    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       THE SECURITY FAILURES OF BENGHAZI

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 10, 2012

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-193

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

             Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                    Ranking Minority Member
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina   ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    JIM JORDAN, Ohio                         Columbia
    JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TIM WALBERG, Michigan                WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan               JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York          GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona               MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
    RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho              DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          PETER WELCH, Vermont
    JOE WALSH, Illinois                  JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
    TREY GOWDY, South Carolina           CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida              JACKIE SPEIER, California
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
    VACANCY

                       Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
                    John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
                         Robert Borden, General Counsel
                           Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on October 10, 2012.................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood, Utah National Guard, U.S. Army
        Oral Statement...............................................     9
        Written Statement............................................    13
    Mr. Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, U.S.
      Department of State
        Oral Statement...............................................    16
        Written Statement............................................    19
    Ms. Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
      International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S.
      Department of State
        Oral Statement...............................................    31
        Written Statement............................................    35
    The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management,
      U.S. Department of State
        Oral Statement...............................................    43
        Written Statement............................................    46

                                    APPENDIX

    Letter from Mr. Eric A. Nordstom pertaining to a list of Security
      Incidents-Libya................................................   108
    Benghazi Weekly Report-September 11, 2012 from Amber R. Pickens,
      AMEmbassy Tripoli..............................................   109
    Request for DS TDY and FTE Support from Carol R. Johnson,
      AMEmbassy Tripoli..............................................   112
    Request to add Les Ambassador Protective Detail Bodyguard
      Positions in U.S. Embassy Tripoli from Jairo Saravia, AMEmbassy
      Tripoli........................................................   115
    Request for Extension of TDY Security Personnel from Eric A.
      Nordstrom, AMEmbassy Tripoli...................................   117
    The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the
      State of Maryland, Opening Statement...........................   120
    The Honorable Michael R. Turner, a Member of Congress from the
      State of Ohio, Statement for the Record........................   122
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Member of Congress from the
      State of Virginia, Opening Statement...........................   124
    Letter from the Honorable Michael C. Burgess, a Member of
      Congress from the State of Texas to the Honorable Barack H.
      Obama, President of the United States..........................   126
    Questions from the Honorable Darrell Issa, a Member of Congress
      from the State of California to the Honorable Patrick F.
      Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of
      State and Ms. Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
      International Programs.........................................   128
    Responses to the questions sent to Patrick Kennedy and Deputy
      Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb by the Honorable Patrick
      Meehan, a Member of Congress from the State of Pennsylvania....   131
    Questions asked to Patrick Kennedy from Rep. Kucinich............   134

                       THE SECURITY FAILURES OF BENGHAZI

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, October 10, 2012

                      House of Representatives,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in Room
    2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
    [chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Issa, Burton, Jordan, Chaffetz,
    Lankford, Gosar, Labrador, Meehan, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Ross,
    Farenthold, Kelly, Cummings, Norton, Kucinich, Lynch, Cooper,
    Connolly, Davis, and Murphy.
        Also Present: Representatives Rohrabacher and Adams.
        Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Adviser; Thomas A.
    Alexander, Senior Counsel; Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff
    Member; Robert Borden, General Counsel; Molly Boyl,
    Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director; Sharon
    Casey, Senior Assistant Clerk; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff
    Director; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and
    Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Frederick Hill,
    Director of Communications and Senior Policy Advisor; Mitchell
    S. Kominsky, Counsel; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark D.
    Marin, Director of Oversight; Rafael Maryahin, Counsel; Kevin
    Corbin, Minority Professional Staff Member; Ashley Etienne,
    Minority Director of Communications; Susanne Sachsman Grooms,
    Minority Counsel; Devon Hill, Minority Staff Assistant;
    Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Press Secretary; Carla Hultberg,
    Minority Chief Clerk; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Dave
    Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; Rory Sheehan, Minority New
    Media Press Secretary; and Carlos Uriarte, Minority Counsel.
        Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order. Would you
    please take your seats?
        Perhaps most appropriately today, the Oversight Committee
    mission statement reads: We exist to secure two fundamental
    principles. First, that Americans have a right to know that the
    money Washington takes from them is well spent. And second,
    Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works
    for them.
        Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
    is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
    hold government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have
    a right to know what they get from their government. It is our
    job to work tirelessly, in partnership with citizen watchdogs,
    to deliver the facts to the American people and bring genuine
    reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is the mission of the
    Government Oversight and Reform Committee.
        On September 11th, 2012, four brave Americans serving their
    country were murdered by terrorists in Benghazi, Libya. Tyrone
    Woods spent 2 decades as a Navy SEAL, serving multiple tours in
    Iraq, Afghanistan. Since 2010, he protected the American
    diplomatic personnel. Tyrone leaves behind a widow and three
    children.
        Glen Doherty, also a former SEAL, and an experienced
    paramedic, had served his country in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
    His family and colleagues grieve today for his death.
        Sean Smith, a communications specialist, joined the State
    Department after 6 years in the United States Air Force. Sean
    leaves behind a widow and two young children.
        Ambassador Chris Stevens, a man I had known personally
    during his tours, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, ventured into a
    volatile and dangerous situation as Libyans revolted against
    the long-time Qadhafi regime. He did so because he believed the
    people of Libya wanted and deserved the same things we have,
    freedom from tyranny.
        We join here today expressing, from this side of the dais,
    our deepest sympathy for the loss of lives of the families in
    Libya.
        Additionally, other Americans were injured in this
    terrorist attack, some suffering very serious injuries. I spoke
    to the father of one American who is presently recovering here
    in the United States in a military hospital. He hopefully will
    have a full recovery, but he has gone through supplemental
    surgeries that will require a long period of recuperation and
    reconstruction.
        Yesterday, the State Department began the process of coming
    clean about what occurred in Benghazi, or at least they issued
    a broad and definitive statement headed by a gentleman here
    today, Ambassador Kennedy. They made witnesses available in
    interviews. They made every effort from what we can tell to
    ensure that the people we wanted to talk to were available to
    us.
        More importantly, yesterday they held a broad news
    conference over the phone in which they made it very clear that
    it had never been the State Department's position, I repeat
    never been the State Department's position, that in fact, this
    assault was part of a reaction to a video or the like. This is
    corroborated by numerous witnesses and whistleblowers. Contrary
    to early assertions by the administration, let's understand
    there was no protest. And cameras reveal that. And the State
    Department, the FBI, and others have that video.
        Speaking of video, the one in California, made by an
    individual and out there for a period of time, also clearly had
    no direct effect on this attack. In fact, it was September
    11th, the 11th anniversary of the greatest terrorist attack in
    U.S. history in New York, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon. It
    was that anniversary that caused an organization aligned with
    al Qaeda to attack and kill our personnel.
        I deeply, again, appreciate Secretary Clinton's efforts to
    cooperate with this investigation. She stepped in and
    instructed her people to cooperate, and they have.
    Additionally, I have had conversations directly with the
    Secretary, and I believe that our service together since 2001
    in the United States Congress plays no small part in her
    recognition of the role we serve on both sides of the dome.
        Today, however, this hearing has been called for the
    express purpose of examining security failures that led to the
    Benghazi tragedy. The safe haven within the compound which some
    State Department officials seem to think could protect the
    Benghazi compound's inhabitants did not work, and in retrospect
    could not be expected to work. The overall level of security at
    the compound did not meet the threat existent or standards
    under Inman or any other reasonable assessment for a facility
    of this sort.
        Today's hearing is the result of concerned citizens with
    direct knowledge of the events in Libya ultimately reaching
    this committee. As we look back on what occurred, our challenge
    is to identify things that clearly went wrong, and what the
    benefit of hindsight will be for the men and women serving at
    dangerous locations around the world.
        Accounts from security officials who were on the ground and
    documents indicate that they repeatedly warned Washington
    officials about the dangerous situation in Libya. Instead,
    however, of moving swiftly to respond to these concerns,
    Washington officials seemed preoccupied with the concept of
    normalization.
        We will ask our panel here today what normalization means.
    In accounts we have heard, it included artificial timelines for
    removing American security personnel, replacing them with local
    Libyans. These occurred even as training delays and new threats
    also occurred. This rush toward a reduced presence of U.S.
    personnel continued even as a bomb blew a 12-foot opening in
    the wall of this very compound we speak about today. Requests
    for extensions of more security by the mission in Libya,
    however, appeared to have often been rejected, or even, more
    deliberately, officials in Washington told diplomats in Libya
    not even to make them. Or as we have had in sworn testimony, if
    you make them they will not be supported.
        We know that the tragedy in Benghazi ended as it did. We
    now know that in fact it was caused by a terrorist attack that
    was reasonably predictable to eventually happen somewhere in
    the world, especially on September 11th.
        In closing, as Secretary Clinton has empaneled a blue
    ribbon board to fully investigate what occurred, and this work
    is important, it is much broader for us and for that panel to
    take up an additional challenge. There are hundreds and
    hundreds of facilities similar to this around the world. There
    are thousands of personnel serving this country who at any time
    in any country could be a target. Some of those are high risk
    and obvious, like Libya. Others may be lower risk. This
    committee is dedicated to ensure that security is taken
    differently than it was leading up to the events here. We owe
    it to our Federal employees who put themselves and their
    families in harm's way around the world.
        The history of these panels is in fact that they deliver
    full and complete results and they pull no punches. Admiral
    Mullen is no stranger to controversy, and in fact getting to
    the bottom of it. So I do encourage all to look at the final
    result of the blue ribbon panel.
        But today it is 30 days since the September 11th attack,
    more or less. It is a long time to wait if you are sitting in
    Cairo, in Algeria, in Beirut, in Damascus and you don't trust
    that the security measures you need have occurred. Today we
    begin the process of saying they must be able to trust because
    you must be able to assure them that you are doing your work
    differently than just a short time ago.
        Today, we expect full cooperation from our panel. We expect
    to get to the truth. But it will, in fact, be a much longer
    time before all the facts are known. We do not intend to flesh
    out all the facts. We intend today, on a bipartisan basis, to
    ensure that we begin the confidence building for our men and
    women serving this country around the world that we will ensure
    that they be protected and, if anything, protected more than
    the perceived threat, and never less.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening
    comments. And then by unanimous consent, one additional, the
    chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and his
    counterpart will be recognized for opening statements. All
    other members will have 7 days in order to put their opening
    statements in the record. With that, I recognize Mr. Cummings.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me
    be very clear. You said that your side of the aisle grieves the
    loss of our fellow countrymen. It is not just your side of the
    aisle, Mr. Chairman, it is this side of the aisle and our
    entire country. We grieve the loss of Ambassador Christopher
    Stevens, Sean Smith, and Navy SEALs Glen Doherty and Tyrone
    Woods.
        I believe we should conduct a thorough and responsible
    investigation into the attack on the United States mission in
    Benghazi. We need to carefully, very carefully investigate
    allegations that have been made over the past week. And we need
    to run them to the ground before we jump to conclusions. We
    should not be about the business of drawing conclusions and
    then looking for the facts.
        Let me start by thanking Secretary Clinton and the State
    Department for cooperating fully with this committee. They
    agreed to all of our witness requests. They offered additional
    witnesses beyond those requested. They promptly organized
    interviews with department officials. And they have been
    collecting documents sought by the committee.
        Today, there are several specific allegations I would like
    to ask the witnesses about. For example, Mr. Eric Nordstrom, a
    former regional secretary officer in Tripoli, he told the
    committee there should have been five diplomatic security
    agents in Benghazi. In other interviews we conducted yesterday,
    we learned that there were, that there were in fact five agents
    in Benghazi on the day of the attack. Should there have been
    even more? We will ask him about this. And I hope he will be
    prepared to answer that, because there has been so many
    allegations in the press saying that there were not. And we
    will ask the State Department for its views as well.
        Another witness, Colonel Andrew Wood, has said he believes
    that a military unit stationed in Tripoli should have had its
    term extended because of security concerns in Libya. Just
    yesterday, we learned that this team was extended not once, but
    twice. Should it have been extended a third time? We need to
    ask. Where else was it needed? And were its functions being
    fully served by others on the ground by the time it left the
    country?
        We should listen carefully to these and other allegations.
    We should listen just as carefully to the responses. I am
    disappointed to say, however, that although the chairman claims
    we are pursuing this investigation on a ``bipartisan basis,''
    that has simply not been the case. For example, the chairman
    concealed the committee's interactions with Colonel Wood until
    Friday night, when he appeared on national television. The
    chairman then refused requests to make Colonel Wood available
    so we could speak with him, ask him basic questions, and
    prepare for the hearing. We could not even get a phone number.
    The chairman has withheld documents that were provided to the
    committee, which is in violation of the House rules. And he
    effectively excluded Democrats from a congressional delegation
    to Libya this past weekend. We were told about the trip less
    than 24 hours before it was supposed to take place.
        It is a shame that they are resorting to such petty abuses
    in what should be a serious and responsible investigation of
    this fatal attack. The problem is that these actions deny
    members of this committee the ability to effectively and
    efficiently investigate this incident. The members on this side
    of the aisle are just as concerned as the members on the other
    side of the aisle. We each represent about 700,000 each people
    too. We want to make sure that all the questions are answered.
        In contrast, on the Senate side, every member of the
    Foreign Relations Committee, Democrats and Republicans alike,
    joined in a bipartisan letter to the State Department
    requesting information on the attack.
        So what do we do today? What do we do today? My goal is to
    try in some way to put the toxic partisanship behind us and
    focus on the security of our personnel. Every 2 years we put
    our hands up, as Members of this Congress, and we swear to
    protect the people of the United States of America. All of us
    do that. Not just Republicans, not just Democrats, all of us.
    And those people that we promised to protect are not limited to
    just the folks that are within our shores and our boundaries of
    this Nation, but those people who go out and put their lives on
    the line every day for us in foreign lands.
        The chairman has said that our committee will examine not
    only the Libya attack, but security at outposts across the
    Middle East. Mr. Chairman, I fully support this effort. And if
    that is our goal, we have to examine the funding. The fact is
    that since 2011, the House has cut embassy security by hundreds
    of millions of dollars below the amounts requested by the
    President. The House has done that. The Senate restored some of
    these funds, but the final amounts were still far below the
    administration's request. And they were far below the levels we
    enacted in 2010.
        Mr. Chairman, I just heard what you said about making sure
    that we do everything in our power to make sure that this never
    happens again. And I join you in that statement. And we can do
    better. I would like to ask the chairman to join me in doing
    so. Mr. Chairman, I ask you to join me in calling on our
    leaders in the House to immediately consider a supplemental
    funding bill to restore funding for embassy security that was
    cut by the House over the past 2 years.
        According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, we could save
    $2.5 billion per year just by eliminating the tax break for oil
    companies. Even Republicans now agree that we should do this,
    including Governor Romney. We could fully replenish these
    embassy security accounts with just a fraction of that amount.
    Restoring our commitment to embassy security could make a real
    difference for thousands of Americans who serve our country
    overseas, often in extremely dangerous circumstances, as you,
    Mr. Chairman, just stated. And I do agree with you, we should
    act with utmost urgency. Every single moment counts.
        From this day forward, it is my hope that our committee
    will thoroughly investigate this matter in a truly bipartisan
    manner, because our dedicated Foreign Service personnel and our
    Nation deserve nothing less.
        With that, I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. I might note for the
    record that I said this side of the dais, which is all of us on
    the dais relative to all of those in the audience.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. Although you didn't name a
    particular rule that you say I violated, do you have a rule
    that you believe I violated?
        Mr. Cummings. We will provide you with that. We want to get
    on with the hearing. But I promise you I will provide you with
    it.
        Chairman Issa. With that, I would ask unanimous consent
    that our colleagues Mr. Rohrabacher and Ms. Adams be allowed to
    participate, pursuant to our rules. Without objection, so
    ordered.
        We now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on
    National Security, and the individual who first began this
    investigation, Mr. Chaffetz.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
    thank all of the members on both sides of the aisle for being
    here today. I thank the chairman for his tenacity in pursuing
    this. I believe we have a moral imperative to pursue this. We
    have four dead Americans. We have others that are critically
    injured. Our thoughts and prayers on both sides of the aisle
    are with those people and their families. We cannot thank them
    enough for their service, their dedication to our Nation. We
    also thank the people here on this panel for participating, as
    I know all four of you care deeply about this country.
        This is a very serious situation. We have to understand how
    we got here, because before 9/11, 2012, and after the
    revolution there in Libya, it was a very tumultuous and
    difficult situation. I would ask unanimous consent to enter
    into the record a document that was provided to us by Mr. Eric
    Nordstrom. It was dated October 1st.
        Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I would like to read, Mr. Chairman, the last
    paragraph of that statement that he sent to us. There was,
    again, 230 security incidents in the country of Libya. ``These
    incidents paint a clear picture that the environment in Libya
    was fragile at best, and could degrade quickly, certainly not
    an environment where post should be directed to, quote,
    'normalize,' end quote, operations and reduce security
    resources in accordance with an artificial timetable.''
        Of all the things I have seen and read, that to me is one
    of the most disturbing. And I appreciate the guts of those that
    stood up and will provide us this information, because it does
    take guts to do it.
        I am going to ask that we have some photos here. We have to
    understand how we got here. Broad daylight, June of 2012, two-
    car convoy carrying the British ambassador was ambushed
    military-style with rocket propelled grenades in Benghazi.
    Sorry, these pictures seem to be out of order. What you haven't
    seen before--there we go--this was an attack literally weeks
    before what happened in Benghazi.
        Next slide, please. And the next. And the next. And the
    next. These pictures are of an attack that happened in
    Benghazi. The first was a so-called fish bomb. This is the
    compound in Benghazi before the attack. Go to the next slide,
    please. The second bombing was an improvised explosive device
    that was placed on the north gate, breaching the wall. It was a
    test by terrorists, and it was successful. And we didn't
    respond fully and adequately. We didn't acknowledge it. We
    didn't talk about it. We pretended it didn't happen. It was a
    terrorist attack on a U.S. asset in Libya and it was never
    exposed. We pretended it didn't happen. Well, guess what? The
    third time the terrorists came to attack us they were even more
    successful, killing four Americans. I believe personally with
    more assets, more resources, just meeting the minimum
    standards, we could have and should have saved the life of
    Ambassador Stevens and the other people that were there.
        Now, this was a massive attack, no doubt about it. We are
    getting new details. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, the reason we
    have those details is because of this hearing.
        Mysteriously, the State Department decided to give a press
    briefing last night. We weren't invited. Certain news outlets
    weren't invited. Any reasonable person looking at the security
    situation in Libya had to come to the conclusion that it was
    tumultuous at best. I wish I could tell you everything that I
    learned. I did go to Libya. I did drop everything. I had the
    same type of notice that was given to the Democrats. In fact,
    the State Department sent an attorney to follow me in my every
    footstep. So to suggest you didn't have an opportunity to go is
    absolutely wrong. I wish I could share everything that I
    learned there. But we have to be careful about the sensitive
    secure information, about sources and methods in a classified
    setting. I think some of the information that the State
    Department has shared overstepped some of those bounds. Let us
    be careful today to not reveal some of that classified
    information. It has been too hard, too difficult to get basic
    information. I will tell you, though, that when I was in Libya
    a good part of the day, never once did a person ever mention a
    video. Never. And I am fascinated to know and understand from
    the President of the United States, from the Secretary of
    State, and from the Ambassador to the United Nations how they
    can justify that this video caused this attack. It was a
    terrorist attack. Let's be honest about it.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. I look forward to this
    hearing. May God bless those men and women who serve us. I
    thank you for being here. And let's always remember those who
    serve this Nation. I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman is
    correct, both sides were informed once we had gotten clearance
    for Libya. And with that, we recognize the gentlelady from the
    District of Columbia for a response.
        Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, the tragic events in Benghazi
    point up the hazards of serving our country go far beyond the
    military. I agree with Mr. Chaffetz that perhaps had there been
    more resources we might have had a different result. But I must
    note that while the Republican budget increases the budget of
    the Defense Department, it slashes the budget that would have
    protected these diplomats.
        The Ambassador, Chris Stevens, and the three others who
    died were men of unusual courage who died heroically protecting
    their mission. The best tribute to the Ambassador comes from
    the mourning in the streets that we saw from the citizens of
    Benghazi and of Libya. It must be said that Ambassador Stevens
    did something that you rarely see in diplomatic work across the
    world. In little more than a few months after the Arab Spring,
    he had already established an entirely new and promising
    relationship between the United States of America and Libya.
    What an extraordinary man he must have been.
        So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing this
    afternoon, even in the midst of a campaign. It was and is
    important to hold a hearing now, when memories are fresh. And I
    certainly want to go on record for thanking the State
    Department, especially Ambassador Clinton, for what the
    chairman says has been the very open cooperation of the
    Department with this hearing.
        I want to suggest that when there has been loss of life of
    this kind in service to the United States, there can be no
    difference between Democrats and Republicans in desiring a
    hearing to discover exactly what transpired. That is why I
    regret that the spirit of bipartisanship and openness that came
    from the State Department has not occurred here in this
    committee, that there has not been the sharing of information
    and witnesses so that both sides could be prepared to question
    witnesses and find out exactly what has happened.
        I yield the remainder of my time to Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my colleague. And I welcome the
    witnesses here today. I join my colleagues in expressing the
    desire for a bipartisan inquiry. And I certainly hope that the
    committee will endeavor to make it genuinely bipartisan. I
    regret the fact that a trip to Libya occurred with no members
    of this side of the aisle in attendance. I had the privilege of
    going with David Dreier, the Republican chairman of the Rules
    Committee, to Libya in May. It is an inherently unstable
    situation. It was then, it is now. It is one we Americans hope
    will stabilize over time. I certainly hope that today's hearing
    is not going to be perceived as an effort to exploit a tragedy
    for political purposes 27 days out from an election. I hope in
    fact it is the down payment of a serious inquiry into how can
    we make this kind of thing not recur? How can we redouble our
    efforts to provide security to the brave men and women who
    serve in our Foreign Service? How can we make sure that we take
    a fresh look at the resources required and make sure, on a
    bipartisan basis, we are providing them?
        So no good is done to the security of the United States to
    politicize this tragedy. And I can't imagine that the late
    Ambassador Chris Stevens would want us to do that. And so I
    hope that we will proceed in a bipartisan way and get to the
    bottom of not only what happened, but what are the forces at
    work that led to that. Far beyond just the issue of what our
    failures were, what is the nature of the challenge we face in
    countries like Libya post-Arab Spring?
        Thank you, and I thank my colleague for yielding.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. I might note that the funding
    that is currently enjoyed by the State Department was voted
    bipartisan, one more Democrat voting for the appropriations
    than Republicans. So hopefully we now can understand how
    bipartisan it was. In fact, it was voted by more Democrats than
    Republicans.
        The chair will now recognize our panel of witnesses. First
    of all, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood is a member of the Utah
    National Guard and, I believe, a Department of Interior
    employee. Mr. Eric Nordstrom is a regional security officer at
    the United States Department of State. Ambassador Patrick J.
    Kennedy is Under Secretary for Management at the Department of
    State, and a frequent witness. Ms. Charlene Lamb is a Deputy
    Assistant Secretary for International Programs at the U.S.
    Department of State.
        I want to welcome you. And pursuant to our rules, I would
    ask that you rise to take the oath. Raise your right hands. Do
    you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about
    to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
    truth?
        Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the
    affirmative. Please take your seats.
        Pursuant to our rules and tradition, each witness will have
    5 minutes. Please, when you see your time expiring, wrap up.
    Your entire prepared statements will be placed in the record. I
    will take a moment only to admonish that Colonel Wood, we got
    yours fairly late, but we understand that this is not a regular
    shtick for you. For the administration, I am a little
    disappointed. We do have a 24-hour rule. And Ambassador
    Kennedy, if you would take back that it arrived, it is in, but
    we would appreciate in the future getting it a little earlier,
    because I think members on both sides pore over it.
        With that, we recognize Lieutenant Colonel Wood.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                        STATEMENT OF ANDREW WOOD

        Colonel Wood. Thank you. I am Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
    Wood. I am a member of the Utah National Guard, with 24 years
    of service as a Special Forces soldier. I was mobilized for the
    Winter Olympics in 2002, Afghanistan from September of 2003 to
    May of 2004, and for counterterrorism work in the southern
    Philippines in August of 2007 to May of 2008. I currently work
    for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation as an Upper Colorado
    regional security officer. I am responsible to Reclamation for
    a security program that oversees 58 high and significant hazard
    dams in five Western states, one of which is Glen Canyon Dam, a
    national critical infrastructure facility.
        Upon hearing of the death of Ambassador Stevens, and later
    the congressional inquiry, I identified myself to my
    congressional representative's staff as a person with intimate
    knowledge of the security situation prior to the attack. I was
    subsequently contacted, and began a dialogue with staff
    investigators.
        I made a personal decision to come forward with
    information, and do not represent DOD or any government agency.
    I had unique access and placement to many government leaders
    and agencies while working in Libya. I feel duty bound to come
    forward in order to inform and provide a portion of ground
    truth information. I feel a sense of honor for those
    individuals who have died in the service of their country. I
    realize much of my work in Libya was entangled in sensitive
    government work, and I must be careful not to betray the trust
    and confidences that have been placed in me. The killing of a
    U.S. Ambassador is a rare and extraordinary thing, and requires
    our attention as a people. As a citizen, I made the
    determination that this outweighs all other interests, and will
    risk whatever circumstances may result from my testimony.
        I served as Site Security Team commander in Libya from 12
    February to 14 August of this year, 2012. I was mobilized from
    the Utah National Guard in title 10 status and reported to
    Special Operations Command Africa, SOCAFRICA, which serves
    directly under AFRICOM. I was detailed in title 22 status to
    the Department of State and assumed command of the SST. The SST
    element consisted of 16 members. It is my understanding that it
    was drafted by the National Security Council to meet the
    demanding security challenges facing the Department of State
    and their requirement to reestablish diplomatic relations with
    a post-Qadhafi or free Libya. The SST loaned considerable
    support to the Department of State's security posture in this
    uncertain and volatile environment.
        The SST's mission was to support and answer to the chief of
    mission in Libya. I worked directly for the regional security
    officer. We provided security support, medical support,
    communications support, for every facet of security that
    covered the embassy.
        As the SST commander, I had a seat on the country team. I
    was closely involved with the operational planning and support
    to the RSO's security objectives. The embassy staff lived and
    worked together at two locations, in Tripoli and embassy
    property in Benghazi. The SST supported security movements for
    diplomatic officers in and around Tripoli and other parts of
    Libya as their work required. On two occasions I sent SST
    members to Benghazi to support and bolster security at that
    location. The SST was closely integrated with regular
    diplomatic security agents working directly for the RSO, as
    well as Mobile Security Deployment teams.
        I traveled to Benghazi on two occasions with the RSO, once
    with the RSO to evaluate the security situation there, and once
    to conduct some work for the defense attache's office. I was
    there a second time in June when the U.K. ambassador's convoy
    was attacked. I responded with DS agents in order to help
    provide medical and security assistance to wounded U.K.
    security personnel. I conducted a post-attack investigation
    ofthe ambush or assault.
        I regularly met with and held frequent conversations with
    Ambassadors Cretz and Stevens and other members of the security
    team. In June, when Eric Nordstrom rotated out, I was the
    senior member of the country team with the exception of
    Ambassador Stevens. We lived and worked closely together in an
    atmosphere that is common to an expeditionary post. Ambassador
    Stevens was an avid runner, and played tennis as well. The SST
    was heavily involved in performing his security detail when he
    ran. I ran with him on several occasions.
        The SST provided an important link for the country team to
    SOCAFRICA with its intelligence assets and resources. There was
    a good exchange of information between SOCAFRICA and the RSO.
    There was a great working relationship between SST and
    diplomatic security agents and the MSD members of the embassy
    post throughout Libya.
        I reported three times a week through a video
    teleconference to SOCAFRICA and sent daily situation reports. I
    had the communications capability to provide a direct link to
    SOCAFRICA 24/7. I no longer have access to email or documents
    that I worked with on a daily basis, as much of this was
    contained on AFRICOM servers and computers that I worked
    through. My recollection of dates is mostly from memory, and I
    will need to re-access that information in order to specify
    dates with greater certainty.
        The State Department's decision not to extend SST's
    security work beyond the 5th of August terminated our security
    work in this capacity. The military members of my team were in
    the process of changing status from title 22 back to title 10
    shortly before my departure.
        The situation on the ground was continuously updated with
    reports that I sent to my military chain of command and CC'd
    the RSO on. The RSO sent information on security and threats in
    a similar manner up his chain of command.
        While the sound of gunfire in and around Tripoli subsided
    from February to April, the situation remained unstable.
    Libyans struggled with a transitional government that hesitated
    to make decisions, and were forced to rely upon local and
    tribal militias with varying degrees of loyalty. In late
    spring, the police were allowed to return to work to help with
    traffic, but were limited to that only. Fighting between
    militias was common when I departed. Militias appeared to be
    disintegrating into organizations resembling freelance criminal
    operations. Targeted attacks against Westerners were on the
    increase. In June, the Ambassador received a threat on
    Facebook, with a public announcement that he liked to run
    around the embassy compound in Tripoli. When I arrived in
    February, there were three MSD teams on the ground. Ambassador
    Cretz was confronted with having to lose one of those teams,
    and requested an equal number of regular diplomatic security
    agents. The Ambassador struggled with renewing the SST beyond
    April 5th. That is Ambassador Stevens. The second MSD team was
    withdrawn shortly after Ambassador Cretz's departure, and the
    last MSD team was restricted to performing security work only--
    restricted from performing security work only, and limited only
    to training local guard force members in July. The remaining
    MSD was withdrawn at about the same time the SST security work
    was terminated. The RSO struggled to maintain these losses with
    regular diplomatic security personnel.
        The security in Benghazi was a struggle, and remained a
    struggle throughout my time there. The situation remained
    uncertain, and reports from some Libyans indicated it was
    getting worse. Diplomatic security remained weak. In April,
    there was only one U.S. diplomatic security agent stationed
    there. The RSO struggled to obtain additional personnel, but
    there was never--but was never able to attain the numbers he
    felt comfortable with.
        I hope the information I provide will be put together with
    data points from others so an accurate picture can be obtained.
    We need to be dedicated to the understanding--to understand the
    problems that surrounded this attack in order to find a
    solution. Our failure to do so will result in repeated
    instances that allow our adversaries to take an advantage over
    us. My purpose in conveying this information is to prevent
    their ability to take the life of another ambassador or kill
    another valuable and talented public servant working for the
    diplomatic service of their country.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Lieutenant Colonel Wood follows:]

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        Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom.

                   STATEMENT OF ERIC ALLAN NORDSTROM

        Mr. Nordstrom. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
    Cummings, and other distinguished members of the committee. My
    name is Eric Nordstrom, and I currently serve as a Supervisory
    Special Agent with the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
    diplomatic security. I joined the Department in April 1998, and
    I have served in domestic and overseas postings, including
    Washington, D.C., Tegucigalpa, Honduras; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
    New Delhi, India; and most recently as the regional security
    officer at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya, a position I
    held from September 21st, 2011, until July 26th, 2012. As the
    regional security officer, or RSO, at the U.S. embassy in
    Tripoli, I served as the principal adviser to Ambassadors Cretz
    and Stevens on security and law enforcement matters.
        I am here today to provide testimony in support of your
    inquiry into the tragic events of September 11, 2012, including
    the murders of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty,
    and Tyrone Woods. I had the pleasure of working with Ambassador
    Stevens during the final months of my tour in Libya, and would
    echo what many are saying, the loss of Ambassador Stevens is
    not only tragic for his family and sad for our country, but his
    death will prove to be a devastating loss for Libya, struggling
    to recover from its recent civil war. My family and I would
    like to offer our personal condolences to the families of these
    four patriots who gave their lives in the service of their
    country.
        My contribution to our Nation's efforts in Libya will prove
    to be only a small part of a wider effort. There were many of
    us dedicated to the mission in Libya, both at home and abroad.
    To my colleagues who served with me and to those who are
    presently there in the aftermath of this attack, you have your
    country's sincere thanks and prayers.
        Let me say a word about the evening of September 11th. I
    had not seen an attack of such ferocity and intensity
    previously in Libya, nor in my time with the diplomatic
    security Service. I am concerned that this attack signals a new
    security reality, just as the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks
    bombings did for the Marines, the 1998 East Africa embassy
    bombings did for the State Department, and 9/11 did for our
    entire country. However, we must remember that it is critical
    that we balance our risk mitigation efforts with the needs of
    our diplomats to do their jobs. The answer cannot be to operate
    from a bunker. Arriving in Tripoli in the midst of the Libyan
    civil war, it was immediately obvious to me that the post-
    revolution Libya was a weakened state, exhausted from their
    civil war, and operating under fragmented and paralyzed
    government institutions. They were barely able to protect
    themselves from armed gangs, Qadhafi loyalists, or roving
    militias. As a result, the Libyan temporary government was
    unable to extend security assets to diplomatic missions in
    customary ways that we expect around the world. We could not
    rely on the Libyan Government for security, intelligence, and
    law enforcement help to identify emerging threats or to ask
    them for assistance in mitigating those threats.
        In Benghazi, however, the government of Libya, through the
    17th February Martyrs Brigade, was able to provide us
    consistent armed security since the very earliest days of the
    revolution. Routine civil unrest, militia on militia violence,
    general lawlessness, and surprisingly, motor vehicle accidents,
    were the primary threats facing our mission and personnel
    during my time in Libya.
        As Colonel Wood noted, in the spring of 2012 we noted an
    increasing number of attacks and incidents which appeared to
    target foreign-affiliated organizations. In response to these
    incidents, we implemented a number of changes to our security
    posture designed to mitigate those threats and disrupt any
    planning by would be attackers. Those efforts included
    reviewing and practicing our emergency preparedness drills, and
    most importantly, we reiterated our requests at all levels of
    government for a consistent armed host nation security force to
    support the mission. We also requested security staffing and
    extensions of the DOD Security Support Team. In my opinion, the
    primary security staffing issue that we dealt with was
    maintaining U.S. security personnel, whether diplomatic
    security agents or Security Support Team members, for a
    sufficient amount of time to enable the full training and
    deployment of a local bodyguard unit.
        In early July 2012, prior to my departure, post requested
    continued TDY staffing of 15 U.S. security professionals,
    either DS field office agents, Mobile Security Deployment
    agents, or DOD/SST personnel, plus retention of a six-agent
    Mobile Security Deployment training team that would work with
    our newly created bodyguard unit. Earlier post extension
    requests for our DOD/SS Team in November 2011 and March 2012
    were approved. Also, in March 2012 I requested DS staffing
    levels in Tripoli of five full-time agents to be permanently
    assigned there, 12 temporary duty DS agents, and six Mobile
    Security Deployment DS agents, again to train our newly created
    bodyguard unit. A request to maintain a level of five TDY DS
    agents in Benghazi was included in that same March 2012
    request. Our long term security plan in Libya was to deploy an
    armed, locally hired Libyan bodyguard unit. Due to Libyan
    political sensitivities, armed private security companies were
    not allowed to operate in Libya. That was the case under
    Qadhafi, and that was the case under the free Libya.
        Our existing uniformed static local guard force, both in
    Tripoli and Benghazi, were unarmed, similar to our local guard
    forces at many other posts around the world. Their job is
    simple. It is to observe, report, and alert armed host nation
    security or armed response forces, possibly DS agents if that's
    the case. The use of local nationals as armed bodyguards is a
    routine practice in the Department, and we often do so to
    comply with the local firearms regulations of the host nation.
        Local nationals provide us with continuity, local
    expertise, threat awareness in their community, and language
    and cultural skills. I am confident that the committee will
    conclude that officers and employees of the Department of State
    diplomatic security service and mission Libya conducted
    themselves professionally, and with careful attention to
    managing the people and budgets in a way that reflected the
    gravity of the task.
        I am proud of the work that our team accomplished in Libya
    under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. The protection
    of our Nation's diplomats, our embassies and consulates, and
    the work produced there is deserving of the time and treasure
    invested.
        I am glad to further discuss my experiences, and hope it
    provides beneficial to the committee, the State Department and
    my fellow DS agents who are protecting and advancing U.S.
    interests abroad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. May
    God bless our country as we work towards peace in a contentious
    world. I stand ready to answer any questions that you might
    have of me.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Nordstrom follows:]

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        Chairman Issa. Ms. Lamb?

                     STATEMENT OF CHARLENE R. LAMB

        Ms. Lamb. Chairman Issa----
        Chairman Issa. Could you turn your mic on, please?
        Ms. Lamb. I am sorry.
        Chairman Issa. That's all right. It is your first time.
        Ms. Lamb. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, members
    of the committee, my name is Charlene Lamb. I am Deputy
    Assistant Secretary for International Programs in the Bureau of
    diplomatic security at the Department of State. I have been in
    law enforcement for 35 years, including 17 consecutive years
    stationed abroad as a regional security officer in Nicaragua,
    Tanzania, Kuwait, Guatemala, and Germany. I am here today to
    share our best information to date about what happened in
    Benghazi on September 11th.
        As you know, there are ongoing investigations and reviews
    being conducted, and we are speaking today with an incomplete
    picture. But as this process moves forward and more information
    becomes available, we will continue to engage closely with
    Congress.
        Let me begin by describing the actual compound in Benghazi.
    It is more than 300 yards long and nearly 100 yards wide. The
    main building was divided into two sections. The public section
    included common areas and meeting space. The private section
    was a residential area that included a safe haven. A second
    building, Building B, housed diplomatic security agents. The
    tactical operations center occupied a third building. The
    fourth building on the compound served as barracks for the
    Libyan 17th February Brigade members.
        After acquiring the compound, we made a number of security
    upgrades. Among other steps, we extended the height of the
    outer wall to 12 feet, with masonry concrete, barbed wire, and
    concertina razor wire. We increased the external lighting and
    erected Jersey barriers outside the perimeter. We also added
    equipment to detect explosives, as well as an imminent danger
    notification system. We installed security grills on windows
    accessible from the ground, and included escape windows with
    emergency releases.
        There were five diplomatic security agents on the compound
    September 11th. There were also three members of the Libyan
    17th February Brigade. In addition, a well trained U.S. quick
    reaction security team was stationed nearby at the embassy
    annex.
        All of these measures and upgrades were taken in
    coordination with security officials in Benghazi, Tripoli, and
    Washington. I work closely with more than 275 facilities around
    the world, determining the right level of security for each
    one. It is an intensive, ongoing, constantly evolving process,
    one that I appreciate and understand from my own time on the
    ground as a diplomatic security officer.
        That brings me to the events of September 11th itself. At
    approximately 9:40 p.m. local time, dozens of attackers
    launched a full scale assault. They forced their way through
    the pedestrian gate, used diesel fuel to set fire to the Libyan
    17th February Brigade members' barracks, and then proceeded
    towards the main building. A diplomatic security agent working
    in the Tactical Operations Center immediately activated the
    imminent danger notification system. He also alerted the quick
    reaction security team stationed nearby, the Libyan 17th
    February Brigade, the embassy in Tripoli, and the diplomatic
    security Command Center in Washington.
        One agent secured Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, the
    information management officer, in a safe haven. The attackers
    used diesel fuel to set the main building ablaze. Thick smoke
    rapidly filled the entire structure. The agent began leading
    the Ambassador and Sean Smith toward the emergency escape
    window. Nearing unconsciousness himself, the agent opened the
    emergency escape grill window and crawled out. He then realized
    they had become separated in the smoke, so he reentered and
    searched the building multiple times. Finally, the agent,
    suffering from severe smoke inhalation, barely able to breathe
    or speak, exited to the roof. Other agents retrieved their M4
    submachine guns from Building B. When they attempted to return
    to the main building, they encountered armed attackers and
    doubled back. They regrouped, made their way to a nearby
    armored vehicle, and then drove over to assist the agent on the
    roof in search for the Ambassador and Mr. Smith. After numerous
    attempts, they found Mr. Smith. Unfortunately, he was already
    deceased. They still could not find the Ambassador.
        The quick reaction security team arrived with 40 members of
    the Libyan 17th February Brigade. They all continued the search
    for the Ambassador. Then, at approximately 11 p.m., the Libyans
    insisted for everyone's safety they needed to evacuate the
    site. The combined security team made a final search for the
    Ambassador before leaving the annex in an armored vehicle.
        Ms. Lamb. They took heavy fire as they pulled away from the
    main building and on the street outside the compound but were
    able to make their way to the annex----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Point of order. Point of order.
        Chairman Issa. The gentlelady will suspend.
        The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that we are
    getting into classified issues that deal with sources and
    methods that would be totally inappropriate in an open forum
    such as this.
        Chairman Issa. The gentlelady, Ms. Lamb, Mr. Kennedy, is it
    your intent to declassify any or all material in Ms. Lamb's
    statement?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chaffetz, the information
    that we are presenting today in open session is entirely
    unclassified.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, I totally object to the use of
    that photo.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman will state his reason.
        Mr. Chaffetz. I believe it to be classified information
    that goes to sources and methods and should not be disseminated
    in a public manner such as State is doing here today.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. Ranking Member?
        Mr. Cummings. I was just wondering, these are people from
    the State Department. They apparently have clearance to show
    this information. I assume they wouldn't come here unless it
    was cleared. So I would just----
        Chairman Issa. Yeah. I appreciate the gentleman's comments.
        Ambassador, it is your statement that these either are now
    declassified or you are declassifying them at this hearing; is
    that correct? In other words, is this cleared through your
    channels to be given here today?
        Mr. Kennedy.  This information is available, sir, for
    public dissemination, yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Okay.
        Colonel Wood. You can Google this.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman's point of order, although
    noted--it is the prerogative of the executive branch to
    determine what is not classified.
        The one thing I would note, my able staff has compared last
    night's press conference and the opening statement of Ms. Lamb,
    and it appears as though her opening statement should have been
    given to us last night since it was obviously the one given to
    the press.
        We will reset----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. Yes? The gentleman will state his comment.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Can I make one more comment?
        I was told specifically while I was in Libya I could not
    and should not ever talk about what you are showing here today.
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, if I might, this is commercial
    digital imagery that we--from a commercial satellite source,
    sir.
        Chairman Issa. Well, I appreciate that. Ultimately, I am
    going to side with the administration, that you have a right to
    show what you want to show and consider it unclassified.
        I would, again, recognize that we were shown documents this
    morning in camera that said unclassified, but they weren't
    turned over to the committee. If you have anything else that
    you intend to use, if it hasn't been provided to the committee,
    I would strongly suggest that that binder and other materials
    be provided at this time.
        Again, it is your prerogative to declassify. It is not your
    prerogative to selectively tell a Member of Congress something
    is classified and then come to an open hearing and say it is
    not. Since Mr. Chaffetz visited with your people, people that
    work for you, Mr. Kennedy, Secretary Kennedy, I would ask that
    you rectify this in the future.
        The gentlelady may----
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. I have ruled that they----
        Mr. Cummings. I just have a question, a point of order, Mr.
    Chairman. I just have one question so that we will be clear,
    because we don't want any misconceptions.
        Just, Ambassador, can we get that on Google?
        Chairman Issa. This is not a point of order.
        Mr. Cummings. I just--I want to know. I mean, I am just
    curious.
        Chairman Issa. The ranking member----
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you for letting me ask my question.
        Chairman Issa. --is not stating a point of order.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Please reset it for 2 minutes.
        If you could finish within 2 minutes, Ms. Lamb, we would
    appreciate it.
        Ms. Lamb. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. The gentlelady is recognized.
        Ms. Lamb. Thank you.
        In the early morning, an additional security team arrived
    from Tripoli and proceeded to the annex. Shortly after they
    arrived, the annex started taking mortar fire, with as many as
    three direct hits on the compound. It was during this mortar
    attack that Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty were killed and a
    diplomatic security agent and a quick reaction security team
    were critically wounded.
        A large number of Libyan Government security officers
    subsequently arrived and escorted the remaining Americans to
    the airport. We were then able to confirm reports that the
    Ambassador's body was at the Benghazi General Hospital, and the
    Department coordinated the transfer of his remains to the
    airport.
        Before I close, I would like to say: The men and women who
    risked their lives in the service of our country are heroes. I
    have served with many of our security professionals around the
    world. They are my friends and my colleagues, and I trust them
    with my life.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Ms. Lamb follows:]

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        Chairman Issa. I would direct that that chart be taken
    down.
        Upon further reflection, you know, although commercially
    available, in this hearing room we are not going to point out
    details of what may still, in fact, be a facility of the United
    States Government or more facilities.
        So you may continue. I respect your right to deliver what
    you want. But I will caution, once again, Ambassador, that that
    which is told to us on a classified basis needs to remain that
    way. You can't have it one day a classified briefing, which I
    attended yesterday, and then the same--substantially same
    material be presented unclassified the next day.
        The Ambassador is recognized.

                STATEMENT OF THE HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY

        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished
    members of the committee, I would like to share a few words
    with you. Quote, ``Libyans face significant challenges as they
    make the transition from an oppressive dictatorship to a stable
    and prosperous democracy, but it is clearly in the U.S.
    interest and it will be an extraordinary honor to represent the
    United States during this historic period of transition in
    Libya.''
        Those were Ambassador Stevens's words at his confirmation
    hearing, and they help us understand why he went to Libya, his
    passion for the country, its people, and the mission. He
    believed that no challenge was too big or too hard if our
    national security interest and our values were at stake. And
    that is what is at stake in Libya.
        At your request, in the spirit of cooperation, we are here
    today to do our best to answer your questions. But I ask you to
    understand that we do not yet know all the answers or results
    of ongoing reviews. And there may be, as the chairman had
    noted, information that is classified and can only be dealt
    with in classified session.
        As Secretary Clinton has said, the American people,
    especially the families who lost loved ones, deserve a full and
    accurate accounting. We at the State Department are determined
    to get this right, and nobody will hold us more accountable
    than we hold ourselves. We lost friends and colleagues, a
    cross-section of those who put their lives on the line every
    day in the inherently dangerous work of diplomatic service to
    our Nation.
        The Secretary has already appointed an accountability
    review board and has begun working to determine whether our
    security systems and procedures were appropriate in light of
    the threat environment, whether they were properly implemented,
    as well as any lessons that may impact our work around the
    world. The Secretary has asked us to work as quickly and
    transparently as possible without sacrificing diligence and
    accuracy.
        This is a complicated review that will take time as we
    learn more about what happened and as we are better able to
    assess the information we have. Until then, it is an incomplete
    picture, and, as a result, our answers today will also be
    incomplete.
        No one in the administration has claimed to know for
    certain all the answers. We have always made clear that we are
    giving the best information we have at the time, and that
    information has evolved. For example, if any administration
    official, including any career official, were on television on
    Sunday, September 16th, they would have said what Ambassador
    Rice said. The information she had at that point from the
    intelligence community is the same that I had at that point.
    Clearly, we know more today than what we did on the Sunday,
    September 17th, after the attack. But we will continue
    consulting with you throughout this process.
        I would like to address a broader question that may be on
    your minds: Why is the United States in Benghazi when there are
    real dangers there? This question does go to the heart of what
    we do for the State Department and America's role in the world.
        Ambassador Stevens arrived in Benghazi during the height of
    the revolution. The city was at the heart of the opposition to
    Colonel Qadhafi, and the rebels there were fighting for their
    lives. It was dangerous. A bomb exploded in the parking lot of
    his hotel. The transitional authorities struggled to provide
    basic security. Extremists thought to exploit their own agenda.
        But Chris understood that the State Department must operate
    in places where our military cannot or does not, there are no
    other boots on the ground, and where there are serious threats
    to our security. He understood that the new Libya was being
    born in Benghazi and it was critical that we have an active
    presence there.
        That is why Ambassador Stevens stayed in Benghazi in those
    difficult days and returned as Ambassador as the Libyans began
    their difficult transition to democracy. He knew his mission
    was vital to our interests and values and was an investment
    that would pay off in a strong partnership with a free Libya.
        After the September 11 attack, the Libyan people showed how
    right he was. Thousands marched in the streets of Benghazi,
    mourning their fallen friend with signs saying, ``Chris Stevens
    was a friend to all Libyans.'' They overran extremist bases.
    Civilians insisted that the militia disarm and support the new
    democracy. They confirmed what Chris Stevens knew so well: The
    United States is better off because he went to Benghazi.
        We must review the security procedures in place and improve
    them, asking ourselves if our people had what they needed and
    how we can reduce the risk of this happening again. But one
    thing is not up for debate today or any other day: Those who
    risk their lives in the service of our country are heroes, and
    we must support them, particularly those who provide security
    in an unsecure environment.
        Diplomacy must be practiced in dangerous places. The United
    States sends people to more than 275 diplomatic posts. No other
    agency is asked to stretch so far. We do this because we have
    learned that when America is absent, especially from dangerous
    places, there are consequences. Extremism takes root, our
    interests suffer, and our security is threatened.
        As the Secretary says, leadership means showing up. That is
    what we do. That is how we protect this country and sustain its
    global leadership. We can and we will reduce the risk to those
    who serve, but no one can eliminate it. Our facilities must be
    protected, but not all are fortresses.
        I want to be clear: We regularly assess risk and resource
    allocation, a process involving the considered judgments of
    experienced professionals on the ground and in Washington using
    the best available information. The assault that occurred on
    the evening of September 17th, however, was an unprecedented
    assault by dozens of heavily armed men.
        We must continue deploying our diplomats and development
    professionals to dangerous places like Benghazi. There is no
    alternative. As the Secretary has said, we will not retreat, we
    will keep leading, and we will stay engaged everywhere in the
    world. All of us in the State Department will honor our fallen
    colleagues by continuing their work with the same purpose and
    resolve they demonstrated.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity. The
    Congress is a crucial partner in providing diplomatic security,
    so I look forward to working with you and the members of this
    committee to continue providing America's diplomats with the
    support and resources needed to carry out their important work.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9871.027

        Chairman Issa. Ambassador Kennedy, yesterday you made a
    significant press announcement. I want to ask you a couple of
    questions.
        This morning, and only this morning, we were shown, our
    staff was shown a book, a binder in camera. The documents in
    that book all indicate unclassified. Are you prepared to
    deliver those documents to us at this time?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that we did
    make information available to the committee both last night and
    this morning, and we have that material still here. We would be
    glad to meet with the committee or committee staff afterwards.
        Chairman Issa. No, we want it for this hearing. The
    information when looked at in camera was unclassified but, in
    fact, perhaps embarrassing. Will you make that information
    available at this time so I can circulate it to all the Members
    on the dais?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, the information--while
    individual pieces may be unclassified, the totality of the
    information is such that it must be considered to be
    restricted, and the context is all important.
        Chairman Issa. I agree with you.
        And, with that, I now move that the unclassified document
    of September 11th, 2012, appearing above the signature of the
    Ambassador, be placed in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        And the staff will distribute it.
        Additionally, I move that the document of March 28th, 2012,
    be placed in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        Additionally--and these will have to be printed--the
    document of August 2nd, 2012, from the Ambassador, and of July
    9th, 2012, be placed in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. Yes?
        Mr. Cummings. Just so that we will be clear, you already
    have the documents? I just want to be clear, that is all.
        Chairman Issa. In real time, a whistleblower has provided
    us with some of these documents. We confirmed that these
    documents are similar to the documents being--or, identical to
    the documents being withheld. It is the determination of the
    chair that these documents were responsive, unclassified, and
    appropriate for discovery.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I was just asking if you
    already had the documents.
        Chairman Issa. Well, if you will notice, I am looking at
    one on an iPad.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah. You already have them. Okay, that is
    all I asked.
        Chairman Issa. We do have them, and others. So they will be
    circulated.
        Mr. Cummings. To both sides?
        Chairman Issa. To both sides, of course.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. They are now documents of this hearing and
    of this--and before I do my opening statement, or before I do
    my questioning, Ambassador, I don't like doing this, but,
    ultimately, the cooperation we received has caused individuals
    to say things which are consistent with these documents which
    are being withheld. And since the documents are unclassified,
    we can reach no other conclusion but that they are
    inappropriate.
        And, quite frankly, after my years in the military and my
    years on the Hill and my years on the Select Intelligence
    Committee, to say that a broad array of unclassified documents
    somehow in totality makes classified is to make everything you
    do unavailable to the Congress.
        With that, we will begin the clock.
        Mr. Nordstrom, you have done a lot of things that I
    appreciate in communication. October 1st, you sent a statement,
    an email to Mr. Chaffetz. He read it in his opening statement.
    Do you stand by that statement?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I do. That was a response, again, as a
    follow-up to our meeting on the same day where we discussed a
    number of documents that you were interested in getting,
    specifically the list of incidents that we had discussed.
        Chairman Issa. In that statement, basically what you were
    saying is there wasn't sufficient resources provided,
    considering the escalating, the coming together of what could
    have and turned out to be a catastrophic attack. Would that be
    a fair paraphrasing of what you said?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That was one of the main reasons I continued
    to ask for those resources, yes.
        Chairman Issa. Now, we had an informal meeting with you,
    bipartisan meeting. In that, you relayed something I think is
    very important. I asked you about Ambassador Stevens, a very
    skilled career diplomat, and how he dealt with threats related
    to security. And you told me--I am paraphrasing--that, for
    example, when there was a perceived threat in his running, he
    ceased running.
        Then, when both you and Colonel Wood were able to come up
    with an acceptable way that he could continue, by varying where
    he went and so on, he ran again, but only ran again under your
    authority and your recommendation.
        Is that correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct, Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. And I think I asked you, was he a compliant
    officer? Did he do what you thought when you recommended it, or
    did he chafe at any time over what you thought was best for his
    security?
        Mr. Nordstrom. At no time did I have any concerns raised to
    me by Ambassador Stevens.
        Colonel Wood and I, senior member of the Mobile Security
    Deployment team, routinely met with him and discussed general
    threats but also specific concerns that we might have about his
    schedule, his routine, and his meetings.
        As I noted, in that informal hearing, you know, one of the
    specific threats that we had received that was referenced this
    morning was a threat that was posted to Facebook. We came
    across that threat as a result of Senator McCain coming out to
    post to review the elections that were held in early July.
    There had been some postings about that.
        But my point of is that he was absolutely responsive, and
    he deferred to what our concerns were.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Ms. Lamb, yesterday you told us in testimony that you
    received from Mr. Nordstrom a recommendation but not a request
    for more security. And you admitted that, in fact, you had
    previously said that if he submitted a request, you would not
    support it. Is that correct?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, after our meeting last night, I went back
    and--at the time----
        Chairman Issa. Well, first answer the question, then I will
    let you expand. Did you say that yesterday, that you would not
    support it if he gave you the request?
        Ms. Lamb. Under the current conditions, yes.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. And then last night you discovered
    what?
        Ms. Lamb. I went back and reviewed the July 9 cable from
    which I was referring, and that was not in that cable. I have
    been reviewing lots of documents----
        Chairman Issa. Well, we have a July 9th cable--it is one of
    them that I put in the record----
        Ms. Lamb. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. --that, in fact, has the word ``request.''
    It doesn't meet your standard of, perhaps, what you call a
    formal request; you described that. But it does request more
    assets.
        If you looked at the July 9th, 2012, cable--and this is
    less than 60 days, or roughly 60 days beforehand--it says,
    ``Summary and action request. Embassy Tripoli requests
    continued TDY security support for an additional 60 days.''
        Now, yesterday you told us, under penalty of perjury,
    essentially, that it wasn't a request, it was a recommendation.
    Does the word ``request'' mean ``request''? And are you
    prepared to say today that they requested these assets above
    and beyond what they had on September 11th, rather than that
    they simply recommended?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, we discussed that there was no justification
    that normally comes with a request. That cable was a very
    detailed and complex cable outlining what----
        Chairman Issa. Right. Well, we have now read that cable,
    and you are right, it is detailed. And in several more places
    it expresses concerns.
        The September 11th cable from the now-deceased Ambassador
    expresses current concerns on that day. Repeatedly in the
    cables that were denied to us what we see is people telling you
    that al-Qaeda-type organizations are coming together.
        Now, the problem I have is that the State Department is
    basically saying, Mr. Nordstrom didn't do his job; he didn't
    make a formal request with justification. The Ambassador didn't
    do his job; he didn't make a good enough case. And that is what
    you are standing behind here today, in addition to saying,
    well, there were five people there, therefore.
        An embassy--a compound owned by us and serving like a
    consulate was, in fact, breached less than 60 days before,
    approximately 60 days before the murder of the Ambassador in
    that facility. Isn't that true?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, we had the correct number of assets in
    Benghazi at the time of 9/11 for what had been agreed upon.
        Chairman Issa. Okay, my time has expired. To start off by
    saying you had the correct number, and our Ambassador and three
    other individuals are dead and people are in the hospital
    recovering because it only took moments to breach that
    facility, somehow doesn't seem to ring true to the American
    people.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member.
        Mr. Cummings, have you received the copies of the cables
    yet?
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Okay.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Mr. Nordstrom, you testified here today--your testimony
    here today paints a different picture than what has been
    portrayed in the press. In your testimony, you stated that you
    were, quote, ``impressed with the plans that would send our
    team into Libya, a massive show of well-organized resources,''
    end of quote.
        You further explained that, and I quote, ``The Department
    of State Diplomatic Security Service, and Mission Libya
    officers conducted themselves professionally and with careful
    attention to managing people and budgets in a way that reflects
    the gravity of that task.''
        Did you say that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Yes, I did, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. And you stated that you felt that the vast
    majority of your resource requests were, and I quote,
    ``considered seriously and fastidiously by DS and the
    Department,'' end of quote. Did you say that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. Did you mean that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. In fact, you list out a litany of security
    improvements that you were able to make in both Benghazi and
    Tripoli.
        I think all of that is helpful to put into context the
    concerns that you have raised about staffing numbers.
        In your interview on October 1st, 2012, you told the
    committee that you thought that there should be five diplomatic
    security special agents stationed in Benghazi and that you sent
    two cables, one in March and one in July, making that request.
    Is that right?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct. And if I could add to that
    point, it was not my decision to come up with the five agents
    in Benghazi. That number originated from a December 2011 cable
    detailing the future of operations in Benghazi.
        Mr. Cummings. All right.
        Mr. Nordstrom. That cable was drafted in the Department. I
    had at no time an opportunity to add or comment on that.
    However, the principal officer in Benghazi had an opportunity
    to comment on that. It was that number, five, which DS had
    committed to which we continued to ask them to meet throughout
    my time there.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, we have reviewed that July cable, and it
    states further, ``Post anticipates''--and I quote, ``Post
    anticipates supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one
    permanently assigned RSO from Tripoli; however, would request
    continued TDY support to fill a minimum of three security
    positions in Benghazi.''
        So that would be a total of four; is that right?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct.
        Mr. Cummings. I understand that you left Libya before the
    attacks; is that right?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is absolutely correct.
        Mr. Cummings. Ambassador Kennedy, let me turn to you. We
    have now been told there were, in fact, five--five--special
    agents in Benghazi the night of the attack, contrary to press
    reports.
        Can you verify whether, in fact, there were five special
    agents in Benghazi on the night of the attack? Were there also
    any additional armed guards at the compound on that night?
        Could you answer those two questions, please?
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. There were five diplomatic security
    special agents on the compound the evening of September 11th.
    And there were three additional armed security personnel
    provided by the Government of Libya.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, Agent Lamb, how do you respond to
    concerns that you failed to respond to requests for additional
    special agents in Benghazi? You know, that is a serious charge
    there.
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, sir. And we have evaluated that; I have
    evaluated it both with Eric Nordstrom and with a senior RSO
    that spent TDY time there, as well. I asked them to do a
    serious assessment of the numbers that were needed there.
        When Mr. Nordstrom and I discussed the duties of the agents
    out in Benghazi, they were using one agent to drive the
    vehicle, and they were using another agent to watch classified
    communications equipment 24/7. So these are not normally duties
    that are assigned to DS agents.
        So I just--I asked Eric to review that. And when Renee
    Crowningshield, another RSO, went to Benghazi, was also asked
    to review the numbers.
        And Eric worked closely with post management, asked them to
    hire a driver, and we hired a driver, trained a driver. And
    then the driver took the place of what the DS agent was doing.
    And then they came up, through technical security means, a way
    around the need to have the 24/7 coverage.
        Mr. Cummings. One last question: When the Ambassador
    traveled to Benghazi before the attack, could the security team
    in Tripoli have sent additional agents with him if they thought
    it was necessary?
        Ms. Lamb. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. Very well.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Cummings. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Were any of those five DS agents that were
    there from Tripoli that had come down with the Ambassador?
        Ms. Lamb. Two had traveled with the Ambassador.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So, for the record, there were three
    there and two happened to be there because the Ambassador was
    there. That is not the same as five being in Benghazi
    ordinarily.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir.
        Chairman Issa. So if in the ordinary course there had been
    five, there still would have been two more coming down with the
    Ambassador, for a total of seven.
        Ms. Lamb. But post had agreed that three was a sufficient
    number to have on the ground.
        Mr. Cummings. So, just one question.
        Chairman Issa. Of course.
        Mr. Cummings. So, Mr. Nordstrom, the cable we talked about
    asked for four agents, not five; is that right?
        Mr. Nordstrom. If you could just clarify which cable? As I
    said, I sent a number of requests back by cable.
        Mr. Cummings. The July cable.
        Mr. Nordstrom. July 9th?
        Mr. Cummings. Yes. It asked for four and not five.
        Mr. Nordstrom. It asked for a minimum of three. And our
    plan was--at the time, we had three full-time permanently
    assigned agents in Libya: myself and two assistants.
        Mr. Cummings. So, even so, there were five on the night of
    the attack; is that right?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is my understanding, although I was not
    there.
        Mr. Cummings. All right, thank you.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We now recognize the former chairman of the full committee
    for his questions, Mr. Burton.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kennedy, right after the September 11th attack, you
    were up here on Capitol Hill giving a briefing to aides, and
    you indicated--in fact, you said that this appeared to be a
    terrorist attack. Do you stand by that?
        Mr. Kennedy. What I said, Mr. Chairman, is that I was--
    former chairman, Mr. Burton, sir----
        Chairman Issa. Once a chairman, always a chairman.
        Mr. Burton. Yeah, right.
        Mr. Kennedy. The question I recall being asked was, was
    this a premeditated attack. And I responded----
        Mr. Burton. It says----
        Mr. Kennedy. I responded to that that I am not prepared to
    render a formal opinion on whether or not it was premeditated,
    but I thought it involved a degree of complexity that was
    significant.
        Mr. Burton. Well, according to people who were there, you
    called it a terrorist attack.
        Mr. Kennedy. Oh. That was--in a separate statement, yes,
    sir, I said----
        Mr. Burton. Okay. That is all I wanted to know.
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Burton. That is all I wanted to know.
        Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely.
        Mr. Burton. Okay. Because today, as I listen to people--and
    you, Ms. Lamb, have said--you have described these attackers in
    a number of ways, but you don't mention terrorists at all. Why
    is that?
        I mean, the compound had been attacked once before and
    breached. And these people had all these weapons--projectiles,
    grenades, all kinds of weapons. Why would you call this
    anything but a terrorist attack? And why do you call them
    attackers?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, I have just presented the facts as they have
    come across. I am not making any judgments on my own, and I am
    leaving that----
        Mr. Burton. Okay, well, let me ask you a couple of other
    questions. There were 16 troops that were there at that
    compound, and they requested them to be kept there. And they
    sent a suggestion to you that they be kept there, and then you
    responded, saying that if that was presented to you, you would
    not accept that. Was that your sole decision?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, they were not in Benghazi. They were in
    Tripoli. I just want to make sure that we are----
        Mr. Burton. I understand. Go ahead.
        Ms. Lamb. Okay. And when the cable came in where RSO
    Nordstrom laid out all of his staffing requirements and needs,
    I asked our desk officer to go back and sit down with him, or
    through emails and telephone conversations, to work out all the
    details and line up exactly how many security personnel, armed
    security personnel, did he need.
        Mr. Burton. Okay. Well----
        Ms. Lamb. But----
        Mr. Burton. You did not agree with that assessment that
    they needed those there.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir. We had been training----
        Mr. Burton. No, no. I just want to know----
        Ms. Lamb. --people, local Libyans----
        Mr. Burton. --did you or did you not say that if that was
    presented to you, you would not accept it?
        Ms. Lamb. He was post----
        Mr. Burton. Did you or did you not say----
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, sir. I said that, personally, I would not
    support it.
        Mr. Burton. Okay. Now, why----
        Ms. Lamb. He could request it.
        Mr. Burton. --is that? Why is that?
        Ms. Lamb. Because----
        Mr. Burton. You knew about all these other attacks that had
    taken place. There had been 12, 14.
        Ms. Lamb. We had been training local Libyans and arming
    them----
        Mr. Burton. Well, now----
        Ms. Lamb. --for almost a year.
        Mr. Burton. Okay. Well, let me just interrupt and say that
    the local Libyan militia that was there, many of them
    supposedly were told by friends and relatives that there was
    going to be an imminent attack on that compound, and so many of
    them were left.
        Ms. Lamb. Yes.
        Mr. Burton. They didn't want to be involved in the attack.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, with----
        Mr. Burton. Did--well, wait, wait, wait, wait.
        Ms. Lamb. Okay.
        Mr. Burton. Yeah.
        Ms. Lamb. Sorry.
        Mr. Burton. So I don't understand why you would say out of
    hand that you don't think those 16 troops should be there.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, with due respect, they were in Tripoli; they
    were not in Benghazi. And it would not have made any difference
    in Benghazi.
        Mr. Burton. Okay.
        Mr. Nordstrom, do you care to comment on this?
        Mr. Nordstrom. As DAS Lamb indicated, beginning in about
    the January-February time frame, I had a number of
    conversations with DAS Lamb, with the regional director for
    Near Eastern Affairs, and also the desk officer for Libya
    itself. And a lot of those discussions were specific to
    determining what exactly our personnel needs were, looking at
    metrics, looking at what the duties would be that these
    personnel would be doing, be it DOD-sourced or Department of
    State-sourced.
        The number that we continued to come up with--and it is
    generally the same number that was requested in March, in my
    first request--was approximately 12 armed security, with an
    additional 6 persons that would be focused on training that
    local guard unit.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Burton. I would be happy to yield.
        Chairman Issa. Isn't it true--we had this in testimony by
    the other RSO yesterday from Benghazi--that they would have as
    much as 30 percent turnover per month in these people they were
    training; that, in fact, you were not getting, if you will,
    good career people to come in, but, in fact, had very high
    turnover both in the unarmed and, to a lesser extent, in the
    armed portion of the training.
        Mr. Nordstrom. We had--just in terms of a point of
    clarification, we did have--the guard force was somewhat
    confusing. In Tripoli, the guards that we employed were
    directly hired by the Embassy. They were----
        Chairman Issa. I am only speaking of Benghazi.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Okay. Those were subcontracted. The decision
    to go with a contractor, Blue Mountain, was largely based on
    our concern of how long we would be in Benghazi. We were
    concerned that if we retained or brought on board full-time
    employees, we would have to then find a position for them if
    that post ever went away.
        So, yes, it is my understanding that there was a very high
    turnover with those people.
        In terms of the armed security that were there, the 17
    February, it was a core group that stayed there largely for the
    duration.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired, but,
    Colonel Wood, if you want to finish up on anything that is
    responsive, that would be fine.
        Colonel Wood. Yes. The 16 members of the SST did go to
    Benghazi on two separate occasions to support movement of the
    principal officer in that location, to bolster the security
    that was there. She made trips to Tobruk and Derna, and they
    were needed there for the extra--just the extra movement that
    she had and to remain--to guard the compound and to provide a
    quick reaction force, if necessary.
        We did that on, like I said, two separate occasions to
    provide that extra support. The SST on loan to the security
    force goes above and beyond normal, I guess, law enforcement-
    oriented security. These individuals were familiar with and
    carried larger-caliber, better weapons, and the tactics they
    would employ would be to counter a military-style attack.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Ms. Norton?
        Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Kennedy, I want to make sure I clarify one of
    the most controversial parts of this matter, and that is how
    the public first learned of the first reason given for the
    disturbances in Benghazi.
        Now, I understand that the State Department did not take
    any position, including the position taken by Ambassador Rice.
    So I think it is important to trace how the Ambassador came to
    the conclusions that she reported on television.
        She said that her information was that the Benghazi matters
    were similar to the protests that had arisen in Cairo. And she
    referred to extremist elements, opportunistic elements taking
    advantage, essentially, of that protest.
        Now, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    issued a statement that indicated that it had been the source
    of the Ambassador's statement. And I would like to read what
    the National Intelligence Director said.
        ``In the immediate aftermath, there was information that
    led us to assess that the attack began spontaneously, following
    protests earlier that day at our Embassy in Cairo. We provided
    that initial assessment to executive branch officials and
    Members of Congress, who used that information to discuss the
    attack publicly and to provide updates as they became
    available. Throughout our investigation, we continued to
    emphasize that information gathered was preliminary and
    evolving.''
        I note, by the way, that, Mr. Nordstrom, you say in your
    testimony--I am looking at page 2--that the ferocity and
    intensity of the attack was nothing that we had seen in Libya
    or that I had seen in my time--my entire time in diplomatic
    service, indicating that this was something of a surprise
    attack and, I might say, suggesting that perhaps we should be
    about rethinking how to protect our outposts, since it is clear
    we are not going to do it with lots of funds.
        But what I read as the statement, Ambassador Kennedy, could
    I ask you, from the National Intelligence Director, could I ask
    you if you have any reason to doubt that Ambassador Rice relied
    on that information from the National Intelligence Director?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, Ms. Norton. When I came up to give a
    briefing earlier that week, followed I think a day or 2 later
    by Ambassador Rice, both of us were relying on the same
    information. As I said in my oral statement, that if I or any
    other senior administration official, career or noncareer,
    would have been on that television show, other than Susan Rice,
    we would have said the same thing because we were drawing on
    the intelligence information that was then available to us.
        This has been, as you all know, very much an evolving
    situation. What we knew that first week and that first weekend
    has evolved over time, so we know much more now than we knew
    then.
        Ms. Norton. Indeed, the National Director issued a
    statement on the 28th, and he said, ``As we learned more about
    the attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new
    information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized
    terrorist attack carried out by extremists.'' So we see the
    evolving nature of it.
        Look, I have to ask you about the diplomats who were
    stationed in Cairo who were accused by Governor Mitt Romney of
    sympathizing with the attackers. I would like to know how these
    diplomats, these personnel in Cairo reacted to that criticism.
        Mr. Kennedy. I am afraid, Ms. Norton, I don't know. I have
    not had any conversations with the public affairs section in
    the Embassy in Cairo.
        But I can assure you, from just my general knowledge of for
    39 years in the foreign service, that there is not a foreign
    service officer or foreign service professional in our service
    who at all sympathizes or agrees with terrorists.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        We now go to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Could you yield me 10 seconds for a quick
    question?
        Mr. Jordan. Sure.
        Chairman Issa. Let's understand. What you are saying here
    today is that one piece of intel, one piece of intel got you
    guys, yourself and Ambassador Rice, to make a wrong statement 5
    or 6 days later and still be making it? Because Sunday is a
    long time after Tuesday.
        So you are saying that you got it wrong and it stayed
    wrong, you didn't know any better, between the 11th and the
    16th; is that right?
        Mr. Kennedy. The information that was available----
        Chairman Issa. No, no, I just----
        Mr. Kennedy. The information that was available from the
    intelligence community to both myself----
        Chairman Issa. Ambassador----
        Mr. Kennedy. --when I----
        Chairman Issa. Ambassador--Ambassador, you are a great
    witness historically. I asked you, did you have any contrary
    knowledge over those 5 days? That is all I want.
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. You didn't know any better for the
    next 5 days is your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman? May I ask unanimous consent
    that we give equal time to Mr. Cummings to respond and then
    give Mr. Jordan his full 5 minutes?
        Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, on that request----
        Chairman Issa. To be honest--Mr. Lynch, are you requesting
    time?
        Mr. Lynch. On a point of order. On a point of order.
        Mr. Cummings. I was just----
        Chairman Issa. I ask unanimous consent that the ranking
    member have 15 seconds.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Lynch. On a point of order. Objection. Mr. Chairman,
    with all due respect, you just went over----
        Chairman Issa. You don't have to apologize to me.
        Mr. Lynch. With all due respect, you just allowed Mr.
    Burton to go over by 2 minutes, and you are giving Mr. Cummings
    15 seconds. You know what I mean? There is a little bit----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Lynch. I am sure you are going to balance out the time.
        Chairman Issa. No, I understand. And we have gone over,
    both on witnesses and that. And I am going to pull it back into
    5 minutes----
        Mr. Lynch. There you go.
        Chairman Issa. --very solidly.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. But just be fair to the ranking member.
        Chairman Issa. Before we get down to your part of the dais,
    I will get there, I promise.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, can I----
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Without objection, the ranking member is given equal time
    to ask a question.
        Please.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah, I just want to go back to you,
    Ambassador. I think Ms. Norton and the chairman asked a very
    critical question.
        The chairman talked about the 5 days. Can you give us--can
    you try to explain that to us, that, you know, during that
    period of 5 days or whatever it was, not being able to--not
    having the information, contrary to what Ms. Rice may have
    said? And I understand that was based on intelligence, but can
    you explain how that could happen to the public?
        In other words, were you all still gathering information?
    Was the State Department in the process of trying to get it
    right? I mean, what was going on there? Do you know?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Cummings, we were gathering information.
    We were closely coordinating with our colleagues in the
    intelligence community.
        We wanted to know what was happening more than anyone else
    because we also had dozens of other embassies that we were
    concerned about, including attacks on three or four other
    embassies. So we were looking for every piece of information
    that we could get from no matter what rational and reasonable
    source to feed into our consideration of what steps we should
    take to protect U.S. Diplomatic facilities abroad.
        Mr. Cummings. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman.
        Is it unusual for you all to rely on the intelligence
    community for that kind of information?
        Mr. Kennedy. We have a great partnership, Mr. Cummings,
    with the intelligence community, and we heavily depend upon the
    information they provide us, just as they heavily depend upon
    the information we provide them.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank you.
        And now the gentleman from Ohio has exactly 5 minutes.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you. I thank the chairman.
        Lieutenant Colonel Wood, how many months were you in Libya?
        Colonel Wood. I was in Libya approximately 6 months.
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Nordstrom, how many months were you in
    Libya?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Approximately 10.
        Mr. Jordan. Ms. Lamb, how many times have you visited Libya
    in the--how many times have you visited Libya, period?
        Ms. Lamb. I have not.
        Mr. Jordan. None over the last 14, 15 months?
        Ms. Lamb. No.
        Mr. Jordan. None since the 200-plus incidents, security
    incidents, in Libya you have visited?
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir.
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Kennedy, how many times have you been to
    Libya?
        Mr. Kennedy. None.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Let me go to this process. We had numbers earlier from Mr.
    Nordstrom. You talked about three/five in Libya. Then we talked
    about you wanted 12, plus a backup of 6. So I want to know
    about this process. And, actually, I will go to Mr. Kennedy
    first.
        In your testimony, Mr. Kennedy, you say, ``The Department
    of State regularly assesses risk in allocation of resources for
    security, a process which involves considered judgments of
    experienced professionals on the ground and in Washington using
    the best information available.''
        So that process, I want to know how the decision was made.
    Are you involved in that process, Ambassador Kennedy?
        Mr. Kennedy. In most normal occasions I am not involved.
    There is an ongoing dialogue----
        Mr. Jordan. Where does that process go to? Are people in
    the White House directly involved in that process? Is Secretary
    Clinton directly involved in that process?
        Mr. Kennedy. The process--if there are disagreements
    between the post in the field and the diplomatic security----
        Mr. Jordan. Would you classify what took place here as a
    disagreement, based on what Mr. Nordstrom and Mr. Wood have
    testified to and what Ms. Lamb has said?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir. I would----
        Mr. Jordan. This didn't reach the disagreement level?
        Mr. Kennedy. I would describe it as a dialogue between the
    post and diplomatic security----
        Mr. Jordan. So this didn't reach a level where you needed
    to weigh in or someone higher needed to weigh in?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir, it did not.
        Mr. Jordan. Anyone at the National Security Council, did
    anyone weigh in there?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir, it did not.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Mr. Nordstrom, let me turn to you then. I want to know, in
    the email that Congressman Chaffetz referenced earlier, the
    interview you had with Congressman Chaffetz and Chairman Issa
    back on October 1st, you stated, quote, ``This is not an
    environment where posts should be directed to normalize
    operations and reduce security resources in accordance with
    artificial timelines.''
        And yet today in your testimony it was a little different
    tenor, as I think the ranking member brought out. And you
    mentioned at one point, the answer should not be to operate
    from a bunker. So I want to ask you these questions.
        First of all, since that interview with Chairman Issa and
    Chairman Chaffetz, staff has indicated they have tried to
    contact you six different times via telephone and you have not
    responded. Is there a reason you did not respond to those
    telephone calls?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct----
        Mr. Jordan. No, it is correct you didn't respond. Is there
    a reason?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I had been advised by the Department of
    State that all inquiries----
        Mr. Jordan. And who specifically advised you to do that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Our legislative affairs office.
        Mr. Jordan. And did they say where that came from? Did Ms.
    Lamb specifically advise you not to talk?
        Mr. Nordstrom. No, she did not.
        Mr. Jordan. Did Ambassador Kennedy tell you to do that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. No, he did not.
        Mr. Jordan. Did Secretary of State Clinton tell you to do
    that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. No, she did not.
        Mr. Jordan. So who was the person who told you not to talk
    with our staff after you gave us this interview where you gave
    us this information?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I was advised by the Assistant Secretary
    Boswell----
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Mr. Nordstrom. --by his office, his staff that all requests
    for information and documents would need to go--would need to
    be vetted or routed through that office.
        Mr. Jordan. Did those same individuals help you prepare
    today's testimony?
        Mr. Nordstrom. In the sense of providing general guidelines
    on how----
        Mr. Jordan. Did they tell you they wanted to look it over
    before you came in front of this committee and gave it today?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Of course.
        Mr. Jordan. And did they write it for you?
        Mr. Nordstrom. No, they did not.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Ms. Lamb, I want to go back to--I want to go back to this
    decision-making process. So is it customary to not listen as--
    well, I would characterize it as listen as intently as I think
    you should to the guys in the field and what they wanted to
    have happen when they requested the 12 plus the 6 backup?
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, sir, I listened intently to those
    conversations.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Mr. Wood, let me bring you into the conversation here. I
    want your comments on that, specifically the number you wanted
    to add in Libya, plus the additional six.
        Colonel Wood. We agreed to the numbers, between Eric and I,
    and put forth those numbers. We felt great frustration in the
    fact that those demands were ignored or in some cases just
    never met.
        Mr. Jordan. So the process I was earlier referencing when
    asking Ambassador Kennedy, tell me who you felt was involved in
    that process? Who were the individuals in Washington? You were
    the folks on the ground, at post. Who were the folks in
    Washington in that process?
        Mr. Wood. I heard Eric Nordstrom refer to Ms. Lamb, as far
    as the deciding authority on providing those additional
    resources.
        Mr. Jordan. Experienced professionals on the ground in
    Washington. Who were the other experienced professionals in
    Washington that helped make that decision?
        Colonel Wood. I wouldn't know the answer to that.
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Nordstrom, who else?
        Because all we got right now, we know the Secretary of
    State wasn't, we know the White House wasn't, and we know the
    National Security--and we know Ambassador Kennedy wasn't.
    Somebody had to decide. Someone in Washington was telling you
    guys you couldn't get what you wanted. So was it just Ms. Lamb,
    or were there other people involved in this process?
        Mr. Nordstrom?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Again, I can't speculate in terms of who
    was. The person I dealt with was our regional director, Jim
    Bacigalupo, and then Ms. Lamb. The----
        Mr. Jordan. Okay----
        Mr. Nordstrom. The Ambassador and the DCM, if I could just
    add----
        Chairman Issa. Okay, you can finish----
        Mr. Nordstrom. --raised the same concerns. The DCM met with
    DAS Lamb also in February, raised the same concerns in person.
    And it is my understanding that Ambassador Cretz made
    additional phone calls. All of us at post were in sync that we
    wanted these resources.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. Anyone that needs to answer that
    question, but the gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Lamb?
        On behalf of Ms. Lamb, Ambassador Kennedy.
        Mr. Kennedy. Because I want to make----
        Briefly, please.
        Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
        I was asked--on a different question, I was asked whether I
    was going to request a third extension of the SST. I consulted
    with my colleagues, and because our colleagues had put
    together----
        Mr. Jordan. Wait, but that is not what you said earlier.
    You said you weren't involved, and now you are telling me you
    are. Which one is it?
        Mr. Kennedy. This is a--you asked a specific question----
        Chairman Issa. Okay. This question, I am afraid, will be
    for the next round for both of you.
        With that, we recognize the gentleman from Ohio also, Mr.
    Kucinich.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kennedy has testified today that U.S. interests and
    values are at stake in Libya and that the U.S. is better off
    because we went to Benghazi. Really? You would think that after
    10 years in Iraq and 11 years in Afghanistan, that our country,
    that the U.S. would have learned the consequences and the
    limits of interventionism. You would think that after trillions
    have been wasted on failed attempts at democracy-building
    abroad while our infrastructure crumbles at home, Congress and
    the administration would reexamine priorities.
        Today we are engaging in a discussion about the security
    failures in Benghazi. There was a security failure. Four
    Americans, including our Ambassador, Ambassador Christopher
    Stevens, were killed. Their deaths are a national tragedy, and
    my sympathy is with the families of those who were killed.
    There has to be accountability, and I haven't heard that yet.
    We have an obligation to protect those who protect us. That is
    why this Congress needs to ask questions.
        The security situation did not happen overnight because of
    a decision made by someone at the State Department. We could
    talk about hundreds of millions of dollars in cuts for funding
    for embassy security over the last 2 years as a result of a
    blind pursuit of fiscal austerity. We could talk about whether
    it is prudent to rely so heavily on security contractors rather
    than our own military or State Department personnel. We could
    do a he-said/she-said about whether the State Department should
    have beefed up security at the Embassy in Benghazi. But we owe
    it to the diplomatic corps who serves our Nation to start at
    the beginning, and that is what I shall do.
        The security threats in Libya, including the unchecked
    extremist groups who are armed to the teeth, exist because our
    Nation spurred on a civil war, destroying the security and
    stability of Libya. And, you know, no one defends Qadhafi.
    Libya was not in a meltdown before the war. In 2003, Qadhafi
    reconciled with the community of nations by giving up his
    nation's pursuit of nuclear weapons. At the time, President
    Bush said Qadhafi's actions made our country and our world
    safer.
        Now, during the Arab Spring, uprisings across the Middle
    East occurred, and Qadhafi made ludicrous threats against
    Benghazi. Based on those verbal threats, we intervened--absent
    constitutional authority, I might add. We bombed Libya, we
    destroyed their army, we obliterated their police stations.
    Lacking any civil authority, armed brigades controlled
    security. Al Qaeda expanded its presence. Weapons are
    everywhere. Thousands of shoulder-to-air missiles are on the
    loose.
        Our military intervention led to greater instability in
    Libya. Many of us, Democrats and Republicans alike, made that
    argument to try to stop the war. It is not surprising, given
    the inflated threat and the grandiose expectations inherent in
    our nation-building in Libya, that the State Department was not
    able to adequately protect our diplomats from this predictable
    threat. It is not surprising, and it is also not acceptable.
        It is easy to blame someone else, like a civil servant at
    the State Department. We all know the game. It is harder to
    acknowledge that decades of American foreign policy have
    directly contributed to regional instability and the rise of
    armed militias around the world.
        It is even harder to acknowledge Congress's role in the
    failure to stop the war in Libya, the war in Iraq, the war in
    Afghanistan, the war in Pakistan, the war in Yemen, the war in
    Somalia, and who knows where else. It is harder to recognize
    Congress's role in the failure to stop the drone attacks that
    are still killing innocent civilians and strengthening radical
    elements abroad.
        We want to stop the attacks on our embassies? Let's stop
    trying to overthrow governments. This should not be a partisan
    issue. Let's avoid the hype. Let's look at the real situation
    here. Interventions do not make us safer. They do not protect
    our Nation. They are, themselves, a threat to America.
        Now, Mr. Kennedy, I would like to ask you, is al Qaeda more
    or less established in Libya since our involvement?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kucinich, I will have to take that
    question for the record. I am not an intelligence expert.
        Mr. Kucinich. Oh, you don't have the intelligence, you are
    saying. Well, I am going to go on to the next question.
        The next question: Are Americans safer, Mr. Kennedy----
        Chairman Issa. Mr. Kucinich?
        Mr. Kucinich. Excuse me?
        Chairman Issa. I think the other two may have an opinion,
    also, if you wanted to ask them about that.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, I wanted to ask Ambassador Kennedy.
        Next question, Ambassador Kennedy: How many shoulder-to-air
    missiles are capable of shooting--that are capable of shooting
    down civilian passenger airlines are still missing in Libya?
    And this happened since our intervention. Can you answer that
    question?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir. I will be glad to provide it for the
    record.
        Mr. Kucinich. You are saying that you don't know.
        Mr. Kennedy. I do not know, sir. It is not within my normal
    purview of operations at the State Department.
        Mr. Kucinich. Does anyone else here know how many shoulder-
    to-air missiles that can shoot down civilian airliners are
    still loose in Libya? Does anyone know?
        Mr. Nordstrom. The figures that we were provided were
    fluid, but the rough approximation was between 10,000 and
    20,000.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired. Did you
    want them to answer anything about al Qaeda growth?
        Mr. Kucinich. If anyone there knows the answer.
        Chairman Issa. If anyone has an answer on that one, they
    can answer, and then we will move on.
        Mr. Kucinich. Yeah. Is al Qaeda more or less established in
    Libya since our involvement?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir, and their presence grows every day.
    They are certainly more established than we are.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        With that, we recognize the chairman of the subcommittee
    and a doggedly determined individual to get to the bottom of
    this, Mr. Chaffetz.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Nordstrom, as we spoke before and I think is clear in
    the record, you were asking for more personnel and that was
    either rejected or denied or just simply ignored, correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Actually, to clarify, we were asking just to
    keep what we had.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And when you weren't able to just even keep
    what you had, what happened to your pay and the other security
    officers' on the ground?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I am sorry, I----
        Mr. Chaffetz. As I recall, what you told me is, when that
    was denied, you were given a pay increase. They increased your
    pay.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Ah, okay. What I think you are referring to
    is the increase in danger pay for post. As part of normal
    procedures, we are asked for input at post. I, as part of that
    process, would provide information on security----
        Mr. Chaffetz. So, to clarify, you were asking for more
    assets, more resources, more personnel; that was denied. But
    the State Department went back and reclassified it as more
    dangerous. The danger pay, therefore, increased. They didn't
    tell you that we didn't have resources, hey, that Congress just
    cut your budget. They gave you an increase because the danger
    was rising, correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct. We received a danger pay
    increase.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
        Did the buildings in Benghazi meet the so-called Inman
    standards? After the bombings in Beirut, we went back as a
    government and formalized some minimum standards. Did they or
    did they not meet those minimum standards?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Neither the buildings in Benghazi nor the
    buildings in Tripoli met those standards, nor was there a plan
    for the next phase of construction, what was called the interim
    embassy, would they meet the standards either. That interim
    embassy was scheduled to be on the ground for approximately 10
    years. That was a major cause of concern, and that was the main
    physical security issue that we continued to raise.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I would point to an August 20 cable,
    that U.N. Officials believe the Supreme Security Council is,
    quote, ``fading away,'' unquote, unwilling to take on, quote,
    ``anyone with powerful patrons or from powerful tribes,'' end
    quote. This cable back to Washington, D.C., also said that
    incidents continue in this ``security vacuum,'' as they
    referred to it, in Benghazi.
        Mr. Chairman, I would also point to September 4th. In their
    memo, they highlighted the September 1st, quote, ``maximum
    alert''--a maximum alert, September 1st. This was the
    information that was coming.
        And what is infuriating is that we have hundreds of
    terrorist types of activities. Our consulate is bombed twice.
    The British Ambassador has an assassination attempt. And you
    are over here arguing about whether the number was five or two,
    or five or three. And the security experts who actually have
    even been to Libya didn't get the resources that they asked
    for.
        Colonel Wood, did you participate in any way, shape, or
    form in requests for additional personnel in Libya? And what
    was the consequence of those requests?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir, I did. I assisted Eric Nordstrom in
    preparation of the requests for support. Inasmuch as they dealt
    with SST support, I reviewed some of those documents and
    assisted in the preparation of those.
        I would like to add also that there was frustration from
    the beginning. The initial, or perhaps it was the second
    request for extension that occurred on April 5th, Ambassador
    Cretz encountered some difficulty in understanding what was
    going on. He was getting conflicting signals from DOD and DOS.
    I got him together with General Ham. They worked out a complete
    understanding, and General Ham made it very clear to Ambassador
    Cretz that he could have the SST as long as he needed them.
    This was a great interagency cooperation, and that was made
    very clear to him.
        It was also made clear to Joan Polaschik, who took over as
    charge d'affaires in between Ambassador Cretz and Ambassador
    Stevens. He came personally and told her that.
        He also had a VTC with Ambassador Stevens and reiterated
    that same point, that the SST was his as long he needed them.
    All he had to do was request them, and General Ham was
    perfectly willing to provide that support.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Nordstrom, did you ever specifically ask
    Charlene Lamb--rather, did she ever specifically direct you not
    to ask for additional DOD SST extension?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I recall two specific phone calls, one in
    the February timeframe, one in the July timeframe. I had the
    opportunity to refresh my recollection on one of those phone
    calls by talking to the two agents who happened to be present
    in the living room of the Ambassador's residence, which is
    where we used as our office.
        In those conversations, I recall that I was specifically
    told you cannot request an SST extension. How I interpreted
    that was that there was going to be too much political cost, or
    for some reason, there was hesitancy on that. In the first
    case, in February, the Ambassador and DCM and I all felt
    strongly about the need for that. And we went ahead and
    requested it anyway.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. Thank you.
        We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts--and we
    appreciate his patience--for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank
    the witnesses, all of you, for your willingness to come and
    help the committee with its work. Obviously, I want to
    acknowledge the tremendous sacrifice of Ambassador Stevens and
    former Navy SEALs Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty, who was a
    favorite son of Massachusetts, my home State, and as well as
    Communications Specialist Sean Smith.
        I want to make two points, however. One is, I think the
    best way to honor the memory of those American heroes is to
    address the general and global issue of embassy security so
    that when we do assign other brave Americans to fill these
    posts, that they do have adequate security.
        Now many members of this committee, both sides of the aisle
    here, have traveled to the Middle East dozens and dozens of
    times. We have visited some--and the chairman has mentioned
    them in his opening remarks--mentioned Damascus; Syria;
    mentioned Beirut, Lebanon. I just came back from Sana'a, Yemen,
    where at least in Yemen, they are undergoing some structural
    changes there in response to threats there. But we have some
    embassies that predate even the attacks on Nairobi, Kenya, or
    Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, so that we have got old-world
    embassies that are located right on the street, right on the
    souk in the Middle East that are terribly exposed to car bombs
    and to attacks.
        So I think the best way really to approach this thing is,
    number one, is take a holistic approach to this and figure out
    how we can prevent this type of thing from happening again.
        And I think my second point, really, the easiest way to
    strengthen embassy security is to get on the same page. I have
    to tell it like it is. And in recent budgets, my Republican
    colleagues have supported cuts to funding for embassy security.
    Well, the first thing you have got to do to strengthen embassy
    security is to try to meet Secretary Clinton's request for
    funding for embassy security. That will help a lot.
        Ambassador Kennedy and Ms. Lamb, what would a few hundred
    million dollars, like was cut from the President's request and
    Secretary Clinton's request for embassy security, what would
    that mean to you in terms of providing that level of protection
    that every son and daughter of America deserves when they
    accept that post to go into a dangerous area, especially some
    of the spots that we have got right now in the Middle East,
    what would that few hundred million dollars do to your ability
    to provide an adequate level of protection on their behalf?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Lynch, if we received the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2013, which is still pending
    before the Congress, we would be able to construct new
    facilities and we would be able to upgrade additional
    facilities to get to the higher standards we seek.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, look, I want to go back to the Chairman's
    point, the situations in Damascus and in Beirut. Obviously,
    Damascus we have withdrawn our embassy personnel. But we have
    still got the same problem there when things get straightened
    out. We are still on the main street. We are negotiating--we
    were negotiating. I had personal conversations with President
    Assad a couple of years ago about getting a new facility there.
        Do we have a task force that is looking at providing the
    setback we need to provide that level of protection and to
    relocate some of these embassies?
        Mr. Kennedy. We do, sir. We have a strategic plan. We know
    which embassies are more in danger than others. We are working
    through that. But there are limitations on funds. I can only
    construct so many new facilities each year, depending on the
    funds I have available to me.
        Mr. Lynch. I just want to go back to one point, Ms. Lamb.
    In your written testimony at page 2, first paragraph, you
    mention that in addition to the security team you had there,
    there was, I think you described it as a rapid response force
    that was located in the annex. How many folks are in that
    rapid, do you know? How many are in that rapid response task
    force or team that would help? Or, Mr. Nordstrom, I don't know
    if you know the number of that.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, there were seven. And their job was also to
    hook up with----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Point of order. Point of order.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Again, I would renew my deep concern that we
    are getting into an area that is classified--and should be
    classified. The dealing with the map is one issue. I believe
    that the markings on that map were terribly inappropriate. But
    the activities there could cost lives.
        Mr. Lynch. On the point of order--may I speak on the point
    of order?
        Chairman Issa. You may speak on the point of order, of
    course.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay.
        This whole hearing is responding to allegations that there
    were not enough people on the ground at the Benghazi facility,
    those accusations that you made publicly, so that now I am
    trying to get an answer of how many people were there, and all
    of a sudden that is off the record, that is classified
    information? You have got to be kidding me. You have got to be
    kidding me.
        Chairman Issa. I am prepared to rule.
        Unless you are prepared to get clearance to declassify any
    and all information about additional personnel, this hearing
    will be limited to the information already given, which is the
    amount of individuals who responded from that rapid force. This
    hearing is not specifically about September 11, but it is
    intended to clarify much more prospectively failures,
    accountability decisions. I don't think that any of us--and I
    don't want to overly state this--but I don't think any of us
    figure since four people are dead, something went wrong. Having
    said that, there has previously been testimony as to the
    individuals that have responded.
        I would certainly recommend the entire committee have a
    classified briefing as to any and all other assets that were
    not drawn upon but could have been drawn upon. And I would ask
    the gentleman to respect that. And I would yield the gentleman
    an additional 1 minute to finish his questioning.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. Mr. Ambassador, can you clarify any answer
    around that question that may not violate----
        Mr. Kennedy. Certainly, sir. The U.S. mission, the American
    embassy annexes in Benghazi consisted of two separate compounds
    because we could not all fit on one compound. There were
    security personnel stationed on both compounds. There was an
    affected type of mutual assistance arrangement that had been
    worked out by the regional security officers, so if one
    compound came under attack, security personnel would flow from
    one to the other or vice versa. It is a common practice. And so
    we are very, very interested in making sure that we have the
    maximum utilization for common U.S. Government-State Department
    security personnel in any country, and we do that. And we are
    certainly mindful and respectful of the general security
    concerns.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        Only one point of clarification. Mr. Nordstrom, during your
    time were those people under any of your control or could you
    task them?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I am glad you asked that question. Again, in
    being completely cognizant, because I have some of the same
    concerns, all of the people there were under the Chief of
    Mission. But not necessarily all of the security people fell
    under my direct operational control.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. I think that clarifies it. We now
    go to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lankford, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I need to shift my
    questions a little bit from what I intended just based on some
    of the conversation that we have had so far.
        Ms. Lamb, can you clarify for me, where were you working
    September 11th? Were you in the Washington area or in the main
    facility there?
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, sir. I was in the DS Command Center on the
    evening of the event.
        Mr. Lankford. You note that in your testimony, that you are
    in the diplomatic security command center, and then you make
    this statement: I could follow what was happening almost in
    real-time.
        Ms. Lamb. That is correct.
        Mr. Lankford. So once they hit the button in Benghazi you
    are alerted. It said you could have. Did you follow what was
    happening in real-time at that point?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, what was happening is they were making
    multiple phone calls and it was very important that they
    communicate with the annex in Tripoli because this is where
    additional resources were coming from. So they would hang up on
    us and then call back.
        Mr. Lankford. But you are tracking it back and forth, what
    is going on.
        Ms. Lamb. Yes.
        Mr. Lankford. Then, after a very long night for them, they
    are evacuated out into Tripoli. Where they in communication
    with you then once they got to Tripoli? This would have been
    the next morning at that point.
        Ms. Lamb. No. At that point Embassy Tripoli took over
    communicating.
        Mr. Lankford. So you had no other communication with them
    after they got to Tripoli. You weren't aware of that or----
        Ms. Lamb. No. They notified us when there was wheels down.
    They notified us when they got to the hospital. They notified
    us when they were wheels up in route to Germany.
        Mr. Lankford. Obviously, these are your folks. I cannot
    imagine the emotion of that for you. So you had no other
    connection to know what happened, the details of that, what
    occurred. These frantic phone calls and all these things that
    are happening back and forth, they get to Tripoli and you are
    not aware any more of what actually had just happened?
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir, we continued to follow them, but half
    the team had to be rushed to the hospital----
        Mr. Lankford. Right.
        Ms. Lamb. And treated. They had just been through a
    horrific ordeal.
        Mr. Lankford. Oh, it is horrible. Your detailed account of
    this is horrific.
        Ms. Lamb. So at this point, providing them the comfort to
    just come down from the adrenaline and the horror of what had
    happened, we respected that and we worked through our
    colleagues at the embassy in Tripoli.
        Mr. Lankford. Right. Here is my struggle with that. You are
    listening in on the command center. You are in communication as
    this is going on. They get to Tripoli. There is all kinds of
    conversations that are happening back and forth as people are
    checking on them. And yet State Department is testifying still
    today, 5 days later they didn't know what happened; that that
    was--a coordinated--maybe this was some spontaneous event that
    occurred, when there was constant communication happening.
        Did someone come to you and ask you from State: Was this a
    protest? Because I would assume you knew pretty quickly this
    was not some protest that went out of bounds because there was
    no protest even there that day. So it is not like there is a
    big group of people and 24 people jumped out and started
    shooting. There was no gathering at all that day. I assume you
    knew that immediately.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir. It was not clear. It was a very large
    compound and each individual agent was looking at what was
    happening from a different perspective and a different angle.
        Mr. Lankford. Was it clear to you there wasn't a protest
    going on outside? It is not that large of a compound you can't
    see out the front gates and know if there is a protest.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir. It happened so fast. When they rushed
    through the gate, it is was not clear.
        Mr. Lankford. I completely understand; 9:40 at night. The
    initial reports were this was some large protest that had
    happened over a video and it kind of birthed out of that where
    people are running out with RPGs and had attacked. And
    Ambassador Kennedy said that is the best we would know even 5
    days later. I find that hard to believe, based on your report
    that you are tracking what is occurring and that individuals,
    when they get to Tripoli the next morning are reporting back
    what happened, that someone didn't say: Here's what occurred.
    And the word ``protest'' never came out of it. And 5 days later
    no one knows?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, they were all fighting for their lives on
    that compound.
        Mr. Lankford. I completely understand that. My question is:
    The testimony seems to be conflicting today. We are getting
    reports from State that--this wasn't them, this was the
    Intelligence Community that made this report, but I hear from
    you, you were aware of what happened and what went on and
    others around you, and folks at the embassy, I can't imagine 5,
    6, 7--7 days later the White House press secretary standing up
    and still giving the same report 7 days later, that no one has
    done this.
        Now there are lots of other issues I want to talk about,
    but I am kind of amazed at this whole dialogue today that it
    seems like no one knew and there is this best case scenario
    that is coming out. And I am struggling with just the basic
    facts on this. Now this is irrelevant to the overall of what we
    are going to do in the future and what happened in the past.
    But I can't seem to put all these pieces together when I am
    getting such conflicting stories of people that are listening
    to it firsthand what is happening on the ground.
        Ambassador Kennedy, do you want to respond to that?
        Mr. Kennedy. If I could, sir. There were multiple reports
    coming out. Multiple reports.
        Mr. Lankford. Were any of the reports saying there was a
    protest?
        Mr. Kennedy. There were reports.
        Mr. Lankford. There were reports coming out of Benghazi
    that there were protests that day.
        Mr. Kennedy. There were reports that we received saying
    that there were protests. And I will not go any farther than
    that. And then things evolved. Period.
        If I could, one other thing.
        Chairman Issa. Before the gentleman goes on, you said you
    wouldn't go any further. I would only ask why you are not going
    any further. If you want to revise and extend other things,
    that is fine, but why won't you go further?
        Mr. Kennedy. Because I don't want to cross certain lines in
    open session.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So you are testifying there were
    multiple reports, but in this setting, you cannot tell us the
    multiple reports and where they came from?
        Mr. Kennedy. In open session.
        Chairman Issa. I appreciate that. We will arrange for a
    classified.
        If the gentleman will conclude.
        Mr. Lankford. Just my one issue is there is ongoing
    conversation happening, there is ongoing conversations the next
    morning when they are in Tripoli. I find it very difficult 5,
    6, 7 days later this same story is coming out when there was
    constant communication with a group of people. It just seems
    like a very difficult story for me to be able to believe.
        Mr. Kennedy. If I could.
        Mr. Lankford. Of course.
        Mr. Kennedy. As I said in my opening statement, Mr.
    Chairman, Mr. Lankford, there were multiple reports. We are
    trying to reconcile the reports. Because we regard our
    responsibility to keep the Congress informed, we came up very,
    very early to talk when we still had multiple threads out
    there. And those--we were not about to precipitously try to
    reconcile those multiple threads.
        Chairman Issa. I appreciate that. And I do appreciate the
    fact that 2 days later you called it a terrorist attack; well,
    many days later others were using other terms.
        As I pass over to the minority for a moment, yesterday in a
    closed session, I asked you for the 50-minute tape that exists
    that would allow us to see the video feed that was available.
    You said it wasn't available; another part of government had
    it, even though you had a copy of it. Have you been able to
    make that available? I think on both sides of this side of the
    dais, we would like to see that 50 minutes of video that was
    turned over by the government fairly quickly.
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I have made it clear to the
    other government agency that has this tape--I have communicated
    your request to them.
        Chairman Issa. With your recommendations that they do turn
    it over?
        Mr. Kennedy. Since this is involving investigative process
    on their part, I do not feel that I am in a position to make a
    recommendation about an investigative process.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. And for the ranking member's
    edification, I apologize that I only barely learned about that
    hearing, or that briefing in order to get there for a few
    minutes, so that I want to confirm, the FBI is doing the
    investigation. They do not have custody. Another government
    agency does. I don't have any doubt that it is not the
    investigating agency, the FBI that has custody of that tape.
        Mr. Cummings. The same briefing that you are talking about,
    we were not--the Dems on the committee, we weren't invited.
    Didn't even know about it.
        Chairman Issa. Your committee did know about it.
        Mr. Cummings. But we weren't invited.
        Were you invited?
        Chairman Issa. I learned about it in a discussion with the
    Secretary of State. And so I went up there, only then
    discovering that they were surprised to see me. But I was glad
    I went there and I was glad to have the opportunity to confirm
    the existence of a 50-minute tape that has been floating around
    that is not needed by the FBI, but, in fact, is in the custody
    of another government agency.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, one more thing. I think you
    would agree that we don't want to do anything to interfere with
    an ongoing investigation. Do we?
        Chairman Issa. I would like this committee to have that 50-
    minute tape before the press has it. And quite frankly, we
    should have had it before today to see it. It is not
    interfering with an investigation. In testimony, the last 2
    days that both of our committees had, we were told, for
    example, that when the wall was blown up some months earlier,
    they didn't see it blown up because they didn't have the video
    equipment to do it and it was pointed the wrong way. They told
    us they didn't have enough people to man the TOC, so they, in
    fact, were not there being able to pan and look for it. They
    told us they didn't have the people inside. And much of that,
    perhaps, is beyond the scope. But since people told us what
    assets they didn't have with specificity, and that will be in
    our report, yes, I would like to see what those tapes did
    discover.
        Ms. Lamb told us that there was somebody monitoring the
    TOC. Quite frankly, we were talk that they slept there and
    there were not people to constantly be panning those cameras.
    So I have like to see when they began panning them, example.
    And there is multiple evidence that we haven't gotten. We are
    not going to get it here today. I just wanted to make sure that
    the State Department would be clear that they have no
    objections to us having it.
        Mr. Cummings. Is that right, Mr. Kennedy?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Cummings, Mr. Chairman, we defer to the
    law enforcement investigative elements on this matter.
        Chairman Issa. The FBI told me they don't have it and it is
    not theirs and they don't need it. So hopefully, you will stop
    using law enforcement, another part of government.
        Thank you.
        We now go to the very patient gentleman from Tennessee for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All Americans mourn
    the loss of the four brave Americans who died in Benghazi. It
    is important, I think, that we put their sacrifice, their
    tragedy in context; particularly, historical context. Serving
    America abroad is dangerous. And certainly every U.S. veteran
    knows that freedom is not free. Our State Department personnel
    know that too. But sometimes civilians comfortable here at home
    forget. And sometimes these terrible incidents are not covered
    as they should be. But sometimes we are focused on other
    things.
        I would like to read an honor roll of the fallen from a
    previous time. These men, in some cases women, died as victims
    of terrorists. It was in a different time, when we had a great
    President, Ronald Reagan, who is particularly known for his
    strength on national defense.
        I was only able to find a database of the Navy and marine
    victims. But there are 56 dead, 46 wounded. And a lot of us
    remember that as more or less a peaceful time. It was not. So
    let me read.
        Master Bosanmate Sam Novello, killed by Turkish leftists,
    Istanbul, Turkey; three marines wounded in a terrorist attack
    in Costa Rica; one crewman killed, three wounded from the USS
    Pensacola, attacked by terrorists in San Juan, Puerto, Rico;
    one U.S. embassy marine security guard wounded, Beirut,
    Lebanon; terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut,
    Lebanon; Lieutenant Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, killed
    by terrorists, San Salvador, El Salvador; Corporal Guillermo
    San Pedro, killed in a terrorist attack in Cyprus; Captain
    George Tsantes, shot by terrorists near Athens, Greece;
    Lieutenant Corporal Rudolfo Hernandez, killed in a terrorist
    attack, Germany; Hospitalman Carl P. Englund, wounded, Beirut,
    Lebanon; Petty Officer First Class Michael R. Wagner, assigned
    to the Defense Attache Office, killed; Civil Engineer Corps
    Builder Harvey L. Whitaker, killed; Builder First Class Steven
    E. Haycock and four marine security guards wounded in terrorist
    bombing of U.S. Embassy Annex, East Beirut, Lebanon.
        Seabees. Steelworker Second Class Robert Dean Stethem of
    Underwater Construction Team One, killed by terrorists, Athens,
    Greece; Off-duty marines assigned to Marine Security Guard
    Detachment, San Salvador, killed by terrorists armed with
    automatic weapons at a cafe in San Salvador; 37 killed, 5
    wounded when the USS Stark was struck by Iraqi missiles,
    Persian Gulf; terrorist grenade attack at the USO Club in
    Barcelona, Spain.
        Colonel Rich Higgins, killed by two pro-Iranian terrorists;
    USS Samuel B. Roberts struck by an Iranian mine, Persian Gulf;
    Japanese Red Army terrorist bombing of the USO Club in Naples,
    Italy; loss of an attack helicopter during operations against
    Iranian naval forces; and Captain William E. Nordeen, Defense
    and Naval Attache, killed by terrorist car bomb, Athens,
    Greece.
        And that was just during one administration of a President
    known for his strong defense policy.
        So we should be thankful for the sacrifice of our men and
    women abroad. As you pointed out, Ms. Lamb, you are in charge
    of 275 posts around the world. Too many Americans can't find
    these places on a map, much less appreciate the sacrifice and
    the risks involved of serving in many lawless zones.
        So I appreciate Lieutenant Colonel Wood and Mr. Nordstrom
    in particular for helping supervise our security needs in these
    posts, because the dangers are incredible, especially when we
    can live in comfort here at home. So thank you for your service
    and sacrifice.
        Mr. Burton. [presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Gosar of Arizona.
        Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, my family
    would like to honor the memory of our fellow patriots that loss
    their lives in this senseless and preventable act of violence
    committed in Benghazi on September 11th, a day that will
    forever be regarded as a day of unity for American citizens--
    and a warning. And with that, I am going to come back.
        In an interview with the committee yesterday, Ms. Lamb said
    that in May, 2012, Embassy Tripoli had come back and said
    things were going so great, the RSO gave up 6 of the 16 SSTs. I
    just assume that if the RSO, Nordstrom, was willing to give up
    assets and not ask for replacements, that he didn't need them.
    But, again, the functions that they were being used for were
    being slowly filled by local national employees.
        Lieutenant Wood, is it true in your time in Libya that
    things were going that great, and would you describe the
    conditions in Libya from your personal point of view?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir. From my personal point of view,
    things in Libya always remained difficult and uncertain and
    could devolve at any moment into further problems and result in
    loss of life almost at any minute. SST members were fully
    integrated with the diplomatic security people there and worked
    through and under all these difficult circumstances.
        I have a couple of things here I am trying to find.
        There were numerous incidents. Lawless situation was pretty
    much the norm. There was assassinations that went on of Qadhafi
    loyalists. And back and forth. Insurgent activity continued
    along the border town of Al Kufra, where it drained a lot of
    the meager resources of the fledgling government to go down
    there and try to put down rebellious and insurgent activity
    going on down there. There was no control of the borders or
    weapons smuggling in or out of the country. There was a loss of
    control of weapons types previously mentioned here--the
    shoulder-fired missiles. And tanks and anti-aircraft guns could
    be found in the possession of almost anyone anywhere in Libya.
    Tribal interests frequently competed with each other and
    resulted in fire fights. It was a common occurrence.
        When I first arrived on the ground in Tripoli, I got to
    where I could recognize celebratory gunfire from actual
        gunfire fights. They were shooting at each other. That did
    die off a little bit. However, we did notice an increase in
    targeted attacks towards Americans. These indicators spelled
    out to me that the country was far from secure and that the
        SST, as it had been originally conceived, was still in need
    at that location.
        Mr. Gosar. Well, in a document that was produced in late
    July--and I have that document right here. The document is over
    230 events in Libya since June of 2011. Mr. Nordstrom included
    this in his part of the general assessment on the security
    environment. In fact, prior to this attack on our embassy,
    didn't the Red Cross and the British consulate move out of
    Libya?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir, that is entirely correct. The
    British consulate moved out when I was there and they actually
    had an MOU with us to leave their weapons and vehicles on our
    compound there in Benghazi. They would come back and occupy at
    times, draw their weapons and vehicles, and do their work, and
    return them and leave.
        The attack on the International Red Cross was another
    attack that also involved us and threats to the compound there
    in Benghazi. The threats were made on Facebook to both the
    remaining Western influences there in Benghazi, being the Red
    Cross and the U.S. Embassy compound. The Red Cross was attacked
    with rocket-propelled grenades in early June. When it was
    attacked a second time, I believe they made the decision they
    were going to give up and leave Benghazi. When that occurred,
    it was apparent to me that we were the last flag flying in
    Benghazi. We were the last thing on their target list to remove
    from Benghazi.
        I voiced my concerns at the country team meeting. Although
    it was a difficult thing, the country team was left with no
    options at that point to try and change the security profile
    there in Benghazi. The resources had been withdrawn. The
    decision to not renew the SST was pretty much a foregone
    conclusion by that point in time, but I urged them to do
    something and anything, to include withdrawal from Benghazi,
    although I knew that was impossible at the time.
        Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. [presiding.] Would the gentleman yield to
    me?
        Mr. Gosar. I would happily yield to the chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Colonel Wood, you weren't there on September
    11. Mr. Nordstrom, you weren't there on September 11. My
    understanding is several Americans successfully got out alive.
    The three armed individuals who represented Libyan nationals
    survived. From your experience, from your combat experience,
    from your training, both of you, what is the marginal
    difference between everybody getting out and half or so getting
    out? In other words, the State Department has been saying
    effectively nothing could have stopped this, this was so
    overwhelming. My question is: What would it take? Would one
    more armed agent have made a difference that everyone would
    have gotten out? Would two more, three more? I understand we
    will never know for sure, but what is the difference between
    chaos and control in a fire fight? Colonel Wood?
        Colonel Wood. Superior weapons and superior tactics. That
    is what the SST brought to the table. Those were the qualities
    and attributes and the bolstering effect that they added to
    diplomatic security in this type of environment. When they were
    on the ground, those resident qualities were there for the use
    of the RSO. And when we left, they were no longer available as
    a possible resource.
        Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom, you would agree; that if it
    became necessary.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely. In Tripoli, where we had--with
    the SST, I was never concerned that we would be able to repel
    any sort of assault there with the 16 and the additional DS
    agents.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. We now go to Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for 1
    minute. You went 2-1/2 minutes over. Just a minute and a half.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield--I
    would ask unanimous consent the gentleman from Virginia has 6
    minutes. Would the gentleman from Virginia consider yielding to
    the ranking member?
        Mr. Connolly. I was hoping that the chairman was going to
    say that he asked unanimous consent to give a minute and a half
    to the ranking member. And I gladly would wait for that
    request, sir, and support it.
        Chairman Issa. Take what you get.
        Without objection, so ordered. Six minutes.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you. The gentleman yields. Thank you
    very much.
        I just want to go back to something that you wrote in your
    statement, Mr. Nordstrom, in reference to the question that the
    chairman just asked you. And I quote you. I am reading from
    page 2. You said, ``Having an extra foot of wall or extra half
    dozen guards or agents would not have enabled us to respond to
    that kind of assault.''
        Did you write that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Yes, I did. And I still believe that.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
    ranking member. I just want to say, picking up on my friend
    from Tennessee's remarks, I was a young professional staff
    member in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the early
    1980s when Ronald Reagan was in the White House and our marine
    amphibious unit was attacked by a truck bomb at the Beirut
    airport and dozens and dozens of young Americans were killed.
        I had just been to Beirut on a Senate staff study, and
    shortly after I returned, our embassy was bombed in downtown
    Beirut, killing many more Americans, including a good friend of
    mine who worked at that time for USAID.
        It is very serious business when tragedies occur in a
    dangerous world. To attempt to exploit it politically--and I
    know we are not trying to do that here, 27 days out from the
    election.
        Colonel Wood, you testified that you had concerns and you
    approached--you are with the Utah National Guard, is that
    correct?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. And you approached your Congressperson with
    these concerns. I assume that is our colleague, Mr. Chaffetz?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir. Initially, I tried to make contact
    with Senator McCain, because he had made several visits to
    Tripoli. I was unable to get a response from his office.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank you. And about what time did you
    approach your Congressperson with these concerns?
        Colonel Wood. I sent an email on Sunday, I believe it was
    the 28th of September.
        Mr. Connolly. Of September. So fairly recently?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. Are you aware of the fact that the Democratic
    side of this aisle made several attempts, including an email to
    you last weekend, to try to contact you and to have some
    opportunity to explore with you the nature of those concerns
    you shared with Mr. Chaffetz, and possibly to understand what
    you might be testifying to today--a common, by the way,
    practice?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir. I assumed that the information I
    was giving would be shared to the whole committee at some
    point. I wasn't sure when.
        Mr. Connolly. So that is why you did not respond to the
    emails from Democratic staff members?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. You weren't, in any way, to pick up on Mr.
    Jordan's questioning of, or others on the panel, you weren't in
    any way encouraged or discouraged from talking to the
    Democratic side of the aisle in preparation for this hearing?
        Colonel Wood. No, sir. It was simply easier for me to talk
    to one point of contact. With everything else I had going on,
    it was just easier to do.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank you.
        Ambassador Kennedy, is there an ongoing investigation into
    what occurred in Benghazi?
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes, Mr. Connolly, there are actually two
    ongoing investigations, one being conducted by the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation, and another being conducted by the
    Accountability Review Board, which is a congressionally-
    mandated process that comes into being after a tragedy of this
    nature.
        Mr. Connolly. And when do we expect those investigations to
    be completed and a report provided?
        Mr. Kennedy. I cannot speak to the FBI investigation, sir.
    That is beyond my kin. But I know that the Secretary has asked
    the Accountability Review Board to proceed as expeditiously as
    possible while making sure that they are thorough and accurate.
        Mr. Connolly. So we are having this hearing as those
    investigations have not completed their work or provided their
    findings?
        Mr. Kennedy. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. I see. One of the things, if I am
    understanding, is it is awfully hard for me and others, I
    think, to follow what we are trying to get at here. Would you
    agree, Mr. Nordstrom, that certainly the Libya I experienced
    briefly--I was in Libya about the same amount of time I believe
    our colleague Mr. Chaffetz was, and I don't know, did he go to
    Benghazi? I don't think he went to Benghazi. Did you, Mr.
    Chaffetz?
        Mr. Chaffetz. No. I was not allowed to go.
        Mr. Connolly. Right. He and I both went to Tripoli. I was
    there in May. And it seemed a very volatile situation in terms
    of too many people with too many weapons, lots of militia,
    trying to keep control over who was a good guy and who was a
    bad guy. No matter how many security personnel we might have
    had in the field, that was a problem at that time, and I gather
    is still. Would that be an accurate assessment, Mr. Nordstrom.
        Mr. Nordstrom. It was. That was one of our main struggles,
    just trying to figure out who was who.
        Mr. Connolly. Right. And so inherently unstable as we are
    trying to transition from Qadhafi to something we hope is more
    democratic--a lot more democratic and more stable. Fair?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Correct.
        Mr. Connolly. Okay. Ambassador Kennedy described it not so
    much as a dispute as we are going back and forth about needs
    assessment. And it was your recommendation that the site
    security team be extended a third time, is that correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct.
        Mr. Connolly. And, Mr. Ambassador, your view was, or your
    colleagues' view was actually we are trying to graduate from
    that. And we think we have got the assets to do that.
    Therefore, for whatever reason, that request was not honored
    because it was felt that it wasn't needed or what?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Connolly, what we were trying to do is
    build in a State Department capacity to replace the personnel
    we had borrowed from the Department of Defense. The SST was
    great. We really appreciated the assistance they were
    providing. They provided some airport analysis that the airport
    was finished. They provided medical capability. The State
    Department replaced it with its own medical capability. They
    provided communications capability. We replaced that with the
    State Department communications capability. And then they also
    provided direct security assistance personnel, wonderful
    colleagues from that unit. We were also, though, replacing
    them, as we do all over the world, by building an inherent
    State Department capability. And my colleagues believed we had
    achieved that right balance between what the State Department
    could provide and what the military had been providing to us
    when we were not ready to assume those responsibilities.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. The best part is you got that extra 30
    seconds and some you wanted, very artfully.
        Mr. Connolly. You are always generous. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. With that, we go to the gentleman from
    Idaho, Mr. Labrador.
        Mr. Labrador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the most
    difficult jobs I have as a Congressman is to call the families
    of the men and women who lose their lives in service of this
    country. And I take that responsibility very, very seriously.
        I am looking right now--and I am really confused,
    Ambassador Kennedy, by some of the statements that your making
    today. In particular, the statement that has been addressed
    before. You said, for example: If any administration official,
    including any career official, were on television on Sunday,
    September 16, they would have said what Ambassador Rice said.
    The information she had at that point from the Intelligence
    Community--and I see how specific you are being--from the
    Intelligence Community, is the same that I had at that point.
        Can you explain to me how it was that on September 12 you
    told congressional aides that you believed there was a
    terrorist attack?
        Mr. Kennedy. Congressman, I told them that that was my
    personal opinion and that I also believed that it was, because
    of the nature of it and the lethality of it, that it was a
    complex attack.
        Mr. Labrador. So how can you say here today that--the
    following day, you had an idea that it was a terrorist attack,
    in your opinion--I understand you claimed you are not a
    security expert--but in your opinion, it was a terrorist
    attack, how can you claim today that you would have made the
    same statements that Ambassador Rice would have made on TV?
        Mr. Kennedy. Ambassador Rice was asked certain questions
    about information that she had in her possession. And that was
    the same information I had in my possession.
        Mr. Labrador. But you came to a different conclusion from
    your information.
        Mr. Kennedy. No, sir, I did not.
        Mr. Labrador. Yes, you did. The statements are clear. Let
    me just ask you, you said today that there were multiple
    reports. And you didn't want to specify what those multiple
    reports were about what happened on September 11. Can you tell
    us at least when those multiple reports came out?
        Mr. Kennedy. I would have to go back and refer to notes,
    sir.
        Mr. Labrador. Did they come out a day after the incident, 2
    days after the incident?
        Mr. Kennedy. I will be glad to get that information.
        Mr. Labrador. That is crucial. You knew you were coming
    here to testify before Congress. And you are coming here to
    tell us that there were multiple reports. You cannot tell us
    when those reports came out?
        Mr. Kennedy. As I said earlier, Mr. Labrador, we were in an
    evolving series of reports over every day since the 12th of
    September.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman suspend?
        Mr. Labrador. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Ambassador Kennedy, I want to make it clear,
    the gentleman's asking a reasonable question. To the best of
    your ability, approximating, we know that 7 days after the
    attack there were, in fact, false statements made. The
    gentleman's only trying to figure out how many reports continue
    to come to you 7 days, 6 days, 5 days, 4 days. Give us your
    best estimation and then we will let you be accurate for the
    record exactly.
        The gentleman may continue.
        Mr. Labrador. Can you answer that question?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Labrador, I am not going to
    speculate on numbers that I don't have firmly in my head, sir.
        Mr. Labrador. Can you tell me if there was at least one
    report before September 16 that contradicted what that
    Intelligence Community was telling you and Ambassador Rice? Can
    you answer that question?
        Mr. Kennedy. I don't remember--I don't remember a report
    that contradicted what the Intelligence Community was telling
    us. No, sir, I do not remember.
        Mr. Labrador. You just told us here there were several
    reports. And you said there were multiple reports that had
    different conclusions.
        Mr. Kennedy. As I said in response to an earlier question,
    you are asking me to go into the nature of classified reports.
    And I cannot do that in this session.
        Mr. Labrador. Okay. It is pretty clear that you are coming
    here with information about reports that you are unwilling to
    say. And I think we are going to have to have a classified
    hearing at some point.
        I just have a quick question for Lieutenant Colonel Wood
    and Mr. Nordstrom. Given the information that you saw on TV and
    your knowledge of the situation in Libya, did you come to a
    conclusion as to whether this was a terrorist act or whether it
    was based on some film that was on the Internet? Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood.
        Colonel Wood. It was instantly recognizable to me as a
    terrorist attack.
        Mr. Labrador. Instantly recognizable.
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Labrador. And why is that?
        Colonel Wood. Mainly because of my prior knowledge there. I
    almost expected the attack to come. We were the last flag
    flying. It was a matter of time.
        Mr. Labrador. Mr. Nordstrom, same question.
        Mr. Nordstrom. The first impression that I had was that it
    was going to be something similar to one of the brigades that
    we saw there. Specifically, the brigade that has been named in
    the press that came to my mind was Ansar al-Sharia. It was a
    unit or a group that Lieutenant Colonel Woods' personnel and I
    had tracked for quite some time; we were concerned about. That
    specific group had been involved in a similar but obviously
    much smaller-scale incidents at the end of June involving the
    Tunisian consulate in Benghazi, where they stormed that
    facility and it was in protest to what they claimed was an
    anti-Islamic film in Tunis.
        Mr. Labrador. Thank you very much. I just want to make it
    clear for the record that on September 16, Ambassador Rice went
    on TV. And I am assuming it was at the direction of this
    administration. She was not there on her own. I am sure she has
    better things to do on a Sunday morning. And she went to
    specifically tell the American people that all of the
    Intelligence information led to only one conclusion, when it is
    clear that Intelligence experts, security experts, and even
    Ambassador Kennedy, looking at the information that was
    happening on TV, could have concluded something different. I
    think that is outrageous and it is shameful.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the
    gentleman from Illinois, who has been patiently waiting, Mr.
    Davis, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    thank all of the witnesses for participating by appearing here
    with us today. I also want to commend all of the brave men and
    women who risk their lives on a daily basis by serving in these
    high-risk areas. I also extend my condolences to the families
    of those who lost their lives or were injured during this
    tragic attack.
        Following the death of longtime ruler Muammar Qadhafi,
    Libya and its citizens entered a critical transition period.
    Ambassador Stevens once described this period as ``a time of
    great excitement as the Libyan people first experienced
    freedom, but also a time of significant trepidation for what
    might come next.'' Ambassador Stevens, I think, obviously, was
    correct.
        Ambassador Kennedy, Benghazi was the cradle of the
    revolution. Could you explain to us the importance of the
    diplomatic mission in Libya and the special post in Benghazi?
        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you much, sir. Absolutely. Benghazi was
    the cradle of the revolution. There is essentially two major
    parts of Libya: east and west. In order to help the Libyans
    move forward, to help the Libyans take advantage of their
    newfound freedom and to build a democratic structure we all
    wish for any nation to have, we could not hunker down, we you
    could not stay out. As I mentioned earlier, the State
    Department has to go into harm's way. If we are going to
    advance U.S. national security interests, we cannot retreat.
        We have to go, to use a colloquialism, we have to go where
    the action is. We will take every step we can to mitigate the
    risk to our personnel abroad. But we cannot end those risks, we
    cannot stay out of the action. We have to go there. And
    because, as you correctly posit, sir, because of the importance
    of Benghazi and the development of the new Libya, we had to
    have a forward operating location there and we had to have
    visits there by Ambassador Stevens.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Nordstrom, on the other
    side of this, can you describe some of the challenges faced by
    security offices in analyzing security risks while allowing the
    diplomatic mission to interact with the local leaders and
    individuals in the population and still be effective?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely. That was one of the tensions
    that we always had. We obviously understood the need to engage
    across a wide spectrum of programs. That was one of the main
    reasons we wanted that security resources, so that we could
    deploy sufficient resources to respond when there was a
    problem.
        There was not open warfare at all times in Libya. Generally
    speaking, we saw a lot of improvements. It was fairly
    permissive during the daytime. Things started to heat up after
    hours. We had sort of a joke--I saw that it was in the
    newspaper--but we had a saying that in Libya, you would be fine
    until you are not.
        Our problem was if someone found themselves in an issue. We
    had three officers specifically trapped in the prime minister's
    building when it was stormed by some fighters protesting a pay
    issue. Were we going to have sufficient people who could
    respond and navigate their way in and extricate those people?
    With time and with less resources, we were not going to have
    that.
        One of the frustrating things that I found early on, and as
    I mentioned in my testimony, I was extremely pleased with the
    planning to get us into Libya. The frustrating thing that I
    found is once the first teams and the first TDYers started to
    expire at 60 days, there was a complete and total absence of
    planning that I saw in terms of what we were supposed to do
    from that point on. So when I requested resources, when I
    requested assets, instead of supporting those assets, I was
    criticized, and somehow it was my responsibility to come up
    with a plan on the ground and not the responsibility for DS. I
    raised that specific point in a meeting with the DS director in
    March; that 60 days, there was no plan. And it was hope that
    everything would get better.
        Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for unanimous consent
    for 15 additional seconds?
        Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. Ambassador, could you tell
    us how security risks at a post are evaluated and when are
    requests for increased staff or resources justified?
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. We have a formula that we try to
    use. It is not a quadratic equation. But we look at the
    stability of the government, the threats against us, host
    government counterterrorism capability, the setback, the
    physical plant that we can muster, the ability to get
    sufficient local guard capability there. We put all that
    together. But in the end, this is an inherently risky
    operation. We cannot withdraw always to fortresses.
        We look at this and then we try to place, as we believe we
    placed in Libya, on the basis of all the information we had to
    date, all the information we had, we put a security program
    into effect. That is what we call risk mitigation. We cannot
    end the risk. If we cannot achieve that level of risk
    mitigation, as we did in Damascus or as we have done in other
    locations, we simply remove our personnel from there because we
    cannot achieve that level of risk mitigation.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. I appreciate the
    courtesies.
        Chairman Issa. Happy to do it. With that, as a favor to the
    former chairman of the full committee, I would ask unanimous
    consent he have 2 minutes to speak out of order. Without
    objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank my
    colleagues. I will be real brief. First of all, Colonel Wood
    and Mr. Nordstrom, you said that al Qaeda is growing and it is
    even exceeding our goals in Libya right now. Is that correct?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir, I make that assessment.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Nordstrom, you saw Ansar al-Sharia, which
    is another terrorist group loosely affiliated with al Qaeda, is
    very active there, too, and was involved?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Interestingly, I would not say it was
    necessarily affiliated. It was actually one of the brigades
    which fell under the control, if you want to call it that, of
    the Libyan government.
        Mr. Burton. But it is a terrorist organization as well?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Not according to the Libyan government. It
    was actually one of their pseudo-militias.
        Mr. Burton. What is your assessment?
        Mr. Nordstrom. We were concerned that it was an extremist
    organization that wanted to bring----
        Mr. Burton. Don't split words. It is a terrorist
    organization.
        Okay. Ms. Lamb, there were three mobile security
    detachments; 18 people, six in each one of those detachments.
    They were supposedly asked to stay, the leadership did. And you
    were required to make a decision. They left and they were not
    replaced. They were supposed to be backfilled by diplomatic
    security agents. The 16 troops that--and you said you were
    watching in real-time, incidentally. That is very interesting.
    But the 16 troops that were supposed to be replaced, or were
    going to be requested to be replaced, you said no. And then you
    said they were going to be in Tripoli. But the fact of the
    matter is they not only worked in Tripoli, but when needed,
    they went down to Benghazi. Is that not right?
        Ms. Lamb. I believe they made two to three trips.
        Mr. Burton. I know, but they did go to Benghazi. And they
    could have gone to Benghazi. But they weren't there, so they
    were gone. And you decided that you thought that they shouldn't
    be redeployed.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir. As Under Secretary Kennedy has stated,
    the specialized skills that they brought when they came
    originally had been backfilled by other parts of the State
    Department. And the specialized skills----
        Mr. Burton. But not with U.S. military?
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir.
        Mr. Burton. Okay. That is all I need to know. I really
    appreciate you folks taking all the time you have today.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. Colonel Wood, would
    you just respond? You looked like you were chomping at the bit
    when Ms. Lamb talked about specialized skills. She made an
    assessment. Would you agree with that?
        Colonel Wood. No, sir, I would not agree. A special forces
    soldier is way above the skill level of a hired local national
    armed with a pistol, or even the MSD agents that were on the
    ground there as well.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. I think I remember the quote:
    Never take a knife to a gunfight.
        With that, we go to the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
    Murphy.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I add my
    gratitude to those members of the diplomatic corps and military
    who are putting their lives on the line for this country. And,
    of course, my sympathies to the families of those that were
    lost.
        Mr. Chairman, I think you had maybe one of the most
    important lines of questioning about 20 minutes ago when you
    were inquiring as to what level of security might have really
    been necessary to repel this attack. I maybe wanted to pursue
    that one step further with you.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
        Mr. Murphy. Sure.
        Chairman Issa. Your characterization is almost exact. I was
    actually talking about in order to extricate successfully those
    who otherwise died. Ultimately, I think it was made clear that
    you can't repel forever typically that size force.
        Mr. Murphy. I simply wanted to expand on that line of
    questioning with Mr. Nordstrom. Because you very clearly do say
    in your testimony that the numbers that we are arguing about
    today, one or two additional unarmed security forces, six or
    seven armed security forces, may not have made the difference.
    You didn't really get the chance to answer that question fully,
    so I want to pose it again to you.
        When you look back on this attack and you look at what was
    requested versus what would be necessary to either fully
    extricate everyone or to fully repel an attack such as this, do
    you think there is any amount of sort of reasonable numbers
    that could have been present on the ground there at the time
    that would have prevented this attack and this tragedy?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Again, I am just hesitant to speculate on
    the specific numbers, but I think it goes without saying that
    having more resources on the ground is generally not something
    that you are going to turn down in a firefight. I would rather
    have more guns. I would rather have more Special Forces
    soldiers that have combat experience. And I would rather have
    more armed DS agents on the ground. Certainly the more of those
    you can bring to bear, I think the outcome is going to tip in
    your favor.
        Mr. Murphy. And sort of a similar question to the
    ambassador. You know, we shudder at the notion that an attack
    like this could happen in the future, that this exceptional
    event in which 120 attackers, armed with assault rifles and
    rocket propelled grenades, could pose a threat to another
    installation. What is our position on trying to equip our
    outposts with the kind of armor and staffing that would be
    necessary to repel an attack of this size? Is that possible?
    And does this attack reframe your position and our country's
    position in terms of the resources that we give our outposts?
        Mr. Kennedy. Sir, we are never going to be able to achieve
    a defense of an American facility abroad against that level of
    lethality with internally generated resources. What we try to
    do, and we have done it in many places around the world, and we
    are still constructing more and more, is we construct new
    embassies, and we build into those new embassies physical
    protections that we hope will permit our personnel who will
    have withdrawn into that building with the capability to wait
    until the host government, as they are required to do under the
    Vienna Convention and diplomatic law, responds to our attack.
        But an attack of that kind of lethality, we are never going
    to have enough guns. We are a diplomatic service. We have I
    think some of the finest law enforcement professionals in the
    world in the diplomatic security Service, but we are not an
    armed camp ready to fight it out as the U.S. military does if
    there was an attack on a U.S. military facility in Afghanistan,
    using that as a current example.
        Mr. Murphy. So let me just ask a variant of that question
    to you, Ambassador. What have we learned, and what has
    potentially changed? If we can't repel this kind of lethal
    attack, are there changes that you can share with us--some of
    them may be classified--as to how we protect our installations
    abroad?
        Mr. Kennedy. The Accountability Review Board now, which is
    currently meeting, is going to judge whether our security there
    was adequate for the information that was available to us,
    whether we implemented it correctly, and whether or not there
    are lessons learned.
        Mr. Murphy. So they will make recommendations?
        Mr. Kennedy. They will make recommendations, yes, sir.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. The chair would
    announce that we know that there are some members who will have
    flights to catch since we are not in session broadly today. If
    anyone needs to go first, if you get close to your deadline,
    please inform the chair, and we will reserve the right to take
    people out of order.
        But for now, we go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Meehan.
        Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Nordstrom, you made a comment, a complete and total
    absence of planning.
        Lieutenant Colonel Wood, you were brought in the first
    place to the country, part of a team that was in place to both
    be responsive, but to provide security, one of three teams of
    16 people associated with the Department of Defense, not coming
    from the budget of Mrs. Lamb, but nonetheless providing. And I
    see a tale of two cities. That while you have that kind of
    force early on in the process, notwithstanding your requests,
    continuously that group is worked down from, three teams to
    finally one team towards the end, instead of 16, your final
    request in which it is eight.
        At the same time, we see a worsening of the circumstances.
    I see this is a draft from Joan Polaschik in February of the
    month: Overall security conditions continue to be
    unpredictable. Large armed groups, not under the control of the
    central government. The continued presence of Security Support
    Teams was essential to provide static security in the absence
    of an appropriate local guard force.
        Now, we saw with this a litany of issues, the IED thrown
    into the diplomatic post in Benghazi, the RPG attack on the Red
    Cross, the IED attack, a second one on the--we see a litany.
    Colonel Wood, was there the capacity to be able to provide the
    kind of security that you thought was necessary while things
    continued to get worse?
        Colonel Wood. Yes, sir. I thought that was the genius
    behind the design and construct of the SST. It brought all the
    elements of government power together for the embassy, the
    diplomatic, the informational, military, and economic. It gave
    them the military side of that governmental power that we can
    project abroad. It gave them the expertise of some of the
    finest quality soldiers in the world and the backup resources
    that they could tap into at SOCAFRICA and AFRICOM as well to
    provide them with all the intelligence and additional
    capabilities. Why they would turn that asset down is best
    answered by themselves.
        Mr. Meehan. Let me ask you about this process called
    normalization. There was an effort during this period of time
    as well to transition from people who were trained here by the
    United States, our soldiers, et cetera, who were in country,
    and to transition to trained locals, largely Libyans. As I
    understand it, there was a posting that would be put out where
    they just asked for people to apply for those positions. You
    were there. Part of your responsibility was to train those
    locals to be able to do the work. From your professional
    opinion, were there sufficient numbers sufficiently trained to
    be able to provide the kind of security that should have been
    necessary in the circumstances?
        Colonel Wood. Sir, I think Eric Nordstrom can back me up on
    this. The individuals that were trained were local Libyans that
    we had hired. Indeed, you are correct that way. The SST
    participated with MSD in training some of those individuals.
    But the caliber and quality I think was subject. I can see
    where they are dealing with numbers on this end of the table,
    adding up numbers on a piece of paper. I think it reflects,
    from the description of the Benghazi compound, not being
    accurate in the fact that the RSO and security agents there had
    to sleep with their weapons. With the secure communications,
    they didn't have a complete understanding of how difficult it
    was or failed to recognize that.
        Mr. Meehan. Ms. Lamb, why your response that this needs to
    be something in which these professionals need to be replaced
    by locals who, by a professional opinion, aren't sufficiently
    trained to do the work?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, this is the same model that we used in
    Sana'a. It has been very successful. These trained guards
    protected----
        Mr. Meehan. Did you take any time to listen to the reports
    that were coming up during the period of time that the events
    were getting worse? Not the same model. But was there specific
    attention paid to the events in country?
        Ms. Lamb. Yes. And at the same time, post had reduced their
    travel policy. Instead of moving with full motorcades, they
    were allowing personnel to go out with an embassy driver and a
    hard car. So the positions that were being filled by this team
    and by our team members had been reduced. They were using a
    quick reaction force that was available for multiple people to
    be moving with drivers. And it reduced the numbers that were
    needed at post.
        When asked to do a function earlier in his testimony today,
    Eric Nordstrom cited the fact that he had requested 12 armed,
    plus six more. In essence, we had actually worked out with his
    desk officer, they had outlined a program that he needed 21
    armed security personnel. We had made a commitment from
    Washington that we would provide him with 23. It has not
    dropped below that number since that commitment was made.
        Mr. Meehan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one just additional
    question not in response?
        Chairman Issa. Briefly.
        Mr. Meehan. Reports came.
        Mr. Ambassador Kennedy, reports have been made, public
    reports, in which it has been stated that the imprisoned Omar
    Abdel-Rahman Brigades--this was on CNN--is believed to have
    possibly been one of the groups that is suspected of carrying
    out these terrorist attacks. CNN has reported that. Are you
    aware of any determinations at this point in time in which
    there has been any discussions within the State Department for
    the potential transfer or release of the blind sheik from
    American security?
        Mr. Kennedy. I am unaware of any such discussion, sir.
        Mr. Meehan. It says the State Department--this was in
    September--the State Department said that the topic had not
    come recently from any senior official in Egyptian authorities.
    So you are aware of no discussions whatsoever that involve the
    State Department for any kind of a transfer or release of the
    blind sheik from incarceration or otherwise?
        Mr. Kennedy. That is correct, sir. I am unaware of any such
    discussion.
        Mr. Meehan. Are you prepared on behalf of the State
    Department to make an unequivocal statement that there will not
    be a release of Abdel-Rahman.
        Mr. Kennedy. I am not going to appear to avoid that
    question, sir, but I am the Under Secretary of State for
    Management. I have a series of responsibilities. And that is a
    question I will be glad to take for the record to get a
    complete State Department position for you.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Nordstrom, you were trying to answer the previous
    question. You want to respond on that.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Yeah. I would like to actually, if I could,
    make a couple points on that. DAS Lamb mentioned that we had
    shifted to a, quote, lesser security profile. I would like to
    point out that that was done in March. That was done because we
    had 18 DS agents, and we were told that it was going to move to
    12. Three MSD teams down to two MSD teams. There was an
    emergency action cable dated in March that specifically
    references that. And if I recall, in general recollection, that
    the tone of that was that since we had no choice, because we
    did not have the assets, we had no other option but to move to
    a model, not unlike in basketball, moving from man to man
    defense to a zone defense. So I think that is an important
    point to make.
        The other point that was made earlier about the reduction
    of SST by six persons, that is something that Colonel Wood can
    back me up on as well. Those six SST did not leave country.
    Those six SST were still there on compound, could provide us
    internal defense support. What they were doing was involved in
    training and liaison with Libyan Special Forces.
        Now, why were we doing that? Because as I have testified
    before, we had absolutely no ability to call upon a host nation
    force in the event that we were attacked. Our conclusion was
    the Libyan Special Forces was one such force that we might be
    able to count on. So we saw that very much as bolstering our
    internal defense and our footprint.
        Chairman Issa. And Mr. Nordstrom, we placed in front of you
    something that a different whistleblower gave us. Is that the
    document you are referring to on May 28th? Or March 28th, I am
    sorry.
        Mr. Nordstrom. This was the specific one in terms of a
    follow up for support. But there was an earlier document in
    March where we adjusted our movement transportation because we
    simply would not have the bodies to provide a security agent in
    each vehicle.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Ambassador Kennedy, I would now request that that earlier
    document that has been testified to be taken out of your in
    camera review and delivered to us. Would you do that?
        Mr. Kennedy. I will take that request, sir. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. No, no, I am asking you now.
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I have not had--I have not had a
    chance to review the document. I have not had a chance to----
        Chairman Issa. Wait, wait, wait. Wait a second. You can't
    come to a hearing and tell us that you haven't reviewed the
    documents you were going to allow in camera review of, and you
    have allowed it. Somebody on your staff has.
        At this point, I will enter into the record the March 28,
    2012, and specify that the earlier document is being withheld
    by the State Department. I regret that. Hopefully, you will
    reconsider so that it can be put in the record reasonably close
    to real time.
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I did not say I was
    denying it. I was simply saying that since I do not have the
    document in front of me, I have not had a chance----
        Chairman Issa. David, would you put the document in front
    of the ambassador, please? You have it, don't you? It is in the
    in camera. Would you put it in front of the ambassador at least
    so he can at least see it in camera? You will have to remove
    it--it is an unclassified document--so that the ambassador can
    see it.
        With that, would the staff please make sure--this one is
    being distributed while we will see whether we will get the
    other one.
        Okay. It has been distributed.
        Okay. Not wanting to delay this any further, we will come
    back to this, Ambassador.
        With that, we go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Kelly, for 5 minutes. And I thank him for his patience.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all of you for being here today.
        The question really isn't about the patriotism and the
    heroics of the people that lost their lives that day. It's
    really, what can we do to prevent that from ever happening
    again? And I am kind of surprised. You know, I come from
    western Pennsylvania. And people look at things in maybe a
    little different fashion. When I am down here in Washington,
    D.C., amid all these brains and all the intelligence, and you
    get back home and you talk to people, if I were to say to you,
    Lieutenant Colonel Wood, what does 9/11 mean to you?
        Colonel Wood. This last 9/11?
        Mr. Kelly. No, just any--just 9/11. Like I would say
    December 7th. What does December 7th? 9/11----
        Colonel Wood. It is an attack upon the United States of
    America.
        Mr. Kelly. Mr. Nordstrom.
        Mr. Nordstrom. The same.
        Mr. Kelly. Ms. Lamb.
        Ms. Lamb. The same.
        Mr. Kelly. Ambassador.
        Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely, sir.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. So if you can all connect the dots right
    here, why in the heck did it take so long for all these highly
    briefed and intelligent people to try and figure out that it
    actually wasn't a 15-minute YouTube video; it actually was a 9/
    11 event, a terrorist attack? Now, I don't know--look, this
    stuff about what is classified and not classified is getting
    confusing for me because I sat in a Members-only briefing.
        And Mr. Chairman, I ask, this is on September the 20th with
    Secretary Clinton and some other personnel. Is that something
    we are allowed to talk about or not allowed to talk about?
        Chairman Issa. If it was in a classified setting, the only
    thing that I would think would be appropriate is any
    inconsistencies you have seen in testimony today, you could
    relate. Otherwise, the specifics I couldn't judge it from the
    dais.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. Well, it comes down to this, what caused
    this?
        And Ms. Lamb, I read through your testimony. I think it
    would be horrible to sit there and watch it in real time what
    was going on. And I read another account where, this is kind of
    strange, that same night, this is about the ambassador, at 8:30
    p.m. the ambassador said good night to a visiting Turkish
    diplomat outside the compound, and the streets were empty. But
    at 9:40 p.m., noises, gunfire, and an explosion were heard by
    the agents located in the TOC and Building B.
        It is absolutely preposterous to me that we would watch
    Ambassador Rice go out and say what happened 5 days later. That
    I would sit in a briefing, and it was, no, you have it all
    wrong. This is not a terrorist attack. This is a result of a
    15-minute YouTube. Now, we are either in denial or
    unfortunately--and I don't if some of the Members are
    concerned, because I got to tell you; it is very unfortunate
    that terrorists don't recognize that this is an election year.
    And they tend to just do what they want any time they want to
    us. And when we have a weakened position around the world, and
    when we leave our embassies and our consulates and our people
    as unprotected as we do, and then we say, you know what, this
    is terrible because this is 27 days before an election, why are
    we bringing it up now?
        And I ask the same question. Where the heck were we before
    9/11, this 9/11? Why weren't we questioning it then? My
    goodness, 230 security instances in Libya between June of 2011
    and July of 2012. Of those attacks, 48 took place in Benghazi,
    two of which at the U.S. diplomatic compound and the scene of
    the September 11th, 2012, terrorist attacks. And we are still
    saying I think it is the result of a video that was on YouTube.
    And this is based on intelligence.
        Now, listen, I got to ask you, Ambassador Kennedy, because
    you say you couldn't possibly have had a different idea about
    it than Secretary Rice did when she went before the Nation on
    September the 16th.
        I am going to tell you this thing smells from every single
    end. Listen, it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck; it
    is a duck. And for you to come in here and say, well, it was
    based on some of the things I knew, but I can't tell you all
    that I knew, we have got four Americans dead. And I got to tell
    you, it is very upsetting for me to go back home and look at
    those people in the eye, people who don't do what we do here,
    with all the briefings and all the intelligence, just guys that
    go out and work every day and women that go out and work every
    day, and they can come home, and they can figure it out. But we
    are still trying to figure it out and piece it together, and
    you watched it in real time? And the account wasn't there of
    the ambassador that night saying goodbye to a Turkish friend
    outside the gates and everything was quiet. But my goodness,
    those terrorists got ahold of--these Islamic extremists got
    ahold of that video, and between 8:30 and 9:40, they decided to
    just go crazy. And Africa is on fire.
        And Mr. Nordstrom, thank you for pointing out, as Mr.
    Romney did, that hope is not a strategy.
        And I feel sorry for you and Lieutenant Colonel Wood to
    have to come here because it is you who were on the ground. You
    are not watching it in some far away room in real time. Your
    people are there in real time. We have watched our colleagues
    be killed. And the question doesn't become, what is it that we
    didn't know? It is because we have become lax. We have dumbed
    down. We have turned down the dial.
        You know, by the way, at the same time--and I know it is
    about the money to some degree, right? Although I saw a whole
    list of all the things that we were able to do. Apparently, it
    wasn't for the money there. You know that the embassy in Vienna
    in early May, we did a beautiful, beautiful presentation of the
    embassy going green. Spent $110,000 on a little electrical
    thing to plug the cars in. Had two Volts there. Had 100 people
    there. We are sipping champagne and eating hors d'oeuvres, and
    my goodness, my goodness. On September 11th, we had a tough
    day. And a couple of bumps in the road.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Kelly. I got to say, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. I
    know I am going over. But the people of America should be
    outraged to have to sit here and listen to what we are saying
    and say, what are we doing to protect the other embassies and
    our personnel? They are true patriots. But you know what they
    rely on? The State Department for their security. And we let
    them down.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. There was no question there, Ambassador. I
    perceive no question. The gentlemen felt he had no question.
        With that, we go to the gentleman from Florida for 5
    minutes, Mr. Ross.
        Mr. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you. Mr. Nordstrom, earlier in your testimony you
    were discussing your recollection of a conversation that you
    had had with two agents in the room regarding the denial of the
    extension of the SST. Now, and it was your understanding that
    you were not to request an extension at that point. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct.
        Mr. Ross. And who was on the other end of the line that
    told you that?
        Mr. Ross. I was on the telephone call with DAS Lamb.
        Mr. Ross. Was Ms. Lamb on the phone call with you?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is. I am sorry.
        Mr. Ross. So she did tell you that?
        Mr. Nordstrom. That is correct.
        Mr. Ross. Okay. Now, she, just the other day in an
    interview with the committee, indicated that on your July 9
    cable to Washington requesting security personnel, you didn't
    formally request an SST extension. In fact, you just made a
    recommendation. Can you explain if there is a difference
    between a recommendation and a request?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I in post felt that was a pretty clear
    request for resources.
        Mr. Ross. Had you done it before with the idea that it was
    a request?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I believe it was also titled ``request for
    continued TDY staffing.''
        Mr. Ross. And it was a denial of that extension.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Well, actually, we never actually received a
    response.
        Mr. Ross. Other than that phone conference that you were
    on.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Correct. We never received a response----
        Mr. Ross. And as a result of that phone conference where
    you were denied, did you seek any further effort to follow up
    or make a re-request?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I believe actually to clarify, the telephone
    call was prior to sending in the cable. What we decided, since
    we continued to get resistance, instead of specifically asking
    for SST, or MSD, or whatever, we just said, you know what, give
    us the 13 bodies, wherever you come from, and that's the way in
    which we crafted the cable.
        Mr. Ross. Now, Mrs. Lamb, you testified in an interview
    with this committee that you trusted your RSOs in the field,
    such as Mr. Nordstrom. Now, how do you square that statement
    with you telling Mr. Nordstrom that you would not support an
    extension of the SST?
        Ms. Lamb. The cable that he sent in indicated that any of
    the categories----
        Mr. Ross. But before the cable was the phone conversation.
        Ms. Lamb. That is correct.
        Mr. Ross. But you wouldn't support his request or his
    recommendation at that time.
        Ms. Lamb. Because we had Department of State diplomatic
    security assets that could do the same functions of the
    remaining----
        Mr. Ross. And that was explained to him as well?
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Ross. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Wood, I understand that
    you were the senior officer of the SST team. Is that correct?
        Colonel Wood. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Ross. And do you have any reason to believe that if you
    had to go up your chain of command at AFRICOM for a request
    from the State Department that they extend the tour of duty of
    an SST that your chain of command would not grant that?
        Mr. Wood. General Ham was fully supportive of extending the
    SST as long as they felt they needed them.
        Mr. Ross. So the resources were available for the SST.
        Colonel Wood. Absolutely.
        Mr. Ross. And had they been there, they would have made a
    difference, would they not?
        Colonel Wood. They made a difference every day they were
    there when I was there, sir. They were a deterrent effect.
        Mr. Ross. Thank you. Now, Ambassador Kennedy, just real
    quickly, and everybody has been beating this, and I understand
    it, but I just want to reconcile it in my own mind. Here we
    have got the official statement of the State Department that
    this protest, this attack, was all as a result of a video that
    was controversial. But yet the next day, the President of Libya
    comes out and says, well, it was not as a result of a
    controversial video. In fact, he had no doubt that it was an
    act of terrorism. And so I guess my question is, is it that the
    Libyan intelligence is so superior to the American intelligence
    that they knew within 24 hours that it was a terrorist attack,
    and within 6 days, we are still saying it was a result of a
    video?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Ross, I am going to take a liberty here,
    and I am going to correct one point, if I might. You asked the
    colonel, would his team have made a difference?
        Mr. Ross. No, sir, you are on my time right here, so I have
    to control this.
        Mr. Kennedy. His team was not----
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman from Florida controls the time
    for questions he wishes to ask.
        Mr. Kennedy. Very good, sir.
        Mr. Ross. So the intelligence between the Libyans and the
    Americans just wasn't the same. Apparently, they were more
    superior. Now, if they were more superior in their
    intelligence, and you testified just earlier that you were
    still gathering information, that is why you didn't say it was
    officially a terrorist attack, then why in the world did you
    say it was anything at all when you put Jay Carney out there
    and Ambassador Rice to say that this is a result of an
    inflammatory reaction to a controversial film?
        Sir, it begs the question. What happened was it was a
    result of political pressure trumping professional protocol,
    was it not?
        Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Ross, I have been a career Foreign Service
    officer for 39 years. I have served every President since
    Richard Nixon. I have directly served six Secretaries of State,
    Democratic and Republican. On my honor, no, none, political
    pressure was applied to me in this case by anyone at the State
    Department, at the National Security Council, or at the White
    House.
        Mr. Ross. Then it was a professional protocol malpractice.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We now go to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy.
        Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, for almost a year there was an escalating
    pattern of violence directed towards the United States and
    other Western targets in Libya: Attacks on the consulate in
    Benghazi; attacks and assassination attempts on the British
    ambassador; attacks on the International Red Cross; attacks on
    courthouses; judges assassinated; culminating on September the
    11th in the murder of four Americans, including our ambassador
    to Libya.
        Before those four murders, Mr. Chairman, just a few weeks
    before that, our embassy in Libya said this to the Department
    of State: The security condition in Libya remains
    unpredictable, volatile, and violent.
        So Mr. Chairman, despite what would appear to any
    reasonably objective observer as an escalating pattern of
    violence, including sophistication, coordination, and
    management, this administration blamed the murder of our
    ambassador and three others on a video.
        Don't take my word for it, Mr. Chairman, let's look at what
    Ambassador Rice herself said: Our current assessment is that
    what happened in Benghazi was, quote, in fact initially a
    spontaneous reaction. I don't know what the phrase ``in fact''
    means in diplomatic legalese. I can tell you what it means in a
    courtroom, Mr. Chairman. It means it is a fact. And she went on
    national television, and she said, not as this ambassador has
    said, that I am not going to speculate, that I have got to get
    all the information; she said, in fact, this was a spontaneous
    reaction to what had just transpired hours before in Cairo,
    almost a copycat of the demonstrations against our facility in
    Cairo, which were prompted, of course, Mr. Chairman, by a video
    is what she said.
        And then she proceeds to say the attack was spontaneous. I
    can think of few things, Mr. Chairman, more antithetical to
    spontaneity than a 12-month long prologue of violence in Libya.
        And then she said she relied solely and squarely on the
    information the intelligence community provided. Mr. Chairman,
    I would like to have another hearing where we can ask
    Ambassador Rice under oath, who told you what when? You are
    going to blame the intelligence community; you come before this
    committee and you tell us who told you it was a video. Who in
    the intelligence community said it? Who in the diplomatic
    community blamed this on a video?
        And then we move to Jay Carney, who is the spokesperson for
    the leader of the free world. This is what he said, Mr.
    Chairman: ``I am saying based on information that we--our
    initial information that includes all information--we saw no
    evidence to back up claims by others that this was a preplanned
    or premeditated attack. What we saw was evidence that it was
    sparked by the reaction to this video. And that is what we know
    thus far based on evidence, concrete evidence''.
        Mr. Chairman, you know that in a former life, I spent a
    little time in the courtroom. So when I hear the phrase
    ``concrete evidence,'' it means something to me. That is even
    stronger language than simply saying something is in fact. So
    two representatives of this administration gave demonstrably
    false statements, not just to us, but to our fellow citizens on
    national television. Now, is the explanation for those
    demonstrably false statements, as my colleague from Florida
    just asked, was it negligence? Was it just a reckless disregard
    for the truth? Or was it more nefarious than that?
        Mr. Chairman, the American people are reasonable. People
    understand investigations take time. People don't expect you to
    speculate until you have all the facts. What they will not
    forgive, Mr. Chairman, is being misled. We want our questions
    answered. And I want them answered by the people that went out
    before the American people and sought to mislead them by
    blaming this on a video when there is no evidence, concrete or
    otherwise, to support the assertions made by this
    administration.
        Mr. Chairman, I just had a conversation with Jason Chaffetz
    out back. And I hope he doesn't mind me saying this. He still
    gets emotional talking about what he saw in Libya. There were
    four brave Americans who died under circumstances that we can
    scarcely fathom, the terror, the fear, the anarchy of being
    killed in that fashion. They did what their country asked them
    to do. They stood post under dangerous circumstances even after
    requests for security were denied. They stood their post. The
    least we can do is stand this meager post that we have been
    assigned and demand that this administration speak the truth to
    the people it is supposed to serve. This was never about a
    video. It was never spontaneous. This is terror. And I want to
    know why we were lied to. And I yield back.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Issa. The ranking member.
        Mr. Cummings. I have to, as an officer of the court, I have
    to--I am looking at the transcript from the date, and I will
    read it, if you want. I mean, to sit here and accuse one of our
    fellow citizens and Secretary Rice of lying, that is a very,
    very serious statement. And I am very concerned about that
    because I mean, she made it clear over and over again that she
    was dealing with the information that she had at that moment.
    And she said it over--I looked at every single interview. I
    think we have to be very careful. Just as the gentleman talks
    about he wants some truth and all that to come forward, I would
    be happy to join and have Ms. Rice come up here.
        But I think we have got to be careful, a distinguished
    attorney, a distinguished woman, and she made it emphatic, she
    said this is the information I have at this moment.
        Chairman Issa. I appreciate the gentleman's comment.
        I would inform the committee that the ranking member and I
    will be requesting a classified interview at the earliest
    possible date, perhaps as early as next week, that would be
    similar to the one that Ambassador Kennedy was in yesterday.
    And we will inform both sides as soon as that has been granted.
        Additionally, it is our intention to follow all of the
    clues to where they lead, including how a week after this,
    people could still say with certainty that in fact something
    was true that we now know not to be true.
        And I appreciate the ranking member's statement. And I
    thank the gentleman from South Carolina.
        With that, we now go to the ever patient senior member of
    the--I am sorry. We now go to the equally patient gentleman
    from Texas, Mr. Farenthold.
        Mr. Farenthold. I am not sure my wife would agree with you
    on patience.
        Chairman Issa. She is actually more patient than you. We
    have met her.
        Mr. Farenthold. Anyway, after listening to Mr. Gowdy, you
    know, we have a list of four brave Americans who gave their
    life for this country, Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen
    Doherty, and Tyrone Woods.
        And I think Mr. Gowdy hit it on the head, at best, this is
    negligence. We have an ongoing pattern of requests for more
    help and it not going up the chain of command. How many more
    people are we going to have to add to this list? And that is
    what I want to pursue in this line of questioning.
        And I will start with Mrs. Lamb and Ambassador Kennedy. Are
    there other embassies similarly situated, other State
    Department outposts that are asking for more help because of
    volatile situations that are not getting it?
        Ms. Lamb. In volatile locations, no, sir.
        RSOs just need to confer with their post management,
    because it is a matter of bed space and logistical issues and
    the requests and the justification for what these personnel
    will do, and it is granted. If we don't have permanent
    assignments to put there, we immediately put temporarily
    assigned agents there.
        Mr. Farenthold. So there is not a budget problem; it is not
    you all don't have the money to do this?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, if it is a volatile situation, we will move
    assets to cover that.
        Mr. Farenthold. Would you have considered--at the time, did
    you consider Libya to be a volatile situation?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, absolutely. And the desk officer sat--talked
    and sent emails and came to an agreement with Eric Nordstrom.
    We were trying to get a clearly defined list of exactly what he
    needed out there.
        Mr. Farenthold. So how long does this have to get tied up
    in bureaucratic red tape? To me, it is like saying we are on
    fire, let's figure out how many firemen to send. Let's just
    send some.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, we did provide everything that he asked for.
        Mr. Kennedy. Sir, do you want my response to that, too?
        Mr. Farenthold. Yes, please.
        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much, sir.
        The answer is we did provide resources. And as a point of
    clarification following on your question, there has been a
    large discussion here about the SST team headed by Colonel
    Wood. The SST team was the Tripoli team.
        Mr. Farenthold. Okay. I want to go to Mr. Nordstrom,
    because he was there on the field. You guys, I was talking to
    you guys about what was happening in D.C.
        Do you think it was on fire, and you needed more people and
    you communicated that urgently up the chain of command?
        Mr. Nordstrom. I think that my cables stand as they are in
    terms of addressing the assertion from DAS Lamb that there
    wasn't a specific or detailed list.
        For the members that are here, they can see that this is
    more than detailed. I also have a number of memorandums that
    went back as far as February detailing not just the numbers we
    needed but the specific hours those people would be working and
    the duties.
        Mr. Farenthold. And you didn't get them.
        Mr. Nordstrom. I think the question to be asked is, again,
    as was asserted after my July 9th cable, that the plan was to
    source our security needs from the Department of State rather
    than from the Department of Defense. I think the question is,
    were those resources ever provided? And I think the answer is
    no.
        Mr. Farenthold. Okay. You have anything to add, Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood?
        Colonel Wood. No.
        Mr. Farenthold. Okay. I realize you guys don't, Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood and Mr. Nordstrom, you all don't have the level of
    information that Ms. Lamb and Ambassador Kennedy have. But
    having been in the biz, so to speak, do you think there are
    other embassies out there and other State Department facilities
    similarly situated to what we had in Libya that are at risk
    today?
        Colonel Wood. Sir, it is my impression that a cookie-cutter
    approach or some sort of a plan was being applied to us. That
    is what we felt down there in the field as we tried to work
    this situation. And certainly Libya met none of those
    requirements.
        Mr. Farenthold. Yeah. As a former military person,
    historically, it is been the Marines that have protected our
    embassy and for a variety of political situations. And I need
    point no further than Iraq, with the huge amount of money we
    are spending to protect our embassy with contractors, when for
    political reasons or whatever we are not putting Marines in. Do
    you think that is a good idea that we are doing that, we are
    not relying on the Marines?
        Colonel Wood. Sir, I think there is definitely a place for
    it. It needs to be studied. And I think each location is going
    to present you with a different situation that needs to be
    looked at for the merits on its own merits.
        Mr. Farenthold. And I think as we have the Arab Spring
    coming, and we have the freedom and democracy coming to these
    Arab states, we have got to be aware that sometimes there are
    going to be times of transition when countries are not stable.
    There may be election results that we don't like or when people
    who don't like us are elected. And I think we need to take this
    as a lesson that we need to be much more proactive and project
    more strength so this doesn't happen in times that can change
    literally in a matter of hours. I see I am out of time, so I
    will yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        With that, we are going to go to our very patient invited
    Members of Congress, starting with the senior member of the
    Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Rohrabacher.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And as chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
    Subcommittee of Foreign Affairs, I appreciate you taking the
    lead in making sure that we are deeply getting in deep into an
    issue that is important to the American people.
        It has been suggested that budget cuts were responsible for
    a lack of security in Benghazi. I would like to ask, Ms. Lamb,
    you made this decision personally; was there any budget
    consideration and lack of budget which led you not to increase
    the number of people in the security force there?
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir. And it----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. That is all I need. Thank you very
    much.
        Okay. So it wasn't a lack of money, as we have heard by
    some people trying to suggest that. Was it a lack of
    intelligence? Was this a failure of intelligence? Or was it a
    lack of competence? Or is this just something that will happen?
    No matter how we try or how competent we are, we are going to
    lose lives like this.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, this was an unprecedented attack in size and
    ferocity, as the words of RSO Eric Nordstrom. And as long as we
    have the need to be outside of the wire in these volatile
    countries, we can't defend against that.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me just note that I do not
    believe that that is the case. But I think that you honestly
    believe that.
        . There are other factors involved here that make us
    vulnerable or not vulnerable to these type of evil forces that
    are in the world. So I would like to--I know we have touched on
    these issues of preparedness, et cetera, and the bureaucratic
    things that people go through to make sure that we don't have
    this type of suffering and loss of life. But I would like to
    focus on not the bureaucratic planning and what could have been
    done and not done; I would like to focus on one other area. We
    heard from one of our colleagues a list of names of those
    killed during the Reagan administration who were killed by
    terrorists. I worked in the Reagan administration. I can tell
    you not once, when all of these Americans were being killed by
    terrorists, did the administration in any way try to excuse or
    in any way these murderous attacks as some sort of spontaneous
    outrage due to something that the administration had done or an
    American citizen had done. Big difference. We are talking about
    a mindset that may encourage evil forces in the world to kill
    Americans.
        This administration has been bowing and scraping to try to
    prove its sincerity and friendship seeking to the Islamic world
    since day one. It has projected not strength, but weakness and
    has demoralized our friends and emboldened our enemies, which
    perhaps had something to do with people who took a long time to
    plan out this kind of attack. This mindset might be seen in a
    psychological minimizing of the threat of radical Islam in
    general and maybe even specific situations. This mindset might
    also be seen in situations like this when we are trying to
    describe and come to the realization of what happened in a
    horrific terrorist attack on our people.
        For example, there is a mindset that might lead people who
    are here testifying not even to use the word terrorism in their
    testimony when we are talking about a terrorist attack that
    murdered our ambassador. That is not your fault. But there is a
    mindset there somewhere that says those--the word terrorism
    doesn't come into your written testimony. I would also suggest
    that we need to--that mindset may be when people jump to the
    conclusion, because it is an easy conclusion, to blame a film
    maker and let terrorists off the hook for responsibility of
    these terrorist acts. That mindset of minimizing the threat of
    terrorism and blaming it on us, freedom of speech in America,
    we permitted a film that created outrage overseas, instead of
    putting the blame where it belongs.
        And that is where the testimony from Mr. Kennedy comes in.
    Mr. Kennedy, we need to understand that whole scenario after
    this event to understand the mindset that may be at play here.
    We need to understand the scenario of what happened. Six days
    afterwards, we know the American people were given false
    information about who was responsible. You were here today, and
    you are unable to give us a view of how that came about. And
    the fact is, as far as this Member of Congress is concerned,
    you were engaged in stonewalling or a coverup or whatever it
    is. Lets me ask you it flat out. Did anyone tell you not to
    answer this question?
        Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely no one.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So you have taken it upon yourself not to
    answer what is a simple scenario. When did you first know about
    this? Or as they said during the Nixon years, when did you
    know? What did you know? And when did you know about it? But
    you are not able to give us that answer.
        Mr. Kennedy. If I could respond, sir?
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired, but the
    ambassador may respond.
        Mr. Kennedy. Let me quote exactly what Susan Rice said on
    that Sunday talk show: ``But our current assessment, based on
    the information that we have at present, is that in fact what
    this began as was spontaneous, not premeditated.''
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
        Mr. Kennedy. She said very specifically, ``based on our
    current assessment.''
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And Mr. Chairman, the retort to that is we
    are not just talking about her one statement. If you notice,
    this innuendo and this blame for the time immediately after was
    what we heard--all heard about it. It was the film. How many
    times? The Secretary of State used the word the film. So it is
    not just one speech that you are talking about, which may or
    may not be correct. This is something that we need to get to
    the heart of the matter.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We now go to the gentlelady from Florida, who is extremely
    familiar with law enforcement and how it is to be worked, Ms.
    Adams.
        Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank the committee for allowing me to sit here today.
        Ms. Lamb, I am a former law enforcement officer, as I know
    you have stated you are. So I am going to go along that line,
    as my colleague who is a prosecutor. We tend to listen very
    intently and are trained to do so. So I believe you will
    understand some of the questions I am going to ask you. And yes
    or no is fairly easy on some of them, like Mr. Burton asked
    you, was it your sole discretion to deny the extra manpower.
    Yes or no? Your sole discretion. Was it your sole discretion to
    deny the request from Mr. Nordstrom?
        Ms. Lamb. No.
        Mrs. Adams. Who above you had to approve that?
        Ms. Lamb. The response cable would be approved by two
    senior----
        Mrs. Adams. And who are they?
        Ms. Lamb. The director of diplomatic security and the
    Assistant Secretary.
        Mrs. Adams. Names, please?
        Mr. Lamb. Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell.
        Mrs. Adams. Thank you.
        Now, as a former law enforcement officer, I recognize there
    are certain dates that law enforcement across our great Nation
    prepare for because we believe they are significant to certain
    groups, one of which is September 11th. And it is significant
    to which group, Ms. Lamb? Which group would make that
    significant?
        Ms. Lamb. I am not sure I am following you.
        Mrs. Adams. Which terrorist group finds September 11th
    significant?
        Ms. Lamb. I am sure all terrorist groups find it.
        Mrs. Adams. But mostly al Qaeda, would you not agree? Yes
    or no. If you don't agree, then say you don't agree.
        Ms. Lamb. Yes, I am sure.
        Mrs. Adams. Thank you. So, we have requests, over 230 clear
    incidents, we have, you know, bombings that have already
    entered our compound. Yet multiple requests, over 230 clear
    incidents, violence erupting everywhere around, and you and
    your agency deny the security personnel that they have
    requested. And then, on September 11th, which is known to be
    one of those dates that all of law enforcement and many people
    around the world look at--and I hope you helped her out, Mr.
    Ambassador, I am watching very closely and intently, as I was
    earlier--why is it that after all of that, that we have our
    ambassador to the U.N. go to the talk shows on the Sunday
    afterwards and many other people from your agency, even here
    today, that say, well, with the information that we had, why is
    it that they said it was a film, when everything, all my law
    enforcement training taught me, that it was pointing quite
    differently? Can you ask me--answer me did you believe, you, on
    September 11th and the morning after, did you believe that it
    was a video and not a terrorist attack? Yes or----
        Ms. Lamb. With 35 years of experience, I choose to wait
    until the investigation is complete before drawing a
    conclusion.
        Mrs. Adams. Well, that is good. Because that is the other
    thing I wanted to ask about, too. With my investigation
    experience, I also know that you follow the leads very
    carefully, and you don't go out and immediately claim one thing
    until you do have the facts, Mr. Ambassador.
        So, on September 14th, Ms. Nuland from your agency said
    that we have an open FBI investigation on the death of these
    four Americans. We are not going to be in a position to talk at
    all about the U.S. Government may or may not be learning about
    how any of this happened, not who they were, not how they
    happened, not what happened to Ambassador Stevens, not any of
    it until, Justice Department is ready to talk about the
    investigation. So you did talk about it yesterday. So did the
    Department of Justice say that they are ready to talk about it
    and you, therefore, can go ahead and give up that information?
        Mr. Kennedy. What we talked about yesterday----
        Mrs. Adams. I am asking Ms. Lamb.
        Ms. Lamb. I am sorry, I thought you were speaking with
    Ambassador Kennedy.
        Mrs. Adams. Did Department of Justice say, okay, our
    investigation is at a point you can now release this
    information? Yes or no?
        Ms. Lamb. No.
        Mrs. Adams. So you went ahead, and on September 14th, 3
    days after the attack, said you wouldn't release it, and then
    yesterday, you did release it, but the Department of Justice
    did not----
        Ms. Lamb. The FBI has cleared everything that we have said
    here today.
        Mrs. Adams. And yesterday also.
        Ms. Lamb. I was not in the briefing yesterday.
        Mrs. Adams. Mr. Ambassador, yesterday also?
        Mr. Kennedy. The material we used yesterday was drawn from
    the same pool that the FBI cleared.
        Mrs. Adams. The Department of Justice said, it is okay to
    release that information.
        Mr. Kennedy. We presented, we presented in a closed session
    to the Congress.
        Chairman Issa. Is the gentlelady referring to the press
    avail?
        Mrs. Adams. I am.
        Chairman Issa. It is your press conference in which you
    sort of stated a lot of things categorically for I guess
    everybody except Fox.
        Mr. Kennedy. I think the distinction--I think the
    distinction I would draw, Congresswoman, is that there is a
    difference between the investigation to determine who the
    perpetrators were and a rendition of the facts that we now know
    ran out. So there is a timeline, and then there is the cause.
    And that is the distinction I humbly am making.
        Mrs. Adams. But your spokesperson said you would not--who
    they are, who they were, not how they happened, not what
    happened to the ambassador, not any of it until Justice
    Department is ready to talk. Is the Justice Department ready to
    talk on this?
        Mr. Kennedy. The Justice Department is certainly not ready
    to talk about the first two of the----
        Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time is expired.
        And I don't think you are going to get an answer out of the
    gentleman on that subject. I appreciate your effort.
        The chair would inform everyone that we are not terribly
    interested in a second round. I am going to ask a couple of
    quick, very quick clarifying questions, and then if anyone
    really has a burning desire, they may. Otherwise, we will
    conclude.
        Everyone has been very generous with their time.
        And it really boils down to there was a statement that
    hasn't been covered any further, Ambassador Kennedy, that the
    DC-3, an aircraft that was available, was taken away because,
    quote, commercial airline capacity was created. Correct?
        Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So why are there five fixed-wing
    aircraft, at least one of them very big, quite a few of them
    big, and 35 helicopters in Iraq, even though they have
    commercial aircraft?
        Mr. Kennedy. There is no safe commercial air service
    available within Iraq. There is safe commercial air service
    available to and from Libya, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So Libya is safe; Iraq isn't.
        Mr. Kennedy. In terms of air service, specifically to move
    people in and out of the country.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. I just want to make it clear.
    Additionally, and I am not trying to unreasonably use a prop,
    but I was given it, and I used it in an earlier hearing,
    everyone that goes to Iraq gets one of these, or at least an
    opportunity. This is from a brigade-size force of diplomatic
    security personnel.
        Thank you.
        I guess it looks better this way.
        Do you recognize--have any of you even it in Iraq,
    Ambassador? Ms. Lamb?
        Mr. Kennedy. I have never seen that, sir.
        Chairman Issa. It has been told to us in testimony that
    between 80 and 100 diplomatic security personnel have been
    working Iraq over the last year. Is that roughly right?
        Ms. Lamb. Eighty-eight, yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So Iraq, a place that the war is
    supposed to be over, it is safe, has like 6,000 contract
    personnel, 14,000 of our government employees direct and
    indirect, and 80 DSS, but you couldn't spare six more for
    Libya. Is that correct?
        Ms. Lamb. Sir----
        Chairman Issa. Or you didn't see the need for them.
        Ms. Lamb. No, sir, I am not sure where the number six is
    coming from.
        Chairman Issa. That was the difference between two crews
    and three crews. It would have been a difference of similar
    numbers had you backfilled with military personnel that were
    available and offered to you by General Ham.
        Ms. Lamb. Okay. Sir, as I said, Eric Nordstrom and the desk
    officer agreed on a number. We fulfilled that number. If he
    needed six additional people----
        Chairman Issa. Okay.
        Mr. Nordstrom, you are saying you don't agree on the
    number. That is probably the most important thing to get here
    straight. The number available on September 11th is not
    consistent with what you thought was the need when you were
    last in country. Is that correct?
        Mr. Nordstrom. Whether or not the numbers were agreed upon,
    when I left, we did not have the 12 numbers that were quote-
    unquote agreed upon.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you very much.
        I want to thank all of the witnesses. Okay. Then I won't
    close at this point. I recognize the ranking member.
        Mr. Cummings. Just a few questions.
        Just following up on what the chairman just talked about,
    Ambassador, what is the budget for Iraq's embassy? Just an
    estimation.
        Mr. Kennedy. I think the budget is probably up close to a
    $700 million, $800 million run rate.
        Mr. Cummings. What about Libya?
        Mr. Kennedy. Much smaller than that, sir. I didn't bring
    that exact number with me.
        Mr. Cummings. Ms. Lamb, you have been--I listened to the
    description that you gave of what happened. And somebody asked
    the question a moment ago, basically, why you made the
    decisions that you did make. And I got to ask you, I am
    assuming that you were always concerned about the safety of the
    folks that were there. Is that right?
        Ms. Lamb. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. And you, I assume you used your best judgment
    trying to make those decisions?
        Ms. Lamb. Absolutely. In fact, we sent an email to post
    right before the last MSD team left, offering to leave them
    there to continue training even though they didn't have the
    full complement for another class of armed bodyguards. And
    basically, we gave post two options. If they needed them, they
    could keep them there. We would be happy to train a lesser
    class. And then we also gave the option that we could come back
    a month later and train a full class. And post chose to allow
    the MSD team to leave and come back at a later date. And these
    are assets that would have been on the ground there as well.
        Mr. Cummings. The reason why I am asking you these
    questions is because I am just trying to put myself in your
    place right now. And the implications that you are either
    incompetent, that you didn't give a damn, or you are some kind
    of Scrooge, and I don't think you are any of those. And I just
    want you to just, you know, just give you an opportunity to
    respond to that.
        Ms. Lamb. Sir, we do have limited resources, and it is very
    important that we have our regional security officers in
    coordination with their emergency action committees at post and
    with their ambassadors clearly lay out and articulate exactly
    what they need and why they need it. And Eric Nordstrom did a
    fantastic job. He had a very difficult job as the first RSO
    going in there. And sometimes putting pen to paper and sitting
    down and coordinating a transition exit strategy, especially
    for the SST was very difficult. And we engaged him on a regular
    basis to try to come up with this exit strategy that we could
    all agree upon and to move into it gradually.
        Every time a mobile security division left, there were
    three, before each team left, they spoke with RSO Nordstrom,
    and they spoke with the Ambassador at post and they reviewed
    everything that they had accomplished and what the post needs
    still going forward and they got permission to leave before
    they left post.
        Mr. Cummings. Are you satisfied with your decisions?
        Ms. Lamb. I made the best decisions I could with the
    information I had, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Mr. Kelly, you wanted to make a brief statement in closing?
        Mr. Kelly. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and all of you
    thanks for being here.
        I know there's incredible pressure put on you but you are
    all at part of the executive branch, not so much the two
    officers, and there is a time, and I said earlier, these things
    come at a bad time and people talk about being 27 days before
    the election but every once in a while you have to worry more
    about running the country than running for reelection, and you
    have to make decisions as the executive, and you have to make
    sure that the staff you have on board is really somebody that
    you can rely on all the time.
        These folks have to rely on you to make the decisions.
    While we can do some things in appropriations and oversight, it
    does come from the executive branch that all of these things
    fall into place. If you look at the organizational chart of
    this government, the State Department, Secretary of State has a
    great, great deal of responsibility. We lost four American
    lives. And I would think that as we go on, we have to ask these
    type of questions, and we have to ask what did we learn from
    the losses?
        And if we do have people out there that are in harm's way,
    are we protecting them the way we should? Are we making the
    commitment to them that they made to us? They put their lives
    on the line. And then I keep hearing, well, we didn't have the
    resources. But that is not true. It is priorities that count.
    How do you prioritize those moneys that you have?
        And I have got to tell you. I have watched this thing now
    since September 11. I am trying to understand why in the world
    we've sat back and we continue to try to find out who to blame.
    The blame is that there is a group of people in the world that
    are really bad people, but we have to be able to deal with
    them. But other question is we put our people in harm's way.
    Did we do the best job we could to protect them? They put their
    lives on the line. Did we do everything we could to protect
    them? And after what has happened in Benghazi what have we
    learned from that? And I know you are in law enforcement, I
    would tell the CSI Benghazi there is not a crime scene that has
    not been more contaminated than the one that is there right
    now. How would we learn from that after what we have allowed to
    have happen?
        So I know that it has been a long day for all of us for you
    specifically, but for those four Americans and the families
    that lost those lives, it is a much longer day. And for those,
    Lieutenant Colonel Wood, Mr. Nordstrom, those are your
    colleagues. That hits you deeper than any of us, so I do
    appreciate your being here. I know how difficult it is. But I
    would like to say that as elected officials, we have a
    commitment to do, when we took our oath of office. It has
    nothing to do with Republicans or Democrats. It has to do now
    with Americans and patriotism. And we better start to be able
    to look at this and place emphasis on where it needs to be, and
    Mr. Chairman I thank you very much.
        Chairman Issa. I thank you. Mr. Jordan.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief here.
    In a 13-month time frame, we had 230 security instances in
    Libya. When the 231st happens, the administration blames it on
    a video. We got two guys on the ground who repeatedly asked for
    additional security personnel and are denied, denied by people
    who have never been to the country they have been in for months
    at a time. There is a process in place, according to Ambassador
    Kennedy's testimony and statements, where professionals come
    together and they make assessments and decisions about what the
    field is requesting.
        Earlier, not in my questioning with you, Ambassador, you
    said factors that you look at, and I didn't get all of them
    listed, but three that I did jot down, stability of the
    government, threats against it and facility concerns. Well
    certainly in those three, there was nothing in Libya that would
    say they shouldn't get what they are asking for. The stability
    of this government, the government is a transitional
    government, that is the name of it. Threats against us, we had
    230, facility concerns, you have admitted that in testimony the
    facility wasn't up to code.
        So I guess I just want, it seems to me that the $64,000
    question is what would it have took to give the guys on the
    ground who have been there for months where you haven't been,
    what would it have took to get the additional security
    personnel? Would it take 232, 250 incidences? Would it take a
    government that had been in power 8 months, not 5 months? What
    would it have took to do what the professionals in the field
    felt needed to be done to protect American assets and the lives
    of these four individuals?
        And we will start with you Ambassador, and then Ms. Lamb.
        Mr. Kennedy. We do assessments every day of security around
    the world. We look at every, we look at every location. There
    were 234 incidents. Only 20 percent of them were in Benghazi,
    the rest of them were in Tripoli or elsewhere. There had not
    been a single incident in Benghazi.
        Mr. Jordan. Were the more serious ones in Benghazi?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, they were elsewhere. There was not ever a
    single incident in Benghazi of the lethality of the nature of
    the armed attack which I pointed out was almost unprecedented.
    Therefore, we then worked very, very carefully. We cannot end
    the risk to our people overseas. The State Department must go
    into harm's way. We attempt to mitigate that level of threat.
    And if we cannot mitigate the level of threat, we will withdraw
    our people as we have done.
        Mr. Jordan. The British ambassador, there was an
    assassination attempt, our embassy was bombed twice. I guess
    one of those, what does it take to, again, this is not Congress
    telling you, these are the professionals in the field who say
    we need more security personnel in Libya. Okay, maybe all over,
    this is for Libya, the whole country and you guys say no. And
    you allude to in your testimony this process of considered
    judgments of experienced professionals in Washington.
        Well, I want to know what those considered judgments of
    experienced professionals, 234 incidences in the country,
    violence attacks on our embassy, on Ambassadors, what does it
    take?
        Mr. Kennedy. What I said, Mr. Jordan, there was not any
    actionable intelligence as the Director of National
    Intelligence had said----
        Mr. Jordan. Are these guys professionals? These guys do
    their job right? Would you agree with that? These guys said
    they needed more help.
        Mr. Kennedy. If I could finish my statement, sir, please.
        Mr. Jordan. Then I want to go to these guys.
        Mr. Kennedy. There was no actionable intelligence that was
    available that indicated----
        Mr. Jordan. The word of Mr. Nordstrom and Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood wasn't good enough?
        Mr. Kennedy. There was no actionable intelligence
    indicating that there was a plan or any indication of a massive
    attack of the nature and lethality. Yes, absolutely, there was
    a single rocket-propelled grenade fired at the Red Cross, there
    was an attack on the British compound. We analyzed those
    things. And I should also note that, for example, that the
    French and Italians and the United Nations looked at that same
    threat stream----
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Nordstrom, do you think they were ever
    going to give you what you wanted? What do you think would
    warrant actually them saying you know what, these guys know
    what they are talking about, we are going to meet their
    request.
        Mr. Nordstrom. Thank you for asking that question.
        I actually had that conversation when I came back on leave
    and for training in February. And I was told by the regional
    director for Near Eastern Affairs that there had only been one
    incident involving an American where he was struck by
    celebratory fire, one of Colonel Wood's employees. The take-
    away from that for me and my staff, it was abundantly clear we
    were not going to get resources until the aftermath of an
    incident. And the question that we would ask is, again, how
    thin does the ice have to get before someone falls through?
        Mr. Jordan. If I could Mr. Chairman, Lieutenant Colonel
    Wood.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman, Colonel Wood you can answer
    also.
        Colonel Wood. Yes, I agree with Eric Nordstrom. Not only
    did we have an individual struck by a bullet, but we also had
    individual members of SST that had a firing shooting incident
    just before we terminated our duties there.
        Again, pointing to the instant ability for anything to
    happen there, it was an attempted carjacking and there were
    shots fired going both ways.
        Mr. Jordan. If I could, Mr. Chairman, Lieutenant Colonel,
    Colonel Wood and Mr. Nordstrom, were you pulling your hair out?
    Were you just flat flabbergasted that, what can we do? What can
    we say? What can we put in writing? What can we say on the
    phone? What else can we do? Was that your sense and attitude
    when you got the answers from Washington that you did?
        Colonel Wood. We were fighting a losing battle. We couldn't
    even keep what we had. We were not even allowed to keep what we
    had.
        Mr. Nordstrom. If I could add to that, and I told the same
    regional director in a telephone call in Benghazi after he
    contacted me when I asked for 12 agents. His response to that
    was you are asking for the sun, moon and the stars. And my
    response to him, his name is Jim and I said Jim, you know what
    makes most frustrating about this assignment? It is not the
    hardships, not the gunfire not the threats; it is dealing and
    fighting against the people, programs, and personnel who are
    supposed to be supporting me. And I added it by saying for me,
    the Taliban is on the inside of the building.
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our witnesses in
    particular, Mr. Nordstrom and Colonel Wood for coming forward.
        Chairman Issa. I want to thank all our witnesses
    additionally. In the case of Lieutenant Colonel Wood and Mr.
    Nordstrom, if as a result perceived or actual of your testimony
    here today, you are in any way approached or anything happens
    in your professional lives with the United States Government
    that you have any questions about, please come to this
    committee. We take the work of whistleblowers and people who
    give testimony very seriously.
        You have been critical to bring out things that would not
    have come out of the ordinary course of the administration.
        I am going to close only with two comments that I took away
    from today. One is that you don't reduce security at the same
    time as you are increasing hazardous duty pay. It doesn't make
    sense. I haven't heard that question asked and answered, I only
    heard that it occurred. And I think the State Department should
    take away from today an understanding that that sends a message
    that says we will pay you for the risk, we will not pay to have
    you made safer. That is the impression that anyone would get if
    you reduce the staffing below recommendations or request and
    then increase the pay.
        I don't think that is what the men and women who serve us
    overseas want. I know that pay and compensation for hardship is
    important, but safety comes first especially on these
    unaccompanied assignments.
        Lastly, Colonel Wood, I have a marine fellow that works for
    me, actually I have a former marine fellow on the side there.
    The United States military very generously delivers people for
    other branches for their needs, and in return, those
    individuals come away understanding and more able to do a broad
    variety of jobs.
        Your time, working with the State Department, is invaluable
    as you continue your career. I would only say that whether you
    are talking to your National Guard commanders or the SECDEF or
    others, that we do appreciate the fact that our men and women
    have varied careers in which they can assist others with assets
    that would not be available and then take that back to their
    units.
        And I want to thank you for your service and use you as a
    conduit for so many men and women who, around the world have
    added to what otherwise would not be there in the way of
    security and protection. And with that we stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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