    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 112-159]
                        UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY
                          SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
                           REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND
                    IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               DECEMBER 19, 2012

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

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                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
    ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         ADAM SMITH, Washington
    MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    W. TODD AKIN, Missouri               MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio                 RICK LARSEN, Washington
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
    ROB WITTMAN, Virginia                LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana     BILL OWENS, New York
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
    TOM ROONEY, Florida                  MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    TIM RYAN, Ohio
    SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia               C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    CHRIS GIBSON, New York               HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
    JOE HECK, Nevada                     COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois            KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
    JON RUNYAN, New Jersey               JACKIE SPEIER, California
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                RON BARBER, Arizona
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
    STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
    ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
    MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
    MO BROOKS, Alabama
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana
                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                     Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
                     Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
                        Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2012

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, December 19, 2012, Update on the Evolving Security
      Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
      Implications for U.S. National Security........................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, December 19, 2012.....................................    57
                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2012
    UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
             THE CONGO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
      California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..............     1
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Affleck, Ben, Founder, Eastern Congo Initiative..................    36
    Carafano, Dr. James Jay, Vice President, Foreign and Defense
      Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation........................    34
    Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau
      of African Affairs.............................................     6
    Chollet, Hon. Derek, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Affairs.................................     4
    Frazer, Dr. Jendayi E., Ph.D., Distinguished Service Professor,
      Carnegie Mellon University.....................................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Affleck, Ben.................................................    99
        Carafano, Dr. James Jay......................................    88
        Carson, Hon. Johnnie.........................................    70
        Chollet, Hon. Derek..........................................    65
        Frazer, Dr. Jendayi E........................................    79
        McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''..............................    61
        Smith, Hon. Adam.............................................    63

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        ``The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on
          Security Sector Reform,'' by Ben Affleck, Founder, Eastern
          Congo Initiative...........................................   113

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Forbes...................................................   137
        Mr. Johnson..................................................   138
        Ms. Sanchez..................................................   137
        Ms. Speier...................................................   138

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Garamendi................................................   143
    UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
             THE CONGO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 19, 2012.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
    McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

        OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
     REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the House Armed
    Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
        Before I go any further, though, I want to acknowledge that
    this is our last hearing that we will hold this Congress, and
    we are losing several Members off of our committee. And I just
    want to mention their names: Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Akin, Mr.
    Platts, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Schilling, Mr. Griffin, Mr. West, and
    Mr. Young, on our side of the aisle; and Mr. Reyes, Mr.
    Heinrich, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Critz, Ms. Sutton, Ms. Hochul, Mr.
    Ryan, on the other side.
        So we are losing a lot of Members. We want to let them know
    they will be missed, and I hate to see you leaving.
        I guess you feel the same about them, too, right?
        Mr. Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman, yes.
        I mean, this is a committee that, you know, the expertise
    is critical. And while we all replenish and restock and move
    forward, but as Members leave, we lose their expertise and
    their experience on this committee. And all of those Members
    have served this committee very, very well, and their expertise
    will be missed.
        So we appreciate their service to this committee. They have
    been part of what, you know, has given us our success as a
    bipartisan and successful committee. So I appreciate your
    bringing attention to their service.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Some of them are freshmen that
    have been here one term. Some, like Mr. Bartlett, has been
    here, we came together 20 years ago, so a lot of memories.
        I want to start this morning by thanking my colleague, the
    committee's ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we
    hold this hearing on the DRC [Democratic Republic of the
    Congo]. I believe it will help the committee to understand the
    complexity of some of the issues within Central Africa. The
    situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to
    evolve and is driven by a complex interplay of regional power
    dynamics as well as an intricate web of economic and social
    issues.
        What is clear is that the situation in the DRC is tragic
    for the innocent people caught in the conflict; innocent people
    who are simply trying to raise their families, and live their
    lives. As I have followed the media coverage of the situation
    in the DRC, I can't help but reflect on the millions of
    innocent people around the world who are caught in
    fundamentally unjust and socially complex situations. These
    situations can make anyone's heart break and, naturally, leads
    one to consider the simple question, what can be done?
        I know one thing, it sure makes me appreciate our country.
    You know, I have heard that less than 2 percent of the people
    that have ever lived here on the Earth have lived under the
    kind of freedoms that we enjoy. We are so blessed, and when we
    see how innocent lives are--how people are hurt so much by some
    of the things that are happening around the world, it just,
    again, really makes me appreciate home.
        The question, and likewise, the answer, becomes more
    complex as we contemplate what can be done within the context
    of U.S. national security interests, constrained budgets,
    ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the globe, and
    potential future contingencies that the military has to be
    prepared to execute. Given the looming threat of sequestration,
    or further cuts to the military, I believe most of us on this
    committee have become ever more focused on ensuring our
    military's missions are both essential and appropriately
    tailored.
        That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD
    [Department of Defense] to address the situation in the DRC. I
    understand that, in the recent past, the Department of State
    conducted important diplomatic efforts, such as the Tripartite
    Plus, which furthered stability in Central Africa and within
    the DRC, in particular.
        Although the Administration is no longer pursuing this
    particular effort, perhaps there are other similar
    opportunities, given how the situation has negatively evolved
    in the DRC. Moreover, it seems the U.S. could pursue deeper
    diplomatic engagement with regional partners and our allies to
    leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to address
    this issue.
        Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We
    cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in
    Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from
    Afghanistan, to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must
    recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that
    directly threaten the United States and our allies. Therefore,
    we must ensure that our military is sufficiently resourced and
    that our national leaders prioritize our defense resources
    toward efforts that are appropriate for the U.S. military and
    our national vital security interests.
        I look forward to learning more about the situation on the
    ground, as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address
    the situation in the DRC.
        Mr. Smith.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
    Appendix on page 61.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you very
    much for taking the time to hold this hearing.
        This is a very important issue. As you described, the
    situation in eastern DRC is dire. It is the largest
    humanitarian crisis, I think, that too few people have heard
    of. By some estimates, in the wars that have gone on there over
    the course of the last 15 to 20 years now, nearly 5 million
    people have been killed; many more wounded, injured, raped,
    displaced. It is a place where a lot of people are suffering.
    And it is a place where I believe we can make a difference in
    helping to reduce that suffering.
        Stability in the region is incredibly important to the
    United States. We have key partners in that area that we have
    worked with in Uganda and Rwanda, as we have dealt with
    situations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and the
    instability coming out of the DRC is a threat to all of that.
        We have seen, you know, in recent months that Africa is
    increasingly important in our national security interests. The
    instability there is giving rise to the many Al Qaeda-inspired
    insurgencies and that instability threatens our security. So
    one of the biggest purposes of this hearing is to get a greater
    feel for what the Department of Defense can do in that region
    to help. The biggest problem in eastern DRC is a lack of
    governance, a lack of the rule of law, and just a rogues'
    gallery of warlords, revolutionaries, and violent groups and
    individuals have taken advantage of that ungoverned space and
    created no-ending problems. So building toward greater security
    and stability in that region, has to be our focus.
        Now, I know the DOD has done some work in that region. We
    are currently working with the Ugandan army and dealing with
    the Lord's Resistance Army, one of those revolutionary groups
    that has helped to destabilize the DRC, but we have also in the
    past tried to work with the DRC's military, training one
    battalion a few years back, to very, you know, strong success.
    That battalion is considered to be able and capable, but it is
    too small to make the big difference that needs to be made in
    that region. So I believe there is a critical role that the DOD
    can play in building the security capacity in the eastern DRC
    and working with the surrounding nations, like Rwanda and
    Uganda and Burundi and others that are critical to bring
    stability to us. So we want to explore further how DOD can be
    helpful.
        And obviously, there is a huge diplomatic element to this
    as well. I think it is critically important that the U.S.
    engage, that the U.N. [United Nations] engage a high level
    envoy to that region, either from the U.S. or the U.N., can
    make a critical difference in bringing the partners together. I
    know Ambassador Carson has been working--or, sorry, Secretary
    Carson has been working on those issues, and others have as
    well. And we are anxious to hear more about what we can do to
    help move forward those efforts and be successful in the
    region.
        This is something that does matter to us. In addition to
    the security issues, there is incredible economic opportunity
    in this region of Africa, economic opportunity for trade,
    partnerships with U.S. businesses. But we have to get the
    stability there in order to take advantage of those
    opportunities.
        So, again, I thank the chairman for having this hearing. I
    look forward to the testimony. I look forward to learning what
    more we can do to help the situation in the eastern DRC.
        Thank you, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 63.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        We will have two panels today. The first panel we have the
    Honorable Derek Chollet, from the Department of Defense. He is
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
    Affairs. The Honorable Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary
    of State for the Bureau of African Affairs.
        Mr. Chollet.

    STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

        Secretary Chollet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking
    Member Smith, and the Members of this committee. Thank you for
    this opportunity to discuss the urgent crisis in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo and the struggle to bring about long-term
    stability to the people of DRC and the Great Lakes region. I
    would like to submit my full statement for the record and offer
    some brief opening remarks.
        The Chairman. Both of your statements will be included in
    the record, with no objection.
        Secretary Chollet. Mr. Chairman, this committee knows well
    that the U.S. has many competing security priorities in Africa,
    from Somalia to Sudan, to Libya, to Nigeria, to Mali, but the
    DRC also remains important, both because of the potential
    opportunity lasting stability would bring but also because of
    the imperative to prevent mass atrocities, which is a priority
    for this Administration.
        One of the key threats facing Congolese civilians,
    particularly in the eastern DRC, is a wide array of violent
    armed groups, most notoriously including the M23 [March 23
    Movement], the Lord's Resistance Army, and the remnants of the
    genocidal militias, now calling themselves the FDLR [Democratic
    Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]. But undisciplined state
    security forces have also proven to be a danger to civilians,
    particularly when the forces are not well supported, have
    absorbed armed groups without vetting for human rights abuses,
    operate under a separate chain of command, or have not been
    trained in their legal obligations.
        The confluence of such security concerns is why the Defense
    Department is closely following the security developments in
    DRC and the Great Lakes Region and are actively involved, along
    with our State Department colleagues, to address them.
        The unfolding crisis highlights the Congolese government's
    failure to provide effective security, governance, and services
    in the eastern provinces. It has also highlighted the continued
    political and economic tensions between the DRC and its eastern
    neighbors, especially Rwanda. Outside support, in particular
    from Rwanda, has enabled the M23 to be the threat it is today
    and poses a serious challenge to the efforts to stabilize
    eastern DRC and ensure the protection of civilians.
        As President Obama made clear yesterday in a phone call
    with Rwandan President Kagame, any support to M23 is
    inconsistent with Rwanda's desire for stability and peace.
        Although the Rwandan military remains a valuable and
    capable partner in peacekeeping operations outside the
    immediate region, based on their support for M23, the
    Administration has suspended Rwanda's foreign military
    financing. As a situation in eastern Congo develops, we will
    continue to monitor reports of external support closely and
    respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance.
        Inside the DRC, the U.S. is prioritizing security sector
    reform. This means working with our partners and the DRC to
    develop a comprehensive approach that addresses all three
    elements of security sector: the Congolese defense forces,
    military justice, and the police.
        We must work to develop more professional forces that
    respect human rights and protect both the DRC's territorial
    integrity and population. In this regard, the Defense
    Department has provided training to the Congolese military,
    including the training of a light infantry battalion in 2010.
        Sexual- and gender-based violence prevention and human
    rights training were incorporated in every aspect of this
    effort. In addition to the ongoing training on human rights and
    law, the Defense Department engagements with the FARDC
    [Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo] have
    included logistics, exercise participation, basic military
    intelligence training, military medicine, humanitarian
    assistance, and humanitarian mine action. Moving forward, the
    Defense Department stands ready to work with our state
    colleagues ensuring the best way ahead in supporting security
    sector reform, including by providing additional infantry
    training for the FARDC.
        Mr. Chairman, the scale of the need is significant. To
    date, we have trained one battalion of 500 soldiers in a
    military that numbers approximately 150,000. Other European and
    African partners have also provided training, but the FARDC
    absorptive capacity for assistance is limited. The Congolese
    Defense Ministry has been slow to respond to our requests for
    the provision of appropriate personnel for training and
    information necessary for congressionally mandated human rights
    vetting. The lack of language capacity further inhibits
    training opportunities.
        While the DRC continues to work to develop its own security
    capabilities, the United Nations peacekeeping operation or
    MONUSCO [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in
    the DRC], remains essential in providing security for the
    civilian population in the DRC. MONUSCO has a challenging
    mandate in a very fluid security climate. We are reviewing
    options for improving MONUSCO's ability to meet the civilian
    protection requirements in the DRC.
        To assist MONUSCO, the Defense Department has secunded
    three U.S. military officers who are helping to support
    operational efforts and ensuring an efficient flow of
    information between MONUSCO headquarters and field components.
        Despite many challenges, we have an interest, an enduring
    interest, in helping develop a more capable Congolese military,
    and this fits within Secretary Panetta's broader policy
    emphasis on building partner capacity. Our persistent
    engagement helps our partners to provide for their own
    security. These relationships can also foster respect for the
    rule of law and human rights.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, I am grateful for the
    efforts of Congress, and specifically this committee, for
    continuing to shine a light on this important issue, one that
    deserves attention on a continent crowded with security
    challenges. And I should also note the indispensable work of
    the many nongovernmental organizations, who not only provide
    policy advice but are helping people on the ground in the DRC
    each day.
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important
    issue with you today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Chollet can be found
    in the Appendix on page 65.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Carson, Secretary Carson.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
                   FOR THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

        Secretary Carson. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
    Members of the committee, thank you very, very much for the
    invitation to testify today on the crisis unfolding in the
    eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, also referred to as
    the DRC.
        The security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is the
    most volatile and violent in Africa today. An estimated 5
    million people have lost their lives since 1998, and millions
    more have been uprooted and displaced. The people of North and
    South Kivu provinces in particular, have faced repeated cycles
    of conflict, atrocities, and displacement, with the current
    crisis simply being the latest iteration.
        The rapid fall of Goma last month to the Congolese rebel
    group known as the M23 provided a stark reminder that the root
    causes of the entrenched instability and recurring conflicts in
    the DRC and the region remain unresolved.
        At the highest levels of the United States Government, we
    are committed to helping the DRC and its neighbors in this
    cycle of violence and instability, so that we do not find
    ourselves back here in 3 years facing yet another crisis in
    eastern DRC.
        Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, Under Secretary For
    Political Affairs Ambassador Wendy Sherman, and I have all
    spoken or met with senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and U.N.
    officials in the past weeks and months to advocate for a rapid
    and peaceful resolution to the current crisis.
        I have traveled to the region just last month with my
    British and French counterparts to press the Congolese,
    Rwandan, and Ugandan governments to work together to stop the
    crisis and to address the underlying causes of instability. All
    three governments reiterated to us their commitment to these
    shared goals. In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken
    action to ensure that five of the most senior M23's most
    abusive commanders are now under targeted sanctions, and we
    have placed those same individuals under U.S. sanctions.
        Talks between the DRC government and the M23 began on
    December 9, in Kampala, Uganda, and are being mediated by
    Uganda as the chair of the International Conference on the
    Great Lakes Region, known as the ICGLR.
        While the two sides have yet to begin substantive talks,
    the current cease-fire in the eastern DRC is holding, and the
    parties continue to express commitment to a dialogue.
        Much of the M23's military prowess and success would not
    have been possible without outside support. There is a
    creditable body of evidence that corroborates the assertions of
    the U.N. Group of Experts that the Rwandan government provided
    significant military and political support to the M23.
        While there is evidence of individuals from Uganda
    providing support to the M23, we do not have a body of evidence
    suggesting that the Ugandan government has a policy of
    supporting the M23. Nonetheless, we continue to urge Ugandan
    officials to ensure that supplies to the M23 do not originate
    or transit through Ugandan territory.
        We have not limited our response to diplomacy alone. As
    required by the Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Act, Secretary
    Clinton suspended foreign military financing, or FMF, to Rwanda
    in fiscal year 2012 because of its support to the M23.
        The Department continues to closely monitor reports of
    external support, and we will continue to respond
    appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance to deter
    this support if it should develop.
        The highest levels of the United States Government are
    committed to helping the DRC and the region achieve a
    sustainable peace. As my colleague, Mr. Chollet, said,
    President Obama spoke yesterday with President Kagame and
    underscored that any support to the M23 is inconsistent with
    Rwanda's desires for stability and peace in the region.
        President Obama emphasized to President Kagame the
    importance of permanently ending all support for armed groups
    in the DRC. Abiding by the recent communication that he made in
    Kampala, along with Presidents Kabila and Museveni, and
    reaching a transparent and creditable political agreement that
    includes an end to impunity for M23 commanders and others who
    have committed serious human rights abuses. President Obama
    believes that from this crisis should emerge a political
    agreement that addresses the underlying regional security,
    economic, and governance issues, while upholding the DRC's
    sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Obama has also
    delivered the message to President Kabila that the DRC must
    take concrete steps toward security sector reform and improve
    governance in order to reach a lasting peace in eastern DRC.
        Looking forward, we are using all the tools at our disposal
    to help address and end this crisis. We are monitoring
    humanitarian needs and working to mobilize resources to ensure
    continued emergency assistance to civilians in need.
        We are calling upon everyone involved in the conflict to
    maintain the current cease-fire, to permit humanitarian access,
    and to pursue a sustainable political resolution through honest
    and meaningful dialogue.
        While the talks between the M23 and the DRC government
    continue, we believe that direct dialogue between Presidents
    Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni is paramount to achieving a long-
    term, durable solution in the region.
        Some of the root causes of this conflict can only be
    addressed through government-to-government dialogue and
    negotiation. These include issues of land tenure, refugee
    resettlement, the illegal exploitation of natural resources,
    border security, and support networks for armed groups.
        While the responsibility to implement change rests first
    and foremost with the governments of the region, we encourage
    the United Nations Secretary General to appoint a high-level
    U.N. special envoy to engage the relevant countries on a
    sustained basis to help them reach a durable political
    resolution and ensure the successful implementation of that
    resolution over the long term.
        Throughout this peace-building process, civilian protection
    is and must remain a priority. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in
    the DRC, MONUSCO, has come under very heavy scrutiny in recent
    weeks. While we believe that MONUSCO's performance has been
    acceptable given the very difficult circumstances, there is
    always room for improvement.
        We and our fellow U.N. Security Council members and troops-
    contributing countries are reviewing the proposals on the table
    to improve and strengthen MONUSCO's capacity to protect
    civilians and to counter armed groups. We are encouraging our
    partners to ensure that any new efforts are coordinated with
    and perhaps even integrated into the U.N. peacekeeping efforts.
        In the meantime, we remain committed to supporting
    MONUSCO's robust implementation of its current mandate. The
    primary responsibility for protecting the DRC and the Congolese
    people rests with the DRC government itself.
        The crisis over the past few months has demonstrated to
    devastating effect the critical need for a professional and
    capable Congolese army that can protect the country's citizens.
    To reach a sustainable peace, the DRC government must
    accelerate its efforts towards comprehensive security sector
    reform. We have and will continue to work with the DRC
    government to professionalize its military, including
    continuing our training to army officers and support to the
    armed forces' military justice capacities.
        Along with military reform, the DRC government must expand
    governance across the country. The governance vacuum that
    exists in parts of the country has allowed armed groups to set
    up parallel civil administrations and to exploit the
    population.
        Efforts to expand governance must include electoral reform,
    holding long-delayed provincial and local elections, and
    strengthening state institutions to provide much-needed public
    services.
        We believe that the time has come for the DRC and the
    international community to permanently break the cycle of
    violence and impunity that exists in the region.
        Today's crisis is a deep tragedy, but it also offers an
    opportunity to help the DRC and the region to set a more
    sustainable course toward peace, prosperity, and long-term
    stability.
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Carson. We urge the international community, the
    Great Lakes Region, and the Congolese people to demonstrate the
    resolve necessary to achieve this peace and prosperity, and
    achieve the goals that we all seek.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Carson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 70.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Chollet, please describe the strategic defense
    priorities within Africa, and how does the situation in the DRC
    situate within these priorities?
        Secretary Chollet. Sir, thanks for the question.
        First and foremost, the priority recently has been on
    counterterrorism issues, and we have seen that--oh, I am sorry.
    Can you hear me right now?
        The Chairman. Yes.
        Secretary Chollet. Recently, the top priority is, of
    course, always with us, the Department of Defense, to protect
    the American people, and so we have been acutely focussed on
    counterterrorism issues throughout the continent, and that is,
    I think, most recently North Africa, where that has gotten a
    tremendous amount of attention.
        We are also, though, very, very keenly interested in the
    overall security as it bleeds into the atrocities prevention
    concerns that we have. And the Great Lakes Region, of course,
    the brutal history of that region is something that we are all
    very well aware of, and that is why we have sought to focus
    some of our Defense Department efforts on improving the
    capacity of partner countries to ensure that hardships can be
    alleviated and that we can prevent atrocities.
        But to be honest, the bulk of our focus in the Department,
    and particularly our AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] colleagues,
    has been on the counterterrorism mission as well as building
    partnership capacity to both fight that mission but address the
    humanitarian needs as well.
        The Chairman. Secretary Carson, my understanding is that
    the State Department managed an effort known as Tripartite Plus
    to address issues in the DRC and in the region. My
    understanding is that the State Department stopped this effort
    in 2009. Can you explain why the Department of State is no
    longer pursuing this effort, and what has taken its place?
        Secretary Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
        Prior to 2009, there was in existence an effort called the
    Tripartite Plus. When the Obama Administration came into office
    in 2009, we contacted the leaders of the four key states in
    Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi to ask those leaders whether
    they were interested in carrying on with the Tripartite Plus
    arrangement. There was no consensus among the states to do so.
    And in fact, Rwanda did not want to carry on the process.
        We did not, in fact, attempt to pursue it when we found
    there was division among the four countries. However, to
    maintain our high level of interest, Secretary Clinton
    appointed a Special Advisor for the Great Lakes, the late
    Howard Wolpe, who was a Member of the House of Representatives
    from the State of Michigan for many years, and he served for
    the first 2 years of the Obama administration as the special
    envoy. He passed away, and he was replaced by Special Envoy
    Ambassador Barry Walkley, an experienced diplomat who had
    served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the DRC and had served in
    a number of other francophone posts. He continues to work on
    regional Great Lakes issues, but the decision to stop the
    Tripartite Plus was based, in fact, on a reluctance of all of
    the governments in the region to carry on.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Carson, Rwanda has increasingly been getting
    attention as a major source of the problem in the region. And
    obviously, there is a lot of history here going back and forth
    across the border of atrocities, frankly, committed on both
    sides, the Congolese against Rwandans, and vice versa. And
    Rwanda has an interest, obviously, in maintaining security
    across the border, but it is very clear that, you know, that
    they continue to deny involvement in M23, despite the fact that
    it is obvious that they are deeply involved in that and other
    aspects of it.
        And I think we are going to need as a country to start
    putting more pressure on Rwanda to change their behavior. And
    certainly, they are not the only part of the problem. There are
    a ton of gangs involved there. But I am curious, going forward,
    what do you think Rwanda sees as their interested in that
    region? Because, on the one hand, certainly they want to
    protect themselves from any cross-border problems. On the other
    hand, their support for M23 seems to be simply driving up
    instability, you know, and creating more armed gangs and armed
    violence right on their border. So I am curious what you think
    their thinking is on that.
        And then the final piece of it is, you mentioned, I think
    both of you mentioned it in your remarks, the minerals that are
    so important to that region. There are a lot of folks involved
    there and a lot of people making a lot of money, despite the
    chaos. They figured out some ways to work with whatever local
    warlords they need to work with to get the stuff out. To what
    extent, in your opinion, is Rwanda involved with that? Is it
    the situation that the armed gangs that are there are creating
    enough wealth for Rwanda that they have got their cut, they
    have got their deal, and they are simply trying to protect
    that? Is that part of the equation now? What is Rwanda's
    thinking, and how can we better move them toward working toward
    stability, because right now, they are not being a positive
    actor? They are not even being honest about what they are doing
    in the region. How can we improve that situation?
        Secretary Carson. Ranking Member Smith, I think there are
    several obvious reasons for Rwanda's involvement and engagement
    in the region.
        The first is their deep concern and worry about elements of
    the former Rwandan military who continue to exist in the
    eastern part of the country; the FDLR, as they are called,
    members of the Rwandan army who participated in the genocide in
    1994. Rwanda's desire is to see all of these individuals taken
    off the battlefield, brought to justice. And part of their
    actions are motivated by security and their desire to see the
    FDLR completely eliminated.
        The second desire is to ensure that all Rwandaphone
    speakers, Tutsis in the region, who cross the borders between
    Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC, are treated fairly; that
    they are not subject to harassment and intimidation and to
    human rights violations. And there has been a deep concern that
    many Rwandaphone speakers have been disadvantaged in the
    eastern Congo.
        And thirdly, they would like to see the issues of refugee
    resettlement taken care of. There continue to exist a large
    number of Congolese who are in refugee camps in Rwanda and in
    the region who should be allowed to go back to the east. All of
    these are things that motivate their interest in the area.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        I have one more question, but I see we have been joined by
    Congresswoman Bass, so I want to ask unanimous consent that
    noncommittee Members be allowed to participate in today's
    hearing after all committee Members have had an opportunity to
    ask questions, if the chairman will permit.
        The Chairman. No objection. So ordered.
        Mr. Smith. I will tell you, Mr. Chollet, the question on
    the other side of it is, whatever role Rwanda may be playing
    and that the DRC is clearly the main source of the problem,
    that they cannot provide adequate security in that region. You
    mentioned in our efforts to train battalions there, we have
    legislative requirements in terms of human rights standards
    that need to be met by what any country that the DOD is going
    to be involved in training their military, and that the DRC
    struggles to meet those standards. Can you talk a little bit
    more about that, and what the DRC would have to do and how
    problematic it is, the Kabila government is, in getting to a
    solution to this problem?
        Secretary Chollet. Thanks for the question. You are
    absolutely right. The human rights concerns are huge in the DRC
    in terms of the--it is the FARDC, which is one of the reasons
    why we do have an interest in helping to train them. Because we
    have shown in the one battalion that we have trained, we have
    seen, as you pointed out, it is relatively successful. And that
    battalion has not shown any real--much evidence of human rights
    abuses or the certain things that we are concerned about when
    we think about the Congolese military.
        In terms of training a second battalion, and then training
    going forward, we are engaging with the Congolese government
    about what standards they would need to achieve for us to
    proceed with doing that. In fact, there is an outstanding
    training MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] that we are awaiting
    for signature that would then perhaps allow us to move forward
    in the future in terms of----
        Mr. Smith. Are we going to be able to get that signed do
    you think? Do you think we have reached the point where that is
    going to work?
        Secretary Chollet. Well, we will see. I mean, I think we
    are prepared on our end. It is on us to work with our Congolese
    colleagues to----
        Mr. Smith. Get the DRC to agree.
        Secretary Chollet. Absolutely, absolutely. But that is a
    prerequisite for us being able to move forward for further
    training, which of course helps on the human rights abuses
    problem.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, at the outset, today you mentioned this was
    the last hearing we would have this year, and you and the
    ranking member are always very gracious in thanking the Members
    of this committee and our witnesses for the great job that they
    do, but we want to thank both of you for your hard work and
    also maintaining--this still is probably the most bipartisan
    committee, I think, in Congress, and we appreciate your efforts
    towards that.
        Mr. Chollet, I have a question, and I don't--I support what
    you do, and I don't want you to misinterpret my question, but
    it is a question we have to ask, is, as we look--as you know,
    we have had cuts to national defense, and especially the
    Department of Defense. Some would argue $487 [billion]. It is
    really more like $800 billion in the last few years. We have
    got a half trillion we are looking at in sequestration. When
    you look at the dollars that we are spending with the DRC and
    Rwanda, can you give us any ballpark of what kind of resource
    dollars the Department of Defense is spending there? Secondly,
    are those dollars adequate? And third, how would you prioritize
    that in terms of some of the other cuts that you see coming
    down, and how do we justify that and explain that?
        Secretary Chollet. Sir, it is a great question. As you know
    very well, Secretary Panetta is seized with the issue of
    sequestration and possible future defense cuts and very
    concerned about the impact that will have on our military and
    our national security generally. So it is something that we are
    very focused on in all of the issues that we confront in the
    Department.
        You ask a very good question about a total number. I would
    like to get back to you to add up all of the different pots of
    money that are coming in, so I can give you an accurate answer.
    I can say that in the grand scheme of our spending, it is a
    relatively modest expenditure in terms of our overall defense
    spending. And we are prioritizing the areas in terms of the
    security sector reform, as I said, particularly in the Congo,
    where through education and through basic training programs, we
    can help the Congolese--lift the Congolese military up and get
    it up to the--closer to the standards that we want to see in a
    military and the standards that we think would help solve the
    problem.
        I want to stress that that is still a relatively modest
    investment of our money and time, and we find that we are able
    to get a fairly large return on that investment in terms of the
    output. But it is no secret that if we were to seek further
    defense cuts, if we were to be--those reimposed on the
    Administration, that it would--we would have to take a close
    look at all of these efforts, even as modest as the
    expenditures currently are.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, Mr. Chollet, if you don't mind, and I
    don't want to catch you off guard today, but give that some
    thought and if you would get back to us for the record on that,
    and again, just kind of pull together as best you can the
    dollars that we are spending.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Mr. Forbes. But also, we would love your thought, are they
    adequate?
        Secretary Chollet. Yeah.
        Mr. Forbes. I mean, are we putting the right dollars in?
    And then, third, just give us some idea of the prioritization
    because at some point in time, we have got to look at all of
    that in the grand scheme of things.
        Secretary Chollet. Absolutely.
        Mr. Forbes. And we appreciate your opinion.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. McIntyre.
        Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this hearing.
        I would like to ask the panel what you felt like with
    regard to M23, their ultimate aims, and do you feel like that
    their threat is subsiding? Or do you think it is possible that
    it could lead to a new regional war in terms of M23's motives
    and ambitions?
        Secretary Carson. Thank you. I will take that question,
    Congressman McIntyre.
        The M23 is basically a rebel group that has been once
    integrated into the FARDC, the Congolese military, and has now
    broken away from the FARDC because they believe that the terms
    that were signed on their integration into the FARDC on March
    23rd, 2009, were broken.
        What we are seeing in eastern DRC is a rebel group that has
    defied its military command. They refused to be relocated out
    of the eastern region as units, and they refused to be
    relocated out their separate senior officers. This is at the
    heart of the current rebellion, but the origin of the M23 is
    that it was, in fact, a rebel group prior to 2009. It went
    under a different acronym then, the CNDP [National Congress for
    the Defence of the People], but it is basically a rebel group
    of military commanders who have sought to parlay their military
    influence into political influence.
        Mr. McIntyre. Do you believe their activities are going to
    lead to some kind of regional war? And how serious are their
    continuing activities?
        Secretary Chollet. That is the concern. They are a group of
    growing capability. They have shown in the recent months to be
    a match, if not a superior, of the Congolese forces. Their
    continued activity and the continued support that they get is
    something, that is the reason why we are concerned about it,
    because if this continues much longer, there is a fear that
    this would spark a deeper war, along the lines the Congo has
    unfortunately seen too much of in the last 20 years.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Coffman.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        One question is, what is the estimated strength in terms of
    active participants in M23? Either one of you.
        Secretary Chollet. Roughly 1,000.
        Mr. Coffman. Roughly 1,000, and could you go over again--I
    think you mentioned that the support is coming from Rwanda. Do
    you believe, and if so, why again is Rwanda supporting M23? Why
    do you think that they are supporting M23?
        Secretary Chollet. There is, as Secretary Carson has
    outlined, there is a credible body of evidence that Rwanda is
    supporting the M23. This is the part of the conversation the
    President had yesterday with the Rwandan president. I think one
    of the reasons that there is support there, it goes to the
    origins of the group and Rwanda's interest that Secretary
    Carson outlined, is that the M23 sees themselves as the kind of
    the guardians of the Tutsi in the east, and so the argument
    would be that if they--the extent the Tutsi are threatened and
    the M23 can help protect the Tutsi in the east.
        Mr. Coffman. And what is the strength of the DRC military
    again, the army?
        Secretary Chollet. So there are roughly 150,000 total, but
    the Congo is about the size of Western Europe, so I believe the
    estimates are somewhere in the 6,000, 5,000 or 6,000 deployed
    in that--or no, there is more. That is the MONUSCO, sorry,
    5,000 or 6,000 deployed in that in the east. I don't know what
    the exact estimate of the Congolese military deployment in the
    east is because this is a vast amount of territory that the
    military is trying to cover with 150,000 troops.
        Mr. Coffman. Still, I mean, we are talking about a force of
    1,000, and so why is this such a big issue for the DRC in order
    to be able to basically prevail in this situation?
        Secretary Chollet. You want to go?
        Secretary Carson. Yeah, let me say just a slight revision.
    I think probably today, the M23 probably has some 2,000 or so
    troops. I think Mr. Chollet has pointed out the size of the
    Congo, but I think it is useful to graphically describe the
    Congo as a country which is as large as the eastern part of the
    United States, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. It is an
    enormous country, and since the split of Sudan, it is, in fact,
    geographically, the largest in Africa.
        The eastern Congo is one of the most difficult areas in
    which to operate. It is an area that is deeply forested in some
    places, double and triple canopies. It is also an area that has
    a large number of volcanos, some of which are active, and it
    also sits in what is called the Western Rift Valley, which
    gives it both altitude and low-level depth at the same time. It
    is an area which is very difficult terrain-wise to operate in.
        I think in terms of the estimation of the number of
    soldiers that the DRC has in the eastern Congo, probably is in
    the neighborhood of somewhere around 20,000 to 30,000,
    stretched over not only the North and South Kivus but also
    Ituri. They are not only faced with the rebellion of the M23.
    There are probably at least a half a dozen to a dozen other
    smaller rebel groups operating in the area, including the FDLR,
    which is an anti-Rwandan group which is of concern to the
    government in Kigali. But they are also operating against
    probably seven or eight different groups that go under the name
    of Mai-Mai, that have a third acronym that goes behind them.
        So it is an area that is volatile. Instability prevails,
    and a number of rebel groups are operating there, which also
    requires the attention both of the FARDC, as well as the
    MONUSCO forces from the U.N.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you both for being with us this morning. It is
    important that we are here discussing these issues, I think,
    talking about security and the abuse of human rights in the
    DRC, and I appreciate that effort. As you stated, the violence
    that is taking place in this part of the world is really a
    threat to stability and human rights across the globe. We know
    that such injustices always are. That is why we have to set
    those priorities, as has been stated, but we have to recognize
    the reality there.
        Could you please speak specifically to the successes or
    setbacks in the efforts to professionalize the military forces
    in the DRC with regards to the effectiveness of those forces in
    combating sexual violence against women and children? To any
    extent that our efforts have been successful in this endeavor,
    how can we further support those efforts? And to the extent
    that we have seen no marked improvement, you mentioned earlier
    that indiscipline and impunity persists, what should we be
    doing to address it?
        Secretary Chollet. Thank you.
        And as I said in my statement, the sexual violence is
    something that--and preventing that is a huge priority for all
    of our programming in this part of the world, around the world,
    but particularly in this part of the world, where we have seen
    just horrific stories and accounts coming out.
        A couple of comments. First, in the specific battalion that
    we have trained, we have seen a successful effort in terms of--
    so far at least--in terms of human rights abuses, lack of human
    rights abuses coming out of that group compared to the rest of
    the Congolese military. Secondly, we have a program----
        Mrs. Davis. Can I just, to what do you attribute that? What
    is the----
        Secretary Chollet. I think it is the training effort that
    we helped--to the education, the discipline that we were able
    to help instill in the command and control. The Congolese
    military is riddled with problems; among them logistics
    problems, and but simple training and education and lack of
    command and control. It is hard to keep discipline within that
    military.
        But we also have ongoing programming. In addition to these
    focused training efforts, ongoing programming on the rule of
    law and military justice, we spend a few million dollars on
    that per year to work with the Congolese military in a more
    wholesale way on helping with education and mentorship to
    ensure that the rule of law and human rights are instilled
    throughout that military. And that is programming, I think,
    that, although relatively modest, again, we see some benefit
    from.
        Mrs. Davis. And where you have seen the efforts not working
    at all, I mean, what is it that--is it the same where we see
    the successful efforts?
        Secretary Chollet. Yeah, where we are seeing--again, the
    challenges are paramount. I mean, these are forces that don't
    have a great amount of discipline, don't have great training
    and, often cases, don't have great education. As I mentioned in
    my statement, there is a real absorptive capacity problem
    within the DRC, and so it makes it even harder to try to train
    them up in a way that meets the standards that we would like to
    see in any military.
        Mrs. Davis. Did you want to comment further?
        Secretary Carson. Yes, I would. I would say that security
    sector reform in the army has been a failure for the most part.
    It is a failure because of all of the things that my colleague,
    Mr. Chollet, has said, but it is also a failure because of
    elements of corruption. Soldiers are not paid on a regular
    basis. They are not sustained and re-equipped in the field.
    They do not have appropriate housing for themselves or for
    their families. And many times, when they are sent out, they
    are basically forgotten.
        I think that one of the reasons why our 391st Battalion has
    been successful is because we put down a number of very clear
    conditions on the Government of the DRC to ensure that this
    battalion would be effective. We said to the Government, they
    must be maintained as a cohesive unit; they cannot be broken
    apart and sent to different units.
        They must be paid on a regular basis, and we even talked
    directly, and I must say, I spoke with President Kabila and
    members of his Government about this, introducing a mobile
    banking system to ensure that soldiers would be able to get
    their pay as long as they had a cell phone. This is starting to
    take place.
        We also said that they must be properly housed, and they
    must be supported with resupply. And additionally, we also
    assigned and paid for a couple of mentors to work with them
    after their training to ensure that they would retain their
    cohesiveness and their sharpness. And in fact, they have been
    very, very good, and they were a part of the counter-LRA
    [Lord's Resistance Army] operations, the counter-LRA operations
    in the northeastern part of the country for a long time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And Mr. Chollet, I represent Robins Air Force Base, which
    is the home of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack
    Radar System], and I would like to talk with you a little bit
    about both the security and the humanitarian situation in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo and the use of our ISR
    [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platforms over
    there to assist both in the humanitarian mission and in the
    military mission. And could you speak to what is being done now
    with the use of our ISR platforms?
        Secretary Chollet. Thank you. And as you are very well
    aware, the ISR issue is incredibly important to us, and it is
    something that there is huge value in everything we are doing.
        I can say on the issue we have been talking here today
    about regarding eastern Congo, there is not much ISR work there
    that we are providing. Most of the military assistance we are
    providing is in the form of training and mentorship. And that
    is the kind of support we have been talking about.
        Obviously, the ISR question is absolutely critical when it
    comes to the C-LRA [counter-Lord's Resistance Army] mission,
    which is the northern part. And that is something that we can--
    we are helping to contribute to as we are working with the
    Ugandan military on the C-LRA mission.
        Mr. Scott. We do have the ability, though, with our ISR
    platforms, especially through the JSTARS, to show the tracks of
    where rebel units are moving. And I do think that is important,
    both from a humanitarian mission and from a military mission.
        And, Mr. Carson, you said that we are going to have to
    permanently break the cycle. You used the word ``eliminated''
    with regard to the FDLR. Certainly, what has gone on in the
    country of Africa and the human rights abuses, very few things
    in the world, I think, reach the level of the abuses that have
    been occurring there for years.
        My concern with kind of the way we try to handle these
    things through the State Department, if you will, is that we
    are always playing defense. And so if it is going to be
    necessary to eliminate organizations like the FDLR and M23 to
    permanently break the cycle, at what point are we going to help
    the Democratic Republic of Congo go on offense against these
    groups?
        Secretary Carson. Thank you for the question.
        As I said in my testimony, the responsibility for resolving
    the problems in the Great Lakes are principally the
    responsibilities of the Presidents and the leaders of the
    respective countries.
        We have to engage diplomatically with them to recognize
    that instability, violence, continued refugee flows, and
    impunity are not in the interest of any of these states. It
    requires political will on their part to recognize that it is
    in their interests to promote peace, prosperity, and stability
    not only in their countries but also in the states that border
    them.
        We will continue our diplomatic efforts, but we will also
    help, as we have pointed out, to train Congolese battalions.
    The 391st is a good example. We are committed to training a
    second battalion if the Congolese Government is prepared to
    sign an MOU with respect to how this battalion will be
    maintained.
        Mr. Scott. Mr. Carson, I am close to being out of time. Can
    I ask you something----
        Secretary Carson. Sure.
        Mr. Scott. The 391st, how many men make up that battalion?
    And how well equipped are they?
        Secretary Carson. Approximately 500 to 600. And they are
    well equipped. They have been maintained appropriately.
        Mr. Scott. Okay. I again--and I apologize for interrupting
    you. But if we are going to permanently break this cycle, you
    can't--I don't understand how diplomacy works with somebody who
    has made a living out of raping and murdering other human
    beings. And I do believe that at some point, especially with
    our--I don't think that it needs to be the United States
    military that does this, but I do believe that our ISR
    platforms are an asset that we can deliver to the people who
    are trying to get rid of the people that are committing the
    murders and the rapes over there.
        And I would just encourage that as we go forward we help
    train another battalion and that we make our ISR platforms
    available to those battalions so that they can take out people
    who, quite honestly, aren't going to stop murdering and raping
    people until they are eliminated.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Carson, the first question is for you, and it
    has to do with--has to do with training and equipping. And we
    have several tools--the State Department and the Department of
    Defense have several tools available to them. A few years back,
    last year perhaps even, we created the goal--or authorized the
    goal of a Security Contingency Fund that was created for
    complex challenges like the issues we have in the DRC. And can
    we expect to see a contingency fund proposal for the DRC in the
    future?
        For Ambassador Carson first.
        Secretary Carson. Let me say, that is under--that is under
    review, and it is quite possible that you--that you will see
    one.
        We are, as I say, looking at the prospects of trying to
    train a second battalion in the DRC, provided the Government is
    willing to commit to a number of obligations which we think are
    important to ensure the effectiveness of those who might be
    trained.
        Mr. Larsen. Would you use a different--did you use, then, a
    different source of money for the first battalion, to train the
    first battalion?
        Secretary Chollet. Yes.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes, you did? What source of money was that?
        Secretary Chollet. I think PKO [peace-keeping operations]
    funding was the----
        Mr. Larsen. Peace-keeping operations. And why would you not
    use PKO this time? Or why didn't you use Global Security
    Contingency Fund the last time?
        Secretary Carson. I think it was a matter of--yeah, well, I
    think----
        Mr. Larsen. One at a time, one at a time.
        Secretary Carson. It was a matter of what we had.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay.
        Secretary Carson. There is an enormous demand on all of our
    funding that is appropriated for Africa, both for our ACOTA
    [African Contingency Operations Training & Assistance] moneys
    as well as our PKO moneys.
        Much of what we have done in the last several years has
    been to support what has turned out to be a successful effort
    in Somalia to eliminate Al Qaeda's representatives, Al-Shabaab,
    there.
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        Secretary Carson. So we have put a lot of money into that
    effort. And we have put a lot of money into the counter-LRA
    effort with respect to Uganda.
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        So what would be in an MOU for the second battalion that
    wasn't in an MOU for the first battalion? Have things changed?
    Have we learned some lessons? Were things missing the first
    time around that we need to have in the second--to develop a
    second battalion, and what were those things?
        Secretary Carson. Let me--and Mr. Chollet can go into this.
        What we said to the DRC Government is that we want you to
    sign an MOU with the United Nations to prevent the recruitment
    and retention of child soldiers in your entire military--not
    just in the battalions that we--but in your entire military.
    They have now done that. That was done about 45 days go.
        We also said as a part of this MOU, there must be complete
    Leahy vetting of all of the participants who would be a part of
    this battalion.
        Mr. Larsen. Just for the committee's sake, Leahy vetting
    would be focusing on human rights.
        Secretary Carson. Exactly. Exactly.
        And we also said, you must keep this as a composite unit,
    you must pay them regularly, you must equip them. And we said,
    these are the requirements going forward.
        Mr. Larsen. So those weren't in the first MOU?
        Secretary Carson. Those are things that we have demanded
    the first time around and we are insisting upon them for this
    time. But as I said, we have expanded out because we insisted
    that they must sign a document with an action plan with the
    Government to deal with child soldiers, retention and
    recruitment across the entire----
        Mr. Larsen. So those two big issues would be different than
    the first MOU.
        Secretary Carson. Exactly.
        Mr. Larsen. What is the organic logistics capability of the
    391st? And what would you expect the logistics capability to be
    for the second battalion, as well? Getting at the point of, who
    is backing these folks up? Is it us, or is the U.N. mission?
    For the logistics--communications, transportation, moving these
    people from A to B.
        Secretary Carson. It the FARDC. It is the Government of the
    DRC that is responsible for moving these people around the
    country and providing additional equipment and supplies to
    them.
        Mr. Larsen. All right. That is great.
        Mr. Chollet, do you have anything to add to these--as
    answers to these questions?
        Secretary Chollet. No, the Ambassador has covered it quite
    well.
        Mr. Larsen. That is great.
        Thank you very much. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. West.
        Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks, gentlemen, for being here.
        I would like to ask, we are talking about an area of
    operations here at the DRC, but I think we need to look at the
    bigger region, the area of interest. And so when we look at the
    DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, we talked about the M23, but
    what are the other--we kind of mentioned it--what are the other
    major nonstate, nonuniform belligerents that we have to contend
    with in this region?
        Secretary Carson. Let me say, Congressman West, there are
    probably a dozen. I don't have a list, but I will give you one
    and make sure that you do have it.
        There is the FDLR, which is comprised of former Rwandan
    soldiers who participated in the genocide.
        Mr. West. Okay.
        Secretary Carson. We know that there is a group of
    insurgents called the African Democratic Liberation Front who
    are in the eastern Congo, who are anti-Uganda and anti-
    President Museveni. And they have operated across the border.
        The M23 and the M23's predecessor was something called the
    CNDP, which is a--was a rebel group.
        And there are at least 10 other groups that start off their
    rebel names with the name Mai-Mai: Mai-Mai Cheka--there are
    various groups that are based on ethnic communities and
    allegiances of rebels----
        Mr. West. So it is a multifaceted, mostly tribal-based,
    would you say?
        Secretary Carson. Yes, I would say mostly ethnically and
    regionally based.
        And someone has passed on to me----
        Mr. West. Thank God for staffs.
        Secretary Carson. That is absolutely right.
        Let me just quick--ADF, which I mentioned, ADF Nalu, an
    anti-Ugandan group; APCLS, a Mai-Mai group; FDLR, Hutus who
    carried out genocide in Rwanda; FRPI, based in the Ituri area,
    doing conflict minerals. There is the M23. There is the Raia
    Mutomboki group. There is the Mai-Mai Cheka.
        Mr. West. Well, let me get to my point because the time is
    running out. You know, I spent a few days in the military, and
    one of the things we always listened for: What are the tasks?
    So as I listened to the two gentlemen as you spoke, you talked
    about sustainable peace; you talked about training, you know,
    militaries, foreign internal defense type of mission; and then
    I also heard the term ``eliminate,'' which means that is more
    of an aggressive action.
        So what I am trying to understand, what exactly are you
    looking at being done? Because if you are talking about foreign
    internal defense, do we have the capability and the capacity
    with our SOC AFRICOM to be able to go in there and do that?
        And, furthermore, while I looked at this list of
    belligerent groups, as soon as you put American soldiers there
    in that position, I got to tell you that some of the things
    that you all were talking about reminded me of three previous
    regions that we were in: Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Somalia. And
    we didn't do so well, you know, initially.
        So what I am trying to ascertain is, what are we initially
    going in to do as far as the goal and objective at a strategic
    and an operational posture? Do we have the capability and
    capacity to do that? Do we need to go to coalition partners,
    being Britain and France? Do we need to go to the Organization
    of American States?
        And then where is the potential of mission creep and
    escalation, which is exactly what we saw happen in Somalia? And
    we know how that kind of dovetailed off in that battle at
    Mogadishu. And I don't think you mentioned the amount of
    warlords, did you?
        Secretary Carson. Warlords are not here, but these----
        Mr. West. Yeah, so that is another that we added to the
    mix.
        Secretary Chollet. Sir, very briefly, the goal of our
    efforts, the Defense Department's efforts, are to help build up
    the Congolese military and to make them capable of taking care
    of these problems.
        Mr. West. So that is foreign internal defense.
        Secretary Chollet. Internal defense.
        And the footprint issue, which you have quite rightly
    raised, is extremely limited. Right now, we have three
    personnel who are part of the MONUSCO mission. We have secunded
    to the U.N. mission to help them on information-sharing as well
    as some intelligence issues. When we had the training effort
    under way for the 391st, for this battalion, it was about 60
    folks, special forces and others, to help train them up, but
    they are now out.
        So it is a very limited footprint. We are one of many
    players, including the British and the French, the Belgians,
    the South Africans, and the U.N., importantly. About 17,000
    U.N. troops in the Congo.
        Mr. West. But my concern would be--and I will close on
    this--all of these different non-state, non-uniformed
    belligerents, you know, coming together against our efforts. Is
    that a potential to happen there?
        Secretary Carson. No.
        And I would like to just underscore what Mr. Chollet has
    said. We are not talking about American soldiers on the ground
    engaged against rebel groups in the DRC. That is not something
    that is in our game plan or in our thinking.
        What we need to be focused on----
        Mr. West. But we said that in Vietnam and Somalia and other
    places.
        But my time is gone. I yield back.
        Secretary Carson. Train, enable, build capacity. Build
    capacity, enable, and train.
        The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The continent of Africa, gentlemen, is the richest in the
    world in terms of minerals and natural resources. This
    continent of Africa is the source of 90 percent of the precious
    minerals, gemstones, and strategic raw materials used by the
    industrialized nations of the world. But yet the people on the
    continent of Africa are the poorest of the poor. And I am
    pretty sure I would get no disagreement from either one of you
    on that point.
        Another point I would like to make is that, over the recent
    centuries, dictators and corrupt leaders of failed African
    states have cut deals with multinationals from the developed
    world. These deals generally pay meager royalties for the raw
    materials that are extracted from the land. Part of the money
    goes into the Swiss bank accounts of the corrupt leaders, and
    the money never trickles down to the development within the
    country.
        And it is the multinationals that export the raw materials
    out of Africa to places where they can be developed. And in
    that development process, it means the people who live in the
    places where the goods are being refined are able to get jobs,
    and then they are able to have some prosperity throughout the
    land. But that does not take place in Africa.
        Then you have the issue of the debt that is extended or
    moneys that are extended to these African countries for
    development and then the debt is unpaid and unforgiven, which
    permanently locks in poverty. Because the resources that are
    available that are not going into the Swiss bank accounts have
    to go to be paid--have to go to repay the debt.
        And then in the DRC we have the same kind of abject
    poverty, hunger, starvation, disease, and lack of basic social
    services. And despite the fact that--and I will quote from our
    memo. It says, ``Economic growth, buoyed by high global
    commodity prices, has been strong in recent years,'' speaking
    of the DRC, ``reaching an estimated 6.9 percent in 2011.'' And
    DRC also receives high levels of donor aid, with over $5.96
    billion being disbursed in 2010.
        What I would like to know is, what part does the economic
    exploitation of Africa and its natural resources play in the
    support of these forces that are throughout the DRC? You
    mentioned the Mai-Mai Cheka, the M23, the FRPI, and others.
    What impact does the quest for the natural resources of Africa
    have to play on the support of those groups?
        Secretary Carson. Let me say, thank you very much for the
    question. There is no question that conflict minerals
    contribute to sustaining conflicts in Africa. Groups are able
    to take control of mineral-rich areas and then to smuggle those
    minerals out through neighboring states into the international
    market. And so it does play a role in sustaining these kinds of
    conflicts.
        And this is why legislation passed here by Congress has
    been useful in putting a check and a control over what U.S.
    companies can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo.
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the gentleman's time has
    expired. If you could finish that for the record, please.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 138.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Brooks.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Could one of you all tell me how much the United States of
    America is spending on Congo efforts now, both military and
    non-military aid?
        Secretary Chollet. I think, sir, the total cost in the
    last--from fiscal year 2009 to 2013, I believe, is about $137
    million in the security sector, both--that is military--from
    State and Defense.
        Secretary Carson. The total assistance package to the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo is running approximately $480
    million. And that is the total package that includes both the
    military and the economic and humanitarian assistance that we
    provide to the country.
        Mr. Brooks. Does the United States----
        Secretary Carson. Yes, a year, $485 million.
        Mr. Brooks. Does the United States of America have a
    national security interest in Congo? And, if so, what is it?
        Secretary Carson. We do have interests there.
        Mr. Brooks. A national security interest?
        Secretary Carson. We have interests in helping to do as
    much as we can to maintain stability that can, in effect, have
    a direct impact on the United States. The largest single U.N.
    peacekeeping program in the world is in the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo. We spend and appropriate some 25 to 26 percent of
    what is authorized by the U.N. for this program. It consumes an
    enormous amount of time in New York at the Security Council,
    and we have to respond to humanitarian crises in the region----
        Mr. Brooks. Okay. Mr. Carson, I apologize for cutting you
    off, but we have limited time and I have some things that I
    wanted to cover.
        It sounds like to me you are talking about a humanitarian
    interest as opposed to a national security interest. Something
    that threatens the survival of the United States of America is
    my definition of a national security interest.
        And it also seems to me, and I may be wrong in my
    interpretation of your remarks, but the interest that you have
    just described would mean that the United States of America has
    a national security interest in every place in the world, the
    way you have defined ``interest.'' And I noticed you focused on
    the word ``interest'' as opposed to ``national security
    interest'' in your answer to me.
        I have reservations about the United States of America
    continuing to be the world's police cop.
        And, Mr. Chairman, we all know the impact of President
    Obama's sequestration policy that Congress, unfortunately,
    approved in August of 2011, with the adverse effect on our
    uniformed personnel being numbers less than or equal to that of
    immediately before World War II, number of naval vessels being
    reduced or cut to naval operational size of World War I era,
    and then the Air Force having the smallest number of
    operational aircraft in the history of the United States Air
    Force.
        And so that is what we are looking at because of President
    Obama's sequestration policy, again, that Congress approved. So
    it is everybody here in Washington that is involved in this
    attack on our national defense capabilities from a financial
    perspective. The United States of America has limited funding.
        And, Mr. Chairman, that all being the case, to the extent
    that you and this committee have significant influence over
    where that money goes, I would strongly urge us to use that
    $480 million being spent on the Congo, according to Mr.
    Carson's testimony, instead being used to help people in the
    United States of America who are in need of help or to help
    reduce the deficit that Admiral Mike Mullen testified from
    these very same chairs is the national greatest--excuse me, is
    the greatest national security threat to the United States of
    America. So it is a matter of priorities.
        I would emphasize that I appreciate the very noble--and I
    emphasize the word ``noble''--effort to try to help people who
    are in harm's way in various parts of the world. And my
    colleague from Florida mentioned Somalia and Mogadishu.
    Certainly, in Vietnam we tried to do the noble thing. But we
    are in a different financial reality. And in the absence of a
    compelling national security interest in the Congo and various
    other parts of the world, I am afraid that sequestration is
    going to force us to retract, even though we may otherwise wish
    to the contrary.
        So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of
    my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. A couple of questions.
        First of all, if I recall correctly, sequestration is not
    only Obama's but it is also our responsibility. I believe we
    all voted for it. Let's keep that in mind.
        Mr. Brooks. I did not vote for it. But I can't speak for
    others.
        Mr. Garamendi. I don't believe I yielded to you.
        We have talked here about this whole issue. Mr. Frazer, who
    will be on the next panel, suggests that there is perhaps less
    than $30 million of that $480 million that is actually for the
    military issues. Is that about correct? Is that basically the
    number?
        Secretary Carson. 480----
        Mr. Garamendi. $480 million, but about $30 million of that
    is directly related to the military issues here in the eastern
    Congo. Is that more or less correct?
        Secretary Chollet. I am afraid I would have to get back to
    you on the specific number, but that sounds about----
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, that is his testimony. We will hear
    that in a few moments.
        If that is correct, I would point out that this really is a
    national security issue for America because the destabilization
    of Africa provides the direct opportunity for Al Qaeda and
    related terrorist organizations to find safe havens.
        Is that the situation in Africa today?
        Secretary Chollet. I could speak first to this.
        It is certainly throughout the continent that is a concern.
    In this particular region that we are focused on this morning,
    we have not seen that concern yet.
        Mr. Garamendi. Beyond this region.
        Secretary Chollet. Beyond this region, absolutely, that
    there is a concern in North Africa----
        Mr. Garamendi. All right. So let's make it clear that
    Africa is a national security issue for the United States. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Carson. There is absolutely no question that
    where we have----
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
        Secretary Carson [continuing]. Seen prolonged instability--
    --
        Mr. Garamendi. Just yes or no. I want to deal with the
    previous questioner.
        The other issue is that we are currently, today or
    tomorrow, going to vote for an $88 billion appropriation out of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Afghanistan. That
    must assume the full contingent of American troops in
    Afghanistan for the entire year 2013 budget. And given the
    amount of money that is presently available to deal with the
    military situations in Africa, this committee might consider
    how we allocate American resources. I will put that on the
    table for the next NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
        My next set of questions deals with the issue of, in your
    testimony, Ambassador Carson, you wrote that the underlying
    issues of illegal exploitation of natural resources is one of
    the major problems in this region, and I believe in other
    testimony and answers you have said throughout Africa. Is that
    the case?
        Secretary Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Would you consider the ivory trade to be an
    exploitation of natural resources of Africa?
        Secretary Carson. Absolutely.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Do you have any indication, any
    evidence that the ivory trade is supporting the M23 and related
    rebel organizations in the Congo?
        Secretary Carson. I don't know, but I could find out what
    we have on that and get back to you.
        Mr. Garamendi. I will share with you that the international
    environmental and wildlife community believe the answer is yes.
        What resources are we presently putting into the effort to
    understand the illegal ivory trade and its connection to not
    only the Congo situation but other destabilizing forces in
    Africa?
        Secretary Carson. Thank you.
        Approximately 1 month ago, Secretary Clinton hosted at the
    Department of State a meeting between major African countries
    that have large wildlife populations and also a large number of
    countries in Asia that are believed to be the purchasers and
    recipients of illegal ivory. It was an effort to indicate our
    great concern.
        We are putting more money into trying to beef up anti-
    poaching operations across Africa and also trying very much to
    get the demand reduced in Asia.
        Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. On the military side of it, what
    is the DOD doing?
        Secretary Chollet. I am not aware of anything on that. I
    will have to get back to you.
        Mr. Garamendi. You should be aware. My final 27 seconds.
    You should be aware. In fact, it is, by all evidence presented
    at an ad hoc hearing here in Congress just less than 3 weeks
    ago, a major element in the destabilization and in the support
    of various rebel groups, many of whom are clearly aligned with
    Al Qaeda. I would appreciate a detailed response from the
    military about exactly what the African unit is doing.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Chollet. You will have that, sir. Thanks.
        The Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Hunter.
        Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I have specific questions.
        One, have you worked with the guys that have been training
    our troops in Afghanistan? When you talk about the Congolese
    military as unmotivated, illiterate, undisciplined, corrupt, a
    mobile banking system, all the stuff that we--those exact same
    words have been used to describe the Afghan military and the
    Afghan forces. I would hope there is crossover. All the lessons
    learned and the billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan over
    the last decade, the people that have been doing that there
    transferring their knowledge and capability to you and,
    frankly, anybody else in your situation where you are training
    those types of troops and in the advise and assist role.
        So is there a crossover?
        Secretary Chollet. Absolutely. We have learned a lot of
    lessons over the years in Afghanistan in terms of training
    indigenous forces. And that is being applied across our
    military wherever we are performing these kinds of activities.
        Mr. Hunter. Specifically, people from Afghanistan, though,
    and lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures from
    Afghanistan, putting in place specific procedures?
        Secretary Chollet. As I said, there is--obviously, general
    doctrine has been influenced. I will have to get back to you
    whether the specific individuals who performed training in
    Afghanistan are perhaps some of those--the 60-some folks that
    helped train this Congolese battalion that I mentioned earlier.
        Mr. Hunter. Right.
        And the second question is specifically on the ISR. You
    talked about ISR. Mr. Scott mentioned JSTARS. Do you have any
    of the lower-flying ISR systems right now or platforms? You
    don't, right?
        Secretary Chollet. In this region?
        Mr. Hunter. Yes.
        Secretary Chollet. No.
        Mr. Hunter. And the money that has been authorized, I think
    $50 million I was just told, for ISR for the front end and the
    back end, what region is that going to? In this bill----
        Secretary Chollet. I think that that is the counter-LRA
    mission.
        Mr. Hunter. So that is not specifically the mission that
    you are talking about right now today?
        Secretary Chollet. It is not eastern Congo, no, sir.
        Mr. Hunter. Okay.
        Then--well, my question is, then, how is that going to help
    you?
        Secretary Chollet. So it is a separate mission, the
    counter-LRA mission, which is in a part of Congo but not the
    specific issue that we are talking about in terms of the
    instability in the eastern Congo. But it certainly is related.
    It is what we are working with the Ugandan military on and to
    try to strengthen their efforts to go after the LRA.
        Mr. Hunter. Well, I mean, are you going to be able to use
    that money to set up systems that can be used in both places?
    Do you have the flexibility to use it in both places?
        Secretary Chollet. I think it is--we are planning to use
    that against the C-LRA mission. In terms of using it for
    another mission, I don't--that is not in our plans right now.
        Mr. Hunter. And my last specific question on the ISR--and I
    don't know, there is not a military person up here that could
    probably answer this better. Are you expecting any capability
    gaps in the ISR that we have been using in the Middle East and
    southwest Asia? I mean, because it is totally different
    country, obviously. You talked about triple-canopy jungle
    versus desert and mountainous regions.
        And I am curious to see, once this goes into effect, if we
    notice capability gaps because we haven't been looking at ISR
    in that aspect. Can it see through triple-canopy jungle? Does
    it work in that kind of an environment? Because we may learn
    that it doesn't, right?
        Secretary Chollet. Sir, you are absolutely right. The
    terrain there presents specific challenges and unique
    challenges in terms of our ISR. I can get back to you a more
    detailed answer on the capability and how the money that we are
    asking for to spend on ISR on the C-LRA mission will go to the
    systems that will enable us to really use it.
        Mr. Hunter. I would hope that you would capture that for us
    and maybe give it to us because a lot of--there is probably not
    a whole lot of people looking at how the platforms we have now
    and the weapons systems we have now work in that type of an
    environment because we haven't had to be in that kind of an
    environment. But who knows what tomorrow brings.
        So I would hope that you could capture that, put down some
    requirements, so we at least have people looking at, if we are
    not in a desert or just mountainous region, if we are in that
    triple-canopy jungle, does the stuff that we have, does it
    actually work.
        Secretary Chollet. Well, we will definitely follow up with
    you on that.
        Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Can I have an estimate from each of you as to how many
    rapes occur in the DRC a year?
        Secretary Carson. I will get back to you on the precise
    number. It is extraordinary. It is probably a higher level than
    anyplace else in Africa and certainly maybe the highest in the
    world.
        We do have an estimate, but I would like to give you a
    precise answer. Some have described it as the--as the rape
    capital of the world. The number is extraordinary. I have a
    number in my mind, but I don't want to----
        Ms. Speier. Well, it is easily hundreds of thousands.
        Secretary Carson. Yes. The number is extraordinarily high.
        Ms. Speier. So the rapes are taking place by
    representatives of M23 and the DRC; is that safe to say?
        Secretary Carson. Yes. It is taking place by all the rebel
    groups, and the FARDC has also participated in these illegal
    activities, as well.
        Ms. Speier. So an article in The New York Times by Jeffrey
    Gettleman referenced the ``rape capital of the world'' comment.
    And he asked the question, ``What strategic purpose is there of
    putting an AK-47 assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the
    trigger or cutting out a woman's fetus and making her friends
    eat it? The government's response has been a shrug.''
        Now, that is diabolical. And yet we are funding on a yearly
    basis $480 million into this country that allows this kind of
    horrendous abuse to go on. And it appears we do it with full
    knowledge of the extent of these rapes, and we are not holding
    them accountable. It is like giving an addict more dope. How do
    we justify it?
        Secretary Chollet. Ma'am, if I could start, the funding
    that the Defense Department is providing is for the training
    and the education and the--that would instill the discipline to
    prevent this very kind of horrific behavior. Because it is
    absolutely unacceptable. And so the funding we have supported
    is for specific programming, for training and mentoring to make
    sure that we can prevent this from happening from the Congolese
    military.
        Now, the rebel groups, that is another problem. But with
    the Congolese military, we fully understand there is a huge
    capacity problem there, that there is outrageous and
    unacceptable behavior happening by members of that military,
    and that is why our program is specifically aimed to ensure
    that that doesn't happen.
        We have seen, in the modest programs that we have
    conducted, some success along those lines----
        Ms. Speier. All right, I would like to have a list of the
    programs that you have funded and the, quote, ``modest
    success'' that you have defined.
        Secretary Chollet. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. Carson.
        Secretary Carson. Let me say that we agree with you about
    how horrendous and horrible this is. And it has been a
    continuing priority of the Administration at all levels,
    including from the Secretary, to address this issue and to
    bring it to the leadership of the DRC Government. Starting from
    the very beginning of this Administration, we have pressed very
    hard that there be no impunity for anyone, including Government
    officials and soldiers.
        In early 2009, Secretary Clinton traveled to Goma in the
    eastern Congo to see President Kabila, and this was one of the
    major subjects on her mind. At that meeting, she demanded and
    asked for the arrest of five senior DRC officers whose troops
    had been engaged in the rape of women. They were called the
    ``FARDC Five.'' We have been----
        Ms. Speier. My time is running out. Could you tell me
    what----
        Secretary Carson. We have been aggressive on this, and we
    continue to be aggressive on it. It is not an issue that we
    have tried to hide. As I said, it is horrendous. It is the rape
    capital of the world. Jeffrey Gettleman----
        Ms. Speier. Actually, Mr. Carson, let me just ask a
    specific question. The Secretary asked for these individuals to
    be incarcerated or removed. What has happened since her request
    was made?
        Secretary Carson. Three of them have been arrested. Two of
    them have fled----
        The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. If you
    could answer that for her on the record, please.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 138.]
        The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us.
        I have just one question of our military witness there. I
    would be very interested to follow up with respect to what Mr.
    Hunter asked about with respect to lessons learned out of
    Afghanistan and training up the military and police or whatever
    it is that we are doing that, and the real specifics to that.
    So if you could provide that for the record, I would appreciate
    it.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Ms. Sanchez. And the rest of my questions are for our
    Department of State Secretary there.
        My question to you is about all the other programs, because
    it seems to me like the majority of the money is going in
    through the mission that we have there into other arenas. Some
    of the paperwork says, you know, trying to put in a justice
    system and local police, et cetera, et cetera.
        I am interested, because I also sit on Homeland Security,
    Mr. Secretary, about border security. Because if M23 is being--
    if we are seeing Rwandan-backed troops coming across to aid or
    be part of M23 and then going back across, what, if any, of the
    programs that we are putting in between the countries?
        Because it seems to me like this is a bad neighborhood. I
    have been in some of these areas, the Horn of Africa and coming
    toward--not specific to the Congo; I haven't been to the Congo.
    But in most every other area around there, I have been there.
        And so my question would be border security and are we
    training up there. And what type--you know, give me a--paint a
    picture for me of what that looks like, if it can be easily
    traversed, if we are doing anything about it, if we are putting
    unmanned aerial to take a look at what is going on.
        Secretary Carson. Border security in the region is almost
    nonexistent. There is very little security along the borders.
    People move back and forth. They are not clearly delineated for
    the populations who live in the regions. These are forested
    areas in which----
        Ms. Sanchez. Are they mountainous?
        Secretary Carson. They are indeed. Some areas are very
    mountainous.
        Ms. Sanchez. I am trying to look at this topography map to
    try to figure out what is going on here.
        Secretary Carson. Yeah. No, they are. There are active
    volcanos right in and around Goma and both in the North and
    South Kivus. So people----
        Ms. Sanchez. Is there some idea of maybe putting some
    effort toward that? Or is it just so porous that no matter
    where we would go--are we in passes? I mean, how do you do
    that?
        Secretary Carson. It is an enormous challenge because of
    the enormous size of the--of the country. This is a country
    that shares borders with nine other countries--nine other
    countries. As I said, geographically, it is as large as the
    eastern part of the United States and certainly as large as all
    of western Europe by a multiple.
        Ms. Sanchez. And it seems to me it shares some waterway
    borders, too.
        Secretary Carson. It shares a--yes. The Congo River divides
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the
    Congo, known as Congo-Brazzaville. And there are lakes that
    divide the country between its eastern neighbors and the Congo.
        Ms. Sanchez. I would be interested, as Ms. Speier had asked
    for a delineation of the moneys, aside from military, that we
    are putting in there. And, you know, with a big question as to,
    why aren't we helping them with border security? I mean, that
    is one of the main things that we have found in Iraq that we
    needed to put in in order to ensure that, you know, the bad
    guys weren't going from one country into the other and then
    slipping across. And, of course, it is one of the biggest
    problems that we have with the mountainous regions of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        So, you know, some--some comment to this committee,
    specifically to me, about any ideas about how we handle some of
    that.
        Secretary Carson. Absolutely.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        Secretary Carson. Will do.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 137.]
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Bass.
        Ms. Bass. First of all, let me thank the chair and ranking
    member for letting me sit in on today's hearing. I just have a
    couple of brief questions.
        Ambassador Carson, you were responding to Congressmember
    Speier, and I wanted to know if you could finish. You were
    talking about the five commanders that the Secretary asked to
    be arrested.
        Secretary Carson. Yes. And I will get back to you and give
    you a status report on exactly what has happened to them. I
    know that this was back in 2009. We tracked these individuals
    for a period of time. Several were arrested; several of them
    fled. But I will get back and give you a status report on that.
        But beyond that, I would go to some of the things that my
    colleague, Mr. Chollet, has said. We have put a lot of effort
    in trying to get the Congolese to address the human rights
    problems within their own government and within the military.
    We have strengthened the capacity of the military judicial
    system. We have called for no impunity. We have trained judges.
    We have increased the number of military--female military
    police offers and police.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Let me ask a couple other questions.
        You mentioned the other rebel groups. I think you said
    there were about 10. And when we had the hearing last week in
    the Africa Subcommittee, I don't remember that coming up, the
    other groups outside of the M23.
        But I wanted to know if you could talk about what their
    numbers are and who is supplying them. And if they are anti-
    DRC, are they collaborating with M23? You know, what is their
    basis for their----
        Secretary Carson. I can give you a listing of these
    organizations with a very, very rough approximation of their--
    the numbers. And I will pass that on to you.
        There certainly are at least a dozen. Many of these groups
    have no affiliation with the M23. They are groups that are both
    self-protecting of ethnic communities and regions, and they are
    groups that are both protecting communities and exploiting
    communities and their natural resources.
        Ms. Bass. Are they more like gangs? And who is supplying
    them? Are they supplied through the----
        Secretary Carson. They are self-sustaining because they are
    marauding groups that live in communities and exploit those
    communities. And they may be exploiting minerals, as well. They
    are protecting and doing things that the Government would do if
    it were capable of doing.
        Ms. Bass. Right. Okay. Thank you.
        The Chairman. That concludes our questions for Dr. Chollet
    and Dr. Carson. We want to thank you.
        And the committee will adjourn for a few minutes while we
    change the panels.
        Thank you very much.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        I don't know why, but the media seems to be quite
    interested in this hearing.
        Our second panel is comprised of Dr. Jendayi Frazer,
    distinguished service professor, Carnegie Mellon University;
    Dr. James Carafano, vice president, foreign and defense policy
    studies, and director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
    Institute for International Studies from The Heritage
    Foundation; and Mr. Ben Affleck, founder of the Eastern Congo
    Initiative, and a few other things.
        We are happy to have you here. And we will follow in that
    order.
        Dr. Frazer, please.

       STATEMENT OF DR. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED
             SERVICE PROFESSOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Frazer. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and
    Members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to
    testify on the evolving security situation in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo and its implications for U.S. national
    security.
        I will keep my remarks to 5 minutes or so and ask that you
    place my full written testimony in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered. Five minutes
    will be fine.
        Dr. Frazer. Thank you.
        Giving your time and your attention at this critical moment
    is a welcome sign of U.S. leadership that is essential for
    reinforcing regional efforts to achieve sustainable peace.
        My analysis of the current crisis in eastern Congo is based
    on my shuttling between Kinshasa and Kigali since the M23
    rebellion started in April. I have met and spoken repeatedly
    with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and senior ministers and
    officials in both governments. I have been an informal listener
    who knows the background, has built trust with the leaders, and
    is known to only be on the side of peace.
        I mention this context because I believe the dialogue on
    how to resolve the Congo crisis has become unhelpful and
    polarizing, driven by sensational but shallow news reporting.
    It has dissolved into emotional grandstanding and official
    finger-pointing. Without a foundation in U.S. strategic
    interests and objectives, our policy risks becoming rudderless
    and driven by narrow and vested interests.
        So what are U.S. interests in the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo? I believe the United States' primary interest in DRC
    should be to support local and regional efforts to, first,
    achieve national peace and regional stability; second, advance
    good governance and national integration and reconciliation;
    and, third, create the enabling environment for the development
    that benefits all Congolese.
        Congo's strategic location at the very center of Africa,
    bordering nine countries, means that instability in the Congo
    touches all of Africa to the north, south, east, and west.
    Moreover, the country of 70 million people was endowed with
    vast human and natural resources, great forest and mineral
    wealth, and enormous hydropower, making it a strategic country
    in the global effort to address food security, climate change,
    and generate clean and alternative sources of energy.
        Yet, despite its vast potential, 71 percent of the
    population lives below the poverty line, and many Congolese
    live in fear of marauding domestic armed groups, including the
    M23 rebels, and foreign negative forces that are on the U.S.
    terrorist exclusion list, namely the Democratic Forces for the
    Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR; the Ugandan Allied Democratic
    Forces, ADF; and the Lord's Resistance Army. Tackling these
    negative forces is a necessary condition to achieve sustainable
    peace in DR Congo and regional stability in the Great Lakes
    region.
        In addressing the evolving situation--security situation,
    an urgent priority has to be resolving the current crisis of
    the March 23rd Movement, M23, but doing so with an
    understanding that it is a symptom, while the root causes of
    insecurity in the Congo and region have to do with governance,
    institution-building, national integration, and porous borders.
        As background, M23's precursor, the armed CNDP, signed a
    peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Government on 23rd March 2009 that established CNDP as a
    political party. And many of its soldiers and officers were
    integrated into the country's armed forces, the FARDC. The CNDP
    units within FARDC were viewed as both capable and highly
    motivated to take on FDLR.
        Two points are relevant from this background. The CNDP
    units saw their mission more locally and against FDLR. That is
    where they were fundamentally focused. And secondly, the DRC
    and Rwandan Governments were closely aligned from 2009 until
    this past April in their common efforts to eliminate negative
    forces from eastern Congo.
        This spring, three largely concurrent developments led to
    M23's rebellion. First, the soldiers were dissatisfied with
    conditions in the army, particularly not receiving their pay
    and provisions, so they mutinied. Second, the international
    community's relentless pressure--relentlessly pressured
    President Kabila to arrest their ICC [International Criminal
    Court]-indicted leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, and he led M23
    into mutiny. And, third, the Government made clear its plans to
    mainstream and redeploy former CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus.
    And M23 claims, of course, that they were not protected, so
    they mutinied.
        The main point is that the current crisis is fundamentally
    a mutiny within FARDC, so coming out of deeper challenges of
    governance and regional security. Also, whereas in 2008 Rwanda
    demonstrated its ability to influence CNDP's actions when it
    prevented them from taking Goma, when we fast-forward to 2012
    the past constructive cooperation between Kabila and Kagame has
    been severely undercut by the U.N. Group of Experts'
    accusations of Rwandan and Ugandan support for M23.
        So what are the key recommendations for U.S. national
    security policy? My bottom-line three recommendations are:
    reinvigorate diplomacy, support regional mediation, back the
    proposed Neutral International Force. A whole-of-government
    effort is required for the United States to assist the Congo
    and the region to establish the conditions for sustainable
    peace and stability.
        First and foremost, Presidential leadership is needed.
    Advocacy to a point of Presidential envoy for the Great Lakes
    region will only achieve its intended purpose if the President
    is engaged. Envoys gain their clout from perceptions that they
    really have the ear of a President that cares. A call every few
    years won't work. The sustained Presidential leadership of
    Bush, Rice, and Powell helped in the Congo war in 2003 and set
    the conditions for reasonably peaceful regional relations until
    they deteriorated this year.
        Second, backing regional mediation is the surest path to a
    sustainable peace. Here I commend the Howard G. Buffett
    Foundation's recent announcement of an initiative to support
    the peace talks mediated by the Ugandan Government under the
    auspices of the International Conference for the Great Lakes
    Region. It is a beacon that should be followed by the U.S.
    Government and advocacy groups.
        The USG [U.S. Government] can also play a positive
    diplomatic role in the mediation by helping set the agenda and
    keep it focused on military grievances to prevent M23 from
    opening a wider and prolonged political dialogue that is better
    held in the DR Congo, where the broad civic participation is
    possible.
        Third, sustained, robust, and imaginative diplomatic
    engagement is essential. Peace-building requires establishing
    processes that can build confidence between protagonists and
    communities as milestones are achieved. It is much more
    effective than sanctions that simply drive a wedge between the
    essential actors capable of ending the M23 rebellion, will
    freeze the conflict, and undermines U.S. efforts to engage all
    sides.
        Fourth, to support confidence and peace-building efforts
    within Congolese communities, the State Department should
    consider properly securing and reopening Goma House to extend
    our diplomatic reach beyond Kinshasa.
        Beyond diplomacy, the U.S. national security policy--beyond
    diplomacy for U.S. national security policy, I would suggest
    four more initiatives on the military side.
        First, maintain the International Military Education and
    Training program and funding for demobilization, disarmament,
    reintegration, military justice; second, train a second
    battalion to augment the major military reform effort the USG
    has undertaken by training the 391st light infantry battalion;
    third, if asked, the USG should consider providing planners,
    logistics, and possibly equipment to support a neutral
    international force to monitor borders between Congo, Rwanda,
    and Uganda and to act as a strike force against all negative
    armed groups.
        USG can also use technology to offset some of the--to some
    degree, the number of peacekeeping personnel needed by offering
    contract advisers with unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the
    border areas, watching for unlawful rebel crossings and illicit
    activities.
        And, finally, there needs to be consideration of how to
    improve the peacekeeping MONUSCO's poor record of protecting
    civilians. Some in the Administration are considering an option
    to bring the neutral international force under MONUSCO's troop
    ceiling levels. Sierra Leone is a model that could be
    replicated. In that case, Pakistani forces joined the UNAMSIL
    [United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone] peacekeeping operation
    under a U.N. mandate but with a distinct mission to move the
    Revolutionary United Front rebels off the diamond mines in
    Sierra Leone.
        However, the neutral international force should not become
    part of a peacekeeping mission where the mandate is confused,
    the rules of engagement are varyingly interpreted and
    communicated by U.N. headquarters in New York, the special rep
    to the Secretary General in Kinshasa, and the force commander
    in the east.
        Dr. Frazer. In conclusion, the U.S. Government, and we in
    civil society, must act with humility, recognizing that the
    governments and people of the regions themselves are ultimately
    responsible. We can only assist them to establish the inclusive
    governance, the robust regional security mechanisms that are
    the foundations for eliminating all armed negative forces in
    creating the conditions for empowered citizens and economic
    prosperity.
        Thank you very much, Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer can be found in the
    Appendix on page 79.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Carafano.

     STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN
          AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

        Dr. Carafano. Thank you, sir. I want to start by saying, I
    believe the United States does have an interest in promoting
    peace, prosperity, and freedoms among the nations of Africa and
    that I believe the U.S. can play a constructive role in the
    DRC, albeit limited. And from a security standpoint, we want a
    stable Central Africa, so that we can focus on our real
    national security concerns in the region, which are a growing
    global Islamist insurgency and transnational terrorist threat
    out of North Africa.
        So I think where we start is we start by acknowledging
    where we are. And that is that the status quo is, and I think
    everybody agrees that there is no status quo, that things are
    getting worse. And you know, one witness stated last week in
    the Foreign Affairs hearings, the Congo is too big to fail.
    Well, I would submit, in the eastern Congo, we are failing.
        So I make three recommendations in my prepared statement.
    And the first one is, stop doing what isn't working. The U.N.
    peacekeepers in the Congo have been a failure. Our efforts to
    reform the Congolese army have been a failure, and we should
    stop throwing a lot of good effort at the bat. I spent 25 years
    in the military. I am hard pressed to find a security force
    less competent and less equal to the task at hand.
        So my second recommendation is that we really seriously
    think about the United States getting behind moving through a
    different model. Some people call this the Somalia model, but I
    do think that the alternative credible option is something like
    like-minded African nations banding together, working to
    provide security in this situation. And I think it may be
    controversial; I think, at the end of the day, Uganda and
    Rwanda have to be a part of that. They can't be the lead,
    because, obviously, they are not objective, and they have to
    play by the rules. But I think if they--if we construct a
    situation where they see that it is in their interest to
    cooperate and work in that direction, that that is a force that
    could credibly bring some peace to the east Congo.
        So the third is, and what I principally want to talk about
    today is, what is the U.S. military role. And I think the U.S.
    military role is for the United States military in Africa under
    AFRICOM to continue to do the things that it does very well,
    which is limited but important capacity-building efforts. And
    the thing is, you build capacity, where you can; not where you
    want. So you have to work with countries that you can actually
    credibly do the capacity building. So some of these programs,
    such as IMET [International Military Education and Training
    program], the individual military education training program,
    they are very low cost and they have very, very high impact.
    For many years, I was affiliated with the National Defense
    University, the Fellows Program in the College of International
    Security Affairs. These are amazing programs. You know, I would
    meet--work with these guys one on one, and it wasn't about
    Americans lecturing to them because they were with fellows from
    countries all over the world facing very similar situations
    learning from each other. Everyone I ever worked with was
    incredibly dedicated. They were smart, and they left wanting to
    go back to their country and make a difference. And the ones
    that I have kept in contact, over the years, they have made a
    difference.
        So I think these programs are enormously important. They
    have to be very well integrated with the rest of what the
    interagency community is doing on the other fronts. They have
    to be better integrated with other individual efforts, such as
    things being done like by the USIP [United States Institute of
    Peace] and some of their initiatives, and what some NGOs [Non-
    Governmental Organizations] and things can do. One of my
    favorites is Spirit of America. They are not currently active
    in the Congo, but Spirit of America is a terrific NGO that
    works with U.S. military on the ground, helping build capacity
    for what they need.
        My biggest concern that I think that this committee should
    focus on is, keeping AFRICOM doing the right things; is that a
    sustainable effort over the long-term? And I have significant
    concerns there, when you look at the global responsibilities
    that the United States has to protect its interest and you look
    at the long-term plans to provide for that, I think they are
    simply inadequate. One of the first things that will fall off
    the table, and this is somebody that lived through this in the
    1990s, when we almost went hollow then, is the small low-cost
    efforts that have very big pay off, because they keep brush
    fires from becoming forest fires, are often the first thing to
    cut, to go.
        And my two, I think, most important recommendations for the
    committee are: Number one, I really think you need an
    independent review of the next Quadrennial Defense Review to
    really get a cold, clear-eyed assessment if we are really
    providing the resources that our military needs to do all of
    these missions from the big important vital national security
    missions to these helpful tasks that prevent a future national
    security crisis. And the second is, I would recommend to the
    committee that you need a better way of really understanding
    the readiness of some of these low-end things, these assistance
    missions which are so important and helpful and very low cost--
    and if they are done correctly and they have the right mission
    sets, they don't just lead to mission creep--that those things
    aren't falling off the table. So I think this committee needs
    some way the Department of Defense can give them a better
    assessment of the readiness to do these mission and then the
    long-term viability of these missions. Because the Congo,
    regardless of the most brilliant solution that anybody on this
    panel comes up with today, this is not a problem that is going
    to go away in 5 minutes.
        Thank you so much for the opportunity to speak today.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano can be found in the
    Appendix on page 88.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Affleck.

      STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK, FOUNDER, EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE

        Mr. Affleck. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith,
    distinguished Members of the Armed Services Committee, on
    behalf of the Eastern Congo Initiative, I want to first thank
    you for holding this hearing and devoting your time and
    attention to the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo.
        My name is Ben Affleck. I am the founder of the Eastern
    Congo Initiative. We are the only U.S.-based grantmaking and
    advocacy organization entirely focused on working with, and for
    the people of eastern Congo, a region that has the unwanted
    distinction of being one of the most volatile in the world and
    the site of the deadliest conflict since World War II.
        From the outset, let me say that I am not here to ask for
    American tax dollars. I am here today to respectfully request
    that you use the most important power you have, your collective
    voice as Representatives of the United States of America.
        From 1998 to 2003, eight African nations fought on
    Congolese soil, causing the deaths of millions, forcing tens of
    thousands of children to become child soldiers and, in some
    areas of Congo, subjecting as many as two of every three women
    to rape and other forms of sexual violence.
        The United Nations estimates that as many as 900,000
    Congolese have been newly displaced in the North Kivu Province
    since fighting reignited earlier this year. As you know, just a
    few weeks ago in Goma, the economic center and capital of North
    Kivu Province was temporarily controlled by the newly formed
    M23 militia and injuring hundreds, displacing tens of
    thousands.
        M23 is just the latest in the long list of armed groups who
    have destabilized the Congo since 1994. With the latest
    violence, the world is reminded that the systemic sources of
    instability in this region have yet to be addressed.
        Still, on the face of this violence and suffering, the
    people of eastern Congo remain committed to helping their
    neighbors and rebuilding their communities. ECI [Eastern Congo
    Initiative] staff and our partners have continued to work
    throughout the crisis, not only providing humanitarian
    assistance but continuing important development activities
    focused on a brighter future.
        When heavy shelling began last month near our office in
    Goma, the surgeons, doctors, and nurses of ECI's partner, HEAL
    Africa, rushed to the hospital, anticipating increased numbers
    of wounded in what is already an overcrowded hospital. Many of
    these same caregivers were still at the hospital 5 days later,
    providing free treatment to numerous civilians wounded in the
    conflict.
        Another ECI partner, Mutaani FM, continued to broadcast
    news throughout the crisis. Mutaani, the only independent radio
    station in Goma, is located across the street from the
    Congolese army headquarters, which was seized and occupied by
    M23 during the height of the conflict.
        Despite the odds, these brave journalists, all young adults
    in their 20s, stayed on the airways, either reporting from the
    front lines or locked safely inside the radio station,
    reporting on the fighting as it spread across the region.
        Every day I am inspired by the resilience and the
    determination of the Congolese, who desperately want to live
    their lives in peace, earn a decent living, and raise their
    families just like the rest of us.
        Mr. Chairman, they deserve better than the cycle of
    violence and upheaval that continues to undermine their daily
    work of rebuilding this war-torn community.
        While the M23 has withdrawn from Goma, they have not
    disbanded. In fact, as of this morning, our team on the ground
    tells us they are just 4 miles away from the city center, and
    there are fears that they may attack Goma again. We have seen
    this cycle repeat itself too many times: Violence flares up,
    and the international community turns its attention for a
    moment to this part of the world. Violence recedes, and the
    world turns away in relief, without addressing the systemic
    issues that must be dealt with in order for lasting peace to be
    established and maintained.
        Since my very first visit to Congo in 2006, it is clear to
    me that the pursuit of durable peace in Congo is not hopeless;
    quite the contrary, in fact. The solutions are not new, nor are
    they particularly complex. But without persistent high
    leadership by the United States, the key players will not come
    to the table and will not do their part.
        First, let's set aside the notion that the recent talks in
    Kampala will end this cycle of violence. Last week's
    negotiations were not even attended by the region's key
    players. It is for this reason that ECI has called on the U.N.
    Secretary General to appoint a special envoy under the joint
    auspices of the U.N. and the African Union to bring all
    stakeholders together to craft real, implementable solutions.
    We are delighted that Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
    announced the State Department's support for this idea in his
    recent testimony.
        For 15 years, the United Nations has run a peacekeeping
    mission in Congo. The time has come to fundamentally reconsider
    its mandate. As M23 moved into Goma, the 17,000 troops deployed
    across DRC that make up the United Nations stabilization
    mission, known as MONUSCO, did not protect civilians in harm's
    way. This failure raises serious concerns. That said, the
    larger failure most certainly lies with the DRC's own security
    forces' continued inability to protect their citizens.
        With focused U.S. leadership, the U.N. mandate should
    reflect the needs of the country, and the DRC security sector
    must be reformed. Last week we were delighted that the U.N.
    Secretary General launched a review of MONUSCO's mission. We
    hope that the United States will take the lead in the Security
    Council, supporting significant changes to MONUSCO's mandate.
    At a minimum, the mandate must be strengthened to enable
    whatever force remains to actually keep the peace and protect
    the people.
        We also believe the U.N.'s mandate in Congo should not be
    indefinite. An open-ended mandate undermines the urgency for
    the Congolese Government to take responsibility for protecting
    their own citizens.
        Looking beyond the United Nations, donor countries have
    enormous leverage in the region which they should exert to
    bring key regional players together for serious negotiations.
    International donors can play a more active role in preventing
    violence from returning.
        And of course, Congo's neighbors play a critical role in
    regional security. There will be no lasting stability without
    their leadership.
        The United Nations has been presented with evidence that
    M23 is sustained by significant outside support from Rwanda and
    Uganda. If these accusations are true, any support must end.
    Congo's neighbors have legitimate security concerns and their
    national economies greatly benefit from DRC's natural
    resources. We hope the President of Rwanda and Uganda will
    engage in serious discussions about the many issues that affect
    regional stability.
        The Obama administration can and should leverage its unique
    relationship with these leaders to insist they pursue
    resolutions directly with the Government in Congo, rather than
    indirectly through the support of armed militias.
        It is not enough for the M23 to withdraw from Goma. Until
    the militia is disbanded, the people of the eastern Congo will
    live with a daily threat of violence. To be clear, eliminating
    M23 alone will not restore peace. Just the last time I was in
    Congo in February, there were at least 27 armed groups
    operating in the eastern provinces.
        The regional aspect of this conflict include failures in
    Kinshasa. Since the last ceasefire in 2006, too little has
    changed inside Congo. Kinshasa must take seriously its lack of
    legitimacy in many parts of Congo and act now to address the
    grievances of its people.
        When Goma fell to M23, there were spontaneous riots in
    Bukavu, Kisangani, and Kinshasa, aimed not only at militia
    violence but also at the failure of President Kabila's
    government to protect its citizens. To restore legitimacy, the
    Independent National Electoral Commission should immediately
    set a date for and begin to organize the provincial elections
    that were supposed to take place in March of this year. The
    electoral commission itself has been seen by opposition parties
    and international election observers as an obstacle to
    political legitimacy. It must be reformed.
        President Kabila must also commit to the overdue reform of
    Congo's security sector. This is critical. Without competent
    military and law enforcement institutions, Congo's territory
    will continue to provide safe haven to armed groups who prey on
    civilians and disrupt economic development.
        In April of this year, ECI helped lead an effort alongside
    nearly 300 Congolese civil society organizations to publish a
    comprehensive support about the need for security sector reform
    in Congo. This report, which I ask to be submitted for the
    record, calls for an end to the conflict through a
    comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include
    the military, law enforcement, such as police and the courts.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 113.]
        Mr. Affleck. President Kabila has expressed an interest in
    SSR [Security Sector Reform], but it has not been a priority of
    his administration. It must become a priority now, and the U.S.
    has an important role to play in assuring that this happens.
        Mr. Chairman, I realize we are laying out a very broad
    agenda, but we know that none of this, not the revised MONUSCO
    mandate, the increased donor involvement, the responsible
    behavior of DRC's neighbors, or internal DRC reforms, will
    happen without direct, high-level, focused U.S. leadership.
    President Obama and many of you have unique leverage with key
    international and regional stakeholders, and the United States
    is held in very high regard by the Congolese people. Your
    leadership can make a difference if we act so decisively, and
    do so today.
        This is why ECI has called on the President to appoint a
    temporary special envoy to signal clearly that finding a
    lasting solution to the crisis in Central Africa is a priority
    for his Administration.
        Past models for this approach, including Senator John Kerry
    to Sudan, the late veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke on the
    Balkans, or General Colin Powell to Haiti, demonstrates that
    high-level diplomatic intervention at the right moment can cut
    through deadly impasses and open the way toward peace and
    lasting stability.
        At the United Nations, the new Presidential envoy should
    work with the Secretary General to establish a timetable for
    regional negotiations, revise MONUSCO's mandate, and draw up a
    strategy for reinstating a ceasefire in case violence flares up
    again.
        Internationally, the U.S. should encourage our NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and other key partners to
    provide police, judicial and military training so that the
    Congolese government can increase its capacity to protect its
    own people as MONUSCO's mandate winds down.
        U.S. Africa Command's, AFRICOM's, work with the Congolese
    army has demonstrated that a little training could have a big
    impact. During the most recent crisis, ECI staff in Goma got a
    car stuck in a ditch. It happens a lot, unfortunately. A truck
    full of Congolese soldiers pulled up and offered to help, and
    to be honest, our staff wasn't sure what to expect. In the
    past, this kind of help would most likely have been accompanied
    by a request for a bribe. In this case, the soldiers brought
    the car out of the ditch and simply waved goodbye. It turns
    out, they were part of the unit that AFRICOM trained in 2010.
        The successful AFRICOM training mission is only the latest
    example in the 52 years since Congo's independence of the close
    U.S.-Congolese ties. As a major donor of humanitarian and other
    assistance our country has much more influence in Kinshasa than
    we have been willing to exert.
        The President's envoy should engage directly with President
    Kabila to accept assistance in developing a strategy for
    implementing comprehensive security sector reform. With an
    agreed-upon deadline in place for announcing the SSR strategy,
    the U.S. should step in to provide Congo with whatever
    technical support it needs in partnership with the EU [European
    Union], NATO, and others to complete planning.
        AFRICOM--I am rushing to try to get through the 5 minutes,
    which I think I passed about 15 minutes ago--AFRICOM's plan to
    train a second unit of the FARDC should be put on hold until
    provincial elections are organized and President Kabila
    produces and commits to a workable plan for implementing
    comprehensive security sector reform. But once that commitment
    is clear, Congo will need and deserves international support to
    ensure that reform takes hold.
        Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress and the Armed Services
    Committee in particular hear more urgent requests for U.S.
    leadership in the world than can be answered. Resolving the
    cycle of violence does not necessarily require significant new
    financial investment by the United States or U.S. boots on the
    ground. It does, however, require American political
    leadership, moral leadership even, to bring the parties
    together to address the larger sources of instability in the
    region.
        I may be naive, but I believe that our actions in foreign
    policy represent our values as a country. They represent who we
    are as a people. Soon, I will be making my tenth trip to Congo,
    and I know that if your constituents were to go to Congo and
    see what is happening there, they, too, would insist that we do
    something about it.
        I founded ECI in part to serve as a megaphone to amplify
    the voices of the people of eastern Congo, and I thank you very
    much for the opportunity to do that today. In fact, it is an
    honor. Even in the face of violence and upheaval, the Congolese
    remain resilient and entirely determined to rebuild their
    country. The 70 million Congolese deserve a better tomorrow,
    and they haven't given up trying to build a better future.
        With support from Congress and leadership from the
    President, the United States can help them get there. We can
    help, and we should. Thank you very much. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Affleck can be found in the
    Appendix on page 99.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        You brought up a point that always bothers me about these
    hearings. We bring in experts, give them 5 minutes to tell us
    everything they know about it, and then we are supposed to
    absorb all of that and make policy.
        I would prefer sitting around the coffee table and
    discussing it to get really to the point of the matter. But it
    is what it is, and we will deal with it.
        You all are very familiar with the situation. I, frankly,
    knew nothing about the Congo, other than what I have learned
    here today. It is not an area of the world that we have focused
    on. We have a war in Afghanistan. We just completed a war in
    Iraq. We are looking at other very serious threats around the
    world, and that is kind of where my focus has been, so I really
    thank Adam for bringing this to our attention, and for
    encouraging us to hold this hearing, because I think it has
    been a real eye-opener to me.
        I was in a meeting the other day when it was brought up by
    a Member about the seriousness of Syria, and in a year, we have
    lost, had 40,000 people killed there. And that is something
    that the whole world is focused on. And yet, I come here today
    and learn that we have lost 5 million people in the Congo, and
    I didn't know about it until right now.
        It is amazing what we know and what we don't know. Having
    said that and having listened to this testimony and
    understanding that we are spending $480 million, roughly, a
    year in this area--you have all been there, you understand it--
    is that, are we spending it the way we should?
        If you were a king for a day, or queen, what would you--say
    we are able to keep spending that money. We have sequestration
    that is hitting us. We are cutting a trillion dollars out of
    defense over the next 10 years if all of this goes through. You
    already heard the stories of how much we are cutting back our
    military and our ability to carry out our missions, but
    assuming we could keep spending that same money there, what
    would you do with that money, each of you?
        Mr. Affleck. First of all, I am not sure sequestration is
    going to hit. We have to plan for success, I think, and my
    answers will reflect the assumption that that is--that doesn't
    take place.
        There are a number of things I would do, you know, if I
    could wave a magic wand. But speaking in practical terms, you
    know, the mandate needs to be completely reexamined. Even if
    you talk to people within the United Nations, they talk about
    MONUSCO being a failure. You go to Congo and you talk to
    Congolese civilians, and they have got an anger and a
    resentment toward, you know, people from the United Nations
    that you can't believe. They are spending a billion [dollars]
    plus total down there trying to help people, and they deeply
    resent it. And the reason they deeply resent it is because
    their mandate is to protect civilians, but when trouble breaks
    out, they are hiding in barracks, or they are avoiding these
    confrontations, or they are allowing militias like M23, which
    is the size of half a battalion in the United States military,
    to run roughshod and take over the city.
        So civilians are not being protected. The mandate is deeply
    flawed.
        Leadership probably needs to be reexamined. I think that I
    would, in a very broad sense, look at making sure that we are
    protecting civilians and making sure that we are using the
    leverage that we have through MONUSCO--as you say, we are
    spending over $400 million, you know, a year--that we get our
    money's worth for the American taxpayer, that we need to ask
    for better. It is a noble and valiant mission. It is a place
    where people are suffering, and we can do better.
        And one of the ways that we can do better is to try to
    expand upon some of the training that they are doing there,
    trying to address this issue of soldiers getting paid, which is
    one of the real problems down there, is that nobody gets paid.
    Their salary is $40 a month, and they are not even getting
    that. And there is a culture handed down since Mobutu that
    says, you know, well, don't worry about getting paid; you are
    really going to live off the population. And that is what has
    given rise to the FARDC being responsible for more than 40
    percent of the gender-based violence in that country.
        As you can see, it is quite a web, but I think, you know,
    we have a lot of levers for sure at the U.N., and we ought to
    be examining those right away.
        Dr. Frazer. Thank you, Chairman.
        I think the first thing to do is to get the policy or the
    diplomatic framework correct. And by that I mean that, without
    spending any money, really, if the Administration would put in
    place the type of bilateral commissions in which they can then
    focus the Congolese government's attention on security sector
    reform and raise the priority and the attention of the
    Congolese government, that would go very far, without really
    costing anything more than plane tickets.
        So that is the first thing, is really focus on the
    diplomatic framework in which this relationship is happening.
    Right now, it is extremely weak. It was much stronger during
    the last Administration through mechanisms that were put in
    place, like the Tripartite Plus process and joint planning
    cells.
        Secondly, I think that Ben is exactly right; the MONUSCO
    mandate is problematic, but we strengthened it over many, many
    years. We are spending $1.5 billion. That mission costs $1.5
    billion. I mean, it is not, obviously, having the effect that
    we want. I would really focus on training both the Congolese
    battalion that we talked about, but this international neutral
    force, which is really African forces, and we have done this
    before. We are doing it successfully in the AMISOM [African
    Union Mission in Somalia], which is mainly Uganda and Burundi,
    who have really stabilized Mogadishu and are playing a very
    positive role in Somalia. We did it very effectively in
    Liberia, when we first had African forces on the ground, and
    then they transitioned to blue helmets. In this case, we have a
    blue helmet force already, but I would say that if we can train
    up and work with regional forces, and the Southern African
    development community, namely South Africa, Tanzania, and maybe
    Angola, have said they would put forces. So plan with them,
    work with them, and they may not need equipment, and they may
    not even need movement because they actually have that capacity
    within their army. But the planning side, work very closely
    with them, bring them in as maybe part of MONUSCO's mandate;
    maybe not. I think that is for the Administration to work out,
    but get a real strike force that could have some real
    capability on the ground.
        And African forces are increasingly showing both the
    responsibility as well as the capacity to do this type of
    mission. And this is a planning mission. This is not U.S.
    boots, you know, getting into offensive operations. So that
    would be the second.
        Thirdly, I would say that really we are not spending very
    much on the type of issues, as my colleague here said, on the
    IMET, the International Military Education Training. We are
    spending less than half a million dollars, about $450,000,
    which is in military justice, on human rights training, and
    other types of professionalization and changing the ethos of
    the Congolese army. I think that, you know, $500,000 really is
    not going to hurt anybody. Those numbers are actually
    decreasing. We probably should sustain that level, if not
    increase it slightly. But I don't want to ask for money in a
    certain environment, but certainly, we shouldn't be decreasing
    or we really need to put a focus on that type of
    professionalization and training of the Congolese army. Thank
    you.
        Dr. Carafano. I will be very quick. I think we all agree,
    we could have different solutions, but we all agree that the
    security force that is there now is not adequate. So we are not
    getting the return on investment. I think that is very clear,
    and I would put that as number one.
        I certainly think spending a lot more money is not going to
    make a lot of difference. This is the largest country in
    Africa. It is the 19th largest country in the world, [19th]
    most populous country in the world. But we can get much, much
    more efficiency for what we have.
        So the one area where I might differ a little, is this
    notion of kind of, I think, top-down reform, particularly in
    the security sector, I am just not very optimistic about that
    at all. I do think the key has to really be empowering at the
    provincial level. So I think the provincial level is very
    important, but I, honestly, I mean, you know, we can build all
    the battalions that we want. In a country of this size, you
    know, we have got to have capacity at the local level, and I
    think we have to go from a top-down approach to a bottom-up
    approach.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Carafano, your opening remarks said a couple of things
    that are very near and dear to my heart, talking to the Somalia
    model and how this is really sort of, you know, building
    capacity of local partners, and it is a light footprint
    approach that can yield huge results. I think that is the
    direction that our foreign policy needs to go in, is
    partnership between DOD, State, and also we do need to really
    improve on the development and economic piece as well, so that
    we are not spending a lot of money and we are not putting, you
    know, U.S. lives at risk. Both, that saves us money, and it is
    also, as you just said in your last remarks, it is much more
    effective. You build the local capacity. We can't simply show
    up and say, we are here, we are going to fix your problems.
    That doesn't work. It has got to be capacity building. It has
    got to be locally driven.
        And I think Somalia is an excellent model. We worked with
    Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, and, you know, we have
    had success, by Somalia measures at any rate, based on their
    efforts in that country, in a very light footprint. And the
    partnership there has also helped us in Yemen. You look at what
    we invested in Iraq and Afghanistan versus what we invested in
    the Horn of Africa problem and what resulted, and you see the
    wisdom of this approach. And I definitely think that we need to
    move that that direction, and I think the DRC is a very
    important place to do that. It has to be locally driven.
        That said, I want to explore a little bit on the training
    of the battalion issue. That kind of is locally driven. You
    know, light footprint, we train their military to get better at
    security, and it seems to me that none of this is going to
    happen unless we figure out how to do it.
        I think the U.S. has to play a role. So, two questions
    about that. Do you think it makes sense to look for
    opportunities to train more battalions, use that light
    footprint to build the DRC capacity? And then, second, the
    thing that would be really helpful, but it is really tough in
    the eastern Congo, is to get the support from those countries I
    just mentioned, who gave us support in Somalia and also Angola
    to play a role in this, too. There is a lot of painful history
    with all of those countries in the eastern Congo. Do you think
    we can overcome that and that those countries can be a useful
    part of, sort of, you know, sort of flopping that Horn of
    Africa model over onto the eastern DRC? How do we build that
    vision?
        Dr. Carafano. Let me answer the second part of that
    question first. I am a strategist, so for a strategist, the
    right answer is the right answer, right. There is no such thing
    as a universal model that works everywhere.
        Mr. Smith. Absolutely.
        Dr. Carafano. On the other hand, I would say that this
    region is prime for something that looks like the Somalia
    model, recognizing all of the difficulties involved. The payoff
    here I think is enormous, and I think it is the quintessential
    piece.
        To go back to the first question, I am just very skeptical
    about security sector reform in a country that is thoroughly
    corrupt, where the government is widely perceived as
    illegitimate, and where you don't have the infrastructure, and
    you have this enormous army. So these little tiny battalions, I
    am sure are wonderful little models, but it is the 19th most
    populous country in the world. And the eastern Congo is a huge
    region.
        So I think if you want to get something in there and then
    stabilize that, the Somalia model a very worthy and important
    first step that stems the bleeding.
        And then I think this, as in the DRC, I mean unless we--you
    are not going to see this dramatic reform from the top down at
    any time in the near future. You really have to look at models
    in the countryside, at the provincial level, empowering
    provisional officials to look after this.
        Now, you can find bad examples of these things. If you
    don't do it right, you can have war lordism, right, and the
    country can devolve into civil war. If you are just throwing
    money and weapons at people----
        Mr. Smith. I think we----
        Dr. Carafano. Right. So the key is actually something
    really you mentioned, and something where the United States has
    learned an awful lot of very good lessons, and that is to look
    at these things in a more holistic way, to do the kind of
    security development and economic development and civil society
    development. You know, there is no perfect model for this.
    Again, side by side, in tandem, keep these things in mind, and
    they do provide enduring solutions.
        Mr. Smith. But, actually, I think we have resources that
    can do that.
        And, Mr. Affleck, I wanted to ask, if you could sort of put
    a positive piece on this, because I know in working with the
    Eastern Congo Initiative before, there are a lot of positive
    things going on in the eastern DRC, in terms of economic
    groups, in terms of groups. I was over there, visited with HEAL
    Africa, a group I know you support, trying to combat the
    institutionalized rape that happens there. There is economic
    development happening, which I know you guys have been focused
    on. Again, somebody can paint the picture and go, this is
    hopeless, nothing can be done there, but that is really not the
    case. Talk a little bit about some of the positive stuff that
    is going on, even now, in the DRC.
        Mr. Affleck. Sure. You know, at ECI, we really see the
    country through the prism of the people that we meet on the
    ground. And I agree with you that, you know, there necessarily
    needs to be an effort from the ground up to reform some of
    these larger institutions.
        I also believe that the top-down reform is necessary, as
    well.
        But when I think about Congo, when I look at Congo, I don't
    think about well, you know, all of the dead and all of the
    sexual, the gender-based violence, all of the terrible things
    you hear; one in five children die before the age of 5 years
    old. That misery, that suffering, is real. Just as real is a
    tremendous and indomitable spirit that you see from Congolese
    people, that we see with so many of our grantees, who are
    teaching, who are building capacity with former child soldiers
    to help them find work in the economy, for people who are
    struggling mightily and oftentimes in the face of literal
    warfare to keep their country together, and not just keep their
    country together but to build their country. And so I have to
    reject on a very basic level this sort of pervasive notion of
    hopelessness that exists.
        It becomes sort of fashionable to say, like in a larger
    sense, the continent of Africa, oh, well, you know, hopeless,
    corrupt, problematic, can't fix it. You know, not true. Not
    true in Africa. Not true in Congo. Not true in eastern Congo,
    because it is seeing advancements.
        And I do believe that there is, you know, necessarily a
    kind of incrementalism that has to be part of one's approach
    that, yes, these battalions are rather small, and right now,
    they are just emblematic of what could happen, but it can in
    fact happen because I have seen other similar progress take
    place. And I have seen it engineered, conceived, and driven by
    people who live there, you know, which makes sense if you think
    about it. The people who are best equipped to rebuild their
    neighborhood are the people who live there. And so when I think
    about that, and when I think about the hopefulness that I have
    seen, then I do believe that it is possible to, for example,
    where with funding through the Panzi Hospital in South Kivu,
    women's organizations for, sort of, to pursue legal solutions
    to having been raped. We see that some of the police force can,
    in fact, be improved, and we take these signs, albeit, you
    know, small measurements, and we assume that if it can be done
    in this minor way, it can be done on a larger scope. Will it be
    easy? No. Is it, you know, are they simple solutions? No. But I
    know for a fact, from having been on the ground, from having
    seen the people there who have a tremendous desire to work, and
    many of whom who are educated, many of whom who understand and
    reject the corruption in their own country. It is not a
    pervasive thing where all Congolese are corrupt. You know, as
    you all know, we fostered and supported a corrupt guy named
    Mubutu during the Cold War because he was, for national
    security reasons, and that inculcated a culture of corruption
    within the sort of official government level.
        But people in that country don't want that. They reject it.
    And if people show up and say, let us partner with you in
    trying to rid your country of this, I think you will find that
    the people of Congo will be extremely receptive and not just
    willing but active partners.
        Mr. Smith. All right. Thank you very much. It is one of
    the, you know, most rich countries in minerals and resources.
    There is a lot of potential there for a very positive
    relationship with the U.S., you know.
        Beyond just the terrorism concerns that can arise from
    instability, there is an economic opportunity there that I
    think we should work to try and seize. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Affleck, Dr. Frazer, Mr. Carafano, I think you all
    raised one central issue, and that is the lack of security
    among the population. So, right now, we are relying upon the
    Congolese government to provide that security. In Afghanistan,
    we have had a questionable partner in the Karzai government,
    and that has been difficult. And we have a less than credible
    partner, I think, in the Congolese government. In Afghanistan,
    we have gone to these village stabilization operations to
    provide--as an alternative way to provide security at the local
    level within villages, within communities, whereby we have been
    providing some arms and some training to the local population
    there, so that they can provide their own security. Obviously,
    the Karzai government is opposed, has been opposed to that.
        Are there any opportunities for any alternative strategies,
    given the nature of the Congolese government in the DRC?
        Mr. Affleck.
        Mr. Affleck. Well, I will, you know, in a second just yield
    to expert fellow panelists here, but you know, one of the
    things that I think, the basic issue, and a really simple issue
    and one that would go a long way and I alluded to earlier, is
    that, you know, applying some influence to President Kabila so
    that payment is made to his troops. I think that, if there is
    one fell swoop, one stroke that would dramatically improve
    people's lives off the bat, you know, that would be it. And
    that would do a sort of--that would take a wholesale step
    toward improving the security sector.
        You know, but as we talk about security sector, as if it is
    this kind of mammoth thing, and on one level, it is, but on
    another level, if you had paid soldiers who had any incentive
    to fight, for example, you wouldn't have a major capital
    overrun and taken over by 1,200 guys. I mean, that is half the
    size of the kids at my high school. That shows you the degree
    to which the Federal Government, in effect, is unable to exert
    control, even the smallest amount of control in the east. And I
    think that that issue is--goes hand in glove with security
    sector reform, and then I will----
        Mr. Coffman. Dr. Frazer, and then Mr. Carafano.
        Dr. Frazer. I will be very brief. This, actually, working
    in training in local communities for self-protection was
    actually done in Rwanda against the FDLR.
        I am not so sure about doing this in Congo. It is
    attractive to me, but I guess I would say, depends on the
    community. And I also would say that I think that the key here,
    again, is really to engage and embrace the Congolese government
    at the most senior level, but not just at the presidential
    level, but even at the ministerial level, which is why I keep
    talking about some type of binational commission, because then
    I think you can start penetrating those ministries, which have
    the responsibility, even bring governors over, so that you can,
    you know, deal at the provincial level.
        But I guess I think that the real heavy lift here is more
    on the diplomatic side and working very, very carefully with
    the Congolese government, which is essentially isolated and
    doesn't have very much contact, frankly, with our officials at
    this point in time.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Carafano.
        Dr. Carafano. So I remember about an army that wasn't paid,
    and the Government reneged on all its promises. And when the
    American Revolution ended, the Continental Army went home. That
    says an awful lot about the nature and the character of the
    society, and I think that we will all agree that if you have a
    security solution that doesn't fit with the situation on the
    ground and the people on the ground, it is simply not going to
    work.
        I am sorry, I am very skeptical that the Government in
    Kinshasa is ever going to be a force for good in resolving
    this. But, on the other hand, I totally agree with Mr. Affleck
    and Dr. Frazer. This is a country of great people, and if we
    can enable them to take control of their own lives, I think we
    will see constructive--that is why I am much more optimistic
    about solutions at the provincial level.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. West from Florida.
        Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks to the panel for being here. And I want to try
    to a draw on, you know, what I saw my year in Iraq and 2\1/2\
    years in Afghanistan. I see this kind of, how do you put
    together a train? And too often what we do, we put a caboose
    before the engine, and then we have the train wreck and come
    back and say, why did it happen? Because we never figure out
    what comes first, the secure environment, or does the
    legitimate governance, or does the individual, the military
    education and training?
        So what I would like to ask you all, knowing what is the
    situation on the ground with Congo--and I do agree that you
    have to start at the provincial and the district level. I mean,
    we kind of learned that lesson late in Afghanistan, because, I
    mean, that is the basis of that culture. Which is the right
    model to go with here?
        Because, Mr. Affleck, you talked about 27 different militia
    type of groups, so even if you try to have the governance
    corrected, if the militia groups are still running around, they
    continue to delegitimize the efforts that you are doing with
    the Government, which is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan
    when we tried to focus on Kabul, and Kabul doesn't extend out
    beyond the city limits. So as we build this train in the Congo,
    which would you all recommend to come first in order for us to
    be on the track to success?
        Dr. Carafano. You know, I would just start that, you know,
    if you get the international security assistance piece right,
    and you had European--I mean, excuse me, African nations,
    including Uganda and Rwanda, participating, then I think that
    gives you some breathing space to move on. So, to me, that is
    the essential thing that has got to happen first.
        Dr. Frazer. I guess I would say that, one, I take--I
    understand the premise, but I believe you can do both at the
    same time. I think you have to deal with governance, but
    obviously, creating greater security for the----
        Mr. West. Governance at which level?
        Dr. Frazer. At all levels, but you cannot, I don't think,
    frankly, do real governance at the provincial level with
    governors, unless you are dealing with the capital, because of
    the nature of the Congolese government and how it works.
        That said, I think that you start where you are, and you
    have MONUSCO. You have this force that is of no real
    effectiveness. Try to bring in units or create a new unit
    within it that has that capacity. And so I guess I would say
    that you definitely need--I guess I would put my, if I were
    forced to make a choice, I would--and I was dealing at the
    provincial level, the only force that is out there right now is
    MONUSCO. So I would try to bring into MONUSCO units that are
    actually capable.
        What I would say is that it is ironic for me to hear the
    Somali model presented as a success because that is something
    that has taken years to get to the point where it is, and it is
    going to be the same thing in Congo. And we never said, well,
    we can't deal with the transitional federal government at the
    same time that we are dealing with AMISOM. We had to do them
    together, recognizing that it was going to take a long time.
    There were going to be casualties on the ground, and we were
    going to learn as we went. I mean, I think that it is really
    getting in there and working, without putting our forces at
    real risk, that is going to be necessary.
        And so I--and also I would just say, add to that is, I have
    actually worked with the national government, and it is not as
    hopeless as is being presented here either. It obviously needs
    a lot of work, but you deal with who you are dealing with.
        Mr. West. Okay.
        Mr. Affleck. I did not have the honor to serve in the in
    our Armed Forces, and I did not have the opportunity to go to
    Afghanistan and Iraq, so I am speaking from secondhand
    experience. But the sense that I get was that the United States
    Government and United States Armed Forces successfully trained
    troops in Afghanistan and in Iraq, both under circumstances
    where, very much unlike DRC, where they were doing so under
    hostile circumstances, folks who were sometimes--and some folks
    who turned out to be hostile to the United States, and there
    was a situation of violence, and lives were lost.
        What that tells me is that it is doable. It is a doable
    thing because the United States has done it. Not perfectly, you
    know, but it was done. Now, I am not suggesting that we spend
    the kind of money that that took, but I am pointing to that, in
    a much more difficult situation, this goal was achieved. Now, I
    don't think it should be the United States that steps in and
    reforms the 100,000-plus FARDC military. I do think that it is
    a job for multinational forces. I think it is a good idea. It
    may be a good job for NATO. It is the step, I believe, that
    will go the furthest the quickest in changing the quality of
    life for people and eliminating the 27 armed groups that you
    talk about--are going to find it much more difficult to operate
    when they feel as though there is a force present that they are
    not equal to. And all of a sudden people aren't going to want
    to take Goma and people aren't going to believe that they can
    achieve political goals through violent means because there is
    an active state security force that prevents that kind of thing
    from happening, so as happens in developed countries when
    people turn to the ballot box. I can't speak to the exact model
    of how that would work because I am not qualified to. But I can
    speak to the fact that it is possible.
        Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. West.
        Mr. McIntyre.
        Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks to all of our witnesses for coming today.
        Mr. Affleck, you mentioned in your testimony about how
    AFRICOM's work with the Congolese army is demonstrating that,
    as you said, a little training can have a big impact, and you
    gave the instant about the car being stuck. ECI, obviously, has
    a great impression of that presence of U.S. Forces, and working
    with AFRICOM and helping in the ways that we haven't been able
    to help. Do you feel like the perception of the U.S. by the
    people themselves, the Congolese, is a positive one for the
    presence we have in training and working with their forces?
        Mr. Affleck. Yeah, I do, for the most part, you know. I
    mean, you have a big country, and it has got, you know, so
    there are a number of different competing opinions about it,
    you know, and it is not unlike the way we are here. However, I
    would say that primarily--I will give you an anecdotal example.
    I was asked to shoot a film for the U.N., and I went into a
    bunch of refugee camps. It was about refugees, and this was
    during the fighting, the early fighting, when the previous
    version of M23, which is called the CNDP, was being led by a
    guy named Laurent Nkunda, and they were making very similar
    advancements on Goma, a lot of instability, a lot of fighting.
        And I was walking around with a camera with my big U.N.
    badge. And I was experiencing a lot of hostility from folks in
    the camp, and I was experiencing, you know, some real
    resentment to the point where I thought maybe it is not wise
    for me to be in here. And so I took off the U.N. badge, and
    then people asked me, where are you from? You know, and I said,
    oh, America, I am American. And then, all of a sudden, among
    people who were really, really suffering at the bottom end of
    the pain ladder that was going on there, I was welcomed, you
    know, and treated quite nicely.
        Now, this is anecdotal. It is one incident, and it could be
    the only place that happened, and I don't use this as an
    opportunity to beat up the U.N., who I do think, despite some
    of its failings, you know, also does do important work, you
    know, infrastructure work in particular in Africa and in the
    Congo in specific, but it did show me that Americans were
    respected and held in some esteem.
        Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        And your efforts to call on the U.S. and the Administration
    for a special envoy, have those calls been received by anyone?
    Have you gotten any response yet from the Administration?
        Mr. Affleck. I have been given the impression that this is
    under review, which is ``government-speak'' that I just
    learned.
        Mr. McIntyre. Okay, right, very good. Fair enough, thank
    you.
        Mr. Chairman, I know we had a little question about the
    order a minute ago. I am going to yield the remainder of my
    time to my colleague, Ms. Sanchez, who I know had some
    questions she wanted to ask.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you to my colleague.
        I really want to talk to Mr. Carafano, but I would like
    to--but it relates to something that Mr. Affleck said. He
    thought that we had done a good job with respect to training
    military and police, or both, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I
    would probably--maybe I am the only one on this committee, but
    I would say that that is a disaster for us, in most cases, a
    lot of the work that we have done.
        When we recruit in Afghanistan and 63-year-old Afghans
    come, I wouldn't hire a 63-year-old for a police or an army
    position here, let alone somebody who is probably coming from a
    country where 63 is really old.
        So we have got all those phantom army people that we have
    in Afghanistan. We have trained supposedly over 350,000, but
    when we really take a count to see who is there, maybe 20
    percent of them are hanging out there.
        And remember, this is a force that we, the American
    taxpayer, are paying for. It is not being paid for by the
    Afghanistan government; it is being paid for by us. Their
    police stations are being paid for by us. So when I look at a
    situation like the Congo, where they can't even pay them $40 a
    month, or what have you, I think there is a real problem.
        So, Doctor, tell me the truth. Do you think that this can
    work, that we are actually going to go in there or somebody is
    going to go in there and train these guys, or some African
    group is going to go in there and train these guys and, you
    know, we are talking about a battalion? I mean, I think Mr.
    Affleck got very lucky that day, but what do you think? And you
    know, usually I am the most optimistic person, but on this
    issue, I just see disaster.
        Dr. Carafano. Well, I mean, they are both good and bad
    lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. We have learned an awful
    lot. But Afghanistan is a very good example, where at the end
    of the day, we are kind of getting it wrong because we got on
    too quick a path, and we focused on a metric of just getting
    numbers by a certain dates. We are throwing a lot of people out
    there that don't have their requisite skills and training and
    capacity to do the kinds of things we are going to expect them
    to do when we turn things over to them.
        So you draw yourself a little triangle, and you say, what
    is the security situation? What is my goal here? And then how
    much am I willing to spend? And then, on the third point of
    that triangle is, it says, okay, what is a realistic capability
    that I can put on the ground that is going to accomplish my
    goal?
        So it is all a question of, you know, good security is
    security that is good enough, right? So, you know, an
    American--creating an American unit is almost impossible feat.
    I mean, we spent, you know, years and years and years creating
    an NCO [non-commissioned officer] core, training officers,
    sending them to college. So I think it is about, you know,
    about this balance of having the clear-eyed realistic goals for
    the amount of resources that you are willing to commit with and
    what you are going to accomplish.
        So you brought up the point of ISR and border security
    before. Those are good examples of things that are really
    extremely expensive to field and sustain. So ISR is great, and
    the question is like, well, what kind of ISR do you want. And
    my favorite story was, a guy from California told me, he said,
    we were having forest fires, and the DOD guy came in and said,
    here is some satellite imagery we have for you. And the guy
    goes, oh, this is cool. Usually, we use a Cessna, but thanks. I
    mean, so there is a case, you know, where--kind of a not good
    match of resources.
        So maybe the ISR you want isn't necessarily a Global Hawk
    or a Scan Eagle. Maybe it is people on the ground that you can
    trust with a cell phone who are calling and telling you what is
    going on in the countryside. So it really is about this kind of
    realistic planning, and that is honestly, at the end of the
    day, that is the great thing about AFRICOM. If AFRICOM does its
    job right and it does the IMET and it does the training
    exercises and it does the capacity building that they know how
    to do, they are going to provide, they are going to help
    Africans provide realistic solutions.
        Heritage was, I think, the first foundation to make a
    credible argument for establishing AFRICOM. And we made the
    argument not because the United States is going to take over
    Africa, but because we want to facilitate solutions within
    those countries to solve the problems so the United States
    doesn't get drawn in. So if we let AFRICOM do its job, it could
    lead people through these triangles in partnership with the
    other interagency people and the NGOs and create sustainable
    solutions. I really believe that.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor.
        And Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging. I am sorry.
        Mr. Affleck. Can I just add one thing? I think I may have--
    conjuring up Afghanistan may have been a mistake because it is
    associated with a lot of intense political feelings that folks
    have. And this was an example of a space where there were, you
    know, exponentially more hurdles to constructing a police force
    and a military force than there are in Congo.
        My point simply was that we have done it in the past. Yes,
    we have failed in some ways; yes, in some ways, we have fallen
    short, but we have done it. It is doable, and if it is doable
    in places that are much more difficult to work in and operate
    in than DRC, then it can be done here. It is simply a note of
    optimism rather than an effort to try to sort of----
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Affleck.
        I didn't mean to--I mean, I was sort of just putting my
    position on this.
        Mr. Affleck. I understand.
        Ms. Sanchez. Because there may be some on this committee,
    maybe a majority, who thinks that we have got the job done in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. I got news for you, America, we don't
    have that job done. And it is going to be very expensive for
    us, and it continues to be very expensive for us, and you know,
    it is a lot of money.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Larsen, State of Washington.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        A couple of issues where there seems to be maybe only
    slight differences among the three folks, and I just want to
    get some elucidation from you all on why you think the way you
    are thinking, and mainly under the purview of the committee, so
    it is mainly defense and training issues, as opposed to other
    issues.
        And it gets to the difference here between Mr. Affleck's
    call to delay, if you will, the training in the second
    battalion until after there is a commitment from the Congolese
    government or commitment to reform, versus Dr. Frazer's
    comments and even Mr. Carafano's comments about, you know,
    focusing on the training. And maybe it is--maybe it is an
    omission that you think that ought to be delayed until there is
    a commitment to security reform, and maybe there is no
    difference at all.
        But if there is a difference, perhaps, Dr. Frazer, you
    could start by commenting, do you think we ought to move
    forward on training a second battalion without a commitment to
    reform, and why is that?
        And then, in interest, obviously, of the different view,
    Mr. Affleck, maybe respond about why you think it is important
    to have that reform in place first before you move forward.
        Dr. Frazer.
        Dr. Frazer. Sure. Thank you for the question.
        Yes, I think we should move forward right away. And I don't
    think that we should delay. I think the delay is an issue about
    trying to leverage the Congolese government to do some other
    things that they probably need to do for sure. But the amount
    of time that it actually takes us to actually do a training
    mission, the lead time that is necessary, the sort of, you
    know, interagency work that is necessary, it could be a very
    long time after the decision is made before we are actually
    doing that training mission. So I don't think that we should
    delay.
        Moreover, I think--I don't think, as a matter of policy, we
    should use this issue of training a battalion that can protect
    civilian lives; we shouldn't hold it up for another issue about
    the nature of the election that has happened and, you know, the
    legitimacy. That is a different question that fundamentally has
    to be decided within Congolese society. And if we had this
    high-level policy engagement that I am talking about, you could
    address that issue of legitimacy in the elections while at the
    same time preparing to protect people by training a battalion.
        Mr. Larsen. Sure.
        Mr. Affleck.
        Mr. Affleck. Yeah, I respect and appreciate Ambassador
    Frazer's position and admire her a great deal for her work in
    Africa.
        I think it is a very, very small distinction, frankly. Part
    of our position revolves around this notion of making sure that
    we are dealing with good partners in good faith. And that is
    really--really the question.
        And, again, it goes to the issue raised by many--many
    Congress men and women here today about, well, how do we know,
    you know, that we are working with good partners? And the idea
    is to take--to try to take equal steps down that road rather
    than just saying, hey, look, we are going to sort of come in
    and do this and the status quo can go on.
        Ambassador Frazer's point is well-taken, that it is a time-
    sensitive thing to get people out there to protect civilians. I
    see that as sort of a micro-issue that would kind of be--not in
    principle; I believe it in principle. But what we are asking
    for are the symbols of that. What we are going to get out of
    Kabila and his government before we do this will probably be
    something that would be addressed once we sort of got into the
    weeds of that situation. But both the Ambassador and I, I
    think, agree on that.
        Mr. Larsen. A second issue, and this gets at the envoy
    issue. And Ambassador Carson's testimony from the previous
    panel said that the Administration encourages the U.N.
    Secretary-General to appoint a high-level U.N. special envoy,
    whether they--you know, whether they have done that recently or
    not, but they certainly encourage it.
        Should it be a U.N. envoy, as you all, ECI has said? Or
    should it be an envoy within the United States Government? Is
    that a better fit?
        Dr. Frazer and then Dr.--how about this?
        Mr. Affleck. Go ahead.
        Dr. Carafano. Well, I work at The Heritage Foundation, so I
    am never going to sign up thinking that another U.N. thing is a
    good idea.
        So, you know, I think there is a role for a U.S.
    interlocutor there. I think, you know, you have to bring
    something to the table. So I do think we--we need to get our
    strategy together so we are bringing something to the table
    when we are trying to move this.
        And I think that might be a helpful role if, indeed, we are
    bringing something in the sense of a coherent way to address
    this, other than the concerns which have rightly been raised,
    which is, we get excited when it is in the news, and then when,
    you know, Mr. Affleck goes back to Hollywood, we all ignore it
    again.
        Mr. Larsen. I don't think he lives there.
        Dr. Frazer. Well, if you can have the disclaimer of The
    Heritage, I will disclaim as a former Assistant Secretary who
    never wants a special envoy.
        But, with that said, I have seen them work. Senator
    Danforth's worked extremely well.
        And I really do think it is about tying it with the
    President. So the U.N. has its envoy, the special
    representative of the Secretary-General, that is on the ground
    there. I think if we are going to have a high-level, it should
    be a Presidential U.S. envoy, and they should be able to go
    into the Oval Office and tell the President what they are doing
    and the President gives them guidance about what they should
    do. And then it could be quite constructive.
        Mr. Affleck. Yes, I--Heritage Foundation never offered me a
    membership. I guess it is fitting that I am on the far left of
    the panel.
        But I do--I--I strongly believe, frankly, that we should
    have both. I think there is a role for both. I think there is a
    role for a U.N. envoy. That is quite important, as Ambassador
    Frazer said. There is a role for an envoy for the United
    States.
        And I do believe it should be a very, very high-level
    envoy. Again, I concur with this idea that these envoys are
    only as effective as their ability, or their perceived ability,
    at the very least, to access the President of the United
    States.
        And if we are able to do that, I think you will find that
    that person can make a huge difference just by doing shuttle
    diplomacy and can warm things up and can move policy. So, yeah,
    I would advocate for that.
        Mr. Larsen. All right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly, we all have to go
    home somewhere. It is a matter of if we keep thinking about the
    things we are working on when we are there.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Johnson of Georgia.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The history of the Congo, the Belgian Congo and all of its
    iterations from the, I guess, 1700s up to the mid-20th century,
    characterized by colonialization, European colonialization,
    extracting the raw materials and minerals, taking them
    elsewhere to be developed, leaving the nation impoverished.
        Then during the 1950s and 1960s you have insurgencies that
    seize power from the colonialists. And Mobutu Seko comes to
    power; renames the country Zaire. Gross corruption. His Swiss
    bank accounts were fatter than many industrialists'--$4
    billion. He comes to power. He is corrupt, but he is an
    anticommunist, so he is America's buddy. But when the Soviet
    Union falls, then he ceases to be useful.
        And, meanwhile, Laurent Kabila seizes power. He is--his
    son, Paul Kabila--excuse me--Paul Kagame is a child soldier--
    commander of a group of child soldiers participating in that
    movement to get rid of Seko.
        So Laurent gains power. Then he is assassinated within
    hours of the close of the Clinton Administration, back in 2001.
    His son, 30 years old, former child--commander of a child army,
    emerges as the President. And he remains in power up to this
    time.
        Now, his daddy was supported by the Rwandans, the Angolans,
    the Ugandans, the Zimbabweans in his quest for power. And when
    he got to power, he told them all that I am going to be the one
    that controls the natural resources of this country.
        After he is assassinated, his son, what--what attributes do
    any of you all attribute to the son, as far as his leadership
    abilities? Joseph Kabila, who was recently reelected in an
    election in 2011, which many characterized as a rigged
    election. What do we know about the current President?
        And why do we support leaders in Africa who exploit their
    citizens, and the poverty that ensues makes them more
    susceptible to extremist elements like Al Qaeda, talking about
    you will receive 100 virgins when you--when you do the suicide
    attack and whatnot. You know, how--how can we get ourselves out
    of this, America?
        Somebody talk to me, please.
        Dr. Carafano. Can I just say very quickly that, you know, I
    think you are right and I think you raised a key issue. This is
    part of a generation of African leaders that are simply not
    going to move their countries forward. Fundamentally, at the
    end of the day, this is really an issue of economic freedom.
    And until they have the opportunity and these people in these
    countries to create societies in which there is economic
    opportunity and freedom so they can govern their own lives and
    their own use of the resources, we are just going to come back
    here and have hearings over and over again. So I do believe
    that you hit on exactly the right issue. And I hope it is the
    one thing that we all walk away today thinking is very
    important.
        The only other thing I would say is, from my perspective,
    Mr. Affleck is sitting on the far right, but I am okay with
    that. Because I think here today we really----
        Mr. Affleck.--that point of view.
        Dr. Carafano. But we all do agree that the issues that you
    raise really are the things that fundamentally are--addressing
    those are really the fundamental future of these African
    countries.
        Dr. Frazer. You asked a question about the character of
    Joseph Kabila and what we do know about him. I have actually
    worked with him. I first met him in 2001, in January, when he
    came to meet with Secretary Powell. And they sat in the--in the
    Secretary's office, soldier-to-soldier and statesman-to-
    statesman.
        And Joseph Kabila laid out a vision about what he wanted
    for his government. And that was a vision of democratic
    governance, about peace with his neighbors, and economic
    development for his population.
        Mr. Johnson. What country put Joseph Kabila into----
        Dr. Frazer. I would probably say the entire international
    community, for the very reasons of the history that you just
    laid out, brought him to his position. Which is, it is a long
    and complicated and dirty history that we have all participated
    in.
        The point is is that Joseph Kabila is often underestimated.
    He is shy in nature. He has--he does--he is visionary. He is
    leading a huge and complicated country. And into a second term,
    it may show some weariness of leadership that often comes with
    trying to move such a big country forward.
        I think that there is much more that is needed from him. I
    think he is capable of delivering it. And that is why I think
    that the U.S. Government needs to work with him. He is isolated
    internationally today, and it doesn't help. He is who he is,
    and he is where he is. And our interests are to try to push him
    to deliver on that initial vision that he set out with
    President--with Secretary Powell.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
        Would you disagree with that, Mr. Carafano?
        Dr. Carafano. I guess I am just a pessimist.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. Mr. Smith, Ranking Member.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is fine. I wasn't
    sure if he was done or not.
        Mr. Coffman. Oh, I am sorry.
        Mr. Smith. But respect for Members' time, I think he is
    over time.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. Very well.
        Mr. Smith. If you have any more questions, we could submit
    them for the record.
        I am sorry, and I think that will close our hearing. I
    don't think there are any more Members asking questions.
        I just want to again thank the chairman and thank the
    Members of the committee for having this hearing.
        Thank our witnesses. This beings us together for a very
    important issue.
        Mr. Affleck. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffman. Hearing adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
    ?

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                                A P P E N D I X

                               December 19, 2012

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               December 19, 2012

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                  Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon

                  Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

                                   Hearing on

                   Update on the Evolving Security Situation

                    in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

                  and Implications for U.S. National Security

                               December 19, 2012

        The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo (DRC).
        I would like to start by thanking my colleague and the
    committee's ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we
    hold this hearing on the DRC. I believe that it will help the
    committee to understand the complexity of some of issues within
    Central Africa.
        The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    continues to evolve and is driven by a complex interplay of
    regional power dynamics as well as an intricate web of economic
    and social issues. What is clear is that the situation in the
    DRC is tragic for the innocent people caught in the conflict--
    innocent people who are simply trying to raise their families
    and live their lives.
        As I have followed the media coverage of the situation in
    the DRC, I cannot help but reflect on the millions of innocent
    people around the world who are caught in fundamentally unjust
    and socially complex situations. These situations can make
    anyone's heart break and naturally leads one to consider the
    simple question: What can be done?
        Of course, the question--and likewise the answer--becomes
    more complex as we contemplate what can be done within the
    context of U.S. national security interests, constrained
    budgets, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the
    globe, and potential future contingencies that the military has
    to be prepared to execute. Given the looming threat of
    sequestration, or further cuts to the military, I believe most
    of us on this Committee have become ever more focused on
    ensuring our military's missions are both essential and
    appropriately tailored.
        That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD to
    address the situation in the DRC. I understand that in the
    recent past, the Department of State conducted important
    diplomatic efforts such as the ``Tripartite Plus,'' which
    furthered stability in Central Africa--and within the DRC in
    particular. Although the Administration is no longer pursuing
    this particular effort, perhaps there are other, similar
    opportunities--given how the situation has negatively evolved
    in the DRC. Moreover, it seems the U.S. could pursue deeper
    diplomatic engagement with regional partners and our allies to
    leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to address
    this issue.
        Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We
    cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in
    Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from
    Afghanistan, to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must
    recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that
    directly threaten the United States and our allies. Therefore,
    we must ensure that our military is sufficiently resourced and
    that our national leaders prioritize our defense resources
    toward efforts that are appropriate for the U.S. military and
    our vital national security interests.
        I look forward to learning more about the situation on the
    ground as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address
    the situation in the DRC.

                          Statement of Hon. Adam Smith

               Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services

                                   Hearing on

                   Update on the Evolving Security Situation

                    in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

                  and Implications for U.S. National Security

                               December 19, 2012

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome our
    witnesses today and thank them for appearing to talk about this
    important topic.
        The United States faces complex national security
    challenges across Africa. The terrorism and violent extremism
    that plague the continent, along with instability, corruption,
    governance, poverty, illicit trafficking, and more, combine
    into a potent mix that threatens the long-term prospects of the
    African people, our interests, and the interests of our friends
    and partners. Nowhere are these challenges more apparent than
    in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly in the
    eastern portion of the country.
        The Eastern Congo has been mired in seemingly endless
    conflict and an insidious cycle of instability. It is a crisis
    that has, by some estimates, led to the death of over 5 million
    people over the last 14 years, an untold amount of sexual
    violence and the current displacement of nearly 1.5 million
    people.
        The United States has clear strategic national security
    interests in the DRC due to its size, location, and especially
    because instability within the DRC can breed instability within
    the broader region. The government of the DRC cannot project
    law and order in much of its territory nor secure its borders
    and we know that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are present in
    East Africa and in West Africa and are looking for places for
    safe haven.
        Any U.S. effort to address this instability has to take a
    ``whole-of-government'' approach. Diplomacy and development,
    under the direction of the State Department and U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID), have the primary
    responsibility. But they can do nothing if there is no
    security. To that end, then, the Department of Defense, through
    U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has a significant role to play.
    Capacity-building efforts like those in place in Uganda to
    address the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) are an example of the
    way in which AFRICOM can play a significant role in the whole-
    of-government approach to promote American priorities within
    Africa and help inform our response to the Eastern Congo's lack
    of security.
        As AFRICOM has recognized, Africans are best suited to
    solve African security challenges. The U.S. has trained the
    first of what was originally intended to be multiple Congolese
    Army battalions in 2010. Our assistance provided for basic
    military training, of course, but also the sharing of values
    that are intrinsic to our armed forces, such as military
    justice, human rights, civil-military relations, rule of law
    and defense resource management--qualities that many military
    organizations in the region lack. From accounts on the ground,
    this battalion has been well regarded by those who have
    observed it in action. Too often the Congolese military (FARDC)
    are the perpetrators of violence and abuse. Additional training
    could go a long way toward the development of a meaningful
    Congolese security force that is not only capable but respects
    human rights.
        This process of enabling our partners to better deal with
    our shared security challenges is the way forward here. We have
    had success with this model in the Philippines, Somalia and
    Yemen, for a comparatively small amount of resources and
    troops. It is the right approach: it presents a light
    footprint, and it is also fiscally responsible in a time of
    tight resources.
        The key to any partnership is that both partners believe
    they share mutual interests and work toward mutual goals. The
    U.S. is fortunate in that we have a long-standing relationship
    with the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda and so together we can work to
    achieve a long-term peaceful solution. As noted in the recent
    United Nations Group of Experts Report, however, the support
    DRC's neighbors are providing to the primary rebel group, M23,
    is deeply concerning and must stop. The United States has cut
    off military aid to Rwanda in response but more can be done to
    hold to account anyone providing significant support to the
    M23. Additionally, today the House will take up the Conference
    Report on the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, which
    will go a long way to reduce the financial support available
    for the M23 and potentially limit its ability to undermine
    stability in the region.
        While the challenges in the Eastern Congo may seem
    daunting, there is hope. It is an incredibly robust region with
    massive potential. The Congolese are anxious to grow and create
    greater opportunity, and end the constant displacement. If they
    can achieve peace and stability, there is an abundant amount of
    opportunity for the DRC, the region, and the world.
        I look forward to engaging with our expert witnesses today
    and continuing the dialogue about how best to achieve peace and
    stability in the Eastern Congo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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                               December 19, 2012

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               December 19, 2012

    =======================================================================

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

        Secretary Chollet. U.S. forces used the same Afghanistan model of
    training and fighting alongside the host nation counterparts as the
    model when training and equipping the FARDC 391st battalion and this is
    the same model currently being used to train other African forces today
    in areas such as Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Burundi, etc. Also
    building on the Afghanistan model, when training partner forces, DOD
    works to develop a training plan that meets the host-nation's
    requirements, which in the case of DRC and our training of the 391st,
    was a base line internal security capability.
        The geography and operational profile of Afghanistan and the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are very different; and many
    lessons learned do not necessarily translate directly to DRC. However,
    experiences in Afghanistan have built capable and competent Special
    Forces operators who have the necessary skill sets to engage with
    foreign forces be successful in developing their capabilities. Also,
    lessons learned from efforts to build partner capacity (BPC) in
    Afghanistan are also being incorporated into U.S. doctrine and training
    for BPC, and the Department of Defense believes this will have a
    positive impact on global BPC efforts. [See page 28.]

        Secretary Carson. Border security in the region is almost non-
    existent. There is very little security along the borders. They are not
    clearly delineated. People move back and forth easily. Some of the
    areas are very mountainous. There are active volcanoes in and around
    Goma, and in both North Kivu and South Kivu. It is an enormous
    challenge also because of the enormous size of the country. This is a
    country that shares borders with nine other countries. As I said,
    geographically, it's as large as the eastern part of the United States,
    and certainly is twice as large as Western Europe. It also has several
    water borders. The Congo River divides the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo from the Republic of the Congo, known as Congo Brazzaville. And,
    there are several lakes that divide the country from its eastern
    neighbors.
        In addition to the challenges posed by the size and terrain of the
    border, the DRC military does not have the manpower or the expertise to
    undertake effective border security. We continue to urge the DRC
    government to recommit and accelerate its security sector reform
    efforts. We have provided extensive training to the DRC military and
    are prepared to provide additional training; however, none of it is
    directly aimed at border security.
        While border security is not one of the mandated tasks of the UN
    Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Security Council
    recently took note of and voiced no objection to the use of Unmanned
    Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for MONUSCO's use. Rwanda, a member of the UN
    Security Council since January 2013, joined the consensus. While it is
    unclear who will supply the UAVs, they are expected to be used, in
    part, along the DRC/Rwanda border to help track armed groups and
    provide real-time intelligence. Imagery from the UAVs may also assist
    the work of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), a
    regional body tasked with investigating allegations of cross-border
    support.
        The UN is also weighing the option of integrating a regional peace
    enforcement brigade into MONUSCO. The force would consist of over 2,000
    African troops and would have a mandate to pursue aggressively the
    armed groups in the DRC, including the M23. While border security would
    not be a specific component of the force's mandate, greater border
    security could potentially result from its operations. [See page 30.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

        Secretary Chollet. Some fiscal year (FY) 2013 budgets are still
    being determined. Assuming funding amounts remained the same, the U.S.
    Government planned to provide approximately $6.5 million in military
    assistance to the Government of Rwanda in FY 2013.
        The majority of these funds support HIV/AIDS prevention and Rwandan
    peacekeeping missions in Darfur and South Sudan. The Department of
    Defense (DOD) portion of this assistance is approximately $3.5 million,
    which includes Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
    funding to renovate a school and community center and DOD HIV/AIDS
    Prevention Program (DHAPP) funding to help counter the effects of HIV/
    AIDS within the Rwandan armed forces.
        Regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the U.S.
    Government plans to provide approximately $21.7 million in security
    assistance in FY 2013. Approximately $15 million of this assistance is
    peacekeeping operations funding to build DRC military capacity. The DOD
    portion of this assistance is approximately $396 thousand in OHDACA
    funds to renovate hospitals in the DRC.
        Regarding questions as to whether the assistance provided to these
    countries is adequate and how funding should be prioritized for these
    countries in light of future budget constraints, the needs in Africa
    are always significant and there is always a need for more funding as
    DOD works to build the capacity of partner forces on the continent. In
    particular, the DRC has a significant need for assistance, but the U.S.
    Government should closely monitor the DRC's ability to absorb
    additional assistance.
        USAFRICOM's priorities remain to counter threats to the United
    States emanating from Africa and to be in a position to respond
    appropriately to areas of instability. [See page 12.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

        Secretary Carson. Let me say, thank you very much for the question.
    There is no question that conflict minerals contribute to sustaining
    conflict in Africa. Groups are able to take control of mineral rich
    areas and then to smuggle those minerals out through neighboring states
    into the international market. And so it does play a role in sustaining
    these kinds of conflicts. And this is why legislation passed here by
    the Congress has been useful in putting a check and a control over what
    U.S. companies can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo.
        Reducing the illegal trade in minerals and increasing conflict-free
    sourcing diminishes the revenue available to help sustain armed groups.
    Also, when there are jobs available to support conflict-free mining
    areas, the incentive to join a rebel group as a means of making a
    living is not as strong. Mineral smuggling also is one of the
    incentives for outside interference in the DRC. Smuggling by armed
    groups can benefit supporters of those groups by providing them with
    revenue or with the minerals themselves. We are working with our
    international and regional partners to increase conflict-free sourcing,
    counter mineral smuggling and address this contributing factor to the
    region's destabilization. [See page 22.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Secretary Carson. Of the so-called ``FARDC Five,'' senior officials
    of the Congolese military accused of raping women and girls in separate
    incidents in the eastern DRC between 2004 and 2006, three were
    subsequently arrested in response to U.S. and international lobbying
    efforts: Brigadier General Jerome Kakwavu, Lt. Col. Bebimobuli
    Engandela (a.k.a. Colonel 106), and Colonel Safari. The highest ranking
    officer of the FARDC Five, BG Kakwavu, remains on trial in Kinshasa for
    two counts of rape as a war crime. A second, broader file against
    Kakwavu, opened in May 2012, includes two acts of torture as a war
    crime, one act of murder as a war crime, and nine acts of murder as
    crimes against humanity. Charges are still pending against Lt. Col.
    Bebimobuli, who remains in prison in Kinshasa; proceedings have been
    delayed pending the transfer of his case to Bukavu and related
    logistical as well as security challenges. Bebimobuli's prosecution is
    also complicated by the ongoing insecurity in the eastern DRC, which
    has also prevented prosecutors/investigators/police from reaching
    witnesses. Colonel Safari was acquitted by a military court in October
    2011. The remaining two officers of the ``FARDC Five'' were removed
    from their command positions--a significant step--but subsequently
    fled. One of those officers, Colonel Mosala, remains at large. While
    charges are still pending against Mosala, the case hinges on the
    willingness of the sole victim to press charges. The other, Major
    Pitchen, was reported dead in April 2012. The arrests of such high-
    ranking officers--including Kakwavu, the first general officer to be
    prosecuted for rape by a military tribunal--represent significant
    progress, but major challenges remain to ending impunity and protecting
    Congolese women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
    at the hands of security forces. We remain engaged not only in pursuing
    the prosecutions of these individuals, but also in pressing the GDRC to
    continue to arrest any official implicated in human rights violations
    as part of comprehensive security sector reform. U.S. and UN
    assistance, as well as that of other bilateral partners and non-
    governmental organizations, to the Congolese military justice system
    through prosecution support cells and other programs have helped
    provide the tools, expertise, and skills that prosecutors and judges
    need to adjudicate cases such as these. Our programs and our diplomatic
    engagement have also helped to begin generating and sustaining the
    political will to take on cases so as to end impunity for the
    perpetrators of SGBV, regardless of rank. We continue to monitor
    incidents of alleged sexual violence in conflict, wherever they occur.
    [See page 28.]
    ?

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               December 19, 2012

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

        Mr. Garamendi. What actions are being taken by the Department of
    Defense to address the trade of ivory within the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo and central Africa?
        Secretary Chollet. The Obama administration strongly condemns
    poaching and other wildlife trafficking crimes. Not only do these
    activities affect natural resources, but they pose a real threat to
    security public health, and economic prosperity. Counter-poaching is
    largely a law enforcement matter that is typically undertaken by police
    forces, but USAFRICOM will look for opportunities to leverage their
    engagements with African militaries to support counter-poaching efforts
    where possible.
        The presence of USAFRICOM enables greater engagement with African
    militaries in efforts to build their capacity for a broader range of
    military missions. Training on international legal norms is also a key
    component of USAFRICOM engagement. DOD believes the most effective way
    to reduce illegal activities is through African militaries that could,
    if so directed by their governments, contribute to counter-poaching
    efforts.
        The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for coordinating
    an interagency approach to address the increase in poaching and DOD
    participates in their efforts to build a whole-of-government approach
    to counter-poaching.
        Mr. Garamendi. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd
    Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?
        Secretary Chollet. The Department of Defense has not identified any
    conclusive evidence that M23 rebels are directly involved in the
    hunting and illegal killing of elephants. M23 operates in the highlands
    and too far south and east for ivory. M23 funds itself primarily
    through taxing the movement of goods and people through its territory.
    M23 also extorts labor and goods from locals.

        Mr. Garamendi. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd
    Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?
        Secretary Carson. We have seen no specific reporting that would
    indicate that M23 is involved in poaching or, specifically, involved in
    the trade of ivory. At the same time, M23 does control large swaths of
    Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where
    there is a small elephant population, providing a limited possibility
    that M23 is directly or indirectly benefiting from the trade in ivory,
    or from other forms of wildlife poaching. We will continue to assess
    the situation and respond accordingly should we obtain information of
    M23's direct involvement in the ivory trade.

        Mr. Garamendi. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd
    Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?
        Dr. Frazer. The M23 rebel group has a diverse strategy for
    generating revenue to finance its activities. In addition to
    allegations they have been extracting payments for goods entering at
    border crossings, M23 rebels have also been accused of smuggling gold
    and other minerals across the Democratic Republic of Congo's borders.
    However, at this time there is no direct evidence that demonstrates any
    involvement of the M23 group in the illegal ivory trade in central
    Africa.

        Mr. Garamendi. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd
    Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?
        Dr. Carafano. The ivory trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo
    (DRC) is widespread, specifically in Garamba National Park and the
    Okapi Reserve, located in the northeastern part of the country.
    International crime syndicates, rebel groups, militias, militaries from
    neighboring countries and even the DRC's own troops, have either
    participated in the poaching industry or have been complicit in such
    activity. The ivory trade is particularly useful to groups such as the
    Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Forces
    (FDLR) and Janjaweed fighters from Sudan and Chad who lack steady
    sources of income. While M23 has only been in existence since last
    spring, its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defense of the
    People (CNDP) (disbanded in March 2009) allegedly participated in
    poaching. Poaching is by no means limited to the DRC or Central Africa.
    Poaching is a threat to elephant and rhino populations across the
    continent--from Chad to Kenya to South Africa. The terrorist group, al-
    Shabaab in Somalia has reportedly sought to expand its income through
    the ivory trade in Kenya.

        Mr. Garamendi. a) Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd
    Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?
        b) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative undertake any initiatives to
    address the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or
    central Africa?
        c) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative have any recommendations as to
    initiatives that the Department of Defense and/or Department of State
    could undertake to address the trade of ivory in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo or central Africa?
        Mr. Affleck. Eastern Congo Initiative is unable to determine
    whether or not M23 is involved in ivory trade. We know, however, that
    poaching remains a very serious problem in the region. It is a
    lucrative business fueled by high demand in international markets. In
    the past, ECI has partnered with ICCN at the Virunga National Park in
    North Kivu to help stem poaching and other activities that are
    detrimental to the ecosystem. For instance, we have funded economic
    development initiatives with the national park to provide new income
    opportunities for communities surrounding the park. ECI also
    operationally supported the national park during a critical time period
    when M23 took control of the vast majority of Virunga National Park. We
    have to view poaching and related activities in the context of the
    prevailing insecurity that plagues Congo, particularly in the eastern
    provinces. Just like militiamen seem to continuously elude DRC security
    forces, poachers are often better equipped and more motivated than law
    enforcement agents. Thus, the security of national parks and the
    protection of endangered species need to be part of security sector
    reform initiatives. The United States Government has in the past
    assisted Virunga National Park to stem poaching through the U.S. Fish
    and Wildlife Department and the best way for the Department of Defense
    and the Department of State to help fight and stem poaching and ivory
    trade would be for them to lead international engagement in DRC
    security sector reform. Congo depends on international donors for
    nearly every critical function of the state. As one of DRC's top
    donors, the U.S. is well-positioned to encourage the government of
    Congo to focus efforts on this important aspect of the country's
    progress. Such international engagement would require substantial
    planning, logistical and training support from the U.S. and its allies
    and other partners. Without competent professional military and law
    enforcement institutions, DRC's territory will continue to provide safe
    haven to various armed groups, which prey on the civilian population
    and illegally exploit Congo's resources. In the absence of these
    critical institutions, poachers and their networks will also continue
    to thrive.