    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          BENGHAZI AND BEYOND, PART I:
                     WHAT WENT WRONG ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
         AND HOW TO PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AT OTHER FRONTLINE POSTS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 15, 2012

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-189

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    RON PAUL, Texas                      RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    TED POE, Texas                       ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   KAREN BASS, California
    DAVID RIVERA, Florida                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
    ROBERT TURNER, New York
                       Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
                 Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Michael Courts, Acting Director, International Affairs and
      Trade, Government Accountability Office........................    18
    Mr. William Young, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation.......    57
    James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison
      Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation.....    66
    The Honorable Ronald E. Neumann, President, American Academy of
      Diplomacy......................................................    75

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Michael Courts: Prepared statement...........................    20
    Mr. William Young: Prepared statement............................    59
    James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................    68
    The Honorable Ronald E. Neumann: Prepared statement..............    77

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    90
    Hearing minutes..................................................    91
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement...............    93
    The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Florida: Prepared statement.......................    94
    The Honorable Mike Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement...............    95
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    96
    The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas: Material submitted for the record..............    98

    BENGHAZI AND BEYOND, PART I: WHAT WENT WRONG ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 AND
           HOW TO PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AT OTHER FRONTLINE POSTS

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2012

                      House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
    in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
        After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
    Berman, for 7 minutes each for opening statements, I will
    recognize the chairmen and ranking members of our various
    subcommittees for 3 minutes each for their opening statements.
    I will then recognize all other members for 1-minute opening
    statement.
        We will hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that you
    summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before we
    move to the question and answers part with the members under
    the 5-minute rule.
        Without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will
    be made part of the record and members may have 5 days to
    insert questions and statements for the record subject to the
    length limitation in the rules.
        Before I begin my opening statement, I also want to state
    for the record that my remarks and questions were written prior
    to an interagency classified briefing that the committee held
    yesterday afternoon.
        Further, I would like to note that Secretary Clinton has
    committed to testifying before our committee and the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee on the Accountability Review
    Board's report, which is expected to be concluded by early to
    mid-December.
        Also before beginning, I want to assure the families and
    friends of four brave Americans killed in the attack on the
    consulate in Benghazi and our diplomatic personnel serving in
    high-risk posts worldwide that we are committed to recognizing
    what went wrong and what needs to be done to prevent any
    further American lives from being lost in such attacks. Our
    thoughts and prayers are also with those wounded during the
    attack as they face a long and difficult recovery. The Chair
    now recognizes herself for 7 minutes for an opening statement.
        The coordinated, preplanned and brazen attacks against the
    U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11th was an outrage.
    Also disgraceful is the sad parade of conflicting accounts of
    the attack that we have received from administration officials
    in the weeks and months since.
        Successive revelations and public reports indicate that the
    administration failed to adequately protect the American
    consulate and denied consulate requests for additional
    security. It has come to light that the administration was
    warned of the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi 1
    month before the attack on September 11th, with the personnel
    stationed at the post asserting that they could not withstand a
    coordinated assault.
        We also know that our consulate sustained two previous
    attacks this year and that there were approximately 10 Islamic
    militia and extremist training camps nearby. Yet the
    administration denied repeated requests for additional security
    measures.
        We have also learned that the consulate alerted both Libyan
    authorities and the administration about members of the Libyan
    security forces possibly compromised with ties to extremists as
    they were caught photographing the consulate prior to the
    attack, and still the consulate's requests for additional
    security were ignored.
        The consulate even warned that the situation was trending
    negatively and that the daily pattern of violence was the new
    normal given the minimal capabilities of the Libyan security
    forces. These revelations make clear that the security
    situation was deteriorating and that the administration was
    aware that the security was grossly inadequate.
        Under Secretary Kennedy publicly testified that the assault
    on September 11th was an unprecedented attack by dozens of
    heavily armed men. This explanation is unsatisfactory. You have
    the al-Qaeda attacks against our embassies in Kenya and
    Tanzania in 1998 and, more recently, the 2008 assassination of
    U.S. diplomat John Granville in Sudan, as well as repeated
    attacks in Pakistan, including the 2008 attack on our U.S.
    consulate general's armored vehicle, the April 2010 attack by
    militants against the U.S. consulate, killing three Pakistani
    security officers and a civilian in a gun battle outside the
    building, and the bomb attack on the vehicle of two U.S.
    consulate employees just days before Benghazi, on September
    4th. Adding to that the now publicly documented string of
    incidents prior to 9/11/12, how could the Benghazi attack have
    come as a surprise or be deemed as unprecedented.
        Unfortunately, the legitimate security concerns from
    personnel on the ground sometimes go unheeded by executive
    branch officials. For example, prior to the 1998 Nairobi
    attack, Ambassador Prudence Bushnell had warned of the extreme
    vulnerability of the Embassy, but her concerns were discounted
    based on faulty threat assessments and inadequate intelligence.
    In an op-ed in the aftermath of the Benghazi attack, Ambassador
    Bushnell stated that ``for 2 years before my team and I fought,
    nagged was word State Department colleagues used, to have
    security threats and vulnerabilities addressed. We were too
    close to the street, an easy target. Washington's assessment
    was that things were okay.''
        The events leading up to the attacks of September 11th of
    this year appear to repeat the same disastrous pattern. This
    time, we must learn the lessons and fix the problems. In
    addressing these underlying issues, we must move past the
    perennial question of what did the administration know and when
    did they know it and toward actually defining the problem.
        In this respect, I would ask our witnesses to consider the
    following: What are your recommendations for improving both the
    security assessment process within diplomatic security and
    overall Embassy security? What systematic issues do you believe
    need to be re-addressed? How do you believe the State
    Department should reevaluate the risk-assessment process for
    other vulnerable U.S. sites overseas as a result of the
    Benghazi attacks? What are the critical components of any re-
    assessment regarding attacks against Benghazi as well always
    our posts in Egypt and Yemen on 9/11 and on the ensuing days
    and weeks? What are your thoughts or what can be done to ensure
    greater cooperation and coordination between U.S. agencies,
    including embedding other agencies in high-risk diplomatic
    posts with an expertise in security, such as an FBI presence
    beyond the LEGATT officer? What are your thoughts on altering
    individual missions within the Embassy structure, such as
    changing the Marine Corps' detachment's mission within high-
    risk posts?
        The Government Accountability Office has been looking into
    this issue for some time and has repeatedly stated that the
    Diplomatic Security Service continues to face staff shortages
    and operational challenges that tax its ability to provide
    protection over an increasing number of dangerous posts. GAO
    has called for the State Department to perform a strategic
    review of diplomatic security so that it can properly allocate
    its resources and balance security needs with the diplomatic
    mission. However, the State Department has failed to follow up
    on this recommendation with the result, according to GAO, that
    diplomatic security, or DS, fails to perform adequate training
    and oversight.
        Among other things, without strategic planning, DS is
    forced to utilize stopgap measures, including detailing
    domestic officers to unfamiliar overseas posts, to make up for
    shortages in protective details.
        Realistic security assessments need to be conducted, and we
    must ensure that our frontline diplomats are provided the
    necessary protection to do their jobs effectively. Our
    frontline diplomats should be secure in the knowledge that the
    United States Government will provide for their safety while
    they carry out their duties on behalf of our country. Safety
    must not be sacrificed on the altar of vague and uncertain
    agendas or other pet projects, from climate change to bailouts
    for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whose value is
    questionable. Our diplomatic personnel deserve no less.
        With that, I turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr.
    Berman.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and thank
    you for calling this hearing on a very important and pertinent
    issue, the safety and security of our embassies and missions
    around the world.
        It has been a little over 2 months since the tragic events
    in Benghazi, where terrorists attacked our consulate and killed
    four dedicated and courageous American public servants. I want
    to again convey my condolences to the families, friends and
    colleagues of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen
    Doherty and Tyrone Woods. These men committed their lives to
    advancing our values and interests in often dangerous places.
    We owe them an enormous debt of gratitude.
        Today we have responsibility to help ensure that we better
    protect Americans serving abroad; not only in Libya, but in all
    of our nearly 300 diplomatic posts around the globe. As
    Congress examines the Benghazi tragedy, it is important that we
    not jump to conclusions before we know all of the facts, and
    these facts are being gathered as we speak by an Accountability
    Review Board, or ARB. The ARB is tasked by the State Department
    to analyze what happened, why it happened and what can be done
    to reduce the risks facing our personnel in the future.
        The practice of establishing ARBs after security incidents
    at our diplomatic posts began in the 1980s based on a
    recommendation of the so-called Inman Report, which itself was
    a response to the bombing of U.S. facilities in Beirut which
    caused massive casualties. In 1986, Congress made the
    establishment of ARBs a requirement under law. Since then, at
    least a dozen of them have been set up under both Democratic
    and Republican administrations.
        This particular Accountability Review Board is being
    chaired by Thomas Pickering, a highly respected and experienced
    diplomat. His 45 years with the State Department, including
    service as Ambassador in six countries with serious security
    challenges, makes him particularly well suited for this
    position. Among the other members of the Board is retired
    Admiral Mike Mullen, until recently the chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. So I think we have the right people in place
    for the job.
        Their report, along with the recommendations to Secretary
    Clinton, is supposed to be ready early next month, as the
    chairman mentioned.
        As a result of the ARB investigation, I expect the State
    Department to examine our security posture at posts around the
    world, including temporary facilities, like Benghazi, in order
    to determine whether the diplomatic security and the Overseas
    Buildings Operations Bureaus should institute new security
    procedures.
        There are several critical questions which I hope this
    hearing will help answer: Should we continue to maintain so-
    called temporary facilities, like the Benghazi consulate, and,
    if so, how should we protect them? What steps can we take to be
    better prepared for the type of large-scale assault that took
    place at Benghazi? And are we devoting enough resources to help
    ensure the security of our overseas facilities?
        Secretary Clinton put it well when she said, and I quote,

            ``Our diplomats and development experts are on the
            front lines, just like our troops, and the entire
            United States Government needs to work together to
            protect them. We will not retreat. We will keep
            leading, and we will stay engaged everywhere in the
            world, including in those hard places where America's
            interests and security are at stake. That is the best
            way to honor those whom we have lost.''

        I could not agree more.
        And I thank you, Madam Chairman and yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
        We will now hear from the chairs and ranking members of our
    subcommittees, starting with Mr. Smith, the chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
        Mr. Smith. Madam Chair, thank you very much for convening
    this very important hearing and your leadership on this very
    important issue.
        In the 2 months since our Ambassador to Libya and three
    other Americans were murdered at the U.S. consulate compound in
    Benghazi, we have been deluged with numerous reports and
    explanations about what happened, many of which are
    contradictory. We are now waiting for the report of the
    Accountability Review Board and hope that it will provide
    answers to the many unanswered and disturbing questions.
        I would note parenthetically that 14 years ago, on almost
    the same date, another Accountability Review Board was convened
    to examine the 1998 attacks of our U.S. embassies in Kenya and
    Tanzania. I had the privilege of chairing the oversight
    hearings of that report and will be looking to see whether the
    lessons learned from those tragedies were implemented and could
    have prevented the deaths on September 11th.
        I would also note, as Mr. Berman pointed out so well, the
    Bobby Inman Report back in the 1980s was also very important
    and provided the framework upon which all of our diplomatic
    security, including setbacks, putting Mylar and other kind of
    protective protections on windows, all of that came out of the
    original Bobby Inman suggestions or recommendations. And,
    again, we also looked at how many diplomatic security personnel
    are needed, where they should be deployed. It was all part of a
    robust effort to protect Americans, especially our Ambassador
    abroad.
        I am deeply disappointed that State Department officials
    continue to be unavailable for public questioning by this
    committee. The classified interagency briefing yesterday is of
    some value, but the American people deserve a clear and honest
    public explanation of what happened at U.S. facilities in
    Benghazi and elsewhere in September.
        The American public needs to know why our U.S. Ambassador
    had minimal security protection in a location identified as
    dangerous as a result of no fewer than eight attacks on the
    U.S. compound and other Western facilities in the Benghazi area
    between April and August of this year. They also need to know
    why, given the circumstances I just described, our Ambassador
    was under the primary protection of a militia with questionable
    associations. They need to know why media representatives could
    go into the Benghazi consulate days after the September 11th
    incident and recover sensitive materials, including Ambassador
    Stevens' journal, that our Government obviously failed to
    secure and recover first. They need to know how our embassies
    in Egypt, Tunisia and other countries were so vulnerable to
    attacks by mobs, which not only defaced our facilities but also
    raised terrorist flags on what is essentially American
    sovereign territory.
        More recently, the resignation of General Petraeus has
    opened up even more questions, such as what is contained in the
    report he prepared following his visit to Benghazi. It should
    be very informative regarding who knew about what threats were
    involved there, when they knew about it and what they did with
    the knowledge they provided.
        I thank you, Madam Chair, and yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
    Middle East and South Asia is recognized.
        Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chair for calling this important
    hearing, and I look forward to learning the facts. I think it
    is important that we do that instead of some of us launching
    our own attacks.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Burton, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and
    Eurasia, is recognized.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Let me just start off by saying that we had a hearing on
    this issue in the Government Reform and Oversight Committee
    shortly after this tragedy occurred, and a lot of the
    information that we received from government officials,
    publicly and privately, does not comport with the testimony of
    the people who were at that hearing. The people who were at
    that hearing consisted of Eric Nordstrom, who was the regional
    security officer for the U.S. mission in Libya; Lieutenant
    Colonel Andrew Wood, who was in charge of the military support
    team there, Special Operations Command support team, SST. It
    was also Charlene Lamb, who was in charge of all of the
    embassies and consulates around the world as far as security
    was concerned, who incidentally said when the attack took
    place, she was following it in real time immediately because
    she was in Washington in her office at the time. And then we
    also had Patrick Kennedy, who has testified numerous times
    about this issue.
        And the thing that bothers me the most is that Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood, in charge of the security force there, the SST,
    and Eric Nordstrom, the regional security officer, said time
    and time again they needed more security, particularly at
    Benghazi, and they were denied. In fact, even though Nordstrom
    tried to get more security there for Benghazi, he was told you
    are asking for the moon and the stars.
        Now, they were supposed to have five people there, but
    there was an unwritten law I guess that you could only have
    three there. And yet when Mr. Nordstrom and Lieutenant Colonel
    Wood went down and checked the area out, there weren't three
    even. There were supposed to be five, the unwritten rule was
    there were three, but there was only one there, only one. The
    security was lax.
        There were 230 different kinds of incidents, some pretty
    strong attacks, some not so strong, but nevertheless the
    security officer in charge and the lieutenant colonel in charge
    of the security people there contacted Washington time and time
    again and said we need more security, there is a threat of an
    attack. There had been one attack in Benghazi where they blew a
    hole in the compound wall, and yet time and again Ms. Lamb and
    Mr. Kennedy continually said no, we don't need those. No, we
    don't need those. And they have tried to cover their fannies a
    number of times in testimony here in this body or in this House
    and it does not comport. It is not consistent with what Mr.
    Nordstrom who was in charge of that region and Lieutenant
    Colonel Wood said.
        This is not only a tragedy, it is a perfect example of
    malfeasance at the State Department.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.
        Mr. Faleomavaega is recognized. He is the ranking member on
    the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I, too, would like to also offer my deepest condolences and
    sympathies to the family of Ambassador Stevens and the three
    gentlemen that accompanied him in this tragic incident that
    occurred in Benghazi. I do want to associate myself with the
    comments of our ranking member, Mr. Berman.
        Hopefully, with the witnesses we have before us, we will be
    getting a little better understanding of what has happened.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. He is the chairman on the
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and thank you for
    holding this hearing, Madam Chairman. I appreciate your
    leadership on this and other very significant issues.
        Last month, at the Committee on Oversight and Government
    Reform, I asked Secretary Lamb, who is the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of State for International Programs in the bureau
    of--let's see here her exact title, well, I asked her, she was
    the one who was specifically responsible for the decision as to
    what level of spending they would have for security at the
    Benghazi consulate. I asked her whether budget considerations
    were actually part of her decision not to increase the level of
    security. She stated emphatically no, that was not part of it,
    although some Democrats on the committee and Vice President
    Biden in the debates during the recent Presidential campaign
    tried to shift the blame for this debacle to Congress. So it
    was not a budget consideration that caused this horrible
    situation where our people were murdered.
        What was it then? What did happen? Witnesses at the earlier
    hearing that I just referred to would not say, and we have been
    told over and over again, well, we are going to learn the
    details. But yet, just as late as yesterday, the President said
    that we would be learning all the details; he would be
    cooperating with Congress. Yet we have no witness from the
    administration here with us today to talk to us and to explain
    under oath what the details of this debacle really are.
        What is clear is that this administration, including the
    President himself, has intentionally misinformed, read that
    ``lied,'' to the American people in the aftermath of this
    tragedy. Now President Obama has the gall to float the name as
    possible Secretary of State the name of the person who is the
    actual vehicle used to misinform the American people during
    this crisis. The arrogance and dishonesty reflected in all of
    this is a little bit breathtaking.
        And it is about time that the President of the United
    States decides to level with the American people. Let's find
    out the facts. Let's not stonewall this issue and cover up
    mistakes as appears to be happening today.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman for holding this hearing so we
    can get to the bottom of all this.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Sherman is recognized. He is the ranking member on the
    Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
        Mr. Sherman. I want to thank the administration for
    providing us with those very details, namely a classified
    briefing provided yesterday afternoon.
        The security of our diplomats depends upon the host
    country. We are here today discussing whether we should have
    had two or four or maybe even five security personnel onsite.
    It is by no means clear that that would not have simply led to
    more deceased security personnel.
        With the number of guns in Benghazi, the number of militias
    in Benghazi, it is by no means certain that even five of our
    finest security personnel could have been successful against
    this attack.
        We ultimately have to rely on the Ambassador and people on
    the ground to know what is safe and what isn't, where to go,
    where not to go, when and with what security, and ultimately
    they have to realize there is some risk. And they show heroism
    every day in going to places where they know there is some
    risk. And we should not criticize them because what they
    thought was a small and manageable but still possibly deadly
    risk turns out to be an absolutely fatal one.
        There is a lot of discussion about whether additional
    assets should have been provided, but much of that discussion
    focuses on Tripoli rather than Benghazi. There was a drone in
    the area, but press reports state that it was an unmanned
    drone.
        Congress has a role here. The administration asked us for
    $1.65 billion for security. The House cut that by nearly 10
    percent in negotiations with the Senate. It still ended up well
    below the administration request. Yet we cannot say that that
    particular congressional decision led directly to these
    results.
        There is all this discussion as to whether this was a
    carefully planned terrorist attack or an ad hoc mob whipped up
    by some recent reason to hate the United States, and I think
    much of our confusion relates to the idea of thinking it has to
    be all of one or all of the other. Newer press reports indicate
    that it was some of both, an attack that doesn't seem to be
    overly carefully planned and ad hoc additions from an armed
    citizenry in Benghazi that includes those that hate us.
        Finally, these unfair attacks on Ambassador Susan Rice are
    simply wrong. She had to rely on the intelligence that was
    provided. I sat here while Colin Powell provided the
    intelligence that he had regarding weapons of mass destruction
    in Iraq. Ultimately, State Department personnel have to rely on
    the intelligence reports they are given, and Susan Rice's
    integrity, capacity and record are beyond question. There is no
    political reason for the administration to have characterized
    this attack one way or the other.
        And I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        We will now hear from Mr. Royce, who is the chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair. Excuse my voice.
        We do have to rely on our Ambassadors on the ground and we
    should listen to them. And one of the eerie experiences here in
    reading the cables is to realize that there is a foreboding in
    them in a way in terms of how our personnel think they might be
    attacked, and it is the fact that those cables were sent and
    the fact that nothing was done that I think brings us here
    today.
        It is 2 months later, and too little is known about what
    took place. Too little is known about why we didn't respond to
    those cables, especially given the fact that the deteriorating
    situation in Benghazi was no secret, certainly no secret to the
    United Kingdom, no secret to the Red Cross. Even the security
    challenged U.N. were very, very concerned about what was about
    to happen. You had the U.K., the Red Cross closing their office
    as a result of attacks, RPG attacks on the motorcade. You had
    the bomb targeting our own mission there. And somebody
    obviously forgot to circle the calendar only 9/11. We do have
    some experience with attacks on 9/11.
        But it wasn't as though our own U.S. personnel were not
    warning us of this gathering storm, and that is the other
    aspect of this as you read the cables that is so concerning
    when Ambassador Stevens warns of a security vacuum, when
    another cable cites car bombings, gun battles in the street,
    growing Islamic influence. Another says al-Qaeda camps were
    growing and expressed concern about the mission's ability to
    even defend itself in these circumstances. So our mission there
    sat in a cauldron of weapons, of fighters, al-Qaeda upwind of
    Benghazi; its requests for more security denied. But yet a
    State Department official told Congress last month we had the
    correct number of assets in Benghazi at the time of 9/11.
        Well, that is not the way our personnel felt. I think we
    will find that the State Department, unfortunately, prioritized
    the normalization of the relationship with Libya above all
    else, no matter the facts on the ground, no matter the danger
    on the ground, and I think our personnel were wise enough to
    see that that was happening. I have several questions about
    what took place during the 6 hours, the 6 hours, that our
    personnel were under attack. Why wasn't more done to protect
    American lives during that time?
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
        Thank you, sir.
        Ms. Bass is recognized. She is the ranking member on the
    Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.
        Ms. Bass. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, thank you
    for your leadership and for providing an opportunity to better
    understand the events that transpired in Libya on the evening
    of September 11.
        I want to commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle,
    for the vigorous call for hearings to get to the bottom of what
    took place in Benghazi makes clear the commitment we all have
    to the security of our diplomats. We have an obligation to the
    American people and to all who serve and represent our Nation
    to ensure that a tragedy such as this does not happen again on
    anyone's watch.
        The real danger I am concerned about, though, in a
    situation like this is to rush to judgment before we understand
    all the available information. I urge my colleagues to allow
    the State Department's ARB to finish its work so that we have a
    clear picture of the events of that tragic night. I think it
    would do a disservice to Ambassador Stevens and those who paid
    the ultimate sacrifice if we do not take the time necessary to
    understand what happened.
        We do an equal disservice not to come together and address
    security issues that may impact the nearly 300 U.S. diplomatic
    facilities abroad. It is vital that we look to future.
    Countless Foreign Service and civil servants represent our
    Nation in challenging environments around the world. They do so
    not for fame, not for fortune nor prestige, but out of a
    genuine sense of service and commitment to our Nation. Their
    sacrifice paid by those in Benghazi reminds us that we, Members
    of Congress, must do all in our power to ensure these brave and
    committed women and men are well protected in their service to
    this great Nation.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Bass.
        Our last 3-minute opening statement will be Mr. Chabot, the
    chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I know it has not been easy to pry information out of this
    administration, and I want to commend you for being relentless
    in your efforts over the last 3 months to get to the facts
    surrounding the attacks on American outposts and personnel in
    Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia on September 11, not only
    behalf of this committee, but on behalf of the American people
    as well and especially for our brave public servants who serve
    around the world, oftentimes in the face of imminent danger.
        I won't use all my 3 minutes, Madam Chair, because we want
    to be able to get to the testimony of our panel of witnesses
    this morning and questions from members, but I do want to take
    a moment to say a couple of words about our late Ambassador to
    Libya, Chris Stevens.
        Many members and staff on our committee had the opportunity
    to know and work with him even before he was named U.S.
    Ambassador and I think all would agree that he was one of our
    most able diplomats. I had the opportunity to visit with him in
    Libya a little less than a month before he and three other
    outstanding Americans were murdered in Benghazi.
        His enthusiasm for the job at hand was immediately evident.
    He was excited about the opportunity to help a nation newly
    freed from decades of brutal dictatorship. On my first night in
    country, I had the opportunity to join Ambassador Stevens for
    an IFTAR dinner with a number of newly elected Libyan
    parliamentarians. They were optimistic about building a
    democracy and creating a vibrant economy and restoring
    fundamental human rights for the Libyan people, and he was as
    enthusiastic about those prospects as they were.
        The murderers who took the lives of Chris Stevens and his
    colleagues should take no pride in their cowardly acts. They
    have merely shown the world that their brand of senseless
    violence is reprehensible and should be condemned by all decent
    people.
        Madam Chair, I hope these hearings, and I understand that
    today's meeting is just part one, will bring to light the true
    facts surrounding the September 11th attacks and will help to
    create a better diplomatic security system that will prevent
    similar attacks from taking place in the future.
        I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        I thank all the chairmen and ranking members of the
    pertinent subcommittees, and we will now beginning with 1-
    minute opening statements from our members, starting with Mr.
    Sires from New Jersey.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chairlady, for holding this
    critical hearing and for investigating the events of September
    11 at Benghazi, and let me offer my condolences also to the
    families of Ambassador Stevens and the three U.S. personnel
    that were killed.
        You know, now that the election is offer, let's try to get
    to the bottom of what happened, because this an area in
    transition, and I have a funny feeling that we are going to
    encounter some of this incident again and again, and I want to
    make sure that the people that we send to assist in the
    transition in this area of the world are secure. I do not want
    to send Americans to a place where the security is not there
    for them to perform the job that is needed to make sure that
    the transition in these areas is a safe one. So I would hope
    that after the investigation, we can determine exactly what
    happened and we can make the necessary arrangements to make
    sure it doesn't happen again.
        I am also interested in terms of--there is talk about a
    safe house where we can put our personnel, and if you can
    expand on that, that would be great, because I think we need to
    make sure that everybody is secure in this area.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Madam Chair, for
    calling this hearing, and our heartfelt condolences and
    sympathy to the families of the four innocent Americans who
    were killed serving our country.
        The American people have legitimate questions and deserve
    answers from the President, the State Department, the
    Department of Defense and the CIA as to what happened on the
    evening of September 11th, 2012. Why did the administration
    refuse to send an immediate response after the consulate
    requested it during the 6-hour attack? Why did the
    administration place blame on a video rather than reveal to the
    world that it was an organized terrorist attack? And more
    importantly, why has the administration failed to provide
    answers to these valid questions after 2 months of inquiry?
        It is my hope that the appropriate officials of this
    administration will appear before Congress and provide us with
    the answers the American people deserve. Senator Lindsey Graham
    has reported 13 separate letters have been sent over the past
    month seeking explanations. The American people deserve to know
    for the protection of our country and American families.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And I thank you Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Berman
    for convening this hearing to focus on the events of September
    11 in Benghazi. I want to begin by extending my thoughts and
    prayers to the family of the late Ambassador Christopher
    Stevens and the families of the other three American heroes who
    lost their lives in service of our Nation.
        I hope that as we conduct this hearing we recognize that we
    owe them a careful, comprehensive and thorough review of this
    matter.
        We ask Americans to serve our Nation all over the world and
    recognize that we need to be engaged in places all over the
    world, even in places that are dangerous, but we owe it to them
    to be sure that we are doing everything that we can to ensure
    the safety of our diplomats.
        I thank you for convening this hearing so we can review
    this in great detail. I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Judge Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. We must have accountability for the assassination
    of four Americans on the anniversary of 9/11, accountability
    for those who failed to protect the Americans and
    accountability for the murderers. I have written a letter to
    Secretary Panetta asking him if there was evidence that United
    States weapons were used in the attack on our consulate until
    Benghazi. I haven't heard back from him, and I ask unanimous
    consent that that letter be made part of the record.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
        Mr. Poe. The morning after the attack, I mentioned on the
    House floor that the terrorist group Ansar al Sharia claimed
    responsibility for the attack. This was public knowledge within
    24 hours of the attack. But for 2 weeks after the attack, the
    administration blamed the attack on a YouTube video. That was a
    patently false assertion at the time.
        We have yet to see any justice in this matter. The FBI took
    24 days to get to the attack site, long after media groups from
    all over the world had been there. Americans have been
    receiving much misinformation from our Government. The
    perpetrators need to be brought to justify and those
    responsible for the lack of security need to be held
    accountability, because justice is what we do in this country.
    And that is just the way it is.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Ms. Wilson of Florida.
        Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking
    Member for holding this important hearing.
        The September attacks at the U.S. consulate in Benghazi
    ended tragically with the death of four Americans. First, it is
    important to honor the sacrifices of these Americans who gave
    their lives promoting and protecting American ideals of
    democracy and freedom abroad.
        I wish to convey my sympathy to the families of the fallen
    heroes.
        And to honor those Americans, it is essential that we
    maximize security protocols for U.S. diplomatic posts in
    volatile areas and ensure that contingency plans are in place
    to prevent loss of life and U.S. property abroad.
        The FBI and the State Department are thoroughly
    investigating the Benghazi events, and it is important that
    this committee provides appropriate assistance to those
    agencies so that we may get to the bottom of the situation, as
    well as find ways to prevent similar tragedies in the future.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Wilson.
        Mrs. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        First off, my heart goes out to the families of those who
    lost their loved ones, including Ambassador Christopher
    Stevens, Foreign Officer Sean Smith, U.S. Security Officers
    Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.
        But I think we need to have a real honest explanation of
    what happened. First off, could this have been prevented, and
    secondly, how can we ensure that those that are in harm's way
    will never have this happen to them again.
        I think the saddest part about all of this is that we are
    not getting clear explanations to date. This administration
    continues to put out things that are just not quite true,
    starting with the YouTube video, on September 11th, as the
    explanation, which continued on to September the 18th, until
    finally, on September 19th, Matthew Olson, Director of National
    Counterterrorism Intelligence, did confirm what we heard on
    September 12, that, yes, this was an attack conducted by al-
    Qaeda terrorists. We need to know what the bottom of this is,
    and I hope we can find it out in this hearing.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Ms. Schwartz of Pennsylvania.
        Ms. Schwartz. Thank you. I just wanted to add my words, of
    course, of sympathy for America the loss of Ambassador Stevens
    and the other fine Americans who lost their lives in Benghazi,
    and I hope that in this hearing and in future discussions, we
    will be able to honor their service by making sure we fully
    understand what happened, what could have happened differently
    potentially and, maybe most importantly, identify lessons
    learned so that our Embassy personnel at every level serving in
    dangerous parts of the world, as they do, that we protect them
    as best as we can. I hope that is the result of these
    conversations going forward.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Johnson of Ohio.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Like my colleagues, I, too, am saddened and outraged by the
    terrorist attack in Benghazi that claimed the lives of our four
    American citizens, including U.S. Ambassador Stevens.
        What makes this even harder for me to stomach is the
    administration's complete failure to provide answers, answers
    to the families of those killed, to Congress and to the
    American people.
        As a 26-year veteran of the United States Air Force and my
    last assignment being at U.S. Special Operations Command, I
    know and understand national security and what it takes to
    provide it. After 230 security incidents in a year at the
    Benghazi consulate, I am appalled that the administration could
    not anticipate escalating violence and then failed to step up
    security measures to protect our diplomats. Furthermore, we
    have seen blunder after blunder as the administration avoids
    responsibility and accountability.
        The delay tactics are unacceptable. So now that we have
    made it past the convenient distraction of an election, I
    expect to hear some real answers. It is time to 'fess up.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Deutch of Florida is recognized.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this hearing.
        Madam Chairman, the attack on the U.S. consulate in
    Benghazi on September 11 was a grave tragedy. The circumstances
    surrounding the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and
    three other brave Americans must not be spun for political
    gain. We must learn from this tragedy. We must get the facts,
    not make hasty determinations, certainly not hasty political
    determinations.
        We have an obligation to protect the thousands of Americans
    serving in our embassies and consulates around the world. Today
    we must focus on how to protect them, how to ensure that they
    are able to look at after American interests abroad, and how to
    ensure that they can continue to represent the American ideals
    that they stand for and that they represent so nobly in every
    corner of the globe.
        I look forward to discussing these issues today, and I
    yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rivera of Florida.
        Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for this
    hearing. I also send my condolences to the families of those
    brave Americans, those patriotic Americans that gave their
    lives during this horrible incident. We need to always make
    sure and honor the great sacrifice they gave personally, but
    also to our Nation.
        I think we can all agree, Democrats and Republicans
    together, that these events are wholly unacceptable and that
    Americans demand accountability. The only way to achieve that
    accountability is to make sure and get all of the facts out.
        This hearing is an important step toward achieving
    accountability. Much more needs to be done, particularly on the
    part of the administration. But as important as getting that
    information out toward achieving accountability is to ensure
    that such an incident never, ever happens again. And I implore
    the administration to finally recognize that need to have
    accountability, get all the facts out, and ensure that a
    similar incident is never repeated.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Keating of Massachusetts.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Madam Chairman, ranking member.
        I just want to give my sympathy to the family members of
    those heroes who lost their lives.
        I want to also mention and thank the information we have
    had thus far, including in secure briefings in this regard.
        And I also want to just mention as someone who has been
    involved in many forensic investigations myself in my own
    career, things take time. The most important thing is to get it
    right, and the most important thing after that is to bring
    those responsible to justice, and I remain confident that that
    will occur.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner of New York.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        In all these emergency situations, there are protocols and
    procedures that are in place. The timeline would suggest there
    are serious lapses in both the communication and judgment and
    our response time. I don't know if these procedures were
    followed. I don't know why it took 90 minutes before the
    Secretary of Defense even knew about this, and why were these
    delays made? And what was the cost of them? And what can we do
    to fix this in the future?
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Engel, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the
    Western Hemisphere, is recognized now recognized for his 3-
    minute opening statement.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        As we begin this hearing about what happened in Benghazi
    and the lessons we can learn, there is one thing I keep in mind
    throughout, the respect I have for America's diplomats and the
    gratitude this committee should show them. We ought never
    forget that the work of diplomacy has risks and that our
    Foreign Service officers who travel to all parts of the globe
    to promote and defend the United States' interests deserve our
    full support.
        For me, that is what this hearing is about. It is about
    understanding the facts of what happened in Libya and elsewhere
    on September 11 and 12 of this year and how we can learn from
    these events to make sure that our diplomats can achieve the
    difficult balance between security and forward presence. How
    can we ensure that there is enough security for Ambassadors and
    Embassy staff alike so that they can observe the countries
    where they are posted and meet with as many people as they can
    and yet do so safely?
        It is not an easy question. I am glad that Secretary of
    State Clinton has appointed a Blue Ribbon Accountability Review
    Board, led by former Ambassador Pickering, to look into what
    happened and to make recommendations. I think this committee
    should ask all of the questions it needs to ask today. We want
    to get to the bottom of what really happened, and there are
    some questions that need to be asked. But we should also defer
    judgment until the ARB issues its findings.
        Let us agree to make this hearing about how American
    diplomats can be as safe and effective as possible. Let's not
    devolve into a political spectacle. Friends, the campaign is
    over, the signs have been taken down. TV commercials are again
    about Ginsu knives and exercise videos and Americans have had
    enough of it. They want us to solve problems and not go on
    political witch hunts.
        I am very disturbed at some of the political rhetoric I
    hear. You know, Barack Obama was no more responsible for what
    happened in Benghazi than George Bush was for September 11th or
    that Ronald Reagan was with the blowing up of the U.S. Marines
    in Beirut. And in times of national tragedy, what we really
    need to do is band together as Americans and show that we are
    united against the forces of terrorism or others that would do
    us harm.
        I don't think playing political games is what we should do.
    We want to get to the bottom of this. We don't want anything to
    be covered up, but I think that we have to do that from a point
    of view of American unity; not to try to score political points
    here and there, not to try to point fingers at the President or
    the administration, but to say what went wrong and how can we
    fix it so that it doesn't go wrong in the future.
        So I, like my colleagues, want to talk about Ambassador
    Stevens and the other three martyrs who died. We will never
    forget their service, we will never forget them. Let's use this
    hearing to make sure all Americans in the future remain safe.
        I thank you, Madam Chairman, and I yield back the balance
    of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
        Mrs. Ellmers of North Carolina is recognized for 1 minute.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        I echo the notion of sympathy for those families of our
    murdered Ambassador and the other Americans in this terrorist
    attack.
        I have to further say that America and these families need
    to know the truth, and that is what our job is. And I have to
    say that I deeply resent this continued notion on the part of
    our colleagues that this is a political issue and that there
    will be political gain made here. The fact that they continue
    on this pursuit actually makes it a political issue for them.
        Now, we have got to get to the bottom of this, and that
    means we are going to have to look at these issues
    constructively and find out what went wrong and how we can
    prevent it in the future, and we have got to put this political
    notion aside.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        You know, I just want to observe that a tragedy occurred.
    It ought to be something that brings us together. It ought not
    to be a political football. It ought not to be an opportunity
    to smear other people's reputations, prevent other people from
    participating in a meaningful way in the formation and
    enunciation of U.S. foreign policy. Those are tactics this
    Congress ultimately condemned during the Joe McCarthy era.
    Let's not revisit that. Let's not return to that.
        Let's have a rational, analytical examination of what
    happened so we can learn from this tragedy and try to take
    measures to prevent it. That is what we ought to do for the
    sake of our country, and I urge that we resist the temptation
    to persist in political posturing to try to find some elusive
    advantage. The election is over, and this tragedy needs to be
    dealt with.
        I yield back, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Kelley, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Asia and
    the Pacific is recognized for 1 minute.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        President Obama and Secretary Clinton have both claimed
    responsibility for the Benghazi situation. Yesterday at a press
    conference, the President said, and I quote, And you know, we
    are after an election now. I think it is important for us to
    find out exactly what happened in Benghazi, and I am happy to
    cooperate in any ways that Congress wants. We have provided
    every bit of information that we have, and we will continue to
    provide information, and we have got a full-blown investigation
    and all that information will be disgorged to done.
        Yet this administration has not provided any witnesses who
    are part of the State Department's chain of command with
    respect to diplomatic security to appear at this hearing:
    Specifically Hillary Clinton Secretary of State; Patrick
    Kennedy, Department of State Under Secretary for Management;
    Eric Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
    Security; Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
    International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security; Scott
    Bultrowicz, Director of Diplomatic Security Service; and Jim
    Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
        Now, this administration has failed to respond to a letter
    I sent on behalf of 53 Members of Congress. It details
    questions regarding the security failures. I would like to
    introduce that into the record, if I may.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection. And thank you
    very much, sir.
        Mr. Fortenberry, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on
    Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized for 1
    minute.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you Madam Chair for calling this
    important hearing today. Sadly, again, we must remind ourselves
    that Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans are dead, and
    we all wish to extend our heartfelt sympathies to their
    families.
        But I think it is important today at this hearing that we
    have a few questions answered. We need to know why the
    Ambassador's expressed security concerns and calls for help
    were unmet; why reinforcements never arrived; why the U.S.
    compounds were left unsecured for so long after these attacks;
    and why the official video narrative persisted so stubbornly
    long after it was clear that the attack that killed Ambassador
    Stevens was terroristic in nature.
        Madam Chair, I hope today's hearing is a constructive and
    honest unpacking of so many contradicting pieces of
    information. I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Marino. I have no statement. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        President Obama is sadly mistaken if he thinks the House of
    Representatives won't get to the bottom of the Benghazi tragedy
    and hold him responsible if the evidence points to the White
    House.
        If Ambassador Rice had nothing to do the Benghazi cover up,
    then why did the administration use her as a mouthpiece to
    mislead the American people on five Sunday talk shows? The
    American people will have answers to the questions of what led
    to the deaths of four brave Americans as well as the actions
    from the administration in the days following.
        With that, I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Griffin of Arkansas?
        Or Mr. Bilirakis of Florida.
        Thank you. So, with that, the Chair is pleased to welcome
    our witnesses on the first panel, Michael J. Courts.
        Mr. Courts is the Government Accountability Office, GAO,
    acting director in the agency's International Affairs and Trade
    Team. Mr. Courts began his career in GAO's San Francisco office
    and served overseas in the agency's former European office as
    well. Since 2003, he has directed GAO reviews on a wide range
    of U.S. Government operations and programs in the international
    arena to assist the Congress in carrying out its oversight
    responsibilities.
        His contributions have been recognized with numerous GAO
    awards, including a meritorious service award and an assistant
    comptroller general award. Without objection, the witness'
    written statement will be made a part of the record and Mr.
    Courts is recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL COURTS, ACTING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
          AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Courts. Good morning Madam Chairman and Ranking Member
    Berman and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here
    this morning to discuss diplomatic security challenges at U.S.
    embassies and consulates overseas.
        This testimony is primarily based on a 2009 GAO report on
    challenges facing State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. It is
    also based on subsequent work that GAO performed to follow up
    on the recommendations in that report.
        This work is part of a series of GAO engagements to review
    the State Department's efforts to secure our people and
    property at diplomatic locations worldwide.
        GAO was asked to testify this morning on the growth of
    Diplomatic Security's mission and resources in recent years and
    some of the key challenges that the Bureau faces in executing
    its work.
        The primary message of my testimony this morning is that
    Diplomatic Security's mission has grown substantially over the
    past decade and the Bureau's funding and personnel have
    increased considerably as a result.
        Despite these increased resources, however, the Bureau
    faces a number of operational challenges. State is maintaining
    missions in increasingly dangerous locations. Staffing
    shortages as well as other operational challenges tax the
    Bureau's ability to implement its mission. And finally, State
    has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of
    adequate strategic planning.
        My first point is that Diplomatic Security's mission and
    resources have grown considerably over the past decade in
    reaction to a number of security incidents. From 1998 to 2009,
    there were 39 attacks on embassies, consulates, or official
    U.S. personnel, beginning with the 1998 attacks against the
    embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
        In conjunction with its expanding mission, the Bureau's
    budget increased nearly tenfold from 1998 to 2008. The size of
    its direct hire workforce doubled during that period and its
    reliance on contractors increased dramatically as well.
        My second point is that despite these increased resources,
    the Bureau faces a number of challenges. First, State is
    maintaining missions in increasingly dangerous locations. The
    missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, have required an
    extraordinary level of security resources on the part of State
    and even more so after the military withdrew from Iraq in late
    2011.
        State is also maintaining an increasing number of other
    dangerous posts, such as in Pakistan and Yemen and Libya, where
    the security situations are such that State would have
    previously evacuated such posts.
        Despite the Bureau's considerable staff growth, some
    offices have been operating with severe staffing shortages. In
    2008, for example, approximately a third of Diplomatic
    Security's domestic sub offices operated with a vacancy rate of
    25 percent or higher, affecting their ability to conduct the
    work and leading to backlogs and training gaps.
        We found other operational challenges as well. For example,
    we found that 53 percent of regional security officers didn't
    speak or read foreign languages at the proficiency level
    required by their positions.
        My final point is that diplomatic security's tremendous
    growth has been more reactive than strategic. While State's
    strategic plan identifies some security priorities and goals,
    it doesn't fully implement our recommendation to identify the
    resources needed to meet those goals or to address the
    management challenges we identified in our work.
        In summary, Diplomatic Security's mission and resources
    have grown tremendously over the past decade. Despite these
    increased resources, the Bureau faces a number of operational
    challenges, and State hasn't fully implemented our
    recommendation to conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of
    Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities
    address the department's priority needs as well as the
    challenges that we identified in our work.
        Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Berman, this concludes my
    prepared remarks. I would be happy to address any questions you
    may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Courts follows:]

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        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Courts.
        And I will begin the questioning. You said in your written
    testimony that while Diplomatic Security officials had taken
    steps to enhance performance management, they had not yet
    conducted the review that GAO recommended in 2009.
        How would a strategic review help the State Department with
    its Diplomatic Security mission to be ready for attacks after
    Benghazi? And one of the questions that I raised in my opening
    statement is, how do you believe that the State Department
    should reevaluate the risk-assessment process for other
    vulnerable U.S. sites overseas as a result of the Benghazi
    attack?
        Mr. Courts. Thank you.
        I would start by saying, as long as the department
    continues to levy missions on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    without regard to how it fits into overall departmental
    strategic planning and what the resource implications of those
    missions are, Diplomatic Security because, it is a support
    function will salute smartly and attempt to fulfill the
    mission, whether they have the resources required or not.
        So we think it is critically important that the department
    involve the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on a strategic level
    in their planning to look at the missions that they are
    requiring, to rationalize those missions, to look at the
    resources that are required for those and to make some honest
    and tough trade-offs about whether they can accomplish the
    mission within those resource constraints or whether they need
    to adjust the mission.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Well, you discussed the dangerous
    posts, Egypt and Yemen, what are the critical components of any
    reassessment regarding attacks against Benghazi and all of
    those trouble spots on 9/11 and ensuing days and weeks?
        Mr. Courts. Well, first of all, the work that we did found
    that there were a number of areas where the capabilities of the
    Bureau of Diplomatic Security were not where they should have
    been, and I mentioned some of the staffing shortages. Over a
    third of their offices, for example, domestically that had over
    25 percent vacancy rates; that means that work is not getting
    done in those offices, in some cases, or it is not getting done
    as quickly as it should be done. It also means that training is
    not being achieved for the agents in those offices, which
    ultimately affects the readiness at overseas posts when those
    agents rotate overseas.
        I mentioned foreign language deficiencies. That is an area
    that needs to be addressed as well. As a matter of fact, we
    found in some of our field work, at a post of strategic
    importance to the United States, a security officer received a
    telephone call from an informant and transferred that call to a
    locally employed staff person at the Embassy because she didn't
    speak the language. That could have compromised the informant's
    identity; it could have even threatened the informant's life.
    So it is critically important that they have those language
    skills.
        We also found experience gaps. Over a third of the officers
    in positions overseas were at grade levels below that which was
    designated for those positions. That means that those officers
    didn't feel as prepared to carry out those duties as they would
    like to have been. It also means that managers, leaders are
    distracted from their more strategic responsibilities to have
    to train those people and bring them up to speed. So there are
    a number of challenges that need to be addressed, and again, we
    think it all comes back to strategic planning at the
    departmental level.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you very much.
        I yield back the balance of my time, and I hope that all of
    our members are able to read the thorough report from GAO.
        Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Mr. Berman is recognized for his questioning.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
        Mr. Courts, you said, in 2008, 25 percent of the Diplomatic
    Security positions in our different posts were unfilled. Do I
    understand you correctly?
        Mr. Courts. In 2008, over a third of the domestic sub
    offices of Diplomatic Security had vacancy rates of 25 percent
    or higher.
        Mr. Berman. Oh, over a third. That is different. Over a
    third of the posts had vacancy rates of 25 percent or higher.
        Mr. Courts. The domestic posts, not the overseas posts.
        Mr. Berman. Oh. That is very different. Forget that.
        Moving on.
        I am curious, though, this comment about strategic review,
    in the 2009 report, it says Diplomatic Security stated that it
    fills all positions in Iraq and Afghanistan before filling any
    other positions. That sounds like a strategic position. I mean,
    that is a broad conclusion that I guess the administration
    made, State made, Diplomatic Security made, about how to fill
    posts.
        Mr. Courts. That is correct. Diplomatic Security does fill
    the most critical positions first, especially in places like
    Iraq, before they fill other positions. As I mentioned, they
    will try to address life and death situations, and they make
    that their first priority, and rightly so.
        The problem is that they are often robbing Peter to pay
    Paul. And I mentioned, for example, those domestic offices. The
    problem with taking people from those domestic offices and
    putting them overseas is that there is other critical work that
    is not being done in those domestic offices. For example,
    passport and visa fraud investigations, and of course, getting
    that work wrong has lethal consequences as well.
        Mr. Berman. Just to make sure we understand, an unfilled
    position is a position for which there are appropriations; it
    is not a request. It is not a plan. The item has been funded to
    the level that would fund all the positions including the
    unfilled ones.
        Mr. Courts. It is not a requested position. It is an
    authorized position.
        Mr. Berman. Authorized and funded?
        Mr. Courts. Whether it is funded adequately or not, I can't
    speak to that.
        Mr. Berman. I would like to turn to the contractors issue.
    Resources for protection of our diplomats abroad, as you
    mentioned, have been stressed by operations in the two war
    zones and higher counterterrorism threats. In addition to the
    filling of permanent positions, we have massively increased our
    reliance on contractor, contract personnel. Part of the
    argument is it can save costs by not having to pay pensions, et
    cetera.
        Given the ongoing and long-term nature of these threats
    against our diplomats, is this practice sustainable? How is
    State properly overseeing these contracts? To your way of
    thinking, is there something in the effort to save that money,
    are we losing some of our protection by relying on contractors?
        Mr. Courts. The GAO work that we did in 2009 did not
    directly address that issue. I would say that when I mentioned
    that some of the staff that are Diplomatic Security staff, the
    direct hire staff, that were put in positions overseas, were
    contractors to manage those staff told us in our field work
    that they did not have the skills, did not have the training to
    properly manage contractor staff, so there are risks there.
        Mr. Berman. And then if I can get this last question in,
    how do we address these shortages? How should diplomatic
    security prioritize staffing requirements?
        Mr. Courts. We think that the department needs to, at a
    departmental level, take a strategic look at rationalizing the
    Bureau's mission. The Bureau itself isn't in a position to do
    that because, as I said, they are a support function. So if
    they are told they need to provide security for a post like
    Benghazi or anywhere else, they are going to salute smartly and
    try to carry out that mission.
        What the department needs to do is take a look at all of
    the enormous mission responsibilities that diplomatic security
    has accrued over the last 10 years or so and take a look at
    whether they have got the resources to actually carry out all
    those missions. They may need to make hard decisions. They may
    need to consider whether they need to close some posts in order
    to be able to adequately staff others.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Courts.
        And thank you, Mr. Berman.
        Mr. Smith is recognized.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Courts, thank you for your testimony and for the great
    work that GAO does on just about everything, so thank you so
    much for this.
        Let me ask you a couple of questions, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Lamb said that there were the correct number of
    assets in Benghazi at the time of 9/11. She testified that
    budget considerations played no part in considering additional
    security.
        And I assume that part of those assets had to have been the
    local militia, the 17th February brigade, the local armed
    militia, which reportedly received monetary compensation and
    training from U.S. officials and were part of the protection
    force.
        My question first is, how adequate are these militias? Has
    GAO looked at that? How often do we use militias, as opposed to
    a central force or armed forces from a country?
        Secondly, if I could, I have been a big fan for most of my
    career of best value contracting. And unfortunately, except for
    Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, best value is not used to award
    contracts to the technically acceptable firm offering lowest
    evaluated price, low bid, in essence, and I am wondering if
    that type of process has led to including those protection
    assets that are inferior.
        Best value is something I have been pushing at DoD for
    years, especially as it relates to my local military base,
    known as joint base. They go with low bids so often and get a
    shoddy product as a direct result. It seems to me best value is
    something to look at it, if you can comment on that as well.
        And finally, in your comments you do point out that we
    previously had identified many posts that did not meet all
    security standards delineated by the overseas security policy
    board and the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism
    Act of 1999. I note, parenthetically, I am the prime author of
    the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
    1999, and I would like to know, if in looking at that, whether
    or not our consulate in Benghazi fell short of the security
    standards that were proscribed by that act as well as by the
    Overseas Security Policy Board.
        Mr. Courts. Thank you.
        With respect to Benghazi, GAO does not have any information
    on the specific security arrangements at the consulate in
    Benghazi, and hopefully, the ongoing investigations by State,
    the FBI and others and also as a result of these Congressional
    hearings will help us understand what happened there, what
    lessons are to be drawn there. We do know from past work that
    State considers the likely threats that a post will face and
    its physical security posture when it makes those arrangements.
    But I would have to defer to the Department of State on what
    those actual security arrangements were in Benghazi.
        With respect to the contracting issue, we did not address
    that as part of this body of work. We do have specialists in
    GAO that have looked at contracting in contingency environments
    like Iraq, and I would be happy to put you in touch with those
    people to share their findings with you on that.
        In terms of the standards, the security standards at
    embassies, as you know, not all of State's overseas facilities
    meet their own security standards. Obviously, the newer the
    Embassy, the more likely they are to meet those standards. They
    have programs in place to try to upgrade and retrofit existing
    and older embassies to try to mitigate some of the deficiencies
    there. But clearly, the more people we can get into the newer,
    more robust facilities, the safer our people are going to be.
        I don't know whether or not the facility in Benghazi met
    those standards, but that is a question that should probably be
    asked.
        Mr. Smith. Could you pose that as well? Could you look into
    that as well, whether or not the Benghazi consulate met that
    standard? It seems to me it would be a very good line of
    inquiry for GAO.
        Mr. Courts. Thank you. I would say that there are a lot of
    questions that have arisen from the incident in Libya that have
    ramifications for our presence around the world, and GAO stands
    ready to assist the Congress and this committee in addressing
    that work.
        Mr. Smith. If you could take that back thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Smith.
        I was going to recognize Mr. Sires of New Jersey, so I will
    go to Ms. Bass--no, then I will go to Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        I want to address this idea that somehow the confusion as
    to whether this was mostly a planned attack with some ad hoc
    help or an ad hoc demonstration with terrorists coming in or
    somewhere along that spectrum is somehow part of some
    intentional effort to mislead the American public for political
    reasons.
        If you take the view that this was a carefully planned
    attack, you would come away with the view that there are
    terrorists organized in Benghazi, something we all knew to be
    true before and after the Benghazi attack.
        If you take the position that there were people off the
    streets who were angry at us and willing to take violent action
    against us, then you would say our public diplomacy efforts in
    the Middle East have not been entirely successful, and there
    are hundreds of thousands of people with great anger toward the
    United States.
        I know of no political plan, nor could I conceive of one,
    that would ever be successful in trying to convince the
    American people that either of these problems weren't there,
    that our policy in the Middle East had been so successful that
    either all organized terrorist groups had been eliminated or
    that all public anger against America had been eliminated.
        Mr. Courts, are you aware of any evidence of an intentional
    effort to mislead the American people about what happened in
    those terrible hours in Benghazi?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, the GAO's work did not address
    that issue. I am not in a position to answer that.
        Mr. Sherman. I understand.
        Focusing on future security measures, what types of lessons
    do you think will emerge from this current attack? Will those
    who mean us harm learn lessons as to how to attack us and as a
    result of, I realize, what is an incomplete review of what
    happened in Benghazi, what else should we be doing either with
    the physical facilities, the decision on where to have our
    diplomats or the number of security personnel to have or the
    number or the types of weapons that they should have with them
    on a regular basis?
        Mr. Courts. Thank you, Congressman. I think it is still too
    early to know exactly what lessons are to be drawn from
    Benghazi, with respect to, for example, whether it is a risk-
    assessment issue, whether it is a capabilities issue, whether
    it is an information-sharing issue, we just don't know yet, but
    GAO does stand ready to assist, as I said, Congress in pursuing
    those issues going forward.
        Mr. Sherman. We have a Foreign Service that is in dangerous
    places today. We, as a country, need to decide how much danger
    to expose our people to. We can never have them entirely safe
    in places like Benghazi, under--with an American flag on top of
    the building. And I would ask your comment, but it is really
    more a decision for this committee to determine the extent to
    which we put our Ambassadors and other Foreign Service
    personnel at risk and evaluate what the benefits are of having
    somebody today in Yemen, what are the difficulties of not have
    been having somebody in Damascus, and when is it worth having
    somebody in Benghazi? I don't know, Mr. Courts, whether you
    have any comments or insight on that?
        Mr. Courts. I would say I would agree, first, that there is
    no way that our diplomats will ever be at zero risk. As long as
    the United States seeks to engage foreign governments and
    further U.S. foreign policy interests abroad, our diplomats
    will inherently be at risk. And as we saw with al-Qaeda linked
    attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and more recently,
    obviously, with the attacks in Libya, those who would seek to
    do harm to Americans have plenty of targets to choose from. But
    to mitigate that, State needs to have the capability in place
    to address those threats, and as I mentioned, we found in our
    work where there are a number of areas where those
    capabilities, frankly, were not where they should be.
        Mr. Sherman. I would just say that we really have to rely
    on the host government to a great extent, especially from an
    organized attack. And I don't know whether if we had had three
    or four more people on the ground, whether we would be talking
    about no American casualties or eight American casualties.
        And I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana is recognized.
        Mr. Burton. First of all, I am not going to attack the
    White House, the administration.
        What I want to do is point to some of the what I consider
    malfeasance at the State Department. There were over a couple
    of hundred different kinds of incidents during the last year.
    But I want to focus on just some of the more important ones. On
    April the 11th, 2012, a gun battle between an unidentified
    armed group and forces loyal to the transitional national
    council occurred near the consulate in Benghazi. The gun battle
    included use of anti-aircraft guns and RPGs. This was back in
    April.
        In May, two RPG rounds were fired at the Benghazi office of
    the International Committee of the Red Cross, approximately 1
    kilometer from the consulate in Benghazi.
        In June 2012, Ambassador Stevens, who normally took morning
    runs around Tripoli along with members of his security detail,
    according to sources, they were posting his picture and talking
    about when he was running so he might be a target.
        On June the 6th of 2012, under the cover of darkness,
    assailants placed an IED on the north gate of the consulate in
    Benghazi, blowing a hole in the security perimeter that was
    described by one individual big enough for 40 people, 40 men to
    go through.
        On June 10, 2012, a two-car convoy carrying the British
    Ambassador was attacked in broad daylight with an RPG. And the
    British consulate then closed their consulate there.
        Late June 2012, the International Committee of the Red
    Cross was attacked again. They closed down the Red Cross office
    there.
        And weeks before the September 11th attack on our compound
    in Benghazi, unarmed Libyan guards employed by the British
    contractor Blue Mountain Group were being warned, warned by
    their family members, to quit their jobs guarding the consulate
    in Benghazi because there were rumors that there was going to
    be an impending attack. Now that sounds like to me you ought to
    be concerned about that.
        Now let's go back and talk about the people who were making
    decisions and who were in charge. Mr. Nordstrom was the
    regional director, regional director for security. This guy
    knew what was going on. He was there. And he contacted the
    people back at the headquarters in Washington, at the State
    Department, and here is one of the things that was said. He
    said, you know, we really need to do something. He is concerned
    there has only been one incident involving an American, but he
    was struck by fire. And the take away from that and for me and
    my staff, this is what somebody said back at the headquarters
    of the State Department, and here is what Nordstrom said, the
    guy that was in charge of the security there. The take away
    from that for me and my staff was abundantly clear; we were not
    going to get resources until the aftermath of an incident.
        And the question that we would ask again, and this is what
    he asked of State back at the headquarters here in Washington,
    how thin does the ice have to get before someone falls through?
    So he warned them that.
        Now Mr. Wood, the lieutenant colonel in charge of the unit
    there that was for security, here is what he had to say: We
    were fighting a losing battle. We couldn't even keep up with
    what we had. We were not even allowed to keep what we had.
        And then Mr. Nordstrom, once again, when he talked to State
    here in Washington, they said to him when he asked for more
    security, you are asking for the sun the moon and the stars.
    And his response was to the man he was talking to at State,
    Jim, do you know what the most frustrating thing about this
    assignment is? It is not the hardship. It is not the gunfire.
    It is not the threats. It is dealing and fighting against the
    people, programs and personnel who are supposed to be
    supporting me back at State. And I added it by saying, for me,
    listen to this, for me, the Taliban is on the inside of the
    building.
        Now they have said time and time and time again that there
    was a security problem. There were incidents of attack. The Red
    Cross closed down their office in June. The British consulate
    closed down their office in June. We were attacked. There were
    threats all the way up to weeks before the attack on September
    the 11th, and the people back at State here in Washington
    continued to deny additional security, and they continued to do
    away with security that was already there.
        Now, to me, that shows incompetence. To me, that shows that
    the people at State ought to be re-evaluated who were involved
    in this. And I'm talking about Ms. Lamb, and I am talking
    about--let me see who else it is--Mr. Kennedy. Those people who
    were in the decision-making process ought to be taken to task,
    and I have talked to him on a number of cases, and I am not
    going to go into the security meetings we have had. But what
    they have said does not comport with what was said at our
    Government Reform hearing.
        So I think this committee, Madam Chairman, ought to bring
    lieutenant Colonel Wood and Ms. Lamb before our committee to
    find out why there are inconsistencies between what we are
    hearing now and what we heard back when we had that other
    hearing.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I am sorry, Mr. Burton, I had not
    noticed that the clock had run.
        Mr. Ackerman is recognized. He is the ranking member of the
    Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia.
        Mr. Ackerman. Let's just hang the guilty parties.
        You know, the stench of hypocrisy that hangs over this city
    today emanates from this room. I have listened, and I did come
    here to try to learn--but I have listened to my colleagues talk
    about the President of the United States and others in the
    administration using terms as ``deliberate lies,''
    ``unmitigated gall,'' ``malfeasance,'' which is the malicious
    and knowing evildoing, ``disgust,'' ``cover-ups,'' asking
    questions of who is responsible in this town for what happened?
        But if you want to know who is responsible in this town,
    buy yourself a mirror. Those of us who have been to these
    hearings and briefings and markups hear time and time again
    from our colleagues that this costs too much money, and we have
    to make cuts. Well, our evil-doing American-citizen-hating
    administration requested a lot more money than we provided.
        They requested for worldwide security $440 million more
    than you guys wanted to provide, $0.25 billion in security
    upgrades that you refused to make in this committee, and then
    you have the audacity to come here and say why wasn't the
    protection of these people provided for?
        And the answer is because you damn didn't provide it. You
    reduced what the administration asked for to protect these
    people. And the answer to the question is, how do you protect
    these people? It costs money, believe it or not. Whether they
    needed more sophisticated weaponry paid for at a bigger price
    or not doesn't matter. They didn't have the wherewithal or the
    personnel.
        And some of you keep referring to it as a consulate, which
    I would advise you costs a lot more money than the temporary
    mission facility that it actually was, more money that you
    refused to provide.
        Ask not who the guilty party is; it is you. It is us. It is
    this committee. And the things that we insist that we need have
    to cost money.
        Now, Mr. Courts, you are not just some bumpkin off the
    street who wound up here today. If you increased two people,
    who are security people, making an assumption that all security
    people cost the same amount of money--we do pay them in money
    right?
        Mr. Courts. Yes.
        Mr. Ackerman. If you increase from two to five, as a former
    math teacher, it suggests to me that that is a 150 percent
    increase from two to five. Is that accurate?
        Mr. Courts. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Ackerman. So if we went from two to five, if that was
    the right number, it would cost 150 percent more than this
    committee was willing to provide. Is that accurate? Assuming
    they all got paid equally.
        Mr. Courts. It would have cost more money.
        Mr. Ackerman. That is hedge, but that is okay. Could you
    tell me which of my colleagues on this committee was as
    bodacious in their insistence that we provide more money for
    American security in the State Department budget, I would
    appreciate it.
        And if any of my colleagues and I might have missed you and
    I apologize for overlooking, made that insistence that we give
    more State Department, please raise your hand, and I will yield
    to you.
        Six, five, four, three, two, one. Your time has expired.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Your time has expired, Mr. Ackerman.
        And we are so pleased to yield to Mr. Rohrabacher, the
    chairman on the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And again, Madam Chairman, thank you for
    your leadership over the years to make sure the American people
    get the straight story.
        And yes, I think that there is a smell of hypocrisy in
    politics here. Let's start by making sure that we go on the
    record again so that all may hear this, the last, my last
    colleague's statement notwithstanding, the lady who made, the
    official, I should say, happens to be a lady, who made the
    decision at State Department at what level of spending would be
    spent for security for the Benghazi consulate testified under
    oath that there was no budget consideration whatsoever in her
    decision--under oath. Anyone suggesting otherwise should not be
    pointing fingers of hypocrisy at this side of the aisle.
        Yes. This is not simply a cover up of a third-rate
    burglary. We have four of our diplomatic personnel dead, and it
    is not a McCarthy-era tactic to demand accountability and to
    demand that the American people are not misinformed about it to
    the point that they don't know what the threat is.
        So I ask this witness the level of security in Libya that
    has been determined, have you determined that it was, that
    there was a deficiency because of cost and that the decisions
    made to provide a level of security had anything to do with
    budget considerations? Are you contradicting Ms. Lamb's
    testimony in other words?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, GAO doesn't have any specific
    information about the security arrangements in Benghazi. We
    have not done that work.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Has GAO found, it is very difficult
    not to notice that the administration went out of its way for a
    number of days, at least a week, trying to present the image of
    this murderer of our diplomats as a crowd that went out of
    control because of movie rage, of some being upset about a
    misportrayal or a portrayal of Mohamed in a movie, that, of
    course, by insisting on presenting that as the evidence, we are
    downplaying the threat of radical Islam, which is out there and
    means to hurt us and to hurt Americans and specifically. Has
    there been any evidence that you have seen that people in this
    administration have been instructed not to use the words
    ``radical Islamic terrorists''?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, again, I am sorry. We did not
    address that issue in this work. I can speak to the broader
    problems facing diplomatic security, but we did not address
    that.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, in terms of money for diplomatic
    security, let's note that this year the State Department has
    requested $1.4 billion for worldwide security for its
    facilities and personnel. In addition, they have requested $215
    million for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. That comes to
    $1.6 billion. At the same time, this administration wants to
    give Iraq $850 million to train a police force and $900 million
    for military financing, which comes to $1.7 billion.
        How can the Obama administration and members of this
    committee justify giving more money to Iraq for its security
    than we are for giving for our protection of our own diplomats?
    I don't expect you to answer that.
        Is there any indication that, during your investigation or
    your what you have been trying to uncover, is there anything
    that would suggest that this was not a well organized,
    murderous hit on an American diplomatic personnel rather than
    just a crowd that got out of control?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, GAO did not look at the incident
    specifically in Benghazi, so I can't comment on that.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. If it was a crowd that got out of control,
    was the security enough to handle that alternative?
        Mr. Courts. I can't answer that question either.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's just, again, note that this is not a
    budget issue. Those people who are suggesting it is are the
    ones who have been guilty of trying to politicize this issue,
    demanding that the American people being given the correct
    information, rather than intentionally misinformed, is not
    something that we should tolerate.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
        And Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member on Asia and the
    Pacific, is recognized.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Madam Chair, I just want to say that, as I have mentioned
    earlier, that the name of Ambassador Stevens, and I think it
    was somewhat dismissive of me in not realizing that what I
    consider to be the roll of honor, not only for Ambassador Chris
    Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Glen Doherty and Mr. Tyrone Woods
    should be remembered names and not just mentioned as security
    officers who accompanied Ambassador Stevens. Truly they are
    true heroes as far as I am concerned.
        Mr. Courts, you mentioned that the GAO probably in the past
    10 years had given indication that there is a tremendous
    increase of the needs to provide necessary resources for our
    Diplomatic Security program. I am curious how many embassies do
    we have worldwide total and the total number of consulates that
    we current have right now?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, the combined figure of consulates
    and embassies, I believe, is somewhere around 270. I don't know
    what the breakout is between embassies and consulates, but
    together they are around 270 or so.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I have always been curious how our
    Government goes about when it, for example, makes a decision to
    build an Embassy here or there a consulate, and one example
    that comes to mind, and correct me if I am wrong, didn't we
    build a more than $900-million Embassy in Iraq? What was the
    total cost of that Embassy that we built in Iraq?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I don't have that figure at the
    top of my head. It was an expensive Embassy, though.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And do we currently have about 1,000
    Foreign Service officers servicing that Embassy right now?
        Mr. Courts. I believe that is fairly close to what the
    figure is.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And could that have been possibly the
    reason why that some of our Foreign Service officers or the
    resources of personnel that we had, if they had to be drawn
    from other consulates and embassies, Iraq is a classic example
    and that the Libyan Embassy and their needs could have been
    affected because of this.
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I can't speak to whether the
    Libyan mission was affected by the need for staff in Iraq.
        I can say that when we did our work in 2009, we did find
    that staffing the mission in Iraq did result in staffing
    shortages in some other locations of Diplomatic Security.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Has there ever been any GAO study or
    review procedure on how our Government goes about in measuring
    the kind of embassies that we build in any given country? Is it
    based on population or is it resources? Obviously, the number
    of people in Iraq and building a $900-million Embassy there
    strikes me as somewhat strange. How do we end up, I can see
    maybe having an Embassy like that in China or in India, but
    with Iraq only, what, 20 million people or less? And servicing
    1,000 Foreign Service officers? Can you share with us where we
    are with this?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, GAO has not done any work to
    address the reasons for the size of the Iraq mission.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Is it because no Members have ever
    requested that such a review process be taken.
        Mr. Courts. I don't believe they have requested a review
    with those specific objectives.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. You had also indicated that there were
    foreign language deficiencies, and some 53 percent of our
    diplomatic security officers don't speak the foreign language
    of that host country. How critical is that factor?
        Mr. Courts. It is very important. As I mentioned, we did
    find examples of where that did degrade their ability to
    operate in those countries. I mentioned, for example, a local
    informant in a country of strategic importance to the United
    States that was handed off to a locally employed staff, and of
    course, in a country like China, for example, we have to assume
    that all of the locally employed staff works for the Chinese
    Government. So that is, obviously, a very problematic thing.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry, but if there is a deficiency
    of foreign language competency of our Diplomatic Security
    officers, what about the Foreign Officers themselves? You know,
    this impression sometimes our Foreign Service officers, and I
    am not demeaning them, but they come, but they don't really go
    out and be with the host country people, learning their
    language perhaps. Don't we have a very comprehensive program
    teaching our Foreign Service officers how to speak that foreign
    language?
        Mr. Courts. We do. But GAO has found that there are
    deficiencies across the department, not just in Diplomatic
    Security in terms of foreign language skills. It is worse in
    the Bureau of Diplomatic Security than in some other cones
    within State Department.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. So you suggest Congress needs to do
    something about it.
        Mr. Courts. I think State Department needs to do something
    about it. I am in not in a position, sir.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is up.
        Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
    Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized.
        Mr. Royce. Yes, I think that one of the problems for many
    of us who followed the story from the initial attack was simply
    that when we saw the attack, and we noticed that an al-Qaeda
    affiliate had taken credit for the attack, it just seemed at
    odds with the report about the attack being spontaneous, the
    report that it was an outcome of a protest that spun out of
    control, and the fact in five news shows that argument was put
    out there and then, 8 days later, that argument was still being
    debated, it just seemed rather fantastic to those of us who
    were following what was going on, had gone on, on the ground.
        And the concern for me, and I am glad you are here, Mr.
    Courts, one of my concerns is the emphasis that we put on
    security because when I read your report, you say that security
    is treated as a support function at the department.
        In your work, you found that these security issues are
    getting, what, high level attention or lower level attention?
        Let me start with that question.
        Mr. Courts. I believe the State Department takes security
    issues very seriously and certainly----
        Mr. Royce. I certainly agree with you, but the question is
    whether that gets top level attention from the Secretary, from
    top management, or are those issues second- and third-tier
    issues? Because one of the things that struck me about the
    original situation on the ground was, as I noted in my opening
    statement, there was this normalization of relations underway
    with Libya, and we had assumed that we would go forward with a
    certain approach that was at odds with our allies.
        Usually, as I recall, as I talk to foreign Ambassadors,
    they say we learn from the United States, and one of the things
    we do is we make certain that we have security to defend our
    interests there, and we do not rely on the locals. We make
    certain in an environment like this that we have security.
        It just seems as though in this theater, it was so much out
    of character with modus operandi, with what we have told our
    allies in the past about how you guarantee security. We are the
    ones that help teach it. And I just wanted to ask you about
    that.
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, again, I have to say with respect
    to the specific security arrangements in Benghazi, GAO's work
    did not cover that issue. That post didn't actually exist at
    the time we did our work. I would say, just as a general
    matter, that the host government in any country, whether it is
    Libya or anywhere else, according to the Vienna Convention,
    does have the primary responsibility for protecting our
    diplomatic missions just as we have that responsibility----
        Mr. Royce. They do have that primary responsibility. There
    is no doubt about that. But nevertheless, we tell our allies
    what you need to do is make sure you have security personnel in
    place. And it is the fact that a 16-member team in Tripoli were
    pulled out several months before; it is the fact that we have
    in our hands the memos from individuals, now deceased,
    expressing a concern that went unheeded, and we are trying to
    get our arms around what happened. But also how it would be
    possible afterwards that this video narrative was being pushed
    day after day in the light of facts that just seemed to
    indicate that, on 9/11, al-Qaeda planned a hit, took credit for
    it.
        And this is why it is important. It weakens our national
    security. It is important to learn what happened in Benghazi
    because at the end of the day, it could happen again. Al-Qaeda
    plans attacks over and over again. And one witness warns that
    al-Qaeda affiliates will have U.S. embassies in their sites now
    as a consequence for many years to come. So we really do have
    to get to the bottom of how this went awry because it seems so
    much to me out of character in terms of the way that we have
    taught security for our consulates.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce.
        Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And I thank Mr. Royce for the civil and inquisitive tone of
    his, how he frames this issue. I think that is proper, and I
    join with him in wanting to know what happened.
        I am sorry our friend from California, our other friend
    from California, Mr. Rohrabacher takes umbrage at the
    comparison to McCarthyism. But smear, character assassination,
    judgment before all the facts are in is McCarthyism.
        I have a letter here from one of our colleagues asking
    people to co-sign declaring that Susan Rice is unfit to be the
    Secretary of State, our U.N. Ambassador. This is before
    investigations are completed. This is before this hearing. It
    is signed the day before. We have apparently made up our mind.
    That is not an honest inquiry. And that is an attempt to
    besmirch, in my opinion, the reputation of a very talented and
    capable public servant.
        And I want no part of it. And when we do that, and I
    understand why Mr. Rohrabacher might be upset, but he invites,
    not he personally, one invites the kind of reaction you will
    get from this side of the aisle.
        The election is over. The President won reelection. The
    voices of the public were heard. They want us to cooperate. If
    you want an honest investigation of this tragedy, we will join
    you. But if you want to persist in trying to somehow to put
    this, lay this at the doorstep of the President or the
    Secretary of State or the United Nations Ambassador, you will
    find us ready and willing to resist to the teeth.
        Reference was made of the Oversight and Government Reform
    Committee hearing. I was at that hearing. I am a member of that
    committee. Let me quote under oath what Mr. Nordstrom, the
    security officer in Tripoli, said. What he said under oath,
    ``Let me say a word about the evening of September 11th. The
    ferocity and intensive of the attack was nothing we had seen in
    Libya or that I had seen in my time in the Diplomatic Security
    Service. Having an extra foot of wall, a dozen guards or agents
    would not have enabled us to respond to that kind of assault.''
        He is saying it was unprecedented.
        Ryan Crocker today was interviewed, the former two-time
    Bush Ambassador and one-time Obama Ambassador, and he decried
    the tone of the discussion about the tragedy of Benghazi here
    on the Hill, worried that it was going to have spillover
    consequences all over the world in terms of Foreign Service. He
    pointed out the Foreign Service is inherently dangerous in
    certain circumstances and Libya especially.
        I was in Libya in May. Were you there, Mr. Courts?
        Mr. Courts. No, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. You didn't go to Libya?
        Mr. Courts. No, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, what I found, and nothing has changed,
    is the country is not settled. There isn't a domestic
    peacekeeping force. There isn't some kind of host country group
    we can rely on to provide security. Surely you know that is
    true.
        Mr. Courts. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. There are militias all over the place. When I
    landed in Tripoli, there was a militia, not the government,
    guarding the airport in Tripoli.
        It is an inherently unstable situation. After 40 years of
    autocratic rule by Qadhafi, it is not settled. Just today, they
    finally inaugurated a government, but there are still seven key
    cabinet positions that are vacant. Tragedies happen.
        You mentioned, I think, in your testimony, Mr. Courts, that
    there were 39 incidents of attacks or attempted attacks on U.S.
    embassies and consulates in some period of time. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Courts. That is correct.
        Mr. Connolly. And I don't know, in the history of the
    Foreign Service, we have had tragedies, have we not?
        Mr. Courts. Yes, Congressman.
        Mr. Connolly. Are they always avoidable?
        Mr. Courts. I can't answer that question. Our work didn't
    address whether they were avoidable or not.
        Mr. Connolly. Some of them might have been; some of them
    might not have been. Is that correct?
        Mr. Courts. That is probably correct.
        Mr. Connolly. Finally, I would just say, Madam Chairman,
    and I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter the full
    testimony that we received in the Oversight and Government
    Reform Committee.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, subject to the
    limitations.
        Mr. Connolly. On page 7 of his testimony, he actually lauds
    the State Department's response to his request for resources
    and delineates them in great detail under oath.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot is recognized. He is the chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Courts, yesterday President Obama held his first news
    conference since March, now that the election is over of
    course, and he defended Susan Rice, who clearly misled the
    American people, saying she shouldn't be criticized for her
    false statements because she had nothing to do with Benghazi.
    The logical question this raises is why do they send her out to
    tell the American people what happened about Benghazi a person
    who had nothing to do with Benghazi? Now I assume your GAO
    report didn't address that.
        Mr. Courts. That is correct, Congressman.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And for weeks, the administration
    stuck to the story about a video causing the attack on
    Benghazi, that it was not a terrorist attack, that it was just
    a spontaneous response to this video, that it arose from street
    protests, yet in real time, the State Department and others saw
    that there was no protest going on, that the streets were
    quiet, and that it was clearly a terrorist attack carried out
    over a fairly extended period of time. Your GAO report didn't
    cover that either, I assume?
        Mr. Courts. We did not, Congressman.
        Mr. Chabot. Now, it appears to many Americans that this
    administration failed to adequately protect U.S. personnel,
    including a U.S. Ambassador and other--three other very
    important American citizens, resulting essentially in their
    deaths in Benghazi, then misled the American people about what
    happened. I assume the report really didn't go into that area
    either.
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, no. The work that we conducted,
    concluded in 2009.
        Mr. Chabot. Let me address a little more specifically then.
    In other high-risk countries, the State Department uses armed
    contract forces provided by private security companies to
    protect our diplomats. It is my understanding that such
    security personnel were not deployed in Libya, and that is
    apparently because of objections by Libyan authorities. Could
    you address that issue?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I don't have any specific
    information about the security arrangements in Libya.
        Mr. Chabot. It is my understanding that the security
    personnel oftentimes in local countries may not be up to the
    same standards that American companies, with our much more
    experienced and oftentimes better-equipped, et cetera,
    personnel, are able to bring about in an area. Your report
    didn't cover that?
        Mr. Courts. We didn't address that issue, Congressman.
        Mr. Chabot. Are you able to address the--some of the
    differences between the security that was in place in Tripoli,
    where I was--I was not in Benghazi but in Tripoli, at the
    Embassy there, in comparison to the consulate or the temporary
    mission, as Mr. Ackerman referred to it, in Benghazi?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, our work was conducted before
    those posts existed.
        Mr. Chabot. Relative to the local security forces, rather
    than American companies or other companies of a similar nature
    that are protecting our embassies around the world, are you
    aware of what other embassies we may have locals rather than
    American companies protecting?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I believe we use, we contract with
    local companies in quite a few countries around the world for
    guard services around our embassies and consulates.
        Mr. Chabot. Are you able to comment on any comparisons
    between the locals versus our folks?
        Mr. Courts. I don't have that information. We didn't
    address that as part of our report. I could try to get that
    information for you.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
        Mr. Higgins is recognized.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Just to provide some context here, I remember traveling in
    the summer of 2006 to Lebanon. It was immediately after the
    Hezbollah-Israeli war, and we had to fly from Cyprus to the
    United States Embassy in Beirut along the Mediterranean Sea by
    helicopter. We landed, and the Ambassador at the time Feldman,
    Ambassador Feldman brought us into the residence, the
    Ambassador's residence, and he had an ashen look on his face
    and said that anti-American sentiment is at an all-time high.
    We later left the residence and drove to a meeting with Prime
    Minister Siniora to the streets of Beirut, and I was sitting
    next to the Ambassador, and I asked him if he was okay. He said
    he would be tomorrow because the United States Marines were
    doing to dispatch 75 Marines to guard the Embassy, and for the
    past week and a half, they had been guarded by the Lebanese
    national army. And his concern was that if they decided to make
    a move, Hezbollah, which is a violent Shi'a group committed to
    violent Jihad, on the Embassy, perhaps the Lebanese National
    Guard's loyalties would be mixed.
        I think the point here is that diplomacy is tough work, and
    it is very, very dangerous work. By definition, diplomats are
    supposed to mix with the people and mix with the culture, not
    hide inside the Embassy when things get tough, because the real
    work and the tough work of diplomats occurs during the toughest
    times in the most difficult places, like Benghazi.
        For the past 40 years, we, the United States, there have
    been attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets, including 64 under
    President Bush. There were fewer under Clinton than there were
    in the first George Bush. There were fewer under the first
    George Bush than under Reagan, a little bit more under Carter,
    a little bit fewer under Ford, and a little bit more under
    President Nixon.
        The point is I think what I have heard here consistent with
    Mr. Ackerman's concern is that we are looking to assign blame
    rather than looking to find exactly what happened and how we
    can take actions to protect our diplomats more effectively. And
    I could easily talk about the budgetary issues and the fact
    that this Congress rejected the administration's request for
    over $400 million more for Embassy security than they received.
    You hear the assertions of projecting weakness within a
    political debate or peace through security.
        Mr. Ackerman is right; there is a stench of hypocrisy. And
    if we are serious, if we are serious as a body in trying to
    protect our diplomats, the world is not getting any easier. It
    is getting a lot more complicated. It is getting a lot more
    fouled and confused, and as these places seek to evolve to
    become more stable, our diplomats are going to continue to be
    in danger in all of these places.
        So I really don't have a question, but I just think the
    context is important here, and we need to understand that
    America is the greatest country in the history of the world,
    and it is because we export our values. And when we as Members
    of Congress conduct hearings that really don't seem to be
    intent on getting to the root of the problem, but rather saying
    that they are more responsible than we were, I think we do a
    great disservice to America, to Americans, but more
    importantly, to America's unique place in the world.
        With that, I will yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina is recognized.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And I would like to join with my colleagues in thanking the
    persons of the Foreign Service. It is such remarkable bravery.
    In fact, an Ambassador who I have grown to respect is Ronald
    Neumann, who is here today, and I am very grateful for his
    service in Algeria, Bahrain. I had an opportunity to visit with
    him in Afghanistan. So I know what an extraordinary challenge
    it is and the dedicated work that is being done.
        Additionally, I think we need to point out that there
    actually has been--lightning is going to strike--bipartisan
    cooperation in regard to worldwide security protection, and
    that is that in 2012, the House increased the funding for the
    worldwide security protection by almost $100 million above the
    2011 levels, and increased the 2012 funding for Diplomatic
    Security by $5 million above the administration's request.
        And I appreciate, Mr. Courts, in your report that you
    indicate that Diplomatic Security has increased its budget by
    from about $200 million in 1998 to $1.8 billion in 2008;
    additionally, that in 2011, there are 35,000 security guards
    that are available for Diplomatic Security. Additionally, in
    2011-2012, spending bills that were passed by the House--it was
    bipartisan--there were many Democratic votes for this, and it
    did pass the Senate and was signed into law by the President,
    the House did not unilaterally set levels for Embassy and
    Diplomatic Security. It did not even have the power to do so.
        Then that gets to, who makes the determination of the level
    of protection for each of our facilities?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, that is a decision that is made
    within the Department of State.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. So it wouldn't be directed by
    Congress. It would be the priorities of Department of State; is
    that correct?
        Mr. Courts. With respect to the security arrangements at
    individual posts, yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And based on that, something
    that is of concern, again, I am confident bipartisan, that
    there were unclassified cables indicating that there was
    increasing danger in Benghazi. Was it addressed?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, again, I am sorry, GAO did not
    address what happened in Benghazi. Our work concluded in 2009,
    before those posts existed.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Do you know, even though it
    concluded prior to the attack, was there any increase of
    security provided based on Ambassador Stevens' concerns?
        Mr. Courts. Again, Congressman, I am sorry, our work did
    not address the events in Libya specifically.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. These issues are so
    important. It really does concern me that Senator Lindsey
    Graham has pointed out there have been 13 separate letters sent
    to the Department of Defense, CIA, to the President, asking
    specific questions that are of great concern to the American
    people, and in particular great appreciation of our diplomatic
    personnel, and a concern, too, is proper protection being made.
    Why would there be a delay of receiving a response from a group
    of U.S. Senators who are vitally concerned?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I can't speak to that. Our work
    didn't address it.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. In the future, do you think
    that there should be a more prompt response so that the
    American people do understand the dangers that are being faced
    by our diplomatic personnel?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I would say that we need the
    details to come out to know what exactly the lessons are that
    should be drawn from Benghazi. GAO doesn't have those details
    at this point.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. For so many of us, it was
    shocking what appeared to be a diversion indicating there was a
    protest, and then we found out it wasn't a protest. Then it was
    alleged that it was a protest based on a video, which actually,
    since it wasn't a protest, it wasn't due to the video. People
    are really legitimately concerned. And, for me, as to whether
    it was a terrorist attack, the moment I heard it, within 15
    seconds I knew this was sadly a celebration of the mass murder
    of American citizens on September 11, 2001. And the American
    people need to know that our Government responds quickly.
        I yield the balance of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Kelley, the vice chair of Asia and the Pacific, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Kelly. I thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Courts, thank you
    for being here today.
        When I read through your report, it really goes back to the
    2009 report where you--I don't know that you were part of the
    department at that time, but I know you guys are the watchdogs
    for the American taxpayer dollar. You were suggesting then that
    the Department of State do a review.
        Mr. Courts. That is correct.
        Mr. Kelly. Has it ever been done?
        Mr. Courts. It has not been done. We don't consider that
    they fully implemented that recommendation, no.
        Mr. Kelly. Did they implement any of it?
        Mr. Courts. The Diplomatic Security Bureau itself has taken
    a number of measures to improve their strategic planning. But
    what we recommended is the Department needed to do a strategic
    review of the bureau, because the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    is not in a position to say no when they are asked to provide
    support. So we really think that the Department needs to take a
    hard look at all the missions, all the many diffuse missions
    that the Diplomatic Security Bureau is responsible for, and
    make some hard choices about what they can achieve with the
    resources that they have or whether they need additional
    resources or whether the mission itself needs to be reduced.
        Mr. Kelly. So what I am trying to understand is though in
    2009, we are in 2012. So the results of September 11 of this
    year, then we got to ask, so 2009, 2010, 2011, now we got
    almost all the way through 2012 and there is still this
    accountability that has not been taken into account. And I am
    just trying to understand that when we look at this whole
    event, it is not about the money, because the money was there.
    In fact, it was greater amounts than were there before. And we
    also know that the Department of State has discretionary power
    over how the money would have been spent anyway. So it can't be
    that.
        Ms. Lamb herself said it wasn't for lack of money, so I
    think it is kind of foolish to say that somehow it was a
    budgetary thing and that we put these people at risk. We didn't
    put them at risk. We actually put them at risk by completely
    ignoring a full year ahead of time the fact that this was a
    very vulnerable and very violent place.
        I don't know, and I heard Mr. Nordstrom, I was there to
    hear his testimony, he talked about what they tried to do to
    increase the protection at the consulate or outpost, whatever
    you want to term it. This thing gets bounced around too much. I
    think the question that begs to be answered is why did we leave
    our Ambassador--and my colleague said he was there in Libya--he
    said you weren't, so you didn't see it, but he would tell you
    how bad it was. I mean, it was absolutely unstable. It was kind
    of a Wild West show.
        So my question is so if that is the case and if it wasn't
    about money and it wasn't about budgetary counts, why would we
    continue to put our Ambassador at risk in an area that we took
    our security support team, Special Ops people, if it wasn't
    about the money, and we replaced them with $4-an-hour Libyan
    nationals, who were unarmed, by the way. So an area that is so
    vulnerable, so violent, everybody that goes there says that it
    is a Wild West show, and we are saying, yeah, you know what we
    thought? We thought we should dumb down our security for that.
        The GAO had nothing to do with that. Were the taxpayer
    dollars spent the right way? Did we get a return on our
    investment? I would say that it goes far beyond what we spent.
    We spent four lives because of a lack of attention to an issue
    that everybody says was completely out of control and unstable.
    It just doesn't make sense.
        And forget the political end of it. Why we would put an
    Ambassador and other Americans at risk in that area and somehow
    back away from it now and say we just didn't see it coming? We
    saw it will coming for a full year. There were 230 attacks in
    Libya. There were 48 in Benghazi; there were two on that
    consulate. The day he died, Sean Smith tweeted to somebody, if
    we do not die tonight, we have to get these Libyans out of here
    that are taking pictures of the inside of our consulate.
        My goodness. Everybody saw it coming. When the
    International Red Cross is targeted and attacked, when the
    Brits pull out and we are the last flag flying and we are
    saying we are surprised this happened because we had really
    normalized relations there; we even took their airplane away
    from them because it was so safe. At same time, we were telling
    people, travelers, don't go there, it is a danger zone.
        So, Madam Chair, I thank you, or Mr. Wilson, you are
    sitting in the chair right now, and I appreciate what the GAO
    does, and I appreciate your coming here today. But the answers
    really are that we had the money; we had the resources; we got
    the ability to do it. This falls squarely on the shoulders of
    the Secretary of State, the Department of State, the President
    of the United States. They turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to
    an area that was so unstable.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina [presiding]. Thank you very
    much, Mr. Kelley.
        We now proceed to Congressman Cicilline of Rhode Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Mr. Courts.
        I would like you to, if you could, address what the
    implications of the Budget Control Act of 2011 are and what
    sequestration, what the impact would be on Diplomatic Security
    and the funding that is necessary. The across-the-board
    reductions, which are scheduled to occur on January 23rd, 2013,
    are estimated at about 8.2 percent of funding for security of
    our diplomats could be reduced. I just wonder if you have had
    an opportunity to look at what the implications of that kind of
    reduction would be on Diplomatic Security, kind of all across
    the world.
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, no, GAO has not conducted that
    work. I can't answer that question.
        Mr. Cicilline. Well, I mean, is it fair to say a reduction
    of that magnitude would not enhance security for our diplomats?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I don't know if the State
    Department were to take cuts, where they would apply those
    cuts, so I can't answer that question.
        Mr. Cicilline. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
        We now proceed to Congresswoman Jean Schmidt of Ohio.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you, Chairman.
        I am concerned about what happened on September 11th, not
    for political reasons but for security reasons for the
    individuals, both here and abroad, because as I listened to all
    of the missteps that happened, I think it boils down to one
    thing, and it is called miscommunication.
        First and foremost, we know that when the event occurred,
    somebody made up a tale that it was a YouTube video, and it was
    a spontaneous attack. Now, how did they determine that, and how
    did it get so widespread that this administration continued the
    tale all the way until the 18th of January? Now, I don't
    believe that this administration did it because they wanted to.
    I think that the miscommunication occurred and continued
    because further miscommunications occurred, which does a
    disservice to our President, to our Secretary of State and to
    everyone else involved.
        But the other part that bothers me with this
    miscommunication is if this happened, why didn't we know
    something was going to happen ahead of time? Why didn't our
    intelligence community see it? I know they listen to chatter.
    Was there no chatter, or was it accidentally missed? I think
    that is another question that has to be answered, or else we
    are going to have this happen again.
        Over the break, I saw a very good movie called ``Argo,''
    and it is about what happened in Iran back in the 1970s. And,
    yes, it is a Hollywood version. But you know what was
    strikingly similar? It was miscommunication. And if we had
    miscommunication 40 years ago and it is occurring today with
    all the technology that has evolved since then, I think we need
    to find a way to make sure that it is prevented in the future.
        I think the second thing that bothers me in all of this is
    the security or the lack of security, and could this have been
    prevented? Maybe it could have been with more money and more
    people on the ground. Maybe it was going to happen anyway. And
    I think whatever investigations occur need to look at that,
    because when you come up with a report about how we spend our
    money and should we improve on the spending of the money, it is
    not just spending money; it is spending it in the best manner
    possible so that we don't have these situations in the future.
        And it is really not a question to you. It is really what I
    think the frustration is with the American people out there on
    this situation. They want to know what happened and why it
    happened. They don't want the political rhetoric with it. They
    just want an honest and clear answer. So all I am saying is
    that is what I am searching for. And if you have any crystal
    ball wisdom to anything that I have said, I would love to have
    the answer.
        Mr. Courts. I would just add that there are a lot of
    questions that have arisen as a result of what happened in
    Libya, and GAO certainly stands ready to assist the Congress
    and this committee in addressing those issues going forward.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mrs. Schmidt.
        We now proceed to Congressman Ted Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As of today, what would you assess the risk of this type of
    attack happening again somewhere against one of our Ambassadors
    or embassies? What would be your risk assessment?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I am not privy to the risk-
    assessment information that State Department has at its
    disposal, so I can't answer that question.
        Mr. Poe. So you don't know?
        Mr. Courts. No, I don't.
        Mr. Poe. Do you feel like the State Department has done an
    adequate job of securing our embassies?
        Mr. Courts. I can't speak to Benghazi, because I don't know
    what the arrangements were there. I would say that when we
    looked in 2009 at the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, we found
    that there were a number of areas where the capabilities that
    they had in place were not where they should have been.
        Mr. Poe. You are talking about embassies throughout the
    world?
        Mr. Courts. That is correct. I am talking about the Bureau
    of Diplomatic Security worldwide.
        Mr. Poe. So have you assessed that assessment since 2009?
    In other words, have you determined whether there was follow up
    by the State Department to fix all those problems that you
    found in 2009?
        Mr. Courts. We made a recommendation in our 2009 report
    that the Department take a strategic look at the Bureau of
    Diplomatic Security's mission and properly match that with the
    resources, and to date, they have not fully implemented that
    recommendation.
        Mr. Poe. What does that mean, fully implemented? Have they
    done 5 percent? Ninety percent? Give me something I can----
        Mr. Courts. I can't give it to you in percentage terms. I
    would say that we asked them to take a more meaningful look at
    all of the diffuse missions that the bureau is responsible for,
    to rationalize them, and then after rationalizing them, to
    ensure that the resources that were needed, the staffing that
    was needed and all the other resources were in place, and that
    they do that sort of strategic plan at the departmental level.
        When I say that it is perhaps partially implemented, I am
    recognizing that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security itself has
    taken steps to improve their own strategic planning, but the
    Department hasn't taken the step that we recommended. And we
    think that is important because as I said before, the bureau
    itself is a support function. If they are told to secure the
    mission in Libya or anywhere else, they are going to salute
    smartly and try to do that, even if it means muddling through
    and pulling the resources from somewhere else.
        Mr. Poe. So if I understand you correctly, you came up with
    a valuation, a risk assessment of some kind, in 2009 for the
    State Department to help secure our embassies and our personnel
    overseas. That was given to the State Department. Here we are 3
    years later, and based on what you know of the original risk
    assessment, there are still things that haven't been done that
    you recommended. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Courts. I wouldn't call what we did a risk assessment,
    but I would say that they have not fully implemented the
    recommendation that we had in our 2009 report.
        Mr. Poe. Okay. Do you know what those items are that they
    have not fully implemented?
        Mr. Courts. The main thing that they have not done is, on a
    Department level, they have not done the strategic review of
    the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that we recommended. And we
    recommended that that review not only take a look at the
    resources and the missions as I mentioned but that it also
    address those challenges, those problems, those deficiencies
    that we had identified in our report, and that included the
    staffing shortages, that included the language deficiencies and
    the experience gaps and a number of other challenges.
        Mr. Poe. And is it still your recommendation that those
    items that haven't been done, whatever they are, should be
    done?
        Mr. Courts. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. All right. The other question I had for you, in a
    hypothetical situation, based on what you have now learned
    about embassies and protection of embassies, if you had
    received a request for aid or help in the same situation, an
    Ambassador is in trouble outside the Embassy, our consulate
    compound, would you send help, or would you not send help?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, I can't answer that question. I
    don't have the specifics of the security arrangements in
    Benghazi. I don't know what competing priorities existed at
    that time or what the factors for the decision were.
        Mr. Poe. Is it your understanding though that calls for
    help were ignored?
        Mr. Courts. Congressman, our work did not address the
    incident.
        Mr. Poe. So you don't know if that is true or not?
        Mr. Courts. No, I don't know.
        Mr. Poe. I yield back, Madam Chairman.
        Mrs. Schmidt [presiding]. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Save the best for last, I guess. The other side keeps
    talking about a $400-million increase request from the
    President. Do you know how many days it has been since the
    United States has had a budget?
        Mr. Courts. No, sir, I don't.
        Mr. Duncan. 1,296 days. The mathematician that you are,
    that is 3\1/2\ years, plus or minus. It has been 3\1/2\ years
    since the Nation has had a budget, and the President submitted
    a budget to the United States Congress, as he does every year I
    suppose. Do you know how many votes that budget got in the
    United States House of Representatives?
        Mr. Courts. No, Congressman, I don't.
        Mr. Duncan. Zero. It didn't get a single Democrat or
    Republican vote in the House of Representatives. When it was
    brought up in the Democratic-controlled Senate, how many votes
    did it get over there?
        Mr. Courts. I don't know that answer.
        Mr. Duncan. That number is zero, too. His request for an
    increase got zero votes in the United States Congress. It is
    not the amount of money that is allocated, it is how that money
    is being spent, and I appreciate you bearing with me as I
    pointed those facts out for the American people.
        The questions that have been asked today are questions that
    are on the minds of the American people. These aren't just
    questions of the Republicans or maybe not questions of the
    Democrats. These are questions that the American people have
    about what happened in Benghazi: Why there weren't, I get the
    questions, why there weren't Marines there? Why did we allow
    the embassies or consulates to be protected by elements of
    foreign governments? What is true sovereign territory of a
    sovereign nation in another country? Why didn't we do enough
    with assets in the region to protect and rescue those four
    Americans that bravely lost their lives in Benghazi? These are
    questions that the American people have, and I believe the
    American people deserve answers for.
        I think that we deserve answers as to why Ambassador Rice
    was run out to mislead the American people prior to an
    election. Those are valid questions of the American people that
    I believe we have the oversight responsibility here in the
    legislative branch to get answers to.
        Under the Vienna Convention, diplomatic facilities are
    supposed to be protected by the host nations. In the case of
    Libya, the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were under the
    protection of the 17th February Brigade, a local armed militia,
    which reportedly received monetary compensation and training
    from U.S. officials. Is that common? Is it common, and this is
    a question, how common is it for a U.S. diplomatic post to be
    under the protection of local armed militias rather than the
    central government forces? How common is that?
        Mr. Courts. I don't believe that is very common,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Duncan. What is the normal structure of the agreements
    that we have in these countries?
        Mr. Courts. Well, as you mentioned yourself, the Vienna
    Convention requires that the host government protect our
    diplomatic missions abroad, just as we are responsible for
    protecting foreign missions that are here in the United States.
    Usually it is just a local guard force and our own personnel
    that provide primary security for our diplomatic facilities.
    But all of the----
        Mr. Duncan. And that is common for other countries as well,
    is that correct?
        Mr. Courts. That is correct.
        Mr. Duncan. So they were guarding our U.S. Embassy or
    consulate, but they were also guarding--on September 11, 2012,
    there were militia members probably guarding the British
    Embassy in Benghazi?
        Mr. Courts. I am not familiar with specific security
    arrangements in Libya. I can't answer.
        Mr. Duncan. I will answer it for you, because the British
    had left Benghazi. So we ask the question, well, surely the
    militia, the 17th February Brigade was guarding the French
    Embassy in Benghazi. The answer to that is no as well, because
    they saw the hostile environment of Benghazi, they saw this
    coming and they left Benghazi and went back to Tripoli, as did
    the Red Cross.
        We were the last man standing. The American flag was there
    as a target for the violence that was going on in Benghazi, and
    we failed to recognize that on 9/11, a day that is a red letter
    day for American history, that our enemies, folks that want to
    do us harm and al-Qaeda and others, may do something to attack
    America. And we saw the pattern in Benghazi of an IED thrown
    over the fence, a bomb placed on the exterior perimeter that
    blew a hole that 40 men could be run through, pictures being
    taken by elements of the militia that is supposed to be
    guarding us.
        We missed those signs. Those are the questions that
    Americans wants answered, and I believe this Congress is going
    to get to the bottom of that. This is just the beginning in
    this committee, and I look forward to answering those for my
    constituents.
        I appreciate your service. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Did you want to add anything, sir?
        Mr. Courts. No, thank you.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Well, I want to thank you for your time. We
    have learned a lot and I wish you well.
        Our next panel, are you ready? You have been waiting a long
    time.
        Our second panel, we will start with Mr. William Young, a
    senior policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
    Corporation. Mr. Young managed and led intelligence collection
    operations for the national clandestine service for over 30
    years before he retired in 2011. He spent most of his career in
    the Middle East and South Asia working on counterterrorism,
    counterinsurgency and counterproliferation issues. He also
    served in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    as the Intelligence Community's mission manager for Yemen and
    Somalia as well as the national intelligence manager for Yemen.
    Prior to his work for ODNI, he was the Director of Operations
    Technology Office at the CIA.
        The next witness will be Dr. James Carafano, who is the
    deputy director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
    Institute for International Studies and the director of the
    Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies,
    both at the Heritage Foundation. Previously, Mr. Carafano was a
    senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
    Assessments. He served 25 years in the Army, achieving the rank
    of Lt. Colonel. Dr. Carafano writes a weekly column on national
    security affairs for the Washington Examiner and has written
    numerous books on defense and security.
        Our last witness will be Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann who
    is the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. As a
    career member of the Foreign Service, he has served as
    Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain and Afghanistan, as well as
    posts at the U.S. embassies in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates
    and Yemen, among others. He served as Deputy Assistant
    Secretary in the Bureau of Near East Affairs from 1997 to 2000
    and as director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs from
    1991 to 1994.
        Ambassador Neumann served as an Army infantry officer in
    Vietnam, which personally I want to thank you for your service
    in Vietnam and for all of you who have had military service.
    And you hold a Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal and Combat
    Infantry Badge. In Baghdad, he was awarded the Army's
    Outstanding Civilian Service Medal. He has received numerous
    awards at the State Department rewarding his service.
        Without objection, the witnesses' written statements will
    be inserted into the record.
        Mr. Young, we will start with you.

      STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM YOUNG, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND
                              CORPORATION

        Mr. Young. Madam Chair Schmidt, Ranking Member Berman,
    other members, thank you for the opportunity today to talk to
    you about Embassy security. What I would like to do is offer a
    framework, a way to look at Embassy security or Diplomatic
    Security in high-threat environments, and to offer suggestions
    to improve it.
        It is good to begin with an understanding that it is not
    possible to mitigate all risk in environments like this. Once a
    decision is made to establish a diplomatic presence, planners
    at the State Department look at the actual facility that will
    house our people, the housing areas if they have to live
    outside the diplomatic compound, and also the routes to and
    from.
        First and foremost among all the considerations for
    planning for security in these types of areas is the support of
    the local or host government. Without it, in my opinion, it is
    not possible to secure any civilian facility in a high-threat
    environment.
        The local government, whether it is a militia or whether it
    is the actual government, should be willing to provide a
    visible military presence at the outside of the mission. They
    should be willing to provide barriers. They should be willing
    to close the streets in order to increase the setback from the
    local population. They also should be willing to provide
    information about what is happening in the neighborhoods
    surrounding the mission in order to give us some early warning.
        Second in importance when planning for security for these
    types of missions is knowing or having an awareness of what
    actually is happening outside the fence line of the Embassy.
    This can be done using roving patrols, local investigators,
    which can establish--or who can establish relationships with
    local shop owners, with neighborhood committees. All of these
    people in the neighborhoods around a mission have a vested
    interest in protecting their way of life, their families, their
    businesses. They often know what is going to happen before it
    happens. We need to be able to set up mechanisms to collect
    this information and to bring it quickly back into the mission
    multiple times a day so that when action is necessary it can be
    taken in a timely manner.
        The third leg of the security stool is the actual mission
    itself, the structure of the building and the layout of the
    compound. Is it an Inman style building, meaning does it have
    blast-resistant walls and glass, does it have sufficient
    setback from the street? Or is it a residence that was the only
    property that was available for us to move into? If so, then
    measures can be taken to harden such a facility, locks and
    gates and walls, local guard force, which is typical in these
    instances, a Marine security detachment of guards, perhaps a
    quick reaction team from Diplomatic Security, all of which is
    intended to deter an attack. Terrorists do not want to fail.
    They have resource considerations also. So to the extent we can
    deter their attack, the better.
        Technology can help in this regard. I consider it the
    fourth leg of the stool when talking about security for these
    places. Long-range acoustic devices can be fitted on the
    outside of the missions to repel attacks. They can be
    configured for the bottoms of armored vehicles to take our
    people to and from work. Cameras can be fixed to the outside
    walls of the mission with pattern-recognition software to
    determine what is happening on the streets in order to give us
    a heads up, some early warning. We can monitor social media for
    the intensity of language being used and to find out again in
    terms of early warning why the shops might be closed tomorrow
    afternoon, and then we can send our local investigators out in
    order to get more of the detail.
        Other lower-cost measures can be taken, although these
    other measures are not high cost. Plywood can be put on the
    windows to prevent shattered glass from killing people. Wire
    mesh can be put over the facility to pre-detonate certain types
    of rockets that are shot.
        So all of these measures are helpful, but none of them by
    themselves or even in tandem can prevent a full military
    assault on an Embassy compound. This is why I think it is
    important to focus on shaping the way the local residents view
    our diplomatic presence and, to the extent possible, to create
    a deterrent posture, enough of a deterrent posture to convince
    the attackers to go elsewhere.
        Thank you again for the opportunity, and I will try to
    answer any questions you have.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you so much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mrs. Schmidt. Dr. Carafano.

     STATEMENT OF JAMES JAY CARAFANO, PH.D., DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND
     SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE
                               FOUNDATION

        Mr. Carafano. Thank you so much. The greatest honor that we
    can bestow on the fallen and the debt we can repay to their
    families is to do better. I want to begin by saying why it is
    not just important to learn the lessons of Benghazi but to
    apply them.
        The first is if you look at al-Qaeda and its affiliates,
    they have had a tradition or a practice that once they have
    settled on a tactic, they come back to it again and again and
    again. So regardless of who actually perpetrated this attack,
    you can't but believe that al-Qaeda and its affiliates will
    look at this, and this will be a target in the future.
        The second thing I think we have to remember is this is a
    department at war. The State Department has been at war for 10
    years. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has been significantly
    grown, their missions have expanded, their resources have
    expanded, their responsibilities have expanded. This is a
    department with very deep operational experience in dealing in
    high-risk, high-threat areas. This is the kind of attack we
    should have expected, and indeed, a majority of the attacks
    against U.S. assets in 2011 were in the Near East region. It is
    like we spent 10 years getting ready for 9/11, and then what we
    got was a 9/11.
        So where do we go from here? And I think what this
    committee can best focus on is how do we turn tragedy into a
    good case study where we can extract lessons learned that can
    be applied to systematic reform if that is what is called for.
        When you look at security in high-threat areas, it is
    basically a belt and suspenders business. There are really four
    key areas, and that really prompts four key questions. And I
    really do believe if anything I have heard said today makes
    sense at all, getting the answers to these four questions is
    absolutely essential.
        The first is, what were the counterterrorism and early-
    warning mechanisms that were in place? Look, you can't
    childproof everything, and we know from experience the single
    best way to stop a terrorist attack is to stop it before it
    gets started. So that is particularly important I think in
    light of the fact that this administration put its
    counterterrorism strategy in 2011.
        The second question is look--the administration put a
    counterterrorism strategy in place in 2011.
        You are going to get attacked, so the second question is
    what risk assessment did you do, and what kind of risk-
    assessment mitigation message did you put in place to deal with
    that? The State Department recognizes this. That is why there
    are regional security officers. They play a pivotal role in
    doing risk assessments and organizing risk mitigation.
        The third question is, look, I don't care how safe you
    think you are, you may get attacked anyway. So then the
    question is, what kind of contingency plans were in place to
    respond to rescue, to recover; how well were they exercised?
    How full and complete were they? Again, the State Department
    recognizes this. This is why they form emergency action
    committees to coordinate these kinds of plans and then
    hopefully integrate them with other agencies.
        And, finally, once a crisis happens, you want to draw on
    all of the resources that are reasonably available to respond.
    So then you really want to understand what was the process for
    interagency cooperation and crisis management. Again, that is
    why we have a Diplomatic Security Command Center at least for
    the State Department worldwide to organize these kinds of
    things.
        My advice to this committee is, look, whether these are
    markers that need to be laid down for the ARB or what other
    kinds of investigative or review processes are in place, you
    get to the answers to these four questions, and then we can do
    better.
        Thank you.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mrs. Schmidt. Ambassador Neumann.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEUMANN, PRESIDENT,
                     AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY

        Mr. Neumann. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you,
    Representative Berman, for asking me to join this hearing that
    has a focus on the future as well as the past.
        This focus needs a perspective that embeds security within
    the context of our larger diplomatic purpose. Thus I think my
    added value to you is in speaking about the issues of carrying
    on diplomacy in a dangerous and difficult world. I have four
    basic points to make.
        First, as you have heard from other witnesses, there is no
    absolute security, and there will not be. We recently saw a
    full-up Marine base in Helmand suffer a perimeter breach, loss
    of life and destruction of aircraft by about 15 attackers.
        Second, remember that the central issue is about balance,
    how much risk to take to accomplish what mission, and how
    important is that mission to our national purpose? Many
    decisions of this type will need to be made in the field by
    senior diplomats working with their security professionals.
        Many foreign governments will not allow all the security
    measures that we deem necessary. Sometimes we will shove them
    into agreement. But, for example, many of our embassies are
    located closer to streets than we would like in the age of car
    bombs, and many of these countries will not agree to close all
    of the streets we would like closed. That includes ones in much
    more civilized or much more calm areas.
        So, all I am really pointing out is there are constant
    decisions all over the world about how much risk to take.
    Perhaps, in some cases, we should pull out rather than take
    risks. But those are going to be difficult decisions. Just to
    suggest how to think about that, let me suggest the real one of
    Libya and the likely future one of Syria.
        In Libya, we have a weak but sensitive government and
    extremely difficult security situation and a national interest
    in trying to support more moderate elements to help the country
    to a stable future, free of extremism. In this fluctuating
    situation with a multitude of political players, I believe our
    policy interests absolutely require on-the-ground work to know
    the people, make judgments about what will work and suggest
    corrections essential to policy implementation.
        Perhaps one could argue that in Libya, it is just too
    dangerous and we shouldn't be there, we have to pull out. But
    even if you could make that case for Libya, consider Syria.
    When the day comes that Bashar el Assad leaves, the situation
    in Syria is likely to be at least as dangerous and chaotic as
    the one in Libya. Iran, Hezbollah, Iraq, Turkey and Israel will
    all have strong interests in what happens inside Syria. I doubt
    that we will be able to say that this is just too dangerous,
    and we have to leave the future to others, and that will mean
    taking risks with our people.
        My third point touches on the role of the State Department
    in supporting security. I just want to make the basic point not
    about whether there was enough money and the issues you were
    talking about this morning, but that when security is tight,
    there is always a constant tension between new demands in
    evolving situations and the difficulty of finding funding in
    budgets that have to be established years in advance. I think
    there is some reason to think about whether there should be
    some form of reserve funds that have more flexibility.
        My final point, and I think it is perhaps my most important
    one, deals with the level of responsibility for risk. Some
    decisions are Washington-only to be on the ground. The second
    issue of providing security resources is shared between field
    and headquarters. If State says no to a request, an Ambassador
    must decide whether and how to appeal or not.
        But there remains a critical area of responsibility to
    consider, and that is the need to leave space for decisions in
    the field about the balance between risk and benefit. A zero
    risk approach, a search for fault that becomes overly
    politicized and turns into a gotcha game will increasingly
    create a political climate in Washington that is
    counterproductive for achieving our foreign policy goals.
        Senior officials of this and future administrations,
    fearing responsibility for whatever goes wrong, will reinforce
    a climate that is already too far advanced, in which our
    diplomatic personnel spend their time behind walls rather than
    getting out.
        A great many of my, I should say, former diplomatic
    colleagues are prepared to accept risk, as they have when
    volunteering for Iran and Afghanistan. Many feel that their
    jobs are already excessively hampered by our security
    restrictions. Not every risk is worth running, but neither can
    America's diplomatic interests be achieved from behind walls
    and razor wire.
        I think it is absolutely correct to do a post mortem, as
    you are doing. After all, it was Ambassador Stevens who made
    the judgment that he should travel to Benghazi. As you inquire
    about how to adapt, I hope you will ask how to avoid
    overreaction, because the policy costs of security
    considerations need to be weighed along with the risks that are
    posed to our diplomats.
        These are difficult decisions, and that is why I believe
    the Congress and the executive have a mutual responsibility to
    support reasoned decision making in the field by our senior
    diplomats as well as giving them the resources to be as safe as
    possible.
        Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Neumann follows:]

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        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you very much,
    Ambassador.
        And thank you to all of our witnesses.
        I had read your written remarks. In my opening statement, I
    had referenced a New York Times op-ed by Ambassador Bushnell
    who had served in Kenya during the horrific bombing of our
    Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and she entitled that ``Our
    Diplomats Deserve Better.''
        In that op-ed, she discusses the dangers and the risks for
    those who pursue diplomacy on behalf of our country and
    acknowledges that not every danger can be prevented, but she
    offers some advice, and I wanted your comments on it.
        She says, The Foreign Service is short on people, and those
    people are rushed into the field short of training. We build
    concrete fortresses when we have to, but we don't invest in the
    mobile communications and security technology that would
    protect diplomats when they leave the Embassy, as they must.
    What kinds of technology systems, training and deployments do
    we need to get results through diplomacy in the 21th century?
    She says, These are difficult questions that will remain
    unanswered while diplomats disappear from public view once
    again until the next time someone dies. Then we see the same
    sorry responses all over again.
        So I ask our witnesses, can you address the questions that
    she references? What kind of technology systems and training
    and deployment do we need in this new century that keeps our
    diplomatic personnel safe as they seek to advance U.S.
    interests abroad?
        Mr. Young.
        Mr. Young. Thank you for the question. During my remarks, I
    spoke about the use of social media----
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Could you put that just a little bit
    closer.
        Mr. Young. Certainly. Is that better? During my remarks, I
    spoke about the use of social media analytics as a way of
    monitoring not just what is happening beyond the walls of the
    mission, but also to gauge the intensity of the language being
    used to determine how violent protests are becoming or perhaps
    if there are plans afoot that we need to know about. I think
    that it would be useful to establish some kind of study to look
    at how that could best be done, by leveragaging existing
    capabilities within the government, such as the Centers for
    Disease Control in Atlanta, which has an excellent way of
    predicting the outbreak of infectious disease. Anyway, that is
    it.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Doctor?
        Mr. Carafano. Thank you. I spent 25 years of my life being
    a risk manager. Every day when I was in the Army, I planned how
    to take men and women into battle knowing that some of them
    could be injured or killed and knowing that my job was to
    figure out how to minimize that risk and at the same time get
    the mission done. That is just the nature of the security
    business.
        One of the reasons why I emphasized the four questions that
    I did in my testimony was that that will help us really
    understand was it is all about risk taking. Was the risk taking
    prudent and at all levels of government, from the highest to
    the lowest? That I think is really the most invaluable
    knowledge of all, because we need to learn how we can--risk
    managers are always going to have to deal with the resources
    they have and the conditions they face. So the best resource we
    always have is a brain that knows how to be a prudent risk
    taker.
        That said, in answer to your second question, the other
    great value I think would be of answering these four questions
    is it will identify a menu of things where if we had had
    another tool in the tool kit or a different tool in the tool
    kit, how may that have helped in the range of these things? How
    may it have helped to do counterterrorism or early warning
    better? How may it have helped to do risk mitigation better?
    How may it have helped us plan on how we could bring a resource
    in better? Or how could we have used the resources we have
    available more effectively to integrate them and operationalize
    them?
        So, again, if you don't get the answers to the questions,
    you are not going to be able to know if these things--what is
    the most prudent thing I can do to make me better prepared to
    respond.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Ambassador.
        Mr. Neumann. Thank you. On the making of judgments about
    risk, which is one I have had to do also in various capacities,
    the only point I wanted to add is as you find the answers to
    the specifics of Benghazi, please remember to leave enough room
    for people in the field to make decisions, understanding that
    sometimes they may make a wrong decision; sometimes they may
    make a bad one; and sometimes they may just run out of luck.
    But we have got to have room to do that. Otherwise we will all
    be in our bunkers, and you will not be well informed about much
    of anything.
        On your second question about what we need to do about
    training, that was worth coming here and a long wait just to
    answer that question, because in my day job at the American
    Academy of Diplomacy, we did an extensive report about 1\1/2\
    years ago on professional education and training for diplomats
    where we have quite a few lapses and a lot more that needs to
    be done. I call that report to your attention because I think
    it is still important. But one of its key conclusions is that
    we still need to fund a training reserve or float for the State
    Department if we are to engage in long-term training. There is
    a huge difference.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        I am so pleased to turn to my good friend Mr. Berman for
    his questions.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and I
    thank all of you. In a very short time, you came with a lot of
    sort of metrics for analysis here.
        I want to follow, your Syria reference was a very
    interesting one. There for quite a while after the protests and
    demonstrations started against Assad, we kept our Embassy open
    and our Ambassador there and implementing a policy that the
    administration had. It was quite evident he performed a very
    useful role in some of the actions he took, and my assumption
    is in the information he provided back to Washington. There
    came a point where I guess, under the way you guys are looking
    at it, the risks of his safety and survival and other personnel
    there became so great that we were required to pull him out.
        Now, Ambassador Neumann, you raised the question of
    assuming there becomes a point we hope when Assad falls and
    something replaces it, how important our being able to have
    information and, therefore, how important our need for
    diplomatic posts and personnel there are, having large
    implications for an entire region.
        Mr. Young says unless you can rely--his first point was you
    got have got to have a local military protection operation
    there. He didn't say, if you don't, don't go there, but the way
    he said it made me think that was the implication. If you can't
    rely on it, you shouldn't even open up a post there. What is
    your reaction to what he said?
        And is that what you meant, Mr. Young?
        Mr. Young. Yes, that is what I meant, sir.
        Mr. Berman. And given all the compelling arguments for
    reestablishing outposts in Syria at that time, how do you deal
    with that, Ambassador Neumann?
        Mr. Neumann. I follow this with a good deal of interest
    because our Ambassador there, Robert Ford, was my deputy in
    Bahrain and my colleague in Baghdad and a very close friend of
    mine. I know some of the decisions he made and why he made
    them. And the basic point is that you can't make those
    decisions on a flip-switch basis from a distance. You will have
    to make them on the ground with a very high focus on detail.
        There may well not be a government. We have to hire local
    security. We depended for years in Lebanon, even during much of
    the Civil War, on local security which we hired, trained and
    vetted. I depended on local guards in Algeria when we lived
    under a blanket death threat to all foreigners for my moves
    around town with a few Americans to supervise them. We had some
    risk mitigation, I won't bother you with the details of, to
    make sure that we didn't get betrayed by people who might have
    somebody's mother at home with a knife at her throat. So there
    can be a point at which you just can't do it, as Ambassador
    Ford found in Syria.
        Mr. Berman. By the way, did he make that decision or did
    Washington make that decision?
        Mr. Neumann. He was highly involved in it. And it came to a
    point where there was a larger risk to the total mission that
    he felt he couldn't expose his staff to, even though he was
    prepared to take a fair amount of risk himself and did in
    several cases.
        So my only point is I don't think you can make that
    decision in advance or on a very general basis of is it going
    to be risky or not. It is going to be risky. The question is,
    can you mitigate the risks? And then you are going to have to
    work down through the mitigation in detail.
        Mr. Berman. Let me just quickly ask in my remaining time,
    do you know enough now to know whether it was a mistake to put
    a temporary consulate compound in Benghazi, or in hindsight,
    which is always great, or do we still not know enough to know
    whether that was the right call?
        Mr. Neumann. I don't think I know enough. I would frame the
    question that needs to be answered in part as to whether the
    mission or anybody around the government had any information of
    the size of attack that eventually overwhelmed them. If that
    threat information was there, then obviously, we were
    overmatched. If that threat information was not there, you deal
    with the threats you have got as best you know them. If you had
    to deal everywhere in the world with every level of
    hypothetical threat, we could not operate anywhere.
        Mr. Berman. That is why it is called risk management.
        Mr. Neumann. Yes. And the trouble is when you run out of
    luck or you make a bad call, you know, then you haven't managed
    it well. But the whole problem of that is you are always
    managing, as Dr. Carafano said, a level of risk and danger,
    which is why I buried a few friends.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
        Mrs. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you.
        I want to thank all three of you for your testimony.
        I have certainly learned a lot. My question to all three of
    you is once we get a clear idea of why the situation happened
    and the miscommunication that apparently occurred during and
    after, we will have a better chance to understand future
    opportunities to mitigate the risk. Am I correct on that?
        Mr. Young. I would assume so, yes.
        Mr. Neumann. You may. You may not. The generals are often
    accused of fighting the last war; the civilians are going to
    have the same problem. So we will have a better idea of how to
    deal with certain kinds of threats, whether that will be the
    threat that comes to us.
        Also, Libya poses some interesting issues. It is close
    enough to the Mediterranean; there are ways you could, I
    suppose, have had military reinforcements. We are going to have
    a lot of posts in Africa where you won't have those kinds of
    options. So there will certainly be lessons learned that will
    be valuable. Whether they will reach the totality of the
    threat, I would doubt.
        Mr. Carafano. You know, I do think that with the publicly
    available information, it is a fair conclusion to say that this
    was a predictable and reasonable threat. I also think it is a
    predictable and reasonable threat that we could likely see
    again a U.S. diplomatic facility in a high-threatened
    environment in the future.
        That said, I don't think there is enough publicly available
    information at this point to conclude what is the best
    combination of counterterrorism changes, risk reduction, better
    contingency planning, better crisis response, which would have
    mitigated the risks they faced in abuse Benghazi.
        Mrs. Schmidt. My second part to that is once the air clears
    and we get a better sense of what happened, political rhetoric
    will continue. And I ask all of you, because you are very
    level-headed, is to find ways to get out what you believe is
    the right response of what we should be doing. You write for
    The Examiner, Doctor, you have an opportunity because you have
    the power of the pen, but so do both of you.
        I am going to be a citizen after the first of the year, and
    I am going to be sitting back in my chair wondering what is
    going on and I would like to hear it from some level-headed
    sources. Thank you.
        Mr. Carafano. I do coordinate the national security and
    foreign policy research at the Heritage Foundation, and we will
    be assessing the results of the publicly available information,
    whether it is from the ALB or other sources, and I am providing
    evaluation of that and if it is adequate and if the
    recommendations that are drawn from that are adequate.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Good. Get it out there to the public. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mrs. Schmidt.
        And Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
    Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        The best way to mourn our heroes is to avoid the tendency
    here in Washington to politicize things and to look at Dr.
    Carafano's approach of cost-benefit. We have got to do
    everything possible so that we have the maximum State
    Department effectiveness while the minimum risk to our
    personnel. And the most fitting way to honor our heroes is to
    have a hearing that is designed to do just that and to fix the
    problem to the extent it can be fixed.
        And this hearing, I think, has done a lot of that. It has
    also had some unnecessary political attacks. They call it the
    fog of war for a reason, but the military is designed to deal
    with the fog of war. To think that you always get it right when
    you are subject to a war-like attack and you are not even a
    war-fighting operation is absurd.
        Ambassador Susan Rice has done an outstanding job. Yes, she
    presented to us the intelligence provided to her by the
    intelligence community. I would point out that many State
    Department officials came into this room and presented the
    intelligence community's views on weapons of mass destruction
    in Iraq. That is not a reason to criticize those who are
    presenting.
        And what strikes me as utterly bizarre, because I
    understand politics perhaps better than those of you who focus
    on foreign policy, is in what bizarre universe is there
    political gain by trying to convince the American people that
    there aren't armed terrorist groups in the most lawless cities
    in the Middle East? No one attempted to convince the American
    people of that. No one tried to say, oh, no, we couldn't have
    an al-Qaeda type group operating.
        But also in what bizarre universe is it politically helpful
    to tell the American people that any old YouTube could be a
    spark on a tinderbox that causes thousands of Muslims in the
    Middle East to charge into our armed security, giving up their
    own lives in a few cases, because they are so angry at a
    YouTube? I would say that would be an even more dangerous world
    to think that that would be reflective of any significant
    portion of opinion on the Arab street.
        The fact is we do have both problems. There are armed
    terrorist groups, and there are thousands of people who hate us
    a lot, and the slightest provocation or YouTube video can set
    them off.
        Dr. Carafano, and perhaps others will answer this as well,
    we had in Benghazi a situation where perhaps dozens of well-
    armed attackers went to our diplomatic facility. The host
    country didn't provide significant help for many, many hours.
        Is there any plan--I mean, I realize in Iraq, we have the
    most enormous Embassy in the world, but assuming we are dealing
    with what could possibly be done in consulates and temporary
    diplomatic facilities in secondary cities in relatively small
    countries, is there anything we can do that would allow us to
    deal with dozens of well-armed, planned, coordinated attack
    while not getting any help from the host government for many
    hours?
        Mr. Carafano. Congressman, you raised a really excellent
    point, and again, from the publicly available information, I
    think your conclusion is reasonable that given the level of
    security that was available, even adding people wouldn't have
    been sufficient to mitigate the risk of that base being
    overrun. I think that appears to be a very reasonable and
    accurate conclusion.
        But that is why I laid out the four questions, because then
    you have to ask the other questions, given that, that is a very
    reasonable conclusion and we knew that beforehand, was what
    these people were doing, was that so important that running
    that risk was valid? And if it was, we also, we never leave
    people alone so, if that was going to happen and the worst-case
    scenario did happen, did we think through, and again--I can't
    tell this from the publicly available information--how are we
    going to deal with that, and did we act on our contingency
    plans? And again, that is why I laid out the stress we need the
    answers to all four of the questions to really draw prudent
    conclusions.
        Mr. Sherman. I don't know if any other witness has a strong
    desire to answer that question, and my time has expired so
    regardless of what that----
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        And thank you, Mrs. Schmidt, and thank you to our witnesses
    for excellent testimony and good answers, and our committee
    looks forward to continuing to examine the risks that our U.S.
    personnel undertake as they are deployed to dangerous
    environments and the risks inherent in operating places like
    Benghazi, compounded by the absence of clearly defined and
    capable support from host countries remain a very complex set
    of circumstances.
        So we remember them every day, and we thank the men and
    women who are proudly serving our Nation in many different
    circumstances throughout the world.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony, and to
    our members, and the committee is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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