    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                    THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN CONGO

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                                AND HUMAN RIGHTS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 11, 2012

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-191

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                                     ______

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    RON PAUL, Texas                      RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    TED POE, Texas                       ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   KAREN BASS, California
    DAVID RIVERA, Florida                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
    ROBERT TURNER, New York
                       Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
                 Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

            Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

                   CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           KAREN BASS, California
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York          THEODORE E. DEUTCH,
    ROBERT TURNER, New York                  FloridaAs of 6/19/
                                             12 deg.

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary, Bureau of
      African Affairs, U.S. Department of State......................    10
    Mr. Steve Hege (former member United Nations Group of Experts on
      the Democratic Republic of the Congo)..........................    32
    Mr. John Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough Project.............    47
    Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, Peter J. Duignan Distinguished Visiting
      Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University................    58

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of California:
      Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012,
        from Members of Congress.....................................     5
      Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012,
        from various organizations...................................     8
    The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement.................    14
    Mr. Steve Hege: Prepared statement...............................    36
    Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement.........................    51
    Mr. Mvemba Dizolele: Prepared statement..........................    62

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    82
    Hearing minutes..................................................    83
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
      Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights: Statement from World
      Relief.........................................................    84

                    THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN CONGO

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2012

                  House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
                                      and Human Rights,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:16 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
    Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
    afternoon. I apologize for the lateness in starting. Today's
    hearing will examine U.S. policy regarding the conflict in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo. This conflict was exacerbated
    by Rwanda's intervention in neighboring Eastern Congo as
    documented by the release of three United Nations reports this
    year. These reports confirmed Rwanda's support of militia who
    have ravaged and continue to plague this region. The State
    Department was unavailable to testify at our September 19th
    hearing on this issue, and the subcommittee promised at that
    time the follow-up when State was available to testify.
        In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, successive U.S.
    administrations have turned a blind eye to reports of Rwandan
    plundering of resources from the DRC and support for rebels who
    have devastated Eastern Congo and its people. It seems that
    guilt over the Clinton administration's colossal failure
    responding effectively, as they did not, to the genocide in
    Rwanda, has led to subsequent U.S. administrations being
    reluctant to criticize the Government of Rwanda.
        With these U.N. reports on the government's behavior in the
    DRC, we must overcome our regret over what happened 18 years
    ago. As an NGO letter to President Obama points out, the United
    States is now out of step with our European allies, who have
    cut aid to Rwanda because of their interference in the DRC, as
    recommended by the U.N. Group of Experts in their recent
    reports. The Group of Experts also recommended imposing
    sanctions on responsible Rwandan officials, including the
    Defense Minister.
        Additionally, the Government of the DRC has failed to
    ensure that its military adequately provides security for its
    citizens. In fact, the National Forces of the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo is alleged to be a perpetrator of human
    rights violations in the East. Security sector reform is
    critical in the DRC, and the United Nations Organization
    Stabilization Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO, has not been able
    to completely train military elements that too often terrorize
    their own people instead of protecting them.
        At this point, it is vital to understand what the
    administration intends to do about the U.N. reports on Rwanda's
    violations of the arms embargo, on nonstate groups in Eastern
    DRC, and how this impacts U.S. relations with Rwanda.
    Furthermore, we must know how the administration intends to
    deal with the DRC Government in light of its deficiencies in
    security sector reform. This hearing will also take a
    comprehensive look at who was responsible for the insecurity in
    Eastern Congo beyond the two governments and the militias.
        Most attention is being paid to the M23 rebel movement in
    Eastern Congo, and justifiably so, in light of their recent
    seizure of territory and overall destructive impact on the
    people of Eastern Congo. However, there are reportedly as many
    as two dozen armed groups terrorizing Congolese in this region.
    According to a November 2012 report from Oxfam, Commodities of
    War, nine of these militias are believed to be the most
    prominent. They range from those with a focus on Rwanda or
    Uganda to those that were formed in response to the flight of
    perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the DRC, or
    those singly focused on the DRC itself.
        Whatever the reason for their founding, these militias have
    terrorized the people of Eastern Congo and the DRC as a whole.
    We must identify their support base and then the flow of arms
    and other aid that enables their ongoing reign of terror.
        According to the U.S. Office for Coordination of
    Humanitarian Affairs, insecurity in Eastern Congo has displaced
    approximately 2.4 million people nationwide, especially in the
    East. Despite long-standing conflict in Eastern Congo, the OCHA
    estimates that the majority of displaced persons typically
    return to their areas of origin within 6 to 18 months of their
    initial displacement and require minimal return assistance.
    While that may be true, it does not account for the kind of
    life Congolese will have once they return to their homes. Women
    continue to be targeted for gross abuse in the DRC. A study
    that recently appeared in the American Journal of Public Health
    concluded that an average of 48 women and girls are raped every
    hour in the country.
        So as with our February 2nd and September 19th hearings on
    the DRC this year, more than 100 females in DRC will have been
    raped before our hearing today ends. Their rejection by their
    families, husbands, and communities casts a cloud over their
    future effort to recreate communities destroyed by the militias
    in the DRC. This is an issue that must be addressed by the
    Congolese themselves, of course, with any help that can be
    provided from the outside, sooner rather than later.
        Since our hearing in September, M23 has made significant
    gains in territorial control, occupying Goma for 10 days while
    moving southward potentially toward the South Kivu town of
    Bukavu. However, international pressure played a major role in
    the group ending its advance southward and withdrawing from
    Goma by early December. DRC President Joseph Kabila's
    government and the M23 rebels reportedly have agreed to peace
    talks in Kampala sponsored by the Government of Uganda. There
    have been peace talks and peace accords in the DRC before, and
    they didn't hold, as we all know. Will this effort achieve a
    lasting peace?
        The DRC is home to an abundant mineral wealth, including 70
    percent of the world's coltan used to make vital components of
    cell phones and other electronic equipment, 30 percent of the
    world's diamond reserves, and vast deposits of cobalt, copper,
    and bauxite. Unfortunately, these natural resources have
    attracted international looters and fueled civil war. Now oil
    has been discovered in Eastern Congo. Can a way be found to
    prevent the DRC's blessings from being turned into curses?
        The tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994 has had lasting
    repercussions in the DRC, but since the 1880s resentment over
    the perceived influx of people considered foreigners in Eastern
    DRC has contributed to conflict in this region, including two
    regional wars. Various leaders of the region have used this
    antipathy for political purposes, pitting their supporters
    against their perceived opponents. Can the interethnic problems
    in the DRC and its neighbors be finally resolved so that a
    lasting peace among all the people of the DRC can be achieved?
        Our witnesses today are well positioned to address
    questions regarding a path forward toward sustainable peace in
    the DRC and the obstacles that lie in that path. It is time now
    to find a way to bring an end to the horrific suffering of the
    people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I yield to my
    friend and colleague Ms. Bass for her opening.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for
    your leadership on this issue and also for holding this
    important hearing. While this committee held a hearing on the
    DRC not too long ago, recent events in Eastern Congo motivate a
    closer examination of this current crisis. I want to especially
    thank Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Carson, and our other
    witnesses for offering testimony at today's hearing.
        I would also like to commend many of you sitting in the
    audience for your tireless work toward peace and justice for
    those affected by the past and current crises. Your concerns
    have been heard, and this committee will continue to elevate
    the status of the DRC so it receives the international
    attention needed to bring about lasting peace and stability.
    Myself, members of this committee, and our colleagues in the
    Senate are deeply concerned with on-the-ground reports of human
    rights violations, forced rape, the recruitment of child
    soldiers, and the involvement of DRC's neighbors in the Eastern
    region.
        I want to stress that there is a great need for the
    international community to work in common interest toward the
    resolution of a crisis that goes well beyond the M23. We must
    not look at the current M23 crisis in some civil, political, or
    military vacuum. For a credible, reasonable, and long-standing
    stability to take hold, I urge that transparent and accountable
    processes be put in place that can address reforms at all
    levels.
        I want to be clear on this point. If we are to see an end
    to the violence and instability, then holistic reforms are
    desperately needed at all levels, including politically and
    economically. We must also see a dramatic reevaluation of the
    social constraints to reforms in civic engagement. The results
    of the deeply flawed 2011 election lay bare the significant
    challenges that must be addressed if we are to see a dramatic
    and positive change of course.
        Ambassador Carson, I will be interested to hear what new
    steps the State Department will take to address these very
    serious challenges that remain unaddressed.
        Let me remind the committee what is at stake. Continued
    failure to achieve stability has torn families apart and shown
    clearly the base actions of those who have no concern for life
    and have not been brought to justice. For too long, the DRC has
    been ravaged by instability and war. For two decades, Eastern
    Congo has been under siege by armed groups. Yesterday it was
    the National Congress for the Defence of the People, today it
    is M23. What will it be tomorrow? Will we stand by and allow a
    fragile peace to be held together by empty promises? The
    violence, the rapes, the child soldiers, the murders must be
    brought to an end.
        What is most troubling about this recent conflict is the
    documented involvement by neighboring governments and the DRC's
    territorial integrity. While the Rwandan and Ugandan
    Governments vehemently deny such involvement, a growing body of
    evidence raises questions that suggest otherwise. I close these
    remarks where I began, urging that all efforts be put toward
    establishing mechanisms that lay the foundation for lasting
    peace, not only in the DRC, but throughout the region. I ask
    that a letter being sent to President Obama be submitted for
    the record. Circulated by Representative McDermott, this letter
    calls for the establishment of a special U.S. envoy, U.S.
    Envoy, and U.N.--and African Union envoy. The purposes of these
    roles should be clear, to present a group of international
    stakeholders that can provide critical and balanced political
    pressure toward a unified policy to address all aspects of this
    regional crisis.
        Also worth mentioning is a second letter to be sent to
    President Obama and Secretary Clinton signed by organizations,
    including Africa Faith and Justice Network, The Enough Project,
    Global Witness, Open Society Foundations, Refugees
    International, among many others.
        [The letters referred to follow:]

                                  ----------

                                  ----------

        Ms. Bass. In addition to calling for special envoys, this
    group boldly calls for global leadership to engage
    constructively in a comprehensive political process. Thank you,
    and I look forward to today's testimonies.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, my friend, Ms. Bass. Any
    other panelists like to make an opening comment? Ms. Buerkle?
    Yes, Mr. Turner?
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just I would like to
    raise a point. Throughout the conflict, the mines remain open,
    minerals, gems, rare earth provide the financing for the
    conflict, I think the motivation for a great deal of it. Who is
    buying this material, and what do we know about the chain of
    both dollars and material on an international basis? And is
    there anything that we or the U.N. or the African Union are
    doing to choke this off? That is it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Turner, thank you very much. I now introduce
    our witness from the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador
    Johnnie Carson, serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the
    Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May
    2009. Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in
    public service, over 37 years in the foreign service, including
    time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
    Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this
    subcommittee many, many years ago, and as a Peace Corps
    volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is the recipient of
    numerous awards for his service from the U.S. Department of
    State. Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
          BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Carson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of
    the committee, thank you for the very kind invitation to
    testify before the subcommittee today on the crisis unfolding
    in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC.
        As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the
    Congo is the most volatile in Africa today. An estimated 5
    million people have died in the years since the second regional
    war began in that country in 1997-1998, and millions more have
    been forced to flee their homes. The people of North and South
    Kivu provinces, in particular, have faced repeated cycles of
    conflict and shocking atrocities. The November 20th fall of
    Goma to the M23 rebel group provided a stark reminder that in
    spite of the international community's major investments in
    humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, the underlying causes of the
    recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC remain unresolved.
        The Congolese Government has failed to provide effective
    security, governance, and services in the Eastern provinces,
    and political and economic tensions persist between the DRC and
    its eastern neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Since the M23
    rebellion erupted last spring, the United States has worked
    closely with international and regional partners to mobilize a
    comprehensive response aimed at preventing a further
    deterioration of the situation. Secretary Clinton, Ambassador
    Rice, and Under Secretary Wendy Sherman have spoken or met with
    senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and U.N. officials to
    advocate for a rapid and peaceful resolution to this crisis.
        In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken action to
    ensure that five of the M23's most abusive commanders are now
    under targeted sanctions. We have also stressed the need to
    hold accountable all of those who commit human rights abuses
    and atrocities, and I myself traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, and
    Uganda between November 24 and 28 with my British and French
    counterparts to deliver a clear and common message that the
    Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan Governments must work together
    to stop this crisis and to work toward a sustainable resolution
    of underlying issues.
        All three governments reiterated to us their commitment to
    these goals. We also stressed that there should be no impunity
    for senior M23 leaders who are under ICC indictment or
    international sanctions for human rights abuses. The M23 would
    not be the threat that it is today without external support,
    and we will continue to discourage outside parties from
    providing any assistance to the M23 movement. There is a
    credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the
    Group of Experts report concerning Rwandan Government support
    to the M23, including military, logistical, and political
    assistance.
        The British Government has recently indicated that it
    shares this assessment. We do not have a similar body of
    evidence that Uganda has a government policy of support for the
    M23. Based on this evidence, we have repeatedly pressed Rwanda
    to halt and prevent any and all forms of support to Congolese
    armed groups.
        Looking forward, we expect all parties, including Rwanda,
    to cease any support to M23 and other armed groups, abide by
    the Kampala Accords of November 21 and 24, and to work
    constructively with its neighbors and the international
    community and take affirmative steps to end impunity for M23
    commanders responsible for human rights abuses in order to
    reach an acceptable political agreement.
        We ask the Government of Uganda to also ensure that
    supplies to the M23 do not originate in or transit through
    Ugandan territory, including from individual officials who
    might be acting on their own. The Department continues to
    monitor closely all potential sources of external support, and
    we will continue to respond appropriately, including by
    reviewing our assistance to deter this support as the situation
    develops.
        We are taking a number of other steps in concert with other
    international partners as a part of our comprehensive response
    to the current crisis. First and foremost, we are monitoring
    humanitarian needs and mobilizing an appropriate response. The
    humanitarian situation in the Eastern Congo remains deplorable,
    as it has been for years, but recent attacks by the M23 and
    other armed groups have displaced hundreds of thousands and
    left some areas of North and South Kivu inaccessible to
    humanitarian response.
        The United States provided more than $110 million in
    humanitarian assistance for Congolese refugees, internally
    displaced persons, and conflict-affected civilians in Fiscal
    Year 2012, and at the U.N., we have urged donors to respond to
    the U.N.'s consolidated appeal for the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo.
        Second, the International Conference on the Great Lakes
    Region, known as the ICGLR, the African Union, and the Security
    Council have all demanded that the M23 refrain from further
    offensive operations, and to remain out of Goma. While the
    Congolese Government has agreed to hear the grievances of the
    M23 in discussions that are now taking place in Kampala, we
    continue to call for accountability for the M23's most abusive
    leaders, and we will continue to speak out against the forcible
    recruitment of children and the other crimes of the M23's
    soldiers and rebels.
        Third, we believe that Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and
    Museveni must continue to engage in direct talks to address the
    underlying causes of instability in the region as well as the
    potential drivers of progress. We support the appointment of a
    U.N. Special Envoy to facilitate a long-term solution of these
    problems, and we will consult with the U.N. Secretary General
    about this. We will work to ensure that any agreement between
    the parties is transparent, sustainable, and enjoys support and
    commitment of the region.
        Fourth, more must be done to protect civilians in the
    Eastern DRC. We and our fellow Security Council members and
    troop-contributing countries are reviewing options for
    improving the U.N.'s ability to protect civilians and help
    implement defined aspects of a potential regional political
    settlement.
        Fifth, the DRC Government has the primary responsibility
    for protecting its territory and all, all of its citizens. We
    are urging President Kabila to take clear and bold measures to
    ensure that the soldiers of the Congolese army are
    professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, and
    respectful of their citizens and of international human rights
    norms. The extension of effective governance combined with
    legitimate provincial elections would also help to underpin a
    lasting peace.
        We believe that the time has come for the region's leaders
    and the international community to break the cycle of violence
    and impunity that has existed for far too long in the Eastern
    DRC. We and, most importantly, the region's political leaders
    must ensure that the national security and territory, integrity
    of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi are protected. We must
    help build a future for people who have seen more conflict than
    peace over the past 2 decades. We must help turn the vast
    mineral and agricultural wealth of the Eastern DRC into a
    source of economic pride and progressThe Honorable Johnnie
    Carson, assistant secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S.
    Department of StateMr. John Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough
    ProjectMr. Steve Hege (former member United Nations Group of
    Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo)Mr. Mvemba
    Dizolele, Peter J. Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow,
    Hoover Institution, Stanford University benefiting the people
    of the region and not contributing to conflict.
        The leaders of the region must establish nonviolent means
    of addressing their political, security, economic, and border
    differences. As Secretary Clinton noted when she visited Goma
    in 2009, the Congolese people are courageous and resilient, and
    there are reasons for hope across the entirety of the DRC,
    including progress toward paying soldiers through electronic
    and mobile banking, and building the capacity to provide
    justice in response to mass atrocities and human rights
    violations.
        We need to build on these steps, which have been gravely
    set back by the current M23 rebellion. The decisions taken
    today, the decisions taken now will have a direct impact on
    what happens over the next several months as well as the next
    several years. They will affect the behavior of other militias
    in the Kivus, the success of reforms to promote the conflict-
    free trade and mineral resources, and the ability to sustain
    operations against the vicious Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph
    Kony that has operated in the northern part of the DRC and in
    the Central African Republic.
        Today's crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a genuine
    opportunity to help the Congolese people set a more sustainable
    course toward peace and stability in their own country as well
    as with their neighbors. The framework for action at the
    national, regional, and international levels that I have
    outlined today could help enable the peoples of the region to
    escape the recurring cycles of conflict which have hampered
    progress in the Eastern Congo for nearly 2 decades.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify this
    afternoon. I have a longer submission for the record which you
    may have. I look forward to answering any of your questions.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. Without
    objection, your full statement and the letters referenced by
    Ms. Bass before will be made a part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, a couple hours ago, at least
    online, the Guardian newspaper posted an article, the title of
    which is, ``Obama accused of failed policy over Rwanda's
    support of rebel group,'' and it points out the letter that we
    all are aware of, signed by 15 organizations, takes the
    administration to task for its policy. The article begins,
    ``Leading campaign groups and thinktanks have written to Barack
    Obama accusing him of a failed policy over Rwanda's support for
    rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and calling on
    the President to impose sanctions.'' The letter says in
    pertinent part, ``As the situation once again dramatically
    deteriorates in Eastern Congo, the U.S. response to the crisis
    has patently failed and is out of step with other western
    nations. Since M23 was created in the spring of 2012, U.S.
    officials continue to place faith in engaging Rwanda in a
    constructive dialogue. This approach has clearly failed to
    change Rwanda's policy, as evidenced by the direct involvement
    of the Rwandan army in the recent takeover of Goma as
    documented by the United Nations Group of Experts.'' The
    Rwandans say that the report is fabricated and ``The U.N.
    group's report says: `Rwandan officials co-ordinated of
    creation of the rebel movement as well as its major military
    operations' as well as providing troops and arming the group.''
        It recommends imposing sanctions against Rwandans
    officially. You have just testified there is a credible body of
    evidence that corroborates key findings of the Group of Experts
    reports, including evidence of significant military and
    logistical support as well as operational and political
    guidance from the Rwandan Government to the M23. You also point
    out that we do not have a similar body of evidence that Uganda
    has a government-wide policy of support to M23.
        Now, as we all know, and I on the House side pushed very
    hard to get this legislation passed, a bill that was authored
    by then-Senator Barack Obama called the Democratic Republic of
    Congo Relief Security and Democratic Promotion Act of 2006. It
    calls on the U.S. Government to withhold assistance to any
    foreign country taking action to destabilize the DRC.
        I wonder if you could tell us, do the actions of Rwanda
    merit a withdrawal of funding? Does it not rise to, given the
    corroboration of evidence, as you pointed out, to withholding
    aid to Rwanda until they change?
        Mr. Carson. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I reject the
    headline that the administration has failed to speak out
    against the M23 and against those----
        Mr. Smith. That is not what they said, with all due
    respect. They talked about a failed policy, not that we didn't
    speak out against M23, so just be clear.
        Mr. Carson. I think that what we say and do is a part of
    the policy effort, and I reject that notion, and I must reject
    it pretty soundly. First and foremost, we have been engaged on
    this issue since the M23 rebellion began in April of this year.
    Since April up until yesterday, we have at all levels of the
    U.S. Government, senior levels of the U.S. Government been
    working to advance greater peace and stability, an end to the
    current fighting, a current withdrawal of M23 from Goma, and
    discussions between the leaders in the region.
        Let me just give you a quick catalog. Certainly between
    April and September, I and Under Secretary for Political
    Affairs, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, were in contact on numerous
    occasions telephonically with leaders in the region. I also met
    with leaders about this issue at the African Union summit in
    June.
        In September of this year, Secretary Clinton invited the
    Presidents of Rwanda and of the DRC to meet with her on the
    margins of the U.N. General Assembly to try to find ways to end
    the current rebellion. We participated in September as well in
    Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's special meeting on the Great
    Lakes Region. In addition, Under Secretary Wendy Sherman
    traveled to the region in October, met with Presidents Kagame,
    Kabila, and Museveni, and this was one of the most important of
    her sets of meetings out there. She met with President Kagame
    for over 5 hours in Kigali on that visit.
        Shortly after that we actually did take some action.
    Because we had information that we believed indicated Rwandan
    support, we cut off our foreign military financing to the
    Rwandan Government, one of the first such public acts by any
    government. And I can say that I traveled to the region for
    several days just after Thanksgiving and traveled to Kampala,
    to Kigali, and to Kinshasa to meet with the leaders of all
    three countries. I also traveled with my British and French
    counterparts. In addition, we have sanctioned M23 leaders. We
    are about to sanction more M23 leaders and officials, and we
    have continued to advance our diplomacy as well as speak out
    against what has been happening in the region.
        So, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, anyone who would
    suggest that we have been inactive would be----
        Mr. Smith. Again, Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Ambassador, you are
    both, no one is suggesting inactivity. It is the policy itself
    that is under scrutiny and being criticized by those 15
    organizations, and--I mean, let me ask you this: Are there
    sanctions contemplated or have there been any sanctions imposed
    upon any Rwandese officials or military?
        Mr. Carson. No. But we have, as I pointed out, implemented
    sanctions which have cut off foreign military financing to the
    Rwandan Government and to the Rwandan military.
        Mr. Smith. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary----
        Mr. Carson. I think those are sanctions, and I think they
    are very public, and they have been terminated.
        Mr. Smith. You mentioned support for U.N. envoy. How about
    a U.S. envoy?
        Mr. Carson. We actually have a U.S. Envoy for the Great
    Lakes Region. His name is Ambassador Barrie Walkley. He has
    been on the job for nearly a year. Ambassador Walkley is
    infinitely qualified to serve as our envoy there. He has served
    in two francophone African countries as Ambassador and he has
    previously served as deputy chief of mission in the DRC. He
    travels to the region quite frequently, and so there is an
    envoy out there already. One may quibble with the level, but
    the existence is there. He is active, and he is working hard on
    this issue along with other officials.
        Mr. Smith. Understood. But the gravitas of a Presidential
    envoy I believe would send, perhaps, a stronger message to
    those that are part of the peace process.
        Let me ask you, if I could, John Prendergast, in his
    statement, very strongly says, ``By global standards the
    international effort to construct a credible peace process for
    Congo is manifestly derelict, condemning that country to
    further cycles of devastating conflict. When the curtain is
    pulled back, when one looks behind the occasional United
    Nations Security Council resolution calling simply for an end
    to the violence, the international diplomatic response is
    revealed to be shockingly ineffective, perhaps even violating
    the Hippocratic Oath, `first do no harm.' '' Then he goes on
    from there. How do you respond to that?
        Mr. Carson. Well, I think I don't need to respond for the
    entire international community. All I do is respond for the
    U.S. Government. I know Mr. Prendergast, we have been long-time
    colleagues and friends. He has a great deal of knowledge and
    expertise on the region, but I would submit that the actions
    that we have taken reflect a high degree of interest in this
    situation.
        Mr. Smith. Would troops recently pledged by the South
    African Development Community comprise a credible force to
    protect the DRC-Rwanda border?
        Mr. Carson. Last week, the SADC countries met in Dar es
    Salaam, and there they agreed to send in some 4,000 troops into
    the Eastern DRC to serve as an international or, I should say,
    a neutral international force; 1,000 troops were pledged by
    Tanzania, the other 3,000 were going to be drawn from a
    southern African stand-by force. I do not know the capacity or
    the ability of the countries in the region to pull those troops
    together, but what I would say is that the U.N. currently has
    the largest peacekeeping force in the world in the DRC, and if
    there is an interjection of a new force, it should be done very
    carefully in cooperation and collaboration with the United
    Nations. It should be well thought out and well resourced, and
    one should consider whether it is not better to augment and
    integrate those new forces into an expanded and more assertive
    U.N. force than to create a new force that would be operating
    in the area in which there are already a large number of
    military and rebel forces. It could create some concerns about
    operational effectiveness and operational overlaps.
        Mr. Smith. I, too, have been in Goma myself a few years
    back, and know how unbelievably unstable that area is. Part of
    the problem, I believe, is that there are insufficient troops
    deployed, even under the large U.N. deployment there, and then
    there is always the question of the rules of engagement.
        Let me ask you one final question before I yield to my
    friend, Ms. Bass. There are rumors, maybe they are just rumors,
    that the administration sought to delay the U.N. Group of
    Experts report on the DRC this past summer and attempted to
    soften criticism of Rwandan involvement with M23. Can you speak
    to that?
        Mr. Carson. I reject that as out of hand.
        Mr. Smith. Okay. And one final question, the Rwandans join
    the U.N. Security Council next year. Does that have any bearing
    on what our policy will be, particularly when it comes to
    sanctions, since they will be on the Security Council?
        Mr. Carson. No, it does not. I would just hope that the
    Rwandans, when they join the Council, will carry out their
    duties in a responsible and thoughtful way just as the other 15
    members of the Security Council do.
        Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you, Ambassador Carson. I want to change
    the subject a little bit and wanted to ask if you could speak
    to some of the background of the M23. I mean, I do understand,
    you know, when they started and why, but I just wanted to know
    if you had any further insight as to what their ultimate aim
    is, what is the motivation for them to continue, and also, the
    idea--you mentioned that there wouldn't be impunity to the
    commanders of the M23 to be reintegrated back into the DRC's
    Armed Forces, but how do you reintegrate any of them? How big
    is the M23? How many soldiers are there?
        Mr. Carson. Let me speak to the first question of aim and
    motivation. I believe that the current group of M23 rebels want
    to be able to maintain themselves as consolidated military
    units in the eastern part of the DRC. I think they see
    themselves as guardians of the Tutsi population in the East. I
    suspect that some of them have political ambitions and would
    seek to try to be able to be the top officials in local
    administrations in the East.
        Beyond that, I don't know what their aims and motivations
    are. I know that when this rebellion started back in March and
    April there was a clear desire on the part of the now
    constituted M23 rebels not to be moved from the eastern part of
    the DRC into other parts of the country, and their officers did
    not want to leave the military commands in which they had been
    assigned to take on different commands.
        Impunity, I think there should not be impunity for those
    M23 leaders who fall into three categories--those who are
    clearly ICC indictees, those for whom there are international
    and binational sanctions already, and thirdly, for those where
    there is evidence or a growing body of evidence that they have,
    in fact, committed atrocities and war crimes and rapes
    throughout the last 7 or 8 months. I don't have an exact figure
    for the number of M23 rebels. Initially when they broke away in
    April of this year, the number was probably no more than 1,000.
    Today that number has probably swelled for a lot of reasons,
    but it is not a legion of people.
        Ms. Bass. You know, when you were saying previously that
    what the President, one of the things that led to the recent
    rebellion was the President trying to scatter the troops,
    because how can you ever have peace if, even if you did have
    sanctions against the top commanders, how can you have an army
    when you have a faction that wants to separate and operate
    independently? I don't know how that works.
        Mr. Carson. It doesn't work very well. But let me say that
    there have been a number of countries that have effectively
    integrated rebel groups into their militaries and in the
    process, have made those militaries stronger and more
    consolidated. Here I think there was an effort by the M23 not
    to leave the Kivus, not to be reassigned to other parts of the
    DRC, and for their leaders, not to move out of the areas in
    which they called home. I don't think you can effectively
    operate a military in which you have a reintegrated rebel group
    deciding what it wants to do rather than what the military
    command and the government wants it to do.
        Ms. Bass. Right. Exactly. You also talked previously about
    the ongoing tension on the border of Rwanda and the DRC, and
    you mentioned the U.N. peacekeeping forces, and also the
    possibility of troops coming from South Africa to secure that
    border. Where are the peacekeeping troops? Are they all over?
    Aren't they already on that border?
        Mr. Carson. No, they aren't. I think that the MONUSCO
    troops are scattered throughout the eastern part of North and
    South Kivus. They are there largely to protect civilian
    populations, refugees, and displaced persons. They are not, in
    fact, monitoring or working and observing along the border, but
    are near and in towns, villages, near refugee camps and
    displaced-persons camps to respond to crises and to help the
    FARDC, the Congolese military, when they are called upon to do
    so.
        Ms. Bass. Could you speak to the impact that conflict
    minerals might be playing, the role conflict minerals might be
    playing, especially in providing resources to the M23?
        Mr. Carson. Let me say that conflict minerals have always
    been a factor in providing resources to rebel groups in the
    eastern part of the Congo, but quite honestly as serious as
    conflict minerals are, they are probably not the primary reason
    for the current crisis. They are one of the, you know,
    underlying systemic reasons why the crisis can continue, but I
    think that the current crisis is to be found in what are the
    so-called grievances and in discipline of the M23 and the
    support that they have received from outside of the country.
        Ms. Bass. And then finally, how would you assess the U.S.
    Government's response to the humanitarian crisis in the eastern
    region of the DRC, if you could describe it?
        Mr. Carson. I think, as I noted in my testimony, we have
    given in excess of $110 million in humanitarian assistance.
        Ms. Bass. Maybe you could explain what some of those
    dollars are for?
        Mr. Carson. These dollars are used to provide food to
    displaced persons throughout both North and South Kivus, it is
    to provide food and assistance to refugee populations who are
    there, it is to provide shelter, shelter material and blankets,
    it is also to provide clean and potable water, and also to
    provide prophylaxis for malaria and also the medicines for
    dealing with issues of cholera and hygiene.
        Ms. Bass. And, I am sorry, just one final question. What
    more would you like to see from Congress? How can we be helpful
    in this situation?
        Mr. Carson. Congresswoman Bass, I think your hearings,
    hearings such as this one give us downtown an opportunity to
    indicate to you what we are doing. They also give us an
    opportunity to hear from you what things you think we haven't
    been doing that might be useful to do to improve the situation.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, a statement from World Relief
    will be made a part of the record. I yield to Mr. Marino.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, for
    being here today.
        Mr. Ambassador, my research shows me that the United
    States, perhaps with some assistance from other countries in
    Europe, have given about $1 billion over the last 10 years to
    Rwanda and not quite that much to Uganda. Can you explain if we
    have reduced any amount given to either of those countries and
    how much?
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Congressman, we have certainly in the last
    6 months reduced our foreign military financing to Rwanda by
    some $200,000. This would have been monies that the Rwandan
    military could have used for the financing and purchasing of
    equipment. We have not reduced any of our development
    assistance money to Rwanda, and I might say here that Rwanda
    does a remarkably good job of utilizing its foreign assistance
    resources probably more effective than most countries across
    Africa. They do a very good job in using that money to provide
    health care, agriculture, education to their people, and they
    do get very high marks for that. We have not touched any of
    their development assistance money.
        Mr. Marino. How do you draw the distinction between where
    the--did you say $200,000? That is a drop in the bucket,
    $200,000. And I think the remark from the Prime Minister or the
    General was $200,000 was nothing, it doesn't bother us at all.
    So it doesn't seem that we are very serious about this,
    blatantly not very serious about this, and how is the so-called
    remainder of the billion over the 10 years less the $200,000,
    how is that disbursed and who disburses it?
        Mr. Carson. I am not sure what the billion is that you are
    referring to?
        Mr. Marino. The billion dollars that my research shows that
    the U.S., with some assistance from Europe, has given Rwanda
    over the last decade. Now, you say that has been reduced at
    least this year, I am assuming this year by $200,000, so if you
    break that billion over a 10-year period, still $200,000 is
    nothing over an annual basis, and how can we guarantee that
    even though there is a reduction of $200,000, and you say, I
    believe you say to the military, and correct me if I am wrong,
    it is all fungible.
        Mr. Carson. It is not fungible. Let me, first of all, say
    that in Fiscal Year 2012 that has just concluded, we provided
    Rwanda with some $195 million in assistance. This money went
    primarily into health and to agricultural programs. Rwanda has
    used its development assistance dollars extraordinarily well.
    As I said, probably better than most other African countries
    and most other developing countries.
        Mr. Marino. How do you----
        Mr. Carson. Moreover, we do not provide them with direct
    budgetary support. We are not providing them with a check or
    with cash. We work through NGOs, through international
    development organizations and agencies, and there is a high
    degree of accountability for all of the funding that we have
    given to the Rwandan Government. Their utilization of foreign
    assistance in an effective manner really is not at question nor
    at issue because in that regard, we have to be both frank and
    honest, and they do a very good job. We don't give them cash,
    we don't write them a check, but the monies that they get
    through the international partners is effectively utilized for
    the purposes it is intended for. We are pretty----
        Mr. Marino. I have understood through my research and
    contacts that there has been a great deal of hijacking of these
    resources by groups such as M23 and using it for their own
    purposes or selling that to buy weapons. Do you have any
    information on that?
        Mr. Carson. Not--I am not aware of that whatsoever.
        Mr. Marino. Has the U.S. had any contact, directly or
    indirectly, with M23 leaders?
        Mr. Carson. No. I am not aware of any direct contact
    between U.S. officials and M23 leaders. There have been two
    meetings in Kampala between leaders of the M23 and members of
    the DRC Government along with other diplomats. We have been in
    the room as observers when those sessions have been public, but
    we have had no direct contact of which I am aware with any, and
    I underscore any M23 leaders.
        Mr. Marino. Are there any plans to get more directly
    involved for whatever reason by the Department of State with
    M23?
        Mr. Carson. Well, I think--no, not at the--no, not that I
    am aware of. Certainly not.
        Mr. Marino. You stated that numbers have increased with
    M23, they have swelled over the last several months. For what
    reasons?
        Mr. Carson. Defections from the FARDC, recruitment of
    individuals in the communities that they have captured and
    taken over, the forced recruitment of young men, all of these
    have contributed to an expansion of their numbers.
        Mr. Marino. You started explaining a little bit the reason
    for the crises, but can you expand upon your answer as what you
    see the cause, the direct cause of the crisis that is taking
    place, particularly with M23's origination?
        Mr. Carson. Well, M23 rose out of the--an organization
    called the CNDR which was integrated into the Congolese army
    back in March 2009. Most of these individuals were from North
    and South Kivu, they were a part of a rebel movement. Most of
    them were Rwandaphones and Tutsis in origin. In order to bring
    an end to a previous rebellion by this group, the Government of
    the DRC brought them in to the military, integrated them in,
    and attempted to make them a part of the army. They broke away
    in April of this year. I might add that not all of the CNDR
    members from 2009 and before broke away. Some of them remained
    in the army. But the principal reasons for their decision to
    bolt and run, they claim, was a failure of the DRC Government
    to live up to the agreement of March 23, 2009, but other things
    that are clear is that the DRC Government wanted to move units,
    some of these integrated CNDR units to other parts of the
    country. They resisted this. They wanted to move some of the
    leadership to other parts of the country. They resisted this.
        President Kabila also did something that disturbed the
    CNDR, and he announced that he would try to arrest one of the
    most notorious of the CNDR leaders who had been integrated into
    the army, and that was Bosco Ntaganda, who was an ICC indictee,
    and so all of these reasons that have a lot to do with
    disgruntlement within this integrated rebel faction are the
    background to the current crisis.
        Mr. Marino. Mr. Ambassador, you stated that the aid that we
    are supplying to Rwanda via NGOs, how can we guarantee that any
    of that aid is not going into regions controlled by M23.
        Mr. Carson. Again, I want to separate both the DRC from
    Rwanda. We have no evidence, no proof that any of the aid that
    we have given to Rwanda has been misused or mischanneled into
    the hands of any rebel group. As I said before, the issue here
    really is not about the effective utilization of aid and aid
    resources. Rwanda has a high level of credibility with respect
    to the way it uses its resources. That is not at issue. I have
    no doubt that they are using their resources well.
        So it is not funneling across the border, and it is not
    direct assistance, so we work with NGOs and international
    organizations. We audit what we give, and they use it
    efficiently. It is not being misused.
        And in the areas of the DRC, we are providing only
    humanitarian support and assistance. And that humanitarian
    support and assistance is going through organizations, mostly
    U.N. organizations, World Food Programme, or through UNHCR, or
    through the development assistance arm of the international--of
    the United Nations, or through Caritas or Save the Children or
    ICRC.
        Mr. Marino. Is that an audit that the State Department
    conducts or is that an audit based on information that the NGOs
    give the State Department?
        Mr. Carson. We can provide you with a full answer to this,
    but USAID conducts routine audits of all of its assistance
    programs. I cannot tell you when they did the last ones with
    respect to these programs. But they conduct routine audits to
    ensure that there is accountability. Again, that is not at
    issue here.
        Mr. Marino. How do you get the attention of a country like
    Rwanda and Uganda from supporting M23 by not stopping aid to
    the country, whether it is for humanitarian needs or not? How
    do you get their attention?
        Mr. Carson. By engaging them continuously, diplomatically,
    at a high level, and by doing such things as indicating that
    we, as we have done, that we will cut off their foreign
    military financing if they persist in carrying on.
        Mr. Marino. I don't mean to be facetious, but this may be
    more rhetorical than a question you have to answer, but how is
    that negotiating going?
        Mr. Carson. It is like any set of negotiations, sometimes
    much longer than any of us would like, but we know that
    persistence over the long run pays off.
        Mr. Marino. So is it your position that the U.S. keep the
    plan that they have in operation right now and continue trying
    to negotiate this? At what point do you stop? How many people
    have to die before you stop the negotiations and get serious
    about this?
        Mr. Carson. We can't stop. We continue, and we will
    continue to persist. This is not in our hands alone. We can
    only facilitate. We can only encourage. We can only prod,
    cajole, and push peace, and the effort to bring about peace and
    stability is always in the hands of those who are adversaries.
    Our desire is to get them to see reason, and to see it sooner
    rather than later, and to understand that the persistence of
    conflict and violence only means greater loss of life and hurt
    for people.
        But it is not simply in our hands. We can only do as much
    as we can to bring people to the table and encourage them to
    see reason.
        Mr. Marino. And in closing, this is more of a statement
    than it is a question, from my reading of the research, it
    seems that this situation is not getting the attention that I
    think is required from the United Nations as well.
        Thank you, Chairman. I yield.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
        Without objection, the audit information requested by Mr.
    Marino and promised by Ambassador Carson will be made a part of
    the record. So we look forward to receiving it.
        Chair recognizes Chairman Royce.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
        Let me just ask Ambassador Carson a couple of questions.
    One, just going to MONUSCO's mandate, I think the force there
    of M23, that militia is probably about 2,500 people from at
    least the press accounts. And I know the French have a
    perspective here that the ability to secure the safety of the
    civilian population could be addressed by a more robust
    authorization that would allow them to come to the defense of
    the civilian population. And I was going to ask you that
    question.
        And the second question I was going to ask you goes to the
    issue of naming Rwanda for its involvement here with M23, and I
    know there was that debate in the Security Council over whether
    or not we would expressly name them. And as I recall, the U.S.
    position was not to do so at the time. But I think in light of
    events since then, we have now sort of taken the position, or
    it seems that the administration has taken the position that we
    are pointing to Rwanda's engagement here. So de facto maybe we
    have named them. Just a couple of--just your observations on
    those two points, Ambassador.
        Mr. Carson. Chairman Royce, thank you very, very much for
    both of those questions, and also thank you for your continued
    interest in Africa. Let me respond to the second question first
    and repeat a part of my testimony that you may have missed at
    the beginning.
        I said that the M23 would not be the threat that it is
    today without external support. And we will continue to
    discourage outside parties from providing any assistance to the
    M23. There is a creditable body of evidence that corroborates
    key findings of the Group of Experts reports concerning Rwandan
    Government support to the M23, including military, logistical,
    and political assistance.
        Mr. Royce. Ambassador, I think you put that very, very
    well. My only question was, we hadn't put it in the resolution,
    in Resolution 2076, and perhaps it should have been there. But
    you couldn't be more explicit than you just were, and I thank
    you for that.
        And let me just ask you about the proposed alternatives to
    ensure more civilian safety with respect to the mandate.
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, the current MONUSCO mandate is
    for some 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers. Currently, that mandate is
    undersubscribed by approximately 2,000 individuals. I think
    MONUSCO today has a force level of approximately 17,700
    individuals.
        Certainly, it would be desirable to see the full complement
    of the mandate met. It certainly would help to allow the
    MONUSCO to carry out its responsibilities. Following in the
    aftermath of the current situation in Goma, and the Eastern
    Congo, I think I also made reference to in my statement, to the
    fact that it would be useful for a reexamination of the
    effectiveness of the force and whether the mandates and other
    responsibilities are being met and whether there are adequate
    resources to meet them. But the force is undersubscribed by
    approximately 2,000 people.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. The last question I will
    ask you just goes to this group, the Allied Democratic Forces/
    National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, which has been
    around for a while, and it goes to this issue of rebel groups
    increasingly joining forces beyond their national borders. This
    particular group has done some work with al-Shabaab, and a
    bombing, for example, July 11, 2010, in Kampala, which killed,
    I think, over 70 people.
        And so you have this nexus. If we look at the leader of
    this group, he got his training, I think he is a converted
    Catholic, Jamil Mukulu, who converted to radical Islam probably
    while he was in Sudan. But in Sudan, he met Osama bin Laden,
    and through the initial work with these radical organizations
    put together his own little vision of how he could create
    change, and including a lot of mayhem, but none of it that
    spectacular until al-Shabaab began to give him the wherewithal,
    you know, to carry out attacks like this one.
        And I was going to ask you about that phenomenon. You have
    these organizations where part of his support network come from
    disaffected Congolese, and here is Ugandans in the operation as
    well and, you know, people from throughout the region who join
    a cause that becomes sort of transnational, and begin working,
    in this case they suspect him of working with al-Qaeda as well.
        Ambassador Carson, just anything you can do to bring me up
    to speed in terms of organizations like this that, frankly, he
    is based right now in eastern Kivu. So, you know, we have got
    the--in North Kivu. So we have got the same phenomenon
    spreading, apparently.
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, three quick points on that. First
    of all, it is absolutely essential that all the states in the
    region agree and commit themselves not to harbor, not to
    support, not to defend, not to provide equipment, or
    sustenance, or training to rebel groups operating against the
    leaders of a neighboring state. This is one of the problems
    that we face today with the M23. It is also a problem that we
    face with the Allied Democratic Forces. This is incumbent upon
    all of them, incumbent upon every state in the Great Lakes to
    do this. If we could get that, we could cut off a lot of the
    support for rebel groups.
        With respect to the Allied Democratic Forces, indeed, they
    have been operating in the eastern part of North Kivu against
    the Ugandans. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo needs to do everything that it possibly can to not allow
    groups like this to continue to operate out of and from their
    territory. I am not in any way accusing them of aiding and
    abetting, but the mere fact that they don't have security and
    control of the territory effectively allows this to go on. But
    it needs to stop, clearly needs to stop.
        Third point, with respect to the leader of the Allied
    Democratic front, Mr. Mukulu, we have, in fact, sanctioned him.
    We have imposed both visa travel and financial sanctions on him
    in response to the very criminal things that we know that he is
    responsible for doing.
        Mr. Royce. Ambassador, thank you very much, and thank you
    for all your work on the ground in Africa with these groups. I
    know that as things were unfolding in Eastern Congo you were
    there trying to influence the course of events, and we
    appreciate that.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
        Let me ask just two final questions.
        And, Ms. Bass, if you have a final question, please fire
    away.
        Again, you have in your testimony made it very clear that
    there is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key
    findings of the Group of Experts, including evidence of
    significant military and logistical support, as well as
    operation and political guidance from the Rwandan Government to
    the M23. I know on your most recent trip you were precluded the
    opportunity to meet with Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda.
    Did the officials with whom you met with, did they dispute
    that, and when Under Secretary Sherman met with President
    Kagame some months back, several weeks back, did she get a
    report back from him? Did he tell her that this is all rubbish,
    not true, or did he admit to anything?
        Secondly, one of my most disappointing takeaways today, and
    Mr. Marino, I think, drew you out further on the suspension of
    foreign military financing, that we are talking about $200,000
    when the 2006 Act at least envisioned a more robust and
    credible sanction against a country that is aiding and abetting
    a nefarious organization like M23. So if you could speak to
    whether or not additional sanctions are under consideration, at
    least against Rwanda, and specific individuals as well.
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, let me answer the first question.
    You are correct. As I stated earlier, I and my British and
    French colleagues met in Kampala for several hours with
    President Museveni, and in Kinshasa we met for an extended
    period of time with President Kabila, as well as his Foreign
    Minister and his Prime Minister.
        In Kigali, it is regrettable that President Kagame chose
    not to meet with us. The message about our concerns, again, not
    just those of the United States, but Britain, and France, we
    traveled there as the P3, the three permanent members of the
    Security Council who have worked together on many, many issues,
    but we did speak with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister
    Louise Mushikiwabo, plus some of her colleagues. Again, we
    raised the issue of the need to end outside support.
        As in previous discussions, the Rwandan Government
    strongly, vehemently denies that it is providing any assistance
    to the M23, and it has not taken the steps of publicly
    denouncing on a bilateral basis the M23. So we have raised
    this, and it is important that we continue to monitor this, as
    others in the international community do, on a very, very close
    basis.
        With respect to your second question, about international
    support to, or at least our bilateral support to the Rwandan
    Government, I start with what I said to Congressman Marino
    earlier, is that they utilize their international assistance,
    not only from us in particular, but others, very, very
    effectively. And they use it with great integrity. People get
    it. We are not providing any cash or check transfers. It all
    goes through international organization and donor groups that
    work with the government. We don't think there is a level of
    fungibility, and we do not believe that the money is being
    misused or misdirected. We focused on the military because that
    is where the issue and the problem derives.
        I know that a number of European governments have suspended
    large amounts of funding to the Rwandan Government, but they
    handle their resources differently. In most instances, they are
    making budgetary transfers that are cash payments and checks
    into the government. We don't do that. So it is a very, very
    different thing. Our desire is not to hurt the Rwandan people.
    Our desire is not to cut them off from essential support for
    agricultural, education, or health programs. Our real desire is
    to get a change in the regional policy.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, but sanctioning individuals
    within the Rwandan Government would not in any way hurt
    individuals. And frankly, the argument you are making, I serve
    in this panel and began my service on this panel in my second
    term, in 1983, and voted in favor of sanctioning South Africa,
    and there were people who said you will hurt innocent people if
    you do so. But sometimes the egregious harm is so compelling
    that a very strong statement needs to be made. But minimally, I
    would think we would want to sanction individuals in the
    Rwandan Government.
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, I have heard your request and
    your concerns.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.
        I would like to now ask our second panel to make their way
    to the witness table, beginning first with Steve Hege, who has
    worked on the Eastern DRC, where he has served with three
    consecutive mandates as the armed groups expert for the United
    Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. He investigated and
    coauthored six public reports submitted and presented to the
    U.N. Security Council's sanctions committee. During the group's
    recently expired 2012 mandate, he was also the coordinator of
    the six-member team working under Security Council Resolution
    2021. Prior to joining the U.N. Group of Experts, Mr. Hege
    worked with several humanitarian and peace-building
    organizations.
        We will then hear from John Prendergast, who is a human
    rights activist, a bestselling author, and co-founder of The
    Enough Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes
    against humanity. He has worked for the Clinton administration,
    the State Department, and in Congress. He has also worked for
    the National Intelligence Council, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch,
    the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Institute of
    Peace. He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps
    and helped launch the Satellite Sentinel Project with George
    Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace in Africa for
    well over a quarter of a century.
        Then we will hear from Mvemba Dizolele, who is a visiting
    fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and
    professor, lecturer in African studies at the Johns Hopkins
    University's School of Advanced International Studies. Mr.
    Dizolele has testified several times before the Congress. His
    work has appeared frequently in many major news publications
    and he is a frequent commentator on African affairs on
    television and radio. He has served as an election monitor in
    the DRC in 2006, and again in 2011, and has also been embedded
    with United Nations peacekeepers as a reporter there. In
    addition, he is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps.
        Thank you for your service. And I would like to now go to
    Steve Hege.

    STATEMENT OF MR. STEVE HEGE (FORMER MEMBER UNITED NATIONS GROUP
          OF EXPERTS ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)

        Mr. Hege. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members
    of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights,
    thank you for this invitation to testify at this hearing on the
    current crisis in Eastern Congo. I have been working in the
    Congo for over 8 years, including the past three as a member of
    the United Nations Group of Experts. The Group of Experts'
    mandate recently expired on 30 November, during which I served
    as the coordinator of our six-member team. As such, I am no
    longer affiliated with the United Nations, and the views I
    share today do not reflect those of the organization or that of
    the Group of Experts, but rather strictly my personal
    perspectives.
        The Group of Experts is a Security Council-mandated body
    which reports to the Council's sanctions committee. Its role is
    to investigate, document, and inform the sanctions committee of
    violations of the United Nations' arms embargo on non-state
    actors in the DRC, as well as related issues such as the
    illegal trade in natural resources and serious violations of
    international law, including the recruitment and use of child
    soldiers. During the course of the previous mandates, the group
    found that since the very outset of the M23 rebellion, the
    Government of Rwanda had provided direct military support to
    M23, facilitated recruitment, encouraged desertions from the
    Congolese Army, and delivered arms and munition, political
    advice, and intelligence to the rebels.
        At the strategic level, Rwanda has also spearheaded
    fundraising and membership drives for the political cadres,
    even nominating the movement's political leadership and
    directly instructing them of their demands to be made before
    the Congolese Government.
        The Rwandan Army has not only set up an elaborate
    recruitment network within Rwanda to ensure a steady supply of
    new troops to M23, including children, but they have also
    integrated their own officers and trainers within M23's chain
    of command on the ground in North Kivu. During all major
    military operations, the Rwandan Army has deployed thousands of
    additional troops to reinforce M23 in their principal attacks,
    such as the recent offensive on Goma.
        While members of the international community have expected
    Rwanda to diminish its support in light of diplomatic and
    financial pressure, the group has found that such direct
    involvement has only increased with time, precisely because
    M23's de facto chain of command culminates with the Minister of
    Defense of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe. Nevertheless, the
    Government of Rwanda continues to deny any involvement. In
    annex 3 of our final report, we thoroughly responded to each of
    their criticisms. However, when its substantive arguments
    proved unconvincing, Rwanda turned to attacking the Group of
    Experts, claiming bias and even orchestrating a media campaign
    defending that I was a sympathizer of the Rwandan Hutu rebels
    of the FDLR and a denier of the Rwandan genocide.
        Nevertheless, Rwanda had previously recognized my
    objectivity through the group's extensive detailed
    investigations on the support networks and financing of the
    FDLR in recent years.
        In addition to Rwandan backing to M23, in our final reports
    the group documented support for the rebels from important
    networks within the Government of Uganda. Senior Ugandan
    officials provided the rebels with direct troop reinforcements
    in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical
    assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation
    of external relations. They also supported the creation and
    expansion of the political branch of M23 permanently based in
    Kampala even before President Kabila had ever authorized any
    interaction with the rebels. A Ugandan Government
    representative acknowledged this type of support was indeed
    taking place in an official meeting of the Group of Experts in
    early October.
        Throughout our mandates, the question most often posed to
    us was quite natural and logical: Why? Why would Rwanda
    undertake such a risky and politically dangerous endeavor?
    Though it is not the work of the Group of Experts to establish
    causes or drivers of conflicts, I will humbly attempt to
    analyze some of the stated motives behind this war, beginning
    with M23's key demands.
        Since the rebellion's initial stages, M23 has presented an
    assortment of demands and justifications. First, the rebels
    have claimed that the government reneged on the 23 March 2009
    peace agreements. Nevertheless, in reality, this accord was
    essentially an afterthought to formalize a bilateral deal
    between Kinshasa and Kigali which was predicated on the
    affording the latter with immense influence in the Kivus, in
    exchange for arresting CNDP Chairman Laurent Nkunda and forcing
    the rest of the CNDP to join the national army under the
    leadership of Bosco Ntaganda.
        For many within the CNDP and the Rwandan Government, the
    integration of the CNDP into the Congolese Army was merely a
    tactical move, but never constituted a fundamental alteration
    of their objectives. The short-term deal, nevertheless, was
    immensely generous to Rwanda, the Congolese officers of the
    CNDP, particularly Ntaganda and his loyal officers, who took
    control over much of the army in Eastern Congo.
        Paradoxically, the rebels have also complained of the
    pervasive corruption within the Congolese Army. Nevertheless,
    as the most powerful commanders in the Eastern DRC, they were
    some of the worse perpetrators of salary theft and
    racketeering. Moreover, the rebels have claimed discrimination
    of Tutsi officers within the army and the killing of those
    former CNDP officers who had been redeployed outside of the
    Kivus.
        While certain historical animosities cannot be denied,
    dozens of Tutsi senior officers and over four-fifths of the ex-
    CNDP have chosen not to join the rebellion. In recent months,
    M23 has increasingly claimed that they want a review of the
    discredited 2011 Presidential elections in an attempt to
    attract sympathies of a broader constituency. Nevertheless, the
    CNDP political party had in fact joined the President's
    electoral alliance and many top M23 commanders orchestrated
    massive fraud on his behalf.
        Now, if it is not really the claims of the March 23rd, 2009
    agreements, or good governance, human rights, then what does
    Rwanda really want in this crisis? Despite the extremist
    paranoia about Balkanization, which has been so prevalent for
    many years amongst the Congolese population traumatized by
    multiple foreign invasions, only one of the rebel demands has
    any lasting explanatory power, and that is federalism. Rwandan
    orchestration of the M23 rebellion becomes more comprehensible
    when understood as a determined and calculated drive to spawn
    the creation of an autonomous federal state for the Eastern
    Congo. There has been speculation over whether Rwandan
    involvement was driven by security interests, economic
    interests, or cultural ties, but a federal state for the
    Eastern Congo would encapsulate all of these issues.
        Prior to the November 2011 elections, one of the most
    senior Rwandan intelligence officers argued that because the
    Congo was too big to be governed by Kinshasa, Rwanda should
    support the emergence of a federal state for the Eastern Congo.
    He told me, Goma should relate to Kinshasa in the same way that
    Juba was linked to Khartoum in reference to Sudan.
        During our official meetings with the Rwandan Government in
    Kigali in July, the Rwandan delegation consistently stated that
    our investigations were simply a distraction from reaching a
    definitive solution for governance in the Eastern Congo. When
    pushed further, several representatives did not hide the fact
    that the only solution they had in mind was indeed federalism.
        Not surprisingly, Rwanda has openly aided and abetted self-
    declared Congolese secessionists so as to set the bar high
    enough to position federalism eventually as an acceptable
    compromise. During several internal meetings of M23 for
    mobilization, senior government officials, including the
    Minister of Defense's special assistant, openly affirmed that
    establishing this autonomous state was in fact the key goal of
    the rebellion. One M23 spokesperson recently stated to the New
    York Times, ``We want more than decentralization, we want
    federalism,'' and ``The eastern parts of the Congo's interests
    are in eastern Africa.''
        Even senior Ugandan security officials also acknowledge
    that this was the aim of the Rwandans in this M23 war. One
    officer who was himself involved in supporting M23 in
    cooperation with the Rwandans told us, ``they're thinking big .
    . . you need to look at South Sudan.''
        This objective also explains why Rwanda has consistently
    sought to depict all armed groups in the Eastern DRC as one
    single, united, credible front against Kinshasa, and repeatedly
    calling the Congo a big black void in the Congolese state as
    fictitious. A federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo
    would cement and guarantee Rwanda's already extensive influence
    over military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of
    life.
        The Government of Rwanda, to its great credit, since the
    horrific events of the genocide in 1994 has exhibited
    unparalleled ambition to rebuild its country with unmatched
    progress. However, that same determination has led Rwanda's
    leaders to erroneously adopt this inherently destabilizing
    long-term geopolitical strategy for the Eastern DRC.
        So if Rwanda's geopolitical aspirations are indeed as I
    suspect so ambitious, then what can we expect from current
    negotiations, particularly when Rwanda has demonstrated in
    recent weeks that it has the upper hand on the battlefield? For
    his part, President Kabila feels very strongly about
    negotiating the March 23rd agreement, but talks will inevitably
    falter unless the key issue of federalism is put front and
    center on the negotiating agenda.
        Will the U.S. and others in the international community
    support a federal solution for the Eastern Congo with full
    knowledge that this was likely Rwanda's primary objective in
    the first place?
        Stepping back from the current dynamics, federalism in and
    of itself is neither inherently a good or bad proposition, but
    when driven by a neighboring state which would benefit
    enormously from it federalism can be problematic to say the
    least. Diplomats commonly affirm that Rwanda can and must be a
    part of a solution. Which solution, I would ask. The Rwandan
    solution for this crisis appears to have been identified well
    before the shots were even fired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share the
    findings of the group and my perspectives on the crisis.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hege follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. And now Mr. Prendergast.

       STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, THE ENOUGH
                                PROJECT

        Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much, Representatives Smith
    and Bass and Marino and Turner, for your extraordinary
    commitment to the people of the Congo. It is deeply appreciated
    by everyone in this room, I can tell you.
        I want to begin, though, by echoing something you said,
    Congressman Smith, earlier in the hearing. No one is
    questioning the hard work and the dedication and the decades-
    long commitment that key administration officials have
    exhibited on behalf of peace in Congo. I would particularly
    point out for special commendation Ambassador Johnnie Carson,
    and Ambassador Susan Rice at the U.N. I am particularly
    saddened by the personal attacks we have seen against
    Ambassador Rice in the press and the blogosphere over the last
    couple weeks over issues related to the Congo. The Washington
    shark cage has been fully activated and I guess some people see
    blood in the water. But knowing Johnnie and Susan and working
    with them over the past 16 years, I can tell you from personal
    experience that they have worked tirelessly for peace in the
    Great Lakes.
        Reasonable people, however, can disagree over tactics and
    over strategy, and it is in that spirit that I deliver my
    testimony today. I am going to focus my remarks on issues
    related to the Congolese peace process in the interest of a
    division of labor amongst my colleagues here at the table.
        Throughout the latest Congolese conflagration and previous
    cycles of conflict there, the root causes of war have not been
    addressed, leaving these peace processes, the endless peace
    processes to focus on flimsy power-sharing deals and
    arrangements that have undermined the sovereignty of the
    Congolese State and the professionalism and neutrality of its
    armed forces. This, in turn, has left the civil population of
    Eastern Congo subjected to globally unparalleled violence,
    perdition, and impoverishment.
        Another unrepresentative agreement between powerful
    interest with the biggest guns that we may see coming out of
    these Kampala talks might ease open fighting momentarily, but
    it lays a deeper foundation for further devastation and state
    deconstruction down the road. The United States should not be a
    party to such a short-term and destructive approach and must
    alter its policy to help avert an outcome that simply sows the
    seeds for further war. This hearing and your leadership, I
    believe here in Congress, will be an important building block
    for the kind of step-change that we are seeking from the
    administration and the broader international community.
        Here is the crux of it. The lack, I think, of a credible
    and effective and internationally mandated and leveraged peace
    process addressing these issues in Eastern Congo is becoming a
    major reason for that war's continuation. The current
    negotiation in Kampala between the Government of Congo and the
    M23 rebels is already making the same mistakes as its
    predecessor processes and will likely result in the same kind
    of short-term deal that keeps the Congolese Government in
    power, reduces international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda for
    backing the M23, and redivides the spoils of war. The root
    causes of structural violence will remain unaddressed and any
    agreement will lack the involvement of political parties, of
    representative civil society elements, including women and
    religious leaders and local armed groups representing the
    diverse voices and interests of Eastern Congo.
        The time has come finally for a real international peace
    effort, the kind that actually has a chance of ending the
    deadliest war globally since World War II, and the U.S. needs
    to help make that happen because if it is left solely to the
    combatants and their regional sponsors, it will not.
        We believe that two key pieces of the solution are missing
    now. For a lasting peace, a process needs to address those
    fundamental root causes, rooted in economic and political
    drivers of war.
        First the economic. A shared framework for the future must
    be agreed upon, in which the entire subregion of Central
    Africa, Congo first and foremost and at the center, can benefit
    much more from peaceful, legal natural resource development
    rather than the violent illegal extraction that exists today.
    Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank bill, which this Congress
    heroically passed in the face of a lot of industry money and
    lobbying, a nascent regional certification effort, initiatives
    by some of the forward-leaning companies, electronics companies
    who have started working in support of real progressive change,
    and then new OECD guidelines, these are all catalyzing movement
    in the right direction, but more must be done to change the
    economic incentives from war to peace, just as cleaning up the
    blood diamond trade helped incentivize peace in West African
    countries.
        Coupled with strong international investment, these efforts
    will create the conditions, I think, for transparent and
    effective governing institutions. Dealing with the economic
    roots of war not only removes the main driver for the conflict
    today, but creates the main engine for state reconstruction.
        Second, the politics. A political framework for Congo must
    be agreed upon that restores public confidence and brings back
    the viability of the Congolese State while ensuring that
    further rebellion does not ensue. President Kabila faces a
    political crisis as a result of the failures of the army and of
    the elections last year, and the talks with M23 alone will only
    erode his authority and provide further insult and injury to
    the Congolese people.
        It is now time for a wider inter-Congolese dialogue in
    which leaders from the government, from political parties, and
    from throughout civil society across Congo actively participate
    and decide on a national consensus on reforms on key issues
    such as the political framework for the country,
    decentralization, protection of minorities, the return of
    refugees, and other issues that would be put on the table by
    the Congolese themselves.
        I have five recommendations for strengthening U.S. policy,
    some of which are echoing some of the good points that you all
    at the congressional table raised earlier. The first one, and
    foremost, I think, is the need to appoint this Presidential
    envoy, and I say Presidential because it needs to have that
    kind of rank. The current U.S. policy structure simply doesn't
    allow the United States to exercise its latent leverage, its
    creativity, and the international coordinating function with
    respect to supporting peace in Congo that we should be
    planning. If you appoint a Presidential envoy, that helps to
    rectify those problem. The envoy should be a high-level
    individual with experience and relationships in the region who
    will be responsible for developing a unified policy, the step-
    change we are talking about, toward the regional crisis and be
    able to fully invest in helping to deepen this political, this
    peace process to address its current gaping deficiencies. Such
    an envoy, we hope, would leverage America's economic,
    political, and military influence to ensure that all parties
    fully cooperate with the international political process and
    work closely with the AU and the U.N. and the ICGLR.
        The second recommendation is one that everyone seems to be
    for, but it is not happening. That is to get a U.N. envoy out
    there as soon as possible. Everyone is saying that they want
    this, including, we just heard, from Ambassador Carson very
    encouragingly. But it wasn't in the United Nations Security
    Council resolution last week. The congressional letter that
    Congresswoman Bass referred to earlier couldn't be better timed
    in that regard. Both of these envoys will be appointed only, I
    think, if the Congress stays on this case and demands that we
    see these kinds of things happen.
        The third recommendation--again, I am echoing--we want to
    support robust United Nations sanctions against key people. The
    international community I think is--and this is terribly
    important for the peace process and for forward movement--we
    are leaving a huge reservoir of leverage on the table by not
    following the recommendations of the U.N. Group of Experts and
    others. There must be accountability for those who have
    restarted Congo's war and for those who are orchestrating or
    funding crimes against humanity and war crimes.
        As a responsible supporter of the United Nations sanctions
    regime, the United States should be compelled to push, to
    impose sanctions on all individuals identified in the U.N.
    Group of Experts final report, and those individuals and
    entities that are supporting the criminal networks, the mafia
    networks through the trade and natural resources. This won't
    happen, I do not believe, if Congress doesn't continue to pound
    away on this issue. So I think progress is, in part, in your
    hands.
        The fourth recommendation I would put forward is the
    importance, and this was well articulated in the discussion I
    think between Ambassador Carson and the congresspersons on the
    panel, we need to suspend certain U.S. assistance to any
    government supporting conflict and obstructing peace. That is
    military assistance for sure, but there are certain categories
    of bilateral non-military assistance, and particularly
    multilateral assistance, non-humanitarian aid to governments,
    whoever they are, who are supporting a conflict in Eastern
    Congo.
        Now, for example, if Rwanda and Uganda are found to be
    continuing their support for M23 and are supporting M23 efforts
    to obstruct a peace process, progress at the peace table, then
    corresponding measures should be taken by the U.S., other
    partner governments, and multilateral organizations to which
    the U.S. contributes huge amounts of American taxpayers'
    dollars. Let's be clear about this aid. We don't want health
    and education and microenterprise, the kind of small-scale
    assistance that goes to the people of Rwanda to be stopped.
    That aid should continue, I believe. But it is the budget
    support and military assistance, those two categories of aid
    that are critical. And it is the World Bank, the World Bank has
    $135 million on the table right now in budget support for the
    Rwandan Government. That should not be disbursed until we get
    clear forward movement on the peace process in Congo.
        Fifth, and finally, and this one hasn't been discussed yet,
    but we would call for a high-level summit on responsible
    investing in the Great Lakes. The United States, in partnership
    with the European Union, the African Union, could facilitate an
    international investment conference on investing in peace mines
    rather than the conflict minerals that exist today, in order to
    help expand the pie in the region for conflict resolution and
    for development in which all the people of the subregion can
    benefit, particularly and at the center, the people of the
    Congo.
        The summit could focus on developing market-based
    opportunities for responsible investment in Congo and the
    region. Again, we have got to turn those incentives away from
    illegal, extractive, violent mining, to peaceful, legal
    development that goes into the tax treasury, into the treasury,
    and funds development in Eastern Congo.
        Bob Hormats, an Under Secretary of State in the
    administration, could be a kind of person who could help
    spearhead that as someone who has helped build this public-
    private alliance that involves companies and the United States
    Government and civil society, trying to help promote
    responsible investment, spurred on by 1502 from the Dodd-Frank
    law.
        Conclusion, my bottom line is this, in two sentences. A
    credible, internationally driven peace process that deals with
    the root causes and includes broader Eastern Congolese civil
    society won't absolutely guarantee peace, but its absence,
    however, absolutely guarantees war. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Prendergast.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Mr. Dizolele.

          STATEMENT OF MR. MVEMBA DIZOLELE, PETER J. DUIGNAN
      DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD
                               UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Dizolele. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and
    members of the Subcommittee on Africa, thank you for the
    invitation and honor to testify before your committee. I come
    before you as a Congolese and concerned U.S. citizen. The views
    I express today in the statement are mine and mine alone.
        This important hearing comes at yet another critical time
    for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I would like to
    commend you for your interest in my home country.
        Congo is too big to fail, and the U.S. should care today
    for the same strategic and security reasons it did during the
    Cold War. With its mineral and other natural wealth, DRC is the
    equivalent of the world's breadbasket of critical resources. At
    this time of Chinese scramble for resources, we cannot stand
    idle and let Uganda and Rwanda destabilize the heart of Africa.
    Measured in human lives, the cost of their military
    adventurism, which has indirectly killed over 6 million
    Congolese, now rivals King Leopold's holocaust. Ironically,
    Rwandan President Paul Kagame blames King Leopold for the
    current crisis.
        Substantial U.S. military assistance to Rwanda and Uganda,
    and Washington's reluctance to denounce and stop the support
    for these regimes, makes the U.S. an accomplice to the tragedy.
        Today the greatest challenge and obstacle to resolving the
    crisis in Congo is neither the confusing alphabet soup of
    militia names, nor the lack of engagement of the international
    community. Rather, it is the lack of understanding of the
    drivers and dynamics of the conflict that stands between
    policymakers like yourselves and the right prescriptions.
        For two decades the policy discourse on DRC has been
    defined by a narrative that focuses on the ramification of the
    problem, such as ethnic identity, citizenship issues, sexual
    violence, looting of natural resources, but ignores the root
    causes of the crisis. While the problem is often viewed as a
    humanitarian disaster, which it is, DRC is paralyzed by a
    political crisis which requires political solutions and that is
    where you can have the greatest impact.
        Congo has been muddling through a series of crises for
    nearly two decades. The causes, of course, are well known: An
    inept government with a weak leadership, no articulated vision,
    no legitimacy after the botched 2011 election, lack of capacity
    to resist or contain predatory designs of neighbors, i.e.,
    Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, proliferation of armed groups, and
    an underachieving and over-politicized U.N. peacekeeping
    mission.
        This cocktail of problems is topped by an apathetic
    diplomatic community motivated by short-term interests of the
    countries it represents, rather than the long-term
    stabilization of Congo and Central Africa.
        The M23 rebellion is to be understood through this optic.
    As the M23 crisis enters a new phase with the withdrawal of the
    rebels from the battered city of Goma, the people of North Kivu
    and their fellow Congolese citizens everywhere wonder whether
    the storm has passed or the rebels' retreat represents the
    quiet before a super storm. Either way, telltale signs and
    history indicate that the conflict will continue unless
    appropriate deterring measures are taken.
        M23--like its precursor, the CNDP of Laurent Nkunda--and
    the dozen armed groups roaming the hills of eastern provinces,
    expose Congo as a dysfunctional state with weak political
    leadership and lacking a competent army and security
    institutions. With the failing of the state, old latent
    community grievances stemming from land disputes, demographic
    pressure, ethnic tensions, and control of resources and trading
    routes has turned Eastern Congo into a tinderbox. This means
    that ambitious war entrepreneurs and demagogues only need a
    cause and find a sponsor--it can be a community, a business,
    political elite or a state--to start a militia.
        The M23, which is primarily a Tutsi mono-ethnic armed
    group, sought to exploit these dormant grievances, citing
    discrimination against Tutsis as one reason for the rebellion,
    but they failed to generate support from important Tutsi
    communities, such as the Banyamulenge who have so far refused
    to join M23. Instead, the Banyamulenge are serving with the DRC
    Army and fighting the rebellion.
        The rebellion had also threatened to take over Goma and
    march on Kinshasa and liberate the DRC. But when Goma fell to
    M23 elements, spontaneous protests broke out in Bukavu, in
    Kisangani, and Kinshasa, denouncing Kinshasa's failure to
    protect the city and exposing even a greater ire against the
    rebellion and the United Nations Stabilization Mission,
    MONUSCO.
        While it may be too early to draw meaningful conclusions,
    M23's failure to rally other Tutsis who had previously
    presented a common front may signal the beginning of a new era
    of trust building between ethnic groups. After two Presidential
    and legislative elections that empowered the Congolese to seek
    change through the ballot instead of at the barrel of the gun,
    M23 has no popular appeal.
        But the highly controversial and contested 2011
    Presidential and legislative elections eroded the legitimacy of
    President Kabila, making it impossible for the government to
    mobilize the masses in this time of crisis.
        M23 rebellion further exacerbated the legitimacy crisis by
    exposing the state's inability to protect its citizens. The
    government has failed to build a professional army, perhaps the
    single most important element in ensuring Congo's territorial
    integrity, and the security of its citizens and coveted natural
    resources.
        Without such a competent military, DRC is unable to stop
    the proliferation of militias. Instead, the Government of DRC
    has chosen to compromise with militiamen and co-opt them into
    the army with no disruption of their ranks and files. The lack
    of an adequate military integration program has resulted in the
    establishment of parallel commands and structures in the
    national army. This means that the militias who join the
    national army remain in their areas of control and keep their
    command nearly intact. This arrangement allows the former
    militiamen to perpetrate abuses on the civilian populations and
    keep their access to local resources, all under the protection
    of the Congolese military uniform. This integration model
    enabled disgruntled ex-CNDP elements stationed in North and
    South Kivu to mutiny and launch M23 when DRC ironically sought
    to arrest their commander, General Bosco Ntaganda.
        The predatory designs of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda also
    fuel the volatile situation as we have heard before. Both
    Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo twice, with continued
    incursions into Eastern Congo where they still support
    militias. Several U.N. reports, as we heard Steve Hege say a
    few minutes ago, have linked both countries to Congolese
    militias and the looting of resources. And of course, now they
    are linked to M23.
        Both countries have denied the charges and insist that they
    are wrongfully accused and used as scapegoats for the DRC
    Government's failures. Their denial and deceit, however,
    undermine the chances for lasting peace. It is impossible to
    solve the crisis when the parties to the conflict refuse to
    assume their share of responsibility. When you invade your
    neighbor twice, arm militias, support rebellions, loot its
    resources, and indirectly cause the death of over 6 million
    Congolese, you are not a scapegoat. You are a serious problem.
        So we know the primary supporters of the militias, and
    whether they be in Congo or in neighboring countries or
    overseas. We also know the primary routes of the illicit export
    routes, and which neighbors profit from. So what should the
    U.S. do? I think that is probably what is of most interest to
    you. Number one, we need to unequivocally support security
    sector reform for the reasons we have heard today, from my
    colleagues and from the Assistant Secretary. Reform is long
    overdue. But reform means serious commitment to rebuilding a
    new army, and not cobbling together old militias and new units.
    Millions of dollars have been invested in training, but not
    enough attention has been devoted to the reconstruction of the
    military.
        Unfortunately, these initiatives amount to very expensive
    window-dressing. For instance, the Belgian-trained elite units
    that fought M23 early in the spring did not receive the
    institutional support they needed to succeed in their mission.
    U.S. AFRICOM has also trained a unit which could have made a
    positive contribution in North Kivu in another context, had the
    leadership and the structure been different.
        The current broken military structure cannot absorb newly
    trained units effectively. Real military reform requires that
    we break down the old decrepit foundation and build a new army
    from scratch. And such a reform process will phase out and
    discharge top commanders who came from militias, as well as
    former militiamen who now fill the ranks. We cannot put new
    wine in old vases. They will break.
        So, number two, we need to implement U.S. law. The
    Congolese, like many other people in the world, look up to the
    U.S. as a beacon of principles and leadership. There is a law
    passed by then-Senator Barack Obama, we have mentioned that
    already, called the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief,
    Security, and Democracy Promotion Act. This bill includes
    provisions on conflict minerals, sexual violence, sanctions on
    armed groups and their state sponsors, and so far, we have
    hardly scratched the surface of this law. It still baffles
    people. It definitely baffles the Congolese.
        Number three, we need to activate the State Department
    Reward to Justice Program. I think we need to encourage
    associates of militias who are trying to get out of the system
    to turn on their colleagues who are keeping them in the system.
    It is very much like a gang mentality where once you are in, it
    becomes very difficult to get out, especially if that is based
    on ethnic affiliation.
        Number four, we need to apply sanctions against individuals
    and institutions identified in the reports. I commend the U.S.
    Government and the Congress for the recent initiative to
    sanction leaders of M23, but it will not serve the intended
    purpose. If we sanction Makenga, we sanction Bosco Ntaganda or
    anybody else and will not sanction the backers in Rwanda or
    Uganda or where else they may be, then the game will continue.
    If Makenga becomes a burden, he will be replaced. When Nkunda
    became a burden, he was arrested and replaced with Bosco. So
    tomorrow it will be somebody else, and I think we cannot act
    like we are doing something impactful when in fact we are just,
    again, doing window dressing like with security sector reform.
        And then number five, we need to push for the completion of
    the electoral process and opening of the political space. We
    have talked about Rwanda and Uganda, but the big elephant
    really is Kinshasa. Eastern Congo often is discussed as if it
    were a country. Eastern Congo is not a country, it is part of a
    larger country called Congo. The crisis that is taking place in
    the Kivus in Eastern Congo has its roots in Kinshasa, in the
    failure of that leadership. For the last 5 years, from 2006-
    2011, the Congolese have been emboldened by the electoral
    process. We have not stood, we, meaning the international
    community, have not stood up with the Congolese to fight that.
        We need to open that process so that the botched electoral
    system would move forward. We need to support the holding of
    the municipal and provincial elections. At this point, both the
    national senate and the Electoral Commission are serving
    without any mandate. So until that happens, we have a system
    that has no legitimacy.
        Then last, we need to insist on the restructuring of the
    Independent National Electoral Commission. They are part of the
    problem. We looked the other way when the system was botched.
    We cannot move on without this change. This is why President
    Kabila cannot really speak with the backing of his people. This
    is why when people riot against M23, they also automatically
    riot against Kabila, and that cannot continue.
        Then, finally, I would like simply to say that this
    conflict has gone on too long. It has gone on too long. It
    challenges now our morals and principles as a country. We
    cannot talk about democracy, we cannot be outraged about sexual
    violence when, in fact, we are not taking the steps to stop
    this. In Congo, armed groups and their international and local
    backers are the enemies. But there is an even greater enemy,
    and the greater enemy is the Congolese Government in its
    failures. It is also the Congolese army, which itself is a big
    tapestry of different militias. When you are in Congo and you
    see, if you want to talk about insecurity, I define insecurity
    as the feeling you get in your gut when you see somebody in
    uniform in front of you. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Dizolele, thank you so very much for your
    testimony.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. All three of your testimonies were
    extraordinarily incisive, certainly timely, and prescribed a
    way forward for the administration as well as for Congress, so
    for that, our subcommittee is deeply grateful for your presence
    here today and for sharing with us not only your understanding
    of the situation on the ground but what ought to be done
    perhaps to truly rectify it.
        I think the emphasis on root causes couldn't be more timely
    as well. I will never forget years ago, in the early days of
    the war in Yugoslavia, I, along with Congressman Frank Wolf,
    went to Vukovar and other places in Croatia after it had been
    devastated, and then we went to Belgrade and met with Slobodan
    Milosevic and others within that dictatorial government of his,
    and I will never forget getting a map of a greater Serbia that
    included Bosnia and Croatia, and the lack of understanding on
    all of our part about what the end game was was appalling. We
    thought this was something that would abate over a short period
    of time, and I think, Mr. Hege, your point about the key goal
    of establishing an autonomous state is largely
    underappreciated, and perhaps our other two distinguished
    witnesses might want to speak about that. You point out that
    Rwanda's deeply ingrained federalist vision is born out of the
    geopolitical regional strategy adopted by Kigali's leadership.
    A federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo would cement
    and guarantee Rwanda's already extensive influence over
    military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of life.
        And I think that is underappreciated almost in the extreme
    as to the why of it. We know the mineral wealth is an engraved
    invitation to looters and thieves, you know, to do what they
    do, but this idea that it is part of the government's overall
    strategy, perhaps you as well as our other very distinguished
    witnesses might want to elaborate on.
        Mr. Hege. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the question of the
    Rwandan strategy for creating or spawning an autonomous state
    for the Eastern Congo, a few things that I would like to
    mention as well in terms of timing. Some of my colleagues here
    have mentioned the cyclical nature and the numbers of wars that
    have taken place in Eastern Congo. It appears that the Rwandan
    backers of M23, the real masterminds that orchestrated the
    creation of the rebellion were looking toward the post-
    electoral period precisely for the reasons that Mvemba
    described, the discredited 2011 Presidential elections as a
    period where they would be able to mobilize an eastern common
    front against a delegitimized Kinshasa and President Kabila
    himself. This was certainly a part of their calculations about
    why to push for this now.
        Also the question of the CNDP's cycles of impunity and the
    fact that the international community was increasingly
    resistant to allowing their capacity to control parallel chains
    of command to have access, unfettered access to illegal trade
    in natural resources. They understood that this was a time in
    which that, those networks could be curtailed, that Kinshasa
    could attempt to curtail them, and that they would need to
    capitalize on that, on those assets before any of those
    individuals were eventually redeployed out of the Kivus or in
    the case of Bosco Ntaganda that he would have been arrested
    himself.
        The third element that I think that they took into account
    in preparing this strategy, because it was quite well prepared,
    we have extensive evidence that shows Makenga himself back all
    the way in 2011 was amassing huge amounts of weapons at his
    home and in numerous arms caches in preparation for a return to
    war precisely after the elections, but the Rwandans also
    understood that there was a generalized Congo fatigue, as it is
    often described, that there is a sentiment that Congo is sort
    of always a mess. President Kagame, I have been told by Rwandan
    diplomats, likes to say that the Congo has been a mess before
    he was born and will be a mess infinitely or indefinitely.
        Certainly within the U.N., there are member states that are
    questioning the strategy on the Congo, how long can they
    continue to foot the bill for a peacekeeping mission which is
    so costly, and should we start to think of more radical
    solutions, definitive long-term solutions for the Eastern Congo
    and whether the current governance structure is a viable one. I
    think that Rwanda felt that that was a right period to push for
    this, and that unfortunately their success on the battlefield
    recently would likely embolden them to continue to drive for
    this end game, and any other issues, smokescreen issues on the
    table in political talks would only prolong this process until
    they can get to that key and core issue.
        Mr. Prendergast. I want to add to what Steve said and then
    Mvemba will have something, too, of course. I will do my three
    points: Security interests, economic interests, and political
    interests that the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda have in
    Eastern Congo and why there continues to be intervention, both
    direct and indirect, by the neighboring governments in Eastern
    Congo.
        Security first. Rwanda has been legitimately concerned over
    the last 18 years since 1994 about the possible strengthening
    of the FDLR. They want to ensure without any doubt that the
    FDLR cannot come back and threaten Rwanda. And then in that
    context, can't allow a strong Congolese state that might
    provide support to the FDLR. For the Ugandans, they will say it
    is the ADF, and we have talked, we have heard already some back
    and forth with Ambassador Carson and the committee on that.
        There is a second role, issue, the economic issues that I
    think are deeper than the security ones. Rwanda has benefited
    massively over the last decade from the looting of natural
    resources in Eastern Congo, particularly, and this is why this
    whole campaign in the United States has unfolded particularly
    amongst young people on college campuses, this conflict
    minerals campaign because everyone is somehow complicit in
    this, all of us that buy cell phones and laptops and other
    electronic instruments are helping to underwrite this smuggling
    network and these competing mafias that are ruining and
    continue to immiserate the people of Eastern Congo.
        Tin, tantalum, and tungsten are the three minerals today.
    There were others decades ago, and going all the way back to
    King Leopold, that looting that goes across borders that
    benefits us with no protections for the Congolese people. It is
    a huge windfall for Rwanda. Foreign exchange, balance of
    payments, all the rest of it drives their economic development
    miracle, post-genocide economic miracle. In Uganda it is gold,
    it is smuggled gold. Huge amounts of gold travel across the
    border illegally from Congo into Uganda and are then exported
    out of the country. These are, again, windfalls that are hard
    to replace by domestic economic development.
        Then the third arena, the third issue is political. Both
    Uganda and Rwanda I think, the bottom line, want proxies in
    positions in Eastern Congo, whether they are military or
    civilian authorities, to ensure their economic and security
    interests. So when President Kabila tried after the elections
    to redeploy the CNDP elements, as Ambassador Carson was
    describing, he described all the facts of what happened, but
    what was underneath the facts, I think, was that the CNDP had
    established for years with Rwanda and Uganda, particularly
    Rwandan support, this ability to export illegally and extract
    natural resources and ensure the political and security
    interests of the State of Rwanda. And so when Kabila, when
    President Kabila tried to redeploy these forces out of that
    region, which would have undermined that control, that proxy
    control that the neighboring countries have over the politics
    and the economics of the east, the rebellion immediately
    occurred because they couldn't allow that to happen, so of
    course, the Rwandan support comes pouring in into the formation
    of the M23. They change the acronyms, it is the same group.
        Whittled down, though, Mvemba's points are very important
    about the lack of any kind of domestic constituency that the
    M23 have, but nevertheless the result is the same. It is more
    destabilization, more instability, and then allowing those that
    have powerful proxies inside Eastern Congo to profit from that
    destabilization.
        Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple
    points. One is on the peacekeeping mission. We have brought up
    MONUSCO a few times today. I think MONUSCO is now part of the
    problem. It has become an enabler of insecurity just like
    Rwanda and Uganda and the government in Kinshasa in the sense
    that, you know, part of the challenge when we look at Congo, is
    that a lot of people discovered Congo with the 1994 genocide in
    Rwanda, but Congo existed way before that. Those of us who were
    born there and grew up there knew a country that worked. So
    when we go to Congo today, we don't recognize this country.
    That does not mean the Congolese people are not capable. Some
    of you are old enough to remember the first U.N. mission in
    Congo, ONUC. ONUC was much more bolder, robust but also very
    determined to carry out its mandate. It lasted only 4 years.
        The war in 1960 was much bigger than what we are seeing
    today. You had Che Guevara show up in Congo, you had the
    Chinese, you had the Egyptians, you had French mercenaries, and
    the Belgians who wanted Katanga. But because ONUC was really
    committed in helping the Congolese meet their obligation to
    protect their country and build it together, they fought, they
    protected the civilians, and they allowed then Colonel Mobutu
    to build an army that eventually became the country, the army
    that the U.S. relied on in Angola, in Chad, when somehow Congo
    was your strategic ally.
        I am not sure what happened, but I simply mean that we need
    to scale down that MONUSCO mandate very quickly, make it very
    clear how much longer they are going to stay in Congo, and what
    the mission should be so that the Kinshasa government does not
    lean on the U.N. for excuses.
        So let me illustrate. If 200 women are raped in some hamlet
    in North Kivu, the headlines in the New York Times will say
    some women were raped, in fact, but the blame will fall on the
    U.N. first. They will say there was a contingent of Bangladeshi
    troops around that didn't do anything. No one will ask where
    was the Congolese army. And we can do that because there is a
    force there that is supposed to help that is falling much
    shorter.
        The U.N. has failed to protect civilians throughout this
    entire M23 event. They failed in Bunagana, but the press was
    not there to report it, so they are going to just live with
    M23. When Rutshurv and Kiwanja fell, MONUSCO forgot that in
    2008 there had been massacres there by CNDP. They didn't do
    anything. They said we will absolutely protect Goma, Goma will
    not fall. Well, then when Goma fell, they say we didn't fight
    because they didn't want to endanger civilians. And then when
    M23 withdrew and they raided Kibumba, Mugunga, and Kibati IDP
    camps, the U.N. was nowhere to be seen. So going on nearly two
    decades, the U.N. is not the solution for the DRC. Thank you
    very much.
        Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
        Ms. Bass. I am going to unfortunately have to leave at this
    point, but I want to thank you all for your testimony and the
    time you took out to come, and I look forward to continue to
    work with you, and especially to follow up on what we can
    specifically do here in Congress and I am most interested in
    the notion of sanctions and also sanctions on individuals and
    how that might work and how we might get that started from
    here, so thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Marino.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank
    you for being here. Most of us in the room here know at least
    one measure that must be taken against Rwanda and Uganda, and
    that is considering the enactment of serious stinging
    sanctions. However--and let's call this the way it is, you
    know--the Obama administration refuses to engage in serious
    monetary sanctions against these countries, and this is not
    atypical in other foreign affairs matters that plague the world
    today with this administration.
        So my simple question is, what do you propose that we do or
    that you can do to persuade this administration to enforce
    these sanctions the way that it has been so eloquently stated
    here today from you gentlemen and from this panel? So you can
    start, Mr. Hege, and each one of you, could you respond to
    that, please.
        Mr. Hege. Sure, I can speak from the perspective of the
    Group of Experts. We submit annually a list of recommended
    individuals and entities for consideration before the U.N.
    sanctions committee. Obviously the United States Government
    plays an important role in taking forward and studying those
    names. Many of those names, while the list remains
    confidential, many of those names are included in our public
    reports, so there is not a great deal of surprise of the
    contents of that list.
        However, the group itself steps away from the consideration
    and discussions of the list that it provides, so in essence, we
    remain sort of indifferent to the steps that are taken
    subsequently. However, I can say, having stepped away from my
    role in the Group of Experts, that measures to identify the
    individuals and sanction the individuals who are externally
    supporting M23, and in our conclusion they are not necessarily
    just externally supporting, they are actually commanding and
    running the rebellion in its day-to-day activities, which goes
    beyond external support in many cases. That measures to
    identify them, be that sanctions, be that diplomatic pressure,
    all of that is critically important in identifying the problem.
        As I said, Rwanda continues to identify itself as the
    solution. However, sanctions or efforts to identify publicly
    the individuals running the rebellion in the Rwandan Government
    would go a long way to ensuring that the problem is squarely
    understood as a Rwandan orchestration, as a Rwandan-driven and
    commanded rebellion, and that will have enormously important
    consequences for any peace negotiations in terms of framing the
    issue and not necessarily getting lost in, as I said, some of
    the smokescreen issues that have been post facto used as
    pretext to justify the rebellion. So I would encourage any of
    those measures and any symbolic efforts that can be made to
    ensure that the problem itself is squarely identified partly as
    a Rwandan-driven rebellion. Thank you.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you. Mr. Prendergast.
        Mr. Prendergast. Thank you. There has been an amazing
    amount of continuity, I think, in U.S. policy going back to the
    Clinton administration, Bush administration, Obama
    administration. All three very, very slow to utilize pressures.
        Mr. Marino. Agreed.
        Mr. Prendergast. It has been an incentive-based policy.
    This is a long-term problem, a belief I think fundamentally--we
    heard it from Ambassador Carson very clearly today--a belief in
    quiet diplomacy and in direct engagement in what I would call
    in the conflict resolution theory an insider partial model that
    has been pursued, and I think the response to that, I will give
    my recommendations as to what Congress can do to help the
    situation, and then say what we can do as civil society groups
    on the congressional side, I think publicizing the failure of
    this 15-year policy.
        Again, what has been so effective about Congress' work, it
    has been bipartisan. The failure has largely been bipartisan,
    so a bipartisan effort in Congress saying it is not working, we
    need to do something differently is crucial. That can be done
    through the media and through, I think, the contact with--
    direct contact with administration officials. The letter that
    is circulating, there are numerous I think initiatives, both in
    the Senate and the House, right now attempting potentially to
    pass a quick resolution before the end of the term.
        There are various things that could be done to put this
    very clearly on the public record, this 15-year failure of
    constructive engagement, which is where we are going now as we
    bring that kind of terminology that has been used in other
    contexts and talk about this. We need more, we need to utilize
    those sticks.
        For our part, the NGO community, the civil society
    community, the letter that was cited by Congressman Smith at
    the opening is an example of how groups that work on all kinds
    of different issues internationally are coming together and
    saying let's unify our voices around a certain set of points
    and an agenda that can press the administration to become more
    bold in its approach, and we will undertake, as will other
    groups, The Enough Project and many other groups, a series of
    campaigns going out, particularly to young people, to faith-
    based groups and others who actually care about what is
    happening in the Congo, and that I think constituency of
    conscience is actually expanding fairly rapidly on Congo, just
    as we saw in 2003, 2004, 2005 on Darfur, we are starting to see
    that now in Congo, and the more I think Americans care about
    what is happening to the people of Congo and say, you know
    what, the present, the status quo is just simply unacceptable,
    and U.S. policy, the more, I think, we will have a shot at
    altering that status quo.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you.
        Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Congressman Marino. That is an
    important question. I think all of us today who spoke to you,
    including Ambassador Carson, mentioned all the ingredients that
    need to be put in place. I think on one side you have the
    government that refuses to call a spade a spade, so we talk
    about external threat, external support. If it is external,
    then we know where it is coming from, we should be able to name
    it. But I think we have talked about everything. So personally
    I would say one recommendation in order to put pressure on the
    Obama administration--the U.S. Congress has always been at the
    forefront of certain watershed events in Congo and Africa.
        It was this House that passed the anti-apartheid bill, it
    was this House that supported the emergence of the democracy
    movement across Africa in the 1980s. I think the chairman was
    around. So I think one recommendation I will say, because
    Africa is always a very bipartisan area, maybe you should
    consider passing a robust, more robust version of the Obama law
    here that you can push then to be applied because I am not sure
    why the White House, and the State Department are shying away
    from that and decide to hide behind the economic miracle of the
    Rwandan recovery. It is very troubling because this is what
    happened with King Leopold. He was a great philanthropist, he
    was bringing civilization to the savages in Congo, he was
    saving them from slave traders. Look at this great global trade
    outpost called Congo. But then behind the shadow of that
    civilizing mission, they were chopping off people's limbs,
    killing people, over 10 million of them.
        Something similar is happening today. We have laws on the
    books. People are speaking, good people like you listening to
    us, but nothing is happening. So I think you have community
    leaders like John, who has rallied thousands of millions of
    young people to push Congo causes, have been listening to us,
    then I think we need your support so that the other side can
    start listening to what we ask because the interest is already
    there. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Marino. I think I am right in saying that you do agree
    with me, each of you, that the previous administrations and
    this administration know what the facts are, know what is going
    on. I mean, they are not ignorant to these facts. I mean, it is
    very blatant. But they chose and choose not to do what should
    be done about this.
        So, Mr. Prendergast, I think you are absolutely right in
    getting more people involved, particularly young people. I am a
    freshman, next year I am coming back as a sophomore, and my
    daughter and I had the opportunity to visit the continent of
    Africa. We went to Liberia and Ghana. My daughter is going to
    be a physician. But she said, ``Dad, we have to take care of
    these people, we have to help them, and if we do not do it, who
    is going to?'' So you know, it is like banging my head against
    the wall sometimes. I have signed numerous letters that have
    been sent to the administration and the secretaries. We never
    get a response from them. So maybe we do have to take this
    more, with more passion to the public to get our Government to
    respond to it. You can be assured that my daughter and I will
    be there doing it. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Marino. Let me just ask
    one final question, and then I will leave any final comments to
    our three distinguished witnesses.
        Mr. Hege, there have been reports that at least one U.N.
    Security Council member wanted to delay the report on Eastern
    Congo this summer to perhaps lessen its criticism of the role
    played by Rwanda. Can you definitively tell us is that true or
    not?
        Mr. Hege. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We submitted an
    interim report during the month of May which did not include
    information regarding arms embargo violations committed by the
    Government of Rwanda, precisely because those violations had
    just really manifested themselves more overtly. However, we
    briefed the sanctions committee of those, of the information we
    had gathered in June and suggested that we provide an
    additional annex to that report, that interim report, outlining
    the violations of the arms embargo by the Government of Rwanda.
        The committee requested that we engage once again with the
    Government of Rwanda, although we had already gone to Kigali in
    May to meet with them over a period of 3 days during which they
    refused to accept us for any substantive meetings. We remained
    in our hotel room for those 3 days. The committee asked us to
    provide, particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs--the
    Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time was coming to
    New York at the end of June. I personally met with her in New
    York.
        I presented to her our work, our methodology, our approach,
    the reason why this information had not been included in the
    interim report. I outlined in detail our findings, and at that
    stage, she declined to provide any response, explanation or
    justification of those, of our findings. As such, we proceeded
    to submit that document, and it was then made public as an
    addendum and not an annex to our interim report.
        So the answer to your question is, yes, as a committee the
    consensus of the committee was that Rwanda, the Rwandan
    Government, its request to have an additional right of reply
    should be granted by the group, and out of good faith in
    working for and under the guidance of the sanctions committee,
    we provided them with that opportunity. They declined to
    provide any right of reply, and unfortunately proceeded to make
    public statements that nevertheless, they had never been
    provided a right of reply, which for us, obviously, is quite
    frustrating, given that we purposefully delayed the submission
    of that information in order to engage in this dialogue with
    the Government of Rwanda.
        So we, as I said, proceeded to submit that, and that report
    then was published at the end of June.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Any final comments from any of our
    distinguished witnesses?
        Mr. Dizolele. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to
    mention two things. I originally at the outset said Congo is
    too big to fail. There are quarters of enlightened people,
    smart people, you know a couple weeks ago, the New York Times
    ran a piece saying Congo should be split in half or in various
    portions. Anybody who entertains that idea is smoking
    something, because if Rwanda, as small as it is, has trouble,
    we know Rwanda would be the ideal country if I were a leader:
    Everybody speaks the same language; they have the same name;
    and they have two castes, the Hutus and the Tutsis. Yet, they
    have been killing each other over and over.
        If Rwanda thinks or if anybody thinks Rwanda can control
    the Kivus, then we have not seen the half of it. The Kivus are
    not Rwanda, is not the same makeup, they don't know these
    people. The Rwandans tried to march all the way to Kinshasa,
    and they were kicked out of Kinshasa by the civilians in 1998,
    which led them to do the rebellion.
        So this is an idea that we should resist by all means, so
    anybody who is entertaining that will have blood on his hands,
    and he doesn't know the half of it.
        Number two, I think we need to stand for something. In DRC,
    the people of Congo have already rallied around the democratic
    principles. They are waiting for your support. The Congolese
    don't need help changing things. They need help to push the
    process along. They are very capable people, they are
    resourceful, and I would like, on their behalf, to thank you
    for your continuous interest in their plight. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Mr. Prendergast. My last point, Congressman Smith and
    Congressman Marino, would be that we have, today, I think a
    clash of two visions of policy. One vision is a belief that I
    think we need to encourage the neighboring countries of the
    Congo to become part of a solution, and thus sanctions and aid
    cutoffs and those kind of things, punitive measures would
    undermine our influence. So that would be, I think, at this
    juncture what the administration and past administrations have
    pursued vis-a-vis Congo and the continuous intervention cycles
    that we have seen from outside from the region.
        The alternative belief that I think this table has
    articulated and the committee, key members of your committee
    have articulated as well, is that these kinds of punitive
    measures which, by the way, involve withholding hard-earned
    U.S. taxpayer dollars for the kinds of support that are
    fungible, military and budgetary support. We are not talking,
    again, about the development and humanitarian assistance that
    goes straight to the people of Rwanda but, rather, the budget
    support that goes to the countries, the government. That if we
    utilize these punitive measures, that that will provide
    leverage for a solution, and if we are successful, I think, in
    convincing the administration to move in that direction, which
    I believe we will work assiduously to do, then we need to have
    somewhere for Rwanda, Uganda, and other elements in the Congo
    that don't want a solution, we need to have a place for them to
    go, and I believe that place is a legitimate, credible,
    internationally supported peace process that allows the Eastern
    Congolese people to be part of the solution at the table, and
    the root causes finally to be addressed, and it is not going to
    happen unless we get U.S. leadership, and that is why we need
    that Presidential envoy. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Hege. Just to conclude, there is a great deal of
    analysis of Rwandan Government behavior which concludes that
    essentially their sticks don't work, that they are very
    ambitious, very determined, and that any punitive measures will
    not necessarily deter their behavior. There is likely a great
    deal of evidence. Since our reports in June exposed their
    direct creation of M23, the rebellion has only grown and their
    involvement has only become more overt, and I would say many of
    their commanders have become more emboldened. Obviously the
    taking of a very important provincial capital such as Goma was
    a perfect example of that.
        However, that doesn't mean, as I said earlier, that we
    shouldn't continue to frame the problem as a Rwandan determined
    effort to obtain this objective, which is, as I said, an
    autonomous Eastern Congo. They believe that any of the short-
    term consequences of their current project may be outweighed by
    the gains of that state, particularly, as I said, given the
    wealthy economic interests that Rwanda has in Eastern Congo,
    the cultural ties, and the security interests that they would
    be able to ensure, including the FDLR and other political
    dissidents.
        However, that said, what is needed at this point in order
    to, faced with that Rwandan determination, a peace process will
    have to find a way to identify a solution which appears to
    appeal to their long-term objective in order for them to stop.
    I am not convinced that anything less at this stage than
    something close to that long-term objective would call the
    Rwandans to stop.
        However, if that solution is identified, it could be some
    sort of decentralization process, as already stipulated by the
    Congolese constitution. However, that, the implementation of
    that agreement will require significant accompaniment,
    tremendous long-term investment not only from the United
    States, but other members of the international community to
    reinforce the capacities of the Congolese state and precisely
    insulate it from external control and manipulation, and that
    will be, as I see, practically and realistically, one of the
    keys to moving forward from this current crisis, but it
    requires, as I said, a very long-term commitment to building up
    an economically and politically independent Congolese State in
    the Eastern Congo, where its neighbors will eventually look at
    it as an equal and not a country which it can continue to
    manipulate, they can continue to manipulate and benefit from.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, all three, for your extraordinary
    insights again and testimony, and I do want to thank C-SPAN for
    in their editorial and independent judgment seeing their way
    clear to cover this hearing because people in America know far
    too little as to what is going on in DR Congo, and as you
    pointed out earlier, the enormous loss of life, 6-plus million
    people who have died, and the fact that as we speak people's
    lives are being taken from them by this terrible rebellious
    M23. So thank you so much, and this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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         Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

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       Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
     Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
       chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights