tenure, it is difficult to keep tabs on what medicines
    have been prescribed along their path. I understand the
    complicated importance of that.
        However, in 2009, the Army created a pain management task
    force to give us a standardized DOD vision and approach to pain
    management to optimize the care for warriors and their
    families, and I want to commend you for that and for the work
    that you have been doing. In February, you announced plans to
    expand drug testing to include hydrocodone and benzodiazepines,
    whatever that is. Varying press reports have told us about
    different drugs that are already being tested by the Army.

                           PRESCRIPTION DRUG TESTING

        Are you testing for codeine, morphine, oxycodone,
    especially OxyContin?
        Mr. McHugh. My understanding is, we have tested for
    oxycodone since 2009. We have expanded, as you noted, our
    testing particularly for the marker and indices in such drugs
    as Valium, Xanax, those kinds of prescription drugs that sadly
    are becoming widely used as recreational drugs. I think for the
    moment, our testing regimen and our protocols are such that we
    are covering many of the drugs that are a problem. There are
    other drugs that we are told we are not able to effectively--no
    one is able to effectively test for yet. Some of these ever-
    emerging chemical concoctions, such things as spice and others
    that are more and more being used recreationally, provide a
    great deal of danger to the health of the force and to the
    individual but are extraordinarily hard to test for, and we are
    always working to try to find better ways to do that.
        But it really is a two-part problem. Those who would
    purposefully abuse drugs, that is a legal challenge; and our
    random testing programs, I think, are becoming more and more
    effective as we root out those people who have a problem. And
    the others are who those who become inadvertent abusers. As you
    know, Mr. Chairman, the ability to track movement and migration
    of soldiers through the force and their medical records is a
    challenge, but it is one I think we are getting on top of. We
    are doing a far better job in tracking, through medical
    records, the kinds of prescriptions that are doled out by our
    military physicians, but therein lies another problem. These
    are American citizens. And while they may receive a set of
    prescription drugs for whatever challenges they face at the
    military health facility, they are free to go off base and
    receive perhaps another dose of the same medicines or other
    medicines that we simply can't track. So we need to do a better
    job working with the civilian sector and ensuring that we have
    a full range of understanding of what drugs are being
    prescribed to individual soldiers.
        The other thing I will tell you is, we have become
    extraordinarily vigilant, particularly in our treatment centers
    and our wounded warrior care centers, for those who are in a
    polypharmacological situation, multiple drugs. If you have over
    four prescriptions, we have a single dispenser, a single person
    who has a responsibility for tracking those prescription drugs
    that are administered to you. We have instituted--I believe we
    talked last year--something called EMA, which is an electronic
    medicine disposal. You can only get so many drugs. We have
    limited the number of supplies of drugs that anyone can get for
    many of these types of prescriptions.
        So we are trying to do what we can. But clearly the data
    show that this continues to be a big problem that we are
    fighting against each and every day.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, as you know, these drugs we are talking
    about are highly addictive and are extremely difficult to kick,
    especially OxyContin, which is a great pain reliever but is
    really subject to terrible abuse. What progress have you made
    in preventing addiction, and also helping those who admit to an
    addiction, particularly the implementation of the
    recommendations made in your pain management task force report
    from May of 2010?

                            PAIN MANAGEMENT CENTERS

        General Odierno. Congressman, first we have now opened
    eight pain management clinics that talk about alternative means
    to address pain as you start to take yourself off of these
    drugs, especially our wounded warriors and other people who
    have done this. And we are finding those to be very, very
    successful, these alternative methods. We are testing codeine,
    morphine now starting this year. We expect to be about 20
    percent in the next month or so, and that will continue to
    increase throughout the year. You know, the electronic records
    have improved significantly in tracking this. One of the holes
    we have found was in drugs being prescribed in Iraq and
    Afghanistan that were not making it back into the medical
    records. We have now fixed that problem, so we now understand
    and have a system in place to track that. So I think through
    the pain management clinics, through the understanding of
    helping our soldiers who have been injured to begin to think
    about how you wean yourself off of the pain and how you have
    alternative methods to do this, I think we are finding some
    success in this.
        But as the Secretary has stated, it is difficult sometimes
    to track what they do outside of the military medical system,
    and that is what we are trying to gain more awareness at the
    leader level so they understand the signs so they can identify
    this to us so we can get them the help necessary.
        Mr. McHugh. If I could just add, Mr. Chairman, you
    mentioned a very important part. What are we doing to help
    these people directly? We have, as we discussed last year, the
    Army substance abuse program and it covers both alcohol and
    drug abuse. And what we are trying to do is encourage soldiers
    who understand they have a problem, the challenge of addiction,
    to come forward voluntarily before they are somehow discovered
    and that places them into the disciplinary process. And I think
    you look at the data and it is somewhat encouraging. We are
    having more and more soldiers self-report, self-identify, go
    get the help they need, whether it is relief from pain
    addiction, pain control addiction or alcohol addiction, and
    then return to their military service with no punitive action.
    But it is hard to convince someone that if they self-divulge
    something that not so many years ago was a complete career
    killer, that they are just going to receive help. But we are
    making progress there as well. And ultimately, I see that as a
    very important part of our response program.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I appreciate your being on top of the
    problem. It is a problem not just for the military but, more
    importantly, I guess for the population at large. In bringing
    this up, I don't want to take away from the importance of pain
    medicine for those who are in need of it on the battle front.
        So thank you for your work.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And thank you
    for being here today. Now I have checked the clock and the very
    good attendance. So I think we are going to have to do the best
    we can to stick to the 5-minute rule for the balance of the
    hearing. And at this point I would yield to Mr. Moran.

                              REPROGRAMMING FUNDS

        Mr. Moran. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        John, nice to see you. General.
        I am concerned that the executive branch over the years on
    a bipartisan basis really has attempted to usurp the
    prerogatives of the legislative branch. It is our
    responsibility to determine how money is to be spent and yours
    to carry out those requirements that we put into law. We had
    this issue with the Air Force yesterday over Global Hawks, when
    we appropriated the money and they just decided not to use it.
    Now just over a 3-month period last year, you reprogrammed $4.8
    billion. Now is that an aberration or are we going to continue
    to see that kind of thing in the fiscal year 2012 budget?
        Mr. McHugh. We had a very good conversation yesterday with
    a number of Senators who had that very same concern. I am
    somewhat conflicted. I have this dual vision on both sides.
        Mr. Moran. You are one of us, John. Don't forget, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Mr. McHugh. The short answer to your question is: We are
    going to do better.

                            IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION

        Mr. Moran. That is fair. All right. I wanted that to be the
    last word on the record.
        In this budget, you have asked for money for involuntary
    separations from the Army because you have got to draw down by
    80,000 people. But we also have a sequestration looming on the
    horizon this fiscal year. Now what would that mean to the Army
    if the sequestration was actually allowed to take effect?
        Mr. McHugh. Well, the problem that you have just mentioned
    would be dramatically exacerbated. The Chief spoke to this in
    his opening comment. If you look at it mathematically--and I
    think in is a best-case scenario, sequestration would require
    us to find cuts of at least another $134 billion. You could
    translate that into a minimum of another five BCTs, probably
    more out of the Active component, and I think many on this Hill
    are concerned how we are going to manage the current eight.----
        Mr. Moran. So roughly, are we talking 200,000 Active plus
    Reserve and Guard?
        General Odierno. We have 86,000 now. It would be another
    additional 100,000 at least.
        Mr. Moran. Sure. So it is about 200,000, roughly. And then
    on the Reserve and Guard, we actually have a retention rate of
    110 percent. It is more than we had even anticipated. Now are
    you going to also ask for money for voluntary separations, like
    severance packages and that kind of thing, particularly with
    regard to what that may mean for morale? Obviously if it is
    voluntary it is a lot more of a morale booster than involuntary
    separation.
        General Odierno. Well, I would just say, Congressman, if we
    do not go to sequestration, and we continue just to do the
    80,000 that we are doing now--we went through voluntary
    incentives in the 1990s; and frankly, it didn't work out so
    well. Our assessment is the people we wanted to stay were
    leaving because they felt more confident about leaving and
    being able to do other things. And we want to have control
    somewhat over keeping our best people. So we would use that if
    we had to, but it would be something of a last resort to use
    something like that.
        Mr. McHugh. Could I add to? Because I know some of your
    Northern Virginia concerns. This just isn't military. This is
    civilian as well. And those kinds of cuts would have to be
    equally weighed against civilian reductions, which are already
    a challenge for us, even under the current budget. So it would
    be a huge problem.

                          JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

        Mr. Moran. Very good point. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And
    lastly and very quickly, you have got about 150,000 high
    mobility wheeled vehicles. We are going to be sort of switching
    to the prototype, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. But we have
    got a problem in that we are requiring that we have the kind of
    MRAP protection underneath them for IEDs and so on. But the
    problem is that that weight is sinking them into light soil.
    And I see that, from the prototype testing and so on, that has
    been a real problem. How are you going to deal with that,
    General?
        General Odierno. Are you asking about the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle?
        Mr. Moran. Yes.
        General Odierno. We believe that the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle will actually be able to provide better protection
    based on the new technologies that we have. So that is one of
    the benefits we believe of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. So
    we think it will provide us better protection at less weight.
    We will see as we go forward with this. That is what we believe
    we will get. But we do have that problem with Humvees clearly
    right now because they are so heavy.
        Mr. Moran. Thank you.
        Mr. McHugh. I would note, we worked very carefully with the
    Marine Corps to do the joint acquisition program, as you know,
    to reduce weight; in fact, 3 years shorter to acquisition and
    reduced the price by about 50 percent. So we feel pretty good
    about that program at this point.
        Mr. Moran. That is terrific. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Moran, thank you very much. Mr.
    Frelinghuysen.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
    my absence yesterday.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. General Odierno,
    New Jersey is proud of you as a West Point graduate, your
    enormous success and your leadership of today's Army.
        I have a general question and a specific question: There is
    a lot of talk of pivoting to the Pacific, the Asia Pacific.
    Representative Calvert and I had the privilege of visiting
    General Thurman on the Korean Peninsula. We also went and
    looked at some issues that related to our appropriations
    process and decisions here with the Navy in Japan. I hear a lot
    of talk about the Marines and the Navy and confrontations, you
    know, in the air; the Air Force has to meet challenges.
        Where does the Army come into the picture here? You know,
    for some who read the newspaper, they feel, Well, maybe we can
    do everything with special operators. We can do things with
    drones. But when push comes to shove--and God only knows we
    hope it never happens--we need boots on the ground. Where do
    you see the Army getting into this picture? And how are you
    going to get today's Army into the fight to address issues of
    confrontation?
        General Odierno. Well first, thank you, Congressman. While
    I remind everybody, if you go into the Pacific region, there
    are actually more Army soldiers there than sailors and airmen
    combined. I will just continue to point that out to everyone,
    for those who believe there is not Army in the Pacific region.
        The second thing is, though, as I mentioned earlier, seven
    out of 10 largest land armies. What I didn't say is, 22 out of
    the 27 chiefs of defense are Army. The most influential
    organizations within the Pacific region in each country is the
    Army itself. So it is important that we engage army-to-army.
    And both Admiral Willard and Admiral Locklear, the new PACOM
    commander, have said one of the issues they have had is they
    have not been able to engage with all of the armies because of
    the tension in the Middle East. So I think there is an
    opportunity for the Army here to build relationships, to do
    multilateral training. So we are relooking, prepositioned
    stocks in the Pacific. We are looking at how we can do that for
    both training and for if we need it for deployment. I believe
    the Army can help with gaining access for future conflicts, if
    necessary. And I believe in both Korea and outside of Korea,
    there is a need to have a joint combined arms capability which
    would require ground forces. And so we are working that very
    carefully as we move forward in the Asia Pacific.
        So I think there is a big role for the Army. I think we are
    being aggressive at making sure everybody understands that I
    made my first trip over there and talked to both the chiefs of
    defense and the ministers of defense of both Japan and Korea. I
    recently had the head of the Australian Army here, and we are
    going to work very carefully with them as well as others. And I
    am going to go back there again this summer to some of the
    other nations to have these discussions and why it is important
    to have the Army involved there.

                             GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I must say, there seems to be a more of
    a public focus on Marines and Navy and the Air Force and we are
    for joint training with the Australians, who have always been
    supportive of us I guess since World War II. And I mean, you
    have worked and trained with the Australians. They are pretty
    good soldiers. They have been loyal to us. And obviously we
    have other allies.
        One program question: Where do we stand with the Ground
    Combat Vehicle? How is that program going? A less pointed
    question than I had last year. Where do we stand?
        General Odierno. We are in good shape. We had the protest.
    The protest was resolved. That delayed us a little bit, but we
    are on track. It is still a 7-year program. We are on track to
    get to Milestone B where in Milestone B, there will be two
    competitors that are developing a system. And then at that
    time, we will bring off-the-shelf capability to compete. Also
    at Milestone B, along with the new developmental capabilities
    to ensure that we are selecting the best infantry fighting
    vehicle----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is still 7 years?
        General Odierno. It is.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Whoa. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.
        Ms. Granger.

                              OH-58D KIOWA WARRIOR

        Ms. Granger. General Odierno, thank you for your service
    and for being here. It is wonderful to be here. Thank you for
    speaking up about sequester and we have all got to be very
    specific about--this is what it is going to cost us in manpower
    and equipment, whatever, because we have got to stop it.
        Secretary McHugh, thank you very much. I just have one
    question. It has to do with OH-58d Kiowa Warrior and you
    mentioned you are modernizing and replacing the existing
    commercial--the way I understand it, you are converting a
    commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft as a replacement for the
    Kiowa Warrior. And my question is, did you look at
    modernization and upgrading that? Because it is just the
    highest operational tempo and readiness and it has always just
    been a really magnificent vehicle.
        Mr. McHugh. The Kiowa Warrior has been a terrific platform.
    There is no question about it. And it still remains one of the
    focal points of our planning for the way ahead. The current
    status is, we are in an AOA, an analysis of alternatives, to
    try to determine what kind of progress could be made were we to
    build the next generation of armed aerial scout. That analysis
    will be done somewhat later this year; and at that point,
    looking at the Kiowa Warrior, the costs and such of continuing
    to have the SLEP, the service life extension program, for that,
    where bringing in a new platform will be decided. So we really
    haven't finalized a way forward.
        In the meantime, we do have what is called the CASUP
    program, which is the cockpit upgrade program for the Kiowa
    Warrior. We are implementing that. We are asking for funding to
    continue that. That brings that new capability set and
    modernization that you spoke about. If we go through to
    completion of that, that would keep the Kiowa Warrior in the
    fleet until about 2025. But we have got some important
    decisions to make probably by the latter part of this year.
        Ms. Granger. But you are considering all your options?
        Mr. McHugh. Yes, ma'am.

                 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT RESPONSE PROGRAM

        Ms. Granger. Thank you. Let me just say one more thing
    about what Jerry Lewis said, and that has to do with sexual
    assault. I was on the Air Force Academy board of visitors when
    they went through just a complete examination because of some
    situations there. I know it is Air Force. They did an amazing
    job. They brought in a new administration and they went through
    just an examination of everything. And it really was pretty
    amazing because I was brought on during that period of time.
    And of course not drug use but alcohol had a great deal to do
    with these assaults, and as you talk about drug and alcohol.
    And what they learned and the examination they went through
    would be beneficial. Other boards I served on, universities, I
    said, you need to look at this because it also happens in your
    university. But I would say that they really learned a lot and
    made a lot of changes. Some of them were situational. I mean,
    they went to women and said, All right, how could this be
    different? Because they looked at prevention really more than
    criminal charges and what was happening after. I would just
    suggest that.
        Mr. McHugh. I was on the West Point board when you were on
    the Air Force board, and we looked hard at what the academy out
    there did, and it did some darn good things. I think you would
    agree it is breathtaking, first of all, that we have this
    problem but that we have it at places such as West Point, Air
    Force Academy and, of course, at Annapolis, it makes it even
    more disturbing. And whether it is at the academies or just in
    the regular Army, alcohol abuse and the nexus between alcohol
    abuse and sexual abuse is disturbing. And we have got a real
    way by which we can control the latter by doing better on the
    former, and we are working that real hard.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Rothman.

                       MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

        Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you. Thank you for
    your career in public service, which is continuing with
    extraordinary results for our country. Thank you, sir.
        General Odierno, New Jersey is proud of you, sir, as a
    Jersey guy myself. I saw you at least once or twice in Iraq.
    And again, you have led an extraordinary career of military
    service. I hope your son is doing well. And God bless you, sir,
    for all you have done.
        I have a limited amount of time, so I want to get right to
    my question. The overarching issue for me at this moment, for
    my limited time here, would be theater missile defense. Is that
    an issue for you? How do you address it? I know that some of
    the PATRIOT 3 missiles have been upgraded. I have been told
    that the Medium Extended Air Defense System, the MEADS, has
    been canceled; yet the budget request includes about $400
    million for that system for fiscal year 2013. Can you talk a
    little bit about this?
        Mr. McHugh. Yes. I will start with MEADS. This has been a
    2-year excursion. And the reality is, the way forward is
    largely influenced by an agreement that was reached amongst the
    United States, Italian, and German Governments. The agreement
    stated that at the end of 2014, we would reach this magical
    place called ``proof of concept.'' I can't really tell you what
    that means other than at the end of that year all financial
    obligations on the participating partners would be discharged.
    The agreement also calls for anyone who leaves unilaterally has
    to pay all the termination costs. So the judgment that the
    Department of Defense and the Army, as the executive agent for
    it, had to make last year was, would we spend approximately
    $800 million in termination costs, the estimate of what it
    would be to just walk away? Or would we spend roughly the same
    amount of money and get to the end of 2014, the proof of
    concept, and share in the technical capabilities package,
    whatever that might be?

                                   PATRIOT 3

        Mr. Rothman. I just want to make sure I don't run out of
    time. The PATRIOT 3s, how effective are they, General?
        General Odierno. Well, first, we are continuing to increase
    the effectiveness. They are one of the most wanted items around
    the world. 50 percent of our current fleet is either deployed
    or is preparing to deploy right now. We continue to procure
    PAC-3 missiles. We have 84 in 2013. Beyond that, we will try to
    do 56 a year. We are also improving the electronic launcher
    system, which upgrades its hit-to-kill capability. So we feel
    like we are investing appropriately there. It is a system that
    is wanted.
        Mr. Rothman. We have a joint U.S.-Israel missile defense
    program on the David's Sling, and we find that the President
    put in his budget last year $204 million for Iron Dome. Those
    are technologies that are being shared with the United States,
    obviously, and are being partly manufactured here. I am
    wondering if the Army is considering, rather than reinvent the
    wheel, so to speak, comparing those technologies, if we have
    got any lessons learned that we can make use of those
    investments we have already made?
        Mr. McHugh. Well, we are always trying to do better. And
    the partnership on missile defense with the Israelis has been
    one of the more productive ones. We also have PAC-2s as part of
    that layered missile defense.
        Mr. Rothman. Could you just talk about--most Americans
    don't understand the need for theater missile defense. What is
    the threat that you are addressing with the theater missile
    defense?
        General Odierno. It is an integrated system, and it has to
    do with short-range ballistic missiles, SCUDs, items like that
    that could be launched into a country, Israel is one example,
    from Iran.
        Mr. Rothman. But how about for our own forces?
        General Odierno. Well, as our forward forces are deployed,
    it protects us from a ballistic missile attack as well as some
    other capabilities, short-range missile capabilities. And it
    defends our forces against that as they are deployed. So it is
    an incredibly important piece of our integrated missile defense
    system for tactical operation formations.
        Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Crenshaw.

                               M1 TANK PRODUCTION

        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    your service and for being here today.
        I was interested in Mr. Dicks' question about tank
    production because if you remember last year, we had kind of a
    conversation about that, about how the production lines were
    going to be shut down. And I wondered how much thought had been
    given at the time about the question of whether you spend money
    to shut down a production line or you keep it open and actually
    produce something. And I think that is why the Committee at the
    end of the day, under the leadership of Mr. Young and Mr.
    Dicks, said, Well, it would be $255 million to see what would
    happen and hopefully end up getting a tank, as opposed to just
    spending money, closing a production line.
        So I was interested in hearing your comments. It sounds
    like there has been some study and documentation. I think the
    committee might like to see that, just to hear more about what
    went into your decision to how that works. Because I think we
    all agree, we are in this thing. We have got to spend less
    money. But we also have got to spend money in a smart way. And
    we all agree that it would be better to spend money and get
    something than to spend money and get nothing. So let's
    continue that conversation. I think we would love to know more
    because I think at the end of the day the Bradleys are going to
    be in that same situation, as I understand it, in terms of
    production and what we are going to do there, so how we are
    going to deal with that.
        And I guess one question: General, just in terms of saying
    we have got enough tanks, as I understand it, the active
    military has the SEP tanks and the National Guard has the A1.
    And I know you have got firsthand knowledge. Can you talk about
    a couple of the advantages of the SEP tank over the A1 tank?
        General Odierno. Well, firstly, the National Guard has a
    combination of SEP and A1s. The active component has SEP tank.
    First, it is the integrated system between the commander's
    module and the gunner. The ability to--it is inside of the
    cockpit, for lack of a better term--the ability to coordinate
    and synchronize engagements and to be able to see longer
    distances at night is the major advantages of the SEP tank over
    the A1. The A1 AIM tank is a very good tank. And in fact there
    are some people who will tell you they like it because it is
    not as, for some people, technically confusing. It is much
    easier to operate. But they are both incredibly very good tanks
    that we are comfortable with, very, very comfortable with. And
    the reason they are important for the National Guard is, as you
    know, they have reduced training time. So in many ways, it is
    easier for them to have the AIM tank because it takes less
    training time to be able to operate and it is just as effective
    in terms of lethality as the SEP tank.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Sir, would there be any benefit of everyone
    having a SEP tank?
        General Odierno. Yes. There could be. But the other thing I
    would like to point out is, again, we are in the process of
    reducing force structure. So as we look at reducing force
    structure, my guess is we will reduce some of our heavy
    requirements. So there will be tanks moving from the Active to
    the Reserve component probably as we move forward. So we have
    to continue to do that analysis and understand how many will be
    moving and how many will not be moving before we make a
    determination whether we need more SEP tanks or not.
        Mr. McHugh. Just to give you some figures to think about:
    If we were going to pure fleet A1, A2, SEP2, D2, it would cost
    $600 million a year. That is the minimum sustained rate at Lima
    for 70 tanks a year for 6 years; so in other words, an
    additional $3.6 billion.

                         MI TANK ENGINE REVITALIZATION

        Mr. Crenshaw. And one last quick question about tanks, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Last year you talked about the fact that the Abrams tanks,
    most of the maintenance issues relate to the engine in terms of
    fuel efficiency. And I think this Committee, in its report,
    encouraged you to pursue ways to deal with that fuel efficiency
    as well as maintenance. And I wonder, is there any money in
    this year's budget to pursue those kinds of issues?
        Mr. McHugh. We have continued money through I believe the
    end of 2014, as projected for the TIGER program, which is the
    Total InteGrated Engine Revitalization program, which brings in
    those kinds of capabilities. We are always looking to improve
    that as well. But the answer is yes.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you Mr. Crenshaw.
        Mr. Calvert.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both
    for coming. And John, I miss seeing you around here. General,
    thank you for your service.
        Sorry I was late. I was representing the Appropriations
    Committee at the Budget Committee about the sequestration.
        Mr. Young. That is very, very important. And thank you very
    much.

                        GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE UNIT COST

        Mr. Calvert. Well, it is daily progress. And tomorrow Mr.
    Cole and myself will be at an interesting meeting.
        But since--and maybe this question has already been asked,
    so I apologize if it has. This is regarding ground combat. I
    heard some comments about it, the Ground Combat Vehicle.
    Acquisition has been kind of a pet peeve of mine for years, the
    complexity of the acquisition process and the time that it
    takes to do these things. But since joining this subcommittee,
    I have taken a particular interest in that subject. And the
    current acquisition, as you know, is the Ground Combat Vehicle.
    As I understand it, the Army stated that the average unit
    production cost will be between $9 million and $10.5 million.
    And the average unit production cost will be between $11
    million and $13 million. And the Pentagon's Office of Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation reportedly estimates that
    average unit production will be in the $16 to $17 million
    range.
        So I guess I would ask: Why is there such a large
    difference between what the Army is saying it is going to cost
    and what the Pentagon's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
    office says it is going to cost?
        Mr. McHugh. I don't want to speak for CAPE, and they don't
    want me to speak for them either, but I think you always have
    some differences in those estimates because they are, in fact,
    estimates. But part of the reason it is hard to pin down these
    costs precisely is the very fact that we have learned a lot of
    the lessons that people like you, Mr. Calvert, have been trying
    to teach us; and that is to take a more realistic approach.
        We, as you know, first issued the RFP for the GCV. There
    were over 900 must-have requirements. That was a lot of the
    ``here we go again'' syndrome. And to the Army's credit, they
    withdrew that RFP, reconfigured it, rescoped it, and reduced
    those must-have requirements to under 200. The other thing that
    I think that is causing some differences of estimates is the
    fact that we are using competitive prototyping. And while we
    think that the effects of that may save a bit more than CAPE
    does, I think all of us can agree that is a very smart way to
    go about this kind of acquisition program, this 7-year major
    acquisition program.
        Number two, analysis of alternatives, looking at
    nondevelopmental alternatives from other nations, other
    platforms. The Chief has spoken earlier today about looking at
    the Stryker or a stretch Bradley or something as that instead
    of going to a GCV that causes cost estimates to become a little
    bit more uncertain as well. But for whatever differences we
    have with CAPE, OSD supports this initiative. They have given
    us the okay to go forward with it, and we think we are on a
    good track.
        Mr. Calvert. I appreciate that. But as you know, Mr.
    Secretary, unfortunately, CAPE in the past has been more
    accurate than the Army.
        Mr. McHugh. It is a new Army and a new CAPE.

                        GLOBAL HAWK BLOCK 30 RETIREMENT

        Mr. Calvert. Hopefully that is the case. One thing, I just
    wanted to make a point. I was in Korea recently with
    Congressman Frelinghuysen and I met with General Thurman. We
    had a very candid conversation. And I imagine every combatant
    commander would love to have 24/7 persistent surveillance in
    their theater. And General Thurman is no exception. And I was
    wondering what kind of communication you had with your brothers
    in the Air Force when they determined to park the Global Hawk.
    Did you have quite a conversation about that versus being able
    to use that platform?
        General Odierno. We did not have a specific conversation
    about Global Hawk between the Army and the Air Force. I think
    the combatant commanders in the Air Force had conversations
    about it. You know, it is not one of our programs, so we didn't
    have a specific discussion about that.
        Mr. Calvert. But obviously you are a big customer.
        General Odierno. I am. Was.
        Mr. Calvert. And I would suspect that your people are the
    ones that are at risk here. And was there any candid
    conversation taking place between the Air Force and the Army?
        General Odierno. It is about coming up with--you can't just
    take that capability away. You have to replace the capability.
    They believe they are going to replace the capability with some
    other fixed wing assets that they have. So they have worked
    very hard to explain to us why they will be able to replace
    those capabilities. And we would have to wait and see, have
    further discussion about that.
        Mr. McHugh. If Secretary Donnelly were here, I am hopeful
    he would defend me as well. It is not all Global Hawk. It is
    just the Global Hawk Block 30.
        General Odierno. That is right.
        Mr. McHugh. So they have sustained the Global Hawk program.
    It is just a niche capability that is achieved that they feel
    they can cover with onboard available assets that they have at
    a cheaper price. That was their analysis. But again, we were
    not consulted.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Hinchey.

                        BATTERIES AND THE SOLDIERS LOAD

        Mr. Hinchey. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary, it is great to see you. Thank you very much. And I
    very much appreciate what you are doing. And it is a great
    pleasure to listen to you and understand all the things that
    you are doing. Of course we do understand a lot of things you
    are doing and how effective they are. We deeply appreciate it.
    And, General, thank you very much as well. We deeply appreciate
    you and all the things you are doing. And I appreciate the work
    both of you have done to bring attention to the Army's energy
    challenges and the need to improve energy security. A whole
    host of other things. Thanks for everything you are doing.
        I just have a couple of simple little questions about the
    safety and security of these Army people. And one of them has
    to do with a report that soldier load can be as high now as 130
    pounds. And that 130 pounds comes about as a result of a lot of
    things. But mostly apparently it is batteries. At least a big
    chunk of it is batteries. I know that this is something that
    you are paying attention to and something that you are trying
    to deal with effectively to try to make it more safe and
    secure. So I wonder if you could just talk a little bit about
    that and what is likely to happen and what things you are going
    to do to try to make it more safe and secure.
        Mr. McHugh. I would be happy to. I will start with the
    battery part and the Chief can talk about the operational
    loads. He is far more conversant than I am. You are absolutely
    right. My favorite data point is to put a platoon on patrol for
    72 hours, they have to take 400 pounds of batteries with them.
    So what we are trying to do is pretty simple, and that is
    replace those disposable batteries with rechargeable batteries.
    When the conflict started back in the early 2000s, only 2
    percent of the battery supply of the United States Army was
    rechargeable. Today it is 52 percent. And we can reduce the
    individual soldier load by taking that 400-pound battery
    requirement away from that platoon by about six pounds per
    soldier, dispersed across the platoon. Now we still have 48
    percent of those batteries to go, but that is something that we
    are working on very, very diligently, and making sure they have
    other recharge capability out on patrol. What you can really do
    is extend a foot patrol indefinitely. Whereas before batteries
    are as deadly--or lack of batteries can be as deadly as the
    enemy. If you don't have a sustainable electrical supply, you
    have to bring those soldiers back out of the field. So----
        General Odierno. If I could, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and
    the 1st Brigade 82nd are getting ready to deploy to
    Afghanistan, and they are going to be the first brigades
    equipped with some of our newest energy systems. That should
    reduce the load of batteries.
        I will just give you a couple of examples. The Rucksack
    Enhanced Portable Power System, which is solar panel charged
    batteries. They will be given 89 of those within the brigade.
    They will be down to squad platoon levels to help reduce loads.
    There is the Solar Stick, which is a solar module battery pack
    and charging system.
        So these are some of the operational energy things that we
    are now employing and giving to the units getting ready to
    deploy that will help reduce the load of batteries and also,
    frankly, increase our ability to use less batteries and more
    safe batteries as well. So we continue to work this very hard,
    but we are very understanding of this problem of weight on our
    soldiers.

                               ENERGY EFFICIENCY

        Mr. Hinchey. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the
    attention to that and the positive effort that has being done.
        One other simple little question about the safety and
    security of our people. And it is related to the battery issue.
    It is important to recognize that energy security efficiency
    projects being developed and deployed, you know, all of that
    has saved lives and that is something else that needs to be
    done to continue to do that. And I know that you are very much
    aware of the fact that over 3,000 American servicemembers and
    contractors were killed protecting fuel convoys between 2003
    and 2007. And I am sure that number has increased since 2007. A
    lot can be done to cut down on the number of convoys and to try
    to do this more effectively and more safely.
        I think it is important to educate and create a culture
    that considers energy efficiency a necessity. Soldiers should
    know that their greater efficiency is helping keep their fellow
    soldiers out of harm's way, implementing best practices at FOBs
    and take fuel trucks off the road and ultimately save American
    lives. So I know that this is something that is troubling you
    and something that you are paying a lot of attention to and
    dealing with, and I hope that maybe you can tell us some of the
    things that you are dealing with this and some of the things
    that you think might be more effective as time goes on.
        Mr. McHugh. Excellent point. And you know we want to do
    this to save money. We want to do it for a lot of reasons. But
    at the end of the day, one of the most important is force
    protection. Convoys, for every 44 convoys we have approximately
    results in a casualty. So every time we have to put another
    convoy on the road we are putting our soldiers at risk and that
    is something we want to minimize. One of the key ways in which
    we are doing it, because about 70 to 80 percent of all of our
    convoy load is either water or fuel, what we are trying to do
    is lessen our requirements for water and fuel. We have
    installed shower reuse systems that can save about several
    thousand gallons, about 9,000 gallons of water per day per
    unit. Therefore, fewer convoys. One of the best things I think
    we are doing is what we are calling spot mini generators. They
    are going to save, when all installed, forward deployed, 50
    million gallons of fuel a year. That is the equivalent of 55
    trucks a day taken out of convoys each and every day, fewer
    casualties.
        So these are the kinds of things we have to do, yes,
    because it makes environmental sense, yes, because if we do it
    smartly it saves us money, but most of all, it keeps our
    soldiers safe.
        General Odierno. Can I just add, in Afghanistan we have 22
    mini grids that have been established that have saved us about
    over 30 million gallons of fuel a year. We have 22 employees.
    We are adding six or eight more this year. So that is a
    significant savings in the amount of fuel that is being used.
    We are looking at a new turbine engine for our aircraft which
    will reduce fuel by 25 percent. So these are all keys things we
    will continue to work for. And it is about force protection, as
    you said, in the theater, and it is about us reducing our fuel
    costs as well. So it is dual purpose here. And it is very, very
    important.
        Mr. Hinchey. Well, thanks very much. I appreciate your
    response to this, and I seriously deeply appreciate all the
    attention and effectiveness that you deliver and the
    responsibilities that you have. Thank you very much for
    everything that you do.
        Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me? Because I
    don't believe Mr. Hinchey was in the room and I have served
    with Maurice since our days in the State legislature and I know
    he is not running again either. As a fellow New Yorker, I want
    to thank him for his friendship and, more than that, for
    decades of leadership and concern. I wish you all the best.
        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for that,
    because we love our colleague Mr. Hinchey, and we also wish him
    the very best. And thank you very much, Mr. Hinchey.
        And now I will recognize Mr. Cole, who is also one of the
    representatives of this subcommittee to the Budget Committee as
    they try to protect our numbers when the budget funding comes
    out. Mr. Cole.

                      PALADIN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT (PIM)

        Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is always
    great to see you, Mr. Secretary. I had the good fortune of
    being your vice chairman when you are a subcommittee chairman
    on HASC. I was there when you were ranking and now I am here
    when you are Secretary. So if you could tell me what you are
    doing next, I would have some idea the arc of my career is
    because I seem to kind of follow you around.
        General, thank you for your extraordinary service and the
    sacrifice of your family. It is noted and appreciated greatly.
        I am going to ask a parochial question and then I have a
    couple serious ones. The parochial one is this. A number of--as
    I know the Secretary knows and the General knows as well--Fort
    Sill is in my district. I have a lot of Indian tribes and when
    you guys canceled the Comanche I literally got a call from the
    Chief who said I can't imagine the U.S. going to war with
    Kiowas or Apaches and no Comanches. So the next time you name
    something, if you could just--I don't care what it is but if
    you could get the Comanches back in the mix, I would have
    15,000 very happy constituents. He reminded me. He said, look,
    we fought against, with and for the United States Army more
    than anyone else. We ought to be a part of it.
        More seriously, at Fort Sill in Lawton obviously we have
    lived through the cancelation of the Crusader, we have lived
    through the cancellation of the NLC. We are following the
    Paladin, the PIM program, with a great deal of interest. And so
    I would like to know from your standpoint what the status is,
    how the program is progressing and what you see for it going
    forward.
        Mr. McHugh. PIM remains one of our critically important
    developmental and modernization programs. We have to have that
    capacity that can keep up with our formations, particularly as
    we begin to develop JLTV, GCV and other components of both the
    tactical and nontactical vehicle fleet. We want a mobile
    artillery system. In Iraq I came across a figure the other day.
    We fired over 200,000 rounds of artillery. So I think we are
    pretty safe in assuring ourselves that we are going to need
    this capability in the future. So we remain dedicated to it. We
    have a way forward. And we are going to stick to that. Whether
    we can rename that or not, I am not sure.
        General Odierno. I did not mention that as one of our key
    programs, but the PIM program is essential for us as we move
    forward. As an old artillery man, I can tell you how important
    it is not only to the ground force but in fact the joint
    integrated force. And it is about providing a system that is
    more capable, more survivable, and we need this improvement
    very badly as part of the combined arms maneuver team and we
    are moving forward with that. And we are very encouraged by the
    program and the progress it is making so far.

                              PRECISION MUNITIONS

        Mr. Cole. You have actually already answered part of this
    in my question and maybe all of it. And it will be my last
    question, but since we are changing the nature and the
    structure of the force, and I know you are thinking in very
    long-term ways, if you could sketch out again sort of your view
    over time of where artillery will be. Are we going to
    eventually have another artillery piece? As you think through
    these problems, I think a lot of folks are interested in where
    that fits in the future Army.
        General Odierno. Well, what we have learned--and the
    Secretary kind of mentioned it, over the last 10 years of
    warfare which is considered a counterinsurgency both in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been significant use of
    indirect fire systems both by us and by the insurgents,
    frankly, and its value continues to be critical to us as we
    move forward in what we are considering to be a very complex
    hybrid environment that we are going to have to operate in,
    which could include conventional forces, irregular warfare,
    terrorism, and criminal activity, the need for us to be able to
    protect ourselves and also to provide fire as essential to that
    mission. So we don't see it being degraded. It will continue to
    be integrated within our maneuver formations both in the light,
    medium and heavy capacity. So we will continue to have to
    modernize our ability to provide accurate, longer-range
    capability in support of our infantrymen on the ground. And it
    will continue to be a key system that we move forward with.
        Mr. McHugh. One of the things that assures that is the
    amazing development of precision munitions. And whereas in the
    past someone might have questioned the use of artillery in
    certain environments, with precision missions there is
    virtually no environment in which we can't use it very
    effectively.
        General Odierno. Excuse me, Congressman. We talk about one
    of the characteristics. I was talking about lethality, but it
    is not just lethality, it is about discriminate lethality. And
    frankly ground forces can be the most discriminate lethality
    possible. And part of that is having an artillery system that
    is able to deliver at very close range very accurately. So that
    is key to us as we move forward.
        Mr. Cole. I appreciate that very much, and again thanks to
    both of you for your terrific service to our country. You have
    paralleled but very splendid careers in making sure all of us
    stay safe and the country stays free. Thank you very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

                        BUDGET REDUCTIONS AND READINESS

        Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for
    a good hearing. I might change the tone just a little bit, but
    it is all in the interest of protecting our country.
        Members of this subcommittee take very seriously the direct
    responsibility that we are given by Article I, Section 8 of the
    Constitution dealing with our national defense and dealing with
    appropriations. Last year we were required to reduce the fiscal
    year 2011 bill by $18 billion below the President's budget
    request and the fiscal year 2012 bill we were required to
    reduce it by some $20 billion below the President's budget
    request. It was not easy because we were committed and
    determined that we would not do anything to affect readiness or
    to affect the soldier. Now we have substantial reductions again
    this year, and we are going to do the same job. And we did it
    very carefully. We have a tremendously professional staff. We
    even went through line by line, item by item, contract by
    contract. We saved those billions of dollars and we did not
    affect readiness. And we have asked that question of all the
    services and they agreed. Those 2 years we did not affect
    readiness.

                                      RISK

        Now yesterday at our hearing, I heard the phrase
    ``acceptable risk.'' You can imagine we had quite a
    conversation about what is the acceptable risk. Is it just a
    phrase? Or is it something that they really knew about? Today I
    heard the phrase ``hedge risks.'' Mr. Secretary, what do you
    mean by that?
        Mr. McHugh. As you know, Mr. Chairman, as the members of
    this committee know, you can never buy down to zero risk. We
    could spend every dollar in the Federal Treasury on defense and
    we would still have risks. We understand as we look toward the
    future we cannot in this budget and in this strategy foresee
    all unforeseen things. And when I speak of hedging against risk
    I am talking about the need to engage in some high-end,
    unforeseen, I don't think at this moment reasonably predicted
    conflict against our need to ensure that our end strength is
    balanced by the realm of requirements, readiness, making sure
    we have family programs, making sure we have modernization
    programs. So we are at a point under the budget dictates that
    we were handed, as you were over the last 2 years, where I
    think that when we hedged against risk we have accepted that we
    have a way by which we can accommodate today and the reasonably
    close in future but also in reversibility and in other ways
    meet that unforeseen risk that is always present.
        Mr. Young. And I understand that, sir. Let me just ask
    this, are you comfortable that when you consider risks, are you
    comfortable that this budget is adequate to face up to any
    risks that you might know about today or that you think might
    be a potential risk tomorrow?
        Mr. McHugh. The risks that are envisioned today--and this
    is not just John McHugh talking. If I may, I would like to
    defer to the Chief as well. He is required by law to tell you
    what he thinks, me not so much. But all of the combatant
    commanders were brought in on this development. All of the
    service secretaries, all of the service chiefs. We had an
    unprecedented meeting with the COCOMs, the chiefs, the
    secretaries, the national security staff, the principals of it,
    the President and Vice President of the White House everybody
    had their opportunity for their say. And I think in the context
    of this entire budget, this strategy makes sense, and I feel
    the Army has the necessary resources to do the duty that this
    Congress will assign to us in the future.
        Mr. Young. Well, you know I have much respect for your
    opinion. And General?
        General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, as I
    have looked through this budget, there is three things that the
    Secretary and I constantly look at. It is end strength, it is
    modernization, it is readiness: Man, equip, train. And how do
    we balance those three things together in order to sustain the
    best Army in the world? And that is what we are going to be
    focused on. And so for me it is about mitigating the risk
    associated with less dollars and delivering an Army that can
    meet any of the spectrum of missions that we might be asked to
    do. So we talked about reprogramming before. There was a
    question about that. That is why as we continue to assess this
    we might have to come back to you next year or year after, and
    start talking about that we have found some risk in the program
    where we will have to adjust these three dials in order to get
    it right. But as it looks for the whole strategy, the risks
    that we are taking in the Army is if we get into two
    simultaneous sustained operations again. We realize we do not
    have the end strength to handle that. That does not mean we
    cannot do two simultaneous combat operations if they are of
    short duration. We can do that. But when they extend out for
    long periods of time and they are large capacity operations, we
    will then run into the same problems we ran into in the 2000s,
    is that we do not have the end strength to continue to support
    two of those operations at one time. And we understood that
    going in. That was the risk that we decided to take because we
    believe the chances of that happening are fairly low, having
    two simultaneous operations that would extend for a very long
    period of time. And so that is the risk we will look for as we
    move forward.
        Mr. McHugh. But if I may, we also took steps to mitigate
    that should it become reality. We have taken 1,000 forces that
    generally major and senior NCOs, placed them into the
    generating force. Those are the people you can't grow overnight
    if for some reason you have to grow end strength quickly. So we
    tried to mitigate and hedge those risks where we can.
        General Odierno. That is also why we are looking at the
    reorganization of the brigade because I think if we do this
    properly, that could also mitigate the risk of potential
    expansion in the future. And that is part of the analysis we
    are doing as we look at this.
        Mr. Young. Well, I understand that it is real challenging.
    It is challenging to me because I have this ingrained in my
    conscience for years of working on this Committee and having
    worked on the Armed Services Committee prior to that and the
    Intelligence Committee. But I believe that when it comes to
    defense we cannot just pick a number out of the air, and I do
    not think you have done that. But we cannot just make a
    political number, and I do not think you have done that. But we
    have got to base our investment in our national defense on what
    is the threat that we see today, that we know today, and what
    we see as a potential threat tomorrow, next week, next month.
        So forgive me if I tend to be a little bit stronger on this
    issue of readiness and spending and making sure that your
    soldiers have whatever they need. I do not want one of your
    soldiers to be on patrol and reach out and need something and
    all of a sudden it is not there. I do not want that to happen,
    and I know that you do not want that to happen.
        So anyway, that is my sermon for today on the issue of
    readiness. But we are here to be supportive. As you know, over
    the years we have been totally supportive of the
    administration, whichever the administration was, to make sure
    that our country was safe and secure and that the soldiers, the
    troops who keep it secure, that themselves are secure. And now
    I would yield to Mr. Dicks.

                                 SEQUESTRATION

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you. And just to follow with the chairman,
    I assume from all we have heard that if we have sequestration
    all of this is a completely different scenario. What were the
    numbers you have, General, of the reductions in personnel
    beyond what we are going to do now?
        General Odierno. 100,000 is our estimate. And it will be a
    mixture of Active and Reserve component. We would have to,
    depending on the mix, it would depend on the specific number,
    we have to work our way through it, but it would be about
    100,000 additional soldiers, so a total of about 186,000
    reduction.

                               SYSTEMS ENGINEERS

        Mr. Dicks. Just one other thing, our surveys and
    investigation staff looked at shortages of key engineering
    personnel such as systems engineers. Now, if you are going to
    beat Shy Meyer you have got to get some systems engineers. What
    has the Army tried to do about it? Is this a legitimate
    concern?
        Mr. McHugh. The nomination the President sent to the Hill
    for the next Army ASAALT is a systems engineer. So we are
    trying to hire her at the highest level. But this has been one
    of the critical areas in which from our developmental
    perspective we have been challenged. Because at the end of the
    day as the systems get more complex you have to have someone
    who understands what you can and what you cannot put together.
    And we are trying very hard, and Congress has given us a mark
    on the wall to end source a great deal of those kinds of
    experts into our acquisition core. And we have come a long way,
    but we still have a ways to go. Like a Major or a Captain you
    do not grow an acquisition expert, particularly a systems
    engineer overnight, but we are working it.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. And Mr. Secretary and
    General, thank you very much. This has been a good hearing, you
    responded directly to our questions without any hedging, if I
    can borrow your word again, and we appreciate very much both of
    you and your service to our country.
        And so the Committee will be adjourned until 10 a.m.
    tomorrow, at which time the three Surgeons General of our
    military will be here at 10:00.
        [Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Kingston and the
    answers thereto follow:]

                            Downsizing the Military

        Question. The Army proposes cutting 72,000 soldiers, per the budget
    proposal; Reserve strength is scheduled to be cut by an additional
    5,000. Will these be specific targeted military skill sets or across
    the board cuts?
        Answer. As part of the new DoD Strategic Guidance, the Army will
    downsize approximately 79,000 Soldiers to 490,000 in the Active
    Component, and will reduce its Reserve Components by 9,000 from 358,200
    to 350,200 in the Army National Guard and from 206,000 to 205,000 in
    the United States Army Reserve by the end of the Future Years Defense
    Program. The Army's deliberate and responsible drawdown plans will take
    into consideration operational demands, unit readiness, and will
    proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success and retain
    flexibility to respond to unforeseen demands at a tempo that is
    predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force. The Army's
    plan will ensure that the force contains the required capability,
    capacity, and mix of skills to meet current and future operational
    requirements within authorized end strength. In general, we will see an
    increase in Army Aviation, Special Forces, Military Information Support
    Operations, Civil Affairs, Infantry and Armor skills. We will see a
    decrease in Field Artillery, Chemical and Signal skills. An
    announcement on specific force structure actions is expected sometime
    before, or in conjunction with, submission of the FY14 President's
    Budget in early February 2013.
        Question. How will these personnel cuts impact Deployment/Dwell
    time ratio for those that don't get cut?
        Answer. The Army will accomplish force reductions in a responsible
    and controlled manner in synchronization with units deploying or
    redeploying to and from Afghanistan. The Army will execute force
    reduction measures by following a drawdown ramp that allows us to take
    care of Soldiers and families, while maintaining a ready and capable
    force to meet any requirements, including our current operations in
    Afghanistan.
        Question. There are some news reports beginning to circulate
    talking about the Army cutting as many as 13 BCTs. Would cutting 13
    BCTs mean that we will be losing even more personnel than has already
    been announced?
        Answer. The Army announced during the President's Budget 2013
    release that a minimum of 8 BCTs and other force structure totaling
    57,400 would have to be reduced over the course of the 2013-17 Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP) to achieve the Active Component (AC) end
    state of 490,000 by the end of FY17. Additionally we have said that the
    Army continues to assess the design and mix of BCTs based upon the
    lessons from the last ten years of war. This analysis could lead to a
    decision to reorganize BCTs within the 490,000 AC end strength, into
    more capable and robust formations, requiring further BCT reductions in
    order to increase overall versatility and agility for tomorrow's
    security challenges. An announcement on specific force structure
    actions is expected sometime before, or in conjunction with, submission
    of the FY14 President's Budget in early February 2013.

                                     C-27J

        Question. It is my understanding that at least part of the
    rationale for divesting the C-23 (Sherpa) fleet was that we were going
    to acquire the C-27J. With the C-27J fleet now being divested, do we
    need to re-look at the original C-23 divestiture or can the
    requirements be met with other assets (like the C-130)?
        Answer. The C-23 is an obsolete aircraft. It is limited on payload,
    range, speed, and ``high/hot'' performance. The time sensitive/mission
    critical cargo mission has been shifted to the United States Air Force.
    To continue with the C-23 would be cost prohibitive.

                                  Afghanistan

        Question. Is the United States still on track to transfer Afghan
    forces to the lead security role, as we have planned with our NATO and
    ISAF allies? What impact does it have when nations (like France, most
    recently) announce that they are withdrawing early? Has this impacted
    our decision at all with respect to our withdrawal timing?
        Answer. We are well into the process of transitioning security lead
    to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) as agreed to at the 2010
    NATO Lisbon summit. Currently, approximately 50 percent of Afghans live
    in areas that are in the transition process and the ANSF are on track
    to assume lead for security for all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
        Our coalition partners, including France, remain committed to the
    Lisbon-based transition process. The U.S. and members of the ISAF
    coalition realize that transition is critical to ensuring Afghanistan
    is safe and stable, not merely the way out. Over the next two years
    coalition forces will remain combat ready, but increasingly focused on
    security force assistance missions as we continue to move the Afghans
    into security lead. Both the U.S. and ISAF partners will continue to
    coordinate their drawdown plans to support overarching ISAF campaign
    plan objectives.
        Question. What were some of the military & national security
    considerations that were taken into account when looking at the timing
    of withdrawal? What level have these discussions been occurring at?
        Answer. The pace of force reduction is based on several factors
    including the recommendation of our military commanders as well as
    analysis of progress towards the core goals of the campaign of
    disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda, and preventing
    Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven that could threaten
    the United States or our Allies and partners. In the process, the
    administration carefully looked at all input. The discussions regarding
    the pace of force reduction and the handling of security resulting has
    been discussed at all levels in the military chain of command, the U.S.
    government and the Government of Afghanistan.
        Question. Is the withdrawal of surge forces this year in sync with
    the need for trainers at the Afghani police and Army unit levels?
        Answer. Yes. We are shifting to a Security Force Assistance model
    that will enable ISAF to continue with ANSF development as we reduce
    U.S. Force levels.
        Question. When will the ``reset'' of equipment used in Iraq and
    Afghanistan (estimate) be complete? Any idea of how much it will cost?
    (DoD comptroller, Mr. Hale said we have $9.3B planned for FY13 OCO
    reset at the 15 Feb HASC hearing).
        Answer. The Army estimates that the Reset of equipment used in Iraq
    and Afghanistan will be completed 2-3 yrs after completion of
    operations in Afghanistan. We will require Reset funding for that
    period to complete the Reset effort and ensure equipment readiness for
    future contingencies. We estimate that if contingency operations ceased
    today, the Army would need $10-15B to complete Reset. There are many
    factors and assumptions that can affect the total future Reset
    requests, such as battle losses/washout of equipment, the condition of
    equipment at the time of retrograde and the final determination on what
    equipment we will retrograde from theater. The Army conducts an annual
    Reset Liability study in conjunction with the Office of Cost Assessment
    and Program Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
    revise and re-baseline our Reset estimates.
        Question. What is the rationale behind refurbishing our legacy
    equipment versus deciding to buy new equipment? On what basis is the
    line drawn between buying new systems and repairing/refurbishing the
    legacy systems?
        Answer. The rationale behind refurbishing legacy equipment rather
    than buying new equipment is to ensure the Army gets the capability
    required in the most cost effective way while getting maximum use out
    of the equipment. Refurbishing equipment is considerably less costly
    than buying new and allows for technology insertion, ensuring the
    legacy system is upgraded to the current production standard and
    required capability.
        There is no firm line drawn between buying new systems and
    repairing/refurbishing legacy systems. Each case is evaluated
    separately using a Business Case Analysis (BCA) to evaluate the cost,
    schedule and performance of each course of action. In each case, the
    current Maintenance Expenditure Limit (MEL), which is a percentage of
    the new production cost, is taken into account. If the equipment can be
    refurbished below the MEL, while still meeting the required capability,
    the Army will opt to refurbish the equipment. If the equipment cannot
    be refurbished below the MEL or the equipment can no longer meet the
    required capability, the Army will opt to buy new equipment.

                         Individual Carbine Replacement

        Question. The FY 13 Army base budget request contains approximately
    $21 M for Individual Carbine Replacement. How much progress can we
    expect to make this year with that level of funding? What are the
    goals--where would we like to be coming out of FY13 and into FY14 in
    this program?
        Answer. The Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) Carbine funding line, BLIN 24,
    containing $21 million, supports the procurement of 12,000 M4A1
    configuration carbines to maintain an active production line during the
    Individual Carbine (IC) competition. The IC competition is not
    scheduled to be completed until the 1st Quarter of FY14.

                 Ft. Stewart Growth in Unmanned Aerial Systems

        Question. With respect to the Army going to a concept of
    ``consolidated stationing'', where not all Combat Aviation Brigades
    will get a dedicated Grey Eagle UAS organization, we've been told that
    most will consist of 3 squadrons of 12 aircraft each, 6 ground control
    stations and 128 personnel per company. Is this accurate? How many
    contractor personnel will be associated with a typical organization? Is
    it true that these units will be attached to CABs that don't have Grey
    Eagles and will rotate with them for deployment/training?
        Answer. U.S. Army Special Operations Command will receive two fully
    equipped Gray Eagle companies, each with 12 aircraft and 165 personnel.
    For the General Purpose Forces (GPF), the current plan is to collocate
    three Gray Eagle companies at five installations. One of the three
    companies will be fully equipped with 12 aircraft and 6 ground control
    stations (GCS), and will be deployed or available for deployment. The
    two remaining companies will each be equipped with 4 aircraft and 2 GCS
    in order to support training requirements. All GPF companies will have
    their full complement of 128 Soldiers and rotate through deployment
    cycles attached to deployed CABs. As the Gray Eagle is a complex system
    that is very early in its life cycle, a heavy contractor presence is
    required for sustainment--the first company deployed to Afghanistan
    with 28 contractors. Upon redeployment in FY13, this number will be
    reduced to approximately 12, and by FY15 will be further reduced to 5.
        Question. How is the progress going in working with the FAA to get
    the agreements in place to operate the Grey Eagle UAS at those bases?
    Are there any problems getting the authorizations that you need to
    operate unmanned systems in our training airspaces?
        Answer. Outside of the training base at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the
    Army has not yet pursued a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA)
    from the FAA to support Gray Eagle operations. Requests will be made
    after a detailed risk analysis is completed for each installation to
    ensure safe operations. We have a great deal of experience with the COA
    process, and do not anticipate any extraordinary problems gaining the
    required certifications.
        Question. What are the advantages of this new approach? How much
    money will the Army save by doing this?
        Answer. The consolidated stationing and reduced equipping of Gray
    Eagle companies enabled the Army to reduce costs while fielding
    additional force structure with a greater deployable capability. It
    enables continuous deployment of five companies while maintaining a
    trained rotational pool in the dwell force. This construct allowed the
    Army to procure 32 fewer aircraft at a savings of $76M and reduced
    associated military construction by $725M than if all companies were
    fielded with separate facilities.

                            CH-47 Chinook Helicopter

        Question. (As part of this year's budget, the Army has submitted a
    request for approval to enter into a second multi-year contract for the
    CH-47 Chinook helicopter (five years & 155 aircraft). Coming off of our
    first five-year, multi-year contract for Chinooks, are there any
    lessons that we've learned--things that we need to do differently? What
    has the Army seen that led to this request authority for a second
    multi-year contract?
        Answer. The first five-year, multi-year contract for Chinooks was
    exceptionally successful and there were no significant issues that
    would cause the Army to adjust the multiyear contracting approach. The
    primary reason for requesting a second multi-year contract is the
    significant savings made possible. The first multi-year contract
    realized savings of $449 million (M) on the base contract for 181 CH-
    47F aircraft. In addition to the base contract savings, the program
    office procured 34 option aircraft for an additional $86M in savings.
    The current Chinook multi-year contract is a firm fixed price contract
    for Fiscal Year 2008-2012. The contract has executed on cost and
    delivered on schedule. The second requested multi-year contract is
    projected to yield a 10 percent savings or $373M.

                          Armed Scout Helicopter (ASH)

        Question. For FY 2011, this committee was a proponent of providing
    $15 million for a flight demonstration of a new Armed Scout Helicopter.
    I understand that the Army is going to issue a Request for Information
    (RFI) to industry, looking for technology solutions for the Armed Scout
    Program. What is the way ahead for an evaluation of the different
    capabilities available from industry? Is this program an Army priority?
    Is this program fully funded?
        Answer. The Army has asked the Defense Acquisition Executive to
    authorize a Request for Information (RFI) and a voluntary flight
    demonstration to assess the current state of technology within
    industry. The voluntary flight demonstrations will help define the
    capabilities available from industry to fill the Armed Aerial Scout
    (AAS) requirement. After assessing the available data, the Army intends
    to make a capabilities decision that either conducts a service life
    extension of the Kiowa Warrior helicopter or pursues increased
    capability with a new helicopter through an achievable and affordable
    moderate risk program.
        Funding for a new AAS helicopter program is yet to be determined.
    However, the Army is funded in Fiscal Year 2012 to release an RFI and
    execute the voluntary flight demonstration. Understanding the
    affordability of a new helicopter program will be a critical factor in
    the upcoming capabilities decision. The AAS capability remains a top
    equipping modernization priority for the Army.

        Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System
                                    (EMARSS)

        Question. The Army and the Air Force have been engaged in airborne
    tactical Intelligence Reconnaissance (ISR) in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Have the Army resolved the division of responsibility for
    this function between the Army and the Air Force?
        Answer. The deliberation of roles and missions is still ongoing,
    but the issue of direct support apportionment of manned medium-altitude
    Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) assets was
    not discussed during the 15.7 FEB 12 Army--Air Force talks. That being
    said, this issue of EMARSS is really a larger issue within the
    Department as it pertains to redundancy. During the POM 13-17 build,
    CAPE analysis identified an existing shortfall of manned medium-level
    AISR. This identified shortfall is exacerbated by SOCOM's new
    requirement for an increased number of manned AISR orbits. The Chairman
    of the JS directed the J8 to conduct a review of all Services ISR
    assets to include SOCOM's request. The termination of the EMARSS due to
    affordability did not reduce the requirement for manned medium-altitude
    AISR support for Army BCTs. Joint interdependency would rely on AF
    providing manned medium-altitude requirement. While we continue to work
    towards a commitment to this higher level of support, the Army will
    assess additional options and other potential investment strategies to
    satisfy these JROC approved requirements. The lack of EMARSS multi-INT
    capability continues to be a major gap within the AISR layer.
        Question. What is the role of the EMARSS program in support of the
    overall strategy in this area?
        Answer. The initial Engineering and Manufacturing Development
    EMARSS systems will deploy in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
    Though the affordability discussion impacted the EMARSS program
    decision, the requirement for manned medium-altitude Aerial
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) still exists
    within the Army. The Army is committed to addressing these shortfalls
    by acquiring additional EMARRS platforms and/or recapitalizing existing
    Quick Reaction Capability AISR systems.

                Army Corps of Engineers Projects in Afghanistan

        Question. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) recently issued
    an RFI for a Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan. A United States
    firm briefed the USACE prior to issuance of the formal RFP on the
    potential use of American-made, prefabricated steel detention cell
    modules for the project. The USACE completed the design and advertised
    an RFP using an Afghanistan produced reinforced concrete, fully grouted
    contract masonry unit construction. Did the USACE consider ``made in
    America'' products like these prefabricated detention cell units? Would
    the USACE consider use of products like this in future requirements for
    detention and force protection?
        Answer. The Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), Afghanistan, is
    being executed via two USACE-awarded construction contracts. The first
    of these contracts was awarded on August 25, 2011. The more recent
    Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued by USACE Middle East District on
    October 22, 2011. The proposals were received on November 22, 2011. The
    contract was awarded on January 30, 2012.
        It is correct that the DFIP RFP specified reinforced concrete,
    fully grouted masonry unit construction. An extremely short
    construction schedule was mandated by the customer and end-user to meet
    critical detention space requirements. As a result, it was imperative
    that the contractor be allowed to use locally available materials and
    products that would allow for site fabrication and would not require
    the delivery of long lead items through unreliable border supply
    routes. However, the terms of the contract did not preclude the
    submission of alternate means and methods for Government approval. If
    the contractor had proposed prefabricated detention cell units as an
    alternate construction method, this method would have been reviewed for
    acceptability including impacts to the construction delivery date.
        USACE would consider use of products like the prefabricated steel
    detention cell modules on future projects.

                  Military Trends and Issues Facing the Force

        Question. I have a large military community in the district (active
    and retired members) that I represent, and I also hear from some
    medical professionals involved in treatment of addiction and mental
    health problems in this population. I know the Army is attempting to
    deal with these problems, but could you address some specific actions
    that have been taken recently to address the following areas:
        a. Suicide
             What is the Army doing to stem the tide of suicides in
            the force? From an article in Army Times, April, 2010:
             Eighteen veterans per day are committing suicide
             Although only 1% of Americans have served in the
            military, former service members represent 20% of suicides in
            the United States.
        b. Drug & Alcohol Dependency
               I continue to hear that a lot of our soldiers
            returning from overseas are struggling with drug and alcohol
            dependency. (Article from NIH (National Institute of Health)
            and NIDA (National Institution on Drug Abuse), April, 2011)
               Prescription drug abuse doubled among U.S. military
            personnel from 2002 to 2005 and almost tripled between 2005 and
            2008.
               Study of Army soldiers screened 3 to 4 months after
            returning from deployment to Iraq showed that 27 % met criteria
            for alcohol abuse (compared to a prevalence of alcohol abuse of
            7.4% and of drug abuse of 1.5% in the general population).
               Drug or alcohol use frequently accompanies mental
            health problems and was involved in 30% of the Army's suicide
            deaths from 2003 to 2009 and in more than 45% of non-fatal
            suicide attempts from 2005 to 2009.
        c. PTSD (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) & Depression
               According to the Rand study conducted in 2008,
            nearly 20% of military service members (1 in 5) who have
            returned from Iraq and Afghanistan--300,000 in all-report
            symptoms of PTSD or major depression. This is compared to a
            lifetime prevalence rate for PTSD of 6.8% and for depression of
            6% among the general population.
               Aggressive behavior or alcohol misuse was also
            present in about 50% of the soldiers who had PTSD or
            depression.
        Answer. The Army is executing numerous initiatives that address
    drug testing, confidential alcohol treatment and education, counseling,
    prevention services to geographically-dispersed Soldiers, expeditionary
    treatment services, risk reduction, and stigma reduction.
        Prescription Drug Abuse. The 2008 DoD Health Related Behavior
    Survey (HRBS) is used as a benchmark. The Army is aware that our
    Soldiers come from the civilian population where drug abuse is on the
    rise and is tracking prescription drug abuse. The HRBS rates cited in
    your question are self reports, and therefore different than the Army
    drug testing rates. The percentage of Soldiers on active duty that
    tested positive for illicit prescription drug abuse in FY02 was 0.13%,
    rising to 0.23% in FY11. The Army began testing for the ``Oxy'' family
    of painkillers in FY06 and has led the charge to have DoD implement
    expanded testing for the hydrocodone family of painkillers and
    benzodiazepine (tranquilizer) testing for all Soldiers by the end of
    FY12.
        The Army was actively involved in National Prescription Take Back
    Day and continues to develop a prescription substance abuse campaign
    for the force. Army policy was recently changed that limits the length
    of time to six months for prescription medication. With expanded
    prescription testing and campaign efforts, we believe the second order
    effects will be a disposal of unused medications and a decrease in
    prescription drug abuse.
        To deter Soldiers from using emerging drugs, the Secretary of the
    Army issued a memorandum banning the use of Spice.
        Alcohol and Drug Abuse of Returning Combat Veterans. The Army asks
    Soldiers about high-risk behaviors via the Re-integration Unit Risk
    Inventory (RURI). RURI data shows that, of the Soldiers serving in
    Iraqi Freedom, 24% (2116 of 8810) were screened as potential problem
    drinkers within six months of returning, and 2% (189 of 8810) of
    Soldiers admitted to illicit drug use. The DoD HRBS cites 16% alcohol
    abuse and 20% drug abuse for the comparable civilian (18-25 year)
    population, rather than use the general population statistics.
        The Army is using an online prevention tool that allows Soldiers to
    self assess high-risk behaviors and attitudes and then prompts them to
    make lifestyle changes. This program is part of the new Expeditionary
    Substance Abuse Program (ESAP) for deployed and geo-dispersed Soldiers.
    Near future efforts include opening a call center for deployed troops
    and giving specialized substance abuse training for mental health
    specialists who will provide direct services in theater.
        The Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot (CATEP) was
    started in 2009 to provide confidential alcohol education and treatment
    to Soldiers. It is piloted at six installations and is currently being
    evaluated for Army-wide implementation.
        The Army has focused on increasing the number of Army Substance
    Abuse Program (ASAP) counselors from 320 in October 2010 to a total of
    493 as of April 2012.
        Drug and Alcohol Use and Suicides. Army data reveals that, from Jan
    2004 to June 2011, 21% of suicides involved alcohol while 9% involved
    drugs. From that same time period, 56% of suicide attempts were due to
    drug and alcohol overdose. To address suicides, the Army Health
    Promotion and Risk Reduction Task Force represents a portfolio of 60 +
    Soldier and Family programs that will be leveraged to reduce high risk
    behaviors that can culminate in suicide. Over 439 specific tasks have
    been developed and 135 implemented to address the issues. CATEP and
    limitation of drug prescriptions, both previously mentioned, are two
    example tasks from the Task Force.
        To address stigma, the Army has developed a Stigma Reduction
    Campaign Plan with messages to help combat the negative perceptions of
    seeking help for substance abuse, behavioral health, and other
    challenges that Soldiers experience.

                        Ministry of the Interior Funding

        Question. The FY13 Army O&M budget cuts the Afghan National
    Security Force funds from $11.2B in FY12 to $5.7B. DoD has stated that
    this reflects the ``front loading'' of funds for equipment, facilities,
    etc, and does not reflect a decrease in commitment to the training
    mission. However, Ministry of the Interior forces (which include the
    Afghan police) is cut from $1.1B in FY12 to $570M in FY13, a decrease
    of almost 50%. This would appear to be a real blow to the Afghan
    police, who will be largely charged with maintaining stability and
    security, as well as bolstering confidence in the Afghan government's
    ability to care for its people just as the US military is pulling back.
        Are there similar equipment and facilities costs associated with
    the Ministry of the Interior funding? If not, what is the rationale for
    such drastic cuts, which would appear to occur just as we are needing
    the Afghans to step up their roles?
        Answer. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), specifically
    the Afghan National Police (ANP), is growing in capability. This growth
    in capability is covered by two distinct phases: Build ANP capabilities
    and Sustain ANP capabilities. During FY 2012, the ANP will achieve
    their planned end strength of 157K. This fact passes the ANP into the
    Sustain phase in FY 2013 and subsequently reduces their requirement for
    initial entry training to only sustaining the force level. Another
    savings is projected based upon the Afghans assuming a greater role in
    overall training mission in FY 2013 and thus significantly reducing the
    reliance upon mentor and trainer contracts to meet these needs. The ANP
    is growing in overall strength and in capability. This capability will
    be reflected in both their operating and generating forces. For
    clarification, the funding decrease for training and operations for the
    ANP is $1.1B in FY 2012 and $570M in FY 2013 for a reduction of 48%.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Kingston.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the answers thereto
    follow:]

                  Ground Combat Vehicle (Defense Acquisition)

        Question. Please explain why you believe the Army estimate for the
    ground combat vehicle (GCV) unit production costs is more accurate than
    the Pentagon's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
    estimates.
        Answer. The CAPE and the Army used two different approaches to the
    GCV cost estimates. The Army estimate is a detailed estimate directly
    driven by the GCV design concepts that take into account technical
    maturity, allowable trade space built into the GCV performance
    specification, and continued use of a detailed Cost Informed Trades
    process. It is based on the current planned schedule for delivering a
    production vehicle. The CAPE estimate is based on a conservative
    parametric estimate influenced by significant historical cost growth in
    various prior Army programs. As such, it is influenced by historical
    cost trends and is not directly driven by the GCV design concepts. For
    these reasons, we believe the Army estimate is a better reflection of
    anticipated GCV costs.
        Question. is my understanding that three GCV development contracts
    were able to be awarded but only two actually were. Why wasn't the
    third contract awarded?
        Answer. The GCV Technology Development (TD) phase Request for
    Proposals (RFP) specified that the Government would award up to three
    contracts for the TD effort. In response to the RFP, three offerors
    submitted their proposals. The Army conducted a thorough source
    selection and determined that the proposals submitted by British
    Aerospace Engineering (BAE) and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
    provided the best value to the U.S. Government. On August 29, 2012,
    Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) filed a post-
    award Government Accountability Office (GAO) protest. On December 5,
    2012, the GAO denied SAIC's protest and found that ``With respect to
    SAIC, the Army found that, although the firm's Final Proposal Revision
    presented some strengths, it also had four significant weaknesses and
    numerous other weaknesses,'' and ``In deciding not to award a third
    contract to SAIC, the Source Selection Authority concluded that there
    were clear and meaningful differences between the proposals and that
    the SAIC's proposal did not represent the best value to the U. S.
    Government.''

               Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (Defense Acquisition)

        Question. Last year, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
    program appeared almost dead. Ford even declined an opportunity to bid
    on the project.
        What makes it feasible now?
        Answer. The JLTV is one of the Army's top three priorities. The
    Army and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) revised the Acquisition
    Strategy and Requirements to ensure that the MTV will be affordable
    while improving reliability and maintainability, providing commonality
    in design, and be procured competitively in order to reduce total
    ownership cost. The JLTV will fill the force protection and payload
    gaps not currently satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
    Vehicles. It also fills the mobility and transportability gaps in the
    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Family of Vehicles.
        Question. Why should Congress consider it to be a responsible
    acquisitions move now, when it arguably was not, last year?
        Answer. Last year, the U.S. Congress expressed valid concerns about
    the program as it was structured prior to the efforts to align the
    program with the results of the Technology Demonstration phase. The
    Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) have worked diligently to revise
    requirements, reduce the length of the program by more than 15 months,
    and reduce the development costs in the Engineering and Manufacturing
    Development (EMD) phase by nearly one half.
        The U.S. Army and the USMC conducted trade and risk analysis
    through a Cost Informed Trade Assessment (CITA) to evaluate the Average
    Unit Manufacturing Cost of the base vehicle. The assessment yielded
    cost savings while only modestly affecting vehicle performance. The
    CITA process reduced the cost by 27.5 percent.
        Question. Is the JTLV being offered as a lowest price/technically
    acceptable (LPTA) contract? If so, why was that contracting vehicle
    chosen?
        Answer. No. The basis of the JLTV Engineering and Manufacturing
    Development (EMD) phase contract award(s) is not LPTA. The JLTV EMD
    Request for Proposal, released to industry in Jan 2012, specifies that
    the U.S. Government will select the proposals that represent the best
    value to the U.S. Government according to a range of technical and
    other evaluation criteria.
        The U.S. Government will award up to three contracts on a full and
    open competition basis for the JLTV EMD phase. The relative strengths,
    weaknesses, and risks of each proposal are considered when selecting
    the offer that represents the best overall value to the U.S.
    Government. Criteria for the EMD phase are focused on the maturity of
    the designs that are being bid, and the ability of those designs to
    meet at least threshold requirements. The solicitation also makes it
    clear that performance above threshold levels will be evaluated in the
    final selection for low rate initial production.

                                 Sexual Assault

        Question. Some members of Congress have suggested that changes need
    to be made to the services prosecution of sexual assault. One proposal
    would establish a central body at the Pentagon to prosecute all sexual
    assaults in the Department of Defense.
        In your opinion, would prosecuting sexual assaults separately from
    other criminal acts that occurred at the same time facilitate or delay
    prosecutions; cause any evidentiary issues; or have any potentially
    negative consequences for victims?
        Answer. The separate prosecution of sexual assaults from other
    criminal acts occurring at the same time would delay prosecutions,
    cause evidentiary issues and unnecessarily subject victims to multiple
    investigations and trials. Many investigations arising from an
    allegation of sexual assault involve a variety of offenses (i.e.
    housebreaking, violations of regulations, alcohol offenses, false
    official statements). Bifurcation of these offenses for purposes of
    disposition and trial would be inefficient and contrary to basic
    principles of due process and equal protection by treating one class of
    offenses differently. Separate trials could raise complex issues
    regarding the admissibility of evidence, and create perceptions of
    potentially inconsistent findings, verdicts and unjust sentences.
    Separate trials would subject victims to additional interviews and
    cross examinations by defense counsel, forcing victims to recount the
    circumstances of the offense in a public forum on multiple occasions
    and delaying closure for the victim.
        Question. Would removing the chain of command from the sexual
    assault prosecution process help avoid barriers to proper prosecution
    of allegations?
        Answer. The Army's efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute
    allegations of sexual assault are unprecedented. The result of 4 plus
    years of consistent focus and resourcing has made an enormous positive
    impact in culture change, in the quality of investigations, and in the
    way in which we hold offenders accountable. By any measure, our system
    of military justice is responsive, responsible and effective in dealing
    with this serious crime. Specifically, there are no barriers to the
    proper prosecution of sexual assault allegations under the Uniform Code
    of Military Justice in which Commanders, with the advice of Judge
    Advocates, are given the authority to dispose of allegations against
    members of their command. Commanders are appropriately trained,
    resourced and committed to reviewing all allegations of misconduct and
    holding offenders appropriately accountable. There is no evidence that
    removing the chain of command from the disposition of sexual assault
    allegations will improve decision-making or remove discretion from the
    process.
        A Commander is responsible and accountable for all that goes on in
    a formation health, welfare, safety, morale discipline, and readiness
    to execute the mission. The adjudication of alleged offenses inside the
    unit must be efficient, visible, and just. Adjudication of sexual
    assault offenses by local commanders promotes these ends. Commanders
    are best-positioned to understand the impact of an offense on readiness
    and morale on his or her unit and the aggravating and mitigating
    factors of each unique offense. Transfer of the Commander's authority
    to an outside, centralized source does not ensure efficiency, reduces
    transparency, and undermines the credibility of dispositions of sexual
    assault cases. The military justice system, which utilizes the chain of
    command to adjudicate offenses, promotes loyalty to both superiors and
    subordinates, and is perceived by commanders, soldiers and the public
    as a just system.
        Question. What has the Army done to disseminate the sexual assault
    programmatic changes that were included in the 2011 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) to the field? Do you have confirmation that
    the changes required by the 2011 NDAA have been implemented?
        Answer. The FY11 NDAA required from the Army: Sec. 1602: Army
    Regulation 600-20, Appendix K (2) requires all Army Commands, Army
    Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to submit an
    annual report to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) which
    includes findings from any evaluation of the implementation of the
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program, actions and
    initiatives taken, recommendations for changes to SAPR policy, and any
    resource shortfalls.
        Sec. 1611: Army Regulation 600-0, Appendix K (2) requires all Army
    Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units
    include SAPR as part of their Command Inspection program, and conduct
    periodic evaluation of compliance. Additionally, The Department of the
    Army Inspector General (DAIG) conducts inspections at the direction of
    the Secretary of the Army. The Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
    and Prevention (SHARP) Program Office works closely with the DAIG to
    help the inspection team prepare for inspections of the SHARP Program,
    to include identifying subject matter experts to augment the team. The
    DAIG last inspected the SHARP Program from July 7, 2009 to November 6,
    2009 and the report was approved on January 25, 2010. SHARP related
    inspections were not conducted in FY11 nor are planned for FY12 at
    either HQDA or Army Command-level, however SHARP related inspections
    were conducted at some TRADOC installations this past year. A look at
    SHARP may also occur incidental to other inspections. As an example, a
    recent inspection on Disciplined Leadership/Company Administration at
    numerous Army installations included a look at whether units were
    conducting SHARP training and the frequency of occurrence. Units are
    conducting SHARP training as required and in a timely manner. The topic
    will likely surface as an item of interest in future planned
    inspections as well.
        The Army has a field grade officer/Major assigned to the DoD Sexual
    Assault Prevention and Response Office.
        Sec. 1631: Army submitted its annual report for FY11 on March 12,
    2012.
        All other sections were not applicable to the Army.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calvert.
    Statements submitted by Mr. Visclosky.]

        Mr. Secretary, General Odierno, I would like to express my support
    for the changes that have been made to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV) program. Last year, the Army and Marine Corps engaged in a
    thorough review of the program's schedule and requirements. By working
    closely with industry leaders, realistic determinations as to how to
    recalibrate this critical program were made, and the result is an
    accelerated, more cost effective program. I am pleased that the Army
    and Marine Corps leadership has taken these important steps on the JLTV
    program.

        [Clerk's note.--End of statement submitted by Mr.
    Visclosky. Questions submitted Mr. Moran and the answers
    thereto follow:]

                      Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

        Question. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a U.S. Army,
    U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. Marine Corps
    collaborative program to replace the current High Mobility Multi-
    purpose Wheeled Vehicle (Hum-vee) with a fresh design to incorporate
    the survivability lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.
        General Odierno, the Army currently has about 150,000 HMMWVs. As
    the Army comes home from Iraq, and downsizes, how many light tactical
    vehicles will the Army maintain, and of that total number, how many
    will be JLTVs?
        Answer. The Army will maintain approximately 136,000 light tactical
    vehicles, of which 49,099 will be JLTVs.
        Question. General, during technology demonstration testing in March
    2011, all three prototypes had difficulty navigating soft soil due to
    vehicle weight. The prototype's weight was driven by underbody
    protection equivalent to MRAPS. Is the JLTV's underbody protection
    requirement incompatible with the mobility requirements of the program?
        Answer. The JLTV's underbody protection requirement is not
    incompatible with the mobility requirements. The adjustments that were
    made to the requirements preserved the key core capabilities that the
    MTV must satisfy by delivering significantly improved payload,
    protection and performance over our current light tactical vehicle
    fleet, without paying a premium in terms of either cost or schedule for
    marginally increased capabilities. Based on the Technology Development
    results, we have adjusted performance requirements so that the vehicle
    weight is reduced from approximately 24,000 lbs to approximately 19,500
    lbs. This reduction in weight reduced the risk of meeting the mobility
    requirements.
        Question. It is rumored that the testing period for the JLTV
    program will be reduced from 48 to 33 months. Is that true? What are
    the risks involved? What is driving an accelerated testing schedule?
        Answer. The Joint Program Management Office revised the Acquisition
    Strategy, reducing the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
    phase from 48 to 33 months. Out of those 33 months, the testing period
    for the JLTV program during the EMD phase is 14 months in length.
    Testing will include Contractor performance and U.S. Government
    reliability, performance, and blast testing.
        The Department's program change from 48 to 33 months reduced
    program length and shifted from a traditional development phase where
    Industry would be paid with cost plus contracts for design to a program
    strategy that leverages and tests mature and production-ready industry
    designs. This adjusted schedule and strategy has reduced the total EMD
    cost by nearly $400 million.

                          Tour Normalization in Korea

        Question. Since the 1950s, soldiers assigned to Korea have served
    one year tours and family members are not supported or sponsored, With
    the exception of a few senior officers, the entire command in South
    Korea would rotate every year. In 2008, the Department announced ``Tour
    Normalization'' for Korea, which would normalize deployments to Korea
    by establishing two year tours for single service members and three
    year tours for married service members to include their family members.
        How many soldiers do you estimate will take advantage of tour
    normalization?
        Answer. Because tour normalization is currently on hold, the Army
    has not determined how many Soldiers will take advantage of tour
    normalization.
        Question. Do you have an estimate of the additional cost per year
    for tour normalization?
        Answer. If it is the decision to pursue full tour normalization the
    additional cost is estimated to be $481M per year, not including
    construction.
        Question. Is adequate housing available for families that decide to
    accept a three year assignment in Korea?
        Answer. Tour length is not a factor when determining the quantity
    of adequate family houses. The number of command sponsored families
    does not change with the increase in tour length.

                 Counterbomber Suicide Bomber Detection System

        Question. The Congress has expressed concern over many years about
    the continued failure of the Army acquisition system to field systems
    to operational forces on a timely basis.
         DOD has spent approximately $50 million developing and deploying
    the CounterBomber suicide bomber detection system. Over the last 5
    years, the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force have expended
    millions of dollars testing the system and optimizing its performance
    against female bombers. Army ATEC formally tested the system at White
    Sands and Yuma Proving Grounds, where test reports indicate the
    CounterBomber system exceeded virtually all threshold and many
    objective thresholds from CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Needs
    Statement CC 315 for this kind of capability. The system has been
    continuously deployed by the Marines since 2008 and the Air Force since
    2009 which includes 23 by the Army, 14 by the Marines, and 4 by the Air
    Force (total of 40). Unfortunately, only 6 Army systems are being
    operated, of which 2 are in Iraq and 4 are in Afghanistan, while others
    remain ready for deployment in transit boxes and some are in the
    manufacturer's warehouse undelivered due to lack of direction from the
    Army.
        The Army has developed an innovative ``Entry Control Point in a
    Box'' for its soldiers, but has not yet included CounterBomber in that
    program while it conducts still more testing and evaluations and
    discusses which Army acquisition organization is responsible for it.
        If the Army paid for CounterBomber systems, why haven't they been
    deployed?
        Answer. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
    (JIEDDO), a joint services organization established to reduce or
    eliminate the effects of improvised explosive devices used against U.S.
    and Coalition Forces, funded 31 CounterBomber-3 (CB) systems for the
    Army. Of the Army's 31 CBs, 10 are in support of the Office of Security
    Cooperation-Iraq, 12 in Operation Enduring Freedom, and two in Kuwait.
    The remaining seven systems are located within the continental United
    States where they are used in support of the homeland defense mission.
        Question. Why is CounterBomber not under the control of Army
    organizations responsible for the Entry Control Point in a Box program?
        Answer. On April 3, 2012, Counter Bomber was assigned by the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
    to the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
    Defense (JPEO CBD). The JPEO CBD is responsible for Non-Intrusive
    Inspection Systems (NIIS), and Entry Control Point in a Box.
        Question. Question. Why is ownership of Counter Bomber still
    ``stuck'' internally in the Army between PEO Ammo and PEO CB Defense?
        Answer. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
    Biological Defense (JPEO CBD) has been designated the Integrated Base
    Defense (IBD) lead, which provides the capability to present a holistic
    solution set, to include Counter Bomber 3 (CB-3). As of April 3, 2012,
    Counter Bomber was assigned to the JPEO CBD.
        Question. What do U.S. forces use today to screen entry control
    points for personal-borne suicide bombers, and how close do potential
    bombers get to U.S. troops who inspect them? Why is this acceptable to
    the leadership of the Army?
        Answer. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
    Biological Defense (JPEO CBD) was given the lead for the Integrated
    Base Defense (IBD) so integration of all applicable assets to screen at
    entry points are used in a system that can easily be accessed by the
    Base Commander. In addition to Counter Bomber (CB), the Army has
    procured other material solutions to screen personnel, to include
    Subtle Magnetic Anomaly Detection Networked Systems, Light Guard, Rapid
    Scan, Back Scatter Vans, walk-through metal detectors, Biometrics, and
    Random Antiterrorism Measures and the capabilities associated with
    Entrance Control Point in a Box. These systems provide protection
    against Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device and Personnel Borne
    Improvised Explosive Device attacks. They allow the Army to generate a
    layered system of systems approach, a capability that is superior to
    CB, and capable of leveraging CB's ability to detect anomalies at a
    distance of up to 100 meters. This is acceptable to the leadership
    based on approved requirements from Commanders in the field.
        Question. What systems is the Army fielding currently to meet the
    JUONS requirement for protection of U.S. forces against suicide bomber
    attacks?
        Answer. The Army has fielded the following material solutions to
    meet the requirement for protection of U.S. Forces against suicide
    bomber attacks: Counter Bomber, Subtle Magnetic Anomaly Detection
    Networked Systems, Light Guard, Rapid Scan, Back Scatter Vans, walk-
    through metal detectors, Biometrics, Random Antiterrorism Measures and
    the capabilities associated with Entrance Control Point in a Box. These
    systems provide protection against Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
    Device and Personnel Borne Improvised Explosive Device attacks. The
    Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense
    continues coordinating the integration of the systems to ensure a full
    solution that meets the requirements of the Combatant Commander.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submited by Mr. Moran.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Hinchey and the answers thereto
    follow:]

                         Solar Panels on Military Bases

        Question. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your efforts to
    stand up the Army Energy Investment Task Force and provide the
    leadership to ensure the Army meets its renewable energy goals.
        The progress made by the Task Force is evident in its recently
    released draft RFP to develop $7 billion worth of renewable energy
    projects on bases via Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), where third
    parties own and operate the system while leasing the power generated to
    the Army.
        As you know, I am an ardent supporter of the military utilizing
    solar panels on these installations that comply with the Buy America
    Act. I am concerned this multi-year contract effort by the Army will
    allow solar panels from non-signatory WTO Government Procurement
    Agreement countries on sensitive U.S. bases.
        How can the Army adjust the RFP to stop the circumvention of the
    Buy America Act for installation of solar panels on military bases?
        Answer. The planned competitive Request for Proposals (RFP) for the
    Multiple Award Task Order Contract will include all provisions of the
    Buy American Act as required by Part 25 of the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation (FAR) and Part 225 of the Defense Federal Acquisition
    Supplement (DFARS), and the resulting award(s) will comply with the Buy
    American Act.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hinchey.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the anwers thereto
    follow:]

                              Army Force Reduction

        Question. As part of its fiscal year 2013 budget, the Army is
    proposing to reduce its end strength from 569,400 in fiscal year 2011
    to 490,000, a reduction of over 80,000 troops.
        General Odierno, the Committee is concerned that the proposed troop
    strength reduction is budget driven rather than based on military
    requirement. In your expert military opinion, will the Army have
    sufficient manpower based on the proposed end strength to meet its
    current obligations and respond to any future potential military needs?
        Answer. The Army has sufficient end strength to meet current
    requirements and can implement the new defense strategy while affecting
    end strength reductions. By deliberately reducing end strength over a
    five-year period, the Army is able to take care of Soldiers, meet
    requirements in Afghanistan, and respond to unforeseen contingencies.
    We have planned a manpower reduction ramp that minimizes the number of
    Soldiers who will be involuntarily separated as well as reduces
    turbulence for recruiting and training requirements. Imposing arbitrary
    end strength floors would be detrimental to our deliberate manpower
    reduction plan. The Army will rely on Reserve Component (RC) forces to
    surge for major contingencies and maintain the proper deployed/home-
    station balance for the Total Army. We will also ensure the Army
    capitalizes on the investments of the past decade, such as
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,
    Special Operations Forces (SOF), and leader development to support the
    new strategy as we decrease the Army's end strength. Investment in
    readiness, retention of high quality and combat experienced mid-grade
    officers and non-commissioned officers, and reliance on Reserve
    Component forces will allow the Army of 2020 to remain flexible to
    expand to meet requirements and to support long duration operations, if
    needed.
        Question. Could the Army sustain additional reductions in end
    strength without overstressing the force or causing significant risk?
        Answer. The reduction of the active Army to 490,000 Soldiers will
    enable the Army to meet both projected steady-state requirements and
    combatant commanders' timelines for warplans. Continued investment in
    readiness is required for this leaner stance, given the strategic
    environment of uncertainty and threat.
        Question. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, the Army active and
    reserve components were operating at or near their authorized end
    strengths, and they were meeting or exceeding their recruiting and
    retention goals. In fact, the active component was at an average of
    110% retention rate. For fiscal year 2013, the Army has requested
    increased funding for involuntary separation payments.
        Given the high recruiting and retention rate, please describe how
    the Army plans to reduce the size of the force by 80,000 personnel.
        Answer. The Army will use precision and care in determining who
    must leave our service, and will make every effort to keep faith with
    our All Volunteer Force and treat Soldiers and their Families fairly
    while continuing to meet the operational requirements of the Nation.
    First, the Army will minimize the number of induced (forced) losses
    needed to meet future end-strength requirements by lowering accessions
    without jeopardizing current and future operational requirements; thus
    allowing us to retain the greatest percentage of our seasoned force as
    possible. Second, the Army will use our proven centralized selection
    board processes to identify both Regularly Commissioned and Non-
    commissioned Officers with the greatest potential for continued service
    as we shape the force by grade and specialty. Finally, Commanders will
    be empowered to retain only the highest quality Soldiers. When
    feasible, fully qualified Soldiers identified as excess due to strength
    limitations will be afforded the option to volunteer for
    reclassification into a shortage skill. Additionally, in lieu of
    involuntary separation, voluntary options (when applicable) will be
    afforded to fully qualified Soldiers targeted to leave the service.
        Question. Will reductions fall proportionately on officer and
    enlisted ranks?
        Answer. Yes. While the number of enlisted inventory reductions will
    be greater in absolute terms, the proportionate reductions will be
    between 5.5% and 6% of the inventory for both enlisted and officers.
        Question. The Army has already begun to request increased funding
    for involuntary separation payments--I understand that the Army plans
    to rely primarily on involuntary measures such as this to draw down.
    What impact will this have on the morale of the force? What is the
    rationale for using involuntary separation rather than incentives to
    encourage voluntary separations? Is the Army planning to use any
    voluntary separation payments in addition to the involuntary payments?
        Answer. The Army seeks funding for several voluntary separation
    programs to ensure it retains flexibility as it continues to refine
    planning for inventory reductions. No final decisions have been made on
    specific programs or options at this time; however, a key precept of
    planning is that the Army will decide, to the greatest extent possible,
    who will remain and who will separate from service. These decisions
    will facilitate shaping the future force to requirements while
    retaining experienced Soldiers with the greatest potential for future
    contributions. Although DoD's force reduction objectives include
    guidance to maximize the use of voluntary separations, the Army's
    intent is to apply lessons learned from the 1990s drawdown when the
    magnitude of the voluntary separations made it difficult for the Army
    to control the quality of those service members choosing to separate.
    Post-drawdown analysis of the 90s reductions indicated that a large
    number of Soldiers accepting voluntary incentives would have separated
    without incentives.
        In order to preserve this seasoned, All-Volunteer force, the Army
    will reduce accessions to the lowest level consistent with sustaining
    future mission capability, limit enlisted retention to support
    quantitative requirements based on a qualitative assessment, and employ
    proven and trusted centralized selection board processes to identify
    Soldiers, based on a qualitative review, who will leave our formations.
        When forced separations are required, the Army will selectively
    target grades and specialties where excess capability exists, and will
    make maximum use of cross training and re-designation to fill
    critically short skills. The Army is an organization founded on an
    ethic of service to the nation. Soldiers understand that the Army must
    shrink or expand in response to the Nation's needs. Those who are
    identified to leave will be given the maximum amount of support in
    making the transition to retirement or other employment. Finally, the
    Army is evaluating use of voluntary separation incentives such as
    Temporary Early Retirement Authority as part of its overall strategy.
    Specific authorities and level of use will be determined as we finalize
    our planning and actively monitor execution in the future.
        Question. Are you considering using new incentives, such as
    severance packages and early retirement packages, to encourage
    voluntary early separation as well?
        Answer. As the Army finalizes our plans, we are analyzing the
    authorities provided by the Congress. We continue to evaluate the best
    methods to retain the best and brightest of our high-quality,
    experienced personnel as we shape our All-Volunteer force.
    Incorporating new incentives along with existing voluntary separation
    incentives will be determined as part of our final plan based on need
    and funding availability.
        Question. Will forced separations or a Reduction in Force (RIF), be
    implemented to assist with the drawdown?
        Answer. The normal losses we project through accession, retention
    and promotion processes will not achieve the end strength goals set for
    us. As a result, some combination of voluntary and involuntary
    separations will be necessary to achieve end strength goals. The Army
    will decide to the greatest extent possible which Soldiers will leave
    our service, and we will determine the most effective mix of all
    options for voluntary and involuntary separations as we finalize our
    planning.
        Question. The Department's strategic guidance states that you will
    retain, to the extent possible, the ability to adjust or reverse force
    structure in case ``unforeseen demands'' arise in the future. Please
    explain how you plan to retain the ability to adjust or reverse changes
    in force structure should it be necessary.
        Answer. The Army is examining strategies, policies and investments
    which posture the Army to slow down and reverse a planned drawdown of
    Army end strength and formations, and rapidly expand in response to a
    future crisis. Investment and Regeneration (I&R) will be attained
    through the adaptation of current manning, equipping, and training
    policies and procedures to enable the Army to reverse and expand by
    accessing additional soldiers annually to support regeneration of
    additional BCTs and enablers in response to any unforeseen requirements
    or changes in the defense strategy.
        Additionally, the Army will identify military requirements resident
    in the Generating Force that can be concomitantly identified to support
    I&R.
        Question. Under the new guidance, there will be an increased demand
    for certain military specialties even as the overall size of the force
    shrinks. While the size of the force is shrinking, are there certain
    occupations or skills that you would like to see grown? Please describe
    how you will reduce the size of the force while retaining or even
    increasing the number of personnel qualified for these high-demand
    specialties.
        Answer. Although the overall force will be smaller, there are
    certain occupations or skills that the Army would like to see grown to
    both meet the new defense strategy and respond to lessons learned from
    current and recent operations. These include occupations such as those
    found in the Special Operations community, Cyber Operations and
    contracting specialists. The Army continues to carefully analyze
    personnel cohorts by skill and grade to determine where excess exists
    and alternatively where growth will be required. Our force shaping
    actions will be targeted and will allow the Army to make the choice to
    keep our best qualified personnel with the highest potential for future
    contributions to the Nation's defense.
        Question. General Odierno, many of our mid-level soldiers have only
    been in the military during war time. Concerns have been expressed
    about how to keep those soldiers used to the high op-tempo of the past
    ten years excited about staying in the Army. Are you concerned about
    how you will retain those soldiers, which will be the backbone of your
    smaller force, in this changing Army environment?
        Answer. The Army remains committed to retaining the experienced,
    exceptionally capable mid-level Soldiers within our projected force
    structure. Soldiers at this level are remaining with the service for
    benefits, incentives, job satisfaction, security, and being part of a
    successful team. Army retention and promotion processes focus on the
    quality of the Soldier. Our goal is to keep Soldiers at all grades with
    the greatest potential to serve our Nation. This is accomplished for
    enlisted members by approving reenlistments based on a commander's
    review of the ``Whole Soldier''. Criteria for this review include
    meeting and exceeding Army standards, leadership potential, Soldier
    competencies, and overall military experience. Enlisted Soldiers with
    poor evaluations, no potential for future service, misconduct, and
    repetitive non-judicial punishments will not be retained as we shape
    our service to meet new fiscal realities. Officer career development
    and promotion policies ensure that only the best qualified and most
    experienced will be retained to advance to higher levels of
    responsibility.
        Question. If we were attacked on two fronts, would we have the
    force strength and the resources necessary to respond?
        Answer. The Army will carefully balance capability and risk as we
    size the force to meet national security demands. The Army uses a
    combination of factors when sizing the force: war plans, approved
    Defense Planning Scenarios developed in conjunction with the Joint
    Staff, and known and projected steady-state activities. These ranges of
    force demands are assessed in conjunction with force structure and end
    strength analysis to help the Army and senior leaders determine the
    risk associated with any course of action. Our ability to provide
    future forces is heavily dependent upon how we source units in
    accordance with Army priorities. Readiness will be a focus across all
    of our formations, emphasizing the need to maintain expertise and
    leader competencies, as well as the ability to expand the force to meet
    greater demands, if necessary.

                            Deployment to Dwell Time

        Question. The Army in particular has been experiencing very high
    rates of deployment over the past ten years. The mid-term deployment to
    dwell time ratio goal remains 1 to 2 for active duty units with a long
    term goal of 1 to 3 and 1 to 4 for reserve and National Guard troops.
    Achieving the dwell time goal is critical to restoring unit readiness
    and improving troop morale.
        Please describe the specific measures the Army is implementing to
    reach its mid-term goal of 1 to 2 by the end of fiscal year 2013.
        Answer. The objective for reaching 1:2 for the active Army is
    expected to occur in FY15. The Army implemented a 9 month Boots on the
    Ground (BOG) policy for units deploying in the second quarter of FY12
    and later, which shortened tours to minimize stress on units and
    families.
        To achieve these goals in the future, the Army is redesigning the
    Army Force Generation model to align with DoD strategic priorities and
    guidance while simultaneously providing for longer dwell time and
    appropriate readiness. Training time at home station will increase as
    commitments in Afghanistan diminish. The Army has a progressive
    readiness model for most units, but there are some high-demand, low-
    density units that may be better served by a constant readiness model.
    The Army will adjust the process where units advance through a reset
    phase, a training phase, and an available phase, by prioritizing their
    training and planning in support of a specific Combatant Command and
    mission sets.
        Question. What is the Army doing to address dwell times of high
    demand units that are experiencing dwell time ratios below the average?
        Answer. In the last decade the Army expanded low density, high
    demand capabilities such as aviation, civil affairs, intelligence,
    military police, psychological operations, engineers and special
    forces. We also mitigated shortages with in lieu of sourcing and re-
    missioning of units. The demand for these capabilities remains too high
    to realize a 1:2 Boots on the Ground (BOG):Dwell rotation prior to
    changes in the operational climate.
        Question. What impact will the planned reduction in force have on
    future dwell time ratios?
        Answer. In March 2012, the Army achieved the BOG:Dwell goal of 1:2
    in the aggregate. The Army will sustain this goal even as we conduct
    the planned reduction in force in concert with the deliberate
    withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some low density, high demand capabilities
    have not yet achieved 1:2 BOG:Dwell. In the last decade the Army
    expanded many of these low density, high demand capabilities to include
    aviation, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, psychological
    operations, engineers and Special Forces. We also mitigated shortages
    with in lieu-of-sourcing and re-missioning of units. However, the
    demand for these capabilities remains too high to realize a 1:2
    BOG:Dwell rotation prior to changes in the operational climate.

                                    Suicide

        Question. Suicide remains an issue of ongoing concern among the
    services. Anytime we lose a military member, it is a tragedy. It is
    even more of a tragedy when it is entirely preventable. The rate of
    suicides in the active Army has increased slightly from calendar year
    2010 to calendar year 2011, from 159 to 165. The rate of suicide in the
    Army National Guard, in particular, remains extremely troubling with
    103 suicides in 2010 and 80 in 2011.
        Please describe the suicide prevention training and outreach
    programs currently in operation. What steps is the Army taking to
    identify potential at-risk personnel as well as to improve prevention
    and outreach efforts for them?
        Answer. The Army currently provides suicide prevention training to
    Soldiers, leaders, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, and Family
    members through two main programs: the Ask, Care, Escort (ACE) Training
    Program and the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST).
        The Army's ACE Training Program is built around the actions to take
    to prevent suicide. The battle buddy should ``Ask'' a fellow Soldier or
    co-worker whether or not he/she is thinking about suicide, ``Care'' for
    the individual, and ``Escort'' the individual to the source of
    professional help. The ACE Training Program consists of two components:
    The Suicide Prevention Awareness, Education, and Training component
    (commonly referred to as ACE), and the Suicide Intervention (SI) Skills
    Training component.
        The Suicide Prevention Awareness, Education, and Training component
    is the Army-approved suicide prevention and awareness training model
    for all Soldiers, leaders, and DA civilians, and is available to Family
    members. This training, approximately 1.0 to 1.5 hours in length, helps
    Soldiers, leaders, DA civilians, and Family members to avoid letting
    their fears of suicide govern their actions to prevent suicide. The ACE
    Training Program is supplemented by the ``Shoulder to Shoulder'' video
    series comprised of three installments (``No Soldier Stands Alone'',
    ``I Will Never Quit on Life'' and ``Finding Strength and Hope
    Together'') as well as the interactive videos ``Beyond the Front'' and
    ``Home Front.'' Army Regulation (AR) 600-63, Army Health Promotion,
    mandates annual ACE suicide prevention training for the Active Army,
    Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and DA civilians.
        The ACE-SI Skills Training component is a 4-hour program that
    provides more in-depth suicide intervention training for leaders and
    first-line supervisors to empower them to be part of the solution. The
    ACE-SI training includes suicide awareness, warning signs of suicidal
    thinking and behavior, risk factors, protective factors/resilience, and
    intervention skills development. ACE-SI is a one-time training
    requirement for junior leaders and first-line supervisors that teaches
    the skills in active listening, increases the opportunity to secure
    early intervention before a suicidal crisis, and instructs individuals
    to take their battle buddy directly to a helping provider. In fiscal
    year 2012 (FY 2012), the Army will conduct ACE-SI train-the-trainer
    workshops Army-wide to provide the Army with the maximum number of ACE-
    SI trainers and support the requirement to train all junior leaders and
    first-line supervisors.
        ASIST is the approved suicide intervention training for
    Gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are individuals who, in the performance of
    their assigned duties and responsibilities, provide specific counseling
    to Soldiers and DA civilians in need. ASIST is a one-time training
    requirement that helps Gatekeepers recognize and help individuals with
    suicide-related symptoms or issues. In FY 2012, the Army will provide
    funding to facilitate ten (10) ASIST Train-the-Trainer sessions and
    purchase 23,000 ASIST Kits to support the two-day workshops for
    Gatekeepers Army-wide. A Sole Source Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite
    Quantity (IDIQ) contract with Living Works Education is in the process
    of being approved to support this training requirement.
        In addition to the ACE and ASIST training programs, the Army is
    currently developing curriculum for a new Company Commanders/First
    Sergeants Course that includes key information on health promotion,
    risk reduction and suicide prevention. This course will focus on the
    responsibility role of first-line leaders and peers. The Army is also
    developing a new training course for Suicide Prevention Program
    Managers to assist them in organizing the many Army and community
    resources at their disposal to combat suicide.
        In regards to outreach efforts, the Army continues to train
    Soldiers, leaders, DA civilians, and Family members to identify
    potential at-risk personnel and to have the confidence to intervene
    when someone is in need. The Army has also worked to increase access to
    and availability of behavioral health care to promote help-seeking
    behaviors, and has implemented in-theater mild Traumatic Brain Injury
    screening. Addressing the impact of substance abuse on suicides, the
    Army implemented the Pain Management Campaign to improve the
    appropriate use of narcotic pain medication and reduce medication
    adverse effects; launched the online alcohol and substance abuse risk
    self-assessment tool, ``myPRIME''; expanded military drug testing of
    commonly abused prescription drugs, beginning with Hydrocodone and
    Hydromorphone; and initiated Army suicide prevention and substance
    abuse training at battalion and brigade pre-command courses to improve
    leader understanding. The Army has also worked to improve communication
    between law enforcement and unit leadership to ensure that Soldiers
    subject to investigative or legal actions are monitored for indicators
    of high-risk behavior or self-harm. Through collaboration with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Army has worked to promote the
    use of the free/confidential service (1-800-273-TALK (8255), press `1'
    for veterans) and to develop the Army Campaign theme.
        Question. Secretary McHugh, does the fiscal year 2013 budget
    request adequate funding for suicide prevention training and outreach
    programs?
        Answer. The Active Component Army Suicide Prevention Program is
    forecasted to receive $53.7 million in fiscal year 2013 (FY 2013). We
    assess this funding level will adequately address the program's
    requirements. However, this is not an enemy that can be defeated by a
    particular weapons system. It requires leader involvement from the top
    down and from the bottom up. Every Soldier must be aware and be
    prepared to intervene to stop a suicide. By and large this funding
    supports public awareness campaigns, suicide prevention support
    personnel, and training and education for Soldiers, leaders, Department
    of the Army (DA) Civilians, and Family members across the Active Army,
    Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Suicide
    prevention support personnel include Suicide Prevention Program
    Managers at installations, camps and stations worldwide for
    Installation Management Command (IMCOM), ARNG, and USAR. Army Suicide
    Prevention Program awareness training includes the Ask, Care, Escort
    (ACE) training; interactive and awareness training videos; suicide
    awareness training aids; execution of the Applied Suicide Intervention
    Skills Training (ASIST) Train-the-Trainer workshops and distribution of
    ASIST training materials; and health promotion, risk reduction, and
    suicide prevention training associated with Soldier and Family Ministry
    (Strong Bonds Training).
        The foundation of the ARNG suicide prevention program is the ARNG
    Resilience, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention (R3SP) Campaign Plan.
    The R3SP Campaign Plan redefines suicide prevention as an integrated
    part of a broader based resilience and risk reduction framework.
    Although the ARNG engages in specific suicide prevention and
    intervention activities, the essence of prevention is accomplished by
    building resilient Soldiers and Families with well-developed coping
    skills, a strong support network, accessible and practical resources,
    and a supportive process for post-traumatic growth through times of
    crisis.
        The ARNG FY 2013 funding is $5.3 million. If funding remains at
    this amount, the ARNG is capable of funding 54 Suicide Prevention
    Program Manager positions within each state and territory, providing
    five regional training classes for ASIST, and providing ASIST
    materials. The ARNG has made great strides in improving our support of
    Soldiers and Families. Additional funding would sustain FY 2013
    capabilities for the ARNG Master Resilience Trainer Course.
        Question. The Army recently released their ``Gold Book'', which
    serves as an update to the Army's ``Red Book'' and describes the health
    and discipline of the Force. Please discuss any new findings or new
    measures being taken based on the findings of the Gold Book.
        Answer. The report entitled Army 2020, Generating Health and
    Discipline in the Force, otherwise known as the Army ``Gold Book''
    looks at the current conditions across the Force. It examines the
    prevalence of behavioral health issues, incidents of crime and high-
    risk behavior, as well as relevant rates and trends over the last
    several years. It also reviews new policies and programs put in place
    since the Red Book to address identified gaps, and assesses their
    impact on improving Soldier health and readiness. Overall, the report
    tells us two things: we have made great progress in increasing health
    and discipline, and we have a lot of work still left to do.
        One of the most important lessons that the Army has learned is that
    many health and disciplinary issues, ranging from post-traumatic stress
    to illicit drug use to suicide, are interrelated. As we move forward to
    address suicide, we must foster a culture that facilitates an awareness
    of the interactions of health and disciplinary issues on individual
    Soldiers, units and Army communities.
        The 38 recommendations out of the Gold Book focus Army leaders on
    the actions required to close remaining gaps in Army health and
    disciplinary surveillance, detection and response systems.
    Additionally, the Health Promotion & Risk Reduction Council continues
    to implement and improve upon recommendations from the Red Book, while
    analyzing and incorporating those from the Gold Book.
        Question. While soldiers serving on active duty return from
    deployments to military bases which provide more structured support
    networks, returning soldiers of the Army National Guard and the Army
    Reserve are frequently geographically isolated from their units and may
    not have regular interactions with their peers and chain of command.
    What are you are doing to help this vulnerable population?
        Answer. Deployments place additional strain on our Soldiers and
    their Families. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program serves service
    members from all Reserve Components and supports a safe, healthy, and
    successful reintegration of our Citizen-Soldiers and their Families
    following deployment. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program helps
    Soldiers and Families cope--and even thrive--in the face of life's
    challenges through information sharing, services, referrals, and
    proactive outreach opportunities coordinated at the state and territory
    level. This delivery structure ensures that attendees from all
    components are better prepared throughout the entire deployment cycle
    (pre-deployment, during a deployment, and post-deployment).
        The National Guard Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program provides a
    robust, preventive, and proactive support program for Soldiers and
    Families, promoting preparedness through education, by conducting
    effective Family outreach, leveraging resources, and supporting the
    volunteer force. This provides the continuum of care needed to ensure
    successful Soldier and Family reintegration.
        The Soldier and Family Support Division of National Guard Bureau
    assists and supports the Yellow Ribbon programs in the 54 states and
    territories. During fiscal year 2011 (FY 2011), 929 events were held
    with 89,524 service members and 91,151 designated individuals
    attending. To date in FY 2012, 550 events have been held with 38,397
    service members and 41,172 designated individuals attending.
        The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) provides several behavioral health
    support networks initiatives for Soldiers who are geographically
    isolated from their units. Following return from a deployment, the USAR
    mandates personal contact with Soldiers and Family members between
    Battle Assemblies achieved through a variety of methods such as phone
    calls, Facebook, text messages, twitter, etc. The USAR has increased
    Suicide Prevention training opportunities and disseminated information
    to Family members in regard to risk factors, warning signs and contact
    assistance numbers. The USAR is strengthening Soldiers' and Families'
    support networks by ensuring that first-line supervisors, junior
    leaders, and unit Gatekeepers receive proper suicide intervention
    training. First-line supervisors and junior leaders receive the Ask,
    Care, and Escort (ACE) Skills Intervention (SI) training to help
    recognize suicidal behavior in fellow Soldiers and the warning signs
    that accompany it. Unit Gatekeepers receive the Applied Suicide
    Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), a standardized and customizable,
    two-trainer suicide prevention workshop designed for members of all
    care giving groups. The USAR also promotes Soldier and Family
    resiliency through a variety of programs, to include the Yellow Ribbon
    Reintegration Program, Strong Bonds, Army Strong Community Centers, the
    Army Reserve Fort Family hotline, Army Family Team Building training,
    virtual and real-world Family Readiness Groups, and Army Reserve Child
    and Youth Services. In addition to Army-specific programs, the USAR
    works to promote and advertise local resources to include Chaplains,
    Military and Family Life Consultants, Behavioral Health Providers, Off-
    Post Community Services, Churches, Medical Centers, Crisis Centers,
    Welcome Centers, and the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline 1-800-
    273-TALK (8255).
        Question. Is there a particular demographic of personnel that are
    particularly vulnerable to suicide attempts? (i.e. age, race, gender,
    enlisted versus officer, frequently deployed versus never deployed) If
    so, please describe the measures being implemented by the Army to
    target this particularly vulnerable category?
        Answer. It is important to first note that Soldiers who attempt
    suicide are a different demographic population than those who die by
    suicide. This response addresses those who attempt suicide, and thus,
    the below described demographic group does not represent the most
    vulnerable groups for death by suicide.
        In reviewing suicide attempts from January 2004 to June 2011, the
    U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) Surveillance of Suicidal
    Behavior Report identifies the most vulnerable demographics to include:
    females, young Soldiers, and Soldiers of ``other'' race-ethnicity (non-
    White and non-Black). (Please note that each of these is a separate
    risk demographic, so it is not correct to say ``young, female, non-
    white/non-black Soldiers.'') Within these individual demographic
    characteristics, females were twice as likely as males to attempt
    suicide (attempt rates 128 per 100,000 and 60 per 100,000,
    respectively) and Soldiers age 24 or less were two to four times more
    likely to attempt suicide than older Soldiers.
        The Army is targeting this demographic category by increasing
    Suicide Prevention training opportunities and disseminates information
    to Family members with regard to risk factors, warning signs and
    contact assistance numbers. The Army is also working to strengthen
    Soldiers' and Families' support networks by ensuring that first-line
    supervisors, junior leaders, and unit Gatekeepers receive proper
    suicide intervention training. First-line supervisors and junior
    leaders receive the Ask, Care, and Escort (ACE) Skills Intervention
    (SI) training to help recognize suicidal behavior in fellow Soldiers
    and the warning signs that accompany it. Unit Gatekeepers receive the
    Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), a standardized
    and customizable, two-trainer suicide prevention workshop designed for
    members of all care giving groups. In addition to Army-specific
    programs, the Army works to promote and advertise local resources to
    include Chaplains, Military and Family Life Consultants, Behavioral
    Health Providers, Off-Post Community Services, Churches, Medical
    Centers, Crisis Centers, Welcome Centers, and the National Suicide
    Prevention Lifeline 1-800-273-TALK (8255).
        Question. What mental health services are available to soldiers
    prior to deployment, while in theater, and then at home upon returning
    from deployment? What mental health services are available to their
    families?
        Answer. The Army's Behavioral Health System of Care, under U.S.
    Army Medical Command, has an extensive array of behavioral health
    services and wellness resources available to address the strain on
    service members and their Families throughout the Army Force Generation
    Cycle. Soldiers and Family members have additional counseling options
    and other avenues to deal with stress through Army Chaplain services,
    Military One Source, in-theater combat and operational stress programs,
    psychological school programs, Army Community Service programs, and the
    Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program.

                          Sexual Assault in the Force

        Question. Sexual assault remains a significant problem in the
    military and in the Army specifically. While the Committee recognizes
    the steps the Department has taken to reduce the number of incidents,
    it remains a pervasive problem. The Army's Gold Book states that sex
    crimes in the active duty army have seen a 28% increase from fiscal
    year 2006 to fiscal year 2011.
        In a recent press conference, Secretary of Defense Panetta stated
    that while 3,191 sexual assaults were reported last year in the
    military as a whole, the actual number of incidents was probably closer
    to 19,000. Both as a military and as a society, we must do more to
    change the stigma of sexual assault so that victims are not afraid to
    come forward and report the crime without worrying that their career or
    their personal reputation will be damaged and so that perpetrators know
    they will be held fully accountable for their crimes.
        Please describe the policies and programs currently in place to
    combat sexual assault and provide immediate care and assistance to
    victims of sexual assault. What new programs are being implemented to
    combat this issue?
        Answer. The behaviors of sexual assault and sexual harassment are
    unacceptable to the military profession, and the Army is taking strides
    to re-energize the standards and discipline long at the core of a
    professional, all-volunteer force.
        Inasmuch as behavior such as sexual harassment sets a potential
    foundation for sexual violence, the Army is combining its SAPR Program
    with the Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) efforts. The result is
    a new overarching program called Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
    Prevention, or SHARP. SHARP addresses sexual misconduct at the earliest
    point of intervention, as Army survey data indicates approximately 40%
    of sexual assaults were preceded by sexual harassment.
        The SHARP Program includes the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault
    Prevention Strategy and Campaign, the intent of which is to prevent
    sexual assaults from occurring. Leaders at all echelons facilitate this
    prevention strategy by establishing positive command climates in which
    sexual assault rarely occurs, but when it does, victims can come
    forward with confidence that their leaders will take appropriate
    action.
        The cornerstone of the prevention strategy is the ``I. A.M.
    Strong'' campaign where the letters I. A. M. stands for Intervene--
    Act--Motivate. The purpose of ``I. A.M. Strong'' is to encourage
    Soldiers to take action to prevent sexual assault and to actively
    foster respectful treatment of others. The Army's prevention strategy
    also strives to reduce the stigma of reporting, thus increasing a
    victim's propensity to report incidents for one of the nation's most
    unreported crimes.
        To support commanders in implementing the SHARP Program and the
    ``I. A.M. Strong'' campaign, the Army established an 80-hour SHARP
    training course conducted by SHARP Mobile Training Teams (MTT). To
    date, MTTs have trained 12.8K command-selected SHARP personnel from
    major command down to the company level. These SHARP personnel are
    trained to help commanders establish and maintain positive command
    climates, and provide immediate and accessible support to victims of
    sexual assault.
        Army Regulation (AR) 600-20 (Army Command Policy) formalizes the
    Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program. The
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA
    M&RA) has oversight of the Army's SAPR Program, while the Deputy Chief
    of Staff, G-1 is responsible for program implementation and assessment.
    As we combine the SAPR Program with the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
    (POSH) efforts, Army will combine Chapters 7 (POSH) and 8 (SAPR) of AR
    600-20 into one chapter addressing SHARP.
        The SHARP program is a command responsibility. Therefore,
    commanders are required to: establish a command climate that prevents
    the crime of sexual assault; treat all allegations of sexual assault
    seriously and ensure investigations occur; treat victims with dignity
    and respect; and take appropriate action against offenders. Significant
    elements of the current Army program include:
         Installation commanders and deployed senior commanders (or
    their representatives) have overall responsibility for SAPR Program
    implementation and 24/7 execution. As a critical element of program
    execution, these leaders conduct required monthly Sexual Assault Review
    Boards (SARB). The SARB provides executive oversight, procedural
    guidance and feedback concerning local program implementation and case
    management.
         Army-wide Victim Advocacy Program led by Sexual Assault
    Response Coordinators (SARCs) and supported by a cadre of professional
    Victim Advocates (VA). These SARCs and VAs are available 24 hours a
    day/7 days a week to interact directly with victims of sexual assault
    and other response agencies (medical, legal, law enforcement,
    investigative, and chaplain).
         Command Program Managers, Deployable Sexual Assault
    Response Coordinators (DSARCs) and Unit Victim Advocates (UVA) are
    Soldiers (or civilians assigned to military units) who assist their
    commanders in executing their SAPR Programs and coordinating sexual
    assault response efforts (legal, law enforcement, chaplaincy, and
    medical).
              --DSARCs and UVAs provide/support advocacy services in
            deployed environments and for geographically dispersed units in
            CONUS and OCONUS not serviced by an installation. They also
            augment advocacy services in a garrison environment, as needed.
              --Army policy requires each brigade level unit and higher
            echelon to have one trained DSARC. UVAs are Soldiers (or
            civilians assigned to military units) trained to provide victim
            advocacy as a collateral duty. Army policy requires two UVAs
            for each battalion sized unit. (Some units may require more
            than two due to geographical dispersion).
         All levels of Army institutional Professional Military
    Education (PME), from initial entry to senior service school, use a
    comprehensive set of training support packages to conduct required
    training. Annual unit level sexual assault awareness and pre- and post-
    deployment SHARP training is also mandatory per AR 350-1 (Army Training
    and Leader Development).
        Question. Secretary McHugh, incidents of assault appear to be
    highest among the 18-24 year old, junior enlisted population. Females
    compose only 14% of the Army's force, but they make up 95% of all
    victims of violent sex crimes. What are we doing to teach our newest
    servicemembers about the military's no tolerance policy for sexual
    assault and the programs in place should they experience such an
    assault? What programs are in place for both our enlisted recruits and
    at West Point and ROTC to raise awareness of this issue? What programs
    are in place to train our commanders and senior non-commissioned
    officers how to handle such cases?
        Answer. Army research and national data indicate sexual assault is
    a societal issue that affects male and female Soldiers. While female
    victims are more likely to report being sexually assaulted, the Army is
    addressing sexual assault prevention across the entire force. The SHARP
    Program includes the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Prevention
    Strategy and Campaign, the intent of which is to prevent sexual
    assaults from occurring. The goal of phase II of this four-phased
    campaign was to achieve Army-wide synchronization, and included the
    task to aggressively indoctrinate pre-accession and first term
    Soldiers. Soldiers would become advocates for prevention and would
    participate in peer-to-peer intervention training, take action to stop
    harassment and assaults, and speak out against sexual harassment and
    sexual assault.
        Since 2005, the Army has included sexual assault prevention and
    response training at all levels of Professional Military Education
    (PME), from Initial Entry Training (IET) through the Army War College.
    In 2011, the Army revised this PME training, starting with IET.
        To educate new Soldiers in a more attention-getting and intriguing
    manner, the revised IET training includes a set of ten ``Sex Rules''
    (``Sex Rules--Follow Them'') which break down the elements of sexual
    harassment and sexual assault and defines them in simple, relatable
    terms. By linking each Sex Rule to an Army Value, the training helps
    establish the social behavior expected of all Soldiers. The revised
    curriculum challenges Soldiers to ``Know the Rules--Live the Values''
    and includes a pocket guide for Drill Sergeants (``Sex Rules--Teach
    Them'').
        Most of the concepts in the new IET curriculum are also embedded in
    the upgraded ROTC training. In coordination with Cadet Command, the
    Army SHARP Program Office developed new ROTC training which
    incorporates ``Sex Rules'' messaging, an ROTC Cadre SHARP Guide, and a
    critical decision-making tool.
        The IET curriculum also added the live, two-person, audience
    interactive ``Sex Signals''. This 90-minute program includes skits
    dealing with dating, consent, rape and other associated topics such as
    body language, alcohol use and intervention. Newly commissioned
    officers receive Sex Signals training in their Basic Officer Leadership
    Course. We are assessing the use of this program in other educational
    venues.
        West Point conducts a myriad of sexual assault prevention and
    response training and education events which are above and beyond the
    requirements under DoD and Army policy. In addition to the required
    unit level training conducted by every Army unit, West Point conducts
    targeted Sexual Assault /Sexual Harassment education for each class of
    the Corps of Cadets. For example, during FY11, the Fourth Class
    (freshman) cadets received training from Ms. Veraunda Jackson, a
    renowned sexual assault survivor and lecturer. Third Class (sophomores)
    cadets received a cadet/staff facilitated class centered on a
    university-focused sexual assault training package, ``Welcome to the
    Party''. Second Class (Junior) cadets participated in audience
    interactive productions of ``Sex Signals''. First Class (Senior) cadets
    received additional instruction focused on the tenets of the Army SHARP
    campaign, ``I. A.M. Strong'', to prevent sexual assault and sexual
    harassment.
        To ensure our commanders and senior non-commissioned officers know
    how to handle sexual assault cases, the Army's PME training is
    specifically tailored for junior, intermediate and senior leaders. This
    includes training at the Sergeants Major Academy, Army War College and
    Pre-Command Courses (PCC). The PCC curriculum for Brigade and Battalion
    Commanders includes instruction from the Army Judge Advocate General
    School and Legal Center on handling sexual assault cases.
        Question. The Gold Book states that violent sex crimes are most
    likely to occur during periods of transition--during times when
    soldiers are transitioning into their new units and lack the formal
    chain of command and established social network. Young female soldiers
    are most vulnerable to assault. What is the Army specifically doing
    during these transition periods to prevent assaults?
        Answer. The Army uses a battle buddy system for pairing Initial
    Entry Training (IET) Soldiers into teams to teach teamwork, develop a
    sense of responsibility and accountability for fellow Soldiers, improve
    safety, and reduce the likelihood and opportunity for sexual
    harassment, sexual assault, misconduct and suicidal gestures or
    attempts. Under the battle buddy concept, IET Soldiers are formed into
    two-person teams upon arrival at their initial training unit. Soldiers
    must have battle buddies at all times; the cadre will pair ad hoc buddy
    teams of the same gender for sick call, worship services, additional
    unit-specific training, or remedial training. Similarly, ad hoc buddy
    teams are formed on Family Day for Soldiers without family members
    attending. Soldiers must also utilize the battle buddy system during
    all passes except when accompanied by family members.
        The Army takes sponsorship of Soldiers into their new units very
    seriously. Under the Army's formal Sponsorship Program, commanders are
    directed to assign same-gender sponsors for Soldiers and civilians,
    especially first-term Soldiers. Sponsors of first-term Soldiers act as
    battle buddies in order to orient inbound Soldiers to their new
    surroundings, in all aspects of Army life, and to provide support and
    assistance during the transition period. Sponsors of first-term
    Soldiers have a responsibility for their fellow Soldiers and are
    charged to monitor their safety and ``reduce the likelihood and
    opportunity for sexual assault'' during the Soldier's first year in the
    unit.
        The Army has sent training materials focused on the ``I. A.M.
    Strong'' Campaign down to the battalion level. These materials included
    posters, touch cards, brochures, and videos, including Amateur Night, a
    12-minute video suitable for newcomer orientation training.
    Additionally, Annual unit level sexual assault awareness and pre- and
    post-deployment SHARP training are also mandatory per AR 350-1 (Army
    Training and Leader Development).
        Question. The Gold Book states that 97% of victims at least
    casually knew their attackers and that most assaults occurred in the
    barracks in a situation in which alcohol was present. What is the Army
    doing to address the risk associated with high density housing? Does
    the presence of alcohol inhibit victims from coming forward for fear of
    being punished for violating rules regarding the use of alcohol?
        Answer. The primary solution to these issues is positive and
    engaged leadership. That is why we are aggressively implementing and
    expanding the Army's comprehensive Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
    and Prevention (SHARP) Program. SHARP is a commander's program,
    committed to ensuring engaged leadership at all levels to foster a
    climate of trust that respects the dignity of our Soldiers and serves
    to prevent sexual assault.
        To support commanders in this effort, the SHARP program is training
    SHARP Personnel at every echelon down to the company level. To date,
    the Army has trained over 9,000 unit SHARP personnel using mobile
    training teams delivering an 80-hour nationally certified curriculum.
        Additionally, the Army fielded new mandatory annual unit training
    which includes leader and Soldier videos and an interactive video for
    all Soldiers. This self-study video (``Team Bound'') is an interactive,
    multiple scenario product in which Soldiers become the lead character,
    making choices in situations dealing with sexual harassment and sexual
    assault. The revised unit and self-study training began in April 2011.
        Finally, we know that one of the reasons Soldiers may not report
    they are a victim of sexual assault is because they were involved in
    some kind of misconduct themselves, including the unauthorized use of
    alcohol. Since March 2008, Army policy instructs Commanders to consider
    delaying disposition of any collateral misconduct on the part of a
    sexual assault victim so as to encourage reporting and cooperation.
        Question. Does the fiscal year 2013 budget include sufficient
    funding for the Army Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs?
    Does the Army have a sufficient number of sexual assault response
    coordinators so that anywhere you might find a soldier, you will find a
    coordinator?
        Answer. Senior Army leadership has always ensured adequate funding
    for all of the Army SHARP Program. Army currently has contract and
    collateral duty sexual assault response coordinators to provide
    services to the force regardless of location. Per FY12 NDAA requirement
    for full time brigade or like-sized unit Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinators (SARC) and Victim Advocates (VA), the Army is implementing
    an interim manning solution requiring trained, full time military
    personnel in the positions as we transition from contract and
    collateral duty program execution. Army uses Mobile Training Teams to
    train personnel to meet 17,000 Command program manning requirements at
    brigade and below command levels. Army is identifying costs based on
    the FY12 NDAA requirement and will request resources for these
    requirements through the normal programming and budgeting process.

                                   Stop Loss

        Question. In 2009, Secretary Gates announced the phased suspension
    of the Stop Loss Program. Among the Services, the Army relied most
    heavily on Stop Loss to supplement their forces. This Committee
    established a new special pay, which provides up to a maximum of $500
    per month for all service members extended under Stop Loss since
    September 11, 2001. This Committee believes it is important that every
    eligible service member that has earned the benefit have the
    opportunity to receive it.
        How many soldiers have been provided with the benefit? How many are
    eligible to receive stop loss payments but have not yet collected their
    benefit?
        Answer. The Army reviewed 108,946 claims to date. Of those, 82,707
    have been paid; the remaining 26,239 claims did not meet the
    eligibility requirements established by the Department. There are
    11,054 potential claimants remaining to be paid. However, they have not
    responded to the extensive outreach campaign the Army has conducted
    that included two certified mailing.
        Question. In your opinion, have the outreach and education efforts
    adequately reached every service member who is eligible to receive
    these payments to ensure they are aware of the payments and understand
    the steps they must take to collect the benefit?
        Answer. Yes, the Army has conducted a number of innovative outreach
    efforts to include a certified mail campaign advertising in every
    recruiting station, and communications with veteran service
    organizations. As a result, we know that some members have received as
    many as four notifications. We have received claims from every state
    and territory as well as 12 foreign countries. We have also received
    claims from Service Members who served during every major conflict
    going back to the Korean War.
        Question. Is additional time needed to ensure that every soldier
    eligible for this special pay has een provided the opportunity to apply
    for it?
        Answer. No, the Army does not believe additional time will
    measurably increase the number of Soldiers applying for the Special
    Pay. The program has had a number of extensions and the number of
    ``new'' claims that have been received since the October deadline is
    very small.

                          Tour Normalization in Korea

        Question. Since the 1950s, soldiers assigned to Korea have served
    one year tours and family members are not supported or sponsored. With
    the exception of a few senior officers, the entire command in South
    Korea would rotate every year. In 2008, the Department announced ``Tour
    Normalization'' for Korea, which would normalize deployments to Korea
    by establishing two year tours for single servicemembers and three year
    tours for married servicemembers to include their family members.
        Mr. Secretary, do you have a timeline for implementation of Tour
    Normalization?
        Answer. The Army does not have a timeline for the implementation of
    Tour Normalization. The Department's directions were to pursue Tour
    Normalization as affordable and feasible. After analysis the Department
    determined tour norm is not affordable because it would require
    additional housing, schools and require additional funding to support
    families.
        Question. Will all of our soldiers that are bound for Korea be
    eligible for the longer, accompanied tours? If not, how will the Army
    determine which soldiers will be eligible for tour normalization?
        Answer. All movement on Tour Normalization has been suspended as
    General Thurman, current commander of US Forces, Korea, reevaluates the
    strategic and financial environment on the Korean peninsula. Ultimately
    it is his military strategy that will drive the requirement for
    accompanied military members in Korea.
        Question. How many soldiers do you estimate will take advantage of
    tour normalization? Do you have an estimate of the additional cost per
    year, not including the required military construction to support the
    additional families, for tour normalization?
        Answer. The Army has not determined how many Soldiers would take
    advantage of command sponsorship if the Department of Defense was to
    authorize tour normalization. The estimated additional cost per year to
    implement tour normalization is $481 million annually, not including
    construction.
        Question. General Odierno, how has Tour Normalization been received
    by our soldiers and then.FTily members who are bound for a tour of duty
    in Korea?
        Answer. The Army currently does not have a matrix or a survey that
    identifies how Tour Normalization is received by Soldiers. However,
    anecdotal evidence from the chain of command indicates that Tour
    Normalization is well received by Soldiers. The total Army command
    sponsorship positions for the Army is 3740 out of 4645 total for all
    Services.
        Question. Is adequate housing available for families that decide to
    accept a three year assignment to U. S. Forces Korea?
        Answer. Tour length is not a factor when determining the quantity
    of adequate family houses. The number of command sponsored families
    does not change with the increase in tour length, therefore the
    quantity of housing remains adequate given existing limits on
    accompanied tours.
        Question. What is the status of providing facilities such as
    schools, medical clinics, exchanges, commissaries, and other support
    activities that are needed to provide for a large increase in military
    families that are assigned to U.S. Forces Korea?
        Answer. There are no plans to construct additional facilities to
    support tour normalization. The Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA section 2111
    restricts the number of command sponsored tours at the current level of
    4645.
        Question. General Odierno, the Department of Defense recently
    released a report regarding women in combat, which stated that it is
    ``committed to removing all barriers that would prevent Servicemembers
    from rising to the highest level of responsibility that their talents
    and capabilities warrant.'' The Army estimated that, in fiscal year
    2011, 66% of Army active component positions were open to women.
        What percentage of positions will be open to women in the Army once
    this guidance is implemented?
        Answer. Approximately 67% of all authorized positions in the Active
    Army will be open to women based on the policy changes outlined in the
    DoD report.
        Question. Please provide us with some examples of positions that
    would now be open to women. Are there concerns about the impact this
    guidance could have in the field? Does the Army expect it will have to
    adjust either its qualification requirements or it training or
    operations plans to accommodate this new guidance?
        Answer. Example of positions that would become open based on the
    removal of collocation include: Bradley Fighting Vehicle System
    Maintainer, Field Artillery Radar Specialist, and M1 Abrams Tank System
    Repairer. These are positions that have never been available to women.
    Additionally, positions such Human Resources Specialist and Supply
    Specialist, though open to women, women will now have the opportunity
    to serve in units such as Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and Opposing
    Forces (OPFOR) Battalions. Examples of positions that would become open
    based on the exception to the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule
    include: Military Intelligence Officer, Human Resources Officer, and
    Physician's Assistants. Though currently held by women, this will be
    the first time they will be able to serve in these positions in
    Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery Cannon Battalions. As outlined in
    the report released on 9 Feb, the openings of these particular
    positions are limited to only 37 battalions across the Army.
        Yes, there is always some level of concern when doing something new
    or different. However, the Army is a highly disciplined, highly
    professional organization where women have fought side-by-side with
    their male counterparts since the inception of the All-Volunteer force.
    At this time the Army leadership believes this is the right step
    forward. We will not be adjusting any qualifications to accommodate
    this guidance. However, there are minimal billeting requirements that
    are currently working at the Fort Benning training base. The
    requirements entail reconfiguring barracks space that includes
    replacing urinals with toilets and constructing walls that completely
    separate male quarters from female quarters. These are requirements
    already in place at other installations impacted by the opening of
    these positions. Recruiting operations will be adjusted to include
    recruitment of women for positions that have never been available to
    them as we begin recruiting for FY 13.
        Question. Please explain for the Committee any benefits or
    challenges that you envision will be a consequence of the new guidance
    will create for the Army and for the typical soldier, both male and
    female.
        Answer. The greatest benefit under this new guidance is the
    opportunities created for both males and females to serve in a greater
    breadth of roles at varying levels of the force. It is a benefit to
    commanders as it adds flexibility in placing the best Soldiers, male or
    female, where they best fit. It is a benefit to the Army as it
    increases our opportunity to utilize the talents of our greatest
    assets, our Soldiers.
        Question. For the past ten years the Department has focused nearly
    exclusively on counter insurgency, and as a result the military's
    readiness to address units ``high end'' warfighting missions has been
    compromised. Over the past few years the Army' ``Status of Resources
    and Training System'' readiness levels have hovered consistently at 20-
    25 percent, meaning only 25 percent of Army units can accomplish their
    assigned mission. The Army's operation and maintenance budget request
    includes additional training funds to support ``Decisive Action'', the
    effort to rebuild full spectrum readiness.
        Secretary McHugh, the Department's quarterly readiness reports to
    the Congress state that 75 percent of the Army's military units are not
    able to accomplish their assigned mission. How did this impact your
    strategy review? How is this addressed in your budget request?
        Answer. This issue pertains to the Army's readiness reporting (all
    units) of C-Level (Core mission) assessments and the A-level (Directed
    mission) assessments. In addition, readiness reporting is often
    confused with the Army's Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process for the
    rotational units in Operating force. The readiness reporting
    percentages cited in the question reflect readiness reporting C-level
    data aggregated for all Army units, to include units in the Reset and
    Train/Ready force pools.
        The C-Level assessment reflects the ability of a unit to accomplish
    its core functions and to provide the capabilities for which it was
    designed (the core mission or designed mission). The A-Level assessment
    reflects the ability of a unit to accomplish the specific mission that
    has been directed for planning or formally assigned for execution (the
    directed or assigned mission).
        Currently, the preponderance of deployed and next to deploy Army
    units report the highest levels of readiness for their directed
    missions (A-Levels), and a significant majority of these units report
    high C-Levels as well. In many cases, Army units are assigned and
    execute various missions and tasks that are significantly different
    from those for which they were designed (for example, a field artillery
    battalion assigned to execute a security force mission).
        The ARFORGEN process is the structured progression of unit
    readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units
    prepared for operational deployment in support of the Combatant
    Commander and other Army requirements. ARFORGEN utilizes aim points as
    a mechanism to establish benchmarks for manning, training and equipping
    criteria. Units entering into the ``Train/Ready'' force pool report
    degraded levels of readiness to accurately reflect their aim point for
    current resource and training status. Units in the ``Available'' pool
    are expected to be at the higher Core mission levels of readiness (C1/
    C2) for their directed or assigned missions (A-levels). The readiness
    percentages cited in this question reflect Core mission level data
    aggregated for all Army units, to include units in the ``Reset'' and
    ``Train/Ready'' force pools.
        Question. General Odierno, could you explain the Army's training
    activity called ``Decisive Action''?
        Answer. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (ADP 3-0 published October
    2011, provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army
    forces must be prepared for operations across the range of military
    operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and
    multinational partners as part of a larger effort. As described in ADP
    3-0, to achieve decisive action during operations, forces must be
    prepared to effectively execute some mix of offensive, defensive, and
    stability tasks (defense support to civilian agencies in the Contiguous
    United States). Army unit-level training strategies are designed to
    enable units for decisive action across a broad range of missions, that
    is, to perform the fundamental doctrinal tasks needed to conduct a
    combination of offense, defense, and stability operations (or defense
    support of civil authorities); by means of Army core competencies
    (combined arms maneuver / wide area security); as part of a joint,
    interagency, and frequently multinational coalition; against an
    adaptive hybrid threat (mix of conventional and unconventional forces,
    terrorists and criminals); at any point from stable peace to general
    war.
        Question: Secretary McHugh, given the resources available, the Army
    has done a good job of supporting the effort to rebuild the Nation's
    readiness. Could you explain how a sequester would impact the Army's
    readiness budgets?
        Answer. The magnitude of these cuts to both the military and
    civilian force structure, readiness, and modernization would be
    devastating. The indiscriminate nature of these large and arbitrary
    cuts does not provide the Army with the necessary flexibility to react
    to the uncertain security environment.
        Such reductions would result in lower readiness levels of units and
    adversely impact our modernization efforts, as well as the defense
    industrial base. Moreover, we risk breaking faith with our Soldiers and
    their Families who have performed superbly over ten years of continuous
    conflict. Sustaining the all-volunteer force is absolutely essential
    for the Army's ability to support our Nation's defense.

                                The Hollow Force

        Question. In 1980, the term ``Hollow Force'' was coined by Army
    Chief of Staff General Meyer when only four of ten active divisions
    were capable of deploying overseas in an emergency. The term ``hollow
    force'' that was soon widely used to characterize a force was not
    capable of performing required missions. In the 1990s ``hollowness''
    once again became a concern. The force structure following the victory
    in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, the expected cold war ``peace
    dividend,'' and a recession in the early 1990s resulted in a
    significantly reduced DoD top-line, a growing backlog of depot
    maintenance and degraded readiness. The Army's fiscal year 2013 budget
    request (base and OCO) includes $1 billion less (21 percent decrease)
    in equipment maintenance and reset funds from fiscal year 2012 planned
    levels and $1.8 billion less than was spent in fiscal year 2011. The
    impact of the Army's equipment repair budget after prolonged combat
    operations, or ten years of war on equipment is concerning. The
    continuous increase in operations has been unprecedented. Many types of
    military equipment have been used in operations at three to five times
    ``peacetime'' operational rates with a related increase in necessary
    maintenance. The need to ``reset'' equipment has been adequately funded
    over the past five years, although these efforts will need to persist
    for several years after current operations end.
        General Odierno, experts predict that it will take years to repair
    and reset equipment even after current operations end and yet the
    fiscal year 2013 request for equipment maintenance is 21 percent ($1
    billion) less than will be spent this year. Can you assure the
    Committee that the budget request for equipment maintenance will keep
    it capable and will not put us on a path to a hollow force?
        Answer. I can assure the committee that our FY13 request for
    equipment maintenance will adequately address our critical requirements
    and sustain our equipment readiness.
        The Army is ``right-sizing'' its base depot maintenance budget to
    capture its post-war requirements in order to facilitate the transition
    of forces from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to Base funding.
        Depot Maintenance requirements are aligned with Army Force
    Generation (ARFORGEN) demands and resourced according to Army's
    priorities.
        Depot maintenance base program sustains unit readiness by providing
    equipment availability and reliability and is balanced with other Army
    initiatives and priorities, i.e. force structure changes.
        The FY 2013 budget request for Depot Maintenance is  $4.9B ($2.3B
    in Base Sub Activity Group (SAG) 123 and $2.6B in Reset SAG 137). The
    FY 2012 enacted budget for Depot Maintenance is  $5.3B ($3.0B in Base
    SAG 123 and $2.3B in Reset SAG 137).
        I would also reiterate to the committee that reset is a lengthy
    process and even after the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, the
    Army will require funding from OCO for 2 to 3 years to reset our
    equipment from the harsh demands of war.
        Question. The proposed resource reductions to equipment maintenance
    are incremental, and the effects are not immediately apparent. General
    Odierno, can you assure the Committee that cuts to equipment
    maintenance budgets that you propose will not unintentionally reduce
    equipment capability and military readiness?
        Answer. I can assure the committee that our reduction in equipment
    maintenance budget is tempered by the condition and readiness of our
    fleets and our ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies. FY13
    request for equipment maintenance adequately addresses our critical
    requirements and sustains our equipment readiness.
        The Army is ``right-sizing'' its base depot maintenance budget to
    capture its post-war requirements in order to facilitate the transition
    of forces from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to Base funding.
        Depot Maintenance requirements are aligned with Army Force
    Generation (ARFORGEN) demands and resourced according to Army's
    priorities.
        Depot maintenance base program sustains unit readiness by providing
    equipment availability and reliability and is balanced with other Army
    initiatives and priorities, i.e. force structure changes.
        The FY 2013 budget request for Depot Maintenance is  $4.9B ($2.3B
    in Base Sub Activity Group (SAG) 123 and $2.6B in Reset SAG 137). The
    FY 2012 enacted budget for Depot Maintenance is  $5.3B ($3.0B in Base
    SAG 123 and $2.3B in Reset SAG 137).

                      Security Contractors in Afghanistan

        Question. As of December 2011, the Department of Defense employed
    approximately 133,000 contractors in Afghanistan, 20,000 of which were
    security contractors with the majority of these being Afghan nationals.
    President Karzai has long expressed concern that private security firms
    skirt the law and are vulnerable to corruption. In 2009, President
    Karzai issued a decree to abolish the use of private security guards in
    Afghanistan. On March 21st the first tranche of private security
    guards, approximately 11,000 guards, now working for private security
    firms will become Afghan government employees as members of the Afghan
    Public Protection Force (APPF). The United States will finance future
    security requirements via an international security agreement with the
    APPF on a fee-for-service basis.
        What impact has the recent killings of six U.S. soldiers had on the
    transition plan?
        Answer. No combat operations are without risk. While the loss of
    any U.S. service member's life is tragic, these killings will not cause
    us to deviate from the current transition plan.
        Question. Do you have confidence that the APPF has the capability
    and the resources to meet our security needs? If not, what is being
    done to mitigate risks?
        Answer. The APPF has made notable progress over the past year,
    transforming itself from a government-run guard force, lacking advanced
    business functions, into a functioning State-Owned Enterprise, now
    capable of delivering commercial security services to international
    organizations and commercial enterprises. As a State-Owned Enterprise
    (SOE), the APPF is working to develop modern business practices--
    providing effective security services while generating self-sustaining
    revenue. As of this date, the APPF has achieved an Initial Operating
    Capacity (IOC), sufficient to conduct business with and provide
    security to international organizations and commercial enterprises in
    Afghanistan--a significant achievement and a vast improvement from its
    operational capability a year ago. In some areas, however (e.g.
    contracting), the APPF has only been able to achieve IOC with
    assistance from ISAF advisors.
        While the APPF did not fully meet the transition dates laid out in
    the Bridging Strategy, it was able to commence the transition of
    commercial and developmental contracts from Private Security Companies
    (PSC) to the APPF before the transition deadline. Toward that end, the
    APPF expanded its business and operations directorates, bringing in
    some talented Afghan experts from the business world and Afghan
    National Police (ANP), and expanded its operations from existing sites,
    previously contracted under substandard adhesion contracts, to include
    new sites, contracted under modernized contracts that approach
    international commercial standards. To date, the APPF has signed more
    than 50 contracts with domestic and international customers for
    security services, including 27 USAID projects. Four sites are fully
    transitioned to APPF control with another 33 in transition.
        However, while it is an achievement that the APPF has reached IOC
    and begun the transition of security services in accordance with the
    Bridging Strategy, considerable work remains to be done before the APPF
    is ready to provide static security, convoy security and personal
    security detail (PSD) services nation-wide, independent of ISAF
    assistance. In particular, the APPF must mature and hone its business
    operations, implement its solution to overcome challenges associated
    with complex convoy operations, and strategically prepare to assume
    responsibility for ISAF/ANSF construction sites and ISAF bases. The
    APPF Advisory Group will continue to partner with the APPF over the
    next year to execute a smooth transition of security from private
    security companies to the APPF and to help build enduring capability
    for the APPF.
        Question. Will you outline how the Army will contract with the APPF
    for security forces to ensure the security of our personnel?
        Answer. All contracts for private security contractors used to
    guard personnel, sites, and convoys must be replaced by contracts with
    the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) in accordance with the
    following transition schedule: 1) by March 20, 2012, all development
    fixed site and all mobile security will transition to the APPF; 2) by
    March 20, 2013, all International Security Assistance Force bases and
    military construction sites will transition to the APPF. The transition
    of these security services to the APPF is part of an overall shift to
    Afghan-led security by 2014.
        All development sites (non-military) and mobile security contracts,
    which currently rely on private security contractors (PSCs) must
    transition to the APPF by March 20, 2012. The National Afghan Trucking
    (NAT) contract will be impacted by the transition. Under NAT, the prime
    contractors provide transport services and issue subcontracts with PSCs
    when required. The U.S. Government will not contract directly with the
    APPF to provide PSC services. Instead, the NAT contractors will obtain
    PSC services from APPF and are all working their APPF agreements.
        Once NAT contractors have their APPF agreements, the contracts will
    be modified to reflect the APPF rates. All contractors have been
    advised that it is their responsibility to ensure compliance with the
    Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan law while performing
    services under the NAT contract.
        Department of State (DoS) approved the content of an Acquisition
    Only Agreement (AOA) for direct contracts between the Department of
    Defense (DoD) and the APPF for all static security. United States
    Forces-Afghanistan has been delegated authority to negotiate the AOA
    with the APPF. Any changes to the terms of the Agreement are subject to
    approval by DoS. This Agreement will establish the basic terms,
    conditions, and procedures to facilitate the provision of logistic
    support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces personnel, DoD civilian
    employees, and DoD contractor personnel deployed to Afghanistan in
    support of Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security
    Assistance Force missions.
        Question. What is the funding mechanism that will be used to hire
    APPF security guards? What protections will be in place to ensure there
    is no corruption?
        Answer. Customers and users of APPF state-owned enterprise services
    will contract directly with the APPF to fund security services.
        Although DoD contracts have not been established, current
    implementing partners have contracted with APPF for security services.
    An Acquisition Only Agreement has been established for DoD to negotiate
    contracts for security at fixed site lotations, ISAF bases and military
    construction sites. The negotiations for these contracts will occur
    over the next year and will allow DoD representatives to work directly
    with the APPF to contract security services.
        As DoD and DoS help build the capacity of numerous Afghan
    government entities, we are focused on anti-corruption efforts to
    ensure that these entities have credibility and transparency in their
    operations. We are working side by side with the Afghan Government to
    create mechanisms within the APPF that that will ensure transparent
    services for APPF customers. These include a robust quality control and
    quality assurance program and independent oversight.

             Fiscal Management: Growing Reliance on Reprogrammings

        Question. The Department of Defense's increased reliance on
    reprogramming of funds during the execution year has been
    extraordinary. There has been a 1,000 percent increase (10 fold)
    between fiscal year 2000 and 2011 in the magnitude of the annual
    omnibus reprogramming. In fiscal year 2011, $10 billion was transferred
    and used for different purposes than for which it was appropriated.
        While an increased number of funding transfers would be expected in
    the early stages of a contingency operation, the war should not be the
    rationale for increasing funding transfers after ten years. While the
    chart above describes the overall DoD trend, Army's increasing reliance
    on reprogramming seems to mirror the overall Departments. For example,
    last June Army requested $2.3 billion be transferred for use in a
    manner differently than had been requested and appropriated and in
    September Army requested an additional (nearly) $2.5 billion be
    transferred.
        Secretary McHugh, we are concerned that the Army has increasingly
    transferred and spent funding differently than the purposes for which
    the funding was justified and appropriated. For example in the last 3
    months of fiscal year 2011, the Army proposed transfer of $4.8 billion
    to be spent in a manner differently than for which the funding was
    requested and appropriated.
        What actions have you taken to enhance the discipline in the budget
    process?
        Answer. The budget process has been improved with the increased
    emphasis and involvement of our senior leaders. They have directed that
    they be included in all decisions and realignments that are made at
    both an organizational and a strategic level. The process is very
    deliberative and disciplined.
        Additionally, our leadership worked closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Chairman to ensure the Army's strategy was in concert
    with that of the Defense Department. The new strategic guidance was
    developed and provided before any final budget decisions were made to
    ensure that the budget choices reflected the new defense and Army
    strategies.
        Internal to the Army process we have been ``implementing a cost
    culture'' using a Cost Benefit Analysis process that thoroughly reviews
    and costs out options--balancing between the most effective, efficient
    and least costly. Army leadership has taken a hands-on approach to
    conducting in-depth reviews of the programs and portfolios. These steps
    have ensured our budget is accurate and defendable.
        Question. Are you confident in the Army's budget request that is
    before this Committee is fully executable as it is now arrayed? If not,
    will you work with us to adjust your request so that it can be
    appropriated in a manner in which you intend to expend it?
        Answer. The Army's position is that the President's Budget requests
    what is required to meet our mission requirements. The Defense
    Department's new strategic guidance was developed before any final
    budget decisions were made to ensure that the budget choices reflected
    the new defense strategy. While shaping this strategy, the Department's
    leadership did not want to repeat the mistakes of the past. The goals
    were: to maintain the strongest ground force in the world, to not
    ``hollow out'' the force, to take a balanced approach to budget cuts,
    to put everything on the table, and to not break faith with troops and
    their families. As a result, the Army is strongly united behind the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2013.
        Since we developed the FY13 request we have identified several
    areas that could be realigned to better support emerging issues. We are
    working with the appropriators to make these adjustments for the
    upcoming marks and any adjustments made may reduce the number of
    reprogramming actions requested during the year of execution.

                             Ground Combat Vehicle

        Question. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) will replace the Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle. Add on armor kits have significantly improved Bradley
    survivability but sprint speed has been slowed thus increasing exposure
    to enemy fire. The fiscal year 2012 budget request for Ground Combat
    Vehicle development was $768,053,000. The conference agreement provided
    $449,387,000. The reduction was due to program delays and a revised
    acquisition strategy. The fiscal year 2013 budget includes $640 million
    for GCV development.
        General Odierno, please explain the changes made in the Ground
    Combat Vehicle program strategy and how those changes shaped the fiscal
    year 2013 budget request.
        Answer. The Army awarded contracts to British Aerospace Engineering
    (BAE) and General Dynamics Land Systems for the Technology Development
    Phase on August 18, 2011. They were placed in a stop-work situation for
    100 days due to a protest filed by Science Applications International
    Corporation (SAIC) on August 29, 2011. The U. S. General Accounting
    Office (GAO) denied the SAIC protest on December 5, 2011.
        This stop-work period resulted in a 100-day schedule delay in the
    technology development phase of the program, which caused the Army to
    shift planned work into the next fiscal year. The Fiscal Year 13
    President's Budget of $640 million for GCV accounts for this shift and
    associated planned contractor efforts.
        Question. The Committee understands that the GCV program plans to
    review the infantry fighting vehicles that are in use currently in
    other countries, such as the Israeli Namer and the German Puma? What
    sort of trials will you put the vehicles through?
        Answer. The Project Manager (PM) GCV Assessment of Non-
    Developmental Vehicles (NDV) consists of multiple technical and
    operational assessments.
        The technical assessments include testing of armor survivability
    technologies, destructive testing of select vehicles, mobility testing
    of vehicles, a technical review of large remote weapons stations
    currently in service/production in the world (Rafeal, Elbit, and
    Kongsburg), and live-fire testing of select vehicle weapon systems to
    validate lethality performance. The technical assessments also include
    a bi-lateral data exchange with Germany on the PUMA.
        The operational assessments will be conducted in two phases. Phase
    I, which is complete, included training on the CV-9035 at the Danish
    Infantry School and reviewing lessons learned from Denmark and Norway
    in Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally, PM GCV sent a platoon of
    infantry Soldiers from Fort Benning to Israel to attend the Israeli
    Namer training course. Once trained, the platoon conducted two weeks of
    missions on the Namers. This effort was overseen by the Training and
    Doctrine Command Analysis Center and the Maneuver Center of Excellence.
    The focus was to validate the Namer impact on U.S. Army Tactics,
    Techniques, and Procedures while assessing vehicle performance.
        During Phase II of the GCV Assessment of NDV, the Army will conduct
    an operational assessment of five NDV attributes across varying
    operational conditions. The platforms to be assessed include the: 1)
    M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle; 2) Stryker Double V-Hull; 3)
    Israeli Namer; 4) Swedish CV-9035; and 5) M2 Turretless Bradley.
        Key tasks during the assessment include: 1) Conducting a baseline
    assessment of vehicle capabilities against the draft GCV Capabilities
    Development Document (CDD); 2) creating operational conditions to
    highlight key discriminators among vehicle attributes; and 3)
    maximizing the number of vehicles the crews and dismounts utilize
    during the assessment to gather relevant Soldier feedback.
        The assessment will be focused at the platform level using static
    assessments and situation training exercise (STX) lanes. The static
    assessments will benchmark vehicle attributes against draft GCV CDD
    requirements and complement STX lane observations. STX lanes will
    contain varied operational conditions, to include urban and open desert
    terrain, medium armored and dismounted threats, and operations during
    day time and hours of limited visibility.
        The STX lanes will utilize three vignettes: 1) Security Patrol
    (Complex Ambush); 2) Movement to Contact (Far Ambush); and 3) Raid
    (Enter/Clear Building).
        Question. The Army's goal is to transport a complete infantry squad
    in one vehicle. Is that a capability that is found in the infantry
    fighting vehicles of other countries? How important is this criteria?
        Answer. As the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Non-Developmental
    Vehicle Analysis is conducted (as well as other foreign vehicle and
    technology assessments) it has been determined that the capability to
    carry a complete infantry squad in one vehicle exists currently in the
    foreign vehicles under study by the US Army Training and Doctrine
    Command and the GCV Program Management office. Examples of this are the
    NAMER which carries a complete Israeli Squad and the CV-9035 which
    carries a complete Danish Infantry Squad.
        The criterion to carry a complete infantry squad is one of the four
    most important capabilities in the GCV Program. The GCV facilitates the
    9-man infantry squad to better deploy, gain, and maintain the
    initiative and tempo of small unit tasks. The GCV allows small sized
    units to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by enabling squads
    to deploy with unit integrity, providing immediate, coherent combat
    power on the ground. Transporting the entire 9-man Infantry squad
    supports decentralized operations and freedom of movement among other
    small units, enabling an agile and rapid deployment, re-deployment and
    task-organization of combat power across a distributed, ever-changing
    battlefield and missions. This capability provides increased leader
    presence, unity of command, and increased information dissemination
    reducing confusion and uncertainty. Lastly, this capability enables the
    deployment of complete infantry squads in close combat with the enemy
    under maximum armor protection.
        Question. What is the expected date to begin fielding a new Ground
    Combat Vehicle?
        Answer. The Army has consistently stated that it will be seven
    years from contract award to first production vehicle.
        The Army awarded Technology Development (TD) contracts to British
    Aerospace Engineering (BAE) and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) on
    August 18, 2011. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
    filed a protest with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on
    August 29, 2011. Both BAE and GDLS were placed in a stop-work situation
    for 100 days due to the protest. The GAO denied the protest on December
    5, 2011 (Fiscal Year 2012) and work on the TD contracts officially
    began on December 6, 2011.
        The Army's seven-year period must take into account the 100-day
    delay due to the GAO protest. The first production vehicle is scheduled
    for delivery in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. Fielding to active Army units
    will begin in FY21.
        Question. As funding is scarce, and trades must be made within and
    between programs, what is the possibility of continuing with the
    current fleet of Bradley Fighting vehicles with some limited upgrades
    and deferring the production of a new IFV?
        Answer. The Bradley IFV has grown in weight and power demand above
    what it was designed for, exceeding its size, weight, and power-cooling
    (SWaP-C) margin and has minimal growth potential. Without significant
    and expensive turret and chassis redesign, the Bradley cannot
    incorporate latest and most effective vulnerability reduction
    principles, nor can it meet other identified critical gaps in lethality
    and capacity.
        The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) will provide the protected mobility
    and fill capability gaps (Force Protection and Survivability, Network,
    Mobility, and Lethality) that currently exist in our heavy formations.
    The GCV will have growth capacity for SWaP-C to allow incremental
    improvements like the Abrams and be relevant for the next 40-50 years
    and will make our combined arms operations more effective by having the
    capability to carry a full squad in one Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

                                    Network

        Question. The Network is the Army's top investment priority. The
    Army intends to have every soldier plugged into the tactical network;
    able to access and distribute information. Previously the Army fielded
    subsets of the network as the pieces became available. The new approach
    is to field capability sets when the necessary pieces are present, and
    with the receiving unit determined by the force generation process.
        The budget request includes nearly $2 billion for the procurement
    of Network equipment:
        $893 million for 2,166 items for Warfighter Information Network--
    Tactical (WIN-T) for seven brigade combat teams.
        $556 million for Joint Tactical Radio System 11,059 radios
        $274 million for Distributed Common Ground System
        $103 million for Nett Warrior
        $141 million for 1,032 systems of Joint Battle Command--Platform
        How do you rate the status of the Network?
        Answer. The Army Network could best be rated as emerging. Through
    more than 10 years of sustained combat, the Army made significant
    improvements to expeditionary communications capabilities to support
    our Soldiers in the fight. Although significant strides have been made
    to support the expeditionary portion of the Network, there has not been
    an equal focus on the strategic portion of the Network. The strategic
    portion includes the infrastructure on posts, camps and stations which
    enable home station training as well as business systems which enable
    medical, finance, logistics and personnel services for Soldiers and
    their Families. The Army's Network, Land WarNet, is an emerging fully
    integrated enterprise network. It is essential to planning and
    operating with Joint, coalition and interagency partners: It remains
    the Army's number one modernization effort. An enhanced, interoperable
    and fully modernized communications Network is central to the Army's
    efforts to enable Mission Command, ensure our Soldiers always have the
    technological advantage and give the Army a decisive advantage across
    the range of military operations.
        This Network is critical to enhanced decision making and enabling
    our Forces' missions, from the Commander to the Soldier. At the
    tactical level, the Army's modernization efforts remain on track.
    Beginning this fall, the Army will field the first fully integrated
    Network capability as part of Capability Set Fielding this fall. This
    approach is a fundamental change to the way we develop, evaluate, test
    and deliver Networked capabilities. Treating tactical Network
    capability as a cohesive portfolio, Capability Set Management evaluates
    the current operational environment and identifies a suite of systems
    and equipment to fulfill projected Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
    requirements.
        Under this construct, each new Capability Set integrated and
    fielded reflects any changes or advances in technology. This
    incremental modernization allows the Army to buy fewer, more often, to
    help ensure that we leverage industry advancements and keep up with the
    pace of technology change. The Army completes two operational
    evaluations of the entire Capability Set prior to fielding.
        Capability Set 13, the first to be fielded, provides Soldiers
    enhanced capability over current theater-provided Network equipment. We
    will establish the final integrated network baseline and integrate CS
    13 in its entirety during the Network Integration Evaluation 12.2 to be
    conducted at Ft. Bliss, Texas; and White Sands Missile Range, New
    Mexico in May/June 2012. Key capabilities provided by CS 13 include
    Mission Command on the Move (allowing commanders to take the Network
    with them) and Network to the Soldier (providing capabilities through
    advanced radios and handheld devices down to the squad level).
        We must focus our modernization efforts not only at the tactical
    portion of the Army's Network with Capability Set 13, but also on the
    enterprise infrastructure on posts, camps and stations. Modernization
    must address the entirety of the Army's Network to empower a CONUS
    based Army that projects Expeditionary Forces with little to no notice.
    The Army is addressing three major challenges as it modernizes the
    LandWarNet: (1) improving cyber security; (2) meeting operational needs
    in a dynamic threat environment; (3) while becoming more efficient.
        Improving cyber security and Network operations is essential to
    build a single, secure, standards-based Network environment. Non-
    standard Network management tools, multiple access points, vulnerable
    perimeter defenses and inconsistent architectures (many of which were
    deployed quickly to support war efforts) make it harder to prevent,
    identify, isolate, and eliminate security risks. As cyber threats
    increase exponentially, it is imperative that we, as the Nation's
    premiere land force, address this challenge head on.
        Second, balancing the Army's operational needs is a continuing
    challenge, both at the tactical edge and on posts, camps and stations.
    Army users have high operational expectations, and growing need for
    trusted access, assured connectivity, joint interoperability and
    collaboration with mission partners. The Soldiers and leaders expect
    the Network to be available wherever they are, whether they are
    training, preparing for deployment, en route or deployed.
        Finally, as an Army, we are becoming more efficient through
    advanced technology and improved governance. The DoD mandate is to
    streamline, achieve efficiencies, and optimize return on investment.
    For a Networked Force, that translates into a need for enterprise
    systems and solutions, seamless data access, and robust, secure Network
    infrastructure to support every facet of Army, Joint and Multinational
    operations. LandWarNet is the key to retaining the Army's technological
    edge on the battlefield.
        The Army is addressing these challenges through the combined
    resources requested in the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request.
        Question. The RDT&E request includes $214 million for Network costs
    related to Network Integration Evaluations. Explain how the Network
    equipment is evaluated while concurrently supporting formal and
    informal evaluations of other items of equipment? What are some of the
    expenses that total $214 million?
        Answer. The Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) process has
    allowed the Army to bring all elements of the Network together in one
    place for a holistic evaluation by an operational unit in an
    operational environment, and will allow for the validation of a network
    capability set that will be fielded to deploying Brigade Combat Teams
    starting in late 2012. The Army has also brought the materiel
    developers, combat developers, and testers together with industry,
    ensuring continuous coordination in providing the right capability to
    Soldiers. Most importantly, the Army has begun the difficult task of
    changing its processes to provide current network capabilities to the
    force faster and cheaper.
        Treating tactical Network capability as a cohesive portfolio,
    Capability Set (CS) Management evaluates the current operational
    environment, and identifies a suite of systems and equipment to answer
    projected requirements over a two-year period. The NIEs evaluate
    promising capabilities with the potential to close capability gaps
    identified by the Training and Doctrine Command, as well as Network
    capabilities in existing programs requiring formal tests, as part of
    the acquisition process. The CS13 Integrated Network Baseline will,
    upon approval, serve as the operational environment for future testing
    and evaluation.
        The NIE 12.2 will focus on completing the formal evaluations of
    three Systems Under Test and 40 Systems Under Evaluation, establishing
    the initial integrated network baseline and evaluating its operational
    performance. The Army's key objectives for NIE 12.2 are to validate
    CS13/Software Block 11-12 architecture; establish the CS13 Integrated
    Network Baseline and finalize CS13 Mission Command On-The-Move/Soldier
    Connectivity configurations.
        The NIE has established a strong foundation toward realizing the
    network of 2020 and has demonstrated its ability to pay off in
    operational and fiscal benefits. The key NIE expenses include
    engineering expenses, system under evaluation support, test/evaluation
    expenses, and infrastructure. Lessons learned from the NIE construct
    have helped the Army avoid approximately $6 billion in planned spending
    or re-allocate resources to other priorities--all while providing more
    capability, sooner, to our operational formations. This represents a
    considerable savings to a variety of recipients: Congress, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Army. The benefits of the NIE
    construct far exceed testing and evaluation costs.
        The FY13 President's Budget Request contains the following cost
    elements:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Cost Element                  Project          Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Test Experimentation....................          DV1              58.9M
    System of Systems (SoS) Integration               DV1              66.2M
     Directorate............................
    Architecture Development and Systems              DV1              15.6M
     Engineering............................
    Infrastructure..........................          DV1              18.0M
                                             -------------------------------
        Subtotal (Project DV1)..............  ...........             158.7M
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Systems Under Evaluation Integrations...          DU8              45.5M
    SoS Engineering for Common Operating              DU9              10.1M
     Environment (COE)......................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        * The $10.1 million (M) Budget Request in Project DU9 is not for
    the NIE, it will be distributed to support the Army's COE program.

                          Joint Tactical Radio System

        Question. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) dates from 1997.
    The program has been led by a Joint Program Manager since 2005. Program
    subsets include: Ground Mobile Radios; Handheld, Manpack and Small Form
    Fit; and Airborne Maritime and Fixed Station. The program Budget
    Request includes $556 million for 11,059 radios from the Joint Tactical
    Radio Family.
        General Odierno, please give us an assessment of the radios in the
    JTRS family that will be used by the Army.
        Answer. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program has
    experienced success this year. The Army is over 80 percent complete in
    terms of development with two of the JTRS hardware programs, the
    Handheld/Manpack/Small (HMS) FormFit and Multifunctional Information
    Distribution System JTRS. Many of our capabilities, both hardware and
    software, were recently demonstrated in the field with other Army
    networking products and capabilities at the White Sands Missile Range
    during the Army's Network Integration Exercise (NIE). These exercises
    are a critical part of the Army's agile acquisition process designed to
    quickly field new capabilities in a synchronized manner for deploying
    Brigade Combat Teams. In addition to NIEs, we are developing the right
    mechanisms to encourage industry to leverage their own research and
    development funding and bring solutions to the table for assessment and
    potential inclusion as part of a larger interoperable tactical force.
        In terms of the specific hardware programs, we are progressing
    toward production and delivery in many areas. The HMS program will be
    providing near term capabilities with both a Handheld version (Rifleman
    Radio) and a JTRS 2-channel Manpack. Both systems run the JTRS advanced
    networking Soldier Radio Waveform. The HMS program (Manpack and
    Rifleman Radio) completed a successful Milestone C, the point at which
    a production decision is authorized. The Manpack and Rifleman Radio
    have been thoroughly demonstrated and tested though the Army's NIE
    process. For the Rifleman Radio in particular, over 100 radios were
    deployed with the 75th Ranger regiment to Afghanistan, with exceptional
    results. This program is meeting several successful milestones and
    driving toward full rate production and delivery this year.
        Following the cancellation of the Ground Mobile Radio program, the
    Army is looking at a less expensive, mid-tier networking vehicular
    radio running the Wideband Networking Waveform. This capability will be
    an essential component of the Army's tactical network architecture,
    which will provide a critical link between Soldiers at the lowest
    tactical echelon and the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical.
    Accordingly, the Army is already looking at industry-provided
    alternatives that meet the intent of this low cost, reduced size,
    weight and power radios. Competitive production awards are targeted to
    meet the Army's Capability Set 13/14 requirements as part of our
    tactical network architecture.
        The third program--Airborne, Maritime, Fixed (AMF)--is targeted to
    provide Link-16 capabilities to the Long Bow Apache program, and the
    program has delivered pre-production units to the Apache program for
    integration.
        Question. We understand that the Rifleman Radio has been used by
    units in combat. What is the feedback from the field evaluation?
        Answer. The United States Army's 75th Ranger Regiment in
    Afghanistan recently completed an operational assessment of the
    Rifleman Radio. The assessment highlighted the radio's ability to share
    combat-relevant information, voice and data across small units in real
    time. Results from the operational assessment indicate that the
    Rifleman Radio was effective, suitable, and reliable. Specifically,
    Soldiers found the radio easy to use and the appropriate size, weight,
    and power, with more than eight hours of battery life. They also
    experienced enhanced situational awareness via networked voice and data
    communications and effective, reliable communication inside buildings,
    through multiple walls, and to positions outside of compounds.
    Generally speaking, the Soldiers experience very few problems and found
    the Rifleman Radio outperformed current radios.
        Question. Rifleman radios and Manpack radios were used in the
    Network Integration Evaluation at White Sands Missile Range in December
    2011. Please describe how the radios were used, and how they performed.
        Answer. The Rifleman Radio completed a successful Initial
    Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) at the Army Network Integration
    Evaluation (NIE) 12.1 in December 2011. The Army Test Evaluation
    Command (ATEC) conducted the test with support from B Company, 1st
    Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored
    Division (B Co, 1-35 AR, 2/1 AD) using 70 AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radios.
    The independent evaluators used a variety of missions to test the
    radios. The Rifleman Radio was found to be effective by increasing the
    Soldier's situational awareness and providing useful capability to
    execute mission command. The radio was also found to be suitable. The
    radio met the size, weight and power requirements. Neither the size nor
    the weight posed any problems with the Soldiers, and the battery life
    either met or exceeded the eight hour requirement.
        The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Capability
    Manager for Tactical Radios (TCM-TR) conducted a Manpack operational
    assessment in conjunction with the Rifleman Radio IOT&E. The ATEC
    conducted the test with support from B Co, 1-35 AR, 2/1 AD using 18 AN/
    PRC-155 Manpack radios in both mounted, dismounted, and stationary
    command posts. In three weeks of operation using Soldier Radio Waveform
    (SRW), not a single Manpack was withdrawn from the test. The
    Operational Assessment noted good voice quality, reliable
    communications, and that it enhanced the Soldiers' ability to execute
    the mission. The TCM-TR evaluators reported that the Manpack enhanced
    voice and data communications to the tactical edge. The Soldiers were
    generally satisfied with the Manpack's overall design, form factor, and
    weight. The evaluators found that the Manpack clearly supports the
    Warfighting function of mission command. Combined with the Rifleman
    Radio, the Manpack increased every Soldier's situational awareness by
    extending voice and data between all echelons from Team to Company
    level.
        The TCM-TR operational assessment further found that the SRW
    Platoon Network, consisting of both Manpacks and Rifleman Radios,
    provided voice and data down to the team leader level, increased staff
    awareness and provided leaders with valuable information.
        Question. Over the past eight years billions of dollars have been
    provided to the Army to procure SINCGARs radios. Discuss the
    interoperability between SINCGARs and JTRS radios.
        Answer. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) radios are designed
    to be fully interoperable with the Single Channel Ground and Airborne
    Radio System (SINCGARS) radios through JTRS support of the SINCGARS
    legacy waveform. The JTRS family of networking capability provides the
    Soldier with a software programmable and hardware configurable,
    scalable, Internet Protocol-based, wideband, networking radio to
    support Joint Forces requirements across the full range of military
    operations. JTRS uses both networking waveforms (Wideband Networking
    Waveform (WNW), Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), etc.) and legacy
    waveforms (SINCGARS, waveformsLink 16, etc.). Specific wav ornis
    supported by capability are:

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                           Mobile User
                               System                               WNW     SRW        SINCGARS        Legacy SATCOM     Objective System       Link 16
                                                                                                                             (SATCOM)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Handheld/Manpacks/Small Form Kit............................  ......       X                  X                  X                  X  .................
    Rifleman Radio..............................................  ......       X  .................  .................  .................  .................
    Airborne Maritime Fixed.....................................       X       X                  X  .................  .................                  X
    Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio.........................       X       X                  X  .................  .................  .................
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Use of the legacy waveforms ensures interoperability with current
    force systems, thereby capitalizing on the Services previous large
    investments while building capability for the future.
        Question. After field testing, the Ground Mobile Radio and Network
    Integration Kit were cancelled. Have other items of equipment been
    selected to provide the services these two cancelled items were to
    provide?
        Answer. Although the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) program development
    was nearly complete, a recertification decision to formally restructure
    the current program required additional funding and, more importantly,
    delayed delivery of an advanced ground networking capability that the
    Army assessed as too expensive to procure in large quantities. Thus, in
    Fall 2011, the Department of Defense decided to terminate the program.
    However, the insight and knowledge obtained as a result of the GMR
    developmental efforts proved invaluable in establishing the foundation
    for a less expensive, mid-tier radio capability running the Wideband
    Networking Waveform. This capability will be an essential component of
    the Army's tactical network architecture, providing a critical link
    between Soldiers at the lowest tactical echelon and the Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical. Accordingly, the Army is looking at
    Industry provided alternatives that meet the intent of this low cost
    reduced size, weight and power capability, particularly as part of the
    Network Integrated Evaluations. Competitive production awards are
    targeted to meet the Army's Capability Set 13/14 requirements.

                          Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

        Question. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a U.S. Army,
    USSOCOM, and U.S. Marine Corps program to replace the current HMMWV
    with a fresh design, and with the advantage of lessons learned in Iraq
    and Afghanistan in HMMWVs and MATVs (MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle) the JLTV
    is expected to be more survivable, and able to carry a heavier load
    than an MATV.
        General Odierno, the Army currently has about 150,000 HMMWVs. As
    the Army comes home from Iraq, and downsizes, how many light tactical
    vehicles will the Army maintain, and of that total number, how many
    will be JLTVs?
        Answer. The Army will maintain approximately 136,000 light tactical
    vehicles, of which 49,099 will be JLTVs.
        Question. When will JLTV fielding begin and when will it be
    complete?
        Answer. The JLTV will begin fielding in Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) for
    the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and FY18 for the Army. The LTV will be
    fielded in phases with Initial Operational Capability planned for the
    USMC in FY17 and for the Army in FY18. Fielding will be complete in
    FY22 for the USMC and in FY37 for the Army.
        Question. Please describe the objective mix of unarmored HMMWVs,
    uparmored HMMWVs, MATVs, and JLTVs.
        Answer. The objective mix of the Army's Light Tactical Fleet (LTV)
    will consist of High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
    variants and the Joint light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). In the near term,
    the Army will continue to divest and cross level its inventory of
    HMMWVs, retaining Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAH) and the most modern Non-
    Armored HMMWVs (NAH) to meet the LTV requirements. The Army has 53K
    UAHs and has recapitalized 47K NAHs. In the mid to far term, the Army
    plans to procure approximately 49K JLTVs by FY37, which will displace
    un-armored legacy HMMWV variants over time. The Army intends to retain
    approximately 6K Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle-All Terrain
    Vehicles (M-ATV) for use in missions to mitigate Improvised Explosive
    Devices, Rocket Propelled Grenades, Explosively Formed Penetrators,
    underbody mines and small arms fire threats.
        Question. How will the recently announced downsizing of the Army
    impact the requirement for JLTVs?
        Answer. Based on current forecasted reduction of HMMWVs to 136,000
    we expect the requirement for JLTVs to remain stable at 49,099.
        Question. What is the plan to guard against requirements creep in
    the JLTV program?
        Answer. The JLTV program will guard against requirements creep
    through the conduct of Configuration Steering Boards currently required
    on an annual basis for Acquisition Category I programs like JLTV. These
    boards serve as the principal mechanism for reviewing and evaluating
    the program to control cost and identify opportunities for revising
    requirements to meet program objectives.
        Question. The Army and Marine Corps are said to be ``joined at the
    hip'' on JLTV. What compromises did the Army and the Marine Corps
    accept in order to agree on the requirement?
        Answer. The Army and Marine Corps are ``joined at the hip'' on the
    JLTV program. The Marine Corps owns the Capabilities Development
    Document (CDD) which is the document that articulates both the Army and
    the Marine Corps requirements for the program. The CDD was approved in
    March 2012, by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
    services have agreed on a common set of base requirements that allow
    for service unique flexibility such as scalable armor protection and
    external air transportability.

                                  Abrams Tank

        Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2012
    included an additional amount of $255,000,000 to procure 42 additional
    M1A2SEP tanks to support continuation of tank production. Also, it
    directed the Secretary of the Army to provide a report on the plan for
    the use of the additional funds and the plan to sustain tank
    production. In a letter to the chairmen of the congressional defense
    committees, dated February 15, 2012, Secretary McHugh advised that the
    Army will use the additional $255 million to procure 42 additional
    tanks and keep the production line going until June of 2014. The Army
    has been comparing the cost of continuing a sustaining level of
    production, to the cost of shutting down and later restarting when a
    new tank goes into production.
        Secretary McHugh, the Committee appreciates your support, as
    announced in your letter of February 15, 2012 for keeping tank
    production going into mid-2014. We are aware that the Army has been
    studying various courses of action for the tank assembly line going
    forward. In the first option, the Army continues tank production at a
    minimum sustaining rate; in the second option the Army shuts down the
    line and restarts it when needed. The preliminary report of analysis
    compares the costs of the two options, but assigns no tactical or
    monetary value to the tanks that are produced under the minimum
    sustaining rate option.
        Mr. Secretary, it would seem that the comparison of options should
    consider the value of the tanks that are produced under the minimum
    sustaining rate option. Do you agree?
        Answer. The Army agrees that there is an operational value in the
    Abrams tank. The purpose of the RAND Arroyo study is to independently
    validate the Army's assessment of the costs and benefits of the planned
    production break. This study is focused on addressing whether it would
    be more beneficial from a cost perspective to stop or continue tank
    production. The ongoing RAND Arroyo study will not specifically assign
    a tactical or monetary value to continued Abrams tank production. The
    final results of the on-going RAND Arroyo cost refinement analysis will
    be available in the near term.
        Question. When will you have a proposal for the way ahead for tank
    production?
        Answer. From an Abrams fleet requirement perspective, the Army will
    meet its acquisition objective for M1A2/SEPv2 tanks when production is
    complete in June 2014. The Army currently plans to restart production
    in Fiscal Year 2017 in connection with future Abrams tank upgrades. The
    final results of the on-going RAND Arroyo cost refinement analysis will
    be available in the near term. The specific purpose of the RAND Arroyo
    study is to independently validate the Army's assessment of the costs
    and benefits of the planned production break. This study is focused on
    addressing whether it would be more beneficial from a cost perspective
    to stop or continue tank production.
        Currently the Army has a mix of models in the tank fleet. Active
    component units are equipped with M1A2SEP tanks and the Army National
    Guard has M1A1 tanks. The budget request proposes no funding to
    purchase tanks and provides funds only for contractor technical
    support, fielding, and training.
        Question. Currently the Army has a mix of models in the tank fleet.
    Active component units are equipped with M1A2SEP tanks and the Army
    National Guard has M1A1 tanks. The budget request proposes no funding
    to purchase tanks and provides funds only for contractor technical
    support, fielding, and training.
        General Odierno, how many additional new M1A2SEP tanks would be
    required to outfit all of our tank battalions, active, and national
    guard with the newest model, the M1A2SEPv2?
        Answer. Under the current force structure and two-variant fleet
    requirement, all active component Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs)
    and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) will be fully equipped with
    M1A2SEPv2 tanks. The 116th Army National Guard ABCT is currently being
    fielded with 58 M1A2SEPv2 tanks. An additional 435 M1A2SEPv2 tanks
    would be needed to fully outfit the remaining six ABCTs and three
    Combined Arms Battalions in the Army National Guard.
        Pending Active Duty force structure reductions will likely increase
    the number of M1A2SEPv2 tanks available to outfit more National Guard
    units.
        Question. In the concept for the more lethal, high tech military,
    what would be the advantages of a pure M1A2SEP tank fleet?
        Answer. The Army's two-variant fleet strategy equips all Armored
    Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) in Active Component, Army Prepositioned
    Stock (APS), and one ABCT in the Army National Guard (116th ABCT) with
    M1A2SEPv2 tanks. The remaining six ABCTs and three Combined Arms
    Battalions are equipped with M1A1AIM-SA tanks. This fleet mix is a
    result of refining the balance between affordable investment options
    over the last eight years and providing the right level of warfighting
    capability to Active and National Guard units. While there are
    advantages to the concept of a pure M1A2SEPv2 tank fleet, we must
    balance these with the substantial cost involved.
        The Army's MlA1AIM-SA fleet is very new (2-3 years) and very
    capable. The benefits of replacing these tanks, many of which are still
    in the process of being fielded, with the M1A2SEPv2, do not outweigh
    the costs in our current fiscal environment. The principal operational
    difference between Abrams variants is the Commander's Independent
    Thermal Viewer (CITV) on the M1A2SEPv2 that provides the tank commander
    with a separate thermal sight and integrated digital fire control
    system. Despite the differences between the two variants, both Abrams
    variants offer similar lethality, protection and mobility capability.
    While a pure fleet would alleviate the training and logistic
    differences between the two variants, the benefits gained cannot be
    justified by the cost involved.
        Question. What are the key advantages of the M1A2SEP over the M1A1?
        Answer. The principal operational difference between Abrams
    variants is the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) on the
    M1A2SEPv2 that provides the tank commander with a separate thermal
    sight and integrated digital fire control system, which enables the
    Commander and gunner to engage the enemy using hunter/killer tactics--
    the Commander and gunner can search for targets independently from
    their protected positions using high quality optics.
        Another difference between variants is the means of integrating the
    tank's on-board and mission command systems. The M1A2SEPv2 is a fully
    digitized tank with all on-board and mission command systems integrated
    into a single, embedded data bus, where data/output and processes are
    shared between on-board systems. The M1A1AIM-SA tank's mission command
    is applique to the tank (hardware is attached to existing systems
    reducing room in the turret), and its on-board systems are not
    integrated into a single data bus.
        However, both Abrams variants offer similar lethality, mobility,
    protection, and Mission Command capabilities.
        Question. The Army has been working to have as many vehicles and
    systems as possible with digital capability. How important is digital
    capability in our tanks?
        Answer. Today's complex battlefield environment places increasing
    demands on both individual Soldiers and leaders at every level,
    resulting in an unprecedented need to pass information both up and down
    the chain of command. Complex coalition efforts drive additional
    burdens on tactical formations to share common information and
    collaborate to achieve the desired battle field effects.
        All command platforms, including tanks, must provide leaders at all
    levels the capabilities required to execute mission command, from the
    tactical operations center, to the commander on the move, to the
    dismounted Soldier. Mission Command is the conduct of military
    operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type
    orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at
    all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and
    independently to accomplish the mission.
        The network remains essential to planning and operating with Joint,
    coalition and interagency partners: it remains the Army's number one
    modernization effort. Central to the Army's effort to enable Mission
    Command is a modernized, enhanced, and interoperable communications
    network that ensures our Soldiers always have the technological
    advantage and gives the Army a decisive advantage across the range of
    military operations.
        Capability Set 13, the first Capability Set to be fielded, provides
    enhanced capability over current theater-provided network equipment.
    Key capabilities include Mission Command on the Move (allowing
    commanders to take the network with them) and Network to the Soldier
    (through advanced radios and handheld devices down to the squad level).
    Capability Set Management is geared toward our tactical forces, with
    initial sets going to infantry and Stryker formations. Efforts to
    integrate capability sets into armored formations are ongoing.

                      Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)

        Question. The M109 self-propelled 155mm howitzer has served the
    Army well since the early 1960s. However the current model, the Paladin
    is showing its age. The British and a number of other North Atlantic
    armed forces have replaced their M109s with other howitzers. The Army
    is developing a new self-propelled 155mm howitzer and accompanying
    self-propelled ammunition carrier known as the ``Paladin Integrated
    Management'', or ``Paladin PIM''. To simplify logistics, the PIM has
    many components in common with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, including
    the engine, transmission and track. It uses the gun elevating and
    traversing mechanisms from the cancelled Future Combat Systems program.
    The program experienced integration problems and schedule slips in
    fiscal year 2011, but seems to be on track after some key leadership
    changes.
        General Odierno, the Paladin PIM 155mm self-propelled howitzer
    program seems to be on track to reach milestone C and begin low rate
    initial production at the end of the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2013.
    What are the key improvements in the Paladin PIM as compared to the
    current M109 Howitzer?
        Answer. The key improvements that Paladin Integrated Management
    (PIM) offers over the existing M109 Paladin Howitzer are increases in
    Force Protection and Survivability, mobility, responsiveness of fires,
    Space Weight and Power (SWaP) capacity, enhanced Network Capability,
    and commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
        PIM provides increases in Force Protection and Survivability
    through a new chassis, increased ground clearance, integration of a
    remote weapon station, more effective armor materials, improved crew
    seating and hull thickness. PIM can also accept add on armor modular
    kits.
        PIM delivers increased mobility to provide the ability to maintain
    the tempo of the supported force and is able to support Full Spectrum
    Operations.
        PIM improves the responsiveness of fires using electric drives to
    point the gun tube and pivot steer capability, allowing PIM to execute
    fire missions faster than the current M109A6 Paladin which utilizes a
    hydraulic system.
        SWaP enhancements are critical enablers to provide growth margin
    for future requirements and technology insertion which the current M109
    Howitzer cannot accommodate.
        The new 600 volt system on PIM provides Enhanced Network Capability
    over the 28 volt system employed on the M109A6 Paladin. PIM accepts the
    Army's current and future networks and meets the need to remain network
    capable commensurate with supported forces.
        The PIM chassis utilizes a Bradley common engine, transmission,
    suspension, and track. This commonality will reduce the logistics
    footprint of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team and is expected to reduce
    maintenance costs through common parts and maintenance tasks.
        Question. The Paladin PIM shares a number of chassis components
    with the Bradley fighting vehicle, but much of the current M109 chassis
    remains the same. Please describe the improvements in mobility,
    lethality and survivability, plus the advantages in logistics of
    sharing parts and components with Bradley vehicles?
        Answer. PIM has a new chassis/hull design that uses Bradley common
    power train and suspension components. The new hull provides increased
    structural integrity, more effective armor materials for greater force
    protection/survivability, and provisions for add-on-armor to improve
    PIM's survivability over the current M109 Paladin. PIM uses an upgraded
    Bradley power train & suspension providing greater horsepower to
    improve PIM's mobility, enabling the platform to keep up with the
    maneuver force. The larger power train also provides margin for
    additional weight and power demands. Component commonality with Bradley
    reduces the logistics footprint of the Brigade Combat Team and reduces
    the number of unique parts in the Army supply chain. The use of Bradley
    common components leverages maintenance skill sets currently resident
    in the Army.
        Question. At 79,600 pounds, the Paladin is 1,100 over its design
    weight. Is that a matter of concern?
        Answer. The original M109 chassis and suspension fielded in 1963
    was designed for a gross vehicle weight of 53,000 pounds. The current
    M109A6 Paladin gross vehicle weight is 67,200 pounds with no
    substantial changes to the original chassis and suspension, resulting
    in increased wear on suspension components and reduced ground
    clearance. The current M109A6 Paladin does not have the weight capacity
    to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include Force
    Protection packages. The excess weight of the current M109A6 over its
    design weight is a matter of concern to the Army and is one reason for
    the Army's support for the Paladin Integrated Management system.
        Question. Describe the countermine, counter IED and counter RPG
    protection on Paladin?
        Answer. The Paladin's (M109A6) countermine, counter IED and counter
    RPG protection were appropriate to the threats to crew and platform at
    the time of its design in 1993. Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised
    Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems were added to the
    platform in 2004 to mitigate the increased IED threat in Operation
    Iraqi Freedom.
        In developing Paladin Integrated Management (PIM), the M109A6's
    successor, the Army will increase countermine, counter IED and counter
    RPG protection by three levels of protection. The first level is
    improvements to the base vehicle by having a thicker hull and improved
    armor recipe, integrating a remote weapons system, increasing ground
    clearance, improved crew seating, and increasing electrical and
    mechanical power supply to accept future technology force protection
    insertions. Additional side armor to the base vehicle will provide the
    second level of protection against mine, IED and RPG threats. Finally,
    the third level of protection will be achieved by the ability to accept
    an underbody kit to increase force protection and survivability against
    underbelly mine and IED threats. These increases in countermine,
    counter IED and counter RPG protection will allow the PIM freedom of
    maneuver within the battlespace.
        Question. Will the Paladin PIM howitzers have crash and blast
    tolerant fuel tanks?
        Answer. The PIM howitzer design does not include crash and blast
    tolerant fuel tanks. The PIM sponson fuel cells incorporate fire
    suppression powder panels to mitigate potential fuel fires. Fuel
    subsystem vulnerability testing will be conducted using various
    threats.

                                    Stryker

        Question. The Stryker Program was initiated in 1999. The Stryker
    family of vehicles has ten variants ranging from infantry carrier, to
    reconnaissance vehicle to medical evacuation. The Stryker family was
    intended to serve as a bridge to the fielding of the Future Combat
    Systems' vehicles. The FCS program was cancelled in 2009, but the
    Stryker vehicles have performed well. The Army plans to field 9 Stryker
    Brigade Combat Teams. Each of the brigades will have 340 Strykers. The
    Army will have 292 additional Strykers with double-vee hulls for duty
    in Afghanistan. All fielding is scheduled to be complete mid-2013.
        Stryker vehicles have served well in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a
    high level of survivability has been maintained despite attacks by a
    determined and creative enemy. General Odierno, could you briefly
    describe the improvements that have been made to the Strykers to better
    counter IEDs, mines, and rocket propelled grenades.
        Answer. The Army has continually improved the survivability of the
    Stryker vehicle to meet evolving threats. Examples of these additional
    survivability improvements include, SLAT and Stryker Reactive Armor
    Tiles to counter rocket propelled grenades, Driver's Enhancement Kit,
    Mine Roller Adapter Kit, Blast Mitigation Kit, Energy Attenuating
    (Blast) Seats, and Skydex (Energy Attenuating Floor Mat) to counter
    Improvised Explosive Devices and mines, Hull Protection Kit to counter
    Explosively Formed Projectiles and Common Ballistic Shield, Squad
    Leader Integrated Protection Kit and Tire Fire Suppression Kit and
    Driver's Ballistic Shield to counter shrapnel and blast effects.
        In 2010, the Army began integrating a unique, Double-V shaped hull
    onto the Stryker that mitigates the affects of underbelly blasts by
    deflecting the blast away from the vehicle. The Stryker Double-V Hull
    (DVH) has been extremely successful at providing additional
    survivability protection for our Soldiers. Currently, the Army has a
    requirement for a total of 742 Stryker DVHs of which 461 have been
    produced and 256 fielded in Afghanistan. The Army is completing the
    testing on Stryker Reactive Armor II (SRAT II), that provides
    protection against Rocket Propelled Grenade similar to SRAT, but at a
    reduced weight. The latest initiative being worked is a Targeting under
    Armor (TUA) effort that will allow Soldiers to conduct fire support
    mission tasks from under cover, allowing greater protection from the
    effects of IEDs, mines, and rocket propelled grenades.
        Question. Has Stryker off-road mobility been reduced?
        Answer. Continual application of survivability kits, to include
    integration of the Double V-Hull, have increased the weight of the
    Stryker vehicles. Testing conducted on the Stryker Double V-Hull (DVH)
    prior to fielding noted that mobility was affected to some extent in
    loose soil and on slopes; however, testing analysis also noted the
    differences between DVH and flat bottom Strykers were minor. Although
    these measures have reduced off-road mobility, it has not impacted
    operational use in Afghanistan.
        Question. Does the Army plan to eventually convert all Strykers to
    the double-vee hull configuration?
        Answer. Once the Army decides on the appropriate force structure,
    fleet mix and overall number of combat vehicles, the quantity of DVH
    Strykers and variants of Strykers will be finalized. The Army has a
    current procurement target of 2 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT)
    with Double-V Hull (DVH), totaling 742 DVH Stryker vehicles, based on
    minimum operational and training needs to support Afghanistan. This
    plan currently maintains the nine garrison SBCTs with flat bottom
    hulls. Conversion of all Strykers to DVH configurations is unaffordable
    within our Combat Vehicle Modernization Portfolio and Strategy.
        Question. The budget request includes funds for 58 Strykers, all of
    them chemical reconnaissance vehicles. Do you see a requirement for
    more Stryker brigades, beyond the nine being fielded now?
        Answer. The Stryker brigades currently in the force are sufficient
    to meet current warplans and steady-state requirements.

                            Helicopter Modernization

        Question. When Army units move on the battlefield, they would like
    to have tactical cover by armed helicopters. The strike on Osama bin
    Laden by special forces employed specially equipped helicopters to make
    the strike, and for subsequent extraction. In the recent hostage rescue
    in Somalia, the Navy SEALS parachuted into the action but were
    extracted by Army helicopters. However helicopter acquisition has not
    gone well in recent years. Comanche was cancelled. Armed Reconnaissance
    Helicopter--cancelled. And Army and DoD leaders have adopted a three to
    five year delay in helicopter modernization. Production of 24 Apache's
    will be deferred, the equivalent of a battalion. Development of a new
    armed scout helicopter has been deferred also.
        General Odierno, what is your evaluation of the capabilities of the
    current Army helicopter fleets versus the requirements in the future
    force to be more agile, mobile, lethal and high tech?
        Answer. We have been modernizing our current fleet of aircraft, UH-
    60M, CH-47F, AH-64D block III, and continuing to move forward for a
    replacement of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. These modernization efforts
    will keep our helicopter fleet relevant out to 2025/2030. 2030 and
    beyond the Army is heavily involved in the Future Vertical Lift effort
    which may prove to be our next generation of vertical lift aircraft.
        Question. The Army will slow for five or six years the production
    of new Apache helicopters, essentially slipping one battalion of
    helicopters several years to the right. Is the cutback in Apache
    procurement driven by endstrength and structure downsizing or just to
    save money?
        Answer. The reduction in Apache procurement was to save money in
    the near-term by deferring some Apache costs to the out years in order
    to support higher priorities within the Army. The reduction was not
    driven by end-strength and structure downsizing.
        Question. Fiscal Year 13 production of UH-60M helicopters deceased
    from the planned 71 a year ago to 59 in the budget request. However,
    the Army has unfilled requirements of over 800 UH-60s. Why are you
    slowing production?
        Answer. The reduction in UH-60M procurement was to save money in
    the near-term by deferring some UH-60M costs to the out years in order
    to support higher priorities within the Army. The Army still has a
    requirement for a total of 2,135 UH-60 L/M aircraft and will continue
    to procure UH-60M aircraft through the Five Year Defense Plan and
    beyond to meet those modernization requirements. The Army's planned
    procurement of the UH-60M will eventually displace its current non-
    modernized fleet of approximately 800 UH-60A aircraft.
        Question. General Odierno, the Institute for Defense Analysis
    conducted a study on rotorcraft safety and survivability from 2001 to
    2009. Of 375 rotorcraft losses with 496 fatalities, 81 percent were due
    to accidents--not the enemy. Accidents include flying into the ground,
    colliding with other aircraft, and crashing after loss of vision due to
    brown out.
        This has been an item of concern for some time. What is the Army's
    plan to improve procedures, more training, or high tech solutions to
    address the accident problem? What progress has been made?
        Answer. The Army is demonstrating significant improvement in
    reducing ClassA/B degraded visual environment (DVE) related incidents.
    The last compiled DVE statistics reflect a marked decrease in incidents
    per 100K flight hours from 1.47 in FY03-FY06 to .59 between FY07-FY10,
    a decrease of 60%. FY11 DVE rate remains at .54 per 100K hours.
    Reductions are attributable to the introduction of more modernized
    aircraft and DVE emphasis in pilot proficiency training.
        Every aircraft currently under procurement has a fully modernized
    cockpit which includes flight symbology for all modes of flight, moving
    maps and enhanced flight controls to improve controllability. In
    addition, we are looking at focused solutions including active radar
    penetrating sensors to address DVE operations in the legacy platforms
    in support of current operations as well as a bridge to an end-state
    modernized fleet.
        All aircrews practice the tactics, techniques, and procedures
    (TTPs) appropriate to their helicopter to ensure the best use of
    available power, aircraft systems and crew coordination as a part of
    regular crew training. Individual training includes sand and dust
    qualifications as well as unit training at the Combat Training Centers
    and during High Altitude Maneuver Environmental Training.

       Armed Aerial Scout Helicopter and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Teaming

        Question. Army initiated the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)
    program in December of 2004, about ten months after the cancellation of
    the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program. The Comanche was over cost and
    the prospect for production was poor. The ARH was to be an economical
    alternative, based on commercial off-the-shelf aircraft technology.
    However by 2008 the ARH had also experienced significant cost growth.
    Following a Nunn-McCurdy review the ARH was not certified for
    continuation and in October 2008 the Army directed the program be
    terminated. The Committee anticipated, based on the sense of urgency
    and commitment in the Army for a new armed scout helicopter that a new
    program would be started promptly. That has not happened. The Committee
    understands that the Army will defer modernizing the scout helicopter
    fleet for three to five years and will continue to use OH-58D and F
    models with minor upgrades.
        General Odierno, the Army has been searching for a replacement for
    the OH-58 series scout helicopter for nearly 30 years. However, with
    the submission of the fiscal year budget request, the Army delays
    helicopter modernization for three to five years, and will continue to
    rely on the OH-58D and F models.
        General, what capability trades are you making to delay modernizing
    the scout helicopter fleet?
        Answer. The Army is not delaying modernization or currently making
    any trades on the capabilities available to the scout helicopter fleet.
        Modernization of the armed aerial scout capability is being
    addressed in the current Kiowa Warrior helicopter through the Cockpit
    and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP). This program addresses obsolescence
    and weight reduction on the current fleet of OH-58D helicopters and
    modernizes that platform to the OH-58F, but does not extend service
    life. The CASUP program is on schedule and continues to meet its
    program baseline requirements for completion. The first pre-production
    aircraft is scheduled for delivery in the 4th Quarter of FY12. The
    first unit equipped with the OH-58F is expected in FY16. However, the
    Army continues to pursue a potential replacement for the Kiowa Warrior.
        The Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) Analysis of Alternatives was completed
    and submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in January
    2012. In order to make a more informed capabilities decision, the Army
    is requesting to conduct a Voluntary Flight Demonstration (VFD) of
    helicopters currently available from industry representatives. These
    flight demonstrations will help define the capabilities available from
    industry to fill the AAS helicopter role and perhaps better define the
    capability trades as they relate to the OH-58F helicopter. The Army is
    expected to make a capabilities decision once the data from the VFD is
    compiled and analyzed.
        Question. Do you anticipate advances in technology in the next few
    years that will dramatically change rotorcraft capabilities?
        Answer. The Army Science and Technology (S&T) community is actively
    engaged in developing next generation vertical lift technologies for
    the Future Vertical Lift family of aircraft. S&T is developing a
    technology demonstrator to provide a medium lift fleet (Blackhawk,
    Seahawk and Apache) replacement on or about 2030. We seek to achieve
    triple the un-refueled range, triple the operational persistence, or
    time on station, and double the speed of our current fleet aircraft, to
    meet the projected capabilities needed for the future. To achieve these
    operational capabilities, new technologies will be developed over the
    next five years, to include high speed rotors; multi-speed
    transmissions; low drag fuselages and embedded sensors; and internal
    weapons carriage. Upon successful development and flight demonstration,
    the Army anticipates integrating these technologies into advanced
    vehicle designs that provide increased cruise efficiencies, such as
    compound (auxiliary propulsion and wings) configurations (advanced
    tilt-rotor).
        While this S&T effort is addressing the medium class fleet, these
    technologies are expected to support future light and heavy lift
    aircraft.
        Question. Does teaming OH-58 series helicopters with unmanned
    aircraft deliver a significant boost in reconnaissance capability?
    Lethality?
        Answer. Yes, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) complement existing
    OH-58Ds in many but not all of their reconnaissance tasks. UAS operate
    traditionally at higher altitude, with greater endurance and often
    unobserved by the enemy; this allows them to cue the OH-58s to
    additional targets, enhancing their missions. The UAS armed with laser
    designators also allows the OH-58 to engage targets with precision fire
    outside the range of the enemy, enhancing the survivability of the
    aircrew. The OH-58 in turn provides the needed lower viewing angle, and
    more detailed reconnaissance completing the overall reconnaissance
    picture. The ability of all aircraft to share Full Motion Video (FMV)
    with each other and the ground Commander provides greater situational
    awareness, and helps reduce the complexity of target acquisition and
    the number of steps between acquisition and engagement. This was
    demonstrated at a recent National Training Center rotation with our
    first Full Spectrum Attack Reconnaissance Squadron where teaming of
    manned and unmanned aircraft resulted in an increased tactical
    advantage.
        Question. Which unmanned aerial vehicles will be teamed with the
    OH-58s?
        Answer. The Attack Reconnaissance Squadron of the Full Spectrum
    Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) teams the RQ-7B Shadow UAS with the OH-
    58Ds. All Army UAS will also be interoperable with the OH-58D, and thus
    teaming is enabled across the fleet.
        Question. Does the pilot of the OH-58 essentially fly two aircraft
    at once?
        Answer. No, the OH-58D copilot will take temporary control of only
    the sensor on the UAS, and then release control back to the UAS
    aircrew. This enables the OH-58D to survey the target area and
    communicate to the UAS operators how they can best support the
    helicopter's maneuver.

                          Joint Air-To-Ground Missile

        Question. The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) provided greater
    range, insensitive munitions, and a tri-mode seeker with fire-and-
    forget capability. The JAGM was to provide precision engagement against
    stationary and moving targets. It was to be effective against armor,
    bunkers, vehicles, missile launchers, and command and control
    facilities. The very broad nature of the requirements also increased
    the complexity of integration and drove up cost. The fiscal year 2012
    appropriation provides $127 million for JAGM development. The fiscal
    year 2013 request proposes only $10 million to continue development and
    the Secretary of Defense has announced that the Department will focus
    on low cost alternatives such as Hellfire.
        General Odierno, describe for this Committee the significance of
    the capability that is lost by continuing with the older missiles
    rather than fielding JAGM.
        Answer. The full JAGM capability provides the following
    improvements over the current HELLFIRE and Longbow missiles: 1)
    Improved Countermeasure/Adverse Weather capability; 2) More robust
    capability to engage Unmanned Aerial System (UAS); 3) Improved Fire and
    Forget; 4) Improved operational flexibility through the use of the tri-
    mode seeker; 5) Increased lethality against moving/fleeting targets;
    and 6) Extended range (16 km for rotary-wing platforms versus the
    current 8 km for HELLFIRE).
        The Army and Navy reviewed and prioritized JAGM's requirements for
    cost versus operational capability. The restructured program will take
    advantage of the tri-mode seeker we've already developed in this
    program and give it open system architecture. With this architecture we
    intend to incrementally improve its countermeasure and adverse weather
    capability as well as improve its Unmanned Aerial System lethality.
    This restructured approach leverages the development already completed
    and provides a more affordable solution.
        Question. What is the unit cost of Hellfire versus JAGM?
        Answer. The HELLFIRE Fiscal Year 2012 production costs, with
    government support, are $120,000 per missile, given a procurement rate
    of approximately 2,000 per year. Prior to program restructure, the JAGM
    certified costs were estimated by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
    Army (Cost and Economics) to be $169,000 per missile for a 16-year
    production program given a procurement rate of approximately 2,000 per
    year. The intent of the JAGM Extended Technology Development Phase is
    to address potential requirements tradeoff and affordability for future
    production; therefore, the JAGM actual production cost is expected to
    be reduced from the original program estimates when compared at the
    same production rate.
        Question. What is the savings, year by year, of continuing with
    Hellfire rather than procuring JAGM?
        Answer. During the period of Fiscal Years 2013-2017 (FY13-FY17),
    the Army projected savings would be $395.6 million (M).

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            FY13         FY14         FY15         FY16         FY17        Total
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    RDT&E Funding.....................      $159.4M      $145.8M       $37.7M       $26.7M       $26.0M      $395.6M
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * For FY15 and out, the Army would continue to procure HELLFIRE Missiles to meet the Total Army Munitions
      Requirements at approximately $85M per year.

        Question. What upgrades can be added to the Hellfire? At what cost?
        Answer. The Army presently is not planning an upgrade to HELLFIRE.
    During the JAGM Extended Technology Development Phase, however, the
    Army will integrate a multimode seeker on existing qualified components
    of the HELLFIRE system in order to deliver a missile that has much
    greater capability than the current major HELLFIRE variants. The
    expected unit cost of this approach will ultimately be comparable to
    the current HELLFIRE.

          Patriot PAC-3 and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)

        Question. General Odierno, given the potential threat to U.S. and
    allied interests, especially the potential threat in the Pacific region
    posed by Chinese aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles,
    there is a general consensus that more Patriot Missiles, and launchers
    may be needed. The budget request proposes 84 additional Patriot
    Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missiles and 38 launchers, which
    completes the procurement.
        General Odierno, please discuss the requirement for Patriot
    missiles, and the balance, or friction between assets available and the
    requests from the combatant commanders for Patriots to be forward
    deployed in their areas.
        Answer. The Army requirement for Patriot missiles is currently well
    established at 2200. In conjunction with development and planned
    procurement of the next generation Patriot Advanced Capability--Phase 3
    (PAC-3) missile and the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), the Army is
    working a revision to the current Army Acquisition Objective (AAO). As
    combatant commands submit their PAC-3 missile inventory requirements to
    the department, allocation of the PAC-3 missiles is then adjudicated by
    the Joint Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense in the Patriot
    Missile Distribution Plan.
        Question. The Committee understands that some Patriot units have a
    blended capability. That is, the units have a mix of earlier model
    missiles and PAC-3 missiles. General Odierno, please explain the
    strengths and limitations of Patriot units with a blended inventory of
    new and older model missiles.
        Answer. All Patriot units fight with a mix of Patriot Advanced
    Capability--Phase 3 (PAC-3) and legacy missiles. This mix capitalizes
    on the strengths of our newest missile (PAC-3, soon to be Missile
    Segment Enhancement (MSE)), while utilizing legacy missiles until they
    are expended. Commanders can select which missile variant to employ in
    response to their knowledge of the threat. Patriot is deliberately
    planned to have a mix of missiles for the next two decades, at minimum.
    The Patriot force is currently fielded with both newer PAC-3 Enhanced
    Launcher Electronic System (ELES) launchers, which can fire all missile
    variants and older launchers that can only fire legacy missiles. To
    increase commander flexibility, the Army is working to upgrade all
    launchers to the ELES configuration PAC-3 capability.
        Question. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) being
    jointly developed by the United States, Italy, and Germany was to
    replace the Patriot series air defense systems, but MEADS has been
    cancelled. Weighing threats versus Patriot capabilities, was MEADS
    termination the correct move?
        Answer. The U.S. cannot afford to purchase the MEADS and make the
    required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next two decades.
    The estimated MEADS design and development program would have required
    at least $974 million additional U.S. investment on top of the Fiscal
    Year 2012 (FY12) and FY13 funding requirements. Additionally, three
    independent MEADS program studies concluded that the MEADS system
    design would not meet the U.S. requirements, and delays in the MEADS
    development would not have allowed the Army to replace the Patriot
    systems with the MEADS as originally planned. Consequently, the costs
    of completing the MEADS development and procuring it to eventually
    replace the Patriot would have required significant concurrent
    investment in the Patriot sustainment and modernization over the next
    two decades. Together, these costs are unaffordable in the current
    budget environment.
        The Army has programmed significant Patriot modernization
    initiatives across FY13 through FY17. These investments provide
    critical capability upgrades and also help enable longer term
    sustainment of the force, while the U.S. plans to end participation in
    the MEADS. The Preplanned Patriot Product Improvement Program (P3I)
    provides for the upgrade of the Patriot System through individual
    materiel changes. The P3I sustains and modernizes the Patriot system to
    address operational lessons learned, enhance joint force
    interoperability, and make other system performance improvements to
    provide overmatch capability against emerging threats. The Army's
    Patriot modernization approach includes enhanced integration into the
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture, the greater range and
    capability Missile Segment Enhancement missile, software upgrades to
    address specific emerging threats, net centric communication upgrades
    and new system processors with expanded capacity to accommodate current
    and future software evolution.
        The Department will continue to refine the Patriot evolutionary
    development based on information gained from the MEADS Proof of Concept
    and results of the ongoing Army, Joint Staff, and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense reviews and studies.
        Question. The budget request includes $400,861,000 for MEADS in
    fiscal year 2013. For the current fiscal year, 2012, the program is
    funded at $389,630,000. What value is the United States receiving for
    the investment of approximately $800 million over fiscal years 2012 and
    2013?
        Answer. The Department of Defense and our MEADS partners seek the
    results of the final two years of the Proof of Concept (PoC) effort,
    the completed design and testing of the MEADS elements, the capability
    demonstrations and the data archival and performance reporting in order
    to fully assess which elements or technologies would be available to
    transition to existing air and missile defense architectures. Until
    this critical design and performance data is available, no final
    decisions can be made; but, we can say at this point, that multiple
    MEADS technologies, capabilities, and data could be harvested to
    potentially benefit the U.S. air and missile defense. The MEADS PoC
    facilitates demonstration on advanced, rotating Multifunction Fire
    Control Radar and lightweight/360 degree Launcher; and the design and
    limited demonstration of an advanced Surveillance Radar, all of which
    would be considered in follow-on efforts to enhance air and missile
    defense once the MEADS PoC is completed. The system demonstrations in
    2012 and 2013 will demonstrate the maturity of design and be an enabler
    for potential European follow-on efforts and initial U.S. harvesting
    decisions. There is no U.S. MEADS funding planned beyond FY13.
        Additionally, the PoC effort results in data archival and delivery
    for future use, potential options for harvesting, future consideration
    of MEADS Major End Items, and technologies to be assessed by the
    Department in determining future Air and Missile Defense capabilities.
        The following MEADS technologies are candidates for U.S.
    harvesting:
               360-Degree, Long Range UHF Surveillance Radar
            Demonstration Unit/Performance Data
               PAC-3 MSE Interceptor Data
               Performance Qualification Data From Three Flight
            Tests
               360-Degree Engagement Solution Software Logic and
            Algorithms
               Band Fire Control Radar Exciter Design and
            Performance Data
               Lightweight Launcher With Improved Launcher
            Electronics and Near-Vertical Launch Design/Performance Data
               XM1160 FMTV 10-Ton Prime Mover With Armor
               Advanced Power and Cooling Technologies for Rotating
            Phased-array Radars
               Techniques and Algorithms for Track Fusion From
            Multi-spectral (UHF and X-band) Sensors
               Advanced Prognostic and Diagnostics Logistics
            Approaches
               Design for Reduced Personnel Requirements
               Data Link Processor From the BMC4I
               MEADS Intra-Communication System
        More broadly, while the DoD understands the need to make difficult
    choices in the current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of
    our activities, we also note that failure to meet our MEADS Memorandum
    of Understanding funding obligations for FY13 could negatively affect
    our allies' implementation of current transatlantic projects and
    multinational cooperation, as well as their willingness to join future
    cooperative endeavors with the U.S. that are strongly supported by the
    Administration and Congress. Germany is a longstanding Partner in the
    Patriot system, and we are currently engaged in multiple cooperative
    efforts with Germany and/or Italy (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter). The
    ramification of failing to provide funds for this program, which is
    near completion, has already impacted relations with our Allies. Most
    recently, at the Three Nations Board of Directors meeting, our Allies
    expressed severe consternation that they had just formally ratified the
    U.S. recommended PoC, and insist on completing the PoC as agreed to in
    October 2011.
        To remain flexible and adaptive for potential incorporation of any
    of the above technologies into the U.S. Army Air Defense structure, it
    is imperative to complete these final steps. Without this final MEADS
    investment, the U.S. use of these technologies would require
    reinvestment of additional development funds from near inception.
        Question. What is the plan to enhance air defense capability going
    forward?
        Answer. The characteristics of the future Air and Missile Defense
    (AMD) force are based on the new Defense Strategy and The Army Plan
    (TAP), which provide a framework for the modernization effort to keep
    pace with the evolving threat and remain lethal and discriminate. The
    Army's plan to enhance air defense capability entails:
               Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) which will
            provide a single, modular, integrated architecture that will
            enable componentization of Joint AMD systems as well as the
            Patriot system by putting launchers and radars on the network.
               Sustain Patriot, to include planned product
            improvements through 2040.
               Institutionalize the current Counter-Rocket,
            Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) system while seeking improved
            capability through the development of the Indirect Fire
            Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2.
               Investigate kinetic/non-kinetic integration to
            enhance cruise missile defense and counter Unmanned Aerial
            System (UAS) capability.
               Continue Doctrine, Organization, Training,
            Leadership, Material, Personnel and Facilities (DOTLMPF)
            integration with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
               The ability to defeat advanced countermeasures such
            as early release of sub-munitions and Digital Radio Frequency
            Memory (DRFM) electronic attack.
               The ability to provide relevant situational
            awareness and early warning across multiple joint operations
            areas simultaneously.
               In the far term, a 360 degree surveillance and fire
            control capability that enables the employment of advanced
            engagement concepts with other Joint AMD capabilities.

                 Modernized Expanded Capability Vehicle (MECV)

        Question. The Modernized Expanded Capability Vehicle (MECV) was
    designed to build on the HMMWV (uparmored) Expanded Capability Vehicle.
    Though not as well armored as the MRAP series of vehicles, the MECV was
    intended to restore load carrying capability to the HMMWV while raising
    survivability to near MRAP levels. However the Army has terminated this
    program, and will focus on the MTV research and development effort.
        General Odierno, the Army had planned to use a small number of
    MECVs, improved versions of the HMMWV Modernized Expanded Capability
    Vehicles, with improvements in survivability, availability and agility,
    but light enough for airmobile operations. That effort has been
    cancelled.
        What light tactical wheeled vehicle will fill the void for the air
    mobile or airborne units until fielding of the JLTV?
        Answer. The Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
    (HMMWV) (UAH) is the current vehicle utilized for air mobile and
    airborne missions. The HMMWV UAH will continue to be utilized until
    fielding of the JLTV.
        Question. How would you characterize the tradeoff made by focusing
    resources on JLTV and opting not to proceed with MECV?
        Answer. The decision to not resource the MECV production in the
    FY13 President's Budget reflects the U.S. Army's and U.S. Marine Corps'
    commitment to the JLTV as our highest priority to close the capability
    gaps for Light Tactical Ground Mobility, which are to move mounted
    Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces. The JLTV will
    support Air Assault operations in virtually all environments except in
    the most extreme conditions of altitude and heat where we accept
    minimal risk.

                             Reversible Downsizing

        Question. The Department of Defense paper entitled ``Defense Budget
    Priorities and Choices'', January 2012, addressed reversibility
    stating, ``To the extent possible, structure major adjustments in a way
    that best allows for their reversal or for regeneration of capabilities
    in the future if circumstances change''.
        Reversibility or regeneration sounds good. What specifically are
    you proposing to do in the Army so that units can be rapidly
    regenerated if necessary?
        Answer. Reversibility and Expansibility (R&E) will be attained
    through the adaptation of current manning, equipping, and training
    policies and procedures to enable the Army to reverse and expand by
    accessing additional soldiers annually to support regeneration of
    additional BCTs and enablers in response to any unforeseen requirements
    or changes in the defense strategy. The Army is examining strategies,
    policies and investments that would posture the Army to slow down and
    reverse a planned drawdown of Army end strength and formations, and
    rapidly expand in response to a future crisis.
        Additionally, the Army is in the early stages of identifying
    billets in our Generating Force that can also support R&E.
        Question. Is the capability to regenerate found mostly in the
    National Guard and the reserves?
        Answer. A smaller Army requires a capable and ready Reserve
    Component; the Reserve Component is a vital element of the concept of
    reversibility embedded in the Department of Defense's strategic
    guidance. Combat experience and investment in the Army National Guard
    and the Army Reserve in Iraq and Afghanistan has significantly
    increased capabilities and readiness. Currently, we are making only
    small reductions in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The
    challenge is sustaining Reserve Component leader development and
    proficiency, given the biggest constraint, time to train. This requires
    us to carefully manage notification, mobilization, and deployment
    timelines and work closely with Reserve leaders to leverage their
    unique skill sets and advantages for certain missions. To this end, we
    will sustain the progressive readiness model for most National Guard
    and Reserve units in order to sustain increased readiness prior to
    mobilization.
        Currently, the Reserve Components have manning challenges that will
    stress their ability to mobilize trained and cohesive units quickly in
    the event expansion is needed. A total force approach avoids over-
    reliance on one component and the Army will retain, to the extent
    possible, the ability to adjust or reverse active and reserve force
    structures and modernization changes being made today to preserve
    flexibility for tomorrow.
        The Army is working to retain a more senior active force by
    retaining mid-grade NCOs and commissioned officers even as their
    overall end strength decreases. The Army is preserving the
    institutional structure and training force upon which it may build if
    required. In this way, the Army will have the structure and cadre of
    experienced leaders necessary to build upon if we have to re-grow the
    active force quickly.
        Question. Can you provide examples of successful rapid regeneration
    of units in the Army?
        Answer. The most recent example of successful expansion/
    regeneration of the Army is evident in the Grow the Army (GTA) Plan
    approved by the President in January 2007. This plan increased the size
    of the Army by 74,200 Soldiers to improve the balance of forces across
    all three components and better meet the Global Force Demand in an era
    of persistent conflict. The decision to expand the size of the Army
    reflected the clear recognition by the President, the Secretary of
    Defense and the Congress of the importance of joint ground forces to
    meet strategic requirements and the need to reduce stress on Soldiers
    and Families related to the increasing and enduring operational
    demands. A complementary feature of the GTA Plan was Army leadership
    guidance to direct the implementation of a regeneration model that
    would serve to reconstitute and regenerate the force to increase unit
    readiness, improve preparation for deployment, and build strategic
    depth. The Army RESET imperative established a balanced six-month
    process that systematically restores deployed units to a level of
    personnel and equipment readiness that permits resumption of training
    for future missions. RESET encompasses those tasks required to re-
    integrate Soldiers and Families, then organize, man, equip, and train a
    unit. RESET is predicated on the concept of allowing Soldiers and
    Families the opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative
    effects of sustained operational tempo.
        Question. Secretary McHugh, how can the Army assist industry to
    sustain the capability to rapidly reverse cutbacks in the industrial
    base?
        Answer. The Army can assist industry to sustain the capability to
    rapidly reverse cutbacks in the industrial base by identifying areas of
    risk to the preservation of critical capabilities. The Army
    continuously works with suppliers in the commercial industrial base to
    assess and sustain essential capabilities and to reduce the chances of
    single points of failure.
        Related efforts include a Department of Defense Sector-by-Sector,
    Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) effort. The S2T2 effort seeks: (1) to establish
    early warning indicators of risk, particularly at lower-tiers; (2) to
    strengthen the supply chain and mitigate potential points of failure;
    and (3) to perform joint agency assessments providing the Army the
    ability to capture impacts on market sectors, manufacturers, and the
    Warfighter requirements across the U.S. Services. Another effort is the
    Industrial Base Baseline Assessment that seeks: (1) to conduct a
    sector/sub-sector assessment of programs identified as critical by
    Program Executive Offices and Life Cycle Management Commands; (2) to
    determine the impact of reductions in funding to program requirements;
    and (3) to develop recommendations which enable the industrial base to
    sustain current and future Warfighter requirements.
        Question. General Odierno, is the concept of reversibility or rapid
    regeneration an example of relying on hope rather on proven capability?
        Answer. As the new national defense priorities drives us to a
    smaller Army, we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too
    fast or risk losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder
    to expand again when needed. The effort under way is a deliberate
    decision by the Army and DOD to understand how current manning,
    equipping and training strategies and policies will have to adapt in
    order to be able to expand to meet large unexpected contingencies in
    the future. The Army continues to conduct analysis that could lead to
    reorganizing our Brigade Combat Teams into more capable and robust
    formations.

                                 C-27J Spartan

        Question. The Army initiated the C-27J Spartan program in 2005,
    with the aircraft intended to replace the aging C-23 Sherpa, the C-12
    Huron, and the C-26 Metroliner. The C-27J looks like a small C-130, but
    with two engines instead of four. The C-27J would provide frontline
    tactical airlift support to Army units and relieve some of the pressure
    on the CH-47 Chinook helicopter fleet. Also, the C-27J watended to
    serve as the airlift platform for the Army National Guard units that
    were losing C-130s. The Department of Defense changed the Army program
    to a joint program with the Air Force, and eventually made the program
    an Air Force program. The Department has received 38 of the C-27Js, but
    now the Air Force plans to end the program and divest of the 38
    aircraft.
        General Odierno, the Army and Air Force have barely begun fielding
    of the C-27J aircraft and yet the program is being cancelled.
        What was the Army's requirement for C-27J aircraft?
        Answer. The Army's requirement remains the intra-theater movement
    of time critical/mission essential cargo and personnel. The C-27J was a
    platform developed to meet or significantly mitigate this requirement
    gap. The Chief of Staff of the Army has co-signed an agreement with the
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force which will provide Air Force assets in
    Direct Support to Army ground commanders to mitigate the time critical/
    mission essential requirement.
        Question. The Committee understands that the C-27J has served well
    in National Guard homeland missions, and the Ohio National Guard has
    flown the C-27J in Afghanistan. General Odierno, has the C-27J program
    had cost, schedule or performance problems which have led to the
    decision to end the program?
        Answer. AF Response: No, the C-27J program divestiture did not
    result from cost, schedule, or performance issues. Force structure
    analysis informed by the new DoD Strategic Guidance revealed the Air
    Force had excess capacity in intra-theater airlift. A result of this
    force structure analysis, the Air Force made the difficult decision to
    retire 65 C-130s, terminate the C-27J procurement, and divest the
    delivered aircraft. These actions delivered a $2.1 billion budget
    reduction over the Future Years Defense Program and enabled the Air
    Force to focus on common configurations for key weapon systems to
    maximize operational flexibility and minimize sustainment costs.
        Studies conducted by the Air Force and RAND have both shown the C-
    130 to be equally capable of performing the Direct Support airlift
    mission for the Army while offering increased capability to perform
    General Support airlift missions. The Air Force remains committed to
    meeting the Direct Support airlift requirements for the Army and has
    programmed sufficient C-130 force structure to fulfill this
    requirement.
        Based on my experience in Iraq in 2009, when the Army and Air Force
    validated the direct support concept, I am confident the Air Force is
    fully committed to ensuring that this important mission will be
    accomplished.
        Question. General Odierno, please explain the requirement for front
    line tactical airlift, and explain how some tactical airlift can be
    better performed by fixed wing aircraft than by a helicopter.
        Answer. Fixed wing aircraft have a greater cargo, range, and speed
    capacity than tactical rotary wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft can
    operate at higher altitudes, reducing the risk to cargo and personnel
    in regards to threat and terrain. The Army's airlift requirement, time
    sensitive/mission critical cargo, requires both fixed wing and tactical
    rotary wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft is the preferred method to
    accomplish this mission when airfields are available. Tactical rotary
    wing aircraft are required to get the cargo/personnel to the point of
    need, often to locations where there is not an established airfield.
    The Army's airlift requirement demands a complementary fixed and rotary
    wing solution.
        Question. General Odierno, The Committee understands that Army
    National Guard units are in the process of turning in their old
    aircraft, the Sherpas, Hurons, C-12s and Metroliners? Since the C-27J
    program has been cancelled and the Department of Defense plans to
    divest of the few that have been fielded, what is the plan to replace
    those older aircraft?
        Answer. The C-27J program was conceived to mitigate a time
    sensitive/mission critical cargo mission for the Army. When the C-27J
    was transferred to the Air Force, they accepted the entire cargo
    mission for the Army. This negated the requirement for the Army to have
    cargo aircraft like the C-23 Sherpa. The agreement between the Chief of
    Staff of Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force continues to
    validate that Air Force will continue to support the Army's time
    sensitive/mission critical cargo mission requirement. The 26
    Metroliners and 128 C-12s will be replaced with the Future Utility
    Aircraft.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, the C-27J procurement plan at its peak was
    127 aircraft for the Army. That number was reduced to 76 and later the
    program became an Air Force only program with an acquisition target of
    38 aircraft. Now the Air Force plans to terminate the program and
    divest of the aircraft. Is this program another example of a lack of
    control in the Department of Defense regarding the establishment of
    requirements?
        Answer. The Army's requirements have not changed. 127 Aircraft was
    a low risk acquisition strategy and 76 aircraft was a medium risk
    acquisition strategy. The program was transferred to the Air Force in
    2008. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Army Chief of Staff
    and the Air Force Chief of Staff does not specify a specific aircraft
    or platform but does place Air Force assets in Direct Support of the
    Army Ground Commander.
        Question. The Army's program exectitive officer has gone on record
    stating that the Army is considering whether to take the 21 C-27 Joint
    Cargo Aircraft that the Air Force is divesting. Is this accurate? Given
    that the Air Force plans on shutting down the C-27 program by the
    September 30 of this year, when will Army make a decision and inform
    the Committee?
        Answer. The Army's fixed wing cargo mission and the C-27J aircraft
    were transferred to the Air Force. The Army's fixed wing cargo needs
    will be provided by the Air Force. The Army has no plans to take the C-
    27J into the service.
        Question. If the Army is seriously considering this action, should
    the Committee be concerned that the Air Force cannot perform the direct
    support mission with C-130s alone?
        Answer. The C-130 is capable of doing everything the C-27J can. It
    has greater load carrying capacity than a C-27J and will meet the
    Army's requirement for time sensitive/mission critical cargo. The
    memorandum of understanding signed by the Army CSA and Air Force CSA
    places airlift (C-130s) in direct support of the ground commander to
    meet the time sensitive/mission critical cargo requirement.

                           Blast Tolerant Fuel Cells

        Question. Mr. Secretary a January 30, 2012 New York Times article,
    entitled ``For Soldier Disfigured in War, a Way to Return to the
    World'', described the medical treatment of Specialist Joey Paulk who
    was severely burned when his HMMWV struck a buried mine and the
    explosion ignited the fuel tank. The article details the medical
    treatment that Specialist Paulk received at Brooke Army Medical Center,
    and at U.C.L.A. Medical Center. The stories of Specialist Paulk and
    many other U.S. servicemembers who have suffered severe burns when
    their vehicles have been attacked by some form of conventional or home-
    made bomb call to question the commitment of the Army to employ state-
    of-the-art fuel cell technology to make ground vehicles more blast
    tolerant.
        General Odierno, what is your assessment of the level of blast and
    fire survivability of combat vehicles and tactical trucks in Army
    units?
        Answer. The Army is committed to providing the highest level of
    blast and fire survivability protection available in order to ensure
    the safety of our Soldiers. To that end, we have integrated a variety
    of technologies on our combat and tactical vehicles to mitigate the
    impact of conventional and home-made bomb blasts and enhance fire
    survivability of our vehicle crews. These technologies include V-hull
    designs, underbody Improvised Explosive Device improvement kits and
    Explosively Formed Penetrator Armor Kits. In addition to the blast
    mitigation measures, the Army also employs Fuel Tank Fire Suppression
    kits and Automatic Fire Extinguishing System systems on our combat and
    tactical vehicle fleets to enhance Soldier safety and survivability.
    While these measures have contributed immeasurably to saving the lives
    of countless Soldiers on the battlefield, the Army continues to
    investigate opportunities to improve blast and fire survivability of
    our combat and tactical vehicle fleets.
        Question. What guidance has been established in the Army regarding
    the procurement of new vehicles to adopt advances in technology to make
    fuel cells less likely to explode and burn when the vehicle is struck
    by a mine or grenade, or when the vehicle is in an accident?
        Answer. To lessen the likelihood of a vehicle exploding the Army
    has mandated that new tactical vehicle procurements meet the
    requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation for liquid
    tanks. The fuel tanks on new tactical vehicle procurements will be
    self-sealing and all fixed fuel tanks will be mounted external to the
    crew compartment or compartmented away from the crew. Guidance
    concerning new procurement of combat vehicles is in accordance with
    specific military mobility, force protection, and survivability
    requirements codified in the required capability document and
    translated to the vehicle performance specification. Fuel cell
    containment or fire suppression is part of the Performance
    Specification for the Ground Combat Vehicle and Paladin Integrated
    Management self-propelled howitzer, which are the only new combat
    vehicles in the design phase.
        Question. The Committee understands that the Joint Lite Tactical
    Vehicle, that will replace the HMMWV, will have automatic fire
    extinguishers, and self-sealing fuel tanks. However, the Army has about
    155,000 HMMWVs. HMMWVs will very likely remain in use for another 15
    years. Is there a plan to make the HMMWVs more fires resistant?
        Answer. The Army plans to continue fire suppression improvement
    efforts for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that
    include investigating fuel tank, wheel well, battery box, and engine
    compartment protection. There is currently an Automatic Fire
    Extinguisher System in the crew compartment of approximately one-half
    of the Up Armored HMMWV (UAH) fleet of more than 53,000 vehicles. This
    includes a Manual Fire Suppression System which provides an additional
    crew compartment fire suppression bottle that can be manually activated
    from outside the vehicle, if additional fire suppressant is required.

        Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
                                               Thursday, March 8, 2012.

                             DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

                                   WITNESSES

    HON. DR. JONATHAN WOODSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH
        AFFAIRS
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICIA HOROHO, THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED
        STATES ARMY
    VICE ADMIRAL MATTHEW L. NATHAN, MC, USN, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE NAVY
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL (DR.) CHARLES B. GREEN, THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
        AIR FORCE

                      Opening Statement of Chairman Young

        Mr. Young. The committee will be in order. Good morning,
    everybody. Thank you for attending.
        The committee's hearing this morning has to do with the
    fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Defense Health Program.
    I want to welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
    Affairs, Dr. Jonathan Woodson; the Surgeon General of the Army,
    Lieutenant General Patricia Horoho, who has been here with us
    on different occasions in different categories; the Surgeon
    General of the Navy, Vice Admiral Matthew Nathan, who comes to
    us from having commanded the hospital at Bethesda; and the
    Surgeon General of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Charles
    Green, who at our last hearing gave us some very impressive
    testimony. General, we appreciated that then and we look
    forward to today.
        The hearing should be a little bit different. The subject
    is a little bit different today than it was a few weeks ago.
        General Green, by the way, this probably will be your last
    time to testify before our subcommittee.
        General Green. It may be, sir.
        Mr. Young. I would say that it has been good, all of your
    testimony has been good, and we will miss you.
        General Green. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Young. And we wish you the very best.
        Many challenges are facing the Department; growing costs,
    long-term sustainability of the military health system, still
    very serious injuries that you are dealing with coming out of
    the war zones. Military health care costs have risen from $19
    billion in fiscal year 2001 to $53 billion in fiscal year 2012,
    and I would say this committee is committed to providing
    whatever is needed to properly care for these wounded warriors
    and America's heroes.
        This year, for the first time in the last decade, the
    budget request of $48.7 billion for the entirety of military
    health care is lower than the previous year's level. However,
    this level assumes savings associated with several TRICARE
    benefit cost sharing proposals, proposals that must ultimately
    be approved by Congress, and today I can't predict what that
    will be. So we are interested to hear about these proposals
    today.
        Additionally, the committee remains interested in the final
    recommendations recently announced by the Department related to
    the restructuring of the military health system as a whole and
    governance and multi-service markets in particular. We want to
    ensure that any changes to the military health system
    adequately reflect your input as the senior medical officers of
    your respective services.
        Additionally, the Department continues to focus on the need
    for mental health counseling and readjustment support for our
    service members returning from deployments. It is imperative
    for the Department to get to the heart of the issues that
    service members and their families face during and after the
    deployments.
        The committee is anxious to hear about what progress the
    Department has made in the past year with regard to
    psychological health, traumatic brain injury, and suicide
    prevention and what this subcommittee can do to assist in
    making further advances as we progress into the future.
        We look forward to your testimony and to a good question
    and answer session. As I mentioned to you, we are going to have
    votes at an untimely point this morning, so we are going to
    expedite as quickly as we can. In other words, we would be
    asking you to stand by while we went to vote for about an hour
    and I just don't want to do that to you. You have got very
    important things to do. I am sure the members of the committee,
    and the attendance is not all that great this morning anyway,
    but we will do our very best to be completed with everything
    that you have to say before we have to break to vote, and then
    we will just close the hearing and let you get on about your
    business.
        I would like to yield now to my friend, my partner, former
    chairman, Norm Dicks.

                   Opening Statement of Ranking Member Dicks

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all
    of the witnesses. Although we saw you just a few weeks ago, we
    welcome you both in your appearances as Surgeon Generals of
    your services. Also I would like to thank General Green for his
    many years of service to the Nation and for his insights on
    military health. We understand this is his last appearance with
    the committee. We appreciate your dedication in caring for our
    service members and their families and look forward to your
    testimony today.
        The costs for the Defense Health Program have more than
    doubled over the past decade, from $19 billion in 2001 to $48.7
    billion in the fiscal year 2013 request. Military health care
    allows service members, their families and retirees to maintain
    a standard of health as well as peace of mind that world class
    health care is available, not only when serving but after their
    active service is done.
        However, the cost of the Defense Health Program in light of
    increasing budgetary pressures will be difficult to support. As
    a result, a significant part of the Defense Department's budget
    initiatives is focused on reducing health care costs. The 2013
    budget request is $4.1 billion less than the 2012 enacted level
    of $52.8 billion, and $12.9 billion in savings is included in
    the Future Year Defense Program. The majority of these savings
    are from proposed changes to the TRICARE fees, mainly affecting
    retired service members.
        Are these estimated savings realistic? How do you think
    those proposals will be received, and most importantly, would
    these initiatives affect the quality, availability or
    expectation of care?
        Physical and mental health of our service members affects
    readiness, especially when faced with the task of filling
    deployable units in, and in the case of the Army and Marine
    Corps, concurrently drawing down end strength. Preventive
    health and resiliency programs can only raise the health of the
    force, which translates into increased readiness, but may also
    lead to reduced health care costs for physical and mental
    health care. We look forward to hearing how you are addressing
    this aspect of health care.
        Conversely, the committee is also concerned about the care
    service members receive when they are injured on the
    battlefield and sometimes in training, both physically and
    mentally. Much has been accomplished in the treatment of
    amputees and the advancement of prosthetics, in many cases
    allowing our wounded warriors to live a full life. However,
    much work still needs to be done with the invisible wounds of
    traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder.
        Centers of Excellence for these wounds help to combine
    treatment and research, but somehow members still fall through
    the cracks and gaps for treatment and recovery. Today we hope
    to learn about your progress treating those injuries and how
    the results from the efforts have been implemented.
        We strongly support your efforts to provide the best
    possible medical care for service members, their families and
    military retirees. We look forward to your testimony on how to
    best maintain and where possible improve this care.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                             Other Opening Remarks

        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        During the 6 years that I had the privilege of serving as
    chairman of the Appropriations Committee, this committee was
    chaired by Jerry Lewis for 6 years, who did a really great job.
    Do you want to make any opening comments?
        Mr. Lewis. No opening comments. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Frelinghuysen is not only an important
    member of this subcommittee, but he also represents this
    subcommittee as an adjunct through the House Permanent Select
    Committee on Intelligence. In addition to that, he chairs his
    own subcommittee, which is important to national defense
    because he deals with all of the nuclear laboratories and all
    of our nuclear facilities.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen, do you want to make any opening
    comments?
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you all very much. We will proceed to
    hearing your statements. As usual, you summarize them any way
    you like. Your entire statement will be put into the record.
        Secretary, I assume we will begin with you.

                        Summary Statement of Dr. Woodson

        Dr. Woodson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the future of the military health system and
    in particular our priorities for this year.
        Over the last 10 years, the men and women of the military
    health system have performed with great skill and undeniable
    courage in combat. Their contributions to advancing military
    and American medicine are immense. The military health system's
    ability to perform this mission and be able to respond to
    humanitarian crises around the globe is unique among all
    military and non-military organizations on this globe, and I am
    committed to sustaining this indispensable instrument of
    national security.
        The budget we have proposed provides the resources we need
    to sustain the system and maintain our readiness. We must also
    be responsible stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. The 2011
    Budget Control Act required the Department to identify $487
    billion in budget reductions over the next 10 years, and health
    care costs could not be exempt from this analysis.
        The military health system is undertaking four simultaneous
    actions to reduce costs: One, internal efficiencies to better
    organize our decisionmaking and execution arm; two, a
    continuation of our efforts to appropriately pay private sector
    providers; three, initiatives that promote health, reduce
    illness, injury and hospitalization; and, four, proposed
    changes to beneficiary cost sharing under TRICARE. The military
    and civilian leaders in the Department developed these
    proposals and have publicly communicated their support for
    these proposals to you in writing and in person.
        We have recently submitted to the Congress the Secretary's
    recommended path forward for how we should organize the
    military health system. We have learned a great deal from our
    joint medical operations over the last 10 years and we
    recognize that there is much opportunity for introducing even a
    more agile headquarters operation that shares common services
    and institutes common clinical and business practices across
    our system of care.
        The budget we have put forward for 2013 is a responsible
    path forward to sustaining the military health system in a
    changing world and recognizes that the fiscal health of the
    country is a vital element of national security. I am proud to
    be here with you today to represent the men and women that
    comprise the military health system, and I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The statement of Dr. Woodson follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We
    appreciate your being here today.
        General Horoho, we will be happy to hear from you at this
    point.

                      Summary Statement of General Horoho

        General Horoho. Thank you, sir. Chairman Young, Ranking
    Member Dicks and distinguished members of the committee, thank
    you for providing me this opportunity to share with you today
    my thoughts about the future of U.S. Army medicine and
    highlight some of the incredible work being done by dedicated
    men and women.
        From July to October of 2011, I was privileged to serve as
    the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
    Special Assistant for Health Affairs. My multidisciplinary team
    of 14 medical health professionals conducted an extensive
    evaluation of theater health service support to critically
    assess how well we are providing health care from the point of
    injury to evacuation from theater.
        It cannot be overstated that the best trauma care in the
    world resides with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq.
    The AMED is focused on building upon these successes on the
    battlefield as we perform our mission at home and is further
    cementing our commitment to working as a combined team anywhere
    and any time.
        MHS governance changes will change the way we currently
    operate for everyone. These recommended changes will strengthen
    our system in the delivery of military medicine. The military
    departments have more activities in common than not. Together,
    we will drive toward greater common approaches in all areas,
    except where legitimate uniquenesses require a service-specific
    approach. Our commitment is to achieve greater unity of effort,
    improve service to our members and beneficiaries and achieve
    greater efficiency through a more rapid implementation of
    common services and joint purchasing, as well as other
    opportunities for a more streamlined service delivery.
        We are at our best when we operate as part of a joint team,
    and we need to proactively develop synergy with our partners as
    military medicine moves towards a joint operating environment.
    Continuity of care and continuity of information are key to the
    delivery of care as DOD and the VA team.
        There are significant health-related consequences over 10
    years of war, including behavioral health needs, post-traumatic
    stress, concussive care, burns or disfiguring injuries, chronic
    pain and loss of limb. A decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq
    has led to tremendous advances in knowledge and care of combat-
    related physical and psychological problems. We have partnered
    with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Defense and
    Veterans Brain Injury Center, and the Defense Center of
    Excellence for Traumatic Brain Injury and Psychological Health,
    and academia, as well as the National Football League to
    improve our ability to diagnose, treat and care for those
    affected by TBI.
        Similar to our approach with concussive care injuries, Army
    medicine has harvested the lessons of almost a decade of war
    and has approached the strengthening of our soldiers' and
    families' behavior health and emotional resiliency through a
    campaign plan. We will increase our efforts on decreasing
    variance and implementing standards across Army medicine in the
    areas of a behavioral health and integrated disability
    evaluation system. We are implementing recommendations from the
    Pain Management Task Force and incorporating this capability
    across all forms of health care.
        I am incredibly honored and proud to serve as the 43rd
    Surgeon General in the Army and Commander of the U.S. Army
    Medical Command. There are miracles that are happening every
    day across our command outposts, forward operating bases,
    posts, camps and stations because of the dedicated soldiers and
    civilians that make up the Army Medical Department.
        To the Ranking Member Dicks, it has been an honor to serve
    with you over the years. I appreciated your support when I
    served at the Western Region Medical Command at Joint Base
    Lewis-McChord. As you conclude your service to our Nation, on
    behalf of the Army Medical Department, I want to express our
    deepest gratitude and my personal thanks for your enduring
    support of Army medicine throughout these significant times in
    our history.
        With the continued support of Congress, we will lead the
    Nation in health care and our men and women in uniform will be
    ready when the Nation calls, wherever they need to. I look
    forward to answering your questions and thank you for the
    opportunity to be here today.
        [The statement of General Horoho follows:]

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                        Summary Statement of VADM Nathan

        Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. And I want to
    comment when it is my turn about your comment about miracles,
    because I have something to say about that.
        Admiral Nathan. The Admiral and I have had a chance to
    spend a lot of time together because as we visit wounded
    soldiers and marines at our hospitals at Walter Reed, Bethesda,
    he is on the spot. Problems that are brought to his attention
    are fixed. I just really appreciate Admiral Nathan. Thank you
    very much. We are glad to hear your statement now, sir.
        Admiral Nathan. Thank you, sir. Good morning. Chairman
    Young, Ranking Member Dicks, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, I am pleased to be with you today to provide an
    update on Navy Medicine, including some of our collective
    strategic priorities, our accomplishments and our
    opportunities.
        I want to thank the committee members for the tremendous
    confidence, support and resourcing you have shown us in Navy
    Medicine. I will abbreviate my opening comments in the interest
    of time, but may I also add my thanks to Ranking Member Dicks
    for your service, sir, on behalf of the men and women who serve
    in the Pacific Northwest, specifically at Naval Hospital
    Bremerton and at the submarine clinic at Bangor. Your advocacy
    and your support of them is not forgotten.
        I will report to you that Navy Medicine remains strong,
    capable and mission ready to deliver world class care any time,
    anywhere. We are operating forward and we are globally engaged,
    no matter what the environment and regardless of the challenge.
    The men and women of Navy Medicine are flexible, they are agile
    and they are resilient. They are meeting their operational and
    wartime commitments, including humanitarian assistance and
    disaster response, and concurrently delivering outstanding
    patient and family centered care to our beneficiaries. Force
    Health Protection is what we do and it is the very foundation
    of our continuum of care in support of the war fighter and
    optimizes our ability to promote, protect and restore their
    health.
        What is obviously a priority to this committee is clearly a
    priority to us. It is supporting the warfighter, enabling them
    to perform their mission. It is taking care of the warfighter
    upon return from their mission and taking care of their
    families. It is the ability to operate forward and to remain
    congruent in readiness with our Navy and Marine Corps partners.
        In closing, let me briefly address one topic I am sure is
    of interest, which is MHS governance. We appreciate the
    opportunity to begin this dialogue with you that started a
    month ago when you held a hearing on this issue. The Deputy
    Secretary of Defense has submitted his report to Congress
    required by section 716 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National
    Defense Authorization Act. It addresses the Department's plans,
    subject to review and concurrence by the Government Accounting
    Office (GAO), to move forward with governance changes.
        Throughout my remarks this morning and in my statement for
    the record I have referred to our jointness in theater, in our
    classrooms and labs, and in common pursuit of solutions for
    challenges like Tramatic Brain Injury (TBI). I stress our
    commitment again to the interoperability and cost-effective
    joint solutions in terms of overall governance, and I look
    forward to partnering with my fellow Surgeons General and the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in finding
    these solutions.
        Navy Medicine looks forward to working on the next phase of
    the Deputy Secretary's plan. We must proceed in a deliberative
    and measured manner to ensure that our readiness to support our
    services' missions and core warfighting capabilities will be
    maintained and our excellence in health care delivery will be
    sustained.
        On behalf of the men and women of Navy Medicine, I want to
    thank the committee for your tremendous support, confidence and
    your leadership. It is my pleasure to testify before you today,
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Admiral Nathan follows:]

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                         Summary Statement of LTG Green

        Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much. We appreciate
    especially the conversations we had at the last hearing with
    all of you about the new governance. I don't know that we are
    going to do too much on that issue today. We might. We will see
    how it goes.
        General Green, again, thank you for being here. You have
    always been very, very direct in your statements and very
    direct in your answers to our questions that are probing on
    occasion, and we just appreciate that honesty and we appreciate
    you. We are sorry this is going to be your last time to visit
    with us, but we are still your friends and we will still be
    here even after you move on to your next role in life.
        So we are glad to hear from you at this point, sir.
        General Green. Thank you, sir. I too will abbreviate my
    comments today.
        Chairman Young, Representative Dicks and members of
    committee, thank you for inviting me here and for your very
    kind words. The Air Force Medical Service could not achieve our
    goals of readiness, better health, better care and best value,
    without your support, and we thank you. To meet these goals,
    the Air Force Medical Service is transforming deployable
    capability, building patient centered care, and investing in
    education, training and resource to sustain world class health
    care. In the coming year we will work shoulder to shoulder with
    the Army, Navy and DOD counterparts to be ready, provide that
    better health, better care and best value to America's heroes.
    We will find efficiencies and we will provide even higher
    quality care with the resources we are given, and together we
    will implement the right governance of our military health
    system.
        I thank this committee for your tremendous support to
    military medics, and a special thank you to Representative
    Dicks. Our success, both at home and on the battlefield, would
    not be possible without your persistent and generous support.
    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The statement of General Green follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                           Remarks of Chairman Young

        Mr. Young. General, thank you very, very much.
        I told you, General, that I wanted to make a comment on
    your statement about miracles. If you remember a few years
    back, Walter Reed got beat up in the media because of that
    Building 18 issue that really had nothing to do with medical
    care, and I got beat up because I wouldn't join in the chorus
    condemning Walter Reed because I made the point numerous times
    that at Walter Reed and at Bethesda, I personally, not being a
    medical expert, but I personally have seen what I consider to
    be miracles happen at both of those hospitals. And I can cite
    examples, I can cite the patients, I can cite the doctors who
    performed these miracles, and I suspect that God's hand was
    with them. Otherwise some of these soldiers and marines might
    not have made it.
        But there was one marine that was given up for dead, the
    family left the hospital, went home to prepare the final
    arrangements for their son, and this one doctor said, I am not
    going to let this kid die. And he tried something that I think
    maybe today is still a little bit unorthodox, but he saved the
    kid.
        I was surprised a few months later when a police officer
    walked into my office in Washington and he said, you don't
    remember me, do you? I said, no, I don't. He said, well, I am
    the one they gave up for dead and I am the one that they
    brought back to life. I am the miracle. So he survived, he went
    on to go to the police academy and he is serving today as a
    patrolman in the City of New York. So that is just one of the
    miracles that I think I have witnessed there at the hospitals.
        Anyway, I told President Bush right after 9/11 when, of
    course, we all huddled together quickly to do what we had to do
    to recover, to respond, and I said, Mr. President, when we go
    into this war, you are going to find out that our warriors are
    going to be hurt bad. Because of the great advances in military
    medicine, the new medicines, the new training, the ability to
    have corpsmen and medics who are more capable than ever, the
    ability to evacuate from the battle zone and just everything,
    the kids are going to live today who would have not survived in
    a previous war. The issue is they are going to be hurt worse,
    and it is going to require a lot to take care of them. And all
    of you have seen exactly what I am talking about, and all the
    Members of Congress that I can get to come see for themselves
    are amazed by the care and the treatment and the ability to
    save the lives of some of the quadriplegics who maybe will not
    have much of a life left, but, anyway, they are alive and their
    families still have them.
        So this committee is prepared to do whatever we need to do
    to make sure that you have the adequate resources, whatever it
    is, supplies, personnel, whatever you need to make sure that
    these heroes are properly and adequately taken care of, so that
    they can get on about their life and receive the benefits that
    they really, really deserve and have earned with the sacrifices
    they made.
        So, that is my preaching for the day.
        I want to yield to Mr. Lewis.
        Mr. Lewis. Go to Mr. Dicks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Let me go to Mr. Dicks then.

                          MADIGAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much, and, again, I want to
    commend the witnesses for their great service.
        General Horoho, we have talked about this Madigan
    situation. Would you like to just give an overview of what you
    are doing and why you are doing it?
        General Horoho. Yes, sir. We found back in the September-
    October timeframe that we had 17 service members that came
    forward with concerns that their diagnosis was changed from a
    behavioral health diagnoses to one that was non-behavioral
    health after being reevaluated by our forensic psychiatry
    department out at Fort Lewis, Washington, and based on those
    concerns we offered them the opportunity for a reevaluation at
    Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, and then as they
    were being reevaluated we found that there was a brief that was
    provided by one of the forensic scientists that alluded to a
    focus on compensation and the cost of PTSD. So, because of that
    and some other concerns, I initiated an investigation to look
    at the climate and the practices and variance and to make sure
    that we were fairly treating our service members and providing
    them the best care possible. That investigation is ongoing.
        We also initiated an IG assessment across all of Army
    medicine to make sure that we didn't have variance or systemic
    issues. That is still ongoing. Both of those should be
    completed shortly. In addition to that, when we got the results
    back from Walter Reed, we found that 12 out of 14 of the
    service members' diagnoses were reverted back to the original
    decision by Behavioral Health. So then we looked and evaluated
    every single service member that had gone through forensic
    psychiatry as a second evaluation going back to 2007, and that
    was about 1,600 service members.
        When we relooked, there are 285 of those service members
    that had their diagnoses changed. Each one of those are going
    to be personally contacted and offered the opportunity to come
    back to be reevaluated. So currently that is where we are right
    now, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. In the press there has been some insinuation
    that this is being done in a politically correct way. I know
    that is inaccurate. But I think what we are trying to do is to
    have it be done in a medically correct way so that there is not
    pressure for these people to have the decisions reversed, it is
    just review the decisions and make sure they are accurate.
    Isn't that correct?
        General Horoho. Yes, sir. But what we are looking at is
    one, to make sure that our service members received the best
    care possible, and we are also looking at variance. And across
    our processes, forensic psychiatry is not a good capability, it
    is not a bad capability, it is a capability. But it introduces
    variance into the Integrated Disability Evaluation System
    (IDES) process, and that is what is being evaluated as well.
        Mr. Dicks. Also, and I was quite concerned about this, the
    closure of the intensive outpatient clinic at Madigan in 2010,
    and there was concern because a lot of people, and I know this
    is part of the investigation, but there was concern because a
    lot of people thought this was an extraordinarily effective
    program and was having a good result for the wounded warriors,
    and then the program was canceled. So we are doing that
    investigation, and we are looking at Landstuhl, isn't that
    correct?
        General Horoho. Yes, sir.

                               OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM

        Mr. Dicks. Because there were concerns raised there. Tell
    us about the Ombudsman Program. What are you doing on that?
        General Horoho. The Ombudsman Program is a program that
    started in 2007 in response to concerns of making sure that we
    had the ability for service members' voices to be heard with
    any concerns that they have. So we have over 50 ombudsmen that
    are working across Army medicine. They don't report to the
    chain of command. They actually report to me as the medical--
    well, Frank Berlingis is one level, and then it is to the
    MEDCOM commander. And it is a fair way to allow any concerns to
    be raised and to kind of look at resolution of issues at the
    lowest level.
        Because of this occurring out at the Fort Lewis area and
    some concerns, I had an evaluation done to see if there was any
    concerns at Fort Lewis. And then we have also asked AAA, our
    Army Audit Agency, if they would please review the entire
    Ombudsman Program going back to 2007 to ensure that it is
    working in the way that we want it to be working. So that is
    ongoing as well.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, we appreciate the way you have dealt with
    this problem and the fact that the Army, I think, is trying to
    be as fair as possible with these soldiers. What concerned
    Senator Murray and myself was the fact that some of these
    soldiers felt that the reversal of their diagnosis was not
    accurate. So we are pleased that you are doing this. I know it
    takes a lot of work and effort to get it done, but I think it
    will clear the air so the people will have a chance, if their
    evaluation was reversed, to have it reevaluated.
        General Horoho. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. That is all I have today, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        Mr. Lewis, are you prepared?

                         POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

        Mr. Lewis. I am, Mr. Chairman.
        General Horoho, I have similar questions to Mr. Dicks'
    question. They are the result of some communication to me from
    my good friend Dr. Michael Walter, a retired Brigadier General
    from the U.S. Army who is currently employed as a
    gastroenterologist at Loma Linda University Medical Center. He
    brought to my attention the case of Colonel Dallas Homas at
    Madigan. Dr. Walter served and traveled with Dr. Homas in
    Afghanistan and knows him to be an outstanding soldier,
    physician and leader, whose highest priority is taking care of
    soldiers.
        I specifically want to associate myself with the comments
    of Mr. Dicks, and I do appreciate your effort in connection
    with this very complex and difficult problem.
        While not getting into the specifics of this case, I do
    have some questions about the manner in which PTSD is diagnosed
    throughout the U.S. military. Has MEDCOM published any guidance
    in diagnosing PTSD? General Horoho, do you have or have you
    ever endorsed the use of forensic psychology testing in the
    evaluation process of PTSD diagnosis?
        And further, my last question, while I know each case is
    different and unique, I would like to know if all the services
    feel it would be helpful to have general uniform guidelines in
    place in determining the diagnoses of PTSD?
        General Horoho. Thank you, sir. For the very first
    question, there are Department of Defense guidelines for
    diagnosing PTSD which each one of our services follows, so
    those guidelines have been in place and we are all consistent
    with following those. There is also uniform training for our
    providers across the Department of Defense.
        Mr. Dicks. Would my friend yield? Are they the same? Is
    there a difference in how PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder,
    is evaluated? Is it different for each service?
        General Horoho. I will speak just for the Army and then let
    my fellow Surgeon Generals speak to that--there is a common
    standard for diagnosing PTSD. There is the clinical judgment
    that is part of that, because it is not a hard science. So we
    do have standards, but we also have the clinical judgment of
    each provider that is providing that behavioral health care.
        Mr. Lewis. Please proceed.

                              FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY

        General Horoho. Thank you, sir. So we have those standards
    that are out there. The second question that I believe you
    asked is whether or not I have ever endorsed Forensic
    psychiatry. Forensic psychiatry stood up back in 2007. I took
    command of Madigan Army Medical Center in 2008, so this
    capability was in place.
        What was ongoing at that time was in 2007 we were just
    standing up warrior transition units across the Army. We didn't
    have the Integrated Disability Evaluation System. So out West
    we were looking at using all of our behavior health assets to
    work with the backload of medical evaluations and providing
    behavioral health, and then we were also over those ensuing
    years developing a behavioral health system of care.
        In 2010 the Department of Defense rolled out the Integrated
    Disability Evaluation System, which then took the compensation
    piece away from our providers and actually had that as one
    disability rating with the VA. So it took that friction point
    away.
        Then regarding Colonel Homas, sir, there are a couple
    things. When we started the investigation, the chief of
    forensics was actually administratively suspended pending the
    investigation. The warrior transition surgeon was also
    administratively suspended pending the investigation; and then
    Colonel Homas was administratively suspended pending the
    investigation. And those are normal procedures when an
    investigation is ongoing.
        Mr. Dicks. I think the point is that is not an aspersion on
    these officers, it is just that this is the way you do it
    during an investigation. So there is a good chance that they
    could all be cleared, or some of them could be cleared.
        General Horoho. Yes, sir. What we are doing right now----
        Mr. Dicks. Are they being investigated?
        General Horoho. Sir, the command climate, the variance in
    the practice and why this deviation had occurred is all being
    looked at. It is a very comprehensive investigation, because
    the standard across Army Medicine is that we don't typically
    use forensics as part of the disability system once that stood
    up in 2010. So we are looking at all of that.
        Mr. Lewis. I am satisfied. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Okay, Mr. Lewis.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen.

                             BATTLEFIELD EYE TRAUMA

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
    All of us salute the work you do at home and abroad. It is
    remarkable how you get those from the battlefield, evacuate
    them from Bagram or in the past maybe from Balad in Iraq and
    get them to Landstuhl and get them home and the service that
    they get.
        I would like to focus just for a few minutes on battlefield
    eye trauma. I know often the focus is on loss of limbs and
    remarkable things are done in terms of rehabilitation and
    prostheses, and TBI is a huge issue. But would one or more of
    you focus for a few minutes, I believe the VA has vision
    injuries as sort of the fourth largest injury component.
        What are we doing in terms of investments in this area of
    research? It is pretty basic. I just wonder, what are we doing?
    What are you doing jointly or individually to meet these types
    of needs?
        Admiral Nathan. Thank you for the question, sir. I can
    speak to one arm of engagement, which is the Vision Center of
    Excellence which has been stood up. It is one of the four
    Centers of Excellence that is under the aegis of the Defense
    Center of Excellence umbrella portfolio. It exists at Walter
    Reed National Military Medical Center. It is being staffed as
    we speak.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So it exists now?
        Admiral Nathan. Yes, sir, it exists now. It has not reached
    its robust operating tempo yet as they are still staffing and
    hiring the requisite personnel. But it will not be a clinical
    entity, although it is proximal to the very large ophthalmology
    and optometry units at Walter Reed Bethesda. It is designed to
    be a clearinghouse and collating repository for the Department
    of Defense in eye injuries, eye trauma and eye care related to
    wounded warrior care.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So in the overall scheme of things, sort
    of translate for me, this is a priority? Certainly if it is the
    fourth largest combat injury, and we are not minimizing the
    others, is this a priority? Is it reflected in your funding?
        Dr. Woodson. Yes, sir, and there is approximately $15
    million that is available for competitive research, so we are
    trying to make sure that we have the best of intramural and
    extramural research and partners to address this.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I ask the question because I think
    sometimes quite honestly, I have quite a lot of people visit my
    office on this issue and they don't feel that there is enough
    research going on, and often I think the statistics are sort of
    underreported. And even more alarming, Mr. Chairman, I hear
    somewhat anecdotally, and I would like your reaction, that
    there are reports that some of our troops have been--some eye
    damage has been caused by some of our own forces, lasers,
    things from our own, shall we say, friendly fire. Would one or
    more of you comment often that issue?
        Admiral Nathan. Well, my comment would be, sir, that I am
    not aware of the specific numbers of these injuries.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you are not aware of any of those
    that have suffered retinal damage or accidental exposure to
    these types? I wonder, because I just think if there is an
    issue there, how are we dealing with it?
        Admiral Nathan. I certainly wouldn't rule out that
    possibility, and perhaps my colleagues know of a more codified
    review, and the line operators may well have more information
    on that.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. No one does it deliberately, but when
    you have choppers out there, you have fighters out there and
    they are providing close support, things happen. I just
    wondered if you could address it. General Green?
        General Green. Sir, just so you know, we pay very close
    attention to this because of the potential injuries to our
    fliers, because it is a credible threat. So we have some
    research that goes on in terms of detectors, things that can
    actually tell us the wavelength and the power so that we know
    what the damage may be. There is a reporting system in the
    theater that actually captures laser eye injuries. A lot of
    this is worked through the School of Aerospace Medicine. I
    don't have a lot of details today, but I will be happy to bring
    back the details.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Certainly there is the vulnerability of
    pilots to all sorts of lasers. But I am talking about troops on
    the ground. If you don't have the information, would you be
    willing to focus on that for me? I would appreciate it. I think
    it is an issue, and if it should be part of some sort of a
    doctrine here--you are providing the air support, or the Army
    may be doing it too. I just think there are some issues here.
        Admiral Nathan. Sir, ideally the Visual Center of
    Excellence will be able to wrap its arms around all of the
    various----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Will you ask them to wrap their arms
    around that probability as well?
        Admiral Nathan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information follows:]

        The Air Force Medical Service is actively engaged in efforts to
    manage and counter the medical threat posed by lasers. In accordance
    with Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 6055.15 (May 4, 2007),
    ``The Secretary of the Air Force shall establish, administer and
    maintain the Tri-Service Laser Injury Hotline to provide immediate
    expert medical advice in the event of an injury or suspected injury to
    DoD personnel from lasers. The Secretary of the Army shall establish,
    administer and maintain the Laser Accident and Incident Registry for
    DoD Components and analyze data for use in laser safety, protection,
    and treatment programs.''
        The United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine at Wright-
    Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio operates the Tri-Service Laser Injury
    Hotline. A Laser Radiation Accident/Incident Reporting form is used to
    record all events. It has recently been revised and will be distributed
    along with a Laser Injury Guide that is also currently being updated.
        In addition, the Air Force Surgeon General's Modernization
    Directorate has been engaged in research efforts to develop laser
    sensors that possess the capability to detect and characterize incident
    laser beams as well as assessing their potential eye hazard threat.

                            VISION RESEARCH PROGRAMS

        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.
        Mr. Moran.
        Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate Mr.
    Frelinghuysen bringing that up. The subcommittee's concern has
    been that you continue to reduce peer-reviewed vision with the
    justification that the Center for Excellence is doing it, but
    we don't see the research component within the Center for
    Excellence. So that is what Mr. Frelinghuysen was getting at,
    and I share his concern that it is not the same kind of
    activity and we want to make sure that there is an ongoing
    research component. That is why the subcommittee put the money
    in.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Moran. Sure.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Can we ask the chairman whether you
    would help to assure that? Could you assure us that that would
    be part of this center?
        Admiral Nathan. Absolutely, sir. We will communicate
    directly to the VCOE.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you for yielding.

                          PROPOSED SAVINGS INITIATIVES

        Mr. Moran. Very good. Now, my first question is with regard
    to cost sharing in the Defense Health Program. In 2000, as you
    know, the Pentagon spent $17.7 billion on medical benefits, and
    now we spend $44.3 billion, a 150 percent increase. So you have
    proposed things like coinsurance, copays and so on, that
    Federal employees currently pay in their health care coverage
    but that TRICARE beneficiaries don't. I know that those changes
    will not apply to active duty service members or their
    families.
        But I was struck by your quote, Dr. Woodson, and I quote,
    ``That given the constraints of the Budget Control Act, if no
    adjustments are made in TRICARE fees and we don't achieve more
    than $12 billion in savings over the 5-year defense plan,
    additional force structure cuts will need to be made.'' Would
    you amplify on that a bit, Doctor?
        Dr. Woodson. Yes. Thank you very much for that question.
    And just to create a context, before we even considered TRICARE
    fees, there were a number of initiatives and considerations
    taken. The initiatives to control costs really are multiple.
        First of all, you know we are in a multi-year set of
    initiatives to control headquarters costs. Last year we removed
    440 FTES from headquarters and by the end of this year we will
    have achieved removing 780 FTEs. We put in a number of
    management reforms that have yielded very positive results in
    reducing costs, including a robust fraud and recuperative
    program that has yielded $2.6 billion over the last 4 years, a
    pharmacy management program that has yielded $3.4 billion,
    medical supply and acquisition standardization yielding $31
    million annually, other management efficiencies as it relates
    to, again, headquarters management, and the prospective payment
    system that yield about $1 billion annually. So we have been
    aggressively addressing the issue of costs.
        But in the last year, the world has changed. There has been
    a global fiscal crisis, a national fiscal crisis, a
    reevaluation of bond ratings, the super committee and then the
    Budget Control Act. And under Title I of the Budget Control
    Act, the Department of Defense is required to achieve $487
    billion in savings over 10 years, $269 billion over the FYDP.
        The Secretary and senior line leadership in the Pentagon
    had to look at everything. Personnel and benefits costs are
    about a third of the budget, but the decision was made in fact
    that 90 percent of the savings would come from other areas,
    force structure, weapons programs, et cetera, and then only 10
    percent would reflect personnel costs. In truth, the health
    care fee adjustments only represent 5 percent of the savings
    and, as you have correctly indicated, trying to achieve about
    $12 billion-plus over the FYDP.
        When looking at what adjustments should be made, we went
    back to the 2007 Task Force on the Future of the Military
    Health Care Report to look at what we had done and what could
    still be done to achieve savings in health care costs. We
    looked at, there was somewhat I think about 12 separate
    initiatives, and we had made progress really on all except the
    recommendation to update retiree cost share. And what we did is
    we followed that formula, including the tiering. And that is
    how we arrived at the fee adjustments, and we spread it out
    over all of the programs so not one particular program would
    take maximum effect.
        So we consider taking care of men and women who have
    committed to the defense of this Nation seriously and long
    term, but we had to create a structure that would ensure an
    enduring and sustainable program.

                                  TOBACCO USE

        Mr. Moran. Well, thank you. My response was little more of
    an opening statement kind of response than I anticipated, but
    you stand by that statement that if we don't make adjustments
    to health care, it is going to show in the need to further
    reduce force.
        I just had two follow-ups related to the original question.
    We have got a couple of areas where we really are not saving
    the kind of money we are outside the military. One is in
    smoking. Smoking among service men and women is twice as
    prevalent as it is outside the military. Two-thirds of those in
    deployed status are smoking and half started smoking after
    joining the military. So there is about a quarter of a million
    veterans who are going to develop a tobacco-related illness
    which is going to have to be paid for by TRICARE, which is an
    element of spending that we don't have in private insurance
    plans. That is correct, I gather?
        Dr. Woodson. Absolutely, sir, and thank you so much for
    bringing this up, because one of my priorities this year, one
    of the other broad buckets of how we are addressing health care
    costs, is moving from what we call health care to health,
    really creating population health which in the outyears will
    reduce costs. And one of the targeted areas for this year is
    smoking cessation, trying to create more smoke-free campuses
    and disincentives for smoking, bringing leadership,
    particularly senior enlisted leadership, into the campaign to
    reduce smoking among service men and women.

                               PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

        Mr. Moran. Well, that and the issue of drugs, in some cases
    over half of the money spent on drugs is wasted because we try
    to find the right drug and mix of drugs, and if we have got
    300,000 returning veterans who have been given drugs to deal
    with PTSD and depression and traumatic brain injury and
    combinations, it is enormously expensive and it is not
    necessarily immediately effective. It is kind of a trial and
    error situation.
        You can respond if you want. I know I am out of time though
    and I don't want to indulge on the chairman's leniency, but
    those are two areas I do think we need further focus. Thank
    you. Is there anything you wanted to say very quickly?
        Admiral Nathan. If I could just add, for example, one of
    the things we have just been able to obtain is relief from the
    provision that we had to sell tobacco products on our Navy
    facilities at reduced prices. So now that has been alleviated.
    Again, we are looking at every disincentive we can to have the
    service member take the path of least resistance, being to not
    smoke, to not use smokeless tobacco products. More of our
    hospitals are becoming smoke free and we are increasing access
    to smoking cessation programs in conjunction with
    pharmaceutical smoking cessation products.
        General Horoho. Sir, just to address that, in the overall
    movement towards health is we are looking at tobacco cessation,
    as well as sleep management, anger and alcohol abuse, all of
    those stress relievers that may have someone turn to smoking,
    and really look at it from a comprehensive perspective to
    increase their health.
        Mr. Moran. Good. Well, you are trying. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. Thank you very much, Mr. Moran. I appreciate
    your raising that issue, believe me. It is important.
        Mr. Crenshaw.

               CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM

        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
    for being here. I wanted to ask a couple of questions about the
    congressional-directed medical research program. You all know
    that is a program that Chairman Young pioneered and it has made
    some tremendous breakthroughs in a lot of areas.
        There is an area that I know you all have worked on,
    inflammatory bowel disease. I know a little bit about it
    because my daughter has suffered with it for about 12 years. It
    is interesting, when I go, we do a lot of advocacy work, and it
    seems like we will be at a large gathering, either raising
    money or raising awareness, and it seems like every time there
    is a situation, I will meet somebody in the military that has
    come up and said you know, I had IBD. I had to leave the
    military, or it caused a real problem. I think it affects about
    one out of every 200 people. People don't like to talk about it
    because it is about the digestive tract and all that kind of
    stuff.
        But I think it is great that some of the money we have
    appropriated and I know you all have used, they don't know what
    causes it, they don't know how to cure it, but they are
    discovering some of the genetics aspects, and I think that is
    wonderful what you are doing. I wanted to ask you a couple of
    questions about that whole program. Maybe touch on just a
    couple other success stories that you can talk about, number
    one.
        Number two, talk about how you decide what areas to study?
    Is it more that it benefits the military or is it just research
    in general? And maybe talk about what is the difference between
    the research you do through the Department of Defense and what
    other research is done, say through Health and Human Services.
    Can you just talk briefly about those three items?
        Dr. Woodson. Well, first of all, let me thank you for the
    question and thank the entire committee and the Congress for
    supporting Congressionally-directed research programs. It is
    enormously important. Not only does it add value to military
    medicine but obviously American medicine by the advances that
    are made.
        In regards to the specific program, what I would love to do
    is take your question for the record and give you specifics.
    But in general, of course, as you correctly indicated, no one
    knows exactly why this problem comes about and various
    treatment modalities have in fact been devised to address the
    symptoms depending on severity.
        As it relates to men and women in the military, of course,
    we would love to pursue avenues in which they didn't have to
    take immuno-suppressive agents and then not be deployable and
    impact their career. So that is one avenue clearly that we want
    to address, is better strategies for care so that they can
    remain fully employable in the military. But I would love to
    take your question for the record.
        [The information follows:]

        Starting in 2008, the Department of Defense has supported research
    on inflammatory bowel disease. The research projects are part of the
    Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs at the U.S. Army
    Medical Research and Materiel Command. Research in this area is by
    Congressional direction which distinguishes it from research on that
    topic conducted by other Federal agencies. From 2008 to 2010, eight
    research projects have been awarded and research is underway. In
    addition, there are four research awards in this area that are pending
    final approval. We look forward to providing significant contributions
    to the field of inflammatory bowel disease when these research projects
    conclude.

        Mr. Crenshaw. But in general, I am just curious how you
    decide, like when you decide to study disease, is it more just
    research in general, or do you look at a disease that might
    more directly impact military personnel?
        Dr. Woodson. Both. In some of the Congressionally-directed
    research programs, it is particular areas that Congress might
    be interested in that we pursue. But also, you know, our
    research portfolio is always driven by priorities affecting the
    military. So certainly after 10 years of war, a lot of our
    priorities are driven by the invisible and visible wounds of
    war and how to prevent those issues or make wounded warriors
    whole.

                            MEDICATION TO TREAT PTSD

        Mr. Crenshaw. Maybe just one more brief question. When we
    talked about PTSD, I have talked to some people but I guess it
    is a broad category and you have different symptoms and things
    like that. Do you all try to kind of gear, particularly when
    you are dealing with medication, is there one particular drug
    that is used in general, or are there specific drugs that deal
    with specific aspects of that overall condition? Because I have
    heard some criticism sometimes that people say, well, I got
    PTSD, and they say take this drug and things will be fine, and
    it is maybe more complicated than that.
        General Horoho. Sir, I will answer that question. There is
    a lot of work that is being done with not just looking at
    providing medication, but actually looking at yoga and stress
    reduction, virtual reality and many different forums that we
    can actually try to help someone with their behavioral health
    and help them on the healing journey. So there are some
    medications that may work better than others for one individual
    and then may not be as effective on another individual.
        So the Pain Management Task Force has stood up over the
    last 12 to 15 months, and we are really looking at it from a
    holistic perspective, from the behavioral health to pain
    management and to decreasing the stress using all different
    therapies that are out there.
        Mr. Crenshaw. But in the prescribing of medication, it is
    based on individual symptoms, not kind of one pill cures all?
        General Horoho. It is individual.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Got you. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Crenshaw.
        Mr. Dicks. He wanted to make a statement.
        Mr. Young. I am sorry.
        General Green. I was going to contribute to the discussion
    so you hear it beyond a single service.
        In the Air Force, we train all of our mental health
    providers in the diagnostics as well as the treatment. The
    actual treatment in terms of the evidence base for PTSD falls
    into two categories, which is the prolonged exposure training
    and the cognitive processing training, and it is not
    necessarily tied to any particular drug. So the drugs are
    always individually prescribed.
        And the clinical diagnostics actually are the same as they
    would be in the civilian community. We do have DoD guidelines,
    but they draw heavily from the DSM and basically the guidelines
    that are put out for mental health providers to do this. So it
    is very standardized training. It is a clinical diagnose.
        In terms of your research question, if I could contribute
    to that one, we put much more money, into things that affect,
    for instance, Aerovac or wartime skills. We put a lot more
    things into how do we track equipment; for instance, the RFID
    efforts that have been going on to make certain we can track
    things in the Aerovac system, get them back into the system,
    take care of the next patient. Also things like pre-hospital
    care to try and increase the survival rate, can we use new
    devices in addition to the tourniquets and some of the new
    dressings. Are there ways to use new things to stop bleeding.
        So there are a lot of things that go into that. We have
    also reduced the ability to actually transport a patient on
    heart-lung machines so that we can take the sickest of the
    sick. So when you look at what we focus our efforts on, we do
    some research on just diseases that are common that affect the
    deployability, but the majority of our research is actually
    focused on wartime care.
        Admiral Nathan. If I could just add, I think it is
    critically relevant as far as post-traumatic stress, which is a
    syndrome, and post-traumatic stress disorder, which is a
    diagnosis that is clinically defined across the spectrum of the
    services and American healthcare that, we found the
    multidisciplinary approach is really the best. And whereas we
    used to take care of people sequentially, they would first see
    the psychiatrist, then the neurologist, then perhaps maybe
    somebody trained in complementary medicine such as acupuncture
    or manipulation. Now we find that if we can approach the
    patient and the patient's family in a multidisciplinary
    environment with all the medical specialists in tow and look at
    the patient in total, we get the best results. That is good
    news.
        This is personnel intensive, though, because that requires
    a lot of resources at one time. So we are trying to model what
    we have learned in areas such as the National Intrepid Center
    of Excellence (NICOE) at Walter Reed Bethesda, a Center of
    Excellence for TBI and Post-Traumatic Stress, and we are
    branding that now and sending out what we have learned, those
    algorithms of care, to NICOE satellites in other places like
    Camp Lejeune, Fort Belvoir and other Navy and Army facilities.
        Mr. Young. Okay.
        Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield just briefly on this
    point?
        Mr. Young. I yield.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you. There was a story today in The New
    York Times, veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder are
    more likely to be prescribed opioid, I hope that is how you say
    it, painkillers than other veterans with pain problems and more
    likely to use the opioids in risky ways, according to a study
    published Wednesday by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The
    study, published by the Journal of the American Medical
    Association, also found that veterans returning from Iraq and
    Afghanistan who were prescribed opioids for pain, and
    particularly those with post-traumatic stress disorder, had a
    prevalence of adverse clinical outcomes like overdoses, self-
    inflicted injuries, and injuries caused by accidents or
    fighting.
        Are you aware of this concern?
        Dr. Woodson. Yes, and thank you very much for bringing this
    issue up. We know that veterans and individuals, even civilians
    who have post-traumatic stress disorder, are at risk for other
    substance abuse, use of polypharmacy, and then being at risk
    for adverse events as a result of those medications that they
    take. And I think this study that was carried out actually
    confirms those suspicions, and it is why I think within the
    military as we try and advance our strategies for managing PTSD
    we are trying to move away from drugs and medication to
    alternative therapies and other strategies to reduce the PTSD
    symptoms.
        General Horoho. Sir, there has been a tremendous amount of
    work done over the past several years when we look at trying to
    move more towards wellness and prevention. So we have been
    using telebehavioral health in Afghanistan so we can early on
    provide behavioral health support in a deployed environment. We
    have got five touch points when our service personnel are
    redeployed back with behavioral health where they see a
    behavioral health provider face-to-face.
        We have put in policies where if any service member is on
    four or more medications, one of them being opiates, that there
    is a clinical pharmacologist that actually reviews their
    records and works with the triad of care: the physician, the
    cadre member, and the nurse case manager. And then we have also
    put in a policy--because our concern was that when individuals
    may get medication from going to a dentist or someone else--
    that we have stopped the shelf life of the medication, so that
    it is 6 months and then it expires. We have limited it down to
    30 days of supply so that we reduce the amount of drugs.
        And then we also have a sole provider. When we have a
    concern of an individual that may be on an increased number of
    medications, we will then have one provider that monitors the
    medication that they get in the civilian sector as well as what
    they get in the military so that we make sure we are providing
    them the best oversight of care.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.

                                     AUTISM

        Mr. Young. Mr. Hinchey.
        Mr. Hinchey. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you all very much. I just want to express my deep
    appreciation to everything you are doing, the complex
    circumstances that you are involved in, and the clarity of that
    is very, very much expressed in the responses that you provide
    for the questions that are asked of you here.
        So I want to thank you for all your efforts in improving
    the lives of our service members and their families, and I
    would like to particularly applaud on some of the mental and
    behavioral health initiatives.
        But there is one thing that I wanted to mention which seems
    to be also complicated, but is not really being dealt with
    effectively. I am sure that you know there is an estimated
    20,000 military children suffering from autism and, based on
    the data that I have seen, these children are not receiving the
    level of care that they deserve and they are not receiving it
    really by a long shot. In the treatment of autism, early
    intervention and intensive behavioral therapy, including
    applied behavioral analysis therapy, are imperative to success,
    obviously, and I am sure you really know that and deal with
    these things very effectively.
        ABA therapy is the most widely utilized treatment
    recommended by many national medical policy institutions. It is
    recognized as medically necessary in 29 States, but not under
    TRICARE. In fact, TRICARE segregates ABA therapy under the ECHO
    program, which is only available to active duty service
    members. And even the therapy available to active duty service
    members falls far short, providing only about 10 hours per week
    out of the 25 to 40 hours per week prescribed by doctors. In
    some areas, such as this place where we are, for example,
    Washington, D.C., it apparently only provides 5 hours.
    Dependents of military retirees are not eligible, and this also
    includes wounded warriors who are forced to retire medically.
    Imagine being wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan and forced to
    medically retire because of your injuries, and your child, the
    child losing his or her autism therapy.
        We have an obligation to provide the health care needs of
    our military families. Policy changes are urgently needed to
    recognize the medical necessity of behavioral health treatment
    such as ABA and fund them appropriately. Military families who
    serve our Nation, as you provide for them, really deserve the
    best kind of treatment that they could get. And I know that is
    the basic kind of things that go about in so many things, but
    this is one thing that seems to me to be something that really
    needs to be more attention.
        So can you comment on what is being done to ensure that all
    military children get the doctor-prescribed amount of therapy
    for autism?
        Dr. Woodson. Thank you very much for that question, and I
    appreciate your concern and support of service men and women
    who have children who may be afflicted with this condition.
    Part of the issue for us is that it is not an issue of a policy
    change, but it is an issue of a statute change. As it turns
    out, ABA is not considered a medical treatment, but an
    educational intervention for the management of autism, and we
    currently provide about $36,000 a year in benefits for active
    duty service members for dependents who have this condition. As
    you have correctly outlined, once they retire, because of
    statutes again, we cannot provide that care.
        So the issue is not--and then we are statutorily prohibited
    from providing this service under TRICARE except through the
    vehicle of the ECHO program, which I have just signed an
    extension of that program until we can figure out how to do
    this. It is not a policy issue. In many cases, it is under an
    educational benefit.
        Mr. Dicks. What is the ECHO program?
        Dr. Woodson. It is the Exceptional Care Program--let me get
    you the right acronym. But it is an exceptional care program
    that allows us to extend these benefits for certain conditions
    in which perhaps the medical proof is not there, but it seems
    reasonable to provide certain care. But in this case the issue
    is that it is considered an educational intervention, not a
    medical intervention, and so we are limited to providing
    reimbursement for it under TRICARE.
        [The information follows:]

        The Extended Care Health Option (ECHO) is a supplemental program to
    the TRICARE Basic Program and provides eligible Active Duty Family
    Members (ADFMs) with additional financial resources for an integrated
    set of services and supplies designed to assist in the reduction of the
    disabling effects of the beneficiary's qualifying condition. ECHO is
    established in law at Section 1079(d)-(f) of Title 10 of the United
    States Code. The ECHO is not an enrollment program but does require
    registration. TRICARE ECHO provides financial assistance only for
    active duty family members with specific qualifying mental or physical
    conditions, including:
              Diagnosis of a neuromuscular developmental condition
            or other condition in an infant or toddler expected to precede
            a diagnosis of moderate or severe mental retardation or serious
            physical disability
              Extraordinary physical or psychological condition
            causing the beneficiary to be homebound
              Moderate or severe mental retardation
              Multiple disabilities
              Serious physical disability
        ECHO provides benefits not available through the basic TRICARE
    program, such as coverage for:
              Assistive services (e.g., those from a qualified
            interpreter or translator)
              Durable equipment, including adaptation and
            maintenance
              Expanded in-home medical services through TRICARE
            ECHO Home Health Care (EHHC)
              Medical and rehabilitative services
              In-home respite care services (Can only be used in a
            month when at least one other ECHO benefit is being received)
              Training to use assistive technology devices
              Institutional care when a residential environment is
            required
              Special education (does not include tuition for a
            beneficiary to attend private school)
              Transportation under certain circumstances
              Other services that the Director of TMA determines
            are capable of reducing the disabling effects of a qualifying
            condition, such as ABA services for eligible beneficiaries with
            a diagnosis of ASD.

        Mr. Hinchey. Well, I express appreciation for your
    response, because apparently this is something you are deeply
    concerned about and you are doing everything you can to correct
    it and make it much better. So thank you very, very much, much.
    I appreciate it and I appreciate everything you are doing.
    Thank you very much.

                    MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE REVIEW

        Mr. Young. Mr. Hinchey, thank you very much. My turn.
        The chairman has to produce a markup bill to the
    subcommittee and get as much for our national defense as
    possible with the dollars that we are going to have available.
    In order to do that, we have to really tighten up where we can
    tighten up, but we want to make sure that we don't over tighten
    in places like medical care or taking care of our wounded
    heroes.
        Now, in view of that, I am going to open a subject, and I
    want to assure you this is not a rerun of the February 8th
    hearing where we sort of dissected the JTF CapMed. That is not
    my intention. But I do have a question that I think relates to
    money and the good use of money. I have two questions on the
    subject.
        One is, when the JTF was created, it was intended to help
    facilitate the merger of the two flagship hospitals of
    international excellence, Walter Reed and Bethesda, and that
    merger is now complete. But the JTF appeared to be another
    layer of governance over, in addition to, what we already had
    and what we have worked with for many, many years. So I am
    concerned about that. And there is considerable cost to JTF
    CapMed, but I know there are going to be some changes, and that
    is why we are not going to dissect it again.
        But here is my question: There was another joint task force
    that was created to consider what the new system of governance
    should be in the capital region. There were six options. My
    question, Dr. Woodson, would go to you, because I think it was
    at your level where these decisions were made.
        Mr. Young. There were nine voting members. Five of the
    members of that task force voted for the same option. None of
    the other options got five votes. However, the majority Option
    was not chosen. And I am curious. In view of the task force
    that the Defense Department created, the recommendation that
    they made that was supported by the task force was basically
    ignored. And I am wondering why.
        Dr. Woodson. Thank you, Chairman Young, for the question
    and, again, for your support of the men and women in the
    military health system.
        To address your question specifically, the purpose of the
    task force was to present options to the Deputy Secretary for
    reorganizing the military health system governance. And the
    task force, as you correctly pointed out, presented a set of
    recommendations with the voting, as you have indicated, but
    there was a second layer of consideration that involved senior
    leaders in the Department of Defense with line leadership,
    where they vetted the options; and out of that process--so a
    group of recommendations were presented--the decision was that
    the best way to proceed was with the Defense Health Agency and
    the recommendations that the Deputy Secretary came out with.
        So it wasn't that they were ignoring what they presented.
    Their task was to present a set of recommendations and then
    that second level review with the line leadership then produced
    the final proposals for the MHS governance restructure.
        So that doesn't come out I think when you read the initial
    task force report because you see the work that the task force
    did in sort of racking and stacking the options that were
    considered. But there was a second level review by the senior
    leadership and line leadership to say, well, what is the best
    way to go? And remember, the issue of cost was considered, but
    also the issue of ease and implementation and the possibility
    of what would be left open to do in the future. So what I mean
    by that is, we are presently involved in a war, and to try to
    take the departments apart, let's say, and create a unified
    medical command seemed to be an onerous task.
        But any concept, let's say, of a unified medical command
    would require the building of a Defense Health Agency, because
    we have to deal with garrison care and the TRICARE insurance
    program and other shared entities. So when all of these options
    and issues were considered, it was decided that a Defense
    Health Agency with enhancement of the multiservice market
    managers would be the most appropriate way to go because it
    didn't stop us from doing other things down the road, and it
    didn't cause such disruption in the organizational scheme at
    the time when we are trying to deliver care in wartime. It just
    seemed to be the prudent way to go. So there was another layer
    of analysis that went on, sir.
        Mr. Young. Doctor, the Army's representative on that task
    force and the Navy's representative on that task force--and
    those are the two organizations that have to provide the
    medical care--supported the majority option. They did not
    support the other options. So tell me what in the wisdom of the
    Pentagon--tell me, how does the new system of governance, the
    extra layer of governance, as I see it--I may be simplifying
    that. But I see it as an extra layer of governance over and
    above the Army and the Navy that have done this for years. What
    will that extra layer of governance do to enhance what these
    surgeons general and their medical professionals are going to
    do to protect our kids? What will it do to enhance the medical
    care?
        Dr. Woodson. I think it will bring better command and
    control and coordination to the National Capital Region and
    oversight for the two new joint facilities, Walter Reed
    National Military Medical Center at Bethesda and the Fort
    Belvoir community hospital. Plus it will act as the
    multiservice market area management command authority. So in
    essence, it doesn't add another layer.
        If you look at San Antonio, where you have more than one
    service operating in the area, you still have to establish a
    multiservice market manager which requires personnel to
    effectively develop the business plan for the areas. The Joint
    Task Force CAPMED in reduced form--so it is not going to exist
    the way it does now.
        Mr. Young. I do understand that, yes.
        Dr. Woodson. It will be downsized--will provide that
    oversight, develop the business plans for the National Capital
    Region, which is really a complicated market in and of itself.
    So I think you need that command and control. And then when you
    have two joint entities, you have to have a command structure
    to effectively command and control the joint entities.
        Mr. Young. But Doctor, if this is such a good idea, why
    aren't we doing it worldwide at all of our military
    installations, hospitals, clinics? If it is so good in the
    Washington, D.C., area, why isn't it good for somewhere else?
        Dr. Woodson. That is also a very good question. Again, I
    think it gets back to the point I was trying to make before,
    that if you believe that, let's say, a unified medical command
    is the ultimate option, in order to do that, to create that,
    number one, I think it would be a more expensive option, which
    I think the report to Congress points out the number of FTEs
    you have to add to this four-star headquarters. Could we do
    that now in the fiscal environment that we are now in?
        But more importantly, the issue is that this is an
    iterative approach, a sequential, reasonable approach to
    producing greater unity of effort, greater efficiency,
    particularly in those shared entities, without causing major
    disruption at this time. It doesn't prevent us from dealing
    with other things if the time becomes right or the conditions
    become right to do those things.
        So I think this is a responsible iterative approach that
    allows us to manage the transition to greater collaborative
    joint processes, develop common business plans, common clinical
    plans, manage the shared interests, like IT pharmacy, graduate
    medical education, medical education research, much more
    effectively without causing a major disruption that might make
    us weaker for a period of time.
        Mr. Young. When will this new plan be effective?
        Dr. Woodson. So Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the NDAA,
    we have got a prohibition from instituting any restructuring
    until the GAO has had 180 days to consider the proposal and
    then Congress has another 120 days to reflect upon it. So we
    have a minimum, what, of around 300 days or so that we cannot
    do any implementation. I would just point out, though, that
    considering all of the things that the members have brought
    forth today and all of the considerations that are ongoing, we
    clearly needed to do some things to enhance the joint approach
    to, again, these shared services. That is imperative,
    absolutely imperative for securing the future of the military
    health system and its sustainability. So we fully appreciate
    the involvement of the Congress in analyzing our proposals, but
    it is the Department's position that this is the responsible
    iterative way forward that will produce the maximum efficiency
    with the least disruption.
        Mr. Young. Well, let's hope. Let's hope.
        Let me ask the surgeons general, is there any uncertainty
    where you work because of the delay? And Congress has required
    the delay, so we understand that. But is there any uncertainty
    now waiting for that time to run out before the new governance
    actually becomes effective?
        Admiral Nathan. Mr. Chairman, I think that the only prong
    of the task force recommendations and the Deputy Secretary's
    plan is in the National Capital Region, which currently enjoys
    a little bit of ambiguity in command and control. The two
    facilities, Walter Reed--Bethesda Walter Reed, were under a
    BRAC process. And by charter of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    a JTF was stood up to complete the BRAC process and to provide
    integrated care in the National Capital Region. So the Services
    have retained administrative control. The Navy retains
    administrative control over Bethesda and the Army over Belvoir.
    Operational control and tactical control rests in the Joint
    Task Force (JTF). It works currently directly for the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense. I believe the task force, one of the
    reasons it was assembled, was to try to find a better command
    and control venue for those facilities, for those flagship
    facilities.
        And so your recommendations, when they are put into effect,
    will completely remove the services, those two facilities, as
    well as the other National Capital Region facilities, from the
    Service oversight. They will no longer be Navy facilities or
    Army facilities or Air Force facilities, in the case of Malcolm
    Grove.
        That is somewhat different than the other--in reference to
    your previous question--as to the other markets throughout the
    country, whereas the services will retain control of those
    facilities. San Diego will remain a Navy facility but will have
    an enhanced multiservice market management role to oversee care
    for all the Services in the area. Madigan in the Northwest;
    Brooke down in San Antonio.
        But the National Capital Region has been given a different
    twist in that there will be a medical directorate placed over
    it, presumably a migration of what JTF is now, which will
    report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Under
    Secretary of Defense and then to the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense with oversight to the Defense Health Agency. So the big
    difference being that the facilities in the National Capital
    Region will be under the control of the Defense Health Agency,
    whereas the remaining facilities throughout the world will be
    under the control of the Services.
        Mr. Young. I will let the others respond to that if you
    like. But let me ask a follow-up question there: Is this a test
    case? Is this an opportunity to test this system to see if you
    want to expand it throughout the entire system? Or is this just
    something for the Capital Region? And if it is only for the
    Capital Region, if it is good for the Capital Region, why isn't
    it good for everybody else? And if it is not good for everybody
    else, why is it good for the Capital Region? I am just having a
    little bit of trouble. In my own mind, I see additional--I know
    there are additional costs.
        We questioned the Director of the Joint Task Force about
    the additional costs and the cost versus investment versus
    return. We didn't get any answers. So we are using our own
    processes. We will have those answers very shortly. And you all
    will be contacted with our people that are running that down.
        But please, Generals, if you have any comment you would
    like to make on the same issues.
        General Horoho. Mr. Chairman, in an attempt to answer the
    question that you have asked, I believe that it will give a
    comparison of the effectiveness of the structure and the
    processes that are used in the National Capital Area with the
    structures and the processes that will be used for these
    enhanced multiservice market areas. And then over the years, to
    evaluate which one is more effective in patient outcomes,
    decreasing costs and increasing in efficiencies.
        General Green. And, sir, I think there is work to be done
    to actually establish--there is actually a task force that will
    be working while the Congress is looking at this to see exactly
    what the Defense Health Agency's authorities will be and how
    things will be aligned to try to save costs and figure this
    out. The 300-day delay, as you folks look at it, delays the
    implementation for probably--I mean, realistically, if you
    approve the guidance that has come out of the Department, my
    guess is, the first time they would reach an initial operating
    capability would be October of possibly 2013, if you think it
    through. So in terms of whether this is a pilot or--I think it
    was something that was put together essentially to get us
    through a very difficult, very large hospital--two large
    hospital systems integration. And the difficulty that we have
    now is--and honestly the biggest problem with the 300 days is,
    there will continue to be ambiguity in terms of what the actual
    guidance is at each of the hospitals. So the Joint Task Force
    (JTF) clearly will still have the authority, but there still
    remains the problem that there is not joint credentialing nor
    joint nursing policy nor joint patient administrative policy in
    terms of how you would run a hospital because we do that by
    service.
        And so that ambiguity will continue. We have had some of
    that ambiguity over the last couple of years, as we stood up
    the JTF. So I don't know that it will stop. I don't think it
    will affect the quality of care because we have been working to
    basically solve these things. But until there is a joint
    execution or a joint policy evolution, if you will, on how we
    would do this, it is going to continue to be a problem. And
    that is part of what has to be done with this DHA setup as
    well.
        Mr. Young. Well, General, I think you hit the nail right on
    the head. And as Admiral Nathan knows, my wife and I visit our
    wounded soldiers and Marines a number of times each week. And
    as we inquire, we find that the wounded kids--they are not kids
    anymore by the time they get there, by the way. But they
    believe they are getting excellent medical care, which is good.
    And I agree with that. I think they are getting excellent
    medical care. But we don't need the uncertainty that goes with
    the ambiguity, as you pointed out. And I know that you all will
    be able to work this out. Whatever has to be worked out, you
    will work it out. And the medical care for our wounded warriors
    is going to be first class, like it has always been.
        Admiral Nathan. Mr. Chairman, Walter Reed Bethesda just
    underwent the Joint Commission Accreditation Survey.
        Mr. Young. Yes. I am aware of that, sir.
        Admiral Nathan. They passed with flying colors. And for the
    record, I would say it is a tribute to the jointly staffed and
    jointly led team at that hospital, not that Naval Bureau of
    Medicine (BUMED) or Army Medicine or JTF would take credit for
    it. I don't believe any joint oversight from the service
    surgeon generals that are in control of that facility was the
    main engine for success. I give all the credit to the soldiers,
    the sailors, the airmen who work together; and the staff that
    leads; a joint staff leadership. That hospital, by any
    definition that I have, is a joint hospital. It is a hospital
    where you walk in, you see members of all services, of all
    enlisted and officer ranks working seamlessly together, getting
    the work done, putting patient care first. Sometimes they are
    doing effective work because of the system we have handed them.
    Occasionally, they are doing good work in spite of the system
    we have handed them. But nonetheless, the key thing is they are
    doing great work.
        Mr. Young. I appreciate that. And I agree with that. You
    know, maybe we spend more time than we should out there. Maybe
    we just get in the way sometimes. But there are a lot of things
    the government doesn't do, especially for the families. The
    wounded kids are being very well taken care of. Some of the
    families have problems that the government does not address.
    And that is where we play a role in helping--if you recall, one
    day, we brought quite a wealthy family in. And before they
    left, they left $47,000 with families who were losing their
    homes or losing their cars or having their electricity turned
    off. And as General Horoho knows, that has been a commitment
    that my wife has had ever since we began in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.

                               TRICARE PROPOSALS

        Let me change the subject just a minute. And we are getting
    very close to the vote that I told you we were going to get to.
    But I want to pick up on what Mr. Moran started because it is
    going to be a very important issue, both with the
    Appropriations Committee and with the Armed Services Committee,
    and that is issue about TRICARE and retirements. Let me ask,
    how much savings do we expect to be realized with the proposed
    changes to TRICARE fees and pharmacy copays? And are these
    estimates, or are they guestimates? Or are they pretty hard
    numbers?
        Dr. Woodson. Fairly hard numbers based upon what has
    happened over the last few years. But it looks like we are
    recouping about $1 billion a year. We have gotten back about
    $3.4 billion and would expect to do that in the next few years
    as well.
        Mr. Young. Doctor, suppose Congress doesn't approve--you
    know, there is a bit of an outcry throughout the country on the
    Medicare issue--suppose Congress decided not to approve these
    changes. What would be the effect? What would happen?
        Dr. Woodson. As I previously testified, there would have to
    be additional considerations to force structure, with a gross
    estimate of 50 percent more troop reductions in the categories
    that have already been talked about to make up for the $12.9
    billion or so that we estimate will happen with the TRICARE
    adjustments.
        Mr. Young. Have you been asked by the Armed Services
    Committee specifically about the program?
        Dr. Woodson. We have a hearing scheduled; I believe one
    next week and one the following week.
        Mr. Young. We will follow that hearing as well because we
    are running out of time, and they have more time. And they have
    more staff to work the issues. Our staff is outnumbered by
    about 10-to-one with other committee staffs. But the quality of
    our staff is outstanding. So we want to follow this issue
    closely because we want to do what is right. And for whatever
    role that the appropriators have to play here, we want to make
    sure that our contribution is right.
        Now do you all have anything else you would like to add
    before we do break up?

                                Closing Remarks

        Dr. Woodson. I would just like to say, thank you for your
    superb support of all of the military health systems.
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Young. Let's let the witnesses go first.
        General Horoho. I would just like to echo and say thank you
    very much for the support over the years with MILCON funding
    and funding for all the new initiatives that we initiated for
    our servicemembers.
        Admiral Nathan. I would thank you again for your personal
    advocacy, as you take time to visit the wounded warriors and as
    you take their cases and their interests. It is always
    comforting to know that the senior leaders have this kind of
    attention and engagement with this precious part of our
    country.
        Mr. Young. Well, thanks for letting us do that, Admiral. We
    appreciate it.
        General Green. And from my perspective, it has been an
    honor to represent the services to come and talk with you folks
    who support us so well. And I would also tell you that it has
    been an honor to work with your very professional staff. Thank
    you, sir.
        Mr. Young. Thank you very much, General. I will add, we
    will miss you.
        Mr. Dicks, any closing thoughts or questions?

                                     AUTISM

        Mr. Dicks. Yes. One thing I wanted to add, on this question
    about autism, I read an article recently that there is a
    special school in New York--maybe in New York City--where they
    have intensive interaction with these autistic children, and
    they start really young, or I guess when they diagnose it. And
    that intensive interaction makes a big difference. Now I don't
    know if that is even possible. This is kind of an experimental
    thing. But I don't know if that is possible for us to do in the
    military setting or not. But it was interesting that it proved
    to be quite effective and that these kids did much better after
    they had had this intensive interaction. It is like one-on-one
    per child, somebody working with them. I don't know if you saw
    this, but I saw it recently.
        Dr. Woodson. Yes. I don't know the details of the program,
    but about the special schools. Again, one of the things we need
    to do in trying to craft the benefits for our service men and
    women with children afflicted is to understand what needs to be
    addressed within the educational lane versus the health care
    lane. So I think we need a more--how can we say--involved
    discussion to bring the educational folks into it in crafting
    these benefits.
        Mr. Dicks. I was under the impression that sometimes the
    military has compassionate assignments, where if there is a
    good program--years ago, we did the Evergreen School at Fort
    Lewis, and this was aimed at a lot of special needs children.
    So people who had a special needs child could be assigned to go
    to Fort Lewis and then their child got this special care. Do we
    still do that?
        Dr. Woodson. I will allow surgeon generals to talk about
    assignments. I think I have heard of and actually witnessed
    servicemembers who have gotten or wished to be assigned to
    certain areas because of certain facilities when they have an
    exceptional needs child. And when it can be accommodated with
    the interests of the services being protected, I think they do
    make an attempt to do that. But I will let the surgeon generals
    talk to that.
        General Horoho. Sir, we do take that into consideration,
    and then just the opposite, we try not to assign family members
    in places where we can't support them because of the medical
    needs of either their children or their family members. So it
    is something that is considered in assignments.
        Admiral Nathan. The Navy has an exceptional family member
    program, which all of the Services enjoy which actually can
    codify a patient, a family member with special needs, to remain
    in a certain area for proximity of medical care. It prohibits
    or precludes the active duty member from being assigned outside
    of that area, to provide continuity of care. And there also is
    a mechanism called compassionate or humanitarian transfer. So
    if an active duty member or family member has an overwhelming
    humanitarian need to relocate to some area, either for medical
    care or to take care of a sick relative or for some other
    reason, that mechanism is available through the Bureau of
    Personnel.
        General Green. And the Air Force has the exact same
    programs with the exceptional family members programs, where
    constantly the families are reviewed to make certain we don't
    assign them somewhere they would not have services. And does
    have what you call compassionate assignments, the humanitarian
    assignments. There are some restrictions in terms of the length
    of time, in terms of when things are expected to resolve, which
    may affect the ability to get those assignments, particularly
    with an autistic child, where there may not be an end point.
    But I am not as familiar with the New York program, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                        TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY RESEARCH

        Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, a closing issue?
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have some
    interest in the research and development that may be taking
    place regarding treatment of traumatic brain injuries. Could
    each of you speak to that question? Current and future research
    on drugs that may affect traumatic brain injury.
        General Horoho. Sir, there is a lot of research out of MRMC
    as well as our Defense Center of Excellence for Traumatic Brain
    Injury looking at not just different types of drugs but
    concussive care, different types of therapy for mild, moderate,
    and severe. There is collaborative outreach with some of our
    civilian academia partners, and we are also partnered with the
    NFL as well as Boston VA in an effort of really looking and
    saying: what are the right therapies out there in addition to,
    sometimes nutrition, and a combination of drugs to see whether
    or not that is having an impact. We can get you more
    information on details in that area if you would like.
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Nathan. Sir, I would add that in the spectrum from
    post-traumatic stress, which heretofore was a psychological
    diagnosis or assessment, to traumatic brain injury, which was
    an anatomical diagnosis, we are finding that more and more
    folks with post-traumatic stress actually may have an
    underlying TBI-type symptoms. And that at the microcellular
    level, with our new sophisticated imagery and research, we are
    researching that. I would echo what General Horoho said which
    is, I think the real utility is going to be in the partnerships
    that we are now doing with Centers of Excellence in the private
    and academic sectors. And that if we don't widen the aperture
    for TBI to include the VA, the DoD and the private and academic
    sectors, we are not going to be able to get our arms around
    this, not only from a research and diagnostic standpoint, but
    from a therapeutic one. As our patients leave our epicenters
    and military treatment facilities, where we do a pretty good
    job with this, or our polytrauma units in the VA and go out to
    the interstitial spaces of America.
        General Green. And I would say we are locked arm in arm in
    terms of these efforts. The most significant right now being
    what we are doing in theater in terms of how we are managing
    concussion and ensuring rest and time for people to recover
    after a potential injury that could lead to a traumatic brain
    injury.
        In addition to that, we also, as you know, are exploring
    other things that have made popular press but have not yet been
    proven effective, such as that HBO program that is going on.
    The HBO therapy, the hyperbaric therapy, and the study that the
    Air Force did did not show a significant difference with that,
    but it was not the definitive study. It was a preliminary
    study, and the other study is ongoing with multiple sites,
    essentially collecting patients to see if we can get a
    definitive answer on whether hyperbarics can help.
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

                                 WOMEN'S HEALTH

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
    indulgence. Since we have been talking about post-traumatic
    stress, I have some issues that relates to women. This is a
    report that is only anecdotal, but I heard that some women are
    being told that in order for a female soldier to be diagnosed
    and treated for post-traumatic stress syndrome, they must claim
    military sexual abuse; the rationale being post-traumatic
    stress results from action in combat and women are not
    permitted in combat. Are you familiar with this issue?
        General Horoho. Sir, not specifically with that issue. But
    I can tell you what we have stood up is a women's health task
    force; it will be tri-service. And we are looking at PTSD. We
    are looking at sexual assault, sexual abuse. We are looking at
    predeployment, deployment, and postdeployment issues that are
    very specific just to women.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. We had, yesterday Secretary McHugh came
    in; General Odierno came in. Mr. Lewis actually raised the
    issue. But I was unaware of this sort of anecdotal report that
    somehow with the post-traumatic stress, since women are not in
    combat--and obviously, if it involves rape, that is stress.
    That is a serious crime of course. Are you aware of this issue
    at all?
        General Horoho. Sir, I would say that women----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. To be treated for post-traumatic stress.
        General Horoho. Maybe I am not understanding the question.
    I am sorry.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. With post-traumatic stress, women are
    not allowed in combat. So do they qualify for post-traumatic
    stress only because they have been raped?
        General Horoho. No, sir.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So clarify that for me.
        General Horoho. A couple of things. One, for PTSD, you do
    not have to be exposed to combat to have a diagnosis for PTSD.
    And that is with women or men. So that is not a criteria. The
    second one that I would clarify is that, in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, women may not be in combat, but they are exposed to
    combat.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Absolutely.
        General Horoho. We have had 10 years where women have been
    exposed to some of the same combat that our servicemembers on
    the male side have. So they are being treated with the same
    treatment modalities that we have for men and women. I sat and
    met with almost 2,000 women over the last probably 18 months,
    talking with them. And there are concerns with females of how
    they experience some of the same encounters that a male may. So
    what we are looking at now and saying----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. They are under the same combat stress.
    They may be in the region, so they certainly would qualify for
    it.
        General Horoho. Absolutely.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. There are a lot of issues out here.
        General Green. Yes, sir. And if I could add to that
    conversation. We actually see that in the top three suffering
    PTS--not necessarily PTSD--our own medics who are exposed to
    combat injuries, which are not necessarily associated with
    being fired upon and those kinds of things that you are talking
    about. And so I would tell you that we do not restrict our
    treatment in any way. If someone identifies with post-traumatic
    stress, we treat them appropriately. If they actually progress
    into the disorder, we treat them appropriately, and it has
    nothing to do with whether or not they have been assaulted in
    that manner.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are pleased to have that reassurance.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                                Closing Remarks

        Mr. Young. Thank you all for a very good hearing. We
    appreciate the directness of your answers and your willingness
    to be totally transparent and let us know what you know--at
    least I think you let us know what you know. Maybe there are
    some secrets you have that we don't know about. But anyway, we
    really appreciate the openness.
        But even more importantly than that, we appreciate how you
    take care of our sick and wounded troops. And that is a
    tremendous, tremendous obligation to all of you, to all of us,
    to the Congress. The Constitution made it very clear that we
    have that responsibility, and you do it well. And I just want
    to compliment you all for that.
        Thank you for a good hearing. The committee will be
    adjourned. We are reconvening right now on the floor, and the
    vote will come here just in a few minutes. So timing worked out
    just right. Thanks again. It is good to see all of you.
        General Green, we are going to miss you.
        And Admiral Nathan, General Horoho, we look forward to
    seeing you all again.
        And Dr. Woodson, stay in touch.
        General Green. Thank you.
        Admiral Nathan. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Young. We are adjourned.
        [Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Kingston and the
    answers thereto follow:]

                              Overall Budget Costs

        Question. In 2008, the request for health care funding was $38.7
    Billion, where as in FY12 this request has grown to $52.5 Billion..,
    which is a nearly a 36% increase in four years. The FY13 request of
    $48.7B for the Military Healthcare System is a decrease of $4.1B from
    the FY 12 enacted level, a decrease of more than 7%. While we are
    pleased to see a decrease, absent a detailed cost analysis, do we know
    where these savings are coming from?
        Answer. The table below highlights the specific line items of the
    Unified Medical Budget and displays the FY 2012 appropriated amount
    compared to the FY 2013 Request. $4.0B of the decrease is due to
    reduced Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF) Normal Cost
    Contributions (NCC).

                                                    [$ in Milliions]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2012 Approp  FY 2013 Request       Change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operation and Maintenance....................................        $30,586.2         31,349.3            763.0
    Procurement..................................................            632.5            506.5           -126.1
    Research, Development, Test & Evaluation.....................          1,266.8            673.0           -593.8
    Defense Health Military Personnel............................          8,475.0          8,415.0            -60.0
    Defense Health Military Construction.........................          1,130.1          1,037.3            -92.8
    MERHCF Normal Cost Contribution..............................         10,728.0          6,682.2         -4,045.8
                                                                  --------------------------------------------------
        Total Unified Medical Budget.............................         52,818.7         48,663.2         -4,155.5
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The table below details the additional adjustments to the MERHCF
    per capita rates assumed in the FY 2013 budget submission, which
    generates the $4.0 billion savings.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      MERHCF Rates      Reduction
                                 ----------------------     in
                                                         Accruals
                                  Full-Time  Part-Time     ($B)
    ------------------------------------------------------------- -------------
    FY 2012 Medicare-Eligible         5,580      3,260  .........
     Health Care Fund Normal
     Cost Accrual Rates.........
    FY 2013 Medicare-Eligible         4,702      2,597        1.7
     Health Care Fund Normal
     Cost Accrual Rates*........
    Additional Adjustments to FY
     2013 MERHCF Rates:
        Enactment of US Family        (295)      (217)        0.6
         Health Program
         Legislative Proposal
         (FY12 NDAA - Sec. 708).
        FY 2013 President's           (487)      (338)        0.9
         Budget Proposal
         Increasing Pharmacy Co-
         Pays...................
        FY 2013 President's           (219)      (105)        0.4
         Budget Proposal
         Implementing Enrollment
         Fees for TRICARE-for-
         Life...................
                                 -------------------------------------------
            Total Adjustments to    (1,001)      (660)        1.9
             FY 2013 MERHCF
             Normal Cost Accrual
             Rates..............
            FY 2013 Medicare-         3,701      1,937        3.6
             Eligible Health
             Care Fund Normal
             Cost Accrual Rates
             for PB13...........
            End Strength          .........  .........        0.4
             Reductions & Shift
             of Non-Enduring
             Army/USMC Strength
             to OCO Request**...
                                            --------------------------------
            Total Reduction in    .........  .........        4.0
             Base Budget MERHCF
             Accruals From FY
             2012 to FY 2013....
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * August 9,2011 letter from DoD Board of Actuaries.
    ** FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request includes $272M
      in MERHCF Contributions for Army/USMC non-enduring strength.

                           Benefits of Consolidation

        Question. Have any of the services started to analyze the costs
    associated with and saved by these consolidations, combinations and
    eliminations?
        Answer. The Task Force on MHS Governance did provide an initial
    analysis of cost savings and all Services were represented on the Task
    Force. The Department will stand up an Implementation Planning Team
    consisting of representatives of key organizations across the Military
    Services, the Joint Staff, and the OSD staff to identify the actions
    required and to analyze costs associated with any finally approved
    changes. At this time the Team has not been formed, so the Services
    have not begun their analyses.
        Question. How would the recommended changes to governance
    structure, especially those selected which provide increased budget and
    personnel authority, impact the ability of MHS to efficiently and
    effectively utilize, integrate, and procure technological resources?
        Answer. The proposed MHS governance changes should enable
    accelerated implementation of shared services, identification and
    proliferation of common clinical and business practices, and
    implementation of entirely new approaches to delivering shared
    services. In the specific area of technology, common processes in
    requirements generation for purchases across the system should lead to
    volume discounts. In addition, reducing duplication in program
    management, acquisition, and sustainment across the entire MHS will
    provide more effective and efficient services. These efforts and single
    clinical and business processes should enable the MHS to more
    efficiently and effectively use, integrate, and procure technological
    resources, and should allow for significant savings.
        Question. Do we have anything quantifiable to show the impact of
    procuring technical solutions in order to realize some efficiencies?
        Answer. The Military Health System (MHS) has developed plans to
    achieve efficiencies in response to the Secretary of Defense' call for
    efficiencies, to include data center consolidation.
        Approaches to consolidation. Our approaches to technical
    efficiencies include:
         Decommissioning--turn off or eliminate servers not being
    used (or used infrequently).
         Site Centralization--migrate servers/storage to selected
    (larger) data centers.
         Server/Storage Consolidation--eliminate individual
    physical servers and consolidate to blade architecture.
         Virtualization--utilize virtualization technologies at
    selected data centers to maximize central management, enhance disaster
    recovery, and improve utilization metrics (power usage, rack space, and
    floor space).
         Cloud Computing--migrate application functions to
    standard, vendor supported enterprise platforms or services.
        Data Center Consolidation. A specific example is to reduce the
    total number of data centers. Actions plans formed to support this
    includes:
         Consolidate MHS and service applications to regional data
    centers through virtualization and standardization. Application
    decommissioning will also occur when analysis determines this
    alternative to be the most appropriate course of action.
         Walter Reed Army Medical Center merged with the National
    Naval Medical Center to become the Walter Reed National Military
    Medical Center (Bethesda, MD).
         DeWitt Army Community Hospital (Ft Belvoir, VA) moved
    assets into the new Fort Belvoir Community Hospital.
         Advanced Technology Integration Center (TMA, Falls Church,
    VA) moved assets to the new Development and Test Center (Richmond, VA)
    and other sites.
         Denver Center Irvington (TMA/DHSS, Denver, CO).
        Question. How are these impacts being measured--is there any
    applicable personnel and budget information that was used to make the
    analysis and/or recommendations for changes?
        Answer. The impacts of the proposed Military Health System
    consolidations are not being measured yet because the Department has
    not completed planning for the recommendations. An implementation team
    must decide what changes will take place and only after implementation
    of such changes would it be possible to start measuring results.
        Question. Has a cost analysis been accomplished? What gains have we
    made in the management of our budgetary and procurement processes?
        Answer. A detailed cost analysis was not required by the Terms of
    Reference for this 90-day Task Force on MHS Governance. However, the
    Task Force provided a rough order of magnitude estimate of staffing
    increases or reductions based on each organizational construct
    considered. The Task Force acknowledged that no allocations of
    personnel revisions should be considered until a more detailed analysis
    was completed. In attachment 4 of the Department's report to Congress
    on MHS Governance, March 2, 2012, we provided additional cost analyses
    related to the options presented by the MHS Governance Task Force.
    However, cost analyses for the final decisions for MHS Governance
    reform must await the results of an Implementation Planning Team that
    will identify all the actions necessary for reform and perform more
    detailed cost analyses.

                            How Do We Claim Success?

        Question. Overall Organization / Re-Organization--have we
    identified how we can become more efficient, and know that what we are
    doing is working? For example, unifying some medical commands/
    structures that will provide shared services seems like it would yield
    some savings and efficiency gains--do we have any data to show that?
    Have we identified specific areas that would benefit from increased
    oversight?
        Answer. The Department's report to Congress, March 2, 2012,
    provides the best overview to answer these questions and show the
    breadth of the analysis to come up with proposed Military Health System
    (MHS) Governance reforms. We do believe there are opportunities to
    accelerate the process for a shared services model across a range of
    common MHS activities. These activities include, but are not limited
    to: medical education and training, medical logistics, facility
    planning and construction, health information technology, medical
    research and development, public health, acquisition, and other common
    clinical and business processes.

                        Areas for Continued Improvement

        Question. Lack of Joint Standards (amongst the services) has been
    brought up as a potential problem area in the Defense Health Area--how
    do we ensure this gets looked at?
        Answer. The Military Services do follow joint standards. For
    example, all of our medical treatment facilities, regardless of Service
    affiliation, must meet the standards of and be accredited by The Joint
    Commission, formerly the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
    Healthcare Organizations, which is a United-States-based, not-for-
    profit organization that accredits more than 19,000 health care
    organizations and programs in the United States. However, if your
    concern is that there are more opportunities for the Services to share
    common services, we agree. The Department believes that a great
    opportunity exists to accelerate shared services across a range of
    common Military Health System activities. These activities include, but
    are not limited to medical education and training, medical logistics,
    facility planning and construction, health information technology,
    medical research and development, public health, acquisition, and other
    common clinical and business processes. The Department's report to
    Congress of March 2, 2012, provides more detail.
        Question. Where are we with respect to the integration of services
    in the National Capital Region? What do we still need to accomplish? Do
    we know enough to say that the Bethesda/Ft. Belvoir effort has been
    successful?
        Answer. The Department conducted a comprehensive examination of its
    medical infrastructure in the National Capital Region and determined
    that it did not make sense to continue to have large in-patient
    hospitals operating in close proximity to each other when the physical
    assets were aging and the mode of treatment was shifting to more
    outpatient care. This examination resulted in the closure of the aging
    Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the replacement of the Fort Belvoir
    hospital, the expansion of medical facilities at Bethesda (establishing
    the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center), and the closure of
    the inpatient facility at Joint Base Andrews.
        Over the long term, this change is avoiding costs of operating four
    inpatient hospitals in close proximity and having to recapitalize each.
    Moreover, it matches the infrastructure to current medical practices.
    In this particular case estimates at the time indicated that it would
    cost $600-700 million to replace or renovate Walter Reed and that,
    under existing budget assumptions, the work would take many years to
    complete (6-8 years for replacement, 10-15 years for renovation). While
    that is a major cost avoidance for which we could take credit, the
    Department has elected to be conservative in its savings estimates and
    have focused instead on estimating the savings or avoidances that are
    derived by calculating the net facility overhead costs (i.e. the sum of
    the support personnel, base operating support, and sustainment and
    modernization costs saved at the closing location less the sum of the
    incremental increase of those costs at the new location).
        JTF CapMed has been a model for efficiencies in the Military Health
    System and has saved the Department money through its oversight of
    transitioning four inpatient Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) in
    the National Capital Region (NCR) into two and implementing an
    integrated healthcare delivery system (IDS). Specific initiatives
    (implemented and future) include:

                            Implemented Initiatives

         $114M in cost avoidance through equipment re-use programs
         $109M+ in savings through using a single contractor to
    provision Initial Outfitting and Transition (IO&T)
             $77M upfront by competitively bidding the equipment
            and relocation costs
             $32M in savings due to incentive plan allowing IO&T
            contractor to share in savings due to lowering equipment costs
            through competitive pricing events, bulk buying power, as well
            as a willingness for vendors to accommodate the needs of such a
            volume customer
             The total savings from this contract cannot be
            quantified at this time, but will be realized after the
            contract optimization is completed
         $16M per year in savings through staffing and operational
    efficiencies
               $15M a year through establishing a Joint Pathology
            Center to assume core functions of the Armed Forces Institute
            of Pathology (now closed)
             $810K a year through establishing a regional Civilian
            Human Resources Center
             $230K a year by consolidating appointment call centers
            in the NCR

                               Future Initiatives

         Installation of an Integrated Healthcare Data Network
    (Joint Medical Network) across the NCR will reduce IM/IT sustainment
    costs throughout all NCR MTFs as well as provide better performance
         Consolidation of the workforces at Walter Reed National
    Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital
    (FBCH) and authorities sufficient to implement shared services will
    enable efficiencies and economies of scale that will result in
    contractor and civilian personnel savings of approximately $60M per
    year (FY 2011 dollars)
         With command and control over WRNMMC and FBCH, JTF CapMed
    continues to identify additional opportunities to develop shared
    services capabilities and achieve efficiencies in the NCR IDS.

                              Battlefield Injuries

        Question. Due to TED blasts there are reports of large numbers of
    wounded having suffered a variety of injuries including sensory loss of
    vision and hearing trauma. Have the departments identified
    ``battlefield gaps'' in research for these traumatic injuries? Along
    with TBI and limb extremity research programs, are there other injuries
    that require increased funding to improve patient outcomes on the front
    lines?
        Answer. The Department of Defense has identified battlefield gaps
    in research in order to further understand the relationship between
    blast exposure and traumatic injuries to the sensory systems. Current
    research initiatives focus on developing injury risk criteria and
    guidelines for protecting Service members. With respect to restorative
    and rehabilitative care, research efforts are addressing gaps
    associated with the development and evaluation of novel regenerative
    medicine, pharmacological, and sensory substitution approaches to
    restore blast-induced visual and auditory impairments. As more research
    is conducted to elucidate the mechanistic and correlative underpinnings
    of blast-induced sensory system dysfunction, battlefield gaps will
    evolve and be refined to mitigate the deleterious effects of both acute
    and chronic blast-induced sensory system dysfunction.
        Recently, there has been a reported heightened incidence of
    dismounted complex blast injuries characterized by genitourinary/lower
    abdomen trauma. While there is some overlap between the injuries that
    characterize limb and extremity trauma and genitourinary/lower abdomen
    trauma, there also are notable differences. Pelvic and urogenital
    reconstruction are two examples that fall outside of the current
    research efforts addressing limb and extremity trauma. We are working
    to address these battlefield gaps in our research planning.
        Question. I understand that the Air Force, through its San Antonio
    Medical Command, has deployed a new FDA certified NeuroRadiology
    volumetric process that produces an early-stage medical diagnostic
    image that can be used to identify Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI)
    in a service member who has been subject to an IED attack or other
    injury that would cause trauma to the brain. What is the status of this
    new diagnostic technology?
        Answer. NeuroQuant is a proprietary medical image processing
    software cleared for marketing as a medical device by the Food and Drug
    Administration in 2006. NeuroQuant provides a quantitative measurement
    of the volume of specific areas of the brain, including the
    hippocampus. Because Traumatic Brain Injury (TB!) can result in loss of
    brain volume over time, NeuroQuant has potential application for
    longitudinal monitoring of service members who have sustained TBI. Air
    Force acquired this technology on October 11, 2011 at the San Antonio
    Military Health System. Because the TBI population is predominantly
    Army, we installed the equipment at the San Antonio Military Medical
    Center. To date, this application has been applied to images of 92
    patients with history of mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI), the
    overwhelming majority for routine clinical TBI care. The technology is
    also being utilized on four institutional review board approved
    research projects, including the iSCORE project (an imaging subset of
    the national Study of Cognitive Rehabilitation Effectiveness in mTBI).
    On April 1, 2012 the Wilford Hall Ambulatory Surgical Center will begin
    performing the high resolution sagittal sequence required for
    NeuroQuant software application on all routine brain imaging.
        Question. How could the AF use this technology in regular clinical
    practice in order to determine if service members should either be
    treated or returned to duty, and thus avoid the risk of repetitive
    concussive injuries that aggregate into a disabling condition?
        Answer. As an adjunct in the imaging evaluation of mild Traumatic
    Brain Injury (TBI), NeuroQuant provides a quantitative assessment of
    brain volume, particularly the hippocampus, which can be assessed in
    the subacute period and followed longitudinally over a service member's
    career. If progressive hippocampal volume loss is identified and it
    correlates with clinical history, signs, and symptoms of TBI, the
    service member's provider can use this information to aid in return to
    duty or duty limitation decisions that may be required to reduce the
    risk of additional head injuries. Volumetric measurements near the time
    of injury can serve as a baseline measurement to aid in detection of
    volume loss over time, but cannot be used as an acute diagnostic tool
    for mild TBI.
        Question. Can this technology be deployed in a way that assists the
    AF in early MTBI diagnosis in a commt environment?
        Answer. Brain volume loss following Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
    has been documented in the medical literature, but is not a universal
    finding and it remains unclear what severity and frequency of mild
    Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) is sufficient to produce gradual volume
    loss. Because mTBI may result in a small degree of swelling which can
    skew the evaluation of quantitative brain volume, an initial post-
    injury volumetric measurement should not be performed until the
    subacute period (beyond two weeks from time of injury).
        Question. How can the AF use the technology to support the
    activities of the Physical Disability Evaluation System to render more
    quantitative evaluations of service members?
        Answer. Deploying the use of NeuroQuant in the Air Force Medical
    Service, the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans
    Affairs will provide a means for quantitative assessment of brain
    volume, particularly hippocampal volume that can be followed
    longitudinally from the initial injury through separation or medical
    discharge and beyond. Though hippocampal volume loss after Traumatic
    Brain Injury (TBI) has been well documented in the medical literature,
    especially with moderate to severe TBI, it is not a universal finding
    in all who have sustained TBI. In addition, there are other medical
    conditions which may result in hippocampal volume loss. Thus,
    NeuroQuant may provide objective support for the clinical diagnosis of
    cognitive deficits from TBI but cannot be used a sole diagnostic tool.
    This information must be used in conjunction with clinical assessment,
    laboratory evaluation, and other imaging assessment tools to support
    the activities of the Physical Disability Evaluation System.
        Question. Could this technology be deployed in such a way as to
    establish a longitudinal study that would follow a patient through
    their military service and into the VA system?
        Answer. A longitudinal study to follow a service member through
    their career and into the Department of Veterans Affairs system would
    require standardized Traumatic Brain Injury imaging techniques across
    the Department of Defense to include a high resolution sagittal
    sequence required to process NeuroQuant data, an accessible database
    for our wounded warriors' Magnetic Resonance Imaging data at any
    Department of Defense facility and Department of Veterans Affairs, and
    incorporation of imaging and volumetric data with the patient's
    electronic medical record.

        [Clerk's notes.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
    Kingston. Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the answers
    thereto follow:]

                                  TRICARE Fees

        Question. TRICARE for Life is currently a mandatory program.
    Enrollment is automatic. Will this continue to be automatic after the
    enrollment fees are imposed? What will happen if a retiree does not
    want to enroll in or cannot afford the program?
        Answer. TRICARE for Life (TFL) provides TRICARE payment secondary
    to Medicare when a beneficiary entitled to Medicare Part A is also
    enrolled in Medicare Part B. Participation in TFL is not automatic.
    Currently, a beneficiary who is eligible for premium-free Medicare Part
    A participates in TFL by choosing to purchase Medicare Part B. By
    statute, a beneficiary who is eligible for premium-free Medicare Part A
    but declines to purchase Medicare Part B will lose his or her TRICARE
    benefits, except for care in military treatment facilities on a space-
    available basis. These provisions will remain in effect, with the
    Administration's proposed TFL enrollment fee becoming an additional
    prerequisite for participation in TFL. Beneficiaries who choose not to,
    or cannot pay the enrollment fee will not have TFL coverage.

                          TRICARE Contract Management

        Question. The TriWest health care contractor, which provides
    TRICARE services in California, was recently fined $10 million for
    mismanaging its contract and failing to pass savings it had obtained
    from providers on to the federal government. In one instance TriWest
    billed the U.S. $370,000 for care delivered to a patient that had not
    been eligible for care for two years!
        Is anyone at the TRICARE Management Activity being held accountable
    for failing to oversee this contract? Are programs being initiated to
    review all the other TRICARE contractors?
        Answer. TMA currently has multiple contracts performing statistical
    audits of claims processing. Due to the volume of claims, tens of
    millions of claims per year, audits are post pay; currently TMA post
    pay audits established an overall error rate in FY 2010 of .24%. In FY
    2010 TRICARE processed 199.4 million claims.
        TMA/Program Integrity actively works to protect the Program from
    fraud and abuse so that tax payer dollars are utilized to properly
    provide benefits to our beneficiaries, under all of our contracts. In
    the TriWest situation TMA/Program Integrity received a qui tam filing
    against the provider in 2008. A review of the services specifically
    identified in the filing was properly provided to TRICARE
    beneficiaries.
        In assisting DOJ, a review of each of the issues by TMA/PI
    determined that two of the issues were unsubstantiated. The third
    issue, Letters of Agreement (LOAs) is more complex in that the
    contractor paid claims within the Regulation's maximum allowable
    charge, thus raising no payment/processing flags. Additionally, LOA's
    are not required by regulation or contract, however, if negotiated, the
    benefit of the lower rate must be passed onto the government.
        Since, LOAs are not processed as a separate distinguishable subset
    of claims and these claims in particular paid within the maximum
    allowable charges, the claims would not have created an identifiable
    pattern. TMAJPI's findings on this third issue created concerns within
    the DOJ on TriWest's failure to apply negotiated discounts and to
    identify and recoup government dollars in a timely manner thereby
    causing DOJ's limited intervention.

                             Defense Health Agency

        Question. Do you anticipate cost-savings from creating the Defense
    Health Agency? If so, how much do you expect to save? What do you
    expect the start up costs to be for the Defense Health Agency?
        Answer. A detailed cost analysis was not accomplished during this
    90-day Task Force on Military Health System (MHS) Governance; one was
    not required by the Terms of Reference for the Task Force. In
    attachment 4 of the Department's report to Congress on MHS Governance,
    March 2, 2012, we provided additional cost analyses related to the
    options presented by the MRS Governance Task Force. However, cost
    analyses for the final decisions for MRS Governance reform must await
    the results of an Implementation Planning Team that will identify all
    the actions necessary for reform and perform more detailed cost
    analyses.

                          Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)

        Question. As you know, the incidence of traumatic brain injury
    (TBI) among deployed military members has been increasing. However,
    there seems to be some hope in understanding what happens to the brain
    after TBI. Knowledge gained from boxing and football injuries and now
    from troops who have suffered TBI, indicates that TBI may cause minute
    changes in the brain that in turn cause normal tau proteins to change
    to a toxic prion protein. The prion protein then rapidly multiplies,
    causing cognitive and behavioral degeneration. Research suggests that
    with medication, these toxic proteins can be stopped. While the injury
    to the brain cannot be reversed, the progressive damage and brain
    degeneration can be slowed or possibly stopped. We have the ability to
    screen for prions which means we can test troops who have experienced
    TBI and immediately begin medication if they test positive for prion
    proteins. This offers great hope in our efforts to treat TBI-related
    depression, alcoholism, and drug use, and to prevent the most
    devastating outcome--suicide. I know the Department of Defense is
    pursuing several TBI research initiatives, but I'm told that the
    funding for prion drug trials has yet to be released.
        Please provide an update on this research and explain why that
    money is being held back. Is the Department of Defense collecting data
    and/or analyzing whether members who commit or attempt suicide have
    suffered a TBI?
        Answer. Research funding is not being held back. The Department of
    Defense is aggressively working with the Department of Veteran Affairs
    to establish joint funding for a broad, multi-year research consortium
    to investigate the role of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, including
    tau and other factors, in military and veteran populations.
        Yes, we collect these data. According to the Department of Defense
    Suicide Event Report (DoDSER), of the 281 Service members who died by
    suicide confirmed by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System in 2010,
    eight (2.25 percent) had a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury. Of the
    863 attempted suicides reported in DoDSER, 21 (2.4 percent) had a
    diagnosis with traumatic brain injury.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calbert.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the answers thereto
    follow:]

                          Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)

        Question. The CDC reports that traumatic brain injury (TBI)
    contributes to a substantial number of deaths and cases of permanent
    disability. In fact, TBI is a contributing factor to a third (30.5%) of
    all injury-related deaths in the United States. Of the 1.7 million
    people who sustain a TBI each year in this country: 52,000 people die
    and 275,000 people are hospitalized. The estimated economic cost of TBI
    in 2010, including direct and indirect medical costs, is estimated to
    be approximately $76.5 billion. To this effect, combat veterans and
    civilians afflicted from brain injury deserve to have collaborative
    support from the brain research and advocacy communities to advance TBI
    research, significantly improving outcomes and curb the cost burden to
    the U.S. health system. We believe that the intellectual capabilities
    of our healthcare workforce can be better harnessed using collaborative
    technology platforms and to this we offer the following questions:
        Approximately how much money has the DoD spent on combat casualty
    care, TBI, PTSD, since the beginning of the wars?
        Answer. The table below provides an estimation of costs, where
    available, for Combat Casualty Care, TI and Psychological Health (to
    include PTSD).

                                                      [$ Millions]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              FY 2004  FY 2005  FY 2006  FY 2007  FY 2008  FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Psych Health (to include PTSD)*.........                               1,010    1,270    1,5l2    1,836     2012
                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Traumatic Brain Injury*.................       Data not readily          108      135      147      184      214
                                                      available
                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combat Casualty Care**..................       30       50       52      124      114      113       67       72
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Psych Health (to include PTSD) and TBI funds represent Active Duty and their Family Members (to include
      Activated Guard and Reserve and their Family Members) and do not include Retiree.
    ** Combat Casualty Care represents funds obligated through the Overseas Contingency Fund (OCO).

        Question. How is the Department consolidating care for TBI, PTSD,
    and other combat-related mental disorders to provide better care for
    our uniformed service members?
        Answer. Multidisciplinary programs throughout the Military
    Healthcare System (MHS) provide high quality, consolidated care for
    Service members (SMs) with traumatic brain injury (TBI). In addition,
    posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and combat-related mental
    disorders are addressed through coordinated programs. These conditions
    frequently present with similar symptoms and are often seen together,
    making diagnostic and treatment decisions challenging. There are
    currently over 60 TBI programs in the MHS that systematically
    coordinate care for SMs with TBI and co-occurring conditions, which may
    include chronic pain, headaches, PTSD, mood, and sleep disorders. These
    programs provide four levels of care to SMs who sustain a TBI,
    depending on the individual severity of injury and needed care
    requirements. Programs such as Re-Engineering Systems of Primary Care
    Treatment in the Military (RESPECT-Mil) and the Behavioral Health
    Optimization Project (BHOP) enable Department of Defense (DoD) primary
    care providers to screen and treat health-seeking patients in primary
    care clinics for PTSD, suicidal ideation, and depression while
    integrating behavioral health care providers into routine care. These
    programs place psychological health (PH) care providers in
    nontraditional primary care clinic treatment settings, and enhance
    access to PH care while increasing the care quality of both primary
    care and PH care.
        As one means of communicating the state of the evidence to clinical
    providers in the field, the DoD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
    jointly developed Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs), including a CPG
    for the Management of Posttraumatic Stress (2010), and one for
    Concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (2009). The DoD also developed
    companion Clinical Support Tools for providers, veterans, and SMs. The
    PTSD tools are currently in development and scheduled for public
    release mid-2012. In addition, the Defense Centers of Excellence for
    Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE), which was
    established in 2007, facilitates weekly PH and TBI conference calls
    with representatives from the Services and VA to coordinate care and
    identify best practices to ensure that SMs with these clinical
    conditions receive high quality, evidence-based care in alignment with
    current scientific literature. The DoD continues in its effort to
    provide high quality, consolidated PH and TBI care, which includes
    initiatives to reduce the stigma associated with seeking PH or TBI
    care, identify improved methods to access healthcare, establish
    standards for training to improve quality of care, implement telehealth
    technologies to increase access to care, and expand collaboration
    between Departments and stakeholders.
        Question. In light of the recent unfortunate events in Afghanistan,
    what practical diagnostic tools have be developed by DoD's R&D
    investments that can reliably differentiate between the diagnosis of
    TBI, PTSD, or patients with elements of both?
        Answer. There are a number of research projects underway supporting
    the development of evidence-based scientifically-evaluated techniques
    for improving diagnostic accuracy of PTSD and TBI (with a particular
    focus on concussion/mild TBI (mTBI)), to include differential diagnosis
    as well as co-occurring PTSD and TBI. Several research efforts utilize
    brain imaging techniques to elucidate brain indices of risk for PTSD
    and mTBI that are correlated with techniques and technologies that are
    more fieldable (for example, neurocognitive testing, eye-tracking,
    balance platforms). These research studies will yield empirically-
    validated diagnostic tools. There is an effort to develop a validated
    concussion dosimeter to predict likelihood of injury. Concurrently,
    foundational research is underway to understand underlying unique and
    common neurobiological mechanisms of PTSD and TBI in order to inform
    development of improved diagnostics. Lastly, research is focused on
    understanding the potential reciprocal interaction between
    psychological and physical neurotrauma. It is hypothesized that
    neurotrauma may predispose some Service members to the development of
    PTSD. Within the next several years, these research studies are
    expected to produce tools and results that will inform guidelines for
    improved accuracy of PTSD and TBI diagnoses.
        Question. Please describe any tangible benefits in the form of
    delivered and deployed products or improved processes or patient care
    protocols that our wounded warriors have received from the R&D dollars
    appropriated for TBI and PTSD to date. Please distinguish this from
    advances and contributions our military physicians have made in the
    absence of R&D funding.
        Answer. The Department has a significant research investment in
    this area and our research strategy is aligned to the continuum of TBI
    care model. Basic research and epidemiology projects focus on
    understanding mechanisms of injury and incidence of the injury. In
    addition, research projects are being conducted in the following
    categories of the continuum of TBI care model: Medical Standards for
    Protective Equipment; Objective Measures of Head Impact/Blast Exposure;
    Valid Criteria for mild TBI/Concussion Screening Tools; Portable
    Diagnostic Devices for Theatre and Garrison; Pharmaceutics and Surgical
    Technologies for Treatment; Recovery Time-Course and Rehabilitation
    Strategies; and Valid Return to Duty Standards and Measures of
    Rehabilitation.
        Question. What is the status of the helmet sensor for blast
    detection funded through MRMC? Please differentiate from the blast
    detector already deployed with the 4th ID that was developed by DARPA.
        Answer. The Generation II helmet sensor is a Program Executive
    Office (PEO) Soldier initiative designed to provide an objective way to
    measure and record soldier head impact and blast exposures in combat
    and training environments. In a blast or head impact event, the sensors
    measure and record helmet acceleration and blast pressure. These
    sensors are not medical devices, and they are not used to diagnose TBI;
    however, they do provide a means for documenting possibly injurious
    head impact and blast exposures, and they provide a mechanism for
    rapidly identifying soldiers who should be referred for medical
    evaluation and treatment.
        The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) is
    supporting the PEO Soldier Gen II helmet sensor fielding initiative.
    The USAMRMC, through the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury
    in Combat (JTAPIC) program, will help to assess sensor performance by
    leading a sensor data analysis project that will determine if the
    sensor data correlate with events and injuries. The JTAPIC program has
    developed an operational exposure screening tool that will be used to
    rapidly screen the sensor data as they are downloaded from soldiers'
    helmets. The screening tool produces a red-amber-green (R-A-G) output
    indicating the probability of a concussion based on existing concussion
    data from the automotive safety community and the National Football
    League. Soldiers with amber or red events will be referred for medical
    evaluation in accordance with the existing DoD policy on the management
    of concussion/mild traumatic brain injury in the deployed setting.
        The DARPA blast detector is a different technological application.
    USAMRMC is collaborating with DARPA and PEO Soldier to provide an
    objective way to measure and record soldier head impact and blast
    exposures in combat and training environments using the DARPA
    technology.
        Question. How can the DoD enhance its collaborations with other
    governmental and non-governmental organizations to more effectively
    translate basic science advances in the care of neurological disease
    into tangible benefits for the warriors, and their families?
        Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) is collaborating with other
    government agencies, academia, and industry on many initiatives:
         DoD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
    collaborate on many diverse research initiatives, in terms of
    identification of scientific gaps, evaluation of research proposals for
    funding and the progress of research programs. In addition, DoD funds
    nearly 350 VA and VA-affiliated investigators who perform medical
    research, including projects for traumatic brain injury (TBI) and
    psychological health research.
         DoD and VA collaborated in the establishment of four
    Centers of Excellence: Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury
    (DCoE), Vision, Hearing, and Extremity and Amputation Care. These
    Centers facilitate research planning.
         The DCoE develops collaborative projects, such as the
    Common Data Elements Project, with the National Institutes of Health
    (NIH), VA, and the Department of Education.
         DoD is working with NIH to develop a comprehensive
    comparative effectiveness research program on the diagnosis, treatment,
    and outcomes of TBI.
         NIH and VA representatives serve on the DoD Neurotrauma
    Steering Committee and the Joint Program Committees that plan and
    monitor research. DoD and NIH, in partnership, are building the Federal
    Interagency Traumatic Brain Injury Research database to accelerate
    comparative effectiveness research on brain injury treatment and
    diagnosis.
         DoD and VA are embarking on a jointly funded research
    consortium to address the chronic effects of neurotrauma, to include
    psychologic, neurologic, cognitive, and sensory effects.
         In addition to collaborating with various governmental
    agencies, DoD partners with numerous industries that conduct clinical
    trials to develop products that will aid in the diagnosis and treatment
    of TBI.
        With so many promising avenues in simultaneous development, it is
    reasonable to anticipate exciting successes within the next 5 to 7
    years. We believe that the most promising approach to treatment and
    rehabilitation will not be through any single organization, but rather
    through collaboration of existing government and non-government
    research partners. This will require continued dedicated support and
    the combined, coordinated efforts of many agencies, academia and
    industry.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Rothman and the answers thereto
    follows:]

                          Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)

        Question. Traumatic Brain Injury continues to be a leading cause of
    death and disability among our military personnel. Recent figures
    indicated that explosive blast TBI accounted for 60% of combat
    casualties on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom OIF)). Many patients die or are disabled by the initial brain
    injury; but many more suffer additional, often fatal, secondary brain
    damage during the days to weeks after the original injury. Despite
    advances in medical care, therapies for secondary brain injury have so
    far proven minimally effective. There is promising new research being
    done in my home state of New Jersey to decrease or eliminate the
    consequences of secondary brain injury, such as delayed cerebral
    ischemis and rebleeding. Research of this type has the potential to
    categorize secondary injuries of this type as preventable. I am aware
    that there is a wide range of research being conducted by the Services
    and the Defense Centers of Excellence on the subject of traumatic brain
    injury. Developing effective mitigation and treatment of secondary
    brain injury is a critical component of an improved TBI system of care.
        What type of projects or initiatives, and level of resources, has
    the Department devoted to investigate early intervention, mitigation
    and treatment modalities to prevent secondary brain injury following
    TBI?
        Answer. The Department has a significant research investment in
    this area and our research strategy is aligned to the continuum of TBI
    care model. Basic research and epidemiology projects focus on
    understanding mechanisms and incidence of the injury. Additionally,
    research projects are underway in the following categories of the
    continuum of TBI care model: Medical Standards for Protective
    Equipment; Objective Measures of Head Impact/Blast Exposure; Valid
    Criteria for mild TBI/Concussion Screening Tools; Portable Diagnostic
    Devices for Theater and Garrison; Pharmaceutics and Surgical
    Technologies for Treatment; Recovery Time-Course and Rehabilitation
    Strategies; and Valid Return to Duty Standards and Measures of
    Rehabilitation.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Rothman.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Hinchey and the answers thereto
    follow:]

                        Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA)

        Question. Mr. Woodson, in your testimony, you stated that Applied
    Behavior Analysis or ABA therapy cannot be covered under TRICARE Basic
    because it does not meet statutory requirements. You further clarified
    that it is not a policy issue that it is a statutory requirement. Can
    you please explain why this does not meet the statutory requirements
    and include the Department's current interpretation of the law or DoD
    policies that you believe support this assertion?
        Answer. Title 10 United States Code Chapter 55, Section 1071
    authorizes a uniform program--Civilian Health and Medical Program of
    the Uniformed Services--of medical benefits and dental care for members
    and certain former members of the Uniformed Services and their
    dependents. Based on the recent change to 10 USC 1073 (in NDAA FY 2011,
    Section 711), the Secretary of Defense is solely responsible for
    administering the TRICARE Program and making any decisions affecting
    it. The other Secretaries have remaining responsibilities for otherwise
    administering provisions of Chapter 55 in general, but not with respect
    to TRICARE. TRICARE is authorized at Sections 1079, 1086, and 1091 to
    contract with civilian providers for the health care program benefits
    authorized under Section 1077.
        32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.1(d) specifies that the program authorized under
    Chapter 55, Title 10, United States Code, includes a program of medical
    benefits provided by the U.S. Government under public law to specified
    categories of individuals who are qualified for these benefits by
    virtue of their relationship to one of the seven Uniformed Services.
    Although similar in structure in many of its aspects, it is not an
    insurance program in that it does not involve a contract guaranteeing
    the indemnification of an insured party against a specified loss in
    return for a premium paid. Further, the program is not subject to those
    state regulatory bodies or agencies that control the insurance business
    generally.
        Paragraph 32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.1(e) specifies that the appropriated
    funds furnished annually by the Congress are used to adjudicate claims
    received under Part 199. That paragraph establishes that Part 199 is
    the regulatory guidance for administering the program, including
    setting out the benefits that are eligible for reimbursement.
        In accordance with 32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.4(g)(15), any proposed
    TRICARE Basic Program benefit that is characterized as a drug, device,
    medical treatment, diagnostic or therapeutic procedure must be
    determined by the Director, TRICARE to be safe and effective in
    accordance with the reliable evidence criteria. Reliable evidence is
    defined in 32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.2(b) as meaning only:
        (i) Well controlled studies of clinically meaningful endpoints,
    published in refereed medical literature.
        (ii) Published formal technology assessments.
        (iii) The published reports of national professional medical
    associations.
        (iv) Published national medical policy organization positions.
        (v) The published reports of national expert opinion organizations.
        Specifically not included in the meaning of reliable evidence are
    reports, articles, or statements by providers or groups of providers
    containing only abstracts, anecdotal evidence or professional opinions.
    Furthermore, the hierarchy of reliable evidence of proven medical
    effectiveness as listed above is the order of the relative weight to be
    given to any particular source.
        Health care technology assessments were conducted by the ECRI
    Institute, the Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) Technology Evaluation
    Center (TEC) and Hayes, Inc. There is insufficient evidence to
    establish that ABA is medically or psychologically necessary or that it
    is a medical treatment for Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD).
    Additionally there is insufficient reliable evidence to establish that
    ABA is ``proven'' as medically or psychologically necessary for ASD.
    Therefore, there is no current authority to provide ABA coverage under
    the TRICARE Basic Program. However, the results of this assessment do
    support the conclusion that DoD has authority under Title 10 U.S.C.
    Section 1079(d-e) (the TRICARE ECHO program) to provide coverage of ABA
    for ASD for ECHO eligible beneficiaries.
        Question. Dr. Woodson, the statutory law that provides the basis
    for the ECHO program, 10 USC 1079(d)(e)(f), makes no specific mention
    of autism or ABA therapy. Under 10 USC 1079(d)(3)(B) it defines
    qualifying conditions as ``mental retardation, has a serious physical
    disability, or has an extraordinary physical or psychological
    condition.'' Furthermore, ``extraordinary physical or psychological
    condition'' and ``special education'' are not defined anywhere. There
    is a strong case to be made that this therapy more appropriately falls
    under 10 USC 1077(a)(5), the basis for TRICARE Basic, which makes
    beneficiaries eligible for treatment of ``nervous, mental, and chronic
    disorders.'' It should be noted that legislation pending in the House
    (H.R. 2288) would simply amend 10 USC 1077 to include autism as its own
    subsection. Other diseases and disorders have not needed specific
    mention in the statute to be eligible for coverage.
        Answer. TRICARE recognizes an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as a
    neurobiological condition, generally of unknown etiology, which
    requires medical treatment. The TRICARE Basic Program provides such
    medically necessary services as speech therapy, physical therapy,
    occupational therapy, and psychological testing and treatment for ASD
    conditions. By statute and regulation, only medical services may be
    provided in the TRICARE Basic Program. While ABA generally involves
    ``education'', it is considered a behavior modification modality that
    is neither ``special education'' nor a medical treatment for autism.
    The statute proposes to include ABA as medical care when there is yet
    to be sufficient reliable evidence documented in the medical community
    establishing it as a proven safe and effective medical treatment for
    the underlying condition of autism. Instead of relying on a thorough
    review of its safety and efficacy as a medical treatment, which is
    required for all other medical treatments covered by TRICARE, this
    statute would allow individual providers to determine if the ABA
    services being requested are safe, effective and appropriate for the
    beneficiary--unlike the process for covering all other medical
    treatments under the TRICARE Basic Program.
        TMA conducted an assessment of ABA in October, 2010, and reliable
    evidence reviewed indicated that ABA does not satisfy the definition of
    proven medical care that statute and regulation require TRICARE to use.
    By implying that ABA is a medical intervention for ASD, the legislation
    goes against the weight of in-depth health care technology assessments
    conducted by the ECRI Institute and assessments by the Blue Cross Blue
    Shield (BCBS) Technology Evaluation Center (TEC) and Hayes, Inc.
        It is inappropriate to incorporate a non-medical service into the
    TRICARE Basic Program, which has heretofore been restricted to
    provision of medical care. Congress has consistently recognized this
    and established by statute the separate Extended Care Health Option
    (ECHO) to enable provision of certain non-medical services to active
    duty family members.
        Question. Even more appropriate is 10 USC 1077(a)(17) which
    provides ``rehabilitative therapy to improve, restore or maintain, or
    to minimize or prevent deterioration of function, of a patient when
    prescribed by a physician.'' Because the ECHO program does not define
    autism under ``extraordinary physical or psychological condition''
    within the statute or define ABA therapy as ``special education,'' why
    do you believe that this is a statutory issue? It seems to me that this
    is a policy issue. Don't you agree that if DoD considers autism as
    something other than an ``extraordinary physical or psychological
    condition'' and/or ABA therapy as something other than ``special
    education'' that the law would not need to be re-written?
        Answer. ABA has been characterized by the majority of the reliable
    evidence reviewed as not being a medical treatment, but instead as
    involving non-medical, behavioral intervention services. Additionally,
    except as otherwise specifically permitted by law, TRICARE has no
    authority to provide coverage of ``special education'' (10 U.S.C.
    1079(a)(9)) or ``self-help, academic education or vocational training
    services and supplies'' (32 C.F.R. 199.4(g)(42)) under the Basic
    Program (32 C.F.R., 199.4). Consequently, reimbursement can be made by
    the DoD for these services only if authorized by some other statutory
    authority under Chapter 55 of Title 10.
        Section 1079(d)(1)-(3) provides additional authority for payment
    for non-medical services. However, this statutory provision is limited
    to dependents of Active Duty Family Members with a qualifying
    condition. Under 10 U.S.C. 1079(d)(3), the term ``qualifying
    condition'' means the condition of a dependent who is moderately or
    severely mentally retarded, has a serious physical disability, or has
    an extraordinary physical or psychological condition. Active duty
    dependents diagnosed with ASD may have one of these qualifying
    conditions.
        Although the literature characterizes ABA services by the use of
    several non-medical terms, and there does not appear to be consensus on
    any one characterization, a precise characterization of ABA is not
    required for coverage under ECHO as long as ABA: 1) does-not meet the
    definition of a benefit under the medical program; and 2) can be
    reasonably characterized as a benefit under any one of the seven
    categories listed in 1079(e).
        In sum, DoD has authority under title 10 U.S.C. Section 1079(d-e)
    (the TRICARE ECHO Program) to provide coverage of ABA as a non-medical
    service for eligible beneficiaries to minimize the effects of ASD. As
    discussed above, there is no current authority to provide ABA coverage
    under the TRICARE Basic Program.
        Question. Dr. Woodson, you stated during the hearing that ABA
    therapy is an ``educational intervention'' and not ``medical
    treatment.'' I disagree with your classification. First, TRICARE and
    most other insurance companies require a board-certified medical doctor
    in behavioral developmental pediatrics, neurodevelopmental pediatrics,
    pediatric neurology, pediatric psychology, or a specially trained
    physician or PhD psychologist who works with children to diagnose
    autism. Second, ABA therapy is a doctor-prescribed medical treatment
    and is recommended and endorsed by the U.S. Surgeon General, American
    Academy of Pediatrics, National Institute of Mental Health and other
    national medical policy organizations as effective treatment for
    autism. The 2007 American Academy of Pediatrics report concluded that
    the benefit of ABA-based interventions in autism spectrum disorders
    (ASDs) ``has been well documented'' and that ``children who receive
    early intensive behavioral treatment have been shown to make
    substantial, sustained gains in IQ, language, academic performance, and
    adaptive behavior as well as some measures of social behavior.'' Third,
    Board Certified Behavior Analysts (BCBA) administer most of the
    treatment and have no affiliation with Special Education. They are
    highly trained and spend the majority of their careers working with
    doctors, psychologists, and psychiatrists--not special educators. Based
    on these endorsements by reputable people and institutions, why do you
    not believe ABA therapy is a ``medical treatment?'' Please provide any
    supporting documentation the Department used to make its decision to
    classify ABA therapy as special education.
        Answer. See attached TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY Assessment of
    Applied Behavior Analysis for Autism Spectrum Disorders.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Question. Dr. Woodson, currently, ABA therapy is authorized under
    the Extended Care Health Option (ECHO) Program which is not available
    to military retirees, including Wounded Warriors who are forced to
    medically retire. Please discuss why ABA therapy is placed under this
    program when the intent of Congress is to provide basic health care to
    all active duty military and military retirees?
        Answer. ABA has been characterized by the majority of the reliable
    evidence reviewed as not being a medical treatment, but instead as
    involving non-medical, behavioral intervention services. Additionally,
    except as otherwise specifically permitted by law, TRICARE has no
    authority to provide coverage of behavior modification modalities or
    other non-medical services under the Basic Program (32 C.F.R., 199.4).
    Consequently, reimbursement can be made by the DoD for these services
    only if authorized by some other statutory authority under Chapter 55
    of Title 10.
        Section 1079(d)(1)-(3) provides additional authority for payment
    for non-medical services. However, this statutory provision is limited
    to dependents of Active Duty Family Members with a qualifying
    condition. Under 10 U.S.C. 1079(d)(3), the term ``qualifying
    condition'' means the condition of a dependent who is moderately or
    severely mentally retarded, has a serious physical disability, or has
    an extraordinary physical or psychological condition. Active duty
    dependents diagnosed with ASD may have one of these qualifying
    conditions.
        Although the literature characterizes ABA services by the use of
    several non-medical terms, and there does not appear to be consensus on
    any one characterization, a precise characterization of ABA is not
    required for coverage under ECHO as long as ABA: 1) does not meet the
    definition of a benefit under the medical program; and 2) can be
    reasonably characterized as a benefit under any one of the seven
    categories listed in 1079(e).
        Question. Dr. Woodson, doctors recommend children suffering from
    autism must receive at least 25-40 hours of ABA therapy each week to be
    effective. However, the ECHO program limits therapy to $36,000 per year
    which only amounts to an average of about 10 hours per week. In some
    states like the District of Columbia and California, this only pays for
    5 hours per week. This is far less than the recommended amount. This is
    causing military families to pay out of their own pockets to make up
    this difference.
        Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2009, Public Law 110-417, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (14 Oct 2008), Section
    732 established the limit of Government liability for ECHO benefits at
    $36,000 per year. This change was implemented on April 1, 2009. Prior
    to April 1, 2009 there was a monthly government liability limit of
    $2,500 per beneficiary.
        Based on data generated using TRICARE purchased-care ECHO claims
    incurred during FY11 (October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2011), of
    the 5091 TRICARE beneficiaries with an ASD diagnosis using the ECHO
    program, 207 beneficiaries had expenditures above $35,000 per year.
    Another 489 beneficiaries had expenditures between $30,000 and $35,000
    in FY11. Thus, approximately 14% of the TRICARE beneficiaries with an
    ASD diagnosis using the ECHO program are potentially facing out-of-
    pocket costs.
        Question. Why has DoD not funded this program for beneficiaries to
    receive the doctor-prescribed amount? If it is a statutory issue, what
    has DoD done to notify Congress that the ECHO program does not provide
    adequate funding? Have any recommendations ever been made to Congress
    to increase deductibles or put any other measures in place to mitigate
    the financial burden placed on these military families? Please submit
    all related documentation if Congress has been informed of this issue
    in the past.
        Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2009, Public Law 110-417, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (14 Oct 2008), Section
    732 established the limit of Government liability for ECHO benefits at
    $36,000 per year. This change was implemented on April 1, 2009. Prior
    to April 1, 2009 there was a monthly government liability limit of
    $2,500 per beneficiary.
        The Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) to accompany the Duncan
    Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009
    requests the Secretary of Defense to submit a report semiannually on
    the status of the TRICARE Autism Services Demonstration. Pursuant to
    the JES, the semiannual RTC includes an overview of the purpose, scope,
    and key features of the TRICARE Autism Services Demonstration; and
    information related to beneficiary utilization, provider participation,
    and whether reimbursement levels are sufficient to retain qualified
    providers. The most recent report was submitted in September 2011 and
    the current report is in coordination to be submitted by the end of
    April 2012.
        Question. Dr. Woodson, it has been brought to my attention that DoD
    does not want to offer ABA therapy under TRICARE Basic because it will
    cost too much. Can you confirm or deny that this is the reason why you
    are not offering this therapy under TRICARE Basic? Has cost
    consideration played any role in determining whether this treatment
    should be offered under TRICARE Basic? If so, please elaborate on how
    cost has affected DoD's decision making and classification of autism.
        Answer. TRICARE conducted an assessment of ABA in October, 2010,
    and reliable evidence reviewed indicates that ABA does not satisfy the
    definition of proven medical care that statute and regulation require
    TRICARE to use. It is inappropriate to incorporate a non-medical
    service into the TRICARE Basic Program, which has heretofore been
    restricted to provision of medical care. Congress has established by
    statute the separate Extended Care Health Option (ECHO) to enable
    provision of certain non-medical services to active duty family
    members. Cost was not a factor in TRICARE's assessment of ABA.
        Question. Dr. Woodson, please provide estimates of how much
    additional funding would be needed if ABA therapy is placed under
    TRICARE Basic. Please include all assumptions used to formulate this
    amount.
        Answer. Using DEERS data, we estimate that there are approximately
    1.6 million active duty family members (ADFM) younger than age 22 (99.9
    percent of ECHO ASD users are age 21 or younger). The CDC currently
    estimates that about 1 percent of the general population has ASD
    implying that roughly 16,000 ADFM beneficiaries younger than age 22
    have ASD. With 5,091 ADFM users in the ECHO ASD program during FY11, we
    estimate that roughly one third of the ASD population receives
    services.
        In FY11, the average annual cost per TRICARE beneficiary diagnosed
    with an ASD using the ECHO program was $16,249. At the end of FY10,
    there were 5562 retired family members with an ASD diagnosis. Using the
    rough estimate in the paragraph above, we would expect that
    approximately 1800 retired family members would receive services.
    Therefore, if ABA therapy were placed under the TRICARE Basic program,
    at a minimum it is estimated that approximately $30 million annually
    would be required to cover the additional beneficiaries. This does not
    take into account additional costs for all beneficiaries if the annual
    cap of $36,000 under the ECHO program was lifted. This would add
    significantly to the cost.
        It should be noted that annual TRICARE costs for ECHO program
    participants with ASD diagnoses in FY11 was $82.7 million.
        Question. Dr. Woodson, from everything that I have read ABA therapy
    is clearly the therapy that works best to give kids suffering from
    autism the best shot of living a functional life. My perception is that
    DoD is going out of its way to classify ABA therapy as something that
    does not meet TRICARE Basic classification. If there are no statutory
    requirements for DoD's classification of ABA therapy as special
    education, which has been used as justification to prevent coverage
    under TRICARE Basic, what is preventing DoD from recognizing ABA as a
    medically prescribed treatment that would obviously be covered under 10
    USC 1077(a)(5)?
        Answer. See attached TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY Assessment of
    Applied Behavior Analysis for Autism Spectrum Disorders.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hinchey.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
    follow:]

        Question. Mr. Secretary, often times the civilian sector can
    develop outstanding technologies, methods, and programs that provide
    efficiencies to enhance industry and government performance. As
    indicated in your Department's response to senate defense
    Appropriations questions on April 6 of last year, we were encouraged to
    see that you have identified such a program at TATRC in your TS-PASS
    program (since that time, we understand the even Johns Hopkins
    University Medical is beginning to adopt these methods). As such, we
    included report language in the FY 2012 Defense Subcommittee bill
    encouraging you to establish a ten site pilot program using this new
    method for the care of military hospital patients. Can you please
    inform the committee of the status of this implementation?
        Answer. Presently, Tri-Service Patient Acuity Schedule System is
    not an operational data system in the Military Health System nor is
    there any funding allocated to implement it. It is a set of functional
    requirements for which a technological solution has not yet been
    determined. We are exploring some new concepts to staff scheduling with
    TATRC which do appear to have some possible merit in the civilian
    healthcare industry, as you have alluded. The TATRC studies will not be
    complete until later this year and we need this information before we
    can make plans for further pilot studies. I want to assure you that my
    staff is working closely with TATRC and if this technology proves to be
    useful in the military healthcare setting we will follow up on that
    course of action.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
                                             Wednesday, March 28, 2012.

     FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL GUARD AND U.S. ARMY RESERVE BUDGET OVERVIEW

                                   WITNESSES

    GENERAL CRAIG R. McKINLEY, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM INGRAM, JR., DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY WYATT, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK C. STULTZ, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE AND COMMANDING
        GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

                      Opening Statement of Chairman Young

        Mr. Young. The committee will be in order.
        The hearing this morning is on National Guard and U.S. Army
    Reserve readiness. We will focus primarily on near-term
    readiness issues related to personnel, training, and equipment,
    repair, reset, and battle loss replacement.
        Because the senior services have consistently underfunded
    the Reserve components, Congress has provided funding for the
    National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account for over 30 years.
    And, at times, this funding has made all of the difference in
    the ability of units to perform their critical missions.
        We are pleased to welcome several very distinguished
    general officers as witnesses this morning.
        From the National Guard, we have General Craig R. McKinley,
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau and--congratulations,
    General--the first four-star chief of the National Guard.
    Additionally, General McKinley's position has recently been
    made permanent on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that is
    something that we all sort of pushed for for a long time.
    Congratulations again. This recognition and inclusion will be
    very important to the defense of our Nation.
        But, sadly, this will be the last time we will hear from
    General McKinley in his capacity as chief. General McKinley,
    originally from Jacksonville, Florida, from Mr. Crenshaw's
    district, will be retiring and moving back to Florida this
    year. That is a good decision, moving back to Florida.
        General McKinley, we thank you very much for your many,
    many years of dedicated service to our country.
        General McKinley is accompanied by Lieutenant General
    William E. Ingram, Jr., the Director of the Army National
    Guard. This is General Ingram's first time to testify before
    this committee. General Ingram, congratulations on your recent
    appointment.
        Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, III, the Director of the
    Air National Guard. This will be General Wyatt's last time to
    testify before the committee in the capacity as the Air Guard
    Director. General, hopefully, we will have the opportunity to
    hear from you in a future role in your service to our country.
        Finally, we are pleased to welcome the Chief of U.S. Army
    Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, another Floridian
    and soon to be retired and moving back to Florida. The General
    and I have had a long relationship dating back to the Gulf War.
    We have done some interesting work together. Let me put it that
    way. I know that he cares about his soldiers and is eager to
    stand up for their rights and needs. General Stultz, we will
    miss you terribly in the capacity as the Army Reserve Chief.
    Congratulations on your upcoming retirement.
        So welcome. We are eager to hear your testimony on better
    determining the needs of guardsmen and reservists deployed
    around the world. These officers, I say to my colleagues, are
    very well qualified to answer the questions of the committee. I
    know that there were many questions and many concerns that we
    have, along with the officers that are here.
        The committee is concerned about the readiness of the
    National Guard and the Army Reserve. Your soldiers and airmen
    performed so magnificently in Iraq and with distinction in
    Afghanistan and in many other hot spots around the globe. The
    committee would like to commend the soldiers and the airmen of
    the Guard and Reserve for their dedication throughout these
    years in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        This hearing, however, comes at a difficult time for the
    Guard and Reserve components and especially for the Air Guard
    at a time when we find that the Air Force is making every
    attempt to cut equipment and force structure from the Air
    Guard. We find our valued leaders moving on to a well-deserved
    retirement. Still, this committee will do everything possible
    to make sure adequate force structure remains to carry out both
    your homeland and wartime missions.
        So we look forward to your testimony. Your full statements
    will be placed in the record. You can speak them as you will.
        But, before we do that, I would like to recognize my
    friend, Mr. Rothman, for any opening comments he would like to
    make.
        Mr. Rothman. I thank my distinguished chairman.
        Generals, good morning. It is an honor to be with you.
        Mr. Chairman, I would also like to welcome our Guard and
    Reserve leadership to discuss the fiscal year 2013 budget
    request. Specifically, I would like to recognize two of our
    witnesses. First, to thank General Craig McKinley, Chief of the
    National Guard Bureau, for his 38 years of service to our
    Nation and to the men and women of the Air and Army National
    Guard. Thank you, General.
        General McKinley. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rothman. I would also like to recognize Lieutenant
    General Jack Stultz, who has selflessly said yes twice when
    asked to continue as the Chief of Army Reserve. Thank you,
    General Stultz, for your dedication to our Nation and your men
    and women who serve under you.
        You will both be missed.
        Gentlemen, this morning we look forward to your views on
    the fiscal year 2013 budget request and the current status of
    the National Guard and Army Reserve. We look forward to hearing
    how all of you are meeting the unique challenges of Reserve
    service for your soldiers and airmen, as well as meeting the
    needs of the families who support them.
        Over the past decade, the Reserve component, especially
    your organizations, have moved from a strategic force waiting
    to join the fight until needed to an operational Reserve called
    upon in every conflict and war since Desert Shield/Desert
    Storm, serving side by side with your Active component
    brethren. This fundamental shift in the employment of the Guard
    and Reserve erases the perception of the weekend warrior. It is
    now difficult to tell a guardsman or reserve soldier from the
    active one on the battlefield.
        However, as an operational reserve, readiness takes on a
    new meaning. Maintaining the people and the hard-earned skills
    and competencies from the decades worth of deployments, as well
    as the readiness of the equipment that supported those
    missions, will take time and resources.
        The committee has great interest in ensuring your equipment
    needs are being met and will be met through the National Guard
    and Reserve Equipment Account. It is important for us to hear
    just how your requirements are being filled or not filled
    through this approach.
        And just as the Active force is dealing with the profound
    effects of prolonged war, so, too, are the Guard and Reserve.
    Injuries, both physical and psychological, are realities of war
    and Reserve members have not been spared. Access to medical
    care after returning home can be challenging, even without a
    life-changing injury. We are interested in hearing about your
    efforts to help your heroes heal once they are released from
    Active Duty and return home to their families and community.
        Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. Again, thank
    you from the bottom of my heart and all of our Members for your
    service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Rothman, thank you very much.
        General McKinley, we would like to recognize you first. We
    will listen attentively, and we will try not to interrupt you
    as you make your statement, as well as the other officers. But
    then we will barrage you with some interesting questions.

                     Summary Statement of General McKinley

        General McKinley. Thank you, Chairman Young. It is always a
    pleasure to appear before your committee.
        Mr. Rothman, thank you. I know Congressman Dicks will be
    joining us later, but it is a pleasure to have you up on the
    front, too.
        And to all of the members of the committee, thank you so
    much for your dedicated support to the men and women of our
    military services and in particular to the men and women of the
    National Guard.
        I wanted to take this opportunity to thank all of you for
    your dedication to the soldiers and airmen that we represent
    here in front of you today.
        Bud Wyatt to my left and Bill Ingram to my right are my
    battle buddies, my wingmen, who assist me in my preparation to
    do my job as chief. Both of them are former Adjutant's General,
    so they have a unique perspective on the issues and concerns of
    our soldiers and airmen in State Active Duty and Title 32, and
    I couldn't be more pleased with the support I get from both of
    these gentlemen.
        And I would like to thank my very, very good friend, Jack
    Stultz, for his dedicated years of service to our Nation. I
    have enjoyed working with Jack recently in these last 7 years
    here because we have both been through those years together.
    Thanks, Jack, and the best to you.
        We find ourselves in the midst of constrained budgets and
    tough choices. No doubt we must curb spending but hopefully not
    at the expense of our security. That is why I must tell you
    that sequestration is not in the best interest of our Nation.
    It would result in further severe reductions in the National
    Guard, Reserve, and our Active component. The National Guard is
    already facing difficult budget cuts, cuts that impact
    equipment and personnel. Further reductions would significantly
    limit the Guard's ability to function as an operational force,
    decrease the total force's overall capability, and reduce the
    Department's capacity to protect the homeland and respond to
    emergencies.
        The National Guard is a more ready, more capable and a more
    rapidly deployable force than ever in our Nation's history; and
    we thank the members of this committee for helping us be that
    way. We have and will continue to answer the call for
    mobilizations and volunteer in support of our combatant
    commanders.
        More than 50 percent of our Guardsmen have combat
    experience. As a part-time force, the National Guard is a
    proven, affordable defense option for America. During a time of
    constrained budgets, we must continue to be used as an
    operational force to ensure the Nation is getting the most
    defense capability at the lowest cost. As an operational force,
    the National Guard is a strategic hedge for unforeseen world
    events. At any time, the National Guard can augment the Active
    Duty to surge and regenerate forces. The Nation also counts on
    the National Guard to protect our homeland, your home States,
    territories, and the District of Columbia.
        The National Guard is the primary military force to respond
    to complex catastrophes and contributes to our security by
    protecting our airspace and borders. While representing only a
    small portion of the Guard's response capability, last year,
    Federal and State authorities called on one of our 57 civil
    support teams to use their unique weapons of mass destruction
    assessment skills almost twice a day every day in your
    hometowns.
        The National Guard is crucial to our governors. Over the
    past 3 years, members of the National Guard responded to an
    unprecedented string of natural disasters. We are poised,
    forward deployed in our communities, and ready to provide that
    support again. The Guard is the best and first military option
    for domestic response. We have proven this time and again, most
    recently during the devastating tornadoes in the Midwest.
        According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    Administrator Fugate, speed is critical to domestic response.
    He has stated recently during the National Governors
    Association Conference here in Washington that aviation assets
    need to be organic to the National Guard. Other options, he
    added, may not provide the same speed and capacity.
        We are located in over 3,000 communities across the
    country. The National Guard is the connective tissue between
    the military and the American people and is positioned to
    respond quickly and efficiently to any domestic emergency.
        Our dual role requires that we continue to improve the
    quality and quantity of our equipment. The National Guard and
    Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) has been and will continue to
    be crucial to that endeavor. NGREA is vital to the Guard, as it
    provides the ability to meet requirements, including homeland
    defense needs and modernization of legacy equipment.
        After 11 years of war, we continue to work closely with the
    Army and Air Force to reset our force to ensure our equipment
    levels meet the defense strategy. As citizen soldiers and
    airmen, guardsmen are able to blend their unique combination of
    military training and civilian-acquired skills to provide
    innovative approaches to support our Nation's security
    strategy.
        The State Partnership Program is a cornerstone of the new
    defense strategy and demonstrates the Guard's versatility. Our
    partnerships with more than 60 foreign countries have
    strengthened their military capacity and competence as well as
    our alliances. The United States benefits as well. National
    Guard partner nations have reduced the demand on U.S. forces.
    Twenty-two partner nations have provided 11,000 troops in
    Afghanistan, and 40 partner nations have provided over 31,000
    personnel in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
        This year, we celebrate 20 years of the State Partnership
    Program, and we look forward to continuing to provide the
    combatant commanders and the State Department with this
    innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approach to theater
    security cooperation in the future.
        Each year we continue to adapt our skills to better serve
    the Nation's strategy, and that is why this year we are
    instituting a threat-based resourcing model for our counterdrug
    activities. This will direct funding to the States with the
    most pressing needs. The breadth of our skills allows the Guard
    to take on new and emerging missions. For example, since many
    of our guardsmen and women work in the civilian IT field, we
    are ideally suited to support future cyber missions.
        I would also like to address our most important asset, our
    soldiers and our airmen. They are the reason that the National
    Guard has been so successful over the last decade, indeed, for
    the last 375 years. Today, your National Guard is the most
    capable and competent in history, and that is because we are
    recruiting the highest-quality soldiers and airmen.
        Our noteworthy enlistment and retention numbers since 9/11
    are proof that they join because they want to be used and
    expect to be used. This dedication would not be possible
    without the support of our families, communities, and
    employers. That is why I am dedicated to working closely with
    our Army and Air Force to provide our service members, their
    families, and employers with the best and most effective
    support available.
        Thank you again, Chairman Young and members of this
    committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today.
        I would now like to ask the directors of the Air and the
    Army Guard to provide brief comments on their perspectives, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of General McKinley follows:]

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                       Summary Statement of General Wyatt

        General Wyatt. Chairman Young and Mr. Rothman, thank you
    and the committee for your support for the extraordinary men
    and women of the Air National Guard, some 106,700 strong. I
    would like to open with a brief review of 2011 before looking
    to the future of the Air National Guard.
        Your Guard airmen continue to make significant
    contributions to our Nation's defense both here at home and
    around the globe. Last year, Guard airmen filled approximately
    56,000 requests for manpower. About 90 percent of these
    requests were filled by volunteers.
        Air National Guard responsiveness and adaptability was
    clearly demonstrated a year ago, on 17 March, 2011. As the
    United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973
    authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, Air National Guard KC-
    135s from the 134th Aerial Refueling Wing Tennessee Air
    National Guard and 168th Aerial Refueling Wing Alaska Air
    National Guard were diverted en route to forward operating
    bases. These Guard airmen began flying operational missions in
    support of Operation Odyssey Dawn 48 hours later and were
    joined by a significant KC-135 force from other Air National
    Guard State organizations, clearly demonstrating that the Air
    National Guard is both accessible and ready to serve.
        Last year, National Guard airmen spent over a half a
    million man days performing domestic civil support missions, a
    third of it on State Active Duty. This included assisting local
    authorities with explosive ordnance disposal, helping with
    security at special events, such as the Arkansas Governor's
    Inauguration and the Boston Marathon, helping victims of floods
    and other natural disasters, and helping to save lives by
    assisting in search and rescue efforts.
        In addition to supporting civil authorities, Guard airmen
    spent an additional million man days in homeland defense. This
    included helping to defend United States' airspace and
    aerospace control alert, assisting U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection on our Southwest border, and supporting America's
    counterdrug program.
        Congressional funding through the National Guard and
    Reserve Equipment Account has been essential to the Air Guard
    fulfilling both its Federal and State missions. For example,
    Air National Guard F-16 and A-10 squadrons deployed to
    Afghanistan with LITENING generation 4 targeting pods for the
    first time as a direct result of NGREA funding.
        Fiscal year 2011 NGREA funds were also used to procure and
    install equipment for a cyber critical infrastructure range,
    allowing Air National Guard cyber units to train and develop
    tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber warfare without
    disrupting networks used to accomplish day-to-day missions.
        While the fiscal year 2013 budget has challenges for the
    Air National Guard, it also has opportunities, and we adjusted
    our priorities to take full advantage of those opportunities.
    The Air National Guard's priorities in preparing this budget
    were, number one, posture the Air National Guard by aligning
    force size and composition to be flexible, agile, and ready,
    with special attention to new missions such as MC-12 and
    remotely piloted aircraft, (RPA) maintaining a combat-ready
    force able to quickly surge and integrate seamlessly into joint
    operations and by repairing units broken by the base closure
    and realignment process that we recently completed.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am grateful to be
    here today, and I look forward to answering any questions that
    you and the committee may have for me.
        [The statement of General Wyatt follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Young. Thank you very much. I suspect that the issue
    you just talked about isn't going to stir up a lot of interest.
        General Ingram.

                      Summary Statement of General Ingram

        General Ingram. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Young, Mr. Rothman, members of the subcommittee,
    it is truly my honor and privilege to be with you today
    representing the nearly 360,000 soldiers of the Army National
    Guard. The patriotism and sacrifice of these great citizen
    soldiers, their families, and their employers is a source of
    pride for all Americans.
        We are now the best-manned, best-trained, best-equipped and
    most experienced force in our 375-year history. It truly is
    congressional support for the Army National Guard that has
    contributed to our transformation and enhanced our readiness.
    As a result, the Army National Guard is a ready and reliable
    force, fully accessible for contingencies at home and abroad.
    We provide equipped and trained citizen soldiers, giving the
    President and the governors maximum flexibility in times of
    crisis. We are an operational force and a full partner with the
    Active component.
        Since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard has
    completed a half million soldier mobilizations in support of
    domestic operations and overseas missions. We have more than
    35,000 Army National Guard soldiers currently mobilized. In
    fiscal year 2011 alone, nearly 60,000 Army guardsmen have
    deployed in support of ongoing missions around the world.
        Our soldiers represent every ZIP Code in America. They play
    a vital role as Department of Defense first responders for
    natural disasters and terrorist attacks on our soil. Today's
    Army National Guard soldiers continue the proud tradition of
    service to their States and our Nation. In 2011 alone, it was
    citizen soldiers who provided over 900,000 duty days of support
    to communities across the Nation.
        We are attracting skilled soldiers and future leaders. With
    the Nation at war as a backdrop, our recruitment rate for 2011
    was at 94 percent of our goal. This mark is complemented by a
    retention rate of 131 percent of our goal for the same period.
    We have maintained above our authorized strength since 2011.
        The Army National Guard is equipping to meet the 21st
    century challenges through your support of the necessary
    resourcing for modernization of our 28 brigade combat teams,
    including one Stryker brigade and our eight combat aviation
    brigades. We understand our readiness level is dependent upon
    the level of resourcing we receive. The overall Army National
    Guard equipment on hand for our Modified Table of Organization
    Equipment (MTOE)--our combat units, is currently at 88 percent,
    an increase from 85 percent just 2 years ago.
        Overall critical dual-use equipment on hand is at 92
    percent, an increase from 86 percent 2 years ago and a
    significant increase from the 65 percent it was during the
    Hurricane Katrina response.
        From December, 2011, through June, 2013, the Army National
    Guard is programmed to receive over 120,000 pieces of equipment
    from Army procurement funding. Army National Guard
    installations are the foundation of our readiness. We have
    facilities in more than 3,000 communities.
        Providing quality facilities across 54 States and
    territories, however, is an ongoing challenge. More than 46
    percent of our readiness centers are over 50 years old. Many
    are unable to meet the needs of a 21st century operational
    force, while failing to meet modern building standards,
    especially in terms of energy efficiency.
        The Army National Guard continues to make suicide
    prevention a top priority. Our soldiers are our most precious
    resource. We are addressing high-risk behaviors and suicidal
    tendencies through preventive measures, comprehensive training,
    and a range of intervention programs.
        In addition, we are addressing sexual harassment and
    assault response and prevention--that is called SHARP in Army
    terms--through an aggressive training program executed at the
    State level.
        It is crucial that these behavioral health programs receive
    funding in our base budget.
        In closing, I acknowledge the continued support you have
    demonstrated throughout the budget process in program planning
    for an operational Army National Guard through fiscal year
    2015. I want to express the Army National Guard's sincere
    appreciation of the critical role your committee plays in
    resourcing and sustaining the most capable National Guard that
    our Nation has ever had.
        I invite your questions and comments. Thank you.
        [The statement of General Ingram follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Young. Thank you, General Ingram, very much.
        General Stultz.

                      Summary Statement of General Stultz

        General Stultz. Congressman Young, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Rothman, and other members, it is an honor to be here.
        Sir, I want to personally thank you for all that you have
    done throughout my tenure in this position to provide
    unwavering support for our soldiers and our families. And your
    wife Beverly doing the same. She is a champion for us.
        I just returned this weekend from a trip to Afghanistan,
    and so I got a chance to see firsthand what you are getting for
    your tax dollars, and I can assure you, you are getting a good
    return on investment.
        You know, when you look at those soldiers--and I told
    them--you are going to be in history. Because when I testify
    next Wednesday, I am going to tell your story.
        Standing on a platform in Bagram and a day later standing
    on a platform in Kandahar, looking soldiers in the eye, some of
    which are getting ready to go out on another route clearance
    mission, whose unit just got hit the day before, and lost a
    couple soldiers to wounds. Luckily, no one killed but some
    pretty significant wounds. And before they go on the mission,
    they raise their hand and take an oath of reenlistment to stay
    in uniform and to stay at war. That is a national treasure.
        And when I talk to them in the town hall meetings and I
    say, the word I am using to describe you today and that I will
    use next Wednesday is indispensable. You are an indispensable
    force for this Nation. And that doesn't come by chance. That
    comes by design.
        Because as we have shaped the Army in the past 8 or 9 years
    at war, we have leveraged the capabilities we have in our
    Reserve components, as was mentioned, into an operational
    force. But we have also created an Army.
        Number one, my buddy LTG William Ingram and I are over 50
    percent of the strength of the Army. But, more importantly,
    when you look at certain capabilities--transportation, all of
    the logistics--we are 85 percent of the Army's capability. When
    you look at engineers, route clearance, those types of
    capabilities, we are over 75 percent of the Army's
    capabilities. When you look at medicine, that life-saving
    feature out on the battlefield or back here at home, we account
    for 70 percent of the Army's capabilities. Civil Affairs, 85
    percent. Military Police, 70 percent. I can go on and on. We
    have built an Army that is dependent on the reserve component
    for those capabilities, and they have demonstrated that they
    can do it.
        Just as I have talked to the senior leadership in
    Afghanistan this last week, they said, we can't tell you which
    soldiers are Reserve and which are Active. We don't know. We
    just know they are all performing.

                         SUPPORT TO COMBAT MULTIPLIERS

        And it is because of what you have done for us, given us
    the resources over the last several years to get the equipment,
    get the training, to get the support systems that we need for
    our families that we are able to do this. And what we are is we
    are a great return on investment for this Nation. For the
    amount of the budget that we take out of the defense budget,
    which is very minimal, and what we are able to give back, and
    not only give back on the battlefield, but when those soldiers,
    those young men and women, go home, they give back in their
    communities. They are policemen, they are firemen, they are Boy
    Scout leaders, and coaches and teachers, and they are bringing
    that skill set back and applying it there.
        And when we turn around and say, now put the uniform back
    on for us, they use those same civilian skills on the
    battlefield, and we call it a combat multiplier. That soldier
    who may be there as an infantryman or a mechanic but back home
    happens to work, as General McKinley said, in information
    technology and can take care of all of the computer systems. It
    is just amazing how we see those skill sets over and over.
        So my message to you is we have done well with what you
    have given us. We have invested those tax dollars wisely. Our
    commitment is to continue to.
        The challenge we have, as we all know, is we are in an era
    of declining resources. We know we have to tighten our belts as
    a Nation. And so what we have to do is we have to be good
    stewards of the moneys you give us and use them effectively and
    use them efficiently.
        But I have to maintain that readiness levels that I have
    achieved over the last 8 to 9 years. Because that indispensable
    force, we cannot let it atrophy. So I have got to focus on
    training, and I have to migrate some dollars that are in OCO
    dollars back into my base budget, probably around $150-200
    million a year, so that I get the training requirements that I
    need to maintain that readiness. I have got to continue to
    depend on the NGREA funds to give me some flexibility, because
    those soldiers coming home expect to be able to train on the
    same level of equipment that they are going to operate in
    theater.
        And then I have to continue to focus on engaging. As was
    mentioned earlier, if we are going to get the soldiers and we
    are going to train them, we have to use them.
        I can tell you, I have spent the last 3 months in Africa
    and Europe and Asia and places like that visiting our soldiers
    engaged in stability operations, as General McKinley mentioned,
    engaged in a lot of the partnering with other nations. Whether
    it was in Ethiopia, where they were helping a Catholic priest
    set up an orphanage for Ethiopian women, or whether it was in
    Djibouti, Africa, where Captain Yeb, an aerospace engineer for
    Lockheed Martin, who is one of my civil affairs captains, is
    establishing libraries for the education system, or other
    places around the world, those mission sets are still there.
        And we can leverage this capability we have in the future
    and not have to deploy them for 12 months. But we can send them
    to El Salvador for 90-day rotation to provide some medical
    support to win the hearts and minds of those people in those
    countries. Or, as we have done before, we can send them to a
    foreign army in Africa to help train them, as we have done with
    the Ugandans and the Ethiopians so that they can take on the
    mission in Somalia so that we don't have to. But we have to
    continue that support.
        And the last thing I will tell you is what I have said
    before, our soldiers love America because they know America
    loves them. And they know you are committed to them, just as I
    am. So thank you for all of the support you and the Members of
    Congress have given us.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The United States Army Reserve Posture Statement follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
        All four of you, thank you very much.
        I think you will find that this committee is really
    supportive of the Guard and Reserve. I am going to go a little
    bit out of order today, and I am going to yield my first time
    to Mr. Cole, because sometimes we don't get to him because we
    run out of time. And then I am going to yield Mr. Dicks' time
    to Mr. Rothman, and then I am going to yield to Mr. Hinchey.
    These are the two members that usually end up at the tail end.
    So we are reversing.
        So, Mr. Cole, you are recognized.

                                 SEQUESTRATION

        Mr. Cole. It is almost biblical, Mr. Chairman. The last
    shall be first. I am very appreciative.
        I do want to make just one point. Not everybody on this
    panel is retiring and going home to Florida. You have an
    Oklahoman here. We don't expect him to retire, but we expect
    him to come home when he does. We are very proud of General
    Wyatt and his service to the country. And I would be remiss,
    gentlemen, if I did not tell you how proud we are of all of you
    and the men and women that you lead.
        I think the great untold story of this decade will be the
    role that the Guard and Reserve played at the most critical
    moment in our history in providing us the capability to respond
    to an outrageous attack and sustain operations. Every single
    man and woman that you command has enlisted or reenlisted
    knowing that they were likely to be deployed and expecting
    that, and that is a dramatic change over history. Not to
    disparage any previous eras, but this has been an incredibly
    distinguished time.
        I, like you, gentlemen, am very worried going forward. And
    I know every member of this committee is extremely worried
    about the cuts in front of us, the restraints, how we can
    maintain the superb capability, and particularly at the Guard.
        General Wyatt, talk to us about two levels of reductions.
    One, what are you looking at? What capabilities do you have now
    that you simply are not going to have given the Budget Control
    Act and some of the requests that have been made of us?
        And, number two, if sequester were to happen, what would
    that do to your ability to deploy and how would it impact the
    regular forces that you work with?
        General Wyatt. Congressman, I think I would answer the
    first question on capabilities by looking at the force
    structure cuts that the Air National Guard will be taking:
    three A-10 units, one F-16 unit, a C-130 unit, and the Reserve
    component being cut 60 of the 63 C-130s out of this year's
    budget.
        I am concerned that, while we will be able to continue the
    Title 10 fight with the new strategy going forward, I think we
    have the forces to do that, I am concerned that when you cut
    forces out of the Air National Guard you cut forces that are
    also available to the governors when they are not doing the
    Federal war fight. So I think about things like lift. I think
    about all of the capabilities that come with the Fighter Wing,
    such as communications, engineering, medical, security forces
    that will no longer be available to the governors, much less
    the President, should we need them.
        To get to the sequester part of this, it would severely
    handicap, I think, the Air Force going forward on the Federal
    war fight and, by implication, also the domestic response that
    the governors expect out of the Air Guard.
        Mr. Cole. I would like to ask the same question of all of
    you regarding your respective services.
        General Ingram. Congressman, from the Army National Guard,
    right now we are not scheduled for any significant cuts. We
    have 28 brigade combat teams, two special forces groups, eight
    division headquarters, 12 combination of combat aviation
    brigades and theater aviation brigades, and that is our
    aviation structure in the Army Guard. With that, I think the
    cuts that will affect us more in our ability to train. We have
    moved some money from future procurement accounts into a
    training base to train an operational reserve.
        As General Stultz just mentioned, training an operational
    reserve is one thing, but operating it is another. And being
    able to operate the operational reserve I think is the critical
    point as we move forward.
        Sequestration would severely hamper our ability to do
    anything and may in fact cause us to have some force structure
    as well as manpower reductions.
        General Stultz. Along the same lines as General Ingram,
    under the current budget, the Army Reserve is not being hit
    with significant cuts. We are going to reduce about a thousand
    in end strength, which we can absorb.
        My concern, though, is what I said earlier. We are
    indispensable to the Army. My commitment to the chief of staff
    of the Army is to give him about 25,000 of capability every
    year that he can count on being trained, ready, and available.
    And he needs that 25,000 because of the capabilities I listed
    earlier.
        I caution people, do not forget how we got there. I was in
    Kuwait in 2002 as we built the theater before we were able to
    launch into Iraq and earlier into Afghanistan; and all of the
    capabilities to get that equipment there, to get it in place,
    to get it set up, to get all of the combat capabilities,
    whatever, was done by Reserve component forces. It is all the
    logistics, all the transportation, whatever.
        So if we are challenged to go somewhere else in this world
    in the future, we have to have that same capability. And when
    we have run some of the operational plans--and I won't get into
    it for classification reasons--but out of the 25,000 that I
    have, they are committed in the first 30 days of a war. So my
    challenge is how do I maintain that readiness? How do I train
    them and equip them to the standard?
        My fear is, as we go into future, and especially as we hit
    sequestration, we won't by able to give them the training days
    and the type of equipment they need. And we have not been very
    good about predicting the future. Something will happen in some
    other place in the world, and we will try to say, how did we
    get there the last time? And somebody will say, we used the
    Reserve. Where are they? Well, they are not ready yet. We can't
    afford to take that risk.
        General McKinley. Finally, sir, just briefly, the $487
    billion that the Budget Control Act demanded from the
    Department was done in a very bipartisan way; and all of the
    service chiefs, along with Secretary Panetta, did a very good
    job of trying not to hollow out the force. People our age
    remember a hollow military, where you had people not matched to
    equipment, poor leadership, not able to confront the
    challenges.
        And, as Jack said, we just don't see the next decade being
    any more peaceful than the previous decade, and we have got to
    use the Guard and Reserve in an integrated fashion, which we
    have come to do on the battlefield, and be prepared to do it
    over and over again if we are going to be successful.
        Mr. Cole. I just want to comment, Mr. Chairman, this is the
    best bang for the buck, honestly, out there. And I hope as we
    go forward we do everything we can to protect this particular
    part of it. I actually think the regular forces are now much
    more dependent on you than they were at the beginning of the
    decade; and, given the budget situation, they will be
    increasingly dependent on you in the years ahead.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Cole.
        Mr. Rothman.

                              OPERATIONAL RESERVE

        Mr. Rothman. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Stultz, there was a popular perception that the
    members of the Guard and Reserve were being overextended
    individually and that there was an inappropriate level of
    sacrifice being called upon them and their families, not only
    physically and emotionally but also in terms of their
    employment back home. From what you have said, it sounds like
    that is ancient history. But I would like to hear from you
    specifically that in fact it is ancient history and that we
    don't still have those problems where members of the Guard and
    Reserve feel that they are just being taken advantage of and
    unduly so.
        General Stultz. Yes, sir. I think you are exactly right.
    Early on in the war, because of what I said earlier about the
    capabilities that are resident that we need out of the Reserve,
    we were in a lot of cases with certain types of capabilities--a
    medical or civil affairs and our transportation--spinning at a
    very fast rate.
        The other reason was because we weren't ready as a force.
    We were a lot of times having to pull two or three units
    together to make one, and then when the next rotation came
    around, we had to reach back again.
        What we have been able to do over the last 6, 7 years is,
    one, build a readiness across the force, build a manning cycle
    across the force, but also build in more predictability. We
    have adopted what we have called the force generation model,
    the Army force generation, what we say as ARFORGEN.
        But critical to our ability to maintain the ability to
    provide readiness in this 25,000, in my case, to the Army is
    predictability, predictability for the soldier, predictability
    for the family, and predictability for the employer.
        And so we are adopting a 5-year rotation cycle. So that
    would say if you are in the Army Reserve and you are in a unit,
    the first year you are in what we call reset or regeneration.
    You have just come back. And then the next 3 years you are
    training, gradually getting improved training. And then in that
    fifth year you are available. And that gives you predictability
    to tell your family, tell your employer, tell everyone, hey, in
    that fifth year it is my time. So if something happens, I will
    be the first one to go. That is critical, and that is what our
    soldiers tell me. Give me predictability.
        But then the other thing they say is use me. When it comes
    to be that fifth year, I want to go do something.
        Mr. Rothman. General, now it is only 1 year out of 5 that
    they are in combat, so to speak, or in theater?
        General Stultz. Yes, sir. For the majority of our units, we
    are giving them 3 to 4 years of dwell time in that 5-year
    rotation. Now, we still have some units, some of my civil
    affairs and transportation and aviation, that there is just not
    enough in the Army, and we are still spinning at a faster rate.
    But that is starting to level out, also, with the drawdown in
    Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan.
        Mr. Rothman. General, what would you estimate to be the
    time when this 1 year of combat or being in theater out of 5
    would be uniform throughout the Guard and Reserve?
        General Stultz. Well, it is hard for me to foretell the
    future, but my personal opinion, if we go the direction we are
    planning with the current administration's drawdown timelines
    for Afghanistan, I would think by 2014.
        Mr. Rothman. What percentage of your force, General, is
    being called upon to be in combat or be in theater more than
    once--1 year out of 5?
        General Stultz. Well, I have kept about 25,000 out of
    205,000 in some sort of mobilization status, some of them back
    here in the United States, in the hospitals, in the training
    bases and whatever. And then in theater about 15,000. I would
    say out of that 15, probably about 5. So 5,000 out of 205,000
    probably on a faster spin cycle than we would like.

                                  COMPENSATION

        Mr. Rothman. Are we doing anything special for them in
    terms of compensating them in any way for that kind of spin
    cycle?
        General Stultz. Not really. Not like we should.
        Mr. Rothman. Is that something we should work on, General?
        General Stultz. Well, we were looking at some programs for
    extended leave and some other things like that for compensating
    them. They are getting compensated in terms of lowering their
    age of retirement and giving them credit for time they are
    deployed. So they are getting some benefits in that capacity.
    But it might be something, yes, sir.
        Mr. Rothman. Is there a suffering of morale or a
    decompensating emotionally or psychologically for those 5,000?
        General Stultz. No, sir, I don't see that. They understand
    in most cases what their mission set is. As I mentioned earlier
    with the aviation units, they understand it is one Army. They
    are part of one Army.
        Mr. Rothman. Could I ask for the record if you have any
    statistics with regards to the actual number--I know you are
    estimating, and I appreciate that, about 5,000--what the
    experience has been over the last 5, 7 years in terms of PTSD,
    God forbid, suicides, or other troubles that these individuals
    may have faced so we can gauge the urgency of the problem to
    deal with their spin cycle.
        General Stultz. Yes, sir.
        [The information follows:]

        Since 9/11, the Army Reserve mobilized and deployed forces in
    support of global operations at unprecedented levels. Between 1 January
    2005 and 7 April 2012, there were 7,698 AR Soldiers who deployed more
    than once in support of Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom. The average
    time between deployments was 665 days. Unfortunately, out of the 7,698,
    we lost eleven of our Soldiers to suicide.
        The Army Reserve continues to focus on mentoring and training our
    leaders to create an environment where it's okay to ask for help and
    where it's our duty to extend a helping hand. We are committed to
    ensuring all members of the Army Reserve Family have awareness of and
    access to the training and resources available to support their
    personal and professional wellbeing. We will continue to partner with
    our mental health professionals, chaplains, and Family Readiness
    personnel in our efforts to constantly refine and improve our programs.
        There have been 3,815 Soldiers who have deployed in support of
    ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM between 1 JAN 2005 and 7 APR 2012 who
    have been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. There are
    currently over 2,000 USAR Soldiers who are medically not ready due to
    behavioral health related issues; 1,470 of whom were mobilized in
    support of ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM or NEW DAWN. Of the 1,470
    Soldiers, 471 have had multiple deployments and have a behavioral
    health related diagnosis.
        In the fall of 2011 the USAR implemented mental health assessments
    (MHAs) to help identify Soldiers with depression and PTSD. To date 6964
    mental health assessments were conducted for Army Reserve Soldiers in
    conjunction with their Post Deployment Health Re-Assessment (PDHRA);
    22% (1,029) of these Soldiers required behavioral health referrals. For
    comparison, prior to the new Mental Health Assessment, 13% (14,294 of
    109,578) of Soldiers were referred for behavioral health evaluation
    based on the Post Deployment Health Re-Assessment since its inception
    in 2006.

        Mr. Rothman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Calvert.

                                   FACILITIES

        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    rotation.
        Gentlemen, I thank you for your service. I appreciate it
    very much.
        I was going to use the same line before my good friend, Mr.
    Cole, took that line. We get the best bang for the buck from
    the Guard and Reserve. You do a wonderful job for our country,
    and the country appreciates your service.
        One thing that was brought up, General Ingram, in your
    testimony is about the facilities around the United States. I
    know years ago when those facilities were built after World War
    II and during the Korean conflict, those facilities were used
    by the communities, and continue to be. However, as you point
    out, I would imagine that the maintenance costs and the cost of
    just keeping those facilities open is significant, a
    significant cost in an era in which you are looking to
    consolidate your cost.
        I don't want to be parochial about this, but I will be for
    a second. We have the March Air Reserve Base in southern
    California, and we have a number of these facilities like in
    Corona and Riverside and other communities, in Hemet. It seems
    to me that it would make more sense to consolidate. We just
    built a beautiful new reserve facility at March, $50 million to
    train. I know the Guard has been involved in it, too. Wouldn't
    it make more sense to consolidate some of these smaller
    operations into a facility like that? And I would imagine that
    could be replicated across the country to save money. Plus I
    think the consolidation, you could maybe bring down some of
    your maintenance costs and motor pools, on and on and on. What
    is your comment about that?
        General Ingram. Congressman, there are two schools of
    thought about that. The Army National Guard, the National Guard
    in general, is a grass roots organization. We are a local level
    organization with a militia heritage. And that is part of our
    culture. So consolidation means you move out of small places
    into large places, and our base is in small communities.
        As far as funding for facilities is concerned, I don't
    really believe that the National Guard has gotten their fair
    share, especially with the 2005 BRAC. Most of the Military
    Construction (MILCON) money that was coming to us was deferred,
    pushed to the right a bit, and the must do by fiscal year 2011
    projects took precedence. So we have suffered in the last 5 or
    6 years because of BRAC, for one. Moving the Army home from
    Europe and consolidating the military back into the United
    States has taken precedence over some of our projects.
        Our MILCON future looks fairly bleak because of budget
    shortfalls, and our facilities are aging very rapidly. Most of
    the facilities, unlike the Army Reserve, but most of the
    facilities in the Army National Guard are 75-25 with the State.
    So the initial construction was 75 percent Federal money, 25
    percent State and local money. And then the maintenance of
    those facilities is done by the State. And at the conclusion--
    in most cases, at the conclusion of the life cycle of that
    particular building, it is returned to the community.
        So the consolidation and building one large one instead of
    having three small ones is a little counter to the culture of
    the Army National Guard.
        Mr. Calvert. And I recognize in some parts of the country
    that won't work. But California is not the same State as it was
    50-60 years ago. Corona is no longer 25,000 people. It is now
    200,000 people. And Riverside is now half a million people. But
    it seems to me--and I get this from some of your local folks,
    too--that it would make more sense. You have a much more secure
    facility, cantonment area, and obviously you have a large
    airfield and a lot of synergy of utilization.
        I would hope you would take a look at that, and I suspect
    out of 3,000 facilities maybe 500 of them can be consolidated.
        General Ingram. And we truly do that. The goodness of the
    Army National Guard is having 54 Adjutants General in each
    State and territory and the District that make those
    assessments at the local level, and what is right in California
    might not be right in Missouri.

                              COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS

        Mr. Calvert. Right. I would hope as you are going through
    this transition, too, that you are working obviously with your
    brother and the regular Army and Air Force and, obviously, with
    the State. We have heard from some of the governors that feel
    that they weren't involved in some of the discussions about
    where the Guard and Reserve are going, especially the Guard, I
    would say. I guess I would ask, were the governors consulted in
    this case?
        General McKinley. Sir, in 2008, as a result of the
    Commission on Guard and Reserve, this Council of Governors was
    formed, five Republican and five Democrat governors. And they
    met six times specifically to discuss issues that you bring up:
    efficiencies, consolidation, and things like that.
        The Department of Defense budget, as you can imagine, is a
    pretty tight loop inside the system; and, therefore, there
    really wasn't a mechanism to confer or discuss the pre-
    decisional budget with the governors. I think out of this we
    need to--and I believe the Department will--find a better way
    to communicate the domestic requirements with our governors. I
    think that is the long-term vision of why the Council was
    formed.
        We certainly, all of us, understand how important the
    governors are, and we feel we can do a better job of relating
    the needs of the Federal Department to our States.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Hinchey.

                         NATIONAL GUARD FORCE STRUCTURE

        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all very much. I deeply appreciate everything
    that you do and the leadership you provide. And the things that
    you have been talking about today here, all of this is very
    interesting.
        One of the big things that we are facing is the reduction
    of spending. Cuts, very serious, very serious cuts. As I
    understand it, the Defense Department is seeking to receive
    $487 billion in savings over 10 years, and so all of that is
    going to have a very significant change.
        In our situation, one of the major issues facing New York
    is the planned reduction of Air National Guard, the aircraft of
    Air National Guard. Governor Cuomo wrote to Secretary Panetta
    to oppose those cuts. Two hundred and eighty Air National Guard
    aircraft are scheduled to be eliminated over the next 5 years,
    with more than 100 in fiscal year 2013.
        I am sure that these are things that are very heavy in your
    understanding and the dealings that you have to deal with. All
    of this is very, very critically important. Anything that you
    want to say about that, I would appreciate it.
        General McKinley. I will let General Wyatt comment, because
    he was involved intimately with the Air Force budget.
        I will say, as I said in my opening remarks, the Budget
    Control Act created an environment by which all of the services
    had to make some very, very tough choices. And we were heard.
    Our feelings were understood by the Department.
        But if we have sequestration, another $55 billion per year
    will come out of the defense budget, which will mean more
    significant cuts. And so service chiefs, the Secretary of
    Defense, are going to have some very difficult choices ahead.
        The Air Guard was a unique situation this year, and I will
    let General Wyatt talk about that.
        General Wyatt. In talking about the decision-making process
    in the United States Air Force, there were some really tough
    decisions this year with the Budget Control Act.
        As the Director of the Air Guard, I am allowed to
    participate in the decision-making process. In fact, not only
    am I asked for my views, I am encouraged to give my views in
    the corporate process. In fact, I have been very aggressive, I
    think.
        If you ask General Schwartz, he will probably tell you that
    I advocated not only for the Air National Guard but for air
    power of the United States Air Force and for the type of air
    power that I think we need to defend the country. And so I was
    allowed to make some inputs.
        In the end, we are a military organization, and the
    decision responsibilities rest with the Secretary of the Air
    Force. When those decisions are made, regardless of the input
    that I make, my job as a Title 10 officer then becomes to
    salute the flag and implement the decisions that were made
    until told otherwise.
        And so in the case of Niagara, the Air Guard was handed a
    C-130 divestiture bill that we had to meet, and we made some
    tough decisions. And I think the way the process works
    certainly is subject to review. But we did the best we could
    with the marching orders that we were given.

                                      C-17

        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
        General Wyatt, I want to ask another specific question. I
    know there are many of us here in this subcommittee, all of us
    with the concerns that we have, we share concerns, among other
    things, over Air National Guard aircraft, so I would like to
    ask about C-17s.
        One of the things that I have--and I am very proud of,
    frankly--is the representation of Stewart Air National Guard
    based in Newburgh, New York, where the 105th airlift wing has
    almost completely transitioned from a C-5A to C-17 mission. So
    it is my understanding that some of the Air Force's C-17s
    aren't going to have the extended range fuel, the tank that
    they need to provide that extended range fuel. So are any
    National Guard units using the extended range variant, and are
    we sacrificing mission readiness or capabilities by providing
    National Guard air wings entirely with the more limited version
    of the C-17s?
        And, finally, I understand the need to have extended range
    capabilities in Active Duty, but I would think that even one or
    two C-17s with the larger fuel tank would greatly increase
    capabilities of our Air National Guard.
        General Wyatt. Sir, you are right. The extended fuel tank
    does increase the capability and the options available to the
    Secretary and Chief of the Air Force.
        Moneys do not allow us to put extended range tanks on all
    of the C-17s. To my knowledge, none of the Air National Guard
    C-17s have extended range tanks. Stewart is one location.
    Jackson, Mississippi, is another location. In the FY 2013
    President's Budget Request, you will see Memphis, Tennessee,
    transitioning to C-17s. And in the outyears, you will see
    Martinsburg, West Virginia, transition to the C-17.
        There is a modernization effort under way at Air Mobility
    Command seeking to have common configurations across all of
    their weapon systems, including the C-17. So there is a plan to
    eventually get there. But the Air Guard will probably be at the
    end of that plan, as we are with a lot of the legacy airplanes
    that we have.
        Mr. Hinchey. Well, thanks very much, and I know that, you
    know, in the context of this situation, there are a lot of
    things that have to be thought about and a lot of changes that
    are taking place, and the big thought about is to make these
    changes as effectively as possible and to maintain the security
    of these operations. So I am deeply impressed with all of you
    and all of the dedication that you have and the sincerities
    that you are approaching on this. I just want to thank you very
    much for all of that.
        You are involved in some problems. You are going to have to
    do some things that are not easy, but they are more difficult.
    But I am sure that you can do, and you are going to do them in
    the most effective way. And for all of those things, I just
    express my appreciation and gratitude to you and thank you
    very, very much.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Crenshaw.

                                     TANKS

        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, in regard to the
    last shall be first, I will let the record reflect that I am in
    the middle, so I don't really care whether you start at the
    bottom or the top. I am always in the same place.
        Mr. Young. Well, don't you think that was a nice gesture to
    Mr. Cole and Mr. Hinchey?
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you. But thank you all for being here.
    You have my words of thanks and respect, and the chairman
    pointed out that General McKinley is from Jacksonville. He is
    actually more than that; he is a constituent of mine, a voter.
    So if you don't mind, I will offer you a special welcome.
        But I wanted to ask, I don't know who would be best to
    answer, but we have had conversations in this subcommittee from
    time to time about the need for tanks. The Army kind of came in
    and said, well, difficult budget times; we have all the tanks
    we need, so we are thinking about closing the production line.
    And it was pointed out that if you shut down the production
    line and then start it back up, that has a cost, and there is
    arguing about whether that cost, a half a billion or a billion
    dollars or more.
        And so, last year, this subcommittee put about $250 million
    into the budget to keep the production lines open and produced,
    I think, about 40 SEP tanks. As you all know, there is kind of
    a two-tiered tank program, the Active Duty folks have the new
    tanks and the A-1s, most of the National Guard; I think there
    maybe is one combat brigade that has a SEP tank.
        So my question to you all is, is there a advantage for
    Guard to have the newer tanks, number one, and what would be
    your preference in terms of utilization? We heard General
    Odierno kind of talk about maybe the A-1s are less technical
    and maybe that might be better in terms of training, but it
    seems to me if you are going to train on something, you ought
    to train on what you are going to be using. So comment on that,
    on that overall concept of the two-tiered tank system, what is
    your view of that?
        General Ingram. Congressman, I guess I get that one by
    default. The Army National Guard has tanks.
        There are several schools of thought, I think pure fleeting
    is the right way to go, one unit having the same type of combat
    vehicle is another. There are not enough System Enhancement
    Package (SEP) tanks currently for the Army National Guard to
    field SEP tanks in all of our armor brigade combat teams.
        We do have one that is being fielded with the draw down and
    the change in the Army, they are going to reduce the number of
    brigades and reduce the number of heavy brigades in the Active
    component. And as they do that, there will be tanks available
    to cascade to Army National Guard heavy units.
        To answer your question about the assembly line, my
    understanding is that we are keeping enough tanks in the
    inventory, as well as in prepositioned stocks that are
    positioned around the world, for contingency operations, so
    some of those tanks will go into contingency force pools.
    Others will be cascaded to Army National Guard units. And,
    again, from our perspective, as long as all the tanks in our
    units are the same type, that works well for us.
        The SEP tanks are more complicated. The digital systems on
    those tanks are harder to maintain, but they wouldn't get the
    same usage unless we were mobilized that they would get in an
    Active component unit.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Just in terms of training, does that ever
    present a problem, if you are training on an older tank and
    then you are deployed and how does that work out?
        General Ingram. Usually, there is enough time that there is
    not enough difference in those systems, it is all in the fire
    control systems, so it is just getting used to a different
    computer in the turret, as I understand it.

                           OLDER VERSUS NEW EQUIPMENT

        Mr. Crenshaw. But you wouldn't say that you prefer to have
    the older tank just because it is easier to operate?
        General Ingram. We would not prefer to have the older
    equipment. No, sir.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Let me ask a question about the----
        Mr. Dicks. Would you yield for just one second on one
    point?
        Mr. Crenshaw. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. We haven't been using tanks very much in Iraq or
    Afghanistan; isn't that correct?
        General Ingram. We used tanks early on, and we haven't used
    tanks in Afghanistan. We did use tanks early on in Iraq.
        Mr. Dicks. Can you explain why you haven't used them?
        General Ingram. Well, we got into Counter Insurgency
    operations, and we don't use heavy combat vehicles to that
    extent in Counter Insurgency operations.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you for yielding.

                              COUNTERDRUG PROGRAM

        Mr. Crenshaw. Yes, and my only concern is, I think, we all
    are concerned if we are going to spend money, then we ought to
    get something for it, but that is something I think the Army is
    doing a study to kind of look at that, because if you are going
    to spend, whether it is half a billion or a billion dollars, it
    would be better to end up with something that is of value than
    simply to open and close a production line.
        I want to ask about if, be real quick about Florida--the
    chairman and I have seen how the National Guard Counterdrug
    Program works, particularly in Florida, tremendous success. And
    I know last year we funded that program at more than the
    President's request, and the President's request this year is
    like $123 million less than last year. And so could you talk
    about the value of that program, number one; and, number two,
    what would happen if the funding was cut almost in half?
        General McKinley. Obviously, the answer is the reductions
    will have to be pushed out, phased in, and the highest threat-
    based model States will have to receive the money, and some
    other States will have to be reduced. It is not a pretty
    picture, and we have seen the people who are very interested in
    this program proclaim that this is not in the best interests of
    American citizens.
        We know that drug demand reduction is a huge part of our
    Counterdrug Program. Some people said you can eliminate drug
    demand reduction. We know how effective that is in our high
    schools and around our country.
        So I think the model has stood us well over time. This
    committee has been very generous in maintaining the capability,
    but as you say, sir, it looks like a 37 percent reduction in
    2013 over the funding in 2012, so we are going to have to make
    every penny count, and we know that we have a full spectrum
    counterdrug program, from schools, where we train people,
    including law enforcement. We have our people who go out and
    interdict, cut down marijuana plants and use our sophisticated
    technology to do that. All our States, in fact, do that. But it
    will create a severe handicap to what we feel has been a very,
    very successful program over the last two decades.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Ms. Granger.

                                     C-130

        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        And thank you all for being here and to remind us of the
    enormous capabilities and dedication and importance of the
    National Guard and Reserve. I think you get the sense from here
    that we think cuts are shortsighted in many cases.
        As you know, after the Air Force instructed the Air Guard
    to divest some of the C-130s, the decision was made to relocate
    Air Guard C-130s from Texas to Montana. This decision has been
    widely criticized due to the negative impact it will have on
    the ability of the Governors of the Gulf States to respond to
    national disasters.
        General McKinley, you quoted FEMA Administrator Fugate, who
    has frequently referenced the sense of urgency and the speed
    needed to respond to these national disasters, minimizing the
    loss of lives and property.
        General Schwartz has testified several times that assets
    are available to make up for the loss of the C-130s from Texas.
    So, General Wyatt, are you aware of any C-130s under the
    control of the Gulf State Governors, besides the ones at Fort
    Worth?
        General Wyatt. That would be in the nature of the organic
    C-130s available to the Governor immediately and at the behest
    of the adjutant generals, and I am not aware of any at this
    point in time.
        Ms. Granger. I am not either, and I hope the subcommittee
    recognizes that is not the testimony we heard earlier in
    another hearing.
        In addition, can you address the challenges of standing up
    a squadron of new planes in Montana versus Fort Worth, where
    there are many civilian pilots, due to proximity of DFW
    airport? And keeping in mind the 136 Airlift Wing has world
    class pilots and facilities, have you seen any cost estimates
    for the military construction and the pilot training to include
    the cost of flight hours and the costs to train new
    maintainers?
        General Wyatt. Yes. It is true, Montana currently in the F-
    15, those F-15s are moving to California. The PB provides for
    C-130s to move into Montana and the MC-12 to move into
    Carswell. So you have got two units, Montana unit at Great
    Falls and the Carswell unit, that will be subjected to training
    costs to transition in the new airplanes.
        We have done some preliminary estimates. We think the MC-12
    training in Texas will run in the neighborhood of the around
    $10 million maybe a little more. The MilCon won't be that much
    because you already have at Carswell some hangars suitable for
    C-130s that will need to have a little bit of modification for
    the MC-12, we think in the range of $2 million.
        In Montana, the training will be a little more expensive
    because those folks are transitioning out of F-15s into C-130s,
    larger air crew, because of the enlisted folks, enlisted air
    crew that are on that airplane. So, with the training expense,
    preliminary estimates are around $54 million, and the MilCon we
    think will be around $20 million.
        Ms. Granger. Twenty?
        General Wyatt. Yes, ma'am for the suitable hangars for
    the----
        Ms. Granger. So $54 million for the training, $20 million
    for the facilities and probably another $12 million to make the
    changes at Forth Worth?
        General Wyatt. Yes, ma'am, preliminary estimates.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
        One other question, you talked about the process, that you
    were involved in the process in making these decisions. And I
    know they were very difficult decisions because of the enormous
    cuts, but can you give us just of an example of a significant
    proposal you made to retain capability and/or to move
    capabilities with the Guard that were not approved.
        General Wyatt. What we did early on was provide the Air
    Force some inputs regarding different alternatives or different
    ways that we thought the Air National Guard could be used, to
    meet not only the emerging national, the new national military
    strategy, but also provide the type of capability that the
    Governors need, recognizing that in the Air National Guard, you
    have the most cost-effective force. You have probably the most
    experienced force because most of our folks came from Active
    Duty.
        I am an example. I spent 6 years on Active Duty before I
    transferred into the Guard.
        We rely upon the foundational basis of the Air Force for
    our training. We train to the same standards as the United
    States Air Force. General Schwartz has noted that as we get
    smaller as an Air Force, we will not be able to do tiered
    readiness in the Air Force on any of the components. We will
    all be required to be at the high level of readiness that we
    are now. And, in fact, the Air Force has adequately provided in
    my organized training and equip account sufficient training to
    get us at that top level.
        My concern is that as we, if we take these cuts out of the
    Air National Guard, we will be losing the most experienced
    aviators, the most experienced airmen that we have because we
    are generally an older, more mature force, having been trained
    by the Active component.
        You couple that with the concern about rotation forces
    forward; the planning factors are that Air National Guard
    should be available to rotate on a 1-5 deploy to dwell, the
    Active component 1-2. And we stand ready to do that. In fact,
    we are providing more volunteerism right now than the Air Force
    could get even if they mobilize it.
        So our people are trained, experienced. They want to be in
    the fight. They are in the fight, and we think that one of the
    alternatives that we proposed was instead of forming or
    presenting Active Duty forces forward for rotational demands at
    1-2, maybe you should first do Air National Guard at 1-5. That
    would give us predictability. We would know when we would go.
    It would be easier to schedule with our employers, and we could
    do 1-5 all day long. We have been doing high operations tempo
    now for about 15 years so it is not a problem for us, ma'am.
    That is one of the ideas that we proposed.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you. I appreciate it very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Ms. Kaptur.

                                  JOINT CHIEFS

        Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your service to our
    country and that of all your colleagues here this morning.
        General McKinley, I wanted to start with you, if I could. I
    know you participate in the Joint Chiefs meeting, and I am just
    wondering whether that has made a difference in the Guard's
    budget and how you are received and how that is going.
        General McKinley. Well, again, the 2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) gave the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau a four star, and former Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen,
    incorporated me into the Joint Chiefs, so that I could listen
    and participate and make comments in support of the National
    Guard, which I deeply appreciate.
        The current Chairman, General Dempsey, has done the same.
    And then, on January 2, the NDAA permitted me to become a
    member now of the Joint Chiefs. So I have only had this
    position institutionalized now for about 8 or 9 weeks, but I
    can tell you that I have been, well, warmly received by the
    other service chiefs. The Chairman has allowed me to make
    critical comments when needed in support of your National Guard
    men and women, and I can express clearly all the way up to the
    Secretary of the Defense now the issues of concern for the
    National Guard.
        Ms. Kaptur. Do you think it made a difference in your
    budget this year?
        General McKinley. I really haven't had this seat long
    enough to have participated fully in the budget, so the Army
    Guard or the Air Guard, but I can assure you that I was fully
    vested into the National Military Strategy debate that took
    place, which was very helpful for me to comment about the
    hedging capability that Jack's force and our force can give to
    the government if we need more troops and more airmen quickly.
    I was able to give that recommendation, and it was fully
    listened to and has been built into the strategy, yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you very much. I also want to
    thank all of you for the work you are doing to help lead
    America into a new energy age, and I can't comment on each of
    your respective forces, but I wanted to say to General Wyatt,
    thank you very much for the incredible work that was done in
    Ohio on testing fighter jet with camelina fuel, camelina-based
    fuel, which was very, very successful. I think that story
    speaks across the country and across the world, and we
    encourage you in making your bases more energy efficient and
    bringing on new technologies. You really have an incredible
    capability to do that.

                    COST EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD

        General Wyatt, I also wanted to ask you in terms of
    sustaining these budget reductions, it is my understanding that
    the Air National Guard maintains more aircraft per operations
    and maintenance dollar than the Air Force Reserve or Active
    Duty Air Force. And as you look to reduce the budget, as we all
    look to reduce the budget while preserving the greatest
    capability, shouldn't we be focusing on expanding the role of
    the Air National Guard in some way since it is so much more
    cost-effective than the regular standing Air Force?
        Could you comment a little bit about and give us a feel as
    a subcommittee on how those costs can be reduced with
    additional emphasis on the Guard, Air Guard, as opposed to Air
    Force, Active Air Force?
        General Wyatt. Ma'am that is kind of the debate that took
    place in the Air Force corporate process, and you know, my
    position was that we should do exactly that; that we should
    concentrate perhaps at this time, with the budget constraints
    that we have, knowing what may be out there on the horizon as
    far as threats, that we might consider a shift of the
    percentages from the Active Duty to the Air National Guard to
    the Reserve component.
        It was vigorously debated, as I said, inside the Air Force
    corporate process and it is not to say that any, any particular
    position is right or wrong because it depends upon, you know,
    what we anticipate the steady state to be from this point
    forward. We know that if there is a huge threat that would
    require the mobilization of all of the forces, we will all go,
    and we will go as long as it takes to get the job done.
        I think the question is, what level of involvement do we
    see for the United States Air Force in the next 4 or 5 years?
    Should we build a force large enough on the Active Duty side to
    handle that at the, perhaps, expense of more capacity to handle
    the surge war when that comes? And there is a trade-off between
    the two, and the decision was made to go with the shift of the
    forces from the Reserve component to the Active component,
    stressing the anticipated demand that will be there for the
    next 4 or 5 years.
        But it is a debate that I think was healthy inside the Air
    Force and will probably continue on the Hill here as we go
    forward. There are pros and cons of doing it both ways, ma'am.
        Ms. Kaptur. Could you give us a sense, a little additional
    sense of cost savings if one emphasizes the Guard more, the Air
    Guard more than Active Air Force?
        General Wyatt. I saw a RAND study a couple, 2 or 3 years
    ago, comparing the cost of fighter squadrons. And as with any
    analysis, I think as important as the answer are the
    assumptions and the methodology used to get to the answer and
    what it is exactly that you are measuring.
        If you look at the cost of just running a fighter squadron
    in the Air Guard versus the Active component, we do it for
    about 40 percent of the cost. But when we deploy, when we
    deploy, and we bring on all of our part-time airmen in a surge,
    we are as costly as the Active component, and this kind of goes
    to the discussion that I was talking about, if you are going to
    be deployed a lot, obviously the relative cost over time would
    go up the more a particular unit is deployed.
        But the beauty of it is, if the cost goes down, if the
    demand is not what you anticipate it to be, and your forces can
    remain in garrison. So it is a trade-off one way or another,
    but that is kind of--about as brief an explanation as I can
    give.
        Mr. Young. Thank you.
        Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, that is a pretty significant figure.
        I thank all of you. Thank you, Generals.
        Mr. Young. Thank you.
        Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
        Mr. Kingston.

                                 SEQUESTRATION

        Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McKinley, I wanted to get a clarification in my
    mind, the Joint Chiefs have signed off, maybe not necessarily
    enthusiastically, but have signed off on the $487 billion
    reduction proposed by the administration; correct?
        General McKinley. Yes, sir, every service chief has looked
    at that and consulted and given General Dempsey his best
    military advice and has concurred with the $487 billion.
        Mr. Kingston. And so then the Guard bureau, the same thing,
    correct?
        General McKinley. Sir, our services, the United States
    Army, the United States Air Force due to budgets, respective
    budgets, for our Army and Air National Guard, those service
    chiefs incorporate our views into their viewpoint to the
    chairman, and I can add my comments on top of that.
        Mr. Kingston. Okay, and then, but the sequestration, what
    is the Joint Chiefs official position on the sequestration?
        General McKinley. I will give you my military opinion.
    Personal military opinion is that none of the service chiefs
    welcome or can understand how that will be applied to a budget
    that has already taken the $487 billion cut.
        Mr. Kingston. So the Joint Chiefs have not signed off on
    the sequestration proposal?
        General McKinley. No, there has not been any formal
    decision, but I can assure you from my discussions with many of
    the service chiefs that we are very, very concerned about the
    impacts of sequestration.

                               COST EFFICIENCIES

        Mr. Kingston. Okay. One of the concerns that we have, as we
    grapple with the budget, and I don't need to tell anyone in
    this room that the national debt is 100 percent of the GDP, or
    for every dollar we spend, 42 cents is borrowed, but sometimes
    we seem to then shift into, yeah, but don't cut my staff.
        And so what I was wondering is recently there was a GAO
    report that came out that identified, I think, 32 areas in
    which the Pentagon had practices that were costing more money,
    19 areas of duplications. And I was wondering if the Joint
    Chiefs had embraced that report as, well, here is something new
    or here is something we can implement. And the reason why that
    is important is because that would appear to me something that
    Democrats and Republicans and everybody could agree on if we
    have got 19 areas of duplication.
        And, you know, just kind of a side note to that, I have
    never been in a group where I have asked how many of you think
    the military system, procurement system, is broken; I have
    never had anybody say, no, it is not, it is great.
        And I am sure we have all had those conversations, but it
    always seem like everybody agrees the procurement system is
    broken, but nobody does anything about it or knows what to do
    about it. But these 19 areas where the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) said are duplications, have the
    Joint Chiefs looked at that in the context of that GAO report?
        General McKinley. I can't comment on the relationship to
    the GAO report, but I can assure you, sir, that the
    efficiencies that cover the broad spectrum of how we operate in
    our respective enterprises has certainly been wrung out, and
    each of us, including everybody on this panel, has done his or
    her part to try to squeeze out the efficiencies, which I think
    you are alluding to.
        I think an area that the Department is seriously looking at
    is our Information Technology (IT) departments. I understand it
    is about a $37 billion a year bill. There has got to be ways to
    use best business practices to reduce that bill, so, there is
    not a servicemember out there today, including the service
    chiefs, who aren't looking at ways to become more efficient,
    more capable, to have a more effective force, because it has
    got to start with us.

                               MILITARY PENSIONS

        Mr. Kingston. So, frequently, we find as appropriators the
    GAO report will be sitting out there, or an Inspector General
    (IG) report will be sitting out there, and then we hear from
    various departments, yes, we are addressing that. And then, you
    know, a year, 2 years later, another GAO report, another IG
    report, and you know, we are still addressing that. But I think
    in this budget time, it is critical.
        Another question, certainly very sensitive, is military
    pensions. I think the cost of it now is $46 billion for 33
    cents accrued a dollar that is paid out, and yet when we go
    home and talk to our military officers associations and the
    Veterans Service Organization (VSOs), certainly you can't touch
    military pensions, but it is unsustainable on the same, on the
    current path, but I don't know of a proposal to reduce military
    pensions.
        And, again, at $46 billion, that is the size of Homeland
    Security, so it is not like it is a small, small item.
        General McKinley. Sir, I think this is a very important
    subject. I think that is why there is projected to be a
    commission to study the retirement system. I think everything
    is on the table. From my experiences talking with my
    colleagues, this is going to be a very, very important subject
    matter because we feel that we have to do our part within the
    Department of Defense to work programs that, quite frankly, are
    very important to recruiting and retaining personnel. But in
    the same regard, as former Chairman Mullen said, our number one
    national security issue today potentially is our debt, so it is
    juxtaposed against those two issues.

                                  DEPLOYMENTS

        Mr. Kingston. The other thing that, as I listen to 56,000
    requests, manpower requests, and 495,000 mobilizations, but you
    know, General Stultz talked about the troops on the ground in
    Kabul and Kandahar and Bagram last week. But then General Wyatt
    mentioned Boston Marathon, and it would appeared to me that
    there are deployments, then there are deployments. And surely
    in this budget time when the Governor of Arkansas calls for
    some, the National Guard to come to his inauguration, I just
    think we have just got to take a pass; the Boston Marathon, we
    have got to take a pass. Out of all those deployments, we have
    got to take a pass.
        And then I know one that is very difficult right is this
    rub right now between the Homeland Security and the Pentagon on
    the Southwest border that we have had two deployments down
    there, one in 2006 and 2008; 6,000 troops that cost $1.2
    billion; and then there is a current one with 1,200 troops that
    right now is costing about $180 million and a potential 90-day
    extension of $35 million. That one is a structural big-picture
    problem, but it still seems to me like part of the efficiencies
    are, where are we going to deploy to, and what are we doing
    about it?
        General Wyatt. I think it is interesting to note that a
    couple of things that I mentioned, like the Boston Marathon and
    the Governor's inauguration, were out of safety concerns. The
    Guard wanted to do that, and they were not paid for with
    Federal dollars. They were paid for by the States that
    requested that particular support.
        We have a great mechanism in the adjutants general that
    paid very close attention, sir, to what your concern is, the
    operations tempo, if you will. And what we are hearing from our
    adjutants general, what I hear from my airmen when I go to the
    field is that you have trained us; we want you to use us. If
    you don't use this, we will go somewhere else because we like
    what we do, whether it is the State mission or the Federal
    mission.
        I know when I was the adjutant General in Oklahoma, I met
    my returning soldiers and airmen that were coming back from
    Katrina at the Texas-Oklahoma border, and they told me that--
    and they were down there for about 45 days. They said that was
    one of the most rewarding experiences they ever had because
    they were taking care of fellow Americans.
        And so I think we do have, we do have a mechanism for
    measuring that operations tempo, and I trust that our airmen
    and our soldiers and our adjutants generals will tell us if we
    have reached that point where we are doing too much with our
    forces.
        Mr. Kingston. Well, I yield back.
        Mr. Young. Thank you. We are about to run out of time.

                        ARMY NATIONAL GUARD PROCUREMENT

        Mr. Kingston. Yes.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am sure as
    others did before I got here, we want to pay tribute to the men
    and women of our Guard and Reserve and recognize that while
    maybe the focus isn't on the Middle East, we have paid tribute
    to the number of times that they were deployed. It is
    incredible the sacrifice they put forward.
        I guess this question goes to General Ingram, Army
    procurement is up, but Army National Guard procurement is down.
    Can you talk about this budget before us, this budget
    submission? And would you put into the mix a lot of equipment
    still in the Middle East, you know, in a variety of different
    shapes? Where is the Army National Guard in terms of
    procurement, and where does it fit into the picture, a lot of
    the equipment that perhaps could be potentially utilized in the
    future?
        General Ingram. Congressman, for the Army National Guard,
    we are probably in the best position we have been in recently
    with equipment. Pre-9/11----
        Mr. Dicks. Do you have your mike on? Is your mike on?
        General Ingram. Yes, sir, it is. Pre-9/11, our percentage
    of equipment was fairly high, but the quality of the equipment
    that we had was pretty old.
        Today, we are moving into the high 80s in percent of
    equipment on hand, and it is modern, new equipment for the most
    part. We don't have the substitute items, as far as all of our
    equipment is procured through the United States Army, and it is
    allocated through the United States Army. In the past 10 years,
    we have been equipped, the mechanism has been next to fight. So
    the units that are going into theater get the newest and the
    best. There is some equipment left in theater, and as that is
    retrograded and goes through reset, it will be reallocated and
    given back to our units.
        And so far, that has worked rather well. Our units are
    about a year or so after--it takes about a year to a year and a
    half to get that equipment through the reset lines and then
    back.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So, basically, you are satisfied with
    your procurement request, meeting the needs of the Guard?
        General Ingram. We are on par with the Active Army. They
    are not equipped any better at the moment than we are. I think
    as the equipment, the story will be told after the equipment
    returns from theater, and there is a tremendous amount of
    equipment that is in Kuwait that is flowing back from Iraq as
    we speak. And we are retrograding equipment from Afghanistan
    now in anticipation of downsizing in Afghanistan in fiscal year
    2014.
        So if there is enough money in the budget, and that is the
    key to the question, there is enough money in the budget to
    repair the equipment at the depots and reset it and get it back
    to the units, that is the answer to your question, how that
    equipment is allocated as it comes out of reset to the three
    components of the Army.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. The bottom line is that you are
    satisfied with your position?
        General Ingram. Today I am, sir.

                             READINESS AND TRAINING

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just lastly, as our Guard and Reserve
    comes back, the issue of readiness, in other words, you know,
    they are happy to be back. They go back into their normal
    lives, they do focus on domestic responsibilities, but how are
    you going to keep them, keep it so that, I hate to use the term
    tempo, how are you going to keep the skills that they have
    learned, you know, the pressures that they learned to live
    under, how are you going to keep these people who are so
    dedicated on top of their game, God forbid we get in another
    situation where we need to act quickly?
        General Stultz. I will take a shot at that one, sir,
    because it is a big concern for me. We have put these soldiers
    through the best training. We have equipped them with the best
    equipment. We have put them into combat, and I would daresay
    they are not going to be happy if I give them one weekend a
    month to come back to our Reserve center and sit in a classroom
    and look at PowerPoint slides.
        We have got to give them some meaningful training, and so I
    think there are two pieces to that, and one of which you just
    touched on.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. We want to make sure that they are not
    training some old retrograde equipment.
        General Stultz. Yes, sir. We have got to maximize the use
    of some of our simulation capabilities that we have out there.
    And we are using the NGREA funds in some cases to be able to
    buy some of those systems so if that soldier is going to come
    to a Reserve center for the weekend, then let me put him into
    an environment through simulation that replicates what he was
    using in Afghanistan so that he says, I stay on that edge.
        Number two, when I send him to training, and what we have
    tried to do in the Army Reserve is focus our training at major
    centers like Fort Hunter Liggett; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort
    McCoy, Wisconsin, and outfit those training centers with the
    most modern equipment and systems they have got so that when
    that soldier shows up at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he is walking
    into an environment just like he had in Iraq or Afghanistan.
        I am concerned to your point earlier about the equipment
    because in the Army Reserve, while we have approximately 90
    percent equipment on hand, we are still in the seventies in
    modernized equipment. We still have a lot of substitutes. And
    those substitute items may sound good, but for that soldier who
    is going to training, he wants to train on the piece of
    equipment he operated in Afghanistan.
        And my concern also is that we can't kick the can down the
    road and say, well, we are going to put all this stuff coming
    out of theater through reset, but that is going to take several
    years. Or we will wait till the Army draws down and see what
    kind of equipment cascades. I mean, that is a good solution
    set, but I have got soldiers who need equipment today and so we
    have got to focus on realism and training. We have got to focus
    on modernized equipment to keep that cutting edge that has been
    set. Otherwise, we are going to lose those soldiers.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your response.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.

                                   SIMULATORS

        Mr. Dicks. On that subject, you mentioned simulators, and I
    believe that simulation is extremely, is a very valuable tool,
    aviation, the stories about aviation, pilot training with
    simulators, is remarkable.
        What different scenarios do you use simulators in? Could
    you describe that for the committee?
        General Stultz. Yes, sir, from my experience, and my
    colleagues, I am sure, have, especially in the aviation field
    and others, but I can give you just a plain and simple example.
        I commanded a unit in Orlando, Florida, and we have to go
    qualify with weapons twice a year, live fire. To qualify with a
    live fire weapon in Florida, you have got really two places to
    go, MacDill Air Force Base over in Tampa or Camp Blanding,
    which would require me to put all my soldiers on a bus, bus
    them over to MacDill Air Force Base and get out on a range, or
    go to Camp Blanding. When there are simulation, weapons
    simulation systems that are available that I could set up in
    that drill center that give you the same, if not better,
    experience, of firing a live fire weapon at Camp Blanding and
    can also allow me not only to put that soldier in an
    environment with a 300-meter target down range and show him how
    to breathe and picture sight, but then I can switch and say,
    okay, in the next exercise, okay, we are going to put you in a
    village in Afghanistan, and you are going to be walking on
    patrol, and you are going to have determine, friend or foe. You
    are going to have to make some of those decisions.
        Likewise, I went to a simulator with an engineer unit that
    is a route clearance simulator. I just came back from
    Afghanistan. They were out there doing this very task. I can
    put them in a semi trailer route clearance system where they
    sit at four stations in same vehicle they are operating in
    Afghanistan, looking in the mirror seeing their buddy, just
    like they saw him in Afghanistan, and go through that whole
    scenario.
        And the soldiers come out of there with their hair tingling
    a little bit, saying, wow, that is just like it was when I was
    there. Those are the kinds of systems that I am looking at for
    the future of how we better, you know, employ simulations and
    give that soldier a meaningful training period.
        Mr. Dicks. If you had to evaluate, which I am sure you are
    doing, are there a lot of other areas where simulation could be
    utilized? Are we just kind of at the tip of understanding how
    this can be done in terms of training?
        General Stultz. Yes, sir, I think we are, I think we are at
    the very edge of what we do. I mean, there is medical
    simulations capability to keep our nurses and doctors trained.
    There is vehicle convoy line fire simulators to keep our
    transportation, our truck drivers and all trained. The
    engineers I mentioned, there is command and control simulators
    where putting them--you know, I was in an area where we were on
    the deck of an in-shore boat, and on the screen, there was a
    Humvee driving along the beach. And above us was an Apache, and
    we were trying to intercept what we thought were drug smugglers
    in the scenario.
        In the next room, you could go in there and there is the
    Humvee, and on that screen was the boat I just got out of. And
    in the next room, you could go, and there is the cockpit of the
    Apache, and you are looking down.
        The key was they said, you know, this Apache could be at
    Fort Campbell, Kentucky. This boat could be in San Diego, and
    this Humvee could be at Fort Drum, New York. And you are all
    playing this scenario together before you end up in Iraq or
    Afghanistan.
        That is the kind of things that we just haven't leveraged
    yet.
        General McKinley. Sir, could I jump in here real quick?
        Mr. Dicks. Yes.
        General McKinley. Very briefly, Bud and I fly fighters, and
    distributed mission operations, which is the wave of the
    future, will be the Counter Insurgency of the realm. If our
    fighter units are not connected virtually, so that we can do as
    General Stultz said, fly with other units, air refuel in the
    simulator, the costs of the future aviation units that we have
    will be decremented greatly without simulation.
        And then, finally, Bill Ingram's professional education
    center down at Little Rock has a cyber lane where you can go in
    and see cyber attacks occurring on a computer. You can
    recognize them. It is all done in an educational environment,
    and that is something that we must pay some attention to in the
    future.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, our committee, we have added money for
    simulation over the years, and I think it is a great
    investment. And we have had situations, I know, at Fort Lewis,
    where you are talking about, you are actually doing the mission
    that somebody in Afghanistan, or in those days Iraq, were
    doing, and you are doing it with the exact same situation. I
    mean, there can't be a better training than that, I would
    think.

                                     UH-60S

        Now, let me go on one, on the Black Hawks; this is for
    General Ingram. The past 10 years has marked the highest op
    tempo for the Army National Guard Black Hawk fleet, which
    carries out a unique dual mission set, not only supporting
    deployments and other traditional missions, but also emergency
    response missions, including search and rescue, fire fighting,
    medical evacuation and disaster relief at home.
        The result of these sustained operations is wearing out the
    National Guard H-60 Black Hawk helicopter fleet much faster
    than planned. The Army National Guard operates more than 850
    UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters; over 500 of these are older A
    models, and the majority of these are more than 30 years old
    and nearing the end of their useful life.
        General Ingram, is modernization, conversion and
    procurement keeping up with the aging fleet?
        General Ingram. Congressman Dicks, it is not.
        The A-L reset on Black Hawks, it is funded, but it is not
    funded adequately to address the need. Our procurement of the
    Mike model, the newest helicopter, although we are getting
    some, we are not getting as many as we need to keep the fleet
    modern.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Dicks. I yield, of course.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I asked about your procurement needs. Is
    this one of your unmet needs?
        General Ingram. This is a need that is being partially met,
    Congressman. It is not fully met.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay.
        Mr. Dicks. And so the Army has not budgeted properly. It
    hasn't put enough money in, whatever it is, shortfalls, the
    Budget Control Act, for whatever reason it is, we are not
    getting the Black Hawks that we need, right?
        General Ingram. That would be correct, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. I think that is it, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Okay, thank you very much.

                                    HUMVEES

        Mr. Visclosky. General McKinley and possibly General
    Stultz, following up on a response to Mr. Frelinghuysen's
    question and I assume a number of others on supplies, it is my
    understanding that a number of adjutant generals have written
    to Chairman Rogers as well as the chair of this subcommittee
    and Mr. Dicks relative to the Guard's Humvee fleets, and given
    that the Guard has evolved in a strategic Reserve and was
    mentioned with General Stultz that you fight in one vehicle and
    you train in another that may be quite some time old and
    several generations removed from what you are going to use, are
    you concerned that the majority of Humvees that the Guard uses
    to train are much different and older than those that they are
    using in theater, and what is the solution to that problem?
        General McKinley. Sir, thanks for the question. I think,
    quite frankly, we have got to have a commonality in our fleet
    and that begs the question that I am going to punt over to Bill
    Ingram on. The number of our Humvees that are at a certain age
    or older, what would be a modernization program for those, or
    is there a modernization program to replace those Humvees,
    because speaking for the adjutants general, they are concerned
    that there is an adequate fleet of Humvees that have
    commonality, that have been refurbished, and that can come back
    and support the Governors in the domestic mission. That is kind
    of the wheelhouse I work in.
        The overseas mission, obviously Jack and Bill are sending
    Army Guardsmen and Reservists overseas to fight in up-armored
    Humvees. But what about the requirement back home for floods,
    fires, hurricanes, et cetera? I will turn it over to Bill for
    that number.
        General Ingram. Congressman, right now, we have 55,000
    Humvees spread across the Army National Guard; 41 percent of
    those, that is about 21,000, are 20 years old or older; 76
    percent of that fleet is modernized; 30 percent of it are the
    newer up-armored Humvees; and 33 percent are recapped.
        The next vehicle that will replace the Humvee is the joint
    light tactical vehicle. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    ((JLTV), the Army plans to purchase about 50,000 of those
    vehicles and, as I understand it, and this isn't firm, but the
    Army National Guard will likely receive between 14,000 and
    20,000 of those vehicles. But the first fielding will be in the
    fiscal year 2017-2018 timeframe. That is still a vehicle in
    procurement.
        So the trade-off, and everything is budget driven, as we
    all know, the trade-off is, how soon do we get the replacement
    vehicle, and what kind of shape is our fleet in now? Do we want
    to spend, do we want to spend money on something that is
    eventually going to go away? And obviously, we want to
    maintain--we will divest ourselves of the oldest ones first, so
    it is a trade-off and a budget drill as to whether you
    modernize now and wait for the new ones, or that is the trade-
    off.
        Mr. Visclosky. One of the concerns, talking about 2017, is
    that lines tend to move to the right on many of these charts.
    And if there is a delay, understanding there is going to be
    replacement at some point, is there a moderate middle ground
    here as far as refurbishment or some additional purpose to make
    sure that we are not caught short here relative to training and
    the domestic needs mentioned?
        General Ingram. Congressman, we believe it is, and we are
    resetting and modernizing. As I said, 76 percent of our fleet
    is modernized now, even though they are old.

                 MODERNIZATION AND SHORTFALL REQUIRED IN BUDGET

        Mr. Visclosky. Do you have adequate funds in the budget
    request for 2013 to continue what you think you need, or is
    there a shortfall?
        General Ingram. I am confident there is a shortfall. I
    don't know how much. We are going through some very stringent
    budget drills, as you can imagine, and again, we work through
    the Army, Army procurement and Army modernization on these
    programs.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Visclosky. Absolutely.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you are happy with the vehicles you
    have now?
        General Ingram. Congressman, you keep asking me that
    question.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I do keep asking you that question
    because quite honestly, the light vehicle is a way off, and
    General Odierno says it will be 7 years before we have a ground
    combat vehicle. So I know that the Army has its needs, but
    where is the Guard? Are you happy with what you have?
        General Ingram. We would be happier if we had everything
    brand new. I think, in the current budget reality, that is not
    a reasonable expectation.
        My concern is that we get the adequate funds to modernize
    on a schedule that we can all live with.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
        Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate it, and if we could follow up,
    we also have a significant budget problem within the
    subcommittee, but I would at least like information if we could
    have a followup conversation so I have a good perspective, that
    would be terrific.
        Mr. Dicks. Would you yield just for a second?
        Mr. Visclosky. Sure.

                            OFF-THE-SHELF EQUIPMENT

        Mr. Dicks. We tried, our committee tried to keep the Humvee
    going, but the Army was adamant that they did not want to do
    this. They said we have got enough Humvees, and the Humvees
    that we have are vulnerable; isn't that correct? I mean, you
    know, you don't have a double V hull. You don't have the Mine
    Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)-type protection.
        So here is the question I have on this subject. The Army's
    record in bringing something to the forefront in procurement is
    they need a simulator is what they need, okay, to figure out
    how to do it.
        Now, you know, from the Guard's perspective, would you
    rather have them buy off-the-shelf equipment, systems that are
    out there already when you can get them and then incrementally
    improve them versus try to develop a new system that, with
    their record, has maybe only a 30 percent chance of ever being
    fielded? I mean, does the Guard worry about this? I would worry
    about it if I were the Guard.
        General Ingram. Congressman, from my perspective, I think
    we need to be equipped the same way as the Army because of all
    the sustainment systems and all the parts and maintenance that
    we have to do on these.
        Mr. Dicks. But you can get the Stryker or the MRAP or some
    system right off the shelf, incrementally improve it, why go
    through this big development program, 7 years, waste all this
    money, and then, at the end, cancel the program, which has been
    the record of the Army in recent years?
        General McKinley. Sir, I think my colleagues who work in
    Army and Air Force lanes are trying to follow their service
    leads, and I would say, as a chief, that their domestic
    requirements that through no fault of anybody's need to be
    considered. And we appreciate this committee bringing those
    needs up so that we can debate them and talk about them. Those
    domestic needs obviously include an adequate vehicle so that
    our National Guard troops in-State status can get to and from
    the scene of the disaster.
        And so I would encourage us to debate both sides of this
    issue, the needs of the Federal components and also the need
    for the domestic mission.
        General Stultz. Bill is brand new. I am retiring, so I
    don't have anything to lose.
        Mr. Dicks. You tell us.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Tell us like it is here.
        Mr. Visclosky. But he is retiring, too.

                                 AGING EQUIPMENT

        General Stultz. But, no, I think you are exactly right. The
    concern I have got. I understand, we have gone through the same
    dilemma. Of my Humvee fleet, which is about 90 percent on hand,
    only about I think 10 or 15 percent is up-armored capable.
        So how feasible is it for me to put soldiers into combat in
    those vehicles in the future if we are going to go into a
    theater where--and I am sure we are, because everybody has gone
    to school on us and seen how IEDs affect our operations--and so
    I am concerned that those soldiers coming back from theater
    come back home and see those Humvees that they are going to
    train on now and say, you know, this is not really getting me
    ready to go to war. I need something better, and there are off-
    the-shelf solution sets with MATVs and everything else.
        I have toured the plants at Oshkosh and other places like
    that, and so I think we have really got to take a serious look
    and say, what are we going to have to do for the immediacy to
    give those soldiers, maybe it is not 100 percent, because I am
    not going to send 100 percent of the Army Reserve at once, but
    give me enough fleets of equipment that I feel confident that
    everybody that I send into battle and everybody that I train to
    go into battle is training on the piece of equipment they will
    operate in theater and not an old Humvee that is not armor
    capable, and that soldier knows that.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
        Thank you for yielding.
        Mr. Visclosky. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Visclosky. One more?
        Mr. Young. Yes, sure.

                               AIRGUARD REDUCTIONS

        Mr. Visclosky. General McKinley, I appreciate you bringing
    up the domestic component because in my mind, it wasn't in my
    mind until you mentioned that, and I appreciate you doing that.
        On equipment again, and the question deals with the Air
    Guard, Secretary Panetta had talked about a balance relative to
    the reductions at the Air Force and Air National Guard, but my
    understanding is that the Air Guard comprises about 21 percent
    of uniformed members in the total Air Force and yet would bear
    about 59 percent of the total aircraft cuts. There has been
    proposals relative to the canceling of the C-27, eliminating 27
    older C-5s and 65 C-13s--C-130s, C-130s.
        And my understanding is the Council of Governors have at
    least a proposal or some ideas as to how, if you would, to find
    a balance without more money, as I understand it, so that,
    again, the Air Guard is not decimated. Were they left out of
    these decisions, or is there still time to have a consideration
    of this so some balance can be struck? Because, again, I think
    very importantly here, they are not looking for more money, but
    they are looking for a better balance.
        General Wyatt. Yes, sir. The FY 2013 President's Budget
    Request proposal of the Air Force is right along the lines that
    you have mentioned, sir; those are the cuts. Subsequently, the
    Council of Governors, with Secretary Panetta's agreement, have
    presented an alternative proposal, and that is currently being
    discussed and evaluated and reviewed inside the Pentagon right
    now, and we hope to have some sort of answer determination at a
    later date. I don't know the particular status of the review at
    this point of time.
        Mr. Visclosky. I would, and I speak only for myself, hope
    that the people within the Department do give it serious
    consideration because I think the Governors are very serious
    about it, and again, looking to find the balance relative to
    the fiscal policy.
        Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, thank you very much for what you
    do. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Young. My turn.
        First of all, thank you for a really good hearing, and I
    have made more notes than I am going to be able to have time to
    talk to you about, but I, frankly, have some real concerns.

                                  SEQUESTRATION

        Sequestration, I think we are going to find a way to avoid
    sequestration because all of us realize that would be a
    disaster for our national defense.
        But I, during the hearings that we have had so far and
    during the hearings today, I am hearing some words, and I might
    just be a little bit paranoid about this because I think it is
    so essential to maintain the readiness to face any threat that
    we might be faced with. And I am not sure--and in this ``budget
    reality'' is one of the words, phrases that I heard--I am not
    sure that in this budget reality that we are going to do that.
    And let me give you just one example before I go to what you
    all said.
        We had the hearing with General Mattus and General Allen,
    and they were testifying to the fact that they really needed
    more naval facilities in their AOR. Good, and I think they are
    probably right, considering what they have to deal with, the
    threats, the potential threats they are facing.
        On the other hand, we are going to hear this afternoon from
    Admiral Locklear that we are expanding our activities in the
    Pacific.
        But at the same time, we are just not building enough
    ships, enough naval resources to take care one area AOR and
    another AOR and especially to expand them, just an example of
    why I am just maybe a little bit paranoid on this subject.

                          WHAT IS ``ACCEPTABLE RISK''?

        But I hear the word ``risk,'' and I have heard the word,
    not today but in other hearings, ``acceptable risk,'' and I
    have heard the phrase ``not funded adequately,'' and I have
    heard the statement, ``soldiers need good equipment now.'' And
    then I hear ``marching orders,'' we have got our marching
    orders.
        Are the marching orders surpassing the real judgment of our
    military leadership as to what is required to maintain the
    readiness of this country and to be able to properly equip and
    train and secure the soldiers who provide that readiness? Does
    that concern anybody other than me? But it does concern me.
        General Stultz. Yes, sir, it concerns me also. It concerns
    me because I think, and I hate to use the word reality, but
    what our leaders are looking at is what they think that they
    will be given to work with in terms of the defense budget.
        And then some of the challenges within that budget, where
    we know that we need to spend money on equipment, on
    simulations and training, but we also know that we have got
    broken soldiers. We have got a lot of medical needs. We have a
    lot of things that are not in our program budget that we have
    to take care of.
        So I think that is part of the reality also is that we as a
    Nation need to recognize, and it has been mentioned here, the
    stress and strain that we put on our men and women in uniform
    over the past 10 years, and what we owe back to them to get
    them back to the health they need to be, and what it will take
    to do that, and don't make us as a military use our resources,
    that we need to be spending on equipment and other things, to
    do the right thing. And so I think that is part of the
    challenge that we are facing right now. Just in our end
    strengths, as you are talking about bringing down end strengths
    to save money, there are still a lot of broken soldiers in that
    end strength. We can't just get rid of them. We will have to
    keep them. We will have to take them, and we will have to count
    them, which may force us, to get down to where we need to be,
    we will have to get rid of good soldiers that we really need to
    keep.
        I think those are the kind of realities we need to grapple
    with and say: What does it take for this Nation to have a
    military that we need and we deserve, and to take care of those
    soldiers, because what we cannot risk, what is not acceptable
    risk, is that we lose it?
        That is my concern on the Reserve. If we don't resource our
    reserve soldiers correctly, to give them the proper training,
    to give them the confidence that if they go into battle and get
    wounded, that we are going to take care of them when they get
    home, we are going to lose that national treasure. And we will
    go through another dip, just like we did before, where we
    dropped in the Army Reserve from 205 down to about 185, and try
    to climb out of that. And we have. But we will go through that
    again, and we will hit that bottom right about time the next
    conflict occurs.
        General McKinley. Mr. Chairman, from my vantage point, we
    cannot squander the gains that we made in the National Guard
    and Reserve over the last 10 years. It would be a waste of
    taxpayer money. We have the most capable, trained, highly
    qualified, eager force that we have ever seen. And they are
    expecting our leaders to fight hard so that they don't return
    to a status that we have returned to in most other major
    conflicts that our Guard and Reserve have fought in.
        So we are here today to tell you that while we work within
    our service lanes, that we also come here to thank you for
    supporting us in the unique needs that we have, the fact that
    the National Guard and Reserve equipment account takes care of
    an awful lot of things that our services can't take care of,
    that we can utilize in other things like simulations and dual-
    use training equipment, that is vitally important to us. And
    without that, we are going to squander the gains that we have
    made over this last decade of war.
        Mr. Young. Any other comments?
        General Wyatt. I will just add in from the Air Guard side,
    we look at the new National Military Strategy and we look at
    the Air Force's restructuring, I think where we are headed, we
    have the force structure to do what it is that the country
    expects us to do.
        I think the key, though, is making sure that everybody
    understands that the days where we might be able to do some
    peanut butter cuts to hit additional budget cuts are over. And
    if we go down that sequestration route or if we don't do what
    we are doing right now properly, we will find ourselves
    promising some military capability that we can't deliver on.
        Internally to the Air National Guard, for example, what we
    did in 2013 and what we will do for the next 5 years is to
    improve our readiness because General Schwartz has told me,
    when I call on your forces, Bud, they better be ready to go. I
    have said, okay, they will be ready to go. But, sir, what I
    need some help in is divesting some of the sunset under-
    resourced lower priority missions so that I can take those
    resources and put them toward the higher priority, rising
    missions that we think that we will need in the future. So that
    is what we are trying to do internally with the Air National
    Guard.
        Mr. Dicks. Would the chairman yield just for a second on
    that point?
        Mr. Young. Go ahead.

                            NATIONAL GUARD MISSIONS

        Mr. Dicks. You said the lesser missions that should be
    sunsetted; what are those?
        General Wyatt. Some of those missions might be, as we go
    forward and we take a look at the need for maybe combat
    communications, do we have too many combat communications
    missions across units, across all of the components. And we
    talked to the combatant commanders and we have talked to the
    major commands in the Air Force, the Air Guard does, to make
    sure that we don't have any force structure that is not
    important to the new fight. Force structure that may have been
    necessary 10-15 years ago, and we have postured our forces for
    that fight. But as we move forward, things like combat
    communications and increasing need. For example, for maybe
    security forces. We know the growing portfolio in remotely
    piloted aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, reconnissance,
    cyber is going to be the focus of the future.
        So these are difficult decisions. It is not that these
    missions are not important. But as you rack and stack them in
    the level of importance and you try to determine what the risk
    the country is willing to take, to borrow a word that you used,
    Mr. Chairman, there can be some internal readjustments of the
    type of units that you have. That is what we are trying to do,
    take those lower priority units, those units that maybe have
    suffered some force structure cuts along the way that they are
    not as capable as they should be, and just make the hard call.
    It is time to divest and get in those mission sets that we
    think will be important in the future.

                              OPERATIONAL RESERVE

        Mr. Young. General, did you want to comment on my
    statement?
        General Ingram. Congressman, I do. Every man, woman that
    has joined the Army National Guard since 9/11 has--every
    soldier that we have in the Army National Guard has either
    joined or re-enlisted since 9/11. So our force, the most
    capable we have ever had, expects to do something. And that
    speaks to the Operational Reserve.
        At this point, we have funded the training for an
    operational Reserve, but we need to have the money to operate
    the operational reserve, both Guard and Reserve in our United
    States Army. So the Nation expects that.
        The investment that General McKinley just talked about, we
    have spent a lot of Nation's treasure in the last 10 years
    manning, equipping and training the Reserve component of the
    United States Army. And if we don't use that on a periodic,
    predictable basis to do missions around the world or in the
    United States, then we will lose that edge that we have gained.
    I think that is what you are talking about.
        Mr. Young. That is pretty much what I am talking about,
    yes.
        Well, this subcommittee understands the importance and the
    necessity of having your forces and your troops and having them
    trained properly and equipped properly. You will find if there
    is something that you would like to slip under the table, a
    list of things that you need and aren't in the budget, let us
    take a look at it because we are very supportive.
        We are running out of time, so I want to go to the other
    subject that I have talked about.

                                AVIATION ASSETS

        General McKinley, you and I have discussed this in private
    meetings. And that has to do with the aviation assets for the
    National Guard in the respective States, and we haven't talked
    too much today about how the Governors have all written to this
    committee and have written to the Armed Services Committee
    complaining about the loss of their aviation assets. I thought
    I was going to maybe just make a comment--maybe I sound too
    serious--but we were really impressed with what you are doing
    with the simulators. And Mr. Dicks and I are very strong
    supporters of simulators. We have both used them, and we like
    them. But I am just wondering, if, when you need that C-130 in
    Florida for the next hurricane, are you going to use a
    simulator to do what that 130 should do? And that worries me.
    Other members of this committee have expressed that concern to
    the Air Force, to Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. I
    don't think we have made much progress, but it just seems to me
    like we are eliminating an asset that may be more important for
    the State function, the domestic function, as opposed to the
    overall military function. But it is something that is real.
        I have gone with our adjutant general into a hurricane
    situation where the National Guard is there on the scene and
    had to get from Hurricane Ivan, for example, that wiped out
    Pensacola Air Station, and they had to get back to St.
    Augustine because the next hurricane was heading there. They
    were able to get there quickly with the aircraft. No aircraft
    and they would be traveling in trucks or Humvees, and the
    hurricane would be over. Anyway, that is a concern. Many
    members of the committee have expressed concern on that very
    subject.
        And I know, General McKinley, I know where you stand on
    that, and I am not going to get into that any further.
        This has been a great hearing.
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, could I just bring up one quick
    little one?
        Mr. Young. Of course, Mr. Dicks.

                         POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We just had a big to-do out of Fort Lewis, Joint Base
    Lewis-McChord on post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic
    brain injury, anxiety. There were a number of people who felt
    that they had been mistreated, that their diagnosis had been
    changed. And they were. Some of these were reversed at Walter
    Reed Bethesda. Now, do you think this is a problem? Are the
    Guard and Reserve people, are they worried that their diagnoses
    for disability are not being properly handled, that there is
    kind of a secret code in the Army--and the Air Force doesn't
    get this wrap but the Army does--for trying to hold down the
    cost of treating these people? And there are implications to
    this.
        What if somebody is misdiagnosed or not diagnosed properly,
    and then they are sent back into combat and then they get into
    a big mess? Now, Bales, apparently, his wife says he didn't
    have any post-traumatic stress disorder, but a person could.
    This has implications beyond just money. It has implications
    about what these people can do or perform when they are called
    upon in Active Duty combat.
        General Stultz. Sir, I will give you my perspective in
    talking with my soldiers.
        I don't think that they necessarily think that they are
    being treated differently in terms of the concern and care. I
    think their frustration is they are being treated differently
    because of the bureaucracy. And the challenge we have got is a
    soldier comes back from Iraq/Afghanistan that is in 1st Cav
    Division. He is going back to Fort Hood, Texas. He may
    eventually PCS to another installation. But if he starts
    manifesting issues that associate back to his deployment, he is
    still in our system, and he is considered in the line of duty
    and gets treated.
        Our soldiers come back, and we take them off Active Duty,
    and we send them back home to their communities. In a lot of
    cases, they don't start to manifest issues for 6 months, maybe
    a year. And then the bureaucracy of trying to get them back
    into the system, to get the care they need and everything, is
    where it is very frustrating for our soldiers. Or our soldiers
    that we do get back into the system, the Warrior Transition
    Units at Walter Reed Bethesda now, and I just met a soldier
    over there just recently, and he has been in that system for 3
    years because--and it is not anybody's evil intention; it is
    just different types of orders. It is different types of
    authorities. It is different types of line of duties. It is
    different types that we don't have a medical system that really
    is equipped and ready to take care of the needs of the Reserve
    components. We have a medical system that is struggling to take
    care of the Active component as it is. We put on top of that
    the fact that we send them back home, and then they have
    issues; how do we get them back into that system?
        It frustrates me a great deal when I hear somebody
    questioning a soldier, who we know he was in Iraq; we know he
    went through an IED blast, whatever, and he has been back 2
    years and somebody is asking for a line of duty. Don't ask me
    for a line of duty. He was in combat. We know that.
        If that soldier is, for example, at Fort Hood, Texas, and
    he is playing basketball and twists his ankle, he is in line of
    duty, and we take care of him. If one of my soldiers is out
    there jogging so he can pass his PT test and twists his ankle,
    he is not in line of duty; he is not a soldier. The hell he
    isn't; he is a soldier 24 hours a day. He is just not in
    uniform today. We have to figure out a system to say, how do we
    provide the medical care for our soldiers in the Reserve
    components at the same level, not at the same cost, but if we
    say, hey, this soldier needs care and it is a military
    responsibility, we can get him back into the system immediately
    and take care of him.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. And that is a good point. We need to explore
    that. I know of some cases that would fit into that category,
    and we need to fix that.
        Thank you for a really good hearing. We stand here in
    support of the Guard and Reserve.
        This subcommittee is now in recess until 2 p.m. this
    afternoon when we will hear regarding U.S. Pacific Command and
    U.S. Forces Korea.
        [Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the
    answers thereto follow:]

                                Cloud Computing

        Questions. The realities of today's difficult budget environment
    have forced us to look at all aspects of the federal budget to ensure
    that we meet our fiscal responsibilities and make the best use of
    limited funding. In the overall budget plan for DoD, I notice a number
    of programs where savings measures will be achieved through innovations
    in information technology. In particular, I have been following the
    implementation of the Administration's ``cloud-first'' mandate and note
    the successes of other federal agencies, such as GSA and NOAA, who have
    been able to achieve IT cost savings by moving some its programs and
    email users to the cloud. In many instances these savings are reported
    to be in excess of 50% of their prior operating costs.
        Lt. Gen. Wyatt, does the Air National Guard plan to move any of
    existing programs to a cloud environment? If so, will this include
    email systems?
        Answer. In our efforts to assess the viability of moving the entire
    Air National Guard to the cloud, we recently reached out to industry
    with a request for information on available cloud computing solutions.
    The responses received make us optimistic that we will be able to
    potentially leverage a solution for core capabilities to include secure
    e-mail services at a much lower cost. While actual savings are unknown
    at this time, we do believe the Air National Guard can realize
    considerable reductions in hardware, software, environmental and
    personnel costs by moving to a cloud environment. Just as importantly,
    we also believe a public cloud environment will not only offer better
    access to our Drill Status Guardsmen and women, but provide
    collaboration capabilities with state and local governments not
    available today.
        There are still a number of questions that must be answered. How do
    we continue to interface with our Active Duty counterparts in the Air
    Force? Where is the DoD going with the Joint Information Environment
    and will our cloud computing initiative be compatible with those
    ongoing efforts? We believe by working with industry we will be able to
    answer those and other questions going forward.
        Question. Will you be considering the lower cost advantages of a
    Government community cloud in order to achieve the best value for the
    tax payer?
        Answer. Yes, we will be considering both public and private cloud
    offerings as we fully explore cloud computing. Our recent request for
    information from Industry yielded solutions for both private and public
    cloud environments. Ultimately, the security of our information and
    cost efficiencies offered will probably drive toward one solution over
    another. At this time, we don't have enough information to say which
    solution best meets the needs of the Air National Guard.

        Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran.
    Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
    follow:]

            C-27J--Spartan Medium Sized Military Transport Aircraft

        Question. Imagine the visual of brand new C-27Js going from the
    assembly line to the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in
    Arizona.
        When I look at the long history of the C-27 it seems very confusing
    and difficult to understand. Can you explain what has happened starting
    with the Army's control of the program and why you believe the C-27 is
    such a low priority program within the Department of Defense?
        Answer. In 2007, the Department had two robust airlift programs in
    development. The first was the Army's Future Cargo Aircraft program
    which in essence was a recapitalization for its aging C-23 Sherpa
    program. The second was the Air Force's Light Cargo Aircraft program
    which was to supplement the C-130 and C-17 fleet by moving smaller
    payloads into smaller, forward-based landing zones. Those programs were
    merged to leverage a single, common airframe to meet both needs. An
    original 145-aircraft fleet size was moderated to 78, which represented
    a moderate-risk to meet both programs' needs.
        In April 2009, the fleet size was further reduced from 78 aircraft
    to only 38 aircraft. The reduced fleet size was seen as a floor and not
    a ceiling pending more complete fleet mix analyses. In 2010, an Air
    Mobility Command (AMC)-commissioned RAND study concluded that between
    42-92 aircraft would be needed to fulfill the Army's direct support
    requirement to move time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and
    personnel within the joint operational area. AMC believed the retention
    of the 38 C-27Js, and covering the additional capacity with C-130s,
    addressed the RAND conclusions.
        In 2010, growing fiscal realities began to impact future program
    funding. In early 2011, the C-27J program had not received a full rate
    production decision for the final 17 of its forecast 38 aircraft. The
    principle concern was the cost associated with the aircraft's 25-year
    Service Cost Position. Later in 2011, the Budget Control Act directed
    the Department to significantly alter its views on force structure and
    fiscal requirements. The Department undertook a comprehensive strategic
    review of its National Defense Strategy. Given the fiscal reality and
    new strategic direction, the Air Force made the choice to divest older
    weapons systems and smaller, niche fleets. The Air Force posture, based
    on a new strategic guidance, is to reduce the overall requirement for
    intra-theater airlift. The Air Force subsequently determined that both
    the domestic and direct support missions to be performed by the C-27J
    could be performed by the existing C-130 fleet. The Air Force remains
    committed to supporting the original Army premise, and in January 2012
    the Joint Chiefs signed a memorandum to provide direct support for the
    time-sensitive, mission-critical mission. As such, the C-27J fleet
    would be divested and offered to other services or nation partners.
        Question. The Committee understands that the C-27J has served well
    in state units, and the Ohio National Guard has flown the C-27J in
    Afghanistan. Generals, has the C-27J program had cost, schedule or
    performance problems which have led to the decision to end the program?
        Answer. The recommendation to end the C-27J program was established
    by the Air Force. It was based in part on an analysis of estimated
    lifecycle costs, but more so by a strategic change in how the Air Force
    will employ intratheater airlift. The recommendation does not appear to
    have been driven by any schedule or performance issues. The aircraft is
    achieving its original key performance parameters, both at home and in
    theater. Initial issues concerning maintenance reliability have begun
    to lessen as the parts and sustainment system has matured and overcome
    the initial stresses imposed by the immediate deployment of the
    aircraft. For the last six months, the fleet has maintained an average
    86% mission capable rate in the U.S., and over 90% while deployed.
        Question. General McKinley, because you can answer for both the
    Army and Air Guard, how many C-27J aircraft did the Department intend
    to buy at the high point? How many aircraft were to go to Army? How
    many to Air Force? And what mission were these aircraft to have served?
        Answer. In March of 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    approved the Army's Initial Capabilities Document that called for 145
    future cargo aircraft. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs
    of Staff signed a memorandum of agreement that established the way
    ahead for the convergence of the Army Future Cargo Aircraft and Air
    Force Light Cargo Aircraft programs. The agreement specified the Army
    would initially procure a minimum of 75 aircraft (48 of which were
    designated for the Army National Guard), and the Air Force would
    procure a minimum of 70 aircraft. The total fleet at time was forecast
    at 145.
        In May 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed a memorandum stating
    the Army was presently budgeted for 46 aircraft but was fully committed
    to fund a total of 54 aircraft thru Fiscal Year 2013, 40 of which were
    for the Army National Guard. The Air Force was also committed to an
    initial buy of 24 aircraft, bringing the total forecast for the fleet
    to 78 aircraft. In May 2009, the Secretary of Defense moved the program
    entirely into the Air Force, and reduced the fleet size to 38 aircraft.
        The Joint Cargo Aircraft program's Capability Development Document,
    April 2007, established the baseline performance parameters and
    missions to be achieved by the aircraft. The aircraft was to perform
    intra-theater airlift missions in support of the Joint Force
    Commander's objectives, and would be capable of performing basic
    airlift mission sets including general passenger and cargo movement,
    combat employment and sustainment, aeromedical evacuation, special
    operations support, and operational support airlift. These missions
    include operations with night vision equipment, arrivals and departures
    from unimproved fields, and the airdrop of personnel and containerized
    supplies.
        The mission of the C-27J aircraft is to supply time sensitive,
    mission critical deliveries to widely dispersed Army units; it would
    not have replaced the Air Force mission of intra-theater airlift. The
    Army identified a need for less than a full load of cargo carrying
    capacity for the ``last tactical mile'' and the C-27J may be able to
    operate more effectively and efficiently than other Army or Air Force
    aircraft. In addition, the C-27J would replace the Army National Guard
    C-23 aircraft and relieve the pressure on the over-stressed Army rotary
    wing aircraft, particularly the CH-47. Both the Army and Air National
    Guard would employ the aircraft in support of civil authorities and
    homeland defense missions.
        Question. The unit cost of the C-27J is about $32 million. The C-
    130J unit cost is about $65 million. General Wyatt, is there a need for
    front line tactical airlift, and does the C-27J satisfy that
    requirement at a lower procurement cost and lower operating cost?
        Answer. The C-27J was developed by the US Army to fulfill an
    operational gap created with the pending retirement of the C-23 Sherpa.
    The C-27J was designed as a light-cargo airlift aircraft, which would
    continue to meet the Army's on-demand movement of critical cargo and
    personnel to forward operating areas. The C-27J is presently meeting
    that mission set as intended. The aircraft provides the Air Force an
    agile platform to effectively and efficiently move general support
    cargo across the joint operating area. The C-27J's smaller platform can
    be used for those missions that do not meet the general support
    mission's minimum requirements. Such a fleet would allow the AF to
    leverage and apply the right-sized platform for the mission at hand.
    This would maximize the use of airlift capacity at the same time
    increase the fuel efficiency per mission with no loss in mission
    effectiveness.
        Question. General Wyatt, would the initial buy of C-27Js have
    allowed for the retirement of an equal number of old C-130s?
        Answer. When the Air Force accepted the responsibility of the
    program, they specifically accepted the responsibility to provide the
    Army direct support for its intra-theater airlift of the time-
    sensitive, mission-critical supplies and personnel. The Air Mobility
    Command's Air Mobility Master Plan, Nov 2011, identified that lessons
    learned from Southwest Asia revealed the need for a smaller airlift
    aircraft to better support the time-sensitive, mission-critical needs
    of the combatant commander. The C-27J was seen as the right-sized
    aircraft to provide that support and would do so ``by adding a more
    efficient means to move small payloads, shorter distances, into austere
    locations.''
        The initial procurement of thirty-eight aircraft gives the Air
    Force a preliminary means to achieve efficiencies in the movement of
    smaller general and direct support mission loads. However, the small
    fleet footprint is not sufficient to generate efficiencies necessary to
    warrant the replacement of an equal number of C-130s.
        Question. General Ingram, have Army National Guard units turned in
    some or all of their old aircraft, the Sherpas, Hurons, and
    Metroliners? If you no longer have the C-27J in the fleet, what is the
    plan to replace those older aircraft, and if the plan is to use C-130s,
    is that a bit of over kill and wasted money?
        Answer. Resource Management Decision 802 (April 2009) directed the
    Army National Guard divest four C-23 aircraft in fiscal year 2011 and
    another four by the end of calendar year 2012. The Army National Guard
    will divest the remaining 34 C-23s no later than calendar year 2014.
    The Army National Guard has not divested any other types of aircraft.
    The Army is currently staffing a Fixed Wing Utility Aircraft Initial
    Capabilities Document to address the replacement of aging C-12 Huron
    and C-26 Metroliner utility aircraft.
        The Army and Air Force both agreed that the C-130 could effectively
    perform high priority and time sensitive transport/resupply missions
    involving small passenger and cargo loads to widely dispersed units.
    The C-130 did not meet some technical requirements for the joint cargo
    aircraft and was eliminated from the competition in 2006. The C-130 is
    also a larger aircraft than is required for this mission (a 42,000
    pound payload versus 25,000 pounds for the C-27J), and, according to
    Department of Defense reimbursable rates, it costs approximately three
    times more to operate than the C-27J.
        The C-27J would have replaced the C-23 fleet; no other aircraft is
    projected to replace Army National Guard C-27s/C-23s.
        Question. General Wyatt, the Air Force Chief of Staff says that you
    were you a full participant in the Air Force budget process. Did you
    disagree with the decisions put forward in the FY13 PB for the Air
    Force? Did you provide alternate options to the Air Force during the
    process? Have alternate options been provided to the Air Force since
    the release of their budget proposal? If so, how have they been
    received?
        Answer. The National Guard Bureau was directed to cut Air National
    Guard manpower; an endorsement of the overall decision was not part of
    the Air Force process for making this decision. The National Guard
    Bureau participation in selecting force structure changes was to offer
    advice and options to Air Force leadership. The Air Force mandated how
    many, which type of aircraft and/or units to cut. The National Guard
    Bureau offered recommendations for options within the parameters of the
    decision required. At the conclusion of the Corporate Process
    deliberations, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force made
    the final decisions on the size, shape and content of the Air National
    Guard.
        Question. The Committee understands that the Department plans to
    divest of the 21 C-27Js that have been delivered or are in production.
    What does divest mean exactly: store them, sell them, or give them away
    . . .?
        Answer. The Air Force is presently reviewing options for future
    utilization of the aircraft. Initial screening has identified the US
    Coast Guard has interest in 21 aircraft, SOCOM has interest in 6
    aircraft, and the Defense Logistics Agency's Law Enforcement Support
    Office has interest in 5 aircraft. Air Force personnel have indicated
    that formal screening and a final disposition decision is expected this
    summer.
        Initial plans to move all aircraft to the Aerospace Maintenance and
    Regeneration Group for temporary storage pending a final disposition
    decision have been suspended. Instead, the Air Force will support the
    continued aircraft operations for the four primary aircraft at each of
    the three operational Air National Guard Wings. All further aircraft,
    to include those delivered off the production line, will be held at the
    primary contractor's facility in Waco, Texas, pending final decision on
    the Fiscal Year 2013 budget.
        Question. General McKinley, is this program another example of the
    requirements process in the Department of Defense being out of control?
        Answer. The C-27J Spartan was originally designed to serve as the
    recapitalization of the Army's aging workhorse, the C-23 Sherpa. The
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the C-27J as the Army's
    Future Cargo Aircraft. It was subsequently determined that the airframe
    also met the program baseline for the Air Force's Light Cargo Aircraft
    program. This reflected an initial intent to procure 145 aircraft, 75
    for the Army and 70 for the Air Force. Eventually, an agreement was
    signed to merge the programs and thus realize the synergies of
    procuring one aircraft to achieve both Services' mission need. The
    initial acquisition baseline was set to initially procure 78 aircraft,
    54 for the Army and 24 for the Air Force.
        By May 2009, the Services agreed that intratheater airlift was a
    core competency of the Air Force, and as such an agreement was made
    that the Air Force would implement the program and execute the mission.
    This correctly aligned mission sets within the respective Services, and
    was a prudent step to take. However, the initial procurement was
    further reduced to 38 aircraft.
        Since the program inception, each decision to modify or change the
    program came with a decision to reduce the total fleet size. The net
    effect over time has been to produce a program that equates to a
    significant cost per airframe, and a fleet size/basing strategy that is
    less than optimal. The requirement to employ an aircraft that would
    manage smaller cargo loads which must move in `on-demand' environment
    favors this aircraft. The requirement is not wrong, but decision to
    incrementally reduce overall fleet size has hurt the overall program.
        Question. Where are the C-27s in the Air Guard inventory currently
    located? What missions are they filling? Has anything changed in the
    homeland defense and domestic response mission that would indicate a
    need to reduce airlift requirements in the Air National Guard?
        Answer. The Air National Guard has accepted ten of the twelve C-27J
    aircraft presently delivered to the Air Force. In accordance with the
    program of record, each active Wing will receive four primary aircraft.
    The first four aircraft were delivered to the 179th Airlift Wing,
    Mansfield, Ohio. Three aircraft have been delivered to both the 135th
    Airlift Group, Baltimore, Maryland, and the 186th Airlift Wing,
    Meridian, Mississippi. The Maryland and Mississippi Wings await
    delivery of their respective fourth and final aircraft. These aircraft
    still pending delivery this summer from the primary contractor. The
    final two of the twelve aircraft are stationed at contractor-provided
    Flight Training Unit, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. All further
    aircraft deliveries will be held at the primary contractor's facility
    in Waco, Texas, pending final action on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget.
        The primary focus for the C-27J program was to rapidly field and
    train units in order to immediately support deployment requirements.
    The 179th Wing met that goal by deploying two aircraft in support of
    Operation Enduring Freedom in July 2011. The unit has continued to
    aggressively complete mission certification training and to sustain
    deployed operations. The 135th has now deployed to assume the
    operational commitment from the 179th to return home.
        The units maintain a continuous readiness-state to support any
    homeland defense mission, just as they were available during Hurricane
    Irene. We see nothing to indicate a reduction in domestic airlift
    requirements.

                              Counter Drug Funding

        Question. Gen. McKinley, the committee understands the National
    Guard, in a Title 32 status, offers the primary domestic military
    support to combating the nation's drug epidemic by disrupting both drug
    trafficking and transnational criminal organizations.
        How will the decrease in counter-drug funding effect the National
    Guard Counter Drug Program? What can the Committee do to make sure that
    this program remains viable to those states that need it most?
        Answer. The National Guard Counterdrug Program has received an
    overall funding reduction of $86.2 Million or 37% for FY 2013 as
    compared to the previous fiscal year 2012. The State Plans Project Code
    7403 has specifically received a $73.9 Million or 41% reduction from
    the previous fiscal year. That 41% budget reduction will reduce
    operational support by approximately 45-50%.
        The operational reduction will impact support provided to Law
    Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) counter narcotic operations in the
    following mission support areas: Marijuana Eradication, Aerial and
    Ground Reconnaissance, Criminal Analyst support, and Civil Operations &
    Coalition Development (formerly Drug Demand Reduction).
        The National Guard Counterdrug Training Center budget has been
    reduced by $1.7 Million or 16% which may result in a reduction of
    approximately 45,000 Law Enforcement personnel trained at the National
    Guard Counterdrug Training Centers.
        The Committee can assist the National Guard Counterdrug Program by
    working with Department of Defense to establish a stabilized and
    adequate funding stream within the Presidential Budget base. This
    achievement would provide each state program the opportunity to
    deliberately plan support, train law enforcement, and properly plan
    funding expenditures.

                            Domestic Mission Aviation

        Question. The Air Force budget includes the reduction of 65 C-130s
    and the divestiture of all C-27s from the fleet. We know that these
    aircraft are the primary aircraft used in response to domestic
    emergencies. Without aircraft like these to respond to recent disasters
    in the Gulf states, missions may have been compromised.
        General Wyatt, how will the Air Force's budget impact the Air
    Guard's ability to respond to domestic emergencies?
        Answer. In most cases, the first 72-hours of disaster response is
    local and no one knows better what a state needs to respond to support
    its citizens better than the state leadership and their emergency
    planners. We believe aircraft and personnel that can respond to a
    Governor's request can be utilized more quickly than assets not under
    his/her control. The ability to have personnel and aircraft in a
    standby status can speed the response by many, many hours and that
    could be the difference in supplying the lifesaving and life-sustaining
    capabilities needed. Reductions in transport aircraft, search and
    rescue assets, and other keys capabilities from a Governor's control
    may slow a response to a domestic event.
        Question. Given the Air Force's proposed cut, how many additional
    aircraft, and of what types will the Air Guard need to adequately
    perform its domestic mission?
        Answer. The Congress has required a study to look at potential
    capability gaps with the new force structure plan while looking at DoD
    commitments around the world, historical domestic response needs, and
    potential domestic needs to support major and/or complex catastrophes.
    The capabilities based assessments is expected to be completed in Dec
    2012. Once complete, we should be able to provide a more detailed
    response.
        Question. General McKinley we understand that the Air Force
    believes it will be able to provide the necessary aviation assets
    during domestic emergencies through a combination of Guard, Reserve,
    and Active forces. Yet, FEMA, the governors, and Adjutants General have
    all said that time is vital to domestic response and only the Guard is
    positioned to respond in a timely manner. Is there any explanation to
    the Air Force's reasoning on this?
        Answer. We believe the explanation lies in the lack of an
    articulated requirement (Refer to #13 response).

                          Air National Guard Readiness

        Question. The Fiscal Year 2013 budget request for Air National
    Guard proposes such deep cuts in its funding for maintenance
    requirements that only 72% of the aircraft would be adequately
    maintained and ready to fly, while the remaining iron, approximately
    200-300 aircraft; would have to be sidelined. This cut is on TOP of the
    already significant reductions to the number of Air National Guard
    planes. The Air Force objective is to provide enough funding for
    maintenance of aircraft and aircraft engines so that 100% of the fleet
    is mission ready, but this budget seems to fall far short of this goal.
        General Wyatt, do you agree with this assessment? How much
    additional funding would be required so that 100% of the significantly
    reduced Air National Guard fleet would be mission ready?
        Answer. For FY13, the Active Component accepted significant risk in
    other components of Weapon System Sustainment (WSS), while budgeting
    aircraft and engines at 100%. The budget for the Air National Guard
    (ANG) reflects 72% for the entire ANG WSS. While this does allow us to
    fund aircraft and engines at higher than 72%, while accepting risk in
    other areas of ANG WSS, it is not sufficient enough for the ANG to
    fully fund aircraft and engines at 100%.
        The Air National Guard projects a $263 million shortfall to ensure
    100% of the significantly reduced Air National Guard fleet would be
    mission ready. This funding would allow the Air National Guard to fund
    21 engine depot overhauls ($38.0M) and 7 aircraft programmed depot
    maintenance (PDM) inductions ($84.5M). The funding would also be
    utilized to fund Contract Logistics Support for Weapon Systems such as
    E8-JSTARS and targeting pods ($140.5M). Should this shortfall go
    unaddressed, aircraft and engines will be deferred ultimately resulting
    in groundings.
        Question. The Committee understands that the active Air Force
    includes approximately $250 million in funding in its Overseas
    Contingency Operations budget for Air National Guard maintenance. Could
    the Air National Guard use this funding to supplement the shortfall?
        Answer. In Fiscal Year 2010, a Air Force General Counsel ruling
    determined the Air National Guard's (ANG) appropriation is for
    organizing, training and equipping our force. As a result of the
    decision, all Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds (other than
    Yellow Ribbon funds) in the ANG baseline budget were ``reprogrammed''
    out and we support all OCO missions in a ``reimbursable'' status. That
    is to say, any time we support the active forces, that duty is paid for
    from the active appropriations. Since our baseline budget is designed
    to support our peacetime training, the peacetime (baseline funding)
    would need to be increased to resolve the shortfall. All OCO support we
    provide drives increased maintenance costs, the reimbursement from Air
    Force pays only that OCO bill.
        Any additional OCO funding we receive is a direct correlation with
    additional flying, thus the shortfall is not decreased. The money would
    need to be reprogrammed into the ANG's baseline to eliminate the
    shortfall.

         [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
                                             Wednesday, March 28, 2012.

                     U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

                                   WITNESSES

    ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
        PACIFIC COMMAND
    GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
        COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;
        AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
        Mr. Young. The committee will be in order.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Dicks for a motion.
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
    hearing today which involve classified material be held in
    executive session because of the classification of the material
    to be discussed and its sensitivity.
        Mr. Young. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. Young. Today, this afternoon, our hearing is on the
    status of the United States Pacific Command and the United
    States Forces Korea, welcoming Admiral Samuel Locklear, U.S.
    Navy, Commander, United States Pacific Command; and General
    James D. Thurman, U.S. Army, Commander, United Nations Command,
    and Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces
    Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea.
        Gentlemen, I have a really long opening statement, but I am
    not going to make it because of this vote situation, and we
    want to give you all the time that we can give you.
        I yield to Mr. Dicks, and I assure he will----
        Mr. Dicks. Yes, I would do the same thing.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        Admiral, we would like to hear from you, sir, and your
    entire statements will be put in the record and then you can
    just state them any way you like.
        [Clerk's note.--The complete transcript of the heading
    could not be printed due to the classification of the material
    discussed.]
        [The statements of Admiral Locklear and General Thurman
    follow:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                          Thursday, September 20, 2012.

             JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

                                    WITNESS

    LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL D. BARBERO, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, JOINT IED
        DEFEAT ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                         Opening Statement of Mr. Young

        Mr. Young. The Committee will be in order.
        Thank you all for being present this morning.
        The hearing today is about the status of the JIEDDO
    responsibilities and where we are going with it, with the
    organization, with the devices, with the training--anything
    related to JIEDDO. And we really are happy to welcome General
    Barbero, who is, I would say, a very, very distinguished
    military leader.
        And as we looked over your biography, I would tell you,
    General, it is impressive. And I know this is your first visit
    with this subcommittee, and so your biography will be placed in
    our record for history.
        Mr. Young. We want recorded the fact that we had the chance
    to visit with you. So thank you very much for being here.

                              PROTECTING SOLDIERS

        I would have to tell you that the reason I wanted to have
    this hearing--and I would say to my colleagues, too, because we
    haven't had much of a chance to discuss it--I have had a major
    commitment ever since Mr. Dicks and I have been working
    together on national security issues, and that is to do what
    whatever needs to be done to provide the proper training for
    our troops for whatever their mission might be and to be ready
    to perform that mission; and, also, to guarantee that they have
    whatever tools, whatever weapons, whatever technology that they
    need to carry out that mission; and third, and very important,
    was whatever was necessary to protect our soldiers as they go
    about their mission. And I am not really satisfied with where
    we are in protecting our soldiers.

                          General Dempsey's Statement

        And I can tell you that I was very impressed, and I wanted
    to read this just briefly for the Members that might not have
    seen it, with--the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a
    very telling statement last week when he was in the region. And
    General Dempsey was quoted as saying, talking about the problem
    of our soldiers being attacked in Afghanistan, he said, ``You
    can't whitewash it. We can't convince ourselves that we just
    have to work harder to get through it. Something has to
    change.'' I think that it was a very courageous statement for
    someone in his position to make, and I certainly agree with
    that.
        He also said, ``We are all seized with the insider attack
    problem,'' meaning the Afghanis that we are training who are
    turning on us and murdering our soldiers. Dempsey said, again,
    you can't whitewash it. We can't convince ourselves that we
    just have to work harder to get through it. Something has to
    change.
        So you are really responsible, sir, your organization, to
    help take care of part three of the commitment that I have had,
    that Mr. Dicks has had, that all the members of this
    subcommittee have had, and that is to protect our troops.
        So I want to give Mr. Dicks a chance to make an opening
    statement here and then would like to hear whatever you want to
    tell us about your feelings on this and where we are going with
    JIEDDO and what we need to be doing to help you provide
    security for our soldiers, which is a priority to this chairman
    and to the members of this subcommittee.
        Mr. Dicks.

                              Remarks of Mr. Dicks

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to second your
    welcome to our witness, General Barbero, and thank him for the
    important work his office performs.
        Our servicemembers who are deployed in Afghanistan and who
    were deployed in Iraq are no strangers to the improvised
    explosive device, also known as IEDs. This weapon of choice for
    insurgents and terrorist organizations creates havoc and draws
    much attention to the carnage it leaves behind.
        Some reports indicate that undetected roadside bombs have
    caused over 75 percent of the casualties to coalition forces in
    Afghanistan. The effects of these casualties have been far-
    reaching, leaving our troops without limbs, with traumatic
    brain injuries and horrific memories of their combat
    experiences.
        Last November, members of our subcommittee traveled to
    Afghanistan and learned that the ISAF forces are finding,
    detecting 60 to 70 percent of the IEDs that are deployed by the
    enemy. Advances in training, intelligence, and equipment
    championed by JIEDDO have diminished the effectiveness of this
    weapon.

                              HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES

        However, in recent years, commercially produced calcium
    ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Pakistan has become a primary
    component in the production of IEDs. Our efforts to find and
    track these materials have been like finding a needle in a
    haystack since 1 percent of the fertilizer produced makes its
    way to the insurgents. This development has allowed a
    continuing flow of IED materials into Afghanistan despite our
    efforts to the contrary. It is frustrating to know the source
    and yet not stop the flow of this deadly material.
        We strongly support your efforts to defeat the enemy and
    stop as much as possible the use of IEDs. However, the threat
    is still on the roads and in the villages that our troops
    patrol every day. We look forward to your testimony on your
    efforts and the challenges that still exist with the
    insurgents' weapon of choice.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, thank you very much.
        Mr. Young. General, we do have some interesting questions
    for you, but we would like to hear from you at this point. And
    you know our concerns, and I think you understand our
    commitment. No matter where we stand with General Dempsey or
    Chairman Young on the feelings about our relationship in
    Afghanistan, this Committee will commit, will always provide
    whatever is needed for our soldiers at whatever mission that
    they are on.
        Now, we do not try to substitute our judgment for those of
    military commanders in the field. Sometimes we do have some
    strong opinions on the overall mission, which you know that I
    have discussed with you and others about my feeling, and we
    will get into that later.
        But we would like to hear your statement now, sir, please.

                      Summary Statement of General Barbero

        General Barbero. Thank you, Chairman Young, Ranking Member
    Dicks, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to update you this morning on the
    Department of Defense's efforts to counter the IED and to
    disrupt the global threat networks that employ them.
        I have prepared a written statement which I like to submit
    for the record.
        First, let me begin by commenting on the retirement of
    Congressman Dicks.
        Congressman, thank you for your service and your support to
    our troopers and our military.
        And to Congressman Lewis and Congressman Hinchey, thank
    you, as well. You have been great champions for our Armed
    Forces throughout your careers, and for that we are very
    grateful.
        Up front, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I share your
    concerns, and we try to live the commitment that you talked
    about. And hopefully I can answer your questions today.
        But I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
    leadership, and the entire subcommittee for recognizing the
    importance of the counter-IED mission and resourcing it
    accordingly. The funding support you provide has enabled the
    Department of Defense to rapidly field critical counter-IED
    capabilities that our warfighters need to execute their
    mission.
        We still need to do more. And let me say up front that I
    believe the IED and the networks that use these asymmetric
    weapons will remain a threat to our forces and here at home for
    decades. The IED is the weapon of choice for threat networks
    because they are cheap, readily available, largely off-the-
    shelf, easy to construct, lethal, and accurate.

                           PROGRESS IN DEFEATING IEDS

        This trend is readily apparent in Afghanistan, as you
    highlighted, where IED events continue to rise. In the past 2
    years, IED events have increased 42 percent, from 9,300 events
    in 2009 to 16,000 events in 2011. And this year we are on track
    for 2012 to meet or exceed the historic number of IED events we
    saw last year. As a matter of fact, this past June, June 2012,
    we had the highest number of monthly IED events we have
    recorded.

                              HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES

        Contributing to these numbers, as Ranking Member Dicks
    mentioned, are the fertilizer explosives, which remain a
    significant challenge in Afghanistan. Today, 87 percent of the
    IEDs employed against coalition forces are made with homemade
    explosives. And of those, 74 percent are made with ammonium
    nitrate derived from calcium ammonium nitrate, a common
    agricultural fertilizer that is ubiquitous in the area.
        While the overall number of IED events is high, as you
    mentioned, our ability to find and neutralize them before
    detonation has improved steadily, helping to reduce U.S.
    casualties by more than 40 percent this past year.
        Now, many factors have contributed to the decreased
    effectiveness of IEDs in Afghanistan, including: our attempts
    to apply the lessons learned in-theater to our predeployment
    training; fielding the increased number of counter-IED
    capabilities, everything from airborne sensors to handheld
    devices, especially focused on our dismounted troopers; and
    commanders and troopers on the ground continuously refining
    their tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to the
    threat they face in their region.

                    IED ATTACKS DURING AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

        As we begin to transition combat operations in Afghanistan
    and look to 2014, we must not lose our focus on the mission at
    hand. U.S. forces and civilian personnel will remain the target
    of insurgent IED attacks, and the IED will remain the weapon of
    choice. From our experience in Iraq, the reduction of U.S.
    forces must not equal a reduction in counter-IED or other
    critical capabilities.
        As the military footprint in Afghanistan decreases, this
    drawdown and transition will require flexibility to shift
    priorities rapidly, providing the requisite counter-IED
    capabilities, situational awareness, and security and
    protection for these remaining troops.
        While the IED has been the focal point of combat operations
    in Afghanistan and Iraq during the last decade, it is not
    exclusive to those countries or region. The global spread of
    threat networks and proliferation of IEDs and associated
    technology are pervasive and continue to affect U.S. security
    at home and interests abroad.
        Since 2007, IED incidents outside of Iraq and Afghanistan
    have increased to average more than 500 incidents per month
    around the globe. Since January 2011, there have been more than
    10,000 global IED events, occurring in 112 countries, executed
    by more than 40 regional and transnational threat networks.
        The extremist networks that employ the IEDs have proven to
    be resilient, interconnected, and extremely violent.
    Globalization, the Internet, and social media have extended the
    reach of these organizations, providing platforms for
    recruiting, technical exchanges, training, planning, funding,
    and social interaction.
        While we in the military adhere to Napoleon's dictum to
    march to the sound of the guns, these threat networks march to
    the signs of insecurity and take the IED with them. We see this
    in Colombia, Pakistan, Syria, Bahrain, Nigeria, and Somalia,
    among others. Wherever we see turmoil and insecurity, we see
    the spread of these networks and their use of the IEDs.
        Today, as we see in Afghanistan, and in the future, I
    believe U.S. forces will operate in an IED environment. I
    believe it is the reality of the 21st-century warfare, and we
    must plan accordingly.

                       ENDURING COUNTER IED CAPABILITIES

        Currently, the Department, led by Deputy Secretary Carter,
    is in the process of reviewing the number of proven
    capabilities that we have developed over the last 10 years
    during the course of these conflicts to determine which ones
    should endure. And as part of these, I have recommended five
    counter-IED capabilities which I believe should be
    institutionalized.
        The first: We must preserve the ability to rapidly provide
    counter-IED materiel solutions in response to this dynamic
    threat. The constantly changing threat environment requires the
    Department of Defense to maintain a higher level of
    institutional acquisition agility and continued investment in
    counter-IED R&D. Moving forward, DOD must acquire and deliver
    capabilities in months, not years.
        The second enduring capability is the ability to fuse
    operational information and intelligence from all sources to
    produce actionable intelligence for our commanders, delivering
    analytical products that meet the needs of both our operational
    commanders and our domestic security partners. This is
    accomplished through a robust and powerful network of partners
    with whom analytical tools, methodologies, and, most
    importantly, information and intelligence can be shared to
    identify and then exploit the vulnerabilities of these global
    networks. The speed at which our enemies operate requires us to
    operate just as fast and be just as networked.
        Third, counter-IED training, as you mentioned, must endure
    and be permanently integrated into our service and training
    institutions and centers. This is not a passing phenomenon. As
    we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can provide the
    best counter-IED capabilities and tools to the warfighters, but
    without the timely and relevant training component, the full
    capacity of equipment and tactics will never be realized.
    Moving forward, we must train to conduct operations in an IED
    environment which includes an agile networked enemy.
        The fourth enduring capability is our ability to conduct
    timely and relevant collection, analysis, and technical
    forensic exploitation of these devices and identify emerging
    IED technologies. This is done through a process we call
    weapons technical intelligence, referred to as WTI. And we are
    very closely partnered in with FBI on this.
        During the past 8 years, JIEDDO, the military services,
    U.S. interagency, and our multinational partners have developed
    a highly effective WTI process to derive forensic evidence--
    fingerprints, DNA, and biometrics--from these devices that we
    have recovered on the battlefield in order to identify
    personnel and then target them. Our tactical commanders in
    Afghanistan increasingly focus operations to collect biometrics
    and forensic data, and several have referred to this capability
    as a ``game-changer.''
        WTI removes a violent extremist's greatest defense,
    anonymity, and makes them vulnerable to attribution, which is
    why the WTI capability must endure.
        Fifth and finally, the enduring global IED threat requires
    a whole-of-governments approach. As we move forward, we must
    continue to synchronize our counter-threat network capabilities
    among our domestic, international, and other security partners.
    It is not a military mission alone. And today we are working
    with an expanded interagency group to identify the
    vulnerabilities and target some of these networks that we have
    talked about that are moving these materials into Afghanistan.
        Maintaining this momentum against an adaptive threat
    requires the continued focus of the intelligence community,
    however, in order to focus on these networks to provide us a
    common intelligence picture that we can target.
        We will continue to face an ever-present threat from an
    overlapping consortium of networks employing IEDs as a weapon
    of choice. We have to continue to pursue this whole-of-
    governments approach, knitting together all the tools we have
    at our disposal in order to nonkinetically attack these
    networks, including their finances.
        These five recommended enduring counter-IED capabilities
    are integrated into the Department's process being led, as I
    said, by Deputy Secretary Carter. With his leadership, I am
    confident we are on the right track to institutionalize these
    capabilities, but much work remains to be done.
        In closing, the IED and the networks that employ these
    weapons are here to stay, operationally and here at home. As we
    have done from previous conflicts, we must account for this
    enduring threat and retain the hard-earned capabilities. It is
    our responsibility to learn and adapt our institutions
    accordingly.
        But I would like to leave you with one final thought. I
    understand the toll that these weapons have taken on our
    troopers and their families--the deaths, the terrible life-
    changing injuries. I see this. And I promise you we are
    committed to providing every possible capability we can to
    protect our troops into 2014 and beyond. This is my mission.
        Chairman Young, Ranking Member Dicks, members of the
    subcommittee, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today. Thank you for your support. And I now look
    forward to your questions.
        Mr. Young. General, thank you very much, sir.
        [The biography and statement of General Barbers follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 IED LETHALITY

        Mr. Young. You have, in a few minutes, said a lot. And what
    you are telling me is that this problem is not going to go away
    anytime soon. But you are telling me and telling the committee
    that you are prepared to bring together all of the structure
    that is needed to provide technology designs, training, and I
    applaud you for that.
        And I want to tell you that this is really important. The
    IED toll that you mentioned, the numbers that you have
    presented here today are just really disturbing, how the IED
    attacks are growing. And I know that personally. I have been to
    Afghanistan, as have all the members of this subcommittee.
        But I will tell you, General, I have really learned more
    about what is happening with the soldiers by visits to Walter
    Reed in Bethesda. Now, my wife is sitting over there on the
    corner. She is weekly, at least once a week, at the hospitals
    to not only visit with the wounded soldiers, who are getting
    really good care--and if you ask them, they will say, yes, that
    their care, medical care, is good. And I really applaud our
    medical corps, Army and Navy. But some of the families need
    help, and that is where Beverly comes in.
        But some of the stories that we hear, you know, when you
    ask, well, what do you need? Do you have everything you needed?
    And they tell us, yeah, I have all I needed. But almost every
    one will say, what we need is a change in the rules of
    engagement.

                              RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

        Now, I don't know if you could have any influence in
    changing the rules of engagement. I am not sure that that falls
    within your charter. But I think what they are concerned about
    is, and I will just try to paraphrase it, that if they do
    something that might be a little aggressive or that might
    appear to be beyond what their stated rules of engagement are,
    the President of the country that we are trying to help becomes
    their super-critic, demanding that they be punished. And I just
    don't think that is right.

                       AFGHANS ATTACK ON U.S. AND ALLIES

        You know, you can't have an ally part-time. You either have
    an ally or you don't. And I have come to the conclusion, after
    working on this issue for quite some time, that our part-time
    ally is not really our ally. And the stories of the Afghanis
    that we are training turning on us and killing and murdering--
    and murdering in their sleep our soldiers. And that is not a
    JIEDDO issue, but it is still an issue of supporting the
    troops.
        But we had talked about a letter that I had received from a
    soldier, and you said you had not seen the letter. I had
    distributed it pretty widely through the Pentagon. But I have a
    copy for you. And I have taken out some of the personal
    information. I have taken out dates and locations because I
    know that that should not be revealed.
        And I think you know about the case.
        General Barbero. Yes, sir.

                          LETTER FROM A STAFF SERGEANT

        Mr. Young. You can read it at your leisure.
        But when I got this letter, I had heard similar stories
    from other wounded warriors at the hospitals. So I doubled back
    and talked to some of those that I could still have contact
    with, and I hear the same story, pretty much, of what you will
    read in this letter. So it convinced me that there is something
    really needed to be done about this.
        I took this letter, and I talked to leaders at the
    Pentagon. And I sent a very detailed letter, including a copy
    of this letter, to the Pentagon. That didn't really get any
    kind of a response.
        And so the next conversation that I had with the leader of
    the Army was to notify him that the soldier that had written
    this letter prophesying what was going to happen happened, and
    he and his platoon sergeant were blown up with a single IED.
        There is something wrong with that, when the soldiers can
    see the problems--and this is a seasoned soldier. He has been
    there before. And the folks that I have talked to--and a couple
    of them are still at the hospital, by the way--you get the same
    story. Now, when you get the same story over and over again, it
    tends to bother you.

                       COUNTER IED EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

        And the issue of the IEDs where, if a troop is told to go
    into a field or an area that is known to be full of IEDs, there
    has to be some way to give them some protection. And I know
    that you have a number of ways to do that. And I know that you
    have, with the Strykers for example, you have the mine rollers.
    But my information provided to me is that if a Stryker gets
    blown up, the mine roller gets destroyed, the Stryker is
    parked, and it is not repaired. There is no new mine roller put
    on there, so the troops are put on foot patrol.
        This committee is prepared to provide as many mine rollers
    as those Strykers need. We should not take the kids out of the
    Strykers--and I apologize for calling them kids, because what
    they are going through, they are not kids. That Stryker should
    be repaired so that that IED protection of the mine roller can
    be redeployed and so the soldier doesn't have to go on foot in
    a minefield that we know is full of mines.

                         IED DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION

        Now, that is a long lead-up to a question. If you know the
    minefield is full of mines, what can you do? What can you, the
    soldiers do? What do you train the soldiers to do, especially
    if you know that the field is full of mines?
        General Barbero. Uh-huh. Well, Chairman, first of all, I
    will talk about detection in a minute and what we do to protect
    our troopers.
        But if I could, I am familiar with the incident with
    Sergeant Sitton and studied it early August when it occurred.
    And it was troubling, as they all are. And, you know, I spoke
    in my comments about progress we are making. And I understand,
    to some kid at Bethesda or some family in Florida or Washington
    State or Texas or California, that is not progress. They don't
    want to hear about progress. And I understand that. So, you
    know, I start every day looking at, what were the casualties,
    what were the lessons learned, and, more importantly, what can
    we do about it?
        And to take Sergeant Sitton's example, he was killed on
    dismounted operations. And we have focused on the dismounted
    trooper because of the terrible nature of their injuries, the
    amputations. And we have taken steps over the last 15 months to
    field a wide variety of 8,000 handheld detectors, protective
    undergarments, a greater number of sensors and such.
        But it is an IED battlefield. A commander said to me, ``It
    is not a case of encountering IEDs on the battlefield. The IED
    is the battlefield. That is their weapon. And it is combat.''
        Now, can we do better at detecting where these are? We can,
    and we are trying. But the enemy, as I said in my comments, is
    adaptive and smart. They watch us. They know we have handheld
    detectors, so they have gone to nonmetallic IEDs. The pressure
    plates--and, in this case, we think the pressure plate was
    wooden. And what they do is they take carbon rods from D cell
    batteries, which do not have a very high metallic content but
    they have enough to complete the circuit when they are touched,
    and two pieces of wood, a plastic jug filled with homemade
    explosives, ammonium nitrate, bury it with a battery underneath
    so we can't pick that up, and that is what they use. So it is a
    thinking enemy that is watching us and observing.
        And our detection rates and found and cleared rates have
    improved as we have adjusted in this arms race of trying to
    find and detect and clear these IEDs. We are not going to find
    every one of them. They are going to continue to adapt.
        As far as your question about the (Rules of Engagment) ROE,
    you know, my job is to provide the tools that answer our
    commanders' requirements and support them with whatever they
    need, whatever our troopers tell us or our commanders tell us.
    So I can't really comment on rules of engagement because I am
    not there and I have not served in Afghanistan.
        But we have taken steps to protect especially our
    dismounted troopers, our most vulnerable ones. But, Chairman,
    we could outfit these soldiers like medieval knights and if
    they step on one of those weapons, this weapon is effectively
    employed by a thinking enemy, it is going to have effects. And
    I would be untruthful if I told you something different. There
    is no silver bullet in this fight.
        But we are working as hard as we can. And I can give you a
    list of all the equipment that has been fielded to our
    commanders, from handheld devices, dogs, sensors, and
    undergarments, that have had some effect. But, as I said, to
    folks who have loved ones deployed, this is not progress, and
    we realize that. We have to do better.
        Mr. Young. Well, General, thank you for that offer, and we
    would like to have a list of that for our hearing records.
        [The information follows:]

        The list provided contained classified information.

        Mr. Young. And I have a lot more to talk with you about,
    but the other Members have interest in this issue. And I want
    to yield to Mr. Dicks, who, by the way, it will possibly be his
    last hearing with this subcommittee.
        Mr. Dicks. Oh, we may have another one, Mr. Chairman,
    before----
        Mr. Young. Well, maybe we can have a couple more just to
    keep you busy.
        Mr. Dicks. Yeah, keep us busy.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks has been an outstanding Member of this
    Congress and of this subcommittee. And his chairmanship was a
    good chairmanship. It was short-lived, but it was a good
    chairmanship, and he did outstanding work. And the Congress
    will miss him, this Committee will miss him, and I personally
    will miss him because we have worked together for 35 years on
    all of these important issues.
        I yield to Mr. Dicks.

                          FERTILIZER BASED EXPLOSIVES

        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I certainly understand and appreciate your concern. All
    of us are concerned.
        The one issue that just troubles me is the fertilizer that
    keeps coming in from Pakistan, and somehow we don't seem to be
    able to do anything about it. Now, that is something, General,
    we know about, and yet it still exists.
        I know it is a small amount of what is produced in
    Pakistan, but we know it is coming in across the border. I
    mean, this is--and we choose not to do anything about it. I
    mean, we talk to the Pakistanis until we are blue in the face,
    and yet it still comes in.
        What do you have to say about that?
        General Barbero. Early in----
        Mr. Dicks. I mean, all the little committees here in
    Washington--but the reality is, that stuff is still coming
    across the border every day, and we know it.
        General Barbero. Congressman, I agree 100 percent. And
    early in my--when I first arrived on the job, I looked at the
    situation, and my assessment was that in Afghanistan we are
    playing defense. We are sweeping historic amounts of this
    calcium ammonium nitrate off the battlefield, tons, up 100
    percent this year, and yet the number of IED are at historic
    highs.
        You know, when an insurgent can buy a bag of fertilizer,
    about 110 pounds, for $31, boil it with a little propane, add
    an accelerant to it----
        Mr. Dicks. Where do they buy it?
        General Barbero. It is smuggled across. Hundreds of
    crossing sites. We, as I said, capture what we can, detect what
    we can. And they----
        Mr. Dicks. Do you think we are doing enough on that issue?
    I mean, do you think we are--I mean, if it continues to exist
    week after week, month after month, it is very discouraging.
        General Barbero. It is. And I have been to Pakistan twice
    to engage the civil leadership and the military leadership
    about this. And the Pakistanis have a significant problem with
    these networks and devices also. There were eight Pakistani
    civilians killed today with an IED aimed at their military,
    which it was--it misfired.
        And our message to the Pakistanis has been on two issues:
    ``We will help you with your problem, with your IEDs, but you
    have got to do something about this free flow of calcium
    ammonium nitrate that is coming into Afghanistan. Here are the
    effects we are seeing.''
        And we must continue to press them. They must take action,
    and I think they can do more. I can and I would like to, in
    another setting--I can't discuss it now--talk about some of the
    actions we are taking against these networks that we know are
    moving this material and the funding behind them. I just can't
    talk about it here.
        But I share your concern. It is a priority for us. And this
    interagency task force we have put together with Treasury,
    Commerce, et cetera, is totally focused on this. And to date--
    --
        Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can have a secure
    setting, if not today, you know, after the election, to go into
    this, or even have a briefing for the Members who are going to
    be here.
        Mr. Young. Yeah, well, why don't you yield?
        The General and I talked about this yesterday, recognizing
    there will be some areas that can't be discussed in an open
    hearing. And I agree and he agrees that we should have----
        Mr. Dicks. We could do it tomorrow, as far as I am
    concerned.
        General Barbero. Absolutely.
        Mr. Young. Well, we will see.
        Mr. Dicks. All right. At least at some point, I think we
    need, to do our job, we need to do what is being done and what
    the problems are.
        Mr. Young. Good suggestion. Thank you.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.

                       IMPROVED IED DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

        Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Barbero, it was on Monday that I was last at the
    Walter Reed Bethesda. The young soldier in front of me who lost
    his leg just below the knee, that exposure for us tells the
    entire story.
        I would like to have you share with the Committee that
    which you can share about improved technology to detect exactly
    where this material is flowing and what actions we can take to
    stop those flows. I am interested in questions like whether the
    surveillance available by way of the Predator, for example, is
    improving our circumstance. Sixteen thousand events in 2011
    will tell you that, clearly, we are not on top of the entire
    picture, that we can do more.
        So tell the committee, if you will, how that technology is
    working and how we can help you.
        General Barbero. Certainly, Congressman.
        First, let me describe it as I see it in two fights. There
    is the mounted fight and the dismounted fight, because
    different weapons, different variants of the IED are used in
    each, and it requires different technologies and equipment for
    each.
        First in the mounted fight, we see this primarily using
    command wires, like we saw in Iraq, where there is an insurgent
    at the end of the wire and when he sees the vehicle approach at
    the right point he will touch a button, complete the circuit.
    And we see increased explosive weights. They are packing more
    explosives as a counter to our improved armor.
        In reaction to this, we fielded everything from additional
    airborne sensors--which I can talk about their capabilities, or
    provide it for the record, in a classified forum--and we are
    pursuing two additional ones. We have received a request from
    theater for two additional systems, called Copperhead, which
    have proven very effective, as they were in Iraq, for this
    operation; and also these handheld devices.
        The best technique is, when you approach a spot where we
    think there are IEDs or indications tell us there are some or a
    pattern from the past tells us there are, you dismount to clear
    them or you use a mine roller. One of the technologies in the
    last 2 years, my organization has spent $269.5 million on mine
    rollers, repair parts, technicians to repair them. So we will
    look into this report that is very troubling.
        So for the mounted troopers, it is everything from airborne
    sensors, handheld devices, mine rollers, and improved training
    at Fort Irwin, for example.
        For the dismounted troopers, first it is about, how can we
    best protect them? And last year we were informed about these
    undergarments, these pelvic protection undergarments. And in 4
    months we fielded 210,000 sets for about $19 million. That is
    what we get paid to do. The reports are that if our troopers
    are wearing them--and they all are now--that there is a 40
    percent reduction in severe injuries to the area if they are
    wearing these.
        So our technology supports to dismounted includes what we
    can do to protect them, which is limited, to increased handheld
    devices and also some airborne sensors.

                                    TRAINING

        But I would tell you, for both of these, one of the things
    over the last year we have greatly invested in is training. Our
    troopers tell us, hey, sir, this is great equipment, but I
    don't see it until I get to Afghanistan. Handheld devices, how
    do I integrate all these sensors? How do I operate a ground-
    penetrating radar screen and know what to look for?
        So, over the last 18 months, we have purchased 75 sets of
    equipment, and they are fielded out to Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
    the home of the 101 Air Assault Division, to Camp Lejeune, and
    also at our big training centers. And then we have a refresher
    training when they get in-theater.
        So before a trooper goes out on operation, he has seen the
    equipment in his home station and is allowed to operate it, he
    has seen it at these big training exercises where he gets to
    integrate it in a very stressful environment, and then he sees
    it another time on some training lanes when he arrives in
    Kandahar or Camp Leatherneck or other places.
        So training is a nonmateriel factor which I think is
    contributing to what we are seeing.
        Mr. Lewis. General, I think by your comments you know that
    NTC Fort Irwin is in our territory. Is that kind of training
    taking place there, the undergarment sort of training in the
    field?
        General Barbero. Absolutely. The commander at Fort Irwin is
    my deputy for training. And not only is it taking place there,
    it is taking place at Twentynine Palms, at the Marine Corps
    training at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Joint Readiness Training
    Center, where there are other Army units training.

                                LESSONS LEARNED

        And we take lessons learned from the field. When a brigade
    deploys, within its first 90 days we have a VTC with them, and
    Fort Irwin and the Marines and the whole community is on there.
    And we say, what did you learn in training? What can we do
    better? And from those VTCs, we take those actions and put them
    into training.
        I will give you an example, Congressman, recently. As we
    looked at the mounted threat, we noticed that the enemy was
    taking culverts and underpasses and packing them with
    explosives at the end of a command wire, the large amounts of
    explosives they can pack in there. So we heard that in an AAR,
    so we did two things. We said, okay, Fort Irwin and the rest of
    the training centers, you have got to replicate this threat and
    train our forces on it. And then we looked at a solution and
    then fielded hundreds of barrier devices with sensors that will
    hopefully keep our insurgents from getting in there.
        But, to answer your question, our training centers are
    fully linked in on this, and we are updating them as we take
    these lessons learned from individual incidents.

                             PAKISTANI COOPERATION

        Mr. Lewis. Briefly responding to the chairman's inquiry, do
    we have any kind of reliable partnership with the Pakistani
    military leadership relative to identifying the sources of this
    kind of activity?
        General Barbero. I have been to Pakistan twice and met with
    the military. We have a framework for cooperation on this area.
    We press them hard. I think when they hear it from
    congressional delegations, the State Department, and DoD, it
    has an effect.
        I will tell you that we have talked a lot about
    cooperation; we have not seen cooperation yet.
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen.

                                CHAIN OF COMMAND

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your distinguished career since West
    Point.
        I want to get back to the chairman's letter here. Now, we
    have a chain of command here, these units. And, obviously, we
    are respectful of what is on the battlefield, the weapon of
    choice.
        So if a soldier brings something to his superior's
    attention that obviously involves his safety or her safety and
    the people in that unit, what has happened in this situation?
    What have you found through your investigation here?
        General Barbero. Well, I have not investigated the chain of
    command. We look at the incidents and try to learn from them--
    --

                          COUNTER IED EQUIPMENT POLICY

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, no, I am sort of drilling down
    here of the policy issue here. We are providing resources here,
    but obviously we are talking about human beings. And if
    soldiers have an issue about--you know, if all of the equipment
    has been destroyed, someone might say, well, it might be
    difficult to get some in here, or maybe the budget has run dry,
    there are none, you know, in the area that can replace it,
    soldiers have to go out on patrol. Is that the policy?
        General Barbero. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. But, more importantly, in this instance,
    with this situation, how did the chain of command work? And was
    anybody out there listening?
        General Barbero. I----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I assume we have had some time to look
    into this matter?
        General Barbero. I can tell you a couple facts and then
    tell you what I don't know.
        Fourth Brigade, 82nd is in the Zharay province--a very,
    very tough area. And I visited briefly with them in July,
    talked to the brigade commander. And since that time, we have
    had a video after-action review with them on lessons learned
    and things we can do better. That commander is very open when
    he needs something or if something hasn't worked.
        I have not studied the letter. I have reviewed the
    incident, but I have not studied the letter or the comments in
    here, and so I can't comment on that.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is a more personal hearing than
    many of the hearings we have here.
        General Barbero. Right. Right.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. But just run me through the process
    here. Obviously, soldiers obey the command of their superior
    officers. And if equipment is destroyed, you know, and there is
    no replacement, people have to go on foot, right, with all the
    other devices you refer to here? Is that the policy?
        And is there an issue here in this area where there was no
    other equipment available?
        General Barbero. I don't know what the specific policy is,
    but I have never heard a commander say, "Listen, we don't have
    this equipment, but I want you to go out there anyway." I know
    this commander, in particular, has told me, and I even walked
    the patrols, that he will not send out a patrol unless it has
    the following equipment.
        And I am not sure--if there was a breakdown--obviously,
    Sergeant Sitton felt there were--and where that breakdown may
    have fell, I can't answer that, but----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, this is a--obviously, some letters
    have gone back and forth here, and, obviously, this is
    particularly horrific. Of course, all of us as Members have
    constituents. God forbid, many have died, but many have double
    amputees. And I have to be quite blunt. I haven't been good
    enough to question them, in some cases, the way that perhaps--
    the underpinnings of this discussion. But I do think there is a
    policy issue here.

                         PLACING MARKERS IN FERTILIZER

        And on another issue, I think this is in the public arena,
    relative to the ranking member's comments, I thought Members of
    Congress were interested in putting some markers in some of
    this material that has been produced down there. And, quite
    honestly, the response from the bureaucracy was pretty lame.
    Where do we stand relative to that issue?
        General Barbero. Congressman, this has to deal with the
    fertilizer, and I would like to take that on in a different
    session, if I could. I think we will get into some classified
    information.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay.
        General Barbero. But we have asked four things: So the
    fertilizer industry writ large, we have engaged them and also,
    obviously, the Pakistani fertilizer issue, is first dye this
    stuff, put a dye in it, so a border guard on the Pakistan
    border who can't read can----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you are actually answering my
    question even though----
        General Barbero. Well, I will tell you the four things that
    are open. We proposed this.
        The first step is dye. Change the color. Right now it is
    this nondescript white; it is easily repackaged. And we have
    seen this as detergent and other materials. And if you have an
    illiterate border guard on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, it
    is hard to detect when it has been repackaged.
        The second thing is for the fertilizer industry, they need
    to reformulate this. Ammonium nitrate, in its pure form,
    existed until Northern Ireland----
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. General, this Committee has been talking
    about this for 4 years.
        General Barbero. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. You know, I hope we can make some
    progress. On the policy issue, it would be good if you could
    provide some clarification as to what it is.
        General Barbero. Okay. I will.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. We would appreciate it.
        General Barbero. In another session, I can describe in
    detail our conversations of this specific problem.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. We will work with the General to schedule a
    classified version because I understand the reason why we can't
    discuss all of the technologies today and some of the tactics.
        But I wanted to add to what Mr. Frelinghuysen said when he
    was talking about the chain of command. And I told you that
    after getting Sitton's letter that I doubled back with some
    other soldiers who had told me similar stories to what Matt
    Sitton told me. And one of those, by the way, was a
    commissioned officer; they were not just enlisted personnel. It
    was a commissioned officer who suffered from this same exposure
    from the same area.
        So I wanted to make sure that you knew it wasn't just the
    soldier walking in the field, in the minefield. It was a
    commissioned officer that confirmed what Sergeant Sitton said.
        Mr. Visclosky.

              FUNDING THE EQUIPPING AND TRAINING OF AFGHAN FORCES

        Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you very much.
        Regarding the IED equipment--and if you have commented
    earlier, because I apologize, I was late--could you talk about
    the training and equipping of the Afghan forces and how that is
    proceeding? Because it appears you have to be trained up, and,
    even given that, there are very serious dangers here.
        General Barbero. My responsibility and my funding is
    authorized to support our combatant commanders in support of
    U.S. forces. I cannot use any of my funding for equipping or
    even training the Afghan forces. ISAF and the NATO training
    command there has a different fund to do that.
        Mr. Visclosky. Okay. Are they being trained?
        General Barbero. They are being trained.
        Mr. Visclosky. Who trains them?
        General Barbero. NATO forces at the institutions, and then
    when they operate----
        Mr. Visclosky. That would be in-country?
        General Barbero. That would be in-country, absolutely.
        Mr. Visclosky. And who does pay for that?
        General Barbero. Well, I can explain, give you an example.
    My last job before this, I had the training command in Iraq.
    And we had a separate pot of money called ISSF, and in
    Afghanistan I think it is called ASSF--funding to use to
    provide training, equipping of these security forces. And that
    fund is what is used to do that.
        They are being trained in-country in EOD, route clearance,
    basic counter-IED. And the equipping is being procured to allow
    them to do that.
        Mr. Visclosky. It is not coming out of your pot, and you
    are not responsible for it.
        If I could ask the chair or staff, are we responsible for
    that pot of money and it is simply a different agency under our
    jurisdiction? Do we know? Where is that money coming from? Do
    we know?
        General Barbero. It is OCO.

                          PERFORMANCE OF AFGHAN FORCES

        Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
        Do you have an impression as to how this is working and,
    subsequently, whether the Afghans will have money to, you know,
    do this on their own?
        General Barbero. Well, two points, Congressman.
        First of all, Secretary Carter has brought us all together
    and said, our priorities are to see what we can do to
    accelerate their capabilities. And so he has taken this on. He
    has said there are very few higher priorities than to build
    these capabilities for the Afghan forces. So it is a priority
    for him and for the Department to support the training command
    in Afghanistan to do this.
        When I talk to our U.S. commanders about equipping and
    training and what they need and when I was there in July, they
    comment that when--and the statistics prove this--that when
    they operate with Afghan forces, their found and cleared rates
    go up. Because the Afghans are very, as you would imagine, just
    like it was in Iraq, they know what to look for, they know what
    doesn't look right. When they walk into a village to talk to
    people, they will be more forthcoming than they are with our
    forces. So they are effective at this.
        I will also tell you that they are increasingly being
    targeted. Statistics also show us, as they get out there more
    often and they are in the lead and especially effective in
    these counter-IED operations, they are being targeted more by
    IEDs.
        But beyond how capable they are, I would take that for the
    record and get you something from the folks in-theater.
        [The information follows:]

        The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
    has supported Train the Trainer efforts in support of Afghanistan
    National Security Forces (ANSF) by assisting Combined Joint Task Force
    (CJTF) Paladin supporting the National Training Mission-Afghanistan
    (NTM-A). For example, JIEDDO facilitated contracting of 29 counter-
    improvised explosive device (C-IED) trainers for CJTF Paladin by
    assisting with the writing the Statement of Work and providing subject
    matter expertise on what the contractor should accomplish in this
    training. These C-IED trainers will provide training to the ANSF on
    handheld equipment, site exploitation, explosive hazard reduction, and
    C-TED awareness.
        JIEDDO has offered to facilitate NTM-A's efforts to translate the
    C-IED training materials into Dari and Pashtun, but at this time we
    have no formal request for this assistance.
        JIEDDO is not in any position to evaluate ANSF's C-IED capabilities
    directly, as that is the mission of NTM-A.

        Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Crenshaw.

                             TRAINING THE AFGHANIS

        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Along the lines of training the Afghanis, let me ask you
    about that in the context of the green-on-blue situations that
    we are reading more and more about. And I know we have limited
    the number of those joint efforts. And I am sure that General
    Allen would say every time you got one of those situations you
    have a lot of positive interaction that takes place.
        But my question is, when we talk about training the
    Afghanis in terms of counter-IED, is there any concern at all
    on our part that, as we train in terms of counter-IED, that
    some of that information becomes a blueprint for those green-
    on-blue situations, where we are basically telling them what we
    do, we are training them not only in a positive way, how to
    deal with that, but in a very negative way, how they can
    utilize that information in the wrong way? Is that a concern?
        General Barbero. I have not heard that concern raised by
    our commanders. And I can tell you that there are certain
    technologies which will not be transferred to the Afghan
    security forces for a variety of reasons. And we will share
    with them information, but we won't share with them our full
    capabilities for a variety of reasons: their ability to
    integrate that information, classified reasons, and other
    senses.
        But I have not heard a concern from any commander that when
    they share information with their local Afghan counterpart,
    that that then is used against them.

                             BLUE ON GREEN ATTACKS

        Mr. Crenshaw. Is that something that you think that we
    ought to be thinking about?
        General Barbero. Given the nature and the seriousness of
    these blue on green attacks, we need to look at all aspects of
    it, I think. As General Dempsey said, it is not business as
    usual. I think he is saying we have to change something. So I
    believe we should look at all aspects of it.
        Mr. Crenshaw. As you say, this is a thinking enemy. It
    seems like we have to be thinking ahead, not just dealing with
    what we deal with. Part of my question is what do you see next?
    For instance, if we are training the Afghanis when we leave,
    they are going to have these counter-IED capabilities. If we
    don't tell them everything we know, then we leave, we are
    leaving them with inadequate information. Yet if we tell them
    everything we know, the concern that I raise is that they may
    be able to use that as a blueprint for working against us. So
    it seems to me that is a pretty complicated situation. What are
    your thoughts as we leave and as you see what happens day to
    day, what is next? Where do you see an increased use of IEDs
    and things like that?
        General Barbero. Let me just, Congressman, take that in the
    context from what we learned from the drawdown in Iraq and the
    transition there. We saw an increase in a certain type of
    weapon, these explosively formed projectiles, copper plates on
    a command wire. So as we detected this increase, we fielded
    additional capabilities to find these things and to go after
    them.
        I would also tell you that, as I said in my statement, a
    smaller number of troops on the ground does not equal a
    corresponding drawdown in certain capabilities. Counter IED, we
    know it is still going to be used, and we need to increase our
    capabilities there.
        ISR is another one. As your footprint decreases and you
    rely more on local forces, the fidelity of reporting and the
    accuracy of the reporting draws down also. So you must
    compensate for that. And one of the capabilities is an increase
    actually, what we did in Iraq, of ISR, to be able to fill in
    those gaps of situational awareness.
        So those are some of the things that we have to keep in
    mind, that a drawdown in boots on the ground does not equal a
    drawdown across the board in all of our capabilities. And we
    are looking for indicators of other threats. And right now we
    are looking at next spring fighting season. What do we learn
    now, what can we get postured in time to equip our troops for
    that inevitable fighting season?

                             ATTACKING THE NETWORK

        If I could make one point, Mr. Chairman. We have talked a
    lot about the device, defeating the device, and we have to do
    that. Most of our effort and our technology and our funding
    goes to that because that is how you limit casualties and that
    is how our commanders gain freedom of maneuver.
        We also talked, we invest a lot in training because a well-
    trained trooper is our best counter IED tool.
        The third line of operation and the one that is decisive is
    attacking the network. It goes to Congressman Dicks' comments
    about this network that supplies them these materials. And we
    must continue to do that and go after these networks, find out
    where their funds are and bring all the tools of our government
    to bear on these. And we are doing that also. That is a
    decisive effort, though.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Calvert.

                                    PAKISTAN

        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for coming today. We are all extremely
    frustrated, as you can tell. And I am sure nobody is more
    frustrated than you are. As Mr. Frelinghuysen said, this has
    been going on for years to get a coherent strategy on how to
    deal with these IEDs. And we keep going back to Pakistan, our
    supposed ally in the region. What kind of ally would allow for
    this kind of activity to continue? You know, I keep saying
    look, if we had two major fertilizers plants in Mexico and
    people were smuggling across even a small amount of fertilizer
    and killing five U.S. citizens a week, I am sure we would
    something about it pretty quickly.
        Here we are today losing approximately five U.S.
    servicemembers a week, or having horrific injuries, and it
    seems we are unable to do anything with our supposed ally in
    Pakistan. These markers that we were talking about, the
    Pakistani Government is not even interested in dealing with the
    United States in making those markers available. Some people
    think they are effective or not effective, I don't know. But it
    tells you something about Pakistan that they don't even want to
    consider doing anything to help us identify calcium ammonium
    nitrate as it crosses that border. The Haqqani network
    continues to operate with impunity in Pakistan and especially
    in some of the border regions, which we can probably get into a
    more secure briefing area, without any interference with the
    Pakistani military at all. And it seems to me you can do a lot
    of work in Afghanistan and other regions around the world where
    we are going to have this problem, and that is important, but
    specifically to the Afghan theater. If the material that is
    being used continues to cross that border with virtually no
    interference at all because the border is a sieve, you can
    smuggle just about anything across that border, without any
    assistance from the Pakistanis at all, how in the hell are we
    going to deal with this?
        General Barbero. Congressman, I can't argue with anything
    that you have said. As I said at the outset when you are just
    focused on the device and mitigating its impact you are playing
    defense. In another session----
        Mr. Calvert. I think we are all tired of playing defense.
        Mr. Chairman, I think any aid and assistance that we have
    to Pakistan should be directly tied to their assistance to us
    to help us deal with these fertilizer plants in Pakistan,
    especially something as simple as adding a color or an odor to
    the production of this fertilizer. And I know those offers have
    been made. Those offers have been made to cover the cost of it
    and they are not interested in doing it because I am sure the
    ISI finds it convenient to continue to be able to work with the
    Haqqani network to smuggle this across the border. Let's just
    call it the way it is. They like to destabilize the Afghan
    Government, destabilize the NATO allies that are fighting in
    Afghanistan, and the Pakistanis continue to deal with these
    people. And they continue to kill American soldiers every day.
        Mr. Young. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Calvert. Yes, I am happy to yield.
        Mr. Young. You remember that in our defense appropriations
    bill that we passed with a very large number in the House, we
    had some very tough language dealing with the issue that you
    are talking about in Pakistan. But when the Senate chose not to
    take up that bill, that became null and void and we are
    functioning under a continuing resolution which does not
    include the strong language on Pakistan.
        Mr. Calvert. And nobody has worked harder on this issue
    than you have, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that language. It is
    frustrating to us to have to operate under a continuing
    resolution when we could do some things, and I hope maybe
    during the lame duck session maybe we can work toward a real
    bill.
        Mr. Young. We tried to get that language in the CR as an
    anomaly, but we weren't successful there. Thank you for raising
    that issue. It is a very important issue.
        Mr. Calvert. As I mentioned earlier, if these two
    fertilizer plants were in Mexico, I suspect we would find a way
    to neutralize that problem. But they are not, they are in
    Pakistan.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Hinchey.

               SUSPENSION OF U.S.-AFGHAN JOINT MILITRY OPERATIONS

        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Barbero, thank you very much. I very much
    appreciate everything that you are saying. And I think it is
    very, very good we called this hearing today because this is a
    whole host of set of circumstances that need to be focused on
    and dealt with and dealt with as effectively as possible. So I
    think it is worth discussing the news that U.S.-Afghan joint
    military operations have been suspended. They have been
    suspended, and at least below the battalion level after
    numerous green on blue attacks. So this year already, as I
    understand it, 51 NATO coalition members have been killed in
    these types of attacks, various kinds of attacks that have been
    going on over there. So I know that we have justified our
    continued commitment to Afghanistan by our willingness to train
    Afghan forces and hand responsibility as much as possible to
    them, but the situation to some extent continues although I
    think we have done things that are apparently making the
    situation a little bit better, stronger and more effective.
    Less people are getting killed.
        I think it is worth discussing in this Committee since we
    are spending as I understand it $85.6 billion in and around
    Afghanistan by maintaining our presence and training and arming
    people that end up killing our young men and women. So there is
    a whole host of things that are going on and I deeply
    appreciate you and I deeply appreciate all of the things that
    you have been engaged in and how you have been trying to
    straighten this out.
        I wonder how long will training be suspended and what do we
    realistically hope to achieve between now and the end of 2014?
    And is that worth the risks to American lives and the
    tremendous appropriations that are dealt with in the meantime?
        As I said, I know that you are dealing with this very
    effectively, but it is an interesting situation. It is an
    interesting situation to a large extent with Afghanistan
    because of the conflicting activities that are being engaged
    there by that country. So I would appreciate whatever you can
    tell us about that.
        General Barbero. Thank you, Congressman.
        I can tell you what I have seen is that the suspension of
    joint operations has been described as temporary by ISAF, and I
    am not sure beyond that when it will resume. The chairman
    quoted General Dempsey about the seriousness of this, and it is
    not business as usual and the Department is seized with it. And
    I do not want to give you any misinformation on that, but I do
    not deal with green on blue, so I would be just guessing if I
    told you, gave you my views on that. And some of those are
    policy decisions, obviously.
        But I do, and I would like to say before this Committee
    that the issues we have talked about underscore why going into
    fiscal year 2013, having the budgetary flexibility that we have
    requested in our submission is so important. General Dempsey
    described the way forward as not a straight line. And we know
    certain things about 2013, and there are certain things we just
    don't know. We know there is going to be a tough fighting
    season. The Secretary said that the other day. We know it is a
    smart and determined enemy. We have a whole generation of bomb
    makers. And the IED numbers continue to tell us it is going to
    be the weapon of choice. And we know that we will be conducting
    combat operations into 2013.
        Why we need flexibility, and how long will we be at 68,000?
    And how long will we continue to require increased counter IED
    capabilities. The enemy gets a vote. It is a thinking enemy,
    and they are going to do this, what we described today and
    other actions.
        If we have a new initiative that comes our way, that could
    be, have an impact on the counter IED fight, and we are going
    to get it there as fast as we can. We have one in theater now
    that is a new capability that I can't talk about here much,
    although I will tell you it allows us, I think, to detonate
    certain IEDs at the time and place of our choosing. We have
    moved that to theater, so we need that flexibility as we go
    into 2013 to find and field new initiatives. And then there are
    unforeseen requirements from our commanders, just as we had
    this year. For robots and undergarments and additional sensors
    that we need to be able to fund also. So what we have talked
    about here is a very dynamic situation, and it requires us to
    have the flexibility to be able to respond and support our
    commanders and the troopers.

                POLITICAL TURBULANCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

        Mr. Hinchey. Just one more simple little question.
    Afghanistan is a complicated set of circumstances. I am just
    wondering to what extent we are trying to understand just
    exactly what they are doing, what their motivation is, what
    their complexity is, how they are dealing with the complex
    internally within their country. Is there any sense that we
    have with regard to what the future might be and if that future
    is going to be steadily honest, secure, or maybe not?
        General Barbero. I am sure, Congressman, that there are
    experts and leaders who study this and can answer that. I am
    not one of them. I have not studied it and I have not formed a
    view on that. It would be way outside my lane to try to guess
    on the future of Afghanistan or Pakistan.
        Mr. Hinchey. So this is something we need to deal with more
    effectively and get the answers to.
        Thank you very much, General.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Bonner.

             AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT OTHER U.S. AGENCIES WITH DOD FUND

        Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, this has been an enlightening hearing and I think
    we all look forward to the closed session that we will have a
    chance to have with you.
        The chairman made note of the fact that we had language in
    our defense bill which has drawn bipartisan support that
    perhaps would have sent a very blunt and direct message to
    Pakistan with regard to these fertilizer plants and he also
    mentioned that because we are operating under a CR that very
    few on this Committee are excited about that language can't
    take effect yet from Congress. But it is not, correct me if I
    am wrong, it would not preclude the leadership of the
    Department of Defense from recommending it to the Commander in
    Chief that he initiate this message? Are you familiar enough
    with the language that Chairman Young was talking about that
    you could offer a comment about whether you think this might be
    a possible solution with regard to this issue?
        General Barbero. Is this in relation to funding for
    Pakistan?
        Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
        General Barbero. I am not familiar with the specific
    language that is contained therein. But I am familiar with the
    legislative proposal that has been submitted from the
    Department that deals with my authorities to use my funding
    which I would like to recommend support for. It would allow me
    to use my funding to support any activity by our other Federal
    agencies, Border Patrol, FBI and others, to impede the flow of
    these materials from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Right now I
    can't do that. If a Federal agency said we want to put this
    technology in place working with either Afghan border police or
    Pakistan border police, I can't help them, although it directly
    impacts the problem that we have talked about, and the language
    is in the authorization bill, both versions, which would
    support this. I am concerned that I will not be able to enact
    this until the NOAA is passed. But that language, I think I
    know about because we helped prepare it. The Department
    supported it, and it is in both authorization bills and I think
    that is a tool that we can use, which I can talk more about in
    this closed session.

                             MILITARY WORKING DOGS

        Mr. Bonner. You know, every member here has been to Walter
    Reed Bethesda, none more than Chairman Young and his wife,
    Beverly. Every member here has been, like you and others in
    uniform, to the homes of the young men and women who have come
    home in a flag-draped coffin.
        I had the privilege of having breakfast this morning with a
    young man from my district who stepped on an IED. Fortunately,
    I had a chance to have breakfast with him and I didn't have to
    go to a funeral home to pay respects to his family. He lost a
    leg, he is fighting to keep the second leg. So when you hear
    the questions coming from around this table, they are coming
    with frustration and with heartfelt concern that more has to be
    done. They are also coming obviously with the greatest respect
    for the uniform you wear and the tough decisions that you have
    under your responsibility.
        We have talked about the robots and the undergarments and
    the additional sensors and other things. One thing we haven't
    discussed is what is being done with regard to dogs going out?
    Is that something that has been effective? Is that something
    that could be more helpful until we get a permanent--we know
    what the weapon of choice is, but until we find a way to take
    that weapon off the table, are dogs part of the solution? And
    if so, are you getting adequate funding for that?
        General Barbero. Congressman, we are. Dogs are a part of
    this. I tell people we are involved in fielding everything from
    a sensor at 40,000 feet to a four-legged sensor on the ground.
    And they are effective. And our commanders use them.
        Some commanders will not let a dismounted patrol go out
    without a dog. They have limitations--110 degree heat, climbing
    over culverts and into canals and things like that, carrying a
    dog over a wall so you don't go through a likely ambush point.
    But they are effective. But it boils down to selection of the
    handler. If you don't have a senior NCO picking the right
    soldier or marine or airman or sailor to go out there, you are
    not going to be successful. And I am confident all of our
    commanders understand that and are engaged in picking the right
    handler for the dog to really make it an operational team. The
    other part is the preparation and training of the dogs and
    getting them trained on the right senses, ammonium nitrate, for
    example, to sense that. But it is a part of it. It is part of
    this network and part of the tools that my job is to provide to
    commanders and NCOs and let them choose which ones they want to
    take on which mission which is most effective in their specific
    area. But dogs are effective, and we are committed to that. And
    we are adequately funded for those.
        Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                                 SITTON LETTER

        Mr. Young. I would advise the committee in an agreement the
    General and I had yesterday on timing, we have time for each
    member to have a follow-up question. I am going to use my time
    for a follow-up question. I have had a couple of notes from the
    audience asking a little more about the Sitton letter which has
    been mentioned several times. I only have a couple of copies of
    that letter, but I am going to ask Mr. Paul Terry to actually
    read the Sitton letter so you know what we are talking about
    when you hear reference to the Sitton letter.
        Mr. Terry. Hello. My name is Staff Sergeant Matthew Sitton.
    I am in the 82nd Airborne Division stationed in Fort Bragg,
    North Carolina. I am currently deployed with the 4th Brigade
    Combat Team in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in
    Afghanistan. I am writing you because I am concerned for the
    safety of my soldiers. This is my third combat tour to
    Afghanistan. So I have seen the transition in rules of
    engagement and overall tactics over the past 6 years. I am only
    writing this email because I feel myself and my soldiers are
    being put into unnecessary positions where harm and danger are
    imminent. I know the threat of casualties in war and am totally
    on board with sacrifice for my country, but what I do not agree
    with is the chain of command making us walk through, for lack
    of a better term, basically a mine field on a daily basis. I am
    in a platoon of 25 soldiers. We are operating at a tempo that
    is set for a full 35-40 man infantry platoon. We have been
    mandated to patrol twice daily for 2-4 hours each patrol on top
    of guarding our forward operating base and conducting routine
    maintenance of our equipment. There is no end state or purpose
    for the patrols given to us from our higher chain of command,
    only that we will be out for a certain period of time. I am all
    for getting on the ground and fighting for my country when I
    know there is a desired end state and we have clear guidance of
    what needs to be done. But when we are told basically to just
    go walk around for a certain amount of time is not sitting well
    with me. As a brigade, we are averaging at a minimum an amputee
    a day from our soldiers, because we are walking around
    aimlessly through grape rows and compounds that are littered
    with explosives. Not to mention that the operating tempo that
    every soldier is on leaves little to no time for rest and
    refit. The morale and alertness levels on our patrols are low,
    and it is causing casualties left and right.
        Here is an example of how bad things have gotten. Our small
    forward operating base was flooded accidentally by a local [by
    a local--that being citizen] Early one morning a few days ago.
    He was watering his fields and the dam he had broke and water
    came flooding into our living area. Since our forward operating
    base does not have portable bathrooms, we had to dig a hole in
    the ground where soldiers could use for the bathroom. That also
    got flooded and contaminated the water that later soaked every
    soldier and his gear. Instead of returning to base and cleaning
    up, our chain of command was set on us meeting the brigade
    commanders two patrols a day guidance that they made us move
    outside the flooded forward operating base and conduct our
    patrols soaked in urine.
        That is just one single instance of the unsatisfactory
    situation that our chain of command has put us in. At least
    three of my soldiers have gotten sick since that incident and
    taken away from our combat power because of their illness
    caused by unhealthy conditions.
        I understand that as a commander you are to follow the
    orders of those appointed over you. However, there needs to be
    a time where the wellness of your soldiers needs to take
    priority over walking around in fields for hours a day for no
    rhyme or reason, but only to meet the brigade commander's
    guidance of you will conduct so many patrols for such an
    allotted time.
        I am concerned about the well-being of my soldiers and have
    tried to voice my opinion through the proper channels of my own
    chain of command, only to be turned away and told that I need
    to stop complaining. It is my responsibility to take care of my
    soldiers, and there is only so much I can do with that little
    bit of rank I have. My guys would fight by my side and have my
    back in any condition, and I owe it to them to have their best
    interest in mind. I know they would and I certainly would
    appreciate it if there was something that you could do to help
    us out. I just want to return my guys home to their families
    healthy.
        I apologize for taking your time like this, sir, and I
    appreciate what you do for us. I was told to contact you by my
    grandmother who said you had helped my uncle many years ago. He
    was also serving in the military at that time. Thank you again
    for allowing soldiers like me to voice their opinion. If
    anything, please pray for us over here. God bless.
        Mr. Young. Paul, thank you very much.
        That letter was forwarded to the Pentagon, and a discussion
    of that letter took place between myself and numerous high
    ranking leaders at the Pentagon, military and civilian.
        Before we got any kind of a response, Sergeant Sitton's
    prophesy came true. He died. He and his platoon sergeant were
    both affected by the same IED and they both died.
        Mr. Dicks.

                               FUNDING AUTHORITY

        Mr. Dicks. As I understand what you testified, General, you
    do not have the language that you need in order to deal with
    this border situation, and it was in both of the authorizing
    bills but it is not in the continuing resolution; is that
    correct?
        General Barbero. That is true, Congressman.
        Mr. Dicks. So the authorization bills are not enacted and
    the continuing resolution is not amended, you can't do what you
    have asked to be able to do; is that correct?
        General Barbero. That is my understanding, Congressman.
        Mr. Dicks. Can you tell us what this will not allow you to
    do that you want to do?
        General Barbero. This would adjust our funding authorities
    so I can use my funds, which I can commit rapidly to fund
    initiatives by other Federal agencies, Border Patrol and
    others, to take actions along the Afghan-Pakistan border to
    help impede the flow of these materials, either helping Afghan
    forces, Pakistani forces, or otherwise. And this would allow me
    to use my funds which were designed to be able to rapidly
    address issues like this, in my view. So that is what it would
    allow us to do.
        Mr. Dicks. Could this be addressed by a reprogramming? Have
    you thought about that?
        General Barbero. No, I think it could not be.
        Mr. Dicks. So you think it takes legislative language?
        General Barbero. It does. That is what we have been told,
    and that is what we have been working and the Department has
    supported this legislative language.
        Mr. Dicks. Another reason why we ought to get this defense
    bill enacted and get our authorization bill passed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        Mr. Lewis.

                               FERTILIZER MARKERS

        Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, we have noted that the administration has been
    willing to take direct action when the Congress is not acting
    in a number of arenas. Relative to fertilizer and ammonium
    nitrates, relative to markers in fertilizer, are you telling me
    that the Congress, in spite of the Congress, the
    administration, the Secretary of Defense, upon your request,
    could not take action that would specifically require markers
    placed in ammonium nitrates? Are your hands tied to that extent
    that you can't take a direct action that will save the lives of
    our troops by saying, through the Secretary of Defense, by God,
    we have to do something. I am the General, I am asking you to
    do something.
        General Barbero. Congressman, throughout the fertilizer
    industry, there is no one who puts markers or taggants in their
    fertilizer. The issue is----
        Mr. Lewis. Why?
        General Barbero. I think it is purely cost. We have raised
    this to them. There are very strict, since Oklahoma City, there
    are very strict restrictions here on the transfer of ammonium
    nitrate in the United States. Not so, obviously, in other
    places in the world.
        It is going to take Pakistan to take these actions. We
    cannot force it. If the Secretary of Defense ordered it, I am
    not sure how it would happen. It is going to take cooperation
    from Pakistan and this company to do that, and to treat this
    specific case that we have been talking about, about the flow
    of these materials into Afghanistan.
        Mr. Lewis. You know, I do not believe this Committee wants
    to be in a position of serving the Secretary of State, imposing
    our willing upon the Commander in Chief, et cetera, but my God,
    troops are losing their lives. And if we can't indeed at least
    insist that the government of Pakistan help us place markers in
    ammonium nitrate, then what are we here for?
        General Barbero. Secretary of State Clinton, this is on the
    top of her list with engagements and priorities with Pakistan.
    I can describe in another session the interagency actions that
    are taking place to get after this problem. But I just can't do
    it here in this session, Congressman.
        Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

                POLICY ON OPERATIONS WITH COUNTER IED EQUIPMENT

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, correct me if I am wrong, often the most dangerous
    time in war is when you are getting out of Dodge, when you are
    leaving, and we are departing out of Afghanistan. We give you I
    think in our budget $1.7 billion. I am wondering how we marry
    what you are doing with the policy issues raised in that letter
    that was written by Mr. Sitton? We can give you, and God bless
    you for the things that you do and things we have prevented,
    but if the money that goes into R&D is not married to some sort
    of a policy here, what I see, and correct me if I am wrong, is
    that some of these units are out there. Their equipment is
    destroyed. They may be in a God forsaken place to begin with,
    they may be in a forward operating base. Has the equipment been
    drawn down so much because of destruction, its destruction,
    that we can't supply to these soldiers some sort of a
    replacement that would perhaps limit their--the foot patrols
    that were referenced in that letter. In other words, we give
    you resources, but how is the chain of command making use of
    some of these other resources here? We have Stryker equipment.
    We have a lot of stuff that is out there.
        General Barbero. Right. Congressman, a couple of points.
    First of all, the most dangerous time in any military operation
    is a transition. When you go from one to the other.

                                   TRANSITION

        Mr. Frelinghuysen. You can call it what it is, but we are
    in that time.
        General Barbero. We are. We have two this year. There is a
    transition to an advising training role and different
    structure, and then the eventual transition to the Afghan
    security forces. These are fraught with challenges.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. The focus here is what we are going to
    do with all of the MRAPs. What about the soldiers that are on
    point now that are suffering these injuries? Are they missing
    equipment because we can't get the equipment to them? What is
    going on here?
        General Barbero. Obviously from Sergeant Sitton's letter,
    there are some issues we need to look into as a Department. But
    when I talk to commanders, I talk to junior leaders,
    lieutenants, sergeants and some troopers, I ask what them else
    they need. And they give us some very specific requirements
    which we take on.
        We are well funded to provide replacement mine rollers,
    repair parts, and contractors who work on these, and that is a
    constant point of attention, is where do we have the right
    people at the right place to rapidly repair these so when our
    troopers go outside the wire they have what they need. And we
    will redouble our effort based on this. We are not complacent
    about it, and we are looking at it.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just for the record, there are not
    shortages of some of this equipment here?
        General Barbero. Not that I am aware of.
        Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think we would like to actually maybe
    get a greater picture as to what is out there. I understand
    what is referred to and I want to be respectful that we will be
    looking into it. But in reality, this letter was out there and
    there was a call for help, and apparently we were not able to
    meet that call.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Barbero. If I could just make additional comments,
    our budget request for fiscal year 2013 was $1.9 billion. Last
    year it was $2.4 billion. We looked very seriously at the
    reduction in troops. We fielded a lot of equipment last year.
    We did not need to repeat the same funding as last year, so
    $1.9 billion it is my firm belief will allow us to meet the
    challenges that we know and those challenges that I said we
    were not sure about. And anything below that I believe we would
    be accepting risk in the area of the number one weapon used
    against us. So I appreciate your support on that.
        Mr. Young. General, if you would provide for the record
    information relative to the mine rollers and Strykers because
    the information that we have received was that there were
    Strykers sitting idle because they did not have a mine roller.
    If there is a problem in providing mine rollers, this committee
    will find a way to appropriate the money to get the mine
    rollers. Whatever it costs for the mine roller will not compare
    to the cost of a soldier's life or losing arms and legs.
        [The information follows:]

        Currently, the availability of mine rollers is not impacting
    operational use of Stryker vehicles in Afghanistan. This was confirmed
    during a recent site visit by the Project Manager--Stryker Brigade
    Combat Team.
        Of the 144 mine rollers delivered in Afghanistan for use on Stryker
    Double V-Hull (DVH) vehicles, 52 have been issued and another 92 are
    available for issue. An additional 114 mine rollers are currently on
    contract and are being delivered to Afghanistan at a rate of 20 per
    month with an expected delivery completion in March 2013. This will
    complete the total requirement of 258 mine rollers.
        To allow installation of the mine rollers on the Stryker DVH, an
    adapter kit, or ``Delta'' kit has been developed. With regards to the
    Mine Roller Adapter Kit (MRAK) Delta kit, 80 kits have been delivered
    in Afghanistan for use on Stryker DVH vehicles. Of these 80 delivered
    kits, 36 have been issued and 44 are available for issue. An additional
    125 are currently on contract and are being delivered to Afghanistan at
    a rate of 20 per month with an expected delivery completion in April
    2013. This will complete the total requirement of 205 MRAK Delta kits.
        Currently, all current Stryker DVH vehicle fieldings in Afghanistan
    include two Light Weight Mine Roller (LWMR) systems per platoon and
    additional LWMRs are being issued to the current DVH fleet as required.

        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
        Mr. Young. Absolutely.

                             RAPID RESPONSE FUNDING

        Mr. Dicks. We received a letter yesterday, a couple of days
    ago from Secretary Panetta which cited that DoD has a rapid
    acquisition authority to align funds to provide for the safety
    of the troops. The Committee was just given this letter on 9/
    17, and this was authority that was in the 2003 authorization
    bill. Why couldn't this authority be used? If you can't answer
    that directly, take a look into this. I think it could address
    a number of these issues, especially the one dealing with the
    border issue.
        General Barbero. My funding is rapid response. I can
    approve $25 million with my signature. Anything above that is
    rapidly staffed through the four stars and the Deputy Secretary
    approves that. He has never disapproved one, and it takes us
    about 7 days to get that approved.
        Mr. Dicks. So you could do the mine rollers?
        General Barbero. In total, Congressman, we have spent about
    $400-500 million on mine rollers, repair parts and contractors
    to support them. We will look into the mine roller issue and
    report back to this committee.
        Mr. Dicks. We will give you a copy of this letter. Take a
    look at this authority and see if this authority could be of
    assistance.
        General Barbero. Absolutely.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.

                               IED BOMBER NETWORK

        Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, on the networks that protect the bombers and
    provide them supplies, guide them, what success have you had
    against these networks in Afghanistan and Iraq? What remains to
    be done, and particularly as far as the security forces in
    Afghanistan now, have they been helpful, unhelpful? Are parts
    of the network embedded in the Afghan security forces? If you
    could comment.
        General Barbero. I will tell you in a description of the
    networks, and this could be applied in a number of places
    around the world, but in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, we
    see a cooperation or I call it a consortium of networks. You
    have the narco, the poppy network. That is the cash crop for
    the insurgency, and they use IEDs to protect their cash crop.
    You have a smuggling network which has gone across that border
    for centuries. That is involved in this. And then you have the
    insurgents network that is controlling the flow of these
    materials. So when you talk about the network, it is this
    consortium of networks that you have to look at.
        And I will tell you, I believe and as I have said, I have
    done this in Iraq, I believe we are being effective against the
    network. One of the factors I didn't mention, which is driving
    down the effectiveness rates of these attacks, is we have worn
    down the network in Afghanistan to a degree. But they are
    resilient. They are adaptive.
        Mr. Visclosky. Can you be specific? In what respect would
    you characterize you have worn them down?
        General Barbero. Well, leadership. But they are still
    obviously very active and very lethal. Leadership, we have gone
    after their supplies. But it is a continuous effort to go after
    them.
        My reports from the NSA is they are effective in providing
    intelligence and cooperating in the intelligence collection on
    these networks. And I haven't seen any reports to the contrary
    on that.
        Mr. Visclosky. Have you seen any infiltration of the
    security forces by the networks?
        General Barbero. That is the question in these blue on
    green attacks. That is still being determined, whether these
    are individual actors or part of a concerted effort. I have not
    seen the conclusion of the intelligence on that.
        Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Calvert.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am going to go back to Pakistan for a second. It seems to
    me it all goes back to this supposed ally. I know we focus a
    lot of time on Iran and what Iran is doing to fund various
    terrorist networks throughout the world that affect the
    stability and United States security, but Pakistan was the
    country that developed the nuclear weapon and then proliferated
    that weapon to our adversaries.
        Now I hear Mr. Khan is running for public office in
    Pakistan and is revered by the Pakistani population. The
    Pakistani Government continues, through the ISI, to fund and
    help and assist the Haqqani network and other terrorist
    organizations. And God knows, they continue to shield certain
    elements of the Taliban in certain communities throughout
    Pakistan, especially along the border area. They continue to
    attack NATO troops and U.S. interests with impunity. And I
    still have a hard time, I know our intelligence people say that
    they didn't know Osama bin Laden was hiding under their nose
    right there in the largest military town in Pakistan, just
    happened to live there for a few years, and they are upset that
    we went in and killed him. You know, I am just tired of people
    saying we have this ally and we have to be sensitive to their
    feelings. Well, they are not being very sensitive to us when
    they won't even allow for us to pay to put markers in these two
    fertilizer plants. I agree it is beyond just Pakistan. We ought
    to have a national standard for ammonium nitrate throughout the
    world that has a common odor and other markers put into
    ammonium nitrate because you are going to see this problem in
    South America. I wouldn't be surprised if we see it along the
    border regions of the United States and some of these crazies
    that want to do harm to the United States Government. We need
    to be more proactive.
        By the way, on this continuing resolution, the Commander in
    Chief, the definition of a continuing resolution, we give the
    authority to the President to have a lot of authority to fund
    what he wants to fund as a Commander in Chief. We give--we
    relinquished our authority under the Constitution, it doesn't
    matter who the President is. I think we all agree we should be
    doing these bills, but I would think that the President has
    some authority to say to the Pakistan Government, look, you
    agree to work with us on this or you are not going to get any
    money. We have to start playing hard ball with these guys. As I
    said, at the end of the day, you can do all you want in
    Afghanistan to protect our troops, and I know you are doing a
    lot, but at the end of the day, it is like you have your finger
    in the dike. And it is impossible to deal with the amount of
    stuff that is coming across that border.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young. Incidentally, gentlemen, we mentioned there was
    language in our defense bill that is not in the continuation
    resolution, and that language does include comments about IEDs,
    explosive devices, the networks, and the precursor chemicals.
    And so we actually do address that issue in our language that
    is not active now because there is no bill.
        Mr. Moran.

                                     POLICY

        Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I agree with the tone and the content of what
    Mr. Calvert has said, and with all of my colleagues on this
    panel, and I agree with the statements that you most recently
    made with regard to this Afghan conflict. I am glad we are
    having a hearing, but we have the wrong guy here. He is doing
    his job. He is doing the research. He has been given a
    procedural responsibility. But we are asking him about policy
    because the policy is the problem. It is not these very
    competent individuals who are carrying out their assignments.
    The best way that we can stop these horrendous losses of limbs
    and lives is to get our troops the hell out of there. That is
    the way to do it. Instead, we are spending billions and
    billions of dollars on equipment and research and so on when
    the real solution, I think, is staring us in the face.
        With regard to Pakistan, I couldn't agree more. And I agree
    with--did we put this language in that I was handed that we are
    not going to give any more money to Pakistan until they--this
    is actually in the bill, or we want to put it in? It is in the
    bill. Geez, I wish we had talked about it more. It is great
    language. The problem is they have a nuclear weapon, and we
    can't think that Iran hasn't learned that lesson that we are
    teaching every day with the hands off or gentle approach we
    take to Pakistan when they are the problem in Afghanistan.
        So I wonder if it is not time to bring the Secretary back
    after the election in the lame duck session and talk about the
    policy, talk to the policy people. It is not General Barbero's
    responsibility to answer the questions that are on our mind and
    really need answers, but I think it is past time to get some
    policy answers, particularly when it is clear that the green on
    blue attacks are stepping up. We are not making progress. And
    some of the people who have the courage to speak out honestly
    and forthrightly are telling us look, this is a lost cause. We
    are not gaining ground, and we have to try a different
    approach. Maybe the first step is to substantially accelerate
    our troop withdrawal out of Afghanistan. And the implications
    of that, the ramifications it seems to me might be helpful to
    discuss them with the Secretary, even in a public session. But
    that is your call, Mr. Chairman.
        That is all I have to say. I have been told that every
    thoughtful question that could have been asked of General
    Barbero has been asked. And so my alternative was to ask an
    unthoughtful question, and I will pass on that opportunity.
        Mr. Young. I will tell you that we started out on a NATO
    issue, but we did expand to a lot of other issues. And I agree
    with what you said, that we should be pursuing this whole issue
    of Afghanistan. You know my thoughts on that.
        Mr. Moran. And I agree with you.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Hinchey.

                      COUNTER IED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        This is a very interesting and important issue that we are
    dealing with. General, I thank you very much for everything
    that you have said effectively. I just wonder, just briefly, if
    you can discuss the research and development for future
    counter-IEDs? Is there any way you may be able to say something
    about that situation? And are big developments in the work that
    can just simply continue to save lives?
        General Barbero. Congressman, we take our R&D role and
    search for new capabilities obviously as a huge part of our
    mission. General Mattis, one of my bosses, his number one
    priority to us is predetonation. What can we do to detonate
    these IEDs to a time and place of our choosing. He has been
    very vocal about that, but also supportive. We have made--and
    this is hard physics and you are hearing this from an
    infantryman now, so bear with me. But to be able to impart
    enough energy into the ground to activate a blasting cap or
    something like that with different soil conditions and moisture
    is very--is a great challenge. But I would like to tell you
    maybe in the closed session what we are doing in that area,
    what capabilities we have fielded, and the progress of the ones
    that we have behind them in various states of research and
    development.

                             SEVEN CAPABILITY GAPS

        Also, we have identified seven areas. I identified earlier
    what I think are some enduring capabilities we need to have to
    deal with this enduring threat, and the Department is looking
    at those. But also, we have identified seven areas of our
    current capability gaps, and we have made this unclassified. We
    put it on our Web site and we shared it with industry and with
    academia and with the national labs. I have been to all of
    them, and they are directly engaged in helping us identify
    capabilities to help close some of these gaps we have--
    detection, blast mitigation, predetonation, a greater ability
    to pull fingerprints or DNA from these devices so we can
    identify and go after the network.
        So it is very active. Probably in a closed session I can
    tell you what technologies we have recently fielded and which
    ones are in the pipeline.
        Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an excellent
    hearing. I know it expanded beyond where we started at, and we
    do appreciate your willingness to join with us again to discuss
    some of the classified materials that are extremely important
    to the work that we do and to the work that you do. So we will
    be in touch with you to arrange a compatible time for that
    purpose.
        Unless Members have any other business, we are adjourned.
        [Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the
    answers thereto follow:]

        Question. We have seen significant, but insufficient, progress in
    JIEDDO's ability to manage the DoD counter-IED effort. To best confront
    the enemy's techniques, tactics and procedures, I believe we need to
    leverage the entire defense industrial base so long as our uniformed
    servicemembers are in harm's way. How can JIEDDO better leverage the
    entire industrial base, but especially the capabilities of large
    contractors, in a cost-effective manner as the defense budget
    generally, and JIEDDO's budget specifically, declines?
        Answer. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
    (JIEDDO) routinely engages directly with industry, including large
    contractors, to identify innovative capabilities in order to enable
    access to the industrial base to develop and field enablers for
    counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) related operational needs.
    For example:
         JIEDDO solicits proposals from industry, including large
    contractors, through its Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) process. Over
    the past year, JIEDDO received 132 proposals through the BAA process
    from private entities which identified themselves as large businesses
    (with ``large business'' meaning a business not eligible for
    registering with the federal government as a small business).
         JIEDDO invites industry representatives to attend JIEDDO-
    sponsored technology outreach events, such as the JIEDDO Technology
    Outreach Conferences (JTOCs).
         JIEDDO works with industry groups in the development of
    certain kinds of C-IED capabilities--for example, for C-TED solutions
    involving robotic platforms, JIEDDO leverages industry groups including
    the National Defense Industrial Association and the Association of
    Unmanned Vehicle Systems International to maintain awareness of both
    Department of Defense (DoD) and commercial efforts.
        JIEDDO leverages the whole industrial base, including both small
    business and large contractors, to meet the goal of rapid delivery to
    the warfighter. JIEDDO seeks opportunities to leverage large firms
    during the procurement phase of initiatives (i.e., the acquiring and
    fielding of developed capabilities) in order to achieve cost
    efficiencies. Currently, JIEDDO has 29 initiatives with large
    industrial partners.
        To more effectively invest in new solutions to counter an evolving
    enemy, JIEDDO strives to maintain visibility over C-IED capabilities
    being developed and fielded by other DoD components. JIEDDO's primary
    effort in this area is serving as the lead for developing a DoD-wide
    database of C-IED capabilities, which will enable the analysis needed
    to develop a comprehensive DoD-wide inventory of C-TED capabilities.
    JIEDDO is currently evaluating alternative technical approaches for
    developing the database. A timeline for creation and implementation of
    the database will be developed once JIEDDO has selected a new technical
    solution. JIEDDO expects to make a decision on the technical approach
    for the database by the first quarter of FY 2013.
        In the absence of this database and the associated comprehensive
    inventory, JIEDDO employs a number of tools and processes to maintain
    visibility over other DoD components' development and fielding of C-IED
    capabilities and how they leverage the industrial base to meet C-TED
    related operational needs, such as the following:
         DoD Services and Agencies participate in JIEDDO-sponsored
    JTOCs and mini-JTOCs.
         JIEDDO co-chairs, with the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering), the DoD C-IED Science
    and Technology (S&T) Technology Focus Team, a DoD-wide committee which
    coordinates C-IED S&T issues across DoD.
         JIEDDO conducts direct engagements with other DoD
    components (Services, Service laboratories, Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, etc.) on an as-required basis for certain planning,
    project management, and budget execution tasks.
         There are a number of liaison officers from other DoD
    components and other federal agencies who are embedded with JIEDDO.
         The Boards within the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
    Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)
    provide an opportunity for DoD entities, such as the Offices of the
    Under Secretaries of Defense, the Services, and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, to coordinate with JIEDDO on decisions regarding
    C-IED initiatives brought for review and approval.
         Subject matter experts from other DoD components
    participate in evaluation panels to review new C-TED-related proposals
    that are submitted through JIEDDO's BAA Information Delivery System
    process.
        Question. As a multibillion dollar defense organization, can you
    provide the committee with your timeline and approach to audit
    readiness for the Statement of Budgetary Resources in accordance with
    Secretary Panetta's readiness goal of March 2014.
        Answer. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's
    (JIEDDO) timeline and approach to achieving audit readiness for
    Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) is through utilization of the
    General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) in accordance with
    Department of Defense guidance. In accordance with the Department of
    the Army goals, JIEDDO began fielding GFEBS in July 2012 in preparation
    for utilization during FY2013. GFEBS will improve JIEDDO's financial
    management capability and in-turn accomplishes audit readiness for SBR
    by June 2014. Additionally, JIEDDO has implemented monthly and
    quarterly comprehensive management internal controls testing to closely
    monitor financial transactions and sequentially facilitate complete
    audit trails. By 1 October 2013, JIEDDO will execute full utilization
    of GFEBS and conduct internal controls testing to assess audit
    readiness standards. JIEDDO expects to meet full audit readiness
    standards prior to March 2014.

        [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran.]

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                               W I T N E S S E S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Barbero, Lieutenant General M. D.................................   497
    Bischoff, Kim....................................................   552
    Connor, C. D.....................................................   557
    Eckerle, Dr. W. A................................................   582
    Goraleski, Karen.................................................   546
    Gordon, Barbara..................................................   570
    Green, Lieutenant General (Dr.) C. B.............................   137
    Hieshetter, Janet................................................   588
    Horoho, Lieutenant General Patricia..............................   137
    Ingram, Lieutenant General William, Jr...........................   333
    Locklear, Admiral S. J., III.....................................   451
    McHugh, J. M.....................................................     1
    McKinley, General C. R...........................................   333
    Nathan, Vice Admiral M. L........................................   137
    Navarre, R. S....................................................   576
    Norton, N. J.....................................................   573
    Odierno, General R. T............................................     1
    Stultz, Lieutenant General J. C..................................   333
    Thurman, General J. D............................................   451
    Visco, Fran......................................................   560
    Woodson, Dr. Jonathan............................................   137
    Wyatt, Lieutenant General Harry..................................   333