[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SIGAR REPORT: DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS UNACCOUNTED
FOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PART II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-181
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
VACANCY
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
DAN BURTON, Indiana BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PETER WELCH, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 20, 2012............................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction
Oral Statement............................................... 6
The Honorable Allen F. Estevez, Assistant Secretary for Logistics
and Materiel Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 8
Mr. Donald L. ``Larry'' Sampler, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the
Administrator, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S.
Agency for International Development
Oral Statement............................................... 10
APPENDIX
Interim Report on Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and
Lubricants (SIGAR 12-14)....................................... 33
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz, A Member of Congress from the State
of Utah, Opening Statement..................................... 49
Department of Defense Not Adequately Prepared To Transfer
Responsibility for Fuel Management to the Afghan National Army,
Statement of Mr. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction..................................... 51
Joint Statement of Mr. Alan F. Estevez, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and Lieutenant
General Brooks Bash, Director for Logistics Joint.............. 63
Mr. Donald ``Larry'' Sampler, Senior Deputy Assistant to the
Administrator & Deputy Director of the Office of Afghanistan &
Pakistan Affairs at the United States Agency for International
Development, Testimony for the Record.......................... 68
SIGAR REPORT: DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS UNACCOUNTED
FOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PART II
----------
Thursday, September 20, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland
Defense, and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Platts, Tierney, and
Lynch.
Staff Present: Thomas A. Alexander, Senior Counsel; Alexia
Ardolina, Assistant Clerk; Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff
Member; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Counsel; Jaron Bourke, Minority
Director of Administration; Devon Hill, Minority Staff
Assistant; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Leah Perry, Minority
Chief Oversight Counsel; Cecelia Thomas, Minority Counsel; and
Carlos Uriarte, Minority Counsel.
Mr. Chaffetz. The committee will come to order.
I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight
and Government Reform mission statement.
We exist to secure two fundamental principles: First,
Americans have a right to know that the money Washington takes
from them is well-spent; and, second, Americans deserve an
efficient, effective government that works for them. Our duty
on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to protect
these rights.
Our solemn responsibility is to hold the government
accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a right to know
what they get from their government. We will work tirelessly,
in partnership with citizen watchdogs, to deliver the facts to
the American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal
bureaucracy.
This is the mission of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee.
I appreciate everybody here. I appreciate your patience
here as we had votes on the floor. And we will have votes in
approximately an hour, hour and 15 minutes or so.
I want to welcome everybody to this hearing, which is
entitled, ``SIGAR Report: Document Destruction and Millions of
Dollars Unaccounted for at the Department of Defense, Part
II.''
I would like to welcome Members from both sides, in
particular Mr. Lynch, who has worked tirelessly on these types
of issues.
Today's proceedings continue the subcommittee's efforts to
oversee billions of taxpayer dollars spent in support of
military and civilian operations within Afghanistan. Last week,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
or the SIGAR, Mr. John Sopko, testified before this committee
on the findings contained in an interim report entitled, quote,
``Interim Report on Afghanistan National Army Petroleum, Oil,
and Lubricants,'' otherwise known as POL.
His report contains serious allegations of potential waste,
fraud, and abuse and document destruction associated with PLO
procurement. I want to thank Mr. Sopko for being here again
today and for the work that he and his team do.
Given this finding, we found it necessary to seek answers
from the Department of Defense. We also believe it is necessary
to talk about the broader issue of direct assistance to foreign
governments, including Afghanistan. USAID has considerable
experience in this area, and I look forward to hearing how they
ensure accountability in other regions.
From fiscal years 2007 to 2012, CSTC-A has channeled
approximately $1.1 billion through the Afghan Security Forces
Fund to purchase petroleum, oil, lubricants for the Afghan
National Army. In fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Government will
purchase approximately $343 million more in POL.
According to Mr. Sopko, CSTC-A does not have accurate or
supportable information on three key things: how much U.S.
funds are needed for ANA fuel; where and how the fuel is
actually used; and how much of the fuel has been lost or
stolen. Those seem to be some very basic, simple questions that
everybody should be able to see and have in order to make
reasonable, rational decisions. Thus, to the extent in which
ANA fuel is in stock, consumed, or lost at any given time
remains an unknown. Mr. Sopko also testified that, quote, ``No
single office within the U.S. or Afghan Government has the
complete records on ANA fuel purchased, ordered, delivered, and
consumed,'' end quote.
There are allegations that the Defense Department may have
shredded financial records for hundreds of millions of dollars
in POL. And yet, at this time, they are seeking to increase the
assistance by hundreds of millions of dollars. If accurate,
this is totally unacceptable. I have been working closely with
Mr. Tierney and perhaps will introduce legislation soon to
redirect this effort.
Despite the lack of records and justification for fuel
purchases, the Department of Defense proposes increasing
funding. From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018, it plans to
provide $555 million worth of POL per year. The Department of
Defense plans to give two-thirds of this funding directly to
the Afghan Government starting on January 1, 2013, so that it
can buy the petroleum, oil, and lubricants for itself--this
from a government which I believe is one of the most corrupt
governments on the face of the planet.
It begs the question, why do we even bother sending it to
Afghanistan. Why don't we just send it to Dubai and let them
just put it in their own bank accounts? There are some serious
questions.
We are here to try to provide more oversight, and yet what
I see the direction of the Department of Defense going in is
less oversight, less accountability. And that is, again, why
USAID is here. They, too, didn't seem to be moving in this
direction. We can't get the basic information about what we are
consuming and what is being used, and the administration keeps
moving in a direction to send it directly to them. We can't
even account for it; we think the Afghans are going to account
for it? And we are going to increase their funding? That is why
we are here today.
Under the current plan, the Afghan Government will be
responsible for overseeing the expenditure of roughly $2.8
billion of our taxpayer dollars. There are virtually no
assurances, however, that the Afghans will properly oversee
this money. We simply cannot delegate the authority and
oversight of billions of taxpayer dollars to the Afghan
Government without reliable controls in place. Trust, but
verify. I believe that, and we are not doing that in this
instance.
Afghanistan is not the only recipient of direct assistance,
however. This administration has made it a priority to increase
direct assistance to governments in developing countries all
over the world. Under President Obama, the USAID has developed
a new initiative called Forward. Under this program, the
administration plans to double the amount of U.S. foreign aid
budget it gives directly to foreign governments, NGOs, and
businesses.
Already, between fiscal year 2009 and 2010, the
administration has more than tripled its awards of direct
assistance to Afghanistan to $2 billion. And, overall,
excluding Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration goal is
to give 30 percent of nearly $40 billion in foreign aid budget
directly to foreign governments, NGOs, and businesses by 2015.
This is a staggering figure.
I would like to hear from USAID how it ensures
accountability in other regions and whether lessons can be
applied to the Department of Defense.
We must also get a better handle of who is receiving the
contracts. In a letter on Tuesday, Mr. Sopko listed 43
contractors in Afghanistan with affiliations to the Haqqani
Network, the Taliban, or al Qaeda. According to this letter,
these entities have not been suspended or debarred by the U.S.
Government. The fact that these firms with known affiliations
to terrorist groups are omitted from the debarment list is
simply outrageous. I want to know why the Defense Department
has not acted on the SIGAR's recommendations in a timely
manner. I hope today's discussions include solutions on how to
prevent groups with terrorist ties from doing business with the
United States.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here on short
notice. I appreciate your patriotism, your commitment to the
country.
What I like to share with people is, what differentiates
the United States of America from everybody else is we have
these types of candid discussions, in the light of day, on
television, so that everybody can see and hear the good, the
bad, and the ugly, all with the same mutual goal of making it
better. That is why we are here today. I am not here to just
try to embarrass people. We are trying to make it better and
challenge the notions that are potentially there on the table.
So I appreciate these gentlemen who are here answering the
questions from the panel.
And I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking
member, the gentleman from Massachusetts who has worked
tirelessly. I appreciate the partnership we have in trying to
put good government in place, and I would like to recognize Mr.
Tierney for his opening statement.
Mr. Tierney. I thank the chairman for that, and thank our
witnesses for being here today.
And, again, the SIGAR, thank you, Mr. Sopko, for your
report last week and your testimony, as well. I am glad to see
you back here again today.
Mr. Chairman, other than to just take this opportunity to
acknowledge and honor the loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and
the three other United States citizens and note that we have
had our 51st death of NATO forces on the so-called blue-green
situation, and we honor the sacrifice of them and their
families and all of the people that are dedicated servants
still serving, and to note that I think we have a joint
interest here in making sure that our investments in
development, while laudable, are threatened by the potential
that they may exacerbate the situation as opposed to improve
it, and that a lot of the oversight work has to be done to make
sure that this program or any program like it works to our
advantage and not to our disadvantage, I will ask that we just
accept my remarks for the record and we can proceed.
Mr. Chaffetz. Absolutely. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Chaffetz. Does any other Member seek to make a comment
or opening statement?
Mr. Platts. Mr. Chairman, not any real statement, other
than I am going to apologize to the witnesses. I am due in
another meeting here and just wanted to thank the witnesses for
their written testimony and for you holding this very important
hearing.
The issue of transparency and getting to the bottom of
these issues is so important. I commend you and the ranking
member for moving forward with the hearing. And I apologize, I
will be running out of here shortly.
Mr. Chaffetz. Understood. The flexibility, a lot is
happening today, and the lateness in which we start. So I
appreciate that.
Would the gentleman from Massachusetts care to say
anything?
Mr. Lynch. I would, just a brief statement. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I thank the
ranking member, as well. I know you both worked on these issues
extensively.
I also want to thank the witnesses for coming before us and
trying to help us with our work.
This is an important issue for us going forward. The
Inspector General has been--the Special Inspector General has
been terrific on this issue.
Mr. Sopko, you were nice enough to join us last week, where
we in this committee had the opportunity to hear testimony from
the Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction regarding
the current system for procuring petroleum, oil, and lubricants
for the Afghan Security Forces.
We discovered at that hearing that the process is
completely dysfunctional and that the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan is not yet in a position to
ensure that any entity, Afghan National Army or otherwise, will
be able to take over future procurement. This is particularly
disturbing as the Afghan National Army is set to take control
of the petroleum procurement in January 2013.
Corruption and lack of transparency are endemic in
Afghanistan. I have often said that corruption is to
Afghanistan like wet is to water. And that corruption has
proven to be a significant hurdle for U.S., allied, and Afghans
to overcome as we transition out of Afghanistan.
We should not be handing over such responsibilities and
resources without being certain that the institutions in
question are ready to ensure proper oversight and transparency.
That is the mission of this subcommittee as well as the full
committee and our responsibility to the American people.
The witnesses we have brought here today will be able to
shed additional light on the petroleum procurement matter and
what is being done to remedy the deficiencies. They will also
be able to share what improvements are being done to increase
overall oversight of funds provided by the United States
taxpayer.
Now, look, if we don't have the oversight in place, this
money will be stolen. This is billions of dollars of taxpayer
money. We all know the situation in Afghanistan, and right now
they are totally incapable. We have seen it. We have seen it
from Kabul Bank right on down. We have seen it through the fuel
supply contracts--terrible corruption.
And if we proceed down this road where we just hand
billions of dollars over, 30 percent or otherwise, to the
Afghan Government without the proper controls there, this money
is going to go out the door, this will be stolen. So it makes
no sense--it makes no sense to take American taxpayer money and
hand it over to people who are not going to spend it for its
intended purpose.
And I would like to hear from our witnesses today as to how
they envision a way forward to ensure that the transition of
Afghan control will be sustainable, if not successful.
I would like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to
come and testify before the subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for staying on this issue,
especially with the short deadline we have in January. We will
not be in session that much more before this transition to
Afghan control commences. So we have little time and a lot of
work to do.
And I just hate to see us, you know, put good money at risk
here, in any circumstances, but especially right now with the
economy and the finances of the United States being what they
are.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
Members may have 7 days to submit opening statements for
the record.
And we will now recognize our panel.
Mr. John Sopko is the Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction, also known as the SIGAR.
The Honorable Allen Estevez is the Assistant Secretary for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness at the Department of Defense.
Lieutenant General Brooks Bash is the Director for
Logistics with the Joint Staff at the Department of Defense.
And Mr. Larry Sampler is the Principal Deputy Assistant to
the Administrator and Deputy Director of the Office of Afghan
and Pakistan Affairs at the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
That is quite the title. It is a long one. It just rolls
off the tongue.
Nevertheless, we are glad that you are all here.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses need to be sworn
in before they testify. If you would please rise and raise your
right hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Thank you. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate
it if you would limit your testimony to 5 minutes, but we will
be fairly generous with that if you want to continue with a
thought.
And we will now recognize Mr. Sopko for 5 minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOPKO
Mr. Sopko. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Tierney, and members of the
subcommittee, last week I testified before this subcommittee
that SIGAR had serious concerns about how CSTC-A has managed
and accounted for the fuel provided to the Afghan Army. Despite
these problems, CSTC-A still plans to increase annual funding
for the Afghan Army fuel by $212 million per year and is
pushing forward with the transfer of fuel responsibilities and
funding to the Afghan Army.
We believe there is no basis for either decision, and I
continue to surge CSTC-A to halt its plan to increase fuel
funding until it develops a better process for determining fuel
needs, establish a comprehensive action plan to improve fuel
accountability, and delay transferring fuel responsibilities
and funding to the Afghan Army until the problems we have
identified are fixed.
Now let me briefly update you on the destruction-of-records
issue.
First of all, SIGAR's investigations have identified and
begun interviewing individuals located in the United States,
Afghanistan, United Kingdom, and Belgium who were involved in
this matter. We have confirmed that shredding did indeed take
place and have identified two Air Force officers who admitted
to destroying documents covering the time periods of February
2010 to February 2011.
According to these officers, they obtained supervisory
approval to shred the documents because they did not have
adequate storage space. They also claimed that they saved them
in an electronic format. Our investigators are now working to
locate those electronic records to review to see if they are
actually the records in question. These are the records, of
course, that we requested from--in February of this year.
In addition, just this Tuesday, CSTC-A provided our
auditors in Kabul with a CD which they claim contains 97
percent of the documents we had requested for the time period
of March 2011 to March 2012. As you can recall from my
testimony last week, CSTC-A had promised our auditors that they
had complete records for the time period of March 2011 to March
2012. However, when they turned the records over to us and we
did a sample, half of the documents were missing. Nevertheless,
our auditors are now reviewing this new disc to ascertain
whether it contains complete and accurate copies of the records
we requested.
Now, regarding the bulk of the records, those prior to
February of 2010, we still do not know what happened to them.
CSTC-A tells us that--tells our auditors in Kabul that they
have located additional hard copies of the records, including
some prior to February 2010, which we intend to examine.
Let me just say at this point, CSTC-A's handling of its
records is deeply troubling and, to us, raises questions about
their ability to perform this serious function. It appears it
has to take two congressional hearings, 6 months of IG
requests, an interim audit report, a management alert letter,
and my personal meeting with every senior military official in
Afghanistan before CSTC-A deigns to seriously take our request
for records as something they should respond to. We find that
very troubling.
Now, let us also update you on other developments since our
last testimony last week.
CSTC-A informed us of changes to their plans to transfer
responsibilities to the Afghan Government. Subsequent to our
testimony, CSTC-A now says they are going to revise the amount
of funding it plans to provide directly to the Afghan
Government from two-thirds of total funding to one-third.
The time frame for transferring that fuel has also changed.
It appears in a meeting, again subsequent to our testimony,
that the Afghan Ministry of Defense has said they can't handle
this new mission until March of 2013. Although we think this is
a good move, to delay, we are surprised that apparently CSTC-A
never talked to the Afghan ministry about this important
function until subsequent to the hearing.
These developments indicate that CSTC-A is perhaps
approaching the transition to Afghan-run logistics more
cautiously than before. Unfortunately, we know from our audit
work and the work of others, including the Army Audit Agency,
that CSTC-A has struggled with direct assistance in the past.
As I mentioned last week, the Army Audit Agency reported in
February 2012 that CSTC-A's standard operating procedure for
making direct contributions to the Afghan National Security
Forces did not provide a solid quality-control process. SIGAR
itself reported in 2011 that CSTC-A's efforts to help the
Afghan Ministry of Interior develop and implement a personnel
management system to account for the Afghan National Police
workforce and payroll was unsuccessful.
Providing direct assistance to the Afghan Government is a
critical part of handling responsibility for the Afghan
reconstruction--excuse me, for the reconstruction effort over
to the Afghans. But moving forward with direct contributions in
the face of the serious problems that CSTC-A itself has
encountered in its fuel programs reconfirms our belief that
transferring funding responsibility in January is doubling down
on a very risky bet.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I am
open to any questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
We will now recognize the Honorable Mr. Estevez.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. ALLEN F. ESTEVEZ
Mr. Estevez. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to review the findings of the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's interim
report on the subject of Afghan National Army petroleum, oil,
and lubricants.
I would like to note that Lieutenant General Bash and I
have submitted a joint statement for the record.
I would also like to note that we appreciate the work of
the Special Inspector General and that across the Department of
Defense, to include in our deployed forces in Afghanistan, we
are committed to working with the Special Inspector General to
strengthen our processes in Afghanistan and to protect the
taxpayers' dollars.
Before addressing the issues raised by the interim report,
it is important that we put our actions with regard to Afghan
forces in context. It is critically important that we build
Afghan force capability and capacity. This is the key to a
stable, secure Afghanistan, an Afghanistan that is not a safe
haven for extremists like al Qaeda that threaten this Nation.
As part of the process to build Afghan military capability,
we must also build Afghan force sustainment capabilities.
Developing the ability to provide petroleum, oil, and
lubricants, or ``POL'' in the military vernacular, is a
critical part of that process.
I would like it address the Special Inspector General's
concerns with the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan's ability to fully account for POL provided to
Afghan forces and the statements that officials shredded all
Afghan fuel-related financial records from October of 2006 to
February of 2011.
And I will note that I just heard new information regarding
that. However, I will stand by our statement that, to the best
of our knowledge, no documents have been shredded, and records
have been appropriately maintained. And I will say that
electronic copies are valid records, so if a record was
shredded, there is a valid electronic copy. That is to the best
of our knowledge today.
We will continue to provide the Special Inspector General
with all documents relevant to this audit as we accomplish our
ongoing mission in theater. To date, we have collected 97
percent of the documents requested by the Special Inspector
General. These documents include scanned copies of delivery
tickets, invoices, and acceptance forms dating back to 2006.
Ongoing logistics training for the Afghan forces includes
developing the proper procedures for fuel ordering and receipt
and the verification of the quantity and quality of fuel
delivered. Our current process requires Afghan Security Force
units to submit the appropriate requisition and consumption
forms, or fuel orders are refused. Afghan Security Force
personnel, working under the guidance of their coalition
advisers, process fuel order documents by verifying the
quantity of fuel authorized and comparing it with fuel
requested to ensure units do not exceed their fuel allocations.
The quantity and quality of fuel delivered to Afghan Security
Force sites is verified through the reconciliation of
appropriate forms.
The NATO training mission has refined its method for
estimating fuel funding levels for fiscal years 2014 to 2018.
They used 1 year of consumption data, from August 2011 to July
2012, to establish an annual requirements baseline. From that
baseline, using simple trend analysis and taking into account
expected operational tempo increases, planned equipment
fieldings, and seasonal weather factors, they developed future-
year fuel requirements.
To improve the accountability of supplies, the NATO
training mission issued a memorandum in April 2011, prior to
the audit, to the Afghan Ministry of Defense noting that it
would apportion fuel based only on vehicles that were properly
accounted for by the ministry and coalition forces.
The NATO training mission also issued a fragmentary order
in May 2012 directing coalition personnel at Afghan Security
Force sites to report fuel storage capacity at all 46 Afghan
force fixed-location fuel storage sites. This data enables the
NATO training mission to compare quantity of fuel requested
with capacity of potential storage in either fixed storage fuel
tanks or mobile fuel transportation assets.
To further improve the accountability of fuel and provide
closer oversight, we are also consolidating the number of fuel
delivery sites.
In accordance with the overall campaign objectives, the
NATO training mission is currently working with its Afghan
partners in the Ministry of Defense to transition fuel
management responsibility in a controlled, conditions-based
manner--phased, conditions-based manner. Next year, the NATO
training mission will transfer responsibility for only one-
third of the estimated 2013 fuel budget to the Afghan Security
Force. The remaining fuel budget will remain under the direct
control of the NATO training mission.
To mitigate any financial risks, disbursements of funds for
future Afghan Security Force fuel orders will occur quarterly
and will be subject to the outcome of quarterly financial
audits to ensure responsible use of funds.
In addition to the specific actions mentioned above, the
NATO training mission is instituting a number of initiatives to
strengthen Afghan Security Force fuel and POL program.
First, the training mission has formed an assistant-
minister-level bulk fuel transfer executive committee with
members from the NATO training mission and key Afghan
ministries.
Second, the NATO training mission, with the assistance of
the U.S. Central Command-Joint Theater Support Contracting
Command, will advise Ministry of Defense acquisition personnel
on the development of an enforceable contracting mechanism.
Finally, the NATO training mission has requested the
Defense Logistics Agency experts to review the NATO training
mission procedures and provide feedback on how it can improve
operations.
Again, we want to thank the Special Inspector General for
his work and this committee for its work. Ultimately, the aim
of the collective effort is to ensure that Afghan Security
Force POL operations are implemented properly while judiciously
managing taxpayer resources. We continue to work hard to
improve our oversight and management of this critical area.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
And my understanding, again, as you stated, is that it was
a joint statement with General Bash. So we will now recognize
Mr. Sampler for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DONALD L. ``LARRY'' SAMPLER, JR.
Mr. Sampler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. My name is Larry Sampler, and I am the Senior Deputy
Assistant to the Administrator and Deputy Director of the
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at the United States
Agency for International Development.
Afghanistan is and has been a difficult place to do
assistance work. USAID's development assistance for Afghanistan
continues to remain a critical component of our core U.S.
national security objective there, which is to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent Afghanistan from
ever again becoming a safe haven from which extremists can
attack the United States and our allies.
USAID's efforts are part of a whole-of-government, civil-
military effort to advance this strategic objective. Together,
we are committed to promoting the development of a stable
Afghanistan by partnering with the Afghan Government and the
Afghan people to solidify a foundation of sustainable economic
growth and effective, legitimate governance.
I have been working on and off and in Afghanistan since
2002 in both civilian and military capacities for the U.S.
Government. I have worked as a representative of an
international NGO, and I served for about 2 years as the chief
of staff of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. So I do
have personal experience with the challenges of implementing
assistance programs in such a difficult environment, and I have
seen the benefits of our assistance programs in Afghanistan.
Under the Taliban, less than 9,000 boys and almost no girls
had access to education. Today, more than 8 million children,
more than a third of whom are girls, are enrolled in school.
This is important because now there is a generation of young
men and women graduating with critical thinking skills that
will make them better citizens and more resilient in their
opposition to malicious doctrines of the Taliban or others.
In 2002, only 9 percent of Afghans had access to even the
most basic health care. Today, that number is over 60 percent,
and life expectancy at birth has risen by almost 20 years.
Furthermore, maternal mortality and infant mortality have both
dropped significantly.
And, finally, our work in energy has helped triple the
number of Afghans with access to reliable electricity, which
has enabled the economic growth in the country. With USAID's
support, Afghanistan's national power utility has increased its
revenues by approximately 50 percent every year since 2009,
reducing the needed Afghan Government subsidy to that
organization from $170 million to approximately $30 million
last year.
Of course, our ultimate goal is to work ourselves out of a
job by enabling Afghanistan to stand on its own two feet
without direct foreign assistance. To that end, USAID has been
working through select ministries in the Afghan Government
since the previous administration. This work is commonly
referred to as government-to-government or on-budget support
assistance.
I should note that on-budget assistance encompasses a range
of mechanisms such as funds provided to and through the World
Bank's Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, or the ARTF, as well
as specific project assistance that we provide directly to and
through ministries and agencies at the Government of
Afghanistan.
USAID has been constantly learning and reforming our
operations in Afghanistan over the course of our engagement
there. Oversight and accountability is an area where USAID's
leadership has focused extensively throughout the agency and in
particular with respect to Afghanistan.
Protecting taxpayer resources is a vital concern to USAID,
and we have established a variety of layered measures to ensure
that our programs are cost-effective and are having the
intended and the expected impacts. We are mindful that, as
stewards of the U.S. Government taxpayer funds, that we serve
as their representatives as we provide this assistance to the
people of Afghanistan.
USAID works to ensure that the ministries and agencies to
whom we provide assistance are capable of implementing the
desired programs, achieving the desired results, and doing so
in a way that is transparent and fiscally responsible. USAID
accomplishes this through a system of pre-award assessments,
mitigating measures, financial controls, and rigorous
monitoring and evaluation.
As part of the financial controls, USAID maintains control
of funds throughout the lifecycle of a project. We work with
the Afghan Government to develop projects that are going to
achieve specific outcomes, and we allow funds to be distributed
only when certain benchmarks have been met. This ensures that
the funds are accounted for and that we achieve the outcomes
that are critical for our success.
Another layer of oversight and accountability is provided
by the multiple independent oversight bodies that review our
programs. These, of course, include your own Government
Accountability Office, the USAID Inspector General, and the
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. They
complete numerous audits of our programs in Afghanistan every
year that complement and reinforce our own efforts to ensure
that taxpayer dollars are effectively used. And I should add,
we welcome the oversight and the discipline that these reviews
impose on our work. A number of the reviews, actually, have
been requested by our staff.
Finally, I know well that there have been significant
sacrifices made by the American people in support of
sustainability and stability in Afghanistan. We are under no
illusions about the challenges that we face, but these
challenges call for exercising diligence in how we operate as
we carefully and deliberately transition to an Afghan-led
process which meets our standards of achievement and of
accountability.
Our mission of defeating terrorists and denying them a safe
haven remains critical to U.S. national security. The programs
implemented by USAID are making important contributions toward
that goal by helping Afghanistan stand on its own.
I look forward to answering any questions you have, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I appreciate all of your statements.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
And, Mr. Estevez and General Bash, help me understand, who
is ultimately responsible for the POL in Afghanistan? I mean,
does that go through the two of you? Who at the Department of
Defense is responsible for this?
Mr. Estevez. If you are talking POL for U.S. forces, I
would say I have ultimate responsibility in that regard. We are
talking about for billing capacity for the Afghans, so it is a
shared responsibility. We both have oversight of our
contracting capability that is in Afghanistan that supports
both our forces and supports CSTC-A and its mission.
CSTC-A is operating in a training capacity, so, you know,
their ultimate responsibility is through the command structure
there.
Mr. Chaffetz. This Special Inspector for Afghan
Reconstruction, I think he is honest, sincere. He is trying to
do the right thing. It takes months and months and months and
months, as you said, a couple of congressional inquiries.
With all due respect, I would rather not be sitting here
with you today. I would much rather have you provide the
documentation to him and be able to reconcile the books. He
said there is no documents--that they found some of them now.
Why is there such a challenge? Why does it take so long to
get some what should be basic information?
Mr. Estevez. First, let me say that we also do believe that
the Special Inspector General is doing great work. It is very
helpful work for us and for our mission in Afghanistan.
Right now I think in CSTC-A there are 30-some audits going
on. Of course, they are also engaged in the mission and
training in Afghanistan, and I will let General Bash talk a
little bit about that.
So they are working to provide those records----
Mr. Chaffetz. Have you seen them?
Mr. Estevez. I have not.
Mr. Chaffetz. Who has seen them?
Mr. Estevez. The folks in Afghanistan that are pulling them
and the folks around----
Mr. Chaffetz. When will they have them?
Mr. Estevez. They provided, as Mr. Sopko said, a disc. They
are going through that disc to make sure they are giving them
the right documents. A lot of this is electronic backup
records.
They did not know, at least to our knowledge again, until
September 5th that there was an allegation of shredding and
that documents were not available. And they are working very
hard to provide those documents. We expect them to do so.
Mr. Chaffetz. They were going to take roughly--and I am
rounding here--a $350 million line item and bring it up to $555
million. What gave you the confidence that that was an accurate
number? Who signed off on that?
General Bash. Well, Mr. Chairman, ultimately, you know, the
commander at CSTC-A is responsible for the estimation and the
building of the Afghan Army.
Having, myself, spent a year in Iraq and having numerous
visits to Afghanistan, as I know you have, the environment is
challenging to help them build their institutional capacity,
which is really what the core issue here is, trying to make an
assessment of when they can start handling this and the
training of advisers. And because of the way the mission has
developed, they focused on the fighting forces first, and then
now they are starting to get to the enablers, which includes
logistics. So it brings us to the point of how we have
confidence of how much fuel they actually need.
And I would say that, since this special inspection started
in March, in April, and the initial report was provided in May,
which was the preliminary issues of concern provided to the
commander at the time, our review with the commanders there
have shown that, of at that time the six issues, they have made
considerable progress. And I am prepared to share some of those
details.
But I think that there have been challenges--just the fact
that the Expeditionary Sustainment Command only stood up 9
months ago. Because when they recognized that they wanted to
start building a logistics capacity for the Afghan Army, they
said, you know, this is really hard stuff, we need to have the
pros from Dover come out, which is the SC, which has been there
for 9 months now.
So, since that time, since 9 months ago, they have made
considerable progress, and that is in parallel with Mr. Sopko's
investigation. And I think they have been working with that
team. In fact, there has been a SIGAR team member there
consistently. And they were meeting weekly, at least initially.
And I know there are team members still there. So I think they
are working very closely together.
Admittedly, there is frustration that it takes time to find
the records, I think because of the scale. When we talk about
the----
Mr. Chaffetz. But, General, we are talking about increasing
funding by $200 million, just this one line item, $200 million
annually. The SIGAR is saying, there is no basis for this; we
don't see any accounting that would justify this in any way,
shape, or form. You two gentlemen are saying, yes, there is.
Where is it? I think that is a fair and reasonable question to
ask.
And if there has been progress, please do that. I am past
my time, but feel free to share those answers. And then we will
recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Estevez. Let me just address the growth of the Afghan
Army, the Afghan forces, so it is Afghan Army, police, border
police--you know, the whole group. So that has expanded
significantly year by year by year.
In addition, we are providing substantial pieces of
equipment--armored Humvees, pickup trucks, armored pickup
trucks and the like--that all consume fuel. We are providing an
air force capability to the Afghans--I am saying us and our
coalition partners--in doing this.
And as we expand sites, that, of course, also expands the
requirement for fuel at those sites and for using that
equipment. And the Afghan forces are taking more and more of
the responsibility for engaging in combat. So they are out
there using that fuel, consuming it.
Mr. Chaffetz. How much of the fuel are they paying for, and
how much of the fuel are we paying for?
Mr. Estevez. I believe right now we are probably funding
their fuel requirement. I would have to get you----
Mr. Chaffetz. A hundred percent?
Mr. Estevez. I really need to get you that for the record,
sir, but I believe right now that we are probably fully funding
their fuel requirement.
Mr. Chaffetz. General, you said there were some other
developments. I just wanted to give you an opportunity to
expand that thought.
General Bash. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to be
brief here.
But in May, when the SIGAR provided the preliminary issues
of concern to the command, there were six primary issues. And I
will just briefly cover those, and if you want more, we can
provide it.
But, at the time, they said there needed to be a complete
inventory of storage capacity, and also perform an assessment
of short-lived consumption needs. Since that time, NTM has
actually reduced the number of sites from 191 delivery sites--
down to 191 from almost 800. And they are going to 68. So the
scale of the number of sites for delivery has shrunk
significantly, which makes it a lot easier.
They have issued a direction to collect data on fuel
storage capacity. And today they do know how much capacity each
of these sites, 46 sites have, and they know the million-of-
liters capacity. So that gives them an idea of, when they push
fuel out, you know, how much they can actually accept.
They have also refined the processes for determining
consumption. They are just beginning this process, and so we
don't have any success--you know, evidence that I have at this
point. But they are using NATO standard fuel consumption
formulas for vehicles. They are also using NATO operational
planning factors that are accepted.
So for the first issue, I feel confident that they are
making progress. Perhaps still a ways to go there, but I think
they have a process in place.
The second issue talks about, they should establish a
contract vehicle that includes more stringent provisions
regarding fuel quality, quantity, and contractor performance.
They now have a new four-step process. I won't go into details
on that, but it is a new process. Based on this process, in
August and July they had three cases of invoices that were
rejected because the Afghans weren't following that particular
process. So we do have evidence that that is beginning to work.
And, finally, they are looking at coming up with an
indefinite delivery contract to replace the current blanket
purchase agreement, which was one of the suggestions, I think,
that the SIGAR made at the time. That has not been done yet,
but they are moving forward in that regard.
On the third issue, as far as ordering and purchasing, they
are requiring that CSTC-A account for all fuel orders. And
today they are doing 100 percent reconciliation of those fuel
orders, which we have confirmed with the theater.
On the fourth one, which was with regard to documentation,
again, this comes back to the new four-step process, where they
have to get the fuel orders, which are the Form 14s that the
Afghans use. That goes all the way through the reconciliation,
which is the Form 32 at the end of the process. And they are
trying to put maturity into the trainers and advisers that are
advising the Afghans, that overwatch, trying to help them
understand how to do that process with integrity.
And the final two, the last issue, complete info on any POL
purchases not available, the suggestion was to require them to
perform monthly reconciliations, which I already mentioned that
they are doing 100 percent today now, which wasn't necessarily
the case when SIGAR brought this to their attention in May.
And, finally, a suggestion to revise the Afghan Ministry of
Defense Decree 4.6 to establish minimum proficiency
requirements for the Afghans, that has not been completed yet.
It is in progress. Obviously, this is one that the Afghans have
to change their policy direction. The advisers are working with
the Afghans right now to help them understand what changes need
to be made. And hopefully in the future the Afghans will make
that change so that what the advisers are trying to teach them,
they have overarching guidance to follow.
Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Tierney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the rest of the
afternoon, right?
Mr. Chaffetz. For such time as he may consume, yes.
Mr. Tierney. So, Mr. Sopko, what do you say to this?
Mr. Sopko. A couple things.
First of all, any of the efforts that the General mentioned
to improve oversight and accountability we fully support. The
problem is where the rubber meets the road. My auditors--and
you have to remember, they were reviewing CSTC-A's response as
late as August and September--they found no evidence of actual
consumption data reports being used to estimate fuel
requirements.
Now, that is a key. And that is the problem I think we are
seeing with CSTC-A. CSTC-A is using purchase data, not
consumption data. We know what we purchased. We know what we
paid for. The question is, do we know what the Afghans got, and
do they need it? And we are not seeing consumption data.
Now, Mr. Tierney, let me go back to the question that the
chairman asked about the records. It is not just that they
couldn't find the records for us and our audit was delayed 6
months and that we had to narrow the scope from 4 years to 1
year. What it really shows is they didn't have access to the
records that they are now claiming they have access to, that
they are using on a regular basis to determine if the Afghans
are stealing the fuel.
And what we would posit is that the total confusion of
where the records were--we asked a simple question, to give us
the records you are using to oversee the Afghans' usage. They
couldn't find them for 6 months.
We are really concerned. And I don't know how else we could
express it other than to say: Do not proceed with cutting a
blank check in January until you are sure you have a program in
place that you, CSTC-A, is using.
We have had problems with CSTC-A and CSTC-A records in the
past. I mentioned and alluded to it in my opening statement and
my written statement. In January of this year, we had to delay
an audit on the number of vehicles that CSTC-A was using and
had purchased for the Afghan military by 4 months because CSTC-
A didn't have an accounting of how many vehicles they were
actually fueling. We later found out, and we saved over $5
million in fuel, because it turned out CSTC-A was giving fuel
to the Afghans for vehicles that had been destroyed.
My auditors tell me, to this date, CSTC-A is still paying
for fuel to fuel trailers, to fuel nonfunctional vehicles, and
nonexisting vehicles.
So, Mr. Tierney, my response is, I will use President
Reagan's terminology, and I think the chairman did: Trust, but
verify.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
So, General, I am concerned that we have this estimate for
$200 million additional dollars a year at a time when your
people couldn't access or weren't accessing the records. So,
you know, without that kind of consumption information as to
what was being used, I am a little curious as to how they got
this estimate that they were going to need $200 million more
next year.
General Bash. First, I would say that I think the challenge
that CSTC-A has is, there is a difference between the detailed
end records, which are the consumption data and the forms that
the Afghans do, and the trend analysis that they are doing from
a macro perspective of what they are using. Certainly----
Mr. Tierney. Could you explain that to me? You think that,
to make a trend analogy, you don't need to have a good core
base of information, of data?
General Bash. The individual transaction, so it is more--I
am making a distinction between the retail and the wholesale
level. You know, so if you have, you know, hundreds of bases
out there and thousands and thousands of vehicles and
generators, what goes into each individual tank and what is
used is a huge challenge. And----
Mr. Tierney. Well, less so if you have the records
indicating it. You just add them up.
General Bash. Right. So, at the supply level, that is where
they are doing the trend analysis to understand what the FOBs
are using. And they are using a trend analysis, as I previously
mentioned.
As far as the increases----
Mr. Tierney. You know, can I go back? Maybe I am obtuse
here or something like that. I don't think you have answered my
question, but you can maybe bear with me and try again so even
I get it on that.
I would think you need to know how many storage tanks
exist, how many vehicles, and what capacity per vehicle there
are in order for you to get a feel for what is needed
collectively and base by base before you can make any trend
analysis going forward. You have to know where you start in
order to trend forward. Is that not making sense?
General Bash. You are absolutely right, sir. And, in fact,
when this SIGAR started, that information was not readily
available, and today it is based on----
Mr. Tierney. But it appears not to have been available when
the trend analysis was made and the projection for $200 million
additional money was made.
General Bash. Unfortunately, I can't talk about the timing.
I mean, they have been making considerable progress since----
Mr. Tierney. Well, let me say it this way, because the
Inspector General knew that they were asking for $200 million
more when the documents were still not found. So now the
documents were subsequently found. I think it stands to reason
that they didn't use those documents to establish their
baseline on which the trend was then set.
Mr. Estevez. Let me try to answer you, Congressman Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Before you do that, Mr. Sopko, am I off base
here? Does that sound reasonable to you?
Mr. Sopko. You are absolutely correct. And that is our
concern. And I am happy to give more detail because we were
provided--CSTC-A provided their spreadsheet that they used, and
it didn't include consumption data.
So, you know, my auditors on the ground have been doing
this for 9 months, and what they are saying is they are not
using consumption data. They are using purchase data.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Estevez, if you care.
Mr. Estevez. So what they have done is they have looked at
the last year, they have used NATO consumption standards
against the type of vehicles that the Afghans have, and that is
vehicles ranging from, again, armored-type pickups to armored
Humvees to helicopters, aircraft, generators, et cetera. So
they have a year's worth of data. They used NATO consumption
trends against that.
They look at what the expected operational tempo is,
because, obviously, if you have a vehicle and it is not being
used, then there is no consumption. If it is being used X
amount, there is X amount. If I am going to go out on patrol
more because we are pulling back and we are expecting them to
take the lead, that gives you another calculation. All that is
into the calculation on how much fuel we need to buy for the
Afghans.
And the growth of the force, so we are fielding new
vehicles into that mix. All that went into the trend analysis
to calculate how much budget, as well as the calculation of
what it is going to cost. Obviously, price of fuel fluctuates.
Mr. Tierney. What of the trailers and things like that that
were in that calculated number, you know, things that don't
move and don't use energy that were somehow calculated in that
base?
General Bash. Sir, the best that we can figure on that one
is that--and in talking to the commanders out there, is that
today they have done a reconciliation with the Afghan books, if
you will, and they do not provide fuel for vehicles that don't
require fuel. There are trailers that do have pumps and engines
on them to, you know, pump water and that sort of thing that
perhaps are on the records that they get an allotment for fuel
based on the NATO standards.
But the commander has told us that, if that was happening
previously, it is not happening today, because they have gone
through and they now know exactly how many vehicles are on the
Afghan records and they have oversight into--and, of course,
that changes all the time based on losses and whatnot.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Sopko, are you satisfied that the 1-year
records that are said to have been used were accurate for that
1 year? And do you think that that is a complete enough basis
on which to make projections?
Mr. Sopko. No, we are not.
Mr. Tierney. Why?
Mr. Sopko. And, again, let me--maybe the best way to do
this is look at the--our vehicle work showed that at least
1,600 Afghan military vehicles that are not operational are
still getting fuel.
And I would like to also refer to an audit report that I
mentioned, January 12, 2012, and just read from the findings.
And it said--and, again, this is the one where CSTC-A had to
ask us to delay doing our work, doing our field work, because
CSTC-A reported it could not readily provide the documentation
required to address our questions and was in the process of
conducting a nationwide field inventory.
After they did that inventory and allowed us in, they said,
the U.S. was providing fuel for destroyed vehicles. As a
result, CSTC-A saved over $370,000, and if you estimated it--
and 200,000 liters. And if you estimated, it would amount to
over $5 million in savings.
We are not comfortable with the number they are giving,
based upon our prior work there. We don't feel they know what
they are buying and what is being consumed.
And the simple answer is, do you remember the chart I
showed you about how the system was supposed to work? We put it
up. There is a form called a MOD, Ministry of Defense, that is
a form, it is a very good form, that the Afghans are supposed
to fill out which talks about monthly consumption report. As of
last week, when we got a report from CSTC-A in the field, they
are saying they are still collecting those consumption reports
and they are reaching out to the Afghans to try to find them.
So if they are right now trying to find the consumption
reports, how can they justify their budget, which was
submitted, I think, a few months ago?
Mr. Tierney. Do you care to take a shot at that one,
Lieutenant General?
Mr. Estevez. How about if I try to take a shot at that? A
couple things----
Mr. Tierney. I am sure the General is happy with that.
Mr. Estevez. We work together.
I think, you know, as far as the vehicles, you know, we do
not dispute that we had problems with this in the past. We
think we are much better today----
Mr. Tierney. I guess the key is--I hope you don't mind a
conversation.
Mr. Estevez. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Tierney. The key seems to be, you had a problem at the
time that you were making your estimates and your projections.
That is what--you know, I don't mind if you had a problem in
the past. But if you had a problem at the time you were then
finding some reason to make projections and trend analysis on
it, that is what I have a problem with. They can't be very
trustworthy if they are not set on solid ground.
Mr. Estevez. The trend analysis is done in the July-August
time frame, so I believe we are okay there. But I would like
to----
Mr. Tierney. Well, not according to Mr. Sopko. You are
still getting information in August and September.
Mr. Estevez. May I suggest on how we did our trend
analysis--and his auditors may have already looked at this, but
I believe that we need to get CSTC-A and his auditors together
again to walk through that process and hopefully find a way
forward on that. We are satisfying the Special Inspector
General. Again, they are providing us useful help in doing
this.
And I will go back to, you know, back in January, earlier
last year, one of the reasons, as General Bash alluded to, that
we deployed an active Army expeditionary support command to
CSTC-A--and we have one in Afghanistan supporting our own
forces in order to train Afghans how to do this and to do this
in conjunction with them--was because we needed the pros from
Dover in order to get in there and work this process.
And so it is an evolving process as we go forward in doing
this. So we do believe we have the right trend analysis, but we
will be happy to have our folks work that with the Inspector
General.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I understand about trend analysis from one year
to the next. But in order to have a good feel for that, you
have to have a good reference point. And the reference point
would be consumption.
Knowing how everything else goes in Afghanistan, you know,
just hearing what I have just heard and in the previous hearing
as well, I don't get a lot of confidence that we know what the
hell we are doing.
Mr. Lynch. If we are just using a NATO model and we don't
know what--first, we don't know how many vehicles we have, we
don't know how much fuel they are using. I do know how things
go in Afghanistan, and I am not encouraged by that. And so we
are just adding $200 million to what we used last year. And we
don't know if we were being robbed last year, but I suspect the
odds are we were. This is crazy. This is crazy.
So, Mr. Estevez, you said in your opening statement that
you have all the records; they have been properly kept. And the
man to your right, the Special Inspector General, says he has
no records. And you are both under oath, so what am I supposed
to believe here?
I mean, from what I--and all of our members have been over
to Afghanistan a bunch of times. We know how things are going
over there. I mean, how do I get that? All the records are
there; they have been kept in order.
And, by the way, we have been tracking this thing since
2006. Everybody is fast-forwarding to 2011, 2010. What happened
back in 2006? Have we been doing this since 2006? Have we been
counting vehicles, and have we been tracking consumption? Have
we been doing that?
General? Mr. Estevez?
General Bash. Well, sir, to address your most previous one,
as you well know, the surge and the buildup in Afghanistan
didn't occur until the last couple years, so the challenges
prior to that----
Mr. Lynch. But, but, but, we know what the surge was, so if
we had a reference point before that, then you account for the
surge, so you have a known point.
So I don't want to fast-forward and make believe we arrived
in Afghanistan in 2010. I don't want to do that. We have been
there for a long, long time, and so what were we doing then? We
have been there 10, 11 years. What were we doing since the
beginning?
Have we been just pulling the number out of a hat? Because
that is the way it seems, that we are just taking an arbitrary
number, and God knows we have to justify next year's budget, so
increase it by a substantial amount. You know, it is just
unacceptable, number one. But it is not going to continue. We
have to get to the bottom of this.
So let me go back. You say all the records are in order. We
have everything. They have been kept in, you know, due
diligence. So how do we figure out how many vehicles we have
and how much those vehicles consume?
Mr. Estevez?
Mr. Estevez. Let me address a couple of things there.
First, as General Bash was alluding to, 2006, there was not
a drive to a 352,000-man force, Afghan force. That didn't
start, the concerted effort, until the last 3 years or so. So
there was a change in focus and mission in the midst of that
and push of equipment in doing so.
When we say all the records are in order, I said we have
the records, we are pulling the records. Going back to 2006, we
have evidence that that is the case, that we have them on
electronic----
Mr. Lynch. Well, how come Mr. Sopko doesn't have them then?
How come he sits there under oath and tells me he has nothing
and you say, we have everything and it is all in order? How do
we get that?
Mr. Estevez. We are providing those to his auditors.
Hopefully at the end of this, and it is the Department's belief
at this point, that he will have the records that he needs----
Mr. Lynch. When is he going to get the records? Because you
are really----
Mr. Estevez. Our folks in CSTC-A, sir, are working with his
auditors as we speak and providing him those records. And----
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Sopko, how are you doing on the records? Are
you getting the records?
Mr. Sopko. They have provided--as for the records in the
2011 and 2012 framework, time frame, they have given us a CD
and they said the records are there. We are reviewing to see if
they are there.
Mr. Lynch. That is for 1 year, though, right?
Mr. Sopko. That is for 1 year. Remember, that was the year
where they said they had all of the records, and when we did
the survey and we pulled, they didn't have 50 percent of the
records.
Now, that doesn't mean the records are complete. You recall
from last week's testimony, when we pulled it, we could only
find four complete packages which had all of the appropriate
forms you would want and were all signed.
As for the prior records that were shredded--and there is
no doubt that they were shredded. I mean, two Air Force
captains have admitted to my investigators they shredded the
records. Now, I am not saying they did it for evil purposes,
but they were shredded. They claim they made electronic copies.
We haven't found those, and we haven't had a chance to look at
those electronic versions. But the records were shredded.
Mr. Lynch. Now, Mr. Estevez, you know, you are saying there
was no shredding going on. We got--you know, this is a good
hearing, this is pretty good. Okay, we got one guy who says we
have two Air Force folks that have testified that they shredded
the documents. And you tell me none of the documents were
shredded and they were all properly maintained.
Mr. Estevez. If I could----
Mr. Lynch. It is like a parallel universe here.
Mr. Estevez. --I will concede that if the Special
Investigator has people who say they shredded records, records
were probably shredded. That does not mean that records were
destroyed. Electronic copy of record is a valid copy of the
record.
Mr. Lynch. Well, hard copy was destroyed.
Mr. Estevez. That is what I am hearing, sir.
General Bash. Sir, I would also say that CSTC-A was focused
on the initial request of records, which, as the Special
Investigator said, 50 percent was required to be provided right
away. Over the past 4 or 5 months, they have provided now 97
percent of those records.
Now----
Mr. Lynch. That is what you say, right? You are saying 97
percent?
Is that what you are getting, Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. I beg to disagree with the General.
Our initial request--and I am happy to go through the
timeline. We opened the audit on February 13, 2012. February
21st, we held our first conference, entrance conference with
CSTC, and we explained to them what was the scope of the audit.
On April 3rd, we----
Mr. Lynch. And what did you describe as the scope of your
audit? Refresh my recollection.
Mr. Sopko. Well, it was multiple--4 years of records.
Mr. Lynch. Okay, good.
Mr. Sopko. On April 3rd, we made the initial request for
fuel order documents to CSTC-A. At that meeting, the CSTC-A
fuel-ordering officer informed us that he did not have
supporting documentation for any of the earlier fuel orders,
period, no supporting documentation, because they were
shredded.
Mr. Lynch. Okay, let's stop right there.
All right, Mr. Estevez and Lieutenant General Bash, what do
you say to that about the previous years? We are not talking
about the 1 year; we are talking about the other 3 years of the
4-year request.
Mr. Estevez. I don't doubt that the officer in question
said that he had heard----
Mr. Lynch. Do you have those records?
Mr. Estevez. We believe we have given the records that the
Special Inspector General is looking for on the disk. We also
have records----
Mr. Lynch. He is asking for 4 years. Are you giving him 4
years? Earlier, you said the disk was 1 year.
Mr. Estevez. Sir, we are giving him the records that his
auditors requested. They asked for records by number, you know,
I guess by each--and we are giving him the records that he
asked for.
We have records stored going back in time. And I can't say,
you know, what is in these boxes. But we have moved all the
financial records, as time evolved in Afghanistan, back to Shaw
Air Force Base----
Mr. Lynch. All right. From this point forward, I just want
to make sure everybody understands: When we are looking for
records, we are looking for 4 years' worth of records. We want
4 years, not 1 year. So when we say we had all the records, 97
percent of the records, I am hearing you have 97 percent of the
4 years that we are looking for in the audit. That is what I am
hearing.
Mr. Estevez. We have 97 percent of the records, specific
records, that the Special Inspector General has asked for. If
they were looking for other specific records, we will, inside
the Department of Defense, go and find those records for him.
Mr. Lynch. Okay.
I am sure I am exceeding my time.
Mr. Chaffetz. You are not the first, so----
Mr. Lynch. Okay. Yeah.
Mr. Sopko. Mr. Chairman, can I just add to that?
Mr. Chaffetz. Please.
Mr. Sopko. Because I don't want to add to the confusion,
but I think what the confusion is--and then on April 18th--
remember, April 3rd, we were told the 4 years of records are
destroyed. April 18th, that same fuel-ordering officer says,
``You can't get the earlier records, but we do have records for
1 year.'' That is March--so that is what we are talking about,
the 1 year. So----
Mr. Lynch. So, Mr. Estevez----
Mr. Sopko. --97 percent is the 1 year. We immediately asked
for----
Mr. Lynch. Let's stop right there.
So, Mr. Estevez, after you told him you can't get the
previous years, you can get the 1 year, are we skipping over
that? Is that what you are telling me? In this 97 percent
response, you are skipping over the part where he asks for 4
years, and you are hearing, well, we don't have the other 3
years, but we will give you 1 year? Is that what is causing the
confusion here? Because we want 4 years.
Mr. Estevez. I hope not. But I will say that neither
General Bash nor I are privy to the discussions between his
auditor and the levels in CSTC-A that they were dealing with.
Mr. Lynch. Okay. I am talking about the original response
that asked for 4 years of records. And your guys are probably
saying, ``Well, we got them to back off on the first 3 they
wanted. We told them we didn't have them. We told them we have
1 year.'' And so now you are dealing with a much narrower
request. But that is not the entire request.
Mr. Estevez. Sir, if the Special Inspector General asked
for records, we will go find those records for him.
Mr. Lynch. Okay. And we are talking 4 years. All right.
I will yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I will now recognize myself.
One of the allegations, if you will call it that, or one of
the concerns--probably is a better word--is that you had not
been working with the Afghan ministry. Mr. Sopko mentioned that
in his opening statement. How would you react to that?
General Bash. Well, having been an adviser myself, Mr.
Chairman, there is a team that works with the ministry every
day to help them build that institutional capacity.
I wasn't assigned to Afghanistan in that regard. However,
there is no doubt in my mind, once they started to--they
decided to build logistics capacity, which--and they have a
whole plan of eight different ways of building that enabler--
they start to work with the ministers to help them understand
how to do logistics.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Sopko, did you want to add anything to
that concern about talking to the ministers?
Mr. Sopko. Well, all I can say is that, in the latest--they
have set up a meeting, which we applaud, but it was only set up
recently, I believe in the August--well, actually, it was set
up before your hearing, but I think it met after the last
hearing, so it would be last week or earlier this week, at
which time the Afghan ministry, I think, was the first time it
looks like they were consulted. And they said, we are not
prepared to start January 1st.
And that was a briefing that CSTC-A gave us and some
documents they gave us and PowerPoints just this week about
this meeting. So we are just saying it looks like--now, again,
that wasn't the scope of our audit----
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, let me give the General--we are going
to have to pick up the pace here.
General, how do you--I mean, you said you are meeting
daily. The Inspector General is saying you met for the first
time since we had our last hearing, which was a week ago.
General Bash. I think it is a matter of level. I mean,
there are engagements consistently----
Mr. Chaffetz. Are they ready to handle this in January?
General Bash. Sir, sitting here in Washington, D.C., and
talking to the commander out there, their plan is to have a
phased approach based on conditions. So if they are not ready--
--
Mr. Chaffetz. Based on your assessment of the conditions
today--and I think it has been benched back to March of 2013.
General Bash. In fact, that is what we have heard today,
and that tells me that they are not ready on 1 January. And so
now they are going to move that to March to make a new
assessment.
Mr. Chaffetz. All right, let me keep going.
You talked about an ongoing effort to do a quarterly review
as the ministry starts to take over again. I seriously question
we should even do that. But at what point, what is the
threshold, what is the level of acceptable--what is the
threshold by which we say, this is unacceptable, this is
acceptable? Where do you say, well, they got 80 percent of it
right, so we will just keep going? Where is that threshold?
General Bash. Sir, I would think that, to a certain extent,
there is going to be some commander judgment in balancing the
needs of the mission to grow the Afghan----
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess as a follow-up we would love to know
what sort of metrics are going to be in place so we can look at
it objectively, we are not doing this subjective analysis. I
think that is what the Inspector is looking for, and I think
that is what Congress is looking for, as well.
If somebody did shred the documents, what should happen to
them?
Mr. Estevez. Obviously, we should investigate the cause of
the shredding, why they were shredded, and we should hold
people accountable.
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess I am questioning, what would be
``holding people accountable''?
Mr. Estevez. I mean, that will have to--it will depend on
the circumstances.
Mr. Chaffetz. If you could perhaps follow up on this. Is
there any justification--I mean, one of the things that popped
up in this interim report was this $20 million for firewood. Is
there any justification for that?
General Bash. Well, in fact, we did follow up with that on
the commanders. And as you probably are aware, firewood is the
primary source of energy in rural Afghanistan. In the Afghan
Army, every DFAC, every dining facility has a fire that helps
them cook. That is just how they operate there. And so they use
the estimates of fuel--you know, wood is as important as gas.
And so that is the nature of the requirement. We don't
necessarily question the requirement. But, again, it is the
situation of, you know, $20 million at--firewood in Afghanistan
right now because of deforestation, there is only, like, 1 or 2
percent of the country that has it. And so the price of
firewood has no doubt gone up because of demand.
But they have told us that they have, you know, procedures
in place similar to other commodities to track the requirements
for firewood and make assessments about those needs.
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess that is the same concern, because
when the Inspector General's office went in there and asked for
the assessment, how did you come up with this number--I will
let Mr. Sopko fill in the blank on what they said.
Mr. Sopko. They basically told our auditors, Mr. Chairman,
``We don't know. We don't have the records. We just pay it.''
Mr. Chaffetz. So, General, you are sitting in my seat; what
do you do with that? You call a general up here and ask him to
help answer it, and what is the answer to that?
General Bash. I can appreciate that. And we read that
testimony and yesterday asked the commander about it, and he
said that they have--the commander in charge now, they said
they have records that give him confidence that the----
Mr. Chaffetz. When we will have those records?
General Bash. Well, they are working with the Special
Investigator----
Mr. Chaffetz. No, I want a date from you, General. When is
the Inspector General going to have those records? What is
reasonable?
If they have them, right, and they know they have them,
just send them over. I mean, FedEx probably doesn't work in
Afghanistan like it does in Provo, Utah. But, nevertheless,
when is he going to get those records? You are being told they
have them, so it shouldn't be that hard.
Mr. Estevez. Well, again, you know, Mr. Sopko has said we
have given him a disk, he is going through that disk----
Mr. Chaffetz. I want the firewood records. Where are the
firewood records?
General Bash. All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that we will
take that for action and----
Mr. Chaffetz. Sir, with all due respect, I am looking for a
date. Give me a date. What is a reasonable date?
Mr. Estevez. Really, we cannot answer that question sitting
here at a table in Washington, Chairman Chaffetz. There are a
lot of other things going on in Afghanistan----
Mr. Chaffetz. Will you commit to giving me a date within a
week?
Mr. Estevez. I will commit to giving you a date, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Within a week? Is that fair?
Mr. Estevez. Within a week.
Mr. Chaffetz. Very good. Thank you.
I need to talk quickly about debarment. One of the
allegations is that the debarment process is not working. The
Inspector General, in a letter to myself and Ranking Member
Tierney, identifies I believe it is 43 contractors that have
not necessarily been put on the debarment, and that this
process has a backlog.
Can you give us your perspective on that?
Mr. Estevez. I can. SIGAR has referred 122 individuals and
entities to the Army with recommendations. Fifty-two we
received prior to August. Forty-two of those folks are already
debarred. Seventy referrals were received in the last 45 days,
and 59 of those referrals were given after September 4th, or on
September 4th.
There is a due process way that you do a debarment that is
written into law and into the FAR, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. So we have to follow that process to debar, and it
takes a preponderance of evidence. So there is going to be
back-and-forth on evidence. If everything is in order, the Army
can--in this case, the Army happens to be the suspension
debarment authority--can debar within 30 days.
Outside of that process, there is the process that this
Congress authorized last year in Section 841, which is not
contracting with the enemy. And that is not a suspension
debarment process, but we can terminate contracts of folks
identified under that. And, again, that is done within the
CENTCOM chain of command.
Mr. Chaffetz. What sort of backlog do you have currently?
Mr. Estevez. I can't speak to the total Army level of
backlog, but as I just said, they are going through the number
that the Special Investigator just sent over. The Army has--
total debarment this year in Afghanistan is 100. That is double
what was done in the last 4 years.
Mr. Chaffetz. And what is the time frame? If the Special
Inspector General gives a name, what should happen and what is
happening in terms of when does it get to the finish line where
a determination is made?
Mr. Estevez. Well, again, it depends on--first, suspension
and debarment has to be in the interests of the Federal
Government, and it has to follow the Federal Acquisition
Regulation in order to do that. If all the evidence lines up
properly that they need in order to do this, following due
process, they can do it within a 30-day time frame.
Mr. Chaffetz. And, Mr. Sopko, can you give us your
perspective on what is happening and not happening in this
regard?
Mr. Sopko. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the question here--
and we don't disagree with the Army that they have set up a
very good process. But we think that process was set up for the
normal, run-of-the-mill cases, for cases dealing with U.S.
companies or companies here in the United States.
What you have here is you have a war. We are in a war zone.
We have to move quickly. This has to be a priority.
When the Department of Commerce puts an entity, an
individual, a company on a list that is called the entities
list, and these are entities and individuals and companies that
are tied to our enemies, and we have to stand in line with the
other thousand cases and there is no priority given to us and
no priority given to the fact that these are entities which
could actually be getting access to our military bases as we
speak because they have only four--only four--debarment
officials in the entire United States Army and only one
assigned to this region, and it will usually take a year. That
is what the backlog is.
All we are saying is you have a great process, but it was a
process set up for a non-war. We are in a war. Let's take it
seriously. Let's give suspension and debarment authority to the
commanders in the field; let's give it to the SIGAR. And let's
move on this.
I mean, I find it very troubling that one branch of the
government can list an entity as being identified to the
Haqqani organization and the al Qaeda, and now we are waiting
for a year to debar and suspend them. And particularly in
Afghanistan, where we are dealing with subcontractors. That is
what the threat is. You know, the system they have in place is
a system that is excellent when we are not fighting a war. We
are in a war now.
Mr. Chaffetz. I will yield my time and recognize the
gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Tierney. I only want to follow up on that line of
questioning.
Secretary, the SIGAR has made a recommendation for a draft
regulation to the Office of Management and Budget, but the
understanding is that the Department of Defense issued an
objection to that. Can you shed some light on that?
Mr. Estevez. Unfortunately, sir, I can't. I will have to
look into that.
We believe that the process is working.
The entities list, by the way, with the Department of
Commerce is not a list for suspension/debarment, has nothing to
do with it. It is an export control regiment. So that is not
the process.
However, I will point out that this Congress has given us a
number of authorities that we can use, including the
requirement to do, you know, when the contract clause is
written--and, of course, that was just given--to manage
subcontractors and Section 841, which does allow us to
terminate contracts related to contracting with the enemy.
Mr. Tierney. I am familiar with that one; I wrote it.
Mr. Estevez. I know you are, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Having written that, I am very familiar with
it.
But the bottom line is how long does it take to debar
somebody when you are told or the Department of Defense is told
that this person is working with the Taliban or with the
Haqqani group or with al Qaeda? I hope you are going to tell me
a matter of days and not a matter of months or years.
Mr. Estevez. With proper evidence and--two things: again,
841, which you are familiar with, you do not have to suspend/
debar. You can use 841 under the authority of the CENTCOM
commander to do that. So that can be done with evidence, and
that can be done with evidence that can't be used in a
suspension/debarment activity, classified evidence.
A suspension/debarment activity separate and distinct from
what would be done under 841 can be done within 30 days, given
the proper evidence.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Just a little bit more questions.
Mr. Sopko, did you want to add to anything that was just
said there? I just want to finish that up.
Mr. Sopko. Well, I would--you know, with all due deference
to the Assistant Secretary, as a lawyer I would think, first of
all, being listed on the entities list would be grounds for
suspension/debarment. And 841, being listed on 841 is not being
used currently to suspend and debar people.
And the other thing is, once you are on the suspension/
debarment list, then international organizations take notice of
this also. And that is the other problem. We have international
organizations that may be contracting; of course, we are
funding those international organizations.
So the suspension and debarment--and I am happy to provide
additional legal justifications we did on this matter.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I would also mention that myself and the ranking member,
Mr. Tierney, and I are working on a piece of legislation we may
be dropping soon to talk about discussing the possibility of
pushing this back, the POL, and the money going directly to the
Afghan Government, until we can sort this out.
One of the deep concerns here is, we can't seem to manage
it, we can't even seem to get this right, and we have been
operating in-theater for 10 years and we are the United States
of America. And we expect that suddenly the Afghan Government
is going to handle hundreds of millions of dollars and do so in
a proficient manner and do so with great oversight and
accountability? It just seems totally unreasonable.
There was way a reason we invited Mr. Sampler here. I would
like to talk a little bit about USAID. I am going to transition
here for a moment as we start to try to wrap this up.
But, Mr. Sampler, we appreciate your work and what USAID is
trying to do. I have been very supportive of Mr. Shah in his
responsibility as the Administrator there at USAID. I think he
is passionate and cares.
But one of the deep concerns that I have is that USAID is
moving in a direction that is, in essence, less accountability,
less oversight, and more direct assistance. And I would point
to this USAID Forward program that was put out, which talks
about, quote, ``to achieve capacity-building objectives in
using host country systems where it makes sense,'' end quote.
In some regards, that sounds good, but we are typically looking
at third-world countries, developing countries, that don't have
the assets or the sophistication to necessarily do what we
would like them to do.
My general concern is that, rather than teaching them how
to fish, we are just continuing to hand them fish; in fact, we
are trying to expedite that by just handing them more fish at
an accelerated rate, more money, directly there, not knowing if
it actually gets to the finish line, not knowing if it actually
achieves what we are trying to achieve.
We have trouble getting information from USAID to justify
these expenditures as it is, and it seems to me that this would
make it even worse. That is exacerbated by the fact that we are
at war, that we have tens of thousands of U.S. troops on the
ground in Afghanistan trying to do some very difficult work.
Do you have a sense of--and so, that is the general
concern. Can you give me a sense of how much foreign aid we
have given to Afghanistan and how much of that would be
categorized in this, sort of, direct assistance bucket, if you
will?
Mr. Sampler. Mr. Chairman, in a previous testimony, I said
that it was $15 billion was the assistance that had been
delivered to Afghanistan. I cannot at the moment recollect how
much of that is direct or what we call on-budget assistance,
but I will get you that answer.
The number of $15 billion is huge. And as a taxpayer
myself, that raises concerns. But I would characterize the way
that USAID does this as being a layered defense, in the sense
that we protect U.S. taxpayer dollars through a number of
different mechanisms.
And if I could, I will give you two or three of the
examples of how on-budget----
Mr. Chaffetz. One or two would be great. We have to move
swiftly. Sorry.
Mr. Sampler. We projectize the money that we give to the
Government of Afghanistan. That is, we don't give them money
and ask what they are going to do with it. We work with the
ministry to say, the ministry wants to do X. And so it is
projectized.
And at that point, we also provide technical assistance to
help break out milestones for that project. If you are going to
do X, how do we get halfway and halfway again and halfway
again. And on those milestones, we identify particular
benchmarks that we will pay for on a cost-reimbursable basis.
So throughout the lifecycle of the project, we control the
money. The deal is----
Mr. Chaffetz. But, you know, the concern is, going back to
last year, the GAO determined that USAID had failed to conduct
appropriate risk assessments prior to granting a lot of the
bilateral aid. Are you telling me that those problems the GAO
identified last year have gone away, they have been solved?
Mr. Sampler. Actually, I will if we are talking about the
same problems. I pulled the report after I saw the testimony,
and I believe the report referred to determinations that we are
required to make before any disbursement. And, in this case, it
was a series of disbursements to the World Bank Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund. And in that case, there were
determinations that were not made. We made some, and then there
was a period of time when they were not made. It was brought to
our attention through the report, which is, again, one of the
reasons we find these reports so valuable.
And in the response to the report, the mission director and
Sean Carroll, who was our Chief of Staff at the time, noted
that we had been lax in doing those determinations and
confirmed that they would be done henceforth.
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess part of my concern is that, under the
new Forward initiative for USAID, USAID plans to funnel roughly
30 percent of U.S. foreign assistance directly to foreign
governments and NGOs in the hopes that this money can, you
know, quote/unquote, ``build capacity.'' Yet I don't see
examples of where--and maybe, you know, as a follow-up to
this--where we can point to something and say, ``This is how we
are becoming more accountable. This is how we are doing more
oversight.''
That is the help that this committee would like. It is one
of the concerns with this so-called Forward initiative, and it
is an even deeper concern in Afghanistan. Because I think one
of the untold sad stories that we are going to look back here
upon in Afghanistan years, decades from now is the waste, the
fraud, the abuse, that we were exacerbating the problem, we
were funneling money to the enemy, we were funding the enemy. I
mean, the host-nation trucking work that my colleague here, Mr.
Tierney, did is crystal-clear in how problematic it was that we
were funding the enemy.
And I just can't--I just fundamentally have trouble sending
money directly to these governments without the accountability
metrics in place.
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, you articulated two dimensions of
this problem.
One is the 30 percent goal across the world. And that is
actually an aspirational goal. And I will note that the 30
percent is aggregate at the agency level. So if in a particular
country it doesn't make sense to even attempt to get to 30
percent, we won't. There are no disincentives, there are no
punishments if mission directors don't reach this goal. It is
an aspirational goal.
And it is actually in the service of good development.
Development is one of the few industries, perhaps other than
dentists, where we try to put ourselves out of business. And
for us to do development----
Mr. Chaffetz. Not my dentist, I will tell you that. We are
trying to put his kids through college, is what we are trying
to do in our family.
Mr. Sampler. Well, we work to build the host national
capacity. And to not do that would not be to execute our duties
as development professionals.
But we do recognize that, as stewards of taxpayer dollars,
we have to do it responsibly. And there are examples in
Afghanistan where we have done pre-award assessments and we
have said, we will not allow you to do what you have described
but will allow you to do something lesser.
The Department of Education is an example. The Department
of Education wanted us to fund textbooks and training for
teachers. Because textbooks can be counted, we actually
evaluated the Department of Education and said, you meet a
rational standard for being able to on your own execute this
budget and buy textbooks. We will give you money, you will buy
textbooks, we will count the textbooks, and we will consider it
done.
We did not believe that the Department of Education reached
a level of ability to take the same kind of money and execute
teacher training, because it is harder to count the quality and
the number of teachers trained.
So we are still providing technical assistance to the
Ministry of Education so that in months or years ahead we will
be able then to provide that ministry with a higher level of
control and a higher level of autonomy to provide teacher
training.
Mr. Chaffetz. I would appreciate it--and, again, I am not
expecting you to respond right here at the moment to the
details of this. But myself and Chairman Issa, on April 26th of
this year, sent Administrator Shah a request asking for USAID's
internal country assessments--this is also known as the Public
Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework, the PFMRAF
documents--related to this new direct assistance program. But
as of yet, USAID and the State Department have refused to
provide this list in an unredacted form.
I guess what I am asking you to respond to is, will you
give us and provide the Congress that information?
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, I do know that that process is
under way and your staff have been talking to State----
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, the problem is we asked for it in
April, and here we are in September and the process is still
under way. I just don't understand why this isn't a
photocopying exercise.
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, I am sorry, I am not the person
who deals with what documents--I am not familiar with the
details of that process. I do know that----
Mr. Chaffetz. But you were told to say today that we are
working on this? Is that the idea?
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, I wasn't told to say it. I just
know that we are working on it.
Mr. Chaffetz. Okay. This is one of the core questions that
we have, and it gives some of the oversight that--or some of
the information that we need. Would you please talk to
Administrator Shah and look at this April 26th letter? Because
we still have not had the proper and full response to that
letter.
Mr. Sampler. I will take that back today.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I appreciate that.
If the ranking member has no additional questions, I wanted
to provide you each a very brief--because we have gone
exceptionally long--opportunity to give a closing comment, and
then we will conclude this hearing.
We will start with you, Mr. Sampler, and then we will just
kind of work down the list.
Mr. Sampler. Thank you, and I will be very brief.
I think at this committee it is an opportunity to reinforce
the importance that oversight and accountability does play in
what USAID does.
A large part of our work that is seen is seen to be
humanitarian in nature. It is providing education. It is
providing opportunities for women. It is providing health and
benefits to the people of Afghanistan. But a tremendous amount
of our work is done beneath the surface, so to speak, which
does involve the kinds of oversight and the kinds of
accountability that I think your committee and certainly SIGAR,
GAO, and our own inspectors general expect of us.
So it was not gratuitous when I said in my opening remarks
that we value and appreciate the value of oversight and
accountability. And as we move in the direction of on-budget
support, that will become even more important. So I welcome the
opportunity to speak to you today.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
General Bash?
General Bash. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that we take
these issues very seriously. As the chairman's representative,
we do not want to let the taxpayer money go to waste. So we
very much appreciate working with the Special Investigator. We
will continue to do that, absolutely, as we go forward for
their requests to be responsive.
The mission, you know, in Afghanistan is the primary issue,
and to build the institutional capacity is really the core
thing. As we leave, can they do it on their own? And that is
the art of the commander's judgment out there. You know, to use
an analogy, how do you take the training wheels off to let them
have a chance?
And from a logistics perspective, we have only been doing
that for about a year or so. As we move forward, those
challenges will only increase. So it is a journey. But with
regard to the issues we have discussed today, we are focused,
and we will make sure that we make progress.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, General.
Mr. Estevez?
Mr. Estevez. Likewise to what General Bash said.
First, our folks out there are doing some very hard work,
and we need to recognize that in trying to build this Afghan
capacity. It is the key to our success in Afghanistan.
We appreciate the dialogue with this committee on that
matter today. We appreciate the work of the Special Inspector
General. Because it is hard work and not everything is gotten
right the first time, and we need help. We need help in helping
them. So all help is appreciated in doing this.
We are committed to doing that in a transparent way. I
think that is important for our forces, and it is important to
the American people to know how we are doing it. So we are
going to continue pressing that forward. And, again, we
appreciate the work.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. I would just like to conclude by saying that the
importance of the records issue that we have spent so much time
talking about is not so much whether the SIGAR got the records;
the question is whether the records were used and have been
used and will be used to hold the Afghan Government and this
program accountable so we don't have fraud, waste, and abuse.
Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I appreciate your commitment and your work to
this country, the patriotism and the dedication you bring, but
also those men and women, particularly who are serving
overseas, who are doing the hard, difficult work away from
their families and doing what their country is asking them to
do. So please, if nothing else, share that message with them.
I appreciate you spending time before the committee. This
is part of the process. It is how our Constitution is set up.
And I do appreciate your participation here today.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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