[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE AMERICAN ENERGY INITIATIVE, PART 11: THE PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2011
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15 & 21, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-77
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
_____
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky Chairman Emeritus
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MARY BONO MACK, California FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
GREG WALDEN, Oregon BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
LEE TERRY, Nebraska ANNA G. ESHOO, California
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina GENE GREEN, Texas
Vice Chairman DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma LOIS CAPPS, California
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California JAY INSLEE, Washington
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio JIM MATHESON, Utah
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN BARROW, Georgia
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky Islands
PETE OLSON, Texas KATHY CASTOR, Florida
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
_____
Subcommittee on Energy and Power
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
Chairman
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois JAY INSLEE, Washington
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JIM MATHESON, Utah
LEE TERRY, Nebraska KATHY CASTOR, Florida
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington GENE GREEN, Texas
PETE OLSON, Texas LOIS CAPPS, California
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia officio)
JOE BARTON, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
JULY 15, 2011
Page
Hon. John Sullivan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Oklahoma, opening statement................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 41
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Hon. Lee Terry, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Nebraska, opening statement.................................... 48
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 48
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, opening statement....................................... 49
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, prepared statement................................ 176
Witnesses
Hon. Denny Rehberg, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Montana..................................................... 50
Hon. Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California.................................................. 52
Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, Department of Transportation.. 56
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Answers to submitted questions............................... 177
Randall S. Knepper, Director, Safety Division, New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission.................................... 70
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Submitted Material
Discussion draft, dated July 8, 2011, titled H.R. --------, To
amend title 49, United States Code, to provide for enhanced
safety and environmental protection in pipeline transportation,
to provide for enhanced reliability in the transportation of
the Nation's energy products by pipeline, and for other
purposes, submitted by Mr. Sullivan............................ 3
Letter, dated July 14, 2011, from James W. Glasgow, State's
Attorney of Will County, Illinois, to Mr. Rush, submitted by
Mr. Rush....................................................... 42
JULY 21, 2011
Witnesses
Andrew J. Black, President, Association of Oil Pipe Lines........ 90
Prepared statement........................................... 92
Answers to submitted questions............................... 180
Daniel B. Martin, Senior Vice President, Pipeline Safety, El Paso
Pipeline Group................................................. 108
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Answers to submitted questions............................... 187
Eric Kessler, Vice President, Pipeline Safety Trust.............. 121
Prepared statement of Carl Weimer, Executive Director,
Pipeline Safety Trust...................................... 123
Charles F. Dippo, Vice President, Engineering Services and System
Integrity, South Jersey Gas Company............................ 134
Prepared statement........................................... 136
Answers to submitted questions............................... 190
Gary Pruessing, President, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company........... 146
Prepared statement........................................... 148
Answers to submitted questions............................... 193
THE AMERICAN ENERGY INITIATIVE, PART 11: THE PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2011
----------
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Sullivan
(vice chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Sullivan, Shimkus, Terry, Burgess,
Bilbray, Olson, McKinley, Gardner, Griffith, Upton (ex
officio), Rush, Inslee, Castor, Green, Gonzalez, and Waxman (ex
officio).
Staff present: Gary Andres, Staff Director; Charlotte
Baker, Press Secretary; Michael Beckerman, Deputy Staff
Director; Maryam Brown, Chief Counsel, Energy and Power; Andy
Duberstein, Special Assistant to Chairman Upton; Garrett
Golding, Legislative Analyst, Energy; Cory Hicks, Policy
Coordinator, Energy and Power; Katie Novaria, Legislative
Clerk; Jeff Baran, Minority Senior Counsel; and Caitlin
Haberman, Minority Policy Analyst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SULLIVAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Mr. Sullivan. I want to thank everyone for being here.
Today marks the 11th day in our American Energy Initiative
hearing. While these hearings have allowed us to examine a
multitude of issues regarding energy production, regulation,
and consumption, today we will focus on what can be done to
improve the safety and secure delivery of oil and natural gas
via pipeline.
Several tragic pipeline accidents have occurred over the
past year, which demonstrates the need to reauthorize and
enhance current safety laws. Despite this committee room
frequently being the site of many tense debates and
discussions, pipeline safety is an issue I hope we can all work
together on to produce meaningful and effective legislation to
ensure the safety of our oil and gas pipeline infrastructure
for the future while protecting the American people and our
environment.
Over the past several years, we have been able to pass
bipartisan bills on pipeline safety, sometimes under suspension
on the floor. This is because our pipeline infrastructure
touches every congressional district, and accidents can happen
anywhere, anytime.
Before us at the witness table, we have a Democrat from
California and a Republican from Montana. Both have dealt with
major accidents recently, and both understand Congress must act
to strengthen current pipeline laws.
It is critically important that our pipeline infrastructure
is both reliable and durable. And to this end, the discussion
draft under examination today makes many important
modifications to existing law that will promote greater
pipeline safety standards.
[The discussion draft follows:]
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Mr. Sullivan. We are glad to have an opportunity today to
hear from the experts how this discussion draft might be
improved or otherwise modified to ensure pipelines remain a
safe and economical means of transporting energy supplies and
help power our economy and create jobs.
With that, I yield the balance of my time to Ranking Member
Rush.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank all of you who are panelists who are
gathered here today with us.
In the past, the issue of pipeline safety has been one that
we have worked on in a bipartisan manner. And it is my sincere
hope and expectation that we will continue on in that tradition
as we tackle reauthorization of this bill, as well.
I look forward to today's hearing with such a stellar
lineup of expert witnesses. And I commend you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this hearing today with such distinguished
panelists.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge Representative
Speier and Representative Rehberg, both of whom I know have a
personal interest on the subject of pipeline safety.
Representative Rehberg represents Montana, where they are
dealing with the aftermath of the Silvertip pipeline spill in
the Yellowstone River. And Representative Speier represents the
district of San Bruno, where last summer's pipeline explosion
claimed the lives of eight people.
So, while we so far have been fortunate to avoid loss of
life in my own home State of Illinois, we have recently been
experiencing pipeline leaks due to old and decrepit lines. Just
yesterday, I had a conversation with the State's attorney of
Will County, Illinois, where he informed me that recently there
were three separate pipeline spills: two oil leaks and one
butane leak. And he warned that future leaks are a real
possibility due to the aging infrastructure.
Will County State's attorney's letter for the record, Mr.
Chairman, on this condition of aging pipelines--I would like to
introduce into the record these letters from the Will County
State's attorney, dated July 14th, and signed by State's
Attorney Jim Glasgow. I request unanimous consent that this
letter be entered into the record.
Mr. Sullivan. No objection.
[The letter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rush. And so I look forward to hearing from all of our
witnesses today, including our House colleagues, to gauge their
thoughts on the draft bill we are discussing here.
Additionally, I am interested to hear Representative
Speier's ideas on what elements of her own bill, H.R. 22, the
Pipeline Safety and Community Empowerment Act of 2011, that we
may be able to incorporate to strengthen the legislation that
we are considering in this subcommittee.
As far as the discussion draft, Mr. Chairman, I am
committed to working with you in good faith to improve and
strengthen this legislation where necessary in order to ensure
that we have the strongest bipartisan bill possible moving
forward. As I understand it, many elements of this discussion
draft mirror provisions in the Senate bill, but there are some
outstanding areas where I think we could make some vital
improvements so that we have a stronger bill that can gain
bipartisan support on the subcommittee, the full committee, as
well as when this bill reaches the floor.
Some areas where I believe this bill can be strengthened
include ensuring that there is regulation for gathering lines
when appropriate, tightening up the integrity of management
system requirements, and ensuring that information regarding
emergency response plans and industry-developed safety
standards are indeed available to the public at large.
Mr. Chairman, if we are able to do this work on this bill
together and include input from both the majority and the
minority sides, then I am confident that we can move forward
with this legislation from this subcommittee to a point where
it can actually pass the Senate and also maybe the President
will sign it in to law.
The issue of pipeline safety, in the face of everything
that currently takes place, from various spills and explosions
to the debates over fast-tracking various pipeline proposals,
is one that we must act on because this Nation needs updated
and comprehensive pipeline safety.
So, once again, Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and I applaud
Chairman Whitfield in his absence for holding this timely
hearing today. And I look forward to hearing from all of our
witnesses.
Thank you, and I yield back the 32 seconds.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Ranking Member Rush.
And next I would like to recognize the chairman of the full
Energy and Commerce Committee, Congressman Upton, for 5
minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you very much.
Today, this subcommittee will examine a discussion draft of
the Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act of
2011.
Pipeline safety is an issue that crosses regions, politics,
and parties--yes, it does--and it affects all of us and our
constituents in the same manner. Though pipelines remain the
safest means to transport oil and natural gas, over the past
year we have witnessed a number of accidents that have
destroyed property, ecosystems, and, most importantly, lives of
innocent people.
Last summer, an old pipeline ruptured and spilled into a
stream and river which flows through my district. The spill
sent over 20,000 barrels of oil into Talmadge Creek and
Kalamazoo River. Different alarms sounded in the operator's
control room for nearly 18 hours before the leak was confirmed.
And, after that, it took an hour and 20 minutes for the initial
call to the National Response Center to be placed.
In September of last year, a gas pipeline in San Bruno,
California, exploded, killed 8 people in addition to destroying
37 homes. It took over an hour for technicians to manually shut
off the flow of gas, which continued to feed the fireball.
And, of course, last month, a pipeline buried beneath the
riverbed of the Yellowstone River near Laurel, Montana,
ruptured and spilled up to a thousand barrels of oil into the
Nation's largest undammed river.
I look very much forward to testimony from ExxonMobil and
Congressman Rehberg, as well as their answers to our many
questions concerning the recent spill in Montana. Though the
discussion draft does not specifically address some of the
preliminary issues raised by the incident, I hope that what we
learn today can provide better understanding on the adequacy,
or lack thereof, regarding current pipeline safety standards
related to water crossings.
What all of these incidents tell us is that pipeline safety
laws must be enhanced to prevent tragedies like these in the
future and better prepare us for response and containment once
they occur.
The Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act is
the Energy and Commerce Committee's initial offering into this
year's drive to reauthorize pipeline safety laws. We are fully
committed to working in a bipartisan, bicommittee, and
bicameral fashion to get a pipeline safety bill signed this
year in to law. The public demands it, and so does our
responsibility as their elected leaders.
Among its many provisions, the discussion draft under
examination today seeks to: one, set a 1-hour time limit for
operators to report incidents to the National Response Center,
similar to legislation in the last Congress that was passed on
the House floor; two, require the use of automatic or remote-
controlled shutoff valves that can stop leaks and spills in a
fraction of the time needed for manual valves; three, require
better leak-detection technologies for the monitoring and
assessment of leaks; four, substantially increase civil
penalties on pipeline operators who have major accidents; five,
require highly enhanced inspection techniques and technologies
which cover more pipeline mileage than before; and, six,
increase the number of pipeline inspectors at the Department of
Transportation. Perhaps also, the idea that we will require
pipelines to be buried further underneath waterways, as
probably was the cause in Montana.
This discussion draft is an important first step in getting
a companion House bill out of the starting blocks and on a
trajectory to merge with existing Senate legislation. It is my
intent to move a bill through this subcommittee over the next
couple of weeks and have full committee action upon our return
from the August recess.
I look forward to the conversation today and yield the
balance of my time to the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LEE TERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
Mr. Terry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my hope that both this committee and T&I will move to
report a very strong piece of legislation by the end of this
year.
When we hear of tragedies involving pipelines in San Bruno
or in Montana, our hearts go out to those affected. But, as
legislators, it is necessary and important that we quickly
learn from these accidents and move to write laws that protect
human health and the environment--bearing in mind that
pipelines remain the safest and most efficient means of
carrying vital energy across great distances.
Pipelines are such an important part of our commerce, and
all involved must have the confidence that the system works
well. I appreciate the outline that our chairman made of
improvements that could be made to pipeline safety.
And I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Terry.
Next, I would like to recognize Mr. Waxman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we will examine the safety of the Nation's oil and
natural gas pipelines and begin to consider legislation to
update and strengthen our pipeline safety laws.
During the last 12 months, a litany of tragic failures has
reinforced the need for stronger pipeline safety laws.
Since last month's hearing on this topic, ExxonMobil's
Silvertip pipeline ruptured in Montana, spilling an estimated
31,500 to 42,000 gallons of crude oil into the Yellowstone
River. It appears that the oil may have been carried as far as
240 miles downstream. Pockets of oil have been confirmed at
least 90 miles down the river. Ranchers are struggling to
prevent the contamination from destroying their livelihoods. We
don't yet know the cause of this spill, though much of the
focus is on whether the pipeline buried beneath the river was
uncovered by erosion from flooding and became vulnerable to an
occlusion from debris.
During May of this year, two serious spills occurred on the
first Keystone pipeline, which brings Canadian tar sands oil to
refineries in Illinois and Oklahoma. This is a brand-new
pipeline. It was predicted to spill no more than once every 7
years, but in just 1 year of operation, it has reported 12
separate oil spills.
In February, a natural gas pipeline in Allentown,
Pennsylvania, exploded, killing 5 people and damaging more than
50 homes and businesses. This was an old cast-iron pipeline.
Last September, a natural gas pipeline on the other side of
the country ruptured and exploded in San Bruno, California.
Eight people died; many more were injured. The gas-fed inferno
spread from house to house, driven by the wind. Thirty-eight
homes were destroyed, and 70 more were damaged. The explosion
left behind a suburban street with a massive crater and burned-
out vehicles. The vice chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board described it as, quote, ``an amazing scene of
destruction.''
Two months before the San Bruno explosion, a crude oil
pipeline ruptured near Marshall, Michigan. Over 800,000 gallons
of oil spilled into the Talmadge Creek and then flowed into the
Kalamazoo River. The cleanup is ongoing a year later and is
expected to cost $550 million.
These are just some of the catastrophic pipeline failures
our country has experienced during the past 12 months. These
failures have occurred all around the country. From California
and Montana to Michigan and Pennsylvania, natural gas pipelines
have exploded; oil pipelines have ruptured. Some failures
involved old, outdated pipelines. Others involved brand-new,
supposedly state-of-the-art pipelines. When we step back and
look at the last 12 months, I think it is impossible to
conclude that our pipeline safety laws are working as intended.
We need to seize this opportunity to reauthorize and update
the pipeline safety statute. The Senate Commerce Committee has
produced a moderate, bipartisan bill. I think the Senate bill
is a good place to start, and I hope that we can work together
to strengthen and improve that bill.
The discussion draft we will be examining today contains
several of the same provisions but also weakens some other
provisions. With the benefit of the testimony we will hear
today, let us use this discussion draft as a foundation to
craft a strong bill together. I don't think there is any reason
for this to be partisan issue. We want to work in a cooperative
fashion to produce a good bill that will meaningfully enhance
pipeline safety.
Mr. Chairman, I want to now yield the remainder of my time
to Mr. Green from Texas.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I thank both the ranking member of the full committee and
the subcommittee for giving me time to speak.
I am pleased we are having this hearing today. Pipeline
safety is probably an utmost important issue of my
constituents, because many are employed in the oil and gas
industry and thousands live in communities near pipelines in my
Houston-area district.
As this process moves forward, I look forward to working
with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to build
consensus and move a bill that will update the regulations in a
way that makes sense. So far, I am pleased with the Senate
bill, which is moving quickly over there, has garnered
bipartisan support, and hope that we can have the same success
here.
This hearing is a valuable step to analyze the strengths of
both bills and examine areas that need improvement. And I
appreciate our witnesses being here, particularly our
colleagues.
And, Mr. Chairman, we have to get this right with pipeline
safety simply because the alternative is putting more trucks on
the road carrying those same chemicals, or those same products,
and that is why this is so important.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Green.
At this time, we will hear testimony from our first panel
of witnesses.
I would first like to recognize Congressman Denny Rehberg
from Montana.
STATEMENTS OF HON. DENNY REHBERG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA, AND HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNY REHBERG
Mr. Rehberg. Thank you for recognizing me.
And I want to offer my sincere appreciation to you,
Chairman Sullivan, for chairing this meeting today; Mr. Upton,
for calling the meeting; Ranking Member Rush, for your kind
assistance today and your recognition of the panel that follows
the two of us, because the staff really put a lot of work in to
it. And I think you are going to hear a lot about the necessity
and the opportunities in pipeline safety.
Your committee must accomplish two critical things today.
First, we need to share our knowledge in regards to the
ExxonMobil spill so that we can determine what can be done to
prevent it from happening again. Second, if Congress moves
forward with authorization of the Pipeline Infrastructure and
Community Protection Act of 2011, I want to be absolutely
certain that we are doing everything that we can to prevent
future environmental, health, economic impact from pipeline
failures.
For many, the Silvertip pipeline breaking was just another
news story about an oil spill, but for Montanans, this is our
home. Water and rivers play a big role in the lives of many
Montanans. For the Maclean family in the famous movie ``A River
Runs Through It,'' it was the Big Blackfoot River. For me and
my family, it is the Yellowstone River. I grew up in Billings,
just a few miles from the riverbanks of the Yellowstone. As a
boy, I swam and fished that river. I spent time with my family
and friends floating down it in inner tubes and barbecuing on
its banks. In fact, I have lost a couple of high school friends
in separate drowning accidents in that river. You could say
that, like thousands of other Montana families, the Yellowstone
is our family river. So this oil spill is a pretty big deal for
us. We have questions, and we deserve answers.
As Montana's Congressman, I fly into Billings just about
every week. I fly over the Yellowstone River, but I also fly
over the oil refinery that provides so many good jobs to our
community. Just like the river is a part of Montana's culture,
so is the energy industry.
Montana is a warehouse of energy options. We have it all:
wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, oil, gas, coal, biofuels.
These energy options help us provide the energy this country
needs to end our addiction to foreign oil and creates good-
paying jobs.
The reason I point this out is simple: While there might be
some people out there who think that we should develop our
resources without any regard for the environment, that is not
me. And there are others who think we should stop all human
impact on the environment whatsoever. That is not me either.
Neither of these options work for Montana or America.
I am fifth-generation Montanan. I hope to pass it on to the
sixth generation. I was a rancher before I came to Congress,
and I will be a rancher after I leave Congress. And,
ironically, I have a petroleum pipeline that crisscrosses my
ranch. It is a Conoco pipeline. And I can't begin to tell you
what good neighbors they have been. They flag it, they monitor
it, they work it. I receive no financial benefit. My great-
grandfather actually granted the easement for this pipeline.
So these kind of pipeline legislations matter a lot to me.
I want to know that private-property rights are respected, I
want to know that people are respected, but that the
environment is respected as well. Because, while I receive no
financial benefit from a pipeline that crisscrosses my ranch, I
would have the benefit--or, the failure or any of the problems
as a sidenote of the failures of a pipeline that exists and
occurs. So this kind of legislation is important to those of us
who work the land.
We must demand a third option, a way to utilize our natural
resources while doing everything we can to protect the
environment. It is a reasonable and responsible expectation.
The United States is leading the way in providing clean,
effective energy. We are not perfect, but when there is a spill
or a mistake, you won't find a more scrutinized response
anywhere in the world.
This is one of the reasons domestic energy production is
such a good idea. Our standards and expectations are so much
higher than the countries we import oil from. A kilowatt hour
of energy produced in the United States is, on balance, going
to be cleaner and safer than a kilowatt hour of energy we
import.
In Montana, one of our most valuable resources is nature
itself. Montanans get it. We hunt, we hike. We don't just visit
the outdoors; we live there. That is why I have always said
Montanans are excellent stewards of the land and that we don't
need Federal bureaucrats telling us how to manage our land and
wildlife.
This spill was a failure that did not live up to that
standard, and we want to know why, we want to know what is
being done, and we want to know how to prevent it in the
future. And that is what this hearing is about.
In the meantime, Montanans of all backgrounds have already
come together in the Yellowstone Valley to clean up this mess.
ExxonMobil has hundreds of people on the ground working closely
with local, State, and Federal officials. And they are joined
by scores of regular Montanans who are volunteering their
personal time to help clean up the spill.
Maybe more than any testimony here, I think that speaks
volumes about the urgency of this response. In Montana, when
the chips are down, you don't wait for outside help. You roll
up your sleeves, you join your neighbor on the front line.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing today. I
stand ready to answer any questions from my unique perspective
of being on the ground from day one of July 1, working with
Exxon, EPA, and anybody else that will work with us to see
that, one, we find out what happened; two, we fix the problems;
and, three, it never happens again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Congressman Rehberg.
I would just like to make an announcement. I would like to
announce that the third panel will be testifying next Thursday,
as we expect a lot of votes on the floor here very soon in the
next hour. So I apologize for that. But it seems to be able to
work better if we do that, and I apologize if it inconveniences
anyone. I know it probably does. Thank you.
Next, I am pleased to welcome Congresswoman Jackie Speier
to deliver her testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking
Member Rush and colleagues, for the opportunity to speak to
you.
Let me say at the outset that I am thrilled that this
committee is going to move swiftly to address this issue. I
have a couple of concerns that I will address this morning, but
at the outset let me say that, you know, before September 9th,
I knew very little about this issue. I now feel like I have a
Ph.D. in it. I hardly knew about the National Transportation
Safety Board. I knew nothing about PHMSA. I didn't know what a
maximum operating pressure was. I didn't know what a psi was.
But I know all about all of those things today.
I also know that I went to the funerals of eight people in
my district. I visited the burn center in San Francisco where
seven victims slept, hung to life for 4, 5, 6 months. This is a
tragedy not just for the San Francisco Bay area. This was a
national story; it was an international story.
And for as much as we are talking about today, there are a
couple of things that are not in this bill that need to be
addressed.
One is, if you look at pipeline safety historically and the
laws that we have put on the books, we grandfathered in all of
the pipes that were pre-1970. So all of the older pipes are not
subject to the kind of scrutiny that newer pipes are.
This was a pipe that was actually placed in service in
1956. It has lots of problems. The National Transportation
Safety Board will come out with its report at the end of
August. The wells appear to be flawed. The operator didn't know
what was under the ground, thought it was a seamless pipe when,
in fact, it was a seamed pipe; didn't have the instrumentality
to determine that the wells were poor; had maximum allowable
operating pressures that exceeded what probably should have
been used. But, having said all of that, they followed the law.
They followed the law because they were grandfathered in.
Now, I have introduced legislation that addresses a number
of these elements. The local operator in my community, Pacific
Gas and Electric, has implemented every single measure that is
in my bill. Now, they have done it for a lot of reasons, but
they are looking at over a billion dollars in liability right
now. And for all the operators across the country, the kinds of
steps that we are recommending, I think, are very important.
One of the things that is not addressed in either bill is
notice to the residents. PG&E has noticed everyone in their
region if they are 2,000 feet from a transmission line. Now,
that is important and good not just for the resident but for
the operator. If the homeowner doesn't know that they have a
transmission line in their backyard or front yard and they are
putting up an in-law unit, they are not going to take the kinds
of precautions necessary. And, as we know in pipeline safety,
most ruptures occur from third-party impact.
So that is a very important feature. PG&E did it. They did
it swiftly. It was not, I think, an extraordinary cost to them.
It is notice to not only the residents, but it is also notice
to the local first responders. The fire chief in San Bruno
didn't even know there was a transmission line running through
the middle of the street.
Now, it took an hour and 30 minutes or more for PG&E to
turn off the gas. Now, I am passing out to you photographs.
This photograph shows you the kind of fireball, 30 feet in the
air or higher. They thought it was a plane that had crashed at
first.
But it took an hour and 30 minutes for them to turn off the
gas because they had to go all the way to another community to
get the keys to open the gate to get to the valve. If there are
automatic and remote shutoff valves required in high-
consequence areas--these are areas where you have high
population and/or seismic risk--that could have been turned off
within 20 minutes at the very most.
So the fire raged for an hour and a half, taking lives and
extensive property. Over 37 homes were demolished. And if you
look at this, it looks like a war zone in many of these
pictures. And this community is still trying to recover today.
So I think it is very important for us to look at putting
automatic and remote shutoff valves not just on new
construction; it is the most vulnerable construction that is
pre-1970 that we should be concerned about. And we should be
concerned about it in high-consequence areas, where there is
high population, where population has grown up around
transmission lines that were put in place many decades ago. It
is no one's fault at this point. It is just that we have to
make it safe for the consumers, for the ratepayers.
And I think as we look at what the costs are associated
with it, I can tell you as one person who has witnessed this
firsthand, if it means slightly more on my PG&E bill to make
sure that there is going to be safety first, then I am willing
to pay that price to make sure that lives aren't lost.
Now, I have a written statement that I am not going to
spend much time on because I think that it kind of speaks for
itself. But I do want you to appreciate that there has to be
disclosure of the location of these pipelines to the first
responders. If they don't know where they are located, if they
are not trained, then they are sitting ducks when an explosion
occurs. There has to be notice to the consumer; that automatic
and remote shutoff valves need to be put in place in high-
consequence areas.
The language in both bills is really pretty squishy. It is
basically, you know, they need to use the best technology
moving forward. Well, I am much more concerned about the older
pipelines than I am the newer pipelines.
And for all those operators that have pipelines that they
do not have paperwork for--and in 30 percent of PG&E's system,
they do not have paperwork, they do not know what is under the
ground--in those situations, that pipeline needs to be hydro-
tested, because there is no way of knowing whether or not it is
safe. There is a whole new technology around what is called
``smart pigging,'' but if you have pipe diameter that ranges
from 30 to 24 to 40, you are not going to be able to use smart
pigging. So the only way to make sure that that is safe is to
do the hydrostatic testing.
None of that, frankly, is in the legislation today.
So I urge my colleagues to recognize--if these pictures
don't speak a thousand words, I don't know what does. This is
not anything you want to have happen in your district. And when
it does, it consumes you for years. And it has been a huge toll
in my region and something that really needs to be addressed on
a Federal level.
I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Congresswoman Speier.
I would like to recognize myself for a question to
Congressman Rehberg.
Could you briefly tell us about how the Unified Command is
working in Montana?
Mr. Rehberg. Yes. You may have seen some press where the
Governor pulled out of the Unified Command, but for the most
part, they have worked extremely well together. And so, you
know, there is probably some politics over policy involved in
the situation, but we are really pleased.
The EPA has done a great job. We have the Coast Guard
involved, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the State
Department of Fish and Wildlife and Parks, the DEQ in the State
of Montana. And, really, they have worked well together. And
that doesn't always happen.
And one of the reasons, I think, is because Exxon stepped
forward and said, ``We are responsible.'' As you know with the
gulf situation, you get a lot of finger-pointing. Everybody is
saying, ``Not me, not me, not me.'' Well, in this particular
case, Exxon stepped forward and said, ``We are going to make
you whole. We are going to stay until the job is done. We are
going to clean up the environment. We are going to pay those
that have a loss of use on their properties.'' And so, you
know--to allay some of the fears of the economics. There are
people that can't graze their pastures because of the oil
residue. Exxon has got people in there and working to figure
out a fair settlement so that they can get in and fix it.
So, for the most part, the coverage has been good, the
comments have been as good as possible in a very emotional
situation. But we just appreciate the Federal effort, the State
effort, the local effort, and the company effort to do the best
they can.
Nobody wanted this to happen. Most of all, the company did
not. But we think the Unified Command has worked very well. It
has been a good process. And thank you for the question.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir. That sounds good.
And I would like torecognize Ranking Member Rush.
Would you like to ask a question?
Mr. Rush. To Congressman Rehberg, as the Representative who
represents an area where Exelon is based, I am glad to hear
good comments about the company--oh, Exxon.
Oh, OK. Well, I represent Exxon. I thought he said Exelon.
OK.
All right. Well----
Mr. Rehberg. Yes, sir, we actually have three refineries in
the area, so it is a major part of our economy.
Mr. Rush. Oh, OK. So it is Exxon, OK.
Mr. Rehberg. It is Exxon, Conoco, and then there is a co-
op.
Mr. Rush. OK. I am sorry, I misunderstood.
I just want to--Congresswoman Speier, I want to just
identify with your comments. I was just talking with a man, the
State's attorney in my own district, in the Will County area.
And he is afraid that, whereas we have not had this kind of
spill or any kind of explosion that you have experienced, we
are afraid that that is going to happen because of--you know,
and we have seen those start off, they start off small, and
then they kind of build until you have a giant explosion.
And I certainly concur with your attitude about how we can
strengthen this bill. And I want to just thank you for the
timeliness of your comments and insightfulness of your
comments. I think you have helped us to--with your attention,
your advice, and your consideration, you have certainly helped
us to strengthen this bill in a lot of ways. And I really
appreciate it and appreciate the fact that you are doing
something to help us out.
But I was curious, in reading this comment on the
notification to your citizens, you seem to be disappointed,
very disappointed. How can we reallyassure that those who live
in the communities, that they have proper response, proper
alerts, and that they really need and have some prior
knowledge. I think if they knew or know beforehand that they
have pipelines running close to their properties, then they
would be more mindful of some of the things that may give us
some forewarnings.
So can you address the issue of prior notification or
notification of your constituents?
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ranking Member Rush. I would be
happy to.
It is important to note that the industry has been driving
policy--not surprising, but very much the case as it relates to
pipeline safety. Most of the studies that are commissioned by
PHMSA, 60 percent of them are funded by the trade association,
and the trade association determines whether or not to do
certain studies.
The trade association has also developed the, quote,
``educational component.'' And in PG&E's case, they paid an
entity that was somehow related to the trade association to do,
quote, ``education.'' And they did a survey, and the survey was
exposed at the National Transportation Safety Board hearing
that occurred in March on the explosion. And it was shameful
that how much ever money was spent on the survey to ratepayers,
they got a response of 15 people. Thousands and thousands of
surveys sent out; 15 people responded.
Now, PG&E has taken it upon themselves to notify every
resident. They did it simply and swiftly. If you are going to
bill people, you can also send a separate notification out to
tell them that they are within 2,000 feet of a transmission
line.
Now, it is important to the resident, but it is also
important to the operator, because the third-party digs are the
most likely occurrence of ruptures. So, right-to-know should be
very important to everybody--to those that are living next to a
transmission line, to the first responders. And that is why I
think that is so critical.
There has been a lot of money spent on, quote,
``education'' that has been absolutely pointless. And I think
that we need to take the next step in terms of right-to-know.
Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Rush.
I would like to thank our panelists, Congresswoman Speier
and Congressman Rehberg. Thank you so much.
And now we would like to move to our next panelists, get
them up here.
Thanks.
Mr. Rehberg. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I would like to thank you for being
here.
If you are ready, I would like to recognize Ms. Quarterman,
the head of PHMSA, for her statement.
STATEMENTS OF CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND RANDALL S. KNEPPER, DIRECTOR, SAFETY
DIVISION, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, ON BEHALF
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PIPELINE SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you. Good morning, Vice Chairman
Sullivan, Ranking Member Rush, members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's
oversight of America's vast network of energy pipelines and
reauthorization of the pipeline safety program.
PHMSA and our State partners' safety oversight provide
critical protection for the American people and our
environment. The Department is actively working to ensure the
safety and reliability of the Nation's pipeline infrastructure.
The recent ExxonMobil incident has focused all of our attention
on the importance of preventing pipeline failures. PHMSA has
fulfilled all but one of the requirements of the Pipeline
Inspection Protection and Enforcement Safety Act of 2006, and
we are in the final stages of addressing that last remaining
mandate.
To help combat pipeline vulnerability to excavators, PHMSA
continues to provide State Damage Prevention Grants for State
one-call centers, State pipeline safety agencies, and other
authorized recipients. PHMSA also provides comprehensive
training for all State and Federal pipeline safety inspectors.
Through rulemakings and pipeline safety advisories since
2009, PHMSA has closed a record 12 of the National
Transportation Safety Board's safety recommendations. During
that same period, PHMSA also obtained closure on all of its
pending Office of Inspector General and Government
Accountability Office recommendations.
PHMSA looks forward to working with Congress on
reauthorizing its pipeline safety program. We are pleased that
the Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act of
2011 picked up nearly all of the provisions of the
administration's proposal. At the same time, we need to
remember that each new mandate will require rulemakings to be
developed and published in compliance with the Administrative
Procedure Act and subject to review of our two technical
advisory committees.
As for some of the bill's provisions, PHMSA supports
increasing administrative civil penalties for violations
leading to deaths, injuries, or significant environmental
damage, especially since maximum penalties have not increased
in almost 10 years. However, we do not support removing maximum
penalties for incidents that occur in high-consequence areas or
adding the requirement that those violations be willful and
knowing.
Significant spills and incidents also have occurred on
gathering lines, and we strongly believe that Congress should
eliminate exemptions to allow PHMSA to regulate the remaining
pipeline mileage that is currently unregulated. We also do not
support mandatory removal of class locations before PHMSA has
had a chance to consider the issue. We support prohibiting
States from being exempt from damage prevention--creating
exemptions from damage-prevention laws; however, we suggest
that Congress take a phased approach to any funding
restrictions to allow time for States to remove those
exemptions.
Reforms to allow for the collection of additional data on
physical attributes and pipeline locations are also supported.
In addition, we support reforms to provide us with
reimbursement from project applicants for design review,
consulting and field oversight, as well as for costs incurred
to review special permit applications.
While Congress works through the reauthorization of the
pipeline safety program, PHMSA is moving forward and taking a
hard look at our Nation's pipelines. Many of the provisions
that are in your bill are things that we are already
considering and working on regulatory implementation of.
Under Secretary LaHood's leadership, we have developed the
Pipeline Safety Action Plan and will ensure the safety of the
American people and the integrity of the pipeline
infrastructure.We are also executing this plan in a transparent
manner, with opportunities for public engagement and a
dedicated Web site.
In closing, we look forward to working with Congress to
address any issues you may have regarding PHMSA's pipeline
safety program and the regulation of gas and hazardous-liquid
pipelines. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Quarterman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
I would next like to recognize Mr. Knepper. Thank you. You
are next.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL S. KNEPPER
Mr. Knepper. Thank you. My name is Randy Knepper. I work
for the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, and I am
here on behalf of the National Association of Pipeline Safety
Representatives.
For the majority of the people in the room that don't know
what that organization is, we are the inspectors for the State.
We have about 325 inspectors, we have about 50 program
managers, and some administrative clerical help. And in
laymen's terms, we are the boots on the ground. We are the
field soldiers that do the inspections at the State level. So I
am very appreciative of being here today to be able to talk
about these things that we see firsthand.
As far as the bill, we have looked it over really quickly.
And I will keep this very brief. There are four components that
we talked about in our testimony. And one of them that is very
dear to me is the State damage-prevention language that talks
about not having any exemptions for mechanical excavation and
any governmental entities.
We, as States, are--there is no Federal underground damage-
prevention program. States are the ones that have them. We have
differing laws in each State. But we do believe that there are
some exemptions that make sense. In my own State, we allow
farmers to use their own property to plant and for tilling of
agricultural and seeding. We think that makes sense. The
language that is in there would prevent that.
There is language just for the pipeline operators
themselves that would be excused. If they were to respond to an
emergency themselves to fix their own, we allow them to fix the
pipe, respond to that emergency, and don't have to call the
one-call, because we think you are trading one safety
prerogative over another.
So there is some language in there that we think that
exemptions do make sense in limited situations. And States have
put that in to their own respective laws where they make sense,
and so I would be very careful and mindful of that.
The second thing that we think that can be very helpful to
States is the maintenance-of-effort clause that is in there. We
strongly believe in maintenance of effort. States contribute
almost $15 million of their ratepayers' money to handling these
things, and we just think that the language should be updated
from the years of 2004 through 2006 to the latest, the 2009 and
2010.
We think that is the best way to get some of the PHMSA
money into the States since we are the front lines. You know,
we are 75 percent of the workforce, and we inspect almost 90
percent of the Nation's pipelines. So those are the pipelines
that go right up to people's homes and businesses and actually
enter some of the buildings sometimes. So we are there, front
and center.
We do have concerns with the language about class locations
for integrity management. We think the language there, as
written, should be either stricken or should be studied. We
think class locations apply much more than integrity
management. They apply to design, such as valve spacing,
whether that valve is 10 miles away or 2 miles away;
odorization and operations, leak surveys, patrolling. Class
locations is a much broader concept than just integrity
management, so we do have concerns on that.
And then last, but not least, is we did want to bring up
when you want to have a quicker response time for the
notification centers. Being a State where I get notified all
the time, at a much lower level, long before there is incidents
that rise to the definitions at the Federal level--we get
notified for outages of 50 customers or less, or we get
notified of a single evacuation. So we are getting notified all
the time.
Most States have already written into their laws a
specified time period, usually about 2 hours. So, much of the
time, being on the receiving end of those calls, there is not a
lot of information that is available in an hour. So it is
very--assessments haven't been done. There is a lot of
confusion and things like that. So we would like the committee
to take that in to consideration.
And I can see that my time is about up, so I will leave it
at that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knepper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you for your comments.
Now we will move in to questions. I recognize myself for a
question.
To Ms. Quarterman, the discussion draft proposes that the
automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves be mandated for
pipelines that are constructed or entirely replaced.
One of the witnesses on the next panel testifies that these
valves should be placed in all high-consequence areas. Does
PHMSA have a sense of what this sort of retrofitting would
cost? And if so--even if it is feasible.
Ms. Quarterman. We have not done an economic evaluation of
how much that would cost. I would say that we are--last year,
we put out an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for
hazardous liquids where we asked the question about where it
would be appropriate to put these kinds of valves. We have
plans to do similar rulemaking on the transmission side.
In the short term, I think we are planning to have a
workshop later on this year or early next year to begin to
flesh out issues with respect to replacement or placement of
those valves, but at this point we don't have that data.
Mr. Sullivan. Do you do cost-benefit analysis on these
regulations?
Ms. Quarterman. Oh, absolutely. It is mandatory.
Mr. Sullivan. OK.
Also, Ms. Quarterman, I have anotherquestion. The
discussion draft requires a study on leak-detection systems and
requiring leak-detection systems for hazardous-liquid pipelines
located in high-consequence areas.
One of the witnesses on the next panel commented in his
testimony that we should set a standard now for what the
minimum leak-detection capabilities under various circumstances
should be. Does PHMSA have the information it needs to do that
for now? Or would it make more sense to study technical
capabilities first?
Ms. Quarterman. At the same time that we are looking at the
placement of valves, we are considering the question of leak
detection and where it is appropriate.
Again, that was also included in the advance notice of
proposed rulemaking that went out on hazardous liquids. So that
is something that will be a part of this technical working
group that we are planning for shortly.
Mr. Sullivan. And I have one more question. Regarding your
concerns on gathering-line exemptions, what significant spills
and incidents related to gathering lines can you share with us?
Can you describe to us what regulations are already in place
for gathering lines?
Ms. Quarterman. I will get you a list of significant spills
or incidents. Just off the top of my head, there was, in 2009
or 2010, an incident in Oklahoma involving a gathering gas line
that was 20 inches, about, where I believe 3 people were
killed. So these lines do have or have the potential to have
significant consequences.
We would like to be able to gather data about incidents on
these lines, since they are currently not regulated, and be in
a position to determine what regulation is appropriate.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Knepper, the bill would link removal of damage-
prevention exemptions to the Federal grant dollars. After more
than a decade of incentivizing States to improve these
important safety programs, why shouldn't we be holding States
to the highest standards when Federal grant dollars are
involved? These accidental dig-ins are, after all, the leading
cause of death and injury associated with pipelines; is that
right?
Mr. Knepper. I believe accidental--I believe you are very
correct. We are not asking for that. What we are asking for is
to make sure that the language isn't too far-reaching and
broad.
As a person in my own State, I investigate every single
dig-in that occurs, 400 in my State a year. Every Thursday, I
meet with every excavator and every operator. So I know
firsthand what the reasoning is. I do not wish to hide behind
the fact that there are exemptions and things. I know which
exemptions make sense and which don't. I just think that
putting this into the bill and doing it by giving through the
grant process will not accomplish that goal at all.
In fact, first of all, it might be contrary. If I am not
allowed to use and apply for a one-call grant because I have a
minor exemption for someone digging in a sandpit or a quarry,
where it doesn't make sense and we have never had that, I can
no longer apply for that grant, I can't use that grant for
public education purposes and promoting dig safety.
So I do feel that the language there is too far-reaching
and that the States should be consulted first about how that
works. There is not a scintilla of evidence in my State where
that makes sense. I am the only one that has that data. It is
not available on a national basis. So you would have to go on a
State-by-State basis to see where that works.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, you are critical of the incident
notification section because it would lead to too many false
alarms. However, since the rules will be subjected to a process
of regulation, won't such a possibility be taken in to account?
Won't public input and comment allow PHMSA to prevent issuing a
rule that allows something like a customer-suspected gas leak
to count as a moment of discovery?
Mr. Knepper. I believe that we are only critical in the
fact that we just wanted to be aware of it. It will raise up a
lot more false alarms that occur out there. It is the same
resources that are applying. It is people like myself. After
this hearing tonight, when I go back, I am on call tonight. So
I will be getting that 3:00 a.m. Call that happens. So we just
want to be wary of the implications of that.
I am not opposed to--I would rather much more focus on the
quality of the information that comes in within that first
hour, versus focusing on whether it is a 1- or 2-hour
notification.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much.
And I would like to recognize Ranking Member Rush for
questions.
Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Quarterman, it is good to see you again. Thank you for
once again appearing before this subcommittee. You seem to be a
regular witness here. And we certainly appreciate your
testimony and your input.
Congresswoman Speier, in her testimony, was quite critical
of the relationship between industry, agency, or regulators.
Can you respond to that general criticism?
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you, Ranking Member Rush.
Yes, I would, because our agency has close to 500 people,
of which about 200 or so are in the pipeline safety program.
And we have heard this criticism in the past, and it is
something I came in the door having heard. And having spent
time with the employees within the agency, I know that, you
know, they may have some concerns about upper-level leadership,
but in terms of their commitment to the mission, it is the
highest, number-one thing on their mind.
I removed all doubt of any concerns about that when I have
been to the field and visited with our inspectors there. To a
person, their concern is safety and safety of the public. When
they have the obligation to go out and visit a site like the
one in San Bruno, which I got to see, which was absolutely
devastating, the inspectors who were out there said it was the
worst scene that they had seen in their career. It is
impossible not to be affected by that and not to put the safety
of the public foremost in their mind.
I mean, I think to a certain extent it is a creature of the
time and that people are, by definition, concerned about their
public officials, their government, and forget the kind of
commitment these folks have, working 24/7 to respond to these
issues.
Mr. Rush. Right.
What percentage of America's pipelines, do you know or can
you estimate, are grandfathered into the law that is up for
reauthorization? And the second part is, should we maintain
that grandfathered status in the reauthorization, or should we
eliminate it?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't have a percentage. That is a number
that we are trying to ascertain ourselves. We are, as I
mentioned earlier, in the process of doing an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking on gas transmission pipelines. One of the
things that I think you will see there are questions about
precisely this provision. It was put in to effect many years
ago and affected very old pipe then, and it has continued
forward.
The grandfathering, I think the notion was at some point
the grandfather would pass away and we would move forward with
a safety program. We need to know exactly how many pipelines we
are talking about there, how much it would cost to get those
pipelines hydro-tested or otherwise inspected or replaced. But
that is something that is top of our agenda.
Mr. Rush. Do you have enough inspectors on the ground,
enough boots on the ground, or should we be trying to include
additional dollars for more boots on ground?
Ms. Quarterman. The administration's proposal in 2010 would
ask for 10 additional inspectors per year for the 5 years of
the reauthorization, so 10 new ones every year.
Our biggest challenge is actually hiring people, in that we
don't have direct hire authority and there is a lot of
competition for engineers. They are all engineers.
Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Rush.
And I would like to turn to our chairman, Fred Upton, for
questions.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you. And in the interest of time,
knowing that we are going to have votes soon, I will try not to
use all my 5 minutes.
Ms. Quarterman, what are the current regulations regarding
the burial of pipelines under waterways? It is my understanding
that it is a minimum of four feet. Is that true?
Ms. Quarterman. With respect to pipelines that are in a
stream that is greater than 100 feet wide, the minimum
requirement is 48 inches unless there is rock to be blasted
through, in which it is an 18-inch requirement for hazardous-
liquids pipelines.
Mr. Upton. And that is in more than 100 feet wide. Is that
just at that particular point? Does it look at the flood stage
status? I mean, as I have talked to Congressman Rehberg and the
folks at Exxon, I knew that that area was flooded just like my
area in Talmadge Creek was flooded when we had that burst last
year.
Ms. Quarterman. It doesn't specifically address flood
stages. However, for example, in the Montana spill, it was an
area that was in a high-consequence area, and there are other
rules that would apply. When you design a pipeline, you have to
also ensure that it is capable of withstanding certain stresses
and external loads.
And since it is in a high-consequence area, it would be
subject to the Integrity Management Program requirements, which
are continual requirements upon the operator to ensure that all
local conditions, including climatic, like flooding, are taken
in to account.
Mr. Upton. OK. And it is my understanding that that was
because of--that standard was designed by a 1970s ASME
standard.
As we look to the future, will the ExxonMobil pipeline be
rebuilt? As it is rebuilt, will it use those same traditional
excavation techniques? And as I understood it, as I talked to
Exxon immediately afterwards, that they did excavate and then
lay the pipe down. Do you know what type of replacement will be
used when that pipeline is reopened?
Ms. Quarterman. We issued a corrective action order on July
the 5th requiring that they replace that pipeline using
horizontal drilling technology, which would put the pipeline
substantially below the riverbed.
Mr. Upton. ``Substantially below'' being how far? Ten feet
below? Twenty feet below?
Ms. Quarterman. We have not yet received a plan from Exxon
as to where they would like to put that pipeline. I read
someplace that they were talking about 30 feet, but we have not
received that plan yet.
Mr. Upton. OK. Question: Do you know what percentage of
pipelines across the country are remote versus manual in terms
of close-off valves?
Ms. Quarterman. We don't have that data, no.
Mr. Upton. Do you have any idea?
Ms. Quarterman. No, I don't.
Mr. Upton. Back-of-the-envelope?
Ms. Quarterman. No, I don't.
Mr. Upton. Forty percent? Twenty percent? Eighty percent?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't have any idea.
Mr. Upton. Is there any way to get that information?
Ms. Quarterman. We would have to survey the operators. We
don't maintain that kind of data.
Mr. Upton. The last question, Mr. Knepper, because the
bells have run for votes. It is our understanding that
ExxonMobil did not meet the 1-hour deadline for requirement for
reporting. As you deal with your other PUC commissioners, what
are your thoughts as to what it should be?
Mr. Knepper. Well, I mean, for our own State, you know,
where the Federal leaves it kind of up to discretion, we
specify in our State, you know. Response times have to be
within 30 minutes, 45 minutes, and 60 minutes.
I would not expect the Federal Government to have across-
the-board response times. It is all dependant upon the
landscape and what the expectations are of that public in which
you are serving. So we have determined in our State what it is.
And many other States have gone to that same type of thing;
they determine what the specifics are.
So I think that is the best approach, and it is
implemented.
Mr. Upton. OK.
Let me just finish up, Ms. Quarterman, by saying that, as
you are looking at pipelines as they go underneath streams and
riverbeds, if you would work with our staff, because we are
going to be looking to add this piece, I think, to our
discussion draft, in terms of a minimum of what should be. If
you could share with us what you think the fair standard ought
to be, and, obviously, feasible, we would certainly appreciate
that.
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
And I would add on your last question about shutoff valves
that one of the provisions in the legislation that we put
forward, and I believe here, relates to data and the ability to
collect some of this data that you are asking about.
Mr. Upton. I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Congresswoman Castor for 5 minutes.
Ms. Castor. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses for your testimony and
insight.
One of the most important developments in the regulation of
pipelines during the last decades has been implementation of
integrity management programs. Under these programs, pipeline
operators are required to continually evaluate the threats to
each pipeline segment's integrity and the consequences of a
failure. Inspections are required and operators must take
prompt action to repair any defects that could reduce a
pipeline's integrity. Since 2001, over 34,000 defects have been
detected and repaired.
But under current law, these programs only apply in so-
called ``high-consequence areas'' with high populations or
sensitive environments. That means that these programs only
apply to 44 percent of hazardous-liquid pipelines and 7 percent
of natural gas transmission pipelines.
Are those numbers correct, Administrator Quarterman?
Ms. Quarterman. I believe they are.
Ms. Castor. OK. An important priority for safety advocates
has been to expand the miles of pipeline covered by integrity
management programs. There is a separate set of requirements
called ``class location requirements'' that protect areas with
high population densities in a variety of ways.
Industry has argued that these two sets of requirements are
redundant. The Senate bill would require PHMSA to evaluate
whether integrity management programs should be expanded beyond
high-consequence areas and whether class location requirements
would no longer be needed. Then the agency would issue the
appropriate regulations based upon the evaluation.
The discussion draft takes a different approach. It
includes the evaluation of whether integrity management
programs should be expanded beyond the high-consequence areas,
but it wouldn't allow the agency to act on this evaluation. At
the same time, the draft requires the agency to roll back the
class location requirements.
Mr. Knepper, the discussion draft approach seems to be on
balance. Do the State regulators think it is a good idea to
require PHMSA to eliminate class location requirements for
pipelines that are subject to integrity management?
Mr. Knepper. No, we don't.
Ms. Castor. Why not?
Mr. Knepper. Because we think class locations goes beyond
integrity management. It goes into the initial design of it. So
integrity management, like you said, only applies to a certain
percentage, those in Class 3, Class 4 locations, high
population centers. But class location also goes in to--it
affects operations, such as odorization. It affects maintenance
about how often things are leak-surveyed. It affects the
patrolling of pipelines, things outside of the integrity
management section.
So we think eliminating that, I would not even use the term
that it is ``redundant,'' would be a problem.
Ms. Castor. Administrator Quarterman, what do you think,
are these two sets of requirements redundant? Or do you agree
with Mr. Knepper, should we roll back the class location
requirements without further study?
Ms. Quarterman. I agree with Mr. Knepper.
Ms. Castor. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area where the discussion
draft needs to be improved. This provision I think is weakening
safety protections, when it should be expanding and
strengthening them.
I now yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Castor.
Next, I would like to recognize Representative Lee Terry
from Nebraska.
Mr. Terry. Thank you.
Yes, Ms. Quarterman, I am a little confused on your last
comment. Just regarding integrity management, can you describe
what your position is on how integrity management programs and
class location requirements are not redundant? When issuing
integrity management rules, didn't PHMSA draw the conclusion
that IMP makes class location rules obsolete?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't know what the original rulemaking
said, but the position that we have taken in our draft and in
the Senate bill would require us to do a study that takes some
consideration of this issue. And I think that is the
appropriate course. I don't think it is appropriate just to
eliminate----
Mr. Terry. To do a study of what, specifically?
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. How to deal with class
locations, whether or not to----
Mr. Terry. Should it be fully Federal or have a mixture of
State?
Ms. Quarterman. I am not following, I am sorry.
Mr. Terry. OK. Go ahead. How much time do you think a study
would take? And would that delay our ability to pass a
comprehensive pipeline safety bill?
Ms. Quarterman. No, I believe the approach that is in the
Senate bill would permit us to do a study and proceed as
appropriate following that.
Mr. Terry. OK.
In regard to detection, we have had discussion about older
pipelines, newer pipelines. It seems to me that the technology
that is being used, in the type of electronic equipment that
can monitor, inspect, do you feel that the bills properly
address increasing the level of inspections and they could be
for both older and newer? What are your recommendations?
Ms. Quarterman. I recommend that we proceed apace to
continue to look at the question of leak detection. I mean, for
me, in the past year, noticing the number of incidents, I have
been concerned that large spills occurred before anyone knew
what was happening.
And I think it is an appropriate time for us to take a
closer look in terms of making the requirements more
prescriptive than they currently are. Right now, they are, in
the integrity management program, more a question of people
deciding what to do. Maybe we need to set some standards here.
Mr. Terry. In regard to setting standards, Mr. Knepper,
does that impact the States? You mentioned in your testimony
that you think the States are in a better position because you
have knowledge of what a reasonable time to shut off or
inspect--or, not to inspect, but if there is a problem, once it
is detected, to actually resolve.
Mr. Knepper. We just have to be careful about which segment
of the Nation's pipelines and infrastructure we are talking
about. The vast majority of transmission lines are inspected by
the Federal Government, not the State, although the State does
a big portion. So I would say that, when I was gauging and
talking about emergency response times, that was more for
distribution-type--the vast majority of pipelines that are out
there.
I think your question has to do with the transmission lines
and what we feel about that. I guess I think that, here is an
area where a lot of States will defer to the Federal Government
for some of the things because they are the inspection force
that is out there most often looking at those. We do that,
although it is a small percentage of the amount of pipelines
that we look at. So I would----
Mr. Terry. Well, let me just interrupt.
Thirty seconds, Honorable Quarterman. Should we put
something in this bill that says, on detection, after
detection, you have 1 hour to respond? Thirty minutes to
respond? Is there something like that that would be
appropriate?
Ms. Quarterman. I may have misinterpreted your last
question. I thought we were talking about leak-detection
systems.
In terms of the timing, we currently, on a Federal level,
have an advisory bulletin that says between 1 and 2 hours
people should notify after something happens, they should
notify the National Response Center.
Mr. Terry. And if they don't, a fine?
Ms. Quarterman. A potential fine if it is not reasonable.
Mr. Terry. OK. That is all. I yield back.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Terry.
I would like to thank the witnesses.
And we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
THE AMERICAN ENERGY INITIATIVE, PART 11: THE PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2011
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:17 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Whitfield
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Whitfield, Sullivan, Terry,
Burgess, Bilbray, Scalise, Olson, Gardner, Pompeo, Griffith,
Upton (ex officio), Rush, Dingell, Green, Gonzalez, and Waxman
(ex officio).
Staff present: Gary Andres, Staff Director; Charlotte
Baker, Press Secretary; Michael Beckerman, Deputy Staff
Director; Maryam Brown, Chief Counsel, Energy and Power; Andy
Duberstein, Special Assistant to Chairman Upton; Garrett
Golding, Professional Staff Member, Energy; Cory Hicks, Policy
Coordinator, Energy and Power; Katie Novaria, Legislative
Clerk; Jeff Baran, Minority Senior Counsel; and Caitlin
Haberman, Minority Policy Analyst.
Mr. Whitfield. I will now call the hearing to order.
As you know, this is a hearing regarding the discussion
draft, the Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act
of 2011. We had to interrupt the hearing the last time. We had
heard from two panels of witnesses. So, today, we are going to
hear from the last panel of witnesses; and we do appreciate you
all taking time to come back and offer us your thoughts on this
discussion draft.
On the third panel today we have Mr. Andrew Black, who is
the president of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines; and he is
also testifying on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute.
We have Mr. Daniel Martin, who is senior vice president,
pipeline safety, El Paso Pipeline Group; and he is also
testifying on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America.
We have Mr. Rick Kessler, who is the--I don't know if he is
the executive director or not, but he is here testifying on
behalf of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
Mr. Kessler. Vice president.
Mr. Whitfield. Vice president. Thank you.
Then we have Mr. Charles Dippo, who is vice president,
Engineering Services and System Integrity, for South Jersey Gas
Company and also on behalf of the American Gas Association.
Then we have Mr. Gary Pruessing, who is the president of
ExxonMobil Pipeline Company.
Once again, welcome. Thank you for being here. We look
forward to your testimony. Each one of you will be given 5
minutes for your testimony.
Mr. Black, we will begin with you. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENTS OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF OIL
PIPE LINES, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE;
DANIEL B. MARTIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PIPELINE SAFETY, EL
PASO PIPELINE GROUP, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; ERIC KESSLER, VICE PRESIDENT, PIPELINE
SAFETY TRUST; CHARLES F. DIPPO, VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING
SERVICES AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY, SOUTH JERSEY GAS COMPANY, ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION; AND GARY PRUESSING,
PRESIDENT, EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE COMPANY
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BLACK
Mr. Black. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Whitfield. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear on behalf of AOPL and API.
Advancing the cause of pipeline safety is a goal we all
share. The subcommittee discussion draft would improve pipeline
safety by building on the good work in S. 275, the pipeline
safety reauthorization bill approved by the Senate Commerce
Committee on a bipartisan basis. We hope S. 275 will be
approved by the full Senate soon, although there are changes we
seek to it before it were to become law.
The draft before this committee today is an improvement
over S. 275 in certain areas. My written testimony makes
certain suggestions on how the draft can be improved further.
I specifically want to commend the draft bill's provisions
regarding damage prevention. Excavation damage is the leading
cause of pipeline accidents that kill or injure people.
Eliminating exemptions to one-call programs that require an
excavator to call 811 before digging, as the draft would do, is
a meaningful pipeline safety enhancement. This section will
save lives, reduce injuries, and protect the environment.
The draft wisely delegates many technical and engineering
risk management decisions to PHMSA. Proper pipeline regulation
involves a technical engineering analysis of risks and
potential solutions. I encourage the committee to avoid
presuming new regulations are necessary unless there is
evidence that the current regulatory framework has failed. In
many cases, the draft properly avoids presuming such failures
in advance of study.
We support the draft's provisions concerning operator
incident notification procedures to the National Response
Center and revising PHMSA enforcement processes.
The draft also requires several studies we do not oppose,
including on leak detection technologies. The last time leak
detection was studied, just 3 years ago, PHMSA did not conclude
that this complex issue was in need of a rulemaking. Leak
detection is a combination of technologies, practices, and
systems, often customized, sometimes proprietary, and not one
off-the-shelf technology. While we all want leak detection to
improve, priority should be placed on improving the technology
and capability to match increasing expectations.
Our members contribute to research on leak detection and do
not believe Congress should require a rulemaking before knowing
what the study will conclude. We recommend the committee delete
the requirement for a rulemaking in the draft but keep the
study.
We fully support timely and accurate reporting of pipeline
incidents, but we want to make sure replacing the current
reporting standards with a hard deadline does not create the
potential for more false-alarm notifications just to achieve
compliance with the deadline. False-alarm notifications cause
unnecessary deployments of first responders and an unwarranted
expenditure of resources and manpower by government. We
encourage the committee to discuss this issue with PHMSA and
State regulators. You may find the revisions to the reporting
procedures in the draft by themselves facilitate more prompt
notification of pipeline incidents.
A lot of attention now is being given to the pipeline
incident in Montana earlier this month. Once the root cause of
an accident is determined, we can identify the proper
responses, both technical and regulatory. Any premature
regulatory changes not based on the investigation and
understanding of the underlying cause of an accident could
distract regulators and the industry from addressing the real
cause of the incident. Basing pipeline regulation on solid
information will help achieve our shared objective of
minimizing pipeline accidents. Nobody wants to avoid pipeline
failures more than we do.
The safety performance of the liquid pipeline industry has
improved over the past decade but can always improve further
toward the goal of zero accidents. Our associations and our
members work hard to prevent pipeline accidents and identify
and implement lessons that can be learned from them.
Each of the major causes of pipeline failures decreased
over the last 10 years, reflecting the success of several
different strategies to manage risks. The major causes of
pipeline failures are already addressed by a thorough set of
Federal and State regulations, including internal corrosion,
external corrosion, materials and equipment failures, and
operations errors. Also, PHMSA is an aggressive regulator,
unafraid to use its many tough inspection and enforcement
tools.
We welcome the opportunity to work with members of the
committee and other stakeholders, including the Pipeline Safety
Trust, on legislation to further improve pipeline safety. The
discussion draft is a good start.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Black.
Mr. Martin, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL B. MARTIN
Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is
Dan Martin; and I am senior vice president of pipeline safety
for El Paso Pipeline Group. El Paso owns and operates 43,000
miles of interstate and natural gas pipelines, representing 13
percent of the total U.S. capacity. Twenty-six percent of the
natural gas consumed in the U.S. flows through one of our
pipelines.
Today I am testifying on behalf of the Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America, or INGAA. Our members include
virtually all of the interstate natural gas transmission
pipelines in the United States, operating about 220,000 of
large-diameter pipelines that are analogous to the interstate
highway system.
Last month, INGAA testified before this subcommittee and
outlined our perspectives on pipeline safety generally and our
positions on particular provisions of the Senate pipeline
safety bill, S. 275, specifically.
We stated this last month, but it bears repeating, that
while the safety record of the natural gas transmission system
is very strong, we at INGAA recognize that continuous
improvement in the safety of our pipelines is an imperative.
Our goal is zero pipeline incidents. This is an ambitious goal
to be sure, but it is only by setting ambitious goals that the
highest levels of performance can be reached.
We think that the draft bill being discussed today does
advance continuous improvement in pipeline safety, and
therefore we support this bill and offer the following
comments:
First, on damage prevention. We think the draft bill is
extremely aggressive in terms of eliminating exemptions from
participation. Most, if not all, of the groups at this table
support comprehensive damage prevention or call-before-you-dig
programs as the best solution for avoiding the most preventible
and the most deadly type of pipeline accident. Added to the
already strong list of prohibited exemptions from the Senate
legislation is mechanized excavation, which effectively is
requiring universal participation by all major excavators. This
is raising the bar significantly.
Next is the provision on integrity management. Our
association has embraced the idea of expanding integrity
management beyond the existing focus on high-consequence areas,
and we therefore support authorization from Congress for DOT to
undertake such an effort. We do think that it is important to
continue to focus on reducing risks in populated areas and
likewise want to see the Integrity Management Program expanded
in a manner that reduces risk to an increasing number of people
living or working near pipelines. The draft bill enumerates
those components of an expansion.
The draft bill also requires a rulemaking on removing the
redundancy between legacy class location regulations to natural
gas transmission pipes and the newer integrity management
regulations. Both regulations are designed to address the same
issue, reducing the risk of an incident in populated areas. The
difference is that class location requirements were created in
1970 before pipeline inspection technologies were invented and
therefore before the development of pipeline monitoring
capabilities that are a realty today under the Integrity
Management Program.
Let me be clear. The Integrity Management Program regulates
all natural gas transmission pipeline segments located in
populated areas, including especially the most densely
populated areas. Our goal is to eliminate the belt and
suspender situation today, where we have a newer and far
superior regulation that has been added, while at the same time
an older regulation to accomplish the same objective has
remained in place.
As we mention in our written testimony, when DOT performed
its cost-benefit analysis on the gas transmission integrity
management rule back in 2003, it assumed that class location
requirements would be waived for pipe segments covered under
the new Integrity Management Program and therefore counted a $1
billion savings to industry as part of the new rules benefit.
Rather than depending on waivers to address this redundancy,
though, there ought to be a consistent policy developed through
a rulemaking. If integrity management is a program that needs
to be expanded, then we should also eliminate older, less
effective regulations designed to address the same issues.
Mr. Chairman, we have other comments in our written
testimony, but in the interest of time I will conclude here by
thanking you and the subcommittee for inviting INGAA to comment
on the draft bill and, most importantly, for getting this
reauthorization under way so it can be completed this year.
I will be happy to answer questions at the appropriate
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Martin.
Mr. Kessler, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ERIC KESSLER
Mr. Kessler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Chairman Upton and members of the committee and subcommittee. I
appreciate you inviting the Pipeline Safety Trust to speak
today and provide its views on the draft legislation.
Now, according to PHMSA's own statistics for the past 10
years, pipeline accidents kill or hospitalize at least one
person in the U.S. every 8.7 days on average and cause more
than $470 million in property damage each year. Even since the
Trust testified last month before the committee, another
incident has dumped somewhere on the order of 42,000 gallons of
crude oil into the Yellowstone River. On top of tragedies in
Michigan, California, and Pennsylvania, I think it is important
that we now move forward on a strong bill to address the
tragedies of the past year and close gaps in pipeline safety
that have been identified to help restore the public trust.
I agree with my friend and former committee colleague, Mr.
Black, in that the draft bill is a good start, but, because
time is short, I am going to focus on some improvements we
think need to be made to the bill.
In Section 2, civil penalties, PHMSA has ample discretion
in how it applies fines and usually leans toward the low end,
in our opinion, if a fine is even levied at all. If Congress is
to create a new major consequence category, the words
``knowingly, willfully, and intentionally'' must be removed,
since those are standards that are not only very difficult to
prove but more appropriate for criminal, not civil, penalties.
Gathering lines, section 4, PHMSA has already told its
technical advisory committees that there are problems with the
regulations of these lines so there is no more need for study.
Instead, this section should require the necessary rule
changes; and those changes should include clarifying
definitions, adding lines to the national mapping system,
reporting incidents, and bringing these lines under similar
regulations to transmission pipelines.
In section 5, the new rules for the placement of remote or
automatic shutoff valves should be expanded to at least include
existing lines in high-consequence areas, not just new lines.
The current draft would have provided no increased safety for
San Bruno.
Integrity management, we completely support moving forward
on expanding integrity management, as INGAA has called for as
recently as yesterday. Since class locations also are what in
many ways define which pipelines fall under integrity
management, at a minimum any change in class location rules
must go hand in hand with expansion of integrity management, I
think a point my friend, Mr. Martin, was getting at.
With regard to cast iron pipelines, while the survey
required in this section is important, this problem has been
known for years and continues to kill people. It is time to
move beyond surveys and put in place rules that will force
pipeline companies and State rate setting agencies to
responsibly and expeditiously replace cast iron, bare steel,
and other high-risk pipelines.
Leak detection, we feel this section does little to address
the current leak detection shortcomings. Leak detection is
already required for pipelines in high-consequence areas, but,
as we have seen in Salt Lake City, North Dakota, and Michigan,
leak detection systems in place did little good. What is needed
is a clear standard to define the size of the leak the system
is required to be able to detect and the time required for the
system to issue an alarm.
Oil flow lines, the limitation in this section that
precludes PHMSA from regulating oil flow lines needs to be
removed, in our opinion. There is ample evidence that these
lines can and have caused significant damage. We just saw this
recently again in Montana with the FX drilling flow line spill
which went unreported for a week.
Special permits limits the Secretary to reviewing only a
company's regulatory record when considering whether to grant a
waiver from a safety standard. Certainly they should be
considering that, but, by limiting it, you leave out a number
of important considerations, contextual issues like population
density or environmental sensitivity.
Maintenance of effort, we question the need to require the
Secretary to grant a waiver to States who claim financial
hardship, particularly since most States can make that claim if
they want to. I have been a State employee. Most States are in
a crunch. But the Secretary already has the authority to waive
and has used it. And the reality is that States can charge
pipeline companies user fees to fund their safety programs or
find other methods, so excuses of financial troubles should
have little bearing, and it is also unfair to States that make
the effort, particularly as pipe infrastructure greatly expands
in nontraditional areas like the Marcellus shale.
Section 26 relating to administrative enforcement is at
best unnecessary, since they address regulations DOT can and
have started to change on its own initiative. They issued a
rule just last week. At a minimum, the requirement for hearing
on the record within 20 days must be removed, because it will
severely drain very finite sums of resources finitely that
should be going to safety.
Finally, in summing up, one critical area covered in the
Senate bill left out of this draft was a provision on maximum
allowable operating pressure, which is a real problem in San
Bruno.
Thank you again. We stand ready to work with you to move
this reauthorization forward; and with the changes I have
outlined here the committee can continue to report the kind of
bipartisan, balanced bill we did when I worked here in 2002 and
2006. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Carl Weimer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Kessler.
Mr. Dippo, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. DIPPO
Mr. Dippo. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am Charles Dippo, vice president of South Jersey
Gas Company and chairman of the American Gas Association's
Operating Section. I am here today testifying on behalf of AGA,
which represents over 200 local energy companies that deliver
clean natural gas to more than 65 million customers throughout
the United States.
Natural gas pipelines transport one-fourth of the energy
consumed in the United States through a safe 2.4 million mile
underground pipeline system. This includes 2.1 million miles of
local distribution pipelines and 300,000 miles of transmission
pipelines that provide service to more than 175 million
Americans.
Industry has demonstrated that it can increase the delivery
of natural gas while continuously improving safety. Data from
PHMSA shows serious incidents and leaks have been reduced by
nearly 50 percent over the last 20 years, but as I remind my
staff each day, you can never be complacent, because excellence
in safety requires continuous improvement.
The pipeline industry leadership has joined Transportation
Secretary LaHood in his call to action to repair, replace, or
rehabilitate the highest-risk infrastructure and to raise the
bar on pipeline safety. To do so, we must keep our focus on key
initiatives that are already showing success. This includes
distribution and transmission integrity management, control
room management, public awareness, excavation damage
prevention, and voluntary initiatives, such as AGA's Best
Practices Program.
Secondly, we have an opportunity to enhance safety through
better excavation damage prevention programs, establishing a
data quality committee, reducing hurdles to implementing new
technology, and adopting the latest consensus standards. Most
importantly, we must obtain pipeline safety reauthorization.
AGA has reviewed the discussion draft bill and commends the
committee for developing a solid, bipartisan bill for pipeline
safety. AGA is generally supportive of the draft bill. However,
we want to highlight a few areas because they cause us some
concern.
Let me begin with automatic and remotely controlled shutoff
valves. Transmission pipeline ruptures are rare events and
operator resources should focus on preventing rather than
mitigating pipeline releases. The presence of an automatic
shutoff or a remotely controlled valve on a transmission
pipeline will not prevent that incident from occurring. The
benefit of these valves is the potential reduction in the
amount of natural gas released after the incident has occurred.
Although both automatic and remotely controlled shutoff
valves allow for faster closure than a manually operated valve,
they also introduce the possibility of false valve closures
with unintended consequences. Nevertheless, AGA supports the
bill language that requires the Secretary to initiate
rulemaking that will require the use of automatic or remotely
controlled shutoff valves or equivalent technology.
AGA also has concerns that the draft bill's provisions that
require operators to make telephonic reports to the NRC no
later than 1 hour after discovery will cause thousands of
unnecessary reports to be submitted. This will overburden the
emergency responders, regulators, and other parties that must
respond to NRC notifications.
AGA believes Congress has a legitimate concern to assure
that there is prompt notification of pipeline incidents. The
record shows that most incidents are indeed promptly reported.
Operators are responsible for the operational response to
incidents in coordination with their local emergency
responders. Standard safety practices and the incident command
structure mandate that these tasks receive the highest
priority. Once the preliminary extent of a situation is known
and local action is initiated, operator personnel will notify
the NRC. Typically, the call to the NRC will be made in less
than 2 hours.
Prompt local emergency response and Federal reporting are
important issues. AGA believes that PHMSA has the technical
expertise to promulgate the appropriate regulations on this
important issue that balances the needs of all parties and to
implement technically-based notification requirements.
Finally, it has been suggested that the Transmission
Integrity Management Program be changed and expanded beyond
high-consequence areas. AGA believes imprudent expansion would
be contrary to the intent Congress has for the program, which
is to focus resources on the densely populated and
environmentally sensitive areas where an accident will do the
most damage.
All pipelines must comply with stringent State and Federal
safety standards even before the TIM program is applied. As
part of its regulation on transmission integrity management,
DOT has already included provisions for pipeline operators to
have an added layer of protection on low-stress pipelines which
are outside of HCAs already.
AGA believes it is reasonable for Congress to direct DOT to
evaluate the effectiveness of the existing Integrity Management
Program no later than 1 year after the completion of the
baseline assessments in December of 2012. The study should
include the comparisons as presented in the draft legislation.
In conclusion, the natural gas utility industry has a
strong safety record, and we are committed to working with all
stakeholders to improve. To that end, we applaud this
committee's focus on moving pipeline safety reauthorization
forward. Passage of this important bill this year will help us
achieve a common goal--to enhance the safe delivery of this
vital energy resource.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dippo follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Whitfield. Thanks, Mr. Dippo.
Now, Mr. Pruessing, help me with your pronunciation.
Mr. Pruessing. It is Pruessing.
Mr. Whitfield. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY PRUESSING
Mr. Pruessing. Chairman Whitfield, members of the
subcommittee, last week I had the opportunity to discuss with
your colleagues on the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials the pipeline incident that occurred
July 1 in the Yellowstone River in Montana. I appreciate the
opportunity to do so again with you today.
Since I submitted my statement to the subcommittee last
week, we have achieved additional progress in cleaning up the
spill which I would like to update you on this morning. Before
I begin, however, allow me to repeat our sincere apologies to
the people of Montana. We deeply regret that this incident
occurred and are steadfastly committed to not only complete the
cleanup, but also to build the learnings from this incident
into our future operations.
This requires, first, that we understand exactly what
occurred. We do not yet know the precise cause of the apparent
breach in the Silvertip pipeline and will not likely know until
our investigation is complete. We do know that the pipeline had
met all regulatory requirements, including a 2009 pipeline
inspection and a December, 2010, depth-of-cover survey.
Additionally, as recently as last month, the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, or PHMSA, performed a field audit of the
pipeline's Integrity Management Program.
Of course, we do know the effects of the incident. The
pipeline lost pressure the night of July 1, and within 7
minutes our employees shut down the pumps. Shortly thereafter,
we began closing the valves to isolate segments of the pipeline
and minimize any release.
We estimate that no more than 1,000 barrels of oil spilled.
We notified the National Response Center and immediately began
implementing our emergency response plans, drawing upon our
local resources at the ExxonMobil Billings refinery, as well as
our experts from across the country.
A unified command center led by the Environmental
Protection Agency and involving more than 780 people now
directs the response. This coordinated effort, combining the
resources of government, industry, and others, is crucial to
effective cleanup and recovery.
I speak on behalf of our entire company in thanking the
public servants at all levels of government and the volunteers
from nongovernmental organizations contributing to the effort.
This includes professionals from PHMSA, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the
Montana Department of Environmental Quality, Montana Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks, Yellowstone County Commissioners, local
response organizations, International Bird Rescue, and many
others.
As part of our cleanup strategy, we have divided the aerial
down river of the spill into four zones. In the first two
clean-up zones, covering a combined distance of approximately
19 miles, we have deployed over 57,000 feet of boom, 277,000
absorbent pads, and several vacuum trucks, boats, and other
equipment to capture oil. Our priority is to ensure that the
cleanup is safe and effective, a task made more challenging by
the persistent high water levels in the Yellowstone River.
On July 17th, we completed a 2-day procedure to remove any
remaining crude oil from the Silvertip pipeline at the
Yellowstone River crossing. The work was conducted under the
direction and oversight EPA and the Montana Department of
Environmental Quality. At the same time, through the unified
command, we continue to conduct air and water quality
monitoring of over 200 miles of the river as well as wildlife
assessments and recovery efforts. To date, EPA monitoring
confirms there is no danger to public health and no reported
water system impacts.
We have also brought in recognized experts such as
International Bird Rescue to actively monitor the impact on
local wildlife. So far, impacts have been limited and small in
number, and a list is available on our Web site. Monitoring and
mitigating the impact of the spill on wildlife will remain a
priority throughout the spill cleanup.
The Silvertip pipeline plays an important role in supplying
energy to the Billings area and therefore helps sustain local
jobs and economic growth. We are committed to replace the
damaged pipe using horizontal directional drilling techniques
with a new section that will lay approximately 30 feet below
the riverbed, consistent with the PHMSA direction.
Of paramount concern to us is the impact on local
communities. We established a community information line and
have received more than 390 calls. About 170 of these calls are
claims related to property, agriculture, and health; and we are
actively responding to each one of these. We have also sent
several teams door to door to visit approximately 250 residents
in the most impacted areas. It is our goal to respond to
individual concerns within 24 hours.
I am pleased to report that these outreach efforts have
mostly received a very positive response. In fact, about 170 of
the calls to the information line have been offers of help.
This outpouring of local volunteer support is immensely
helpful. It testifies to the resilience, industry, and
generosity of the people of Montana; and we deeply appreciate
their understanding and support.
To repeat, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company takes full
responsibility for the incident and the cleanup, and we pledge
to satisfy all legitimate claims. But even then our work will
not be done. We are equally committed to learn from this
incident and to build those learnings into our future
operations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pruessing follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Pruessing, thank you; and I thank the
panel for your testimony.
I will recognize myself now for 5 minutes of questions.
The discussion draft of the bill states that notice should
be given to the National Response Center at the earliest
practical moment following discovery of a release of gas or
hazardous liquid and not later than 1 hour following the time
of discovery. Now, some of you made reference to that
notification requirement, and we know that when you pass
legislation it is not unusual that sometimes you end up in
courts and then trying to define what it actually means.
I would just ask each of you to comment briefly on what
does this mean to you: 1 hour after an operator sees the sign.
Does it mean something out of the ordinary, or 1 hour after
confirmation, or is there any ambiguity from your perspective
and how could we improve it in any way?
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. We understand that to apply 1 hour after
confirmation of discovery. Right now, it is earliest
practicable moment in the regulations right now. PHMSA
interprets that as about 1 to 2 hours, and I believe when the
administrator was here she didn't suggest a change was needed.
But if you do do it, we interpret that as 1 hour after
confirmation of discovery.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. Yes, that is the same for us. One hour after
time of discovery is what we would interpret that to be.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Kessler?
Mr. Kessler. I think, generally, I would be in agreement.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. That is correct. We would also agree.
The concern with the natural gas distribution industry,
though, of course, is that there are releases almost every day
relative to struck mains and services, and our concern would be
how this would impact the overloading of the NRC.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Pruessing?
Mr. Pruessing. We agree. It is 1 hour after confirmation.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. All right.
Now, last week, Congresswoman Speier testified, and she
addressed this grandfather pipeline issue that one or two of
you mentioned in your testimony. I would ask what is needed to
confirm the maximum allowable operating pressure for those
pipelines constructed before the 1970 pipeline safety
regulations were implemented? Do you support the Senate
provision on this issue?
Mr. Black?
Mr. Black. The Senate provision did not cover hazardous
liquid pipelines. There is not the equivalent grandfathering
issue.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. INGAA members commit to a systematic validation
of records and the maximum allowable operating pressure in
their pipelines in the highly populated areas.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Kessler?
Mr. Kessler. The situation was that there wasn't an
accurate record of the pipe in the ground, and all regulators
regulate to the record, not so much the actual physical
properties. So we do strongly support the Senate provision. We
think it is reasonable.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. Yes. The concern is, of course, that a one-size-
fits-all approach to the maximum allowable operating pressure
is it does not work for the natural gas distribution utility
industry. We do believe that, in terms of the records
validation, that all operators should be doing that with their
facilities. But we are reluctant to get involved with
validating MOP through hydrostatic testing of lines that are in
service.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Pruessing?
Mr. Pruessing. ExxonMobil Pipeline operates liquid
pipelines, so, as Mr. Black said, there is no grandfathering
for the liquid lines.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now, the National Association of State
Pipeline Self-Regulators, when they testified, addressed
redundancy between class location requirements and integrity
management. Can you all elaborate on where these redundancies
exist and where they do not? Mr. Black?
Mr. Black. It is not a liquids issue, just gas.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. Yes, for the gas pipelines, what we were
talking about, class location requirements are embedded
throughout the regulations, from design, construction,
operation, and maintenance; and the focus we were talking about
with the Integrity Management Program that went into place back
in 2003, that is really on the area of operation and
maintenance. And where we see the overlap is we are collecting
a tremendous amount of information in the new regulation and
requirements and evaluating the risks and the threats
associated with our pipelines and taking the appropriate
action, where the existing class location requirements simply
state in some cases you must just change out the pipe without
looking at all this information.
So getting back to the cost-benefit analysis that was done
back in the 2003 evaluation, that was the $1 billion savings
they were talking about, is the redundancy related to the new
requirements versus changing out the pipe. We think those
dollars, those safety resources, ought to be expended elsewhere
in our programs, even if we are talking about expanding the
HCAs beyond the existing requirements today. Those are
resources that could be used to do that more effectively.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Kessler?
Mr. Kessler. Looking at redundancies is something we
support in that area, but, again, we believe this has to be
coupled with--you cannot disassociate that from other
regulations, particularly the Integrity Management Program. So
you really can't move one block without affecting the other. So
you need to do both together.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, I would agree with Mr. Martin's position
that there is duplication in the regulation. In fact, a
transmission pipe operated by a local distribution company is
covered both by transmission integrity management and
distribution integrity management. We feel DOT needs to study
this inefficient duplication.
Mr. Whitfield. Do you have any comment, Mr. Pruessing?
Mr. Pruessing. No.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. At this time, I would like to recognize
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, you are most kind. I commend you
for this hearing.
I would like to welcome our panel, particularly my old
friend Rick Kessler, who has been in this room before, as you
will well recall. I would like to direct this question first to
Mr. Kessler.
Normally, the standard for criminal violation is knowingly
or willfully violating the law. In the current pipeline safety
statute, the standard for criminal penalties is knowingly and
willfully. That appears to me to be an unusually high standard
to meet. The bill proposes to extend the standard of knowingly
and willfully to civil penalties. Is that right?
Mr. Kessler. It does propose to do that, in part.
Mr. Dingell. It makes it very hard to reach civil penalties
and apply them to serious misbehavior, does it not?
Mr. Kessler. It does, Mr. Dingell. In fact, to our
knowledge, the knowingly and willfully standard currently in
law has only successfully been applied once, and that was in
the Bellingham situation.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Kessler, section 18 of the draft deals
with waivers from the law. The discussion draft has only two
items the Secretary must consider in granting a waiver: one,
the applicant's compliance history; and, two, the applicant's
accident history. I am concerned this may preclude the
Secretary from considering other information, such as whether
the pipeline runs through a wildlife refuge or other
environmentally sensitive areas like a national park or
something of that kind. The Senate version of this legislation
contains a clause which allows the Secretary to consider any
information or data the Secretary considers relevant.
Now, Mr. Kessler, yes or no, do you believe the Secretary
needs additional authority to ensure that these waivers are
issued properly? Yes or no.
Mr. Kessler. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Kessler, do you believe that the
provision in section 17 dealing with cost recovery for design
reviews at PHMAS would allow PHMSA to generate significant cost
recovery? Yes or no.
Mr. Kessler. Not as currently structured, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Should it?
Mr. Kessler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, for the rest of the witnesses, starting
with you, Mr. Black, how many projects have your groups had in
recent years that cost more than $4 billion?
Mr. Black. I don't know of any, but I don't have that data.
Mr. Dingell. Would you submit that for the record? As a
matter of fact, would our other panel members please do that?
Now, section 5 of the draft bill requires automatic or
remote shutoff valves where technically, operationally, and
economically feasible on new--and I emphasize the word
``new''--pipeline.
Starting with you, Mr. Black, yes or no, is this something
the industry is doing already? Yes or no.
Mr. Black. On new construction, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. On new construction, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Kessler?
Mr. Kessler. As far as I know, on new construction, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, both on new construction and on existing.
Mr. Dingell. And our last witness?
Mr. Pruessing. To my knowledge, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Now, you all know about the recent San Bruno
explosion which resulted in eight deaths and the destruction of
38 homes. It took PG&E 90 minutes to manually shut off the
valve, resulting in some 35 million additional cubic feet of
gas being released. I seem to remember this was subject to
debate some 15 years ago, and I would note that action has not
been taken on this problem, which appears to continue to exist.
Now, question: If the San Bruno pipeline had an automatic
or remote shutoff valve, would this have reduced the amount of
damage caused by the accident? Yes or no. Starting with you,
Mr. Black, please.
Mr. Black. It could have, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. I believe it could have reduced it, yes, but I
think there still would have been the issue of the gas escaping
from the pipeline after they were closed.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Kessler.
Mr. Kessler. We believe it definitely would have, just as
it would have in Edison, New Jersey, 15 years earlier.
Mr. Dingell. The next witness?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, anytime the valves are shut quicker would
reduce the amount of damage.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Pruessing?
Mr. Pruessing. We only operate liquid lines, so I am not in
a position to speak to the gas systems.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I have completed my time, and I
thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
At this time, I recognize the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank the panel for coming back because we
had votes last week. So I appreciate your adjusting your
schedules to be able to be here this morning.
I have actually a couple of questions.
Mr. Pruessing, there was a story in today's USA Today and
some other publications as well that said Federal inspectors
found a problem in the oil pipeline a month before it ruptured
in a Montana river, but it was not significant enough to force
a shutdown, the government's top pipeline regulator said on
Wednesday.
Was this rupture--was this problem anywhere close to the
place where it actually ruptured or not? Can you tell us a
little bit about this?
Mr. Pruessing. Those of us that are in the industry
understand that pipe is manufactured to a certain
specification, and there is a certain tolerance around that
pipe. It is not unusual to find some small variations in the
thickness of a pipe.
When we did our inspection in this line in 2004 and again
in 2009, we identified one small area of a pipe that was
slightly thinner. Again, over that period 2004 to 2009, that
had not changed. It is likely an original fabrication issue and
certainly was within tolerance. It did not affect the
performance of the pipe, and it did not require it to be
addressed under the regulations. At this point in time, we have
no reason to believe it had anything to do with this incident.
Mr. Upton. OK. I only have a limited time. That is good. I
appreciate your answer.
I want to go back to Mr. Dingell's question but expand it a
little bit as regards to automatic shutoff valves in high-
consequence areas. We had a little of that testimony by our
colleague last week, which I think all of you heard, and that
is the question as to retrofitting these pipelines in high-
consequence areas. We all liked the answer--I think it is in
the bill--that any new pipeline has to have this type of
equipment.
But let's talk about retrofitting literally the tens of
thousands of miles of oil and gas pipelines with automatic
shutoff valves. What are the costs? What percentage of the
pipelines could be viewed as high-consequence areas and how far
apart do they have to be if we looked at the issue of
retrofitting?
Mr. Black, and we will just go down the line.
Mr. Black. First, operators are required right now to
consider the use of remote operate and automatic shutoff valves
in high-consequence areas, and that analysis and decision is
available to PHMSA for inspection and audit. So there is a
requirement for this review right now. And often these valves
are used upstream at a river crossing.
But retrofitting, CRS has looked at this issue, and on new
construction, which is cheaper, they said it can be in the
hundreds of thousands, potentially even more millions of
dollars. When you think about 170,000 lines of liquid miles,
that is tremendously more expensive. Liquid lines don't get
compressed. What is important is to shut off the pumps and then
close the valves and try to isolate it.
But they do analysis right now on the drain-down and
determine where those valves should be. There is not a specific
mileage. It should be site specific, and it is today.
Mr. Upton. As I recall, one of my questions last week was,
do we know what percentage of the pipelines already have this
type of equipment on them, and the answer was they did not
know. I will maybe add to that my question as we go down the
line.
Mr. Black. I am not aware of that data. Forty-four percent
of the liquid lines are in high-consequence areas, so for that
44 percent this determination is required. But I don't have
that information. I am not sure if PHMSA does either.
Mr. Martin. For the interstate natural gas system, 6
percent of our mileage are in HCAs. So that is the mileage for
the interstate system.
Much as Mr. Black said, when we do the Integrity Management
Program, we do the evaluation on the valves as well. On new
construction, that is something that is looked at for automatic
or remote control valves.
As far as retrofitting existing valves or going beyond
HCAs, that is something that we are looking at right now. But I
don't have a cost figure for you for that. It would vary, based
on the pipeline, the location, availability for power and so
forth in there for some of these valve operators.
Mr. Kessler. Mr. Chairman, we believe that there should be
a requirement that these be used where technically and
economically feasible, particularly in high-consequence areas.
I think that is the most important aspect to cover. We are not
saying--this should be a risk-based type of approach to
retrofitting. We recognize that this is costly, which is why we
would agree that technically and economically feasible is a
good standard.
Mr. Dippo. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just indicate that
AGA members have--there is a provision, as Mr. Black indicated,
in the code for adding these additional levels of protection
for high-consequence areas in terms of retrofitting valves for
automatic or remote operation. So the costs are very site
specific, and the spacing would also be very site specific.
But, as Mr. Kessler had testified earlier, our biggest
concern would be the entire cost. For AGA members, we have
estimated that would be over $13 billion to go back and
completely retrofit, and our concern would be how that funding
requirement takes away from other fitness-for-service
requirements such as bare steel or cast iron replacement
programs.
Mr. Upton. I know my time has expired, but if you might
provide that information in terms of how you calculated the $13
billion to the committee, that would be great. Thank you.
Mr. Dippo. Yes.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Pruessing.
Mr. Pruessing. We already have a number of remotely
controlled valves along all of our pipelines, and we actually
used those to isolate this line that we recently talked about.
In liquid systems, automatic shutoff valves are a bit of an
issue because of the large mass you have, and you can actually
over-pressure a line if you slam a valve closed too quickly. So
automatic shutoffs are a concern about liquid systems, but
certainly remotely operated valves are something that are used
broadly already.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Green, you are recognized for 5 minutes
of questioning.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
extending the hearing. I know we had it last week, and even 5
minutes is not enough because most of you know where I come
from pipelines are just part of our daily life. I have so many
questions, we will probably submit some in writing.
Mr. Black, I believe you advocated for taking significant
care when considering the regulation of offshore gathering
pipelines. Onshore are not currently regulated gathering
pipelines.
Mr. Black. They absolutely are, by States.
Mr. Green. By States. Do they have any Federal standards at
all? Or is there some continuity between Federal standards for
pipelines and what typically the States would have in Texas, as
an example, or Louisiana or Oklahoma would have, a significant
amount of gathering pipelines?
Mr. Black. I can't speak to that. A lot of gathering is
affiliated with production, and we are representing
transmission pipelines.
Mr. Green. Would the situation with Exxon in Montana, would
that be considered a gathering line?
Mr. Black. No, that was a transmission line.
Mr. Green. An actual transmission line from the field to
the refinery.
Can you tell me about your concern about offshore
regulation of the gathering pipelines?
Mr. Black. Sure. For decades, the law by Congress has been
that this is regulated by States. If it is only offshore, it is
subject to the Federal lands agency there. We haven't seen the
evidence that the regulatory framework has to be changed.
You are well aware of the hurricanes that have come through
in the last decade or so, and the pipeline network has proven
itself quite resilient there. There is a study in the bill, and
we don't oppose that study. We think it will find that the
current regulator framework works.
Mr. Green. OK. Let me ask the total panel for thoughts on
the 1-hour notification. I guess I have concern about the
definition, because, as Mr. Dippo talked about, there are some
releases that are very brief and I would call them a leak if
they were liquid as compared to a rupture. Is there a
difference in the 1-hour notification or an hour notification
if you discover there is a rupture as compared to just a leak
that you can repair very quickly?
Mr. Black. Well, operators know the rules. They know what
types of events need to be reported. If--well, we have been
talking about improving the reporting procedures to try to
facilitate prompt discoveries. We think going to 1 hour without
those particularly could facilitate false alarms.
But to answer your question directly, there is a specific
understanding of what types of events need to be reported
quickly and what do not, because they are small, like you say.
Mr. Green. In the report to the National Response Center,
does that trigger some type of national Federal response?
Because, in all honesty, most of the immediate response is from
the pipeline owner and their resources and also the local EMS
and the first responders locally.
Mr. Black. We think the National Response Center process is
a good one. It is one call for the operator to make, and the
National Response Center notifies all of the local and Federal
agencies and first responders along the right-of-way that need
to be known. The Senate bill somehow confuses this and might
place the requirement of an operator to notify State and local
responders. We think the important thing is to get, as this
committee did, get one call made to that National Response
Center, as is done now.
Mr. Green. And the responsibility of the National Response
Center would also be the network that they have on the State
level?
Mr. Black. They know who to call, depending on the issue
and where it is.
Mr. Green. OK. In the current regulation concerning
notification, obviously, you feel like it is preferable. Is
there anything else we could do, any suggestions, including Mr.
Kessler, on the difference between the 1 hour and the current
requirement?
Mr. Kessler. A little confusion here I think is that the
bill language, much like the committee-passed and House-passed
legislation last year on this subject, does reference and take
as its baseline the existing regulation. So if you are getting
false alarms, if you are going to get false alarms after we
move the reporting requirement up to an hour, those are the
same false alarms you are getting now. That is not going to
change. What is going to change is the timeframe and also how
you report these things, which is something industry had asked
for, how you categorize them.
Mr. Green. Mr. Pruessing, you said--and I have to go back
to your testimony--but Exxon actually notified the National
Response Center within the hour, or within an hour?
Mr. Pruessing. When we actually had identified we had a
leak and identified where that was, we had called the National
Response Center within 34 minutes of that time.
Mr. Green. OK. So you fit the newer standard at least for
liquid pipeline, and I understand there is a substantial
difference between natural gas and liquids.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mr. Green. Mr. Dippo, this is just for my own reference.
South Jersey gas distribution, in your testimony you talked
about the additional discovery of natural gas. Are you actually
receiving natural gas from some of the shale plays that we see
in West Virginia and Pennsylvania?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. I guess because we have heard in the last few
weeks some concern about our shale plays being a little over-
dramatized in the success of them, but we are actually cooling
homes, I assume, in New Jersey today with that natural gas.
Mr. Dippo. Yes, sir. Cooling and heating, of course.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, 5 minutes
for a Texan is not long enough.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Green.
Mr. Olson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. I thank the chair. We are going to have the
Texas run here, it looks like. My colleague after me is going
to be another one from Texas.
I want to thank the panel today for coming back, for your
patience, your expertise, and your perspectives.
At the last hearing, I made a statement that no member
cares more about pipeline safety than the one who represents
the 22nd Congressional District of Texas. That is me. And since
a picture is worth 1,000 words, I have brought little pictures
for you all today.
The first one here is a PHMSA product. This is the pipeline
system in Harris County, Texas. The little red Post-It note
down here is where I grew up, and the one on the right side of
the chart is where I live now and where I am raising my family.
Those of you who have been to Houston rush hour may not believe
it, but the gold lines are the transportation infrastructure
for cars and trucks. The red and the blue lines are the
transportation and infrastructure for our petrochemical
industries. The blue lines are gas transmission pipelines. The
red lines are hazardous liquid pipelines.
Focusing a little more on the area right over here in
southeastern Harris County, you might know what that is.
Bearing down a little, this is the pipeline infrastructure that
supports the Port of Houston. It is the Nation's most busiest
port in terms of foreign tonnage. Again, Harris County is the
third most populous county in the country. Houston is the third
most populous city. The place where I grew up is right there.
So you can see how important this pipeline infrastructure,
having a safe infrastructure, is to the people of the greater
Houston area and also to our economy.
I just want to invite any of my colleagues, if you want to
come down and see a pipeline infrastructure firsthand, give me
a call. I am happy to take you down there and take you around
and show you how it really works down there.
I just have a couple of questions for you, and this is for
Mr. Martin and Mr. Black. The discussion draft proposes that
automatic and remotely controlled shutoff valves be mandated
for pipelines that are constructed or entirely replaced, and
Mr. Reamer testified that these valves should be placed in all
high-consequence areas.
Do you have a sense of what this sort of retrofitting will
cost--a couple of questions--if it is feasible? And then just
one example. There is a great company in the district I
represent, in the greater Houston area, Spectra Energy. I
toured their facility. They have incredible remote-sensing
valves all throughout their pipeline going up to the northern
and eastern part of the United States. Would they be asked to
somehow retrofit the current system they have got there, or
would they be held to some sort of new standards?
Do you have any sense of what would happen to companies who
already have got a tremendous system that can guarantee that
the flow from some sort of drop in pressure will be shut off,
nothing will escape for the next 15 minutes, something that
would have been very beneficial out in California?
Mr. Martin. I would just say on the automatic and remote, I
think there are some applications, that it is appropriate to
have those installed, and I think that is what we are proposing
to look at, is doing a study. Where it is technically and
economically feasible to install those, those should be looked
at, focusing on the high-consequence areas. That is obviously
where you would want to focus your time and your resources on.
So that is something that the INGAA companies are looking at
and certainly support as far as the bill goes.
As far as costs, we have talked about that. There are so
many variables in there about what the actual costs would be
that I couldn't give you a number now. We really would have to
look at that in some great detail to determine what some sort
of cost would be for those. But that is certainly a significant
consideration that has to be given for any requirement to do
that on a broad basis.
Mr. Olver. Mr. Black, anything you want to add?
Mr. Black. On liquid lines, remote-controlled valves are
used pursuant to a risk and engineering analysis that is
required in high-consequence areas and elsewhere. You will see
them used. They are prevalent on new construction.
These can be costly. You have got the valve itself, the
dig, the lost use of the assets. Whoever is getting the product
from you doesn't get it during that time. And then, as Mr.
Martin said, the cost of bringing power and communications
there just increase it.
We don't have specific costs, because these are costs
determined by the location and the use. But in retrofits they
are much more expensive, and we think on existing high-
consequence area lines there is not a gap. That determination
is required.
Mr. Olson. I see that I have used up the balance of my
time. Again, I would like to extend, if anybody here on the
panel or any member of this committee would like to get out of
the D.C. heat and trade it for the Houston heat, cooler, come
on down. I will help you out.
I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. We will let you know about that, Mr. Olson.
Mr. Gonzales, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I also want to wish to thank the panel and seeing
Mr. Kessler here today, but especially for the delay, just the
way things happen around here.
I am glad, I think Mr. Dippo pointed out, just to put
things in perspective, if you are looking at 2.5 million miles
of pipeline that are carrying natural gas, hazardous liquids,
and crude oil throughout this country, compare it to basically
any federally funded or any highway that receives any Federal
funds--and that is just about every road out there--would only
comprise half that amount, about 994,000 miles. So you can
imagine what is underground and such that needs to be regulated
and inspected for many, many reasons.
Yet we did have Administrator Quarterman here last week,
and I think--I didn't write it down, maybe my colleagues would
remember--but I think she said PHMSA has maybe 500 employees,
200 that are assigned to pipeline safety and such. So we
understand the partnership that is absolutely necessary by the
enormity of the challenge, and that is you have got to have,
obviously, industry but all of your State officials and
regulators. So whatever standard we set here, we are really
passing it off to be executed by others. I think that is the
greatest challenge.
I am going to start off with oil, and the reason for that
is just looking into the future and where we are and hopefully
increasing domestic production. But, presently, we import
1,930,000 barrels per day of crude from Canada, followed by
Mexico, 1,140,000, and then Saudi Arabia, 1,080,000.
I would ask Mr. Pruessing and I believe Mr. Black, my oil
guys, what is the special challenge of the Canadian crude, and
that is tar sand crude, that it presents in the way of
pipelines and moving it through the pipelines? And, again, any
additional challenges, things we need to be preparing for,
things that are or are not adequately addressed under the
present regulatory scheme? Mr. Black?
Mr. Black. When diluted bitumen or oil sands crude is moved
through a pipeline, it is just like every other heavy crude
from California or Venezuela. No special corrosion risk. There
is a study. It is in this discussion draft.
Mr. Gonzalez. But to get it to flow does take a process,
doesn't it? It is diluted. What is that process?
Mr. Black. They mix the bitumen with a condensate that is
part of the natural gas processing and convert it into diluted
bitumen. That is one way to process oil sands crude.
That is not really a concern. The concern for us accessing
western Canadian crude is just increasing pipeline takeaway
capacity. A lot of that crude is stranded right now, and the
market is calling for more access to it.
Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Pruessing.
Mr. Pruessing. The technology is actually well established.
We have been running heavy crudes in the industry for a very
long time; and, as Mr. Black has indicated, these heavy crudes
just need to be diluted so they can be pumped.
Mr. Gonzalez. Now I want to ask Mr. Kessler and then--off
of Mr. Kessler's questioning regarding it is going to be a new
category. I think Mr. Dingell also touched on major consequent
violations for on the civil side. And I agree with Mr. Dingell.
I don't understand why the standard, if it is going to be of
major consequence, that you just have a knowingly standard.
Because I would imagine that much happens as a result of
negligence. And so--but what is the logic? What would be the
reasoning, as you see it, to create a major consequence
violation category under civil and then have a standard that
really applies to criminal prosecution when it comes to the
willful and knowingly.
Mr. Kessler. I see none. As I said, the provision in
current law of knowingly and willfully is an aberration because
it is generally knowingly or willfully. And the standard has
only been successfully prosecuted once with Bellingham. And
then to put it in a civil penalty section, I have just never
seen it. I don't--I believe the chair and others who came up
with the proposal are trying to do something good here, but I
think the standard is misplaced as well as intentionally. Those
are all things that generally apply to criminal. They get to
state of mind, not negligence or gross negligence.
Mr. Gonzalez. My time is up, so I thank everyone.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. We appreciate you all raising that issue on
the standard on the civil penalties. A number of people on both
sides of the aisle have expressed concern about that, and we
appreciate you all mentioning that.
Mr. Pompeo, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am close enough I am
not sure I need this.
One of the things--I am new to all of this. One of things I
see done in the regulatory environment is we just keep adding
standards, and I understand we want to continue to improve
safety where we can. I know industry wants that, too.
Mr. Kessler, I am interested, it sounds like you have a
history on this committee and the issue is pretty deep. Is
there anything in this piece of legislation or in the existing
rules that you would say, yes, that doesn't make sense anymore,
we are driving costs, we are forcing pipeline distribution
companies, these folks, to spend money, and it no longer makes
sense? We can either let them not spend the money or spend it
more effectively on safety someplace else?
Mr. Kessler. Absolutely. As I alluded to earlier, I think
if you couple the repeal of redundant or unnecessary class
location with expanded protections, integrity management, then,
yes, that is something that you should be getting rid of, but
it has to be done in context.
Also, similarly, I think some of the--I lost my train of
thought. I am sure there are things. This is a statute that is
kind of all over the place. It always has been. It has always
been a desire, I think, of the members of this committee to
make it make more sense, which a good thing.
So I think there are some things in the bill. One thing I
think was inadvertent in the bill--and this isn't our issue--
but you asked a question that gives PHMSA arrest authority, and
I think that probably doesn't make sense. It is a nice
sentiment, I think leftover from days when the Coast Guard was
at DOT, but probably--PHMSA's never been a law enforcement
agency.
Mr. Pompeo. Gotcha. Thank you.
For Mr. Black and Mr. Dippo, you came through with various
things that you would like to see changed. If you were to
prioritize and say, hey, here is the most important thing I
would like you all to go back and look at. Seriously, can you
kind of--I cut the list, but could you prioritize and say, here
are the two things I think are most critical that I think you
need to go revisit from this draft legislation.
Mr. Black. I think two of the most costly things that could
be done in this industry and reauthorization is a leak
detection standard without knowing what PHMSA would do and then
some retrofit requirement for remote control valves beyond what
is considered today. You don't have the remote control valves
issue unsatisfactorily to us in the draft, but you do require a
leak detection rulemaking before even PHMSA has completed a
study and concluded one is necessary. So that would be our top
priority.
Mr. Dippo. Yes, and our concerns would be expansion of the
transmission integrity management regulations beyond the
current high-consequence areas, particularly before PHMSA has
had the opportunity to review the effectiveness of the existing
program, which is not scheduled to have baseline assessments
completed before 2012.
And then, of course, the concern about the extreme costs
associated with retrofitting existing valves for automatic or
remote-controlled actuation in high-consequence areas and the
effect that that may have on pulling funding away from other
replacement programs that we are involved in.
Mr. Pompeo. Great, thanks.
I have just got 1 more minute. Mr. Dingell asked Mr.
Kessler about Section 19, the waiver provisions, where there is
just two considerations. I don't think anyone else had a chance
to chance to speak to that. It just gives two things that the
administrator can consider in Section 18 when granting special
permits. Did anyone else have a view?
Mr. Kessler's view was there ought to be potentially other
things that the administrator could consider. Anybody else have
a view of if we got it right?
Mr. Black. Well, S. 275 section on special permits we
thought gave PHMSA the authority to be subjective rather than
objective on special permit applications. I haven't seen a
proposal like Mr. Kessler is talking about, about additional
contextual information. We think risk of the special permit
proposal should absolutely factor into the decision. Where we
want S. 275 to improve is make sure the Secretary and the
administrator are using objective information.
Mr. Pompeo. You want to know what you are up against.
Mr. Martin. I don't have any additions.
Mr. Kessler. I think Mr. Black makes a good point. I mean,
there does need to be certainty for industry. It is just that
if a gas pipeline goes through an earthquake zone, high-density
population area, in granting a waiver for that segment you
should look at that, or an oil pipeline through a national park
or refuge. So we are saying those should be enumerated, and the
industry does deserve certainty on these things.
Mr. Pompeo. Thank you. Thank you all.
I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Rush, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kessler, in our last hearing on pipeline safety we
discussed the issue of transporting diluted bitumen such as the
type of Canadian crude Keystone XL pipeline carried through the
middle of the country if it is approved. The discussion draft
calls for a say on this subject, but it doesn't take the next
step of requiring PHMSA to update its regulations. The study
shows there is an increased risk when transporting diluted
bitumen.
In your opinion, do you believe that this discussion draft
goes far enough in ensuring that we will have the necessary
procedures and mechanisms in place to safely transport diluted
bitumen through the heart of the country, or do you believe
that there are additional steps that we can include in this
bill to ensure that we are being proactive and taking every
precaution on this subject?
Mr. Kessler. Thank you, Mr. Rush.
We do support the study in the bill and would support that,
whatever recommendations are made from that, that they be
implemented. We don't take a position on the oil sands, tar
sands bitumen itself, but we do believe there are unique
characteristics that must be addressed and engineered, too. We
have seen something like a dozen leaks from the XL pipeline in
the last year, and this can be and should be addressed. It is
something that we are right to study, and then PHMSA should
take the necessary steps based on that study.
Mr. Rush. I want to divert my questions to another matter
that are very seldom discussed in these type of hearings. I
just want to ask Mr. Black, you represent the Association of
Oil Pipe Lines and also on behalf of the American Petroleum
Institute?
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rush. How many minority contractors are members of the
Association of Oil Pipe Lines?
Mr. Black. Could you repeat your question?
Mr. Rush. How many minority or women-owned businesses are
members of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines?
Mr. Black. I don't have that information.
Mr. Rush. Can you get it to me?
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rush. The same on the American Petroleum Institute.
Mr. Black. I will be happy to ask for that.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Pruessing, you are president of ExxonMobil
Gas.
Mr. Pruessing. ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, liquid
pipelines.
Mr. Rush. How many minority contractors--minority and
women-owned contractors do you contract with?
Mr. Pruessing. I will have to get that information for you,
sir.
Mr. Rush. OK, all right, OK.
Mr. Pruessing, ExxonMobil estimated that its Silvertip
pipeline spilled up to 42,000 gallons of crude oil into the
Yellowstone River in Montana, and the cause of the rupture is
not yet known. This pipeline was buried beneath the river and
crossing, and because of severe flooding the river was moving
very quickly.
Prior to the rupture, in the city of Laurel PHMSA raised
concerns about whether the floodwaters would erode the material
covering the very pipeline, leaving it exposed to debris.
According to PHMSA, the agency contacted ExxonMobil on June
1st, and ExxonMobil confirmed that there was at least 12 feet
of cover, is that correct?
Mr. Pruessing. Actually, sir, we did a depth-of-cover
survey in the river in December of 2010. We confirmed that
there were 5 to 8 feet of riverbed cover over the pipeline in
the riverbed. Then, as you moved on to shore, between the
shoreline and the first valve we had approximately 12 feet of
cover on the shoreline.
Mr. Rush. And was that in the bank or under the bed?
Mr. Pruessing. The 12 feet was actually on the shoreline
between the edge of the river and the first valve.
Mr. Rush. What action did ExxonMobil take in June to
maintain that cover and keep the pipeline buried far enough
below the river to protect it from debris collision?
Mr. Pruessing. There are a number of things we have been
doing to maintain the integrity of this line. If you go back to
2009, we had done an inline inspection consistent with the
regulations to confirm that the pipe was safe and it didn't
have any integrity problems. I mentioned the December, 2010,
depth-of-cover survey. Actually, PHMSA came in just a month
ago, in June of 2011, and did a full review, an audit of the
integrity management program for this pipeline.
Further, we were working with the city of Laurel during the
high water period. We actually took the shutdown of the
pipeline during 1 day to stand back and do a further risk
assessment to confirm that we had a safe line. In working with
PHMSA and the city of Laurel and looking at the integrity data,
we had--we believe we had a safe line, so we restarted the
line.
Mr. Rush. Uh-huh.
Mr. Kessler, current regulations require an underground
pipeline crossing a river to be buried at least 4 feet
beneath--below the bottom of the river. Are you confident that
4 feet is adequate to contain a pipeline from erosion and
debris in cases of flooding or high-speed waters?
Mr. Kessler. It does not appear to be. I am not an
engineer, but, thus far, it does not appear to be, particularly
if it is not reexamined and required to be maintained at least
at that level.
Mr. Rush. Would it make sense to vary the required depth of
the pipeline based on the characteristics of the river?
Mr. Kessler. It certainly might indeed, Mr. Rush.
Mr. Rush. As I understand it, the requirement to bury the
pipeline at least 4 feet below the river applies when the
pipeline is constructed, but there is no specific requirement
to maintain the burial depth of 4 feet over time, and that
seems like a huge gap----
Mr. Kessler. Agreed.
Mr. Rush [continuing]. The regulations. Do you have any
additional thoughts on this?
Mr. Kessler. We agree, and there are different ways to get
at this, and that is definitely a gap, we think, in the
regulation, the idea that it doesn't have to be reexamined to
maintain that depth. So----
Mr. Rush. Thank you very much. My time has concluded.
Mr. Whitfield. At this time, I recognize the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Gardner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for the
testimony today. Just a couple of quick questions.
Several years ago, we had a big debate in the Colorado
State legislature regarding borrow ditch excavation and
notification and calls; and that got, as you can imagine,
pretty interesting conversations both sides of the issue.
When it comes to section 3 of the bill, there is language
in there that talks about appropriate--the minimum standards
for State one-call notification programs in order to receive
funding from the Federal Government to that program. It talks
about appropriate participation by all underground facility
operators, appropriate participation by all excavators,
including all government contract excavators, flexible and
effective enforcement under State law. And then exemptions
prohibited, a State one-call notification program may not
exempt mechanized excavation.
Are you satisfied with this language or is there a concern
from States that this language may actually prohibit some
activities that the States have exempted right now? Is anybody
aware of activities that the State has exempted from their
notification system, that this could actually override State
law or State exemptions?
Mr. Martin. I don't know that I am aware of any of those
that override, but I am not all that familiar with all of the
details in the State requirements on that. I do think the
language that is in the draft bill is very appropriate.
As you mentioned, some of the borrow pits--I know there are
some examples that are used that says it is a borrow pit, no
harm. But a borrow pit runs out. You have to extend that borrow
pit. It might go wider, where a pipeline or utility might be.
So that would be the reason why we would want to include all
excavation activities into something like that, so that we are
reasonably safe that a utility isn't impacted by somebody
excavating it.
Mr. Gardner. For instance, Colorado right now has some
exemptions for their notification on landscaping. Would this
language exempt mechanized excavation? Would that override an
exemption for landscaping exemptions in the State?
Mr. Martin. If I understood that to be, it would be putting
additional requirements on the States to include those groups.
That would be my understanding.
Mr. Kessler. Mr. Gardner, we are generally in lockstep with
the industry on this issue. It is the exemptions themselves
that are one of the major problems with our one-call system.
And actually having been a landscaper in my previous life and
operated backhoes and whatnot, I can tell you I am pretty lucky
over time that I never hit an underground facility. They should
definitely be included. I don't think it is a huge ask.
Mr. Gardner. I certainly think when it comes to using
backhoes and thing like that, but you know where there may be
other activities----
Mr. Kessler. Ditch switches, things like that.
Mr. Gardner. Ditch switches certainly ought to be included
in that. But you have other activities, too, that may be lesser
disturbance that we ought to consider. The States I think have
done a good job--at least Colorado has done a good job of
taking those conversations into account. So I want to take a
little more look at this language to make sure that we are not
overriding State exemptions that have been well-thought and
well-planned.
Mr. Kessler. I think the telecom industry also has similar
issues and is supportive in the same way. The pipeline industry
and safety community is, too. So you should consider them as
well.
Mr. Gardner. Appreciate that. I thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Gardner.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Waxman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Over the last 12 months, we have seen a series of oil and
natural gas pipeline failures all across the country. I think
it is clear that our pipeline safety laws need to be improved
and updated. As the committee develops pipeline safety
legislation, we need to ensure that the legislation
meaningfully addresses the regulatory weaknesses revealed by
these accidents.
Mr. Kessler, your organization is devoted to enhancing the
safety of pipelines. I would like to ask you about some of the
tragic accidents we have seen this past year and what needs to
be done to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the
future.
Last year, an Enbridge pipeline spilled over 800,000
gallons of oil into the Talmadge Creek which flows into the
Kalamazoo River. The pipeline was hemorrhaging oil all night
long, but the company was not able to detect this massive leak.
The discussion draft includes a provision on leak detection. Do
you think it is adequate? And, if not, how can it be
strengthened?
Mr. Kessler. We applaud the committee draft for including
leak detection, but, no, we don't think it is adequate. We
think some kind of a best-available-technology standard--or
really what we need to get at is the amount that triggers it
and the timeliness of providing these warnings. Clearly, that
didn't happen in the case of the Kalamazoo River. And the
contents of that actually have different properties than
normal. We are finding more heavy metal, and it is more
difficult to clean up. So it is even more important, I think.
Mr. Waxman. OK. Last September, the San Bruno gas pipeline
explosion left eight people dead and many other injured. There
was also tremendous property damage. Observers said that the
suburban neighborhood looked like a war zone. The California
Public Utilities Commission investigated and found that PG&E
did not have records that could verify the type of pipeline
they had in the ground and was therefore not properly operating
and inspecting the pipeline.
The Senate bill includes a provision on maximum allowable
operating pressure verification. The discussion draft does not
include this provision. Mr. Kessler, in your written testimony,
the Pipeline Safety Trust encouraged the committee to add this
provision to the bill. Can you explain how this provision would
address the problem we saw at San Bruno and why we should add
it?
Mr. Kessler. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.
Again, in almost every statute in the committee's
jurisdiction I am aware of, we regulate two records. We don't
actually necessarily regulate to the physical--the individual
physical properties or under question. If you don't have
accurate records, you can't regulate accurately. You can't set
standards. You can't tell. So the Senate provision is vital we
think, and based upon an NTSB recommendation, to making sure
our regulatory system works as it should. Without it,
everything is in question.
Mr. Waxman. In February, an old cast iron natural gas
pipeline exploded in Allentown, Pennsylvania, killing five
people. As I understand it, this pipeline was over 80 years old
and wasn't scheduled to be replaced for another 100 years. Mr.
Kessler, the discussion draft includes a provision requiring a
survey of cast iron pipelines. Do you think this is adequate?
And, if not, what should we require instead?
Mr. Kessler. Thank you.
We are glad it is in there, but we believe it absolutely
needs to go farther to assess the risk and require action. I
think Atlanta, Georgia, long ago took steps to replace its cast
iron pipeline. We have been talking about this. I think there
has been something on the books for at least 30 years. And it
is really time to act. Especially when natural gas prices are
going down and we are building more pipe, we can I think
capture some of that delta and then use that for this
replacement program. You know what, one way or the other, you
are going have to replace them and it would be better to
replace them before they blow up than afterwards.
Mr. Waxman. I think that makes sense. I want to thank you
for your answers.
I look forward to working with the majority to strengthen
the discussion drafts so that our pipeline safety laws are up
to the challenge of preventing future tragedies like those we
have seen during the past year.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Sullivan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for the entire panel. I will start with Mr. Black.
With regards to expanding integrity management beyond high-
consequence areas, should there be some sort of logical process
for how the expansion occurs? For example, should the focus be
on covering more people living or working around pipelines and
therefore adding pipeline segments based on population in a
phased manner?
Mr. Black. There is an ongoing rulemaking on liquids, on
expansion of the pipelines, and on expansion of integrity
management areas. We think the focus should remain, as Congress
and PHMSA has put it, on high-consequence areas and make any
expansion of that risk based. There may need to be a review of
the repair schedule that is required within high-consequence
areas right now if that is to be expanded. That repair schedule
may not be as technically based as it should, and it is
probably in need of updating.
Mr. Martin. Yes, if there is an expansion of the high-
consequence areas, I think it is something--a study that should
be conducted through the PHMSA organization with input from the
industry as to the effectiveness of doing that. I do think it
should be focused on population, as I stated in my testimony,
of people living and working around our pipeline system. So I
would agree with that.
Mr. Kessler. I think any expansion we should delegate to
the agency with the expertise and require input from not just
industry but local governments, safety and environmental
groups, a wide array of affected groups.
We do think that any change in the class rating system
needs to go hand in hand with expanding integrity management,
but they should be looked at together. Either we can study
both, or we can require action on both. But I don't think you
can do one without the other. And I think we should give some
direction to the agency, but I think we should allow the agency
to do its work.
Mr. Dippo. Yes, AGA would agree with the position offered
by Mr. Martin of INGAA that we believe PHMSA should study the
existing regulations and what has been accomplished in the
baseline assessment period, which is expiring next year, before
they try to fix the existing regulation. It could, as you say,
involve expanding HCAs to address areas that are more highly
populated or perhaps expanding the number of miles that are
being covered by the high-consequence areas.
But the idea is to understand for distribution companies
there are many transmission facilities that are embedded into
the distribution system. And as part of doing these assessments
it is imperative that we take into account the singular
directional fees that exist on the majority of our lines.
Mr. Pruessing. ExxonMobil Pipeline uses the same integrity
management program for all of our pipelines, including those
that are not in HCAs. I do agree with Mr. Black's comment. It
would be important to look at the repair schedules to make sure
the risks are included in that.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Martin, Pipeline Safety Trust testifies that all
gathering lines should come under the same regulation as
transmission pipelines. Do you agree?
Mr. Martin. Well, representing the Interstate Natural Gas
Association, we don't have the gathering lines as part of the
association. So that is really not an area that we are focused
on at this point.
Mr. Sullivan. OK. And then, Mr. Black--I have a little bit
of time here--with regards to the leak detection standards,
what is AOPL's view of the current provision? How would the
best available standard affect operators who are forced to
implement leak detection technology?
Mr. Black. Well, we don't know, but it could set up a
standard that is very unattainable and quite costly with
potentially little benefit. Right now, operators are required
to conduct a leak detection capability evaluation in high-
consequence areas. That is available to PHMSA for inspection
and audit.
We have proposed in the PHMSA rulemaking that they require
that of us throughout the transmission system. We think that is
where the focus should be, is between PHMSA and the operator,
evaluating what the leak detection capabilities are.
We also support research on this, and we think it is
important to improve the technology. I think some type of a
best available technology doesn't fit with leak detection as a
series of practices and not one technology.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Scalise, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
having this hearing on the legislation.
Of course, both the House and the Senate need to take
action before the end of the fiscal year for reauthorization if
we are going to continue to have a guideline for pipeline
safety. I think what is important about this draft document is
that it does seem to incorporate a lot of lessons learned, and
all of us want to continue to learn as there are incidents.
Nobody wants to see any kind of pipeline incidents, but we
also--just as, if a plane crashes, you surely don't stop all
other planes from flying. You find out what happened to cause
that crash to do whatever you can to make sure it doesn't
again. In some cases, there may be things that went wrong,
human error, and you can't necessarily do a lot about that,
might do some things. But, in some cases, you might have a
mechanical error or might have problems where you might need a
recall. But, at the same time, the FAA doesn't ground all the
planes.
But you need to learn your lessons, and that seems like
that the gist of this is. It seems like some of those safety
improvements are incorporated into the draft, and that is good
news.
I do want to ask--I was looking on section 20 of the
legislation. It talks about leak detection, and it requires the
Secretary of Transportation to come back to us, the relevant
committees, with guidelines on leak detection systems utilized
by operators of hazardous liquid pipelines, transportation-
related flow lines. And then it further goes on in subsection B
to require the Secretary to prescribe regulations and, of
course, have notice hearings, the requisite things to come up
with the best regulations for leak detection.
It was suggested by one of the panelists that we actually
set standards in this bill, as opposed to having the Secretary
bring us some of those recommendations. I wanted to ask you,
Mr. Black, to get your take on that, kind of the difference
between what was presented by one of the panelists versus what
is in the draft document in section 10 dealing with leak
detection.
Mr. Black. Part A in section 10 is the study. We don't
oppose the study. A study was completed about 3 years ago and
concluded what I think we all know here, that this is very
complex, there is no one size fits all. And they did not
conclude a rulemaking was necessary.
Item B assumes what the study will find. It assumes that
there is a rulemaking requirement. And we do not believe that
the Congress should presume that the rulemaking is necessary.
We encourage the support of the Federal Government on leak
detection technologies. I know PHMSA is considering some of
this, as are we. We fund consortium research on leak detection
availabilities. I think that is the focus, rather than a
rulemaking.
Mr. Scalise. OK, I appreciate that input.
As we look at continuing to make improvements, ultimately
bringing this formal bill to a markup and hopefully moving it
through the chambers, I hope you also keep in mind that it is
critical that we continue to maintain our ability to transport
oil products, natural gas products through our pipelines.
Because if you don't have that pipeline system--I think most
would agree that it is probably the safest method and most
efficient method of transporting these types of products that
people use every single day throughout our country. Because if
you don't have that, you will be putting them on rail or on
trucks and moving them in other ways. And so you have got a
system that is built in right now.
We need to learn from any mistakes that have been made in
the past and continue to improve safety, but, at the same time,
keep in mind--unless you are somebody that just doesn't believe
anybody should be able to use fossil fuels, which there are
clearly people like this on this committee. But, in the real
world, I don't think many people are ready to plug in their
cars to a plug and get to where they need to go. They are going
to be using fossil fuels for a long time. And if we are going
to do that, we better have good methods of transporting.
And, clearly, if you look at all the different methods
available, I think most would agree the most safe and efficient
method is the pipeline system. And so as we continue to improve
upon it, I think it is also important to remember that we
cannot let this authorization expire, which it would if we
didn't have this legislation.
So, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing it; and I
look forward to the debate as it continues on with actual
legislation.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
At this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Bilbray, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I know it doesn't specifically address this
piece of legislation, but, Mr. Kessler, there is one thing that
I think we don't talk about enough and that is, you know, long-
term planning and trying to get cooperative efforts before a
crisis. We always kind of respond to crisis.
My question is, you were talking about how many people die
every year or whatever with these accidents. We lose--what--100
people a day on our interstate freeways. But the Federal
Government has taken a lead and required local governments to
take a lead at citing freeway alignments, doing the
environmental, looking at the big picture. We don't ask the
companies that build freeways for us to do the environmental
assessment and do the alignments and do it the right-of-way
acquisition. We have government involved but in a proactive
way, not a reactive way.
Just like we require the council of governments and the
States to participate in the citing of the freeways and just as
cities and counties in the urban areas cite power lines, gas
lines, and water lines, don't you think it is about time we
start talking about having council of governments be proactive
of where is the best place to put the utility easements and try
to do this comprehensively as a responsibility of good
planning, rather than continuing to ask the private sector to
always sort of go do it yourself and it is not our job?
Mr. Kessler. Mr. Bilbray, more planning, more
collaboration, more discussion between companies and local,
State, Federal Government is always a good thing. And, as you
know, oil pipelines are cited by States and interstate gas by
the FERC under the Gas Act. And there are gaps. And, in fact,
this committee in 2002 included a provision that required
development of planning and information. You know, there is a
lot of encroachment on existing pipelines. It is not the
pipeline's fault that cities have grown up around pipelines.
And what you need to do, as you said, better plan and better
communicate. And we have advocated for--there is a report that
has come out of the 2002 Act, but we need to fund that kind of
outreach, and we need to do more of what you are talking about.
Mr. Bilbray. I only bring this up because those of us that
were in the game--I started off at 25 as a council member and I
was a mayor at 27, so a county of 3 million I supervised. I
think those of us in government are quick to point fingers at
the private sector that they need to do more, but we are slow
at talking to ourselves or our colleagues in government of
saying we need to be willing to take the heat. We have got to
be willing to stand up and say this is the best way for an
alignment or this is the safest way, whatever.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to bring that up because I
think we are treating symptoms a lot of times with regulatory
oversight mandates because we haven't set the great foundation
and required those at the State and especially at the regions
to take the responsibility at being proactive and telling the
private sector, hey, just like we do with our streets in our
urban areas, here is the alignment. This is the alignment we
set aside for you. You have access to this. And here we go.
And we may even want to charge for it, which they do in
urban areas, but we at least take the heat of running those
lines down, rather than somebody later showing up, my God, I
didn't even know this was running through my city. Not only
should they know that, but they should be required to
participate in the decision making of where it runs through
their city, just like we do with freeways.
We don't allow cities and counties to say, it is not my
business. We don't have a Federal FERC or a Federal
transportation agency deciding those easements. We don't have
State do that. We have local and regional do that. And you
agree we ought to be moving towards that kind of participation
in our utilities.
Mr. Kessler. Again, the committee was wise to put the
provision in in 2002 under Mr. Tauzin and Mr. Barton. We got a
good report. We need to actually put those things into effect.
You are absolutely right. More collaboration, more planning is
always better. It is good for the companies, and it is good for
the general public and the environment.
Mr. Bilbray. And more government trying to find answers,
rather than trying to find fault.
OK, I yield back.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.
Before I conclude this hearing, I would like to ask one
other question. And then, Mr. Green, did you want to ask a few
more questions? I had the impression that you would like to ask
a few more.
My question would be this. On section 10 of the bill
entitled leak detection, we talk about a study by the
Department of Transportation on technical limitations and so
forth, and all of you are sort of experts in this field. I
would just ask a general question on your view of the
technology and leak detection. Are we making real progress in
that area or what are your impressions on that?
Mr. Black. Yes, I think the ability to detect a leak is
improving. I think the expectations for a pipeline operator on
detecting a leak are also improving.
The reason this is a tricky issue is leak detection is a
bunch of things. It is your SCADA system, it is your gauges,
the accuracy of your gauges, your control room processes, your
displays, formulas that are used in determining whether this is
a false positive or indeed a leak. All of that is improving but
certainly needs to improve further.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. Yes, obviously, in the bill that was addressing
liquids lines, gas or different material that is going through
the pipeline, but we do have leak detection programs. And I
would just agree with Mr. Black on the advancements. We have
done a lot of work and made a lot of progress, but we still
have a lot of work to do.
Mr. Kessler. We have done a lot of study of this issue. And
I would note that the State of Alaska on liquid pipelines--not
exactly the most liberal or certainly not an anti-production
State--has a 1 percent standard--leak detection standard. We
would love to see that taken nationwide, but we recognize there
is different characteristics, different pipelines, both the
pipelines themselves and the surrounding area.
This is not about getting companies to pay unreasonable
amounts. This is about risk, and it is about putting these
things with the best technology where they are most useful, not
everywhere. This is being made out to be something much more
than it is. If Alaska can do it, why can't other States? Why
can't the country do this?
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, I know the bill discusses leak detection on
the liquid side, but on the gas side, as Mr. Martin said, we do
do leak detection every day, continuously. That is part of
running a system and making sure that it is fit for service.
Mr. Whitfield. OK. Mr. Pruessing.
Mr. Pruessing. I agree with Mr. Black that leak detection
takes a number of different areas. It covers a lot of things.
I would say that there is really not a standard out there
right now that anybody's technology meets what everybody wants,
so it continues to evolve. And a lot of companies, ourselves
included, are doing internal proprietary work to try to develop
that next level of standard. There is not something out there
right now that is off the shelf that people could go use that
would meet all the requirements that people are asking for.
Mr. Kessler. I would just like to point out that the bill
draft does contemplate economic circumstances, technical
circumstances. You have wisely included that. So I don't think
it is fair to say that these aren't going to be considerations,
because you have wisely seen that they will be. So I just want
to make sure that was----
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
You do? Mr. Rush has questions; and then we will go to you,
Mr. Green.
He defers to you, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. I just want to follow up some of the questions
from members and on the hour versus the immediate. How often do
operators--and this would be both liquid and gas--just have
some anomalies in the pipeline that you may not think it is a
rupture, but it is--and you find out it really is something. Is
that pretty common? Is it in liquids, Mr. Pruessing?
Mr. Pruessing. You can have indications on a pipeline that
do not actually reflect a leak but that just--you don't
understand. So there could be cases where you would make that
call without really having a full understanding if you had a
leak or not.
Mr. Green. And you would assume you would make that call
based on the safest possible----
Mr. Pruessing. Yes, we are always going to take the
conservative approach.
Mr. Green. Mr. Dippo?
Mr. Dippo. Yes, the concern for the natural gas
distribution industry is to focus on the response. So with the
proposed legislation, we are concerned the 1-hour limit will
take the focus away from making that initial emergency response
to the scene. And, as I said, with the one-call provisions and
some existing exemptions, it is not unusual for us to see
struck means and services on a daily bases.
Mr. Green. Would it make sense to have different standards
for liquids versus natural gas? Have there been any discussions
of that over the years, depending on the product that goes
through the pipeline?
Mr. Dippo. I am not aware that there has been any of those
discussions. Again, our focus would want to be to respond to
the emergency situation and then follow up with the reporting
call to the NRC.
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I have a series of questions. I
would like to see what is happening for ExxonMobil, mainly
their relationship between EPA and the response. I know we
don't have time now, but if I could submit those and see how
the relationship has evolved on those disasters. We all watched
what happened with BP, the Department of Energy, and different
Federal agencies, because it was all on the national news.
Montana is not the Gulf of Mexico maybe, but if I could submit
those questions, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Whitfield. Absolutely.
Mr. Rush, you are recognized.
Mr. Rush. In recent years, there has been a large expansion
known as gathering pipelines. These are the pipelines that
bring natural gas and oil from production facilities to
Federally regulated transmission pipelines. With thousands of
new gas wells being drilled, even highly populated urban areas
now have gathering pipelines beneath them, and some of these
gathering pipelines are of similar size and operating pressure
as transmission pipelines. The problem is that the Federal
Pipeline Safety Agency is explicitly prohibited from regulating
gathering pipelines under current law.
Mr. Kessler, does it make sense for the pipeline safety
statute to include a blanket regulatory exemption for gathering
pipelines?
Mr. Kessler. No, sir. The development of the Marcellus
shale and other nontraditional areas is a tremendous benefit to
the country. It is great that it is being developed, and it is
resulting in more and more pipelines. And, as you point out,
some of these gathering lines really have all the
characteristics--whether it is pressure, size--of a
transmission line. And like the old saying goes, if it looks
like a duck and quacks like a duck--to paraphrase--it probably
should at least be considered to be regulated as a duck, and
the law doesn't allow that right now.
Mr. Rush. Well, why is it important for PHMSA to consider
regulating some of these gathering pipelines?
Mr. Kessler. I think you already made that case. Because of
lot of them are popping up in nontraditional areas that are
densely populated, that have no experience, and again have all
the characteristics of the things that we do regulate. It
shouldn't be what we call them. It should be the
characteristics of the line themselves that require the
regulation.
Mr. Rush. As I understand it, the administration proposal
includes a provision to first eliminate the statutory barrier.
Then the proposal would require PHMSA to review all of the
existing regulatory exemptions for gathering pipelines and
eliminate the ones that are not justified. Under that approach,
all gathering pipelines wouldn't necessarily be regulated like
transmission lines; is that correct?
Mr. Kessler. That is correct.
Mr. Rush. PHMSA would have the flexibility to decide which
gathering lines should be treated like transmission lines; is
that correct?
Mr. Kessler. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Rush. I think the approach proposed by the
administration makes a lot of sense. The Federal pipeline
safety agency shouldn't be barred from regulating all gathering
pipelines, as there are certain gathering pipelines that pose
the same risks as the new transmission pipelines that are
currently regulated. I would like to work with them in order to
strengthen this section of the discussion draft.
I want to bring to your attention the fact that just this
month there was a gathering line oil spill in Montana that
apparently went unreported for at least a month.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you, Mr. Rush.
It is my understanding that our staffs are working together
and that you all have submitted a list of priorities from your
perspective. So, hopefully, we can come out with a product.
Your testimony helped us a lot today, and we appreciate
that. We appreciate all of you being here. I know Mr. Kessler
and Mr. Black roamed the halls of the Energy and Commerce
Committee for a few years, so we hope that you felt good being
back with us today.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman, I might remind the witnesses that I
am looking forward to getting the report on the minority
membership and their various associations.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes, there were some unanswered questions
and then some questions will be submitted. In fact, we will
keep the record open for 10 days so that members may have an
opportunity to submit additional materials.
And, with that, we conclude the hearing and look forward to
working with all of you as we proceed on this legislation.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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