- MISMANAGEMENT OF FUNDS AT THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE AND THE IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF WEATHER FORECASTING

[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

MISMANAGEMENT OF FUNDS AT
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE
AND THE IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF
WEATHER FORECASTING

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012

__________

Serial No. 112-103

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas PAUL D. TONKO, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
SANDY ADAMS, Florida FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
Tennessee VACANCY
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia VACANCY
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi VACANCY
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
------

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., PAUL D. TONKO, New York
Wisconsin ZOE LOFGREN, California
SANDY ADAMS, Florida BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois JERRY McNERNEY, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

C O N T E N T S

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sandy Adams, Vice-Chair, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 11
Written Statement............................................ 12

Statement by Representative Paul D. Tonko, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 13
Written Statement............................................ 15

Witnesses:

Panel I

Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Environmental Observation and Prediction and Deputy
Administrator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 20

Inspector General Todd J. Zinser, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Inspector General
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 28

Panel II

Dr. William B. Gail, Chief Technology Officer, Global Weather
Corporation, Committee on the Assessment of the National
Weather Service's Modernization Program, National Research
Council of the National Academies
Oral Statement............................................... 52
Written Statement............................................ 55

INVITED - Ms. Maureen Wylie, Chief, Resource and Operations
Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce

Mr. Richard Hirn, General Counsel and Legislative Director,
National Weather Service Employees Organization
Oral Statement............................................... 64
Written Statement............................................ 66

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

INVITED - Ms. Maureen Wylie, Chief, Resource and Operations
Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce.................................... 84

Inspector General Todd J. Zinser, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Inspector General.................................... 89

Mr. Richard Hirn, General Counsel and Legislative Director,
National Weather Service Employees Organization................ 100

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

Department of Commerce Acting Secretary, Ms. Rebecca Blank, May
24, 2012 memorandum submitted by Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan....... 114

Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, Dr.
Lubchenco, May 24, 2012 memorandum submitted by Dr. Kathryn D.
Sullivan....................................................... 126

Joint NOAA DOC investigative report's Executive Summary
(redacted)..................................................... 132

MISMANAGEMENT OF FUNDS
AT THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE AND
THE IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF
WEATHER FORECASTING

----------

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:33 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sandy
Adams [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

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Vice-Chairwoman Adams. The Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight will come to order.
Good afternoon. Welcome to today's hearing entitled
``Mismanagement of Funds at the National Weather Service and
the Impact on the Future of Weather Forecasting.'' Today's
hearing will consist of two panels. You will find in the front
of you packets containing written testimony, biographies, and
truth-in-testimony disclosures for both of today's witness
panels.
I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
As Vice Chair of the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to chair the hearing in Dr.
Broun's place.
We are here today to better understand what led to the
mismanagement of funds at the National Weather Service. Our
first panel will provide insight into how that mismanagement
occurred, why there was insufficient oversight by department
leaders, how the investigation was conducted, and the decisions
and corrective actions that NOAA and the Department of Commerce
will make going forward.
Our second panel will provide context for how we got in
this situation in the first place. We will hear from the
National Weather Service Employees Organization about the
stresses on labor funding and staffing, as well as the National
Academies of Science about their recent report on how to plan,
deploy, and oversee future improvements at the Weather Service,
specifically the need to integrate advances in science and
technology.
Congress' appreciation of the value of the National Weather
Service is evidenced by its financial commitment to it. Since
2007, Congress has exceeded the Administration's request for
the National Weather Service in all but two years, including
2011 when this Congress had to move a CR six months into the
fiscal year. So when Congress is informed that the Weather
Service has been experiencing a budget shortfall for several
years, we are understandably concerned. Keeping Congress in the
dark while there is a storm brewing at the Agency is at best
irresponsible, and at worst dishonest.
We have also been informed that no ``NWS employee committed
fraud or received personal financial gain through their
actions.'' Yes, I am glad that no one stole money for personal
gain, but make no mistake; Congress' trust--my trust--has been
violated. Money designated for programs like the Advanced
Weather Interactive Processing System and Weather Radio
Improvement Projects, important investments in future
capabilities, were used to pay for other near-term expenses.
Why did the Agency decide to ``rob Peter to pay Paul,'' rather
than appropriately prioritizing in the first place? Perhaps the
clues lie in the May 24, 2012, decision memo issued by
Administrator Lubchenco when she states, ``the NWS operated
with an unacceptable lack of transparency relating to budgeting
and without mechanisms for staff to air their concerns about
budget formulation and execution within NWS, creating an
environment of mistrust.''
Then there is the question of NWS oversight, or lack
thereof. The same memo also states that the investigative team
that reviewed the financial mismanagement issues found
``failure of management and oversight by NWS leadership.'' In
addition, the team found significant problems with budget and
financial controls at the National Weather Service and that
department financial and management controls were ineffective
at detecting or preventing this inappropriate reprogramming.''
Yet, despite this admission, NOAA and the Department of
Commerce refused to provide an important witness for today's
hearing. NOAA's Chief of Resources, Operations, and Management
(CROM), and former CFO during the events in question, would
have been able to provide a historical context for the funding
issues the Weather Service faced, a description of the
impediments of transparency she experienced as CFO, and a
detailed understanding of what NOAA needs to do going forward
to fully understand what happened and how it can be prevented
in the future. The Committee was willing to work with NOAA,
even going as far as allowing the Agency to only submit one
piece of written testimony, but NOAA still refused.
While I appreciate Dr. Sullivan's willingness to appear
before the Committee, denying the Committee's request to hear
from the person who was the Agency's principal financial
manager during a time in which millions of dollars of resources
were secretly misallocated is simply unacceptable. This should
be embarrassing for an administration that repeatedly declares
itself ``the most transparent in history.''
The Committee has also requested a number of documents from
NOAA, some of which were originally requested months ago.
Unfortunately, NOAA has not provided a number of resources that
should be readily available. When an agency refuses to provide
a witness, as well as requested documents, it makes it
difficult for us to conduct a thorough oversight. It also makes
it difficult for us not to ask: what are you hiding?
The Committee will continue to track this issue as NOAA and
the Department of Commerce attempt to identify the exact costs
and impacts of these transfers, as well as how they plan to
prevent it from happening in the future. Unfortunately, as the
Commerce IG will mention in his testimony, allegations of
similar behavior are still coming in, even as recently as last
month.
Now, as a former law enforcement officer, I understand that
allegations have to be investigated thoroughly, but the simple
fact that these complaints are still coming in tells me that
NOAA and the Department still have a problem on their hands.
I look forward to all our witness testimonies and thank
them for appearing today.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tonko for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Adams follows:]

Prepared Statement of Subcommittee Vice-Chairwoman Sandy Adams

Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing. As Vice-Chair of the
Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to chair
the hearing in Dr. Broun's place.
We are here today to better understand what led to the
mismanagement of funds at the National Weather Service. Our first panel
will provide insight into how that mismanagement occurred, why there
was insufficient oversight by department leaders, how the investigation
was conducted and the decisions and corrective actions that NOAA and
the Department of Commerce will make going forward.
Our second panel will provide context for how we got in this
situation in the first place. We will hear from the National Weather
Service Employees Organization about the stresses on labor funding and
staffing, as well as the National Academies of Science about their
recent report on how to plan, deploy, and oversee future improvements
at the Weather Service, specifically the need to integrate advances in
science and technology.
Congress' appreciation of the value of the National Weather Service
is evidenced by its financial commitment to it. Since 2007, Congress
has exceeded the Administration's request for the National Weather
Service in all but two years, including 2011 when this Congress had to
move a CR six months into the fiscal year. So when Congress is informed
that the Weather Service has been experiencing a budget shortfall for
several years, we are understandably concerned. Keeping Congress in the
dark while there's a storm brewing at the agency is at best
irresponsible, and at worst dishonest.
We have also been informed that no ``NWS employee committed fraud
or received personal financial gain through their actions.'' Yes, I'm
glad that no one stole money for personal gain, but make no mistake,
Congress' trust--my trust--has been violated. Money designated for
programs like the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System and
Weather Radio Improvement Project, important investments in future
capabilities, were used to pay for other near-term expenses. Why did
the agency decide to `rob Peter to pay Paul,' rather than appropriately
prioritizing in the first place? Perhaps the clue lies in the May 24,
2012 decision memo issued by Administrator Lubchenco when she states:

``NThe NWS operated with an unacceptable lack of transparency
relating to budgeting and without mechanisms for staff to air their
concerns about budget formulation and execution within NWS, creating an
environment of mistrust.''

Then there's the question of NWS oversight, or lack thereof. The
same memo also states that the Investigative Team that reviewed the
financial mismanagement issues found:

``failure of management and oversight by NWS leadership. In
addition, the Team found significant problems with budget and financial
controls at the National Weather Service and that Departmental
financial and management controls were ineffective at detecting or
preventing this inappropriate reprogramming.''

Yet, despite this admission, NOAA and the Department of Commerce
refused to provide an important witness for today's hearing. NOAA's
Chief of Resources, Operations, and Management (CROM), and former CFO
during the events in question, would have been able to provide a
historical context for the funding issues the Weather Service faced, a
description of the impediments to transparency she experienced as CFO,
and a detailed understanding of what NOAA needs to do going forward to
fully understand what happened, and how it can be prevented in the
future. The Committee was willing to work with NOAA, even going as far
as allowing the agency to only submit one piece of written testimony,
but NOAA still refused. While I appreciate Dr. Sullivan's willingness
to appear before the Committee, denying the Committee's request to hear
from the person who was the agency's principal financial manager during
a time in which millions of dollars of resources were secretly
misallocated is simply unacceptable. This should be embarrassing for an
administration that repeatedly declares itself ``the most transparent
in history.''
The Committee has also requested a number of documents from NOAA--
some of which were originally requested months ago. Unfortunately, NOAA
has not provided a number of resources that should be readily
available. When an agency refuses to provide a witness as well as
requested documents, it makes it difficult for us to conduct thorough
oversight. It also makes it difficult for us not to ask: what are you
hiding?
The Committee will continue to track this issue as NOAA and the
Department of Commerce attempt to identify the exact costs and impacts
of these transfers, as well as how they plan to prevent it from
happening in the future. Unfortunately, as the Commerce IG will mention
in his testimony, allegations of similar behavior are still coming in--
even as recently as last month. Now, as a former law enforcement
officer, I understand that allegations have to be investigated
thoroughly, but the simple fact that these complaints are still coming
in tells me that NOAA and the Department still have a problem on their
hands.

I look forward to all of our witnesses testimony, and thank them
for appearing today.

Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I start with several statements of the obvious. The
National Weather Service, or NWS, is a vital public safety
organization and the public greatly values the organization and
its work. Congress authorizes and appropriates funds to federal
agencies for specific purposes and has been supportive of the
NWS and its mission.
In light of this, the financial misconduct at the National
Weather Service is shocking. There are well established and
widely understood processes for NWS to use if top management
believes that funds must be reprogrammed. At their heart,
these--those processes involve consulting with Congress. If you
move money around without any accountability, as the former
Chief Financial Officer at NWS did, you are violating the Anti-
Deficiency Act, a statute that clearly sets limits and
penalties for spending money not authorized or appropriated by
Congress. The power of the purse is enshrined for Congress in
the Constitution and for any senior official to ignore the law
and the Constitution is a deeply troubling event.
There are important investigative questions about what
happened and why in the NWS, but the committee majority has
expressed its preference not to release the investigative
report produced by NOAA management to the public. The Committee
has not engaged in its own investigation to test the findings
in that report to reach our own conclusions. This Subcommittee
has much more work to do before any of these questions could be
answered. Instead, much of this hearing will be about the path
forward for NWS and NOAA in ensuring that a future CFO cannot
engage in systematic financial deception. That is fine as far
as it goes.
I think the proposals put forward by the Agency make sense.
However, I am not sure we agree with this hearing's focus or
scope. While there is no question that wrongdoing occurred at
NOAA, just as troubling to me is the failure by the Inspector
General's office at the Department of Commerce to take
aggressive steps to investigate this matter. The IG is the cop
on the beat, so to speak, at federal agencies. Congress
empowers IGs with broad authority to investigate the inner
workings of their agency, provides funding for investigative
staff, and has established whistleblower protections for
federal employees to try to encourage a culture where
accountability is rewarded.
The IG offices are vital partners in Congress' oversight
responsibility. In this instance, the cop appears to have been
taking a break and the partnership failed. Inspector General
Zinser has included in his testimony an accounting of the
allegations his office received regarding financial
irregularities at NWS and the disposition of those allegations.
After receiving multiple tips, the IG's office recognized the
potential problem. But the response to allegations of high-
level financial shenanigans seems to have been to send those
allegations back to the Agency to ask them to check on their
own misconduct. It seems counterintuitive to me that the best
way to ferret out problems is to ask potential wrongdoers to
investigate their own wrongdoing.
Even the one preliminary investigation that was triggered
by the hotline tips coming into the IG's office reveals
something a little odd. That tip appears to have come in during
October of 2010. However, Mr. Zinser was unaware that his
office had received the allegations, that his staff had
launched a preliminary investigation, or that his staff
believed an Anti-Deficiency Act violation had occurred until
November of 2011, one year later. By the time Mr. Zinser had
seen his staff's memo, NOAA had already conducted its own
preliminary investigation and had begun to take steps to remove
the CFO from his post. And when it came time to launch a full
investigation, the IG allowed the Agency to conduct its own
investigation. The IG's office was limited to offering
investigative advice and questions to the team that NOAA put
together. These procedures bear no resemblance to the conduct
of an independent investigative office.
Since the scandal broke, the IG has instituted a new system
where allegations are aggregated each week and forwarded to a
senior level review team led by the IG himself. That is
certainly a positive step but for five years his office did not
do this. One has to wonder whether other anonymous tips were
ignored or sent back to the perpetrators with the
recommendation that they investigate themselves.
Finally, the IG has a mandate to inform Congress in a
timely fashion of important agency misconduct and
mismanagement. Yet to my knowledge, the IG did not inform this
committee or the Appropriations Committee that they had
uncovered evidence of this apparent violation of law. This
represents a real failing to follow the intent that the IG
communicate with Congress about significant misconduct at their
agency. There is no partnership where there is no
communication. This is unacceptable.
Madam Chair, I hope you agree that this committee deserves
answers to our questions about what went wrong in the IG shop
as we rely on that office to be our eyes and our ears for
wrongdoing. Congress has a responsibility to the taxpayer to
not allow--to not only allocate budgets to the agencies but to
ensure that allocated funds are spent wisely and in accordance
with the law. I am concerned that the Department of Commerce
OIG has failed to carry out the mission of his office and I
expect his full cooperation in helping us understand what they
did, good and bad, and that he stand accountable for those
actions.
And with that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tonko follows:]

Prepared Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Paul D. Tonko

Thank you, Madame Chair.
I start with several statements of the obvious: The National
Weather Service (NWS) is a vital, public safety organization, and the
public greatly values the organization and its work. Congress
authorizes and appropriates funds to federal agencies for specific
purposes and has been supportive of the NWS and its mission. In light
of this, the financial misconduct at the National Weather Service is
shocking.
There are well established and widely understood processes for NWS
to use if top management feels that funds must be reprogrammed. At
their heart, those processes involve consulting with Congress. If you
move money around without any accountability, as the former Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) at NWS did, you are violating the Anti-
Deficiency Act-a statute that sets clear limits and penalties for
spending money not authorized or appropriated by Congress. The power of
the purse is enshrined for Congress in the Constitution and for any
senior official to ignore the law and the Constitution is a deeply
troubling event.
We will not be able to delve deeply into the details of this
incident at today's hearing or answer many outstanding questions. Why
were these funds being moved without a reprogramming request? Which
accounts received additional funding and which accounts were short-
changed? Why did whistleblowers have to complain repeatedly to the
Agency and the Inspector General's Office before anyone noticed that
something was amiss in the NWS budget?
The Committee Majority have expressed their preference not to
release the investigative report produced by NOAA management to the
public. The Committee has not engaged in its own investigation to test
the findings in that report to reach our own conclusions. This
Subcommittee has much more work to do before any of these questions
could be answered.
Instead, much of this hearing will be about the path forward for
NWS and NOAA in ensuring that a future CFO cannot engage in systematic
financial deception. That is fine as far as it goes. I think the
proposals put forward by the Agency make sense. However, I am not sure
we agree with this hearing's focus or scope. While there is no question
that wrong-doing occurred at NOAA, just as troubling to me is the
failure by the Inspector General's office at the Department of Commerce
to take aggressive steps to investigate this matter.
The IG is the cop on the beat at federal agencies. Congress
empowers IG's with broad authority to investigate the inner workings of
their agency, provides funding for investigative staff, and has
established whistleblower protections for Federal employees to try to
encourage a culture where accountability is rewarded. The IG offices
are vital partners in Congress's oversight responsibility. In this
instance, the cop appears to have been taking a break, and the
partnership failed.
Inspector General Zinser has included in his testimony an
accounting of the allegations his office received regarding financial
irregularities at NWS and the disposition of those allegations. After
receiving multiple tips, the IG's office recognized the potential
problem. But, the response to allegations of high-level financial
shenanigans seems to have been to send those allegations back to the
agency to ask them to check on their own misconduct. It seems counter-
intuitive to me that the best way to ferret out problems is to ask a
potential wrong-doer to investigate their own wrong-doing.
Even the one preliminary investigation that was triggered by the
hotline tips coming into the IG's office reveals something a little
odd. That tip appears to have come in October of 2010. However, Mr.
Zinser was unaware that his office had received the allegation, that
his staff had launched a preliminary investigation, or that his staff
believed an Anti-Deficiency Act violation had occurred until November
of 2011--one year later.
By the time Mr. Zinser had seen his staff's memo, NOAA had already
conducted their own preliminary investigation and had begun to take
steps to remove the CFO from his post. And when it came time to launch
a full investigation, the IG allowed the agency to conduct its own
investigation. The IG's office was limited to offering investigative
advice and questions to the team that NOAA put together. These
procedures bear no resemblance to the conduct of an independent
investigative office.
Since the scandal broke, the IG has instituted a new system where
allegations are aggregated each week and forwarded to a senior level
review team led by the IG himself. That is certainly a positive step.
But for five years, his office did not do this and one has to
wonder whether other anonymous tips were ignored or sent back to the
perpetrators with a recommendation that they investigate themselves.
Finally, the IG has a mandate to inform Congress in a timely
fashion of important agency misconduct and mismanagement. Mr. Zinser
has expressed to Committee staff that he believes there was sufficient
evidence in the preliminary investigative memo done by his staff in
November of 2011 that an Anti-Deficiency Act violation had occurred.
Yet, to my knowledge the IG did not inform this Committee or the
Appropriations Committee that they had uncovered evidence of this
apparent violation of law.
His explanation was that he believed that the Agency was going to
inform Congress, but there was no follow up to confirm this. In fact,
this Committee, which has black letter jurisdiction over the National
Weather Service, did not learn of the situation until April of 2012.
This represents a real failing to follow the intent that the IG
communicate with Congress about significant misconduct at their agency.
There is no partnership where there is no communication. This is
unacceptable.
I understand that this IG had a lot on his plate with oversight of
the recovery act and politically-charged requests for investigations
into topics such as climate science. Being the Inspector General at the
Department of Commerce has been a notoriously difficult post. However,
it is clear that in the five years that this IG has been on the job he
did not put in place information and decision-making processes to
guarantee that credible, important allegations receive high level
attention and timely action. If the first complaint from Spring of 2010
had been acted on quickly by the IG, as it should have been, we might
have kept this situation from spinning so far out of control.
Madame Chair, I hope you agree that this Committee deserves answers
to our questions about what went wrong in the IG's shop, as we rely on
that office to be our eyes and ears for wrong-doing. Congress has a
responsibility to the taxpayer to not only allocate budgets to the
agencies, but to ensure the allocated funds are spent wisely and in
accordance with the law. I am concerned that the Department of Commerce
IG has failed to carry out the mission of the office, and I expect his
full cooperation in helping us understand what they did--good and bad--
and that he stand accountable for those actions.

Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you, Mr. Tonko.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
Now, I am going to introduce our first panel.
At this time, I would like to introduce our first panel of
witnesses. Our first witness is Dr. Kathryn Sullivan, the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation
and Prediction, and the Deputy Administrator for the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration at the United States
Department of Commerce. Our second witness will be Inspector
General Todd Zinser of the United States Department of Commerce
Office of Inspector General.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee
will have five minutes each to ask questions. Your written
testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. It is
the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do either of you
have--or do any of you have any objection to taking an oath?
Dr. Sullivan. No objection.
Mr. Zinser. No objection.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect that all
witnesses were willing to take an oath.
You may also be represented by counsel. Do any of you have
counsel here with you today?
Dr. Sullivan. I do not.
Mr. Zinser. No.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect none of the
witnesses have had counsel.
If you would now please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the
whole truth, nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. Sullivan. I do.
Mr. Zinser. I do.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect that all
witnesses participating have taken the oath.
Thank you.
I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Kathryn Sullivan.

TESTIMONY OF DR. KATHRYN D. SULLIVAN,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION

AND DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE NATIONAL

OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Dr. Sullivan. Thank you, Vice Chair Adams, Ranking Member
Tonko, Mr. McNerney, Members of the Committee. I want to start
by thanking you for your support of NOAA and specifically for
the National Weather Service throughout the years. I know you
join me in admiring the men and women of the Weather Service
who, day in and out, provide the accurate timely warnings and
forecasts that protect lives and livelihoods across our Nation.
Unfortunately, I am here today to testify on misconduct and
budget formulation execution within the Service. Before going
further, I do want to stress a vital point. While the conduct
was wrong and breached the trust between NOAA and this
Congress, at no point did it compromise performance of our core
forecast and warning mission.
We first learned of the alleged misconduct in late November
2011. NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco notified then-
Deputy Secretary Dr. Blank and directed several immediate
remedial actions. We put a government employee on
administrative leave, we assigned the Chief Financial Officer
from NOAA Fisheries to serve as the acting Weather Service CFO.
Dr. Blank and Dr. Lubchenco launched an internal investigation
led by myself as the senior NOAA official and a counterpart
from the Commerce Department's CFO office. We also informed the
Department of Commerce Inspector General of our intended
investigation and he agreed that an internal inquiry was the
proper course of action. Finally, we notified the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations of both the allegations and
our investigation.
As we reported upon conclusion of the investigation in May,
we found that the Weather Service reprogrammed funds in fiscal
years 2010 and 2011 without appropriate Congressional
notification. The mechanisms used were complex and undetectable
by existing financial controls. We also found a significant
lack of transparency and ineffective oversight of budget
execution within the Weather Service. Importantly, as noted, we
found no evidence of fraud or personal financial gain by any
employee.
We found further that the Weather Service had not actually
operated in the red or as a whole with overspending its funds
in a given year to accomplish its core mission. It did become
clear, however, that the Service did not have the right sums of
money in the right accounts to support labor and operating
costs.
On May 25 of this year, Acting Secretary Blank and Dr.
Lubchenco each issued a memorandum directing a set of
corrective actions. These have been underway since that date.
Dr. Lubchenco ordered 12 corrective actions all designed to
strengthen financial controls and increase transparency within
the Service, as well as to ensure no similar issues exist
elsewhere in the Agency. We directed changes in the Weather
Service supervisory structure to strengthen oversight of the
CFO by both the Weather Service Deputy AA and the NOAA CFO. We
are creating a well documented and transparent process to
ensure that Weather Service budget formulation and execution
are properly aligned and within the limits of appropriated
funds. We strengthened the NOAA CFO's supervision over summary
level transfers, one of the mechanisms used to executive the
expense transfers inappropriately in this case. Lastly, we have
awarded a contract to conduct an independent financial review
and analysis of the National Weather Service books going back
to fiscal year 2006.
In May, we worked with appropriators of both chambers to
reprogram $36 million, the sum needed to sustain current levels
of performance and our core forecast warning services and avert
the necessity of employee furloughs. This involved moving funds
out of research and spare parts inventories and delaying some
programs that support improvements for future years. The cuts
were not easy but few options remained open to us that late in
the fiscal year. The exceptional performance of the Weather
Service during Hurricane Isaac confirms that these have not
negatively affected our current warnings and forecast
performance.
We are fully cognizant that it is imperative and incumbent
upon us to restore sound financial management in the National
Weather Service. We are committed to doing that and to keeping
this committee informed of our progress. But even amid this
immediate challenge, we must be looking toward the future and
taking actions that ensure the long-term vitality and
effectiveness of the National Weather Service. The National
Academy study that the Congress requested is already guiding
our thinking in this regard. We share the Academy's sense that
the Service must, ``evolve its role and how it operates, making
it more agile and efficient,'' and we look forward to the
follow-on operations study directed by the CJS FY12 conference
report due in April 2013.
We hope that in the coming months our dialogue with the
Congress, our employees, and our stakeholders can focus on the
future, on how we all can work together to create that more
agile and efficient organization, a National Weather Service
for the 21st century that is, as the Academy says, second to
none.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify on this
very important matter. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sullivan follows:]

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Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. And I now recognize our
second witness for the panel, Inspector General Todd Zinser,
for five minutes.

TESTIMONY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL TODD J. ZINSER,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Mr. Zinser. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Tonko, Members of
the Subcommittee, good afternoon.
The invitation from Chairman Broun asked us to specifically
address four areas. One, identify how and when we received the
allegations relating to financial misconduct at the National
Weather Service. During the period June 2010 to August 2012, we
received numerous complaints through our hotline and from GAO
via their FraudNet. Eight concerned allegations of improper
reprogramming, and four concerned allegations about a former
employee of the National Weather Service Office of Chief
Financial Officer, who was brought back as a contractor. That
person is now a former contractor, thanks to the National
Weather Service staff who contacted our hotline and Dr.
Sullivan's prompt management action.
Two, explain our role in and provide a preliminary analysis
of the joint NOAA departmental investigative report following
NOAA's internal inquiry. I first became aware of allegations of
improper reprogramming at the National Weather Service in
November 2011, when the head of our audit staff sent a
memorandum to the National Weather Service Chief Financial
Officer and several other NOAA and Departmental officials which
basically said that we thought they had a $10 million improper
reprogramming issue concerning AWIPS funding and that they
should get an opinion from the Department's Office of General
Counsel. In our conversations with the National Weather Service
CFO's office during our review, they insisted that they had not
engaged in improper reprogramming. We disagreed and said they
needed to get the lawyers involved. A copy of our memorandum is
attached to our written statement.
At about the same time, in a November 2011 conversation
with the former NOAA Deputy Undersecretary, I learned that NOAA
was finishing up a review of similar reprogramming allegations
that had been referred to them by my OIG hotline staff. That
review reached the same conclusion that we did that there was
improper reprogramming occurring. The issue was elevated very
quickly to the Deputy Secretary and Undersecretary. There was
interest in additional fact-finding, especially about the
extent of executive responsibility and knowing the extent of
the reprogramming, so initially NOAA, then the Department and
NOAA jointly, undertook further fact-finding between November
2011 and May 2012, when the NOAA review report was issued and
corrective actions ordered.
Three, explain the rationale for conducting a sufficiency
review of the investigation rather than an independent OIG
investigation. Generally, when we refer a hotline matter to the
Department or one of its Gureaus for resolution, we ask for an
answer. Once we receive the answer, we then conduct what we
call a sufficiency review. We do not have the resources to look
into every allegation we receive through the hotline, so this
is a common method used by IG offices across the government to
leverage our resources with those of the agencies to resolve
management and administrative matters.
In this case, it was my view that the Department and NOAA
were in the best position to carry out the follow-up fact-
finding for a few reasons. At the end of the day, the
determination as to whether the reprogramming actions were
proper or improper was going to be made by the Department and
OMB and the basic facts were already known. We had already
reported our observations in our November 2011 memorandum and
it was now up to the Department and NOAA to address these
observations with their budget, accounting, and legal staffs.
That put my office in a better position to evaluate the
Department and NOAA's actions and response. We are in the
process of doing that right now.
Four, discuss what follow-up activity OIG has planned. Both
our audit and investigative staff are engaged in follow-up
work. These activities are discussed in further detail in my
written statement. Among other things, our audit staff is
tracking progress on the 20 or so corrective actions that were
directed by Acting Secretary Blank and Undersecretary
Lubchenco. Our audit staff is also going to try to get a better
handle on the reported structural deficit and budget shortfall
referenced in the May 2012 report that is said to underlie
improper programming. We would also like to get a better
understanding of the impact, if any, of the reprogramming
actions on the National Weather Service programs, especially
AWIPS.
Our investigators are conducting follow-up interviews about
how far back this may go and which other officials may have
been aware of the structural deficit, the shortfall, and the
reprogramming activities. The investigative work is also in
response to hotline complaints received after the May 2012
internal report was issued. We will keep both Congress and the
Department informed of our work.
This concludes my statement, Madam Chair. I would be happy
to answer questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zinser follows:]

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Vice-Chairwoman Adams. I thank the panel for their
testimony. Reminding Members that committee rules limit
questioning to five minutes, the Chair will at this point open
the round of questioning.
The Chair recognizes herself for five minutes.
Dr. Sullivan, you state in your testimony that you did not
find evidence that NWS officials improper action put life or
property at risk or jeopardized the delivery of timely or
reliable weather forecast and warnings. You also state that as
part of the fiscal year 2012 reprogramming, NOAA will take
funds out of NWS accounts that will lead to postponing
procurements of spare parts and deferring enhancements to
weather systems, among others.
How can you be sure that the future of NWS operations won't
be impacted by these transfers? We have basically been eating
our seed core by taking money from programs like AWIPS and
WRIP. What does this mean to the future of NWS' ability to
deliver timely and reliable weather forecasting warnings? And
will the fiscal year 2013 budget request be modified to reflect
the current shortfall or can we expect to revisit a scenario
next year again where NWS either runs out of money or has to
come back to Congress with more reprogramming requests?
Dr. Sullivan. Thank you for your question. We are--we share
your concern that we are taking from programs that underwrite
the long-term future of the Weather Service to balance this out
and make sure we support the current forecast. Across
government, senior managers are wrestling with very much the
same challenge, short-term urgent matters, longer-term
investments under the tight fiscal constraints that we are all
facing. We don't have a simple silver-bullet answer, Madam Vice
Chair. I would say in making the specific choices that we did
make both for the fiscal year 2012 reprogramming and for the
adjustments that we have proposed to fiscal year 2013, we
looked carefully at performance metrics in our key forecast
warning areas. We looked at rates of progress of those
procurement programs. We made difficult, painful choices to
slow rate of progress towards the future--not halt it but slow
it--and be sure that we sustain the performance that is so
vital every day to the American public.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. So are you saying that you don't
believe that this will impact AWIPS or WRIP?
Dr. Sullivan. We have restructured the Weather Radio
Improvement Program only partly due to the reprogramming
actions I have testified about today. There was separately and
independent from that a very significant performance issue with
the contractor that first was awarded that worked some years
ago. And thirdly, the development of AWIPS as it came along
through the years and technology advanced showed the
opportunity to accomplish the WRIP upgrade through the AWIPS
system itself rather than by a separate stand-alone proprietary
approach. So we have modified the approach to that program. The
capability will come into the Service.
On AWIPS a couple of things are happening simultaneously.
We are fielding an advanced AWIPS system called AWIPS II. We
have worked carefully to be sure that the adjustments that we
have made in our budget do not affect the phased deployment of
AWIPS II. Above and beyond that, there are subsequent
downstream enhancements that we have been working to prepare
and software further algorithms. Those enhancements are what we
have had to slow to make these adjustments.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. You know, I just--I am--
why--Mr. Zinser, why didn't the IG's office assume
responsibility for the investigation of NWS given how high up
the allegations go? Wouldn't it have made more sense to handle
it at the IG level rather than provide a supporting role to the
Bureau in the Department's investigation? I mean I think that
is--you touched on it in your testimony. I would like a little
bit more as to why.
Mr. Zinser. Yes, Madam Chair. The fact that the initial
complaint had been reviewed by our audit staff and by an
internal team at NOAA that resulted in their November 2011
report, taking those two things together established the basic
facts. We both concluded that there was improper reprogramming
going on. The additional fact-finding that the Acting Secretary
was interested in dealt with whether proper accountability had
been identified among the executive ranks. My concern was that,
at the end of the day, a determination of whether the
reprogramming was improper, whether it constituted an Anti-
deficiency Act violation, that was all going to be determined
by the Department's Office of General Counsel and OMB.
And at the same time, what I told the Acting Secretary was
that I thought that they could go ahead with the additional
fact-finding, but I had two concerns. One concern was that, if
there was any evidence that there was money going to somebody
personally, that we would step in. The second concern was that
if the people whom they had to interview were of such high rank
that the interviewing team felt uncomfortable interviewing
them, that we would do that. And, in fact, we have done that
and we continue to interview people and re-interview people
whom the initial fact-finding team have already talked to. That
is going to be part of our follow-up review.
So what I told the staff when we briefed them--your staff--
was that there is a lot of work left to be done, but right now,
we have a good set of documents NOAA pulled together and a lot
of statements that have been made by various witnesses and we
are in a much better position to do the follow-up work that I
think needs to be done.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. My time is expired.
And I now recognize Mr. Tonko for five minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Zinser, I think you have taken good steps to fix the
way your office handles hotline complaints, but would you agree
or disagree that the system--the old system was inadequate?
Mr. Zinser. I definitely agree and I think there are other
factors involved, but there were some process improvements that
were required that we put in place, yes, sir.
Mr. Tonko. And to that original system for handling
complaints, that basically led your office to ignore important
warnings about the Weather Service, and I worry about what else
you may have missed. Have you done a risk assessment of what
was missed perhaps?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir. While I am not in agreement that we
ignored the National Weather Service, I don't think we----
Mr. Tonko. Well, you received whistleblower complaints----
Mr. Zinser. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. --and nothing happened of that. Why would there
not have been some sort of immediate response?
Mr. Zinser. Well, the person who was managing my hotline
operation at the time no longer works for me so I can't go back
and ask him. And other factors that existed at the time--I
don't want to sound like I am making excuses--but that was a
period of time when the decennial census was operating our
hotline was absolutely flooded, sir. But in any event, the risk
assessment that we did do--what happened with the first GAO
FraudNet, what that staff member did was what we call ``zero-
filed'' it. They catalogued it; and set it aside. So zero-files
are things that you are not going to take action on right away.
You are going to file it and if additional complaints come in
on the same subject, you have some history of the complaint. I
would not have handled it that way, but my staff did.
Now, we went back and looked at all the other complaints
that we zero-filed, and what I was told is that, out of 500 or
so, there were maybe 10 that weren't very well documented. I
don't know that we would have acted any differently, but we
really couldn't tell the rationale for why they were zero-
filed. But we have done a risk assessment and we have put in
place a number of process improvements, and we have provided
training to the Department. We have issued a guide on how to
conduct these types of administrative reviews. We have also
established a community of interest in the Department of
anybody who works on hotlines. I am reporting on these on a
quarterly basis to the Acting Secretary as part of our balanced
scorecard. So we have strengthened, I feel, our whole process.
Mr. Tonko. So as you evaluate what might have been missed,
can I ask that we receive a copy of the evaluation of what was
missed?
Mr. Zinser. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Tonko. And Dr. Sullivan, we hear of the failure of this
system--of an IG system regardless of the human behavior or
failure, it took that to draw attention to what should be a
very obvious situation, a whistleblower or a team of
whistleblowers doing their thing. Is it credible that no one at
NWS or NOAA knew of financial misconduct? It seems that there
were numerous complaints. And can you convince me that the CFO
at NWS was really the only senior person who knew what was
going on? I mean it is a major move of money. Am I to believe
that it was just whistleblowers and then a failed IG response
that we required when in fact the management of that situation
should have been on top of it?
Dr. Sullivan. I would say, Mr. Tonko, our inquiry team,
based on the witness statements that we took, really did find a
very--an unfortunate and quite ineffective management climate
at the senior levels of the Weather Service.
Mr. Tonko. I am told this goes back to 2006?
Dr. Sullivan. We have heard that anecdotally. Within the
scope of our investigation, we couldn't verify that. That is
why we have commissioned an independent evaluation by Grant
Thornton to look back to fiscal year 2006 and try to confirm
that. There certainly were lots of what the Assistant
Administrator of the Weather Service called ``griping,'' what
he says in his statement he construed as ``normal carping'' of
program managers who disliked the pressures that their budgets
were on.
Again, if you look at the details of the report we found a
budget formulation process, you know, that fails to bring
forward in crisp and actionable fashion questions that clearly
needed to be addressed more squarely. If we don't have
sufficient funding to advance a program at a certain rate, what
do we do about that? Meetings were held, PowerPoint charts were
given, but in the instant cited--and I think it was 2010 in our
report--with all of that chatter and chitchat within the
Service itself, leadership at the Weather Service level did not
bring together, force together, crystallize specific issues,
specific risks, specific responses. They did not do that within
the Weather Service and certainly did not bring any such
justification or risk or warning forward to NOAA leadership.
That is the only instance of such conduct I can speak to
personally. It happened--we uncovered it and looked into it
during our investigation. There may have been others previously
before I arrived on station. I can't speak to those. But the
one we did look at in our inquiry certainly says to me
questions that needed answers, solid answers, well developed
budget justification and risk answers were not being handled
that way at the time within the Weather Service and were
certainly not coming forward.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
And I now recognize Mr. Hultgren for five minutes.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for both being here. I apologize for being a
little bit late, had a couple other meetings going on at the
same time but I do appreciate your testimony.
I do want to ask a couple questions. I am not sure if this
was covered in your oral testimony or not but wanted just to
clarify it.
First of all, Dr. Sullivan, I wondered just on time line
when we could expect the Department to conclude its review to
determine if Anti-Deficiency Act violations had occurred?
Dr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Hultgren.
It is my understanding that the preliminary determination
has been concluded and the matter is in the process of being
referred forward to appropriate--through appropriate channels
to OMB and--sorry--Justice I presume. I confess to not being
completely clear on the procedural details for that process and
that report and write-up should go forward perhaps as soon as
the end of this week.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. So you think we would start seeing
those, then, in the next couple of weeks? Is that your thought
or----
Dr. Sullivan. Again, I am not conversant with the
procedural details that move these matters from a preliminary
determination all the way through and bring them to the
Congress' attention. But my understanding is there is a
preliminary determination. I believe it is an affirmative one
and that the package is moving forward.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. Also, Dr. Sullivan, there are several
deadlines for action identified in the NOAA and DOC decision
memos and then we had--many of them had deadlines that have
already passed. How many of those action items were completed
by the listed deadline and what are they?
Dr. Sullivan. The far majority of them, Mr. Hultgren--and I
can give you a detailed listing of those--I am sorry I can't
recount them to you one by one. You appreciate there is quite a
number. We have been holding biweekly meetings on the progress
of those actions at very senior levels. Both the Undersecretary
and the acting Secretary were briefed at the 90-day point on
progress to date. There were many of the very early actions
confirmed to be completed. There were none that I recall that
were not underway or at an expected point of progress by that
90-day point with I think one exception whereas the team
investigated the actions needed to fulfill the order that was
given. They found the scope was more complex than realized and
requested permission to delay one milestone. But I would be
happy to get you that full accounting.
Mr. Hultgren. If you would, that would be great. If you can
get that to our office and maybe also the Committee, that would
be terrific.
Dr. Sullivan. We will be glad to do that.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you.
Mr. Zinser, just a couple questions for you. When do you
anticipate completing your response to the investigative
report?
Mr. Zinser. Sir, we really have just begun because part of
that is to go and track the progress of the sufficiency of the
corrective actions that have been directed and that NOAA and
the Department are putting in place. We have reviewed the
reprogramming request, for example, and spoken to the
appropriators about that and the request was subsequently
approved. And we have also received one report that Ernst &
Young performed for NOAA and the rest of the Department on SLTs
about how the controls are or are not in place for the SLT
mechanisms that are used in the accounting of--for the budget.
Beyond that, most of our work is still underway and it is hard
to determine, you know, exactly how long we will be. Plus, we
are doing some follow-up interviews, and as you probably are
aware, you really never know where those are going to lead you.
Mr. Hultgren. With your work, do you plan on issuing some
sort of report or other documentation of the work that reflects
what you are doing and the investigation that is ongoing now?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir. We have opened a formal audit, made
the announcement, and will issue an audit report upon its
completion. But during the course of that, we would be happy to
come up and brief the Subcommittee and keep you informed on the
progress.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. And obviously, we would get copies of
the report when that is completed, is that right?
Mr. Zinser. Absolutely.
Mr. Hultgren. Good. Also, Mr. Zimmer--Zinser, I am sorry--
in your testimony you identify a series of complaints that
began January 11 of 2012 relating to an NWS employee who
allegedly promised funding for programs in return for hiring
the employee's relative. Dr. Sullivan's testimony states that
the investigative team found no evidence that the NWS employees
committed fraud or received personal gain through their action.
I wonder based on your preliminary review of the allegations,
do you agree with Dr. Sullivan's statement or do you have any
position on that?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, I think the review that the Department and
NOAA did focused strictly on the reprogramming issue. In that
case, if you put aside the fact that a willful violation of the
Anti-deficiency Act could constitute a criminal act and be
considered a fraud, you put that aside for now, the issues that
we reported and a series of hotline complaints dealt with are a
conduct issue and a contracting issue inside the office of the
Chief Financial Officer at the National Weather Service. They
are not directly about the reprogramming.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. I think that sort of answers my
question. But so you don't have any direct statement of whether
you agree with Dr. Sullivan's statement on that or not, that
there is no evidence of personal gain received by these
employees?
Mr. Zinser. I think that the issue involving the former
employee and contractor, I think he did improperly obtain
personal gain but not through the reprogramming effort. We
didn't find any evidence in the reprogramming activities that
money was going into anybody's pocket, for example.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. McNerney.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Sullivan, when did the last summary level transfer take
place?
Dr. Sullivan. Mr. McNerney, summary level transfers are
commonplace, financial management mechanisms. They are
designed--their intent is to allow accounting officials to
correct codes improperly entered inadvertently, really make
technical level corrections. So they are a common and commonly
used tool both within NOAA and across the Department widely.
They--I don't know the precise answer but I suspect it is
probably within some recent days for legitimate accounting code
corrections.
Mr. McNerney. Well, how about improper programming? When
was the last incident where improper programming took place?
Dr. Sullivan. I don't have specific evidence that allows me
to answer that, Mr. McNerney. We put new controls and oversight
measures into place effective August 1 that significantly
change both the----
Mr. McNerney. August 1 of this year?
Dr. Sullivan. August 1 of this year in response to the
corrective actions directed by Dr. Lubchenco.
Mr. Zinser. Sir, if I may?
Mr. McNerney. Yes.
Mr. Zinser. The nature of these summary level transfers and
the way they were carried out was such that NOAA and the
Department could not figure out which summary level transfers
were appropriate and which ones were not appropriate. That is
why it took them five months trying to nail down the
transactions. There was no documentation on the transfers that
were made and the notations that were made in connection with
those transfers were so cryptic that you didn't really
understand the purpose of the transfers. And when Ernst & Young
came in and looked at it, their first finding was there that
there were no controls over this process.
Mr. McNerney. So, Dr. Sullivan, has the improper
programming had any impact whatsoever either way on the polar
satellite procurements?
Dr. Sullivan. This reprogramming that we investigated
within the National Weather Service I am very confident has not
affected that. A different organization with NOAA executes
those programs.
Mr. McNerney. Okay. I mean you must be sensitive to how
this hurts the case for asking for those kinds of program
funds?
Dr. Sullivan. We are very sensitive to the concerns of the
Committee, the Subcommittee, and the Congress at large and we
share them, and that is why a number of Dr. Lubchenco's
corrective actions, as well as the acting Secretary's actions
charged our teams with looking beyond the horizon of this
investigation and digging in to confirm that anywhere in the
Department we did be sure--we did change controls, add
controls, strengthen them to be sure that we had none of this
happening and could have higher confidence that it could not
happen across our other program areas.
Mr. McNerney. Okay, Mr. Zinser, did I hear you correctly
that you first heard on November of 2011 about the improper
reprogramming?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir.
Mr. McNerney. Well, that is a little bit contradictory of
something else you said, that you allowed NOAA to conduct its
own investigations because those departments were the most
capable and the most ready to do those investigations, so that
happened before November of 2011.
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir. There are actually two efforts by
NOAA and the Department. The first one NOAA did as a result of
my staff referring a matter to them. I wasn't briefed on that
until November of 2011 either. It was after that, the follow-up
review that was done by the Department and NOAA between
November of 2011 and May 2012. That is when I went through a
decision process with the Acting Secretary about how best to
handle that follow-on investigation or fact-finding activity.
Mr. McNerney. So you had no say, then, personally in the
decision to send those investigations back to the NOAA?
Mr. Zinser. Well, our process wasn't set up at that point
for me to really get involved to that level of detail with the
hotline program.
Mr. McNerney. You know, I am--there are some
inconsistencies still. By November of 2011, it was clear that
some misconduct had occurred by some very senior National
Weather Service officials and that your own staff made it
apparent that those were in violation of the Anti-deficiency
Act. That is an Act we take pretty seriously here in the
Congress and yet those allegations were sent back to the
Department even though they involved possible criminal
behavior. What does it take for the IG to declare that an
investigation has to take place within your department?
Mr. Zinser. Yeah, let me clarify that, sir. When we have a
finding and we make a recommendation, the Department does not
have to pay attention to me. And so when we tell them we think
there is an Anti-Deficiency Act violation----
Mr. McNerney. This is the Department?
Mr. Zinser. The Department of Commerce, or any department
with an OIG, our recommendations do not have to be accepted or
followed by the Department. And in the case of an Anti-
deficiency Act violation, the Department itself and OMB makes
the determination whether there was a violation or not. I can
make my observation and I can make my recommendation, but until
the Department weighs in and agrees, that is when action is
taken, not just based on the IG's views.
Mr. McNerney. Well, my time is expired.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
And I believe we have enough time for a second round, so
maybe some follow-up if you would like on that.
I now recognize myself--the Chair recognizes herself for
five minutes.
Dr. Sullivan, as part of your testimony, you explained that
of the 36 million fiscal year 2012 reprogramming request, 29.9
million will be from NWS programs. Protecting lives and
property is central to NOAA's mission and NWS forecasting and
warning is the primary line of office with that responsibility.
Instead of further draining the resources of NWS, why doesn't
the reprogramming request come from other non-NWS NOAA funds?
Dr. Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We made a few judgments in working on the reprogramming.
One was that the service in which we had had the failings
should be the primary horizon in which we look to balance
properly, for that reason and also to be sure that we really
understood what sums needed to be where in the Weather Service
itself. Secondly, although the National Weather Service is a
very frontline and top priority mission for NOAA, we are
charged with quite an array of missions that are of great
importance to the country. I don't want to get into some debate
about which of our children we love the most. It is by design
an integrated ocean and atmosphere agency with a range of
science service and stewardship responsibilities that touch
Americans every single day. There is importance in our view in
all of them. We attempted to make a balanced decision and
prevent further degradation in mission areas that have
suffered, frankly, greater budget erosion in recent years than
the Weather Service itself has.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. By the reprogramming?
Dr. Sullivan. No, by----
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Okay. So again you are taking and
reprogramming funds and you are doing it from NWS?
Dr. Sullivan. That is correct.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. And so I would like to know what, if
any, other programs could have sustained such reductions?
Dr. Sullivan. That sum--that is a very large sum to take
across other NOAA program areas. And again our first driver and
view was that it was right to solve this problem within the
Service where the misconduct issues had occurred. That late in
the year, that was not altogether possible to do due to the
expenditure rate and execution pace of the Weather Service
itself and something on the order--if I recall the sum
correctly--of $4.2 million we did turn outside of the Weather
Service and take those cuts there.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Okay. And so when I asked you
earlier about the reductions and everything else, and then my
colleague asked you about the polar systems and stuff, so you
are saying you believe that you have enough money to do what
you need to do, even with the reprogramming? And a simple yes
or no will----
Dr. Sullivan. Within the National Weather Service?
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Within NOAA, yes or no? Because you
are going to reprogram so do you believe you have enough money?
Dr. Sullivan. We can operate at that level, yes, ma'am. I
don't think any of us feel we are living fully up to the
missions that the American people expect of us.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. So in saying that, I think that it
is very concerning because we have allocated and appropriated
funding and it is taxpayers' money. And if you didn't need it
in the first place and you can still do your mission, it is
kind of concerning, okay?
The other question I have, in the fall of 2011, the Weather
Service conducted an internal review of the allegations it
received from the IG. The preliminary findings of that review
led to NOAA placing an NWS employee on administrative leave and
prompted a NOAA-Commerce senior level review that began in
December of 2011 and did not conclude until May of 2012. During
that time, NOAA created a new position, the Chief of Resources
and Operations Management (CROM) to oversee the enterprise
functions such as finance, information technology, and
administration. This position was filled by the then-current
NOAA CFO before the conclusion of an investigation into the
management of NOAA finances. How was NOAA sure that this--that
it was not giving a promotion to someone who had turned a blind
eye towards or that was naively oblivious to improper financial
activity when it had not concluded its report at the time that
they made this appointment?
Dr. Sullivan. By the time that appointment was made, Madam
Chair, we had taken--we judged sufficient witness statements to
offer review, that the misconduct was substantially confined--
totally confined within the Weather Service itself. As I said
earlier, we had indications from a number of the witnesses and
events that we reviewed that the Service was not bringing
forward up the NOAA budget chain the kinds of indications--
evidence, data----
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. But isn't it the responsibility of
the CFO's office for establishing and ensuring the adequacy of
financial internal controls and this person was there and then
was promoted during your investigation? Is that not correct?
Dr. Sullivan. That is the timing, yes, ma'am.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. My time is expired.
I now recognize Mr. Tonko.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Sullivan, I know that you have taken the situation at
NWS very seriously. At the same time, I have to mention how
outraged I am and shocked to learn that with relative ease
people were able to manipulate accounts in the way that they
did. I still don't feel secure in what I am hearing, how that
could have happened. You know, we talk about the funding
shortages for labor that I am told are in the order of 10 to 15
million a year. And that is not insignificant but it does not
explain the tens of millions of dollars that were moved around
that were non-labor. In fact, material provided to the
Committee shows that the NWS was coping with a shortage of over
40 million in non-labor funding shortages. You know, at any
other agency I would think funding shortfalls would lead to
dropping some initiatives because there simply wouldn't be the
resources to support them. But I get the impression that NWS
did not do that and instead tried to keep everything going by
moving money around. Why didn't NWS simply seek a reprogramming
of funds to meet the financial needs or even ask for a
supplemental appropriation to fully fund what is needed to be
done?
Dr. Sullivan. Mr. Tonko, I can't speak to what the
intentions or motives or thought processes were of people who
didn't bring such matters directly to me and raise them or
through our CFO chain and raise them in a way that was open for
discussion. Again, I think as the corporate board matters that
we discuss in our investigative report make clear, the
processes--budget formulation and review processes within the
Weather Service itself clearly seem deficient to really
grappling with those kinds of questions squarely and bringing
forward crisp alternatives, risk-based alternatives, evidence-
based alternatives for management consideration and action.
Mr. Tonko. Well, when you do your budget request every
year, that goes to NOAA. Am I correct?
Dr. Sullivan. Each line office makes a budget request----
Mr. Tonko. Right.
Dr. Sullivan. --that comes up and is aggregated into the
NOAA budget, yes, sir.
Mr. Tonko. Well, that is for the NWS. And then to the
Department of Commerce?
Dr. Sullivan. Correct.
Mr. Tonko. And then finally to OMB?
Dr. Sullivan. Correct.
Mr. Tonko. Which would then end up with formulating the
President's request for Congress to take action. Would there be
any reason to believe that NWS requests for funds after they
have gone through all these offices would be inadequate to
fully fund all their priorities?
Dr. Sullivan. Again, Mr. Tonko, I can't think of--both in
my non-profit career and my corporate career and government
career, I can't think of a time in any budget formulation
process where each manager doesn't feel that the amount of
money they really need to do the job they want to do the way
they want to do it is less than is available in the total pot.
It is commonplace everywhere. It is certainly commonplace in
government. It is the challenge of managers at every level to
make the best arguments, show the evidence of what they--what
can they do, what can they delivery, what are the risks, if
budgets don't conform to the requests that they have made, and
one final budget allocations are made at any of those levels
including by the Congress to adapt and adjust their operation
to conform with that direction. It is always a challenge but it
is a common challenge everywhere through government.
Mr. Tonko. And when it came to the CFO, was there any
reason to believe that anyone advised him that--or encouraged
him that they should do this fungible thing and move the
dollars around?
Dr. Sullivan. The Weather Service CFO? Based on the
materials we garnered in witness statements, I cannot recall--
which would have been hearsay or speculation as to his motives
in any case--but I don't recall any of our witnesses opining on
their views of his motives, and I have no personal contact with
that individual which he made any statements to me, so I
couldn't speculate to that.
Mr. Tonko. Can we imagine any motivation to put one's
career at risk or reputation or integrity on the line simply to
balance an agency's budget? What would possess a CFO to take
such a bold stand?
Dr. Sullivan. It defies my imagination, Mr. Tonko, and
further understanding the critical importance of trust to the
mission and performance and effectiveness of the National
Weather Service overall, it defies my imagination that someone
would do something that might even faintly go outside of the
law for any reason.
Mr. Tonko. Well, the failure at the Department and then the
ignoring of the whistleblowers by the IG and the lack of quick
and ready response by the IG are all discouraging. And I look
forward to additional information that will be exchanged with
the Committee.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. And I know that the
Committee is looking forward to some information also I think
that you have been asked--your agency has been asked for a
dozen or so materials requested months ago, including the CFO
counsel and some program oversight briefing, so hopefully, you
can get that provided to the Committee as soon as possible.
Dr. Sullivan. We are working on that, Ms.--Madam Chair.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Hopefully, it will be done fairly
quickly.
Dr. Sullivan. That is my hope as well, ma'am.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. I would like to thank the panel for
their valuable testimony. The witnesses are excused and we will
move to our second panel.
And Dr. Sullivan, if you could ask them to please get it to
us before we come back next month would be awesome.
Dr. Sullivan. I will pass that request----
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
Dr. Sullivan. --and add my urgings. Thank you very much.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Okay. We will get started with our
second panel. The first witness on our second panel is Dr.
William Gail, the Chief Technology Officer of the Global
Weather Corporation who serves on the Committee on the
Assessment of the National Weather Service's Modernization
Program at the National Research Council of the National
Academies. The final witness on our second panel is Mr. Richard
Hirn, General Counsel and Legislative Director, National
Weather Service's Employees Organization.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee
will have five minutes each to ask questions. Your written
testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. It is
the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you have
any objections to taking an oath?
Mr. Hirn. No.
Dr. Gail. No.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect that all
witnesses were willing to take an oath.
You may also be represented by counsel. Do any of you have
counsel here with you today?
Mr. Hirn. No.
Dr. Gail. No.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect that none of
the witnesses have counsel.
If you would now please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Ms. Hirn. Yes.
Dr. Gail. I do.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Let the record reflect that all
witnesses participating have taken the oath.
I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Gail, to present his
testimony.

TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM B. GAIL,

CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER,

GLOBAL WEATHER CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON THE

ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE'S

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Dr. Gail. Madam Chair, Committee Members and colleagues,
thank you for inviting me to talk to you today. My name is Bill
Gail. I am cofounder and Chief Technology Officer of Global
Weather Corporation, a provider of precision weather forecasts
to businesses within the energy, media, transportation, and
consumer sectors. We are a successful startup in today's
economy because quality weather information is increasingly
needed by businesses to serve customers and improve operations.
I am speaking to you today in my role as a Member of the
Committee that produced the report ``Weather Services for the
Nation: Becoming Second to None,'' issued by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.
The Weather Service modernization of the 1990s produced
major improvements to our Nation's weather observing systems
and to the Weather Service structure. It was primarily a
response to an internal lack of modernization over several
decades. The Committee felt the Weather Service successfully
learned most lessons from the modernization and has since
continued to modernize.
Today's challenges are no less important but they are
largely external challenges reflecting the ever-evolving user
needs and technology context of our society. The first of these
challenges is keeping pace with advances in science and
technology that are taking place around the Weather Service.
The second challenge is meeting society's expanding needs for
better weather information. The third challenge is effectively
partnering with and supporting the larger enterprise to achieve
the greatest public benefit. Meeting these key challenges will
require the Weather Service to evolve its role and how it
operates. The goal is for it to become more agile and
effective. Our report presents three main recommendations for
accomplishing this.
Our first recommendation is that the Weather Service should
refocus on its core capabilities. These include creating
foundational data sets, performing essential functions such as
forecasts and warnings, and conducting operationally related
research. All are needed for the Weather Service to perform its
central role of protecting lives and property and for it to
support the enterprise as a provider of additional services. In
executing this recommendation, the Weather Service will need to
prioritize those things only it can do and avoid replicating
capabilities where there are viable alternatives.
Our second recommendation is to update Weather Service
function and structure. The current Weather Service structure
reflects needed functions of the 1990s. Technology has changed
much of the rationale for the present Weather Service
organizational structure. The committee was aware that Congress
has requested a separate external review of Weather Service
function and structure, so we chose to limit our detailed
recommendations in this area but noted that any such study
requires significant technical input.
Our third recommendation addressed the need to better
leverage the larger enterprise providing weather services and
systems. The relationship between the Weather Service and the
rest of the enterprise has improved considerably since the
modernization with praise deserved by all parties. Improved
leveraging of the enterprise enhances the Weather Service's
ability to serve the Nation. This is especially important at a
time when the Weather Service seeks to enhance its services
subject to constrained resources.
Better weather information can save both lives and be a
growth engine for the economy. A recent study showed the
variability in U.S. economic output due to weather-related
supply and demand inefficiencies is more than three percent of
GDP. In some States, it is over ten percent. A significant
portion of this can be recovered as economic growth through
improved weather information. I would like to provide two
examples from my own company's experience that illustrate the
importance to our Nation of both the Weather Service and the
Committee's recommendations.
The Omaha World Herald News Group, owned by Berkshire
Hathaway, has recently acquired nearly 100 small- and mid-sized
newspapers. Their vision is that newspaper companies are not
dying, but rather the best source of critical local information
which will be delivered increasingly over web and mobile.
Accurate weather forecasts are often the most important
information they provide to these smaller communities.
Xcel Energy is the off-taker utility for ten percent of
America's wind farm capacity. Starting in 2009, Xcel privately
funded research and development focused on improving the
accuracy of wind forecasts. Operational use of this system
saved $7.9 million for Xcel ratepayers in 2011 alone.
In both examples, commercial weather companies are helping
to implement the vision but Weather Service foundational
information is essential to making it possible.
In summary, meeting today's challenges will require changes
at the Weather Service over as much as a decade. Our
recommendations will help make the Weather Service more agile
and effective. In a constrained resource environment, this
approach makes possible benefits to the Nation beyond what the
Weather Service budget alone allows.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gail follows:]

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Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
I now recognize our second witness for his testimony on the
panel, Mr. Hirn, for five minutes.

TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD HIRN,

GENERAL COUNSEL AND LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION

Mr. Hirn. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Tonko.
Thank you for inviting me to present the views of the National
Weather Service Employees Organization and the 3,700 Weather
Service employees we represent nationwide.
The Weather Service budget shortfall should not have come
as a surprise to the leadership of NOAA as it did earlier this
year when an emergency reprogramming request was submitted.
Although the amount and cause of the structural shortfall is an
open question, its existence was well documented and public
knowledge. In January 2005, the Director of the Weather Service
delivered a PowerPoint presentation to the American
Meteorological Society that showed a cumulative funding gap
that began in fiscal year 2001 and that had grown to $37
million. In February 2005, the Weather Service Budget Director
also told the Washington Post that the Agency had a cumulative
shortfall of 37 million that stemmed from chronic underfunding.
In April 2006, DOC had to submit a reprogramming request to
add 13 million to the local warnings and forecast baseline to
``sustain operations and avoid a nationwide hiring freeze.'' By
2008, the Weather Service had increased its lapsed labor rate
to nearly five percent in order to mitigate the shortfall. In
other words, the Weather Service intentionally delayed filling
vacancies so that five percent of all Weather Service positions
were vacant at any given time.
On December 3, 2008, I and other NWSEO representatives met
with a NOAA transition team for the incoming administration.
Both team members with whom we met would later be appointed to
senior leadership positions in NOAA. We presented them with
some of the documents on the shortfall that we had been
previously provided by Weather Service, including a spreadsheet
showing that the Weather Service anticipated an annual
shortfall of $30 million through fiscal year 2013. Thus, the
incoming administration was clearly told of the substantial
financial problem left them by the outgoing administration.
In a recent appearance before the Commerce, Justice, and
Science Appropriations Subcommittee, the Under Secretary
testified that the Weather Service is not operating with
insufficient funds. This assertion is refuted by nearly a
decade's worth of evidence to the contrary.
Now, over the years, the Weather Service has erroneously
attributed the structural shortfall to growing labor costs,
which they say has outstripped increases in agency
appropriations. But between 2002 and 2012, the salary rates of
most Weather Service employees rose 27 percent. However, during
the same ten-year period, the amount appropriated for the local
warnings and forecast base line item, the line item for which
90 percent of all employees' salaries are paid, rose by 31
percent and overall funding for NWS operations rose by 34
percent. In other words, the general salary rates which have
not grown faster than funding for NWS operations and employment
levels of the Weather Service have been essentially flat since
2005 authorized at slightly over 4,600 employees.
Now, also in her recent testimony to the House
Appropriations Committee, the Under Secretary stated that the
Weather Service needs to evolve into ``the most efficient and
cost-effective manner in face of changing budgets.'' This year,
the Administration proposed to eliminate 122 personnel at local
forecast offices as a first step, a proposal that was soundly
rejected in a bipartisan fashion by both the House and the
Senate Appropriations Committee and by the full House, all of
whom restored funding for these critical positions. Staffing
reductions are simply not an option for mitigating the Weather
Service structural shortfall. The 122 forecast offices operate
24/7, and most of the time, there are just two forecasters on
duty who have responsibility for protecting the lives of nearly
three million people on average.
Last year's National Research Council's retrospective
assessment of the Weather Service modernization recognized that
forecast offices are staffed only for fair weather and that
staffing is at preciously low levels during severe weather.
Staffing levels are continuing to remain at dangerously low
levels because the Weather Service and the NOAA Workforce
Management Office now delay filling vacant operational and
emergency essential positions for six months or more leaving
offices critically understaffed.
Finally, it is important to note that although the number
of federal employees have grown over the past decade,
employment levels at the Weather Service have remained
stagnant. In fact, there are approximately 15 percent fewer
Weather Service employees and only half as many offices as
there was 20 years ago.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hirn follows:]

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Vice-Chairwoman Adams. We thank the panel for their
testimony.
Reminding Members that committee rules limit questioning to
five minutes, the Chair will at this point open the round of
questions. The Chair recognizes herself for five minutes.
Mr. Hirn, the term ``structural deficit'' has been used in
different ways depending on the perspective of the speaker. Can
you please explain what a structural deficit is from the
perspective of the union? Is this deficit a result of
insufficient planning, for yearly wage increases, for salary?
Mr. Hirn. We don't think it can be primarily attributed to
insufficient salary planning because, as I have noted, the
salary levels have gone--the salary rate--general schedule
salary rates have gone up certainly no more than the Weather
Service appropriations. And when we say structural deficit, we
are just using the terminology that the Weather Service
management through this previous administration and several
Weather Service Directors and CFOs previous have used, laid out
in all their charts and spreadsheets, which we have provided
the Committee, listing what programs and what essential
operational things are not being funded, what maintenance is
being delayed, what procurements are not taking place. It has
been pretty much laid out by the Weather Service. This is not
our terminology. And those details have been provided to the
Committee in hard copy.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
Mr. Gail, will the Weather Service continue to be second to
none if it does not continue to support investments in science
and technology?
Dr. Gail. It is essential that these investments are
supported, absolutely.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. And to both of you, a large portion
of the Weather Service's budget is devoted to labor. Mr. Hirn's
testimony indicates that forecasting centers are already
running on skeleton crews. The Academy's recent reports say
that as scientific and technological progress continues,
critical components within NWS are lagging behind the state of
the science. Understanding current budget realities, what
advice would you provide Congress on how to address this
predicament? Mr. Hirn and then Mr. Gail--Dr. Gail.
Mr. Hirn. Well, one of the--well, what we have worked--we
supported what Congress did last year and that is called for an
outside study of the Weather Service structure, its operations,
and its needs for the future. We have worked with the National
Research Council this year and the previous year on their
study. We think that it has to be a nationwide dialogue to
first establish what job the Weather Service is going to be
doing, what new capabilities it can engage in in the future
before a long-range plan can be set, but at a very minimum, the
structural deficit may be in the realm of $30 million, there
needs to be an adjustment in the fiscal year 2014 budget, if
not in the 2013 budget.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Dr. Gail?
Dr. Gail. Yeah, we agreed that there are efficiencies that
can be gained within the Weather Service in terms of better
utilization of technology. Technology is evolving rapidly, and
those can be used to improve the quality of the forecast. At
the same time, we said that the human element of the forecast
is essential, and as technology evolves, humans can play
different roles in performing those forecasts, focusing on
those areas where they contribute most, focusing on use of
automation in areas where automation can be used best.
In addition, we said that the Weather Service has the
ability working with the broader enterprise to create leverage
in terms of value that is generated for the Nation using the
private sector, using other entities that work with the Weather
Service closely and can perform roles in providing benefits to
both businesses and the public in terms of enhancing what the
core weather service capabilities are. But it does come back to
making sure that those are protected.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you.
And Mr. Hirn, what was the reaction from NWS, NOAA, and/or
DOC leadership to your efforts to inform them about the
structural deficit and to your recommendations on how best to
address it?
Mr. Hirn. I can only say that it was ignored. Had the
incoming administration relied on our advice or had at least
taken us seriously with the information we provided them, this
whole reprogramming problem--unauthorized reprogramming problem
that we have had over the past two years would never have
happened because the problem would have been fixed two or three
years ago had they gone back and--the new administration in
their budget request to Congress had fixed the structural
shortfall. And we have every confidence that Congress would
have approved it because we--anything that the Weather Service
has asked for basically has been approved by--has gotten
bipartisan support from Congress.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. Thank you. I yield back my--the rest
of my time.
And I now recognize Mr. Tonko.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Some people may think the weather can just be grabbed off
the television or forecasts are churned out by computers. So
Mr. Hirn, can you clarify for the Members of the Committee the
role of forecasters and the work over at NWS?
Mr. Hirn. Wow, that is a big job but I will just give--as
capsule job--as capsule summary as I can say. Basically, twice
a day, based on weather data gathered by weather balloons,
satellites, observation centers, there are computer models--a
number of computer models with what is called synoptic
forecasts that are produced here in Maryland at the National
Center for Environmental Prediction, goes out to the forecast
offices--122 forecast offices nationwide. Those modeled
forecasts are pretty large scope and need to be tweaked,
changed, adapted to the local communities based on the
knowledge and expertise of the local forecasters who put out
several times a day marine, aviation, public, all kinds of
forecasts that we rely upon directly to the public, to the
press, to the private companies rely upon.
And as they are doing that, as they are watching the
weather, adopting these models, tailoring them to the local
needs, they are also keeping the eye on the weather for
developing severe weather. And then when severe weather
develops, while they are doing these forecasts, they also--and
they often have to call in extra staff because no two people
can do this on their own--get on the radar, get the reports and
issue the warnings and watches of tornadoes, severe
thunderstorms, blizzards, flash flooding that we see in the
media. So they are doing two things at one time. They are
adopting the model forecast for--to specify for the local
communities and they are also keeping an eye on the weather and
then teaming up to--when necessary to issue warnings of severe
weather.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. The National Academies highlight the
role of technology in empowering the NWS to do even better work
than they do now. So Dr. Gail, do you see embracing new
technology as a labor-saving exercise or is it that technology
and labor levels don't necessarily connect in terms of a
savings or is it just getting even better work out of the
process? Is there a labor impact from the investment of
technology in your mind?
Dr. Gail. Well, the human work that is done now is a
combination of highly skilled things and more routine things.
And as with any industry, automation can step in and support on
the more routine aspects of things that are done and free up
that human labor to be applied where it is most needed in the
judgment area, in the areas where you are trying to discern
things that may not have been seen before, a particular set of
conditions that seem somewhat unique. And yet the ability to
create a forecast based on that knowledge is still critical to
public safety. And so better applying the human judgment, the
human capabilities where they can do the most good I think is
where technology will be able to help most.
Mr. Tonko. So it is freeing up some of the labor to do the
more judgmental or interpretive outcomes?
Dr. Gail. Well, I think one of the things that is important
to realize is that this is not a static situation. The demand
for these kinds of things is increasing rapidly, both on the
business side that I see within my company and on the public
safety side as we see in terms of vulnerability to severe
weather and things like that. So there is a demand that is--
certainly will not be met in the future unless we really
progress rapidly both in terms of our scientific and technology
capability but also in terms of applying the human resources
appropriately.
Mr. Tonko. Um-hum. And Mr. Hirn, in 45 seconds can you
offer any observations there?
Mr. Hirn. Well, yes. To answer that, there is an increasing
demand for the Weather Service to engage in what is called
decision support services to have our forecasters work with
directly face-to-face local emergency management personnel
during severe weather events. We now have forecasters go out to
the--all out West to all the wild land fires and do forecasts
on the spot, face-to-face with the firefighting crews to the
extent that better computer models and technology can free up
time so that our folks can be more involved in these decision
support services to the emergency management communities, we
really are looking forward to that.
And in fact, it was at our request and our design that the
Weather Service has now started several pilot programs around
the country by adding an emergency response meteorologist to
forecast offices whose primary job is more social science and
interrelation with emergency managers to bring the product out,
to make sure people are aware of the product, the help the
local communities and the emergency managers make better
decisions based on the weather information. The union has been
the one that designed those programs, convinced the Agency that
they were needed, and we jointly designed and are experimenting
with that in several places around the country.
Mr. Tonko. I can tell you, having been impacted in our
district--Congressional District with severe storms over the
last year, I can tell you the communities and the individuals
that I represent could strongly endorse that kind of
connection.
Thank you so much.
Vice-Chairwoman Adams. I would like to thank the witnesses
for their valuable testimony and the Members for their
questions. The Members of the Subcommittee may have additional
questions for witnesses and we will ask for you to respond to
those in writing.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
comments from Members. The witnesses are excused and the
hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Appendix I

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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan

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Responses by Ms. Maureen Wylie

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Responses by Inspector General Todd J. Zinser

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Responses by Dr. William B. Gail

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Responses by Mr. Richard Hirn

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Appendix II

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Additional Material for the Record

Department of Commerce Acting Secretary, Ms. Rebecca Blank, May 24,
2012 memorandum submitted by Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan

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Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, Dr. Lubchenco,
May 24, 2012 memorandum submitted by Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan

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Joint NOAA DOC investigative report's Executive Summary (redacted)

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